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FOREWORD

This issue of Asian Studies underscores the growing recognition of area studies as part of the scholarship in the social sciences and the humanities. This also complements the Asian Center's aim to further develop and strengthen its area studies programs.

The contributors in this issue, mostly faculty members of the Asian Center, are specialists on the Philippines, Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. Most of the articles are concerned with issues on Japan and Philippine-Japan relations.

In recognition of the growing importance of area studies in the University of the Philippines, this volume presents the Center's contribution to the current collections of academic works on the topic, with the hope of achieving greater understanding and strengthening of Philippine bilateral relations. This volume highlights the cultural aspect of this relationship.

AJIT SINGH RYE
Dean

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PRESENT TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THEIR IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING*

Ajit Singh Rye and Serafin D. Talisayon

Introduction

In the Asia-Pacific Region, three important trends appear to be exerting the most dominant influences on international cooperation and understanding.

First, superpower behavior in the Western Pacific appears to be in the direction of greater stability: China's decision to participate fully in the international trade and investments; America's "Pacific shift"; Gorbachev's Vladivostok peace initiative towards Pacific states; and the establishment or greater use of communication channels at the highest levels among the four major powers with differing ideologies and interests (USSR-Japan, China-USSR, Japan-China, and US-China).

Second, trends point to the Pacific trade basin as an area of greatest potential for trade and peaceful cooperation presently and continuing at least in the near future.

Third, private-sector initiatives and developments point to greater role of the people and non-governmental entities in shaping the future economic, cultural and national life of various Asian societies. These trends are: greater people-to-people contacts and culture-to-culture interfaces due to the global communication explosion; greater role of workers in economic production systems occurring or contemplated in the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, Japan and the US; and heightened activities of private business interests in pushing for greater and freer trade in ASEAN and Asian NICs (or newly-industrializing countries).

This paper will present and discuss the thesis that these trends point to the Pacific area as most likely going to be a prosperous, stable and indeed "pacific" region in the near-term future and probably also in the long-term future.

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*Paper read at the UNESCO Conference on Present Trends in International Relations: Their Impact on International Cooperation and Understanding with Special Reference to the Asia Pacific Region, June 1987, Valletta, Malta.

Political Trends

China's Greater Participation in International Trade

Three events in China within the last fourteen years [1977-1991] have dramatically transformed the economic and political landscape of the Asia-Pacific region: 1) the fateful decision of the Fifth National Peoples Congress in the People's Republic of China almost a decade ago to triple its economic output by year 2000 towards the eventual goal of transforming China into an industrial superpower; 2) the opening of diplomatic relations with Japan and the United States; and 3) the signing of numerous trade and commercial agreements with the West. China under Deng Xiaoping is a China more willing to participate in international trade and to accept Western capital and technology, for the mutual benefit of China and her partners in economic and technical cooperation. It is also a China showing a measure of willingness to experiment with use of greater private incentives and freer markets.[1,2] The extent of this experimentation and the rate and manner of economic growth are presently the subject of internal debate among China's leaders.

It is interesting to note that for both China and the Soviet Union at this time, the commitment to attain economic growth is definitely expressed, together with the recognition that accelerating this growth requires a serious re-examination of their economic production methods and approaches.

For as long as China has not realized her long-term industrial goals, it appears likely that her leaders will not allow China's resources and attention to be diverted by involvement in any expensive physical conflict or protracted military adventurism in the Asia-Pacific region. China in effect had entered into a "tactical alliance" with the West, for the purpose of helping herself to Western capital, technology and markets. These assessments, if accurate, would imply an appreciable increase in the political stability of the Asia-Pacific region in the near-term (five years or less) as well as medium-term (five to fifteen years) outlooks.

Chinese leaders view their physically huge country as an economically underdeveloped Third World country. Their aging leaders view the excesses of the Cultural Revolution as so much lost time that must be made up as quickly as possible. Their self-image is that of being a "leader of the Third World." If the radical experimentations now taking place in their production systems and production relationships succeed, and China becomes an industrial superpower in a couple of decades, there is however no assurance that this small-power self-image with its associated small-power logic will remain and would not be replaced by a big-power image and big-power logic.

The peacetime scenario that could alter the configuration of the Asia-Pacific region is that of a Japan-China economic and trade tandem. Already, Japan is China's top trade partner. The complementarities between the two big powers' respective economies and resource mixes (China with its huge market, cheap labor, abundant natural resources including energy, and need for capital and technology; Japan with its surplus capital, high technology, export orientation, and great need for resources and energy) are tremendous forces towards peaceful cooperation that will surely be felt in the future.

America's "Pacific Tilt"

Since 1776, the demographic and economic centers of gravity of the United States have been shifting westwards. The acquisition of California, Alaska, Hawaii, Guam and the Micronesia; the colonization of the Philippines; and the defeat and military occupation of Japan — these actions have sealed America's fateful links with the Pacific for the next decades and perhaps even centuries. Immigration from Asia has been growing faster than that from Europe. The population and economic impact of Asian immigrants to the United States are increasing.[3]

Her 1975 defeat in South Vietnam was not sufficient to detract from her continuing self-image as "an Asian and Pacific power," but only led to a geographical redefinition of her security commitments in Southeast Asia.

For the first time starting in the 80s, United States Pacific trade had surpassed her Atlantic trade.

> If the flag follows commerce, as history teaches that it does, logic suggests that the focus of US foreign policy and military planning will shift increasingly to the Pacific...[4]

The United States is clearly the dominant military power in the region. Here, there is no "balance of power" in the sense of equilibrium arising from near parity in military power among major actors. The American defense umbrella covers Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, the Micronesia, and New Zealand.

The approximate equilibrium or stability that obtains in the Pacific area is one that arises from clear military dominance of one power: the United States. In absolute quantitative terms the Soviet Pacific Navy is still way behind that of the United States' (except in submarines).

Some other events are tending to erode American superiority in the Pacific. There is a conflict between anti-nuclear position of the New Zealand govern-

ment and its commitments under the ANZUS Treaty; while in the Philippines there is the issue of whether or not to renew the Military Bases Agreement beyond 1991. The Philippine Constitution provides that such an action takes the nature of a treaty and is therefore a prerogative of the Congress, which can choose to refer the issue to the people through a plebiscite. The United States views the Rarotonga Treaty which provides for a nuclear-free South Pacific, and the initiatives by Indonesia and Malaysia to have a similar agreement among ASEAN member states, as diminishing its military flexibility in the American-dominated "Pacific Lake."

However, given the commitments of most western Pacific rim countries to the free enterprise system, and given the existing network of trade and Japanese/American investments in the area, it is very likely that stability stemming from a clear American military dominance will remain in the short and medium term horizons.

Gorbachev's Vladivostok Initiative

A responsible world citizen will hold the position that the horrors of a global nuclear war, at the least, provides heretofore an effective deterrent to superpower adventurism and, at the most, provides a basis for a realistic desire on the part of both superpowers for peace. It is unproductive to view one's and one's friend's desire for peace as genuine, and that his enemy's as insincere.

In this context, the Soviet Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev's "Vladivostok Initiative" in July 1986, followed by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's Asian tour can be viewed as a bold opening for peace towards the Pacific.[5]

In addition to the Soviet Union's desire for peace, there are reasons to suppose that domestic predicaments form another motivation behind Gorbachev's Vladivostok peace initiative, and that the Vladivostok speech was aimed not at the United States but at other Pacific States, particularly Japan.

Declining productivity during the last two decades (see table below), exacerbated by a large percentage of output diverted to defense, was made worse in the 1980s by declining prices of the Soviet Union's most important export earner, petroleum. Western observers claim that the average longevity of Soviet citizens have declined by two years in the past decade.[6] A question is how long Soviet consumers will continue to bear the burden in terms of low-quality goods and scarcity of even the most basic commodities, while continuing to be exposed to the affluent lifestyles in the West. Communication, computerization and biotechnology are revolutionizing the industrial structures of Japan and the West, and promising to leave the Soviet economy further behind.

	Declining Growth Rates in the USSR[7] (% change/5 years)			
	1966-70	1971-75	1976-80	1981-85
National Income	41	28	21	14
Industrial Output	50	43	24	15
Agricultural Output	21	13	9	5
Labor Productivity	37	25	17	13
Real Income/Capita	33	23	18	9

In a speech before the World Forum on Peace and Disarmament in February 1987, Gorbachev declared that:

> Our international policy is more than ever determined by domestic policy, by our interest in concentrating on constructive endeavors to improve our country.
>
> This is why we need lasting peace, predictability and constructiveness in international relations.[8]

It has been argued that the key to the industrial future of the Soviet Union lies in the development of vast Siberian resources, and that sooner or later an eastward shift in Soviet domestic and foreign policy attentions will gain momentum.[9] In this presence, the Soviet Union must come to terms with the political influence and military power of the United States in the Pacific, and with an emerging Japan-China economic tandem. According to this view, a number of Soviet behaviors in and near their Pacific Eastern frontiers are predictable as a neutral course of Soviet economic development dictated by their geography, and less as a sinister plan to overrun the western Pacific — which could mean a collision with the United States, Japan and China, a hardening of China's pro-Western tilt, and even a remilitarization of Japan.

These Soviet behaviors include: 1) construction of the Baikal-Amur Mainline linking Vladivostok and Nakhodka in the Pacific to Lake Baikal, 2) increase in maritime and naval activities in the Sea of Japan, South China Sea and Western Pacific, 3) support of North Korea to obtain access to her ports and land transport network, 4) encouragement of Japanese investments in Siberian network, and 5) the Vladivostok initiative.

Two-thirds of Soviet territory is in Asia, and Gorbachev asserts that the Soviet Union is "also an Asian and Pacific Power." The sooner Asia-Pacific countries come to terms with this geopolitical reality, the more readily would attitudes and structures to build peace develop.

The Soviet Union can develop its Pacific frontiers slowly using scarce domestic capital, or rapidly by attracting additional capital from external sources. Japan, with its burgeoning capital and foreign exchange surpluses and its need for resources that can be provided nearby by Siberia, presents an alternative to the Soviet Union. A Soviet compromise in Japan-Soviet Kuriles islands dispute would open the possibility of a peaceful scenario of Japan recruiting both socialist giants into the mainstream of Pacific trade and investments.

Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal in Vladivostok to hold an Asian Helsinki-style peace conference in Hiroshima and the arrest of newsman Nicolas Daniloff coming at the heels of the speech, tend to support the interpretation that the initiative is not primarily directed at the United States. After President Ronald Reagan's famous "microphone joke", Soviet leaders must have been long convinced that they have to wait out his term of office to achieve any progress in re-establishing peaceful detente with the United States. Therefore, it appears that the Gorbachev initiative is aimed at other Pacific states, most likely Japan.

The political component of any Soviet Pacific shift may therefore take a rather wide spectrum of modalities and possibilities, from peaceful to conflict-prone. It appears that Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech indicates peaceful directions of Soviet participation in the emerging Pacific trade basin. This is a welcome indication. In the meantime, Pacific states are watching for concrete Soviet actions to confirm its verbalized intentions.

Progress in High-Level Communications Among Major Powers in the Asia-Pacific

Progress in Sino-Soviet and Japanese-Soviet high-level meetings is taking place. After nine years of suspension, Sino-Soviet border talks have been resumed. Gorbachev had promised to reduce Soviet troops from Mongolia and appears to have agreed to the recent establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Mongolia.[10] During the six-nation Pacific tour of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, he opened the possibility of Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea. Secretary-General Gorbachev is also expected to make a state visit to Japan soon [President Gorbachev is scheduled to visit Japan in April 1991], the first visit by a Soviet leader to Japan. United States

Secretary George Shultz had just visited China, and further cooperation in technical and even military areas is expected.[11]

Clamor for Greater Democratization

A pattern is discernible among many unrelated political events over the last decade in the Asia-Pacific region:

1) the defeat and pullout of American forces in South Vietnam — the end of the domestic conflict between American military planners and the American people who do not support that war, a conflict resolved in favor of the latter;

2) the "People Power" revolution which peacefully overthrew the dictatorial regime of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos;

3) the growth in the Republic of China (Taiwan) of a political opposition that is presenting a second choice to the people;[12]

4) the Spring student demonstrations in Shanghai, People's Republic of China, towards greater democratization that led to the removal of Vice-premier Hu Yao Bang;

5) the agreement between China and the United Kingdom for the 1997 return of Hongkong, with guarantee from China of Hongkong's continuing economic autonomy under a "one China, two systems" principle;

6) militant actions by minority groups seeking to express their grievances and claiming a greater share of political and developmental participation in their respective national lives: the Muslims in southern Philippines, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, political opposition groups in Korea, blacks and American Indians in the United States, etc.

These events are not always ideologically-inspired and they take place in both free enterprise and socialist societies. These events demonstrate a universal and plain desire on the part of peoples for greater roles in shaping their own fates, for wider democratic empowerment, and for more effective political voice within their larger societies.

Economic Trends

Many business forecasters and political analysts expect that the "Pacific trade basin" promises the best prospects for growth and stability in the next decades. The next century is said to be a "Pacific Century". They point to the rapid growth of Japan; the emergence of Asian newly-industrializing countries (ANICs) or the "small dragon economies" in Asia (Taiwan[13], South Korea, Hongkong, and Singapore); the huge mineral and energy resources of Pacific rim countries (Canada, Australia, Indonesia and Soviet Siberia); and the huge market that can be offered by Southeast Asia and, given the right political conditions, also by the People's Republic of China. Average growth of countries in the western Pacific has consistently surpassed those of other regions of the world during the 1960s and 1970s, except for the Middle East.

	Average GDP Growth Rate	
	1960s	1970s
Western Pacific	7.4	6.8
Middle East	6.2	6.9
North Africa	7.2	5.6
Socialist Bloc	4.8	5.9
Latin America	5.1	5.1
North America	5.0	3.7
Western Europe	5.0	3.2
South Asia	4.2	3.5
Africa (excluding North)	4.0	2.5

IMF, 1981

The two biggest "growth engines" of the world economy, Japan and the United States, are located in the Pacific.

A number of political trends, some of which were touched above, has the potential of creating a favorable environment for the growth of Pacific trade, such as:

1) the entry of China in the mainstream of global economic and technical cooperation, and the willingness shown by her leaders in maintaining the free enterprise system in Hongkong after China regains sovereignty over the British territory (a "one China, two systems" policy) and, by suggestion, also of Taiwan should the reunification of the two Chinas take place in the distant future;

2) the growing importance of the Pacific, especially of Japan, in Soviet domestic developmental imperatives — together with the parallel shift in American trade towards the Pacific;

3) the emergence of ASEAN; and

4) low likelihood of a major conflict among the inner Pacific rim countries.

Other forces may detract from the trend towards a stable and progressive Pacific trading community. Conflicts and potential conflicts exist among the outer Pacific rim countries. However, the conflict areas (Korean peninsula, Sino-Vietnamese border, Kampuchea, Sino-Soviet border) are not as crucial to the two superpowers' vital interests as Europe is to the Soviet Union and as the Persian Gulf is to the West. The latter areas are more likely candidate areas for any triggering of global superpower conflict than those in the northeast and southeast Asian mainland.

Protectionism, a behavior not unexpected among national actors during a period of global economic slump such as what has been taking place since the 1979-80 escalation of oil prices — is harming global trade, and eventually everybody. Because trading behavior is motivated by comparative advantages between trading actors, trade is an activity that generates benefits for both trading parties.

In mathematical game theory, trading is a "game" which always result in net benefit to both "players"' although such benefits may be asymmetrical. In the language of mathematicians, trading is a "positive-sum game."

Protectionism is a form of behavior wherein each trader attempts to tilt the asymmetry in his favor. Both traders still obtain some benefits, no matter how small, otherwise they will not engage at all in any trading activity. Protectionism is therefore basically different from war. In the case of modern warfare, the result is often loss to both parties, although again the losses to the "players" of this type of "game" may be asymmetrical. Nuclear war is said to be a "no win" situation, including that between a small and a big nuclear power. It is certainly a "negative-sum game" wherein both parties exert to tilt the asymmetrical losses against the other.

From this viewpoint, if the choice is only between the two, trade conflict is preferable over military conflict. By the very nature of incentives/disincentives involved, national actors — once they view the consequences rationality — will both try to avoid both types of interaction and will try to develop a healthy trading environment. The more interdependent nations become, one can argue

that the incentive to cooperate in maintaining a stable and progressive trading system becomes even greater.

A welcome related development is the competition between the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the United States and Japan on the other hand, for development assistance to South Pacific countries.[14]

The private sector, which shares less of the concerns of their governments towards national security and economic protection interests, exerts a collective force in the direction of a healthier trading system.

In the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), thanks to the accumulating fund of political goodwill among its member countries, the non-governmental and private sector groupings notably those under the umbrella of the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ACCI) are very active. ACCI had organized many sectoral business groups across ASEAN countries. ACCI members have been more eager than their own government counterparts in pressing for freer intra-ASEAN trade, investments and monetary movements.

The Third ASEAN Summit which was held in Manila in December 1987 created some expectations about the forging of greater commitments towards economic cooperation, although the private sector in ASEAN countries were not expecting dramatic new initiatives or liberalization of trade. Private sector expectations of the pace and scope of regional trade and cooperation are always higher than what their governments in this regional bloc are willing to commit themselves to.

Moving Towards Ideological Convergence?

Although the difference between capitalism and communism remains fundamental at the conceptual or ideological level, a curious and interesting convergence at the production or operational level is taking place in factories in both the East and the West.

There is a convergence across the East-West ideological fence towards greater role of workers in the production system. If this trend continues to its logical conclusion, the future shape of, and possibilities for, international cooperation and understanding could be radically altered towards very desirable direction.

What is this trend?

It is the social experimentation towards giving more management participa-

tion and/or equity ownership to workers in enterprises. This experimentation is now taking place in one form or another simultaneously in China, the United States, Japan and perhaps soon in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev — and hints at the future likelihood of convergence at the operational or eventually at the ideological level.

In the United States, equity-sharing in favor of employees in the form of "employee stock ownership plans" or ESOPs are gaining. Around 7,000 American companies have now adopted ESOP as part of its strategy for achieving greater employee loyalty and productivity. Research on ESOP companies discovered that they display higher profitability, productivity and employment growth than conventionally-owned companies. Employees expressed greater satisfaction over their roles in their companies.[15]

A common ESOP modality is for the company to set up an ESOP fund, which receives tax-deductible contributions in stock or cash and which holds company stock in thrust for the employees. In many companies, the ESOP trust fund is leveraged; that is, it is used as a basis for borrowing money to buy more company stock. The ESOP plan becomes a technique for the company to raise new capital at the same time that it creates a deferred form of employee benefit.

In the Philippines, about 60% of the stocks of the largest sugar refining company (Victoria Milling Company) is owned by its employees, either directly or indirectly through an innovative pension foundation. The publisher of a local newspaper (Malaya) had started to sell stocks to its employees. A small-scale gold mining company (Olecram) is jointly owned and managed by the capitalist and the miners. The Land Bank of the Philippines, a government financing agency, is planning to set up "village corporations" which would eventually be fully owned and managed by the farmers themselves, with the bank performing the role of a temporary or "steward" investor and manager.

A parallel experimentation is, surprisingly, taking place at the People's Republic of China. Chinese economic planners and theorists are in effect beginning to deviate from the Marxist principle of sole state ownership of capital, and have begun to experiment in part-ownership of enterprises by company managers and employees. The state continues to own the biggest percentage of a factory's stocks, but avant-garde Chinese economists believe that

> when enterprises are at least partially owned by managers and workers, the latter have a vested interest in making the concerns work [16]

And that

> To develop productive forces, ownership of the means of production must be diversified on the basis of predominance of public ownership, which also constitutes an important part of the economic structure reform.[17]

Interestingly, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev is watching the Chinese experiments in private worker incentives and manager "responsibility system", and have made announcements of economic and political reforms along parallel lines: worker incentives, decentralization/ devolution of planning downwards to the factory level, encouragement to writers and intellectuals, "glasnost" (or openness), secret ballot and multiple candidates during election of party officials. These measures, if they succeed in the Soviet Union, will result in greater participation of the Soviet citizen in determining their own economic and political fates.[18]

During the visit of Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Qian Qichen to Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze remarked that they are "following with great interest the Chinese people's efforts to succeed in their modernization program."[19]

To revitalize their stagnant economy, Vietnam has adopted new policies: one-year tax holidays and other incentives to "privately-owned production" and inventors, relaxation of the rule against public servants taking a second job, offer of government loans and use of private trademarks, etc. The direction and policy intentions, independent of whether implementation will match policy, are themselves meaningful trends that parallel the trends pointed out above in other countries.[20]

More well-known is the Japanese style of management which is worker-oriented:[21] lifetime employment, no lay-offs, assured eventual promotion, worker participation in management via Quality Control Circles or Productivity Improvement Circles, etc. The company is like a big family or "iemoto" (a form of formal organization not based on kinship) wherein the company president is like a father whom everybody can approach for help. The Japanese style of management reflect the Asian premium on the virtues of loyalty and personalism in business and official undertakings.[22]

These trends, basically motivated by the desire for greater efficiency of production, and also greater competitiveness in the international marketplace, hinges in the philosophy of integrating workers into a more organic relationship with the owners and managers of the enterprise. These schemes make the worker part-manager and part-capitalist, and if carried further can lead to the

beginning of the blurring of distinctions between laborer and capitalist. A more organic relationship is being developed at the workplace. From different ideological starting points in the East and West, the production-structure in more operational terms is becoming interestingly similar.

If this trend of "operational convergence" continues into the future, then whatever ideological differences will remain between the major powers in the Asia-Pacific would, hopefully, in time not be seen as worth shooting at each other with nuclear weapons.

CULTURAL TRENDS

Much of cultural trends in the Asia-Pacific region are also global in scope. "Democratization" and "decentralization" trends are discernible in the winds of change sweeping the region. More participation and clamor for greater participation of individuals in various spheres of life are felt.

Technological developments are contributing to this trend. Easier communication and travel are bringing peoples and cultures together. Microcomputers are democratizing access to information. Satellite communications and the microwave dish antenna together are promising the prospect of individual households receiving regional television broadcasts. Arguments are made in favor of decentralized non-conventional forms of energy sources such as solar energy collectors, biogas generators, windmills, etc. [23]

Competition in world trade are spurring innovations in the workplace and adoption of new forms of incentives for workers. An interesting convergence across both sides of the East-West ideological fence is taking place in the direction of experimentation in participatory management and equity sharing. Non-governmental agents are being more visibly felt as development media across national borders; they serve to empower and organize the poor to enable them to lift themselves from poverty.

Greater Roles of Non-Governmental Institutions

The state has been the powerful actors in the international arena for centuries, the only actors with a monopoly of the use of military, police, monetary and other legally accepted coercive powers over its citizens. In this century especially, other forms of organizations have appeared: non-governmental institutions such as multinational corporations, private assistance organizations, cause-oriented groups (anti-nuclear groups, environmental protection foundations, consumer interest groups, human rights organizations), multi-

lateral development agencies, scientific and technological societies, etc. These organizations operate both within and across state or national boundaries, and have begun to exert influences comparable with those of smaller states.

Institutions and conventions established by and among governments have taken up roles that cannot be adequately handled by individual governments, supplementing governmental roles and often creating a life and a self-interest of their own. Multilateral financing bodies, United Nations agencies, conventions (on warfare, patents, telecommunications, etc.) and declarations of human and social rights as well as duties of states — all these are little by little diluting and altering the once powerful sole authority of the king or the state.

Local self-help organizations are learning to assert their roles and complementing government efforts at rural development.[24]

The cry for human rights can be utilized as a political tool by some governments, but it can not be denied that it is contributing towards shaping a global code of conduct, a global moral consensus, which empowers the individual vis-a-vis the coercive powers of states.

Non-governmental organizations or NGOs have mushroomed, for example, in ASEAN. However, NGOs must apply for affiliation with the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, Indonesia and are required to abide by the policies, guidelines and directives of the ASEAN Secretariat. ASEAN NGOs span a wide range of concerns: art and dances, language, health, scientific professions, law, tourism, and other areas. Examples of ASEAN non-governmental groups are: the ASEAN Law Association, the ASEAN Women Circle of Jakarta, the ASEAN Cardiologists Federation, the Committee for ASEAN Youth Cooperation, and a host of others.

The Nairobi meeting on "The Enabling Environment for Effective Private Sector Contribution in Development in Sub-Saharan Africa" in October 1986 is an event that illustrates the essence and fundamental motives behind the trend described above:

> This [meeting] occurs at a time of some disillusionment with the results of previous development strategies based on substantial government control or intervention in the economy, subsidized but loss-making industries, despite protection, and forms of dirigiste planning. Instead developers are seeking succour in the private sector, a designation which spans a broad spectrum from the small businessman to the vast multinational corporation, from the grassroots peasant group or voluntary worker to such national or international non-governmental

organizations such as Oxfam, Caritas or InterAction.[25]

This trend appears to parallel the decentralization/ Privatization experiments being undertaken in the factories in China, the United States and Japan, and being eyed by Soviet leader Gorbachev (described above).

Greater People-to-People Contacts

The dizzying pace of advances in telecommunications, mass media, computers and other information-related technologies is creating what has been called a "global village" or an "electronic cottage." There are more opportunities for people-to-people contact through

(1) international exchange in television programs;

(2) wide dispersal of music, movies and instructional materials through the video cassette recorder/player, the compact disc and now the digital audio tape;

(3) international direct-dialing;

(4) instant transmission of documents through telefacsimile (telefax);

(5) local area networks for information exchange;

(6) subscription to data banks within and beyond national borders; and so on and so forth.

New fields are being created such as cross-cultural management, artificial (computer) intelligence for translation between languages, bilingual television broadcasting, live televised cross-national interviews or conferencing, and so on.

More intensive and extensive cross-cultural interactions are accentuating awareness of differences and similarities among cultures, lifestyles and viewpoints at the level of the man in the street. Information is transferred across borders more readily and inexpensively than traded goods. The patent outcome of these socio-technological changes is empowerment of the people arising from greater awareness of issues.

ASEAN, after establishing the political basis for cooperation in economic and functional (or technical) areas, is presently at the threshold of entering into a qualitatively higher phase of greater cooperation in the cultural sphere that will

tend to merge perceptions, harmonize interests and blend cultures more closer.

An ASEAN Committee on Culture and Information (COCI) facilitates intra-ASEAN cultural and information exchange programs. An ASEAN Cultural Fund was established to finance COCI projects. Some examples of how cultural exchange is carried out are: art symposia, yearly ASEAN film and music contest and festival, children's book production, painting and photo exhibits, an ASEAN exchange program of radio and television artists, an ASEAN Youth Music Workshop, yearly ASEAN Film Weeks in ASEAN capitals, joint projects by the ASEAN Motion Pictures Producers Association, etc.

ASEAN has been moving from mainly official/governmental towards greater private sector and people-to-people contacts. Citizens of ASEAN member states can now travel within ASEAN without prior visas. Regional news items are beginning to compete for space in local dailies with international news items. It is not unrealistic to expect the development of a regional cooperation in daily live television broadcasting, similar to what is obtaining at a subregional scale between Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam. The concept of an ASEAN University has been floated and discussed for years, and the time appears ripe for political commitments in this direction.

CONCLUSION

The trends in international relations in the Asia-Pacific region, in the political, economic and cultural spheres, together point to a coherent over-all trend of: higher levels of peaceful cooperation and people-to-people understanding (see Summary Table). A parallel trend towards decentralization and democratization is taking place at all levels: political, economic and technological.

SUMMARY TABLE

Political Trends: PRC: fuller participation in international trade, investments, and technological cooperation US and USSR: greater attention to the Pacific; less likelihood of nuclear confrontation compared elsewhere Popular clamor for wider democratic participation
Economic Trends: Pacific nations: long-term movement towards a Pacific trading community; protectionism during short-term global recession An indicative "operational convergence" in production systems among free enterprise and socialist economies
Cultural Trends: Greater role of private sector and NGOs Greater people-to-people contacts

The words that most closely describe the essential element or pattern discernible behind the above trends are

(1) "people-orientation" or "empowerment of the people", and

(2) "trade-orientation" as a stabilizing force in international relations and in building a network of interdependence and "economic organicity" among nations.

The Asia-Pacific region best demonstrates these welcome trends in international cooperation and understanding. Altogether the mix of trends appear to support the commonly-held view that the Pacific area is most likely going to be a prosperous, stable and indeed "pacific" region for international cooperation in the near-term and hopefully also in the long-term futures.

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THE EVOLUTION OF POSTWAR JAPAN'S CULTURAL DIPLOMACY: A THEORETICAL INTERPRETATION*

Sylvano D. Mahiwo

Introduction

Given national interest as a priori, the political, economic, military, and cultural dimensions constitute a nation's foreign policy.[1] These dimensions of national interest are areas which policymakers emphasize when designing and charting the course of a nation's external relations. When taken as identifiable units in the realm of foreign policymaking, each area has its own emphasis: the political diplomacy dimension emphasizes the "political interest" aspect; the economic diplomacy dimension ensures the preservation and expansion of access to trade and natural resources; the military dimension maintains, in less visible fashion, the nation's "security and strategic" well-being; and the human and cultural diplomacy dimension brings into relief the "human side" of foreign relations (see Figure 1).

In practice, however, foreign policy cannot be "departmentalized" as there are varying degrees of superimposition among two or more of the dimensions. Limiting foreign policy to only one or two of these dimensions is nearly impossible. On the other hand, interactions between nations crisscross every level, thus increasing the frequency and intensity of exchanges through the different dimensions, individually and simultaneously altogether. The distinction among dimensions may be even further blurred by the following circumstances: first, an overemphasis on one channel of foreign interaction, for instance, economic relations; second, the absence of a clear definition or the use of broad and vague terms to describe policy goals and purposes. In some cases, general slogans, devoid of specific national policy principles, are difficult to sustain due to lack of long-term vision. And thirdly, the evolution of each policy component creates shifts in policy emphasis. Institutional growth, transition, as well as quantitative and qualitative changes require updated redefinition of foreign policy concepts.

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

FIG. 1. The Pillars of Foreign Policy

The subject of analysis of this paper is the "human side" of Japanese foreign policy which is conventionally referred to as cultural diplomacy. For the purpose of establishing a theoretical frame of analysis, the human component must be isolated theoretically and distinguished from other components. There is neither an easy resolution to the issue of essence and concept concerning cultural foreign policy, nor is there an escape from the fact that the term "culture" is often loosely defined in foreign policy activities, making it unlimited in conceptual scope and extremely difficult to measure. But the absence of a clear definition of the cultural aspect of foreign policy does not deny the dimension's existence and significance in the complex foreign policy of modern nation-states.

To mitigate the problem of conceptual manageability, the discussions focus on that aspect of foreign policy that covers the "human flow" dealing with the receiving and sending (exchange), educating, training and development of people. This is referred to, in this paper, as the human and cultural dimension of foreign policy. The human being is the focal subject in the exchange and cooperation activities, emanating from the foreign policy dimension as contrasted to, and analyzed in conjunction with, the "flows of goods", and the "flows of money" between and among countries.

Japan's diplomacy may emphasize on natural resources[2] as a corollary of economic foreign policy; and on human resources[3] as a sub-part of Bunka Gaiko

(Cultural Diplomacy).[4] The political and security dimensions are other components that make up the whole foreign policy.

International human exchange, in general, and as an aspect of foreign policy, in particular, has been revolutionized by technical progress in the means of transportation and telecommunications that link nations and continents. The technological revolution has shrunk the scale of time and distance, barriers to direct human contacts among peoples in different societies. It is possible for a nation-state, through its policy, to conduct and promote direct human contacts on a large scale beyond geographical and social borders for certain purposes. In this modern age, the deliberate manipulation and control of international human flows has become a potent instrument of foreign policy.

Principles Behind Human and Cultural Foreign Policy: Selected Countries

A thorough comparison of Japan's human and culture-oriented foreign policy with those of other countries is not a main purpose of the following discussion. But a brief overview on how the so-called advanced nations insured their ability to influence world affairs, how they pursued and are pursuing human and cultural exchange to attain foreign policy objectives, however, can help elucidate on the nature of Japanese foreign policy approach in this field.

Needless to say, the historical circumstances and factors vary in each country so that it is of limited usefulness to compare Japan's policy concerning human and cultural exchange with other nations of comparable status. Some relevant points and observations on the human and culture-oriented diplomatic policy of some selected Western democracies, however, can shed light on the peculiarity and characteristics of Japanese human exchange policy. There is no standard for comparison except to see the individuality of each country.

With regards to the cultural dimension of foreign policy, France, Great Britain, West Germany, and the United States of America, among modern nation-states, have clear convictions and philosophical foundations upon which cultural and human exchange-oriented foreign diplomacy are based. In these countries, during the postwar period, the pursuit of human exchange through cultural, educational, technological and intellectual activities continue to manifest the spiritual and philosophical motives, even though they are more strategic.

