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JAPANESE COLONIALISM AND KOREAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1910-1945

BETTY L. KING

Since the Kangwha Treaty of 1876 and until 1945, Japanese entrepreneurs have had a virtual monopoly of Korean trade. As early as 1884 more than half of the total Korean imports of \$999,720 came from Japan and more than nine-tenths of the total Korean exports of \$737,635 went to Japan.¹ Unquestionably, Japan had predominant commercial interests in Korea and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 was meant to totally remove Korea from China's "Confucian sphere of influence."² Though Korea's independence was declared by the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895, Korea in fact swung between the alternate domination of Japan and Russia. In 1906, after the Russo-Japanese War, Korea was declared a Japanese protectorate; in 1910, it became a colony of Japan, remaining a Japanese possession until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.

This paper is concerned with the economic changes that took place in Korea under Japanese rule. It intends to show the dialectic³ of

¹ Augustine Heard, "China and Japan in Korea," *North American Review*, Vol. CLIX (July-December 1894), p. 301.

² *Ibid.*, p. 301.

³ The term dialectic is taken in the Hegelian sense, i.e. the diametrically opposed elements of any movement. In this paper, I shall attempt to show the contradictory consequences of Japanese colonialism on Korean economic development.

Korean economic development under Japanese colonialism. The administration of Chosen (1910-1945), as the Japanese called their Korean colony, is the period under study.

The first part of this paper gives an overview of the traditional Korean economy prior to 1910. The second part discusses the process of reorganization of the traditional Korean economy by means of which the Japanese Government achieved institutional control over the Korean economy. The third part describes the growth of the Korean economy during Japanese colonial rule. The fourth part attempts to draw certain conclusions from the findings of this paper.

Overview of the Traditional Korean Economy Prior to 1910

Traditional Korean economy was an "oriental economy" — it was principally self-sufficient and self-sustaining. The family and village were the basic economic units through which production and exchange of goods were effected. Since the structure of the traditional Korean economy was predominantly agricultural (dominated by rice production), with very little handicraft industry and commerce, land was the major source of wealth. Traditional Korean economic thought was dominated by the concept of capital accumulation in the form of land investment.⁴

Ideally, land was owned by the State. The State controlled the distribution of land and in the ideal state, all Korean subjects received land to live upon. In turn, a system of land tax was enforced to provide revenue for the State. The State owned and gave out land to be cultivated and withheld it accordingly. In a parochial sense, there was no private property.

However, it is doubtful whether this structure ever existed in its ideal state. Ever since the Period of Unified Silla (668-918 A.D.), the agricultural structure had been feudal. Land was distributed among the nobility and government functionaries at the expense of the peasantry. As the state's control over the distribution of land gradually decreased, land was increasingly appropriated by the ruling class through various methods. Thus, the system of private land ownership and tenancy among the peasantry gradually expanded.⁵

⁴ Shannon McCune, *Korea's Heritage: A Regional and Social Geography* (Ruthland, 1956), pp. 82-99.

⁵ Hochin Choi. *The Economic History of Korea* (Seoul, 1971), pp. 3-34. See also, Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge, 1968) pp. 32-33.

The traditional Korean economy was a closed economy.⁶ However, foreign trade was allowed but carried only through official channels usually in the form of exchange of goods or presents. In the case of trade with China, it was carried out in the form of tribute.⁷ Korean trade with Japan was limited for a number of reasons. When international market centers were established along the Korean-Manchurian border at the turn of the sixteenth century, private trade was allowed by the Korean government but trade remained principally a government monopoly.

The Achievement of Control Over the Korean Economy by the Japanese

Control over an economic system requires institutional control of the social structure, the agricultural and industrial structure, transportation and communications, and banking and finance. The Japanese Government had achieved this control over the Korean economy by 1920 and only then was it able to integrate Korea into the larger economic system of the Japanese Empire.

The Social Structure

Yi-dynasty Korea (1395-1910) had a rigid and hierarchical social structure. Choice of occupation, eligibility for conscripted labor and military service, liability to taxes, and even style of clothing and housing were determined by an officially stipulated status hierarchy. The main social divisions were:

- (1) The ruling class composed of the *yangban* elite, which monopolized virtually all government positions. They alone had effective access to the more important examinations. They were usually scholars, particularly of Confucian literature, and constituted a politically influential intellectual community.
- (2) The small "middle" class, the *chungin* and *ikyō*, which consisted of professionals or functionaries hired at the lower

⁶ In a "closed economy", no person has any business or trade relationship with anyone outside the area. The term "closed economy" usually refers to an economy in which no imports, exports, or factor movements are permitted across boundaries.

⁷ According to John R. Fairbank, "trade and tribute were cognate aspects of a single system of foreign relations. Tribute was a cloak for trade . . . an ingenious vehicle for commerce." See John K. Fairbank, "Tributary Trade and China's Relations with the West," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. I (1942), p. 140.

Sino-Korean tributary trade involved the exchange of goods not available in each country. For example, Chinese gifts of silk, brocades, books, herbs were exchanged for Korean gifts of ginseng, animal skins and horses.

levels of government, chiefly the central government, and viewed as technicians or clerks.

- (3) The commoners, the *sangmin* (also known as *yangmin*), which included the farmers, merchants, artisans, etc.
- (4) The outcasts, the *ch'onmin*, composed of several elements, like the entertainers, sorcerers and *nobi* or slaves.⁸

Theoretically and ideally, a man's employment was to be hereditary and occupational mobility was restricted.⁹

When the Japanese annexed Korea in 1910 they abolished this traditional status system. Positions at the upper reaches of government which had previously been occupied by the *yangban* were rapidly filled by Japanese immigrants who remained in control of the bureaucracy throughout the colonial period. As a ruling class, the Japanese outnumbered the Korean *yangban* whom they displaced. When the undeclared war with China broke out in 1937, 41.4 percent of Japanese (vs. 2.9 percent of Koreans) were in government service, occupying almost all government positions. Some 16.6 percent of Japanese residents (vs. 2.6 percent of Koreans) were in commerce. In contrast, 75.7 percent of Koreans were still in agriculture.¹⁰ Theoretically, occupations not taken by the Japanese were open to talented individuals including the *sangmin* (commoners) as occupational mobility was allowed. However, the traditional status distinctions were replaced by ethnic discrimination. Even as late as 1944, 95 percent of gainfully employed Korean men and 99 percent of the women were laborers.¹¹ Japanese and Koreans thus existed on a completely different economic level. Such differences tended to increase rather than narrow as expansion and war made the Japanese an increasingly prosperous elite. Koreans watched a rising tide of economic modernization but they were separated from full participation in the modernization process by a thick wall of alien elite occupying almost all important jobs.¹²

The Agricultural Sector

Perhaps the most important sector for both Japan and Korea was the agricultural sector. It was important for Korea because the Korean economy was predominantly agricultural with 80 percent of the popu-

⁸ Edwin Reischauer and John K. Fairbank, *East Asia: The Great Tradition* (Boston, 1960), p. 428.

⁹ Yunshik Chang, "Colonization as Planned Change: The Korean Case," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. V, No. 2 (1971) p. 162.

¹⁰ Henderson, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 76

lation in 1910 engaged in agriculture. For Japan, the agricultural sector was important because Japan was not self-sufficient in rice production and depended increasingly on imports of rice from Korea to meet the demand in the domestic rice market. In fact, a serious social crisis (i.e., the race riots especially at the end of the First World War) resulted from the inability of the Japanese domestic rice market to cope with the demand for rice (demand exceeded supply by 40 million bushels per year).¹³

Between 1911 to 1918, a series of regulations and ordinances on land-holding were issued to establish a new and better-defined concept of land ownership which corrected the complicated agricultural structure in Yi-Dynasty Korea. They provided the legal basis for land ownership, made available a land market, and allowed foreigners to buy lands in Korea. The Japanese colonial government then nationalized the royal and Buddhist lands,¹⁴ and also the private lands for which ownership by the *yangban* elite was not identified owing to inadequate documentary certificates. The vast amount of land thus nationalized was rapidly swallowed through purchase by Japanese companies like the Oriental Development Company and Fuji Industrial Company.¹⁵

By 1936, two-thirds of the total lands in Korea had passed into the hands of Japanese immigrants.¹⁶ From 1913-1939, the number of Korean landowners decreased from 21.8 percent to 19.0 percent; the number of Korean owner-tenants went down from 38.7 percent to 25.3 percent; and the number of Korean tenants increased from 39.4 percent to 55.7 percent.¹⁷ These figures indicate that no improvement was brought about in the structure of land ownership and agricultural management although modern concepts of land ownership such as the legal basis of land ownership were established. On the contrary, changes instituted by the Japanese meant the elimination of the middle class in-

¹³ Chang, *op. cit.*, p. 166. See also Ik Khan Kwon, "Japanese Agricultural Policy on Korea: 1910-1945," *Koreana Quarterly*, Vol. VII, No. 3 (Autumn, 1965), pp. 96-97.

¹⁴ For a fuller description of how land in Yi-Dynasty Korea was divided, see Ik Khan Kwon, *ibid.*, p. 97.

¹⁵ These two Japanese companies were the largest Japanese firms in Korea, whose main objective was to help Japanese landowners and companies increase their Korean acreage. See Choi, *op. cit.*, pp. 202-206, 211. See also Chang, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-169.

¹⁶ Ik Whan Kwon, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 98. See also, Choi, *op. cit.*, pp. 218, 242; Henderson, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

dependent farmers and consequently a more drastic polarization of rural society.

The agricultural structure remained essentially a feudal production system, much like the traditional Korean structure. The only difference was that a minority of alien landowners replaced the indigenous landowners. To illustrate: 23,903 Japanese landowners in 1942 owned more than 2,450 acres of land while only 4,780 Korean landowners owned 2,450 acres of land each.¹⁸

The Industrial Sector

The same trend in the industrial sector can be noted. Ownership and management of all sectors of industry by 1945 were Japanese. In 1910, a *Kaisha-rei* (Regulation of the Incorporation of New Firms) was issued to control "disorderly" Japanese capital investment in Korea. Prior to 1931, Japanese capital investment on large-scale manufacturing industries was deliberately limited by the Japanese government "to prevent any competition between the Japanese and Korean industries as part of the same empire." Japanese capital was put only into government projects such as transportation, communication, electrical plants and land. Whatever may have been the primary intention of the *Kaisha-rei*, its most notable effect was to retain the rise of Korean capitalists.¹⁹

In the ownership of industry, Japanese capitalists dominated all sectors of the Korean industry — heavy industry,²⁰ small and light industries, mining, manufacturing, etc. By 1938, Japanese capitalists owned 3,136 companies or 57.7 percent of the total as against 2,278 firms or 42.1 percent owned by Koreans.²¹ It must be pointed out that most firms owned by Koreans were smaller in scale and capital than those

¹⁸ Chongcho'ol Im, "The Modernization of the Korean Economy, *Asiatic Research Bulletin*, Vol. VI, No. 10 (February 1964), p. 4.

¹⁹ Chang, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

The Japanese colonial government regulated the inflow of capital into Korean industries in order to avoid any competitions between Japanese and Korean industries as part of the same empire. This is an earlier case in point of the coherence of Japanese economic strategy. The present Japanese economic structure is probably patterned after experiments in Japanese colonies, notably Korea.

²⁰ No large industries developed before the 1930's. The world-wide depression of the 1930's brought Japanese economy to near collapse. As the only way out, the Japanese militarists invaded Manchuria in 1931 and prepared for further expansion in China. Korea became the base and it was only then that Korean large and heavy industries were built. See Hender-son, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

²¹ Choi, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

owned by the Japanese. In 1923, only 36 companies or 17 percent of the total owned by Koreans were engaged in mining and manufacturing. This suggests that native capital at that time was mainly invested in small-scale industries and business.²²

The trend in ownership of capital industry and corporations by Japanese capitalists tended to increase during the later Japanese colonial period in Korea. By the end of 1940, 94 percent of the manufacturing enterprises, 100 percent of the electric and gas industry, and 100 percent of the ceramics industry were owned by the Japanese.²³ One Korean economist believed that the Korean share in the overall industrial capital invested in Korea in 1940 was not over six percent and that nearly 90 percent of money invested even in Korean-operated industry came from the Japanese.²⁴ In 1945, the Japanese owned 89 percent of the total paid-up capital of all manufacturing and industrial facilities, as well as controlled all major banking, insurance and others.²⁵

The same trend can be noted in the management and Korean participation in the industrial process which was limited to the lowest level. Important positions in industry were occupied by Japanese. Availability of even technical jobs was limited; skilled manpower required for development of new industries in Korea was imported from Japan. As a consequence, in 1940, Korean technicians occupied only 20 percent of the total industrial technician population; 11 percent in the metal industry; 12 percent in the chemical industry; 20 percent in the electric, gas, and waterworks industry; 29 percent in the mining industry; and 11 percent in the refining industry.²⁶ To make matters worse, Korean technicians were not assigned to important positions other than serving as assistants to Japanese.²⁷ Even as late as 1944, 95 percent of gainfully-employed Korean men and 99 percent of Korean women were laborers.²⁸ The presence of Japanese technicians in the industry hampered the

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 235, 240. See also, Henderson, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

²³ Chongcho'ol Im., *op. cit.*, p. 4. See also Choi, *op. cit.*, p. 236-237.

²⁴ Ch'oe Mun-hwan, "The Path of Democracy — A Historical Review of the Korean Economy." *Koreana Quarterly*, Vol. III, No. 1 (Summer 1961), p. 61.

²⁵ Henderson, *op. cit.*, p. 97. See also, Choi, *op. cit.*, p. 287. For a comparison of Japanese ownership with Korean ownership of industry, as well as the paid-up capital of both Japanese and Korean capitalists. Refer to Table: Company Ownership by Nationality, Cho, *op. cit.*, pp. 236-237. See also Table: Distribution of Industry, Capital by Nationality, Choi, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

²⁶ Chongco'ol Im, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5. See also, Choi, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁸ Henderson, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

growth of Korean entrepreneurship and impeded the development of specialization in the Korean labor force.

The Financial and Banking Sectors

In traditional Korean economy, production and consumption were not separate activities. Exchange of surplus agricultural products was based, for the most part, on mutual trust. Yi-Dynasty Korea did not develop a uniform currency. Several kinds of coins were issued under different pretexts, at different times, and in different places. In central and northwestern Korea, nickel coins were circulated; in southern and northeastern Korea, brass coins were used; and in open ports, Japanese currency circulated freely.²⁹

In order to control the Korean economy, the Japanese colonial government established a system of exchange. As early as 1905 the protectorate regime revived the coinage law of 1901 which provided that Korea was to have the same coinage system of Japan.³⁰ The Bank of Chosen was established in 1909 to carry out this currency reform.³¹ The adoption of a uniform currency was followed by the establishment of banking organizations. In 1910 the Bank of Chosen was made a central bank. In 1918 the Industrial Bank of Chosen (which was formed by the integration of the Agricultural and Industrial Banks created in 1906) was established. Together with the Oriental Development Company founded in 1908, it carried out long-term industrial and agricultural financing (primarily to help Japanese landowners and companies increase their Korean acreage). The Savings Bank of Chosen, commercial banks such as the Chosen Trust and Insurance Company, and other financial institutions were similarly established.³²

Both deposits and loans were virtually Japanese monopolies. In the Bank of Chosen, ownership of deposits was distributed among Japanese and Koreans at a ratio of 95 to five; loans were distributed at a ratio of 98 to two.³³ However, in the Industrial Bank of Chosen, while ownership of deposits was distributed between Japanese and Koreans at a ratio of 76 to 22, loans were distributed at a ratio of 38 to 61.³⁴

²⁹ Bank of Korea, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-57.

³⁰ Chang, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

³¹ Bank of Korea, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 58-71. There were at least six Korean-owned commercial banks and three Japanese banks.

³³ Choi, *op. cit.*, p. 311.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

This trend of the Industrial Bank of Chosen can be noted for both the commercial and savings bank, although between 1929 and 1935, Korean deposits in savings bank increased by 85 percent.³⁵

What do these ratios indicate? They show that by and large, the ratio of Korean deposits to total deposits between 1910 and 1937 remained the same, while the Japanese ratio gradually increased. At the same time the ratio of loans extended to Koreans to all loans increased from 28.9 percent to 39.8 percent between 1910 and 1937; while the ratio of loans extended to Japanese decreased from 68.7 percent to 60.1 percent.³⁶ This is significant because despite the fact that the interest rates on loans were lower for Japanese than for the Koreans,³⁷ Korean loans continued to increase. Therefore, from these ratios we can surmise that the well-being of the average Korean was hardly improved during the colonial period.

Communications and Transportation

The exchange of goods and services within the new colonial economic framework in Korea required improved communications. In addition to the Seoul-Inch'on railway line opened in 1899, the Japanese paid special attention to railroad building expanding the lines to 6,362 kilometers by 1945. The Japanese also took over the construction of new roads (by 1945, 20,000 miles of roads had been built); improvement of maritime transport (by 1945, Korea had 230,000 tons of shipping and many port facilities); and management of postal services and other communications (there was a well-developed network of post offices, almost all equipped to transmit telegrams, 7,100 telephone lines, 5,600 miles of telegraph lines, 15 radio stations, 440,000 radio receivers, 72 theaters and 51 cinemas).³⁸

The great majority of these communications and transportation facilities were built to service Japan's needs and were, for the most part, used by the Japanese. However, we cannot ignore the fact that these communication facilities established in Korea by the Japanese were so extensive and pervasive that these facilities appear unduplicated by

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 309.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 323. For example, notes of interest on loans secured by real estates ranged between 12.9 percent and 19.3 percent per month among Japanese. Whereas among the Koreans, rates ranged between 14.3 percent and 21.8 percent.

³⁸ Henderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-99. See also, Choi, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-213.

many of the emerging nations. For instance, the Korean communications networks concentrated in the north were then only second to Japan in the Far East.³⁹ Moreover, by 1945, Korea had more radios per capita than South Vietnam, Indonesia, Angola, or Kenya were to have; and more than India, Burma, or Nigeria were projected to have in 1975.⁴⁰

Growth of the Korean Economy During the Japanese Colonial Rule (1910-1945)

We have shown how the Japanese established institutional control over the Korean economy. It was so thoroughgoing that by 1920 not only lands and mines but also the industrial, financial, transportation and communication systems had come under the monopolistic control of the Japanese.

At this point we shall analyze how the Japanese colonial administration contributed to the Korean economic development and industrialization. There are yardsticks for measuring roughly the degree of economic progress. The key economic indicators that will be used are: gross national product (GNP), per capita GNP, agricultural and industrial production and foreign trade.

Numerical estimates show that for the period 1910-1945, Korean economic growth, as a whole, was both substantial and impressive. The gross output of goods (not including services) nearly quadrupled in the course of a quarter of a century.⁴¹ Average annual rate of growth was estimated at 5.4 percent (or 3.7 percent per capital),⁴² which is a comparatively high rate of growth.

From 1915 to 1940, agricultural production increased by 85 percent⁴³ and industrial production increased over 80 percent.⁴⁴ While the development of industry increased after 1930 and after 1938 increased even more steeply,⁴⁵ agriculture still dominated the economy as a whole.

³⁹ Henderson, *ibid.*, p. 94.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

⁴¹ Chang, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 177.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 173. See also the table showing Korean agricultural growth in section on Agricultural Production, Part III of this paper.

⁴⁴ Henderson, *op. cit.*, p. 94. See also table showing development of Korean industry in section on Industrial Production, Part III of this paper.

⁴⁵ See Note 20, *supra*. This expansion increased sharply after 1938, with the coming of full-scale Japanese war in China.

More than 40 percent of the total gross output of goods in 1940 remained agricultural and the means of livelihood of more than 60 percent of the total population continued to come from agriculture.⁴⁶

The increase in industrial production after 1930 and its steep increase after 1938 is correlated to the Japanese economic policy towards its colonies. In retrospect Japanese economic policy in Korea was always designed to supplement Japanese economic needs. For the first twenty years of Japanese rule, the economic policy of the colonial government was primarily directed towards developing Korea as a source of food for Japan's expanding population and a market for Japanese manufactured goods. The agricultural sector was emphasized, and industry was not greatly strengthened. In fact, the manufacturing industries were deliberately limited by the colonial government's control over the flow of Japanese capital into Korea "to prevent any competition between Japanese and Korean industries as part of the same empire."⁴⁷ However, with Japan's penetration into Manchuria in 1931, and the preparations for a wider "Japanese co-prosperity" sphere of influence,⁴⁸ Japanese economic policy towards Korea changed sharply. It aimed at building up Korean industry and developing Korean industrial raw materials. After 1937, with the coming of full-scale Japanese war in China, the Korean industry quickly expanded to include war industries. This change in emphasis from the agriculture to the industrial sector of the Korean company was clearly indicated in the sudden increase in the value of production of both mining and manufacturing industries between 1930-34 and 1935-39.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Chang, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

⁴⁷ Chang, *ibid.*, p. 170. See also Henderson, *op. cit.*, p. 94; Ik Whan Kwon, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-111; Chongcho'ol Im, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

The *Kaisha-Rei*, mentioned earlier in this part of the paper, was meant to control "disorderly" Japanese capital investment in Korea. During this early period of Japanese Colonial Rule, Japanese capital that flowed into Korea was mostly put in government projects such as transportation, communications, electricity plants, and lands.

