Asian Studies

Asian Studies

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THE ASIAN CENTER

The ASIAN CENTER, originally founded as the Institute of Asian Studies in 1955, seeks to implement the statement of national policy, Section 1, R. A. No. 5334: "to develop . . . contact with our Asian neighbors in the field of learning and scholarship to attain knowledge of our national identity in relation to other Asian nations through . . . studies on Asian culture, histories, social forces and aspirations." The ASIAN CENTER was proposed as early as 1957 by President Ramon Magsaysay; in 1968, it was signed into law by President Ferdinand E. Marcos upon the active encouragement of President Carlos P. Romulo of the University of the Philippines. Today, with augmented facilities and staff, it offers facilities for conducting studies and sharing the results of research on Asia among Asian scholars. Primarily a research unit, the ASIAN CENTER also administers a degree program leading to the Master of Arts in Asian Studies with four alternative general areas of concentration: East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and West Asia. A specific area of concentration is the Philippines in relation to any of these four areas. The program of study is designed to provide training and research on Asian cultures and social systems on the basis of an undergraduate concentration in the social sciences, humanities, or the arts, and seeks to develop an area or regional orientation, with a multidisciplinary approach as the principal mode of analysis. The CENTER publishes two journals, a Newsletter, a monograph series and occasional papers, in its publications program. It is now the Secretariat for the regional grouping, the Committee for Asian Studies Centers in Southeast Asia.

ASIAN STUDIES

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Issue Editor

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PREFATORY NOTE

Over the years the ASIAN STUDIES has solicited and published materials from a diverse group of scholars both local and foreign. The response, in terms of contributions and the leadership, has been most satisfactory. But a serious gap continues to exist.

Since the journal addresses itself to all who are interested in Asia, we think it proper that all shades of opinion be reflected in the essays and articles contained in the journal, in keeping not only with the spirit of free intellectual expression, but also with the nature of our Asian and international audience. Hence we welcome the entry into this journal of the contributions of a group of young, new scholars—our students—to signal what we hope is the start of a new era of indigenous scholarship. For it is from among the ranks of the upcoming generation of scholars such as these where we shall expect to come those who will maintain this journal and who will create a new tradition of creative research in this part of the world. Up to now the voice of indigenous Asian scholarship has been muted: it is writers such as are represented in this issue who may make academic exchange a two-way instead of the one-way traffic it has been.

It is therefore with a great deal of pride that we present in this issue the work of our students. With this issue we correct the omission.

R. SANTOS-CUYUGAN
Dean

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THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY IN PRE-MODERN ASIA: ITS SOCIO-POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

LILIA S. LEDESMA

INTRODUCTION

FROM EARLY TIMES MAN SOUGHT TO EXPLAIN THE VARIOUS PHENOMENA in him and around him through a trust in the existence of a divine and supernatural control which linked and governed natural phenomena and human affairs by means of laws of mutual interrelatedness and inter-influences. This universal concern of mankind covering "the Power manifesting itself in the universe" remains a characteristic of Eastern ways of thought and culture from the Semite's cry of humble incredulousness:

> "I look up at your heavens, made by your fingers, at the moon and stars you set in place — Ah, what is man that you should spare a thought for him, the son of man that you should care for him? . . ."
>
> *(Psalm 8)*

to the Taoist's groping for expression of this great unity he felt in him, and which he saw in his meditations:

> "There was something undefined and complete, coming into existence before Heaven and Earth. How still it was and formless, standing alone, and undergoing no change."
> "I do not know its name, and I give it the designation of Tao. I am also forced to add the name Great."
>
> *(Huai Nan Tzu, p. xii)*

and the Vedic Indian's highly enigmatic and philosophical feelers for unravelling the riddle of the universe:

> "Not having seen, I ask the poets who have seen, for the sake of knowing, not having known. Who has held apart firm these six regions, what then is that One, in the form of the unborn?"
>
> *(Rgveda 1, 6.)*

The unfathomable depths of the workings of the Universal Power remained man's preoccupation as he forged his way from a "primitive" culture

towards more "sophisticated" levels; and as he put meaning and movement into his lifeways and social order, his fascination with magic and mysteries became as the earth which nourished his other cultural concepts, like the breath which gave life and vitality to them as the elemental water which purified and simplified, and the fire which energized and consecrated into persistence and perpetuity.

The dependence of man on his perception of the unity within the universe is seen clearly in the concept of sovereignty which evolved in the different Asian regions. That the East has retained much of the magic spirit of its primal state is a perception attested to by Martin Buber, foremost Jewish existentialist when he observed that "The magical character adheres for a long while to the products of separation" in the Orient (1957, p. 32). The "products of separation" can only mean the results of process of evolving and extracting through rationalizations independent social institutions from their fused state within simple societies.

This paper attempts to bring out the particular and the common in the ancient and cosmic theories of sovereignty in South Asia, specifically represented by India; in the East Asian countries of China and Japan; and finally, in Southeast Asia, seen either as the area of convergence or point of containment of the great Asian cultural systems. Hopefully, it will draw out the socio-political implications of the concepts of kingship.

I. INDIAN CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY

Cosmology

In the Brhadaranyaka-Upanisad 2, 1, 19, there is the image of a spider at the center of its cobweb actively emitting equidistant and concentric webs in expanding lines parallel and perpendicular to the central point. The spider and central point are a representation of Svayambhu Brahman (i.e. The Self-Existent or the Universal Life-Force), and all other existents which are but continuing manifestations, variations and mutations in time of it, the sole constant and immutable being. (Heimann, 1964, p. 99). The image conjured immediately gives an impression of ceaseless activity but as in a kind of distant subterranean or cosmic throbbing where all the different points of the structure are interconnected. Outside of the relation and creative influence of Brahman, nothing can exist and in Brahman, the Neuter Principle, all things eventually converge in fulfillment and maturity.

The same idea is expressed in the "Asya Vamasya" Hymn of the Rgveda-1 through the image of the "cakram"—

> "The Wheel of Law, with twelve spokes
> goes round and round the heaven; it is
> indeed not to be decayed . . .
>
> (*Rgveda 1, 164-11*)

> ". . . In that wheel having five spokes,
> which rolls on, all the beings stand
> out. Its axle bearing immense load,
> does not get heated. Having its navel,
> it does not break, from the beginning
> itself."
>
> *(Rgveda 1, 164-14)*

The poetic evocation of a wheel which does not break in spite of its immense load or risk decay is interpreted by Dr. C. Kunhan Raja as a vehicle for clear-seeing of what could be the first cause, as could be inferred from Verse 12 of the same hymn:

> "They call him the father, having five
> feet, having twelve forms, full of water
> in the far side of heaven. Then these
> others say (of him) as the clear—
> seeing, placed in the high (chariot) with
> seven wheels and with six spokes."

What strengthens his case is the observation that in the Veda, a clear-seeing Sun-God is frequently mentioned. (Kunhan Raja, p. 26). For us, the interest clearly emerges in the image of interdependence and a centrally-controlled yet eternal cyclic activity. As in the spider simile, there is the perception of a distant yet pervading presence. "Behind of that heaven they utter in a low voice the word that comprehends all, that does not move all." (Rgveda 1, 164-10.).

In India of Vedic Age, Masson-Oursel concurs, "every act is merely the symbol of another act not revealed to our eyes; every object is the symbol of a secret power, every word has a hidden meaning. One is surrounded by mystery. . ." (p. 234).

KINGSHIP

There have been countless and voluminous attempts to decipher the mystic in Indian life and philosophy. Some prefer to view Indian cosmology as one nebulous unity, subtle and suggestive. Others, like Henri Berr, emphasize the structured divisions of this unity and declare dividing and ranking an Indian penchant. C. Kunkan Raja's cautious approach of a context analysis of available literature seems to be the prudent road, one which this paper tries to imitate.

Kingship in ancient India was strongly based on its cosmology. In the "Laws of Manu," the nature of kingship was expressed thus:

> "Because a king has been formed of
> particles of those lords of the gods,
> he therefore surpasses all created

> being in lustre; and like the sun,
> he burns eyes and hearts; nor can
> anybody on earth even gaze on him.
> Through his supernatural power he
> is Fire and Wind, he Sun and Moon,
> he the Lord of Justice (Yama), he
> Kubera, he Varuna, he great Indra."
> (VII, 5-7)

The question that poses itself before us is the nature of the divine kingship in India. If we were to take the words of the great law-maker Manu at face value, we would get the picture of an unreachable king, whose presence was more of a theophany liable to unnerve any average man, even if he were an Indian supposed to have absorbed those concepts.

In another article (V, 96) Manu explains that the king is an "incarnationa" of the eight guardian deities of the world, viz. Indra and company. The problem then centers around this: was the king a god "incarnated" or was he a human being divinized? If the latter, the corollary question would be: why and how was he divinized? A closer examination of the first quotation which exuberantly proclaimed the king's divine nature reveals an apparent inherent neutralizer and clue to the solution of the problem. Manu says:

> ". . . he therefore surpasses all created
> beings in lustre. . ."

It would be easy to infer that since the king is merely one above the rest of creation, he falls in a rank below the gods, that is, if we were to apply Western monotheism and concepts on the East. But in India, the many gods, like men, animals and plants, were manifestations of the Supreme Principle, the neuter IT, which supersedes all gods. Because of this, it would not be correct to jump to the conclusion that the king was a human being raised to the level of the gods solely on the basis of Manu's phrase, "therefore surpasses."

A nearer clue would be to find the nature of Hindu gods. This we find in the Asya Vamasya Hymn (Rgveda I, 51, p. 83):

> "The gods performed a sacrifice with
> sacrifice. They became the first
> dharmas. Lo these greatnesses resorted
> to the heavens, where ancient Sadhyas,
> the gods, are."

This tells us that there was a progression in the Vedic concept of god. One could "become" a god through a rite—"a sacrifice with sacrifice." A sacrifice which was made sacred. Another way of passing from mortality to divinity was through performance of great deeds, like the Rbhus and Maruts (C.

Kunhan Raja, p. 84). Having become a god, one still had to progress through different degrees, like the Saddhyas, who although in heaven, have not reached the fullness of divinity. (*ibid.*)

That India harbors in her cosmology the graduation of "becoming" is another phase of her tendency to regulate and restore every single person and object to the vital primary unity. At this point, it can safely be surmised that in all probability, the king was a human being who became, through a process of transformation, one of the deities. The king, according to Manu, has been "created to be the protector of castes (varna) and orders." (VII, 35). We can take the word "created" to mean "elevated" for another article of the Manusmriti leads us to the social class from which kings sprang: ". . . a kshatriya who has received according to the rule the sacrament prescribed by the Veda, must duly protect this whole (world). (VII, 144).

A Kshatriya becomes. This idea goes back to earliest times when the first ruler (Manu Vaivasvata) was ordained by Brahma to protect the people and the world. The sacrament was carried out in the coronation rites which was called the *mahabhiseka* in early times. The important thing about these rites was a re-birth for the prince who became the son of the sacrificial priests. A symbolic entry into the *homa* fire and exit from it signified a totally different person with heightened and envigorated faculties. The codification of the rites of coronation, specifically the *Rajasuya*, shows the evolution of the people's consciousness of the cosmic influences. The king becomes the associate of Indra if he governs well and eliminates the thief, the adulterer, etc. (Institutes of Vishnu, V, 196). The king becomes identified with the ages of the world for his behavior must resemble the Kali (iron age), Dvapara (bronze age), Treta (silver age), Krta (golden age).

In the coronation rites, much is made of the king sitting on a throne, being fanned, and facing a blazing fire. One possible explanation is that Lakshmi, who as Vishnu's wife is also his sakti, energy or active power, resides in throne, in an umbrella, in a blazing fire (Institutes of Vishnu XCIX, 12).

The king's coronation, which as can be noted is radically a consecration, must partake of the essential elements for the king's divine nature, is taken from "particles of the gods." For that purpose, therefore, "eternal particles of Indra, of the Wind, of Yarna, of the Sun, of Fire, of Varuna, of the Moon, and of the Lord of Wealth" are taken. (Manu, VII, 4). In this way, he becomes "a great deity in human form." The fundamental elements, especially water from the sacred rivers, chief among which was the Sarasvati, became "divine quickeners" which gave vigor and oblativeness on the king's part.

The king is made to look like a deity, and the process was by treating him as one, calling him with the titles of Supreme King of Kings, Chief of

Chiefs, Brahman, Indra of true energy, Rudra, the most kindly. It seems to be a characteristic of Eastern peoples to hold that the title and the person eventually became identical, and calling a person by this name was to draw from the person the characteristic of the name, or, to confer on him the responsibility of living up to it (Coedes, 1963, p. 26). The candidate for consecration did not remain a passive subject of the rituals, in spite of the abundance of deification. He had to prove that he was *the* Kshatriya worthy to become king. This proving of self above the others, and the necessity of rising from the common number is clearly shown by another rationale for the importance of the throne. "They then bring a throne-seat for him; for truly he who gains a seat in the air, gains a seat above others." (V Kanda, 2 Adhyaya, 1 Brahmana 22). Also, the prince-candidate had to ritually conquer the different parts of the world through the use of bows and arrows, etc.

In these coronation rites, the core was the sacrifice whose magical operation creates or preserves the world (Masson-Oursel, p. 130). Hence ritual correctness was the key to success.

Socio-Political Implications

Because of the central idea of a king's role as protector, the original question of a theophanic presence is not upheld in the Vedic literature. The king was regarded as a father and his success lay in this paternal role. In the Ramayana epic, the image of the ideal king is depicted this way:

> "Like the ancient monarch Manu, father
> of the human race, Dasa-Ratha ruled his
> people with a father's loving care."
>
> *(Kanda Ramayana*
> *Bk. I, Ch. I, p. 2)*

Social order was implied to be dependent on the king's right conduct.

> "Kshatras bowed to holy Brahmans,
> Vaisayas to the Kshatras bowed,
> Toiling Sudras lived by labour,
> of their honest duty proud."
>
> *(Romesh Dutt, p. 2)*

Masson-Oursel points out that dissimilar theories of kingship in India pale in significance for the essential point brought out was that "Indian politics consisted not in doctrine of the state but in an art of government, the keystone of which is formed by the education of the prince" (p. 95). Fundamental to the king's training was to learn from the people regarding the various trades and professions. Because of this, a king was supposed to hold a daily audience with the people (Manu, VII, 43). He had to learn

how to govern well for the need of improving his prosperity and that of the people was imposed on him at the coronation when among the names given him, was that of "Much-Worker, Better-Worker, More-Worker."

That the prince had to be educated is indicative that kingship in India was a human institution which had been raised to the level of the divine by rites and magical gestures which made of kingship a microcosm of the larger universe. After the consecration, success lay in the king's conduct and his conformity with the *dharma* which governed and judged the value of each act. Sovereignty, we can say, rested in the people's happiness under a king. But in India, the people were dependent on the right functioning of government.

There has been an emphasis placed on the king's possibility of improving himself. To give the complete picture, it has to be said that the danger of losing one's merit of *karma* was another leverage that the people had on the king. "Doubly armed is the hero—he who battles for the right!"—was a favorite lesson of the epics.

The interrelationship between the king and people was strengthened further by the political novelty that the king earned 1/6 of the merits as well as the demerits of his subjects. There must be a connection here with the fact that the king's paternity was especially recognized in the relation of taxation with the people. He was expected to be lenient, which would make the people happier and earn more merits for them and himself.

At this point of the paper, it becomes clear that the divine kingship in India was more analogical than real. (Masson-Oursel, p. 90). Although to say that the king was divine could be true, provided one kept in mind that the Hindu concept of divinity was a limited, evolving concept which held that divinity could be lost. There was no absolute monarch, especially during the times prior to Buddhist influence, and the seven elements of a kingdom which consisted of the king, his minister, capital, realm, treasury, army and friend were as the triple staff of an ascetic (Manusmriti, IX, 296), where each was declared to be the most important for that particular purpose it alone could accomplish. Human action on the part of each constituent element seems to be the more important factor as compared to fate. But we have to acknowledge that the strongest links which bound the people into a political unit were religious ties (Saletore, p. 84), for as has been repeated, "individuals are nothing else than limited manifestations of Universal being." (Nakamura, p. 67). There is no strong evidence to show that the people participated actively in political affairs but one can infer that they remained present and capable of overthrowing a tyrannical government. Perhaps in the village councils and administrative sections which some authors believe to have existed then. The degree of suppression, however, has to be intense for the people to overthrow what is otherwise deemed to be someone sacred.

The concept of kingship in ancient India will undergo change of emphasis during the time of Kautilya (4 B.C.) where a militant and politically astute king replaced the drove king of Manu's creation.

II. CHINESE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY

A study of the religious cosmography in East Asia showed an 18th century Korean wheel-map which depicted Mt. Khun-Lun Shan as the center of the center of the universe and around which were islands and oceans surrounded by continents and further oceans. The whole imagery is reminiscent of the Mt. Meru concept found in Indian cosmology. The names on this map could not be dated later than the 11th century although its usage in Korea was recorded as an 18th century event. The assumption is made that Korea got it from China which got it when the Buddhist started to penetrate the country (Needham, 1959, p. 216). This must have been around the 4th-6th centuries A.D. when a number of Indian monks went to China to do translations of Buddhist works.

Diplomatic relations between India and China must have existed earlier. We are sure, for one thing, that commercial relations existed since at least the 2nd century B.C. (Filliozat, p. 133). Around 144 A.D., the Indian king Kanishka called himself the Devaputra which in Chinese meant "Son of Heaven." Around the 7th century A.D. a king of Assam boasted of Chinese ancestry, and a Sanskrit version of Lao Tse's work was available (*op. cit.*)

What could have been an active cultural exchange between these two countries was impeded by the Himalayan boundary and by the constant attention that India had to give to her Western and Northwestern passages. Apart from this Northwest orientation, Indian culture will spill over to Asia through Indonesia.

Whatever similarities, then, that we see between Indian and Chinese cosmology and concept of kingship will be more of a parallel development (and a proof of the universality of explaining human affairs by cosmic concepts) rather than of a mutual feeding into each other's cultural strains. A proof of independent development was that the above-mentioned cartograph of Mt. Khun-Lun did not appear to be widespread in China, as it was in Korea.

Cosmology and Kingship

If Indian principles, as enumerated in the Dharmasastras and Arthasastras, merely hinted at the opportunity of the people to revolt, Chinese political writings from pre-Confucian times were explicit on this matter:

> "He has cast himself off from both
> spirits and men. The spirits are
> incensed against him and the people
> revolt. How can he last long?"
>
> *(Fung Yu Lan, p. 25)*

The primary duty of the ruler, it seems, was to pacify the spirits and to put order into men's lives.

Another indigenous belief was that of the spirits coming to rest on men possessed of certain qualities and the spirits entered them. This differs from the parallelism of Indian macrocosmic universe and its variant microcosms. Aside from this belief in a multitude of spirits, there was the belief in a separate Heaven which, however, remained directly active in human affairs—"Heaven has commanded me to destroy him."

The Confucian disregard of Heaven has not been able to obliterate this indigenous belief which will find more refined reflections in the *Shu Ching*. "From Heaven come the relationships with their several duties. . . . Heaven punishes the guilty."

Before Mencius and Lao Tzu were able to crystallize their doctrines into the more significant influences they are now, there arose a school of thought whose deviating teachings can elucidate what generally was the trend of Chinese concepts. This deviating school was the legalist school around 233 B.C. In complete anti-thesis to Confucianism, especially as perfected by Mencius, the Legalist School, the foremost exponent of which was A. Hsun, Tzu emphasized government by law rather than by individual leadership. Reminiscent of Kautilya's difference vis-a-vis Manu, the Legalists put state and political processes above human or moral concerns and ethical values. Their zenith was in the short-lived but brilliant Ch'in dynasty which effected the first unification of China (221-207 B.C.). The contrast between its brilliant ascent and rapid downfall must have struck Chinese sages. The monograph on "The Faults of Chin" provides an important entry-point into the Chinese socio-political concepts.

> "Why did Chin fail, great and powerful
> empire that it was, before a commoner's
> troops of peasants and farmers?
> —Because it failed to rule with humanity
> and righteousness and to realize that
> the power to attack and the power to
> retain what one has thereby won are
> not the same."
>
> *(de Bary, p. 152)*

As a result of Ch'in downfall, there arose a new political thought which remained influential till the beginning of the 20th century (*ibid.*, p. 156). It retained the emperor and invested him with a stronger aura of divine mystery but this did not detract from an actual working of the government through ministers and a bureaucracy of scholars. Indicative of this trend was Ch'en She's speech in the first revolt against Ch'kn:

> "Kings and nobles, generals, and
> ministers—such men are made, not
> born!"

Even though the Indian monarchy was not absolute but more selective and allowed for a choice among a number of Kshatras, it pales in comparison to the apparent generality of Chinese monarchial choices. Was this the reality?

If we continue with the implied assumption in the first pages that there is a close correlation among the cosmic forces and socio-political processes, we would find interesting the fact that the basic concept of Chinese cosmology was the eternal triad of heaven, earth and man. Man stands in equal status with the universe and completes the triad. In fact, his first duty and obligation was to study and comprehend the laws of Heaven so as to live and fulfill them. The Chinese idea of man as a microcosm of heaven does not spell out in a need for parallelism and convergence as in the Indian concept. If man was a microcosm in India, it was the reality for he was wholly the cosmos or heaven but on miniature scale. (de Groot, p. 15). The round shape of his head represents heaven and the square form of the feet the earth. Kingship or leadership, then, was theoretically open to any man as all participated in the excellence of the cosmos. In India, the story of the creation of man ranked according to caste could not allow for a Sudra, born of the feet of Prajapati to rule over the Brahman or Kshatras who belonged to the upper parts.

While anyone was in priniple free to assume political leadership, what prevailed was the usefulness of hereditary succession with the sage as adviser to the king.

It is interesting to note that it is difficult to extract the concept of kingship in China from description of man in general. This is especially true in the earlier writings like Tung-Chung-Shu's "Three-fold Obligations of the Ruler" (de Bary, p. 162). The later descriptions given by Mencius show the difference to be in a greater benevolence and righteousness residing in the sovereign.

Otherwise, the king's duties are fundamentally equivalent to the functions and concept of every man. Tun-Chung-Shu in fact easily jumps from the idea of the king as the basis of the state to the idea of man as one of the three bases for all creatures. This correlation between king and man can be the probable reason why the early kings of China delightedly and constantly referred to themselves as "The One Man." (The Shu King, Bk. III).

> "Ah! ye multitudes of the myriad
> regions, listen closely to the
> announcement of me, the One Man."

This explanation could also be the light to Chuang Tzu's enigmatic statement: "Only a king who can forget his kingdom should be entrusted with a kingdom."

What singled out one man for kingship if the concepts of king and man were close to each other? The answer is found in the book of *The Great*

Plan 4, 4 which set the model for the government of the nation. The sovereign, having established the highest degree and pattern of excellence, concentrates, in his own person the five sources of happiness and proceeds to diffuse them to the multitude of people who will embody this perfection and give it back to the king and secure its preservation. But it is heaven who calls and descends on the future king who is called to rule and instruct the little people. The kind, as in the Indian concept, becomes one for the people for "Heaven sees as my people see; Heaven hears as my people hear." (The Books of Kau, V, p. 128). This has been called the concept of the "mandate of heaven" and it has haunted rulers for fear that it would be taken away from them. Actually, it was effectively taken away by the people through rebellion for Confucius codified the indigenous concept of death to a worthless ruler. The sages, as did Mencius, can proudly say: "Let the rulers have their wealth—I have my benevolence. Let them have their nobility—I have my righteousness." (Works II, 2). The people or inarticulate masses find seething hate for an oppressor by declaring: "He who soothes us is our sovereign; he who oppresses us is our enemy."

The succession to kingship became a matter of "vox populi, vox Dei." A chosen person was presented to heaven and acceptance came from the people.

In China, the relation between king and people was like fluid water, or a magnet drawing iron to him. If a king was good, people came and ratified his kingship.

As the concept evolved, the king gradually emerged from one among men to be the Son of Heaven. James Legge tries to trace its development in *The Sacred Books of China,* but this is unnecessary for this paper.

Further Comparisons Between India and China

The overall impression, after having compared Indian and Chinese scriptures on the concept of kingship, reveals rigidity and strain in the Indian attempts to exalt a god-king above his nature as a human being. *Dharma* (duty) had to be maintained and the least incorrectness in rite or formula could result in the loss of *Karma.* Chinese scriptures, on the other hand, seem to carry a certain amount of ease when they show the relation among the King, Heaven and Man. A tentative explanation to this impression might be evinced when one notes that the trust of Indian efforts was to reproduce and duplicate, although on different scales or dimensions. Hence the parallelism with the gods and their lifestyle through grandiose titles and painfully exacted rituals, so as to rise in rank and status. Perfection would be attained by precision, therefore a strong accent on formulaism.

The Chinese drift was towards completion and harmonization, not of formulas and rites, but of lives lived day by day. While there was also the

emphasis on ritualism, there seemed to be greater emphasis on the correctness of one's conduct, on the enjoyment of food and cloth, and on the right relationships. Instead of the upward exertion of India, and its marked gradations, there were in China the ambient principles of Heaven, Man and Earth. The Emperor's duty was to work for the transformation and completion of his fellowmen and of all nature through good government. Secure in the peace and rationale of his function, the Chinese emperors were wont to humble themselves in a manner of losing themselves among their subjects by referring to themselves as the One Man, the Parent of the People, the Little Child. Herein also lay his perfection; for it was the philosophy of Chinese life that the well-springs of an individual's fulfillment were found in his multiple and mutually complementing relationships. (Houn, 1965, p. 8).

But for both the Chinese and Indian emperors, the main instrument of government, whether executed in precision or harmonization, was moral persuasion. He had to be the divine king as described by Manu or the virtuous king of pre-Confucian and Confucian China. Both were considered protector of the people.

Socio-Political Implications

From the above discussion, we may say that power in traditional Chinese society was well distributed and did not rest on the monarch alone. It was not monolithic nor absolute. A Chinese emperor could not deceive himself into thinking that his authority and position were permanent. The right to rule was contingent upon performance. The various social groups, like the businessmen, the powerful class, the gentry, and the autonomous villages were the check and balance to authority. This, however, does not deny the existence of Chinese tyrants.

Early Japan absorbed the Chinese concepts of imperial rule and called it Tennoism. But the One Man and Son of Heaven concepts were specialized for Japanese rulers who were declared to be descendants of the gods as inherent birthrights. The prevailing concept was the *Mandate of Heaven* which allowed an emperor's merit to "shine through the universe like sunlight" (Tsunoda, p. 88). The Japanese also borrowed the Chinese concept of an eternal trinity of Heaven, Earth, Man, but made man occupy a place midway between the other two. Heaven was superior and in it lay the basis of authority and order and the heavenly bodies communicated heaven's decrees to earth. Heaven also decreed who the sovereign would be and it alone determined the fate of the nation. (Tsunoda, p. 35). The fact that Japan boasts of a one continuous dynasty of succeeding generations seems to be an indication of heavenly nepotism!

Because of this elaboration of heaven's mandate which Japan had originally borrowed from China, we notice an excessive concern for conformity

to the pattern established by heaven as demonstrated in the rhythmic procession of sun, moon and planets across the firmament.

In the reading of the Kojiki and Nihongi, Japan's sacred records and chronicles, there cannot be found the humanism of Chinese literature. One explanation could be the peculiar phenomenon of a country which purports to inhabit only "divine" people, including the soil on which they draw sustenance. A further explanation could be that which was posited by Tsunoda. The well-known legends have been selected to perform the functions of supporting and confirming the religious and political claims of the sole ruling dynasty. (Tsunoda, 1958, p. 12). Thus, the singular route taken by chroniclers was the emphasis of the ancestral line from the sun goddess Amaterasu down through Jimmu Tenno (ca. 700 B.C.)

Other Chinese influences filtered through the adoption of the *Yin* and *Yang* cosmic principles, the adaptation of the Chinese calendar, the proclamation of a 17 article constitution in a combination of 8 smallest *yin* number and 9 largest *yang* number (Tsunoda, p. 35).

This is not to say that the Chinese were the only influences on Japanese culture. Around 1765 A.D., a resurgence of Japanese nationalism sought to disparage Confucian influence by laying claim to an indigenous observance in Ancient Japan of the natural laws of heaven and earth. (Tsunoda, 1958, p. 11). There were also the Buddhist influences to be reckoned with. That is why, around the 6th century A.D., Prince Shotoku of the Soga clan, in his historic attempt to rationalize the Japanese administrative structure, chose Chinese models although he retained Buddhism, brought from India, as the state religion. Confucianism, as utilized by the Japanese served to reinforce the absolute powers of the king. The Shotoku Constitution and the adoption of Chinese legal and bureaucratic institutions buttressed the existing political structure. The choice of posthumous names like Tenchi (Heavenly Wisdom) and Temmu (Heavenly Might) together with the recording of auspicious events preserved for posterity the mythology of the Emperor-Son of Heaven. For it was also shortly after these times that the *Kojiki,* the Records of Ancient Matters were written.

Southeast Asian Concept of Sovereignty

Of all Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam was relatively untouched by the effusion of Indian culture because Chinese influence had penetrated earlier, faster and for a longer time. Traces of Chinese influence are seen in the low prestige of the military and the high social status of the scholar or mandarin. Chinese influence, it seems, was also evident in the strain of political fatalism which accompanied the terrible struggles that marked the many revolutions in Vietnam. The fatalist attitude was supported by the "mandate of heaven" belief that any outcome of the struggle would always prove favorable to the Vietnamese for defeat for the reigning person symbol-

ized the withdrawal of heaven's favour. The Vietnamese, unlike the Japanese, did not systematize or ritualize the mandate of heaven concept for it may have been diluted by the strong streak of spiritism which colored every Vietnamese house and village. Ngo Quyen, a culture hero, appealed to this quiescent Vietnamese tradition by building his capital on the ancient site of worship. On this traditional foundation, the layer of Chinese civilization was laid through the influx of Chinese refugees, scholars, discharged officials, deserters, draftsmen, peddlers, merchants and laborers. Intermarriage with the local aristocracy produced the Sino-Viet nobles, the potential revolutionary force born out of a growing urban merchant group.

For the rest of Southeast Asia, the attempts to cut across the tropical jungle of regicides, revolts and assassinations in order to arrive at the concept of sovereignty are encumbered further by the lack of literature on the matter. The sources of information that remained were the epigraphs—inscriptions which reveal only the magnified achievements of the king in whose honor they were set up. Very little was disclosed about the life of the people and their conditions although a certain amount of knowledge about the life of the high priestly and aristocratic families was revealed. More objective sources of information were the Chinese dynastic annals.

An important clue is the fact that a cultural study of Southeast Asia, Vietnam apart, cannot be done without taking into consideration the permeation of Indian cultural influences which have earned for the region the designation "Farther India." (Coedes, 1968; p. XV).

Central to Indian influence was the predominance of the Meru concept. Mt. Meru, according to the Mahabharata, was the best of all mountains. It touched the sky and was immersed in the earth. On it the gods lived and enjoyed themselves. The Brahmanic and Buddhist concepts perceived Mt. Meru as the center of the universe surrounded by a succession of islands, oceans, and continents. The idea of a close parallelism between the macrocosmic world and microcosms of this world resulted in the attempts of Southeast Asian kings to replicate the cosmic world on the level of their political setting. Hence the parallelism was effected either in the person of the king, especially during his coronation with rituals serving the same purpose as Indian coronation rites, in the style of a temple or palace as the Angkor Vat, or in law and in the division of the administrative structures. (Singaravelu, 1969; p. 55). The acculturation process however resulted in some preferences or mutations. The worship of Siva, particularly its cult of royalty which emphasized the cult of the royal *linga,* quickly took root in the political practices of the time. (Singaravelu, 1969; p. 58). Other inscriptions and pillars reveal that Southeast Asian kings took names which could be variations of Siva's names, or that certain rites of the courts were imitations of Brahmanic ceremonies. But as the Shaivite cult penerated the native culture, further changes of emphasis evolved. The Shiva *linga* became a cult intended to emphasize and legitimize the person of the ruler. The *linga* was

viewed as representing both symbolically and factually the essense of royalty. As such it took a central and primordial place in the king's capital city for the royal *linga* also served as a reminder of the close union between Siva, source of power, and the king, his earthly embodiment. The *linga* cult was further refined into the cult of the *devaraja,* god-king, and would serve to represent the god into whom the king was absorbed at the end of his life. The transformations of the *linga* cult enhanced the prestige and influence of the brahmanic class. For if the king was regarded as the rightful monarch, it was not because he was a god but because he had undergone the proper rites performed by the qualified priests. (Mabbett, p. 208). It was left to the kingly family to ensure its permanence by rendering the priests beholden to the king's lineage. To preserve their authority and mutual interests, the kingly and priestly families inter-married and thus intensified their separation from and superiority to the masses. The lack of independent political communities did not provide the check to despotism as what India had. Coedes reports that several inscriptions recorded the contemptible names given by the upper classes to the people at large. The entrance of Vaishnavism into Southeast Asia was another proof of the careful selection made regarding external influences. The ruling class found support in Vaishnavism as they did in the Shaivite cult. Clearly, the *devaraja* cult was a deliberate effort of the king to exalt himself with his family into the ranks of the gods, Buddhas, or Buddhist saints. Where were the people at this time? The *devaraja* cult was not a spontaneous accolade from them. Their duty, it seems, was to work and build under conscription. Their political participation can be glimpsed in the numerous revolts which took place. These were not popular revolts, however, for these were battles staged by those noble members who were denied a share of the largesse. The lot of the people remained the same no matter who the ruler was. It has been pointed out that the convergence of two main ideas on kingship contributed to the making of more absolute kings in continental Southeast Asia. The king, through the efforts of the court brahmans, was identified with the Hindu gods, Siva and Vishnu; this imposed notion of kingship was completed by the more popular belief of his being a bodhisattva. (Quaritch-Wales, 1959; p. 131).

Other measures intended to divinize the king were done by surrounding him with an aura of mystery and sanctity by the mechanism of taboos, the elaboration of royal pomp and ceremonials, the use of special signs and an official court language. In the diffusion of culture, cyncretism in the linking of the divine and human was not only a common practice, it was a daily thing. (What can be called Indian were the forms and symbolisms of their gods, etc.) That the Southeast Asian colored Indian influences native elements is something to be assumed. No nation has a cultural vacuum. One proof for this is the way modifications have occurred. In Malaysia and Indonesia, for example, much importance is given to the regalia. Among the

Bugis and Makassarese of Ceylon, it is the regalia which reign and the prince governs in their name. (*op. cit.*) In the Ramayana, the two brothers exchange sandals and the younger one uses the rightful monarch's sandals during his temporary reign.

Ancient Siam carried out in peculiar ways the parallelism with the universe. A study of the evolution of its bureaucracy shows a careful count of the cosmic numbers of queens, ministers, court priests, provinces, etc. The whole country was so divided to belong to the right side or left side of the king who was regarded more as bodhisattva.

CONCLUSION

It may be every Asian's pride that the concept of sovereignty which predominates in the great cultures is the idea of protecting the people and a subservience of the ruler in promoting their happiness and prosperity. The problem before us now is the unearthing and nourishing of this concept so it can grow to maturation, but especially that the principle of protection may effectively reach the masses for whom it is intended.

We know little about their true situation for aside from a few shafts of light a peasant leading a revolt and establishing a new dynasty, the majority remain covered by the common noun of "the people" which appears in the records and documents of the nobles and literati. Asia groans for the liberation that modernization and industrialization promise; Asia carries in her soul the seeds for the kind of social order which will preserve the warmth and depth of relationships with the Universal Power and mankind. Asia suffers from the ravages of colonization; Asia can offer the promise of a political order where sovereignty truly resides in the people.