France is one of the first Western countries to define cultural relations as an important part of her foreign policy[5] and implement it in both pragmatic and philosophical approaches. While it sounds arrogant to say that French culture belongs to the world,[6] the French government's belief in sharing its culture is a belief in universality as a philosophical basis for the nation's cultural diplomacy.

This conviction propels France's cultural mission in the world; and the goal to promote its prestige and national interest. Moreover, this aspect of foreign policy displays a "sensitivity towards the cultural requirements of other countries at different levels of development" with a sensitivity to local cultures and ways of life.[7] It is also important to note that the centers and institutions under French cultural missions abroad, i.e., the Alliance Francaise, are intended to be "place of exchange."[8] There is an awareness of the importance of both immediate national goals and the long-term vision. The universal inspiration is a strong selling point of the cultural policy dimension to which the French attach high esteem. The French who just celebrated the 200th anniversary of the Fall of the Bastille claim that they share with the world the three ideals : Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. This is a form of human and cultural contribution that is cherished everywhere as it belongs to all mankind, not only to France."[9]

The United States of America, after World War II, was one of the Western powers outside Europe that pursued a very active cultural diplomacy based on a strategy and a national ideal. On the aspect of idealism, America's cultural, information and educational foreign policy programs and activities manifest the nation's conviction and the practice of the "philosophy which it believes."[10] A predetermined policy vision that guided human and cultural exchange with other countries was clearly expressed. In particular, America's "public diplomacy" or exchange of ideas, information, and products of socio-cultural undertakings through exchange of persons was founded on the principle of "the freedom to know" as part of the American way of life. American human and cultural exchange with societies was motivated by a strong desire to project and share (which could also be interpreted as a subtle imposition and exercise of national power) the American way of life and democratic ideals. With a strong belief in this way of life and in world mission, the U.S., through its foreign policy, attempts to share with other countries its national values and socio-cultural aspirations. One example of an American idea that it tries to share with the world is the principle of "government for the people, by the people and of the people" as a philosophy of governance. Needless to say, American influence in foreign countries has not always been palatable. But it is not easy to attribute the US shortcomings to its cultural diplomacy alone.

Great Britain, since the not so distant past, has been one of the cultural contributors to the modern age, through the influence of the English language. The British, in evaluating their own cultural diplomacy, contend that after the French language, the English would become the "instrument of civilized men all over the world."[11] This perceived mandate of the British empire to carry on the torch passed from France's linguistic dominance over civilized men, while sounding arrogant, was a self-imposed responsibility, inspired by a strong cultural conviction. The goals of economic and political expansionism, and

world ambition of Great Britain, when it was the "Mistress of the Sea" and during the time when it was said that the "sun never sets in the British Empire," cannot be completely dissociated from its cultural diplomacy even in postwar years. A long-term vision for human and cultural relations in British foreign policy, however, was clear, and included cultural spirituality beyond mere mercantile goals. Britain's significance in the world "is not to be measured in terms of penny-pinching housekeeping."[12] Although the cultural aspect of foreign relations cannot be quantified, there was a deep awareness and belief that culture, especially the English language, was a major export of Britain.[13] This demonstrates the distinction between the measurable economic goals and the "intangibles"[14] of foreign policy. The parliamentary system of government was a political and socio-cultural innovation from the British that is shared by many countries.

West Germany is another country in the free world that emphasizes the cultural side of foreign policy. The "cultural work" is considered by German diplomatic missions as "equally important as political and economic work."[15] Obviously reflecting on the lessons of history, specifically, apologizing officially for German atrocities during the last war, the safeguarding of world peace and promoting international understanding were a part of German foreign policy design. The principle of West Germany's promotion of mutual understanding, cooperation and exchange with other peoples of the world is derived from the principle that "the value of what we give is only worth as much as our willingness to take. Thus an open attitude towards others is a principle of our cultural policy abroad."[16] The German approach to cultural and human exchange as a foreign policy activity was characterized by a two-way flow : German cultural achievements to other countries, and the willingness of the Germans to receive from other cultures.

In the above brief discussion of the underlying principles of human and cultural policies of selected countries, it can be inferred that, in general, a clear philosophy and vision preceded the cultural activities and related foreign policy actions. Foreign policy was anchored to a pre-determined vision.

With regards to long-term vision as backbone of foreign policy, did Japan have a universal principle and philosophy behind its human and cultural exchange foreign policy? While the lack of a clear expression of conviction does not necessarily determine foreign policy philosophy, a clear clarification of the philosophical setting of Japanese human and cultural diplomacy is needed. A respected scholar and authority on Japan has this to say:

> "...International understanding is not just a pleasantly innocuous catchphrase for Japanese policy but has become practical necessity... The Japanese are intellectually aware of this situation but they find their own sense of uniqueness difficult to shake off."[17]

Spiritual Foundation of Japan's Foreign Policy

It is a correct assumption that by constantly and consciously comparing herself with the West, Japan sought to equal but not to be exactly the same as other countries. After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japan vigorously pursued a "follow-the-West" policy which gradually developed into a pursuit of "catch-up-with-the-West" aspiration. The "catch-up-with-the-West" idea was different from "doing the same thing as the West." In Japanese cultural diplomacy, while following the trodden path, i.e., increasing the number of foreign students, intensifying cultural exchange activities and the like, there evolved along the process, a Japanese foreign policy pattern that was a product of Japan's policy milieu.

The Japanese tendency to look up to European countries and America for standard of comparison and for models of human and culture-oriented diplomacy are due to various reasons. One is modern Japan's limited experience and disposition to outwardly share,for example, cultural heritage, ideas, and such socio-cultural interplay with other societies. The philosophical and spiritual aptitude to reach out to other people has not been a part of Japanese foreign policy propensity. This can be seen as a kind of an under-development in Japanese foreign relations that needs a further stimulation.

Another reason is that, most of the conventions and practices governing international human and cultural exchange in contemporary foreign relations were established by Western countries. In fact, the ideas and concepts of spreading religion, introducing political and economic systems, educational system, philosophical values, culture and human knowledge were part of the strategic and ambitious schemes to spread Western influence to other countries. The traditional way to dominate was the rule of the game which could be achieved by imposing one's own value system in the local milieu. It reached its peak during the era of colonialism.

It has always been the powerful nations that could afford to conduct the exchange of people for the propagation of certain values and systems. Historical facts demonstrate that, in most cases, the adaptation of a national policy to mobilize people, thoughts and ideas beyond national borders was an outgrowth of a nation's power and dominance. Nations possessing or aspiring to achieve world power status somehow had to develop that power. Because contemporary Japan was definitely an admitted member of the powerful and advance nations' club ,[19] she had to compete with other powers in a situation wherein the rules were established by the Western nation-states. As a participant in the foreign affairs game, Japan had to learn the established art of cultural diplomacy or eventually develop her own approach.

Foreign policy is a manifestation of the spiritual beliefs and values of a nation. It is a reflection of a people's attitude, thinking and philosophy, as well as aspirations with regard to themselves and in their relations with other societies. Western countries, in particular, have been strongly guided by their convictions and values in the conduct of foreign relations. Western religious beliefs, ideals, languages, social practices, missionary zeal to 'civilize' fellow human beings, (these were instruments of imperialism and cultural nationalism in the colonial past) were great motivations behind human exchange activities—the establishment of mission schools, the sending of teachers, volunteers, lay missionaries, doctors, and engineers overseas.

Philosophical and spiritual values undoubtedly inspired most Western policies on human and cultural international exchange. If stripped of the narrow economic, political and material motivations, the human exchange activities carry some universal and individual sense of values.

Flows of people and culture during the European colonial years had been in the name of kings and nation-states (material motives) and in the name of God (mostly Christian spiritual motives). Despite the economic and politico-military ambition of the rulers and monarchs under whose names colonial expeditions were organized, some remnants of universality and altruistic objectives can be discerned. Some degree of acceptance by the receiving side of the values and beliefs that were introduced could mean that visions surpassed the racial, national, cultural and social barriers of the nation-state. The proofs of acceptance of the Western spiritual values where human and cultural exchange activities took place were the religious conversion and adaptation of some socio-political systems in many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In these countries, the Christian ideals and Western thoughts took roots and continue to influence cultural, educational and social systems. While there is condemnation of past colonial exploitative policies of the imperialistic West, it is also fair to recognize the philosophical and spiritual contributions of Western cultural diplomacy like the concepts of democracy, freedom, and equality. For instance, in the Philippines, the 1986 February revolution[20], partly inspired by "Christian love" for fellow human beings, helped topple dictatorial rule with the least sacrifice in human life. The recent uprising of the Burmese people opposing military rule and state-sponsored suppression of freedom was another instance of culturally influenced idealism. These events illustrate how Western-originated ideals were used to fight social ills, whose origin could be partially traced to Western colonial making. The latest example of the influence of Western thoughts and ideas was the erection of the replica of the Statue of Liberty at the Tiananmen Square in Peking during the May-June 1989 demonstrations by Chinese students and intellectuals. The credits go to the brave people of these countries and not to Western philosophy and thoughts. The point

is that Western thoughts and ideals, even in their symbolic meanings, have universal appeal.

Indeed, many countries, mostly Western ones, condemned the student massacre at Peking's Tiananmen Square for reasons of universal values and principles. Japan's reaction to the incident was rather subdued. Apparently, the Japanese stance was based on its own concept of the issues. In the surface, universal principle as introduced by Western societies made them closer to China through a philosophical sharing. Japan used the situational approach to determine its reaction to the incident involving a moral and philosophical issue. The attitude of the Japanese government toward the situation reflected the kind of beliefs and value system of the Japanese as a country and as a people in general and how far this is shared with the world at large.

There are philosophical thinking and ideas that were "transferred" and shared among societies that do not discriminate against color, creed and cultural setting. As far as universal application is concerned, they are a positive legacy of human and cultural exchange diplomacy that transcend the narrow interests of the nation-states that created and contributed these philosophical ideas. One measure of the greatness of a nation is its spiritual influence as reflected in its foreign relations.

Human and Cultural Exchange: Its Locus in Japan's Foreign Policy

In relation to culture, the human diplomacy dimension can be approached in two ways. One way is to look at international cultural exchanges as an all-embracing field which encompasses human exchanges. The other conceptual view is to limit the scope of cultural exchange as just one avenue among many through which international human exchange is facilitated. In the latter approach, the human component traverses and goes beyond the confines of cultural exchange. To technically avoid the ambiguity of the word 'culture' in Japan's cultural diplomacy, and in order not to confuse the widely accepted term cultural diplomacy (bunka gaiko) with the concept of cultural exchange (bunka koryu)[24], while it is presupposed here that the latter may or may not be involved in foreign policy, the former is always in the context of foreign policy (see Figure 2). In other words, cultural exchange is treated here as just one channel of activity under foreign policy. The channels of international human exchange in Japanese foreign policy are:

1) Cultural exchange
2) Technical cooperation
3) Scientific and educational cooperation
4) Youth and friendship exchange

Human flow is the common denominator of these program areas. The four areas combined make up Japan's international human and cultural foreign policy dimension. This dimension has the same category as the economic, political and military foreign policy dimensions with particular emphasis on human exchange activities.



Fig. 2. The Program Areas of International Human Exchange

Government and Private Sector-Based International Human Exchange

When international human and cultural exchange is placed within the direct and indirect purview of the state or its authorized agencies, and is therefore a government-based activity, there is no further need to clarify whether or not the activity is part of foreign policy. But how should the type of human exchange that does not fall directly under government jurisdiction be considered? This is a vital question because a high percentage of Japanese international human and cultural exchanges are promoted and conducted under the auspices and sponsorship of private foundations and organizations. In principle, when dealing with foreign policy, cases of purely non-government-based human exchange is deliberately not included unless they fall within the orbit of foreign policy at some later stage in the program evolution process. The government-sponsored exchange is one major type of international exchange. The Japanese private sector, notably the firms and economic organizations that support institutions for international human and cultural exchange, as a whole, play a major role in the expansion, stability and continuity of the policy dimension. The powerful economic and industrial organizations, in their individual as well as collective capacities, influence government actions on policy matters and determine the output and direction of the foreign policy component.

Joint efforts of government and the private sectors invigorate the evolution of Japanese international human and cultural exchange policy. The so-called national interest pursued by the state, and the commercial interest pursued by the private commercial sector, in the final analysis, are not contradictory in essence. They are complementary.[26]

If distinction is to be made between government and private sector approaches to international human and cultural exchange, the major differences may be found in the manner of implementation, in the scale and scope, time range, the field of emphasis, and in who takes the initiative. Whether the reference to the close relationship of the Japanese government and business sectors[27] is exaggerated or underestimated, the merger of the national interest espoused by the government and the private interests represented by economic and industrial groups is a hard fact. Japan's international human and cultural exchange is a merged area of interests between the government and the private sector bonded by a common process, institutional relations, and general policy orientation. The contemporary trend is towards an even closer coordination between the government and non-government sectors. The need to distinguish the government and the private sector is not an urgent issue in Japanese foreign policy debates. How to get the cooperation of the private sector and Japanese society as a whole, to be more interested in, and open to, international human exchange is perhaps a more pressing concern of Japanese cultural diplomacy. There is an explicit and implicit recognition that government and private sector activities in this policy area complement each other before, now, and in the future.[28]

Policy Goal and Policy Instrument

The areas of culture (under cultural exchange), educational and scientific cooperation, technical transfer, and youth and friendship exchange, taken collectively, comprise human and cultural diplomacy with one general goal—the promotion of the national interest. But when general objectives are pursued in details, the issue of goal versus means arises.

Human and cultural exchange can be conceived as a means or as an objective, or both. As a policy instrument, the Japanese government's policy guides human flows vis-a-vis other countries, one of the goals of the exchange of people, such as students, technicians, trainees, scholars, artists, athletes, and youth, naturally, is the beneficial effect from such activities. The conduct of exchange programs for public relations and information[29] is a major aim. To promote a good image and favorable attitude toward Japan and the Japanese society is one important foreign policy goal. But if this kind of human and cultural exchange is emphasized too much, it is likened to the beautiful

wrappings for a variety of policy packages. In a broader context, peace, development, friendship, understanding and goodwill can be the end goals and human and cultural exchange activities can be the means.

The mere "flows" of people in desired numbers at desired times through desired avenues serve certain policy purposes. When the policy to cause the "flow of people" is given importance for its visible effects, it can be called, for example, as propaganda. The existence of the propaganda element in any nation's foreign policy cannot be denied. It is a vital part of diplomacy. But when policy visibility becomes the main goal of the activity, its essence can be impaired.

On the other hand, each program area of human exchange has specific goals that are superimposed on the broad goal of human and cultural diplomacy. Each category or area of human exchange has objectives like development of human physical, intellectual, mental, as well as spiritual capabilities and potential through education, training, and information activities. The human being is the ultimate justification of the specific activity. This is the second kind of human exchange that is contrasted to the first type because it treats the human being as ends. People being "exchanged" are not treated merely as policy pawns or tools.

The third use of human exchange, in terms of means and objectives, is the combination of the two. In some actual cases, human exchange activities are carried out more as means for other policy goals than as ends, and in some cases, they are mere supplements for priority policies. The degree of dominance of one over the other varies according to the stage of policy evolution and prevailing factors and circumstances.

In the harsh reality of international relations, it is of secondary importance for foreign policymakers to debate whether to treat international human exchange participants as instruments or as goals, if they consider such a philosophical and moral issue, at all. To seek the ideal is desirable but the choice, fortunately or unfortunately, is the prerogative of the policymakers. It is naive to say that morality and philosophy should have priority over pragmatic benefits, specifically at a development phase when pragmatism dictates policy directions. But as the policy component develops beyond short-term objectives, the aspiration to balance the pragmatic means with the ideal and broader goals may grow stronger. Regardless of whether human exchange is pursued for foreign policy, for the individual participant's goal, and for stated and unstated goals, the human being becomes the focus of policy programs.

In Japan's foreign relations, in general, international exchange is an activity that sustains the national well-being. The exchanges are composed of various flows[30]—flows of goods, the flows of money, and flows of information. The

flow of people is being developed recently in postwar Japanese foreign policy. The gradual transformation of the human dimension is, in one way or another, firmly inter-linked with the other "flows." The emphasis on human exchange was partly due to a search for alternative links because the channels of material economic exchange become congested with and stifled by friction. Japan depends on international trade and commerce and she needs the goodwill and cooperation of other countries to maintain the continuous flows of goods and materials. Japan also has to prevent its isolation from the rest of the world community due to natural, historical, geographical, and socio-cultural barriers. The flow of people is an inevitable consequence of the total flows in contemporary Japanese foreign relations.

Efforts and budgets for the promotion of human and cultural activities are investments that promote other foreign policy interests. The human and cultural dimension and the other pillars of foreign policy, for example, the economic dimension, are intertwined and they reinforced one another interchangeably as means and ends.

The Developing Regions and Human Resources Development Diplomacy

The goals for human resources development as part of foreign policy have two aspects : the tangible and the intangible. A pragmatic approach gives priority to manpower training and education for economic needs and activities. The tangible objectives are related to the measurable economic activities like increasing industrial production and upgrading the quantity and quality of certain commercial goods and services. In this sense, pragmatism is reinforced by the active participation of economic and industrial organizations whose manpower and technical needs must be met through human resources development programs. Strong commercial motives influence human resources development to focus on the measurable goals and benefits.

Japan's experience in its national development is the best example of human resources development in as far as its foreign cooperation activities are concerned. Okita Saburo, one of the architects of Japanese postwar development stresses the role of human resources as the 'most vital resource' in development.[31] It is in this area that Japan can effectively cooperate in the development of the Third World.

A fundamental question is what emphasis and for whom human resources should be developed? Should the development be for the benefit of certain interest or for society at large? Is human resources development an appendage of purely economic and industrial development? Is it a spill over of economic

material development? Where the real national interest is not limited to narrow economic motives, foreign policymaking cannot afford to ignore the broader perspective of human resources development.

Perhaps, the non-material orientation of human resources development is considered only when the government has the capability and leeway to steer policy direction from the strong domination of purely economic objectives and interest toward a broader orientation.

Contemporary ASEAN-Japan relations typifies Japanese relations with the so-called developing countries or the Third World. In the level of socio-economic and industrial development, the relationship structure is the so-called North-South framework (with the exception of Singapore, which belongs to the newly industrializing economies or NIEs). For the 'South side' countries, in their aspiration and struggle to pursue the urgently-needed developments which can be summed up as national development, the human resources development is a key factor. It is an indispensable element in the process of nation-building. For this reason, effective Japanese assistance and cooperation to the countries in the ASEAN in the field of human resources development can have far-reaching significance.[32]

For Japan, the policy pursuit could provide a valuable opening for opportunity to participate in the ASEAN economic activities. Human resources development is an area that is most probably least controversial as a policy activity. The importance of technology in the ASEAN on one hand, and the experience and capacity of Japan in the field of human resources development, on the other hand, make cooperation a convenient common ground for policy pursuits. Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Japan's announced intention to contribute to the world community, particularly to developing countries, may find fulfillment in a well-planned human resources development diplomacy. It can be further argued that human resources development is a mutual goal where there is convergence of Japan's national interest and the interests of the developing countries. There is mutual stakes in the long-term mutual benefits from the maintenance of technology-based international economic relations, regional and world security, and stable societies brought about by educational, scientific, technical and cultural advancement. The narrow short-term policy goals and activities of developed and the developing countries, however, may not always find convergence.

Diplomacy Based on Strength and/or Weakness

Foreign policy in general entails ideas, conceptions and perceptions of the domestic and external realities and conditions that eventually induce or trigger programs and activities.

Postwar Japanese foreign relations at the beginning, has been premised on the nation's dependence on foreign countries for national survival. The lack of natural resources in the Japanese archipelago is often pointed out as the weakness of the Japanese nation, coupled with the consciousness of being a "small nation." In theory, when such a stance determines the logic and rationale of foreign policy pursuits, external events and developments are often viewed as threats to national interests, a negative perception. Foreign policy does not go farther where it is not challenged directly. The foreign policy choice is either reaction or inaction and seldom for effecting long-term influences or changes. In the extreme, if survival is not threatened, if national interest is not involved, there is no policy, and there is no commitment and interest.

Extending this line of argument to Japanese policy evolution, this may explain the fact that despite the newly-found status as a global economic power, there is slow development of a national policy aptitude to take up, voluntarily, policy initiatives in the international community. A nation that preoccupies itself with excessive safeguards from external changes is less in a position to consider the needs and situation of other nations. Japan first needs to graduate from the principle of self-survival to the consciousness of a Japan preserved by and among the rest of the world.

The time of the "small nation" mentality is over and cannot be an excuse.[33] Japan has now grown into a world power and her existence looms far larger than during the time when it could pursue a policy focusing mainly on economic diplomacy. The survival and well-being of Japan as a world economic power remains basically dependent on foreign trade and economic relations with other countries but the nation's enlarged status implies the inflation of its high vulnerability. The responsibility, expectations, and the requirements for a komusubi (wrestler of the 3rd rank) do not remain unchanged when he reaches the yokozuna (wrestler of the 1st rank) class in the sumo world.[34] The same analogy can be said of Japan today.

Japanese foreign policy is formulated with conscious consideration of two factors : the area of national strength and the area of national weakness. The simultaneous interplay of the nation's strength and weakness determines the ambivalence of complacency or earnestness in certain policy area of activities. If there is a feeling of confidence in the nation's strength, complacency in foreign relations may develop. If there is sense of weakness in the nation's position vis-a-vis the external environment, vigilance and hyper-sensitivity to world developments and events govern the policymaking atmosphere. The strength and/or weakness may be real or perceived.

The scarcity of natural material resources is said to be Japan's Achilles heel. When foreign policy is determined by this weakness, the actions and non-

actions are cautious responses like walking on thin ice in the international grounds. The nation's foreign diplomacy in the early decades after the war was greatly shaped by a hypersensitive perception of the nation's Achilles heel. Consequently, policy activities were concentrated on its efforts to strengthen itself against the national weakness. This consciousness was heightened by external changes and developments that influenced Japanese foreign policy activities in varying forms and degrees.

The national attitude can be different when the diplomacy is based on a nation's strength. The national strength of Japan is its economic power. There is no argument about this. But looking at the economic quantifiable elements to explain the national strength is certainly an incomplete view. It does not require a complicated analysis to see that the real foundation of the country's economic viability is its highly developed human resources. The literacy rate of the Japanese population on the average is said to be one of the highest in the world. Japanese advanced technology, which is the envy of other countries, is based on, and is maintained by, the highly skilled and well-trained manpower. The nation's confidence, then, lies in its highly developed human skill, literacy, and average quality education. Reliance on economic and technological strength to pursue interactions with foreign countries has become more pronounced. It is logical that if diplomacy is asserted on the basis of national strength, Japanese international diplomacy should find in human and technical resources development an effective instrument. Technology-based human resources development can be Japan's forte in extending cooperation to other countries. Indeed, this is a potent instrument through which the nation can have a leverage vis-a-vis other countries. Being in possession of this advantage, Japan can be in a position to initiate the form, the structure and the mode of interrelationships. Mike Mansfield, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, said:

> "Japan's greatest policy instrument is its economic assistance program. The rest of the world associates Japan with economic power, a power it hopes Japan will use wisely."[35]

The keizai taikoku (economic giant)[36] and high technology era may witness the emergence of opportunities for new initiatives in Japanese foreign policy.

Foreign Policy Formation: Stimuli vs. Taisaku and Kosaku

Postwar Japanese human and cultural exchange policy can be best understood by a follow-through of its path of evolution. The starting point is Japan itself, the national character (kunigara) which refers to the sum total of the nation: its people, geography, culture, values, tradition and historical experience.

In this connection, the social structure of Japanese society upon which policy is based is described as elastic and adaptable. Japan is a "society with a flexible frame" but which becomes brittle when pressure is exerted from outside.[37] This is coupled with a kind of social attitude wherein the people "have never developed a sense of participation in the international life based on a clear awareness of their people in the world."[38] This is a part of the national character which is the given milieu that molds national policy. Domestic and foreign policy activities and programs have had no firm and pre-determined comprehensive foreign policy goal based on a fixed belief and vision. The Japanese "interpret international society in terms of specific external pressure on Japan."[39] As a consequence of the given conditions determining the course of policy process, foreign policy activities and programs started as particular reactions and adaptation to new changes and development in the policy environment.

Against this background, at the initial stage of foreign policy formation, Japanese participation in international cultural, technical, educational and human exchanges were mere reactive and induced activities. Theoretically, reactions do not necessarily imply policy vision and pre-determined goals.

In the course of time, the reactive activities are gradually adapted into routine activities. At some point in time and stage of the evolution process, the regularized activities become institutionalized and are fitted into the mainstream of foreign policy. In the strictest sense, there is a big conceptual difference between the activities emanating from reaction and activities based on policy vision. The former is an ad hoc action determined by the occurrence of external stimuli, i.e., unpredictable events. On the other hand, activities based on conviction and long-term policy have a definite predictable course and method of action that guide and determine present and future decisions.

The process of policy growth provides a transition from the reactive activities to the regularized or routine activities. When certain temporary reactions are found to be effective in serving the national interest, they become part of the national policy when adapted as such. Normally, a foreign policy has goals which may be long-range, medium range, and short-range.[40] In this context, foreign policy, therefore, follows a planned, long-term vision. There is consistency, continuity and stability. At the initial phase, the idea to engage in human and cultural exchanges were reactions to external stimuli or were intended as urgent countermeasures to perceived crisis and other external threats to Japanese national interests. The Japanese term for this is taisaku (cf. taiou) which means literally, counter-policy. The fundamental characteristic of taisaku is that it is a product of the circumstances surrounding the policy formation such as the presence of an imminent crisis that is actually threatening or is perceived to be heading towards the shores of Japanese interest. Essentially, it cannot exist

without the occurrence of gaiatsu (an external pressure), an outside event or development, and other forms of stimuli to be countered. Where there is fire, there is smoke, and when smoke appears, countermeasure is formulated.[41]

The risk and shortcoming in this type of approach is that not all fires are preceded by smoke. Regarding the effective reach of this type of foreign policy, it is like a portable searchlight in the dark that responds towards, and focuses only on the changes and movements within monitoring distance around it.

Moreover, taisaku being inseparably linked to monitored outside stimuli, should emphasize more the techniques and the process to gain the best advantage possible at the shortest time. It has a passive character which becomes more active and charged as the external pressure becomes more intense. This passivity is due to the watch-and-see posture and it becomes activated by the 'other' interacting party.[42] The diplomacy has an expression in Japanese which is ukemi gaiko (passive diplomacy). Strictly speaking, this label refers more to attitudinal approach of policymakers than a policy classification. The decisions and activities are on a TPO (time, place, and occasion) basis. A taisaku may lose steam and cease when the external threat which justified its creation disappears.

Postwar Japanese attitude vis-a-vis foreign countries in general has been characterized more by a perception of threat than as opportunities for interactions. The "black ship of Commodore Perry" still seems to be the symbol of present-day monitoring of events and developments around Japan.

Taisaku has a "search light" focus approach in foreign relations including human exchange relations and can imply a kind of insensitive selectiveness to the kind of problem it addresses; and at the same time a "hypersensitive" disposition towards the external environment, foreigners, foreign countries, and foreign things when they are of immediate consequences to the national interest. The policy type thrives on adjustments on a case-to-case basis. It requires endless monitoring of the reaction of the winds of change in different regions of the world. It enhances and supports a wait-and-see attitude concerning the actions and reactions of other countries before taking policy measures.

While Japanese human and culture-oriented policy may develop from mere activity to countermeasure and finally to policy levels, another policy transition could possibly occur, with a slightly different character. It is described as kosaku which means strategy. Strategy could be a short-term or long-term type of policy. This strategic approach in Japanese human and cultural policy bloomed during the Japanese military reactions with Southeast Asia in the name of the Tai-Nampo Bunka Kosaku. This form of foreign policy is not necessarily peculiar to Japan because many powerful nations, in their own way of promoting their national interests, engage in cultural and human exchange as strategic

their national interests, engage in cultural and human exchange as strategic policy activities. Normally, in international relations, strategic activities are pursued for advantageous position and conditions in a given relationship between interacting nations.

Human and cultural exchange as strategic activities are less dependent on the reciprocity from the targeted country or countries. As such, the process of kosaku policymaking need not be understood by the other side. At the phase when a foreign policy is mainly for strategy, the degree of transparency is low. The role of human and cultural policy to promote understanding is suppressed when it is treated as kosaku.

The Japanese Nariyuki Policy Dynamics

On prewar and wartime manners and attitudes of Japanese dealing with foreign negotiations, the work of Blaker[43] and some scholars give incisive insights and observations. In analyzing foreign policy aspects, it is indeed difficult to say whether the manner of conducting policy is a function of a national character and cultural pattern or the other way around.

The evolution of postwar Japanese foreign policy in general, and its human and cultural dimension, in particular, from taisaku undertakings and finally toward a stabilized initiative-taking policy could best be described by the Japanese term nariyuki gaiko.[44] Literally, nariyuki* is derived from two words: naru- "to become" and yuku- "to proceed." Both combined words refer to evolution and a dynamic process. The nariyuki gaiko term does not refer to a concept of Japanese policymakers. It is not a conscious way, but rather it is an inherent characteristic of approaching issues. It is a descriptive concept of the dynamics in Japanese foreign policy development as applied to the analysis and observation of the growth of specific aspects of Japanese postwar foreign policy. It is a simultaneous occurrence of two processes. In this coined description, it means that the foreign policy is "becoming as it is proceeding and proceeding as it is becoming." The theoretical essence of this analysis is that Japan's postwar foreign policy, with specific reference to the human and culture-oriented dimension, has been a policy of accumulated creation derived from, and designed by, the course of events, changes, and developments through policymaking process. It embraces the total process including transition and transformation of the policy in the hardware and software aspects. External

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*The word nariyuki is used here as a neutral term for description purposes.

intervention such as events, new developments, foreign pressure and criticisms, etc., are most effective in influencing the course of the open-ended nariyuki policy because of its flexibility. But it is wrong to always presume that when Japanese negotiators give in or change their position unexpectedly, they are showing weakness. The change can be interpreted to mean that it is the nariyuki dynamics that operates. Taisaku and kosaku are portions of policy dynamics.

The absence of a rigid principle or philosophy is, in itself, the principle that governs the policy course of the nariyuki gaiko. The policy philosophy is an emerging one, seldom preceding actions or non-actions. The foreign policy in this situation is a product of the process. A passive posture towards changes and developments in the policy environment (domestic and external) is a marked characteristic. The policy that is born of the nariyuki policy dynamics undergoes a protracted birth. The nariyuki evolution mold hardly takes a definite form and shape over a predictable length of period.

In contrast to the nariyuki evolution, the foreign policy born out of a pre-determined policy goal and based on a rigid principle and guiding philosophy is essentially 'complete' conceptually at its inception and formulation stage. The implementation is towards the realization of a more or less pre-conceived scenario of what the desired ideal situation ought to be. The pre-designed and pre-determined foreign policy proceeds on a charted course, less dependent on the policy process. It is not unduly influenced by the contours and terrains of the policy environment. Based on a vision, the policy target is pre-marked and the direction is pre-set. The rigid policy sometimes implies a head-on collision course against the external environment. Policymaking does not follow an attitude of active avoidance of issues but is backed by oftentimes zealous initiatives to influence the outcome of events, to mold and not to be molded. Basically, the policy goal and position do not change according to changes of the weather in the international relations environment because the policy vision prevails in its essence regardless of transition and variations.

One very important visible measure of the growth and development of postwar Japanese human and cultural policy is the institutionalization of its various activities. The institutional expansion is a portion of the nariyuki process continuum of the foreign policy dimension. After the activities that started as reactions become regular undertakings, they are further stabilized structurally with the establishments of agencies, organizations, and bodies supported by the state. The institutionalization phase greatly enhance the administrative aspect of the policy.

Through the policy evolution process, the 'abstract side' of foreign policy programs and activities like the vision, the ideals, and spiritual inspirations are also emerging. The goal, then, is actively guided by a structured concept and

determined path through the established institutions. The cohesiveness and gradual universality of the policy comes with the process.

Finally, the nariyuki evolution, because policy is shaped by the policy milieu, mirrors the short-term thrust of each phase which changes according to time, place and the needs of the country. Each stage of the policy development has its peculiar underpinning and time frame context. If considered in segment, each policy phase in relation to the whole continuum manifests distinct characteristics and orientation.

Thus, applied in the Japanese foreign policymaking in general, and in its human and cultural diplomacy, we can discern a development in the continuum that goes through a transition and then develops from a passive position to a phase of active stance. At the later development stage, Japan starts to take policy initiatives with or without the policy stimuli. A possible development can be a definite policy vision upon which a long-term policy goal can be anchored. Reaching this phase is a part of this Japanese policy evolution. The nariyuki foreign policy evolution is illustrated in Figure 3.