⁴⁸ The Japanese co-prosperity scheme included Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and North China. In this expansion scheme, Korea, together with Taiwan, became the base for Japanese domination of Asia.

⁴⁹ Chang, *op. cit.*, p. 174, explains the rationale for the change in Japanese economic policy in Korea as: "The economy in Korea, viewed in the international context necessitates a change in industrial policy from one previously centered on primitive industry toward a total development in wider range of industries . . . It is necessary to have a close connection between Japan and Manchuria and to assume responsibilities

Korean foreign trade gradually increased with Japan accounting for 97 percent of the total trade.⁵⁰ Korea's balance of trade was consistently unfavorable, a classic symptom of the colonial nature of the economic relationship between Japan and Korea.

For the period as a whole, the standard of living of Korean workers and peasants was far from improved. While consumption standards did move upwards as a result of the importation of more consumer goods than capital goods, the components of imports as of the end of 1931 consisted of: 53.5 percent of consumer goods, 19.2 percent of raw materials, 12.4 percent of foodstuffs, and 4.9 percent of "others" including capital goods.⁵¹ The Korean workers and peasants, as a whole, were reduced from the state of being poor to that of complete bankruptcy and from being underprivileged to being unprivileged.⁵²

Agricultural Production

Immediately after the First World War, food shortages in Japan caused widespread rice riots. The Japanese colonial government in Korea launched a series of Rice Expansion Plans to increase agricultural production, chiefly rice, by 118 percent, using 1916 as the base year. The Rice Expansion Plans (also known as the Rice Increase Plans) were carried out till 1940 with occasional discontinuity.⁵³

The result of the plans was remarkable. As indicated by the table below, the five-year average value of total agricultural output (at constant prices) from 1915 to 1935 more than doubled. During these two decades, agricultural production increased by 85 percent; rice production, by 50 percent; and average rice yield per acre, by 26 percent. Increased agricultural production was achieved by (1) increased use of natural fertilizers; and (2) improved seeds, methods of cultivation and farm equipment.

for the economic needs of the entire imperial area . . . Under present grave circumstances, we should strive to be victorious in the world economic struggle by total utilization of the resources of our economic sphere."

See also Henderson, *op. cit.*, p. 94, Ik Whan Kwon, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-111; Chongcho'ol Im, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁵⁰ Henderson, *op. cit.*, p. 94. See also, Choi, *op. cit.*, p. 293.

⁵¹ Ik Whan Kwon, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

⁵² Choi, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

⁵³ Ik Whan Kwon, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-100.

KOREA: INDEX NUMBER IN AGRICULTURAL GROWTH⁵⁴

Year	Amount (in yen) of agr. products	Amount (in suk) of rice products	Rice Yield per acre	Exports of Rice	Land Under Cultiva tion
1915-19	100	100	100	100	100
1920-24	118	106	106	167	99
1925-29	140	109	106	286	103
1930-34	153	126	116	375	104
1935-39	187	150	127	379	105

1 suk = 4.96 bushels

How far did the Rice Expansion Plan benefit Korea? As the table indicates, rice exports (almost exclusively to Japan) far exceeded the increased production of rice. Using 1915-19 as the index years, rice exports in 1920-24 increased by 67 percent and further increased by 279 percent in 1935-39, whereas rice production increased only 6 percent and 50 percent in the same periods respectively. A logical conclusion from this fact is that the unusual export was made at the expense of Korean consumption of rice. As a substitute for the rice exported to Japan from Korea, cheaper coarser grains were imported from Manchuria. This import of other grains, however, did not offset the curtailed per capita consumption of rice. As the table below shows, total per capita consumption gradually declined during the colonial period from 2.031 suk (10.074 bushels) in 1915-19 to 1.934 suk (8.937 bushels) in 1935-39. This means that imports of lower quality grain from Manchuria involved not only a qualitative sacrifice in substituting coarser Manchurian sorghum (formerly used as cattle fodder) for rice, but also a quantitative sacrifice in the level of food consumption. The table below show the decline in the consumption of other grains, from 1.324 suk (6.567 bushels) in 1915-19 too 1.193 suk (5.854 bushels) in 1935-39. Korean economists call these rice exports "forced or starvation exports."⁵⁵

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 102. See also, Chang, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

⁵⁵ Chang, *ibid.*, p. 174. See also IK Whan Kwon, *ibid.*, p. 110.

⁵⁶ Chang, *ibid.*, p. 174. See also Ik Whan Kwon, *ibid.*, p. 101.

KOREA: PER CAPITA FOOD CONSUMPTION (in *suk*)⁵⁶

<i>Year</i>	<i>Rice</i>	<i>Other grains</i>	<i>Total Consumption</i>
1910-19	0.707	1.324	2.031
1920-24	0.638	1.341	1.970
1925-29	0.512	1.300	1.812
1930-34	0.444	1.2-6	1.660
1935-39	0.641	1.193	1.834

Industrial Production

The period after 1930 was a classic instance of swift industrial development. It was characterized by the entry into Korea of the largest Japanese industrial and trading concerns — *Mitsui*, *Mitsubishi*, *Sumitomo*, and *Yasuda*.⁵⁷ Some other giant Japanese enterprises such as *Noguchi* developed primarily in Korea. It saw the inflow of Japanese capital and skill; the development of electric power; and the exploration of mineral resources, notably gold. Korean manufacturing industry was completely changed from rice cleaning, food processing, and silk fabric manufacturing to such heavy and chemical industries as iron manufacturing, special refining industry, synthetic fiber manufacturing, and chemical fertilizer industry. Manufacturing industry's share in total industrial output, which had been only 11 percent in 1911, increased to 24 percent in 1930, and grew to 40 percent in 1943.⁵⁸ Heavy industry's share in total industrial output, which had been 38 percent in 1930, increased to 73 percent in 1942.⁵⁹ During the period from 1936 to 1943, the number of manufacturing factories increased from 5,927 to 14,856; the number of employees from 188,250 to 549,751; and and the output from 730,806 *yen* to 2, 050,000 *yen*.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Choi, *op. cit.*, pp. 282-283 lists the major projects undertaken by the big entrepreneurs of the Japanese *Zaibatsu*. Special emphasis was placed on industries and resources that could not be developed in Japan. For instance, the *Mitsubishi* Mining Company built an iron refinery in Ch'ongjin, the *Chosen* Nitrogenous Fertilizer Company built a plant at *Hungman*, etc. Most of these modern industries were built in Northern Korea.

⁵⁸ Chongcho'ol Im, *op. cit.*, p. 37. See also Chang, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

⁵⁹ Henderson, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

⁶⁰ Choi, *op. cit.*, p. 284.

The table below shows that the increase in the development of industry was smaller than it appeared. Nevertheless, corrected for changes in price level, the gross value of industrial production increased over 80 percent from 1922 to 1944. The increase after 1938 was steep.

KOREA: DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY IN KOREA⁶¹

Year	Gross Value of Industrial Product	
	Yen Millions	Yen millions corrected for changes in price level (wholesale prices)
1922	223.3	721.7
1929	351.5	641.3
1933	367.2	520.3
1937	959.3	672.0
1938	1,140.1	690.0
1944	20,500.0	1,376.7

Despite the rapid development of industry, there was no balanced development of Korean industry. Firstly, a comparison of the industrial structure of Japan and Korea shows that while the Japanese industrial structure at the end of 1940 was considerably well-proportioned and well-balanced, with metallic and machinery industries sharing 45 percent of the total industrial structure (50 percent is considered the ideal in advanced capitalist countries), Korean industrial structure was considerably imbalanced, with metallic and machinery industries accounting for only 20 percent of the entire industrial structure at the end of 1940.⁶² Secondly, while large factories shared only two percent of the total number of factories in 1940, they accounted for 39.3 percent of total employment. In contrast, the small and medium factories, which shared 98 percent of the total number of factories in 1940, accounted for a low 60.7 percent of all employment.⁶³ It must be pointed out here that most of the large factories were in heavy chemical industry

⁶¹ Henderson, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

⁶² Choi, *op. cit.*, p. 286.

⁶³ Choi, *op. cit.*, pp. 284-285.

which was developed in haste to meet war requirements, and with no consideration given to the complex interrelationship with other industrial fields.⁶⁴ And lastly, though the rapidly increasing amount of manufactured industrial products came from new factories, Korean industry still retained many traditional elements. Household⁶⁵ and handicraft industries accounted for 40.1 percent of the total gross value of industrial production in 1933; and though it decreased to 22 percent in 1939, it was still a considerable share.⁶⁶ This was a case of dual economy.

Foreign Trade

Korea's balance of trade was consistently unfavorable, with Japan accounting for 97 percent of the total trade, as indicated by the following table.

KOREA: VOLUME OF TRADE WITH JAPAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES⁶⁷

	1910 - 1939	1920 - 1931	1932 - 1936	1937 - 1939
EXPORTS				
To other countries	16.2%	7.3%	12.2%	21.4%
To Japan	83.8%	91.7%	87.8%	78.6%
IMPORTS				
From other countries	33.8%	30.5%	15.7%	12.7%
From Japan	66.2%	69.5%	84.3%	86.3%

On the basis of the above statistics, it can be said that the structure of Korean trade bears the characteristics typical of a colonial economy. Firstly, Korean imports consistently exceeded Korean exports. Japan accounted for 86.3 percent of the total Korean imports in 1937-39, and 78.6 percent of the total Korean exports. Secondly, exports on the one hand, consisted chiefly of products of primary industries, i.e., raw materials such as raw silk, raw Chinese medicine, iron and metals, ammo-

⁶⁴ Choi, *op. cit.*, pp. 285-286.

⁶⁵ Household industry, by definition, should be included in the agriculture-related sector. Household industry is industry conducted at the home of the "intrepeneur" and members of his family usually in their spare time.

⁶⁶ Chang, *op. cit.*, p. 178. See also Henderson, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

nium sulfate; agricultural products, i.e., finished or semi-finished food-stuffs such as rice, white soybeans, fishery products. On the other hand, imports consisted of secondary products such as machine and tools, metal products, coal, and manufactured goods such as cloth, dress, medicine material and chemical products.⁶⁸

Per capita Income

In the final assessment, an attempt must be made to measure the economic gain of the average Korean during the Japanese colonial period. In other words, welfare evaluations have to be considered in the analysis of economic development. Total output or volume of production tends to obscure the realities of economic progress. The question posed is: how fully did the sectors of Korean society participate in the benefits of the Korean economic growth? Did increased total production or GNP actually benefit the Korean people as the Japanese colonial government had promised in the Treaty of Annexation in 1910?⁶⁹

In the agricultural sector, we find that Korean tenancy increased by 54 percent in 1941.⁷⁰ Four out of five Korean farm households were tenants. In 1930, the landlords, mostly Japanese absentee landlords who comprised 3.5 percent of the total farm population, owned 60 percent of the total arable land.⁷¹ We also find that the growing number of tenants were compelled to pay not only a rent of 58-90 percent of their total crops or harvest, but also land taxes, fees for inspection of rice, and to provide tribute and all kinds of labor contributions to the landowners.⁷² As a result, tenants were left with only a small portion of their crops, at most, 18 to 25 percent of their rice crops. In 1930, for instance, 17 percent of all farm families earned less than 160 *yen* annually in

⁶⁸ Choi, *ibid.*, pp. 294-298. See also Joseph Whitaker, *An Almanack* (London, 1939), p. 247.

Korea's trade can be an interesting indicator of the direction of Japan's economy. For instance, in the 1920's, rice was the leading import commodity of Japan. But by 1941, iron and metals had replaced rice as the largest export commodity to Japan.

⁶⁹ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Korea: Treaties and Agreements* (Washington, 1921), p. 65.

The treaty proclaimed that ". . . in order to maintain peace and stability in Korea, to promote the prosperity and welfare of Koreans, it has been made abundantly clear that fundamental changes in the actual regime of government are absolutely essential . . ."

⁷⁰ Chongcho'ol Im, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁷¹ Chang, *op. cit.*, p. 175; See also Ik Whan Kwon, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

⁷² Ik Whan Kwon, *ibid.*, p. 98-107; See also Choi, *op. cit.*, p. 218-206.

rice production; while 40 percent of all farm families earned less than 300 *yen* annually.⁷³ In such circumstances, any possibility of saving for improving living standards was impossible. In fact, Korean farmers were usually left with a deficit. They had to borrow, usually at usurious interest rates, in order to survive. We note that in 1931, the average debt of a Korean farm tenant was 70 *yen* and every partial landowner, an average debt of 115 *yen*.⁷⁴

With high tenancy rates and increasing degree of impoverishment,⁷⁵ the Koreans were forced to leave their villages for Manchuria and Siberia where they could at least cultivate a piece of land as their own. At the end of 1937, over a million Koreans were forced to settle in Manchuria.⁷⁶

The poverty of the Korean rural communities became extreme despite farm mechanization during the Japanese colonial period. In 1929, an official investigation⁷⁷ reported that 837,000 families out of 3,191,153 had no means of subsistence and in 1930, 1,253,000 families were gathering grass and bark of trees for food. This situation was officially recognized by the Chosen Government-General in his annual report on the administration of Korea.⁷⁸

In the industrial sector, we find that despite the development of industry there were only 1,632 Korean technicians or 20 percent of the total technicians in Korea by the end of 1944.⁷⁹ As pointed out earlier

⁷³ Chongcho'ol Im, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁷⁴ Choi, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

This explains why Korean loans tended to increase while Korean deposits remained the same, as pointed out in this paper in the section under Banking and Finance.

⁷⁵ This is no exaggeration. The worldwide depression of the 1930's affected every facet of economic life in Japan and Korea. However, the hardest hit were the Korean farmers because the burden was shifted to them through taxes, tenant rates, etc. The Second Sino-Japanese War aggravated the situation. To meet the sharply increasing demand for food, the Japanese colonial government adopted new measures designed to buy Korean rice forcibly and at arbitrary prices. It is believed that more than 70 percent of the total crop of Korean farmers were forcibly "brought" by the Japanese.

⁷⁶ Ik Whan Kwon, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-103; see also, Choi, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

⁷⁷ Ik Whan Kwon, *ibid.*, pp. 107-108.

⁷⁸ Chosen Government-General, *The Annual Report on the Administration of Chosen, 1936-37* (Seoul, 1938), p. 116.

" At this moment, there are about forty thousand families of two hundred thousand persons working in the cultivation of fire field in the mountain districts. These poor people are driven by hunger from place to place, making shelters in log cabins and keeping their bodies and souls together by planting grains and vegetables in the hillside."

⁷⁹ Chongcho'ol Im, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5; see also, Choi, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

in this paper, this restriction was not only on the level of top positions in the government bureaucracy but also on the level of technical jobs seriously hampered the development of Korean entrepreneurship and the specialization of the Korean labor force. We also find that as the war industries expanded rapidly, the number of Korean laborers also increased. In 1931, there was a total of 142,676 Koreans working in various factories and mines; by 1943, this number had increased to 731,751 workers.⁸⁰ Yet, despite this sharp increase in the number of Korean laborers, there was no corresponding improvement of wages. In 1937, the average daily wage for the ordinary mine worker was only 0.763 yen (exchange rate: Y1.00 - \$1.00), which was less than 50 percent of his Japanese counterpart.⁸¹ In most cases, especially the laborers in the textile, wood and cork factories, working hours were usually more than twelve hours.⁸² These exploitative conditions of the Korean workers were reflected by the growing number of strikes which increased from 84 in 1919 to 138 in 1936 despite the extensive network of police and military rule.

Limits of colonial growth

Japanese colonialism in Korea brought a mixture of exploitation and modernization whose impact is debatable and hard to sort out. We have shown that the effects of Japanese colonialism on Korean economic development were manifold and ramified.

During the three and a half decades of Japanese colonial rule, Korean economy underwent rapid modernization. We have shown that during the period of reference (1910-1945), the industrial structure of Korean economy experienced profound qualitative changes. Manufacturing factories were established, railway and telecommunications networks were expanded and large-scale hydroelectric plants were constructed. Yet at the same time, we also noted that Japanese colonial rule did not provide Korean economic progress and industrialization a satisfying or stable social and political framework. We have shown that the industrial structure of the Korean economy was fashioned to fit the Japanese economy as a subordinate and complementary compo-

⁸⁰ Choi, *ibid.*, pp. 244-246, 290-291.

⁸¹ Choi, *ibid.*, pp. 290-291, 244.

⁸² Choi, *ibid.*, pp. 246-254.

ment.⁸³ We have also shown that the industrial institutions had Japanese, not Korean, roots. There was no opportunity for national capital formation, as almost all capital — commercial and industrial, and even land — was controlled by Japanese capitalists. There was no opportunity for Korean entrepreneurship and Korean specialization of labor to develop in a situation where Korean participation in the industrialization process was severely limited to the lowest category. It thus developed that while Korea underwent rapid economic modernization, the Koreans paradoxically, experienced increasing exploitation from Japanese industrial modernizers. Symptomatic of this exploitation was the various peasant movements and agrarian unrest that grew at this time.⁸⁴ Yet, to an extent, this exploitation produced its own reaction — an increased social awareness on the part of the Koreans, a leading factor that propelled Korean national development in the 1950's.

In the agricultural sector, the Japanese by introducing new farming techniques and encouraging agricultural researches gave impetus to agricultural production. In fact, the Yi government made little effort to develop agriculture (in spite of the fact that farming was the backbone of the economy).⁸⁵ Yet, at the same time, the Japanese contribution to Korean agricultural growth was spurious. While agricultural production increased, it meant ironically a decrease in food consumption, and at times, near starvation for many Korean farmers.

⁸³ Perhaps a comparison of the Korean manufacturing industry and the Japanese manufacturing industry would be necessary to assess the position of Korean industry within the "Japanese co-prosperity sphere." Chang, *op. cit.*, p. 184 gives the following figures:

No. of factories	1936	1937	1938	1939
Japan	12,257,588	16,356,176	19,667,270	24,360,130
Korea	5,927	6,928	6,624	6,953
Japan	90,602	106,005	112,332	137,422
No of workers				
Korea	148,799	166,709	182,771	212,459
Japan	2,592,687	2,936,512	3,217,715	3,766,709
Gross Value of Manufactured Industry (in 1000 yen)				
Korea	446,921	638,254	791,130	1,091,780
Japan	12,257,588	16,356,176	19,667,270	24,360,130

These figures show that before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Korea with one-third of the population of the Japanese empire, had only 5 percent of the total number of Japanese factories, 5 percent of the total number of Japanese factories, 5 percent of the total number of workers, and 5 percent of the gross value of manufacturing industry.

⁸⁴ The two major movements are: The Independence Movement of Sam-Il, and the Anti-Colonial Struggle (Yuk-Ship), 1926.

⁸⁵ Chang, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

The Japanese colonial government in Korea succeeded in laying the basis for a modern integrated Korean economy. Roads were built, the basis of modern industrial and mining complex was created in the mineral-rich north, a modern tax and financial structure was set up, and advanced agricultural techniques were introduced. However, it is safe to conclude that while a modern economic structure was developed and rapid economic modernization was effected, the Japanese undermined — in fact, vitiated — most of the benefits of economic modernization and even furthered some opposite results. By putting constraints on Korean economic activity, Japanese colonialism tended to freeze the economic instincts of the Korean people. The Koreans could not perform their own economic experiments in any but the smallest and most meaningless scales for 35 years. Thus while economic development of Korea in the early twentieth century was in some ways successful and efficient, it was a partial and incomplete development. When Liberation came in 1945, the economic base of the Korean state was too weak; its economic infrastructure, grossly inadequate.

UNITED STATES POLICY ON JAPANESE WAR REPARATIONS, 1945-1951*

TAKUSHI OHNO

The question of Japanese war reparations constituted a significant part of United States postwar policy for Japan and Asia as a whole. It was one of the most controversial issues among the Allied Powers, especially those in Southeast Asia during the postwar era. This paper aims to analyze such US policy during the Allied occupation of Japan focusing on the reparations question.

Occupation Mechanism — American Control

The United States played a dominant role in the Allied occupation of Japan. With the war moving to an end, the US government prepared an occupation plan for post-surrender Japan in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration.¹ President Harry S. Truman designated on August 11, 1945 American General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) of the occupation.²

The powers and authority of the SCAP were defined thus:

You (SCAP) will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our relations with Japan do not rest on

* This paper is based on the author's M.A. thesis entitled *PHILIPPINES-JAPAN RELATIONS, 1945-1956: War Reparations Question and Peace Settlement* (526 pp.), submitted in May 1975 to the Philippine Center for Advanced Studies.