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KAUTILYA AND THE LEGALIST CONCEPT OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

HERMELINDO BANICO

THIS PAPER ATTEMPTS TO COMPARE THE CONCEPTS OF STATE AND government suggested by Kautilya of ancient India in his *Arthasastra,* and that of the Legalists, especially Han Fei Tzu, of China. *Arthasastras* are political treaties of ancient India. The one by Kautilya summarizes as he himself states in the opening chapter of his work, some Arthasastras of ancient India laid down by ancient teachers. Legalism, as perfected and articulated by Han Fei Tzu, is a philosophical tradition dealing on politics. The study is very interesting in the sense that one sees a trend of political thinking existing between two contiguous states aiming for the same political ends though differing in their political bases (means) in some ways. The traditional dates for the *Arthasastra* by Kautilya is set between 300-200 B. C.[1] Han Fei Tzu may also have written his works in the middle of the third century B. C. (He died in 233 B. C.).[2] Both persons culled their political ideas from their predecessors making a comprehensive work of otherwise scattered materials.

The historical background of Kautilya's *Arthasastra* and Legalism, especially that of Han Fei Tzu of which this paper is both concerned will be summarized briefly. The former is traditionally attributed to Canakya Kautilya (also known as Vishnugupta), a legendary chancellor of Candragupta of the Mauryan dynasty. Kautilya was a brahmin adventurer who after completing his studies, worked for the emperor of the Nanda dynasty at Pataliputra, the dynasty's capital. Having been insulted, he plotted against the Nanda emperor, and later succeeded to overthrow him. In the latter's throne, he placed Candragupta Maurya.[3]

Legalism flourished in China when Confucian orthrodoxy declined in relevance. The Confucian principles of *li* and *hsing*[4] to hold the state together could no longer support the state. The feudal system that maintained the Confucianist state disintegrated as the sway of the feudal king over the

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[1] U. N. Ghosal, *A History of Indian Political Ideas,* London: Oxford University Press, 1959, p. XXI. R. Shamasastry puts the dates between 321-296 B. C.

[2] Bruce Watson (trans.), *Han Fei Tzu: basic writings,* New York: Columbia University Press, 1964, pp. 2-3.

[3] T. N. Ramaswamy, *Essentials of Indian Statecraft,* Bombay: Asia: Publishing House, 1962, pp. 2 3.

[4] *Li* consists of rituals, ceremonies, rules of conduct, mores, etc. *Hsing* are penalties and punishments. The former governs the conduct of aristocrats; the latter applies to people of ordinary birth.

feudal lords was weakened by those continuous attacks by the "barbarians." They exerted independence from the king. Some feudal leaders even usurped the prerogatives of the king and competed with each other for the control of the whole of China. As feudal leaders conquered other states, the latter grew in size. Traditional feudal system proved inadequate for the needs of administration over a vast territory. Control over the mass of peasant population was difficult vis-à-vis the central government. Against this backdrop, the Legalists came into being. Han Fei Tzu, as the perfecter of Legalist philosophy, saw this need. He wrote copiously about it, getting his ideas from other Legalists,[5] combining and putting them into a "clear and comprehensive whole." [6] His own writings were intended for his own king of the state of Han, but the latter failed him.[7] Another king from the state of Ch'in, King Cheng, put them into good use, conquered Han Fei's home state, and later on, the whole of China.[8]

Both works have been associated with empires, one of Mauryan Empire, the other, the Ch'in Empire. A striking question thus naturally presents itself. The question arises as to the effectiveness of the ideas or concepts, as well as institutions implemented by each one vis-a-vis the empire. The Mauryan Empire lasted for a thousand years. The Ch'in Empire lasted for only fifteen years, however. It is for this interesting reason that this comparative study is being undertaken. What makes for the durability of the Mauryan Empire, on the one hand, and the short-lived character of the Ch'in Empire, on the other? At the outset, it must be stated here that this paper is just a preliminary survey on the subject. It has its limitations. For two things, external politics and military strategy are not included in its discussion.

The problem foremost in Kautilya's mind as well as in the Legalists', was how to preserve and strengthen the state. They believed that this could be realized if the state had considerable power not only within the state, but also vis-à-vis other states. The state must realize policies to that end. To achieve power, the state had to be wealthy and strong. They believed that wealth could be gotten from agriculture. The Legalists, though would prohibit other activities that are not agricultural like being scholars, merchants, artisans, etc. Kautilya, on the other hand, may condone the activities of merchants and artisans. In both cases, wealth is emphasized. Everything was done to maximize wealth from this agricultural pursuit for the state. Every effort was channeled to increase productivity. A strong state also manifested capacity in a powerful army to defend its cities as well as to expand its frontiers. But the strength of the army was dependent upon how much surplus productivity the state could manage to spare for the military under-

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[5] For example, Shen Pu-hai, Shen Tao, and Wei Yang of whom the *Book of Lord Shang* is attributed.

[6] Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[8] China was first united under the Ch'in Empire in the years 230-221 B. C.

takings.[9] As far as the general purpose of the state is concerned, they matched. But in achieving these ends, they differ considerably.

The state as conceived by Kautilya existed for the people, for its happiness, and for its welfare. It follows, then, that the wealth and strength of the state should be applied to the realization of the above. The Legalists, however, considered the interests of the people secondary, if they ever mattered at all.[10] They were not interested in the private individual, or their lives, except perhaps as they affected the ruling class.[11] The state, they visualized, existed for the king so that a line of policies were designed to subject the people in the higher interest of the state identified with the king. In the former, however, the state is identified with the people; the king and his ministers existed only as instruments for the welfare of society.[12]

Government provides the machinery to secure the ends of the state which is to achieve power. Kingship, the law, and administration will be discussed in connection with government.

How did they conceive of the role and function of the king in society? Kautilya conceives of the king as virtuous, well-educated in the "sciences," well-disciplined, as well as being brave. The qualities of a desirable king can be gleaned from the type of training the heir-apparent must undergo. The young prince acquires all these qualities through training.[13] He acquires wisdom from his teachers who are well-versed in the four sciences namely, the Sacred Canon, Philosophy, Economics, and Politics.[14] He takes lessons in the military arts to improve his skill in combat. He controls his senses for his personal discipline. The Legalists would disregard the first qualification as being Confucian. The other qualifications may not be important either. This is because the mechanistic and fixed system of laws the Legalists have conceived would operate regardless of whether the king is possessed of virtue or high intellect.[15]

The Kautilyan king is supposed to be the servant of the people. He looks after the interests of the people, administer justice, and in times of providential calamities "as fire, floods, pestilential diseases, famine, rats, tigers, serpents, and demons" he gives them aid.[16] He makes his peoples' problems his own so that he is like a father looking after the interests of

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[9] R. Shamasastry (trans.), *Kautilya's Arthasastra,* 8th ed., Mysore: Mysore Printing and Publishing House, 1967, pp. 7-8, 293.

[10] Derk Bodde, *China's First Unifier: Li Ssu,* Hongkong: Hongkong University Press, 1967, p. 191.

[11] Watson, *op. cit.,* pp. 6-7.

[12] A. S. Altekar, *State and Government in Ancient India.* 3rd ed., Delhi: Motilal Barnasidas, 1958, p. 160.

[13] Ramasastry, *op. cit.,* pp. 9-12.

[14] Ghosal, *op. cit.,* p. 121.

[15] Fung Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy.* Vol. I, Trans. by Derk Bodde, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952, p. 322.

[16] Ramasastry, *op. cit.,* pp. 236-239.

his own children. The Legalist king would not care for his subjects. He would instead subject his people and keep them in fear of the king through his harsh regulations.[17] The Legalists believe that charity would tantamount to subsidizing laziness and wastefulness which is not tolerated. It would, they say, amount to robbing other people of what they had gained through industry and thrift.[18]

But for all the virtues that Kautilya conceives for the king, the latter is still capable of force, fraud and deceit in the interest of the state. These are, however, levelled against the "anti-social elements of the population and clandestine public enemies and enemies of the state as well as the enemy outside." [19] He is "harsh with his enemies and sinners."[20] In this regard, the king conceived by Kautilya is similar to the king conceived by the Legalists. Force, to the Legalists, is manifested in the fiat of the king and its rigorous implementation. It is the primary instrument by which the king of the Legalist venue is able to subject his people for his own self-interest—the pursuit of power. He keeps his subjects in a lowly position so that they could not be a threat to his position. In both Kautilyan and Legalist thought, the king is possessed of the power of life and death over his subjects. However, in the former this power is limited by "religious and spiritual sanctions, and sanctions of customs and usage."[21] In the latter, the king is an absolute ruler who is not inhibited by moral considerations in his pursuit of absolute power.[22] He is the law unto himself. If anything or any affair runs counter to the laws which the king himself promulgates, the king punishes lawbreakers severely. If they are not covered by law they can not proceed.[23] This discussion on the use of force to manifest power of the kings leads to the discussion of law in both systems of thought.

In the concept of law, they also differ considerably. The Kautilyan conceives of law "to promote individual security, happiness, as well as stability of the social order," the Legalist, to promote order through a mechanistic system of harsh laws. But the order the latter conceived of was a situation in which the king was supreme and his subjects kept in a lowly position and unable to resist him. The subjects just obey the laws and regulations of the king. In Kautilya, the king administers justice according to the four sources of law namely, the Sacred Canon (dharma), evidence (vyavalhara), history (charitra), and edicts of kings (rajasasana).[24] In a way, this limited his power. Punishments were neither too harsh nor too

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[17] Bodde, *op. cit.*, p. 190.
[18] Fung Yu-lan, *op. cit.*, p. 328.
[19] Ghosal, *op. cit.*, p. 154.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 138.
[21] Gokhale, *Ancient India: History and Culture,* 3rd ed. Bombay: Asia Phils. House, 1956, p. 103.
[22] Bodde, *op. cit.*, p. 191.
[23] Fung Yu-lan, *op. cit.*, p. 322.
[24] Ramasastry, *op. cit.*, p. 172-173.

light. They were just proper to keep the people happy.[25] The laws in the Legalist thinking, however, are not designed to give justice. They are harsh. Penalties consist of physical mutilation, and capital punishment.[26] The laws apply equally among all people regardless of status or rank. They affect all spheres of activity. The basic idea being that greater crimes would be prevented if smaller ones are punished severely, and without exception. The Legalists' sinister view of human nature that he is inherently evil led them to implement harsh laws to restrain his inherent nature.

They also differ in their concept of administration. Both agree that a body of ministers and administrators were needed to run the machinery of government. However, they differ in the method of selection as well as the latter's role in the government. Both emphasized technical qualifications for their officials but they ascertained in different ways. In Kautilya, if a person thinks he has the experience in the affairs of state, he seeks the favor of the king through an influential friend.[27] Afterwards, his family background is sought into through his intimates. His dexterity is sought by experts in the field as well as through his associates. His colleagues are sought to determine his sociability, and other amiable qualities.[28] He must pass these several tests, and only then, is he appointed, i.e. if he has the wisdom, ability, loyalty, prestige, character, etc.[29]

The Legalists have a different system of tapping the best man for an office. They are influenced by the Taoistic principle of *wu wei,*[30] and added to this, their system of law based primarily on rewards and punishments. Han Fei Tzu says:

> "An enlightened ruler uses the law to select men for him, he does not choose them himself. He uses the law to weigh their merits; he does not attempt to judge them himself."[31]

By the principle of *wu wei,* the king does not do anything in the administration of the affairs of the state. The ministers does everything for him. They are appointed, however, according to their proposals to the king. After their proposals, an office is made that specifies the duties one is to perform in consonance with the name of the office. This minister must do exactly what his office (name) calls for. The "names" (proposals or names of offices) must correspond exactly with the "actualities" (actual performance or outcome) in order to be rewarded, either by promotion, or by emolu-

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[25] Altekar, *op. cit.,* p. 1.
[26] Watson, *op. cit.,* p. 30.
[27] Ramasastry, *op. cit.,* p. 281.
[28] *Ibid.,* p. 12.
[29] Ghosal, *op. cit.,* p. 122.
[30] *Wu wei,* in the Taoistic sense, means non-action, or non-activity; doing nothing that is not natural.
[31] Watson, *op. cit.,* p. 24.

ments. If the two do not correspond exactly, that is, if a minister (or any other person for that matter) who proposed to do something for the state does less, or more than his office (proposals) required him to do, he is punished severely. Rewards are not based on meritorious work alone. "His acts rather must correspond to the duties demanded of him by the state and which he has promised the state he would do." [32] In this manner, many incompetents are weeded out because of the severe punishments that are imposed if one fails to match the duties he is supposed to do.

In Kautilya's Arthasastra, the minister plays a very important role in the government. Once appointed the group of ministers and administrators aid the king in the formulation of policies. The king consults his ministers on all matters of policy and seeks their advice. This is not mandatory, but he always heeds the advice of his ministers because of the latter's experience. Also, they reflected the popular will.[33]

In the Legalist thinking, the king must not seek the advice of his ministers.[34] The latter are considered as personally interested in the position of the king so that they are regarded with suspicion. The king does not reveal his motives and desires to his ministers because if he does, they will "put on the mask that pleases him." [35] The king gives them titles, posts, or emoluments, but he does not give them the power to bestow rewards and punishments because that would undermine the position of the king. If his ministers possess this power, people would cuddle up to the ministers seeking favors or dispensations. The king's power and influence would diminish thereby.

In the discussion on kingship, law, and administration, the Legalist's king stands out prominently as a consummate despot. His power is never resisted and people are kept in subjection to perpetuate his despotic and absolute rule. He has no sympathy for the feelings and sentiments of his subjects. In Kautilya, the king is despotic only in the sense that he uses fraud, force and deceit against public enemies, etc. He could also be a despot in times of national crises, like financial chaos, but otherwise, he acts impartially and shows concern for his subjects which is lacking in the Legalist's kings. In terms of power, he shares this with his ministers. However, in the latter, the king alone wields the power because if other people shares it, this power might be used to overthrow him.

The Ch'in Empire applied the principles advocated by the Legalists. Partly, the cause of its early death was the tyranny of the government. The absoluteness of the ruler required the people to obey him whatever he ordered them to do. People were overstrained by the construction work of the king,

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[32] Bodde, *op. cit.*, p. 203.
[33] Gokhale, *op. cit.*, p. 104.
[34] H. G. Creel, *Chinese Thought from Confucius to Mao Tse-tung*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1967, p. 155.
[35] Watson. *op. cit.*, p. 16.

which included the building of the Great Walls among other things, as well as the military campaigns outside the state. The people could not resist these big orders. In both instances, people were forced to work on the king's construction projects, or were conscripted into the army.

In Kautilya, the people were to be allowed considerable freedom as long as they were not enemies of the state either from the inside or from the outside. As long as they acquiesce in the rule of the king, then they are always to be treated impartially. The Mauryan Empire lasted for quite some time.

In the two cases above, the amount of human freedom allowed is involved. Is it possible to conjecture that man always seeks freedom, and abhors regimentation?

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ETERNAL DRYAD OF THE INDIAN FOREST

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THIS PAPER IS AN EXPLORATIVE AND SPECULATIVE STUDY OF WOMAN through the eyes of the very early Indian people as they sought to express woman's inexpressible essence by myths and symbols in art and literature by the Hindu-religio-philosophical system, and suffused with that spirit—cosmogonic, mystical and deeply human. We are primarily concerned with what might be referred to as *pre-Vedic* and *post-Vedic* periods [1]—time areas more specifically Dravidian in character and of a primordial ancientness. With the exclusion of other relevant and interesting topics such as fertility cults, the Tantras, polyandry, marriage customs, etc., our discussion will deal with woman as the universal Earth Goddess, woman of the matriarchate, woman as worshipped by the *Shaktas,* and woman's symbols, and woman at the time of male ascendancy and her eventual subjugation. We shall start with the latter.

THE VEDIC PERIOD

The Aryans invaded India through the years 2000 to 1500 B.C. The years immediately following the period of Vedic intrusion show what eventually became an age primarily Vedic in character. The Aryans were a warlike people who imposed upon the population of Dravidians obtaining their language and religio-social system. These herdsman-settlers as represented by the sacrificial hymns of the *RgVed,* were both intellectually and materially advanced. Their language, their religion and their social institutions were of the Indo-European type like those of the ancient Persians of the Avesta and the Greeks of the Homeric poems. They assimilated the more primitive and non-warlike people who in turn assimilated them into that blending that came to be referred to as the Indo-Aryan culture—in some expressions of which the indigenous Dravidian aspect irrepressibly permeated and overwhelmed the new culture.

The Aryans, roving warrior-herdsmen, it can be assumed brought few if any of their own women with them. They probably took wives from among the local population, a factor to be considered in determining what

[1] 'Post-Vedic' generally refers to the preeminent resurgence of the indigenous Dravidian character that often affirms what are considered to be pre-Vedic traits. The Buddhist period followed indeed, however much of the art serving Buddhist ideas remained in a sense untouched by both conservative Brahmanism and renunciative Buddhism. The Hinduic spirit prevailed reconciling all things.

woman's position came to be.[2] Zimmer notes that it was a practice to symbolically inseminate sacramentally the "womb" of the conquered city "by taking possession of its women—hence conquering the principle that embodies the Mother Earth.[3]

The *Vedic period*[4] is basically characterized as a patriarchal society. Writings illustrate that woman's place was strictly confined to the domestic sphere. Sons were preferred over daughters. With male ascendancy was the stratification of society into castes. "Male imperialism" reduced woman eventually into two spheres of subjugation—the courtesan for desire and the dutiful wife and mother.

The Indian Hetaera

The courtesan's primary purpose in life was to render pleasure to men. In the chapters dealing on the courtesan in the *Kama Sutra* of *Vatsyayana,* the writer articulates on the element of "honour" and the relevance of love associated with the profession and, "decides that desire for wealth, freedom from misfortune, and love are the only cause that affects the union of courtesans with men"[5].

> By having intercourse with men, courtesans obtain sexual pleasure, as well as their own maintenance. Now, when a courtesan takes up with a man from love, the action is natural; but when she resorts to him for the purpose of getting money, her action is artificial or forced. Even in this latter case, however, she should conduct herself as if her love were indeed natural, because — men repose their confidence on those women who apparently love them. In making known her love to the man, she should show an entire freedom from avarice, and for the sake of her future credit she should abstain from acquiring money from him by unlawful means....

The courtesan was master of several artistic talents referred to in the *Kama Sutra* as well as in other writings of an earlier date.

> The cultured person and in particular the courtesan of Sanskrit literature... was expected to be educated in *64 Kalas* (arts and sciences), a term often equated with *silpa* "art" or *vidya* "science". Though this number may vary in older Jain and Buddhist texts, a standard list of sixty-four is given by Vatsyayana in the Kama Sutra and a slightly different one in the Policy of *Shukra.* These arts include dancing, singing, acting, flower-arranging, legerdemain, distillation of spiritous liquors, sewing and embroidery work, first aid, metallurgy, cooking, chemistry, posture, duelling, gymnastics, horology, dyeing, architecture and engineering, minerology, calligraphy, swimming, leatherwork, archery, driv-

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[2] Not so related, but interesting to take note of is Simone de Beauvoir's comment (*The Second Sex*): "The worse curse that was laid upon woman was that she should be excluded from the warlike forays. For it is not in giving life but in risking life that man is raised above the animal; that is why superiority has been accorded in humanity not to the sex that brings forth but to that that kills."

[3] Heinrich Zimmer, *Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization,* Pantheon Books, NY, 1946, pp. 177-178.

[4] This period covers the years from 1500 to 500 B.C.

[5] Vatsyayana, *Kama Sutra* (translation: Sir Richard F. Burton), EP Dulton & Co., Inc., NY, 1962, pp. 205-208.

ing horses and elephants, composition and solution of riddles and other puzzles, nursing and rearing of children, and the like[6].

In the early city which was the real center of the second oldest profession (the oldest being that of medicine man), it is the function of the prostitute to care for strangers.

> There is very little need for her under village conditions where the sexes are usually fairly well-balanced in number and adults usually marry. In the ancient city, on the other hand, there was a heavy surplus of males since man could leave their villages much more readily than woman. Everywhere in the Near East the temple prostitute was a regular part of the temple establishment. The city god, like any other male notable was provided with a large complement of women, but since he proved an inactive and unjealous spouse, these women found substitutes for him elsewhere and contributed their earnings to the temple upkeep. A society which was only emerging from village patterns also required sometime in developing adequate techniques for housing and feeding city transients, and this gave an opportunity for prostitution of a different type. The secular prostitute was frequently an innkeeper or had a small apartment in which she received successive travellers and provided them for a few days with a "home away from home".[7]

Linton's description of the ancient city could probably apply to the early cities of Harapa, Mohenjodaro . . . in ancient Mohenjodaro, for example, Kosambi suggests that the pre-Aryan great bath is a ceremonial *puskara*.[8]

> This ancient building situated apart from the city on the citadel—Zikkurat mound, could not have been utilitarian seeing that so much labor had to be expended to fill the tank with water. There is no imagery or decoration of any sort, but the tank is surrounded by what may have been used by living representatives, companions or servants of the goddess, the *apsaras* of the day: The water need not rave been so laboriously drawn, unless for water deities to whom it was essential.[9]

Apsaras were depicted in Sanskrit writing as heavenly courtesans. *Ap* denotes water and suggests that these dancing girls came from a watery origin.

The earthly and human counterpart of the *apsaras* was the prostitute. There were many types of prostitutes over a wide range of levels. Also opinions expressed in reference to her, the manners in which she is depicted show great disagreement and controversy. She was important, highly valued and respected as well as despised, considered as an object for use and abuse, a degraded outcast in that society where even dancing was deprecated.

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[6] Theodore de Bary, ed., *Sources of Indian Tradition,* Columbia University Press, NY, 1958, p. 259.

[7] Ralph Linton, *The Tree of Culture,* Knopf, NY, 1955, pp. 124-125.

[8] Meanings associated with the term *puskara* are lake, lotus, dancing. According to Kosambi ". . . the root *pus* from which it is derived, like the very close *puskala*, denoting fertility, nourishment, plenty."

[9] D. D. Kosambi, *Myth and Reality (studies in the formation of Indian culture),* Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1962, p. 72.

The hetaera of high accomplishment who had great influence was called the *Ganika.*

> As she had a seat in the general assembly, 'Gana', she was known as *Ganika,* and was the pride, beauty and prosperity of the city, i.e., 'Nagarasri', being well-versed in the sixty-four arts. Later on this office was also introduced in the monarchies, for Kautilya states that the superintendent of the prostitutes was to appoint a Ganika born or not born of a prostitute family but noted for her beauty and accomplishments. According to Vatsyayana and Bharata, she was to be the most accomplised of the prostitutes. Thus her office arose not from need of lascivious love but from the desire for the satisfaction of the artistic propensities of the people.[10]

In the writings on social conduct and customs of this period (e.g., *Dharmasastras*) there is little direct reference to the prostitute. It would seem by chance that she is referred to in passing as a self-evident phenomenon sometimes viewed with contradiction and mixed-feelings. On the other hand, much has been said about the devoted wife and mother—the extreme example of which we find in—

The Pativrata

Woman's supreme justification for living was the procreation of sons and worshipful serving of her husband. Uncompounded, *pati* means husband, and its associated meanings are—master, owner, lord, ruler, sovereign, etc. The noun *Vrata* (not vrata) means loyalty, and fidelity; the word also means devotee. "According to the redactors of the Mahabharata as well as the idealist tone of the Rama, the husband was not only a friend but an ideal, principle, perceptor and the very God of the wife. She was to worship him with single-minded devotion. Her position was later on not that of a friend but that of a devotee". Also her affection for him was of the nature of a mother's affection for her child, unconditional and totally selfless.[11]

Previously, in the earlier writing of the Epics woman is depicted more as a *Sadharmini,* i.e., wives who were friends and guides of their husbands; later, she degenerated into *pativrata,* without personality and character, and, upon whom inhumanly high moral standards were imposed.

In this patrilineal-patriarchal society with its strict set of morals, the reasons which led to woman's degeneration are not hard to find. Firstly, she lost her religious status as eventually the priest took over in offering the oblations and certain ceremonies which she was formerly in charge of. "This deterioration went so far as to result in woman being classed with dice and wine as one of the three chief evils (Maitrayani Samhita III. 6.3)".[12] Secondly, she was given to marriage early at the time of puberty or before,

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[10] Shakambari Jayal, *The Status of Women in the Epics,* Delhi, Motilal Bonarsidass, 1966, pp. 215-216.

[11] *Ibid.,* p. 102.

[12] R. C. Majumdar, ed., *The Vedic Age,* London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1957, p. 454.

thereby eliminating the possibility of intellectual development as she was immovably anchored to child-bearing and domestic matters. Her education was abandoned and she was consequently maintained ignorant. Woman's degeneration was unconsciously assured her by the increasing over-domination of the male. She was recognized weak and to be protected. "The father protects her in adolescence, the husband in youth, and the son in old age; a woman does not deserve absolute independence." [13]

> The sacrifice of her own interests and even personality, for her husband and his family, was by no means an easy task. Therefore she was to be trained for it from the very childhood . . . in fact the composers of the Epics seize every opportunity to describe the duties of woman, perhaps thinking that as women were frail and fickle-minded, they must be reminded of their duties constantly.[14]

In the *Mahabharata, Uma* articulates on woman in response to Shivas query,

> She should be beautiful and gentle, considering her husband as her god and serving him as such in fortune and misfortune, health and sickness, obedient even if commanded to unrighteous deeds or acts that may lead to her own destruction. She should rise early, serving the gods, always keeping her house clean, tending to the domestic sacred fire, eating only after the needs of gods and guests and servants have been satisfied, devoted to her father and mother and the father and mother of her husband. Devotion to her lord is woman's honour, it is her eternal heaven . . . .[15]

The husband was the object of her devotion and worship; her love for him must outweigh even that for child. Her 'goal' in life was marriage which was compulsory; her success as wife was based largely on her capacity to bear sons which was ultimately the aim of marriage.

> The relative position of the two sexes is reflected in the keen desire for male progeny. This may be regarded as natural in a patriarchal society where relationship was recognized through the father. But this natural predilection exceeds all bounds of propriety or morality when we read in Aitareya Brahmana (VII.5) that a daughter is a source of misery and sons alone can be the savior of the family. The *Atharvaveda* (VI.II.3) also deplores the birth of daughter.[16]

The functional position of woman is outlined by *Manu,* and in the *Ramayana,* we find that Indian feminine example in *Sita,* symbol of undying fidelity, even after Rama has rejected her. Her endeavor is great in proving her fidelity over many hardships and trials in the jungle in meritorious practice of austerities and meditation.

The patriarchal situation at this time also ejected certain curious attitudes expressive of the ascendant male who in his vanity was nevertheless awed by the phenomenon of woman. Here is a humorous account from the *Mahabharata*—

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[13] *Op. cit.,* Kosambi, p. 444.
[14] *Op. cit.,* Jayal, p. 103.
[15] P. Thomas, *Kama alpa,* DB Taraporevata, Bombay, 1960, p. 101.
[16] *Loc. cit.,* Majumdar, p. 455.

> Originally there were no women in the world and men were reproduced by themselves alone. These sons of men were exceptionally pure and all went to heaven; they crowded heaven to such an extent that the gods found themselves hard-pressed for room. They then addressed their complaint to the Maker to find a way out, and Brahman then created women who very soon diverted the flow of souls from earth to a region far removed from heaven.[17]

The power of woman is considered to be of a worldly nature. Occult powers and intellectual strivings are not for her although there are some instances, scant in comparison indeed, that would prove otherwise. There is one method by which a woman can attain occult powers denied even to man. This is by her *Patrivrityam* i.e., absolute devotion to her husband." [18] Patrivrityam, as we have seen is a patriarchal concoction.

A few sources attest to woman's sexual potency over the male; she is considered to be uncontrollable in her passion. *Kalyamalla,* who wrote *Ananga Ranga* (The Hindu Art of Love), quantified woman's prowess when he said, "a woman eats twice as much as a man, she is four times as much clever, her determination is six times as strong, and her sexual desire eight times as strong as a man's."

Pachasuda, a celestial dancer in the Mahabharata answered a question raised by the sage *Narada*—

> Of truth, there is nothing worse than woman in the three worlds. Women are the root of all evils . . . they are ready to forsake their rich and worthy husband and bestow their favours on others as soon as they get an opportunity. We women know no moral bars and are ready to throw ourselves into the arms of evil men. Women are not swayed by considerations of beauty, youth or character. Any man is good enough for any woman when women do not get any man, they even fall on one another the fire has never too many faggots, the ocean never too many rivers, the all-devouring time never too many beings and beautiful women never too many men. Death, the storm, fire, poison, serpents, the sharpness of the sword, and hell itself—women are all these in one.[19]

Apart from these curious attitudes regarding the subjugated woman, we swing back to long before the Aryan intrusion and the early cities of the Indus Valley civilization. What unseen power was held by the indigenous people of India? From what origins emerged the devotees of the Shakti cults? What esoteric quality enabled the spirit of these very ancient people of Nature to influence profoundly the dominating Vedic imposition?

Primeval times are dark days of man's innocence, permeated with a sense of fear and mystery. Findings in archeology and anthropology shed a dim light, providing clues (as do myths and symbols that live in the culture of India) upon which to speculate.

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[17] *Op. cit.,* Thomas, p. 51.
[18] *Ibid.,* p. 59.
[19] *Idem.*

THE MATRIARCHATE

There is a tremendous amount of evidence to affix as fact that a matriarchate obtained as the earliest Indian form of social organization. Matriarchy, which often though not always featured the rule of mothers, has been considered as a stage of primordial origin that preceded what eventually evolved into the patriarchal system. Throughout early Indian history, an extraordinary amount of material points to woman as playing a predominant role in society. The universality of the notion of Mother Goddess is encountered throughout the primitive world. A whole religious system sprung up from remote and early origins worshipping the goddess rather than the god (e.g., the *Shaktas*). There are several segments of Indian society, especially in the southern parts, greatly non-Aryan, wherein matriarchal forms obtain to the present. The *Toda* tribes, the *Kashi* of *Assam* and the *Nairs* from the south are living examples.

Briffault links this most primitive of social organizations with biological evidence in the animal kingdom and among the higher anthropoids. He says that "In no instance is the father, the provider and protector of the group. In the great majority of instances among mammals, if not indeed in all, the father is not an essential member of the group. As often as not he may be absent from it. The animal family-group consists of the mother and her offspring, and centers round the former." [20]

The patriarchal social order as its own foremost institution marriage with the concommittant sacredness affixed to it. The "family" became the basic unit of society with the insured permanence of the union of husband and wife. This new order of human association upset and overtook that of primitive clan and tribe centering solely around the mother.

> Its formation by the removal of woman from the group to which she belonged, to that of her husband is found to stand in direct conflict with the primal social rules of humanity in its simpler stages. The establishment of the patriarchal family marks everywhere the breaking up and decay of primitive clan and tribal organization. The social group which the sexual patriarchal group was everywhere antagonized and has eventually destroyed is the biological group formed by the mother and her offspring, a group economically self-contained through the cooperation of clan brothers and clan sisters, and one of which the sexual partner is not a member. The forces which make for the association of sexual mates are in uncultured humanity subordinate to those deeper biological ties.[21]

A classic example of the matriarch would be the *Khasi* woman of *Assam*. She was the nucleus from which was drawn the line of inheritance and descent—

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[20] Robert Briffault, *The Mothers* (*matriarchal theory of social origins*), MacMillan, NY, 1959, pp. 156-157.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 45.
Briffault also here quotes an Arab saying — "Love of a clan is greater than love between husband and wife."

> The father has no function in such a group beyond that of impregnating the female . . . that relation of paternity. It involves neither continued cohabitation, nor association, nor permanent duties toward mother and offspring . . . The group does not consist of a family formed around the authority or economic supremacy of the father, but consists of various generations of women associated with their brothers and uncles, and the kinship relations of the maternal clan are matrilinear. The economic privilege upon which the patriarchal family is founded does not exist. Economic production, fundable wealth and communal property are in the hands of the women and are transmitted through them.[22]

Other sources describe the man-woman relations in the matriarchy as "promiscuous". We note that indeed *polyandry* was virtually a conventional and concomitant practice in matriarchates. There is reference to man's ignorance of paternity—

> Our primitive ancestors were not aware that sex activities are responsible for pregnancy in women. Men and women mated solely for pleasure and had not the slightest idea that mating was responsible for the reproduction of the species.[23]

The notions of "family", our notions of love enshrined in the patriarchal institution of marriage was virtually absent in the primitive society we are here speaking of. Briffault explains,

> Maternal affection is an older, more primitive, and more fundamental form of sentiment than affection between the sexes.[24]

And,

> There is no connection in primitive social relations between marriage and propagation than between marriage and sexual relations. The children which a woman bears are not members of a social group to which the father belongs, but of that to which the mother belongs; they do not grow in a separate family, but constitute the increase of her clans. Marriage is no more grounded in that multiplication of the plan than in a patriarchal family which is not formed thereby . . . Neither is their sexual organization founded upon marriage, nor is their social organization founded on the family.[25]

Unrestricted by notions of marriage and patriarchal morals, the matriarchate was also the system that best ensured the survival of the group. Progeny was a real need. "In primeval times old age scarcely existed. The average span of life in the Aurignarian—Perigardian and Magdalenian eras was about twenty years, as Mr. Vallois, of the Mussee de L'Homme (Paris), has deduced from skeletons found in burial places.[26]

Women and Nature were indistinguishable—they held the mystery of life essential to survival. Woman held in her very nature the promise of life as the trees that bore fruit. She was as Nature—life-producing, woman was the Earth.

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[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 311-312.
[23] *Op. cit.*, P. Thomas, p. 1.
[24] *Op. cit.*, Briffault, p. 45-46.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 227.
[26] Siegfrid Giedion, *The Eternal Present* (*A Contribution of Constancy & Change*), Bollingen Foundation, Pantheon Book, NY, 1962, p. 173.

THE EARTH GODDESS

Unearthed in abundant quantities by archeologists have been female terracotta figurines. Scholars are widely agreed that these are representations of the Great Mother Goddess used as object of cult.

The most common type of figurine is rather elaborately dressed. She sports a girdle wound around her, quantities of jewelry, big round earrings and an ornate headdress. Unlike the female figurines, the male ones that were found were entirely nude and in sitting position. Sometimes, statuettes that appear pregnant and with sex characteristics exaggerated have been found together with children and animal figurines.

Giedion notes that while figurines of the Earth Goddess are plentiful, the "phallus on the other hand, appears rarely, as do any male figurines".

Sculptures at *Amaravati, Sanchi* and others of ancient India bear similarities with the early statuettes. The sexual triangle is enlarged, as are the breasts and hips. Sometimes, (as in the case of the *yoni*) the female principle is emphasized, abstracted or isolated. The basic thinking behind this was that this one vital part represented the whole. The *yoni* then was the symbol of the essence of woman, symbol of the essence of life, and like "so many primeval symbols, it centers upon the desire for fertility, for the procreation and increase of the species: human and animal."[27]

Radhakrishnan sums up the religion of the Indus people as having, "consisted in worshipping the Mother Goddess, the deification of trees and spirits, certain animal chimeras and therianthropic figures, the prototype of Siva, the aniconic phallic symbols, the swastika, etc." [28]

The Mother Goddess figures unearthed in the early cities of India are not unfamiliar figures, for other versions of it have been found in other parts of the world concentrated in what are considered to be centers of cult. These figures are effect cult objects and idols of a rather universal ancestral mother.

> In the form of this ancestral mother the hunter reverenced the primeval power of procreation and increase from which the tribe and family came into being; he reverenced the guardian of sexual life through which the tribe and family continued to exist; he experienced the protective spirit of the hearth; and last but not least the helpful powers which guided his hunting.[29]

With the evolution and rise of Hinduism, we find increasingly sprouting throughout India, cults akin to the Shaktas and to the Saivietes. This phase is indicative of the rise of that primeval spirit and profound belief in the regenerative forces of life; for which reason, the female principle became a symbol to be worshipped as—

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[27] *Ibid.,* p. 453.