Fig. 3. Evolution of the Nariyuki Diplomacy

Japanese contemporary foreign policy initiatives pivot around the economic fulcrum. The human and cultural diplomacy is still being nurtured and maintained within the economic framework, wherein directions and orientations are strongly determined by the dictates of economic principles. As such, the gradual deviationsfrom the passive policy stance are still mainly related to

the changes and development in the Japanese economy and in the nation's foreign economic relations.

First, Japan's attainment of world economic power status has bestowed upon the nation an intensifying self-confidence. A confident nation theoretically takes the lead in world affairs. National confidence and strength emanating from economic power can reduce the hyper-sensitivity and dependence on external stimuli for foreign policy. The flexing of the economic muscles enhances policy initiatives.

Secondly, the area where Japan could contribute to the global community—technical cooperation activities—is within the industrial and economic sphere. Japan's economic affluence and strength supported by the global system compel her to take on new responsibilities. The growing expectation from Japan's allies and from the developing countries, that Japan should do more to contribute to the maintenance of the international system concerns mostly economic and technical cooperation. Japanese response usually comes in packages of economic, financial and technical assistance offers. The elements of human resources development and technology transfer are components and subjects of economic negotiations. Hence, the incentives of international human and cultural exchange are closely dependent on economic motives.

On the issue of national security, Japan's human and cultural diplomacy can enhance the trust of other nations through closer cooperation and co-habitation. Cultural activities can gradually reduce apprehensions towards Japan and in a world of increasing interactions, in the broad sense, trust from neighboring countries is an important component of national security.

Post-industrial Japan is cognizant of the so-called Era of Culture, or Bunka no Jidai,[45] and is slowly developing interest in the non-economic activity dimension. No less than the Japanese Diet and government in the postwar years have actually contributed in legislations and policy evolution of both the concept of bunka and bunka koryu as one of the pillars of the nation's postwar foreign policy.[46] But this interest may remain an extension of economic power and economic abundance. Economic affluence is expected to spill over to nurture and promote cultural and human exchange with a broader and long-term perspective now and in the future. But whether the economic and industrial field alone is adequate to develop and nurture an enduring policy philosophy remains to be seen. In the meantime, the Japanese nariyuki pattern is expected to pervade as long as it serves the goals of Japanese foreign policy.

NOTES

[1]Coombs, Philip H., The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy:Educational and Cultural Affairs (Harper and Row, N.Y., 1964).

[2]The term shigen gaiko emphasizes the diplomacy to maintain the various flows of materials and goods, particularly foods and raw materials during the 1950's. Keizai Gaiko is the broader network to promote this foreign policy emphasis. But the human flow, as seen in the program areas have been interchangeably treated with other dimensions of Japanese diplomacy.

See, Gaimusho Senggo Gaikoshi Kenkyukai, Nippon Gaiko 30 Nen-Kiseki to Tenbo, (Sekai no Ugokisha, November 1982) pp.121-124.

[3]The term jinzai gaiko implies that the human being is a type of diplomatic resource.

[4]Cultural diplomacy encompasses not only culture but the human beings involved in the policy activities. In this study, it is therefore co-terminus and co-equal to the concept of "human and cultural"diplomacy in this study.

[5]Mitchell, J.M., International Cultural Relations, (Published in association with the British Council, Allen & Unwin, 1986, London), pp.119-122.

[6]Ibid., p.119.

[7]Ibid., p.121.

[8]Ibid., p.120.

[9]Ambassador Bernard Dorin, French Ambassador to Japan, in his message on the occasion of the 200th Anniversary of the French Revolution, (Asahi Evening News, July 14, 1989).

[10]Ibid, p.117

[11]Ibid., p.124.

[12]Ibid., p.123.

[13] Ibid., p. 124.

[14] Ibid., p. 125.

[15]Ibid., p.126.

[16]Ibid., p.127.

[17]Reischauer, Edwin O., The Japanese Today : Change and Continuity, (Charles E. Tuttle Co., Tokyo, 1988).

[18]Kokusai Koryu Kikin Hoan Kokkai Shingiroku, 1972, (The Japan Foundation (Kokusai Koryu Kikin Rodo Kumiai, 1983).p.3

[19]Japan is the only Asian nation that is a member of the Western industrialized countries, or the so-called G-7 with Canada, U.S.A., France, Great Britain, Italy and West Germany as the Western countries. The first summit was held in 1975. Also, Japan is at present the only Asian country to be a member of the OECD.

[20]The Filipino February 1986 revolution that toppled the dictatorial rule of President Ferdinand Marcos on February 25,1986.The role of the Catholic Church (a Western legacy) was reportedly a big factor in the conduct of the peaceful revolution.

[21]The student demonstrations that started in June 1988 which led to a change of government leadership and still in the process of transition. "Democracy" was a slogan by the Burmese students.

[22]The incident is referred to as the June 1989 Tiananmen Incident where students were massacred. The students demanded for democratization and reforms. The Chinese military's action of firing and killing students and civilians was condemned by most government from Western camp, causing diplomatic rows with Beijing.

[23]The Japanese position was "...rather avoid making a black and white judgment" on the Tiananmen Square incident. See Japan Times June 8, 1989.

[24]The term bunka koryu, meaning cultural exchange, has a broader scope as an activity and it can encompass both government or non-government domain. It may or may not be an official state undertaking.

[25]There is no distinction of 'government' and 'private' in kokusai koryu. Activities in both sectors can be taken as international exchange activities as long as they involve a foreign entity or entities.

[26]Takahashi, Akira, "Economic Cooperation and Cultural Exchange, Southeast Asia and Japan", in Search of Meaningful Cultural Exchange, Southeast Asia and Japan, (The Japan Foundation Reference Series, No.5, 1980), pp.146-158.

[27]Johnson, Chalmers, MITI and the Japanese Miracle, The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975, (Charles E. Tuttle Co., Tokyo, 1982), chapters 2 and 7.

[28]Ohira Sori no Seisaku Kenkyu Hokoku -7 Bunka Jidai no Keizai Un'Ei, by the Bunka no Jidai no Keizai Un'Ei Kenkyu Gurupu, 1980, pp.115-122.

[29]It was implied that the lack of information activities, koho buzoku, regarding Japan caused misunderstanding. See Kokusai Koryu Kikin Hoan Kokkai Shingiroku, 1972, (The Japan Foundation (Kokusai Koryu Kikin Rodo Kumaiai, 1983) p.12.

[30] The Japanese terms for these categories of "flows" are:mono no negare, kane no negare, joho no negare, and hito no negare.

[31] Okita, Saburo, The Most Vital Resource, The Role of Human Element in Development, (Speech at the United Nations Development Program Conference in New York, May 8, 1986. Printed by the Speaker's Bureau,"Speaking Japan" Magazine, (Keizai Koho Center, Japan Institute for Social Economic Affairs, Tokyo, August 1976), p.14

[32]Japanese term for its policy in cooperation with ASEAN countries is " kunizukuri no tame no hitozukuri" (human resources development for nation-building).

[33]The shokoku or shigen no nai kuni, (a small country lacking natural resources). The use of one's weak position to get concession and understanding in international negotiation.

[34]In the sumo world, the higher the ranking, the higher the responsibility to maintain a certain level of wins in order to maintain the ranking. Yokozuna, the highest ranking, carries with it the heaviest responsibility, yokozuna toshite no sekinin.

[35]Mansfield, Mike, Speech delivered before the Asia Affairs Research Council on September 14, 1987.

[36]It is interesting to note that there is no criterion to be called a "taikoku" (giant country) in economic power, etc. The same is true with military power. Despite the fact that Japan's military power is reportedly in the top rank in the world, no reference to it as a military giant is made.

[37]Nagai, Yonosuke, "Social Attitudes and Foreign Policy During the 1970s" in The Silent Power, Japan's Identity and World Role, (The Simul Press, Tokyo, 1976) p.100.

[38]Ibid., p.101.

[39]Ibid., p.101.

[40]Eto, Shinkichi, "Foreign Policy Formation in Japan, "in The Silent Power, Japan's Identity and World Role, (The Simul Press, 1976). p.120-123.

[41]The reaction versus external pressure is a counterpolicy or activity for "coping" with what is occurring in the policy environment. The urgency is indicated by the expressions kibishii jokyo (severe situation) and kinkyu taisaku or urgent countermeasure. This is different from policy. The gaiatsu factor in Japanese foreign policy most probably originated from the U.S. wherein Japan made decisions on policy because it was pressured from outside. See also Orr, R., Jr., Transnational Politics and Japanese Foreign Aid Decision-making: The Role of the U.S., (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Tokyo, March 1988). p.168.

[42] The term aite shidai or senpo no dekata wo mimamoru are revealing of the nature of the reactive countermeasures.

[43]Blaker, Michael, Japanese International Negotiating Style, (Colombia University Press 1977), chapters 1 and 3.

[44]The term as used here does not refer to a foreign policymaker's concept. It is a theoretical tool to analyze Japanese foreign policy dynamics as seen continuity and evolution of the human and cultural dimension.

[45]Ohira Sori no Seisaku Kenkyu Hokoku - 7," Bunka no Jidai no Keizai Un'Ei Kenkyu Gurupu," in Bunka Jidai no Keizai Un'Ei, 1980, p.1-166.

[46]Hirano, Kenicho, "Senggo Nippon Gaiko ni OKeru Bunka" Watanabe, Akio, ed., Senggo Nippon no Taigai (Yuhikaku Sensho, Toyko, 1985), pp.360-363.

SEAMEO AND ASIAN REGIONALISM: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW*

Bonifacio S. Salamanca

For the past twenty-four years, a unique type of inter-governmental organization has been in existence in Asia. This is the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organizations, or SEAMEO, which has silently but steadily pursued its mission and goals with a modicum of success and confidence, if not also spunk and savvy. Yet, not much is publicly known about this regional organization and its existence is probably known only to educators from SEAMEO-member countries and Papua-New Guinea and a few others from countries outside the Asia-Pacific region which had at one time or another provided financial and technical support to SEAMEO's program and projects. This is rather surprising and unfortunate, if not also lamentable, considering that SEAMEO has proven to be a fine example of functional cooperation in this part of Planet Earth. In fact, if we give due regard to SEAMEO's origins, its initial and even later funding and technical support, SEAMEO's history has been the story, as well, of international cooperation to meet regional concerns. SEAMEO's experience thus exemplifies how affluent nations have willingly shared resources and expertise to help solve educational problems, some seemingly insurmountable, afflicting the Southeast Asian Third World.

As SEAMEO approaches the 25th anniversary of its birth, it should merit at least an overview treatment. This article is a modest contribution towards that effort.

A Post-World War II Phenomenon

SEAMEO's history is but a chapter of the larger history of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. It is only fitting, therefore, that we begin with a brief discussion of regional cooperation, or regionalism, in Southeast Asia as well as the Asian and non-Asian origins of SEAMEO. Such an endeavor will enable us to gain a greater appreciation of SEAMEO's role as a vehicle for regional cooperation and its place in the history of international cooperative efforts in Southeast Asia.

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*This article was adopted mainly from the first chapter of the author's The INNOTECH Story (Quezon City: SEAMEO-INNOTECH, 1989), research for which was partially undertaken in Singapore and Bangkok in April 1986.

An important phenomenon in international politics since the last global war has been the rise of regionalism. This is reflected in the elaborate structures and burgeoning network of supranational, inter-governmental and non-governmental institutions, or of just simple or even ad hoc projects of regional cooperation — all addressed to issues and concerns which lend themselves to solutions in a regional context.[1] These institutions have ranged from the relatively cohesive European Economic Community (EEC), or Common Market,[2] to the very loose South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).[3] To these may be added the South Pacific Forum and South Pacific Commission.[4] While such developments are hardly reassuring to the idealistic advocates of "one world" and of the "all or nothing" — not piecemeal — approach to international integration, it is well to keep in mind that the United Nations itself allows and has in fact welcomed, if not altogether encouraged, the emergence and strengthening of regional institutions as instruments of cooperation. The record attests that regionalism as manifested in whatever form or purpose — defense, economic, cultural, and social development — has been found to be compatible with the aims and purposes of the United Nations. More so, since regional organizations or movements also contribute, in their own ways, to the promotion of international understanding, peace, and security.[5]

The Asian Record

What has been the record of Asian regionalism, particularly in Southeast Asia? A quick glance at Asian political history since the end of World War II reveals that like other regions of the world Asia, or at least some of its subregions, quickly responded to the imperative of regionalism. Thus, such now momentous gatherings as the New Delhi Asian Relations Conference in 1949, the Baguio Conference in 1950, the Bandung Conference in 1955 and, last but not least, the tripartite meeting of the heads of government of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines in 1963, which gave birth to the short-lived MAPHILINDO.[6]

To the above may be added the Bangkok-based Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), which was known as the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) when it was established in 1947.[7] However, ECAFE was —and so is its successor — more of a regional arm, or a subsidiary organ, of the United Nations, not unlike such familiar UN specialized bodies as the United Nations Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (UNESCO), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Labor Organization (ILO), and World Health Organization (WHO), to name a few, which have regional offices in Bangkok or Manila. Strictly speaking, ECAFE was not an Asian regional organization since it included members of the United Nations who did not physically belong to the region. It is not like the EEC, SEAMEO or SAARC.

Between these two modes of intergovernmental cooperation — a regional arm of a world organization and intrinsically regional organization — is the Manila-based Asian Development Bank (ADB),[8] a contemporary of SEAMEO, which includes non-Asians but is not a mere Asian extension or arm of a world organization such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), or World Bank.

It is probably asking too much of the peoples of Asia for them to establish, now or in the near future, an all-Asian mechanism for cooperation, even for limited objectives only. Not even the peoples of "historic Europe," which include those of European Russia and Central Europe, and who possess a common heritage of "Western" civilization, have been able to realize or attain the vision of a single European organization, except perhaps the "Concert of Europe" during most of the nineteenth century; the present Council of Europe is essentially composed of Western European nations.[9] The diversity among the peoples of Asia is too immense, even within the Indian, Chinese and Islamic world-cultures, and their modern heritage is not a single Asian civilization but several.[10]

A setting of cultural diversity notwithstanding, there are nevertheless geographic areas of Asia whose inhabitants share some common historical experiences —colonialism for one— to say nothing of common economic aspirations and social problems. By reason thereof, these peoples are strong candidates for regionalism — more so since not a single one among them can hope to solve even their own share of the problems by relying on its own resources. Coming face to face as newly-independent states "long separated by colonial experience," according to a knowledgeable western observer of Asian affairs, these peoples "are becoming acquainted and confronting common problems.[11] Drawing extensively from the "lessons of the past," one of which is that an organization with non-Asians as regular members does not have a future — SEATO for example — some Southeast Asian nations have banded together to establish their own instruments of regional cooperation. Although their efforts had enjoyed financial support and technical assistance from countries and agencies outside the region, especially during the take-off stages of their projects, the instruments which these Southeast Asian countries have fashioned were intrinsically indigenous organizations, not only in form but also in dynamics,[12] and with regular and voting members coming from the region.

The peoples of Southeast Asia have also learned that an ambitious organ of cooperation that has the potentiality of intruding into "sensitive" sectors of national sovereignty —security, for instance — has no place yet in the world of newly-independent and sovereignty conscious Southeast Asian states. Neither are they likely to lend enduring support to one that is merely consultative in

nature. Former Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal's proposed "Greater Malayan Confederation" of 1962, which became a consultative forum as MAPHILINDO (for Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines) in 1963, may be offered as an example. They have therefore limited themselves, in the meantime at any rate, to projects or endeavors or regional cooperation in non-controversial but nevertheless vital areas, with assurance or at least expectation of concrete and tangible accomplishments. The term "functional cooperation" has been applied by specialists on international institutions to such efforts.

In the sphere of economic cooperation, three Southeast Asian nations launched the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961.[13] This organization was doing relatively well as a vehicle for economic cooperation among the Federation of Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand when, in 1963, the Sabah crisis between the new Federation of Malaysia and the Philippines erupted. ASA consequently became moribund, until it was literally reincarnated as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, this time with the addition of Indonesia and Singapore.[14] ASEAN has steadily promoted economic cooperation and, in addition, forged a remarkable consensus on a number of political issues among its members, and on December 15-16, 1987, the Third ASEAN Summit Meeting was finally held in Manila.

In the field of educational cooperation for social, cultural and technological development, mention may be made of the Asian Institute of Technology (AIT), the Association of Southeast Asian Institutions of Higher Learning (ASAIHL) and SEAMEO — all established at almost the same time.[15]

How It All Began

SEAMEO appeared on the international landscape of Southeast Asia in November 1966, although it has become an article of faith — and is so enshrined in official SEAMEO lore — that it was born a year earlier, when the challenge to regional cooperation for social development was given impetus and made all the more attractive by prospects of external support, especially by the United States Government.

It may be asked: how come the U.S. suddenly developed such an interest in the social development of Southeast Asia? At the risk of oversimplification, it may be offered that it all started in 1964, when President Lyndon B. Johnson told his listeners at a Johns Hopkins University lecture series that he was seriously thinking of "meeting the challenge of the underdeveloped world." "We are the world's great arsenal of industry and ideas," he said, "and we just cannot allow a separation between rich and poor nations." "People are going to have food for their children and an education for their souls," he added.[16]

Nothing further was heard from President Johnson until seven months later when, in response to the views specifically addressed to him, by seventeen nations on the worsening situation in Southeast Asia, he elaborated on his proposal the year before for helping the nations of the underdeveloped world. The venue for what turned out to be an important speech, a historic watershed as it were, was, like the year before, Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland. After stating, correctly, that the "countries of Southeast Asia are homes for millions of impoverished people" who get up at "dawn and struggle until the night to wrest existence from the soil," and as a consequence "often are wracked by diseases, plagued by hunger" and die at the productive and "early age of 40," Pres. Johnson went on to say:

> Stability and peace do not come easily in such a land. Neither independence nor human dignity will ever be won, though, by arms alone. It also requires the works of peace. The American people have helped generously in times past in these works, and now there must be a more massive effort to improve the life of man in that conflict-torn corner of our world.

But, President Johnson emphasized, the nations of Southeast Asia must take the initiative: "The first step is for the countries of Southeast Asia to associate themselves in a greatly expanded effort for development." President Johnson then promised: "for our part I will ask the [U.S.] Congress to join in a billion-dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is underway." He included North Vietnam, at the same time expressing the hope that "all other industrialized countries, including the Soviet Union, will join in this effort to replace despair with hope and terror with progress."[17]

President Johnson's message conjures to mind U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall's commencement address at Harvard University in 1947, which led to the launching of the immensely successful European Recovery Program that bore Marshall's name, and which originally embraced all countries of Europe — those of the Soviet bloc included — provided that they devised a European-wide blueprint for economic recovery.[18] The Johnson Plan, if we may call it that, also placed the United States behind a Southeast Asian-wide blueprint for social development — as well as economic and technological development — but it would not underwrite individual countries' blueprints.

What motivated President Johnson, keeping in mind that at the time American military involvement in Vietnam had already escalated to a very high level? Dr. Robert Jacobs, an early American consultant to SEAMES (SEAMEO's Secretariat), offered the view that President Johnson probably wanted to demonstrate to the whole world, particularly those nations which had earlier expressed concern over the situation on mainland Southeast Asia, that bombing North Vietnam into submission was not all that the United States was capable

of doing in Southeast Asia: it was also very much interested in assisting in the economic and social development of the region — through "works of peace" — and as an eager partner in a cooperative enterprise.[19]

Plausible enough, but it might be added that on the American domestic scene, President Johnson had also launched the "Great Society," which he must have sensed would certainly be derailed by massive and costly American intervention in the Vietnam War if it went on indefinitely. Last but not least, President Johnson, who was reportedly an egotist, probably wanted history to be kinder to him and his presidency.[20]

Whatever his motives and reasons, what Pres. Johnson unveiled in 1965 was a policy which enables American participation in the establishment of the Asian Development Bank and eventually provided U.S. funding support for the various educational projects of SEAMEO.

But to continue with our narrative, on the afternoon after his second Johns Hopkins address, President Johnson named Mr. Eugene Black, former president of the World Bank, as his adviser on the economic and social development of Southeast Asia. It was in this capacity that Mr. Black made a trip to Manila and Bangkok in late 1965 to "inaugurate [American] participation in these programs," to use his own words: Manila for the ADB founding conference and Bangkok for the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Meeting.[21] By coincidence, the Education Ministers and Ministers "responsible for Economic Planning" among the Asian members of UNESCO were holding a conference in Bangkok when Mr. Black stopped over on his way to Manila on November 30, 1965. Also in attendance was the late Senator Geronima T. Pecson, then Chairman, UNESCO National Commission of the Philippines. The Minister of Education of Thailand thereupon invited his fellow ministers from Laos, Malaysia, and Mrs. Pecson, to meet with Mr. Black and party, as well as the representatives of such international bodies as ECAFE, the UN Technical Assistance Board (TAB), and United Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). Some lower officials of the Thai Education Ministry as well as the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok were also present.[22]

What took place was a dialogue of sorts, with Mr. Black mainly listening to the educators as they catalogued their individual countries' educational problems, with a problem or two common to the region thrown in for good measure, together with some suggested solutions, one of which —Mrs. Pecson's — was the "transfer of the East-West Center (from Honolulu) to Asia where it would become much more accessible to the people in the area." Mr. Black was evidently impressed and genuinely sympathetic. Since he encouraged the Southeast Asian educators to "develop concrete regional projects for which US and ADB would be willing to give consideration."[23] Buoyed by Mr. Black's

words of encouragement, the four Southeast Asian educators adjourned their informal meeting with President Johnson's special advisor, with the firm understanding to get together again within six months, at the latest, to develop specific or concrete regional projects.[24]

Towards the Manila Conference

The unanimous decision to meet anew signaled the beginning of intensive regional cooperative efforts by the education ministers and their assistants and experts. Quarterbacking that commitment was a modest secretariat in the Thai Ministry of Education, the establishment of which was promptly given funding support by the United Nations TAB. This is the origin of the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Secretariat (SEAMES) which was to play the role of organizational dynamo of educational cooperation in Southeast Asia. Under the Interim Directorship of the hardworking Dr. Kaw Swasdi-Panich of Thailand, the fledgling secretariat quickly husbanded and mobilized the educational talents and enthusiastic foreign educational specialists, in an impressive display of regional and international cooperation. The multi-national efforts resulted in the preparation, in less than a year of frenetic activity, of project proposals for consideration by the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education at their first formal meeting in Manila on November 25-28, 1966, including one for the "establishment of an appropriate organizational structure for implementing regional cooperation in education."[25] The last named proposal had been prepared with the assistance of two foreign consultants or experts, one of whom was Dr. Charles B. Fahs.[26]

At the Manila conference the education ministers of Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and South Vietnam decided to constitute themselves into a Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Council (SEAMEC); the foreign consultants had recommended a "Southeast Asia Education Council." Although meeting formally only for the first time, the seven education ministers/secretaries decided that the Manila Conference was the second Conference of SEAMEC, consequently baptizing the Bangkok tete a tete with Mr. Black almost exactly a year earlier as the "First". This is historically inaccurate, strictly speaking, but it has stuck.

The Manila Conference also endorsed the creation of SEAMES, to be permanently located in Bangkok instead of a roving one hosted by the member countries on a rotation basis, as proposed by one country delegation. A draft charter for SEAMEO was also approved, subject to further refinement and polishing by "experts in international law before ratification."[27]

The Third SEAMEC Conference and After

With so much homework in their hands, as it were, SEAMES and SEAMEC decided not to convene a ministerial conference in 1967. The Third SEAMEC was held, instead, in early 1968, confusing further chronologically-oriented observers, historians in particular.

In many respects the Third SEAMEC Conference, which was held in Singapore on February 6-8 1968, was a milestone in SEAMEO history and, therefore, of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. The SEAMEO Charter was signed on the second day of the conference, thus paving the way for the legalization of the existence of the organization. Also approved were the proposed structure of the permanent Secretariat (together with the appointment of Professor Sukich Nimmanheminda of Thailand as the first permanent Director) and the draft development plans of four regional centers, thereby preparing the way for their commencing interim operations. These were the Regional English Language Center (RELC), Regional Center for Education in Science and Mathematics (RECSAM), Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture (SEARCA) and the SEAMEC Central Co-ordinating Board for Tropical Medicine (TROPMED).[28]

By 1969, with the launching of the SEAMEO Regional Center for Tropical Biology (BIOTROP) just before the end of 1968, the romance of adventurous pioneering in regional functional cooperation seemed to have plateaued, except among the proponents of a Regional Center for Educational Innovation and Technology (INNOTECH), who were encountering difficulties in launching their project.[29]

Then the Fifth SEAMEC Conference took place. The following has been said of the conclave:[30]

> For those who have participated in the work of SEAMEO from the beginning, the Kuala Lumpur Meeting seemed to mark a milestone in the development and establishment of SEAMEO. In early Conferences of the Ministers there was uncertainty regarding the future of the Organization; there was hesitation in making commitments, and there were apprehensions regarding the problems to be faced. At the Kuala Lumpur meeting . . . there was an air of confidence, and there was unmistakable evidence of support for the Organization on the part of the Ministerial delegations. SEAMEO had come a long way from the early days.

Indeed, because SEAMEC subsequently established the SEAMEO Educational Fund (SEDF), "paving the way for [the] financial viability of the Organization."[31]

SEAMEC reached yet another milestone when it admitted the Khmer Republic as SEAMEO's eight regular member at its Sixth Conference, while during its Eight (1973) it established the category of Associate Membership;[32] there are now four associate members, namely: Australia, Canada, France and New Zealand.[33]

In January 1974, the Ninth SEAMEC Conference approved a revised funding plan for the second and subsequent five-year phases of permanent operations of the SEAMEO regional centers.[34] Since this scheme obligated countries hosting centers/projects to underwrite their capital and operating costs — except those under the category of Special Funds which were the responsibility of SEAMES — this decision could not but "be regarded as an embodiment of the spirit of regional cooperation."[35] In its own way, therefore, the Ninth SEAMEC Conference was a significant event, a benchmark, in SEAMEO's history. In this connection, it might be mentioned that project development activities such as regional and national seminars, technical workshops, etc. leading to the adoption of broad development plans and launching of the regional centers/projects, and the latter's operating and project requirements during the ensuing interim phase of operations (lasting for a year or two) were almost completely underwritten by the U.S. government. So was 50% of their capital and operating needs during the first five years of permanent operations, to say nothing of certain programs — training scholarships, for example — through SEAMES.[36]

Indochina and the Ordeal of SEAMEO

But to proceed with our narrative, everything seemed to be going to everybody's liking when the unfolding events in Indochina in the summer of 1975 created a crisis for SEAMEO in general and for INNOTECH in particular, since the Center was then located in Saigon.[37] With three of its eight regular members — or almost one-half — suddenly unable or unwilling to continue their participation in the affairs of the regional organization, SEAMEC undoubtedly had a king-size problem in its hands. It was an inauspicious and incongruous way to mark the tenth anniversary of the birth of SEAMEO.

Thanks, however, to a favorable legal opinion that it could legally transact business despite a dubious quorum. SEAMEC acted quickly and adopted a Provisional Modus Operandi38 to enable SEAMEO and its centers/projects to provide the SEAMEO region with the services expected of them. The momen-

tum of regional cooperation helped SEAMEO overcome the ordeal generated by the Indochinese crisis.

Objectives, Functions and Structure

If one did not read SEAMEO's Charter and simply tried to distill its objectives from an observation of the operations, activities and programs of its Secretariat and its centers/projects, or from a perusal of the proceedings of the annual ministerial conferences, he would readily come to the conclusion that SEAMEO simply strives to promote the educational (or social), cultural and scientific development of the peoples of the Southeast Asian region through co-operation. Such a conclusion would just as readily be off the mark, albeit not completely, because SEAMEO's Charter states, in Article I (1), that:[39]

> The purposes of the Organization is to promote cooperation among the Southeast Asian nations through education, science and culture in order to further respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are the birthrights of the peoples of the world.

In other words SEAMEO has a loftier objective than the mere attainment and promotion of a desirable state of material life. Regional cooperation for the enhancement of education and culture, science and technology is only a means to a higher goal, which is, to reiterate, "to further respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are the birthrights of the peoples of the world." In short, SEAMEO's ultimate goal is to serve the larger purpose of human existence in this part of the global community.

The decision-making organ of SEAMEO, as the preceding pages have shown, is SEAMEC, which also passes on key matters concerning and emanating from the regional centers/projects. SEAMEC was assisted in this crucial role by the Project Officers/High Officials Meeting from 1967 until 1977, when the body was split into the High Officers Meeting (HOM) and Center Directors Meeting. Since 1978, this role has been discharged solely by the HOM, which is ordinarily composed of deputy ministers/undersecretaries or directors general of education (usually the members of the Center/Project Governing Boards), representatives of associate members and, of course, SEAMES which convenes the meeting towards the end of each year. HOM not only screens the agenda for the SEAMEC Conference early the following year, but may even decide on matters which it feels the Council need not be bothered with. It has, therefore, more than a facilitative role.[40]

By now, it must be obvious to the reader that SEAMES is the executive arm, or the work horse, of SEAMEO. Among others, it prepares the agenda of the Ministerial Conference and sees to the implementation of the resolutions. In carrying out this responsibility, SEAMES is assisted by the Center Directors Meeting (formerly combined, as noted above, with the High Official Meeting), although that is not the only meaningful function of the latter.

At the helm of the SEAMEO Secretariat is the SEAMES Director, who used to be a Thai. Since 1972, however, the position has been rotating among the member countries.[41] The Director's term is three years, renewable, as appropriate. There are a Deputy Director, two Assistant Directors (for Program and Finance), two Program Officers, an Information Officer, a Publication Officer, a Finance Officer, a Documentation and Administrative Officer, plus a complement of support staff, mostly from Thailand. SEAMES shares a concrete structure in Bangkok with UNESCO.[42]

The Regional Centers and Projects

Mention has repeatedly been made of the regional centers/projects. Their existence makes SEAMEO somewhat unique among regional institutions; they are the instrumentalities, the arm as it were, which carry out SEAMEO's regional programs falling within their respective areas of expertise, from their host countries and with SEAMES's indispensable support, part of which is financial.[43]

There are currently six operational centers and one project, namely: BIOTROP (hosted by Indonesia), INNOTECH (Philippines), RECSAM (Malaysia), RELC (Singapore), SEARCA (Philippines), SPAFA (Thailand)[44], and TROPMED (Thailand). An eighth center — VOCTECH (for Vocational and Technical Education — is scheduled to start operations from Brunei Darussalam in July 1990.[45]

Each center/project has a Governing Board or Central Coordinating Board (for TROPMED), of which the SEAMES Director is an ex-officio member but without a vote, and a Director or Project Coordinator, as the case may be, and a complement of division heads, program/project directors, specialists and consultant. And, like SEAMES, each has its own library and even printing facilities.

SEAMEO and ASEAN

This paper was intended to provide the reader with an understanding of SEAMEO's place in the geography of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia.

It is only natural and proper, therefore, to conclude it by mentioning SEAMEO's relationship with ASEAN.

A resolution adopted by the original signatories to the SEAMEO Charter (except Laos) states that "the development of the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization shall be within the framework of higher regional organizations established by their governments."[46] This in a nutshell situates SEAMEO in the hierarchy of regional values among its full-fledged or regular members, the active ones anyway, who happen also to be the regular members of ASEAN. The latter entity is unquestionably a "higher regional organization" than SEAMEO; there has not been a single SEAMEO Summit Meeting (meeting of heads of state or government) while there have already been three ASEAN Summits, the last having taken place in Manila only in 1987. To think that SEAMEO is older than ASEAN, or claims to be, by almost two years!

Since ASEAN has remained strictly an inter-governmental organization, SEAMEO must by virtue of the resolution quoted above also remain as such. Thus, SEAMEO may not presume to be more "integrated" than ASEAN and as such assume "supranational" powers, if only because ASEAN is not a supranationality.[47]

What, by the way, is the actual state of SEAMEO-ASEAN relationship, or the operational as distinguished from the conceptual. There is currently none, although efforts have been made to establish a linkage between the two. For instance, following the twelfth SEAMEC Conference in 1977 and pursuant to its authorization, SEAMES initiated discussions with ASEAN representatives with a view to synchronizing their respective programs and thus "avoid duplication of efforts."[48] It is worth pointing out that ASEAN has a cultural program, with assured funding by the Japanese Government.

After almost a ten year hiatus, SEAMEC adopted a resolution requesting the "Secretariat to continue its efforts to establish working relations with ASEAN for the purpose of implementing ASEAN activities which fall within the competence of SEAMEO so as to avoid duplication of efforts." The following excerpts from the SEAMES Director's report on his efforts to implement the Council's resolution needs no elaboration:[49]

> . . . during the year [i.e., 1985] under review I had discussions with the Director-General in charge of ASEAN in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand, who advised me not to pressure [i.e., press] the matter .... The question of establishing working relations with ASEAN ... was raised at the 8th High Officials Meeting and I informed the Meeting that although there had been no formal action since the Council adopted the... resolu-

> tion, for the moment there was the mutual understanding to explore all possibilities for joint action in order to avoid duplication of activities.