¹ US, Dept. of State, *Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968). pp. 2-3.

a contractual basis, but on an unconditional surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope.³

Although the Japanese government was permitted to retain its administrative function under the guidance and discretion of the SCAP, it had no real legal authority whatsoever. There was "no room for diplomatic initiative" in the hands of the Japanese government regarding matters affecting Japan's external relations. These were totally subject to the control of the SCAP.⁴

The US was also successful in securing an overwhelming position in the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), the policy making body for the governance of Japan. The FEC was created on December 27, 1945 at the Moscow conference attended by the foreign ministers of the US, the UK, the USSR, and China.⁵ The FEC was originally composed of the eleven Allied countries namely, Australia, Canada, China, France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the USSR, the UK, and the US.

The FEC was created "to formulate the principles, standards, and policies in conformity with the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under which the terms of surrender may be accomplished." The FEC was also empowered "to review, on the request of any member, any directive issued to the SCAP or any action taken by the SCAP involving policy decisions within the jurisdiction of the Commission."⁶

The FEC, according to the agreement, could take any action with the concurrence of a majority of its member states. However, the vote had to include all representatives of the four major powers (the US, the UK, the USSR, and China) that created it.⁸ This provision implied that any one of the major powers could prevent the acceptance of any policy decision by casting its veto. Another provision stipulated that only the US could unilaterally issue "interim directives" to the SCAP

² *Ibid.*, p. 45.

³ Royal Institute of International Affairs, "Appendix 11, Authority of General MacArthur as Supreme Commander for Allied Powers," *Survey of International Affairs, 1942-1946* (London: Oxford Press, 1955), pp. 506-7.

⁴ M. Kajima, *A Brief Diplomatic History of Modern Japan* (Tokyo: Charles & Tuttle Co., 1969), p. 81.

⁵ R.I.I.A., "Appendix 14, Agreement of the Foreign Ministers at Moscow on Establishing Far Eastern Commission," *Survey of . . . op. cit.*, p. 528.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 529.

⁷ *Loc. cit.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 530.

pending action by the FEC whenever urgent matters arose.⁹ These procedures were obviously advantageous to the US, as these insured that only those policies which the US approved could be adopted.

Furthermore, the FEC had to respect the existing control machinery of the US in Japan, including the "chain of command" for the American government and the SCAP, General MacArthur, and his command of the Allied occupation forces.¹⁰ This implied that General MacArthur carried the dual function of being responsible to his government as an American Commander in the Far Eastern theater while serving as the Supreme Commander of the occupation forces.

Thus, the US practically dominated the Allies' occupation machinery for Japan which made it possible for the occupation to be virtually an American operation.

Occupation Objectives and Reparations Policy

The over-all basis of the US occupation policy was defined in the document entitled the "US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan." revealed on August 29, 1945.¹¹ This document declared two ultimate objectives of the occupation:

1. To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the US or to the peace and security of the world; and
2. To bring about the eventual establishment of peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and *will support the objectives of the US* as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations (Underscoring supplied).¹²

In short, the US aimed to control Japan through the occupation so that the latter would support the American "objectives." For this, the US deemed the total demilitarization of Japan as essential. Japan's democratization also had to be realized.

The demilitarization policy was directed not only to the disarming of Japan, but also to the elimination of all existing economic bases of Japan's military strength. It was in this connection that the US took account of the policy of exacting war reparations from Japan.

⁹ *Loc. cit.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 529.

¹¹ For the full text, see R.I.I.A., "Appendix 10, United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," *Survey of...op. cit.*, pp. 500-505.

¹² *Loc. cit.*

The terms for Japanese reparations were initially laid down in the Potsdam Declaration¹³ and subsequently incorporated into the American policy document. The document stipulated as follows:

Reparations for Japanese aggression shall be made *through the transfer of such goods or existing capital equipment and facilities as are not necessary for a peaceful Japanese economy* or the supplying of the occupation forces . . . *No form of reparations shall be exacted which will interfere with or prejudice the program for Japan's demilitarization* (Underscoring supplied).¹⁴

In formulating this policy, the US considered the bitter lessons from the failure of collecting reparations from Germany after the First World War.¹⁵ She certainly felt that a heavy indemnity levied upon a defeated nation might in turn induce a "desperate reaction" of that country leading to another war as was demonstrated by the German case. Therefore, the US believed that reparations should be made in kind and within Japan's economic capacity. In other words, the American plan ruled out the idea of reparations compensating fully actual war damages caused to the victorious countries and granted Japan the right to sustain a "peaceful" economy. However, the term "peaceful" economy was not clearly defined by the US. Ambiguity in defining the term later brought about controversy among the Allied countries in settling the question of Japanese reparations.

At any rate, it is significant to note that the American policy of exacting reparations was formulated as an integral measure to bring about and assure Japan's security interests.

Pauley Formula

In November 1945 a mission sent by the US government conducted an investigation on Japan's economy to facilitate the implementation of US reparations policy.¹⁶ In December 1945, Ambassador Edwin P. Pauley, head of the mission submitted to President Truman an interim

¹³ The full text reads; "Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war."

¹⁴ R.I.I.A., "Appendix 10 . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 505.

¹⁵ For example, see E. Bennett, *Germany and the Diplomacy of the Financial Crisis, 1931* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1952), pp. 15-39.

¹⁶ US, Dept. of State, *Occupation of . . .*, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.

report and a comprehensive report with recommendations in April 1946.¹⁷

Pauley reported that Japan, in spite of the extensive destruction brought on her by the war retained more industrial requirements. Pauley therefore urged for an "immediate and wholesale removal" of all war facilities and other industrial "surplus" which the Japanese militarists and their business allies had erected during the war. Although he did not reveal what criteria he employed in estimating Japan's "surplus" industrial capacity. Pauley recommended the removal and the turning of a number of army and navy arsenals, aircraft industries, and light metal plants of Japan into reparations to the Allied countries.¹⁰

Meanwhile, Pauley insisted that the US should take "no action to assist Japan in maintaining a standard of living higher than that of neighboring Asiatic countries injured by Japanese aggression." He believed that an industrially less strong Japan would be desirable for the economic and political security and stability of Asia as well as for the national interests of the US. Pauley, therefore, contended that

We, as a nation, are concerned to see that Japan is not to be pauperized, but neither is Japan to be allowed to rehabilitate her economic life in a form which will allow her to gain control or to secure an advantage over her neighbors.¹⁹

Pauley also made it clear that the US had no intention to get Japanese reparations for her own selfish interests. Instead, he recommended that Japanese reparations should be directed to the war-devastated Allied countries, particularly those in Asia. Pauley considered reparations as a means of rehabilitating America's Allies in Asia and as a method of eliminating the economic bases of Japan's war-making potentials. In short, Pauley's reparations formula was designed to scale down Japan's industrial capacity to the "small and harmless" level while building a new economic structure in the Asian region in which Japan would have no room to play a dominant economic role as she did before the war.²⁰

¹⁷ US, Dept. of State, *Report to the United States President from Edwin W. Pauley, April 1946* (Washington, D.C.; US Government Printing Office, 1946).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

¹⁹ *Loc. cit.* See also US, Dept. of State, "US Reparations Policy," *Diplomatic Paper*, 1945, Vol. VI, April 1945, pp. 997-998.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-6.

Interim Reparations Policy and Its Stalemate

Upon the initiative of the US on May 13, 1946, the FEC adopted a policy of reparations removal program as an interim measure.²¹ This policy was a mere adoption of Pauley's recommended formula. However, to implement this policy, various problems had first to be solved. These included the questions of the percentage share of reparations allocation to the claimant countries and the level of economy Japan will be permitted to have.

The US again took the initiative in the FEC in solving such problems.²² However, the USSR appeared to oppose the American concept of reparations. The Russian delegate to the FEC maintained that Japanese properties captured in such territories as Manchuria, Sakhalin, and Kuriles should be considered as "war booty" and should not be included in calculating reparation shares.²³

All the other member states of the FEC rejected the Russian stand, for the "war booty" policy would benefit only the USSR. Nevertheless, the USSR did not change her posture on this matter and consequently vetoed the American proposal leading to its not being passed.

In the meantime, the FEC was to determine the level of economy that Japan will be permitted to have as the basis of her peace-time needs. On January 23, 1947, after a long discussion, the FEC adopted the "Determination of the Peaceful Needs of Japan." This policy statement loosely defined Japan's "peaceful needs" as "being . . . the standard of living prevailing in Japan during the period, 1930-34."²⁴

In spite of these efforts undertaken by the FEC, no substantial policy decision for the implementation of interim reparations program was made. Discussion then came to a stalemate, leaving the question unsettled. This was mainly due to the fact that each claimant state insisted on getting the largest possible share of reparations from Japan.²⁵

Advance Reparations Transfer Program

Meanwhile the Japanese showed little enthusiasm for taking care of their industrial equipment and facilities. As long as there was a

²¹ (U.S. Dept. of State) *Occupation of . . .*, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-32.

²² *Loc. cit.* See also "Official Text: Our Fight for Reparations in the Far Eastern Commission," address of Sec. Romulo before the Manila Junior Chamber of Commerce, Manila, August 21, 1951.

²³ *Survey of . . .*, *op. cit.*, pp. 402-3.

²⁴ For the full text, "Appendix 30 . . .," *Survey of . . .*, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

²⁵ Romulo, "Official Text . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 8.

possibility of their being confiscated as reparations, the Japanese were reluctant to properly maintain and further invest in their industries. Consequently many of those industries deteriorated.²⁶

Considering this situation and the urgent need for assisting in the rehabilitation of the Allied countries in Asia, the US was inclined to unilaterally seek a partial solution to the reparations question. On February 13, 1947, the US proposed to the FEC an advance reparations transfer program. Under this plan, 30 percent of the quantity or value of Japanese industrial equipment and facilities which had been designated as available under the interim removal program, would be transferred in advance to four countries, namely, China, the Philippines, the Netherlands (for Indonesia), and the UK (for Burma, Malaysia, and her other colonies in Asia). China would receive 15 percent, and the rest of the countries would be entitled to 5 percent each.²⁷ The US justified the choice of the four recipient countries on the ground that they had been occupied and seriously devastated by Japanese military aggression.²⁸ On April 4, 1947, the US issued a unilateral directive to the SCAP enabling the program to be in force.²⁹

The issuance of this unilateral directive was an employment of the emergency power granted to the US under the provisions of the FEC rule.³⁰ Thus, the US demonstrated, at least up to mid-1947, her keen interest in exacting reparations from Japan.

Move Towards New Policy

By early 1947, Japan had almost totally been disarmed. Most of the political and economic reform programs for Japan had been initiated by the occupation authorities. These included a promulgation of the new Constitution on November 3, 1946 (enforced on May 3, 1947).³¹

In March 1947, the SCAP pointed out that the major task of the occupation had been completed, and that the various reform programs

²⁶ W. Brown, ed., *American Foreign Assistance* (Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institute, 1953). p. 35. See also T. A. Bisson, "Reparations and Reform in Japan," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. XVI, No. 21 (Dec. 17, 1949), pp. 241-46.

²⁷ World Peace Foundation, *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, Vol. IX (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1949), p. 167.

²⁸ *Loc. cit.*

²⁹ Romulo, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

³⁰ See *supra*, p. 4.

³¹ For details, see E. M. Martin, *The Allied Occupation of Japan* (American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948), pp. 38-44.

introduced had taken root. He admitted, however, that the economic condition in Japan became so chaotic that it threatened to jeopardize the whole occupation program. MacArthur further noted that continued neglect of this critical reality of Japan's economy would force the Allied countries to choose between supporting Japan with American expenses or allowing millions of the Japanese people to starve. Neither of them was seen as desirable.³²

Given these, the SCAP realized the necessity of adopting a new posture towards Japan's economic problem so as to obtain desirable results from the occupation as well as to reduce the mounting financial burden on the American taxpayers who were in effect shouldering the occupation expenses.³³ MacArthur thus showed the first sign of shifting from mere introduction of political reforms to a positive policy for Japan's economic recovery.

This move by the SCAP was meaningful in the light of international events; a new form of political struggle was developing between the US and the USSR. At the start of 1947, it had become undeniable that the power conflict would grow into a "cold war", bipolarizing world politics.³⁴ President Truman, in a message to the US Congress on March 12, 1947, explicitly pointed to the communist powers as "aggressive" and as threatening the national integrity of the "free" countries in Europe and other parts of the world.³⁵

Right after the Truman Doctrine was enunciated, US State Undersecretary Dean Acheson significantly characterized Germany and Japan as "two great workshops of Europe and Asia, upon which the ultimate recovery of the two continents so largely depends." He urged for the immediate reconstruction of these two "workshops" in view of new American security interests.³⁶ In June of the same year, Acheson's statement was followed by the Marshall Plan aimed at Europe's socio-economic recovery.³⁷

³² "MacArthur outlines achievements in Japan," *Manila Times*, March 27, 1947. p. 7.

³³ *Loc. cit.*

³⁴ For example, see D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960* (New York: Doubleday, 1961). See also M. L. Trefouse, *The Cold War: A Book of Documents* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1966).

³⁵ For the full text of Truman's Statement, see R.I.I.A., *Documents on International Affairs, 1947-1948*, pp. 5-6.

³⁶ For the full text of Acheson's statement, *ibid.*, pp. 20-22.

³⁷ For the full text of Marshall's statement, see *ibid.*, pp. 23-26.

A new course of American occupation policy *vis-a-vis* Japan, therefore, must be understood in the context of the changing international situation, which altered America's global strategic planning.

Kennan's View of Japan: New Strategic Considerations

It was George F. Kennan, Chief of the Policy Planning Staff of the US State Department, who undoubtedly played an important role in revising America's policy for Japan in accordance with new strategic considerations. Kennan began advocating his new policy in mid-1947 and later intensified his campaign after a month-long trip to Japan in March 1948.³⁸

Kennan's view of Japan was closely related to his appraisal of American policy for Asia in general and for China in particular. When the Pacific War was moving towards a close, a great number of American policy-planners felt that the whole power situation in the Far East would be changed as a result of Japan's defeat. They believed that, in terms of American national interests, the growth of a "strong and friendly" China would provide a basis for stability and "favorable postwar balance of power" in the region. With this view, the US government was determined to help the Nationalist government of China in building up its prestige under the leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek.³⁹

Contrary to this hope, however, Kennan observed as early as mid-1947 that Chiang's China was "unmistakably slipping into communist control," and that the US could do nothing to prevent it. While he admitted there were "mistakes" in America's China policy, Kennan pointed out that the deterioration of the situation in China was basically due to the "political weakness of the Nationalist regime itself." Yet, he did not perceive this deterioration as fatal to America's national interests. According to him, China was not a strong industrial power nor did she show any promise of becoming one "for a long time in the future."⁴⁰

On the other hand, Kennan underscored Japan's strategic importance in the light of American security interests. He described Japan as

³⁸ G. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925--1950* (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1967), p. 374.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 563-564. See also US, Dept. of State, "An Estimate of Conditions in Asia and the Pacific at the Close of the War in the Far East and the Objectives and Policies of the United States," *Diplomatic Papers*, 1945, op. cit., pp. 556-560.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 374.

the "sole great potential military-industrial arsenal of the Far East."⁴¹ He pointed out:

We, Americans, could feel fairly secure in the presence of a truly friendly Japan and a nominally hostile China — nothing very bad could happen to us from this combination; but the dangers to our security of a nominally friendly China and a truly hostile Japan had already been demonstrated in the Pacific War; worse still would be a hostile China and a hostile Japan.⁴²

Kennan, who was a diplomat with a long experience in prewar Russia and who was later known as an "architect of containment policy" against communism, warned that the advancing tide of communism in China was bound to enhance communist pressure on neighboring countries including Japan. He said that "should these pressures triumph what we would have before us would obviously be a hostile one [Japan]." Nevertheless, he hopefully viewed that Japan and the Philippines would "eventually constitute the cornerstones of a Pacific security system," adequate for the protection of American interests. Kennan stressed:

If we could retain effective control over these two archipelagos in the sense of assuming that they would remain in friendly hands, there could be no serious threat to our security from the east within our time.⁴³

Thus, Kennan advocated for revising the role of China and Japan in America's strategic thinking while emphasizing the importance of Japan, together with the Philippines, in her security scheme. He therefore urged for the basic revision of American occupation policy, in a way that would prevent Japan from falling into the communist orbit, and that would develop Japan's economy to a self-sustaining one according to the "workshop" in Asia.⁴⁴

In connection with a new policy aimed at Japan's economic recovery, Kennan recommended a total halt of the Japanese reparations transfer program. Reparations should, he insisted, be "generally halted, the opposition of the FEC members notwithstanding."⁴⁵

The SCAP agreed with these points of Kennan's view. According to Kennan, his recommendations were respected by the US government and incorporated into its new policy planning vis-a-vis Japan.⁴⁶

⁴¹ *Loc. cit.*

⁴² *Loc. cit.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 381.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 391.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 385-6.

⁴⁶ Overseas Consultants Inc., *Report on Industrial Reparations Survey of Japan to the United States of America* (New York: February 1948), p. 22.

Two Mission's Reports for Revised Reparations Policy

In the meantime, the US government sent to Japan two important economic survey missions in mid-1947 and early 1948, respectively. Chairman Clifford Strike of the Overseas Consultant Inc. led the first group while the second mission was headed by the Chemical Bank and Trust Company's Chairman, Percy H. Johnston. Both missions carried out the task of reevaluating Japan's economic situation and submitted their reports with recommendations to the US government.

The main thrust of the Strike report was an advocacy for prompt reconstruction of Japan's economy. Observing the current state of Japan's economy as "unstable" and "maladjusted," the report stated:

In our opinion, a strong Japan would be less dangerous to the peace and prosperity of the Far East than a continuance of... present state of instability and economic maladjustment.⁴⁷

The Strike report noted the fact that the Allied countries in Asia were in need of Japan's industrial equipment as reparations for their rehabilitation and industrialization. The report, however, pointed out that the ultimate decision with respect to reparations should be formulated "based on a balancing of needs to obtain optimum benefits for the region as a whole." This could be achieved, according to the mission's opinion, by leaving Japan free to reconstruct and use the bulk of her industrial capacity. Strike urged for the suspension of the removal of Japan's industrial facilities (except for primary war industry) for reparations which could be effectively and peacefully utilized in Japan for her economic recovery. Otherwise, according to the report, Japan's economy would be prevented from becoming a self-sustaining one. Moreover, it would be expensive to the American taxpayers to have to continue paying for the occupation costs. In the interest of the Allied countries Japan had to be self-sufficient. Finally, the Strike report proposed a reduction of Pauley's recommended reparations amount in the form of Japan's "surplus" industrial assets.⁴⁸

The points brought out by the Strike mission was further stressed by the Johnston report. In the report, Johnston repeatedly advised that the US as the principal occupying power should "now assist the recovery of Japan." With respect to the reparations question, the report asserted:

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

⁴⁸ W.P.F., "Report of the Johnston Committee to the Secretary of the Army on the Economic Position and Prospects of Japan and Korea and Measures Required to Improve Them," in *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, Vol. X (January 1 to December 31, 1948), p. 161.

Plants which are needed in bringing about the recovery of Japan should be retained and only excess capacity removed. Otherwise the US, which is now extending relief to Japan, would in reality be paying the reparations bill.⁴⁹

The Johnston report urged for a drastic cut-down in the quantity of the industrial facilities to be removed from Japan as reparations. It further recommended the inclusion of some primary war industries in such a reduction plan.⁵⁰ A comparison of the total value of proposed reparations removal as recommended by Pauley, Strike, and Johnston is shown below:

TOTAL VALUE OF PROPOSED REPARATIONS REMOVAL
(In Thousand Yen of 1939 Value)

	<i>Pauley</i>	<i>Strike</i>	<i>Johnston</i>
Primary War Industries	1,475,887	1,475,887	560,000
Other Excess Industries	990,033	172,269	102,247
Total	2,465,920	1,648,156	662,247

It is significant to note that Pauley's policy recommendation of total economic demilitarization for Japan was punitive in nature and without concern for Japan's economic recovery. On the other hand, the recommendations made by both Strike and Johnston were prepared in line with the new objective of encouraging Japan's recovery. Therefore, it is natural that the last two missions found it imperative to radically revise Pauley's reparations formula. The Johnston mission revealed in its report that the SCAP confirmed that the attainment of the economic recovery of Japan had "now properly become a primary objective of the occupation."⁵¹

⁴⁹ *Loc. cit.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 162. See also J. B. Cohen, "Japan: Reform vs. Recovery," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. XVII, No. 12 (June 23, 1948), p. 140.

⁵¹ R.I.I.A., "Statement by General McCoy on the United States Government's Decision to End the Interim Program of Reparations Deliveries, the Far Eastern Commission, May 12, 1949," *Documents on International Affairs, 1947-1949, op. cit.*, p. 728.