[28] Radhakrishnan, *The Cultural Heritage of India,* the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of culture, Calcutta, 1958, p. 124.

[29] *Loc. cit.,* Giedion, p. 173.

THE SAKTI

Sakti is conceived as energy. The Saktas consider Godhead to be essentially feminine. Woman is the life-force suffusing matter and beings to activity; so that even "the Sakti of a god is essentially the god himself and apart from her the god has no existence." Brahman and all the other gods are emanated from her. She is regarded as the "Supreme Mother who evolves the universe and destroys it, or rather dissolves it into herself—to create it again." Sakti as female energy is the mother of the world, the essence of reality and the secret of the cosmos.[30]

Sakti, the cult of the yoni, is found in minority cults throughout India, but its strongholds are mainly in Assam and Bengal. The following legend is said to be found in the Tantrics; it tells of the origin of this cult.

> The story goes that Shiva after killing Daksha took the charred body of Sati in his arms and started wailing over it. He fell into a paroxysm of grief and gone mad with emotion, started dancing with the body of Sati still in his hands. Such was the terrible rhythm of the dance that all fourteen worlds trembled and all the creatures in them were about to perish. In this predicament the terror-stricken gods supplicated Vishnu, the preserver, to devise some means to save the universe from impending doom. Vishnu finding no other method of stopping Shiva's dance took the flaming discus and cut the body of Sati into fifty-one pieces, which falling from Shiva's hands, the God regained his senses and stopped dancing. The fifty-one pieces of Sati's body are believed to have fallen in different parts of the country, and a shrine to have sprung up over each piece. The yoni is said to have fallen in Assam at the site where the Kamkhaya temple stands at present, and Saktiism is believed to have spread mainly from this place.[31]

In this cult, woman is depicted in the following aspects: as a tender and devoted wife, as World Mother, Great Earth Goddess stressing her maternal nature, as a symbol of sexual desire and joy; and Sakti in her terror aspect as Kali, Durga, Bhavani, blood, death and destruction. Many symbols in the form of objects are anthropomorphic representations that embody the feminine essence.

SYMBOLS RELATED TO WOMAN

Literally, *yoni* means 'holder' and properly pertains to the 'vulva'. It means also nest, origin and womb; it is the matrix of generation and symbol of sex pleasure. Shell and ring-stones (*pindika*) have been found in the vicinity of the Indus Valley as common objects of the feminine principle. Often the yoni is found as a flat base, round or square, upon which the upright *lingam* stands—symbols of the regenerative forces of creation which union "gives a direct representation of the creation of the world. Uncompromising in their grandeur they symbolize Genesis itself."[32]

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[30] Raj Mulk Anand, *The Hindu View of Art,* Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1957, p. 49 ff.

[31] *Op. cit.,* Thomas, p. 125.

[32] Max Pol-Fouchet, *The Erotic Sculpture of India,* Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, p. 9.

This union of opposites symbolizes the "first bifurcation of the primal, cosmogonic, realty, now reunited in productive harmony. Under the form of Father Heaven and Mother Earth they were known to the Greeks as Zeus and Hera, Uranos and Gaia, to the Chinese as T'ien and Ti, Yang and Yin." [33]

As they are opposites they also are basically reconciled as *one.*

> The God and Goddess are the first self-revelation of the absolute, the male being the personification of the passive aspect which we know as Eternity, the female of the activating energy (Sakti), the dynamism of Time. Though apparently opposites, they are in essence one . . . The Goddess is the yoni, mother womb of the ever cycling eons, of all the universe endlessly extending in space, of every atom in the living cell.[34]

Mithuna (the sexual union) and the common representation of lovers are symbolic of the selfless union with the Absolute. Mithuna "can be represented by copulation without loss of its esoteric meaning. To some copulation signifies the union of substance (prakriti) and essence (purusha); for others it represents more directly the moment when the self (atman) becomes merged through release with the supreme impersonal Spirit.[35]

We see the expression of these symbols also in the architecture of India. The inner-most sanctum of a Hindu temple is called the *garbha-ghriha* or womb-chamber. It is commonly dark with little or no light at all filtering into it. In the midst of this dome-like structure is the lingam-yoni as central force carved out of living rock.

Other symbols related to woman are the lotus, the moon, her symbolic aspects of Kati and Durga, the cow, the water, etc.

The lotus is widely to be found in all Indian iconography and is as basically related to the pre-Aryan cults as the sacred fire is to the Vedic Aryans. We know that the worship of the mother-goddess was a pre-Aryan practice. The lotus symbolized the Absolute as the generator and sustainer of life. It was "originally the exclusive sign and 'vehicle' of Padma—mother, or yoni, of the universe—it is symbolic of the procreative power (Sakti) of the immortal, adamantine, eternal substance." [36]

The *nagas*—anthropomorphic representation of snakes as the keepers of life-energy stored in the bottom of springs and rivers. They are carved in stone tablets or slabs as votive offerings of women seeking extra fertility. These slabs are usually placed under water for a period of time "to become imbued with the watery element."[37]

Water is a feminine symbol, as are dew and moisture. "According to Hindu conception, the waters are female; they are the maternal procreative

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[33] *Op. cit.,* Zimmer, p. 127.
[34] *Ibid.,* p. 139-140.
[35] *Loc. cit.,* Pol-Fouchet.
[36] *Op. cit.,* Zimmer, p. 128.
[37] *Idem.*

aspect of the Absolute, and the cosmic lotus is their generative organ."[38] *Sarasvati* is the great river goddess who "originally represented the Indus (Sindhu), in the valley which developed the great civilization—along with its tributaries, was the secret of the riches and prosperity, which was responsible for the progress of that civilization. Hence, it is no wonder that the people benefited by it, raised it to a divine pedestal and worshipped it as the great goddess." [39]

Closely related to water is the moon which regulates its tide. The moon is the abode and source of life. The moon controls the waters (tides) that circulate through the universe. The moon maintains and restores, as lord of plants, the moisture to them which is taken from them by the sun. Hence also, the important role attributed to woman in the processes connected with rainfall.[40]

Reference is made to the moon as the cup that contains the drink of immortality—*amrta* (nectar).

These symbols are taken from nature and are related to the generative aspects of Kati and Durga, the cow, the water, etc.
in the figure of *Kali*—bloodshed, pestilence, terror and death. She is hideous and requires human sacrifices or propitiation with the blood of goats. Kali is death—for "the energy of life is finally no less destructive than creative—Life feeds on life. The aging and dying generation is to be replaced by the younger—what the goddess bestows benignantly upon the one, she has ruthlessly taken from the others—Time, the all producing, all-annihilating principle, in the outflow of which everything that comes into existence again vanishes after the expiration of the brief spell of its alloted life—the creative and the destructive principle are one and the same. Both are at unison in the divine cosmic energy that becomes manifest in the process of biography and history of the universe."[41]

Concluding Comment

We note that in the vastness of Indian culture—its intricacy and wealth —without solid overview, or more precisely an integrated conception, of its developments and foundations, one is bound to stagger blissfully about as we have done. In the absence of audacious speculation we have relied on some secondary sources here and there. Our attempt has been solely to obtain a glimpse of woman—in the eternal dryad of the Indian forest.

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[38] *Idem.*

[39] Prakash, Buddha, *The RgVeda and the Indus Valley Civilization,* Vishveshvaranand Inst., Hosiarpur, 1966, pp. 47-48.

[40] J. Gonda, *Change and Continuity in Indian Religion,* Mouton, London, 1965.

[41] *Op. cit.,* Zimmer, p. 212.

SOME REFLECTIONS ABOUT THE COFRADIA DE SAN JOSE AS A PHILIPPINE RELIGIOUS UPRISING

DAVID C. LEE

IN HIS ARTICLE ENTITLED "POLITICAL CONFLICT POTENTIAL, POLITICIZATION, and the Peasantry in the Underdeveloped Countries," [1] Donald Hindley has offered some thoughts concerning the politicization process, several of which may be applied to instances of peasant unrest in the history of the Philippines.[2] He begins with the premise that the common political characteristics shared by all peasant groups is an exclusion from political power; and, that "political conflict potential" is likewise present in all peasant societies, growing both within the group, and between the group and other sectors of the larger society. "The level or degree of conflict potential is a product of the interplay between tension producers and tension reducers to be found in the geographical, socio-cultural, and political characteristics of peasant society." [3] The history of the Spanish colonization in the Philippines is dotted with the physical manifestations—revolts, massacres, insurrections, and assassinations—which represent the actualization of this "conflict potential". Hindley's model may thus represent a basic formula applicable to the study of this aspect of Philippine history. However, it is the intention of this paper to discuss a rather more specific realm of "conflict actualization" in the Philippines, and that is the phenomenon of so-called "religious uprisings," and the contributing factors thereof, i.e., "tension producers" and "tension reducers". Furthermore, since the potential scope of such a discussion would carry far beyond the limits of the present discourse, I will contain my comments to pre-1850 Philippine history, briefly sketching some "joys and sorrows" in the Spanish-colonial marriage of church and state, super-impose the example of the Cofradia de San Jose

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[1] Donald Hindley, "Political Conflict Potential, Politicization, and the Peasantry in the Underdeveloped Countries," *Asian Studies,* Vol. III, No. 3 (December, 1965), pp. 470-489.

[2] The writer recognizes that there are serious limitations inherent to incorporating Hindley's terminology outside, or separate from, the actual context of his arguments. Nonetheless, because the actual terms are rather succinct, and because I have attempted to consistently use the same terms at various points in the narrative, the reader should be afforded a reasonable understanding of the terms without having to read Hindley's article in preparation. Furthermore, the arguments I have attempted to present should not be invalidated on the basis of a weakness in Hindley's terms, but rather in this writer's juxtapositioning of them inappropriately within the scope of this paper. The reader who finds the terms awkward or confusing should refer to Hindley's article for additional explanation.

[3] Hindley, *op. cit.,* p 472.

upon a glimpse into Philippine "religious uprisings," and finally attempt to suggest some valid generalizations and implications of the Cofradia de San Jose in the context of Hindley's useful terminologies.

The Spanish colonial enterprise in the Philippines was, not surprisingly, a venture having several goals. On behalf of the church, the effort was to Christianize the "heathen" Indios, and there seems some doubt that the terms "Christianize" and "civilize" were differentiated in the eyes of the colonizers. Economic exploitation served as the more mundane aspect of colonization, for not only did Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines mean a source of new products and raw materials for the Spanish economy, but the strategic position of this Pacific colony was of critical importance in the development of the lucrative galleon trade. Furthermore, with the growing competition for Asian resources and markets, the opportunity provided by control of the islands for military advantage was certainly a contributing factor in justifying the project—however unsuccessful this particular aspect might have been. Finally, an important self-interest of the Regular clergy, in the name of the Roman Church, was the potential for converts awaiting on the China mainland, and the Philippines served as the theoretical stepping-off place—though again, this objective was never to truly "flower".

It has been pointed out that "a striking feature of Spanish Imperialism was the inseparable union of the church and state. Although both retained a vigorous amount of autonomy, the two institutions were inextricably interdependent. Spanish imperialism was not only theocratic; it was also profoundly bureaucratic." [4] Indeed, it is naive if not illegitimate to comprehend the effect of Spanish culture on the Philippine society without first recognizing the theocratic elements which pervaded Spanish imperialism. The Spanish colonial machine could ill-afford to be powered by a significant military outlay; but the church was ready and willing to extend its services beyond "the saving of souls" and could well draw upon its experiences both in Spain and in the Spanish colonies of America. The friars were motivated by a deeper commitment than short-tenured government officials and military personnel, and were, consequently, those who stayed longest in the colony, learned the language of the Indios, and often took up residence in the remote areas far removed from the bureaucratic headquarters of Manila or Cebu.

> Since the Spanish religious were, in the great majority of "doctrinas", the only colonial officials who were willing to take up permanent residence with the natives, it was thought necessary for the good government of the colony to keep them there. And, as a matter of fact, the mere presence of these zealous missionaries and thoroughly loyal subjects in regions far from the capital dis-

[4] John Leddy Phelan, *The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses,* 1565-1700 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959), p. 6.

pensed with the expense and effort, which might otherwise have been necessary, of maintaining large armed forces for the purpose of policing the colony.[5]

There were four institutions—among a many and varied assortment—that are pertinent to a discussion of the question of church and state cooperation in the Philippines and, the later question of the actualization of the "conflict potential" as evidenced in the example of the Cofradia de San Jose.

The "Patronato Real" was the agreement "by which the Roman Pontiff (by the bull 'Universalis ecclesiae'), granted to Ferdinand and his successors on the throne of Spain the exclusive right: (1) to erect or to permit the erection of all churches in the Spanish colonies; and (2) to present suitable candidates for colonial bishoprics, abbacies, canonries, and other ecclesiastical benefices."[6] Thus, with a mandate from both Pontiff and king, the Spanish friar was not long in becoming the embodiment of Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines, as he had previously done in the American colonies. On all levels of civil administration the clergy occupied positions of power and were seldom out-maneuvered by the government officials who recognized "how indispensable the regular clergy had become not only to the religious life but even to the administration of the colony."[7] And while the Spanish missionary received his stipend from the encomendero (in later times the provincial administrator), the Spanish authorities were seldom successful in using this theoretical position of power against the parish priest that frequently represented the most viable, if not only, provincial representative of Spanish authority.

In return for services rendered by a Spaniard who contributed to the " 'pacification' and settlement of a 'heathen' country"[8] the king of Spain granted an area of jurisdiction called an "Encomienda". This public office holder or "encomendero", had a two-fold job description. First, he was empowered to execute the functions of tax-collection and military protection of those within his jurisdiction. Second, he was supposedly responsible for the religious education of the natives under his authority, in preparation for the anticipated conversion process which was undertaken by the parish priest—if and when such a visitation could be arranged. While the function of tax-collecting was generally more successful than the disbursement of religious-education diplomas, this system nevertheless placed the clergy in direct relationship with the secular officials of the government.

Recognizing the physical obstacles of a widely-scattered Filipino population, and the traditional agrarian pattern of subsistence farming with consequent lack of trading centers, the Spaniards instituted a further measure

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[5] Horacio de la Costa, S.J., "Development of the Native Clergy," *Studies in Philippine Church History,* ed. Gerald H. Anderson (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), p. 73.

[6] *Ibid.,* p. 69.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 55.

[8] Teodoro A. Agoncillo, and Milagros C. Guerrero, *History of the Filipino People* (Quezon City: Malaya Books, 1970), p. 85.

of consolidation which had been found useful in earlier Latin American colonial experience. This method consisted of "congregating" or "reducing" the natives into towns or villages, often enticing Indios who might be reluctant to break their traditional ties with the secluded life by the use of fiestas and ceremonies that were invitingly rich in exotic content. "The ceremonials, processions, liturgical music, theatrical presentations, dances and, above all, the fiestas which the friars introduced, related very well to the traditional Filipino fondness for pageantry, drama, music, color, and ritual feasting."[9] Most Indios continued to resist this colonization method for several reasons. The native was geared to a subsistence economy as preferable to the Spanish demands for "surplus". Tradition demanded that most farmers stay close to the land in order to hunt and fish in supplement to the production of crops. Furthermore, there was a strong sentimental attachment that accompanied the land and homes of the peasant. In spite of this resistance, the friars persisted and eventually there grew up many small communities which served as centers for worship and commerce which led to the increased economic and spiritual exploitative power placed in the hands of the all-too-willing parish priest.

Where this method of "reduction" was not found successful, another institution, the cofraternity or sodality, was introduced. A medieval Spanish phenomenon which had undergone some development and modification in the Indian parishes of Spanish-colonial America, these voluntary associations of laymen and laywomen were intended to provide opportunities for acts of piety and performance of charity. While the original conception of the cofraternity had provided for a wide range of mutual-aid benefits for its membership, in the Philippines the associations were expected to offer "a certain amount of religious idealism and devotional life. . . in the absence of priests and sacramental celebrations."[10] The Jesuits seemed particularly successful in using

> their sodalities as instruments to consolidate Christianization. The members performed two acts of charity. The first was to visit the sick and the dying to urge them to receive the sacraments and to persuade the infidels to request baptism. The purpose of these visits was to discourage the ill from appealing to clandestine pagan priests for consolation. The other act of charity was for members to attend funerals. The presence of sodality members, it was hoped, might discourage ritual drinking, a custom which the clergy was anxious to suppress.[11]

A weakness of this system emerged in the more isolated places where the tendency for the "unshepherded folk" was to increasingly introduce traditional folk religious beliefs into the outward vestings of the Catholic ritual practiced in conjunction with the cofraternity.[12]

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[9] Peter G. Gowing, *Island Under the Cross* (Manila: National Council of Churches in the Philippines, 1967), p. 54.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 54-55.

[11] Phelan, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

[12] Gowing, *loc. cit.*

It must be emphasized that while these institutions were intended to circumvent or modify the traditional social institutions to the end that the "conflict potential" would be controlled if not totally erased through the "civilization" process, the ultimate effect of the methodology was quite different. Teodoro Agoncillo has commented that

> the weakening of native political authority and the subsequent assimilation of many native ruling chieftains into the colonial bureaucracy left the natives with little or no real leadership . . . The incorporation into Christianity of certain debilitating aspects of pre-colonial superstitions and the manipulation of the new religion by a strong friar class to assure the entrenchment of Spanish power in the Philippines discouraged or inhibited resistance to Spanish rule and fostered docility and resignation to the social order established by the conquerors.[13]

While instances of open opposition to the oppressed condition of the peasants (the "actualization" of the "political conflict potential" in Hindley's model), were frequent and widely experienced, each outbreak was normally suppressed with blind vengeance.

> In certain instances the brutality with which these uprisings were quelled benumbed the natives into passiveness and sullen apathy. Thus in every century of the 'ancient regime' until the Philippine Revolution of 1896, Spanish colonial policy produced a chronic state of alternating lethargy and rebelliousness among the people.[14]

Since the friar usually represented the dual identity of sacred and secular authority, his mere presence symbolized for the peasant the root cause of the latter's oppressed social condition, and thus the parish priest was often the target of the peasants frustrated wrath. An obvious contributing factor—and an overt manifestation of the friar's racial and cultural prejudice, coupled with his fear of losing a dominant position in the colonial milieu—was the evident lack of a native clergy that might have been capable of better interpreting the Catholic faith in terms relevant to the Filipino culture. While it was the recorded policy of the officials in Spain that a native clergy be developed, the regulars in the colony were considerably more resistant.[15] In addition to the occupation by a large percentage of friars in direct administration of government agencies and positions, the church cooperated with the state by: (1) providing advice and collaboration in matters regarding civil administration of justice and political missons, and (2) instituting social service institutions such as hospitals, colleges, and orphanages.[16] Yet, the colonial administrtion's policy was consistently one of perpetuating the regular's position in the parish rather than allowing either the "seculars" or

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[13] Agoncillo, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] For the purposes of this paper, a discussion of the development of "native clergy" would be inappropriate; see H. de la Costa, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-104, or, Phelan, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

[16] H. de la Costa, "Episcopal Jurisdiction in the Philippines During the Spanish Regime," *op. cit.*, p. 46.

native clergy access to those responsibilities which would have meant the loss of the government's natural ally. This policy was aptly stated by Governor Sarrio in a memorandum to the King of Spain in 1787, when he wrote:

> a second consideration which has decided me not to remove the religious from the 'doctrinas' is that, even if the 'indios' and the Chinese 'mestizos' possessed all the necessary qualifications (for administering them), it would never conduce to the advantage of the state and the royal service of Your Majesty to hand over to them all the parishes. The experience of more than two centuries has shown that all the wars, rebellions, and uprisings that have broken out, the religious priests were the ones who contributed most to the pacification of the malcontents.[17]

It would be an exercise in over-simplification to suggest that any of the myriad of violent uprisings during the Spanish colonization process were "purely" conditioned by "religious" considerations. The infinite complexity of forces which operated in forming the context out of which each uprising occurred included socio-economic, political, personal, and ecclesiastical grievances. While the clergy were often the overt target of insurrections, the covert forces at work were more often the actual cause for outbursts of violence; and because the church had accepted with little hesitation the mandate of "Hispanizing" as well as "Christianizing" the Filipino, it was natural that the church would provide an obvious vulnerability in the colonial framework. Again, because the clergy were often called upon by the civil authorities not only to function in commercial, administrative and judicial matters, but also in pacifying the underlying tensions and frustrations of the peasant masses, the parish priest personified the evil against which the peasant wished to strike a blow. It is not surprising, then, that the peasants eventually began to agitate for meaningful religious institutions that would replace the incomprehensible dichotomy between the beauty and solemnity of a Catholic liturgy, and the ugliness and violence which characterized many of those who represented Catholicism. Agoncillo has put it this way:

> Disenchantment with Christianity was disseminated by the missionaries, the real precepts and meaning of which the converts never fully understood, and hatred for many priests, who used the church not for spiritual and charitable purposes but to entrench Spanish power in the colony, impelled some Filipinos to found another religion under native supervision. Movements initiated toward this goal—in reality rebellions with religious understones—usually resulted in the murder of priests and the sacking of churches.[18]

While it was true that many peasants readily found fulfillment of sorts—though perhaps a more realistic term would be "enchantment"—in the Catholic forms of ritual and celebration, it was another question whether the peasant would be willing to tolerate the inconsistencies he observed between the welcomed pomp, ceremony and mysticism of the faith, with the equally

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[17] Emma H. Blair and James A. Robertson, *The Philippine Islands:* 1493-1898 (Cleveland: A. H. Clark Co., 1903-1907), III, p. 33.

[18] Agoncillo, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

intolerable oppression which the institutionalized faith perpetuated. Going back to the Hindley model, it would seem that the degree of "conflict potential" was decreased by the mysteries and symbolism of the faith; but, that the ultimate claims of the institutional church for the body as well as soul of the peasant was, in the long run, a "tension producer" which only increased the "conflict potential". Cults or sects which harkened back to the pre-Spanish deities and mysticism in their essence, and the cofraternities became alternatives as "tension reducing" institutions for the peasants in place of the inadequate Catholic and hispanic structures. The consequences of such adaptations and adjustments, however, often proved to be the material for "religious uprisings".

Among the most thoroughly documented instances of this type of insurrection occurring in the pre-modern Philippines are included the Igorot uprising in 1601,[19] the revolts of Bohol and Leyte in 1621 and 1622 respectively,[20] the Cagayan Valley rebellion of 1625 and 1627,[21] the Oton (Panay) insurrection of 1663,[22] and the protracted resistance movement of Dagohoy from 1744 until 1828.[23] While each of these examples, and many more, have unique characteristics growing out of the particular grievances addressed and the particular response initiated by the colonial authorities, several common characteristics are noteworthy.

The Filipino response to the oppressive conditions were frequently instigated by the personal charisma of a person or family having particular grievances with the local authorities. In addition to high tariffs and taxation, these personal grievances might take the form of reaction to a priest's incompetence or corruption, or the deep-rooted resentment by a native chief over his loss of power to the parish priest or local civil administrator. Generally, the instigator would only have to publicize the wrongs done to him in order to gather interest from the neighboring families and towns; then, often using the vehicle of nativistic ceremonies, it seemed a fairly easy step to encourage his followers in overcoming their fears of the Spaniards and in joining the insurrection. Holding of secret meetings and establishing hidden forest fortifications for worship and military purposes were refinements that developed in reaction to the colonizer's resistance to such "heresies".

The Spaniards generally feared the possibility of localized upheavals spreading into larger conflicts and were thus consistent in attempting to suppress any revolt or insurrection with utmost dispatch. In order to divide the Filipino leadership and create the greatest degree of disillusionment

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19 *Ibid.*
20 Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, XXXVIII, pp. 87-91.
21 Agoncillo, *loc. cit.*
22 Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, pp. 215-223.
23 Agoncillo, *op. cit.*, p. 119; and, Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, XXXXVIII, p. 147-148.

among potential as well as actual participants in the rebellion, the Spanish military would enlist native mercenaries, and play upon inter-barangay rivalries by soliciting and rewarding collaborators and informers. Moreover, the friars were encouraged to pressure the insurgents by offering amnesties, pardons, and absolutions; and in the event that these offerings were not sufficient, the harsher but usually more effective devices of threatening rebuke, interdiction, or excommunication were practiced. Finally, when the superior military strength of the Spanish forces coupled with the more imaginative styles of repression practiced by the parish priest had succeeded in routing whatever strength the insurgents could muster, the colonial authorities would generally kill the rebel leaders and whenever possible make the executions available for public display and consumption. As an additional mechanism for providing longer-range disillusionment and inter-unit tensions, the "followers" would usually be released by pardon or amnesty, and dispersed to form new communities where old ones had been destroyed, divided among existing but separate communities, or simply exiled to far-flung reaches of the archipelago.

With this admittedly sketchy treatment of a thoroughly complex social phenomenon, the specific example of the Cofradia de San Jose invites a closer examination.

The founder of the Cofradia, Apolinario de la Cruz, was born a native Tagalog in the year 1815, of a devout Catholic family residing in Lucban, Tayabas (Quezon Province). Under the influence of family encouragement, Apolinario traveled to Manila with the intention of training for the priesthood. Though there seems to be some question as to the exact circumstances that accompanied his frustrated aspirations to that vocation, it is agreed that he was discriminated against as a "native" and thus relegated to working as a "donne" of the Hospital de San Jose de Dios, and to reading theology without benefit of direction or encouragement. (Horacio de la Costa has stated that Apolinario's time was also spent as a "lay associate—'donado'—of the Brothers of St. John of God".)[24]

Returning to Lucban in 1840, by the middle of the year Apolinario had gathered a following among those either discontented with the Spanish rule or desiring a return to traditional religious practices, and he established the Cofradia de San Jose. The meetings were apparently first held in Lucban and later in the caves on Mount Banahaw, Laguna, with most adherents being drawn from the provinces of Tayabas, Laguna, and Batangas.

Only pure-blooded Indios were allowed membership, although both males and females had equal accessibility. Apolinario was proclaimed and baptized "King of the Tagalogs", and letters from him were read in the

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[24] Horacio de la Costa, S.J., *Readings in Philippine History: Selected Historical Texts Presented With a Commentary* (Manila: Bookmark, 1965), p. 214.

meetings. The association adapted the Catholic liturgy for its worship.[25] Additionally, atavism found its inclusion among the society's tenets; namely, that all members of the Cofradia were immune from danger if they wore "anting-antings" or "talismans", and should they face persecution, they would be aided by direct intervention from heaven.[26]

As de la Cruz's movement gained momentum, the friars grew jealous of his popularity and the civil officials feared that the brotherhood was seditious. The Spaniards, "believing that the Cofradia was in reality a political organization using religion merely as a blind, inaugurated a policy of persecution" to ward off its growth.[27] Nonetheless, de la Cruz continued to seek official recognition for his society but was turned down by both ecclesiastical and colonial authorities. The attention of a friar parish-priest was drawn to an anticipated meeting, and on October 19, 1840, a group of government troops surprised the gathering, and out of approximately 500 who were in attendance, 243 members were arrested, though Cruz managed to escape and began to secretly build the movement's membership.[28] The governor of Tayabas, believing the matter to be purely ecclesiastical in jurisdiction, initially ordered the release of prisoners. However, the persistence of the Lucban parish-priest family succeeded in having the provincial governor intervene, and thenceforth the meetings were secretly held in Majayjay, Laguna Province.[29] Thus, Apolinario de la Cruz was "unable to be in an order 'within' the church and was refused permission to found one 'outside' the church."[30] The brotherhood was banned; the leader harrassed; de la Cruz was declared a rebel; and the Cofradia was driven into secrecy.

The voice of the historical record is mute with regard to the development of the Cofradia between the mass arrest of October, 1840, and the next encounter nearly a full year later. On September 19, 1841, government troops once again interrupted a secret meeting, though due to a leaked warning of the impending raid, only a few were actually arrested. The provincial governor of Tayabas, Joaquin Ortega, was in Manila at this time, and a "native adherent or sympathizer" had been left in charge of the local government. "Through his acquiescence" members of the Cofradia gathered in "armed bands" at the village of Bay in Laguna, and were joined there by

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25 Milagros Guerrero, "The Colorum Uprising, 1924-1931," *Asian Studies*, Vol. V, No. 1, (April 1967), pp. 65 ff. Eventually the movement came to be known as "colorum", derived from the misprounciation of "saecula saeculorom", an ejaculation with which many Latin prayers end. The actual Latin phrase is "per omnia saecula saeculorom" or "world without end", was evidently a common element in the worship content of the Cofradia. Now, "colorum" is a term used in reference to any unlicensed property, particularly firearms.

26 Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, LII, pp. 92-93 (footnote).

27 Guerrero, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

28 Blair and Robertson, *loc. cit.*

29 *Ibid.*

30 Richard L. Deats, *Nationalism and Christianity in the Philippines* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1967), p. 34.

Apolinario as he fled from Manila.[31] (Though there seems to be no specific reference to his reason for fleeing Manila, the possibility exists that his flight might not be unrelated to Ortega's visit to that city.) From Bay, the group traveled to Igsaban, Tayabas. The Cofradia next sent a request to the local parish-priest, through the office of the sympathetic substitute-governor, "to be allowed to hold a 'novena' in the church"[32] and to occupy the city (presumably Igsaban).[33] The negotiations proved fruitless, however, and shortly thereupon the provincial governor returned (October 22), promptly ordering the peasant association to disperse immediately . . . an order which received an equally prompt negative reply.

On the following day, October 23, Ortega launched an attack of "over 300 men" against the gathered Cofradia.[34] De la Cruz's band, aided by a contingent of "Negrito archers",[35] withstood the attack, killing Governor Ortega in the process, and fled to Alitao "to celebrate a novena."[36] Leading a force composed of troops sent by Oraa (position and origin unknown by this writer), and joined by troops from the province of Tayabas, the government authorities pursued the fleeing insurgents, and once again attacked the rebel forces on November 1. After "a severe engagement the natives were defeated," and three days later the elusive de la Cruz was captured and killed.[37] However, the execution was not complete until the slain leader's "body was cut into pieces and hung at the crossroads of the town where

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[31] Blair and Robertson, *loc. cit.*

[32] It is interesting to note that at two points in the record of the Cofradia uprising, the insurgents intended or desired to have a novena offered. It might indicate the influence not only of Cruz's solid grounding in the Catholic tradition both at home and from his independent studies, but also might indicate the broader effect that the process of Catholicizing had accomplished on the members of the Cofradia, since they seemed to sincerely desire this institutionalized experience. On the other hand, as had happened in earlier precedents of "religious uprisings" when the outward vestiges of Catholic liturgy and symbolism had been infused with more traditional, "superstitious" content, the Cofradia may have realized the value of adopting the novena as a ceremonial opportunity to dedicate themselves to the struggle against the Spanish authorities by seeking some sort of divine ordinance and grace for the endeavor. This is substantiated by the fact that both allusions to the novena are coincidental to the arming of the Cofradia's membership or immediately after an armed confrontation. A less spectacular hypothesis would be that Cruz might have thought he could actually gain some legitimate recognition for his Cofradia through the device of celebrating a novena in a Catholic parish with a Catholic priest presiding, where he had earlier failed to gain legitimizing recognition using the bureaucratic channels of both church and state.

[33] Blair and Robertson, *loc. cit.*

[34] Another source suggests that the government force consisted of " '150 soldiers and accompanied by several friars'." Deats, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

[35] Though the record is not explicit at this point, that the record does indicate the Cofradia was able to muster support from this quarter might indicate that the movement had a potentially larger mass base from which to operate, and that the fears of the Spanish authorities may have been very well grounded.

[36] Blair and Robertson, *loc. cit.*

[37] *Ibid.*

the Cofradia de San Jose had been most popular."[38] This final touch of madness successfully demoralized any hopes for continued resistance by the Cofradia's membership, and the brotherhood disbanded. Apolinario de la Cruz, who had been popularly known as "Hermano Pule", thus became "the first Filipino martyr to the cause of religious liberty."[39]

The reactions expressed by the Spanish administrators to the event of the Tayabas upheaval reflected far more than simple indignation or condemnation over an isolated incident of violence. Their interpretation of the event was informed by no less than three centuries of conditioning in the colonial mentality, a mentality that had perpetuated the myth of Spanish superiority in civilization and religion—in the Spanish bureaucracy and the Catholic theocracy. Moreover, because the secular and sacred realms of existence had been so closely wedded, and because the church so frequently and pervasively offered the models for the institutional instruments of colonization, moralism and not empiricism was likely to provide a basis of critique for those uncomfortable, insecure, or threatening instances which had often stirred the otherwise placid waters of the prolonged colonial venture. Furthermore, external developments taking place in the early to mid-19th century, had already begun to create tensions and pressures for the Philippine colonizer. A quick glance at these developments will better prepare one to contextualize the Philippine colonizer's reflections in the aftermath to the Cofradia's eruption.

Beginning in 1834, the Spanish government opened a limited number of Philippine ports for the purpose of inviting foreign trade to better accommodate the raw-material market which had been nurtured in the islands. Even though the peasant could not reap the direct benefit from the newly-found prosperity this policy brought, the subsequent improvements in communications and transportation provided better contact between the common "tao". An equally important effect, however, was an increased disillusionment and frustration experienced by the peasant in the wake of a growing middle class which harvested the profits that remained beyond the reach of the masses.

A part of the cargo brought on the vehicle of increased trade was the product of liberal and revolutionary idealisms which had been conceived out of the French Revolution. The idea that the consent of the governed is the "acid test" for those who would govern began to lead toward two reflections: (1) the Spanish colonial effort might not have been truly "enlight-

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[38] Deats, *loc. cit.;* Matta's report of 1843 mentions that the incident of slaughtering the Cofradia's leadership resulted in the mutiny of the native soldiers from the Province of Tayabas who were quartered in Malate. This grew out, in part, from the traditional tactic used by the Spaniards of "divide and rule" which informed the method of recruiting troops from one province, but quartering them in an altogether different setting in order that they might not be involved in, or effected by, the events of their home province. This had been the case in previous uprisings; see Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.,* p. 101.

[39] Gregorio F. Zaide, *Philippine Political and Cultural History,* 2 vols., (Manila: Philippine Education Co., 1957), I, pp. 364 366.

ened" in its disregard for representation of the "natives", and (2) where the consent of the governed had not been recognized, but on the contrary, subverted, it then becomes the right of the governed to revolt against the established authority.[40]

The precursors of the "illustrado" class began to join intellectual forces with the increasing number of enlightened secular and "native" priests, giving academic recognition, if not approval, to the inflow of liberal European values and ideals. In addition, as the Spanish colonial machine began to have its belt tightened by the liberalized thinking which influenced the Iberian-based administrators, discussions centering on the possible withdrawal of Spanish control in the Archipelago were taken with increasing concern by the islands' administrators. A consequent tension thus developed between the various factions which either stood to lose or gain the political and economic spoils of colonization; and, the symbol of that tension was the threat of "emancipation".