The absence of formal linkage or working relationship between SEAMEO and ASEAN, however, has not in any way impaired their viability and, for SEAMEO in particular, capacity for sustained operations along highly technical and functional lines. In fact, on August 21-22, 1989, SEAMES conducted a two-day "Brainstorming Session" in Bangkok to formulate SEAMEO's plans and strategies for "human resource development [in the region] in the upcoming decade."[50] Only the second such exercise in SEAMEO's history — the first took place in 1970[51] — it was attended by "education experts" from the six active SEAMEO-member countries and from Canada, France and the Federal Republic of Germany.[52] It is a fitting way to mark SEAMEO's forthcoming 25th Anniversary and a measure of its buoyant optimism for the future. It is also a concrete index of wholesome and productive regional and international cooperation in the SEAMEO region.

NOTES

[1]For an introduction to the subject of regionalism in past and contemporary world politics, see: Joseph S. Nye, "Comparative Regional Integration," International Organization, XXII:4 (Autumn, 1968), 855-880; Bonifacio S. Salamanca, "Regional Integration and the Confederal Principle," Historical Bulletin (Manila), XI:1 (December, 1963), 269-283; Sunil Banik, "Regional Economic Cooperation and Integration Movements and the Asian Development Bank— Hope of the Less Developed," Asian Studies (Quezon City), VI:3 (December, 1968), 395-420; Lalita Prasad Singh, The Politics of Economic Cooperation in Asia: A Study of Asian International Organizations (Columbia, Mo.:University of Missouri Press, 1966). For Southeast Asia, in particular, see Bernard K. Gordon's "Regionalism in Southeast Asia," in Robert O. Tilman (ed.), Man, State, and Society in Contemporary Southeast Asia (London: Pall Mall Press, 1969), pp. 506-522.

[2]A recent work on the Common Market is John Pinder's "European Community and Nation-States: A Case Study for Neo-Federalism," International Affairs, 62:1 (Winter 1985/6), 41-54. Two earlier studies of F. Roy Willis, "Origins and Evolution of the European Communities," The Annals, 444, November, 1978, pp. 1-12, and Ernest B. Haas, "International Integration: The European and Universal Process, International Organization, XV:3 (Summer, 1961), 366ff.

[3] See Lok Raj Baral, "SAARC But No `Shark': South Asian Regional Cooperation in Perspective," Pacific Affairs, 58:3 (Fall, 1985), 411-426. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation among Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka was formally launched in August, 1984.

[4] Robert A. Scalapino, "Asia's Future," Foreign Affairs, 66:1 (Fall 1987), p. 104.

[5]Joseph S. Nye (ed.), International Regionalism (Boston: Little & Brown, 1968).

[6]Salamanca. "Regional Integration." I was an original member of the University of the Philippines Study Committee on President Diosdado Macapagal's Greater Malayan Confederation in 1962, which prepared the MAPHILINDO proposal.

[7]See David Weightman, Toward Economic Cooperation in Asia: United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (New Haven and London: Yale University Press for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1963.) ECAFE was formally established in March 1947.

[8]A good study of the Asian Development Bank is Sumil Banik's "Regional Economic Cooperation." See, also, Gordon, "Regionalism in Southeast Asia," p. 521.

[9]The late Professor Hajo Holborn, a former mentor of mine at Yale, has a brief discussion of the Concert of Europe, or the Congress System, in The Political Collapse of Europe (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951); a fuller discussion is The Concert of Europe, Rene Albrecht-Carrie, (ed.) (New York: Walker, 1968). For the Council of Europe, see Willis, loc. cit., and the more extended treatment by Arthur Henry Robertson, The Council of Europe, 2nd ed. (London: Stevens, 1963).

[10]One needs only to read any of the many standard history texts on Asia to grasp the diversity of its cultural heritage. John K. Fairbank & Others, East Asia: Tradition and Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967) is an example. For Southeast Asia, see Lauriston Sharp, "Cultural Continuities and Discontinuities in Southeast Asia," Tilman, Man, State, and Society in Contemporary Southeast Asia, pp. 45-54, and Charles A. Fisher, "Southeast Asia: The Balkans of the Orient? A Study in Continuity and Change," Tilman, pp. 55-71.

[11]Scalapino, "Asia's Future," p. 104.

[12]The five-year plans of SEAMEO's regional centers are an example. Dr. Robert Jacobs, noted American educator whose services were made available to SEAMEO during its formative years, told the author that he and his colleagues had to convince US-AID (Washington) to give in to the Southeast Asian educators' strong desire for a five-year budget cycle, instead of the American practice of three years. Interview, July 27, 1986, Philippine Plaza Hotel, Pasay City.

[13]ASA's background and all-too-brief existence is treated in Gordon, "Regionalism in Southeast Asia," pp. 507-513.

[14]A pioneering study is Dr. Estrella D. Solidum's Towards Community in Southeast Asia: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Quezon City, Philippines: University of the Philippines Press, 1970). See also Gordon, "Regionalism in Southeast Asia."

[15]See Amnuay Tapingkae (ed.), The Growth of Southeast Asian Universities Versus Consolidation (Singapore: Regional Institute of Higher Education, 1974); Francis Wong Hoy Kee, Comparative Studies in Southeast Asian Education (Kuala Lumpur: Heineman Educational Books, 1971); Proceedings of the ASAIHL Thirteenth General Conference and Seminar, 14-17 January 1981 (Manila: The Philippine Council for ASAIHL, 1984).

[16]"Remarks to the Faculty and Students of Johns Hopkins University, October, 1, 1964," Public papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964 (Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 1181-2. I am indebted to Dr. Jacobs (interview on July 27, 1986) for leading me to this document and the succeeding one, and to Miss Lucy Concepcion of the Thomas Jefferson Center Library (Makati, Philippines) for xeroxed copies of both documents.

[17]"Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia." Address by the President at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, April 7, 1965," in Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1965, Richard P. Stebbins (ed.), (New York: Harper & Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1966), pp. 140-147. The quoted passages are on pp. 144 and 145.

[18]For the origins of the Marshall Plan, see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: The American Library, 1970), chap. 26. Also, George F. Keenan, Memoirs (1925-1950) (New York: Bantam Edition, 1969), Chap. 14. For later development, see Bayard Price, The Marshall Plan (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1955).

As late as 1968, Mr. Lee St. Lawrence of the Regional Economic Development (RED) Office, USAID (Bangkok), was saying that "[a] programme that would elicit financial support from the USG would be one that was clearly regional in character." SEAMEO Second Project Meeting of Directors/High Officials, Bangkok, 25th-28th June 1968, Final Report, p. 11.

[19]Interview with Dr. Jacobs, July 27, 1986.

[20]See, for example, Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (New York: Harper & Row, 1976, esp. the "Prologue," and Dr. Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), esp. chaps. 2-3.

[21]Eugene R. Black gives a personal account in his Alternative in Southeast Asia, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969.

[22]"Minutes of the Meeting Between Mr. Eugene R. Black, Special Adviser to the President of the United States of America and the Southeast Asia Ministers of Education, Ministry of Education, Bangkok, Thailand, 30 November 1965," in Resolutions of the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Council (SEAMEC), Bangkok: SEAMES, n.d. pp. 1-5.

[23]A transcript of Mr. Black's remarks during his meeting with the educators is among bound materials at the SEAMES Library. See Documents Prior to TW [for Technical Workshop?].

[24]"Minutes" of the Black Meeting (see note 22, above).

[25]SEAMES Director's Annual Report, 1971, p. 3.

[26]I personally met Dr. Fahs, then with the Rockefeller Foundation, sometime in 1951 or 1952, when he visited the Department of History in Diliman, Quezon City, which had a research project under a Rockefeller Grant-In-Aid. I was then a part-time research assistant in the project. By the way, the past Grant-in-Aid (GIA) program of the University of the Philippines System for financially needy students was named, at my suggestion, from the Rockefeller Grant-in-Aid to the Department of History.

[27]Second SEAMEC Conference, Manila, November 25-28, Final Report, p. 43. The text of the Draft Charter is on pp. 35-42.

[28]Third SEAMEC Conference, Singapore, 6th-8th February 1968, Final Report, pp. 15-28.

[29]INNOTECH did not take off until mid-1970, when it started interim operations in Singapore. See my The INNOTECH Story, esp. chaps. 2 and 3.

[30]SEAMES Director's Annual Report, 1971, p. 8.

[31]SEAMEO, Resource Book on SEAMEO, Revised Edition. Bangkok, 1984, p. 22.

[32]Sixth SEAMEC Conference, Saigon, 11th-14th January 1971, Final Report, vol. II, p. 18. The decision to create Associate Membership was also adopted at this conference (p. 7) — "pending amendment of the charter." The Charter was formally amended at the Seventh SEAMEC Conference, Vientiane, January 24th-28th, 1972 (Final Report, Vol. I, pp. 24-29), while the conditions for Associate Membership were adopted only by the Eight SEAMEC Conference, Phnom Penh, 22nd-26th January 1973 (Final Report, Vol. I, pp. 3-40.

[33]France was the first Associate Member to be admitted (April 27, 1973), followed by Australia (November 1, 1973) and New Zealand (November 12, 1973). The SEAMES Director's Annual Report, 1973, pp. 4-5. Canada was admitted as the fourth Associate member during the Twenty-Third SEAMEC Conference held in exotic Bali, Indonesia on February 4-5,1988 (Final Report, Vol. I, p. 27.)

[34]See "Funding Plans for Centres After First Five-Year Permanent Phase," (Mc9/WP/24) in Ninth SEAMEC Conference, Bangkok, 28 January-1 February 1974, Final Report, Vol. II.

[35]Resource Book on SEAMEO, p. 23.

[36]See "Funding Plans for Centres" (note 34 above).

[37]The INNOTECH Center had to leave Saigon in a hurry on April 30, 1975, and stayed in Bangkok (at SEAMES' offices) until the transfer to Manila in July 1976. It had been in Saigon (from Singapore) only for less than two years when Saigon fell to onrushing North Vietnamese forces. I have discussed at length INNOTECH's search for a home in The INNOTECH Story, Chap. IV.

[38]Resource Book on SEAMEO, p. 23-24. According to Dr. Vitaliano Bernardino, Sr., SEAMES Director from 1975 to 1978, the legal opinion was provided by Prof. Dr. Adul Wichiencharoen of Thailand (interview, December 27, 1987). Professor Dr. Adul himself was SEAMES Director from 1961 to 1986, the first to serve for two terms as Director. See biographical profile of Dr. Adul in SEAMEO Quarterly, 3:4 (October-December 1980), 9.

[39]I have reproduced the 1983 version of the Charter as Appendix 1 of The INNOTECH Story.

[40] Interview with Dr. Abraham I. Felipe, December 7, 1986. A former Deputy Minister of Education of the Philippines. Dr. Felipe once served as Chairman of the INNOTECH Governing Board.

[41]SEAMES Director's Annual Report, 1972, p. 44. This rotation system was adopted so as to "encourage regionalism in SEAMEO." Dr. Sudjono D. Pusponegoro of Indonesia was the first non-Thai to serve as SEAMES Director. This portion of my paper, among others, also benefited greatly from the comments of Dr. Aurelio Elevazo, former Assistant Director of SEAMES and as of this writing an Assistant Secretary for International Education and Information, Philippines Department of Education, Culture and Sports.

[42]This building at 920 Sukhumvit Road was constructed for these international organizations built by the Thai Government.

[43] SEAMES grants scholarships for training and staff development, among others, as well as assists the regional centers in soliciting foreign funding for their research projects.

[44]SPAFA was "reconstituted" into a Regional Center for Architecture and Fine Arts in 1986. Twenty-First SEAMEC Conference, 23-25 January, 1986, Final Report Vol. I, pp. 18-20.

[45] SEAMEO Quarterly, 12:2 (April-June 1989), p. 16. For the SEAMEC decision (24th Conference, 12-13 January 1989) setting up the SEAMEO Regional Center for Vocational and Technical Education, see idem, Vol. 12, No. 1 (January-March 1989), p. 10.

[46]Fourth SEAMEC Conference, Djakarta, 7th-10th January 1969, Final Report, Vol. I, "Proceedings."

[47]The supranational character of EEC is treated in Pinder, "European Community and Nation-State," Willis, "European Communities," and Haas, "International Integration."

[48]SEAMES Director's Annual Report, 1977, p. 16.

[49]SEAMES Director's Annual Report, 1985, pp. 33-34.

[50] SEAMEO Quarterly, 12:3 (July-September, 1989), 10, 47.

[51]Ibid. The first was held on September 2-4, 1970. For details, see my INNOTECH Story, pp.

[52]SEAMEO Quarterly, 12:3 (JUly-September, 1989), 10. The cover story of this number (pp.4-5; 7) is appropriately entitled "West Germany's Support of SEAMEO Touches the Lives of Southeast Asians."

"NEVER IMAGINE YOURSELF TO BE OTHERWISE...": FILIPINO IMAGE OF JAPAN OVER THE CENTURIES*

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Introduction

A casual talk among some Filipinos who formed long lines at the rear exit of the Japanese embassy in Makati, Metro Manila can reveal how much, or how little, or how far, a Filipino "understanding" of Japan can go. After receiving his visa to work for a short period of time in Japan, a Filipino commented that the reason why it is so difficult to get a visa is that the Japanese embassy is manned by Koreans! Only senior diplomats are Japanese. Anyone with a slight familiarity with Philippine-Japan relations in the 20th century will know what the Filipino meant. It is often said that the soldiers who committed the most hideous crimes against Filipinos during the Second World War were Korean mercenaries brought to the Philippines by the Japanese Forces. Not that the nationality of those who committed war crimes mattered. But the image of Japanese lower bureaucrats who in reality are performing a mere procedural task, is seen by Filipinos who are asking for a "favor", as officials bent on bringing nothing but hardship upon others, much like the dreaded "Koryano" of the last months of the war.

How did this image come about? Is the memory of the war that deeply etched for a generation born after the war? All these in spite of decades of close official economic ties and social and human contacts between Japan and the Philippines? Or is it simply a continuation of what Japan's image has been over the centuries?

This paper attempts to discuss the subject of Japan's image (Nihon kan) in the Philippines over a long historical period based on primary and secondary historical and contemporary sources on the Philippine side. It is a very large topic and what follows is only a capsulized outline of how Japan's image

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or persisted over many years. A methodological note is needed at the outset: until the end of World War II, much of what passes as "Filipino" primary historical sources are actually colonial records of Spain and the United States in and about the Philippines. There are very little surviving documents by Filipinos themselves until towards the middle of the 19th century. There are more indigenous sources on Japan in the Philippines after independence in 1946.

The significance of discussing Japan's image in the Philippines is for the sake of historical interest and record. Such a record can be the start for explaining dimensions of official, human, social and cultural interaction among Filipinos and Japanese. In general, such interaction has always been mixed. This is hardly surprising since from the earliest known record of Philippine contact with Japan until contemporary times, Japan's image in the Philippines, or the attitudes towards Japan of both colonizers and Filipinos has been a mixture of antagonism, fear, suspicion, respect, amity, inspiration, antagonism and unrealistic expectations. These images and feelings towards Japan and the Japanese changed little throughout the centuries. At certain times antagonism, fear, and suspicion prevailed; at other times, especially during the Revolution of 1896 and the American colonial period, a combination of respect, fear, inspiration, and unrealistic expectations, and during and after the Second World War antagonism, fear, and suspicion prevailed again, at least among certain groups in Philippine society.

From Wako to Goshuinsen

The earliest contact between Japan and the Philippines predated Spanish colonialism in the archipelago. (Spain colonized the Philippines in the late 16th century.) Japanese trader-pirates known as wako were trading with inhabitants of the northern part of Luzon in the Philippine archipelago. They settled in areas where they traded such as the Cagayan River, the vicinity of Agoo,and Bolinao in the present-day province of Pangasinan. They also went as far south as the Bicol region and Calapan in Mindoro Island.[1] There were already signs of antagonism between native traders and these Japanese simply because the latter behaved both as traders and pirates.

Spanish colonialism transformed Manila into a trade center and attracted the wako towards the city. Close contact with the colonizers led to more antagonism. In 1582, the Spaniards had already clashed with the wako in Cagayan, forcing the latter to flee.[2] Aware that the wako could cause problems with a major power (Spain) in the region, Hideyoshi Toyotomi sought to control traders by requiring them to carry special passports stamped with the vermilion seal of the shogunate. These seals earned the ships the name goshuinsen, or red seal ships. They began to visit the Philippines around 1584. Spanish ships also

made return calls to Nagasaki.[3] By 1586 however, there were still reports that the wako continued to come every year to northern Luzon (Cagayan and Ilocos) "to rob and kill many natives, and seize the Chinese vessels that bring us food and goods". The Spaniards considered the Japanese as the third of five threats to the Philippines: the first threat being native revolts, the second the Chinese, the fourth and fifth Moluccas and Borneo, and the English, respectively.[4]

The goshuinsen brought to the Philippines folding screens, lacquer ware, woven silk goods, armor, cutlery band weapons, sandals, salted meat, cordage, copper and other metals for weapons and, more importantly for the Spaniards, wheat flour which could not be produced in the Philippines. The Spanish authorities exempted Japanese traders from import duties, especially in food, ammunition and raw materials. Japanese ships in turn left Manila with gold, deer skins, wax, honey, tree bark for dyeing, wine,Spanish curios and raw silk trans-shipped in Manila from China by Spanish traders. This trade in silk was quite important for the Spaniards because through it they were able to compete with the Portuguese in Macao, an important trading center for Chinese silk.[5] Japanese demand for silk in Manila was so great that Governor Antonio Morga noted in 1598 that the Japanese traders were beginning to compete with Spanish traders. He recommended that the Japanese merchants be restricted from buying silk until the Spanish merchants completed their purchases. Japanese demand for deer skins also worried the Spaniards since it would deplete the animal population of deers. The improved ties with Japan because of the goshuinsen also served another Spanish goals: the spreading of Catholicism in Japan. It is said the there were more Spanish missionaries than traders who went to Japan.

Trade, Religion and Suspicion

Historical records show that there were only about twenty Japanese residents in Manila at the start of Spanish colonialism in 1571. The number grew to 300 by 1593, and 1,500 by 1603.[6] The Spaniards spoke both highly and suspiciously of the Japanese. Governor Morga considered them spirited, brave, "of good disposition" and a "race of noble bearing and behavior." A 1605 report stated that the Japanese were "all very brave men, who have little fear of death and are fond of going to the wars" which, the report noted, made them excellent mercenaries in Spanish expeditions. The same report continued that "their character is most cruel and ferocious, and they are bandits by nature."[7]

Certain events during the early Spanish colonial rule added more fuel to the antagonism. For example, when the Chinese corsair named Limahong attacked Manila in 1574 his second-in-command was a Japanese, most probably a wako.[8] In 1587, an ill-fated Filipino anti-Spanish rebellion led by Don Agustin de Legaspi, Martin Panga and Magat Salamat took place in Manila and adjacent

areas. The Filipino rebels got in touch with a Christian Japanese adventurer named Juan Gayo and enlisted him in a plan to use other armed Japanese to be disguised as traders stationed offshore. On signal, Gayo and his men were to attack from the sea and help the Filipinos drive the Spaniards out of Manila. But when the time of the attack came, Gayo either simply lost interest or betrayed the rebels. The Filipino rebels waited in vain for his help; meanwhile, the Spaniards discovered the plan, rounded up the leaders and executed them publicly.[9] The involvement of a Japanese naturally made the Spaniards more suspicious.

In 1591, a Japanese named Harada Magoshichiro was reported to have studied parts of the Philippines and recommended that Hideyoshi conquers the Philippines. Hideyoshi made concrete plans but sent an emissary the following year to Manila and demanded that the Spaniards become his vassals and pay tribute; otherwise he would invade the Philippines. He has just invaded Korea, and the poorly defended Spaniards could only reply that they sought friendship with Japan. Japanese ships entering Manila were checked thoroughly to make sure they carried no weapons. The Japanese community in Manila was disarmed and resettled outside Manila in a place called Dilao district. The next year, the Spaniards tried to guard their north flank by invading Taiwan but a typhoon thwarted that expedition. Later, Hideyoshi also sent a request to the Spanish authorities in the Philippines for shipbuilders but was refused by the Spaniards who realized that they will be used to build warships. The apprehensive Spaniards sought reinforcements from Mexico.[10] The Japanese were also suspicious of Spanish attempts to proselyte in Japan. This mutual suspicion — Spain fearing a Japanese invasion, Japan suspicious of Spanish evangelization and fearful that Japan might be involved in power conflicts in Europe — was to continue into the early 17th century.

But trade continued between the colony and Japan. At around 1600, Edo and Manila agreed to limit trading ships to six a year. This is significant as a matter of historical fact since the more famous and well-documented Galleon Trade between the Philippines and Mexico sailed only twice a year. The Japanese also encouraged the Spaniards to send more ships to Japan, even as far as the Kanto area. In 1605, it was reported that about five to ten ships were actually arriving in Manila from Japan. Between 1604 and 1616, no fewer than 30 goshuinsen vessels reached Manila. While both countries needed this trade, an additional goal of the Spaniards was to please the shogunate and help the cause of the ecclesiastical orders in Japan.[11]

In spite of these progress, the Spaniards in Manila remained ambivalent towards Japanese residents. They regarded them as good counterbalance to the Chinese traders in the Philippines but at the same time remained suspicious of them. In 1603, the Spaniards enlisted the help of the resident Japanese to help suppress an uprising by Chinese residents. "They are a warlike race, and easily

come to blows with the Spaniards, for they will not suffer ill-treatment" wrote one Spaniard in 1619. There were also riots and uprisings in the Japanese community at Dilao in 1606, 1607, 1608 and 1609.[12] Probably as a result of these, the Laws of the Indies contained a suggestion that the number of Japanese in Manila should be limited. By 1620 there were 2,000 Japanese residents in Manila. Attempts were made to expel many of them in reprisal for the persecution of Christians in Japan as well as for security reasons. The expulsion order however, was not carried out due to government incompetence and corruption.[13] Still, the Japanese continued to serve the Spaniards as mercenaries in a number of battles. In 1615 and 1616, Japanese serving on ships helped defeat the Dutch who tried to invade Manila. In 1639 Japanese residents again helped quell another Chinese uprising in Manila. In 1647 they again helped the Spaniards defend Manila from the Dutch.[14] In this instance however, some Japanese went to the Dutch side to give information.[15]

In the early 17th century Pedro de Acuna,the Spanish governor general in the Philippines felt that the only reason the Japanese had not yet invaded was that they had insufficient knowledge of gunnery and naval construction, skills they can learn from the Dutch. These fears were further intensified in 1609 when Ieyasu requested the Manila authorities for miners, naval engineers and for direct trade with Acapulco.[16]The Manila government relayed these requests to Mexico and requested for reinforcements. There were also reports from Spanish spies that the Japanese were planning to use Taiwan as an advance base for an invasion of the Philippines.[17]

The emergence of British and Dutch power in Asia by the second decade of the 17th century and the alternative trade and security arrangements they offered made the Spaniards more ambivalent in their attitudes towards Japan. In 1617, the Japanese opened trade relations with the British to the detriment of Spanish trade. Ieyasu also refused to sign a commercial treaty with Spain. Catholic attempts to evangelize in Japan were met with harsher bakufu suppression of Christianity and the deportation of Spaniards from Japan.[18] The Spanish administration in Manila, and later the king of Spain himself, was forced to stop the religious orders from going to Japan. The continuing mutual suspicion led to several incidents. In 1628 the Spaniards burned a Japanese junk which entered Philippine territory without proper documents.[19] In 1632, in a move to embarrass the Spanish religious, the bakufu, expecting that the Spaniards will turn away the helpless sick, banished 130 Japanese lepers from Japan to Manila. The Catholic church however took them and established a special hospital for them.[20] (The hospital for the destitute established by Spain survives to this day, the San Lazaro Hospital in Manila.)

There are reasons to believe that the bakufu did plan an invasion of the Philippines during this period. In 1630, the governor of Nagasaki suggested

sending a ship to Manila, ostensibly to reopen trade but actually to scout for likely invasion areas. Later, Lord Matsura Shigemasa also made a similar suggestion. The bakufu neither sanctioned nor obstructed the plan. Once in the Philippines, the ship surveyed the defenses of Manila and drew plans of Spanish fortifications.[21] In 1637, Shogun Iemitsu acted on the suggestion and sent a pseudo-envoy to Luzon to inspect conditions in preparation for concrete plans. Before further plans could develop however, the Shimabara rebellion broke out, and Japan turned to its renown sakoku, or the closed door policy. This was probably the only reason that saved the Philippines from Japanese invasion in the 17th century. There were indeed good reasons to be suspicious of Japan.

From Sakoku to the Meiji Restoration

From that time on until the Meiji Restoration in 1868, contacts between the Philippines and Japan were minimal and were limited to Japanese castaways and survivors of shipwrecks. The Japanese in the Philippines continued to operate their shops in Dilao, San Miguel and San Roque, near Cavite, but they were few in number and the Spaniards watched them closely. Some Japanese settled in Cebu and in the town of Bay in Laguna.[22] They did fight for the Spaniards again in 1660-1661 to crush the Malong rebellion in Pampanga and Pangasinan.[23]

Completely uprooted now from Japan, many Japanese intermarried with Filipinas. The Japanese dealt with the Spaniards only on trade and matters related to the "Christian problem" but continued to live as a foreign community, separate from the Filipinos.[24] Japanese cultural influence during this period was limited to certain skills and crafts like making of some tools and weapons, the tanning of deer skins and some jewel craft. The Japanese also introduced the artificial breeding of ducks and fishes.[25]

In 1868, Spain, not to be left out of concessions in the newly reopened Japan, became a signatory to the unequal treaties imposed by the Western powers on Japan and received the right to call on Japanese ports without giving the same right to the Japanese. Trade picked up slowly and a consulate was established in Manila in 1888. The Philippines presented some potentials as a source of raw materials and food for Japan. Between 1892 and 1896, the Philippines exported sugar, hemp, tobacco, coffee, coconut oil and indigo to Japan. It imported coal, silk, cotton goods, lacquer ware, porcelain, earthen wares and Japanese curios.[26] Japanese concern for security however remained unabated. Through the trade missions and other travelers, the Japanese were up to date with the weakness of the Spanish forces in the Philippines, Spanish maladministration and rising Filipino nationalism. Spanish maladministration also deterred Japanese emigration. While cordial relations prevailed on the surface,

Spain feared the rising strength of Japan. The slow growth of trade was probably due to Manila's sordid reputation: corruption at the customs and all levels of government, inconsistent application of laws, high tariffs, inefficiency, and a shortage of bottoms to transport goods. Spanish laws also discouraged foreign investment.[27] Other than trade, the Japanese were also interested in the prospect of migrating to the Philippines. The Spanish embassy in Japan suggested that the Japanese colonize certain areas in the Philippines similar to what the Japanese did in Hawaii. No formal agreement was reached however because of the resistance of the Spanish religious orders.[28]

Japanese victory in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895 and the colonization of Taiwan intensified Spanish apprehensions about Japan. As a reaction to this and growing Filipino nationalism, the Spanish military and naval forces were reorganized and strengthened. A treaty defining Japanese and Spanish boundaries was signed in August 1895. The Spanish press in Manila, however still played up the Japanese phobia and warned of the dangers of Japanese invasion. Stories of Japanese spies proliferated.[29]

It was only actually at this point that Filipino image of Japan appeared as distinct from the Spanish colonial administration's perceptions. Educated Filipinos began to exert influence on the colonial society from the middle of the 19th century. They were well aware of the economic growth and military power of Japan and of the Sino-Japanese War. As early as 1883, Jose Rizal, a foremost Filipino patriot noted that in Paris Japanese students were studying practical subjects such as engineering, artillery and medicine, while most Filipinos were studying the humanities or law. The La Solidaridad, the official newspaper of Filipino reformists' Propaganda Movement in Spain printed articles on Japanese policies, Spanish-Japanese trade and biographies of Japanese generals. There were attempts to solicit Japanese help for the Propaganda Movement before the outbreak of the Revolution in 1896. In 1895 for example, Jose Ramos, a son of a well-to-do family in Manila, sought aid from Japan for the Propaganda Movement. About to be arrested in Manila for his reformist activities, he fled to Yokohama where he continued working for Japanese support. He married a Japanese, became a Japanese citizen and helped in negotiating purchase of arms for the 1896 Revolution. He even entertained hopes of leading a group of Japanese immigrants to Manila.[30]

In short, Filipinos saw in Japan a potential ally, a fellow Asian who could help in their independence movement. In January 1896, the maiden issue of Kalayaan, the newspaper of the Filipino revolutionary organization called the Katipunan, claimed Yokohama as its place of publication. This claim was credible since there were Filipino nationalists in Yokohama seeking aid for the revolution. In May of the same year, the Japanese cruiser Kongo arrived in Manila on a training cruise. The leaders of the Katipunan, through the

introduction of a Japanese resident in Manila named Tagawa Moritaro, met with the Japanese captain and other officers of the ship. They gave the captain a letter for the Emperor, stating that Japan could be to the Philippines what France was to the United States during the American revolution. The surprised and embarrassed Japanese responded by simply expressing hopes that the Filipinos could visit Japan and that he sympathized with the Filipinos in their desire for independence. The meeting produced no firm promises, but the Katipunan used it for propaganda purposes and inadvertently raised hopes for Japanese aid to the Revolution while none was actually forthcoming.[31] The Spaniards suspected such a meeting, and protested. The Japanese, not wanting to get involved, sent their consul from Hong Kong to investigate and clear up the suspicions.[32]

Before long, however, the Katipunan was discovered by the Spaniards and the Philippine Revolution broke out in August 1896.

Japan and the 1896 Philippine Revolution

It is known to Filipino historians that in spite of high expectations among Filipinos for Japanese support, Japan only went so far as to express sympathy for the nationalist revolutionaries but officially remained neutral of the revolutionary war. Japan simply wanted to avoid any conflict with Spain or other Western powers who might have design for the Philippines. Upon the request of the Spaniards the Japanese promised not to give weapons and ammunition to Filipino revolutionaries. The Japanese also promised to keep watch on Filipinos and Spaniards in Japan who were sympathetic to the revolution. The Spaniards in return agreed to a revision of the unequal treaty with Japan in 1897.[33] But unconscious, or perhaps oblivious to all these, many Filipinos and the leadership of the Katipunan persevered in their hope for Japanese support. The Katipunan for example sent emissaries to Japan after the outbreak of the revolution to solicit Japanese material help.[34] There is something quite tragic about this period on Filipinos' image of Japan. Either through ignorance, obliviousness, or plain childlike naivete, many Filipinos continued to expect material help from Japan for the revolution. This kind of childlike "trust" or naivete was in stark contrast with the realism and rationality of Japanese foreign policy at that time.

There were a number of Japanese who gave moral support to the Revolution in spite of official non-involvement. Shigenobu Okuma and Hirobumi Ito stated publicly that they supported self-determination for the Philippines. Filipinos in Yokohama were reported to be in favor of the Philippines becoming a protectorate of Japan. Filipino revolutionaries continued to actively sought aid from Japan, largely because of a combination of encouragement by Japanese Pan-Asianists or plain delusion about Japan. The Katipunan sent emissaries to Japan who reported back that most Japanese were favorably inclined to the

Philippine cause and that Pan-Asianist sentiments were strong. One such emissary named Mariano Ponce reportedly told the Revolutionary leadership that Japan could offer 200,000 rifles for use by the Philippine Army. Ponce wrote home and recommended their purchase.[35] Examples of Japanese ultra-nationalists or shishi who supported the Philippine revolution were military men like Gen. Nogi who kept abreast of the developments in the Philippines. Some Japanese went to the Philippines to gather information and keep the Taiwan government informed. Some even contacted members of the Aguinaldo government in Hong Kong (during the period of the Hong Kong Junta) to negotiate possible Japanese assistance. Such men however were few in number.

With the outbreak of the Philippine-American War in 1898, liaison between the Japanese shishi and the Filipino continued. Mariano Ponce (with some help from Sun Yat Sen) was able to procure funds and purchased Japanese weapons and a ship to transport the weapons to the Philippines. The arms were ostensibly sold to a Japanese company and then consigned to a German merchant as the final recipient. The ship itself was bought through Sun Yat Sen.[36] The ship, the Nunobiki Maru, was an aged wooden vessel. It left Kobe for Nagasaki where it loaded 10,000 Murata rifles, six million rounds of ammunition, a few pieces of artillery and miscellaneous military equipment, and then proceeded to the Philippines. There were a number of ex-Japanese army officers on board who had resigned from the Japanese army so they could help Aguinaldo in a private capacity rather than follow Japanese official policy. However, almost like comical twist to the episode, the ship encountered a typhoon and sank off Shanghai.[37] Thus, ended the only major-scale Japanese involvement in the Revolution.