Total Cessation of Advance Reparations Transfer Program

Acting upon Strike and Johnston's reports as well as Kennan's recommendation, the US government was determined to halt the further removal of reparations from Japan. On May 12, 1949, the American representative in the FEC, General McCoy, announced that the US government had decided "to rescind its interim directive of April 4, 1947, bringing to an end the advance transfer program" of reparations. McCoy enumerated the following four reasons which led to the US decision:

1. The deficit Japanese economy shows little prospect of being balanced in the near future and, to achieve eventual balance, will require all resources at its disposal;
2. The burden of removing further reparations from Japan could detract seriously from the occupation objective of stabilizing the Japanese economy and permitting it to move towards self-support;
3. There is little or no prospect of the FEC agreement on a reparations initiative by the US over the past three years to assist the FEC in reaching such an agreement. Without agreement on a share schedule, the existing FEC policy decisions regarding reparations are incapable of implementation; and
4. Japan has already paid substantial reparations through expropriation of its former overseas assets and, in smaller degree, under the advance transfer program.⁵²

General McCoy made it clear that the US government had "no intention of taking further unilateral action" to seek additional reparations removal from Japan. He declared that Japan would be permitted to develop her peaceful industry "without limitation."

The claimant countries of the Japanese reparations, including the Philippines, vehemently protested against the US unilateral decision.⁵³ Nevertheless, the US government did not withdraw its decision.

On the other hand, Japanese Premier Yoshida welcomed the American policy. He viewed it as "proof" that the American posture was

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 729.

⁵³ Romulo, "Official Text . . .," pp. 15-16. See also "Romulo blast US Jap policy," *Manila Times*, May 21, 1949, pp. 1; 2. Originally under this transfer program, the Philippines was entitled to receive roughly 1.230 million yen of 1939 value in the form of Japan's industrial "surplus." However, because of the US unilateral decision halting the program, the Philippines received reparations of only 19 million yen of 1939 or 24 million pesos of 1948 value. See RP, DFA, "Memorandum of Cesar Lanza, April 9, 1952)," *Treaty Series*, Vol. II, No. 1 (January 1953), pp. 204-205.

favorable to Japan. He noted that the "hectic period of reforms and confusion" was over, and that Japan entered into a "new and second postwar phase; reconstruction and rebirth."⁵⁴

Move Towards Peace-Making With Japan

The cold war developing through the years 1947-49 in Europe and then involving the Asian region dictated the US to look at the Japanese question in the light of the larger context of America's new strategic considerations. That the US decision of halting the advance reparations transfer program was made along with this policy line has already been discussed. Yet, a successful communist revolution in China in October 1949 undoubtedly gave the US government a positive reason to strengthen its security planning against "communist expansionism" in Asia.⁵⁵

In a speech before the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. on January 12, 1950, US State Secretary Dean Acheson indicated a new concept of American security in Asia and the Pacific region.⁵⁶ While characterizing the communist movement in the region as an expression of "Russian imperialism," the State Secretary stressed that this movement was seriously threatening the interests of the US and the "free" world as a whole. He defined the policy to stop the spread of communism as the "cardinal principle" and the "real interest" of the US security scheme. According to Acheson, the US "defense perimeter" stretched from the Aleutian to the Philippines through the Japanese Archipelago. Emphasizing the significance of building Japan up as the anti-communist bastion in the region, he declared:

There is no intention [on the part of the US] of any sort of abandoning or weakening the defense of Japan . . . Whatever arrangements are to be made either through permanent settlement or otherwise, that defense must and shall be maintained.⁵⁷

It is clear that Acheson's statement was a reflection of Kennan's viewpoint discussed earlier.

⁵⁴ S. Yoshida, *Nihon wo Kettei-shita Hyakuman* (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1967), pp. 120-22. See also Yoshida, *Kaiso no Junan*, Vol. III (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1957), pp. 155-157.25.

⁵⁵ For example, see R. MacFarquhar, *Sino-American Relations, 1949-1971* (New York: Praeger Publ., 1972), pp. 59-153. See also F. Dunn, *op. cit.*

⁵⁶ For the full text of Acheson's statement, *Documents on International Affairs, 1949-1950*, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-108.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

Parallel to this development, the US realized the necessity of restoring Japan's sovereignty so that she could effectively contribute to the strengthening of the defense line described above. Subsequently, President Truman appointed, in April 1950, John F. Dulles as foreign policy advisor to Secretary Acheson and entrusted him with the task of drafting a peace formula with Japan.⁵⁸

In June 1950, Dulles was sent to Japan to conduct exploratory talks on the peace-making question with the SCAP as well as with Japanese officials. While he was in Japan, war broke out in the Korean Peninsula. President Truman immediately issued a statement, in which he criticized the event as follows:

The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.⁵⁹

Similarly, Dulles observed that the Korean War had broken out due to the "strategic importance of Korea in relation to Japan." It showed, according to him, the "length to which Soviet imperialism was prepared to go to dominate Japan."⁶⁰ Giving the Korean War as a convenient excuse, the US government intensified its anti communist propaganda.⁶¹ Equally significant was the outbreak of the War hastening Dulles and other American policy-planners' efforts towards concluding a peace treaty with Japan.

Dulles' No-Reparations Peace Formula

Events moved rapidly thereafter. On September 14, 1950, President Truman announced that he had authorized the State Department to initiate further negotiations with the member states of the FEC regarding a peace settlement with Japan.⁶² Subsequently, in October, the State Department revealed its peace formula in the form of the "Seven-Point Memorandum." This Memorandum provided for the basic principles which would serve as guideline in formulating a Japanese peace treaty.⁶³

⁵⁸ F. Dunn, *op. cit.*, pp. 95. See also, Yoshida, *The Yoshida Memoirs: The Study of Japan in Crisis* (London: Heineman, 1961), p. 248.

⁵⁹ R. MacFarquhar, *Documents on Sino-American Relations, 1949-1971*, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

⁶⁰ J. Dulles, "Japanese Peace Treaty Viewed as a Positive Step in the Free World's March towards Peace," *US State Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 25, No. 642 (October 15, 1951), p. 617.

⁶¹ Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Gaimusho no Hyakumen*, Vol. II (Tokyo: Harashobo, 1969), p. 797.

⁶² *Documents on International Affairs, 1949-1950*, *op. cit.*, pp. 615-6.

⁶³ *Loc. cit.*

A peace treaty to be concluded between the Allied countries and Japan, according to the Memorandum, should restore Japan to an equal political status with other states in the international community without restricting Japan's sovereignty. It should also provide for Japan a "reasonable degree of security" in order to avoid the creation of a power vacuum in that country after conclusion of the treaty. Equally imperative was that Japan should be granted an opportunity to regain her full economic self-sufficiency "by not placing upon her any heavy economic or financial burdens or major commercial liabilities." In connection with this, the Memorandum defined that a treaty should contain provisions stipulating a total waiver of reparations claims against Japan on the part of the Allied countries.⁶⁴ Thus, the peace formula described by the Memorandum was "liberal, generous, and non-punitive" of Japan.⁶⁵ The "soft peace" formula in general and the no-reparations policy in particular were motivated by an American desire to fully utilize Japan's strategic position in the cold war against the Sino-Soviet bloc.

Late in January 1951, Dulles again visited Tokyo to investigate and coordinate the opinions of Japanese leaders on the peace-making question. In Tokyo, he gave public assurance that the US would treat Japan "as a party to be consulted and not as a vanquished nation to be dictated by the victors."¹² Prime Minister Yoshida, on the other hand, expressed a hope to have a peace treaty which would enable Japan to be a "real workshop of East Asia and contribute abundantly to its progress and prosperity." Recognizing that Dulles' peace formula was compatible with his desire, Yoshida particularly welcomed the "no-reparations" policy. It was reported that, after their talks, Dulles and Yoshida had found a "large area of understanding concerning the basic issues" involved in the peace-making question.⁶⁷

In February 1951, Dulles proceeded to the Allied countries in Asia and the Pacific, including the Philippines. His mission was to make them understand and accept the American peace formula. In Manila,

⁶⁴ *Loc. cit.*

⁶⁵ *Loc. cit.* See also G. Kennan, *op. cit.*, p. 391.

⁶⁶ "Dulles' Statement, January 26, 1951," *Contemporary Japan*, Vol. 20, No. 1-3 (Jan.-Mar. 1951), p. 114.

⁶⁷ Yoshida, *Nihon wo . . .*, *op. cit.*, pp. 132-33. See also Yoshida, "Japan and the Crisis in Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (January 1951), pp. 180-1.

Dulles proclaimed to Filipino leaders that the whole purpose of making peace with Japan was "to prevent the rise of Japan as an aggressive nation." He assured them that Japan would be a "good neighbor to all who practice freedom" and a "bulwark against the new tide of despotism which threatens from the Asia mainland." Dulles vigorously underscored the threat to the peace of all "free" countries not by Japan but by the Sino-Soviet bloc.⁶⁸ He stressed:

Never before in history has there been a peril to freedom greater than that which faces us today from the combination of Russian imperialism with the Bolshevik brand of communism.⁶⁹

With respect to the reparations question, Dulles admitted that he had no point to argue the "justice" of the Philippine claim for Japanese reparations. He pointed out, however, that the reparations question was "not merely a matter of justice" but a "matter of economics." He further added that the question was "not what ought to be done" but "what can be done." He then stressed that he could not see "any effective way" of exacting reparations from Japan.⁷⁰

Referring to the lessons of failure in collecting German reparations after the First World War, Dulles brought out the familiar argument, saying that any further imposition of such financial burden as reparations on Japan would jeopardize her economic viability. The only alternatives were, he underscored, either for the US to pay the reparations bill on behalf of Japan or for Japan to fall into the communist orbit. Neither of these alternatives would be to the interest of the Philippines. Thus Dulles appealed to Filipino leaders to be "patient" in this regard.⁷¹

Criticism against Dulles' No-Reparations Policy: the Philippine Case

Dulles' no-reparations policy provoked vehement criticism of the Allied countries in Asia.⁷² Among them, the most vocal was the Phil-

⁶⁸ J. Dulles, "Laying Foundations for a Pacific Peace," *Far Eastern Survey*, *op. cit.*, p. 405.

⁶⁹ "Truman's envoy has long conference on Jap pact with EQ," *Manila Times*, February 13, 1951, pp. 1; 2.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁷¹ "US on Jap resurgence," *Manila Times*, February 16, 1951, pp. 1; 10. See also "Dulles' Radio Interview, Station DZFM," *Manila Times*, February 16, 1951, p. 10.

⁷² F. Dunn, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-122.

ippines. Filipino leaders manifested their disappointment and resentment against Dulles' policy in the strongest possible terms.

The Philippine government demanded from the very beginning, "early and equitable" war compensation from Japan. The reparations claim constituted one of the primary objectives of Philippine policy towards postwar Japan.⁷³ The Philippines saw Japanese reparations as vital for her economic rehabilitation and industrialization. The Philippine government under President Roxas as well as President Quirino believed that it had every reason to claim Japanese reparations.⁷⁴

In an official statement dated March 2, 1951, Foreign Undersecretary Felino Neri condemned Dulles' no-reparations policy as both "surprising and disappointing." He argued:

Reparations is first a matter of justice and the realities of economics are, in our view, a secondary consideration. In our case, reparations from Japan is a matter of absolute necessity.⁷⁵

Dulles' policy appeared to the Filipino people as one where the US was favoring her former enemy and frustrating the interests of her "loyal" ally. They failed to appreciate the fact that Japan bulked much larger political importance in the American scale of priority, and that of the Philippines had increased in absolute but not in relative terms.⁷⁶ Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Vicente J. Francisco bitterly pointed out that "if Japan cannot afford to pay reparations, still less can the Philippines afford not to collect reparations."⁷⁷ According to Senator Francisco, the foreign affairs committees both in the Senate and the House had a unanimous stand on the reparations question. He said:

Seldom has the Congress found itself in such unanimity as it has arrived at on the issue of reparations from Japan . . . that unanimity I am sure, reflect the unanimity of the entire Filipino nation and it will be unwise to disregard it.⁷⁸

On July 13, 1951, the Philippine government declared that the no-reparations peace treaty was definitely unacceptable to the country. It insisted that the treaty should contain provisions for a "categorical acknowledgement of Japan's war guilt" and her "material accountability"

⁷³ Romulo, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

⁷⁴ *Loc. cit.*

⁷⁵ "Neri assails Dulles stand," *Manila Times*, March 3, 1951, pp. 1; 12.

⁷⁶ J. Francisco, "Japan Should Pay Reparations," *Lawyers Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (March 31, 1951), p. 140.

⁷⁷ *Loc. cit.*

⁷⁸ *Loc. cit.*

for war damages caused to the Philippines. It reiterated that the Philippines would never withdraw her reparations claim and would not accept "any provisions prejudging Japan's inability to pay."⁷⁹

"Service" Reparations Policy: the Final Formula

Having heard criticism presented by the Philippines and other Allied countries in Asia, Dulles was inclined to scrap his original policy of no-reparations, although the basic principles defined in the Seven-Point Memorandum were maintained. A revised reparations formula was incorporated into the final text of the peace treaty which was made public on August 15, 1951 by the US government. It was Article 14 of the treaty by which Japan's reparations terms were stipulated. It reads as follows:

It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the War. Nevertheless it is also recognized that resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparations for all such damage and suffering and at the same time to meet its other obligations.

Therefore, Japan will promptly enter into negotiations with the Allied Powers so desired, whose present territories were occupied by Japanese forces and damaged by Japan, with a view to assisting to compensate those countries for the cost of repairing the damage done, by making available the services of the Japanese people in production, salvaging and other work for the Allied Powers in question. Such arrangement shall avoid the imposition of additional liabilities on other Allied Powers, and where the manufacturing of raw materials is called for, they shall be supplied by the Allied Powers in question, so as not to throw any foreign exchange burden upon Japan. (Underscoring supplied).⁸¹

In short, the final treaty text stipulated Japan's obligation to pay reparations through rendering "services" but limited this within her financial capacity. This formula was quite similar to the reparations terms originally defined by the Potsdam Declaration and the document of the US initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, except for the stipulation on "services" terms (instead of Japan's "surplus" industrial facilities) and more emphasis on the maintenance of Japan's "viable" economy.

⁷⁹ "Thirty-third Monthly Radio Chat of President Quirino, July 15, 1951," *Official Gazette*, Vol. 47, No. 7 (July 1951), pp. 3408-3411. See also "Committee unanimous against pact," *Manila Times*, July 14, 1951, pp. 1; 14.

⁸⁰ Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Gaimusho no . . . op. cit.*, pp.801-802.

⁸¹ For the full text, see RP, *Treaty Series*, Vol. III, No. 1 (September 1957), pp. 30-46.

The adoption of this "services" reparations formula, however, did not mean that Dulles already yielded to Filipino criticisms. Rather these criticisms provided Dulles and other American policy-makers an opportunity to arrive at their second thought on the matter. Dulles therefore rationally underscored that Japan's economic condition which was just showing signs of considerable improvement mainly resulted from America's purchases of Japanese products in connection with the Korean War. Nevertheless, the full employment of Japan's labor force was yet to be achieved.⁸² Considering these factors, Dulles came to realize that

Japan has a population not now fully employed and it has industrial capacity not now fully employed and both of these aspects of unemployment are caused by lack of raw materials. These however are possessed in goodly measure by the countries which were overrun by Japan's armed aggression. If these war devastated countries send to Japan the raw materials which many of them have in abundance, the Japanese could process them for the creditor countries and by these services, freely given, provide appreciable reparations.⁸³

Dulles therefore adopted an idea in the final treaty text to mobilize Japan's idle labor forces, together with her unemployed industrial capacity, for reparations payment in processing and/or manufacturing goods, for which necessary raw materials be supplied by the recipient countries. Significantly, the underlying motivation of this "services" reparations formula was to open a channel of raw material supply from the reparations recipient countries (mostly in Southeast Asia) to Japan's industry. The US wished to see the establishment of close economic ties between Japan and the countries in Southeast Asia while preventing the Japanese economy from being oriented towards China.⁸⁴

Thus, the final reparations policy formulated by the US was designed to hopefully contribute to the economic rehabilitation of the Southeast Asian countries as well as Japan's industrial development. Needless to say this policy was an integral part of the US peace-making formula

⁸² See for example, Kamiya, *Chosen Senso*, (Tokyo: Chocoron Sha, 1968)

⁸³ "Statement of J. F. Dulles, September 5, 1951," *Lawyers Journal*, Vol. XVII, No. 1 (January 31, 1952), p. 4.

⁸⁴ J. F. Dulles, "Security in the Pacific," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1952), p. 185. See also S. Okita, "South and Southeast Asia and Japanese Economy," *Japan Quarterly*, Vol. I, No. 1 (Oct.-Dec. 1954), p. 8.

aimed at building Japan up as a "junior partner" under the banner "Pax Americana."

On September 8, 1951, in San Francisco, the peace treaty was signed between Japan and the forty-nine Allied countries including the US and the Philippines.⁸⁵ The Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland refused to sign the treaty, saying that the treaty was only for the US and her allies. Neither Nationalist China nor the People's Republic of China was invited to the San Francisco conference.⁸⁶

The Japanese reparations question is not only an economic issue but also a political question. The US occupation policy for Japan has repercussions not only for the country itself but also for Asian in general. US reparations policy was therefore altered in accordance with changing international situations and consequent American strategic thinking.

During the initial phase of the occupation, or during the 1945-1947, the US demonstrated her keen interest in exacting reparations from Japan. She felt that reparations were both necessary and vital as a means of demilitarizing Japan by eliminating all economic bases of her war-making potential and as a means of rehabilitating the war-devastated Allies in Asia. Behind this policy, the US looked at Japan as a potential menace to her security interest, and therefore, believed that a militarily and economically weak Japan would be serving US interests. The US authorities adopted Pauley's reparations formula which was designed to exact reparations from Japan in the form of existing Japanese industrial facilities deemed as "surplus".

However, after mid-1947, US occupation policy towards Japan was inclined to shift dramatically. Instead of a destructive or reformatory policy, the US began to consider the economic recovery of Japan as necessary. At first, it was motivated by America's vital need to relieve herself of the mounting financial burden in maintaining the occupation forces in Japan. But soon, this policy-shift was re-enforced by her new strategic interests in the wake of growing cold war tension.

The development of the cold war through the years 1947-48 radically altered American security planning. It required the US to reappraise Japan's position. Determined to revitalize Japan's strategic importance, the US swiftly began to treat Japan as a "reliable" ally and assigned her

⁸⁵ *Gaimusho no*, *op. cit.*, pp. 803-809.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 803.

a new role as an "anti-communist bastion" in Asia. When top priority was given to the policy of restructuring the Japanese economy, Pauley's reparations formula was found inconsistent with the new situation and was subsequently totally discarded in early 1949. Those who played a key role in abolishing Pauley's formula were G. Kennan, Chief of the State Department Policy-Planning Staff and such economists as C. Strike and H. Johnston.

In the meantime, the US observed that the advancing tide of communism in Asia was posing a crucial threat to "balanced" power relations in the region. The communist takeover of China in October 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 certainly gave a positive reason for the US to move towards terminating the occupation of Japan so as to strengthen the alliance of the "free world" against the Sino-Soviet bloc. John Foster Dulles of the US State Department assumed the task of drafting a peace treaty.

Dulles, inheriting Kennan's view, formulated a peace-making policy with Japan, which appeared to be non-punitive and generous. He ruled out the exaction of reparations from Japan. Dulles' no-reparations formula was formulated in view of keeping Japan out of the communist orbit and building Japan up as America's junior partner in a "Pax Americana" scheme.

Dulles' no-reparations policy was, however, vehemently criticized by the Allied countries in Asia. The Philippines was the most vocal protester among others. She failed to appreciate the importance of making Japan economically strong at the cost of receiving reparations for her own rehabilitation. Her criticism also touched off emotions as so her being a direct victim of Japan's armed aggression during the war.

At the last minute, Dulles scrapped his original policy of no-reparations on the draft of the final peace treaty. Instead, he carefully elaborated a "token" formula which stipulated Japan's obligation to pay reparations by rendering "services" to the war-devastated Allies but within limits to Japan's financial capacity. The adoption of this formula, however, did not mean that Dulles yielded to Filipino criticism. It was rather a result of Dulles' second thoughts on the question and of suggestions from Japan's business leaders. The "services" reparations formula was aimed at the utilization of Japan's unemployed labor forces and industry. It was also envisaged at the re-establishment of close economic ties between Japan and the reparations recipient countries, mostly in Southeast Asia, with great potentials as raw material supplier to Japan's

industry and as markets for Japan's products. Furthermore, the establishment of close economic ties between Japan and Southeast Asia through reparations was desirable to US interests of keeping the region out of the communist orbit.