Thus, a Spanish colonial administrator, Don Juan Manuel Matta, was compelled to comment in a report on the "Sedition of Apolinario", that only a few Spaniards had become influenced by the "ideas of emancipation;" and, that those few who had been so influenced, were operating out of self-interest for job security as a rule, and did not form any politically viable force. He went on to say:

> The ideas of emancipation have not yet contaminated, nor will they in a long time contaminate the Chinese, the Chinese mestizos, Spanish mestizos, or the natives, with the exception of a few of the 'secular clergy', as insignificant because of their ignorance and few resources as by their lack of influence among their countrymen.[41]

Continuing in the same vein of thinking, but with reference to the Philippine-born Spaniards who might have entertained thoughts of emancipation, he suggested that even they recognized that "political upheavals would be as fatal to themselves as to the Peninsulares."[42]

> The safety of all lies in the stability of the government; but it must be noted that events are daily more serious and that the discontent is spreading. Important reforms are necessary, but matters must be viewed only in the light of the public cause. 'Without virtues there can be no prestige; and, without prestige, it will also be impossible for the lesser part to dominate the great whole'. The conservation of the islands depends on 'radical reforms in their legislation, and peremptory measures of precaution and security'.[43]

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[40] Agoncillo, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

[41] *Ibid.*

[42] *Ibid.*

[43] *Ibid.;* Matta then listed a number of proposed reforms, among which two are of particular interest: " 'The suppression of the colleges of Santo Tomas, San Jose, and San Juan de Letran of this capital, and the conciliar seminaries of the bishopries, as perpetual nurseries of corruption, laziness, or subversive ideas, as contrary to the quiet and welfare of the villages as to peninsular interests;' " and, " '. . . that the attempt be made, in a truly impartial and foresighted system, to conciliate the minds of people, and to put an end to that pernicious mistrust that has been introduced

The stage had long been set, the atmosphere more recently created, and the action had transpired with frightening realism. All that seemed to remain was the epilogue, spoken by the antagonist. Following the first panic of the rebellion's aftermath, several creoles and mestizos of prominence in Manila "were arrested on suspicion of being implicated in it. Nothing was proved against them and they were eventually released; but the incident rankled, and served to make everyone a little more conscious of the widening gap between the peninsular Spaniards who held the reins of government and everyone else." [44]

A certain Consul Fabre, writing to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1842, gives a more impassioned commentary:

> Senor Roxas and the other creoles who were implicated in the Tayabas rebellion (a purely unpremeditated incident, in my opinion) have been released after seven months of preventive arrest. This whole affair, in which the Spanish government, in effect, told the creoles, 'You are our enemies', has added hatred to the jealousy that already existed between Spaniards and creoles. With an unbelievable lack of prudence, the Spaniards themselves encourage this hatred and jealousy by arrogantly assuming an attitude of supreme contempt towards the colonial-born. The authorities are at present seriously considering an ordinance which would permit only Spaniards to reside in the walled city, the creoles being sent out to live in the suburbs.[45]

The early reports that "whites" and "natives" might have collaborated in the Tayabas uprising indicated the fear by many Peninsulares that disenchanted creoles were being influenced by the talk about emancipation of the Philippines. Writing in 1842, Sinibaldo de Mas offered his analysis:

> In the recent occurance of Tayabas, when the first news of the insurrection arrived, I was at a gathering of several Spanish leaders, and they all believed, or at least suspected, that the whites of the country had compromised themselves in the matter. I maintained immediately, and obstinately, that they were mistaken in this, since however disloyal and intemperate one may fancy the Filipino-Spaniards, it was impossible for me to believe that it would ever enter their heads to arouse and arm the natives. In fact, the true spirit of the movement was soon known, and it was seen that the Filipino-Spaniards were as alarmed at the result (if not more so) as were the Europeans.[46]

After satisfying themselves to some degree that the bulwarks were still in place within the colonial administration, the obvious question returned to determine the causes which might have inspired such a rebellion as that witnessed in 1841. In his report dated February 25, 1843, Matta once again

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between the peninsular Spaniards and the sons of the country . . . which is so contrary to the common interest. The government must not be partial to any one class of men, for each class contains good men who should be rewarded and advanced, and bad men who should be closely watched and punished. Merit should be the only cause for advancement. . . .' "

[44] de la Costa, *loc. cit.*

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 215.

[46] Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

addressed himself to the uprising and suggested that the origin of the cofraternity consisted

> only in the character of the superstition which distinguished these natives, who most readily believe whatever is presented to them under the veil of religion and of the marvelous.[47]

Tracing the development of events further, he asserted that the Cofradia became "fanaticism" as soon as measures were taken against Apolinario de la Cruz and his "confreres"; and that it became a "declared sedition" when the "unfortunate Ortega attacked them in Igsaban with more valor than prudence;

> and that from that time presenting the appearance of a near insurrection in the neighboring provinces, it is to be feared that it would have been converted into a revolution capable of compromising the conservation of these important possessions had not the seditious ones been promptly defeated and severely punished in Alitao.[48]

In a second report issued during the same year (1843), Matta noted the fact that the Cofradia had only allowed pure-blooded natives membership, and thus, "the Spaniards have always professed to believe that the cofraternity was political in nature and that religious motives were merely a blind."[49] And yet, an admission suggesting that it was highly unlikely that political motives were originally intended by the Cofradia:

> The fact that Apolinario attempted to legalize the existence of the organization through both ecclesiastical and government centers, which was refused in both instances, indicates that the insurrection was forced by the Spaniards, through either fear or contempt.[50]

Within the space of less than two short years the Cofradia de San Jose was conceived, grew and developed its personality, attempted to express its identity in the larger society, was condemned, and killed. The available records of its history cannot be taken as conclusive evidence that the original intentions of the Cofradia or its founder, Apolinario de la Cruz, had gone beyond a desperate grasp of an expression of religious ideals, as an alternative to the established faith and institutions. On the other hand, the interpretation left us by those in the civil administration of the time—namely, that Cofradia had been little more than an extremist religious sect *used as a guise* for subversive political activity against the interests of the commonweal—may have a simplistic validity in the sense that the rubric out of which the Cofradia had operated seemed nothing more than religious "fanaticism", and the end results of its activities certainly revealed that the stakes for political power were, in the end, contested. Accepting the

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[47] *Ibid.*, p. 101.
[48] *Ibid.*
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 93.
[50] *Ibid.*

limitations of inadequate evidence and the factor of elapsed time, some reflections are pertinent.

The Cofradia was certainly rooted in the religious tradition of the Catholic church: Its leader had been raised in the faith, studied theology, and even aspired to the priesthood; the Cofradia's institutional legitimacy—the cofraternity or sodality—was not only acknowledged, but fostered by the Catholic church; the use of Catholic liturgical style and order was evident in the Cofradia's worship; and, in its attempts to receive blessing from the Church, it revealed a respect for the religious authority. So also, the Cofradia had characteristics that were in ways similar to its predecessory "religious uprisings" in the Philippines: Its leader was charismatic in his reactions to personal grievances with the established order; its "fanaticism" developed from a grounding in the traditional folk beliefs of the pre-Christianized society; its membership grew rather rapidly in response to shared sympathies; and there seemed to be more desire for a separate-but-equal existence, than a desire to revolutionize the predominant religion and its institutions. In these regards, then, the Cofradia's upheaval could well be classified within the spectrum of "religious uprisings".

On the social and economic levels the Cofradia shared some characteristics common to previous insurrections: Its leadership was motivated, in part, by reaction to discrimination and prejudice by the established orders of church and state; its membership was drawn from the disillusioned, disappointed, and disenfranchised of the exploited peasants in a colonial society; and, it was, in large measure, a reaction in response to the oppressive social institutions of the colonial Philippines—social institutions that were born out of the conjugal ties of the Catholic theocracy and Spanish bureaucracy. And in these characteristics, the Cofradia was in the tradition of the majority of insurrections, "religious" or otherwise, which had pre-dated it.

The response given the Cofradia's existence by the representatives of both church and state was as intolerant and vindictive in degree, as were the institutions of Christianization and hispanization narrow and oppressive in their dictations upon the social order. Moreover, this response betrayed an insecurity and fear of any social force—whether political or social—that threatened the position of advantage shared by the alien few who received the benefits of colonizer over colonized. Harkening back to Hindley's terminology, it is apparent that the "conflict potential" had risen to a high level as the result of the inadequate "tension reducing" functions of both church and state institutions; and, instead, these very institutions seemed to me "tension producing" as evidenced in the much-feared mobilization of a peasant group. Both Christianization and Hispanization apparently were inadequate in thoroughly deterring the forces of peasant rebellion, and regardless of its original intentions, or the factors contributing to its growth

and sophistication, the Cofradia was viewed with "political" significance by those whom it threatened.

The Spanish Catholic Church had identified itself with the oppression of the colonizer by association. While the civil administration and merchants of the colony were preoccupied with other matters, the friar undertook the task of pacification in order that the "kingdom of God" might be established.

> "Napoleon, in the early nineteenth century, had declared that 'the religious missions may be very useful to me in Asia, Africa, and America, and I (Napoleon) shall make them reconnoitre all the lands they visit. The sanctity of their dress will not only protect them but serve to conceal their political and commercial investigations.' The politicians of the nineteenth century saw nothing immoral in guaranteeing to missionaries the same right of unrestricted entry into Asian countries as they demanded for the products of their mills and factories. They were quite incapable of realising that the religion of the missionaries would not be viewed as an article of trade but as the Trojan horse of Western domination."[51]

Whether knowingly or not, the Spanish Regular had become identified by the oppressed peasant as simply a tool of his oppressor; and, therefore, an integral part of the target of the peasant's wrath.

The significance of the fact that an institution of tension-reduction—the cofraternity—was employed in reaction to the established order may be overly emphasized. However, it is indeed worthy of note that such an institution, whether wittingly or not, was in fact the vehicle of expression for the grievances which Apolinario and his followers wished to address. Equally important is the fact that the legitimate grievances as well as the root causes which had given rise to them, were muffled in the din of both physical and rhetorical reaction to the Tayabas uprising. In this regard, the Cofradia's existence may serve as prophetic witness of lessons not yet learned.

The politicization process, according to Hindley, involves the conversion of "conflict potential" into "actual conflict", and can be described in terms of a continuum of development having three stages: (a) "political nescience", or unquestioning political acquiescence, which would be characteristic of a truly colonized or subjugated people; (b) "political consciousness", which involves a level of belief that man—regardless of his social position—can potentially change his environmental condition through the implementation of political power; and (c) "political action", that operates on the two levels of a shared group consciousness and the employment of the established political institutions, in attaining the goals expressed by the group.[52]

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[51] Michael Edwards, *Asia in the European Age* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1961), p. 190.

[52] Hindley, *op. cit.*, pp. 481-488.

Though Hindley does not suggest it, I would submit that violent revolution is the natural outgrowth of the frustration of such political action that fails to fulfill its expressed aims. Whether the aims of the group are legitimate, and whether the results of its revolution are successful, are not definitive to an understanding of the process. However, it must be said, that the Cofradia de San Jose seems to have been unsuccessful in completing this politicization process, much less in attaining its desired freedom to exist and participate in the Philippine society of 1841. *But,* that the factors of a developng social consciousness, an idealism that man's social condition may be improved, and a belief that political action may be actualized and employed, were present and operating at one stage or another in the course of the Cofradia's brief history, should suggest implications for the later growth of Philippine nationalism's history—a history which the Cofradia de San Jose shares.

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ANITISM: A SURVEY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEFS NATIVE TO THE PHILIPPINES

STEPHEN K. HISLOP

I. INTRODUCTION

The word *anitism,* or the Hispano-Filipino form *anitismo,* though not in current usage, has been defined in Retana's glossary [1] as "Asociación de ideas religiosas que tiene por fundamento el culto a los anitos," citing Isabelo de los Reyes, who further defines "anitos" as "almas de los antepasados."[2] Fernando Blumentritt characterizes primitive Tagalog religion as continual invocation and adoration of the anitos, the souls or spirits of their ancestors.[3] From its original meaning of "ancestral spirit," the word *anito* acquired throughout the Philippines the general meaning "spirit."[4]

The other term in general parlance to describe Filipino primitive religion was *anitería,* used mainly by Spanish missionaries, often in a very derogatory sense.[5] Though Blumentritt [6] attempted to use the word in a purely descriptive sense, the term *anitería* appears too often in the missionary literature in a prejudicial sense; for this reason I have avoided it in this paper, as I believe de los Reyes' word *anitismo* to be a more useful term to describe the original religious system of the primitive Filipinos.

II. ORIGIN OF PHILIPPINE RELIGION

At first glance, the fact that the Filipinos worshiped the spirits of their ancestors might tend to indicate Chinese influence. In fact, in the year 1375 the Chinese Emperor, during the height of friendly relations between the two nations, incorporated into the Chinese religion the worship of Sulu's

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[1] W. E. Retana, "Diccionario de Filipinismos con la Revisión de lo que al respecta lleva publicado La Real Academia Español." *Revue Hispanique,* LI (1921), 32.

[2] *La Religión Antigua de los Filipinos* (Manila: 1909), 11.

[3] *Diccionario Mitológico de Filipinas,* 1895 (2nd ed.), 19. In fact, Protestant Missionary Leo L. Leeder states positively that, "The dominating ideals of all pagan religion [in the Philippines] is the belief in *anito,* a class of supernatural beings" (*A Survey of Pagan Tribes in the Philippines and of Missionary Efforts Toward Their Evangelization,* Columbia: 1956, p. 7).

[4] R. A. Kern, "Anitu," *Journal of Austronesian Studies,* 1:2 (1956), 6. According to Kern the word *anito* is of Malayan origin and has spread Eastward of Polynesia from the Philippines. He traces the root of the word to *andito,* "those there, far away" (7). See also Blumentritt's summary of correspondences in Malaysian languages with the Filipino *anito* "ancestor spirits" in *op. cit.,* 22-23.

[5] For example, W. E. Retana, *Un Libro de Aniterías: Supersticiones de los Indios Filipinos* (Madrid: 1894). The title gives somewhat of an indication of the author's bias.

[6] *Op. cit.,* 20n. See also Retana, *Revue Hispanique, loc. cit.*

rivers, mountains, and forests.[7] Other than this one instance of incorporation, obviously for political purposes, there is no indication that either country influenced the other's religion. In fact, Blumentritt believed that the Malayan demonology (anitism) was sufficiently diverse from Chinese religion to prove it had an independent origin.[8]

At present Chinese influence in the Philippines is seen mainly in the instruments used in worship, such as Chinese jars and gongs. There are indications from excavations in Palawan that these Chinese jars were used even in ancient times in the same way that today's Tagbanwas use them for storing rice wine which is used in religious ceremonies for communication with the spirits of the dead.[9]

Other observers of Philippine primitive religion have traced it to a likewise superficial basis, such as similarities in manner of dress and ornamentation.[10] A more serious attempt to link Filipino primitive religion with Hinduism is in various explanations of the Filipino deity Bathala, although there is no agreement on exactly what Sanskrit word is the origin of the word *Bathala.*

> Parece probable que deriva del Sans. *bhattra,* respectable, considerable; pero tambien pudiera ocurrir que proviniera de *awatara,* avatar, es decir:: descendimiento de un dios á la tierra bajo una forma visible, como los 10. avatares de Wishnu. En Mal. berhala, que se asemeja á la forma Tag. significa un idolo á que se rinde culto divino. En Pam. *batala,* es un ave en quien tenian sus supersticiones.[11]

A modern Spanish Jesuit, Pablo Pastells,[12] has still another theory, that the word *Bat-ala* is derived from *Bata-Allah,* or "child of Allah"! The fact that this was seriously believed by some of his predecessors may be seen in an anonymous Manila *Relación* of 1572, which forbade the use of this name on the grounds of its supposed Muslim association. Perhaps the simplest and most satisfactory explanation may be that the word is essentially native Malayan, and not from a source as the above forced interpretations might indicate.

Of a different character is the Philippine word *diwata,*[13] which can definitely be traced to India and beyond, to the same source as Greek *theos,* Latin *deus,* Spanish *dios,* English *deity.*[14] However, in this case, although

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[7] Henry O. Beyer, "The Philippines Before Magellan." *Asia,* November, 1921, p. 966.

[8] *Op. cit.,* 20.

[9] See Robert B. Fox, *Pre-History of the Philippines* (Manila: 1967), 17.

[10] See Juan R. Francisco, "Analagous Customs, Beliefs and Traditions in India and the Philippines," *Historical Bulletin,* June, 1963, p. 145.

[11] T. H. Pardo de Tavera, *El Sanscrito en la Lengua Tagalog* (Paris: 1887), 23. See Juan Francisco's critique of this book in *Asian Studies,* August, 1968.

[12] Editor of Francisco Colin, *Labor Evangélica* (Barcelona: 1904), 64n.

[13] With the forms *dewa, devata, dewata, divata, diuata* (Blumentritt, *op. cit.,* 44, 45).

[14] "*Diwata* se *deriva del sanscrito deva ó devatà,* de modo que tanto el latin *Deus* como el filipino *Diwata* tienen el mismo origen." (*Ibid.,* 45n.) With this de los Reyes is also in agreement: "La palabra *diuata* . . . debe proceder de los devas é devatas de los hindus, dioses protectores." (*Op. cit.,* 40n.)

the origin of the word is somewhat clearer, its use is much more diverse, I have collected a list, by no means exhaustive, of sixteen uses of this word in Philippine languages. Blumentritt catalogs the use of *diwata* in eight languages of the Philippines. With the Bisayans, the word is the equivalent of Tagalog *anito*.[15] The Bataks of Palawan believe that *diwata* refers to all spirits, good and bad. The Tagbanwas believe that these are invisible spirits. The Mandayas limit the word to refer to one spirit, but the Manobos believe it refers to spirits. The Subanos use *diwata* to refer to one of their gods. The Tirurays believe *diwata* is a great eight-headed fish. The Maguindanaos have images called *diwata,* but the word *dewa* refers to a goddess.[16] Among the Magahats, *diwa* refers to a forest god and also to the spirit who owns their land. *Diwata* is the thanksgiving feast with the offerings that are offered.[17] Among the Bukidnon, the *diwata* were believed to be men of heaven.[18] The early Spaniard missionaries made the observation that the Cebuanos used *divata* to refer to any god, especially an image of a god.[19] Among the Bilaans, some hold *Dwata* to be the god of goodness, older than the evil god Mele, though others hold that he is younger than Mele, god of evil.[20] It should be noted that the use of the word *Diwata* is confined to the southern part of the Philippines. The Tagalogs, however, were aware of the existence of *Diwata,* believing Him to be the universal Supreme Being, whereas Bathala was the supreme deity of the Tagalog people only.[21]

The word, therefore, which was not original in the Philippines, acquired various meanings throughout the archipelago and did not in any case form a basis for religious faith. The basis for religious faith had already been established in the Philippines before this word had entrance; this already existing basis is what is called in this paper anitism.

III. CHARACTERISTICS OF ANITISM

General Concept

In the eyes of the early Spanish missionaries, the "Indios" had no religion as they understood religion. They were observed to worship without

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[15] De los Reyes (*loc. cit.*) confirms this use.

[16] *Op. cit.,* 44-46.

[17] Timoteo S. Oracion, "Ceremonial Customs and Beliefs Connected with Magahat *Kaingin* Agriculture.' *Silliman Journal,* July, 1955, pp. 224, 231, 232n.

[18] Tranquilino Sitoy, "The Bukidnon Ascension to Heaven," *Philippine Magazine,* October, 1937, p. 445.

[19] In the account of the discovery of the Santo Niño image in Cebu City. See Pedro Chirino, "Relation of the Filipinas Islands and of What Has There Been Accomplished by the Fathers of the Society of Jesus," Emma Blair and James A. Robertson, *The Philippine Islands,* XII, 181.

[20] It was the former consideration which led the Philippine Bible Society (Protestant) to adopt this name for God in their original gospel translation, as far as I know, the first attempt to use a purely native word for God in the Philippines. Lorenzo C. Genotiva, "Bilaan Religious Beliefs and Practices," *Silliman Journal,* 1st quarter, 1966, pp. 57, 58n.

[21] See the Tagalog etiological myth "How Lansones Became Edible," *Filipino Popular Tales* (Lancaster: 1921), 402.

temples or organized priesthood, honored no founder, and used no scriptures.[22] To them it was a vast maze of pagan superstitions to be replaced as quickly as possible. Patterns of worship by the Filipinos may be seen in a sketch by the contemporary missionary, John A. Rich.[23]



Spirits of Ancestors

Both the "spirits of nature" and the "spirits of ancestors" of the above diagram are of course the anitos.[24] Though the theory that the word *anito* was directly derived from the Sanscrit *hantu* ("death") may be doubted,[25] Pardo de Tavera was at least correct in identifying the anitos with the dead. Jose Rizal traced the use of the word *anito* from "tutelary genius, either of the family, or extraneous to it," to the final meaning in his day of "any superstition, false worship, idol, etc."[26] In the usage of the word, it may be

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[22] Antonio de Morga, "Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas," Blair and Robertson, *op cit*,. XVI, 132. I have reserved a discussion of human sacrifice to the end of this section (*infra,* n. 44, p. 13), as the sources are in much disagreement over whether such a practice existed in the Islands. De Morga (133) denies it, but Silvestre Sancho ("Las Creencies de los Primitivos Filipinos," *Missionalia Hispanica,* II, 1945, no 4, p. 16), Retana (*Un Libro de Aniterías,* vi, n), and Blumentritt (*op. cit.,* 70) affirm that it occurred regularly.

[23] "Religious Acculturation in the Philippines," *Practical Anthropology,* September-October, 1970, p. 200. The dotted lines are my addition, and show effects of both sets of spirits on man, and also the effects of ancestral spirits on the other two sets.

[24] Along with Bisayan *diwata,* Ilocano *aroiaas,* and the other terms locally used for spirits of the dead.

[25] See Juan R. Francisco, "Indian Influences in the Philippines with Special Reference to Language and Literature," *Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review,* January-September, 1963, p. 32n.

[26] Editor of de Morga, *op. cit.,* 131n.

seen that it originally meant the spirits of ancestors, then all spirits, then the images which were constructed to represent the household spirits.[27]

The ancestors who had passed on went to the spirit-world and shared an existence with the spirits who had never been mortal. These spirits of the ancestors then had some kind of influence upon the other spirits who could help or harm those still living. In order to keep on good terms with the spirits that had been ancestors, it was believed necessary from time to time to hold great feasts in their honor, so that they would intercede in behalf of the living to the spirits of nature. The spirits of the dead were likewise involved occasionally in causing the death of the living through sickness, so that the afflicted would join his ancestor in the spirit-world.[28]

Other Spirits

Not only people, but also animals, and indeed all visible objects possessed spirits. In addition, a peculiar belief of the Ifugaos was that all things and people had a "soul-stuff" differentiated from the soul itself; the belief was that this "soul-stuff" was what gave desirable attributes to people and things.[29]

But the spirits themselves inhabited both animals and objects in the same way in which they inhabited man. To the anitists, there was no such thing as an "inanimate" object. Anitos were represented in their mythology as having been in existence since the creation of the world,[30] each anito having its own "special office," such as giving rain, making the rice grow, increasing the quantity of the rice, etc.

Objects likewise were believed to possess spirits. Often images were made by one particularly skilled in carving or sculpting,[31] and through them were worshiped the spirits of those who had died.

> They possessed many idols called *lic-ha,* which were images with different shapes; and at times they worshiped any little trifle, in which they adored... some particular dead man who was brave in war and endowed with special faculties, to whom they commended themselves for protection in their tribulations.[32]

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[27] Although images were made for the household anitos, anitos of the mountains, the forests, the streams, and the sea were worshiped, but had no visible representations (Blumentritt, *op. cit.,* 19-21).

[28] From Glen Grisham, "Pagan Priests of Benguet," *Philippine Magazine,* February, 1933, p. 399, and Barton, "My Ifugao Brother's Gods," *Asia,* October, 1929, p. 809.

[29] For a further explanation of these beliefs, and their connection with head hunting, see *ibid.,* 813.

[30] That the Tagalog myths attributed the origin of anitos of nature to creation by Batala may be seen in Miguel de Loarca, "Relation of the Filipinas Islands," Blair and Robertson, *op cit.,* V, 173.

[31] The makers of these images were called in Tagalog *manganito* (Blumentritt, *op. cit.,* 75).

[32] Juan de Plasencia, "Relation of the Worship of the Tagalogs, Their Gods, and Their Burials and Superstitions." Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.,* VII, 189.

In addition to the good spirits (the anitos), the primitive Filipinos venerated out of a feeling of fear evil spirits or *mangalos*.[33] Particularly feared by the Tagalogs was the crocodile, to which they sacrificed pigs by throwing them into the river or lagoon. They often reverenced the crocodile by calling it *nono*[34] or "grandparent" and pleaded to it to be spared from harm.[35] It was believed that the *nonos* had given man five commandments, curiously reminiscent of the Ten Commandments, which were, "Do not kill, do not rob, do not commit adultery, do not lie, do not drink intoxicating beverages."[36]

The *nonos,* like the *anitos,* were "spiritualized" so that a folk-belief was current among the Tagalogs that it was necessary to ask permission of the *anitos* or *nonos* before planting in a field or even before merely walking through it (*pasintabi sa nono*).[37] The belief persists to the present day that the farmer must offer something to the spirits of the rice in order that they may ripen quickly. Thus, the farmer in Malitbog, central Panay, performs the *bari* (breaking) ritual just before harvest, in which he breaks the heads of a few stalks of rice in sacrifice to the spirit of the whole ricefield. As one farmer explained his reason for performing this ritual, "The rice has spirits, too, and when you dry some of the stalks their spirits would appeal to the rest [for] sympathy and this hastens the ripening of the entire crop."[38]

Place of Worship

The first Spanish missionaries were unanimous in their surprise at discovering that the Filipinos did not worship in temples. The worship of anitos was consequently entirely home-centered. All homes, no matter how poor, possessed an altar for anito-worship.[39]

It is not quite accurate to say that the early Filipinos lacked buildings of community worship, as there existed *simbahan* which were "semi-permanent buildings intended for worship"[40] or sometimes caves.

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[33] Los Bisayas antiguos veneraban al *Mangalo,* teniendo que los devorase las entrañas invisiblemente, pues á el atribúan la muerte de los que fallecian no siendo ya ancianos." (Blumentritt, *op. cit.,* 80-81.)

[34] The term *nono* appears to be another word for *anito.* That is, both were terms meaning the spirit of one who had lived before. The *nonos* could further be identified as "visiting anitos." The use of the word *nono* was not confined by any means to the crocodile; the belief appears also in the myth of the old man of the anthill (*matanda sa punso*), in which the white ants (*anay*) were identified with *nonos* or *anitos.* (*Ibid.,* 84.) The balete tree, according to some, was the favorite habitat of the *nonos* (*ibid.,* 88-89.)

[35] De los Reyes, *op. cit.,* 35-36.

[36] Frank C. Laubach, *The People of the Philippines* (New York: 1925), 45.

[37] Blumentritt, *op. cit.,* 97.

[38] Felipe L. Jocano, "Agricultural Rituals in a Philippine Barrio," *Philippine Sociological Review,* January-April, 1967, p. 6.

[39] Masayoshi Shonago, "The Philippine Islands as Viewed from a Religious and Social Standpoint, Especially Before the Introduction of Christianity," *Tenri Journal of Religion,* March, 1955, p. 49.

[40] Eufronio Alip, "Closing Remarks." *The Beginnings of Christianity in the Philippines* (Manila: 1965), 230-231.

The Spanish missionary Juan de Plasencia carefully noted the worship of anitos by the primitive Filipinos.

> It is true that they have the name *simbahan,* which means a temple or place of adoration; but this is because formerly when they wished to celebrate a festival, which they called *pandot,* or 'worship,' they celebrated it in the large house of a chief. There they constructed for the purpose of sheltering the assembled people, a temporary shed on each side of the house, with a roof, called *sibi,* to protect the people from the wet when it rained... During this time the whole barangay, or family, united and joined in the worship which they call *nagaanitos.*[41]

Jose Rizal notes that temples were built only for worship of anitos, and these buildings were called *ulango.* No buildings were made for the worship of Bathala.[42]

PRIESTHOOD

Though the native religious priesthood was apparently not so well-organized as the elaborate Catholic religious system, it was functional and a duly recognized part of the primitive Filipino society. The services of the priests were used by the people mainly in determining which anitos had to be placated and how to do this. The primitive priesthood of the Kalinga is still in existence. The Kalinga medium performs two duties: caring for the departed and curing the sick by seeking and returning the soul of the afflicted.[43]

SUMMARY

A modern Spaniard has summarized Filipino primitive religion by saying it consisted of four basic elements: animism, worship of spirits of ancestors, almost no temples, and human sacrifice.[44] In view of the fact that there is such a scanty record of human sacrifices in the Philippines, it may be concluded that it was not a *typical* practice of the primitive Filipinos. Instead, the existence of a well-defined priesthood may be substituted, this priesthood consisting of mediums (*katalonan*) between man and the anitos.

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[41] *Op. cit.,* 185-186.

[42] *Op. cit.,* 132.

[43] Edward Dozier, *Mountain Arbiters* (Tucson), 165.

[44] Sancho, *loc. cit.* I do not believe he is being fair when he says that Filipino primitive religion was "characterized by human sacrifice." The so-called "human sacrifice" mentioned by Blumentritt (*op. cit.,* 70) in his definition of *Lalaon* is a killing of slaves of a wealthy person in order that they might accompany him to the spirit-world and serve him there. It was not therefore by any means a common occurrence. If human sacrifice played such an important part in Filipino religious observances there should be abundant references in missionary literature beyond the mere statement that it was a common feature of pagan religious practice. As it is, to my knowledge the only fully documented record of a regular (yearly) rite of human sacrifice may be found in Warren D. Smith's "An Account of a Human Sacrifice Held by the Bagobos, District of Davao, Mindanao, P.I.," *The Philippine Journal of Science,* June, 1908, pp. 194-196.

IV. DEITIES

I have described first the spirits because these formed the major part of early Filipino worship. As Rich's chart indicates, the Supreme Being was considered unapproachable. The Filipinos were not ignorant of his existence, of course, but did not believe that man was worthy to worship him directly.

The god *Bathala*[45] has already been mentioned. Its origin has been variously conjectured, but little is known definitely; what is known is that its use is widespread in the Philippine Islands. Sometimes *Bathala* was described as a large bird (*Tigmamanukin*), but the full term in Tagalog for the Supreme Being was *Bathala-Maykapal,* which literally means Creator-God. The Bisayans of the western islands worshipped *Laon*[46] as Supreme God, while those of the Eastern Visayas held *Abba*[47] as Supreme God.

Lesser deities of importance were *Maylupa,* god of the soil, and *Nono,* who when elevated to deity, was god of the waters and was placated by offerings thrown into the water from boats; others believed *Nono* to be a god of the forests, and therefore, it was sacrilege to fell them.[48] Interestingly enough, the supreme deity of the Ilocanos was *Angngalo,* the first man, though they also believed in the Creator *Maykapal.*[49]

The Pangasinans were noted for their gods of war, among them *Apolaki, Makanduk, Inaginid,* and *Barangao.* The latter was known by various Filipinos as god of the rainbow; the rainbow had an important place in their cosmology as the bridge between this world and the spirit-world.[50]

Among demigods, *Ginarawan*[51] was a named evil spirit of the Tagalogs. At this point, the spiritual beings become more numerous and more familiar to their worshipers, for it is these lesser deities with whom the common man feels he can deal directly. Such beings as the *agta,* the *aghoy,* the *engkantada,* the *buso,* the *aswang,* and the myriad host of "myth-animals" and "bad animals" were limited only by the exceedingly fertile imagination of the rural Filipino.[52]

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[45] Other forms are *Badhala, Badla,* and *Bahala* (Blumentritt, *op. cit.,* 27-28).

[46] Whence comes the name of the volcano Kanlaon on Negros Island. See *ibid.,* 69-70.

[47] This was the first of the deities of the Philippine Islands that the Spaniards encountered. Antonio Pigafetta recorded of the Cebuanos that, "they have no other worship than raising their clasped hands and their face to the sky; and . . . they called their god 'Abba.'" (*First Voyage Around the World,* Manila, 1969, p. 30.)

[48] Sancho, *op. cit.,* 19.

[49] De los Reyes, *op. cit.,* 95-96.

[50] Colin, *op. cit.,* 65. See also Sancho, *op. cit.,* 38.

[51] In Tagalog, *si Ginarawan.* Sancho wrongly spells this as one word, *Siguinarugan.* The use of this "personal article" *si* gives somewhat of an indication of more personality or humanity than of supremacy or divinity. For example, the Tagalog Bible always has *ang Dios,* but *si Jesus* or *si Cristo.*

[52] Brief description of the Bisayan *agta* and *aghoy* may be found in Richard Arens, "Animism in the Rice Ritual of Leyte and Samar," *Philippine Sociological Review,* January 1956, p. 2n. In the same place he gives the particular characteristics of beliefs in *engkantada* (fairies) in Leyte and Samar. An interesting description of the beliefs connecting wild and imaginary animals with the spirit-world may be found in Laura

V. TODAY'S CULTURAL MINORITIES

It is the beliefs of the still-remaining mountain-dwellers who have never accepted either Christianity or Islam that the various primitive beliefs may still be seen. These have been thoroughly studied by many anthropologists, and there is abundant literature concerning these tribes' beliefs, especially since the arrival of the Americans. It may be presumed that many of these beliefs are similar to the beliefs of the lowlanders before they accepted a more organized religious system. A few of these persisting beliefs should therefore be examined to give a full view of Filipino primitive religion.

The most notable characteristics of "primitive religion" of the mountains of Luzon are prayer and sacrifice, with which is connected the *kanyao* or feast. The prayers cannot be easily separated into prayers of petition and prayers of worship, for life in the mountains is not divided into "sacred" and "secular" aspects, as is the life of the more "civilized" people. It may even be said that worship forms an integral part of the mountaineers' social structure.[53]

Perhaps the most interesting of the mountain peoples, and certainly the most studied, are the Ifugaos. The number of deities worshiped by these people is almost countless. In modern times there has been an attempt to elevate one of these gods to the position of Supreme God, probably in a desire to prove their native religion has teachings equivalent to those of the Christian missionaries.[54] The two principal native gods considered by mountaineers to be the equivalent of the Christian's god are Lumawig and Kabunyan. Missionary William Scott in examining beliefs concerning these deities concludes "that Cabunian is a class or place of deities; that Lumawig is a culture hero turned into a god; and that either or both have become the subject of an *apo-dios* concept through religious acculturation."[55] Another Ifugao "deity," *Muknongan,* has been called supreme god, but the word merely signifies "one to whom sacrifice is due."[56]

W. Benedict, *A Study of Bagobo Ceremonial, Magic and Myth* (New York: 1916), 31-40.

[53] William H. Scott, "Worship in Igorot Life," *Philippine Sociological Review,* July-October, 1960, p. 19. "Igorot pagan worship penetrates into almost every aspects of Igorot life, and actual prayers, rites, and religious songs accompany every phase or step of his life he considers significant." (*Ibid.*, 21.)

[54] This Supreme Being they term the *Apo-Dios* (Lord-God"), But there is much disagreement among themselves as to which god to be accorded the honor of greatest. For a discussion of this problem in the light of religious acculturation, see William Henry Scott, "The Apo-Dios Concept in Northern Luzon," *Practical Anthropology,* September-October, 1961, pp. 207-216. Scott believes that the idea of one supreme god is a borrowing from Christianity, because none of the native gods bears sufficient similarity to *Dios* of the Christian Filipinos.

[55] *Ibid.*, 216.

[56] Lourdes S. Dulawan, "The Ifugaos," *Unitas,* March. 1967, p. 33. The whole subject is obscure, partially due to the fact that Christian observers themselves may be in disagreement as to the meaning of supreme god among a primitive people. In the examination of the controversy converning the origins of the word *diwata,* it was seen that though the Tagalogs believed Bathala to be *their* supreme deity, they recognized *Diwata* as the supreme deity of the universe. It appears that singling

Rather than attempt to interpret Ifugao religion on a hierarchical basis, the fact must be accepted that it is thoroughly polytheistic and without gradations of deities. A natural question to ask is, why do so many gods exist? For an answer to this query, Ifugao society itself must be examined, for it is natural for a people to construct their religious systems in terms of their own society.