Other ultra-nationalists acted on their own initiative. A certain Capt. Hara Tei attempted to recruit former Japanese soldiers and some officers from the ill-fated Nunobiki Maru to fight with Filipino revolutionary forces. He managed to recruit some men, landed in Manila and joined the revolutionary forces in Bataan. Their operations, however seem to have had little effect on the war.[38] Aguinaldo's government negotiated for a second shipload of arms but American surveillance was so strict that the ship had to unload its cargo in Taiwan, its stated destination.[39] The Revolution and the Philippine-American War ended with Japan not having had any impact at all as some Filipinos, for better or for worse, had hoped.

Prostitutes and Laborers: The Early American Period

If Philippine-Japan relations under Spain was "Spain-Japan relations" until the late 19th century, Philippine-Japan relations under the Americans from 1900 was initially US-Japan relations. If security and trade vis-a-vis

Japan were the concerns of Spain and aid and alliance were the concern of Filipino revolutionaries, American and Filipino concern with Japan during the early US colonial rule in the Philippines was emigration. In 1903, it was reported that there were 921 legally registered Japanese immigrants in the Philippines, about 800 were laborers from Okinawa. The others were traders, small businessmen and prostitutes. There were also an undetermined number of illegal Japanese emigrants with fake passports.[40]

As early as 1899, there were about 200 Japanese prostitutes (called karayuki) in Manila's Sampaloc district. They were patronized mainly by American servicemen and Japanese residents. They had no Filipino customers because they were too proud to accept Filipino customers. The majority of the Japanese residents in Manila at that time seem to have been connected with the prostitution business. In 1901, when the Japanese Association (Nihon Kyokai) was established about forty of the fifty members were prostitutes or owners of brothels. The board members themselves were brothel operators. The image among Filipinos of Japanese women was that of a submissive and tender wives.[41] It was an image that lasted well into the 1950s. As of 1910, of the 209 Japanese women who were listed as employed in Manila, 122 were prostitutes and 35 were yayas (nannies), and the rest were employed in miscellaneous jobs.

The 800 Japanese laborers from Okinawa were used by the American authorities together with Chinese and Filipinos in constructing the famous Kennon Road that leads to Baguio City. These laborers later settled either in Baguio and Davao in Mindanao. The Japanese who stayed in the Baguio area became farmers; those who moved to Manila became artisans, and skilled laborers (carpenters, cabinet makers and the like). But the bulk of them — around 500 —went south and settled down as farmers.

As the Japanese community began to grow, the prostitution businesses declined and were replaced by trading firms and shops. Discriminatory immigration laws against Asian immigrants that were passed in the US mainland in 1907 and 1924 were not implemented in the Philippines. As a result, those Japanese who wanted to migrate to the US went to the Philippines instead.[42] This, plus the generally friendly relations between the US and Japan in the 1910s and some Philippine autonomy in making immigration laws resulted in what Prof. Grant Goodman, a Japan studies specialist calls "permissive colonialism", which was a policy of openness to Japanese immigration. In 1918, 7,806 Japanese entered the Philippines — a full 50% of the foreign population increase for that year. In 1919, as a result of the hemp boom, around 10,000 Japanese entered the Philippines. The boom however did not last long and some 4,000 Japanese returned to their country.[43]

Images of the Japanese in the Philippines during the early years of the

American administration varied. Japanese women in the Philippines were viewed as female, yayas (nannies), flirtatious wives, night club singers and waitresses. Men on the other hand were stereotyped as craftsmen, samurai, rough husbands, an apa (sweet ice cream cone) vendors. By the 1910s however, university educated Japanese began arriving in the Philippines. They became manufacturers, traders and professionals.

The Americans saw the Japanese community basically as "an asset to the community." They were seen both by Filipinos and Americans as energetic, industrious, resourceful, thrifty, neat, clean, honest, law-abiding and with a sense of organization. But others saw them as intruders and a threat to Philippine labor because they worked harder and lived on less compared to Filipinos and Americans. The fact that most Japanese kept to themselves, formed their own groups, did not mix with the Filipinos nor became Christians or intermarried made them look suspicious to Filipinos. In any case, outside business transactions, there was very little direct personal contact between the Japanese and the Filipinos.[44]

Trade between the Philippines and Japan during the early decades of the 20th century grew again with the balance favoring Japan most of the time until 1941. From 1926 onward Japan became the second largest trading partner of the Philippines. The number of Japanese enterprises in Manila grew and after the initial wave of prostitutes (who were eventually deported), the Japanese gradually began to enter manufacturing, the retail trade, shipping, lumber, mining, fishing and the import-export business. Retail trade however, remained a Chinese monopoly and the Japanese only succeeded in getting from five to eight percent of the trade. Big businesses and financial institutions like Mitsui Bussan Co., Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Bank of Taiwan also began to enter the Philippines. Sumitomo and Mitsui were interested in Philippine minerals, particularly iron ore, chromium, manganese, copper and gold and have taken over some mining interests sold by the Americans during the First World War.[45] The Japanese also became prominent in shipping, gravel and crushed rock business, the printing and binding industry, and the manufacture of bricks, tiles, boxes, bags, ice-cream cones, shoes, candies and other items. Many Filipinos lost out to the Japanese in the fishing industry.

Apart from the Japanese community in Davao, the Japanese in the Philippines were rather low keyed. There were Filipinos who were good friends of the Japanese and had joint ventures with them. Some of them allowed their names to be used in papers of incorporation, so as to give Philippine-Japanese companies a seeming 60% Filipino stock ownership as required by law in the purchase of land or the exploitation of Philippine natural resources. In Davao, the Japanese community had grown and developed. A consulate was established in

Davao and various Japanese support systems were set up like organizations, temples and hospitals. Direct trade between Davao and Japan also took place. While the Japanese generally lived by themselves, they were on good terms with the Filipinos, and apart from occasional friction with the Bagobos whose land was being encroached upon by the Japanese, the Filipinos and Japanese got along with each other, living their own lifestyles.

The 1930s and the Philippine Commonwealth

With the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1936 and setting of independence for 1946, the problem of relations with Japan naturally became linked with the prospect of independence. Some Filipinos began to worry about a "flood of immigration" after independence although Japanese immigrants to the Philippines were much less than those who went to the US and South America.[46] There was widespread suspicion that the Japanese who came in were spies, cartographers and photographers who were laying the groundwork for an invasion of the Philippines. The fact that many Japanese worked as household helps of American military personnel, photographers with shops located at strategic places, and that many of the immigrants were of military age, did nothing to dispel suspicions.[47] Some believed that these rumors were deliberately floated by the Americans to justify their holding on to the Philippines as a colony. Others believed that the Japanese did have a plan for economic and military conquest of the Philippines. Still, other Filipinos continued to look to Japan as a friend, a source of inspiration and a liberator from western colonialism.[48]

The impact of the image of Japan on the issue of Philippine independence was that those who were against independence argued that if the Japanese threat was real, then independence was not desirable. Pro-independence Filipinos on the other hand had to prove that the threat was minimal. The Philippine independence missions to the United States from 1919 onward tried to play down the Japanese threat. They claimed, for example, that the Philippines and Japan were too different and Japanese rule in the Philippines will never succeed because the Filipinos could never be assimilated. They even claimed that the Japanese would never want to work in hot a place like the Philippines! An additional problem of pro-independence politicians was that to acknowledge that the Japanese threat was real was also to acknowledge the need for the continued presence of American forces in the Philippines even after independence.[49]

Some Filipinos who saw Japan as a friend were those who were attracted to the idea of Pan-Asianism. They tried to look at the positive side of Japan, and how much there was to learn from Japan's experience. Japan's victory over Russia brought a sense of pride to them as Asians. Many who had been to Japan

were all praises for what they saw.[50] Still, other Filipinos saw Japanese as business opportunities or as a threat to the Philippine economy. The Japanese were interested in Philippines independence because it would eliminate US-imposed trade and investment barriers in the islands. By this time, the Japanese owned real estate in the Philippines, timber lands, mineral lands and agricultural lands. The immigration rate continued to be high. The fishing industry has become a virtualJapanese monopoly. The Japanese established more manufacturing companies in the 1930s producing, among other things, beer,rubber shoes, slippers,candies, canned fish, bicycles and others. The Commonwealth's National Economic Protectionism Agency (NEPA), which was supposed to protect Filipino enterprises from foreign competition, had as officers some men who were partial to Japanese businesses and actually got the NEPA to support Japanese enterprises.[51] Even the retail trade yielded some of its traditional Chinese monopoly to the Japanese. The Japanese embassy in Manila and the consulate in Davao supported Filipino politicians who were partial to Japan, occasionally funding their campaigns to ward off possible anti-Japanese legislations.[52] Japanese manufactured products, especially textile, were outselling US products. There were also frequent violations of the quota systems in textile imports from Japan. The problem of immigration was dealt with by the Commonwealth in the Immigration Act of 1940, which sought to limit immigrants from whatever country to 500 a year. Attempts to protect local industries proved to be of little use. To the concerned Filipino intellectuals, it was obvious that if nothing was done to check the situation, Japanese domination of the post-independence economy was inevitable.

There were a number of sincere and serious Japanophiles. There were journalists like Modesto Farolan and Francisco Icasiano, anti-White or anti-Westerners like Aurelio Alvero. There were also radicals who still looked to Japan for aid in the overthrow of the socio-economic order, like Benigno Ramos and the seditious Sakdal movement. These Japanophiles saw the good points in Japan discipline, patriotism, love of country and hard working—and admired Japanese culture. Others felt that the Philippines must ally itself with Japan and that this was the only way independence could be protected. Some Japanophiles worked openly, publishing articles in the media or editing magazines such as Oriental Art and Culture openly praising Japan. Academicians like Jorge Bocobo extolled the virtues of the Bushido and arranged for Japanese Filipino student dialogues.[53] There were also cultural exchange programs between Japan and the Philippines and cultural campaigns sponsored by the Japanese diplomatic mission.

However, the virtues of Japanese culture and the news of the war in China could not be reconciled. The American press which had strong influence in the Philippines was openly biased against Japan. Photographic exhibitions of atrocities in China clashed with the refined concepts of ikebana and bonsai being

propagated in magazines. The US High Commissioner Francis B. Sayre, reported that the cultural campaign was not very successful: "It does not appear that the Japanese made any strong effort at cultural penetration either with the mass of the people or with the elite groups." There were also organizations who tried to start a boycott movement of Japanese goods as a protest for the war in China.[54]

The reaction of Commonwealth President Manuel L. Quezon to these conflicting views of Japan was to try to develop a policy of neutrality towards Japan as a post-independence policy of the Philippines. He visited Japan twice before the war and was impressed by Japan and even wanted to adopt for the Philippines some aspects of the Bushido. However, the status of the Philippines as a commonwealth of the United States and developments in China in the late 1930s mitigated against actively pursuing a neutralist policy.[55] Japanese assets in the Philippines were frozen on July 1941. Throughout all this time of gathering war clouds, the Filipino masses, again in a childlike way, did not take the problems too seriously. They did not seem to care or worry about Japan. To them, Japan was far away. They believed that the US would protect the Philippines. They still saw the average Japanese as the good loyal gardeners, shopkeepers, photographers, barbers, craftsmen, vendors. Japanese goods were still cheaper than the American ones though they broke easily. Even at a time when Japan was posed for war with a formidable military machine, the term "Laruang Hapon" (Japanese toy) still meant to Filipinos as products that broke easily. And since the Japanese kept to themselves, few people really knew what was on their minds.[56]

The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

Much can be said about the Second World War in the Philippines but as far as Japan's image among Filipinos is concerned, Japan was simply not regarded as a "liberator" of the country from Western colonialism. This probably distinguishes Philippine response to the war with that of Indonesia or Indochina which saw the Japanese interlude in their history as a tactical opportunity to advance their struggle against western colonialism. Except for a few Japanophiles like Artemio Ricarte, almost everyone saw the Japanese as thwarting the timetable for Philippine independence which was to be declared in 1946. Most Filipinos therefore rallied to the American side and loyalty to the Philippines was equated with loyalty to the United States. Many historians interpreted this as simply the result of the Americanization of the Filipinos. However, in fairness, no other western colony in Asia at that time had a definite timetable for independence as the Philippines did. Thus, the almost totally anti-Japanese response during the war was understandable.

Japanese behavior during the war did not help at all to change this attitude of Filipinos. All of a sudden the stories of atrocities in China became real. The Japanese was no longer the loyal and hardworking Japanese they had known before the war. They were now the arrogant conqueror. Physical punishment for minor infractions, slapping, looting, rape and massacre were common place. Women had to blacken their faces and feign pregnancy to avoid being fancied by soldiers. Upon seeing so many Japanese and their physical features, Filipinos began to derogatorily cali them "sakang" (bow-legged).

The perception that the Japanese thwarted the popularly accepted timetable for Philippine independence meant that Japan could not possibly have won the war in the Philippines. It is said that Japan already lost the war in the Philippines on the second day of the war. However, some also say that had the Japanese soldier not been given to the habit of slapping people's faces, Japan could still have won the loyalty of Filipinos. The slapping of the face, while a normal act of reprimand for Japanese at that time, was simply demeaning to Catholic Filipinos who were inheritors of the Malay sensitivity and Spanish pride.

Winning the loyalty of the Filipinos was thus a great problem for the Japanese occupiers. Many pre-war politicians motivated by patriotism and self-interest cooperated with Japanese Military Administration. So did some Japanophiles. The Japanese however simply lost the Filipino masses.

It is worth pointing out however that anti-Japanese sentiments that arose because of the war was not entirely directed at Japanese alone. Any elderly educated Filipino who survived the war would attest that many of the worst atrocities committed by the Japanese Army during the last months of the war were actually perpetuated by Korean mercenaries brought to the Philippines by the Japanese. Many say that the Korean soldier was easily distinguishable from the Japanese soldier in appearance. It was the Koreans more than the Japanese who were more feared and hated by Filipinos. Many Filipinos in their middle ages today would recall that during the 1950s when they were children, to be called "Koreano" (Korean) meant that one was particularly rough and cruel, attributes which used to be reserved for Japanese. But this was only as far as educated Filipinos are concerned; the average Filipino in the streets did not bother to make the distinctions between Japanese and Koreans.

Post-World War II

Viewed from the perspective of a long historical time, Japan's image in the Philippines after World War II and independence in 1946 did not undergo any radical change. The suspicion, antagonism and threat perception remained, albeit more intense because of trauma of the war. After the period of high

economic growth of Japan, respect and a desire to imitate also permeated Philippine perception. In this sense, there is nothing unique about the Philippine perception of Japan compared to other Asian countries which experienced Japanese aggression.

After the war, the Philippines demanded reparations from Japan as a condition for signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty. But under intense American pressure, the Philippines was forced to reduced the original reparations demand of several billion dollars to only several hundred million dollars. The original amount was too unrealistic. In the context of the conduct of Philippine foreign policy after independence, the original amount of several billion dollars was in itself not only a sign of a strong anti-Japanese sentiment but also of a general naivete in the interpretation of Philippine importance to US postwar strategic policy compared to the importance of Japan.

Trade with Japan picked up gradually after the war and a Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation was signed with Japan in 1960. As proof of the intense suspicion and threat perception on the part of the Filipinos, the treaty was not ratified by the Philippines until 1973. The Philippine Congress consistently opposed the treaty for more than a decade. This treaty was probably the most scrutinized and vilified treaty in Philippine diplomatic history. It came under very heavy criticisms from politicians and businessmen alike so much so that the Philippine Congress was forced to freeze the treaty in 1969. It took the extraordinary powers of an authoritarian regime and the abolition of the Congress in 1972 to have the treaty ratified. The treaty was finally ratified in 1973.

This section on the contemporary image of Japan in the Philippines will focus on only two aspects: 1) a discussion of the nature of Filipino suspicion and security threat perception towards Japan, and 2) a discussion of a major cultural exchange program between Japan and the Philippines as they are indicative of Japan's image in the country in comparison with US cultural programs.

Other than as an economic threat, the experience of the Japanese occupation quite logically made the Philippines sensitive to the issue of Japanese defense policy. In a way, this is a logical continuation of the threat perception of the 1930s. The essence of Philippine perception of Japan's defence policy often revolves on the image of "militarism". While this is common knowledge, the intensity of these images in the Philippines is particularly acute. However, the factors that caused a more intense suspicion is not entirely indigenous to the Philippines but is directly related to a certain trend in Japanese politics that emerged from the late 1960s. This trend in Japanese politics was the decline of pacifist and leftist thoughts in Japan. Philippine perceptions of Japanese

defence policy has been greatly affected by the transfer of the pacifist-leftist arguments in Japan, or that group in Japan called the "unarmed neutralists", to some articulate sectors of Philippine society.[57] It mixed very well with the prolonged memories of the historical trauma of the Second World War. These same pacifist-leftist arguments are the legacies of the minshu undo (people's movement) of the 1960s in Japan concerned with then broad national issues. It is a movement which has long degenerated into jumin undo (residents' movement) concerned with highly localized issues of the late 1970s and 1980s. Pacifist-leftist arguments on Japanese security issues began to penetrate the Philippines at a time when the same persuasion was being displaced as a current in the mainstream politics in Japan in the late 1960s. It has contributed greatly to the lingering suspicion towards Japan.

The transfer to the Philippines of pacifist-leftist thoughts on Japanese security policy could be seen in the materials written in the Philippines on the topic of Japanese defense from the late 1960s to the early 1980. It will be noticeable that Japanese pacifist-leftist reasoning on Japanese defense policy began to be reflected in Philippine materials around 1970.[58] These materials were occasionally supplemented by dispatches from the New China News Agency during the height of Maoism. The group in Japan through which these views were transmitted to the Philippines can roughly be traced to those Japanese associated with the Beiheren in the late 1960s, and to the Pacific-Asia Resource Center (PARC) at present. The continuing impact in the Philippines of the pacifist-leftist arguments on Japanese "militarism" is completely out of proportion to the minuscule influence of pacifist-leftist groups in Japan today. (It seems that the Philippines shares this experience with Thailand.)

Philippine perception of Japanese defense based on the literature from 1970 to the early 1980s centers on the "problem" of Japanese "militarism" or rearmament and its threat to Asia. From 1970, the common argument found among Filipino analysts is that Japanese militarism is "on the rise" because of the growth of overseas interest of Japan, alliance with the US, perception of the Soviet threat, and the interest of the Japanese "military-industrial complex". Japanese military power is usually deduced from the size of defense budget and the fact that the Self-Defense Forces' (SDF) budget is the seventh largest in the world and third largest in Asia. It is also pointed out that growth rate of Japanese military expenditure is higher than some NATO members, and that Japan has regular defense build-up plans. Arguments on the symbolic 1% of the GNP limitation on defense expenditure is reiterated. In addition to this, it is also asserted that trends in the SDF arise from Japan's security relations with the US, which makes Japan a "junior partner" of the US in Asia. Japanese security interest in the Malacca and Lombok Straits, prominent in the 1970s, was seen as evidence of Japanese interest in expanded military role in Asia. The possibility of a nuclear Japan is also touched upon as if it is an immediate

alternative.

The transfer of these pacifist-leftist arguments on Japanese defense policy to the Philippines was the result of ideological affinity of groups in Japan with groups in the Philippine media, universities and non-government organizations (NGOs). Other than the phenomenon of the "historical trauma", the appeal of Japanese pacifist-leftist arguments in the Philippines can also be explained by the fact that quite a different set of symbols is attached by a Filipino audience to the arguments. This can be illustrated by using the well-known pacifist Yoshikazu Sakamoto's argument as an example. He once wrote that "The Japanese military has no independent strategy of its own. It can function only as part of the US armed forces in East Asia. The closer the collaboration the more dependent the Japanese military becomes on the United States."[59] If presented to a Filipino audience, an argument of this kind is interpreted as analogous to Philippines' own emotional issue of being a host to US military bases. Security relations with the US is then connected with the overall problem of Philippines economic underdevelopment. Not only is this quite different from the context of Japanese pacifist-leftists arguments, but in this way too the parochialism of Japanese nationalistic pacifist arguments is passed on to Filipinos as universalist ideology through the analogy. The situation is rather similar to the relations between Pan-Asianist thoughts in Japan and in the Philippines during the 1930s.

The simplistic and occasionally inaccurate views of Japanese pacifist-leftist groups have also penetrated the Philippine foreign policy bureaucracy's image of Japanese defense policy. In 1975 for example, the Philippine Center for Advanced Studies (PCAS) which was a short-lived foreign policy think tank for the government, wrote inaccurately the following in a briefing paper for former President Ferdinand Marcos entitled ASEAN II: Basic and Strategic White Paper, dated September 18, 1975:

> For the moment, Southeast Asia itself does not stand in the way of Japan's reinvigorated military machine; the danger will come if and when successful national liberation movements interdict the free flow of raw materials to Japan or nationalize standing Japanese assets. Then extreme right elements are likely to step in and reimpose Japan's armed might over the region. Since the fall of Vietnam, the US defense secretary has stepped up criticisms of the 'slowness' of Japanese military buildup— and the Japanese right wing is chafing under Tokyo government ratification of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which to their mind unduly restricts Japanese military strength. Meanwhile, the Japanese arms industry is doing good business in Southeast Asia, whose armies supposedly prefer the smaller,

lighter Japanese-made weapons."[60] (Emphasis added)

The inaccuracy lies in the implied power of the "extreme right" on Japan and the assertion of Southeast Asian use of Japanese-made weapons. Indeed, anyone would be at a lost in identifying who or what the "extreme right elements" are in Japan. The export of weapons is prohibited in Japan. Also, the Japanese arms industry is probably the most inefficient in the world, thus making Japanese light infantry weapons the most expensive in the world. The PCAS was later replaced by the Presidential Center for Special Studies (PCSS) in 1977. In an undated paper of the PCSS entitled The President's Visit to Japan: Briefing Papers", Japan was described as "quietly rearming" as borne out, again, by the growing defense budget and periodic defense build-up plans. The implied substantial Japanese military power was supported by evidence which were exact duplicate copies of pages from the Japanese Defense White Paper on Japanese armaments, military structure, organization, and statistics with no attempt to connect them to wider trends in the Japanese society and politics.[61]

Another briefing paper of the PCSS prepared for former President Marcos during former Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to the Philippines restated Asian fear of Japanese military power, especially after US President Reagan began pressing Japan for an expanded role in the Pacific. While it is true that there is such a trend, what is noteworthy in the paper is the conclusion that "Japan and the US are committed to protect each other in times of emergency and that Japan has appeared to be the greatest ally of the US in the Pacific".[62] The existence of a Japan-US alliance is of course a fact but one would have expected that something else more than the obvious should have been said about the matter such as the complexities of Japan-US relations.

Japanese official pronouncement on its defense policy can also be interpreted differently in the Philippines in ways that parallels the appeal of the ideological arguments of the pacifist-leftist. For example, former Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe said in an official visit to Manila in early 1986 that Japan will never have a military role in Asia. While quite straightforward as a statement of Japanese policy towards ASEAN, a Filipino audience equates "military role" with military bases, military aid and arms supply similar or equal to the military role of the US. Japan will probably not have this kind of military role for a long time. The meaning a Filipino audience can attach to the Foreign Minister's statement is quite different from what he probably had in mind since a military role similar or equal to the US as conceived by Filipinos may be different from a strategic role which Japan might have.

Thus, for many among the articulate in the Philippines, Japanese defence policy, no matter how it is stated, or what it is, remains a specter that haunts Asia and the Philippines.

It seems however, that the anxiety over the specter of Japanese "militarism" is not shared by the Filipino public. This fact can be substantiated by an opinion survey in the Philippines directly related to the public's perception of external threat. In response to an open-ended question on which country is friendliest to the Philippines, 36% of a nationwide sample of approximately 2,000 respondents in 1986 considered Japan the second friendliest country to the Philippines. (The United States was considered as the friendliest with a score of 73% nationwide. China was third with 11%.) In Metro-Manila, which traditionally is considered as the only place where foreign policy is debated, Japan also ranked as the second friendliest country with a much higher score of 60%. (The US remained the friendliest country to Filipinos in Metro-Manila with 83%; China was again third with 17%.)[63]

In response to a follow-up question in the 1986 survey on which country Filipino respondents see as a threat, the Soviet Union ranked first for both nationwide and Metro-Manila samples with a score of 32% and 51% respectively. Ranked fifth most threatening country nationwide was Japan, but with only 5% of respondents considering it a threat. In Metro-Manila, Japan ranked only 10th out of 12 countries listed as the most threatening country with a score of only 2%.

In a more recent surveys in 1988 and 1989[64] which asked 1,200 nationwide respondents whether they think the Japanese government can be trusted (actual Filipino term used is pagtitiwala and kumpiyansa, i.e., trust and confidence in), 17% in 1988 said they have great (malaki, lit. big) confidence in the Japanese government. This percentage improved to 24% in 1989. For Metro-Manila, 22% felt that the Japanese government was trustworthy in 1988; this improved to 32% in 1989. Respondents who were undecided on whether Japan could be trusted or not was 29% nationwide in 1988 and this rose to 36% in 1989. In Metro-Manila it was 25% in 1988, and 39% in 1989. As for respondents who had little trust and confidence on the Japanese government, the percentages were 52% nationwide in 1988; this declined to 39% in 1989. In Metro-Manila the corresponding percentages of those who have little confidence on the Japanese government were 52% in 1988 and 28% in 1989. The increase among those who were undecided in their attitude towards Japan probably came from the ranks of those who had little trust in Japan.

What the discussion and the figures above probably show is that there is dichotomy and contradiction in the Filipinos' image of Japan. The mass public does not really share the sentiments of the more intellectual class of Philippine society. The image of Japan among the intellectuals has never been part of Philippine popular culture. The situation is quite similar to the situation in the 1930s when the elite were already anticipating problems with the Philippines'

post-independence relations with Japan while the masses were generally oblivious to the problem. The difference is that this time the military threat from Japan is truly minimal.

Cultural and Educational Exchanges

Another way of determining Japan's image in the Philippines is through a discussion of Filipino response to what is probably the most important Japanese cultural program in the Philippines. This is the Monbusho scholarship program which will be discussed and contrasted below in comparison with Filipino response to US scholarship programs in the Philippines. Compared to a single major Japanese scholarship program, the United States has had four major scholarship programs in the Philippines from 1948 to the late 1980s. These are the Fulbright-Hays, Fulbright-Smith-Mundt, the East-West Center degree and non-degree programs. (Both Japan and the US have other minor scholarship programs such as the Japan Foundation in the case of the former and private foundation for the latter. These minor programs are not discussed in detail here.)

Table 1 shows the number of Filipinos who have taken advantage of scholarship programs offered by Japan and the United States.

The earliest US scholarship program in the Philippines was the Fulbright-Hays which started in 1948. The Monbusho scholarship program started in 1954. Later, US degree and non-degree scholarship programs at the East-West Center were started in 1961. (The year of the start of another US program, the Fulbright-Smith-Mundt could not be determined with the sources used in this paper.) From 1954 to the end of 1987, a total of 727 Filipinos studied in Japan under the Monbusho program. In comparison, a total of 2731 Filipinos studied in the US under the four major programs from 1948 to 1984, the latest year that detailed data is available. (If other minor scholarship programs are included, the total figures will be 778 for Japan and 3226 for the US.)

The number of Filipinos who began studying in Japan only started to rise significantly in 1980 and 1981 when it rose to 31 in 1980 and 33 in 1981, up from 21 in 1979. From 1954 to 1978 or a period of 24 years, the annual number of Filipino Monbusho grantee ranged anywhere from three to 17; the average for the period 1954 to 1987 was 20 Filipinos going to Japan under the Monbusho program. In contrast, US scholarship programs from 1948 to 1984 averaged 67 a year. Each of the US scholarship program had averages higher than the Monbusho program with the probable exception of the Fulbright-Smith-Mundt program.

What the data seem to show is that for Filipinos, Japan is not a priority place

for study compared to the US. This contrast is significant specially if one considers the fact that the Monbusho grants are much more generous than US grants. The Monbusho program is an outright grant whereas Fulbright programs for example, during its first decade and a half of existence, required Philippine counterpart funds for the grantee. Japan, in other words, for a large part of the

TABLE 1
Yearly Admission to the Monbusho Program and US Scholarship Programs

Year	Monbusho	Fulbright-Hays	East-West Center, Degree Program	East-West Center, Non-Degree Program	Total US Grantees	Year	Monbusho	Fulbright-Hays	East-West Center, Degree Program
1948		42			42	1971	12	41	15
1949		38			38	1972	9	40	10
1950		47			47	1973	13	36	36
1951		67			67	1974	16	30	30
1952		75			75	1975	15	27	27
1953		75			75	1976	17	16	16
1954	3	76			76	1977	16	18	18
1955	4	137			137	1978	15	21	21
1956	3	61			61	1979	21	22	22
1957	4	61			61	1980	31	25	25
1958	4	57			57	1981	33	23	23
1959	2	69			69	1982	44	24	24
1960	5	70			70	1983	45	18	18
1961	6	68	25	16	93	1984	62		
1962	3	60	22	12	82	1985	76		
1963	4	79	25	25	104	1986	72		
1964	4	102	20	14	122	1987	96		
1965	7	98	23	20	121				
1966	4	74	29	34	103	Yearly Ave.	20	53	21
1967	2	69	10	26	79				
1968	11	59	13	25	72	Sub-total	675	1907	490
1969	8	34	23	21	57				
1970	8	48	15	32	63	No Data	52		
						Sub-total for Monbusho	727		
						Fulbright-Hays-Mundt*			
						Sub-total for US			
						Other Programs	51		
						Total	778	1907	490

Note: Data on the yearly admissions of the Fulbright-Smith-Mundt are not available in the sources used here.

SOURCES: Philippine-Japan Alumni Directory, 1988; Directory of Filipino and American Participants in the Fulbright, East-West Center, Hubert Humprey and International Visitors Programs, 1948-1984, 1985

post-1945 era, has never really been attractive to Filipinos as a place of learning. This is so in spite of the undoubted economic success of Japan from the latter 1960s. The language barrier and Filipino unfamiliarity with the Japanese educational system may be part of the explanation for this tendency. But it is more probable that many Filipinos until the late 1970s never really believed there is much to study in Japan in spite of genuine admiration for Japanese economic success.

The trend only began to change from the mid-1980s. The number of Filipino grantees of US programs began to decrease significantly while Monbusho grantees rose sharply, especially after 1984. It is of course known that the US has serious budgetary constraints while the Japanese government has began to increase its annual budget for foreign students. It is difficult to confirm how much a factor Japanese budgetary constraints was in the 1970s in deciding the number of foreign students to accept. It undoubtedly was a factor; perhaps a combination of a budgetary limits of the Japanese government and image of Japan among Filipinos as not being a place of learning were the basic causes of the trends discussed above. The significant increase in Monbusho grantees after 1984 was definitely an indicator of greater budgetary outlay by Monbusho. Thus, it is also possible that Filipinos only began to see Japan as a place of study when it was less possible (for fiscal reasons of the US government) to go to the US.

Another set of data that can be revealing of Japan's contemporary image in the Philippines is the field of specializations of Filipinos who studied in Japan compared with those who studied in the US. Table 2 below presents comparative data of fields of specialization of Monbusho and US scholarship grantees who studied in Japan and the US, respectively.

TABLE 2
Fields of Specialization of Former and Current Filipino Grantees of the Monbusho Scholarship Program and US Scholarship Programs

	MONBUSHO PROGRAM*		ALL US PROGRAMS	
	No. of Grantees	As % of Total	No. of Grantees	As % of Total
Social Sciences	89	0.150	491	0.279
Education/Counselling	89	0.150	296	0.168
Engineering	70	0.118	53	0.030
Medical Courses	64	0.107	100	0.056
Applied Sciences	61	0.102	56	0.031
Agricultural Sciences	28	0.047	92	0.052

The top five fields of specializations in descending order for Filipino grantees of the Monbusho scholarship program are social science, education, engineering, medical courses and applied science (chemistry, computer science, food science, geography, mathematics, physics, etc). Agricultural science is a distant sixth preferred field of specialization under the Monbusho scholarship. For US scholarship programs, the top five fields in descending order are social science, applied and fine arts (architecture, music, fine arts, theater, literature, communications and linguistic), education and counseling, business and management and biological science. Medical course follows biological course very closely as the sixth preferred field of specialization.

(A short explanation is needed: the high number of Filipinos who studied education/counseling in Japan is probably due to the fact that the Monbusho scholarship offers a special teachers' training program. Other than this, grantees under the Monbusho program are free to choose their courses.)