Thus, due to the development of the cold war the US policy on Japanese reparations changed from the "heavy" reparations formula at the initial stage of the occupation to the "soft" formula during the period of 1948-49. Nevertheless, it does not mean that the US objective of making Japan a supporting power of American "interests" was also altered. During the pre-cold war period, the US believed that the "heavy" reparations policy would be compatible with her "interests." Again, during the cold war period, the "soft" reparations formula would be desirable to the new "interests" of the US. It is therefore safe to say that the reparations question of Japan was only treated by the US as a means to serve American security interests. It was not meant to serve the real war victims — much less the Filipino people.

JAPANESE CULTURAL PROPAGANDA IN THE PHILIPPINES

MARIANO C. JAVIER

On January 2, 1942 when Manila fell into Japanese hands, the existing political parties under the Commonwealth were immediately dissolved, and an educational campaign in the occupied areas was launched. Believing that culture could serve to compliment military might, the Japanese enlisted the help of political commentators, educators and writers from Japan and sent them to the Philippines to purge the people of the thoughts originating from "enemy countries."¹ Newspapers and other publications were mobilized to maintain internal solidarity and unity. "In all the speeches and short talks which the Japanese officials in the military and civil establishments delivered on practically all occasions — the opening of a school, interviews, gathering of peasants, etc. — the dominant ideas were the 'building of a New Philippines', the 'development of a truly Oriental culture', and the 'doing away with American influences and way of life.'"²

The initial military victories of 1941 and 1942 must have given the Japanese confidence in the strength of their moral philosophy. They thought it was strong enough to defy "the shallow, materialistic approach of the Anglo-American."³ They counseled the people to follow Japan and be guided equally by strong moral and political ideals.⁴

¹ Yasotaro Mori, "Nippon's Cultural Strength," *Pillars*, II (May, 1944), 52.

² Agoncillo, *Fateful Years*, vol. I, p.366.

³ Mori, "For A More Spheric Consciousness," *Pillars*, II (May, 1944), 3-7.

⁴ *Ibid.*

General Masaharu Homma, in a speech after the seizure of Manila, exhorted the Philippines to "liquidate the unnatural culture borrowed from a far away country."⁵ He stressed that "a nation which indulged in pretty dresses, nice food, physical enjoyment and expensive fashions could not succeed in establishing a strong nation."⁶

Roots of subservience

It did not take the Japanese long to realize that the Filipinos' cultural and economic dependency on the United States was in a far worse state than they had imagined. They were appalled by the Filipinos' slave-like reverence and dependency on imported materials. They were shocked by the Filipino standard of living which was "measured in terms of sleek motor cars and electric refrigerators, neither of which was produced in the country."⁷ They could not understand why the Filipinos would "always hark back to the pre-war era to lament, not its colonial status but in recalling its artificial prosperity and the imported foods."⁸ They wondered how a nation could take pride in speaking foreign languages rather than their own; or even remain as a nation with a national economy which they described as "standing on a precarious foundation of a foreign trade that could be relied upon to be as stable as the shifting sands of the Sahara."⁹

Looking into Philippine history, they discovered that the country had no culture nor racial identity of her own. They surmised that this cultural deprivation was due to the years of Spanish and American impositions in the Islands. They seized upon the weight of argument to launch an ambitious program, taking upon themselves the heroic task of liberating the people from Western economic domination and rekindling the flame of nationalism which they stretched to the regional level, embracing not only the Philippines and Japan, but the entire East Asian countries as well.

The Japanese also looked into the "unnatural attachment of the people to the United States," tracing its cause to the people's general "feeling of inferiority."¹⁰

⁵ Quotations from *Journal of the Japanese Military Administration*, 2 (1942, V-VI).

⁶ S. Motukawa, "A Hospital Visit," *Philippine Review*, II (May, 1944), p. 21.

⁷ S. Motukawa, "A Hospital Visit," *Philippine Review* II (May, 1944),

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ S. Matukawa, "The Filipino Reorientation Made Easy," *Pillars*, I (February, 1944), p. 23.

... the Filipinos were wont to turn their eyes away from the Orient because they saw the Orient as the slum of the world and felt that embarrassing to be considered a part of it. Consequently, their feeling toward other Oriental peoples was like the universal attitude people feel toward poor relations.¹¹

The Japanese administrator urged the people to regain their self-confidence, deducing the Filipino feeling of inferiority from America's policy of deceit and misguidance.¹² In a lecture commemorating the fall of Bataan, General Yoshihide said that "the United States had sapped Filipino strength with luxury goods, scattered their energies by excessive encouragement of individual rights, and handicapped their future by not building enough vocational schools."¹³

Southeast Asia possesses world control of rubber and tin; one fourth of the world's tungsten and antimony, the greatest exporter of rice, the world's control of copra and coconut oil; the largest chromite deposit and the sixth gold producer of the world.

America Unmasked

A Japanese writer confessed that "the only real element of poverty (in the Philippines) is the poverty of the people's will to develop their country's economy."¹⁴

Although they gave the American credit for the general improvement of the islands, the Japanese explained that the high standard of living was a natural result of a period of industrialization, not a humanitarian act towards the Filipino people. They claimed this was a general trend throughout the world since the close of the 19th century.¹⁵

They denounced America's colonial objectives in the islands, from her interference in the Spanish-Philippine War of 1898 to the sacrifice of Filipino lives in Bataan and Corregidor. They exposed what they claimed was America's organized effort to transform the Philippines into a dependent colony, both politically and economically, so that she would remain an indispensable part of her vast program of Oriental expansion.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

¹² This is an often repeated advice by officers of the Japanese Military Administration, especially by Major Gen. Hayashi Yoshihide, 1st Director General of the JMA.

¹³ Hayashi Yoshihide, as quoted in Theodore Friend, *Between Two Empires* (London: 1965), p. 231.

¹⁴ S. Matukawa, "Filipino Reorientation Made Easy," *Pillars*, I (February, 1944), 24.

¹⁵ T. F. Ito, "America's Altruism in the Philippines," *Philippine Review*, II (May, 1944), p. 38.

A Japanese writer, T. F. Ito¹⁶, gave an explanation of America's supposed modernization of the Philippines which would later become an often repeated argument during the post-war disillusionment of the Filipinos with American colonial policies. Ito wrote that the sweeping change in the political, social and economic institutions after the establishment of the civil government in 1901 was no more than "a prelude to the Americanization of the natives."¹⁷ He added:

Under the banner of altruism, the doctrine of democracy was nominally introduced; then a shallow but dazzling materialistic civilization was brought in, followed naturally by American mannerisms and tastes.¹⁸

Mr. Ito continued to explain that the materialistic civilization introduced in the Philippines which America announced to the world as an act of goodwill, was really no more than a plan to develop a new and exclusive market for the products of her industries.

Masao Matsuoka, another Japanese writer, also maintained that the industrial revolution which swept Europe from the end of the 19th to the beginning of the 20th centuries had increased the production of goods which resulted in a desperate need to seek new markets for these goods. American efforts to acquire the Philippines from Spain was motivated by America's search for new markets for surplus goods. These goods were dumped in the Islands under the guise of America's contribution to the modernization of the Philippines.¹⁹

Prior to the outbreak of World War II, when confronted on several occasions with questions to explain her position in the Philippines, America had managed to prove her absence of any commercial or economic designs by citing the unfavorable balance of trade with the Islands, and also by presenting in figures the enormous expenditures she incurred to maintain the Philippines. But the Japanese refuted this contention. They said:²⁰

As far as the visible items were concerned, this claim was correct. But the truth was that Uncle Sam's profits which were derived out of non-visible items such as insurance premiums, freight charges, interests and bonds and debentures, etc. were more than enough to offset the losses in the visible items.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-44.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Masao Matsuoka, "Japanese Colonial Administration," *Philippine Review*, I (June, 1943), 11.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

As for America's constant reference to the enormous expenditures she had made for administrative purposes and defense of the territorial integrity of the Philippines, and which she claimed to be no less than \$30,000,000 per annum, the Japanese disclosed the truth of this matter.

On the face of it, these appear to be rational arguments. But, the American policy towards the Philippines was not as simple as that; it was much more deeply rooted... America had and still has in mind a sinister objective — the domination of the entire Far East which abounds in economic potentialities. In fact, to America the Orient was and is synonymous to an inexhaustible gold mine. So long as she could reign over the Orient, she would be at liberty to exploit countries through trade monopoly, an arrangement which would amply compensate his losses in the Philippines. The Philippines was an important outpost from which this tentacle of imperialistic exploitation would surreptitiously stretch to the Asiatic mainland. Therefore, so long as the Filipinos could be put 'in the bag' to serve their purpose Uncle Sam was always ready to spend any amount.²¹

Summarizing America's economic interests in Asia, the Japanese maintained that it was the intention of America to make the Philippines and other Asian countries remain and subsist on agricultural economy so that Great Britain and the United States would continue to maintain their economic interests in Asia. Asian countries would continue to provide the much-needed raw materials for Western power which would in turn transform them into manufactured goods to be exported back to the same countries whence the materials had been acquired. The trade relation, so economically disastrous to agricultural countries, was made to appear advantageous to both parties, and was frequently mislabeled "free trade", "international division of labor", "internationalism", etc.²²

Japan added in conclusion that this economic policy of Anglo-America is sustained by force, and that it was for this reason that agricultural countries were naturally compelled to be either British or American colonies.

While exposing American motives, the Japanese unwittingly exposed their own colonial ambition in Asia. Her reputation as a colonial empire which dated from 1894 or 1895²³ with the acquisition of Taiwan, and then the Sakhalin Islands, and later Korea and Manchu-

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

²² Isao Kume, "Rewriting The History of East Asia," *Pillars*, I (December, 1943), p. 7.

²³ Matsuoka, "Japanese Colonial Administration," p. 7.

ria, is common knowledge for the Filipinos to alter their impression of Japan's ambitions for colonial expansion. To free herself from embarrassment, Japan admitted having become a colonial empire,²⁴ but tried to impress the Filipinos with the supposed "nobility of her purpose" by claiming her participation in the war as part of Asia's history of political struggle.²⁵ The Japanese claimed that their country was motivated by the "noble cause of destroying the old order established by Anglo-American imperialism."²⁶ She also imposed upon herself a moral obligation to redeem Asia from "Western clutches" and to establish a New World Order in Asia wherein each country shall be given the privileged position of an independent nation in the concert of free nations."²⁷

While the United States pointed out the sufferings of Korea, Manchuria, North China and Indochina to prove the hallowness of Japan's proposal for independence,²⁸ Japan gave herself the credit for the supposed economic progress of those countries. She presented herself to the Philippines as a "peaceful loving nation", driven into war in order to avenge herself for the "aggravating injuries and insults from the United States and Great Britain." She justified her acquisition of Taiwan "by virtue of the right of conquest," and blamed the Sino-Japanese War on China for the latter's refusal to recognize the independence of Korea. She called the Russo-Japanese war an act of "self defense against Russia's design over Manchuria and Korea."

The Japanese did not devote their criticisms alone to the subject of American imperialism. Other aspects of Philippine culture and society were also evaluated. They looked into the Philippine educational system and discovered its close relationship with American schools — promoting American ideals, language, history, government and even American outlook.²⁹ They found that the country was turning into a cheap imitation of America, and to prevent its shameful and total transformation, the school curricula were drastically revamped. Books and courses on Western culture and values were abolished, and emphasis was placed on vocational education and food production.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Kume, "Rewriting The History of East Asia," p. 8.

²⁸ Friend, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-222.

²⁹ T. F. Ito, "American Altruism In The Philippines," *Philippine Review*, II (March, 1944), 41.

Language as a tool

Tagalog was proclaimed the country's national language and Nippongo the official language in Asia.³⁰ It was the Japanese contention that the introduction of Tagalog in the schools would give people confidence in developing their own culture, and that Nippongo, on the other hand, would direct the populace to Oriental culture and values. In short the introduction of these two Oriental languages would hasten the people's cultural emancipation from the United States.³¹

By the end of 1942, city ordinances were already being printed in Tagalog.³² One thousand basic Tagalog words were prepared by the *Kalibapi* (Kapisanan sa Paglilingkod sa Bagong Pilipino), and titles and offices in the government were Filipinized.³³ Tagalog literature began to flourish through the encouragement of the Japanese Military Administration. Contests on creative writing in Tagalog were periodically announced by the Manila Sinbun-Sya and the Manila City Hall authorities. With this new and favorable treatment of the Tagalog language, a number of our Filipino writers in English were soon trying their hands in Tagalog. A few continued to write in this medium even after the war. The literary activities including frequently conducted contests which marked this period were really focused on one specific theme: "to reflect the spirit and outlook of the New Philippines."

Attempts to 'Nipponize'

Nippongo was also treated with the same enthusiasm as the Tagalog language. Pamphlets on basic lessons in Nippongo were distributed free immediately after the occupation of the Islands. When the press was given permission to function under the supervision of the Japanese Military Administration, all magazines, both in English and in Tagalog, contained sections of basic lessons in Nippongo. These supplemented *The Nippongo Weekly*, a grammar pamphlet which was sold at three centavos a copy.³⁴

³⁰ Military Ordinance No. 13, Concerning Official Language for Public Use, July 24, 1942.

³¹ Takao Yamada, "Reform of the Japanese Language," *Philippine Review*, I (September, 1943), pp. 23-25.

³² Gregorio F. Zaide, *Chronicle of Japanese Occupation, 1941-1943*. (Unpublished manuscripts, no pages.)

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *The Nippongo Weekly* came off the press on February 15, 1943, and issued by the Manila Sinbun-Sya. It is one-half of the regular tabloid newspaper and contained eight pages. From Gregorio F. Zaide, *Chronicle of Japanese Occupation: 1941-1943*. (Unpublished manuscripts.)

Nippongo was made a basic course in the elementary and secondary curricula when the public schools were re-opened under the new regime. Contests on the language were conducted regularly over the radio. In less than two years, a few gifted Filipino youths had learned to speak Nippongo like native speakers of the language.

Columns of the more widely circulated magazines and journals were placed under the supervision of Japanese writers from the Military Information Office. These writers became regular contributors of articles which never deviated from the systematic program of replacing the Spanish-American-oriented culture. They tried to establish a cultural bond between the Philippines and Japan by tracing the past and exaggerating similarities which would link the two nations: from ethnology and history to sociology, art and language.

The persistence to "nipponize" the Philippines was to become absurd when Filipino scholars, compelled to write propaganda articles for the lucrative sums offered by the Japanese controlled press, went looking into the past to search for similarities between the two countries. Wild claims were made in many supposedly scholarly studies, and minute findings were blown into exaggerated proportions. For instance, a Filipino linguist who was directed to find similarities between Tagalog and the Japanese language, came out with an article to suit the demand — a list of Japanese words which he claimed, would be assimilated by the Tagalog language in the near future.³⁵ Later, after the war, said linguist preferred to exclude this particular article from his list of published works.

Historical distortion

Undocumented historical declarations were also made in Philippine history. It was claimed, for example, that Japanese *Samurais* had offered to join the ranks of the Filipinos during the 16th century to smash the Spanish yoke; and that during the Philippine revolution, a number of Japanese had "volunteered to fight and die side by side with their Filipino comrades-in-arms."³⁶

Without evidences to support his contention, a Filipino historian published an article on the supposed intercourse between Japan and

³⁵ Cecilio Lopez, "Foreign Influences in Tagalog," *Philippine Review*, II (July, 1944), 54-57.

³⁶ Mentioned in the Manifesto issued by the Philippine Council of State on Feb. 13, 1943. *Historical Bulletin*, IX (March & June, 1965), 64-65.

the Philippines in the past, and which he elaborately imagined in lieu of real facts and data. Even Rizal's 28 days stay in Japan became an important phase in the life of the hero. Not only did Rizal acquire an Oriental flavor, but even his political ideals were made to originate from Japan.³⁷

Music and the arts also underwent the same systematic pattern of change. American national and patriotic songs, together with books on American values and life, were either burned or banned. Song contests in Tagalog compositions emphasizing Filipino traditions and customs were periodically announced by the Manila *Sinbun-Sya*.³⁸ New Philippine national songs were introduced.³² Japanese songs were taught in schools, public gatherings and entertainment places.⁴⁰

The entire population, young and old, received propaganda education through the schools, through district organizations in towns and villages, and also through their membership in the *Kalibapi* which the Japanese introduced to work for the Filipinization program of the country. Through the *Ka'ibapi*, the Japanese hoped to elicit from the people the essential Oriental outlook and social consciousness they can display by actual participation in social community programs such as food production, neighborhood associations, and community development projects.

Days of significance in Japan were declared special holidays. Parades and mass rallies were held to celebrate historical events which were often highlighted by propaganda speeches of Japanese and Filipino leaders. One huge demonstration which was long to be remembered was the *Ka'ibapi's* mammoth parade of 300,000 flag-waving Filipinos at the Luneta, to celebrate Premier Tojo's early announcement of Philippine Independence.⁴¹

On February 4, 1943, the Manila *Sinbun-Sya* sponsored a movement to change the name of the Philippines to another with a more Oriental

³⁷ Read articles written on Rizal from *The Philippine Review*, 1943-44

³⁸ On February 1, 1943, the Manila *Sinbun-Sya* announced a song contest for the "New Philippine March." C/f Zaide's *Chronicle of Japanese Occupation*. Unpublished papers.

³⁹ On February 7, 1943, the First *Kalibapi* Concert-Meeting was held at the Metropolitan Theatre at 9:30 A.M. The official march of *Kalibapi*, composed by Felipe de Leon, was introduced for the first time to the public. It was sung by a chorus of stage actors and actresses.

⁴⁰ On February 14, 1943, the first presentation of Oriental music in the Philippines was held in the morning by the St. Theresa's College at its Conservatory Hall.

⁴¹ This historic event is recorded in Gregorio F. Zaide's "Epic of Philippine Independence," *Philippine Review*, I (November, 1943), 15.

flavor. To occupy their leisure, local writers, intellectuals and the cultured lower middleclass in the city readily caught up with this particular tempo for Filipinization. The war had temporarily dislocated many of the city dwellers who now spent much of their time idling and intellectualizing in coffee shops where some buy-and-sell business transactions were being made. The Japanese and some Filipino nationalists felt that the move would foster Philippine aspirations and traditions as an Oriental nation. Some of the more outspoken argued that "it is unreasonable for our people to continue honoring the memory of Philip II, a monarch of an Occidental kingdom, and the first to deprive us of our independence . . ." ⁴² The movement was advocated by E. Masao in his daily column in *The Tribune*. The subject became the talk of among others city intellectuals and writers, who were soon divided into two camps: the "fence-sitters" who opposed the change and the "collaborationists" who favored the change. But since the "collaborationists" were each advocating a different name, the debate continued until the list of suggested names included such words as *Silangan*, *Mai*, *Rizal*, *Mailog* (Many Rivers), *Kayumanggi*, *Mutya ng Silangan*, and *Tagala*. A certain D. C. Ticola, even suggested that the country be called "Lapu-Lapu Islands" in honor of King Lapu-Lapu of Mactan. ⁴⁴ The debate went on until a cool-headed Armando Ligaya wrote to castigate:

It is high time that we stop this fancy of changing names. If we indulge in a frenzy of name changing, we shall have a Herculean task before us, because the great bulk of the names of towns and provinces are of Occidental origin. . . . What is wrong with the name Philippines? Why change it to Rizal? Rizal was born under the Philippine sun. Is the name of Jose Rizal y Mercado of Oriental origin? Why don't we change his name too? ⁴⁵

Nonetheless, the Filipinization movement raged for sometime. Manila was divided into twelve administrative districts patterned after the city plan of Greater Tokyo in a colorful festivity on October 31, 1942. ⁴⁶ The event was highlighted by the christening of Jones Bridge into "Banzai Bridge" by Chairman Jorge Vargas in the presence of Japanese and Filipino officials. The new name of the bridge was

⁴² A letter sent by Gregorio Perfecto on February 8, 1943 to the "Public Pulse," *Tribune*.

⁴³ See "our Tomorrow," *Tribune*, February 7, 1943.

⁴⁴ A letter sent to the "Public Pulse," *Tribune*, Feb. 13, 1943, signed D. C. Ticola.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Zaide, *Chronicle of Japanese Occupation*, Unpublished, (no pages).

inscribed in Japanese characters by Lt. Gen. Homma. The twelve districts were given the following Filipino names: (1) *Bagumbayan*: Port Area, Intramuros, Ermita and Malate; (2) *Bagundiwa*: Paco, Pandacan, and Sta. Ana; (3) *Bagumpanahon*: Sampaloc, Sta. Cruz, Quiapo, and San Miguel; (4) *Bagumbuhay*: Tondo, Binondo, and San Nicolas; (5) *Balintawak*: San Francisco del Monte, Galas and La Loma; (6) *Diliman*: Diliman proper, Cubao and University Districts; (7) *San Juan*: San Juan del Monte; (8) *Caloocan*; (9) *Mandaluyong*; (10) *Makati*; (11) *Pasay*; (12) *Parañaque*.