> . . . in the Ifugao society the looseness in organization and vagueness in definition of their local units and the great emphasis upon kinship relation have made the priests to be derived, and to function primarily on the basis of kinship groups, that is, the relationship between practitioners and participants of a ceremonial rite is almost exclusively based on kinship ties. In the dispersion of kindred and the emphasis of nuclear family as corporate groups have resulted in the development of a large number of priests in the Ifugao pantheon. As every priest invokes for his own gods, a great number of priests will obviously create a great number of deities.[57]

The religious practices of today's Kalingas may be characterized as preoccupation with the propitiation of evil spirits. The good spirits and the deities of kabuniyan (the "sky-world") do not need worship, since they do not harm man.[58] This is in agreement with the records of other primitive peoples in the Philippines, that is, the lack of concern for worshiping the higher deities, and a preference for dealing with the more familiar spirits.

The Negritos of the Philippines, the one race indigenous to the Philippine Islands that is not of Malayan stock, nevertheless have apparently similar beliefs to those of the Malay Filipinos. For example, the Negritoes of the Visayas worship *engkantos* and *taglogars* as well as the spirits of their ancestors, just as do the Bisayans. Two differences may be noted; the spirits of the Negritos' ancestors wander underground, and the spirits of nature are not given individual names but are instead considered collectively as the *enkanto*.[59]

VI. INFLUENCES OF ANITISM ON CHRISTIANITY

Even among lowlanders today, Christian observers are alarmed at the extent of pagan practice among those who are called Christians, to the ex-

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out one god for absolute supremacy is a concept foreign to at least some primitive religions; Christian evaluators of these religions are incorrect when they attempt to force these beliefs into categories which are almost meaningless to the primitive people.

[57] Yih-Yuan Li, "The Structure of the Ifugao Religion," *Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica,* spring, 1960, p. 397. In the Chinese text, there is a diagram of the Ifugao's conception of the universe whose center is of course Ifugaoland. See also Francis Lambrecht, "Ancestors' Knowledge Among the Ifugaos and Its Importance in the Religious and Social Life of the Tribe," *The University of Manila Journal of East Asiatic Studies,* July-October, 1954, pp. 359-365. His theory explaining the multiplicity of Ifugao deities connects the deities with ancestors. In fact, many of the deities of Filipinos may definitely be traced to the first men of the tribe (Genotiva, *op. cit.,* 66n).

[58] Dozier, *op. cit.,* 162.

[59] Timoteo S. Oracion, "Notes on the Culture of Negritos on Negros Island," *Silliman Journal,* third quarter, 1960, p. 215.

tent that their true religion may be considered paganism, with Christianity merely an addition to their paganism rather than a replacement of it.[60]

This may be seen, for example, in practices connected with honoring one's ancestors. Observers have seen here a clear and rather free interchange of pagan and Christian elements. Among Filipino fishermen an especially large catch is expected on All Souls' Day, because then the spirits of their ancestors are helping them. Though this is an official church saints' day, the observances of the day are more akin to pagan observances. The spirits are believed to expect a good meal either in the home or at the cemetery in return for their "aid" to the fishermen.[61]

In fact, the rural Filipinos in general believe the Christian *santos* are either the same, or in the same class as, the anitos of pagan belief.[62] This is a serious problem for the Catholic Church. From the very beginnings of Christianity in the Islands, the same images through which the *anitos* were worshiped were then used to worship the *santos* of the Church.[63]

The influence of primitive religion still lingers on, even among those nominally converted to Christianity. Rural Filipinos may, more often than not, still feel it more important to pay one's respects to inhabitants of the spirit-world, rather than to the one Spiritual Father of all. One who has the responsibility for religious training in the barrio must bear this in mind, and must also cope with the pagan attitude of attempting to get something from the higher power or higher powers, rather than the desire to give oneself to God's service in unselfish dedication to a life of helping one's brethren. Finally, we who are more highly educated must resist the tendency to despise primitive Filipinos as possessing unscientific and superstitious notions about God. The Christian engaged in church or social work in rural areas must guard himself against the greatest evidence of paganism—self-centeredness. If he can throw off this sin, he can then be in a better position to aid his less-educated brothers. "How dare you say to your brother, 'Please, let me take that speck out of your eye, when you have a log in your own eye? You imposter! Take the log out of your own eye first, and then you will be able to see and take the speck out of your brother's eye." [64]

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[60] For example, this is Leeder's evaluation of the Isinai (*op. cit.,* 15).

[61] Richard Arens, "Animistic Fishing Ritual in Leyte and Samar," *Philippine Sociological Review,* October, 1956, p. 28.

[62] F. Landa Jocano, "Filipino Folk Catholicism," *The Philippine Educational Forum,* November, 1966, p. 46.

[63] Alip, *op. cit.,* 230.

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GAPANG: THE PRACTICE OF "SLEEP-CRAWLING" IN A TAGALOG COMMUNITY

CAROLYN CRISPINO ISRAEL

SOME OF THE MOST NEGLECTED ASPECTS OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL AND sociological studies in the Philippines are the institutionalized patterns of sexual relations and activities. Aside from studies on formal marriage practices, there has been virtually no attempt made to probe deeper into the nature, causes and consequences of other sexual beliefs and practices such as abberant non-heterosexual relations, i.e., lesbianism and homosexuality, and pre-marital as well as extra-marital sexual relations. The seemingly flourishing institutions of concubinage and prostitution are almost untouched in terms of empirical and theoretical inquiries.* It is very important that studies along these lines be made; such studies may shed light on, and provide a clearer understanding of, the other social components of Philippine society, especially the family system. Furthermore, knowledge of the existing attitudes, values and practices pertaining to sex may provide significant insights about their determining influence in the socialization process and eventually, in the personality formation of the Filipino.

This paper makes a modest attempt to contribute to the limited existing ethnography on Philippine patterns of sexual relations. It describes and analyzes a peculiar sex activity locally known as *gapang* obtaining in a rural Tagalog community**. (It literally means "to crawl.")

Gapang, or what Mead [1] calls "sleep-crawling" in her studies of Samoa, refers to a man's act of surreptitiously stealing into the bedside of a woman

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* So far, the bulk of available materials on these subjects have been written by popular magazine writers who are not really technical specialists.

** Data contained in this paper were collected during a field research on "Social Organization, Cultural Values and Folk Medicine in Bay, Laguna" where the author worked as one of the field assistants of Dr. F. Landa Jocano, concurrently Chairman of the Department of Anthropology, University of the Philippines, in April-July, 1969. The project was sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation through the Comprehensive Community Health Program (CCHP), College of Medicine, University of the Philippines. The author wishes to thank Dr. Jocano for the permission granted in publishing parts of the field materials. She is likewise deeply indebted to the Asian Center for providing the funds necessary in the continuance of her personal research activities in the area, last July-September, 1970.

The methods of field research employed in this study were purely anthropological in nature and consisted of participant-observation, use of key informants and interview schedules and collection of case studies. Continuous residence in the barrio was initiated in April-July, 1969 and July-September, 1970 to facilitate interviews and to allow a closer observation of community life. To test the validity and accuracy of information given by informants, attempts at counter-checking with other subjects were likewise initiated.

[1] In Samoa, Mead notes a similar practice called *moetotolo.* Here a man commits *moetotolo* either because of anger for a girl's failure to show up for their clandestine

at night with the intention of "coercing" her into sexual relations. This is differentiated from the term *akyat* which is sleep-crawling executed by a woman.

In the case of this Laguna barrio studied, which this paper will refer to fictitiously as Barrio Tabing-tubig,[2] there are various motives and justifications given for this sex activity. According to barrio folks, a man desperately resorts to *gapang* when he fails to win the favor of the woman being courted. Thus, he crawls to her bedside at night when most of the older household members, especially the woman's parents, are not at home, often carrying with him a knife or any object with which to threaten the subject's life should she refuse or cry out for help.

The sleeping pattern in the barrio makes for a sleep-crawler's ease in planning out a successful time of "attack." Barrio Tabing-tubig represents a typical fishing community where sleeping habits are directly affected by fishing schedules. The time for going out into the lake follows a seasonal pattern and varies according to climatic temper. There are occasions when work starts from nine o'clock in the evening and ends at early dawn. A fisherman and his eldest son or sometimes even his wife, pack some food for snacks and a bottle of water and sail away into the deep areas of the lake to earn the following day's living. They spread the fishing nets and then wait until they gather enough catch while feasting on their *baon* [3] and drinking *lambanog* [4] in the motorized banca or on an island situated somewhere in the heart of the lake. There are also times when works starts at three o'clock in the morning and lasts until noontime. This happens more often when the weather is unfavourable and staying in the lake at night becomes very dangerous. Gambling in the form of games such as black-jack, lucky nine and *mahjong* as well as *barikan* (social drinking) are also heavily indulged in by the barrio adults, keeping them away from home for the most part of the night.

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encounter "under the palm trees" or due to failure in love. Sometimes, also, the sleep crawler relies upon the girl's expecting a lover or the possibility that she will indiscriminately accept any comer.

Catching a *moetotolo* is counted great sports in Samoa. A cornered sleep-crawler is severely punished by the aggrieved party and becomes the laughing stock of the community.

2 Barrio "Tabing-tubig" is a lakeshore community in Laguna, composed of four sitios and situated some twelve kilometers from the town proper. It has a conservative population estimate in 1968 of 2,700, grouped into about 550 families of which the average is seven. Fishing is the barrio's primary source of economic subsistence although various secondary and seasonal sources of income are available: rice and vegetable farming, rig and tricycle driving and factory as well as road construction employment.

The people are predominantly Roman Catholics although there is an ongoing mass conversion movement into the Aglipayan and the Jehovah's Witness Churches. Literacy is 67.7% (1960 Census of the Philippines). Health and sanitation fall short of the ideal standard since there is the virtual absence of sanitary sewage and drainage system.

3 *baon* — packed food to be eaten on the way to, or at the place of destination.

4 *Lambanog* — a native wine made from fermented coconut water.

Gapang may also involve an attempt on the part of a man to coerce his sweetheart into immediate marriage. This happens when the man feels that his woman is either still hesitant about getting married or is apparently being drawn closer to a new suitor; also when her parents show disapproval of him. Unlike in the first instance where threats are used to force a woman into giving in, here it is the woman's fear of a violent retribution on her boyfriend by the family members which prevents her from crying out for help. For instance, a female fish vendor whom the author had close association during her stay in the barrio confessed that she should not have been married at an early age to her husband had it not been for his "bold act of *paggapang.*"

While incidents of *gapang* due to unrequited love are known, many of the cases, observed interestingly reveal that this practice is often utilized as an alibi to cover up for certain unsanctioned or illegitimate heterosexual relationships. In the previously mentioned motive for *gapang,* force or threat of force is a necessary condition for its successful operation. However, when utilized as a camouflage as when a couple desires to get married but cannot get parental approval, such condition is absent. In short, once *gapang* is used as an alibi, it ceases to be a form of surreptitious rape. In fact, the sexual adventure may be planned out beforehand by the parties involved. The woman sets the time when her sweetheart can successfully enter the house and sleep with her for the night only to be discovered the following morning by the angry and hysterical family members. Should the plan fail to materialize, as when a family member is awakened by careless noises created, the woman will have to pretend by giving a loud outcry while the man has to jump out of the window and run faster than the woman's father (who usually gets hold of a bladed instrument or any possible object of assault and gives chase.)

Lolo L. related an incident of *gapang* committed by his eighteen-year grandson:

> Pedro once had a girl friend residing at Sitio W. When one time he asked her to sleep with him for the night, she consented and even proposed not to sleep with the siblings but near the *batalan* (kitchen area) to prevent the possible discovery of their tryst. However, the exact plan did not materialize for when Pedro surreptitiously entered the house he found no one in the *batalan* So he entered the bedroom and saw three females lying side by side. Thinking that the one lying nearest the doorway was his girl friend, he gently touched her. Unfortunately, it was the younger sister who awakened and gave a loud cry. Pedro made a hurried attempt to escape but the father who was also awakened by the girl's cry met him at the door with a hammer. He was severely beaten up, had all of his lower frontal teeth knocked out and sustained other body injuries.
>
> Neighbor who witnessed the incident said that Pedro could have died had he not been immediately brought to the nearest hospital.

For couples indulging in extra-marital sexual encounters, *gapang* can also become an effective alibi should either of the involved party's spouse

suddenly show up. For instance, the author noted in her field diary the following case:

> I was eating halo-halo [5] at Aling M.'s *ponda* (local mini-restaurant) when I overheard two men talking about a certain Mang C. who was beaten up by his neighbor, Mang B., the previous night. From what I've gathered in the conversation, what happened was that Mang B. arrived home from his fishing work at about four o'clock in the morning. While trying to tidy up his fishing gadgets, he heard whisperings in the house. He called to his wife who suddenly started shouting for help. Mang B. immediately run upstairs with a banca paddle and saw a figure trying to escape through the window. He gave chase and succeeded in hitting the escapee before the latter could jump to the ground and lose himself in the dark.
>
> Mang B. turned to his wife who was still crying. He was told that the man broke into the house and threatened to kill her should she refuse the man's "advances."
>
> At this instance, one of the bystanders who was also listening to the conversation gave a malicious laughter and commented: "naka-isa na naman ang nobyo ni M." (M. is Mang B.'s wife.)

While folks of Tabing-tubig frown on this practice, news of its occurrence is usually taken with humor. The "sleep-crawler" who fails and gets brutally beaten up by the woman's kinsmen is usually ridiculed by the males. He is branded as *mahina.* (The literal meaning of this word is "weak" although what the accusation more accurately refers to is the man's clumsiness in handling the situation.)

Gapang, therefore, appears to be a behavioral mechanism by which a man who was publicly shamed by a woman's refusal to accept his love can prove and assert his masculinity. Masculinity in this context may be defined in terms of a man's skill in winning the favor of the woman being courted through all possible means, legitimate or otherwise. Even if used as an alibi to cover up for an intentioned illicit sexual relations, the mere act of successfully breaking into somebody's house already adds to his reputation of being a "lintik sa babae" or fast with the girls. For the victimized woman, it is well and good should marriage follow such incident. However, even if it happens that the sleep-crawler was unsuccessful, her chastity becomes subjected to doubt and this lessens her chances of marriage. Adelina, a twenty-five year old fish vendor already regarded as an old-maid has had no suitor from the barrio ever since she was unsuccessfully attacked by an unaccepted suitor.

There are very few, if at all, cases recorded of a man's resorting to *gapang* for mere sexual gratification so that whoever the woman is becomes immaterial. The practice presupposes the existence of an earlier or ongoing relationship between the man and woman involved. In short, a man does not just sleep-crawl into any house he finds convenient breaking into.

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[5] *halo-halo* — a food preparation consisting of various diced tropical fruits and tubers mixed with ground ice, sugar and cream.

Besides, there are other and easier institutionalized ways for the fulfillment of the need for sexual pleasure in this community. Marriage usually comes at the early age of sixteen to twenty and prostitution houses litter the nearby towns.

Furthermore, the barrio is frequently visited by roving prostitutes who come in groups of two to four and headed by a male "manager." He and his professionals approach the barrio at about seven o'clock in the evening and proceed to an unoccupied shack earlier prepared for them by the "contact person." The latter is a resident of the barrio whose duties besides preparing the place are to spread the news of the visiting prostitutes and to scout for possible customers.

Accounts of teen-age boys interviewed in this regard offer the following information: When several men have already gathered in the house, the prostitutes would undress and perform some dancing stunts to the lusty music provided by the audience. Afterwards, they retreat to an adjacent room and the manager comes forward to recognize and accept the payments of all those who voiced out their intentions of taking his girls. The usual price for an hour's tryst ranges from one to three pesos.

Sex with the prostitutes may be done privately in the bedrooms, although sometimes, there are male customers who, accepting their friend's challenge, would perform the act in public.

Since there are only two to four prostitutes, the slated customers are serviced in rounds. Occasionally, pails of water are placed by the "contact person" in the room for the "girls' " use in cleaning their sweat-drenched bodies before resuming work. The night's labor ends at about two o'clock in the morning or just before the life of the day begins with the fishermen's slow walk to the lakeshore.

While the man is the aggressor in this particular practice, barrio folks also know of incidents wherein it is the woman who takes the initiative. Another term, however, is more often used to denote a case of *gapang* executed by a woman, and this is *akyat.* (It literally means "to climb" although what it connotes is the woman's discreet ascent to the man's house.) For instance, the author was once struck by the case of a marriage between a seventy-six year old widower and a woman of twenty. When further probing of the case was made, she found out through one of the old man's daughters with the first wife that this marriage came about as a result of the woman's frequent visitation of the old man in the house in which he used to live alone.

Some Social Implications

As stated earlier, *gapang,* when used to overcome unrequited love, functions in two ways: it manifestly becomes a mechanism for effecting immediate marriage with the desired party and latently functions to maintain the image of the offender in the community which was threatened by

his being a rejected suitor. It likewise reinforces the man's acceptance into his peer group or *barkada,* which puts some value in the skillful performance of certain locally considered unconventional sexual escapades.

For married couples, the use of *gapang* as an alibi apparently prevents the "shameful" discovery of the illicit relationship and in a way, also hinders the possible breakage of the home and disruption of family ties, especially the husband-wife relations. It seems that even if a person is aware of an existing extra-marital affair of his/her spouse, he would outwardly accept the alibi if only to save his image in the community. This is so because while the infidel is ostracized by barrio-mates, the latter also put some blame on the aggrieved spouse. It is believed that a married person "fools around" (*nagluluko*) partly because he does not get adequate emotional companionship at home. This assertion is interestingly substantiated by the manner in which barrio folks answer to queries on extra-marital relations and marital separation. Whenever questions in this regard were asked, informants would first strongly criticize the branded offender in the case. Immediately afterwards, though, they would justify the offender's behavior by citing the spouse's faults or shortcomings. To illustrate:

> In one of my casual conversations with Lola I, (my landlady), I inquired about the fate of widows and widowers in the barrio. In response, she gave an enumeration of the ones she could think of. When the name of a certain woman was uttered, Lolo B., who was seated nearby and listening to our conversation, interrupted, saying that the woman just mentioned was not a widow. Rather, she was separated from the husband, who, several years back left home in favor of another woman residing in a nearby barrio.
>
> Lola I. readily accepted her husband's correction and proceeded by commenting on the man's immorality and irresponsibility towards the four deserted children. I inquired whether they know the exact details of the case—the possible reason(s) for the man's behavior—and Lola I, resignedly answered: "Hay naku talaga sigurong ganyan ang mga lalaki." Then, she further added: "Kasi naman masyadong pala-away at tsismosa si N." (What this statement implies is that the woman's contribution to the failure of her marriage is her being very quarrelsome and a gossiper.)

In short, not only are the adulterers saved from public shame through the alibi of *gapang,* but their respective families as well.

It must be pointed out that complete husband-wife separation does not always result from the discovery of an illicit affair of either of the spouses. Sometimes, personality incompatibility and the inability of a person to tolerate some qualities of the marital partner come into the picture. For example, some of the recorded reasons for marriage separation are the dislike for work or "laziness" on the part of the husband, the stealing habit (kleptomania) of the wife as well as female domestic irresponsibility.

Finally, the frequency of *gapang* incidence is far less than the other locally disfavored mechanisms of effecting immediate marriage or for covering up intentional sexual encounters such as elopement and clandestine nocturnal meetings in the distant farm fields or on a sailing *banca* respectively.

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PEASANT SOCIETY AND UNREST PRIOR TO THE HUK REVOLUTION IN THE PHILIPPINES

BEN J. KERKVLIET

*Part I: A case study of social and economic changes in the 20th Century for peasants in Central Luzon.**

AT THE TURN OF THIS CENTURY, THE PLAINS OF NUEVA ECIJA WERE grass lands and forests. Filipinos had used the heavy cover for hiding and surprise attacks in their guerrilla wars against the Spanish and the American armies. After the revolutionaries had surrendered, many of their illustrado leaders held Sunday outings to shoot wild boar and deer in those forests. At the same time, some of the poor farmers in the area, many of them settlers from other parts of Central Luzon and Ilocos region, hunted to add to their meager food stores, just as Negritoes had done before being driven away by the newcomers.

As one travels through Nueva Ecija, he marvels at the expansive rice fields. That the wildlife, grasslands, forests (except for some standing timber high in the Sierra Madres and on balding Mt. Arayat) are gone and in their place stretch rice fields represents a history of interest to more than topographers and botanists. These physical changes betray intricate ecological changes of special importance to the peasants there. If one could study those changes, he could better comprehend the reasons for the growth of agrarian unrest that prevailed in Nueva Ecija and other parts of the central plains, beginning at least as early as the 1930's and peaking about 1948-52. Furthermore, such a study would reveal in some detail the society and economy of Central Luzon peasants. In order to make a manageable study, I have focused on one barrio's history, drawing generalizations by putting the case study data together with more general information about the province and Central Luzon as a whole.

In Tables I and II below the most striking trends are the rapid increases in land use and population growth. Note too the large percentage of farmers who, in 1939, are tenants, with practically all of them being share tenants (*kasama*). The basis of the economy for Talavera, Nueva

* This case study is an abbreviated version of a more detailed one that I am presently writing and will be part of my dissertation. The data was collected, in the main, during four months (March through June, 1970) of interviewing residents over 40 years old living in Talavera, principally in the barrio of San Ricardo. I am deeply grateful to all the people, especially to the peasants in San Ricardo and my hosts in Talavera, who were thoroughly generous to this outsider and talked freely about themselves and their community.

Ecija, as indeed for all of Central Luzon during this time period, was agriculture. *Palay* (unhusked rice) was the most important single crop.

TABLE I: CENSUS DATA[1]

		1903	***1918***	*1939*
Number of Farms	N.E.	13,381	33,764	78,313
	Talavera	n.a.	1,106	4,515
Total Area of Farms (Hectares)	N.E.	90,367	205,410	289,202
	Talavera	n.a.	7,086	17,196
Total Cultivated Area (Hectares)	N.E.	26,763	97,159	221,956
	Talavera	n.a.	4,881	13,689
Population	N.E.	134,147	226,721	416,762
	Talavera	3,352	8,658	20,442

(Note: n.a. = not available in the Census data for that year.)

TABLE II: NUMBER OF FARMS BY TENURE AND YEAR[2]

	# Farms	Owners	(%)	Tenants	(%)	Other	(%)
1939							
N.E.	78,319	26,221	(34)	52,029	(66)	69	(0)
Talavera	4,515	1,084	(24)	3,430	(76)	1	(0)
1960							
N.E.	58,566	13,168	(22)	44,670	(77)	728	(1)
Talavera	2,726	199	(7)	2,518	(93)	9	(0)

(Note: Owners include both full and part owners; tenants include all types. Percentage figures are rounded to nearest whole number.)

There were two main systems for clearing and planting the land in the early 1900's. The first, *buwis* or *buwisan,* was the less common and by the 1930's was practically extinct. The second, *kasama* or share-tenancy, was popular from the early 1900's and continues right up to the present. (According to the 1960 Census, 90% of all tenants in Talavera were kasama. For Nueva Ecija the respective figure is 94%.) Under buwis, a man would clear a small, 3-4 hectares, parcel owned by one with many uncleared hectares. For the first season or two he paid nothing to the landowner, and lived off whatever vegetables he could grow on the still rocky, weedy, and stump-filled land. Then he would probably plant *kaingin* style (slash and burn with no transplanting) for his first few crops of rice, and pay a set

[1] Figures taken from the three respective censuses. *Census of the Philippine Islands, 1903.* United States Bureau of Census. Washington: Government Printing Office. *Census of the Philippine Islands, 1918.* Census Office of the Philippine Islands. Manila: Bureau of Printing. *Census of the Philippine Islands, 1939.* Census Office of the Philippine Islands. Manila: Bureau of Printing.

[2] The 1939 tenancy figures are from the 1939 Census. For 1960, *Census of the Philippine Islands, 1960.* Bureau of Census. Manila: Government Printing Office. Other provinces with high tenancy rates in 1939 were Pampanga, 70%; Negros Occidental, 68%; Bulacan, 64%; Tarlac, 53%.

fee to the landowner. Or he might just continue planting vegetables and bananas, marketing to neighbors and nearby settlements what he could not consume. In the mid-1930's in San Ricardo, Talavera, the fee typically paid for 3-4 hectares was about ₱60 per year.

The reasons why the buwis system did not thrive lie mainly with indebtedness. The majority of those practising buwis could last only a few seasons without going into debt, usually to the landowner himself. Many in fact had to borrow the initial capital, small though it was, to buy tools and rent or buy a carabao. One season of crop failure due to drought, typhoons, or pests was usually enough to put in debt others who had avoided initial debts. In San Ricardo, as elsewhere, the practice was for the landowner and buwis tenant to agree that they shift to the kasama system. Then the tenant would plant palay and give about 50% of the harvest to the landlord.

Most tenants began as kasama right from the beginning. When General Manuel Tinio had hundreds of uncleared hectares in the San Ricardo area, men would approach him and ask for a plot of land. He would assign each man 2-4 hectares, depending on his and the tenant's desires. The tenants for the first year or two paid nothing to Tinio, nor was he paid anything by the hacendero. While the tenant prepared the land for palay cultivation, he raised vegetables to eat and borrowed from the landlord rice rations, which he would repay after he had started palay cultivation. Typically the tenants planted a season of kaingin before the first palay. Thus after about two or three seasons, the land was ready for palay.

Some of Tinio's tenants were families he brought from any one of several haciendas he held in the province. While he held some positions in the Philippine government, he even arranged for ex-prisoners to work his land if they wanted a new start in life. Most tenants, however, were migrants from Pampanga, Bulacan, and Ilocos provinces. Wherever their origin, they were all part of a labor-intensive agricultural system through which Tinio's hacienda of over 400 hectares in San Ricardo was cleared and farmed.

Manuel Tinio was not the only landowner in San Ricardo in the early 1900's, but his holdings were the biggest. His land encompassed the lion's share of the total in the area, and a large number of the people living there were his tenants. It is instructive to examine how he came to own his land.

Like his several brothers and sisters, Manuel Tinio inherited land (about 68 hectares) from his father's estate. The Tinio family had owned large tracts of land dating back to the 19th Century. Before Manuel Tinio could finish his college education in Manila, the Revolution came; he joined and acquired the rank of general. While eluding the Spanish armies, he often hid in the forests around San Ricardo. After making his peace with the Americans, he began purchasing large sections of his former hideout; by 1905 he held between 350 and 400 hectares of formerly public land, paying

50 to 100 pesos per hectare. In 1907 he was appointed governor of Nueva Ecija by the American regime. In 1908 he was elected to that position. Then he was appointed Director of Labor in 1909, the first Filipino to hold a directorship of any agency in the new American colony. He became Director of Lands in 1913, a post he held until 1916 when he apparently retired to hold no more public offices. All this time he continued to collect land holdings in many parts of Nueva Ecija, although some of his methods were reportedly unscrupulous.[3] It is not known exactly how many hundreds of hectares he added during those years, but in the Talavera area alone they exceeded three hundred. Some of the land he parcelled out to relatives; some he later sold for profit. Most he developed into rice haciendas.

Each tenant on the Tinio hacienda in San Ricardo cultivated, roughly, 2-4 hectares, and each was allowed a lot for his house. Most of the houses were built in clusters forming sitios and barrios. Sometimes too Manuel Tinio loaned carabaos to those tenants who had none of their own. Tenants paid all expenses for plowing, harrowing, and harvesting; Tinio paid for seeds and transplanting. They generally shared expenses for threshing and maintaining the irrigation canals, which Tinio had built in about 1918. After harvest and after each party had been re-imbursed for his respective expenses, the remainder was divided 50/50. Any debts owed to the hacendero was subtracted from the tenant's share.

Practically every kasama had *utang* (debt) to Tinio. He was the sole source of rice for those who could not keep a surplus to last a full cycle from harvest to harvest. As mentioned above, the typical kasama was borrowing even before he had planted his first palay. The rice tenant family borrowed for eating of *bigas* (milled rice) each year. For this type of utang no interest was charged. For any money borrowed, the tenants repaid its equivalent in palay at the prices prevailing for palay at harvest time (about ₱2 per cavan of palay in the 1920's). Whatever was left after paying his debts, the tenant took home, although some choose to leave part of their palay in Tinio's bodega at no charge. Most tenants, however, had only a few cavans remaining; sometimes they had none. In any case, they soon would have to start once again the whole borrowing cycle.

The economic aspect was only one part of the relationship between the tenants and the hacendero during those years. Tinio also saw to his tenants' personal needs, such as medical attention, contributing to families during times of joy (like births and marriages) and times of sorrow (like illness and deaths). While he did not always live on the hacienda, he was frequently there and easily and readily interacted with his tenants, including visiting them at their homes. It is reported that Manuel Tinio looked upon his tenants as extended members of his family, perhaps as a grandfather

[3] Several informants said that not only was Manuel Tinio the first Filipino to be a director, he was also the first to be removed from office because of corrupt practices.

looked upon his grandchildren. The tenants, in turn, felt considerable personal debt to Tinio that went far beyond monetary re-payment. Consequently they did all things for him at his asking—e.g., helping around his house and grounds, building and repairing irrigation and canals, clearing land for no re-imbursement, and mending his bull-carts.

The landlord-tenant relationship was reciprocal, with each partner feeling that he benefited. For the tenant there was economic security, knowing he would always have rice to eat, to plant, and enough left over for modest celebrations. The tenant could count on Tinio's ration and loans even in times of crop failures, which were more than occasional. There was also the important social security that the hacendero's paternal protection provided. As regards the landlord, there were financial profit, social prestige, and political benefits for him. His lands were cleared at practically no expense to him, he had a ready source of free labor for any work he might want done around the hacienda or elsewhere, and he could borrow money on the merit of his land and its productivity in order to further expand his holdings or to invest in business endeavors. There too was some capital gain from loaning money to tenants and being repaid its equivalent in palay at the low prices prevailing during harvest. He could hold on to the palay, then sell later in the year at higher prices in order to get more return per cavan. Despite this gain for the landlord, the peasant did not look upon the hacendero as their exploiter. Those old enough to remember describe Manuel Tinio, for example, as their benefactor and protector.

In 1924 Manuel Tinio died. His land was eventually divided among his many children (he had married twice), but from the time of his death until just before the Japanse occupation, one of his eldest sons administered several of Manuel's haciendas, including the one in San Ricardo. Under this new administration, the little world of the peasants there began to change. The causes do not follow simply from that change of hacenderos, yet from their perspective, the peasants attribute much of the cause to that fact. There were both small and large alterations in the system that at first irritated the peasants, but gradually became grave matters of survival.

When he took over his father's haciendas, Manolo Tinio had just graduated in engineering from Cornell University in the United States. He had been away for several years, and did not have the close, paternal-like ties his father had had with the tenants. He set up his house in Cabanatuan, the provincial capital, and rarely was in San Ricardo. He relied more than his father had on *katiwalas* (overseers) to run the hacienda because he had several farms to look after plus other interests in Cabanatuan and Manila. Consequently there was far less interaction with the peasants. This meant not only less of the personal touch but less concern for the tenants' well-being. The tenants knew this—they could feel it and see it.

The hacendero's contributions to a tenant family's baptism, etc., declined in number and amount. There was less assurance that the hacendero would look after a sick tenant or member of a tenant's family. At the same time, the new hacendero's management was *mas mahigpit* (more strict, stringent). Old tenants in Talavera recall that General Manuel Tinio had allowed them to take home free handfuls of palay to feed their chickens and ducks. Manolo Tinio had this stopped. The practice of *pulot* (picking up and keeping for free fallen grain after harvest) was allowed, but was more closely supervised by the katiwalas who had strict orders about exactly what grain could or could not be kept. As the years moved along, the strict enforcement of the new hacendero's policies were institutionalized by means of written contracts that all tenants signed and by armed guards to insure that the contracts and policies were not violated. Theoretically written contracts could have been to the tenant's interest as well as to the landlord's. In practice, not necessarily. The landlord was the one who drew up the terms, for there was no bargaining power on the tenant's part. The tenants were not yet organized enough to play the counterpart to management in a management-employee context. Furthermore, anyone not wanting to follow the rules of the hacienda could be replaced by others with increasing ease. (Recall the earlier population growth figures. Part II of this paper has more discussion on this point.)

The most drastic change for the tenants was the cessation of rations. For a few years Manolo Tinio continued the practice of giving rations but by the early 1930's (if not sooner) he ". . . put a stop to that."[4] His reasons reflect his way of looking upon the hacienda system he had inherited and his decisions to change it. For one thing, the rations were repaid with no interest. This seemed an un-business-like manner to handle one's capital. Second, the hacendero grew tired of seeing "long, sad faces" after such harvest, since most tenants had little or no palay to take home after having paid their debts to the hacendero. Tinio decided that if the tenants needed loans, it was better for his psyche and business that they get loans elsewhere, or, as the tenants put it, *"sa labas"* (outside the hacienda). That way, too, he and his katiwalas would not have to be bothered keeping accounts of loans and collections.

Changes in the landlord-tenant relationship were occurring not only on this hacienda nor only in this part of Central Luzon during the 1920's and 1930's. Landlords throughout the region were becoming increasingly impatient with the kasama system and wanted as little to do with it as possible. Yet in the absence of anything to replace tenant labor, large landowners still had to rely on the kasama for economic returns. Landlords began seeing kasamas as unequal business partners, with the landlord providing the land and most of the capital, and the tenants their labor and some capital—

[4] Manolo Tinio, Interview, 21 May 1970. San Ricardo, Talavera, Nueva Ecija.

principally, carabaos and farm implements. The previous ties binding the paternalistic relationship were gradually cut until only the economic strand was left. Yet even that grew weaker since increasingly the economic relationship was insufficient to meet the peasants' minimum needs. The most unfortunate result for the peasant was that he was left trying to cling to a dying socio-economic ecological system.

While the landlords were breaking their ties with tenants, other alternatives for the peasants were narrowing. In earlier years they could move from one area to the next in search of (1) more fertile soil or uncleared land owned by large landowners and (2) better conditions and arrangements with landlords. Such moving about indeed did continue into the mid 1940's, but the satisfaction it brough declined. First, population density was taking its toll of the land. Uncultivated land became scarce. The few unfarmed hectares in the San Ricardo area just before World War II were quickly converted to rice fields after the war. Where before there had been plenty of room to move around in, by the 1940's it was rather close quarters.[5] Moreover, the soil was less fertile and crop yields suffered. Older tenants in San Ricardo remember pre-World War II days when they could get yields without fertilizers and irrigation that today they can equal only with fertilizers and irrigation (when they have those).

As for searching for better relations with landlords, tenants were finding that practices among landlords were becoming increasingly uniform. Several who left the Tinio hacienda in San Ricardo in the late 1920's and early 1930's found that things were much the same not only elsewhere in Talavera, but all over the province. Example: There was a time when tenants could hope to find landlords who would give loans interest free. But in the 1930's and 1940's, tenants were choosing among landlords who demanded a repayment of only three cavans of palay, rather than four, per cavan of bigas borrowed. At the same time, peasants found themselves in non-bargaining positions. Landlords could set the terms; if a tenant refused, there would be others who would accept.

Homesteading or owning one's own land was one option that a few peasants could try for in the early years of the 20th Century. Then there were favorable homestead laws, which were sometimes administered fairly, and some public lands for that purpose were still available. But in the San Ricardo area, as elsewhere in Central Luzon, the landowner who farms his own small piece of land with his family now, as before World War II, is clearly the exception. This is a consequence not only of big-moneyed people

[5] A good indication of this density and scarcity of farm land is the system of puesto now practiced in Nueva Ecija but did not exist prior to about the late 1940's. Under this system, a tenant farmer who wants to give up his parcel can get a payment (nowadays about ₱1,000 per hectare in the San Ricardo area) from a person who wants to take his place as the tenant on that parcel. Such a payment for the right to cultivate a piece of land was unheard of before because there was at that time land yet to be cleared and cultivated.

buying large tracts of land. Many who did in fact homestead failed to survive the hardships. A handful in San Ricardo, for example, lost their holdings in the 1930's because they were forced to borrow large amounts from money-lenders or larger landowners, then later give up their land in an attempt to pay back their debts.