If the figures above says anything about Japan's image among Filipinos, it shows that Filipinos are basically interested in social science and scientific and technological fields that can be learned in Japan. The humanities and arts of Japan are of little interest to Filipinos. It is also surprising to know that in general, Filipinos do not consider Japan as a place to study business and management. For those who studied in the US on the other hand, the social sciences and scientific and technological fields are also preferred fields of study; therefore as far as these data are concerned the image of Japan and the US among Filipinos are probably the same. However, the striking difference between the data on Japan and the US is that there is a very large number of Filipinos who studied applied and fine arts and business and management in the US whereas very few did in Japan. In terms of numbers, at least 300 of all those who studied in the US studied applied and fine arts whereas at least only 20 did so in Japan. For business and management, the numbers are at least 114 for the US and 27 for Japan. Thus, Japan is not appreciated among Filipinos for its highly developed cultural forms and there is only little appreciation for Japanese business management practice. Japan, like the US, is only appreciated for its social sciences, scientific and technical fields. The difference is that the US is also appreciated for the humanities. This tendency among Filipinos is obviously the result of historical experience but so is everything in any society. These data simply negate a self-image among Japanese that their society can be appreciated either for its highly developed cultural and art forms or its business management practice. At least among Filipinos, Japan is appreciated largely for science and technology, which also confirms a self-image of Japanese about their own society as a high-tech society. Finally, social science is the top field of interest for Filipinos who studied in the US and Japan. More than the image of Japan or of the US among Filipinos, this fact probably shows a type of historical continuity among Filipinos studying abroad. Jose Rizal observed in the

1880s that Filipinos in Europe tended to study law and humanities while Japanese studied technical and scientific courses. Perhaps Filipino preference for social science and humanities courses in Japan and the US or anywhere for that matter is something intrinsic among Filipinos, and Japan's, or the US', cultural impact on the Philippines is quite irrelevant.

Summary and Conclusion

Virtually throughout four centuries of Philippine-contact with Japan, the image of Japan among Filipinos and their colonizers has been a mixture of fear, suspicion, respect, inspiration, antagonism and unrealistic expectations. At certain times fear and suspicion prevailed; at other times, especially during the Revolution of 1896 and the American colonial period, a combination of respect and inspiration, and during and after the Second World War, antagonism, fear and suspicion as well as a place of learning technical skills. Japan has never been appreciated by Fiipinos in the way many Japanese had hope to be appreciated, that is, appreciation and understanding of their highly developed and sophisticated culture. This has particularly been true since 1945. Japan will probably remain as being only good for its technology and business and little else. Perhaps a good way of ending this chapter is with an advise from Alice in Wonderland: do not imagine yourself to be otherwise than what others imagine you to be.

NOTES

[1]Miguel Lopez de Legazpi to Felipe II, 23 July 1567, in Emma Blair and James Robertson, (eds.) The Philippines Islands, (Cleveland: A.H. Clark Co., 1903-1909) [Hereinafter referred to a B&R] Vol. 238, p.99, Vol. 18, p.99; C.R. Boxer, The Christian Century in Japan, 1549-1650 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), p. 260.

[2] The battle is described in Juan Baptista Roman to the Viceroy, 25 June 1582, B&R 5: 192-196; Fr. Diego Avarte, History of the Dominican Provinces of the Holy Rosary, Manila, 1640, B&R 30: 273-275.

[3]Josefa Saniel, Japan and the Philippines, 1868-1869 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1963), p. 29; R.H.P. Mason and J.G. Caiger, A History of Japan (Tokyo: Tuttle, 1972), p. 167.

[4]Memorial to Council, by citizens of the Filipinas Islands (Santiago de Vera et al.), 26 May 1586, B&R 6: 178, 183.

[5] Conde de Lemos to the King, 31 March 1607, B&R 14: 229; Boxer, op. cit., p. 242; Antonio Morga, Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas, B&R 16: 183; Enrique Corpuz, "Japan and the Philippine Revolution," Philippine Social Science Review, (1934), p. 252; Decrees regarding commerce, Felipe II, 31 May 1592, B&R 7: 138.

[6]Boxer, op. cit., 302.

[7]Morga, Sucesos, B&R 16: 198-199; Boxer, op. cit., p. 267-268.

[8]Boxer, op. cit., p. 260.

[9]Santiago de Vera to Felipe II, 13 July 1589, B&R 7: 99; Gaspar de Ayala to Felipe II, 15 July 1589, B&R 7: 124; Aurelio Calderon, The Turmoil of Change in Philippine-Japanese Relations, 1565-1945 (Manila: de la Salle University, 1976) p. 7; Corpuz, loc. cit., has a different account.

[10]Morga, Sucesos, B&R 15: 129; detailed correspondence regarding the affair is in B&R 8: 243, 256-267 and B&R 9: 23 et seq.; also Corpuz, loc. cit.

[11]Saniel, op. cit., pp. 29-30; Boxer, op. cit., pp. 262, 301.

[12]Pedro de Acuna to Felipe III, 15 July 1604, B&R 13: 227; Hernando de los Rios Coronel, Memorial and Relations for His Majesty, 1621, B&R 19: 221; Boxer, op. cit., p. 260.

[13]Milagros Guerrero, "Japanese Trade and Investments in the Philippines, 1900-1941", Philippine Social Science and Humanities Review, (March 1966), p. 8. On the 1621 expulsion policy, see B&R 20: 52, 97, 153 and 169 for the official and unofficial versions of its implementation.

[14]Juan Lopez, Events in the Filipinas Islands, 1639- 1640, B&R 29: 202; Fr. Joseph Fayol, Affairs in Filipinas, 1644-1647, B&R 35: 216; Calderon, loc. cit.

[15]Hernando de los Rios Coronel, Reforms Needed in Filipinas, B&R 18: 308-309; de los Rios, Memorial..., B&R 19: 221.

[16]Calderon, op. cit., p. 31; Guerrero, op. cit., p. 9.

[17]Bartolome Leandro de Arquisola, Conquest of the Moluccas Islands, 1609, B&R 16: 279-280.

[18]Saniel, op. cit., p. 33.

[19]Tavora to Felipe IV, 1 August 1628, B&R 23: 54-55.

[20] See Josefa Saniel, "Origins of San Lazaro Hospital," Philippine Social Science and Humanities Review, XXIII:2-5 (1958) for details of the incident.

[21]Guerrero, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

[22]Scattered references to other Japanese communities are in B&R 22: 222 and 23: 285.

[23]Casimiro Diaz, Conquistas de las Islas Filipinas, (Valladolid, 1890), B&R 38: 167.

[24]Ygnacio de Paz, Description of the Philippine Islands, c. 1658, B&R 36: 91-92.

[25]Calderon, op. cit., p. 11.

[26]Guerrero, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

[27]Guerrero, op. cit., p. 12

[28]Ibid.; Corpuz, op. cit., p. 256; Grant K. Goodman, "Japan and the Philippine Revolution: Image and Legend," Journal of Oriental Studies, (January 1970), p. 101.

[29]Saniel, Japan and the Philippines, pp. 226-233; Goodman, op. cit., pp. 104-105.

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[31]Goodman, op. cit., pp. 102-103; Saniel, op.cit., pp. 186-191; Wada, ibid., pp. 23-24.

[32]Saniel, loc. cit.

[33]Saniel, op. cit., pp. 199-201, p. 207.

[34]Ibid., pp. 255-258.

[35] Ibid., pp. 258-267, 308-315; Rafaelita Soriano, The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines, with Special Reference to Propaganda, 1941-1945 (Doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, 1948) pp. 43-44, p. 46.

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[45]Quiazon, op.cit., p. 192; Guerrero, op. cit., p. 48.

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[47]Goodman, "Flood...", p. 170.

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[50]Goodman, "The Problem of Philippine Independence...", pp. 174-176, 186-187.

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[52]Some of the intercepted communications from the Manila consulate reveal the extent of Japanese involvement in lobby groups and politicians. See, for example, Document 254 in U.S. Department of Defense The "Magic" Background to Pearl Harbor (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), Vol. 2, p. A-138 to A-139.

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PHILIPPINE-JAPAN NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS FROM THE 1900s TO THE PRESENT: A SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS*

Elena L. Samonte

Introduction

This paper is a socio-psychological analysis of the views, opinions, and attitudes of Filipinos and Japanese about each other. The objective is not only to show how the Filipinos and the Japanese regard each other but also to explain how such impressions and attitudes are formed and from there explain the dynamics in a relationship. The analysis of the process of social cognition shall give some understanding of the behavior of these two groups of people and how they affect each other's lives.

The first part of this paper will be a historical account covering both pre-war and present-day data. This does not include however the attitudes during the war, as much has been written about this. The second part will be a presentation of an analysis of these attitudes from a socio-psychological perspective.

Historical Account

It has been said that Philippine-Japan relations began earlier than the middle of the 16th century (Zaide, 1964:155). By the time the Spaniards came, there was already a sizeable group of Japanese in different parts of the Philippine Islands conducting trade in silks, woolens, cotton, indigo and pearls (Alip, 1950:283).

The Japanese government established a consulate in Manila in 1888 for purposes of establishing trade relations with the Philippines. At that time, there were only 30 Japanese in the Philippines. But the number increased to 1,215 as Japanese workers were brought in to work on the Benguet Road (more popularly known as Kennon Road). Aside from those who came in groups to work on government projects, there were also those who came on their own, lured by their successful relatives and acquaintances (Yu, 1989:17). A good example of this is Kanegae Seitaro who came to the Philippines when he was 16. He had two uncles who were doing small business in the Philippines. Determined and

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*Paper read before the Young Women's Christian Association, June 9, 1990, Yokohama, Japan.

with only a small bag containing not even a change of clothes, he came to the Philippines on a fake passport. Without any knowledge of English nor any of the native languages, and quite apprehensive that they would not let him in (Mizuno and Shimamura, 1987). There were also those who just wanted to go south, in search of a better life. One example was Migitaka who wanted to go to Brazil but ended up going to the Philippines as this was the destination of the first available boat.

The Japanese then were carpenters, vendors of sembei (Japanese rice crackers) and mongo con hielo (sweet beans with ice), and operators of bazaars. Many of the women were engaged in prostitution (Jose, 1990:17). "In 1910, of the 209 Japanese women who were listed with jobs in Manila, 122 were prostitues and 35 were yayas (caretaker of children), the rest being employed in miscellaneous jobs." (Ibid.).

Official and Semi-Official Views

One of the official views came from the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce in the early 1900s. The Philippines was seen as an "excellent place for the Japanese to go and engage in agriculture, found industries and participate in commercial activities. They found the Filipinos were friendly and hospitable to the Japanese" (Yu, op. cit.:27). They even thought that "geographically speaking, the two countries were neighbors and their people's minds, manners and customs were similar" (Ibid.).

Vice Consul Iwaya Jokichi who was assigned to the Philippines twice (from 1903 February to 1904 June; 1909 April to 1910 August) described, in his report, the presence of many Filipino-Chinese mestizos. Among the characteristics that made an impact on him were "their fondness for entertaining guests, their being show-offs, vain and respectors of social position, and their tendency to give outbursts to their indignation as well as their fondness for listening to such outbursts" (Ibid.:30).

There were many unsubstantiated stereotypes. Of people in tropical countries like the Philippines, he said that "they mature rapidly and age prematurely. He put their active age for both mental and physical activities at between 16 and 27. As laborers they did not work unless told to do so."

He used the word dojin, meaning natives, so he was probably referring to any Filipino excluding the Spanish and Chinese mestizos. He described the dojin as being fond of cockfighting and other forms of gambling, having no sense of right and wrong. Thus they lied and robbed people.

In general, Consul Iwaya said Filipinos had "a natural love and talent for music, were emotional, with a tendency to make careless decisions, lacked originality and were excessively hospitable towards relatives."

He pointed specifically to non-Christian Filipinos as being friendly to the Japanese (Ibid.:31).

There were other biased observations like that of Matsuoka Tomio who thought that coconut cultivation of the Filipinos was simple but "such simplicity fitted the Filipino limited capability." Another simplistic view was that of Asakura Seijiro, an engineer in the Railways Bureau of the Taiwan Colonial Government, who in his report on Philippine railroads in 1915, said that Filipinos "were fond of sports," as he saw them playing in the open fields (Ibid..34-35).

Nitobe Inazo, an intellectual born to a samurai family of Morioka, was an agronomist, a teacher, a diplomat and a statesman. He noted in his article Fujin to nan'yo hatten (Women and the Southward Expansion) that the women had a high status in the Philippines. In other articles, he said he was in favor of Japanese emigration to the Philippines, that at that time, he did not believe the Philippines to be capable of independence. Moreover, he believed the U.S. to be doing the Philippines a good deed in civilizing the Filipinos.

Tsurumi Yusuke, a politician and a statesman of the Taisho and Showa periods served in the Lower House of the Japanese Diet and filled other government positions. His views clearly smacked of bias and prejudice. He had doubts about the Filipinos' ability to build a great nation. He believed, just like Consul Iwaya, that Filipinos (similar to Malaysians and Koreans) became senile at an early age. Although he noted that the children he observed in Tondo were smart, he was sure that by the time they reached the age of 17 or 18, they would lose their smartness due to premature aging (Ibid.:52).

To doubly handicap Filipinos, not only did he declare their biological inability for greatness, he also described their so-called cultural inability. He did not like the Filipino sense of beauty and art. Filipinos, he observed, were fond of glaring colors, like red. To him, this color preference was proof that they did not have a proper sense of color and beauty (Ibid.).

He considered Filipinos as proud of their European heritage (wearing Spanish clothes and speaking in Spanish). He thought that Filipinos looked down on Japanese because the latter were non-Christians and because their carts were pulled by rickshaw men (jinrikisha). He thought Filipinos were arrogant. He criticized an article by a Filipino who ranked the Philippines with Japan and China as three great Oriental countries and called on these three to join hands.

Tsurumi reacted strongly with the following condescending questions: "What right did the Philippines have to boast of being a chosen people of the Orient? If Spanish and American cultures were removed, the Philippines would have nothing. Can a country that dons a borrowed dress, a country without dignity, be called great?" He thought the Filipinos did not consider themselves Asians.

Ironically,however, Tsurumi also commented that "behind the mask of a Filipino was an Oriental heart" (Ibid.:57). This constant reference to Filipinos being Orientals and the grief expressed over the lost Oriental culture of the Philippines was echoed by Miki Kiyoshi, a philosopher trained in Kyoto and Europe, and well-versed in Buddhist and German philosophy. He thought he had struck gold when he saw the Filipinos looking out of the window and staring at emptiness, heard their traditional music, and saw their attitude of resignation in the face of problems and death. He thought this resembled the Oriental philosophy of "nothingness." But he said, due to the tropical climate, he did not find this "nothingness" as profound as the Japanese concept. It lacked depth. Its hollowness was the same as the emptiness of the beautiful sunset over Manila Bay — a beauty without depth.

He said Filipinos were reserved and polite but these ways were devoid of any philosophical basis, in contrast to the ways of the Japanese and Chinese (Ibid.:258).

He thought that though the Filipinos were once proud of their race, due to American rule, they had developed an inferiority complex towards the white race (Ibid.).

An article by Miyama, a technical expert in the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce described Filipinos as lazy and explained these as a consequence of their living in a country and a climate where they did not have to worry about food, shelter, clothing and the future (Ibid.:67).

After this long litany of negative views of Japanese in official and semi-official positions, it is heartening to note that there were other views that were more positive.

Tsuchiya, in his book Philippine Travels, described his three-month travel in the Philippines, from north to south. In explaining the so-called "laziness" of the Filipinos, he agreed with Jose Rizal that the Spanish oppression contributed to the Filipino lack of motivation to work and a wrong educational system for the dislike of manual work. He said that Filipinos were no lazier than Japanese who suffered under the bakufu oppression (Ibid.:81).

He was optimistic about the future of Filipino industries. "He judged Filipinos to be skillful and intelligent and believed that their natural abilities

could be developed by sending them to Japan for training" (Ibid.:82). He believed that the Philippines was behind the times but in time, it would gradually catch up.

Kobayashi Asakichi, formerly a journalist in China and Korea, was in the Philippines in 1919. He put the blame of Filipino weakness not on the genes but on the environment and social conditions. He said that without the barriers, "an eminent Oriental race will emerge on the world stage" (Ibid.:86). His analysis of the low quality of Filipino culture was that Spanish oppression and abuses of the friars had slowed down its development (Ibid.:86). He also explained the low intellectual ability of Filipinos to be due to the lack of education and the hot climate. Aside from the climate, he cited other factors that hindered mental development of the Filipinos: 1) habit of smoking while still a child, and 2) living in isolation. Houses were built quite far apart, making social contact and mutual intellectual stimulation difficult.

He observed the high social status of Filipino women only in Manila. He did not think that the status of women was intimidatingly high in such provinces as Cebu, Iloilo and the town of Tayabas (Ibid.:87). Although he had heard of happy marriages between Japanese men and Filipinas, he thought that the Japanese men did not want to marry Filipino women because they were intimidated by the high social status.

Generally, the Chinese were observed to be better businessmen than the Filipinos. Kobayashi attributed this to the Chinese being more diligent,having more capital for investment, the Spanish oppression, the natural business acumen of the Chinese and to the Filipino weakness in mathematics.

Another optimistic note came from Hoshi Atsujiko, a Japanese school teacher, publisher and writer and a resident of Davao since 1917. Hoshi found Filipinos to be "hospitable to their relatives, friends and even strangers. Since they did not care about saving, they did not mind spending for other people. Secondly, they were flexible. This characteristic had enabled the Japanese to enter the Philippines and engage in business, in spite of the laws against them" (Ibid.:262).

Views of Japanese Students and Professors

Between 1937 and 1940, four Philippine-Japan Student Conferences (Nippi Gakusei Kaigi) were held. The first and third were held in Tokyo while the other two were held in Manila.

Impressions of the participants in the Second Philippine-Japan Conference were published in the Philippine-Japan Quarterly. Images which struck the students most were: the nipa hut, the calesa (horse-drawn carriage) and the young students neatly dressed in white shirts. They considered Andres Bonifacio, Jose Rizal and Emilio Aguinaldo as exemplifying Filipino patriotism. Other qualities observed in the Filipinos were: patience, optimism and talent for music.

As noted by the other Japanese cited, the students found the Filipinos to be westernized. They described Philippine culture as Americanized and having an overabundance of foreign influences without any sign of discriminate selection (Ibid.:228).

Participants in the Fourth Conference held similar views of the Philippines as those in the Second Conference. They also labeled the Filipinos "lazy" when economic problems were discussed.

The Japanese professors who accompanied the students in both conferences were also of diverse opinions. Whereas Itani Zen'ichi, professor of the then Tokyo University of Commerce (presently Hitotsubashi University) seemed supportive of Filipinos, Matsushita Masatoshi, professor of International Law at Rikkyo University, on the other hand, was quite prejudiced and felt superior to Filipinos (Ibid.:233-34). Negishi Yoshitaro of Rikkyo University thought the Philippines lucky to have a President in the person of Manuel L. Quezon.

Political Views

Politically viewed, the Philippines was judged to be unprepared for independence. Tanaka Giichi, two times War Minister (1918-1921; 1923-24) and Prime Minister of Japan from April 1927 to June 1929 visited the Philippines in May 1922. He noted that "even if the Philippines were given independence, the country, due to lack of racial and cultural unity, a weak economy and a weak national defense, would find it difficult to maintain its independence without the support of a stronger power, or agreement among the powers to protect it" (Ibid.: 121).

The value of the Philippines to Japan was emphasized then as it is now. "Due to its location, the status of the Philippines would affect Japan's security..." Aside from considerations of national defense, the Philippines was also a significant source of raw materials for Japan.

Watanabe Kaoru was concerned about the Philippine economic independence as it was financially unstable. He noted that the fat salaries of government officials was one cause of the imbalance between government earnings and

expenditures. He did not think that decreasing the salaries of these Filipino officials would be feasible (although it was a desirable measure) since "Filipinos had gotten used to the American way of life and could not at all be satisfied with making both ends meet with their own earnings" (Ibid.).

Watanabe suggested projects for the Philippine government to raise revenues which were a reflection of his impressions that Filipinos loved gambling and entertainment.

He emphasized Japan's role in helping the Philippines after it gained independence since he thought government officials would think of furthering only their own interest, that people would be dissatisfied and would protest while the government would try to suppress such a reaction. This matriarchal attitude towards the Philippines was echoed by Matsushita Masatoshi who considered the Philippines as a "jewel yet to be polished, but she cannot polish herself. Japan has to show her how, for she does not know her potentialities" (Ibid.:261).

Like Tanaka and Watanabe, Imamura Chusuke, a pan-Asianist, believed that the obstacles to Philippine independence were: lack of unity, economic problems,and over-subservience to authority. This over-subservience he blamed on the European, American and Chinese influences. Filipinos had been taught under the colonial rule to treat the white race as superior to them. The Chinese had been, since olden times, subservient to authority (Ibid.:179).

Imamura pointed to the excessive Chinese blood which had mixed with the Malayan blood of Filipinos — that instead of the good qualities of the Chinese, he noted that the Filipinos got the many weaknesses such as "love of gambling, using money to corrupt the government and to bow to its authority and being tricky" (Ibid.:180).

Mikami Keicho (1877-1921), the branch manager of Mitsui Bussan, assigned to Manila in 1912 was, on the other hand, sympathetic towards the Philippines' fight for independence. He believed that the Philippines was politically ready for independence and that Japan could provide for these needs.

Miki Kiyoshi found Philippine society to be feudal as seen in the system of land ownership and it was democratic only in the sense that Filipinos love to talk (Ibid.:259).

Views from the Japanese in Davao

The Japanese in Davao comprised a good number of the Japanese who were in the Philippines in the 1920s. In 1926, they numbered 5,452. Thirteen years

after (1939), they had already reached a total of 17,888.

A well-known personality then in Davao was Furukawa Yoshizo, founder of the Furukawa Plantation Co., Inc. After having graduated from the Agricultural College of Tokyo Imperial University in 1913 , and a visit to the plantations of the Ota Development Corporation in Davao in 1914, he was inspired to set up his own plantation. From a capital of P100,000.00 in 1914, it had grown to P10 million in 1941. In his 35 years of business experience in the Philippines, he found the Filipinos to be a "very jealous and revengeful people, inflexible and legalistic.They had a tendency to interpret laws literally; were fond of legal and judicial arguments and readily brought even trivia matters to judicial courts for solution" (Ibid.:139). He did admit that part of the jealousy of the Filipinos regarding land problems was due to their desire for independence.

Masaki Kichizaemon was for many years one of the directors of the Ota Development Corporation. He saw Filipinos as either pro or anti-Japanese. He was hopeful though that Filipinos would remain hospitable to Japanese labor and capital as his corporation had vested interests in the Philippines.

The Okinawans in Davao, who made up the majority of the Japanese in the place, were quite sensitive about their being compared to other nationals. "They did not want to be below or on the level of non-Christian Filipinos around them. They had to be better than them... They could accept that their culture might be deficient and lower than the culture of the Japanese majority but could not accept that the Koreans, Taiwanese and Filipino minorities might have a higher culture than them" (Ibid.:151).

Views On Hygiene and Security

Yzaburo Okabe, in his article on hygiene in the tropical areas advised the Japanese to regularly check structures which were separated from the main house. This was for sanitary reasons. He noted that "natives do not have the sense for hygiene. If you rely on natives to do the cooking, they would usually leave waste food matters and other garbage lying around..." (Dakudao, 1990:68).

He noted that "natives relieve themselves in rivers, streams and trenches" (Ibid.:69) and advised the Japanese to adopt the use of the new type of toilet which made use of a septic tank. He thought that it was advisable to copy the "natives and some Europeans [who] would usually clean themselves using water after discharging their bodily wastes as it "does not irritate the skin, cleans better, and gives a feeling of comfort" (Ibid.). He also warned the Japanese about 1) natives who are usually afflicted with malaria and who do not give any indication of pain or illness they are suffering from and 2) native servants who

steal (Ibid.:70).

Such fear for their lives and property was reflected in an architectural modification adopted by the Japanese. The nipa hut of the Filipino usually had a space below the house used for storage. The Japanese also had such storage space but they kept this walled to keep the processed abaca from being stolen. Bagobos were feared by the Japanese as they were said to enter the farmsteads at liberty. The Japanese faced the problem of defining boundaries in view of the Bagobo's claim that the Japanese were invading their ancestral lands. The Bagobos were known to spear their enemies from under the floor while the latter were asleep.

To sum up the Japanese attitudes towards the Philippines and the Filipinos, during this period, we can say that:

1) The Philippines was seen as a land of promise where Japanese could go and build a new life;

2) Filipinos were seen

   a) by most officials as incapable of political and economic independence; not having the biological ability let alone the cultural ability to become great.

   b) by many Japanese groups as hospitable and musically-talented.

   c) by students and professors in a positive as well as negative light.

   d) as inferior to the Japanese and the westerners.

   e) as Orientals and yet westernized.

   f) as possessing certain negative traits such as laziness, dishonesty, carelessness in decision-making, lacking of originality, etc.

   g) as giving the women high status in the society.

3. Explanations were given for the condition of the Philippines and the Filipinos which put the blame on so-called characteristic or inherited traits (e.g., from the Chinese) to environmental conditions (educational system, hot weather, etc.).

Pre-War: How the Filipinos Viewed the Japanese

There were varying views of the Japanese, both good and bad. The Japanese women in the Philippines were seen as "female barbers, yayas, flirtatious wives, nightclub singers, and waitresses. Men, on the other hand were viewed as craftsmen, samurai, rough husbands, apa vendors" (Wada, as cited in Jose, 1990). This image of the Japanese changed as more college graduates and professionals (engineers, agronomists, etc.) and laborers came to the Philippines. Some engaged in manufacturing, others in business and trade, while still others entered the professional fields. They were considered "an asset to the community." They were seen as energetic, industrious, resourceful, thrifty, neat, clean, honest, law-abiding and with a sense of organization. Those who came from poor prefectures could endure hardship and were used to toiling long hours" (Jose, op.cit.:19).

In Davao, Japanese carpenters were known for their efficiency and were favored and hired by the local residents. These carpenters were famous for their "discipline, diligence and economy ... Some old-timers believed that a pair of Japanese carpenters could perform construction work equivalent to the output of three Chinese or five Filipino carpenters..." (Dakudao, op.cit.:113). They were "orderly and systematic that no time was wasted as they labored on the job site from eight to five, without any breaks in between.They always reported on the site with their carpentry tools already prepared and sharpened." (Ibid.). Not only did the Japanese carpenters accomplish their work in record time.

The Japanese who were better off in Davao were seen to have taken on western ways, such as living in western-style houses which were similar to those of the upper class of Davao's society. "The ordinary elevated house of a non-Okinawan contained a porch, living room, and a bath and toilet serviced by a septic tank " (Ibid.:120). However, despite the adoption of such structures,they were noted to have kept to their old habits once inside the house."The moment the Japanese entered his house, away from the view of the Filipinos and foreigners... in Davao, he will start his Japanese way of living. He may have furniturelike chairs, sofa,tables,but sitting on the floor was still more comfortable for him."

However, the Japanese were seen as careful not to put themselves in a position that would make them look inferior to the Filipinos as they felt themselves superior to the Filipinos. For educated Filipinos, sitting on the floor was unacceptable. This was something only rural folks would do... "The Japanese were careful in their ways that Filipinos would not belittle them" (Ibid.).

Prejudice against the Okinawans by mainland Japanese was carried over to the Philippines. In the 1920's a report of the Japanese Vice Consul to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reflected this attitude. Okinawans were praised for their thriftiness, simplicity and respectful ways with elders and superiors. But they were put down by the longer list of bad points they were supposed to show: "being provincial, low culture, non-cooperation with other prefectures, pre-occupation with money, individualistic, profit-oriented, weak in morality, bigoted, dishonest, unprincipled, with no leader who is sufficiently knowledge-able, uneducated, etc." (Yu, op.cit.:147-48).

Filipinos called the Okinawans "otro Hapon" (the other Japanese). In fact, in Davao, "Filipino residents teased Filipinos who do not dress properly 'daw Okinawa' (like an Okinawan)" (Ibid.:28). There was a derogatory note to this as Okinawans, especially the women, were often seen wearing the yukata (a loose robe, open in front) and walking around like "women of loose morals" (Ibid.:148). These Okinawans were also described as controlled emigrants" as they usually left Japan to fill up a position ready and waiting for them in the Philippines. Conditions at home had less to do with their decision to go than the need for his services.They were considered less intelligent and had less initiative than the "free emigrant" (Dakudao, op.cit.:29).

The Japanese that settled in Davao and Manila could be seen in the various areas of economic life. They had restaurants, tailoring and dress shops, bakeries, dry goods and grocery stores like Osaka Bazaar, construction and building materials stores, photography shops, etc. In the 1930's, they increased their participation in retail activities. They dominated the hemp and lumber production in Davao. Water transportation along the gulf of Davao was also in their hands. Despite their economic affluence at that time, an old-timer of Davao recalls that "there was no racial discrimination shown among the different nationalities co-existing in Davao... Everybody just went about his own business earning a living. Davao was so young and so cosmopolitan" (Ibid.:42).

A content analysis of 6,000 short stories published in Liwayway, the most popular Tagalog magazine was done. Of this, 2,107 were written from 1922-1941 and 3,983 were written from 1946-1983. As cited in the previous paragraphs, the image of the Japanese was generally favorable. They were depicted as friends of the Filipino. The men were known as being asal-dakila (noble in character, fair, honest and sportsmanlike). Japanese women were also described positively. They were maganda (beautiful), mabango (good smelling) and mayumi (feminine, demure). The almond eyes of the Japanese were described as singkit, which during the period was still taken positively (Terami-Wada, 1984).

On the less positive side, they were also seen as "intruders and a threat." Since they worked harder than the Filipinos, did not mix with them (let alone

intermarry with Filipinos), did not become Christian, they were not very well understood and some Filipinos looked at them with suspicion (Jose, 1990:19).

Japan was seen by Gen. Artemio Ricarte and Vicente Sotto, the former newspaper publisher, as a "source of inspiration, a light to Asia and the Philippines, the liberator from western colonialism." However, there were others like Claro M. Recto who warned others about Japan's expansionist ambitions (Ibid.:20). The American military in the Philippines also saw Japan as a major threat. This view was shared by Filipino officers trained in West Point (Ibid.).

Whether seen as a military threat or as a political saviour, the more outstanding image of Japan was economic, more than anything else. Jose (op.cit.:23-24) categorizes the Japanese at that time into five groups: 1) the intellectuals (government officials, professionals and entrepreneurs), 2) the merchants, 3)the fishermen, 4) the carpenters and other artisans and 5) the non-skilled workers.

Filipinos, in general remained unmindful of the threat that Japan posed. So, despite the various measures to limit immigration of Japanese to the Philippines and to protect local industries, for the Filipinos, the Japanese were still "the good, loyal gardeners, photographers, barbers and halo-halo vendors... Japanese goods were cheaper than American ones, but they broke easily.'Laruang Hapon'(Japanese toy) came to mean something broken easily. And since the Japanese kept these things to themselves, few people knew them well.(Ibid.:29).

The Second World War took its toll on both sides. Bitter sentiments attached to the war prevail but there seems less of it from the Japanese side than from the Philippine side.

Post-War: Filipino Migrant Workers

The biggest Filipino group that is now the focus of attention in Japan is the group of entertainers. According to Minister Morihasa Aoki, consul general of the Japanese Embassy in the Philippines, "there are some 30,000 legal Filipino workers and 45,000 to 50,000 illegal Filipino workers at any given time in Japan" (Manila Bulletin, June 17, 1989: 1;16). Visa applications continue to rise, "soaring since 1985 at about the time when oil prices dropped and there was less demand for workers in the Middle East" (Ibid.:16). According to official Embassy figures, Filipinos made up the largest number of illegally staying foreigners apprehended in Japan from 1985 to 1987. But in 1988, they placed third, next to Bangladesh and Pakistan nationals in the number of illegal foreigners deported.

Problems of Filipino migrant workers, especially those who are working illegally, run the whole gamut, from "nonpayment of salaries, violation of contracts, sexual exploitation, unreasonable custody, withholding of passports and tickets, and physical violence (Ibid.).

The stories of Filipinas who have gone crazy because of the ordeals they go through in Japan or those who die because of maltreatment are numerous enough to keep various non-governmental organizations to continuously attend to the needs of these women in crisis. These include the HELP (House in Emergency of Love and Peace), Filipino Workers' Social Center, Asian Laborers Solidarity, and Bahay ni Maria Crisis Center.

Due to the high cost of living in Japan, workers must bear with austere accommodations. They live in flophouses where about 30 people can stay. A room measuring 3.3 sq. meters, with only a bed and cover, cost Y800 a night (Ibid.).

Aside from deplorable living conditions, Filipinos also suffer discrimination, exploitation and verbal insults. "Employees yell bakaero. But the workers have conditioned themselves to think that the expression means baka or beef and therefore oishii (delicious), just to lessen the pain" (Manila Bulletin, June 20, 1989:16).

Japanese Response to the Plight of Filipino Workers

There have been various responses to the Filipino workers. Starting from the Japanese Embassy in the Philippines stringent screening has been applied. By the end of 1988, of a total of 95,337 applicants for visas, only 74,245 were issued (Manila Bulletin, June 17, 1989:16). In Japan, the government's restrictive policies have cut down by about 40% the number of entertainers being deployed to Japan (The Manila Bulletin, May 7, 1989:47). Of late, the new law regarding illegal workers has caused anxiety among Filipinos illegally staying in Japan but they are standing their ground.