The proponents of the Filipinization movement also made the cinema a vehicle for propaganda. They, however, found Filipino movie productions qualitatively inadequate to meet the demands of realism, much less become a source for inspiration and guidance.⁴⁷ They called Philippine movies "a shame to the nation," its themes "flippant and shallow."⁴⁸ Nevertheless, local motion pictures were produced under the direction and guidance of Japanese movie experts, and Japanese films were shown in local theatres through the Eiga Haikyu-Sha, the Japanese film distributor in Manila.⁴⁹

Fascinated with the life and courage of Dr. Jose Rizal, they laid claim to his thoughts as that of a Japanese, and began to emulate his person and to promote his qualities as examples of "the New Filipino."⁵⁰ Thus Rizal became the first hero to be institutionalized during the Occupation Period and his life became the subject of many literary contests where both Filipino and Japanese writers competed with each other to give the hero an Oriental flavor.⁵¹

The same correctional pattern was made in almost all social and cultural avenues except religion which the Japanese allowed to function without interference. They found the Church useful in controlling society, and its tenets were not exactly opposed to their cultural and political program. However, they were to confess later that they did not meddle with the natives' religious beliefs because they felt that such moves might affect Japan's relation with the Vatican whom they expected to play an important role at the termination of the war.⁵²

⁴⁷ Tsutanu Sawamura, "For The Glory of Philippine Movies," *Philippine Review*, I (February, 1944), p. 30.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Daigaro Takeuti, "Contemporary Japanese Motion Picture," *Philippine Review*, I (June, 1943), p. 43.

⁵⁰ Jun-iti Otani, "Last Moments of Rizal," *Philippine Review*, II (June, 1944), 23-27.

⁵¹ Iwao Kume, "Some Reflections," *Pillars*, I (December, 1944), 6-12.

⁵² Takeuchi Tatsuji, *Manila Diary: Dec. 1942-Oct. 1943*, Appendix A, *The Philippine Polity*, (Yale, 1967), p. 218.

Japan's failure

Analyzing the content of Japanese cultural propaganda in the Philippines, it can be said that Japan had made a fairly accurate if cutting diagnosis of the subservient condition of our culture and economy. But one quality which the Japanese lacked is the patience to direct the people, and also the means by which the country shall be raised to its own feet.

While the Japanese propaganda seemed to have given the Philippines a political and cultural direction, no more had been made to rehabilitate the country's economy. The abrupt halt of material goods from the "free trade" relations with the United States and the failure to substantiate this depletion of supply severely affected the continuance of the normal social lives of the people. Added to this burden was the objective of the Japanese Military Administration "to extract war resources",⁵³ so much so that a few Japanese military officials had confessed to "having taken away ore, copper, and other resources of the Archipelago, instead of bringing in goods in the Philippines."⁵⁴ As a result, the Filipino living standard had continually become depressed since the Japanese arrived.

Some Japanese officials confessed to the lack of Japan's concrete program for post-war policy.⁵⁵ Neither did they have an organized political structure that would bring her policy into execution after the war.⁵⁶ Even the Japanese who composed the cultural propaganda group confessed among themselves that their actions under the Military Administration were confined to those needed for the prosecution of the war.⁵⁷

The supposed economic self-sufficiency program, except for the lip-service given to it, never had a headstart. Filipinos were left to improvise and fend for themselves, and the Japanese procured by force whatever they desired on all matters. Without the benefit of industry and science, the standard of living began to decline, accompanied by a hatred for the Japanese whom the people blamed for their misery.

While the miserable condition of life during the occupation was welcomed by Japan as a great leap towards the country's emancipation from American dependency, the population in general saw it as a

⁵³ Royama Masamichi & Takeuchi Tatsuji. *The Philippine Polity*, p. 226.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 277.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 215..

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 212.

degradation, a backward step from the path of progress. When the Japanese forcibly enforced self-sufficiency by creating zone groups into work programs, the educated and the lower middle class deduced the action as an effort to humiliate their persons. When Japan ventured into censoring school textbooks to discourage the corrupting influences of American materialism, the people saw it as a violation of the basic tenets of democratic freedom. Indeed, the cultural and political re-orientation program of Japan was destined to fail, "even from the very start".⁵⁸

The Japanese concept of brotherhood sounded hypocritical to the Filipinos. We were repelled by the Japanese's "glorification of Spartan virtues," and their devotion to duty seemed fanatical and irrational. They were intellectually unconvincing as well as physically repulsive.

On the other hand, the Japanese found the Filipinos "uncooperative," and the "laziest" of all the peoples with whom they had had army experience.⁵⁹ A Japanese writer acquiescingly observed: "It would be a hopeless thing to expect any future for a people devoid of the sense of appreciation for native genius and things native . . . who humble themselves before anything foreign and alien."⁶⁰

Theodore Friend surmised that "by 1941, the Filipinos were already too well developed under American rule or too spoiled as the Japanese saw it, for the invaders to accomplish much . . ."⁶¹

The 'triumph' of Westernization

One has also to consider the circumstances surrounding the development of the Philippines as a nation to understand its people's negative reaction to Japanese intellect and judgment. This country has undertaken a long process of Westernization — a little more than 300 years under Spain, and 41 years under American rule spent by the colonial powers in obliterating our Oriental heritage, and asserting the superiority of Occidental culture. This was began by Spain in a somewhat visible effort when Christianity was forcibly introduced in the Islands and resumed by the Americans on a more extensive scale — through education — during the first half of the 20th century. The adverse effects of this de-Orientalization had been the lamblike willingness of the Filipinos to adopt Western language, culture and even prejudices; the

⁵⁸ Agoncillo, *Fateful Years*, p. 338.

⁵⁹ Friend, *Between Two Empires*. p. 232.

⁶⁰ S. Matukawa, "A Hospital Visit," *Philippine Review* II (May, 1944). 23.

⁶¹ Friend, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

hastening of the Filipinos' desire to turn away from their own past and identity; and their erroneous belief that through the imitation of Western ways and the importation of Western technology can their journey towards progress be ensured.

Because of the extensive process of de-Orientalization, the Filipinos took the entire episode of Japanese invasion as a temporary interlude, a momentary inconvenience brought by world affairs, and our undying faith in America's ability to extricate us from the encumbrances created by the Japanese occupation of the Islands. Indeed, one cannot unlearn in three years a mental attitude which took almost four hundred years.

In addition to this factor, the Filipinos had already been warned of Japan's growing territorial ambitions in Asia, even as early as the 1930's. The Manchurian incident of 1931, the invasion of China in 1937, and the atrocities committed against the people of Nanking which shocked the rest of the world⁶² were warnings against a type of people we were to confront in the future. The atrocities and massacres in Bataan and Corregidor, and the brutalities committed by the Japanese in our country, had confirmed the so-called "perils of the yellow race." It was natural for a people who had been violated to remain deaf to the voices of her enemies, much less to forget, through her propaganda, the memory of a painful experience.

The Great Co-Prosperity Sphere Program

On the other hand, Japan's Co-Prosperity Sphere Program can not be considered a total failure. America's initial defeat in the Pacific may have given Asians the idea of their capacity to free themselves from Western domination. The victory may have given all Orientals a sense of pride, even if the feeling had not been shared by a great section of Philippine society who took the fall of Bataan as their own personal defeat. Nonetheless, the sight of Americans retreating on all fronts in 1941 and 1942 must have given dramatic proofs that the white man was not invincible.⁶³

When the Japanese asked the Philippines to join them in a program of Asia united "in the spirit of universal brotherhood" under the leadership of Japan with each nation allotted its proper place "leading to peace and prosperity," the idea was not exactly unconvincing to some Filipinos. Like many Asian idealists, Filipino nationalists must have seen

⁶² William Craig, *The Fall of Japan*, (London, 1967), p. XIII.

⁶³ John Toland, *The Rising Sun*, p. 507.

in the program a chance to free the Philippines from exploitation by the white man.

Of course it is true that the Co-Prosperity Sphere program had been corrupted by Japanese militarists who looked upon Southeast Asia with its rich natural resources as a solution to their economic ills,⁶⁴ but the program's call for Pan Asianism had its appeal to the masses. The mammoth demonstration of more than 300,000 Filipinos at Luneta to commemorate the Kalibapi's Filipino movement,⁶⁵ the Makapili and Sakdalistas' commitment to the "Asia for the Asians" policy, and the growth of the national language during the occupation, can be viewed as signs of the people's growing consciousness of Asian nationalism and the de-Westernization of the Philippines.

When Japan gave a token gesture to realize the Co-Prosperity program by giving Burma her independence on August 1, 1943, followed by the Philippines on October 14, and the establishment of the Provincial Government of Free India a week later, the Asians considered the events very significant. It is true that the new governments were puppets of Japan, but for millions of Asians, it was their first glimpse of freedom from the white man.

A Japanese writer described the enthusiasm of millions of Asians reaching the culmination of success when China, Manchukuo, the Philippines and Burma sent representatives to Tokyo for the Greater East Asia Conference early in November.⁶⁶ "We were getting together," Ba Maw of Burma wrote, "not so much as separate peoples but as members of a single historical family containing all these peoples." Even Jose P. Laurel, President of the Philippines, found Pan Asianism irresistible: "One billion Orientals, one billion people of Greater East Asia," he proclaimed at the formal reception on the eve of the initial meeting, "how could they have been dominated, a great portion of them particularly by England and America?"⁶⁷

Thirty years have passed and Japan has recovered from the holocaust of war to resume a respected place among the nations of the

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 507.

⁶⁵ Gregorio F. Zaide, "Epic of Philippine Independence," *Philippine Review* I (November, 1943), 15.

⁶⁶ Iwao Kume, "A Comparison of Two Charters," *Pillars*, I (March, 1944), 27-28.

⁶⁷ Jose P. Laurel, Speech in Tokyo, November (?), 1943, as quoted in Iwao Kume, "Comparison of Two Charters," *Pillars*, (March, 1944), pp. 27-28.

world. The Yamato is said to be an exceptional race and is prophesied to turn defeat into victory. The economic and industrial privileges extended by America to Japan after the war have enabled these two nations to control Southeast Asia's economy, both sharing and controlling once again the region's wealth of raw materials, and dictating the economic and commercial policies each government in Southeast Asia is to adopt.

Meanwhile, the Philippines has remained among the nations of the Third World, has twice increased in number, and punctually celebrates a day of each year to commemorate her dramatic defense of Bataan, true to the comic rôle she plays in the theatre of war drama. Often puzzled by the turn of events, the Filipino simple mind could not comprehend beyond the shallow literacy and stereotyped learning with which America had fed her mind before the war, at times wondering, in lucid moments, if Japan, after all, had really won the war of 1941.

The Filipinos today are still well known for their kindness and hospitality. But they are now slowly waking up from the over-extended reigns of mental lethargy and complacency. Their unbounded faith in America and her actions in the Philippines are no longer the prevailing mood among the youth, although it has not been entirely shaken off. There are still Filipino elements who remain subservient to America and to whatever cause she upholds to suit her purpose. The loyalty of these elements are not unshackled by the gravity of historical truth, and they find meaningful solace in the narrow context of their dramatic heroism in Bataan and Corregidor. But today, even that glory is obliterated by the blazing light of political reality, for it holds no relevance to the people's struggle for true democracy and freedom.

This truth is dramatically symbolized in a recent incident⁶⁸ when a veteran of the World War II cried out in protest against a farmer's desecration of the hallowed war-monument in Capas for turning the sacred ground into a pigsty. The action is indeed outrageous, one may say. Yet, on second thought, we may perhaps ask if the action is any different from that of our government when it extended to Japanese investors special economic and industrial privileges to exploit our country and our people.

⁶⁸ See headline, *Bulletin Today* XXIX (April 7, 1975), I.

THE LOST LESSONS OF HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI

KAREN TAKAHASHI

“ . . . it is the threat of universal extinction hanging over all the world today that changes, totally and for ever, the nature of reality and brings into devastating question the true meaning of man's history. We human beings now have the power to exterminate ourselves; this seems to be the entire sum of our achievement.”

— JAMES BALDWIN, *The Fire Next Time*

What happened on August 6, 1945, in Hiroshima and two days later and even more spectacularly in Nagasaki have been described often before: the ruined buildings; the unrecognizable charred corpses piled up everywhere like stacks of charcoal; the burning and the stench; the darkness at mid-morning; the hell-on-earth that these two cities became on those days. The destruction of Nagasaki was worse. The plutonium bomb dropped there was several times more powerful than the uranium bomb used in Hiroshima, and more people were killed immediately and more survivors died off within a shorter space of time. There are, therefore, fewer Nagasaki victims around today, and that is the reason Hiroshima is more often memorialized than Nagasaki. This much is common knowledge to Japanese over the age of thirty, although it is generally not known in other places. It is also believed in places other than Japan that, because the bomb at Nagasaki was dropped off-target due to a cloud cover that morning, it did less damage, was less 'successful' than the Hiroshima explosion. Unfortunately, however, a plutonium

bomb exploded slightly off target will do exactly as much damage as one exploded on target, since it is no longer a question of destroying a specific railroad or factory or of annihilating a given number of people but simply of destroying and annihilating.

In Hiroshima and Nagasaki on those two days, therefore, the skin of people exposed to the flash was instantly and irreparably burned. The wounds were at first slightly red, then redder, then turned yellow and began to stink. Later on, when the burned areas started to heal, they would leave thick growths of weirdly deformed flesh, the keloid scar, that until the end of the victim's life would, at the very least, itch and burn, and depending on the area of the body where it was, might also prevent him from moving his arms or legs or hands or bending over, among other possibilities.

These scars are hideous. Attempts to repair damage with plastic surgery are generally failures because more than the skin is damaged: the cells of the body have also been altered in ways still not entirely known, and have lost the capacity to rebuild themselves. No matter how often the keloid is cut away, it virtually always grows back just the way it was.

There were also countless people who died then and later with no marks on the outside of their bodies. This was the effect of atomic radiation. Hair everywhere on the body would fall out; later paralysis would occur accompanied by internal bleeding, and the victim would die, days, months, even years later. A physician without special training would find these cases impossible to diagnose. It is now well known that excessive exposure to radiation produces leukemia, anemia and cancers and alters, in still unknowable ways, the genetic structure of the body. Those who were young people in 1945 are now grandparents; those who were children then would be trying now to have their own. Even should they appear normal, they carry within their bodies permanently the possibility of diseases that could appear or reappear at any time and could certainly, as has happened in fact, be passed down to their children in the form of brain defects, physical deformities or merely assorted constitutional weaknesses. Such cases have been documented by the hundreds, but they are kept private.

Treatment and care for radiation-caused specifically atomic bomb-caused diseases is expensive and difficult to come by. Because of its very special nature, very particular methods and knowledge are necessary.

As soon as they could after the surrender, the American government moved in and set up a medical research facility in Hiroshima called the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission Hospital. It is still in operation. At this hospital, they are glad to confirm for the victims that they still have radiation poisoning, or that their keloid growths are still there, or that a developing or progressed cancer is probably due to the effects of the atomic bomb, but they do not treat the patients. That is not the purpose of the ABCC Hospital. It is an exclusive research laboratory of the U.S. Government whose purpose is to examine patients and collect data and useful information. Research findings, based on their unquestionably superior knowledge and access to data, are not released to anyone. The reason is that this material is classified and an important part of the research in and manufacture of nuclear weapons that is being conducted by the United States. The latest result of this effort was an announcement in February this year that the U.S. has exploded the biggest bomb yet somewhere in its desert testing grounds.

It is indeed unfortunate that the ABCC does not want anyone else to know what they know. They have all the technical information about those two bombs and have been examining thousands of victims regularly for more than 30 years and their accumulated knowledge would be invaluable to the Japanese physicians and researchers desperately trying to find ways to help their patients.

With the end of the occupation, the problem of dealing with the victims was turned over to the Japanese themselves. And beginning in 1957, eleven and one-half years after the fact and five years after the end of the occupation, the newly democratized Japanese Diet began to pass a series of laws related to medical treatment for financial aid to the victims. These laws have a particular significance. Since they are naturally a reflection of the government's attitude toward the atomic bomb victims, they also help reveal how Japan officially views the implications of finding herself the only country in the world to have suffered nuclear attack. Also, the method of their enforcement and the details and definitions of their provisions provide insight into some of the ways the Japanese government uses its bureaucracy, which has not changed basically from pre-war years, as a tool for its own purposes. And, inasmuch as the laws are also indirectly related to Japan's role in the American defense mechanism, they, and the conception of reality of its makers that they reveal, indicate in part how Japan thinks of herself in regard to the U.S. and to U.S. demands.

Law for medical treatment and financial aid

There are two kinds of laws: those relating to medical treatment and those dealing with financial aid. The medical aid measures are incorporated into the national health insurance plan; the laws for financial aid are part of the general state welfare system. The laws do not actually say that they are applicable to Japanese only, but the fact remains that Japanese make and have always made a clear distinction between themselves and others. The 'others' in this particular case are Koreans, mainly, who are second-class citizens within Japan. Making these traditional distinctions in the case of atomic bomb victims raises some embarrassing questions however. The hosts of non-Japanese who were, like their Japanese counterparts, also on the ground in Hiroshima and Nagasaki on those two days were not in Japan because they wanted to be, but because they were forced to be. The legal restrictions and prejudices they face as atomic bomb victims and as Koreans will be dealt with in greater detail further on.

The laws meant to provide medical treatment for the victims all require the individual to prove he is an atomic bomb victim before he can be considered eligible for any kind of treatment, examination, or medication. And having done that, he must further prove that what is wrong with him is an actively proceeding disease caused directly by the bomb. (Although some may wonder why anyone would seek such treatment in the first place if he were not an atomic bomb victim.)

The laws extending state financial assistance to the victims, since they are part of the welfare system, require not only the aforementioned proofs, but also proof that the individual is a combination of indigent, handicapped, unable to work and the sole support of his family, or any two of these. In spite of the quite obvious fact that atomic bomb victims do not constitute either ordinary medical cases or ordinary welfare cases, there is no special legal provision for them.

Although the bombings took place in 1945, and the Occupation by Allied Forces was over by 1952; and by 1954, the new Japanese Self-Defence Force had been created, it was not until March 31, 1957, that the first Medical Treatment Law for Atomic Bomb Victims was enacted. This law provides for free medical care to qualified persons. It states that this care can be received only at clinics, hospitals and pharmacies

* It is a part of the state medical insurance plan that everyone hold a 'medical booklet' or 'health booklet,' and this is presented when the patient desires treatment.

authorized by the Welfare Ministry which will reimburse said institutions upon request. The law then proceeds to define 'qualified' individuals as those who hold what is called a 'victim's health booklet'. What the individual needs to do to get his booklet is not actually specified in the law itself, but Article 5 of this law's first Enforcement Ordinance says that all details pertaining to the law are decided by other enforcement ordinances issued directly by the Welfare Ministry. (All the enforcement ordinances to these laws, both medical and financial, are issued directly by the Ministry without first having to go through the Diet.)

One of the enforcement ordinances indicates the following requirements for obtaining a 'victim's health booklet': the individual must show a 'disaster certification,' a paper that was supposed to be issued to people in the area after the explosion stating that the holder was in one of the affected areas at the time. If the victim was not issued one of these, or if he was and it has been lost or damaged, he will have to find two witnesses, not relatives, who will testify that he was in the authorized or in the adjacent authorized areas. (The specific block names are listed in a different enforcement ordinance.)

Now, it should be pointed out that if the victim happens to be a Korean or a member of the Buraku-min, the Japanese untouchable group, the chances of his finding anyone who wants to be a witness for him will be slight indeed, and more likely, non-existent. And even among ordinary Japanese this means that one has to keep up good relations with those he needs for witnesses, Japanese society being incomparably clanish and exclusive. In addition to these things another problem with witnesses is that mostly, people do not want to reveal that they are atomic bomb victims because they are discriminated against by others, particularly with regard to marriages. No one is really happy to see their son or daughter marry someone who was exposed to the atomic bomb.

Another enforcement ordinance of this law gives the following categories or levels of victims according to what type of 'health booklet' they hold or would be qualified to hold: (1) those who were within 4 kilometers from the center of the blast; (2) those entering to within 2 kilometers from the center within 2 weeks afterward (many of these where medical staff and people who helped with burying and moving the corpses); (3) those who received residual radiation (again a category defined and authorized in a separate ordinance somewhere in the

Welfare Ministry, but in general, meaning those who picked up radiation from the ground later on); and (4) fetuses of any of the above three categories.

Yet another enforcement ordinance categorizes the victims this way: (1) people within three kilometers of the center and fetuses thereof (the first one said four kilometers); (2) patients previously authorized by the Welfare Minister (another separate ordinance); (3) victims previously defined in Clause 2 of the law and those having 'authorized' diseases (another ordinance); (4) people entering to within two kilometers of the center within three days (the first one said two weeks) and fetuses thereof; (5) persons receiving residual radiation from specified areas, areas to be specified in another ordinance. Nowhere, apparently, is there any mention made of or reason given for the discrepancies and contradictions in the ordinances. The second one is dated later than the first.