As another alternative to adjust to the changing ecological system, a peasant could try to augment his income through other work. This became especially crucial as cash, rather than just rice, became important for the peasant family's budget. While there were no reported "cottage industries" in San Ricardo, men and women did look for miscellaneous work such as cutting wood to sell (in the earlier years of the 20th Century, wood was so plentiful that no one sold it), raising a few pigs or poultry to sell in the market, and growing some vegetables on the few hectares irrigated during the off-palay season. There too was short-term agricultural employment such as transplanting rice seedlings. San Ricardo residents report that work that before had often been done free by friends and relatives later, as the need for work and extra income increased, was done for payment. For example, previously, peasants would help each other harvest palay with no payment expected. By the 1930's and especially in the post-war 1940's, it was common to pay a team of harvesters about 6% of the harvest. Since this expense was usually subtracted from the gross harvest (before the net harvest was divided between landlord and tenant), such payment came out of the landlord's pocket, so to speak, as much as the individual tenant farmer's. In such a fashion the wealth of the barrio was shared not only to increase a tenant's income, but also to provide employment for a small but growing number of men who did not even have a plot of land to work on as a tenant.

Another option was *pagtitiis lamang*—to simply endure the changes and hardship as best as possible. For most this meant, at the very least, borrowing rice and money at higher and higher interest rates, either from their landlords or from money-lenders.[6] Some could get courage and spiritual support through religion. The family system, which included relatives on both the husband's and the wife's side, often helped. People too cut back on their already meager diets, having less meat and more vegetables to accompany their staple food, rice. As an indicator of the desperation and scarcity, elder residents of San Ricardo point to the custom of pulot. They remember when stalks of palay could lie on the ground for week and no one would bother to pick them up. But during the 1930's and even more so after the Japanees occupation, the practice of pulot became very common, with the numerous *namumulot* (those gleaning the fields) following right

[6] Interest rates varied with the loan source and over time, but for rice the general trend in the Talavera area was 50%, then 100%, and by the late 1930's 150% (5 cavans of *palay* to be paid for every 1 cavan of *bigas* borrowed). (Note: 2 cavans of palay equals about 1 cavan of bigas.) For money, interest rates before World War II were about 20%.

along behind the harvesters. For many people it became an important way to add a little to their small incomes.

These various responses by peasants were not done one at a time. People did several simultaneously, trying to regain at least economic security in an eroding system. Some responded with more public and even hostile actions. People began placing blame for their worsening situation. As they did, they began pointing more frequently at the landlords, money-lenders, and, later, apathetic or unresponsive government officials. This process will be analyzed in the second part of this paper.

The conditions analyzed above for one part of Nueva Ecija are not isolated phenomena. What was happening in Talavera is but a microcosm of the general situation in the province and in practically all rural areas of Central Luzon and parts of Southern Luzon. As mentioned earlier, older residents of San Ricardo who farmed in other parts of the province, or even other parts of Central Luzon, said that they experienced worsening relations between landlords and tenants no matter where they went. From interviews with peasants in other municipalities of Nueva Ecija (especially Cabiao and Guimba), I found that conditions similar to Talavera had prevailed there too. Another researcher, doing an intensive socio-economic history of Pampanga, has found that from the late 19th century and continuing through the 20th, the economic and social ties previously linking tenants and their landlords were dwindling in number and strength until only a slim strand was left—and even that was increasingly strained.[7] In *Land and Peasants in Central Luzon* by Takahashi Akira, one can see that in Bulacan as well population pressure on the cultivated land was increasing while ties between landlord and tenant diminished.[8] Newspaper stories prior to World War II would also help confirm that the situation in San Ricardo, Talavera was a microcosm of Central Luzon. (Newspaper accounts for the 1930's will be analyzed below.) Finally, through interviews several former Huks have described such conditions as characteristics of Central Luzon.

Part II: Building towards revolution.

In this section of the paper, I will argue that preceding the Huk-PKP revolution of the 1940's and early 1950's there was a gradual intensification

[7] The researcher referred to is Dr. John Larkin. He has just completed a manuscript on the history of Pampanga up to 1922. That manuscript is now in press, but Dr. Larkin kindly allowed me to read it. He continues the argument started in his unpublished dissertation—that the social and economic bonds holding Pampangan society together were becoming untied. Cf. John Larkin, *The Evolution of Pampangan Society: A Case Study of Social and Economic Change in the Rural Philippines.* Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, 1966.

[8] Tokyo: The Institute of Developing Economics, 1969. While Takahashi's excellent work focuses on present day Central Luzon, there is a historical dimension to the study, albeit interspersed among several chapters. Cf. particularly Chaps. 3, 7, and 15. From Takahashi one sees too that time has not improved the peasants' lot, and my interviews about present day conditions with peasants in San Ricardo would support Takahashi's findings in all essential aspects. Significantly, Takahashi's peasant respondents in a barrio in Baliwag, Bulacan, attribute much to the Huk movement (of the 1940's to mid 1950's) for any improvements.

of events revealing spreading frustration and hostility among the peasants of Central and Southern Luzon against a socio-economic system that could no longer satisfy their basic economic and social needs. This intensification involved several staged processes through which peasants tried to regain the security they needed. These steps were not necessarily followed in the same sequence in all parts of the central plains of Luzon. But what the peasants learned individually and as a class of people was the necessity for united action in order to present their grievances and demands, whether to their landlords, their local political leaders, or the national government. This building of unity was first accomplished, generally speaking, only among small groups, such as tenants for a single hacienda or landlord; but gradually these small groups came together forming larger organizations and unions. Their methods were varied, from more or less individual acts, like assaulting a landlord or overseer, to more complex and long-term actions, such as seeking justice through the court system, waging strikes, or electing chief spokesmen to political office. There were also occasional small outbursts of violence that foretold the eventual outcome—revolution—if the far more numerous actions through the legitimate channels failed, as they eventually did, to bring satisfaction.

Unfortunately for Philippine history there is little published research about peasant groups and sporadic uprisings rooted in social and economic disequilibrium. The few that do exist tend to remove the occurrences from their wider context. Nevertheless, it is instructive here to consider briefly four sporadic uprisings in the 1920's and 1930's that have received some attention from historians. These four are the *Kapisanan Makabola Makasinag* (1924-25), Tayug uprising (1931), Tangulan incidents (principally 1931), and the Sakdalista (principally 1934-35).[9] For more details on each, the reader should refer to the research cited in footnote nine, but for our purposes it is sufficient to extract similarities and differences among the four. Then we can see the relationship of these four to other peasant activity, which will be subsequently analyzed.

In terms of area, these groups had considerable differences; however, they all were confined, for the most part, to Central Luzon. The Kapisanan uprising (which its members hoped would become a revolution) was in the area of San Jose, Nueva Ecija. However this secret society had members in other parts of that province as well as in parts of Pangansinan and the Ilocos provinces.[10] Its members, mostly Ilocanos, grew in number from 800 in 1924 to 12,000 one year later. The Tayug uprising was in Tayug, Pangasi-

[9] For information on the first three groups, see Milagros C. Guerrero, "The Colorum Uprisings: 1924-31," *Asian Studies* 5 (April 1967), pp. 65-78; and Roy M. Stubbs, *Philippine Radicalism: The Central Luzon Uprisings,* 1925-35. Ph.D. Dissertation (unpublished), University of California, Berkeley, 1951. For the Sakdalista group, see David R. Sturtevant, *Philippine Social Structure and its Relation to Agrarian Unrest.* Ph.D. Dissertation (unpublished), Stanford University, 1958; also, see the Stubbs' dissertation.

[10] All my information on the Kapisanan comes from Stubbs' dissertation.

nan, but the participants were part of a larger society generally known as *colorums*. During the American occupation colorum groups had been sprouting in many parts of the Philippines, including Nueva Ecija, Pangasinan, Tarlac, La Union, Batangas, and Surigao.[11] They were not necessarily connected to each other; in all likelihood they were fairly autonomous. But it is difficult to know exactly how autonomous each was from the other since the name *colorum* seems to have been assigned to any band of religious mystics in the country.[12]

The Tangulan was both rural and urban based, being the result of a federation in 1930 between the *Kapatiran Magsasaka* (Brotherhood of Peasants), based in Bulacan, and the *Kapatiran Anak ng Bayan* (Brotherhood of Patriots), confined to Manila. Its members reportedly grew from about one thousand to forty thousand. Its rural membership expanded to include, in addition to Bulacan, parts of Nueva Ecija, Rizal, Laguna, Pampanga, Quezon, Cavite, and Bataan.[13] In terms of membership and area, the Sakdalista movement was by far the strongest of the four, as revealed in the 1934 elections. In Laguna two Sakdalistas were elected to the House of Representatives, two more to the Provincial Board, and four municipalities elected Sakdalista presidents, vice-presidents, or councilors. In Tayabas (now Quezon province), a Sakdalista was also elected to the House. A Sakdalista was elected governor of Marinduque and several more were elected to municipal offices in Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Rizal, and Cavite.[14] A few months before the abortive uprisings in May 1935, its membership was estimated between 68,000 and 200,000. The Sakdal leaders claimed a following of 150,000.[15]

There are several similarities among these four groups that should be emphasized. First, while at first each tried to express their aspirations through a variety of means (including participation in elections by Tangulans and Sakdalistas), each one eventually tried to stage a revolt that would bring a quick end to the established government. In each case repression by the local and national governments (by denying to members basic rights—public meetings, free speech, free press—supposedly protected by law) preceded the outbreak of violence. Also in each case local police and the Philippine Constabulary (PC) quickly put down the revolts. Typically too, members of these groups who had turned informers and revealed plans for the uprisings aided the military considerably. Once crushed, each group disappeared, or, in the case of the Sakdalista, changed its outlook and lost its radicalism. Part of the reason for the death of these groups following their short-lived revolts was the strong tendency for "hero worship" of the prin-

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[11] Guerrero, "The Colorum Uprisings: 1924-31," *Asian Studies*, April 1967, p. 66.
[12] Stubbs, pp. 54, 58. *The Tribune* in the 1930's does this as well.
[13] Stubbs, pp. 95-7, 107. Joseph Hayden, *Philippines: A Study in National Development*. (New York: The Macmillan Company), p. 915.
[14] Stubbs, p. 164.
[15] Stubbs, p. 165.

cipal leader of each.[16] Once that leader had been killed, imprisoned, or discredited, there was little left to hold the group together.

While the groups as such faded away as their leaders were removed, there is considerable evidence that their members did not completely abandon the issues and aspirations that the groups had expressed. The areas where the organizations were the strongest and most active are also the areas where peasant activities were the most vigorous in the 1930's, according to reports from *The Tribune*. (See Appendix, Table A.) I will support this contention in more detail below, but for purposes of illustration we can point to the Tayug area where, according to newspaper accounts, there was peasant unrest in 1931 (aside from the uprising itself), 1935 (2 incidents), 1936 (4 incidents), and 1937 (3 incidents). All these protests reported in the newspapers and the Tayug uprising itself were, for the most part, aimed at worsening economic conditions on one or two haciendas in the area, which together held virtually all the land there. This continuity of area would suggest that followers of one group frequently became involved in another once the first died or lost its appeal. That is indeed the case for many areas of Central and Southern Luzon, as we shall see below. But again as an illustration, many in the Tangulans later were among the ranks of the Sakdalista.[17]

The reason for such continuities of area and participation among the four groups and with other peasant activities of the 1930's lies in the issues and aspirations involved. From the point of view of most participants (mostly peasants), the basic purpose of these groups was economic improvement. More specifically, the peasants in these groups saw the landlords as the primary cause of their economic impoverishment and thus they were hoping for a new order in which their predicament could be improved. Some participants were even hoping that the new order would bring land re-distribution. Especially important was their realizing that unity among themselves was necessary in order to push for change. The various leaders were the ones who told their respective followers that only through independence from the colonial power and its established government could such improved economic conditions come. Because of this, unrest due to economic and social causes took the form of aborted uprisings for immediate independence.

In terms of planning and organization for revolution, the Sakdalista uprising was the most impressive of the four. David Sturtevant argues that the Sakdalista movement was a kind of midway point between blind (and often messianic-in-kind) peasant outbursts, on the one hand, and well organized, will directed peasant movements, on the other.[18] To some extent that is true.

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[16] The phenomenon is easily seen in the findings of Stubbs and Sturtevant. The term "hero worship" was a description used by Pedro Abad Santos, leader of the Socialist movement in Pampanga, for the Sakdalista party. Sturtevant, p. 215.

[17] Stubbs, pp. 102, 115-16, 193-94.

[18] Sturtevant, p. 154.

In 1935 the Sakdalista movement was the largest and most widespread, single peasant organization; and through it peasants did understand more fully the value of unity among themselves. But other Central Luzon peasants, in addition to those in the Sakdalista movement, were also joining together for similar reasons. The Sakdal uprisings in 1935 (principally in Cabuyao and Sta. Rosa, Laguna, and San Ildefonso, Bulacan, involving four to seven thousand people in all) were the most obvious peasant activities at the time. They were by no means, however, the only ones, not even in the provinces where Sakdal strength was greatest (Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, and Laguna). Not even the violence was peculiar to them since there were numerous violent incidents by peasants during that year, even in the same areas. What was unique in 1935 about the Sakdals was their attempt, however premature, to overthrow the government. Most peasant incidents, violent and non-violent, earlier in the decade, as well as after 1935, were aimed not at achieving political power but at demanding solutions for social and economic problems confronting them.

Table A (Appendix) is a summarization of all newspaper *(The Tribune)* reports for the years 1930-40 (inclusive) of peasant and labor activities. Most of the data is summarized by province, but where incidents were few, several provinces were grouped by area, e.g., Northern Luzon and Mindanao. Activities include such things as a few tenants attacking a landlord's bodega; peasant demonstrations in barrios, poblacions, and provincial capitals; petitions of peasants and laborers seeking government help regarding some economic, social, or political problem; burning of cane or palay fields; strikes; notifications of planned strikes; requests from a group of peasants or laborers for improved conditions, etc.; and anything else that indicates an expression of protest or desire for change by laborers or peasants. For the most part there was no difficulty in making a decision about whether or not to code a newspaper item as an incident. Sometimes subjective judgment was unavoidable, but not enough to change the general pattern, which was the main purpose for coding newspaper data.

Each incident was counted as equal. That is, a strike that involved several hundred peasants was counted as one, but so was the burning of a few hectares of sugar cane by a few tenants or a small strike by factory workers in Manila. These qualitative differences among types of activities will come out in the more detailed analysis below.

One additional comment before going to that analysis. When counting incidents, I distinguished between peasant activity and labor activity, but in the summary tables presented in the Appendix those distinctions were eliminated. Labor activity in Central and Southern Luzon was extremely rare, but for the Visayas (except for Negros Occidental), Mindanao, Northern Luzon, and, of course, Manila, labor incidents account for virtually all activity. In Negros Occidental peasant and labor actions were about equal in frequency. Data for peasants actually include a few more incidents than

what would normally be considered strictly peasant activity; I have also included agricultural workers. This means that in addition to actions by peasants *per se,* I have included actions by sugar central workers who worked in the mills themselves or cut and hauled cane for the centrals. The reasons for this inclusion are (1) many who were central workers of this type also were peasants in the narrower sense of the word, (2) such central workers were often fellow union or organizations members with peasants, and (3) frequently newspaper reporting did not draw distinctions between peasants and other agricultural workers.

An examination of Table A immediately reveals a heavy concentration of all peasant incidents in three provinces—Bulacan, Pampanga, and Nueva Ecija. The next most active provinces, but decidedly second to the above three, are Tarlac, Pangasinan, Bataan, Laguna, and Rizal. (One should note, however, that 16 of the total incidents in Rizal are labor, and not related to agricultural work, due to the growing urban nature of Rizal in the 1930's.) Not only are Bulacan, Pampanga, and Nueva Ecija the most active over the whole decade, but practically for any given year within that decade they dominate over the other parts of the country.

Table A also shows that the frequency of incidents was increasing over time. This is a general trend for the whole country, but is even more pronounced in the three principal provinces of Central Luzon—Bulacan, Pampanga, and Nueva Ecija. Table B (Appendix) shows that an increasing number of municipalities recorded incidents of unrest during the decade. Luzon provinces have the greatest degree of unrest for any one year compared to other parts of the country. For a few years Negros Occidental had several incidents in several municipalities, but it does not come close to matching most of the Central Luzon provinces, especially, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Nueva Ecija. Only in 1931, when nine municipalities reported incidents, was that province more active by this measure. An examination of the particular occurrences shows that there was only one incident in each of the nine municipalities and all incidents were labor as opposed to peasant. In that year there was a wave of strikes among lumber and dock workers in Negros Occidental.

Notice that while the number of incidents in Table A is generally increasing in Bataan and Laguna, there is not a large spread in area or number of municipalities (Table B). In each of those provinces there were just one or two large landed estates that repeatedly had trouble throughout the decade—namely, San Pedro Tunasan in Laguna and Dinalupihan in Bataan.

Tables C, D, and E (Appendix) are the breakdowns by municipality for the three core provinces of peasant unrest during the 1930's. Each Table clearly demonstrates the mushrooming number of incidents and the increasing number of municipalities affected. Notice the numerous repeated occurrences within individual municipalities for some of those years, especially as the decade draws closer to 1940. Also note the frequent re-occurrence

of rest within a particular municipality over time. That is, peasant activity not only is continuous and accelerating over time for each of the provinces, but also for many of the municipalities within each province.

In order to better understand the qualitative intensification of these quantitative increases for the three core provinces as well as some of the other areas of Luzon, one must look in some detail at each province in turn.

Nueva Ecija

The first reports in *The Tribune* of strikes in Nueva Ecija were in 1932 when tenants on four different haciendas went on strike in attempts to get loans of rice or cash from landlords who previously refused such requests. The strikes occurred in the months of July and August, the time of year when tenants usually could get loans from landlords. After each strike was settled, a government official announced that trouble in the province was settled and rumors of more strikes or peasant actions pushing similar demands were unfounded. Nevertheless, in the years that followed more strikes occurred, some seeking loans, others increased shares of the crop, reduced agricultural expenses, etc. Simultaneously, peasants in the province, almost all being tenants on large haciendas, pursued through other means similar objectives. The most common method was the use of group petitions. At first it was enough to petition directly to the landlord or his overseer; but increasingly over the decade petitions to local mayors, then to the provincial governors, and eventually to national government officials, including President Quezon, were utilized. Some too sought legal recourse through the courts, starting usually with the local justice of the peace, but almost inevitably having to go to the Court of First Instance (CFI) to appeal the lower court's rulings.

As the peasants went further and further away from the hacienda itself in seeking solutions, they had to rely more on assistance from others to help vocalize strike demands, present their petitions, and argue their court cases. The most public spokesman for Nueva Ecija peasants was Juan Feleo, a former school teacher from Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija. He was a long time peasant leader, starting at least as early as 1922, when he organized tenants in barrio La Fuente, Santa Rosa into a group called *Union ng Magsasaka* (Union of Peasants).[19] While it is certain Feleo served as a spokesman for Nueva Ecija tenants earlier than 1939, it is not until that year that one finds *Tribune* reports of his role.[20]

In that same year (1939) there are the first reported signs that peasants from various haciendas had come together to present joint demands. While

[19] *Kasaysayan ng Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas* (History of the Peasant Movement in the Philippines), undated, p. 10. Exhibit W-412, Criminal Case No. 15844 (Hernandez, et. al.), CFI, Manila.

[20] *The Tribune*, 29 April 1939, pp. 1 ff.

there were peasant organizations that were several years old and had members from many different haciendas in virtually all parts of the province,[21] not until 1939 do *The Tribune's* accounts show that such an organization, in particular the KPMP (*Kalipunang Pambansa ng mga Magsasaka sa Pilipinas* (National Society of Peasants in the Philippines), channeled joint demands for thousands of tenants in the province. The KPMP even served as a kind of bargaining agent for its members when they were threatening a massive strike against over 50 hacenderos in the province. By January 1940, the issues of that planned strike were referred to the CIR. All other attempts at settlement had failed, in part because the hacenderos refused to negotiate with the KPMP.[22]

In the meantime there were numerous incidents of violence. In 1935, *The Tribune* reported that while a tenant and his landlord argued over the possession of a bundle of newly harvested palay that still lay on the field, the tenant struck the landlord with his scythe, killing him.[23] In later years the more typical acts of violence were confrontation betwen groups of tenants and PC patrols, whom the landowners would call, or clashes between "old" tenants (those who had worked the land the preceding season but were evicted for the following season) and newly hired tenants.

Liberally interspersed among petitions, court cases, threatened and actual strikes, and violent actions were activities like raiding hacenderos' rice bodegas, carting away harvested palay before the landlords could take their shares, dividing the crop before landlords or overseers could come to supervise the division, "old" tenants destroying fields planted by "new" tenants, holding demonstrations in town poblacions and in the provincial capital at Cabanatuan.

If one makes a list of the specific causes or grievances involved in all this activity, the assortment is certainly wide. But after closer examination practically all revolve around one or more of the following: (1) payment or taking out of loans, (2) whether interests charged on the loans were fair, within the law, or according to the contract between landlord and tenant, (3) procedure for dividing the harvest (including demands for increased shares), (4) who—tenant, landlord, or both—is responsible for payment of particular farming expenses, (5) miscellaneous benefits, and (6) a peasant's right to be a member of a peasant organization or union.[24]

Often other disputes grew out of these six. For example, in February, March, and April 1939, there was widespread eviction of tenants from their

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[21] *Kasaysayan ng Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas*, pp. 11-13. Also, according to a key informant in Guimba, Nueva Ecija (26 June 1970), the *Kapatirang Magsasaka* (Brotherhood of Peasants) had several chapters in various parts of Guimba, and Nueva Ecija in general, by early 1930's.

[22] *The Tribune*, 16 January 1940, pp. 1 ff.

[23] *The Tribune*, 26 December 1935, pp. 1 ff.

[24] As an example of common demands, below are the 12 demands of a several-month-long dispute between several thousand tenants in Nueva Ecija (most of whom were in the KPMP) and over 50 landlords: (1) reinstate all tenants disposed during

lands. Removing a tenant from the land was one powerful method a landlord (or overseer) used against tenants who were insisting on the enforcement of amendment to the New Rice Share Tenancy Law, which had been passed the year before. That amended law specified a small number of mandatory conditions for any contract between landlord and tenant. Those requirements were aimed at protecting the tenant's interest regarding some of the six issues listed above. However, the contracts were only good for one year. After the harvest in January for the 1938-39 crop, tenants who insisted on the enforcement of that law were denied renewed contracts, and in their stead other men were hired who would not insist on contracts as specified by that tenancy law. By April 1939 at least 4,000 tenants in Nueva Ecija were "purged" and several additional thousand faced the immediate prospect of such ejectment.[25] In other rice areas of Central Luzon, including Bulacan, Pampanga, Bataan, and Tarlac, similar "purges" were occurring, but on a lesser scale.[26] The peasants sought protection not only through petitioning government officials, including President Quezon, but by unifying themselves and refusing to leave after being ejected. At the same time they tried to persuade, peacefully and otherwise, outsiders from signing contracts to work on the haciendas under conditions sub-standard to those required by law.[27] The Philippine Constabulary was very busy that year and the next, forcibly ejecting tenants whom hacenderos had dismissed (a typical method was to wreck the stubborn tenants' homes), intervening in disputes between tenants and hacenderos over the division of the crop, and trying to prevent angry tenants from molesting "new" tenants.

Something very noticeable about the incidents reported in the newspapers was the consistent repetition of trouble. Issues never seemed to be really solved. Indeed attempts at solutions often served only to compound the difficulties. Names of haciendas experiencing incidents repeated occur over the years: for example, the de Leon Hacienda in Cabanatuan; the Santos Haciendas (there were five) in Guimba, Nampicuan, and Cuyapo; the Ja-

1938-39 because there is no just cause for dispossession; (2) give tenants a ration of five cavans of palay per cavan of seedlings planted with no interest the time the fields are prepared up to the time of planting; (3) free rations to each tenant during harvest and threshing; (4) allow tenants to borrow money with which to buy prime necessities, with no interest, during the period immediately after planting up until threshing; (5) expenses for planting, pulling, cutting, must be borne share and share alike by tenants and landlords; (6) planters must be paid ₱2.50 per cavan of seedlings pulled; (7) palay planters must be paid ₱10 for each cavan of seedlings to be planted under *pakiyaw* contract/payment by the job/, and in case of daily engagement, they should be paid ₱0.70 per day; (8) cutters of palay must be paid ₱15 or five cavans of palay for each cavan of seedlings cut; (9) previous agreements entered into between landlords and tenants on the above listed points must be revoked; (10) landlords must recognize the KPMP's rights to collective bargaining for its members; (11) landlords who refuse to recognize tenants' right to ask for immediate liquidation or reliquidation/of the crop/should be punished; and (12) landlords must bear all expenses for irrigation of his farmland. *The Tribune,* 16 January 1940, pp. 1. ff.

[25] *The Tribune,* 21 April 1939, pp. 1 ff.

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] *The Tribune,* 30 March 1939, pp. 1 ff.

cinto Hacienda in Talavera; the Buencamino Hacienda in Cabiao; and the Sabani Estate in Laur, to name but a few.

The trouble at the Sabani Estate is especially noteworthy because that Estate was owned by the Philippine Government, unrer the direct administration of the National Development Company. The newspaper accounts unfortunately lack background history to the trouble, but apprently the government had owned for many years the 11,000 hectare estate (of which only a fraction was actually cultivated).[28] Various grievances lingered without the government paying much heed. Finally in 1937 the tenants joined together in demanding that the government divide the hacienda and sell parcels to the tenants. They also wanted the manager and foreman at the estate removed because of reported maltreatment. The situation grew serious, especially when Philippine Army soldiers were sent.[29] But the peasants were temporarily satisfied and no strikes or serious trouble occurred. The government promised a reduction of rent fom 33% of the crop to 25%. A year later 2,000 tenants, virtually all, on the estate organized a strike to protest a contract they had been asked to sign that would permit them to stay on the farm for only one year.[30] They saw this contract as an attempt by the government to side-step the demand that the estate be sold to the tenants. President Quezon himself investigated and in June 1938 came out in favor of selling the Estate to the tenants on an installment plan.[31] A full two years later the peasants were still demanding the promised sale.[32] In those two intervening years, there had been another strike, several demonstrations, and on at least one occasion the estate manager called in armed guards. The tenants were still asking that the land be sold to them and that the manager be immediately removed. For his part, the manager had reportedly been intimidating peasants from holding meetings concerning their petition and even was removing from the estate some of the leaders, who were tenants there, and threatening the ejection of many others. He eventually ordered that no future meetings be held without a permit, which he alone could grant.[33] Apparently the situation was still in considerable flux up to the time of World War II.

The reader will recall that the first part of this paper was a case study of one area in Nueva Ecija. It is appropriate now to return briefly to the Talavera case; through a closer look at peasant activity there, we can see in more detail the growth of peasant organization for Nueva Ecija and for Central Luzon in general.

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[28] *The Tribune,* 3 June 1938, pp. 1 ff; 21 January 1939, p. 15.
[29] *The Tribune,* 23 February 1937, p. 14; 27 February 1937, p. 3.
[30] *The Tribune,* 31 May 1938, pp. 1 ff.
[31] *The Tribune,* 3 June 1938, pp. 1 ff.
[32] *The Tribune,* 23 May 1940, p. 16.
[33] *The Tribune,* 21 January 1939, p. 16; 9 December 1939, pp. 1 ff; 13 December 1939, p. 14; 16 December 1939, p. 2.

The first *Tribune* report of a peasant incident in Talavera was in 1936. But according to interviews in San Ricardo, there was a strike in 1935; and a few years earlier, some tenants in San Ricardo physically attacked a katiwala who had angered them by once too often denying them a bit of palay for their chickens. Peasants acting together while making demands on hacenderos intensified after 1935 in the San Ricardo area. While there is no newspaper report, two key respondents said that there was a rather large strike in 1938 against a landlord in a barrio near San Ricardo. That strike failed to bring results sought. The PC was called in to stop it; also, because unity among the tenants on the hacienda was weak, only some peasants joined the strike. This served as an important lesson to the peasants in the area—the necessity of acting together if they were to be effective.[34]

As in many other parts of Nueva Ecija and Central Luzon, Talavera had numerous incidents in 1939 and 1940. (See Table D, Appendix). Not all of them were strikes, although many were. One of the troubled areas was the Tinio hacienda in San Ricardo. The increased frequency of activity indicated worsening relations between the landlords (and/or their overseers) and the tenants along with growing solidarity among tenants within a hacienda and signs of unity cross-cutting hacienda and municipality boundaries.

Peasants in the area were learning the importance of united action not only through their own experiences, but also from the experiences of others. One former local peasant leader (himself from a peasant family) said that an important influence in the 1930's was the labor union activity in Manila. "They [the peasants in Nueva Ecija] saw... that workers in Manila had joined together and acted as one in order to get better wages, etc." Also important, and more directly related, was an organization that originated in Bulacan called the *Samahang Magbubukid*, which, this informant said, served as an example throughout Central Luzon.[35] In the late 1930's two other important "teachers" were the aggressive tenant organization on the Santos Haciendas (in Guimba, Nampicuan, and Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija) and Hacienda Bahay Pare in Candaba, Pampanga.[36]

By 1938 or 1939, about 30% of the peasants in Talavera were members of the KPMP, the largest peasant organization in Nueva Ecija that also had members in Bulacan and other provinces.[37] This figure alone is not an accurate indication of peasant action because many peasants who would not necessarily join the KPMP would band together to push certain

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[34] Ely del Rosario, Interview, 16 May 1970. Bagong Sikat, Talavera, Nueva Ecija.
[35] Felipe Bulanadi, Interview, 7 June 1970. Talavera, Nueva Ecija.
[36] *Ibid.*
[37] This figure of 30% is an average of the answers I received from two key informants in Talavera, Nueva Ecija.

demands.[38] Nevertheless, it is true, as this figure indicates, that there was considerable room for improvement in the strength of peasant alliances.[39]

There was usually some form of mutual help among members of the KPMP or other, smaller, peasant groups. When, for example, KPMP members went on strike at a hacienda, fellow members working on other haciendas would supply the strikers food, clothes, etc.[40] There were also an increasing number of sympathy strikes and protests.[41] Each member of KPMP was supposed to pay yearly dues of 70 centavos, although many could only afford 20-30 centavos. About 15% of the total dues collected stayed in San Ricardo chapter of the KPMP, about 20% went to the Talavera chapter, and another 20% to the Nueva Ecija chapter. The rest went to the national headquarters.[42]

Strike was not the only method used by Talavera peasants. This is verified in the newspaper reports as well as in interviews. Typically peasants with grievances would go first to the provincial government in Cabanatuan, either to the Governor or to the Public Defender. There they would file their protest or petition and ask that the government intercede for them to persuade the landlord to make the necessary changes. Typically what was at issue was the failure of landlords, in the peasants' estimation, to abide by either their contracts or the various land tenure laws. Sometimes the matter went to court. But all too often the peasants lost out (*natalo*), whether in court or in the Public Defender's office. In the peasant's opinion, the reason for their defeats was that government officials, including the Public Defender, were "*bata*" (pawns) of the landlords and politicians.[43]

There was at least one instance, however, when peasants were victorious. In 1936 a relative of the deceased General Manuel Tinio, Maria Pilares, claimed as part of the hacienda over which she was in charge large tracts of land in the areas of present day barrios Casili and Bagong Sikat. These barrios are adjacent to San Ricardo; indeed, at that time the latter was still a sitio of San Ricardo. The lands claimed bordered a Tinio hacienda there. Maria Pilares took her claim to the courts, saying that she had been paying the taxes on the land. Meanwhile she tried to evict the peasant families living on and working the land. She argued that at most the peasants were her tenants and that now she wanted them to leave. They refused. Each peasant claimed to be an owner of small parcels of the disputed land. An investigation was made, during which the peasants were represented by an attorney they had collectively hired. At one phase of the

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[38] del Rosario, Interview.

[39] *Ibid.*

[40] *Ibid.*; also, learned from an interview with a former KPMP member in San Ricardo, Talavera, 1 May 1970.

[41] This is particularly apparent in *The Tribune* articles on all parts of Central Luzon.

[42] Interview with former KPMP member, 1 May 1970. San Ricardo, Talavera.

[43] del Rosario, Interview.

investigation, the Bureau of Lands reperesentative rejected some documents the peasants offered as proof of ownership, saying the documents were forged. Tension had been rising, and this rejection caused tempers to explode. Three hundred so-called "ejected tenants" stormed the hacienda of Maria Pilares and almost mobbed the agent from the Bureau of Lands. Despite this outburst, a judge ruled several months later that the homestead applications that the peasants had held since about 1925 were valid because the peasants had been paying the taxes on their plots of land. So the land was awarded to them, and the Tinio family's claim was denied. It was after this that Bagong Sikat got its name (literally translated it means the image of a sunrise; loosely translated, Brilliant Hope) because the people felt that through this victory they had indeed been given a chance for a full, prosperous life.[44] Such success in the courts was the exception rather than the rule, peasants in Talavera emphasized to me. That was true not only then, before World War II, but continues up to the present.

The principal objectives of Talavera peasants, whatever the particular tactics used, were to force landlords to pay the agricultural expenses they were supposed to pay, to prevent the landlords from unfairly ejecting tenants, to increase their shares of the crop (usually seeking 55%), and to have assurances that tenants could borrow rice or money with either no or only reasonable, as opposed to usurious, interest.[45]

Debts and high interest rates were two of the biggest economic problems confronting peasants in the area in the 1930's, according to practically every informant I spoke with, even though their economic needs and aspirations were, relative to present day, still small. (For example, unlike today, peasants then were not even trying to make certain that their children could finish grade school or high school.) The peasants in Talavera, like their counterparts elsewhere in Central Luzon, requested that the government establish loan funds and local banks from which they could borrow at reasonable rates. No such facilities were made available. In the late 1930's, hungry peasants stormed several buildings, including the one in Talavera. They pleaded for rice to eat because either their shares of the harvest were simply too small or they had been removed from their land. As a consequence of these incidents and the general situation in Central Luzon, the national government created an emergency loan fund.[46] How-

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[44] This narrative was pieced together from three sources: *The Tribune*, 10 December 1936, p. 2; Tomas I. Pagaduan, *Kasaysayan ng Talavera, Nueva Ecija*/History of . . . ./, unpublished manuscript, 1967, pp. 78-79; and interviews with two peasants in San Ricardo who are sons of two of the claimants in that case. These two respondents, both of whom remember the incidents because they were grown ups at the time, still work the lands that their fathers had homesteaded. I wish to thank Mr. Pagaduan for allowing me to read his manuscript, which he hopes to publish at Manlapaz Publishing Company, Quezon City.

[45] Manuela Santa Ana, Interview, 16 April 1970. Talavera, Nueva Ecija; also, an interview with a former KPMP member, 1 May 1970, San Ricardo, Talavera.

[46] *The Tribune*, 3 October 1939, pp. 6, 14.

ever, the landlords were required to stand as guarantors for the tenants before they could qualify for such loans. For those peasants who had been ejected, this was an impossible stipulation. Even for those with parcels to farm that requirement was difficult because landlords were extremely reluctant to stand as guarantors.[47] After all, landlords themselves had been refusing more and more frequently to give loans. Besides, many disputes in 1938, 1939, and 1940 were over the so called "refusals" of tenants to pay back their debts.