A volunteer of the Asian Laborers Solidarity and vice president of the Nagoya Bar Association, Lawyer Kiyoshi Inagaki has championed the cause of four Filipino women "who were forcibly detained, raped, pushed into prostitution and physically harmed by their Japanese employer and his staff" (Ibid.).

"Some Japanese students of Tagalog at the Sophia University have expressed the desire to learn the dialect to be able to help other Filipinos in distress, whom they encounter on their jobs. Among the students are a volunteer in an

emergency shelter, a policeman, a prison employee, and a journalist who has been writing about the plight of Filipinos in Japan" (Ibid.).

On the other hand, a Japanese priest describes the reaction of Japanese Catholics to Filipinos as "the kind of people who would do anything for money. Japanese feel allergic to Filipinos. Associating with them scares you that you will catch some infectious disease" (The Manila Bulletin, June 22, 1989:20). This sentiment is supported by Minister Aoki as he describes the "developing resentment for Filipinos" because these "exploited Filipinos chose to go to Japan under false declarations and documents" (Ibid.:1). He adds that "it is primarily the fault of Filipino girls who travel in the guise of tourists and then seek a job as an entertainer and end up being maltreated and exploited" (Ibid.:20). Moreover, he continues to say that "the conditions and plight of the illegal workers are not helping to promote respect of the Japanese for the Filipino people" (Ibid.).

As of 1989, the saving grace seemed to be "President Aquino who, among the heads of government who arrived in Japan to attend the funeral of Emperor Hirohito, earned the respect of the Japanese. She arrived with the smallest entourage, wore black clothes all the while, and refused to wear any fur" (Ibid.). But with the 1989 December coup and the poor economic growth, plagued by scheduled brown-outs, it remains to be seen as to what can be the redeeming aspect of the Philippines as far as Japan is concerned.

Japanese Students' Perception

A survey of 100 high school students in Saitama University made by Prof. Takao Taguchi (The Manila Times, June 1, 1988) showed interesting results. It showed that they did not even know where the Philippines was located. Almost all (97%) thought the Philippines was in South America. The other three percent thought it was in East Asia and Africa. Filipinos were described to be practical (32%), arrogant (23%), diligent (16%), pioneering (18%), and discriminatory (11%).

A majority (71%) answered correctly that Mrs. Corazon Aquino was president. The same percentage answered that Christianity was the main religion in the Philippines. Only a little over half (55%) correctly answered "Manila" as the capital of the Philippines.

Television and radio (50%) were the main media through which they learned about the Philippines. This was followed by textbooks and magazines (31%) and newspapers (12%).

A majority considered the existing relationship between the Philippines and Japan as very important (63%) and somewhat important (18%).

However, a smaller percentage were willing to translate this favorable impression to reality. When asked if they wished to travel to the Philippines, only 17% said they "would like to go very much" and 21% said they "would like to go." There were a little more who did not wish to go (44%).

A study done on Filipino-Japanese couples (Samonte, 1986) showed Japanese husbands to be generally satisfied with their marital life. But Japanese husbands living in Japan were shown to be more satisfied than Japanese husbands living in the Philippines. Japanese wives married to Filipino husbands and living in the Philippines were also not too satisfied with family income.

In a recent survey of 34,925 small and medium scale companies in the manufacturing sector all over Japan, 9,060 companies responded, representing a 26% response rate. About a third, 2,766 companies (30.5%), indicated their interest in overseas investment, either in ASEAN or in other countries. Of those who expressed interest, 59.8% identified one or more ASEAN countries as their preferred investment destination. It must be noted however,that among the five ASEAN countries, the Philippines was the last preference. Moreover, at present, it has the smallest number (53) of Japanese companies, with Thailand (172) and Singapore (101) at the forefront (ASEAN, 1990:14). Concerns of these potential investors are seen through the following anticipated problems: 1) shortage of Japanese representatives (63.1%), 2) relation with local partner (59.2%), 3) shortage of information about the local market, business customs and regulations (44.6%), 4) labor management (36.2%), 5) local political condition (34.1%), 6) immaturity of related industries such as sub-contractors and parts suppliers (31.0%). It is interesting to note that only a third indicated concern about the political condition. But one must put this in the proper time perspective since the study was conducted before the coup in December 1989. A more recent survey would be useful to see if such concerns have increased in intensity.

Interviews with various Japanese who have lived in the Philippines have pointed to more positive attitudes at the end of their stay. When asked what they liked about the Philippines, invariably they answer, the people, their warmth, their friendliness, their humanity. As one man put it, it was in the Philippines where he discovered what it was to be human. That it was all right to feel and to express one's feelings. Another stated that despite his being back in Japan, he still felt close to his Filipino friends, that distance and time do not present any problem or gap.

There are also criticisms about the Filipinos, e.g., the corruption in government, the people who don't seem to try harder to find work, the increasing

number of Filipinos who are leaving the Philippines. Much concern is expressed about the future of the Philippines.

How the Filipinos View the Japanese

Filipinos hold different attitudes towards the Japanese. It is often described as a love-hate relationship. A newspaper feature reports a social worker's view: "the tragedies of Filipinos in Japan rekindle the ill feelings of Filipinos towards the Japanese, remembering the cruelty and killings by the Japanese during World War II" (The Manila Bulletin, June 22, 1989:20). Such reports have created a stereotype of the Japanese as being "ruthless employers, wife beaters and sex starved tourists."

Ann-Ann (Midweek, April 12, 1989:9-10;12) says that the "image of Pinays in Japan is so bad that Japanese cops won't ever touch the women when they fingerprint them. Baka raw mahawa sila (they might catch whatever these women have). At the Japanese immigration, captured TNTs ("Tago ng Tago," which literally means "Constantly hiding from authorities") are handcuffed and tied at the waist."

Ann-Ann, one of the many girls who came to Japan to work, was deceived and forced to work as a hospitality girl instead of a receptionist. Although she tried to escape the first time, she was traced, captured by the Yakuzas and beaten so badly that her "forehead was twice its size, her jaws were swollen, her neck dark from the strangling and her back, thighs and legs were blackened with bruises." She escaped a second time and is now working with the National Council of Churches in the Philippines trying to help the Japayukis. She says, "I'm willing to help just to stop more Pinays from going to Japan" (Ibid.).

A study of 15 Filipina entertainers from various barrios in Hagonoy, Bulacan and Manila (Flores, 1989) shows a different picture from that painted by Ann-Ann. These Filipinas were also forced to go to Japan because of their sad economic situation. Coming from large families (on the average 6-7 bothers and sisters), a majority (9) were not able to go to college, while almost half, (6) of them had parents who were not working. A little over half were also not working before their departure for Japan. Almost all (11) were still single. Most of these women viewed the role of the woman as one of service to the family. Herein lies their main motivation for working in Japan.

When asked about the status of Japanese women as compared to men, the prevailing views reflected a whole range, from very traditional views to more liberal ones. The traditional views are seen in such statements as:

1) "Pagdating sa bahay ng asawang lalaki, galing sa club, lasing, diretso sa higaan. Ang babae, hindi magtatanung-tanong."

2) "Ang papa-san namin, dalawa ang asawa, pero doon siya umuuwi sa mama-san namin. Okay lang kay mama-san kahit umuwi sa no. 2 ang lalaki."

3) "Ang number one sa Hapon [ay] trabaho. Pangalawa lang ang babae."

4) "Sa desisyon, lalaki talaga ang masusunod."

5) "Sa trabaho, mas malaki ang suweldo ng lalaki."

6) [Ang babae] "Mayroon silang time paglabas at may time bawat kilos. May pakialaman. Pero ang lalaki, libreng-libre."

7) "Sa mag-asawa, pag hindi umuwi ang asawa mo, hindi ka kikibo basta may pagkain ka. Pagdating ng lalaki, dapat nakahanda na ang pagkain at damit niya."

More liberated views are expressed as in these statements:

1) "Ang babae, kahit may asawa, puede pang kumabit sa ibang lalaki. Tanggap na iyon. Puede kahit ilang lalaki."

2) "Ang babae, gusto ang maraming asawa. Ang lalaki, playboy din."

3) "Nabibigyan din ng mataas na posisyon ang mga babae."

4) "Liberated sila. After high school, puede nang bumukod kahit wala pa silang pamilya. Karamihan sa kanila, self-supporting sa pag-aaral."

5) "Sa parehong trabaho, parehong suweldo."

6) "Una ang babae sa paglalakad doon."

7) "Kapag galing sa trabahó hindi man lang ipinaghahain ang lalaki. Kusang kakain na lang ang lalaki."

The two sets of statements reflect the juxtaposition of two sets of values now prevailing in Japan as seen in the latest study of the national character of Japanese (Tokei Suri Kenkyujo, 1989). For example, as compared to the Second Survey conducted in 1958, there are more respondents in 1988 who are acknowledging no differences between abilities of men and women (p.58).

There is also a continued decrease, from 73% in 1953 to 28% in 1988, among those who would adopt a child to continue one's family line if one had no children. There is conversely an increase among those who would not adopt a child, 16% vs. 52% (p.57). Certainly, there are also more women who would prefer to be reborn as a woman and less of those who prefer to be reborn as a man. However, answers to other traditional and non-traditional questions have remained basically the same through 35 years of survey.

How were these 15 Filipinas treated by the Japanese, particularly, as compared to how Japanese women were treated?

Although there were statements (3) to say that there was no difference, there were more views citing differences in salary, benefits,and human relations. Clearly, differences in salary showed the Japanese women's advantage. Usually the difference was double that of the Filipina's salary. Benefits seemed to favor Filipinas, if one took a listing of these (free transportation, food, lodging, rice, medicine when figuring in an accident during work hours, water, electricity). They were also allowed to take tips from customers.

Interestingly enough, there were more statements which portrayed favorable treatment of Filipinas. These came in two themes:

1) Filipinas were more respected than the Japanese women, i.e., they cannot be touched and pawed as easily as the Japanese, and

2) Filipinas were better liked because they were affectionate, loving, clean and knew how to handle their man.

When asked about the difference in status, reasons given by the Filipinas for Japanese women having a higher status than them focused more on Japanese women having the same blood as the Japanese men. As for the status of Filipinas being higher, the reasons focused more on certain attributes (both physical and otherwise), obligations of the contract, and being a foreigner, as shown in the following statements:

Physical attribute : "Iba ang ganda ng Pilipina.
Maganda ang kulay... Gustong-gusto nila ang ating mata."

Other attributes : "Mas malambing ang Pilipina. Ang Pinay kahit kapirasong tinapay na lang ang hawak, hahatian pa ang Hapon."

"Ang mga gusto ng lalaki, nakikita nila sa Pilipina."

"Dahil nakikisama ang Pilipina kahit na masama ang ugali ng Hapon.

Obligations of the contract : Kami under contract." Sagot nila kahit anuman ang mangyari sa amin."

Being a foreigner : "Dahil parang guest ang turing sa amin."
"Dahil taga-ibang bansa kami."

Responses of Students

A 1982 study of attributes of 270 Filipino university students (Howell, Carlos, et.al. 19?) showed that all scores became more positive in the interim between 1970 and 1982, with the most positive scores expressed towards Japan. On the other hand, another study, this time of children, showed that of all the children from 10 different countries, Filipino children (n=120) had the lowest score when the image of the Japanese was measured (Tsujimura, Furuhata, Akuto, 1987:265). However after seeing a movie on Japan, they also registered the biggest change towards a more positive image of the Japanese. It was argued that the relatively low scores may have been due to the fact that, of the 10 countries, the Philippines was the only one that experienced Japanese atrocities during the Second World War. Such experiences are reflected in the history books used in Philippine schools.

A study of the Filipino elites' image of Japan and the Japanese people (Carlos, 1989), where 63% of the 95 respondents were university students, 20% academics and 17% foreign service officers, also showed a positive view of Japan (84%) and the Japanese (73%). Japan as a country was perceived as "prosperous, economically developed and politically stable." The main rationale for such a view was Japan's impressive economic development since World War II (41%). When asked about the things usually associated with Japan, 69% gave answers relating to technology and electronics, and 28% to business, industry and economy." A little less than half (45%) favored close cooperation between the two countries. Strangely, 37% said they would like to see "friendly but not close cooperation with Japan."

The Japanese people were viewed as hardworking, honest, reliable, efficient and courteous. Economic development (13%) and personal or vicarious experience with Japanese (13%) were given as reasons for such a positive view. Only seven percent (7%) of respondents thought that the Japanese had qualities worth emulating. Some of these qualities are : dedication to duty (93%) respect for elders (56%), consensus society (31%), non-confrontative stance in human relations (19%) and Japan as one whole family with the emperor as head (13%).

A third (35%) of the respondents were willing to have a Japanese as a best friend while 33% were willing to have Japanese as a neighbor. However, only 10% were willing to marry a Japanese.

Those who held a negative view of Japan(11%) and the Japanese (16%) saw Japan as autocratic, meddlesome, and with imperialist tendencies. Other reasons given were abuse of Filipinos working in Japan (1%), Japanese syndicates operating in at the Philippines (1%) and negative experiences in Japan (1%).

The current relationship between Japan and the Philippines is viewed by 55% of the respondents to have improved while 16% believed that it has deteriorated. About one fourth (23%) said that there was no difference. Some factors cited as contributory to the improved relations were: foreign aid from Japan (54%), cultural interchange (43%) and scholarship and exchange professors programs (43%). The deterioration in relations is caused by such factors as sex tours (63%), problems related to Filipino domestics in Japan (55%), reported covert operations of Japanese tourist groups (32%), increasing incidence of kidnappings of Japanese nationals (31%) and perception of Japan's increased militarism (16%).

In another study which the author conducted among thirty (30) students from the University of the Philippines showed views on various aspects of Japan and the Japanese. Results showed that as a people, the Japanese were generally viewed positively, with "hardworking" as the most dominant trait. This was also the major characteristic describing the Japanese worker. The study also revealed a negative view of the Japanese male and businessman and tourist. The Japanese businessman was usually associated with Yakuzas, being sex-minded, rich and wearing a suit. Japanese tourists were seen as basically sex-oriented. The Japanese male was stereotypically characterized as short, chinky-eyed and bow-legged. The Japanese female, was however, frequently associated with the Geisha. She was characterized as exotic and submissive.

Japanese products such as cameras, cars and electronics were generally seen positively as durable, advanced, using high technology. The Japanese company was viewed as big, rich and progressive. At the same time, it was also seen as manipulative, demanding and exploitative.

Another study looked into the impressions of Filipino students who served as hosts of Japanese participants in the Iwate Cruising Seminar (Cruz, 1989). The age range of these students was 17-29. Some of the characteristics of the Japanese that were most liked by Filipinos were: politeness, generosity, thoughtfulness, simplicity, cleanliness. Those they did not like at all were: the low

regard for women, lack of effort to learn and speak English, the men smoking a lot, and their materialistic orientation. The Iwate guests were seen as polite, respectful, group-oriented, friendly, generous and reserved.

Two studies deal with the attitudes of participants in the 21st Century Friendship Program (Santamaria, 1989; Samonte, Santamaria, et.al. 1990). The first study, which compared participants' views with non-participants, showed differences in perception along several characteristics. Participants viewed the Japanese to be less competitive and less serious. As a nation, they saw Japan to be more philanthropic than did the non-participants. Comparing the different types of participants with the non-participants, those who were government employees saw Japan as more autocratic. Students showed the greatest differences in perception, compared to non-participants; teachers showed the least.

The second study was a content analysis of 35 essays. Of a total of 423 statements, the majority (75.65%) referred to Japan while the rest referred to the Friendship Programme. The most dominant aspect of Japan was the impressions of the Japanese people which constituted 37.59% of all statements regarding Japan. Frequently mentioned characteristics of the Japanese were: disciplined, hospitable, sincere and honest, good leadership, united, respectful of elders, efficient and hardworking.

As a country, Japan was seen to have a stable government. Moreover, Japan was seen as modern powerful force, beautiful, adaptable and compassionate.

Needless to say, the essays consisted of glowing, positive impressions with only a few descriptions that one could categorize as negative (materialistic tendencies, youth-carefree attitudes and unaware of Japan's efforts, timid, slaves of man). The Programme which consists of a one-month-all-expenses-paid tour of Japan has done a lot, as based on the statements of participants, to work towards improving Japan's image. Whether it has achieved its goal of forging close relationships and fostering true friendship between Japan and ASEAN countries remains to be seen. But to start off with, Japan has established itself as a role-model, as seen in the participants' statements as: "we need to learn a lot from Japan; we need to change." Japan is now the standard against which the participants measure themselves and their own country.

In contrast to such a positive view of Japan, students who live longer in Japan, however, seem to develop a resentment and dislike for the Japanese. As one student puts it, "the longer you stay in Japan, the more you dislike the people..." By staying longer among them, "one sees their true colors." These are sentiments which need further investigation.

Filipino-Japanese Couples

The number of Filipino-Japanese couples has been increasing. Applications from Japanese men for certificates of eligibility to marry have been steadily increasing: from 654 in 1986 to 3,287 in 1988 (The Manila Bulletin, June 18, 1989: 18).

A study on Communication and Marital Satisfaction of Filipino-Japanese couples which I conducted five years ago showed that Filipino wives living in Japan indicated greater marital satisfaction than Filipino wives living in the Philippines. One area of high satisfaction was family income.

Philippine-Japan Economic Relations

Perceptions of the Philippine-Japanese economic cooperation are derived from three surveys. The first was a study commissioned by the Japan Centre for International Exchange (Villacorta and Bautista, 1982). The attitudes of 40 government officials, university professors and leading businessmen and civic leaders were gathered. Basically, the findings show that the respondents perceived trade with the Japanese as favoring the Japanese. They felt there was a need for more mutual benefits and better prices for Philippine products. Japanese businessmen were also found to be "ruthless, shrewed, profit-motivated and evasive." They were also seen as "aloof to rank and file, less communicative and less open-minded than their counterparts and unable to adjust to the local way of life."

The second survey of 162 middle class respondents was commissioned by the Institute of Developing Economies (Villacorta, 1982). In this survey, majority of the respondents (consisting of sales executives, practising professionals, academic people and businessmen) agreed that it was good for the Philippines to have Japan as an economic partner.

In the third survey, this time of 251 middle class respondents, Japan was frequently named a model for development, along with the U.S. As to the three Asian countries with whom the Philippines should develop close friendship, Japan ranked first, followed by China and Singapore (Villacorta, 1984).

Perceptions of Japan in the Press and the Political Sector

In the study of Terami-Wada (1984) cited previously, postwar images of the Japanese in the short stories showed that the image of Japanese women remained the same. The male Japanese was portrayed, until 1960, as asal halimaw (beastly in character), brutal and uncouth. However... in the 1946-1950 period, some stories included a good Japanese officer who was sympathetic to his Filipino friends of pre-war days. After 1960, the derogatory expressions disappeared but memories of the war lingered as themes.

Two themes on Japan are given coverage in the Filipino press : 1) Japan's economic assistance to the region, and 2) Japan's defense build-up plans (Villacorta, 19?). The U.S. military bases agreement being a hot issue, Japan, being a strong ally of the U.S. also becomes the perfect target of the Filipino nationalists' ire.

In an article of The Daily Yomiuri on April 2,1990, top-ranking communist guerrillas were said to have warned Japan against "giving official development assistance to projects which aid the Philippine government's counterinsurgency program... and projects that pollute the environment and deny farmers their land."

Filipino politicians, particularly the opposition, have tried to tell Japan not to extend any economic help to the Philippines as they "tend to lengthen the life of the government and prolong the people's suffering" (Bulletin Today April 27, 1984).

Only a few protest rallies have been directed towards the Japanese, however. A rally denouncing the Nakasone visit as the "second invasion" of the Philippines and Asia (Japan Times May 8, 1983) is one of them.

Socio-psychological Analysis

An examination and comparison of attitudes of Japanese and Filipinos regarding each other yield the following results:

There is a preponderance of stereotypes of both countries and people. Japanese were seen to be industrious and efficient while Filipinos were lazy and incapable. Stereotypes, which are natural categories used in social cognition, are intrinsic, essential, and a primitive aspect of cognition. Although ideally, one would want to avoid perceiving people in such a simplistic way, such a tendency is an integral part of cognition. When there is a lack or vagueness of information, the tendency is to adopt the prevailing attitudes. It must be noted that favorable

the tendency is to adopt the prevailing attitudes. It must be noted that favorable impressions of Filipinos and Japanese of each other come from those who have experienced the country for just a short time—from a few days (e.g., Iwate Cruising Seminar participants) to a month (e.g., 21st Century Friendship Programme). Interestingly, those who stay longer in each other's country seem to have less favorable impressions. The variable of time must be taken into consideration when studying such attitudes. Moreover, the types of people encountered and experiences one had must also be taken into consideration.

Much of the content of stereotypes is ethnocentrically evaluated, i.e., judged by the standards of the in-group (Brown, 1986:591). Thus, in the case of the Japanese, having categorized Filipinos as Oriental, therefore, they needed to behave like the Japanese did. Filipinos had to work hard as they did. Despite differences in historical background (e.g., Spanish colonization and oppression), climatic conditions (it is colder in Japan than in the Philippines where it is summer almost the year round), geographic and topographical characteristics, etc. the output as well as manner, attitude towards work were expected to be the same. Moreover, even though their religious affiliations were different, Filipinos were still expected to display somehow the Buddhist philosophy, as seen in Miki Kiyoshi's effort to interpret Filipinos' behavior. Tsurumi Yusuke's view that the Filipinos' preference for glaring colors like red did not fit in with the Japanese' preference for more subdued colors led him to conclude that Filipinos did not have a proper sense of color and beauty.

Stereotypes are also a reflection of political and economic relations at any given time (Ibid.:596). During the pre-war days, it must be remembered that the Japanese had vested interests in the Philippines. Many of its people had come to the Philippines in search of a better life. As they began to establish themselves, to a point where even Davao was called "Davaokuo" (Dakudao, op.cit.), they began to attract more attention. As they acquired more land and property, some tension and uneasiness were engendered on the part of the government and tribal groups like the Bagobos. The American government, at that time, started restricting immigration and the Japanese felt personally threatened by such a restriction. Such reactions prompted them to justify their presence in the Philippines and defend their economic interests.

To justify their presence, they pointed out that the Philippines was a "jewel that needed to be polished but did not know how" and Japan had the skills to teach Filipinos to accomplish this. They emphasized the Filipinos biological incapability (premature aging making them lose their smartness by age 17 or 18), lack of racial and cultural unity, a weak economy, etc., so that Japanese could take on its matriarchal role and take care of the Philippines, guiding its people and showing them how to accomplish their goals. Moreover, they described the Philipines as vast and unpopulated, needing manpower to develop

in the early 1900's was only 200,000) (Mizuno and Shimamura, 1987) and the inflow of Japanese immigrants should not have posed as a threat to the country.

Defending their economic interests, they phrased their good intentions in terms of altruism, that is, by developing such virgin lands as Davao and making full use of its potentials, the country would profit in the long run. At that point, however, the fact that both parties were mutually benefitting from the relationship made the symbiotic relationship quite an agreeable one.

However, the attempt to propagate the greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japan's imposition of its perception of how Asia and the Asians should be, and its aggression against and occupation of the Philippines and other Asian countries during the war became a turning point in Philippine-Japan relations. Whereas before the war, Japan was perceived as ally, (as she was sympathetic to the Filipino cause for independence), she was perceived to be a traitor mainly due to the above-mentioned moves. Good relations turned sour. The war caused chaos, damage to life and property and to the essential ingredient of human relationship, that is, trust.

It is not surprising, then that the once-neutral connotation of "chinky-eyed" was drastically transformed into something negative. Even at this point in time, a description of the typical Japanese as singkit at sakang (chinky-eyed and bow-legged) gives a more negative than positive connotation. It often goes with other negative characteristics such as "short, rough with women, and sex-starved." Following the principle of evaluative consistency, which states that good traits imply one another and bad traits likewise, such an association is expected.

The effects of the war is also seen in the study of school children (Tsujimura, Furuhata, Akuto, 1987) which showed the image of the Japanese to be the lowest for Filipino children. The exposure to reading material which describes the atrocities of the Japanese during the war gives support to the observation that even without direct experience, individuals hold stereotypes of other people. These stereotypes are usually gathered from the media. Could the Japanese media also have contributed to the Saitama high school students' perception that Filipinos were "practical, arrogant and pioneering ?"

The role of media cannot be underestimated. The play-up in the Japanese media of Filipino illegal workers sustain the negative image of Filipinos. A cursory review of newspapers, comics, magazines and TV program shows the Filipinos as sex objects, gun-runners, kidnappers, coup plotters, Smokey Mountain garbage pickers, and illegal workers. For the three months that the author was in Japan, the articles on the Philippines in the various dailies in Japan focused on negative issues: airplane crash, kidnapped/killed Japanese, discord over military bases, drought and brown-outs, and diminished economic growth.

This has sustained the negative image of the Philippines.

Using the resource theory of power, now that Japan has established itself as a formidable economic giant (enough to threaten the U.S. and make them engage in Japan bashing), she, in effect, is seen to call the shots. She has the economic might and the power to dictate on other countries. The tables have turned. Whereas, before, Japanese migrant workers came to the Philippines to better their lives, now Filipinos are coming in droves to seek their greener pastures in the Land of the Rising Sun and Yen. The Philippines, whose GNP has put it in the lower ranks among the ASEAN countries, now projects a beggarly and sorry image. Even immigration police and the so-called Japanese Catholics are "afraid of catching something" if they associate with the Filipinos just as anyone would probably wince if a "dirty, emanciated and stinking beggar" approached him for a dole-out. Filipinos are maltreated, abused and perceived as people who would do anything for money and who can easily bought. In many instances, they keep their silence as their agenda in Japan is to earn the much-needed Yen to send home. They engage in masking and rationalization, such as interpreting "bakayaro" as "baka" by changing the negative connotation into something positive.

Just as Filipinos were blamed during the pre-war for their inadequacies, they are again blamed for their plight in Japan. Minister Aoki's view that it is the fault of the "Filipina girls who travel in the guise of tourists" is an example of actor-observer differences in explaining a situation. Minister Aoki fails to cite the recruiters' (in many cases they are Yakuzas) role in the whole tragedy. He also fails to point to the push factors (worsening economic conditions in the Philippines, family's interdependent structure, value of service to the family, etc.) as well as the pull factors (the high wages in Japan, the "promise of a better life") that contribute to the final decision to take the risk of coming to Japan illegally and be an illegal worker. In attribution theory, the observer is less aware, if at all, of circumstances and processes involved in a particular behavior and is apt to judge the behavior by attributing it to internal characteristics of the "actor."

It must be noted that first impressions count a lot. The principle of primacy usually plays a part in the processing of subsequent information about a person. This principle states that later characteristics are fitted to the given direction of the first impression (Brown, op.cit.) Although many Japanese have gone to the Philippines, there are still many more who have not experienced the Philippines personally. Their first exposure to the Philippines is, most probably, to media which paint a negative picture of Filipinos.

Stereotypes, although responsive to changing political and economic relations, also tend to have a stability over time. From the list of adjectives

describing the Japanese, there remain characteristics which have remained the same: industrious, efficient and progressive. Studies done in the U.S. in 1933 (Katz and Braly), 1951 (Gilbert) and 1967 (Karlins, et.al.) also show that the Japanese have been consistently described as intelligent, industrious, progressive, sly and shrewd. One can still see such adjectives in many books written about Japan. The Filipinos, on the other hand, have been consistently seen as musically talented, hospitable, emotional, lazy and lacking unity.

Beliefs about groups affect the treatment of individuals. The Asians, as a group, have been identified more and more as a migrant-worker group and as such are regarded as inferior to the Japanese. Even when encountered as individuals, reaction is initially colored by one's previously-held stereotypes. Many a travelling Filipino (the legitimate ones) has had to suffer through the thorough questioning and investigation of Immigration and Customs officers. One is presumed to have either a fake passport or the intention to stay longer than is allowed.

The Filipinos, in particular, have been particularly stereotyped to be either entertainers (or prostitutes), domestics, Japanese spouse, or construction workers (in the case of males). It is not surprising then that many a Monbusho (Ministry of Education) student has been approached by Japanese and mistaken for an entertainer or a domestic. However, experience with individuals can contribute to a change in perception. That is, given individual diagnostic information can lead one to disregard traditional stereotypes. Thus, we have the views of the 15 entertainers who generally held a positive view of the Japanese. From their own experience, they had seen changing values in Japan where women are becoming more assertive and more visible in public life. In constrast, the once "promised land" had turned into a nightmare for people like Ann-Ann.

The evaluation of one's experience with the other is also critical. If one can generally evaluate one's experience with the Japanese as "good," using the weighted averaging model, the "good" evaluation outweighs whatever not so good experiences one has had. Expectations play a big role in this. If certain aspects are given more weight and these expectations are fulfilled, then the result is positive. This can be seen in the case of the participants of the 21st Century Friendship Programme.

Moreover, in the context of Filipino values, being a recipient of a one-month all-expenses-paid tour of Japan surely engenders in the Filipino participant a feeling of gratitude. Just as there are the concepts of on and giri in Japan, there is also utang na loob in the Philippines which underscores the gratitude of one for a favor or kindness received. Japan is then seen as generous. For the material resources that Japan gives, she receives the praise, honor and gratitude of the Filipinos. This is very much in line with the social exchange theory.

It cannot be denied that there are strong economic underpinnings in Philippine-Japan relations. It is ironic to note, however, that whereas in the early 1900's, manpower migration flow was from Japan to the Philippines, now it is the reverse. Before the war, the gains of the Japanese and the Filipinos in the Philippines seemed to be mutual. Natural resources were developed, there was economic progress in such areas as Davao, and both Filippinos and Japanese lived peacefully with each other. The Japanese, except perhaps for certain working groups such as the prostitutes and the vendors, were regarded highly by the Filipinos. Presently, with the situation reversed, the perceptions also seem to have suffered a reversal. This, of course, is partly due to the fact that many of the Filipinos working in Japan are staying illegally. But more importantly, the attitude of Japanese towards Filipino workers reflects the power dynamics. Unfortunately, despite their number, the legality of their status is a problem which puts the Filipino workers on the non-bargaining end. Their options are curtailed and they have to "dance to the music."

But as one Filipino worker questioned, why is there differential treatment as far as justice is concerned. A documented study of a white illegal worker shows that he was quickly pardoned by the Japanese courts, while the Filipino was not. Is the hakujin complex still valid in this day and age? It would seem so. Many homestay program shows the difficulty in finding homes for non-white participants. Experiences of Filipinos and other non-whites with the Fudosan-yasan (Housing Agent) shows the same diferrential treatment. There are housing offices which screen out darker-colored gaijins (foreigners).

Despite the campaign for Japan to internationalize, it remains a question as to whether the people, in general, are disposed towards such a move or are they still wary about opening their doors to all foreigners, regardless of race, color or creed?

There are many things in the history of Philippine-Japan relations that maintain current attitudes. Japan, though an Asian country, has shown to the world that she has made it to the top. She now sits in summits where the leaders of the Western World give her due recognition as being "one of them." This prestigious position has, no doubt, given her much confidence. But it seems that, in turn, she has taken on the attitude of the "high and mighty" and now looks down on her not so economically successfully Asian neighbors. The "closed-door policy" and the insular thinking of the ordinary citizen presents itself as a stumbling block in her relationship with her poorer neigbors. If she maintains this stance, despite her financial magnanimity, she will still be regarded with skepticism and distrust.

It is hoped that with some of the dynamics in the relationship identified and explained, the awareness can encourage more openness and critical analysis of

information about one another. In other words, the Philippines and Japan can choose to see what they would like to see. Given the already difficult economic imbalance in the relationship, perhaps they should turn to other factors that can help them understand each other in context. Hopefully, they can go beyond the borders of narrow stereotypes and develop a better appreciation of each other.

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PHILIPPINE-JAPAN CULTURAL RELATIONS: A FILIPINO VIEW*

Artemio D. Palongpalong

Introduction

Philippine socio-cultural relations with Japan has gone a long way from the era of hostilities in the 1940s. The relations have undergone improvement since then. In fact, it has metamorphosed into something very congenial, characterized by mutual respect for each other's people and culture and for each other's achievements as independent nation-states.

Several factors accounted for the change in the state of cultural affairs and social relations between the two countries. Japanese presence in the Philippines — just like perhaps in other ASEAN member-states — fits nicely with the latter countries' needs. Its economic penetration of the region, for instance, coincided with the Philippines' and perhaps her ASEAN partners' requirements for additional factors needed to push their economic growth and development performance upwards. Such performance perforce served as a basis of social and political stability.

To illustrate this, firstly, Japan's needs for raw materials for its industries and markets for her industrial goods are matched by Southeast Asia's search for markets of its commodity exports, and a constant source of financial and technological resources.