The law itself manages to state that the prefectural governments are responsible for conducting a medical examination for the victims and bearing the responsibility of ascertaining whether or not a victim's illness can be classified in any of the 'authorized' disease groups as defined by the Welfare Ministry (Clause 3 of the law). Also provisions are made for (1) medical examinations; (2) distribution of medicines and medical materials; (3) medical treatment; (4) hospitalization; (5) nursing care; and (6) transportation from smaller treatment centers to larger ones. Because of a shortage of trained physicians and nurses, there is no legal provision for medical consultation. According to reports of patients, as a result of this lack, the examining doctors have very little time to spend with them and they are often summarily dismissed. This is particularly the case when their complaints, as so often happens, are not really specific. That is, if they are in danger of bleeding to death or have suddenly developed extreme paralysis, they are more likely to receive attention than if they are merely so tired from anemia that they no longer have any desire to live, or if they merely say that they feel 'strange'. These are by far the most common complaints.

Whether or not a patient would be eligible to receive any treatment at all depends entirely on whether or not it can be proved that he has a disease originating from radiation from the bombs or other effects of the bombs. If a patient merely has what the Welfare Ministry calls 'radiation damage', regardless of its deadliness or the extent of the patient's suffering, and if this disease cannot be classified as one of the already recognized radiation diseases (certainly not all have been isolated

yet), he will be put into the "incurable" category and his illness defined as 'irreparable physical damage'. So before he can treat his patient, the physician must be able to prove that the patient is ill with an actively proceeding disease caused directly by effects of the atomic bomb.

The methods doctors are expected to use to classify diseases are the ones developed by Louis Pasteur. They are: (1) research involving artificial generation of the disease in animals; (2) statistics which have been compiled about past known cases of the disease; and (3) statistics comparing victims with non-victims. (This is something like the statistical results which predict 'contractability' of cancer for smokers as opposed to non-smokers.) Using these methods to classify the diseases of atomic bomb victims presents some problems. In the first place, Louis Pasteur did not have an opportunity to study the illnesses of the atomic bomb victims. In the second place, the Welfare Ministry refuses to accept as proof research results based on animal subjects because they say that animals are not physiologically identical to human beings. So the first method of disease classification, which is the most logical to use when something as irreversible and deadly as radiation is being studied, cannot be used at all.

As far as the second method goes, although there are certainly other cases of radiation-induced sicknesses, Hiroshima and Nagasaki are precedents for actual explosions over populated areas and, needless to say, in order to accumulate statistics about the diseases on which to base cause and effect diagnosis for the present patients, more bombs will need to be dropped on more people. As for the third method, in order to acquire reliable statistics comparing victims and non-victims, the present patients shall have to develop more disease symptoms and then die so that statistics in numbers large enough for comparison purposes may be built up. Asking doctors to seriously undertake diagnosis of the atomic bomb victims' illnesses under such conditions is like asking a double amputee to feed himself using his hands. Nevertheless, the medical people keep trying.

Among those who have tried hardest and longest is the head of the Red Cross Hospital and of the Hospital for Atomic Bomb Victims in Hiroshima, Dr. Fumio Shigeto. On the morning the main event of which produced the material for his life's work, Dr. Shibeto was standing at Hiroshima Station with his medical bag in hand, waiting for a street car that never came. In conversation with the writer Kenzaburo Oe, Dr. Shigeto explained how the medical aid laws contrast with the actual situations of the patients.

"In my hospital, there are usually 150 patients hospitalized at a time; 70 to 80 of them die every year. Out of this number, only about 10 of them are 'authorized' by the Welfare Ministry. People often want to know why the patients who have keloid cannot be authorized. The reason given is that the keloid is a symptom after the fact, not an actively proceeding disease. But the patients complain that the keloid area itches horribly, that they cannot sleep and so on, but nevertheless, it is not classifiable as a radiation-induced disease. And patients who cannot move their limbs because of the keloid might be eligible under other welfare rulings to have themselves categorized as handicapped and receive state aid. But, if the patient is able to do as much as write his own name or feed himself, regardless of the actual keloid damage, he cannot get a 'handicapped' persons classification and therefore cannot receive any aid at all under the law."

Many people who came into the city after the explosion have developed lung cancer and cancer of the liver, and Dr. Shigeto is of the opinion that these diseases are caused by the patients' having been exposed to the residual radiation that was still in the ground all around the area. But because there are many causes for cancer, and all of them are not recognized and categorized, there is no way to prove that the cancers of his patients are atomic bomb-induced, and no way to get them authorized so that they may receive medical care and financial aid.

The group in charge of authorizing the victim's diseases is a specialist commission chosen by the government, each member of which serves a term of two years. Dr. Shigeto is one of the physicians who reports to this group. According to him, "they do their best to interpret the law in terms that would be the most generous to the patient, but it is impossible to really do justice because the law is not good enough." Within the context of the Japanese way of thinking and of expressing one's opinion, this constitutes a rather strong statement.

Dr. Shigeto reports that 'certain parties' have put pressure on him not to publicize the deaths of his patients. He had been in the practice of releasing reports each time one of them died, and these 'certain parties' strongly suggested that he limit this to only twice a year. At that point, Dr. Shigeto says that he jokingly asked these 'parties' whether it would be all right to do 'extra' publicity in special cases, such as if Dr. Tzusuki, a well-known physician in the field of radiation who entered Hiroshima immediately after the blast to investigate, should die of lung cancer or if he, himself, should die of leukemia. Later, in fact, Dr. Tsuzuki did die of lung cancer.

To put it mildly, it is an extraordinary situation when a recognized authority in a certain field, a man who has won a number of achievement awards, can make a statement about the inadequacy of the laws he is forced to work with and have those statements totally ignored by the people making the laws. And that is precisely the situation with regards to the medical aid laws for atomic bomb victims.

If it took 11 years for the Medical Aid Law, it took 23 for the first law extending state financial aid to the victims. It was not until 1968 that the law, called Special Measures for Atomic Bomb Victims, was passed.

Clause 2, Item 3 of these 'special measures' is an allowance of Y10,000 per month to people authorized according to the above explained Medical Care Law. Japan is one of the world's most expensive places to live, and although worth slightly more than now, this Y10,000 is roughly equivalent to \$30.00 (American). With this amount, a housewife, if she is extremely careful, can buy enough very plain groceries to feed her family for half a week. Although such an amount will help toward buying a few extras, it will not help at all toward actually raising the standard of living. And it will not support one single person. In a country where the average rent for a crowded, unfurnished apartment runs around \$200.00 per month, and it is more in Tokyo, an extra \$30.00 is not going to help much.

Clause 5 of the Special Measures is a 'Health Control Allowance'. This is intended to mean that with the extra financial assistance this measure grants, the victim would need to work less and therefore become able to take care of and 'control' his health more efficiently. This particular clause, then, gives Y3,000 per month to persons having 'authorized' diseases who are not already receiving the allowance mentioned in Clause 2; to persons 65 years or older, physically disabled by some 'authorized' disease; and to spouseless women having minor dependents. This law was subsequently amended three times: in 1969, 1974, and 1975.

The amendment of 1969 raised the special allowance of the law's Clause 2 from Y10,000 per month to Y11,000 (with which increase a mother might buy one half of a summer shirt for her son); it decreased the lower age limit from 65 to 50 for those persons receiving the "Health Control Allowance" of the previously explained Clause 5; and it increased the amount of this allowance from Y3,000 to Y5,000.

The amendment of 1974 *decreased* to Y7,500 per month the amount for those not currently receiving medical treatment. There is no expla-

nation given as to how this was determined, but the decision was apparently based on a government-conducted survey which will be discussed further on. The 1974 amendment then went on to increase to Y15,000 the monthly allowance for those who were, in the eyes of the government, receiving medical treatment. The lower age limit of persons eligible for the 'Health Control Allowance' was decreased to 45 years and the allowance increased to Y7,700.

The last amendment to date, 1975, allows the special allowance for those not receiving care currently to go up from Y7,500 to Y12,000, and for those receiving care, the amount is increased from Y15,000 to Y24,000. The age limit on the Clause 5 health control allowance was completely removed and the amount is increased to Y12,000 per month. In addition, an enforcement ordinance issued in that same year stipulated in detail reimbursement allowances for hospitalization, out-patient and nursing care, and a particular allowance for funerals was set at Y33,000. The 1975 amendment also included an income limit of Y117,500 per month above which a patient cannot qualify for any allowances whatsoever. This amount is a little more than a skilled secretary would be qualified to earn. This Special Measures Law also provides for Y6,000 to any person eligible for but not receiving any other aid.

It should be borne in mind that this money is given only to the 'authorized' ill, to the virtually indigent, and to the indigent, 'authorizedly' ill spouseless women with dependents. All of the allowances have to be reapplied for, and 're-proved' every year by the victim.

Now, a Japanese reading this 1975 amendment might notice two things right away. First, the amount extended to help the victims are so utterly piddling in present-day Japan that even welfare cases would not be happy to receive them. To receive them at all, the individual must prove that he is ill, and to actually benefit from such a small amount, his standard of living would have to be pitifully low to begin with — and this in the middle of a country having the highest standard of living in Asia, the veritable little America of the Orient.

What this law means, then, is that the victim will be helped a little only if he cannot help himself at all, and all of these have to be proved. It is as if they are being told to take the blame for their conditions, but whose responsibility is it that these people are ill with atomic bomb-induced diseases? The Welfare Ministry has certainly been making it clear all along that it does not feel it is theirs.

The second point a Japanese, especially one schooled in formal Confucian theory, might notice about this newest amendment is how very paternalistic, how very Confucian it was to have gradually lowered and then removed the age limit on the 'health control allowance'. If people of any age should be receiving aid in 1975, why were they not receiving it in 1968, along with the 65 and older group? Are we to believe that in 1968, younger people had greater resistance to and could effectively throw off the effects of the atomic bomb? Clearly, it was intended, whether consciously or not, that this gradual, suspenseful lowering and then removal of the age limit be viewed as a piece of magnanimity dispensed by the government.

And then, there is a third thing which could be noticed by anyone capable of elementary arithmetic. If all of the monthly and other allowances were put side by side on one sheet of paper, it could be seen that the most financially advantageous step a victim can take is to die and let his family receive the funeral allowance which is Y9,000 higher than the highest monthly allowance.

Since the new 1975 amendments provide the most generous allowances yet, and apparently a lot of people were expected to come forward and apply for them, the Public Hygiene Director issued special instructions to the officials dealing with the application of this law. The instructions begin by acknowledging sympathetically that since 30 years have passed it might be difficult for the victims who have not already done so to prove their eligibility. It then proceeds to instruct the officials in charge to ask the victims to specify their exact location at the time of the bombings within an area two kilometers from the center of the explosion as defined in a detailed table of block numbers. It goes on to require that should the victim no longer be in possession of his 'disaster certification' he must provide letters or photographs. (If his house had been within the two kilometer area this might be rather difficult.) Failing that, the mayor of the city has to approve the certification (the officials are left to imagine what this means as there are no detailed stipulations on this point). Should this also fail, the victim needs more than two witnesses, not related, who can certify for him. And should he not be able to find these witnesses, he can have someone other than himself write out a description in detail of the situation and sign, taking a written oath. (This 'someone other than' the victim would need to have a very good memory.) This last resort, which seems the simp'lest, can only be used after the victim has given sufficient proof that the above-mentioned proofs are not to be had.

The amendment allowing ¥6,000 a month for victims not receiving other aid is prefaced by a notice from the Vice Minister of Welfare to the effect that although these victims may actually be feeling quite all right, they were exposed to radiation and ought to take good care of their health. Now, it is not likely that 30 years after the fact, many qualified victims will enthusiastically appear, having been anxiously awaiting their opportunity all this time to go through the time-consuming and insulting medical and legal procedures necessary to get this ¥6,000 a month, which will in any case, not last them long in Japan these days.

For the sake of argument, we will assume that the Vice Minister of Welfare at least read this notice before he signed it (although in Japan, as any member of the press can verify, such officials are often only vaguely aware of which document they are putting their names to.) One is hard put, anyway, not to wonder how a government, democratic in form, justifies issuing, 30 years after one of the worst war disasters in history, a law amendment prefaced by remarks that mention in passing and in language most condescending and paternal, that people who had the bad luck to be standing 2 kilometers from the epicenter of an atomic bomb explosion in 1945 really ought, it being 30 years later and 1975, to watch their health. And having gotten those facts into the right perspective, one wonders further about the tenuous grasp of reality needed to offer to victims of the world's only two nuclear explosions, after having first made it nearly impossible for them to receive medical care, an amount of money so small as to be guaranteed to disappear into the inflationary void of present-day Japan.

If the realities of the victims' lives and sicknesses and the testimony of Dr. Shigeto are compared with what the Welfare Ministry has done, it would not be impossible to conclude that the government has decided that effects of atomic bomb disasters are greatly overestimated and has taken it upon itself to modify reality in accordance with its own lines of thinking.

Actually, the way the Welfare Ministry has justified these aid laws, particularly the first one of 1968, is that it carried out what it called an 'in-depth' survey in 1965. This was supposed to determine what conditions were in the daily lives of the atomic bomb victims and guide the lawmakers. The survey was done in three parts, the first conducted by mail for all medical treatment booklet holders with questions placing heavy emphasis on the conditions of victims who had been within two kilometers of the explosion center.

This format assumes that (1) people without a 'medical treatment booklet', regardless of the reasons why they may be without it, do not need any help; and that (2) people outside the two kilometers area have no problems worth considering. This is an assumption that contradicts the first Enforcement Ordinance of the earlier Medical Treatment Law which defines the most seriously damaged victims as those who were within four, not two kilometers of the epicenter.

The sole question the survey by mail asked the victims was whether or not they were receiving medical examinations. That was all. The fact that these examinations have been from the beginning the object of intense and bitter criticism from the victims was not even taken into consideration.

The second part of the survey, also done by mail, was called a 'living conditions survey'. It was conducted among all medical treatment booklet holders living in Okinawa prefecture and among a random sampling of booklet holders in other prefectures. The questionnaire included items intended to ascertain whether or not the victim was employed and to what extent his injuries or disease interfered with his life. The question claiming to address itself to the victim's financial situation asked only about expenditures. Therefore, the more dire a person's actual financial circumstances (for example, those living on borrowed money, those who are hospitalized or otherwise unable to work), the less the likelihood that their cases would be truthfully reflected or reflected at all in the survey results. In other words, someone might have been spending ¥50,000 a month on a ¥10,000 a month income, but the survey results would show him rather well-off financially.

The question concerning the extent and nature of the victim's illness and disease asked only whether the individual was 'hospitalized', 'receiving out-patient care', 'other' or 'none'. People unable to have themselves hospitalized or to receive out-patient treatment because they cannot afford it, or because, whether ill or not, they have to work, are simply excluded from the results of the survey.

The third part of this 'in-depth' survey was a complementary case study investigation done by interview among victims and their family members still residing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It asked precisely the same questions using the same formulations as the one just described, and in addition an item about the income of family members, apparently to determine whether the victim really was destitute enough to need state aid.

The government subsequently refused to publish any of the statistics and information obtained from this remarkable 'in-depth' survey, and merely concluded cheerfully and finally that "there is not appreciable difference in the lives of the victims as compared with non-victims".

Said somewhat less obliquely, one or two experimentally dropped atomic bombs have had no effect measurable in terms the government will allow itself to understand, and, therefore, this is not an important problem, and therefore government policies should be perfectly acceptable. The government is, after all, doing its best. It provides free medical examinations; it passes laws; it conducts surveys; it is willing to help pay for the victims's funerals. What more can anyone reasonably ask of them?

Treatment of non-Japanese victims

If bona fide Japanese citizens have so much trouble getting their government to believe them, what of the atomic bomb victims who were and are not Japanese? Koreans, as students of Japanese history know, were in Japan in the first place because Japan occupied Korea and brought them by force to Japan. The Koreans were needed in Japan to build railroads and work in factories and otherwise aid Japan in her efforts to annex the rest of Asia and acquire, thereby, the raw materials and population necessary to grow more powerful. A discussion of this period of history is neither vital nor particularly relevant here; what is relevant is that the Koreans who found themselves in Japan in 1945 did not have any choice in the matter, and this should be borne in mind. Their general situation and status, and especially, of course, that of the Korean atomic bomb victims, reveal unmistakably how Japan feels about taking responsibility for her past.

In Hiroshima at the time of the bombings, there were 60,000 Koreans. Of this number 35,000 died, and 20,000 returned to Korea later. In Nagasaki, 15,000 of the 30,000 Koreans there at the time of the plutonium bomb died and 13,000 returned to Korea when the war ended. This leaves approximately 7,000 Koreans, not counting their descendants, who were atomic bomb victims and still residing within Japan. For these people to receive aid, they must not only go through the procedures described previously, but must face extra burdens as a result of discrimination.

In Japan, it should be made clear, discrimination against Koreans is well-mannered, thorough and institutionalized. Even if a Korean, born and bred as a Japanese, takes a Japanese name and does his best to assimilate himself into the society, once it is known that he is Korean (and somehow Japanese have ways of knowing such things), he will be barred from jobs, universities, housing facilities and his children will most likely, unless they are unusually lucky, be reminded constantly by the other children in unkind ways that they are not Japanese. These are not groundless assertions. Documentation for this is voluminous, if scattered; and, besides, all that is really necessary to ascertain whether this is the case or not is to ask any Korean in Japan or any Japanese. The Korean victim's right to government aid is as valid as that of the Japanese victim's, but the burdens he must bear in order to receive that aid are much greater.

For the atomic bomb victims who have returned to Korea, there is no medical treatment or aid available at all. They likewise cannot apply to the Japanese government for aid because the Japan-South Korea Peace Treaty ended payment of all indemnities between the two countries. The victims living now in North Korea will not, of course, apply separately to the Japanese government for obvious political reasons. Also, and this might have occurred to some already, it was the American government, not the Japanese government, that bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and it is an obvious contradiction of international law to demand compensation from Japan. As far as the possibility of asking the American government about reparations goes, there is none. Japan signed the Peace Treaty in San Francisco in 1952 giving up her right to reparations for any damage done by the US as a result of the war or of the occupation.

Therefore, if a Korean atomic bomb victim now living in Korea wants to be helped, he has no choice but to return to Japan. It has been made extremely difficult for Koreans to get visas to legally enter Japan, and it is even more difficult, virtually impossible in fact, to obtain a permit to remain in the country for as long as would be necessary to receive medical treatment. What is, therefore, the choice of a Korean who wants to be helped but who is not rich and who also does not have any beneficial contacts among government officials? The usual procedure is that they try to enter Japan illegally.

One of the people who did just that has recently won a court case in which he appealed for his right to obtain government medical aid as

an atomic bomb victim. He is Son Chin-tu, born in Osaka in 1927 as a Japanese, and educated in that city at first and later in Hiroshima where he was with his family at the time of the bombing. In 1945, his father died from what appeared to be a radiation-caused disease; then his mother died in 1974 with the same symptoms. Neither had received any treatment. The family had gone back to Korea after the war. In December 1970, Son had entered Japan illegally in order to obtain treatment because he was ill and had apparently the same diseases that killed his father, and later his mother. He was arrested and convicted of illegal entry and sentenced to ten months of hard labor, upon completion of which he was to be deported. He appealed the sentence, but was imprisoned in Fukuoka in the Omura Camp, a special prison for Koreans who have entered Japan illegally. He was subsequently diagnosed as having tuberculosis, in addition to the sicknesses he already had as a result of having been exposed to the atomic bomb explosion. In 1971, he applied to the government for a national health insurance card which was refused in 1972. The reason given was that he was not eligible because he was not Japanese. He filed an appeal to this decision, and was temporarily transferred to the Red Cross Hospital in Hiroshima by the Welfare Ministry. After some time, however, he was removed and again imprisoned in the Omura Camp. It was intended that he complete his hard labor sentence. In the meantime, his appeal to be granted medical aid and treatment as an 'authorized' atomic bomb victim was upheld, and judgment declared on March 3, 1975, by the High Court of Fukuoka. The reason given for the judgment was that the present medical treatment law is, in the Court's opinion, "linked in the legal system as a help to war victims of the last war". The Fukuoka Prefectural government has filed a counter-appeal against the High Court's decision with a still higher court, saying that the High Court judgment is based on a false interpretation of the medical aid law. Son is still in the Omura Camp. He is still unable to obtain a visa. It is presumed that he is receiving medical attention, but it is difficult to determine because his situation on paper is so confusing.

Although it represents some kind of victory that Son Chin-Tu was able to prove legally that he, as well as a Japanese, also deserved consideration under the law, his life has not actually been improved by his having won the case. Furthermore, since the victorious judgment was based on a point of law, i.e., interpretation of the Medical Aid Law as a general "war victims" aid measure, it could just as easily be reversed

by a judge who does not happen to agree that the law is "linked in the legal system as a help to war victims . . ."