In San Ricardo shortly before World War II, several tenants on the Tinio hacienda and other lands had tried to establish a small cooperative through which members could borrow money or rice. No one could tell me how many members there were; indeed, few could remember much at all about the cooperative since it existed so briefly. That cooperative did manage to purchase a small *telyadora* (threashing machine), which members could rent by paying only 4% of their harvest (as opposed to 6% elsewhere). With earnings from the telyadora the cooperative hoped to pay the balance owed on the machine and keep a healthy reserve from which members could borrow. After only two years the cooperative was dead. In 1939 it had to sell the telyadora in order to pay its debts.[48]

In Talavera there were several peasant leaders from the peasant class. Each hacienda in the area seemed to have at least one tenant who would act as a chief spokesman and leader. Newspaper reports indicate this is true for most parts of the country where peasants were active. Two individuals in particular stand out in Talavera because they were extremely active and aggressive; furthermore, their involvement reveals some of the continuity in the history of peasant struggle in Central Luzon.

The first of the two is Patricio del Rosario. He was originally from San Miguel, Bulacan (born in 1881), but he left that province in search of new farm lands. He ended up in San Ricardo, Talavera, sometime before 1924 because he was once a tenant for General Manuel Tinio.[49] He had a fourth grade education, eight children, and his only occupation was tenant farming. In and about San Ricardo he had been a tenant for at least six different landlords (including Manuel Tinio, Manolo Tinio, Vivencio Tinio, and Augustino Tinio). He, like many others in the area, would move from landlord to landlord in search of better conditions. In practically every case he would first have to clear the still virgin land, 3-4 hectares, before he could plant. Not until sometime in the early 1930's did he have

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[47] *The Tribune,* 22 October 1939, p. 7. This article also refers to 400 tenants in Jaen, Nueva Ecija, whose landlords refused to stand as guarantors.

[48] My principal informant on this cooperative is the former member, referred to in some of footnotes above. Interveiw, 24 June 1970. San Ricardo, Talavera.

[49] I am thankful to Ely del Rosario, a surviving son of Patricio, for most of this information about his father. Sometimes Mr. del Rosario could not remember precise dates, but at all portions of the interview he was extremely helpful. 16 May 1970. Bagong Sikat, Talavera.

his own carabao; before then he had borrowed from his landlord. The system for sharing the harvest was fairly standard—50/50 or 45/55 (in favor of the land owner)—but loan terms varied. Frequent droughts and typhoons, which badly damaged the crops, forced del Rosario to borrow; he was never out of debt all through the 1930's. By the mid 1930's, interest rates and borrowing arrangements were practically the same all over; consequently, del Rosario no longer moved in search of better arrangements with landlords. But two times in the second half of the decade he was ejected from the parcels he farmed because he had been active in efforts to get improved conditions—specifically, to increase the tenants' share from 50/50 to 60/40.

In 1932 del Rosario was a leading member of a Tangulan group in Talavera. The objective of this group was to improve the relations between landlords and tenants.[50] Not much else is known what this group did, or how closely it was linked with Tangulan groups elsewhere. It is possible that being a native of Bulacan, del Rosario's inclination toward peasant organization was influenced by any one of several peasant groups that did exist in that province in the 1920's, aside from any attachment he and other Tangulans of Talavera might have had with the Bulacan Tangulans. In 1938, del Rosario helped organize and lead a strike against a hacienda of an absentee landlord in a barrio near San Ricardo. Del Rosario's son recalls that his father was unhappy that the strike was not more successful because many tenants who were *bata* (pawns) of the hacendero's overseer and because several were afraid they would be evicted if they joined the strike. Del Rosario made a point of telling the tenants at a meeting in front of his house afterwards that all peasants must overcome their fears and stand up to the hacenderos and money-lenders.

By 1939 del Rosario and Amado Santa Ana were the foremost recognized peasant leaders of the Talavera area. By that time both were members of the KPMP. Sometimes they went to Cabanatuan and conferred with other KPMP leaders there, including Juan Feleo. On at least one occasion they led a contigent of KPMP members from Talavera to attend a large parade (over 15,000) celebrating May Day 1939 and hear President Quezon deliver a speech (which tried to persuade peasants not to resort to violence and to take their grievances to the proper government authorities).[51]

Amando Santa Ana was originally from Quezon, Nueva Ecija but moved to attend high school in Cabanatuan.[52] He put himself through high school by working at various part time jobs, and had wanted to go to college but

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[50] Pagaduan, p. 154.

[51] The fact that Patricio del Rosario went with others from Talavera to that parade was stated in the interview with his son. But the figure of 15,000 was taken from *The Tribune*, 2 May 1939, pp. 2, 16.

[52] Amando Santa Ana's oldest child, Manuela Santa Ana, kindly provided me with some facts about her father as best as she could remember it. She was born in 1924 so was still quite young before World War II. Interview, 16 April 1970. Talavera, Nueva Ecija.

could not afford it. Not much else is known about his younger life, except he married in 1921.

His wife's family had about six hectares of land on which he worked after he was married. This small piece of land was supporting him and his family (he had "many" children) plus several other families, all relatives of his wife. Eventually his in-laws had to sell the land to help pay some debts. Afterwards Amando Santa Ana had no permanent work; he just earned a little by helping other farmers at harvest time and doing odd job in and around Talavera. He and his family were living in San Ricardo.

Later, but exactly when is not known, he became "a-kind-of-president" of a peasant organization in the Talavera area. From this he received a little rice and money because members would sometimes give him contributions. However this was far from sufficient to support his family adequately. His oldest daughter remembers that she and her brothers and sisters would go out and *pulot* (glean) the fields to get additional rice. They also hired out as transplanters and harvesters. Exactly what organization Santa Ana headed is not known, but it was previous to his KPMP activities. Perhaps it was the Tangulan group of which Patricio del Rosario was also a member. A newspaper report says that Amando Santa Ana was one of 10 men convicted for "sacking" the municipal building of Talavera on 3 May 1932. They were arrested; and their banners, insignias, and homemade weapons confiscated. They pleaded guilty of attempted rebellion.[53]

Apparently jail sentence did not stifle Santa Ana's activism. In 1935 he was a Sakdalista and under surveillance by the Talavera police for his "radical" activities. As mentioned earlier, after his Sakdal days Santa Ana was an important KPMP leader in the municipality. According to his eldest daughter, the reason he continued his activities among peasants and served as a peasant leader was because he was trying to help peasants realize that the only way to get changes was to work together, to organize. And no matter what the particular organization, the central aim was to achieve better conditions for the peasants. This too was the purpose of two strikes which Santa Ana helped organize in 1935 and 1938. He hoped that through the KPMP enough pressure could be put on the government to get legislation passed and implemented that would force landlords to provide basic economic necessities, since landlords had become increasingly unwilling to initiate reforms.

Amando Santa Ana and Patricio del Rosario continued their peasant activities during the Japanese occupation. Both were the principal organizers of the Hukbalahap unit from the Talavera area, and both helped launch the war-time civilian peasant organization that eventually became, in 1945, the *Pambansang Kaisahan ng mga Magbubukid* (PKM; National Union of Peasants). Patricio del Rosario lived to see the end of the occupation and the

[53] *The Tribune*, 18 May 1932, p. 10; 10 June 1932, p. 1.

beginning of the PKM. Santa Ana, however, did not. He was killed in a battle with the Japanese.[54] Del Rosario too was presumably killed, but not by Japanese. He mysteriously disappeared in February 1946. His family never did learn what exactly happend, but they are convinced his death was connected to his political activities. Many in Talavera think assassins hired by hacenderos killed him because at the time he was the president of the local chapters of the Democratic Alliance and the PKM, and was actively campaigning for legislation that would require a 60/40 sharing system (favoring the tenant).[55]

PAMPANGA

In Pampanga, as in Nueva Ecija, peasant activity grew in intensity, and over the decade peasant unity strengthened. There are some indications that peasant organizations were maturing more quickly in Pampanga than in Nueva Ecija. For example, in 1933 and 1934 in three different areas—Sta. Ana, San Simon-San Luis, and Sta. Rita—tenants working for many different landlords in each of those areas presented as a group their respective demands to the landlords involved. In the Sta. Rita case the tenants formed an organization and had a spokesman who tried negotiating with the landlords.[56] In the Sta. Ana case, the newspapers made a reference to Jacinto Manahan acting as the peasants' representative.[57] Manahan at that time was the head of the KPMP.[58] Newspaper reports of similar organized activities among Nueva Ecija peasants working for different landlords came only in 1937 and 1938.[59] These peasant activities cutting across several landholdings in Pampanga and their apparent absence in Nueva Ecija for this early date may just be a function of the large haciendas that predominated in Nueva Ecija, while in Pampanga there were more comparatively smaller landholdings.

There are other indications of greater strength and unity among Pampanga peasants. While not until 1939 was there a province-wide demon-

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54 Republic of the Philippines, Bureau of Public Schools, Division of Nueva Ecija; *Historical Data Papers, 1953. Municipality of Talavera and its Barrios.* (This and many other Historical Data Papers on Nueva Ecija and many other provinces are located in the Filipiniana section of the Pambansang Aklatan (National Library), Manila.

55 Del Rosario, Interview. For speculations that hacenderos killed Patricio del Rosario, my sources are numerous interviews in Talavera.

56 *The Tribune,* 22 May 1934, p. 7; 10 June 1934, p. 11; 23 June 1934, p. 20; 23 August 1934, p. 16.

57 *The Tribune,* 23 June 1933, p. 9; also, for other reports on the Santa Ana story see The Tribune, 2 July 1933, pp. 1 ff; and 8 July 1933, p. 14.

58 I think that Manahan was still president of the KPMP in June 1933. He was the first president of that organization (founded in 1928), but was expelled from it sometime in 1933 because he was considered a traitor to the peasant cause. Just exactly when in 1933 is not clear. Cf. *Kasaysayan ng Kilusang Magbubukid,* pp. 11-12.

59 According to interview data there were organizations in Nueva Ecija before 1937 that drew members from different parts of the province—e.g. *Kapatirang Magsasaka* and the KPMP. But in terms of *public* action involving such organizations, newspaper data is the earliest I have.

stration in Nueva Ecija, as early as May 1935, 3,000 "socialists" mostly from Pampanga, but some from Tarlac as well, marched in San Fernando, Pampanga, to celebrate Labor Day. The first newspaper reference to Pedro Abad Santos as a peasant leader is that article. He reportedly said that there was growing unrest of the masses due to unemployment and oppression, and "unless the abuses and wrongs are immediately stopped, I fear that a movement may break out any time."[60] Demonstrations of solidarity were practically yearly, sometimes twice yearly, occurrences in Pampanga from 1935 onward. Usually they took place in San Fernando, it being the capital town. On May Day 1939, 30,000 peasants and other workers marched, carrying placards denouncing "rapacious landlords" and condemning fascism. Among the speakers were Crisanto Evangelista and Pedro Abad Santos (national chairman and vice-chairman respectively of the Communist Party of the Philippines) and peasant leaders from Pampanga, including Agapito del Rosario and Luis Taruc.[61] The preceding February an equal number had gathered in San Fernando from all over Pampanga to hear President Quezon. The growing size and number of such demonstrations indicate the spread of unrest and increased unity among the Pampangan peasants.

President Quezon had come to San Fernando that February (1939) to calm growing anger between peasants, on the one hand, and their landlords and central owners, on the other. The months of December (1938) through February had been filled with strikes, bloodshed, canefields set on fire, and unthreshed rice carted away. A general strike, which had been threatening since late December, finally started on January 21 when 500 central workers at the Mount Arayat Sugar Company walked out. They were quickly followed by central workers (about 1,300) at the Pampanga Sugar Development Company (Pasudeco) in San Fernando and mill workers (about 700) at the Pampanga Sugar Mills (Pasumil) in the Del Carmen area.[62] These 2.000 sugar mill workers were joined by at least 20,000 peasants working in sugar and rice fields. This general strike effectively paralyzed the province for almost two weeks until representatives of all parties concerned reached some temporary agreements through the mediation of the Department of Labor. On February 5, Pedro Abad Santos ordered all strikers to return to work.[63] Negotiations for a final settlement dragged over several months, with intermittent strikes, burned cane fields, etc. (all of

[60] *The Tribune,* 5 May 1935, p. 4. We know from Luis Taruc that Pedro Abad Santos was working on the behalf of peasants years before 1935. *Born of the People,* (New York: International Publishers, 1953).

[61] *The Tribune,* 2 May 1939, pp. 1 ff. At the end of 1938, the Communist Party of the Philippines, then headed by Evangelista, and the Socialist party, led by Pedro Abad Santos, joined in a coalition. Consequently each man became the two principal leaders of the new organization, which was usually called the Communist Party of the Philippines.

[62] *The Tribune,* 21 January 1939, pp. 1 ff; 22 January 1939, pp. 1 ff; 25 January 1939, pp. 1 ff.

[63] *The Tribune,* 5 January 1939, p. 3.

which indicated that the Socialists under Pedro Abad Santos lacked complete discipline or control over the peasants).

Actually a final settlement never was reached; issues from that 1939 strike carried over to a large strike in 1940. In fact more complexities and cause for unrest sprouted from the 1939 trouble. For example, the hiring of strike breakers, a long time practice of landlords and centrals, created the problem of what to do with the strike breakers once the strikers returned to work. Prolonged hesitation on this question, especially by central managers, contributed to another large strike involving thousands of peasants in late 1939 and early 1940.[64] The Department of Labor declared that strike illegal, which meant that strike breakers now had even stronger claims to the jobs in the eyes of both the government and the central owners.

As in other parts of Luzon, strikes were far from the only activities among peasants in Pampanga. According to the newspapers, the first strike was in 1934 (120 sugar central workers in Mabalacat),[65] but Table E (Appendix) shows that there were several activities elsewhere in earlier years. Like the strikes, however, other activities increased in frequency and intensity from 1930 through 1940. For example, in 1935-36, angry tenants of two different landlords burned some cane fields; but ten fields were set on fire in 1938, six in 1939, and nine in 1940.[66] In addition, many similar acts of vandalism, such as destroying palay seed beds and raiding fish ponds, occurred in 1938-40 whereas only three such incidents were cited in earlier years. Another typical act that increasingly occurred was raiding landlords' bodegas to take rice that the tenants claimed rightfully belonged to them. Clashes between strikers and strike-breakers became more frequent as the number of strikes rose. In 1940, when strikes became so numerous that one loses count, there were at least eight clashes between strikers and strike breakers. Few fights involved guns since few peasants had any prior to World War II. But nevertheless, injuries and sometimes deaths did result since the men typically used bolos and clubs. Most showdowns of this sort were in connection with strikes against landlords, but some were the results of strikes at sugar centrals. Occasionally in 1939 and 1940 there were small battles between the PC, local police, or hired guards of the landlords or central, on the one hand, and peasants, on the other. These brief fights commonly resulted after armed men had been called upon either to protect strike breakers or to stand guard over palay that was being harvested.

By no means were violence and vandalism the peasants' normal activities. In fact, to the extent they occurred, they *usually* followed after other

[64] *The Tribune*, 19 January 1940, pp. 1 ff; 20 January 1940, pp. 1 ff.
[65] *The Tribune*, 13 January 1934, p. 14.
[66] Usually the newspapers do not report any motive for such arsons, but apparently the tenants who had been ejected from the land or who were on strike sometimes burned cane fields as a protest against not only the landlord and his practices but also against his hiring of others to replace them.

procedures had been tried, including petitions (to landlords and central owners and to outside parties, like government officials), court litigation, demonstrations, and strikes. For example, as in Nueva Ecija, various field representatives of the Justice and Labor Departments were kept busy trying to mediate between contending groups in Pampanga. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) played an increasingly important role in this regard all over the Philippines, especially in Nueva Ecija and Pampanga.

One activity that was distinctive to Pampanga was elections. At least the peasants' election activity was more obvious in that province than in any other in 1937 and 1940. In other provinces there may have been some attempts to elect particular candidates who were considered sympathetic to the peasants' cause, but such attempts are not documented in *The Tribune* and certainly must have been less successful than in Pampanga. The Socialist organization ran candidates (under the label of Popular Front) for provincial and municipal offices in those election years, with markedly improved success in the second as compared to the first. In 1937 Socialists won the mayorships in Mexico and San Fernando. In Mexico, Socialists also won for vice-mayor and all six seats on the municipal council. Socialists won six of the eight seats on the council in San Fernando. Their candidate for governor, Pedro Abad Santos, received 16,000 votes, but lost the election to Sotero Baluyut. Pedro Abad Santos' vote was 10,000 more than he had received in 1933 when he tried for the same office. To give an indication of the peasant support in 1937, one of the six councilors elected in San Fernando was a woman peasant, daugther of a tenant farmer. Two others were small farmers. (Of the remaining three, one was a law student and two were tailors). The news article reported that in both municipalities the Socialists won heavily in the barrios in order to make up for the much smaller Socialist votes in the poblacions.[67]

In December 1940, the next provincial elections, Socialist candidates, again under the Popular Front label, won the mayorships in nine municipalities—San Fernando, Vivencio Cuyugan (re-elected); Angeles, Agapito del Rosario; Mexico, Fernancio Sampang; Mabalacat, Virgilio Ocampo; Arayat, Casto Aleandrino; Porac, Marciano Dizon; Floridablanca, Benjamin Layug; Candaba, Eliseo Galang; and San Simon, Patricio Yabot. In San Fernando, Angeles, and Mexico, three of the biggest municipalities in the province, Socialists won all councilors seats. Pedro Abad Santos again ran for governor, but once more lost to Baluyut. Abad Santos did however, continue to increase his vote over previous attempts, receiving 20,538 to

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[67] *The Tribune,* 18 December 1937, pp. 1 ff. Unfortunately there is no information about the councilors elected in Mexico, nor any detail such as how many votes were cast, the distribution of votes by municipality for Abad Santos, etc. Nor is there any account in *The Tribune* for the 1933 election. Moreover, officials at the Commission on Elections have told me that they have no voting data for pre-war elections.

Baluyut's 25,354.[68] Despite his personal defeat, Pedro Abad Santos was elated with the results:

> The result of the election is gratifying even beyond my expectation. We have elected Socialist mayors with Socialist councils in eight out of 21 municipalities of the province. I am especially pleased with our victory in three strategic towns, namely, San Fernando, Angeles, and Arayat. The results shows (sic) that the movement is growing rapidly and steadily. . . . The fact that we won in the municipal governments rather than in the provincial board shows also that the movement is stronger at the foundation of the political structure, which means that the change is coming from below, rather than from above and therefore it is more dangerous to the old order.[69]

It is important to point out that in all nine municipalities except one (San Simon), the peasants had been active during 1940 and in previous years. (cf. Table E). It seems certain that the elections were a continuation of peasants' attempts to improve their situation since these Socialist candidates, and the Socialist organization in general, centered their campaigns around the issues and problems that had been the focus of other peasant activity.[70] Further evidence of this contention is that at least six of the nine men elected mayors (Cuyugan, del Rosario, Sampang, Alejandrino, Dizon, and Layug) were frequently cited in the newspapers as leaders of and spokesmen for peasants and workers in their respective municipalities. Possibly the other three were also leaders but *The Tribune* neglected to mention their names. These six men also had important roles in province wide activities for they often spoke for Pampanga peasants and attended conferences of leaders and participated in negotiations with landlords and government officials when there were attempts to either avert or settle strikes.

This analysis of Pampanga can now turn to the issues involved in all this ferment. As with Nueva Ecija, there were many complaints, but the list can be reduced to a few central issues: (1) payment or taking out of loans: (2) usurious interest; (3) procedure for dividing sugar and palay harvests (including demands for increased shares); (4) payment of agricultural expenses; (5) miscellaneous benefits; (6) increased wages; and (7) individual rights to join organizations or unions. Comparing these basic demands to the list mentioned earlier for Nueva Ecija, the only difference

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[68] *The Tribune,* 12 December 1940, pp. 1 ff. A Socialist also won the mayorship in La Paz, Tarlac (Leon Parungao), but there are no accounts of Socialists winning elsewhere. However, I was told in Nueva Ecija that a few Socialists were elected municipal councilors in that province in 1940. Unfortunately, I cannot find records of such elections.

[69] *The Tribune,* 14 December 1940, p. 9. The quote says eight, rather than nine, municipalities, because some Socialists did not regard Marciano Dizon, of Porac, as a true comrade, even though he was registered as a Socialist. (Casto Alejandrino, Interview, 12 November 1970. Camp Crame, Quezon City.)

[70] Perhaps if one had more local history data for San Simon, one could more easily explain Yabot's victory there. As it is, the newspaper reports only one incident in that municipality—in 1933. However, as late as 1939 there was a rumor that "agitators" were active there, but I did not code such rumors. Cf. *The Tribune,* 9 February 1939, pp. 1 ff.

is the demands for better wages. This demand, stated in various ways, was especially common among central workers, whether they be men in the mill itself or those cutting and hauling cane. Also, wage issues were important for peasants who farmed for a wage. For example, in the general strike of 1939, one of the 13 specific demands was that workers who were hired to plow a field should be paid a minimum of ₱1.50 a day. Regarding crop shares, a common proposal was 55/45 and 60/40, in favor of the tenant. Occasionally groups of tenants pushed for 75/25. Under this latter proposal tenants would have paid all farming expenses, whereas with 55/45 and 60/40 landlords and tenants were to share expenses.

Regarding loans and interests, peasants were trying to get guaranteed loans from landlords while simultaneously seeking to eliminate the ever increasing and burdensome interests. An incident in a barrio of San Fernando in 1935 is typical. A group of 50 tenants on the land of Simeon Aguas had requested the following reforms: each tenant be given three cavans of palay each month (as a ration); each be paid ₱2 per month whether they worked or not; a guarantee that each tenant could borrow up to ₱25 per month; and the landlord should provide free medical facilities. The landlord turned down all of these suggestions. Later when he discovered that some of his cane had been prematurely cut, he called a PC detachment to investigate. During the investigation the PC shot one of the tenants; peasants who were witnesses said that there had been absolutely no provocation. Afterwards one tenant said: "They [the landlords] tightened the screws on us. We cannot live under the present conditions, and when we asked the landlords to be liberal, they told us to accept the old order of things or get out. . . . As for the constabulary, they only serve the rich. They do whatever the landlords tell them to do." [71]

The tenant quoted had touched on another factor that sometimes provided additional issues that grew out of attempts to solve the basic ones—the use of the PC or hired guards to break strikes, etc. Other such related grievances were the refusals to re-hire strikers, the use of strike breakers, unfair practices of government authorities who were supposed to be working on behalf of justice, and no implementation of existing land tenure laws.

BULACAN

The situation in Bulacan during the 1930's was similar to both Nueva Ecija and Pampanga, although of the three provinces it was the least active. Table C (Appendix) shows that while there was considerable spread of activity by 1940, it was not as intense in Bulacan compared to Nueva Ecija and Pampanga. That is, most of the long term, recurring incidents fall within a few municipalities (mainly San Miguel, San Ildefonso, and San Rafael). Nevertheless, compared to the whole country or even to other provinces in Central and Southern Luzon, Bulacan peasants were extremely

[71] *The Tribune*, 26 May 1935, pp. 1 ff.

active. The province had incidents in 19 municipalities; nine of these 19 experienced incidents in two or more years.

In order to analyze the qualitative and quantitative growth of peasant activities and organization in Bulacan, one has to divide the province into two areas. It is clear that the most active areas in Bulacan were San Rafael and San Ildefonso. Together these two municipalities made up the bulk of a huge (27,400 hectares) Buenavista estate owned by the San Juan de Dios Hospital, which is to say, by the Catholic Church. Peasants on that estate faced *some* problems that were different from those faced by peasants elsewhere in the province. The second area consists of the non-Buenavista areas.

In the 1930's the estate was in the hands of a management that was responsible to the Church. The land itself was cultivated (practically all palay) by two different arrangements: (1) by small tenant farmers who paid *canon* (rent) to the estate for small (2-3 hectares) plots, which they themselves worked; and (2) by tenants who also worked small parcels but paid rental not to the estate but to another lessee, who in turn paid a canon to the estate. That is, some tenants had a lease directly from the estate, while other tenants rented from individuals (called *inquilinos*) who had leased a large number of hectares. Newspaper reports are frustratingly confusing as to how many tenants and lessees there were in Buenavista, but the most consistent figures cited during the 1930's are between six and eight thousand.[72] Of this number most by 1940 are tenant-lessees — that is, tenant farmers who leased directly from the estate the small parcels they farmed.[73] However there are indications in other news reports that in earlier years there were more inquilinos than this last reference would suggest. At any rate, by 1939 an estimated 30,000 people lived on the estate lands in San Rafael and San Ildefonso.[74]

The complex history of the Buenavista estate cannot be analyzed briefly and certainly cannot be adequately studied through a heavy reliance on newspaper reports for just one decade. That history, in fact, could be the subject of an entirely separate piece of research. Yet it is important for our purposes to make one point—the continuously intensifying turmoil for the people, mainly tenant farmers, of this area from 1930 right up to World War II. That turmoil resumed and continued to escalate after the Japanese occupation. To this day it is not clear that the affair is settled.[75]

On May 2 and 3, 1935, there was a Sakdal revolt in San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Elsewhere in the province there were also Sakdalista organizations, including one in the San Rafael area. While to most of the nation the Sakdal

[72] *The Tribune,* 12 February 1939, pp. 1 ff; 4 April 1940, pp. 1 ff.
[73] *The Tribune,* 4 April 1940, pp. 1 ff.
[74] *The Tribune,* 12 February 1939, pp. 1 ff.
[75] Primitivo D. Mijares, "The Buenavista Scandal," *The Manila Chronicle,* 29 August 1970, p. 2.

uprisings looked like efforts to gain independence, to the participants and members in San Ildefonso the main objective was to have ownership of the land they and their forefathers had been working but still in the hands of the Church. Through the Sakdalista movement they expressed their impatience with their governments' (provincial and national) numerous broken promises to purchase the land and redistribute it to the people who farmed it.[76] Both before and after 1935 this demand for land ownership was the principal issue. In 1938, 12,000 residents of the estate demonstrated to ask the government to buy the Buenavista lands for immediate re-sale to those working the land.[77] In 1939 President Quezon dramatically issued the necessary orders, principally to Manuel Roxas (head of both the Rural Progress Administration and the Department of Finance) to purchase or lease the estate.

Between the Sakdal uprising in Buenavista in 1935 and Quezon's order in 1939, considerable organization, protest, and violence had transpired. Every year an increasing number of tenants and inquilinos had refused to pay their canon, which they claimed was exorbitant. And each year the estate managers would auction off the lands held by the delinquent tenants and inquilinos. Then fighting and sporadic violence would follow, either between "old" and "new" occupants or between the "old" occupants and the PC or estate guards dispatched to evict them. Between 1935 and 1939, at least three organizations had been formed, all in one way or another aimed at protecting their members' claims to the land. The first was the *Kabesang Tales,* which in 1936 had about 1,000 members.[78] Its members were both tenants and inquilinos. Later the two most powerful groups were the *Dumating Na* (in San Rafael) and the *Handa Na* (in San Ildefonso). In the newspapers there are no decent estimates of membership strength, but between 1937 and 1940 the two organizations grew substantially. Members would refuse to pay the canon and refuse to leave the land. Twice such protests so paralyzed the vicinity and threatened widespread violence that the national government stepped in and prevailed upon the estate management to extend the date for payment of fees. In the meantime the peasants took in their harvests despite management orders to the contrary.[79] In addition, the two organizations, through their principal leader and lawyer, Juan Rustia, had pushed all the way to the United States Supreme Court their claim that the estate did not in fact belong to the Church but to the Philippine government.[80] All previous court decisions (including the Philippine Supreme Court's) had denied such a claim. Rustia was insistent, however,

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[76] *The Tribune,* 21 May 1935, pp. 1 ff.
[77] *The Tribune,* 23 January 1938, p. 3.
[78] *The Tribune,* 24 April 1936, p. 14.
[79] Jose G. Sanvictores, "A Study of the Conflicts at the Buenavista Estate in Bulacan," 21 January 1939, 17 pp. Roxas Papers. Bundle 10. Pambansang Aklatan, Manila.
[80] *The Tribune,* 11 February 1940, p. 32.

and so convincing to the members of the *Dumating Na* and *Handa Na* that he led them to boycott a plebiscite election ordered by Quezon in February 1939.[81]

When Quezon had finally started the government machinery moving to take the Buenavista estate, he decided to let the residents themselves decide whether the government should buy the estate and in turn lease it to the residents or whether the government should lease the estate from San Juan de Dios Hospital and sublease it to those farming the parcels. In leading the boycott of the plebiscite, Rustia argued that the land rightfully belonged to the government, thus it should not have to pay anything to the Church for the land. Secondly, since the government owns the land, it should redistribute it to the present farmers either free or at nominal cost.[82] Thirdly, he and the members of the two organizations opposed certain specific aspects of the government's overall plan for administering the estate. They believed that the proposed "cooperative" would become like NARIC (National Rice Corporation), which they felt was an unwieldy body controlled by a few rice magnates, and hence would just perpetuate the status of the tenants as mere laborers.[83] Quezon's angry reaction to the boycott was to denounce Rustia, order the cancellation of the plebiscite, and announce that the government would proceed to lease the estate, with a 25 year option to buy, and in turn sublease it to the present tenants and inquilinos.[84] Quezon's action aroused the ire of even those residents who did not necessarily agree with Rustia; at the very least the vast majority wanted the government to *immediately* expropriate the land for resale to those farming it.[85] The *Dumating Na* and *Handa Na* continued their stand with Rustia still their spokesman, even though by now he and others in the organization were being harassed.[86]

Meanwhile, inquilinos were also protesting the government's plan because under it the peasants would have to pay only 40% of the crop to the

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[81] *The Tribune,* 21 February 1939, p. 8.

[82] *The Tribune,* 11 January 1939, p. 3. Also see, "Memo for . . . The President [Quezon]; Subject: More incitements in the Buenavista Estate," 24 March 1939, 2 pp. Signed: Patricio A. Dionisio, Confidential Agent, NBI. "Memorandum for The Chief, Information Division, P. C.; Subject: Non Signing of Government Lease Contract by Tenants of Buenavista Estate, San Ildefonso and San Rafael, Bulacan," 24 April 1939. Both documents are in the Roxas Papers, Bundle 10. Pambansang Aklatan, Manila.

[83] *The Tribune,* 21 February 1939, p. 8.

[84] *The Tribune,* 25 February 1939, pp. 1 ff.

[85] *The Tribune,* 1 February 1939 pp. 1 ff.

[86] A document in the Roxas Papers describes Rustia and the organizations Handa Na and Dumating Na as "subversive" and recommends that the principal leaders, including Rustia, of the two organizations should be prevented ". . . from holding any meetings either private or public, within the Buenavista Estate." Cf. "Memo for. . . The President [Quezon]; Subject: More incitements in the Buenavista Estate," 24 March 1939; Signed: Patricio A. Dionisio. Another document in the Roxas Papers is an account by a PC officer following around Rustia and trying to intimidate him. Cf. "Subject: Juan Rustia: To: Provincial Inspector, Bulacan," 7 June 1939, 2 pp. Signed: A. G. Fajardo, 1st Lt., PC. Both documents are in Bundle 10 of the Roxas Papers. Pambansang Aklatan, Manila.

inquilinos instead of 50%, which had been the previous prevailing arrangement.[87]

President Quezon pushed through with the plan, but the trouble did not stop. Many tenants and inquilinos refused to sign the agreement with the new management of the estate—the Rural Progress Administration. The deadline for signing was extended. Eventually most signed, but when the time came to pay the rental the following year, a large number refused to pay. Agitation continued for the sale of the estate. The government administration began ejecting delinquent lessees (about 40% of the total) in an even more drastic fashion than had the previous management.[88] Despite the change in management, therefore, the old problems persisted. Not only did the questions of land ownership and distribution remain, but so did other issues, such as loan shortages, high interest rates, and unequitable distribution of agricultural expenses.

While these last mentioned problems were secondary themes for those on the Buenavista estate, they were primary for the peasants in other parts of Bulacan, just as they were for peasants in Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, and elsewhere in the central plains of Luzon. Strikes, raiding of landlords' bodegas, petitioning, and demonstrations were the typical incidents in the rest of Bulacan, especially San Miguel, Baliwag, Malolos, and Bigaa. And like the two provinces analyzed above and the Buenavista area of Bulacan, the size and intensity of such actions heightened through the decade. While the protests grew larger, the problems remained essentially the same, not only from area to area, but over time in any given area. In the newspapers names of landlords who had conflicts with tenants frequently reappeared, particularly in San Miguel, Baliwag, and Malolos. As an example for the points being made here about Bulacan in the 1930's, one can compare a series of strikes in 1933 with another series in 1940. In June 1933 at least 1,000 tenants of several landlords in the San Miguel area were striking or otherwise agitating for reform. Most were members of the KPMP. They wanted the landlords to share half the agricultural expenses, increase the tenants' share of the harvest to 50%, reinstate tenants who had been ejected because they had gone on strike or otherwise had protested, and guarantee loans to tenants.[89] In January 1940 over 4,000 tenants affiliated with the KPMP in five different municipalities, including San Miguel, called a strike with the principal demands being (1) a larger share of the harvest for tenants (so as to be in accordance with the Rice Share Tenancy Law), (2) landlords should pay half of the agricultural expenses, and (3) landlords should make low interest loans available to tenants.[90] Not only are the demands similar

[87] *The Tribune,* 14 February 1939, p. 16; 25 February 1939, pp. 1 ff.
[88] *The Tribune,* 5 April 1940, pp. 1 ff; 7 April 1940, p. 14.
[89] *The Tribune,* 2 June 1933, p. 9; 11 June 1933, p. 14; 13 June 1933, p. 11; 18 June 1933, pp. 5, 40; 23 June 933, p. 9; 28 June 1933, pp. 1 ff.
[90] *The Tribune,* 12 January 1940, pp. 1 ff; 16 January 1940, p. 16.

between the two years, but at least two of the San Miguel landlords whose tenants had struck in 1933 also experienced the strikes and agitations of 1940.

GENERAL

I have elaborated on Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, and Bulacan to show the quality of the incidents and general unrest quantitatively summarized in Table A-E. The situation in the other Central and Southern Luzon provinces found in these tables could be similarly analyzed; the general picture would be the same, only on a smaller scale. The grievances involved, the gradual building of peasant unity, and the variety of activities found in the three core provinces are also found in other provinces in Central and Southern Luzon. Even the history of Buenavista, with its central issue of land ownership, has parallels in other large estates, particularly the religious estates of San Pedro Tunasan, Laguna, and Dinalupihan, Bataan.

In late 1938 the two biggest peasant organizations in Philippine history up to that time, AMT (Aguman Ding Malding Talapagobra) and KPMP, formally joined together.[91] To commemorate the event they held a large parade on 11 February 1939 in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija.[92] The event is representative of the principal process that was taking place during the 1930's—peasants were learning the importance of unity among themselves. This process did not begin or end during the decade, but it did make greater advances than perhaps in any other previous decades in Philippine history. Both the AMT and KPMP could trace their origins to several earlier and much smaller peasant groups, most of which historians have yet to rediscover but would include the *Kapatirang Magsasaka, Union ng Magsasaka, Lege de Campesinos, Tangulan, Kapisanan Makabola Makasinag,* and *Sakdalista.* The precise history of the building of larger peasant groups with social, economic and, later, political objectives has yet to be written for the Philippines, but this paper has indicated some of the continuities of areas, issues, and individuals involved. By 1939 the AMT, which was the mass organ of the Socialist party, claimed a following of 70,000,[93] drawn from all parts of Pampanga, and portions of southeastern Tarlac, southern Nueva Ecija, and western Bulacan.[94] The KPMP had about 60,000 members,[95] heavily concentrated in Nueva Ecija and Bulacan but also in Laguna, Rizal and Pangasinan.[96]

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91 Guillermo Capadocia, *History of the Peasant and Labor Movement in the Philippines,* [no date], 28 pp. Huk-PKP captured documents. Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

92 *The Tribune,* 12 February 1939, p. 4.