Secondly, other Southeast Asian goals outside of domestic economic and political stability in the 1960s and beyond have been pursued. The diversification of their external economic and political relations, for instance, were gaining grounds, simultaneous with the booming of Japanese industries amidst the waning bipolar world.

As world bipolarity began to wane, Third World nations including the Philippines tried flexing their collective strength in various international forums. They pursued the new international economic order (NIEO). The rhetorics of Third World goals even became louder and clearer during the post-

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Vietnam War settlement as they emerged victoriously in numerous UN decision-making processes.

This paper submits to the notion that bilateral cultural ties form part of a larger framework of bilateral relations. This is in view of the fact that growing complexities in the relations of nations have given rise to very stiff competition for markets, raw materials, financial resources, technology, official development assistance (ODA) and scholarships and grants.

It may be recalled (although this is never an analogy that would lead to the same consequence) that the growing competition among Western colonial countries by the mid-nineteenth century (as an offshoot of the industrial revolution in Europe and the altered nature and character of politics and social classes) led to the actual conquest of Asian hinterlands. Before that, but with lesser competition for trade items such as spices, silk and others, these same countries limited themselves to holding and controlling strategically-located islands and cities in Asia: Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, Penang, Singapore, Malacca, Java, Labuan, Balambangan, Macao, and Hongkong, to name a few.

Colonialism is dead, but the goals which nations seek to attain through securing trade items, markets, financial and technological resources have largely remained the same. This is true both from the industrialized and developing countries' perspectives. The goals of development and economic primacy need more than friendly ties. Based on friendship and cultural ties, national objectives abroad are assured. This assumption has been proven. A study of South-South investments, for instance, revealed that cultural affinities and special political ties served as foundation for strong economic relations. This appears very important especially during initial phases of relations after independence is gained.[1]

Smooth cultural relations during the past centuries have some of the elements for maintaining good, productive, and mutually satisfactory relations. All other factors being equal, close cultural ties serve as a 'clincher' for closer bilateral relations.

Philippine-Japan bilateral cultural relation programs can be categorized under the following: a) those that are handled by government agencies; b) those that are pursued more or less permanently by private international organizations; and c) those that are sponsored by private institutions.

The aspect of culture playing a positive role in the implementation of developmental projects in the Philippines has been included, in consonance with the overall thrust of this paper. It is a recognition both of the Filipinos' trust and confidence on Japanese economic or technological assistance and the Japanese capacity to understand Filipinos culturally that this phenomenon developed.

Government-to-Government Scholarships and Grants

Comprehensive official educational and cultural exchange programs between the Philippines and Japan exist and operate in various forms. Oftentimes appearing as part of a bigger program involving the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the exchanges underpin the rather voluminous economic, political and cultural relations. Some of these educational and cultural programs are under the umbrella of the Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Exchange Program (JACEP) which has the following features: a) the establishment of the Center for the Promotion of Cultural Exchanges between Japan and ASEAN; and b) the exchange of scholars, cultural performers, etc. under the Japan-ASEAN Exchange Projects.

From the Philippine point-of-view, the pre-JACEP projects and those that were implemented during the period of JACEP programs yielded volumes of scholarships and grants as well as other forms of educational and cultural exchanges.

Cultural ties between the Philippines and Japan started to pick up at the opening of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) in 1969, during which the Japanese presented the famous opera "Yuzuru" by the foremost composer Ikuma Dan with a complete cast of Japanese artists. This was soon followed by a series of concerts under the sponsorship of the Japan Foundation. Several outstanding artists performed during the series, namely ballerina Yoko Morishita, saxophonist Sadao Watanabe, composer Ikuma Dan, and conductor Yoshinao Osawa. The Tokyo Philharmonic Orchestra and the Buyo Classical Dance and Drama Troupe likewise came to the Philippines to perform.

The Japan Foundation and the Japan Cultural Aid Program gave a number of grants which benefited the Metropolitan Manila Commission, the Cagayan State University, and the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports.

Another important institution that has been active in this regard was the Philippines-Japan Cultural Institute which was established in 1978 as a non-stock, non-profit private organization. The organization's beneficiaries include

Philippine universities and colleges, churches, the Ministry of Tourism, and other entities.

In the past few years, the Institute has presented performances by various Japanese cultural missions including Ikebana flower arrangements and Japanese Tea Ceremony demonstrations. Other programs of similar significance were also undertaken.

Another interesting program in this regard concerns educational exchanges. Filipino scholars' countries of destination have been rationalized (as shown in a NEDA study) especially in 1988 in view of the economic recovery program of the Aquino Administration which was launched in 1986.

Table 1 presents the number of scholarships in Japan and in other countries availed of by Filipino students. It is interesting to note that during the decade of the 80s, Japan has been on top of these countries which play host to Filipino scholars. Tables 2 and 3 show the structure of Philippines trade and investment relations.

Table 1
Filipino Availment of Scholarships/Grants Abroad, 1981, 1983, 1987

Countries	No. of Slots			Remarks		
	1981	1983	1987	1981	1983	1987
Japan	244	285	156	2nd	1st	1st
USA	261	256	89	1st	2nd	2nd
Southeast Asian Countries						
Indonesia	41	25	23	4th		
Malaysia	37	93	86	4th	3rd	
Thailand	82	124	68	3rd	3rd	4th
Singapore	40	68	49			
South Asian Countries						
India	39	46	26	5th		
Pakistan	1	1	5			
Bangladesh	5	6	3			
Socialist Countries						
PROC	18	31	9			
USSR	6	10	8			

Source: Philippine National Economic and Development Authority.

Table 2
Philippines' Trade With Japan (in million US dollars)

	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Export	1022	1046	1876	853	984	1424
Imports	1266	815	735	868	1121	1421
Balance	(244)	232	(141)	(15)	(137)	3

Source: "Trade Relations between RP and Japan" Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 6, 1989

Table 3
Japanese Investments in RP (BOI-Approved)
(in million US dollars)

Year	Amount	Percentage
1985	568	14.6
1986	485	19.8
1987	454	28.5
1988	591	17.2

Source: "Trade Relations Between RP and Japan" Philippine Daily Inquirer. May 6, 1989

The way economic and cultural relations between the Philippines and Japan are going clearly substantiate our earlier contention. That is, there is a certainty that economic relations are largely reflected in the cultural aspects of bilateral relations.

As shown in official Philippine foreign affairs programs, cultural relations with Japan consists of programs such as a) National Parks Development (Japan-funded); b) Scholarships availed of by Filipinos, and c) the ASEAN-Japan Friendship Program and Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Program.

Insofar as the officially-sanctioned scholarships are concerned, there have been more than 100 slots available.[3]

Social Dimensions

The social dimensions of bilateral relations consist primarily of Filipino migrant workers to Japan, aliens (Japanese visitors) given temporary or permanent permit to stay, and foreign students. Data on these aspects have been considered as the indicators of social relations.

Filipino migrant labor to Japan are of two types: sea-based and land-based.

Filipino seamen during the period 1982-1986 had the following countries as their favorite destination: Singapore, Japan, and the United States. During that period, Filipino seamen who were employed in Singapore numbered 13,733. Those who went to Japan and the United States numbered 7,064 and 4,643, respectively. On record, only two other countries employed a significant number of Filipino seamen during the period, namely, Thailand and Maldives.

The land-based Filipino workers' preferred places of employment are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Iraq, and other West Asian countries. At one time, Saudi Arabia employed no less than 150,000 Filipino workers.

In Southeast Asia, the top countries of destination for Filipino land-based workers are Singapore and Brunei. Singapore employed 9,036 Filipinos in 1983; 8,424 in 1984; 11,147 in 1985; and 15,994 in 1986.

Japan's position in this regard lies in between of Saudi Arabia (the number one employer) and Singapore. In 1982, Japan employed 13,685 Filipino contract workers; 13,068 in 1984; and 26,620 in 1986.

In the Philippines, 1979 and 1980 data show that the Japanese, in terms of magnitude, comprised the largest number among aliens who were given permits to stay in the country. In both years, there were 222 Japanese executives,

managers, consultants and professionals out of the total of 855 aliens in 1979 and 854 in 1980.

In 1979, there were only 157 Chinese, 104 British, 79 Americans and 58 Australians given permit to stay permanently in the country. In the following year, 1980, there were 171 Chinese, 108 British, 84 American, and 41 Australian visitors.[4]

During the 1987-1988 academic years, the number of foreign students in the Philippines indicated that not many Japanese youths study in the country. There were 464 Americans; 893 Thais; 544 Indonesians; 84 Malaysians; and 7 Singaporeans. The number of Japanese students reached only 62. The biggest number of foreign students in both school years were the Jordanians who numbered between 1,391 and 1,450 during the four semesters. Notably, it is only in this indicator that Japan is down the ladder.[5]

Official data on tourist arrivals have not yet been collated and processed. But initial impressions would show that the Japanese constitute the biggest number of tourists in the country, with Manila and Cebu cities (two highly urbanized areas) as their favorite destinations.

In social bilateral relations, therefore, Japan is rated first in terms of her importance to the Philippines.

Actual people-to-people contact serves as the true nuts-and-bolts of bilateral relations. It is through this that cultural or economic or political relations can be institutionalized.

In national decision-making situations, especially if there is a sense of urgency or extreme importance, the true feelings or perceptions of the people concerned count a lot. Decision-makers, leaders and statesmen give much consideration on it.

Thus, as indicators under transactionalist approach, the high-level transactions in terms of manpower movement, tourist flows, permits given to aliens for permanent or temporary stay and others indicate ever-growing bilateral ties between the Philippines and Japan. Incidentally, in a study of regional cooperation, the same trend indicates growing regionalism.

Culture as a Factor in Developmental Projects

The primacy of bilateral economic relations between the Philippines and Japan has to be accentuated even in the study of cultural relations. The economic dimensions of Philippine relations with Japan (which are, once more, stressed in the case of the Philippine Assistance Program) are so crucial that it cannot be over-emphasized. Thus, cultural factors in some developmental projects funded by Japan were looked into.

To start with, Japanese technicians and consultants in these development projects have been conscious of protocol and proper behavior. They normally paid courtesy calls to their counterparts: the technicians, planners, the city, provincial or town officials. Each group is usually led by a senior person (which is normally in accord with Japanese adherence to seniority in various endeavors).

In a pilot development project in Jalajala, Rizal for example, Japanese assistance appears in various categories. Technical cooperation has been pursued in terms of site selection, actual survey by land-use expert, training support for DAR personnel in Japan, agro-industrial feasibility studies, and so on.[6] Various sectors have been involved such as the local government, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Meralco Foundation, a farmers' organization, Japanese missions, etc. Two types of Japanese missions came: one specific mission for the Jalajala project and the other, to know the DAR and its programs.

The implementation phase of the integrated project is yet to start but expectedly the Japanese will extensibly exercise their cultural norms and values as the case may be.

The Bohol Integrated Development Project, already in its implementation stage, is another integrated area development project that has clear manifestations of Japanese cultural norms and values. This project, costing about 1,479,000,000 yen for farm infrastructures, technicians, training, procurement of materials and buildings, employs 3,000 farmer-leaders, 8 Japanese technicians, 23 Filipino trainees who were sent abroad and 502 trained locally. It covers practically the whole island-province.

The Bohol project is one of the most successful joint development projects between the Philippines and Japan. It is here, among other things, Japan's

cultural approaches are astoundingly successful.

The cultural strategy includes demonstration farms utilizing progressive farmers' land; the recruits being invited to the Agricultural Center for Research, Training and Extension (APO) which is also Japanese-funded; actual field visits and lectures; the use of Filipino materials in demonstrating Japanese agricultural technology; and others.

Japanese technicians, experts and consultants normally managed halting Visayan language and some even speak and understand Filipino. They have learned Filipino and English before and during their stint at U.P. Los Banos, famous campus for agricultural training and community development. [7]

Again, proper protocol, respect for Filipino cultural mores and practices, and gaining a solid understanding of their lives and problems have helped in the success of the project and undoubtedly the cultural and economic relations between the two nations have been put on firmer footing.

Culture and Business

In the Philippines, as in other parts of Asia, business has been pursued by the Japanese with due regard for the society and culture. "If the community doesn't welcome you, you will fail", a statement of Hiroshi Hamada, president of Ricoh Co., Ltd., seems to sum up that attitude. In fact, Japanese companies not only provide jobs - tens of thousands of them in Asia - but their managers work tirelessly to overcome cultural differences. The name of the game is cultural adjustment and acceptability to the community.

Japanese companies have also been considered sources of scholarships, grants, and donations. At first, these companies did not know how to react to such requests or proposals. But later on they began to adjust and accept the idea. They had to go through this process because charity giving is not the corporate way of life in Japan.

The Toyota Foundation, for example, has contributed to the giving of scholarship grants and awarding of a good number of academic projects. Other companies, in fact, now enjoy sponsoring cultural activities and sports events as integral part of public relations and marketing strategy.

Thus, it can be said that Japanese business in the Philippines, as elsewhere in Asia, has taken into account cultural and social adjustments in order to attain measure of success.[8]

The marriage between business and culture could be seen the other way around. It can be witnessed even more concretely in the proliferation of schools offering Japanese language courses in the cities and the growth in the number of "Japanese" restaurants. In these entities, cultural matters are the objects of business itself. These have affected the taste and linguistic capabilities of Filipinos.

In the Philippine setting, the impact is mostly felt among the middle classes and the literate population. This is a phenomenon observable in urbanized areas. In order to savor Japanese cuisine, one has to spend rather a big sum of money thus, only the ones with substantial disposable income can afford it. And the cuisine is available only in first and second class cities. Learning the Japanese language are pursued by those who intend to work in Japan: cultural dance troupe members, singers, music band members, and plain or skilled laborers who found employers in Japanese shipping yards or shipping companies and industrial plants.

In these latter examples, the adoption of Japanese culture leads to better employment or business opportunities.

Private Sector Participation: The Example of OISCA

The government-to-government social and cultural relations between the Philippines and Japan have its counterpart in the private sector. This is best exemplified by the projects and activities of the Organization for Industrial, Spiritual and Cultural Advancement (OISCA)-International.

As a private, international non-governmental organization operating in the Philippines, its mission is specific: to extend assistance for community and industrial development. It operates in practically all agriculturally-based economies of the tropical areas of Southern Asia: Papua New Guinea; Indonesia; Malaysia; Thailand; Bangladesh; Korea, Palau and the Philippines. Its projects are designed to help uplift the livelihood of varied communities — from sewing in Palawan, and day-care center in Negros Island, Philippines; to radish farming in Bangladesh, and to poultry-raising in Sabah, East Malaysia.

OISCA's greatest contribution to the development of culture and social relations between these developing countries and Japan is the youth exchange program. As an example, the youth exchanges between Filipinos and Japanese have contributed immensely to the achievement of great bilateral understanding. Every year, 50 Filipinos are brought to Japan to learn the Japanese language, train in agricultural techniques, visit historical places, and other activities. In return, Japanese youths are invited to the Philippines to visit similar places and community projects. During the past 12 years, OISCA-International successfully received and trained over 1,000 Filipino youth and adults in Japan. There were approximately 3,000 Japanese who came to the Philippines under the program.[9]

In pursuing its community-based projects in the Philippines, e.g., agroforestry, youth and farmers training, development of farmers cooperatives, etc., OISCA has to tackle a number of problems. These include language barrier, people's attitude, and on the side of the Japanese, cultural and social adjustments.

The rules that OISCA has instilled in every one of its technicians and workers consist of an injunction to be hardworking, kind and hospitable — in order to set example to rural people.

Thus, the cultural approach is the unfailing guide for the success of OISCA's community-based projects in the aforementioned developing countries.

Present and Potential Problems

Philippine-Japan cultural relations faces one current problem and some potential ones. The current problem refers to the rising expectations of Filipinos who have had training or educational stint in Japan. The potential problems include the developing "dependency" of cultural relations upon economic relations; how to selectively adopt Japanese cultural practices; and the accurate presentation of Filipino culture in Japan.

Right now, an amorphous group of Filipinos who have had training or educational stint in Japan constitutes the discontented lot. After studying in Japanese educational institutions (combined perhaps with proper exposure to the various communities and cultural achievements of the country and, more importantly after having been used to modern ways of living. This group is having a hard time adjusting their lives in the Philippines. This group is now experiencing discontent over their salaries and limited upward mobility, except those who found employment in Japanese companies and other multinational

Table 4
Grant-Aid Program To The Philippines FY 1970-FY 1988
(Showing Cultural Grant)

FY ISCAL	General Grant (Mil. Yen)	Cultural Grant (Mil. Yen)	Food Aid (Mil. Yen)	Emergency Aid (Mil. Yen)	Aid for Increased Food Prodn. (Mil. Yen)	Total (Mil. Yen)	Total (Mil. US$)	Exchange Rate (Yen to US$)
1970	-	-	360	-	-	360	1	360.00
1971	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	360.00
1972	80		154	-	-	234	0.76	308.00
1973	-	-	308	-	-	308	1.13	272.84
1974	-	-	462	-	-	462	1.58	291.84
1975	-	7	-	-	-	7	0.02	297.04
1976	650	13	370	-	-	1033	3.48	296.50
1977	600	-	-	-	1300	1900	7.08	268.51
1978	1550	18	-	-	1900	3468	16.48	210.47
1979	2450	50	-	-	1900	4400	20.08	219.17
1980	2787	35	-	-	2000	4822	21.26	226.79
1981	3950	75	-	-	2000	6025	27.32	220.53
1982	4690	-	-	-	2100	6790	27.26	249.05
1983	5950	106	-	-	2300	8356	35.18	237.52
1984	5493	182	-	119	2500	8294	34.93	237.48
1985	5569	91	-	24	2500	8184	34.40	237.89
1986	6986	82	-	37	2900	10005	59.54	168.03
1987	7721	131	-	-	3140	10992	73.28	150.00
1988	9460	-	-	-	3140	12600	100.80	125.00
TOTAL	57939	790	1654	180	27680	88240	465.59	

Japanese Fiscal Year: 1 April to 31 March
Source: NEDA

corporations and UN agencies.

Among the potential problems, the more serious one is the perceived "dependency" of cultural ties upon trade and investment relations. Presently, it appears inevitable that should something catastrophic happens in the economic and business spheres, culture would suffer. How do we maintain high-level cultural links without considering the realities of economic ups and downs?

The potential problem appears very real and offers no solution at the moment.

Selective adoption of Japanese cultural practices has been confronted by some ASEAN nations a few years back. Specifically, the question of "Japanese-style management" has long been considered partly as a cultural problem rather than an issue in business management alone. Will Filipino managers and tech-

nicians involved in joint ventures, for instance, adopt Japanese strategies and techniques hook, line and sinker? If not, to what extent and which components?

In daily life, will Filipinos, in retracing Asian roots as factor for developing further the Filipino identity, adopt the Japanese view that one's life must blend with the environment? These and similar questions may be posed over and over again as we survey the cultural landscape and really try to find out how much acculturation can we afford vis-a-vis Japanese culture?

Finally, in preparing the Japanese for a stint in the Philippines, how can we accurately depict the country in Japan? This is no esoteric question, if we seriously plan to relate meaningfully, and in a mutually-satisfactory fashion, with that industrial nation. As the experience of many successful economies show, there is merit in emphasizing both positive and negative points as accurately as possible, so that economic planners as well as business strategists, investors and industrialists will know exactly what to expect in the Philippines.

Summary

Philippine-Japan cultural relations, an ever growing and ever improving field in Philippine foreign relations, has been found to undergird the two countries' growing economic relations. Since Japan has limited its political role in Asia[10] and even much less in international military affairs since its rise as an economic giant, the cultural variable of that bilateral ties was only examined relative to economic relations which include technological assistance and grants both at government and private sectors level.

Since the cultural component undergirds bilateral economic relations, this can be taken as a barometer of present and future relations between the two countries.

Presently, there are a number of issues that leaders of both countries the Philippines and Japan must face squarely. One such question is to what extent should Filipinos — be they artists or economists or political strategists, etc. — understand and interpret Japanese mores and cultural values in order to benefit from economic, scientific and technology ties.

NOTES

[1]Asok Desai, "The Forms of Foreign Investment in India" in Charles Oman (Editor), New Forms of International Investment In Developing Countries, OECD, Paris, 1984.

[2]Data and information have been provided by reliable sources, Asia-Pacific Office, R.P. Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), PICC Complex, Manila, June 1989.

[3]Artemio D. Palongpalong, Ph.D. Dissertation entitled "Philippines' Foreign Policy Towards Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan", University of the Philippines, Chapter III, pp. 24-29.

[4]Ibid.

[5] Minutes of Meeting for Feasibility Study on Integrated Jalajala Rural Development Project (signed by Mr. Satoshi Yamamoto, Team Leader of Preliminary Survey Team, JICA and Philip Ella Juico, Secretary, Department of Agrarian Reform, on April 17, 1989, Manila, Philippines). Please refer also to the Summary of Projects Proposed for Possible Japanese Assistance (1988-1992), DAR.

[6]Interview with the Coordinator, Bohol Area Integrated Development Project, Timog Avenue, Quezon City, May 1989.

[7]"Global Connections: The Japanese Presence in Asia; The Asian Presence in Japan," Time Magazine, June 1989.

[8]Interview with Mr. Watanabe, Director, OISCA-Philippines, June 21, 1989.

[9]Japan has been perceived to be starting to play political-diplomatic role, e.g., diplomatic moves vis-a-vis Cambodian problem, the May 1990 suggestion of Thailand former Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan to a visiting Japanese Defense Minister for joint exercise in the South China Sea, and some suggestions from Southeast Asia that Japan should play a role in UN peacekeeping in the post-Iraqi War and the Allied Powers.

MASAMARU, A VANISHING BREED OF ANGLERS*

Cynthia Neri Zayas

Introduction

In the spring of 1988 I undertook my second field research in Izu Oshima, Habuminato*. From March 17-23 I collected written documents regarding the past and present social conditions of the people. While in the process of searching pertinent materials, I also observed the daily life around the port area. Habuminato is a fishing port which also presently serves as an important shelter for boats that fish around the Izu islands, the waters facing Tokyo and the Prefectures of Chiba and Kanagawa (See Map 1). It is strategically located near rich fishing grounds.

This paper is about a knowledgeable man known as Masamaru whom I met on the 4th day of my stay. He is a 57 year-old hook and line fisherman from Yugawara, Kanagawa Prefecture who had been fishing for the past 43 years. He first came to moor in Habuminato in 1950.

I will try to relate the various natural and technological changes that occurred which had affected him to reveal his deep knowledge of the sea which he shared with me. It is of importance to me, as an anthropologist, to hear him talk freely of this hard gained knowledge because fishermen, even if they share information about their fishing activities, never talk about their secrets to other people.

Chance Meeting

It was almost past nine in the morning when the bidding at the nearby fish market ended. Since the weather was quite chilly, I decided to look for a cozy place to drink coffee and write my observations for the morning. I walked a few meters and found a sunaku (drinking pub).

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* Paper read during the monthly meeting of Sikolohiyang Pilipino, Japan Chapter at Komaba Foreign Students' Dormitory, 28 October, 1988. This research is part of the Izu Shoto Anthropological Project of the Division of Anthropology, Institute of History and Anthropology, University of Tsukuba under the grant from the Ministry of Education and Culture of Japan.

There were three men and a woman in a corner sipping hot sake beside a kerosene stove. I found out later that the woman was the mama-san of the sunaku. One man was an operator of a leisure fishing boat who lived with her. The other was his client from Yokohama and the third man was a fisherman from Chiba. I introduced myself as a Filipino foreign student who was doing a study on the lives of the people there.

A few minutes after exchanging pleasantries and explaining to them what particular information I wanted to know, a short balding man of about five feet tall came and joined us around the kerosene stove. The leisure boat operator introduced him as the sensei of the fishermen. He was called Masamaru after the name of his boat.

The Rendezvous

Sunaku is actually a place for transients, a watering hole for fishermen who come to Habuminato to sell their catch, buy their supplies and moor their boats while waiting for the weather to clear up before proceeding to fish. These men may be some sort of mooring nakama, a group of non-local fishermen whose fishing schedule coincide, thus, making them some sort of an intimate group in the harbour where they moor temporarily. Almost all of them are hook and line specialists. I learned that hook and line fishing can be performed in any part of Japan. Unlike net fishing which needed licensing and strict control and has designated areas for fishing, hook and line fishermen are free to exploit the waters of their choice.

Masamaru's favorite fishing spots are very close to Habuminato. He comes to fish 200 days a year. He moors here from 3 to 4 days a week on the average. When asked why he liked the place, he replied:

Jibun ni tekishita sakana ga iru kara.
'Because there are fish that are suitable for me(here).'

Besides, he added, the fish market is right beside the wharf, fishing supplies are available. When I interviewed him, he intended to stay a week more around the area before he returns home. He sleeps and cooks in his kobune, a less than 3 ton-class boat.

The price of fish in Habuminato is relatively lower than in the Yugawara area, an onsen (hot spa) belt, due to the presence of tourists. But due to the

distance between his home port and fishing grounds, it is not economical to return home after every fishing trip. His type of fishing, that is, hook and line with less than a three-ton boat and a low-powered engine is only suitable for a day's fishing trip. If he decides to return home, he has to gather enough fish to cover his long trip and a reasonable quantity to sell to his fishing cooperative association's fish market. Members are expected to sell their catch to their home market. It is through their catch that the cooperative market earns some profit.

The Fisherman as a Teacher

Masamaru considers himself an uwaki (unfaithful) compared to Suzumaru from Misaki, Kanagawa Prefecture, who only fishes for kinme (alfonsin) all year round. He, on the other hand, only fishes for species in season. His annual schedule is therefore affected by the changes of the seasons or the ocean currents. He drew this map (See Map 2) showing the fishing spots, the ocean currents, the periods of fishing and the corresponding species caught together with the type of fishing gear he uses. From his drawings, I learned that the kuroshio (warm current from around April to around October) and its branch which enters the Izu island chain (beginning June), and the oyashio (cold current from around November to February greatly affect the sea environment as well as his fishing activities. These currents make the archipelago a rich fishing ground. Many varieties of fishes, such as polar fishes from the north and tropical fishes from the south can be found. Consequently, Masamaru's sea routes are likewise influenced by the movements of these currents. In general, he follows three routes within a fishing cycle, i.e. (a) from Shimoda (Kanagawa Prefecture) to Chikura (Boso Peninsula, Chiba Prefecture, (b) from Shimoda to Habuminato to Omorodashi, and (c) from Misaki (Kanagawa Prefecture) to Omorodashi, Okinoyama and Chikura. He summarizes his fishing schedule as: (1) from January to June around Omorodashi for kinme, ako and hiramasa, (2) July until the end of summer around Okinoyama for medai, katsuo, shimeji, and kiwada, and (3) from October to November around these two fishing spots for mameji. Since species differ in their seasonal appearance and locations, he also uses different types of line fishing. He alternates using tatenawa (hand line fishing) and tororingu (trolling line). Hand line (See fig. 1) is composed of one long strong line, several hooks, a weight or a balance and some accesories. Trolling line (See fig. 2) is a method of fishing whereby the line is towed on the surface or near the surface with hooks at the end of the line. The bait is principally artificial, but sometimes raw bait, such as cuttle fish is used. For setting hooks, a wooden or plastic trolling board is used, and by adjusting the towing speed, the hooks are sunk to a suitable depth. From his own handwritten map the

following table (See Table 1) will show the various fishing spots, fishes caught, and the kind of lines he uses.

Table 1
Fishing spots, fish names, and gears.

Fishing Spots	Fish name	Gears	
		Tatenawa	Tororingu
(1) Hatsushima oki	kuromutsu	*	—
	kinme		
(2) Chigasaki (3) no ba	kinme	*	—
	ako		
(4) Omorodashi no jinoba	medai	*	—
	onakada	*	—
(5) Omorodashi no asai (23 m) tokoro	hiramasa	—	*
	kampachi	—	*
(6) Omorodashi (7) no minami no ba	ago	*	—
	onaga		
	medai		
(8) Omorodashi no higashi	ako	*	—
(9) Oki no ba	meji	—	*
(10) (Oki no yama) kiwada	katsuo	—	*
		—	*
(11) Chikura oki	kiwada	—	*
(12) Takase	kinmedai	*	—
(13) Niijima mae	mutsu	*	—
(14) Sashikiji	maika	*	—
semba oki	yari ika	*	—
aka ika		*	—
(15) Okata ko	maika	*	—
oki	yari ika	*	—

Legend: * used not used
Note: The number inside the ( ) corresponds to those in Map 2.

Masamaru, the Fisherman

The map which Masamaru drew is a product of 43 years of fishing experience. He began to fish professionally right after graduating from middle school when he was 15 years old. His fisherman father died before his graduation. Life was difficult during those days; he had to continue his father's trade. During school vacation he went to fish with his father. Like all other trades in Japan, skill is learned through apprenticeship.

Masamaru is a disciplined fisherman, who kept records of his daily observations, noted the changes of his environment not only through his 20 year accumulated diary, but also drew nature as he saw it and how it affected him. He is a meticulous craftsman who prefers to weave his own scoop net for two days than buy the easily available nylon mass-produced product.

Masamaru relies basically with his seaspun knowledge more than the electronic gadgets. In the open sea, he can navigate without the help of navigational instruments. He resorts to yamate, a concept of triangulation where mountain peaks, and other 'recognizable' markers on an island are used as guide posts (See fig. 3). For him knowing yamate, he does not need to use the roran (LORAN, an acronym for Long Range Navigational Aid) to find directions or remember fishing spots. For instance, in 500 meter deep waters where fishes are stationary, yamate is sufficient. He may not be blamed for his dislike of mechanical gadgets because he experienced negative consequences from using them. He illustrates the gyogun tanchiki (fish finder), a sound scooping device used to detect the pulse of fish in order to find their location. This device, according to him, affects egg-bearing fish like sea bream whose eggs are stored close in its soft nape. Since many fishermen are now using very powerful gyogun the eggs may either die or grow to have soft bones. He has showed evidence to his claim and reported it to the Misaki Marine Experimental Station. The reply was that they will study the matter further.

With many experiences such as this, he is pessimistic about the future. He thinks that some day remokon roboto, a remote controlled robot, can take his place. He believes that his predictions will come. In fact remote controlled planes are now being used, he said. Yet in spite of his grim images he continues to rely on his knowledge that does not need sophisticated tools. He finds the fishing spots by observing the sea foam, checking the sea water temperature, observing the currents and others. He keeps watch of the wind by looking at the smoke of Miihara Volcano.

From a distance, the most prominent landmark in the island of Oshima is Mt. Miihara, an active volcano. Through the smoke of this volcano he can judge how much work can be possible. When a gentle smoke comes out, he feels secure in the open sea. He does not need to worry about the strong wind. But smoke veering to the west means a strong wind is coming and it is time for him to return to the port. In his words ...

Nishikaze suyoi, nan toyu, toki niwa,	When west wind is strong
Kaze no suyoi toki, suyoi bai wa,	when wind is strong,
yahari, aa, Miihara no kemu ga,	well, smoke of Miihara
ne, aa, nishi no nobite.	is veering to the west
Totte, kaze ni tobasarete,	for the wind is blowing
nakunatta kara.	since (smoke) vanished.
Kaze ga tsuyokunaru kara,	Because wind is becoming
ja, kairo ka naa, toka, ne.	stronger, better return.
Kyo Miihara no kemu ga	Today Miihara's smoke
otonashi kara,	is quiet, so ...
kyo wa, odayakana dakara	today (it) is calm, so ...
yukkuri shigotoshiyo kara.	(I) will take (my) time
(fishing).	

How can this notion be understood by a layman like me? He thought of illustrating this phenomenon to me by the smoke from a cigarette. The following is a transcript of our conversation:

(Miihari funka suru toki ni...)	(When Mt. Miihara erupts...)
Shigoto no shii yasui.	Work is easy.
Shigoto yari yasui.	Work is easily performed.
Subai shiteta, aa,	When conducting your
Miihara no kemuri ga	business and the smoke
nakunatta to iu koto wa,	of Miihara disappears,
kaze ga tsuyokunaru toiu koto.	it means that the wind will be strong
Kaze takusan aru to, kurudatte,	If there is strong wind
usukunachau desu yo?	it becomes less, right?

Odayakana baai wa, tabako datta so	when calm, like cigarette
nan desu kedo, suu fuutekeba,	when blowing smoking
tabako no kemuri, datta,	that cigarette smoke
fuata kemurinan desu yo?	is blown smoke, right?
Kaze ga tsuyoi toki, tabako kemuri	During strong wind, smoke
tonjau desu yo?	disappears, right?

We may not be able to understand now how Masamaru stores, retrieves and processes his knowledge. But we know for sure that there is a man who continues to harmonize with his environment with his simple tools in the midst of his technologically sophisticated milieu.

Map 1. Izu Oshima, Habuminato and its environs







Map 2. The Sea according to Masamaru

(Note: Romanization of place names were the only modifications done in this map.)



Fig. 1 Tatenawa



Fig. 2 Tororingu



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