This is the heart of the matter, and precisely the reality the government pretends to refuse to face. Atomic bomb victims are not the same as welfare cases; they are not ill with diseases that just any physician can treat using the usual methods. Everyone who was in Hiroshima and Nagasaki on those two days was equally vulnerable to the atomic explosions. Being a Korean or a Buraku-min or any kind of foreigner does not offer immunity to radiation diseases as the Japanese Government continues to try to suggest with its laws and de facto policies of discrimination. Being either rich or poor has nothing whatever to do with an individual's also being a victim of the atomic bomb. The victims of epoch-making nuclear explosions constitute a very special case, historically and medically, and therefore legally, and it is brilliantly clear that they need a special set of laws. The government is deliberately trying to minimize the effects of the atomic bomb explosion by implying that the victims' situation is quite ordinary and that no special measures are needed for them.

This attempt at minimization extends to manipulation of statistical evidence as well. Official government statistics for Hiroshima put the number of dead at 78,000. This is the number always given in any general discussion of the first 'atom bomb'. It is customarily compared with the statistics for the Tokyo fire bombings and the bombardment of Dresden to show that less people were killed by the atomic bomb than in the latter two attacks by American airplanes that used 'conventional' weapons.

However, a report made by the Hiroshima Prefecture government to the Ministry of the Interior on October 21, 1945, showed 32,959 people dead. A subsequent report, four days later, reported 46,185 dead, 17,282 missing, totalling 63,612. A Hiroshima Prefecture Police Department investigation report released November 30, 1945, indicated 75,150 dead, 13,939 missing, totalling 92,133. These statistics include civilian victims only. A great number of the casualties were from the military based in Hiroshima, but their number is never added to the 78,000. Before August 6, 1945, the population of Hiroshima City was 420,000. A population survey taken in 1950 turned up 157,500 survivors of the bomb, from which numbers alone it may be deducted that 270,000 people died from or otherwise disappeared in the wake of the atomic bomb blast. This figure does not include those who have died since 1950, equally legi-

timate atomic bomb casualties. Official statistics continue to put the number of people killed by the atomic bomb in Hiroshima at 78,000.

Much less attention is paid to Nagasaki than in Hiroshima, and the statistics of that disaster are virtually never brought up in generalized contexts. It is not difficult to imagine why. The lowest official estimate for the total number of disaster victims, including the injured and not including anyone but civilians, is 120,820. This would not be, in a comparative discussion of World War I disasters, as comfortable a round figure as the official 77,000 for Hiroshima, and it would therefore be useless that the atomic bomb was not nearly so bad as conventional fire bombing. On the other hand, it would be quite useful as evidence that Nagasaki has suffered horribly.

US-Japan nuclear defence mechanism

We are speaking here, with these statistics and these law and these surveys, of people who are ill because they happened to be in a particular place at a particular time, and this is as far as their individual responsibility goes. They have terrible scars and disabling sicknesses and strange diseases that they know will kill them sooner or later. They live every day of their lives with this knowledge. They have been living with it for 30 years.

The way their government has behaved toward everything related to them indicates only one thing: Japan is attempting to minimize the problems of the atomic bomb victims out of existence while offering concessions to quiet the outcry. Indeed, for those familiar with Japanese cultural and historical patterns, it is not too much to suppose that what the government is really doing is simply waiting for the victims to die off, at which point, officials in charge of this mess hope, they will cease to be a problem.

There is good reason for this attitude. Although Japan renounced the right to make war and maintain war potential in her new constitution, and presently maintains only a 'self-defense' force, she has, in the interest of her national security and at the request of the victorious American army and its government, signed so many security treaties and mutual defense agreements that her entire 'self-defense' complex is completely tied up with the US strategic system. As political theorist Masao Maruyama succinctly puts it: the self-defense forces "can exist no other way".

In these security treaties and defense agreements, Japan has relinquished her right to war reparations, and has given to the US the right to use her territory for military bases. In return for this, the US has promised to defend and protect Japan. The latest of the security treaties was renewed for another ten years in 1970.

It would probably not be going overboard at this point to assert that Japan, indisputably the richest and most aggressive nation in Asia, no more actually needs US protection than Indira Gandhi needs advice. But Japan has promised and keeps promising not to play war games any more, and she does need a nuclear defense arrangement. The Japanese nuclear defense mechanism is synonymous with, is the US nuclear defense mechanism, and it should come as no surprise to anyone that the Japanese government line on these and related matters is the same as that of the US, modified in accordance with Japanese terminology.

By reason of this symbiosis, therefore, it is in the interests of the Japanese government to behave as if dropping an atomic bomb, and having it dropped on oneself, not just once, but twice, is natural, understandable, and to be expected in time of war. The Emperor himself had said so.

The Emperor, it should be noted, has been to Hiroshima only three times, and his son, the Crown Prince, has gone to Hiroshima only once and that quite recently. Both of them, however, have been around the world several times, and the Emperor has been to Washington to tell Gerald Ford that he was sorry about the war. Before he left on that trip, he did an extraordinary thing. He granted an unprecedented and now famous personal interview to the Japan correspondent for *Newsweek* magazine. The interview was kept secret until the day it appeared in print, and on the very day that that issue hit the stands, the Emperor, with consummate illogic and tactlessness, did another extraordinary thing: he had a premiere conference for the foreign press, all of whom were not told about the exclusive secret interview with the *Newsweek* correspondent and who thought they would be making history on that day until some of their group, arriving late, carried in with them copies of the *Newsweek* hot off the press.

It was subsequently noticed by the foreign reporters that the Emperor talks in circles and that he was unable to even give a straightforward answer as to how he felt about his impending pleasure trip to Disneyland.

The week after this fiasco, the Emperor went to Washington and told President Ford that he was sorry about the war, that he deeply regretted it and so forth. This marks the first time the President of the United States and the Emperor of Japan have found anything to say directly to each other about World War II.*

When the Emperor came home from this trip, he did one last unprecedented thing. He proceeded to hold the first news conference ever for the Japanese press. One of the newsmen there asked him whether, when he apologized to President Ford about the war, that this meant he was taking responsibility for it also. To this question, the Emperor actually replied that he had not studied literature and therefore did not know the meaning of the words he had used to the President. Immediately after this, another journalist asked the Emperor what he had to say about the atomic bombings. And it was at this point that the Emperor stood up and stuttered out his now famous line that made the Japan Citizen's Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs so angry: "They were unavoidable because it was a time of war."

A few days after this historic news conference, Prime Minister Miki paid an official visit to Hiroshima in connection with that city's baseball team. Wearing a baseball cap reading 'The Hiroshima Carp', and standing with three city government officials similarly capped, the Prime Minister proceeded to state that he did not feel the Emperor 'rounded out' what he meant to say about the atomic bombings, and that he thinks the Emperor, not being used to public speaking, was simply unable to communicate his real thoughts. He also mentioned by way of concluding discussion on the topic, that although aid would be extended within the scope of the two existing sets of laws, he did not believe there would be any special law passed for the atomic bomb victims. The following day, the Yomiuri Newspaper reminded its readers that this stand was a 'retreat' from Miki's previous statements as a member of the Tanaka cabinet when he had insisted on the need for a special law.

This stream of events presents an intriguing picture. It might have occurred to some to wonder, for example, looking at the order

* It was reported in the Japanese press the morning following a dinner party hosted by Ford for the Emperor, that the President became so frustrated with the Emperor's unvaried 'oh, is that right?' response to everything Ford said that, when the party was over, the President asked Ginger Rogers, also a guest, to remain behind and dance several hours with him to relieve the unbearable tension that had built up through the course of the evening.

of priority of the interview and the news conferences, why the Emperor was fit to bless, first the *Newsweek* correspondent, then the foreign press and lastly the Japanese press. It is certainly an unusual arrangement when the rights of a foreign press are recognized over those of a country's own. However, it is not really too difficult to guess what was going on there.

The Emperor, as an apolitical 'symbol' both inside and outside the country, is an obvious and most fortunate choice for goodwill ambassador. His authority is unquestioned and his theoretical political 'neutrality' makes it possible for him to say literally anything. His other assets include his traits of quaintness and his old-Japan charm which are good for public relations and make it impossible for anyone to get anything across to him.

Then, within Japan, to a Japanese, the Emperor is the Emperor. This means that, even if he should condescend to hold a press conference, all questions must be submitted in advance for approval by the Emperor's advisors and merely read off by the journalists at the 'press conference'. The Emperor's answers (if one may call them that) are also prepared in advance. No one is allowed to openly question anything he says, because to do so is not part of tradition; to do so would be tantamount to calling into question the legitimacy of the Emperor himself.

The government of the country exists in form and in theory apart from the Emperor, and therefore, nothing the Emperor says or does can be forthrightly and unambiguously construed as political in nature, as having direct political ends. The Emperor is a symbol of the nation, and has been the legitimizer of authority for whatever power group was controlling Japan for as long as the country has had a history. And, paradoxically, that being so, nothing the Emperor does or says can be unrelated to the political ends of the leaders of the nation. The Emperor is, therefore, a most convenient political tool for all parties concerned. General MacArthur perceived this quite clearly when he insisted that defeated Japan retain him.

Thus, the Emperor can say or be advised to say anything whatever, and in so doing endangers himself and his authority and his advisors' authority and the Cabinet's authority not a single jot within the country. He, and those ultimately responsible for what he says, cannot be made to play the political piper because the Emperor is not a politician. He is a symbol. By the same token, no government official could presume to

translate to the people what the Emperor has said because the Emperor is aloof from politics, somehow sacred, an embodiment of the spiritual and moral integrity of the nation, and a mere politician must not presume to deal with him as if he were on the Emperor's exalted level. Therefore, the Emperor's remarks can never be openly contradicted. They can never be openly and officially shown up as in this case what they are — a piece of asinine irresponsibility and a criminal insult to the people whose identity he symbolizes. This cannot be done even by the spokesman for the ruling party who is, in name at least, the spokesman for the people. Because the Prime Minister is only elected to his position, not an inheritor of it from centuries past stretching back to the very origins of the country, to what was before 1945, Amaterasu, the Sun Goddess. All the Prime Minister is allowed to do, according to this line of reasoning, is reenforce the authority of the Emperor.

Likewise, when on those rare occasions the Emperor gives expression to or is advised to give expression to any idea even vaguely political in nature, any idea actually directly related to the state or the past state of his nation, these expressions take on a sacred officialness, an absoluteness, and a finality — because he is the Emperor. And so the circle is complete.

It is a most convenient state of affairs for the powers that be to have him there. For when he speaks out, as it were, what he says becomes the most natural, the surest, the most authoritatively plausible excuse for demanding that the nation accept as inevitable anything positively related to what he has said. And that being the case, it is simply unimaginable that the Emperor's answer to the question asked by the Japanese press and Prime Minister Miki's defense of those answers were intended to be taken as honest.

No one is really expected to believe that the Emperor, in whose sacred name the war was fought, cannot even speak for himself on the subject; and further, that the reason for this condition is that, as Prime Minister Miki says, the Emperor has had very little public speaking experience. This man is not the Mikado. He has been sashaying around the world on goodwill missions for something like 30 years, and everyone knows that perfectly well. There is not even any attempt being made to fool anyone.

It is simply that, by utilizing the Emperor at this juncture, those in power on whichever side of the ocean are merely making it clear that they will tolerate no opposition.

And the reason the Emperor talked first to *Newsweek*, then to the foreign press, and then insulted the Japanese press with, it should be remembered, prepared replies to previously approved questions, is that, even if the Emperor cannot be absolutely proved to know a single thing, the people running Japan know which side the bread is buttered. And they do not care, they do not *have* to care what the Japanese press thinks, nor, may we presume to add, what the Japanese people think.

If the government line of reasoning is pursued, then, it can be seen that it was no accident that the first personal interview ever granted to a foreign journalist should have been to the *Newsweek* correspondent. It likewise follows that it was politically expedient to have the foreign press meet the Emperor before the trip to the US, but not afterwards. They might well have asked some of the same embarrassing questions that the Japanese press asked, and they could not have been insulted with the same equanimity. They are not bound to venerate whatever the Emperor says.

Likewise, it is no accident that the Emperor was allowed to entertain questions from Japanese newsmen after his trip, after he had made the apology to President Ford about the war. Americans could listen to the Emperor say he was sorry about World War II and not make any more of it than a public relations effort on the part of the Japanese government. But a Japanese listener would have known that, for a Japanese, there is a direct correlation between apologies and responsibility; and he would also have known that so far, no one in Japan has heard any answers to the questions about responsibility for the war. Only a member of the Japanese press would have asked the question in the first place; and allowing the question to be asked directly of the Emperor, and then having him evade it like he did is the most final and authoritative possible method of silencing any further open and legitimate discussion of the issue.

The practical effect of this official attitude is, among other things, that it becomes impossible to realistically deal with existing problems related to the war. If the Emperor says the atomic bombs were an unavoidable result of the war and if no one can figure out what the war was the unavoidable result of, then it follows quite naturally that if atomic bomb victims continue to insist on their right to a special law that they will, by implication, bring themselves into conflict with the Emperor and with sanctified official policy.

And if, as sanctified official policy now has it, the bomb was unavoidable, then so are the victims' diseases, and, in that case, they should be grateful for anything they can get from the government.

It was precisely according to such line of reasoning that the government announced in the spring of 1975 that it would carry out another in-depth investigation to get "a clear picture of the living conditions of the victims and to obtain accurate data about what actually happened in terms of casualties as a result of the bombing". The survey method the Welfare Ministry proposed to use in order to obtain this "clear picture" after 30 years is exactly that of the 1965 "in-depth" survey which concluded that there were no appreciable differences between victims and non-victims.

Confucian practice

It might be instructive to add here that in Japan, the shadow of Confucianism still lies heavily on the land and interferes drastically at times with communication and clear thought. Thus, in the manner of a good Japanese wife relying on the authority of her husband, Japan relies on the authority and might of her powerful ally and former conqueror. Likewise, also in the tradition of the good Japanese wife, Japan can pretend not to know how to answer serious and important questions. She can legitimately refuse to openly admit anything whatsoever, regardless of its obvious truth, if, in so doing, she would not jeopardize her safety, the safety of her family or the security of her position.

For example, in 1968, Prime Minister Sato declared his new four-point policy concerning nuclear arms. This was: (1) their peaceful application; (2) their reduction; (3) Japanese dependence on American nuclear power; and (4) the three do not's: do not produce, do not own, and do not bring in. Now about this last item, according to reports of eyewitnesses in 1974 and 1975, the American government is transferring nuclear warheads through, and in some cases storing them in the Yokosuka Naval Base. The Japanese government has consistently denied that there was any truth to these reports; and all of the denials have taken exactly the same form. The Japanese government always says it has asked the U.S. authorities if they have put any nuclear warheads out at Yokosuka and the answer is 'no'. 'Therefore,' says the official government spokesman, 'there are no nuclear warheads out at Yokosuka'.

Unfortunately for the credibility of the official government spokesmen, however, these neat denials were somewhat besmirched in the

summer of 1975, when a well-known, now retired admiral of the U.S. Navy was heard to comment (he commented to the Japanese press, in fact) that he does not feel it is right for the U.S. to be using Yokosuka Naval Base as a storage area for nuclear weapons because that was not part of the agreement. Nevertheless, an official denial using the same formulations as the previous ones was issued again in December, 1975.

If the earlier analogy is pursued, this chain of events would be something like the good Japanese wife protesting indignantly to a group of gossip-mongers and other housewives that her husband absolutely has no girlfriends; and then having his picture appear on the front page of a newspaper the following day, naked in bed with one. Naturally, she would claim with finality and a serious, drawn face not to have noticed such a thing in that particular day's issue of the paper.

Another example is that previous to Prime Minister Sato's altruistic statement about Japanese nuclear policy, the Department of Education, in 1960, had the descriptions of the atomic bombings that had been appearing in school textbooks cut down from their former 20 pages or more to two or three lines. (1960 was also the year that the Security Treaty between Japan and the U.S. was revised and extended.) This textbook revision means that for the past 16 years, children in Japan have been taught about the atomic bombs only in terms that they were dropped and that they had something to do with ending the war.

Part and parcel of the Confucian thought the Japanese are immersed in from birth is a complicated and inflexible concept of submission to authority. This concept was manipulated and rationalized, under the Tokugawa rule, in such a way as to become more inflexible, and it was, in the process, developed to such a highly totalitarian and refined degree that it became an inseparable part of individual and national identity and consciousness. Thereafter, 'modernization' and 'industrialization' were able to do nothing to alter it. It is somewhat understandable that a nation with such a psychology would, in its present state of enforced powerlessness and therefore enforced defeat, find it most confusing to assert her rights in the face of the conqueror. And the more benevolent the conqueror, according to Confucian tenets, the less likely that the conquered will ever be able more precisely, ever desire to, assert their rights. The reputation of the United States for benevolence is worldwide.

Grim reminder

Outside of Japan, reminders of what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki on those hot summer days are almost non-existent. But the Japanese people who love history and delight in keeping anniversaries commemorate those two days every year. Even if official explanations are not forthcoming to children who started school after 1960, there are unofficial reminders always around during the month of August.

In 1975, the Japanese National Television Network presented an hour-long program on the evening of August 6 in honor of Hiroshima. It was shown again on August 8 for Nagasaki. The makers of the film had simply gone to the victims and asked them to draw pictures of what they remembered of the events of those days.

It was a hard film to watch. In the voices and faces of the people interviewed, there was none of the mask of melodramatic role-playing and forced sentimentality Japanese seem to feel obligated to put on when asked to discuss private things in public. Instead, there was an atmosphere of grim and resigned calm. Many people from many different age and social groups showed their drawings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the camera. People who had been children then tended to draw people in flames and buildings in flames. Those who had been older at that time tended to draw black skeletons and stiffened likenesses of any animate thing. There was one elderly man whose drawing depicted the deaths of his mother, father and two brothers. Their bodies he had drawn stick-like, laid out on the floor and over their heads a space where the roof of his house had been. As the camera moved away from this man and began to take in his face and the face of his sister beside him, it could be seen that they were inhumanly scarred. They were also, they had said, ill with leukemia.

At the end of the program a woman in her early 50's spoke. She said she had anemia pretty badly and never had much energy. Her last remark was made without tears and drama, but somehow pleadingly — August 6, 1945, was the worst day on earth and "I hope it never comes again".

Of course, in Japan, what ordinary people say, even what the film editors of the National Television Network try to imply, have nothing to do with actual government policies. And, in any case, the tone of his program was something like a reminiscence of the past. Japanese appear to adore wrapping any given part of their history, even World

War II and the atomic bomb, with irrelevant tenderness and sentimentality. And it is part of the Confucian tradition in Japan to always allow everyone room for complaint. Such a system cannot be maintained otherwise. Paradoxically, what gets done or not done appears to have no connection with the grievances that were redressed, decision- and policy-making apparently belonging to a different category of thought.

But in any case, it is not impossible to imagine that the makers of the previously described laws could have watched that heart-rending program at home on their color television sets and cried for their memories and the memories of the people in the film. And then, the following day, it being 1975 and not 1945 or 1955, they would have jumped into their air-conditioned limousines and been chauffeured to work.

The victims here were, of course, appearing in a documentary film, but they were authentic. Anyone wanting to know what they think and feel about the way they are treated has merely to ask one of them. There are certainly plenty around. Their existence is a continual, troubling reminder to the Japanese government that all could not be well that ended like that. And the victims' persistent, incredible struggle to keep on with their lives; their insistence that the reality of their lives be recognized by their government, is, likewise, proof that it is not really possible, under any circumstances, to minimize something like an atomic bomb and what it does permanently to human beings. The only thing of importance to these people is their future, and in spite of overwhelming efforts by their government to convince them and everyone else that they need nothing more than what they already have, the victims refuse to be convinced. It seems to be their belief that it is they, themselves — not the Emperor, not Prime Minister Miki, and not the Welfare Minister — who should know what they need; they were the ones who were there.

But be all of their story as it might, the laws are as they are; the government is as it is; the Security Treaty is still in effect; and Prime Minister Miki drank the traditional celebration *sake* last November with sponsors of the Hiroshima Carp's baseball team and said, the cup hardly out of his mouth, that there would be no new law.

In the meantime, the victims — the handsome young man with keloid sleeving his right arm; the fragile, pretty wife of eight years still unable to conceive a child; the grandfather with his useless limbs and

his terrifying memories — these people and thousands like them, go on with getting through their days in high-speed, prosperous Japan; while the testimony of the atomic experiment that their lives and bodies are is gradually lost to the future and to everyone.

“Yet with another part of my mind, I am aware that no man is a villain in his own eyes. Something in the man knows — *must* know that what he is doing is evil; but in order to accept the knowledge the man would have to change. What is ghastly and really almost hopeless ... is that the crimes we have committed are so great and so unspeakable that the acceptance of this knowledge would lead, literally, to madness. The human being, then, in order to protect himself, closes his eyes, compulsively repeats his crimes, and enters a spiritual darkness which no one can describe.”

— JAMES BALDWIN, *Blues for Mister Charlie*

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