93 Taruc, p. 46.

94 Luis Taruc, Interview, 27 January 1970. Quezon City.

95 Kenneth Kurihara, *Labor in Philippine Economics,* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1945), p. 72.

96 Areas of KPMP membership are based on news stories in *The Tribune* for 1938-40.

Together, then, the new AMT-KPMP alliance brought together about 130,000 peasants from Central and Southern Luzon.

The quality of peasant organization is not indicated by size alone. In 1938, 1939, and 1940 several general strikes threatened and sometimes took place. Two of these in Pampanga were cited previously. In early 1940 a general strike of 20-30 thousand peasants in 14 municipalities of Nueva Ecija was only partly avoided through the intercession of government officials.[97] Significant too are the increasing number of peasants going out on sympathy strike or otherwise showing their solidarity for fellow peasants who were striking or facing a crisis of some sort. Strikes in Calumpit, Bulacan, and Balanga, Bataan, in January 1939 were in part sympathy strikes for the general strike in Pampanga during that month.[98] The general strike in Pampanga in January 1940 also affected parts of Bataan, Bulacan, Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija.[99] Another recorded event indicating the growing solidarity among peasants in different provinces occurred in 1939. In March, April, and May of that year, landlords all over Central Luzon had been ejecting hundreds of tenants from their parcels of land. In May several thousand tenants in Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, and Bulacan simultaneously threatened a sit-down strike should landowners continue to eject tenants who were insisting on the implementation of existing tenancy laws. Eight thousand peasants from Arayat, Candaba, and Magalang, Pampanga, and San Antonio and Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, met at the municipal building in Cabiao to warn about the strike and protest such ejections.[100]

Of course there were still many weaknesses in the peasant movement and unity was far from total. For one thing, there were still many peasants, even within Central and Southern Luzon, who were not members of the KPMP, AMT, or any organizations like them. After all, the strike breakers were peasants too, although frequently "imported", so to speak, from other regions.

Secondly, sometimes there were disputes between leaders of different, yet still aggressive, peasant organizations. There were for example, ideological differences among respective leaders of the KPMP and the Sakdalistas.[101] Personal rivalries and differences over policy and tactics between some leaders of the AMT-KPMP organization and Juan Rustia may explain why the KPMP-AMT organization did not have an alliance with the *Dumating Na*

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[97] *The Tribune,* 19 October 1939, p. 16; 10 January 1940, p. 12.
[98] *The Tribune,* 27 January 1939, pp. 1 ff; 31 January 1939, p. 14.
[99] *The Tribune,* 19 January 1940, pp. 1 ff.
[100] *The Tribune,* 18 May 1939, pp. 1 ff.
[101] For some detail, but far from complete, see Jose Lava, *Milestones on the History of the Philippine Communist Party,* [undated; probably written about September 1950], p. 21. This manuscript, prepared from Lava's own knowledge of the CPP and from notes other Party members gave to Lava, was never, to my knowledge, published. Yet there are a few copies available; one is in the Filipiniana section of the Ateneo Library, Quezon City.

and *Handa Na.*[102] Since Philippines organizations have historically tended to be personal followings of the leaders, it is possible that, to the extent these peasant organizations were only personal followings, the building of stronger and wider solidarity among peasants was jeopardized because of disputes among group leaders. Jose Lava says that a serious problem with the peasant and urban organizations prior to World War II was this personal following nature.[103] Undoubtedly this is true. But relative to earlier periods in Philippine history, there were stronger horizontal ties (or perhaps call it "class consciousness") among Central Luzon peasants in 1940 than previously. The sheer size of the AMT-KPMP organization suggests this. Also suggestive is the large number of principal leaders in those two groups, both before and after they joined together. Third, judging from the Talavera study, peasants generally joined together not so much because of special charisma or other attractiveness of its local leaders (del Rosario and Santa Ana) or of provincial leaders (e.g., Juan Feleo). What stood out as the important factors to their joint efforts were (1) the issues and problems involved were crucial to all of them, and (2) the realization that unity was important. The question of personal followings versus cause-oriented organizations deserves considerably more attention than can be allowed now in this paper. In a later analysis, I will take it up in more detail.

Government Responses

The first law passed to regulate landlord-tenant relations was the Rice Share Tenancy Act of 1933. The law was never in effect anywhere in the Philippines until 1936. Up to that time its implementation was at the discretion of municipal governments, none of which ever took the necessary steps to do so.[104] In 1936 the law was amended to allow the President of the Commonwealth to put the Act into effect in municipalities he so designated. The essential provision of the law required that all contracts between landowners and tenants be in writing. In 1937 President Quezon declared that the law should be enforced in all Central Luzon provinces; later he added others. In reality the law merely stamped legal approval on the arrangements between landlords and tenants prevailing at that time.

The law did not reduce the number of tenant-landlord disputes; on the contrary, they increased because, in part, peasants were seeking implementation of the law.[105] "If enforced the Act would have improved the tenant's lot somewhat. But for those estates where the tenants were both acquainted with the law and bold enough to demand its applications, the almost univer-

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[102] *The Tribune,* 4 March 1939, pp. 1 ff.
[103] *Lava,* p. 20.
[104] Stubbs, p. 146; The Tribune, 1 May 1936, p 2.
[105] *The Tribune,* 13 March 1939, pp. 1 ff.

sal reaction of landlords was to threaten ejection at the end of the agricultural year."[106]

The biggest problem with the law was that contracts were only for one year. Peasant organizations tried to get new laws that would make renewal of the contract automatic so long as the tenant had fulfilled his obligations. No such law was passed. The government did pass some amendments aimed at improving the tenants' economic and social welfare. But if any landlord disliked certain specifications of the law, he could simply refuse a contract renewal at the end of the season to any tenants who insisted on contracts with those specifications. Such "purges", referred to in the Nueva Ecija section above, threatened thousands of Central Luzon peasants by 1939. The Department of Labor admitted it was practically helpless to do anything to prevent those evictions.

More laws followed, all as part of Quezon's "social justice" program. But they suffered from the limitations of earlier ones, such as having no automatic renewal of contract. Furthermore, like previous laws, the new ones would, if effectively implemented, bring only moderate change. Let us consider first the additional problem of enforcement, and then the moderate nature of such laws.

Aside from the inadequate administrative machinery and lack of personnel,[108] laws were never impartially enforced because of the political system in the country. In the provinces the landlords and others of the upper class had practically a monopoly on the economic and political power. This monopoly allowed them not only to influence pending legislation in Manila to fit their own interests, but to bend and even ignore the laws once passed. In Talavera the peasants' unanimous and most bitter criticism against the political system prior to World War II (and afterwards, for that matter) was that the system was inequitable since those with wealth and influence could choose to either use the laws or ignore them, depending on their needs, and there was very little that the rest (those without wealth and influence) could do to counteract. Consequently, as noted earlier, peasants and peasant leaders charged that government officials (both local and national) played favorites with landlords and central owners. The Philippine Constabulary, forever being called upon by landlords and central owners, sometimes acted like personal armies of these influentials. In the eyes of the peasants the PC was

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[106] David O. D. Wurfel, *The Bell Report and After: A Study of the Political Problems of Social Reform Stimulated by Foreign Aid,* Ph.D. Dissertation (unpublished), Cornell University, 1960, p. 409.

[107] *The Tribune,* 13 March 1939, pp. 1 ff.

[108] The lack of machinery and the overlapping and conflicting areas of jurisdiction, creating only more confusion, is frequently reported in *The Tribune* for 1930-1940. For example, Manuel R. Joven, a national leader of KPMP, complained that 95% of the tenancy cases filed in the CIR the year before were still pending in November 1940; cf. *The Tribune,* 14 November 1940, p. 11. Regarding the confusing administration of laws, see *The Tribune,* 11 September 1940, p. 10; 18 September 1940, p. 11; and November 1940, p. 5.

in fact just that; peasants rarely would think to call on the PC to enforce an infringement of the law by a landlord.[109]

The court system, especially at the local level, was no refuge for those without wealth or influence. The primary lower court in the provinces was the justice of the peace. These justices were appointive offices. Through the informal appointment process, including various intricacies of patron-client relations and family ties, the justices were usually responsible not to the law but to the wealthy and the influential. This was frequently true also of higher court officials.[110] Pedro Abad Santos expressed the peasants' cynical view of the courts when he wrote to his brother Jose, who was then Secretary of Justice, "I might as well tell you at the outset that the workers [meaning tenant farmers, central workers, and other agricultural laborers] have lost faith in the courts . . . our ruling class has taken the place of the former [colonial] rulers and use the courts to further their interest and privileges." [111]

Turning now to the extremely modest quality of any attempted reforms for the agricultural system, one can refer to other analyses of the "social justice" program, under which all the government's agricultural laws and plans fell.[112] The government (meaning in particular President Quezon) never intended sweeping reforms.[113] While Quezon spoke frequently in favor of "social justice", he did little to implement it because, says Theodore Friend, the government was far more concerned with improving trade relations with the United States than with basic internal development.[114] Others argue that the reason lies in the fact that "social justice" for the masses could only come at the expense of certain claims of property owners, which the Quezon government never questioned.[115] Consequently, most of the laws had built-in protections for the property owners, be they landowners, central owners, rice dealers, etc.

When the laws and other parts of the political system failed to satisfy the peasants, Quezon relied on tokens and "father-like psychology."[116] His

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[109] Harlan R. Crippen also argues that the PC were but tools of the politicians and landlords. "Philippine Agrarian Unrest: Historical Backgrounds," *Science and Society*, 10 (Fall 1946), p. 351.

[110] Peasants in Talavera told me how the judges were "on the landlords' side." Similar evidence comes from an interview with a former lawyer for peasants in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, during the 1920's and 1930's. Interview, 4 February 1970, Quezon City.

[111] *The Tribune*, 18 September 1940, p. 11.

[112] Theodore Friend, *Between Two Empires, Philippines* (1929-1946), (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965). Francisco Nemenzo, Jr., *The Land for the Landless Program in the Philippine Government*, MA Thesis, University of the Philippines, 1959. Loretta M. Sicat, *Quezon's Social Justice Program and the Agrarian Problem*, MA Thesis, University of the Philippines, 1959.

[113] *Sicat*, p. 87.

[114] Friend, pp. 156, 160.

[115] Sicat, p. 90; Nemenzo, p. 78.

[116] Sicat, p. 90; Friend, p. 160.

favorite method was to journey to the provinces and "perform" a speech that pleaded with the people to be patient and admonished them not to use violence.[117] And when there was violence, or widespread strikes and other signs of unrest, Quezon was quick to send reinforcements to the PC units stationed in each province.[118]

By the end of 1940, the government had failed to meet the unrest with commensurate solutions. Ironically, the very laws that the unrest had helped bring about, having served as a kind of catalyst, created more problems and conflicts for the rural society than they solved. Indeed laws that peasants had hoped would protect them socially and economically were in fact used more and more to their disadvantage. The massive ejectments in 1939 and 1940 are the most visible examples. To have contracts with landlords was originally thought to be a step in the right direction but they turned out to be disadvantageous to tenants. Given the nature of the social system, tipped so heavily in favor of the peasants' former patrons, such laws and contracts could not possibly include all the provisions and benefits that the peasants had so long before relied upon. (Cf. Part I of this paper). Of course, had the landed and wealthy been able they could have continued their role as the traditional patron; but by all evidence, that old order was gone for them. The masses, on the other hand, were still trying to hold on to that system.

In 1933 some tenants in San Miguel, Bulacan, opposed the idea of having contracts with landlords. They did not want to reduce ". . . the relations between tenants and landowners . . . [to] to a strictly contractual basis." [119] Symbolic to the whole process taking place in Central Luzon (as seen in Parts I and II of this paper) the landlords increasingly insisted on such contracts while tenants realized, as the ones in Bulacan cited above had realized, that the contracts were contrary to their economic and social security. Such a business like arrangement was not what they wanted. Furthermore, they would always lose, if not by failing to get all the provisions they needed to protect their marginal income, then through the landlords' superior power and influence to escape from any conditions later found too restrictive. But in the 1930's peasants were learning the importance of organization and unity in order to stand up to the system in an attempt to regain the social and economic security they were losing. Under the guidance of their leaders, some of whom had visionary ideas very different

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[117] For example, see the news accounts of three of Quezon's famous speeches in Central Luzon: San Fernando, Pampanga (*The Tribune,* 15 February 1939, pp. 1 ff:); Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija (*The Tribune,* 2 May 1939, pp. 1 ff. 16); and Buenavista Estate, Bulacan (*The Tribune,* 1 February 1939, pp. 1 ff.).

[118] E.g., in March 1939 Quezon prevailed upon the National Assembly to appropriate an emergency fund of ₱500,000 for additional PC being sent to Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, and Bulacan and for more employees in the Department of Justice. *The Tribune,* 4 March 1939, pp. 1 ff.

[119] *The Tribune,* 6 May 1933, pp. 13, 14.

from the peasants' outlooks, they were trying more political channels, hoping to find the political system responsive where the economic and social system had failed to be.

REVOLUTION, 1946-54

From about 1946-1954, a peasant based movement, which I call the Huk-PKP revolution, unsuccessfully attempted to bring about change through organized violence.[120] In this section I want to briefly present evidence that that revolution was a continuation of the unrest analyzed above. That evidence centers around two propositions: (1) the areas of unrest prior to World War II correlate highly with the areas where the Huk-PKP revolution was the strongest, and (2) there are close similarities between peasant grievances and demands of 1930-1940 and of the attempted revolution. This comparison must be brief, with many questions left unanswered. In being so brief, the flavor of the whole period is almost lost—the turmoil, the revolutionary build-up, the government reaction, etc. Nevertheless, the purpose now is not to do justice to the revolution itself. That task is left for future writings.

Spaced between the peasant unrest and organizations of 1930-1940 and the Huk-PKP revolution was the Japanese occupation. Several guerrilla groups fought the Japanese forces during that time; the strongest one in Central Luzon was the Hukbalahap. To a degree the Hukbalahap was a continuation of the increasing solidarity and organization among peasantry since numerous Hukbalahap leaders had been peasant worker leaders; also the Hukbalahap was a united front that included, among other groups, the KPMP and the AMT.[121] The principal areas of Hukbalahap strength and mass support were in Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Pampanga, Bulacan and Laguna,[122] although there were also other guerrillas in these provinces. As an indication of Hukbalahap strength, it reportedly had 10,000 armed men in December 1943. During Liberation, the Hukbalahap was credited with taking from the Japanese three major towns in Central Luzon — Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija; Tarlac, Tarlac; and San Fernando, Pampanga.[123]

The Huk-PKP revolution was strongest in the areas of the former Hukbalahap and the areas of greatest rural unrest prior to World War II. The

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120 PKP stands for *Partidong Kommunista ng Pilipinas.* Usually this Huk-PKP revolution is referred to simply as the Huk movement or Huk revolution. However, the Communist Party of the Philippines was also important in the revolution, yet not always coterminous with the Huks (or, more properly, the *Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan*/ People's Liberation Army/).

121 The best treatment to date on the Hukbalahap is Luis Taruc, *Born of the People.* There is also a document at Camp Aguinaldo that provides some valuable details: *History and Organization of the Hukbalahap and United Front Movement,* December 1945, 15 pp. plus appendices. It was prepared by the Military Police Command, AFWESPAC, Intelligence Division.

122 William J. Pomeroy, *The Forest,* (New York: International Publishers, 1963), p. 39.

123 *History and Organization of the Hukbalahap and United Front Movement.*

first type of evidence to support this contention comes from Huk-PKP documents. Although a thorough analysis of all the relevant documents will require a separate study, one document in particular will serve the purpose of this paper. In 1950 the Huk-PKP leadership prepared a general organizational report, which was a summary of various regional reports from cadres and commanders.[124] Included in that report was a ranking of the various regions. (Table III).

Table III. RELATIVE RANKINGS OF HUK-PKP REGIONS, MAY 1950

	No. of cadre	*No. of armed men*	*Degree of mass Organizations*
Reco 1	1	1	1
Reco 2	2	2	2
Reco 3	4	4	4
Reco 4	3	3	3
Reco 5	6	6	6
Reco 6 and 7	5	5	5

According to the regional committee (Reco) divisions at that time, Reco 1 was Nueva Ecija, eastern Pangasinan, and northern Quezon; Reco 2, Pampanga, Tarlac, Bataan, and Zambales; Reco 3, Bulacan, Rizal, and Manila; Reco 4, Laguna, southern Quezon, Batangas, and Cavite; Reco 5, Bicol; Reco 6, Negros and Panay; and Reco 7, Mindanao.[125] In the document, Reco 6 and 7 were grouped together; had they been ranked separately Reco 7 would be last, judging from other related documents. Again based on a cursory examination of several documents regarding strength of the movement, the first four Recos are distinctly much superior to Recos 5, 6, and 7.

A second source of data for Huk-PKP areas are reports in the *Philippine Free Press,* beginning in 1948, that gave a brief summary of all Huk-PKP activity each week. Such activity included Huk appearance in barrios or towns, clashes between Huks and the government soldiers, etc. Table F (Appendix) is a numerical summary of those reports. For each incident a count of one was given. Since the *Free Press* names the municipality where each incident occurred, I coded incidents by municipality. The (b) columns on Table F are the number of muncipalities in each particular province where one or more incidents occurred.

As with the summary of incidents from 1930-1940, a striking aspect of Table F is the heavy concentration in Central and Southern Luzon. Also, the three most active provinces are again Bulacan, Pampanga, and Nueva Ecija. The next most active province is Quezon. (I should note that the

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[124] *Pangkalahatang Ulat Pang-Organisasyon* (General Organization Report), May 1950, 20 pp. Exhibit 0-1049, Criminal Case No. 14071 (Lava, et al.; Politburo Trial), CFI, Manila.

[125] Pomeroy, pp. 39-40.

increasing number of Huk-PKP incidents in Quezon, Zambales, and Bataan is probably due to Huk-PKP armed men retreating to those mountainous areas while being pursued by government forces.) Of course, the reports in the *Free Press* are not totally reliable, so figures in Table F can at best indicate only general trends and relative strength.

If one compares the overall picture of peasant incidents in 1930-1940 (Tables A and B, Appendix) with Table III and Table F (Appendix), the general conclusion is that the Huk-PKP movement was strongest in those same areas where peasant activities had been the most numerous and continuous. It is clear that there is considerable continuity between pre-World War II and post-World War II for Southern and Central Luzon. One can even say that the strongest continuity lies within the three core provinces of Central Luzon—Bulacan, Pampanga, and Nueva Ecija.

Interviews with former Huk-PKP leaders help to verify these continuities. Central Luzon provinces (principally Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, and Bulacan, and also southern Tarlac) were the easiest provinces for Huk-PKP cadres to organize in and move about. Even compared to Southern Luzon, the revolutionaries had an easier time in Central Luzon.[126] One long time peasant and Huk-PKP leader, Casto Alejandrino (the same Socialist who was elected Mayor of Arayat in 1940), compared the people's support in Southern Luzon to that in Central Luzon: "The initial response was the same—warm, hospitable, and attentive to what the Huks said and did. The difference was in their *stability;* the support of the people in Central Luzon is more stable, more dependable, when times become tough and pressure is great." [127] According to Cenon Bungay, due to politicalization more people in Central Luzon than elsewhere were either in the Huk-PKP movement or supported it. This politicalization had come over time and through struggle to improve their situation.[128] There were only "pockets" of politicalized people in Southern Luzon; most of these were in Laguna and in the Quezon-Laguna boundary area. As in Central Luzon, these other "pockets" were in large measure politicized as a consequence of activity in the 1930's.[129]

Peregrino Taruc said that lack of politicalization over time among the masses (peasants) was the principal reason why Huk-PKP support was never substantial in Iloilo and Negros Occidental, even though the socio-economic conditions in those provinces were somewhat similar to Central Luzon.[130] Other former Huk-PKP activists would agree. Looking again at Table A (Appendix), there were some incidents (mostly among laborers)

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126 Cenon Bungay, Interview, 15 July 1970. Camp Crame, Quezon City.
127 Casto Alejandrino, Interview 14 July 1950. Camp Crame, Quezon City.
128 Bungay, Interview, 15 July 1970.
129 Alejandrino, Interview, 14 July 1950. The term "pockets" of politicalization is from Alejandrino.
130 Peregrino Taruc, Interview, 9 July 1970. Camp Crame, Quezon City.

in Negros Occidental and Iloilo in 1930-1940. Table F (Appendix) and Table III indicate that the Huk-PKP movement was indeed weak in those two provinces, and captured documents I have seen would verify this. Yet the Huk-PKP movement spent considerable energy and sent several experienced peasant organizers and cadres to those areas, trying to get the peasants and laborers there to support and join the movement. The minimal success would not only bear out Taruc's analysis. It also suggests that revolution cannot be exported, so to speak, nor created in a short time. Revolution grows as the conditions allow and as the people come to that conclusion after a substantial degree of frustrated political activity.

Perhaps the reasons the workers in Manila did not support the Huk-PKP movement to any significant degree follow from the above generalization. In 1930-1940 there were numerous incidents (practically all strikes) in Manila. But unlike peasant unrest in the nearby provinces, the laborers' strikes seemed to have brought measurable results—e.g. increased wages and collective bargaining rights. Furthermore, in examining the newspaper reports, one does not see the repeated occurrences of strikes at the same factories, businesses, etc., which suggests again that the occasional strike among a group of workers brought some satisfying results. Consequently, as one Huk-PKP leader said, the workers in Manila did not develop a "political consciousness" because they directed their strikes, etc., at economic issues of immediate concern.[131]

It seems to me that the workers did not have to develop a "political consciousness" and move to the political realm in order to seek what they wanted. The peasants in Central and Southern Luzon, on the other hand, did have to, and later found that even at the political level there was little response to their needs. This discovery helped push them to revolution.

Turning now to the continuity of issues, the best statements of peasant demands and grievances are position papers, resolutions, and other documents of the PKM. (Between 1946 and 1948 the PKM was theoretically not part of the growing Huk-PKP revolution, but in actuality many of its members, numbering about half a million peasants,[132] were already directly or indirectly involved.) Before reading such documents, one would expect to find a loud, shrill cry of "land for the landless", or land redistribution. Instead one finds that the documents assume that the tenancy system will continue and advocate reforms within that system. Prior to 1950 the most radical statement for land redistribution appears in a 1946 document that advocates a long range, many staged program through which more people will own their farm lands.[133] Other than that, the only call for land redistri-

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131 Jesus Lava, Interview, 19 August 1970. Camp Crame, Quezon City.

132 This figure appears in a "Letter to the Congress of the Philippines," 26 January 1948, from The Executive Committee, Pambansang Kaisahan ng mga Magbubukid. Exhibit W-435, Criminal Case 15841 (Hernandez, et al.), CFI, Manila.

133 *Patakarang Pangkabukiran ng PKM* (Agricultural Platform of the PKM), 20 March 1946, pp. 4. 5. Huk-PKP captured documents. Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

bution typically seen is that land owned by Japanese, the Church, and the government should be sub-divided and sold to the tenants. This paper showed earlier that expropriation of such lands was a central issue before the war on a government estate (Sabani in Laur, Nueva Ecija) and a Church estate (Buenavista in Bulacan).

Practically all other proposals regarding agriculture found in PKM and related documents captured from the Huk-PKP movement seek modification of the tenancy system. Most advocate increased shares for tenants (for example, usually 60/40, 70/30 (in favor of the tenants) or *buwisan*—fixed rent—for palay and tobacco; 40/30/30 for sugar, with 40% being for the tenant and 30 each for the landowner and the central); more equitable sharing of agricultural expenses, particularly irrigation fees; and better relations between landlords and tenants.[134] Like Central Luzon peasants before World War II many documents speaking for postwar peasants assail bad practices of landlords, with unjust evictions of tenants being the most common complaint. In addition to such modifications in the tenancy system, the PKM was also proposing more efficient and technologically advanced farming practices.

A 1952 document from the PKP spoke more forcefully about land redistribution and ending the tenancy system once and for all.[135] But such references are the exception; furthermore, I doubt whether they spoke aptly for the peasant base of the movement. When peasants in Nueva Ecija discussed the Huk-PKP movement's objectives, very rarely would they mention land redistribution (other than for Church and government owned estates) or anything bordering on ending the tenancy system. The main objective as regards agriculture, according to these peasants, was to increase the peasant's share of the harvest. Jesus Lava, formerly the General Secretary of the PKP, confirmed this in an interview. He said that peasants only wanted to increase their share; they really were not trying to get the land for themselves. "It was the Communist Party [in the Philippines] that popularized the slogan "Land for the Landless;" that didn't come from the peasants' themselves." [136]

Two other peasant grievances of tremendous importance prior to World War II were (1) landlords frequently refused to give food rations and loans to their tenants and (2) the interest rates for loans either landlords or money lenders were usurious. These were also crucial issues for peasants

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[134] *Patakarang Pangkabukiran ng PKM;* Bataan Provincial Committee, Instruction Number 5, to PKM, June 1947; *General Rules and Regulations of the National Peasants Union* (PKM), September 1945. Huk-PKP captured documents. Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

[135] *Pahusayin ang ating Pagtuturo ukol sa atin Patakaran sa Pamamahagi ng Lupa sa Kabukiran* (Improve our instruction concerning our basis for the distribution of agricultural lands), June 1952. Huk-PKP captured documents. Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

[136] Jesus Lava, Interview, 12 August 1970, Camp Crame, Quezon City.

during the Huk-PKP movement. For example, they are the objects of attack in several articles of the PKM publication *Magbubukid* in 1946.[137] To the PKM the solution was to establish rural banks that would give low-interest loans and to establish cooperatives, which would also provide easy-term loans.[138] Peasants in Nueva Ecija also mentioned the establishment of loan sources as one objective of the Huk-PKP movement, but they said that was a more long-ranged plan. The more immediate solution was to reduce interest rates landlords and money lenders charged.

As regards the agricultural system, then, grievances and demands of peasants during the Huk-PKP revolution are strikingly similar to those during the unrest prior to the Japanese occupation. There are also similarities among non-agricultural issues. The most important of these is that during both time periods, peasants were highly critical of the political system. In both cases peasants believed the government was in the hands of the elite, particularly the landlords, while the poor people had no influence in government and without influence there was no way to get justice. This is how peasants in San Ricardo, Talavera, including former Huk-PKP participants, described the political system prior to and after the Japanese occupation. Similar descriptions appear in captured documents; e.g., "Only the big people and the wealthy have a decent life, while the rest of the people have no chance to escape their misery. At the same time, the government is in the hands of the reactionary capitalists and the poor people's enemy hacenderos." [139] Many peasants and captured documents aimed their criticisms at specific acts of repression, such as landlord armies molesting the peasants, government soldiers harassing PKM members even though that organization was legal (until 1948), and the unjust removal in 1946 of several Congressmen who were defenders of the peasants' interests.

Continuity in the areas of unrest and the issues involved in the unrest prior to and after the Japanese occupation supports the contention that the Huk-PKP revolution was the outcome of a process that started decades before, when the traditional socio-economic order began to disintegrate, leaving peasants in an increasingly precarious, insecure position. The evidence presented in this brief paper is admittedly incomplete, but more can be, and in the future will be, brought together to support the argument and analyze the Huk-PKP movement in some detail. From the evidence presented here one can conclude, at the very least, that the typical interpreta-

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[137] *Magbubukid* (Peasant) issues held among the Huk-PKP captured documents at Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, are few. There is one issue for each of the following months: January, April, May, and July, 1946. Each issue is about 12 pages.

[138] "Ang Kahalagan ng Kooperatiba" (The importance of cooperatives), by Mateo del Castillo, *Magbubukid,* January 1946. Huk-PKP captured documents. Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

[139] "Material Ni Kas. Sigundo, ED ng Secom no. 8" (Material of Comrade Sigundo, Education Instructor of Section Committee no. 8), (not dated; probably written in 1953 or 1954), Huk-PKP captured documents. Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

tions of the Huk-PKP movement have to be abandoned. That revolution was not the work of communists or any other such ideologues. Of course leaders played important roles in the movement prior to and after 1940. They brought organizational, literary, legal, and other skills that helped to shape organizations and to encourage needed discipline and planning. Some of these leaders, especially at the national level, held Marxist-Leninist convictions and acted, in part, in accordance with those convictions. In this sense communism played a role in the whole drama of the movement. That role, however, was limited and directly dependent upon the existence of unrest, which grew out of profound social and economic problems and came from the rural people themselves. People who believe that "outside agitators," communist or otherwise, can somehow create peasant unrest and revolts do a grave injustice to peasants and commit serious errors in judgment. Secondly, the peasants' anger and frustrations were not sudden and new phenomena during the Huk-PKP period. The power holders—American and Filipino—in the Philippines had plenty of time to prevent the revolution. Instead they either could not or would not recognize the signs of unrest all along the way; or perhaps they were incapable of dealing with the basic problems.

APPENDIX *

TABLE A

Number of Incidents	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	Total
Bulacan	3		6	15	5	9	15	10	22	14	20	119
Pampanga	1	3	3	4	4	14	1	19	36	44	64	193
Nueva Ecija	7	3	11	4	0	7	8	24	8	61	38	171
Tarlac	1	2	2		2	1	3	1	11	3	9	35
Pangasinan		2	1			3	11	7	3	1	2	30
Bataan			1	1	1			1		7	15	26
Northern Luzon	2		1		2	2		2	2	4	4	19
Ilocos	1					1		2	2			6
Laguna		1	1		2	5	5	2	1	7	7	31
Rizal	5	1	1		5	7	7	8	5	2	3	44
Cavite	1		1	4				1	1	2	2	11
Batangas		2			1	4	3	5	1	2	3	21
Tayabas	1		1			1	1	1	1	2		8
Bicol							1			1	2	4
Negros Occ.	1	19	16	1		3		2	5	9	6	52
Iloilo	3	4		1	1	2	2		2	2	4	20
Capiz									2	1		3
Visayan (other)		2		2	4	3			2	5	3	19
Mindanao	1		1	4		5	2	2	3	3	1	22
Manila	12	6	4	7	22	9	11	11	29	25	23	159

* Tables A, B, C, D, and E are compilation of peasant and labor incidents as appeared in *The Tribune* (Manila) 1930-1940. It should be noted, however, no coding was done for the following movements: Kapisanan Makabola Makasinag, Tayug up-

TABLE B

Number of Incidents	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	Total
Bulacan	2		4	3	4	6	4	5	5	7		13
Pampanga	1	2	2	5	5	9		7	14	15		17
Nueva Ecija	3	1	6	3		5	5	11	5	19		17
Tarlac	1	2	2		2	1	3	1	6	2		5
Pangasinan		2	1			2	6	5	3	1		2
Bataan			1	1	1			1		4		3
Laguna		1	1		2	3	2	2	1	3		4
Rizal	5	1	1		4	6	5	8	4	2		3
Cavite	1		1	4				1	1	2		1
Batangas		1			1	1	2	2	1	2		2
Tayabas	1		1			1	1	1	1	1		
Negros Occ.	1	9	3	1		2		1	3	5		6
Iloilo		2	2		1	1	2	2		3	2	3

TABLE C

Number of Incidents	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	Total
Province of Bulacan												2
San Rafael	2		1	1				4	3	9	2	3
San Ildefonso	1		1	4	1	1		9	2	9	2	3
San Miguel			2	10	2	1				1	2	3
Baliwag			2			1						1
Malolos						1				2	1	2
Bigaa						3			1			1
Sta. Maria						1						
Bustos				1				1				
Calatagan								1				
San Jose del Monte									1			
Polo					1				1	1	2	
Calumpit											2	
Bulacan (town)											2	1
Hagonoy												1
Plaridel												1
Guiginto												1
Pulilan												1
Bocaue												1
Meycauayan												1
(Unspecified)						1					1	1

rising, Tangulan incidents, and Sakdalista. These four are discussed in the text of this paper. Nor were any counts assigned to two other occurrences: the activities of the Lope de la Rosa gang (principally in Bulacan and Nueva Ecija), and the activities of Asedillo and Encallado (principally in Laguna-Tayabas border area). These two cases must be studied more carefully first.

TABLE D

Number of Incidents	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	Total
Nueva Ecija												
Nampicuan	3								1		1	
Cuyapo				1				3	5		2	
Gapan	2			1		1					2	3
Cabiao			1	1					2		8	4
San Antonio			3						2		3	1
San Isidro			1									4
Cabanatuan			2			1		2	4	4	13	3
Aliaga			1									
Jaen			1						1		3	1
Guimba						3					3	2
Muñoz						1					2	
Zaragosa								1				1
San Leonardo								1			1	1
Quezon									3		1	3
Talavera								1	1		8	5
Bongabon		1							1		1	1
Peñaranda				1		1			1	1		
Sta. Rosa		1							3	1	2	2
Laur										1	5	2
Sto. Domingo										1	1	1
San Jose											1	
Lupao											1	
Licab											2	3
San Carlos												1
(Unspecifiel)	1	2	2								3	

TABLE E

Number of Incidents	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	Total
Pampanga:												
Arayat	1	1		1	1	1				7	3	4
San Fernando		1	1			4			1	2	3	11
Candaba			2	2		3			1		6	4
Angeles						1				3	2	2
Sta. Rita					2	2			1	2		1
Mexico						1			3	2	7	8
San Luis				1		1						2
Guagua						1				1	1	
Porac						1					2	2
Minalin									1			
Lubao									4	4	6	5
Floridablanca									5	5	3	9
Bacolor										2		1
Maguiapo										1		
Mabalacat					1					3	1	5
Masantol										1	3	1
Sta. Ana				1						1	2	1
Magalang										2..	1	5

San Simon			1								1
Del Carmen										1	
Macabebe										1	
Lantakita											1
(Unspecified)		1					1	3		1	

TABLE F: *Huk-PKP Activity—Coded from Philippine Free Press Reports*

Number of Incidents	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	Total
Bulacan		3	3	17	7	20	8	31	13	14	8	85
Pampanga		6	5	14	6	29	11	42	14	64	15	155
Nueva Ecija		6	4	41	21	32	16	55	19	42	15	176
Tarlac		3	3	2	2	5	5	15	9	12	8	37
Pangasinan				2	1	18	10	18	11	7	5	45
Bataan				4	4	4	4	12	9	17	7	37
Zambales						5	3	8	4	10	8	23
Northern Luzon				2		4		17		9		32
Ilocos provinces				6		3		8				17
Laguna		4	2	4	2	20	13	25	15	23	12	76
Rizal		3	3	3	3	4	2	11	6	8	5	29
Cavite				1	1	1	1	1	1	6	3	9
Batangas				1	1	10	7	6	5	13	8	30
Quezon (Tayabas)		4	4	4	3	8	7	29	18	31	13	76
Bicol provinces								8		7		15
Negros Occ.												
Iloilo						3	2	12	4	4	2	19
Capiz & Antique								5				5
Visayan (other)								2		3		5
Mindanao												
Greater Manila				4		5		18		10		37

NOTE: Column (a) is total incidents in the year by year; Column (b) is total municipalities that had one or more incidents that year.

THE POLITICAL STYLE AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN INDONESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES

YEARN H. CHOI

INTRODUCTION

It has been pointed out by many observers that Indonesian politics has strong "ideological" orientations while Philippine politics can be characterized as essentially "pragmatic."[1] Sidney Verba makes the following distinction between the "ideological" and the "pragmatic" political styles:

> The former, the style of the *Weltanschauungspartein* of the (European) Continent, involves a deeply affective commitment to a comprehensive and explicit set of political values which covers not merely political affairs but all of life which is hierarchical in form and often deduced from a more general set of "first principles". A pragmatic political style on the other hand consists of an evaluation of problems in existing comprehensive view of reality. One deals with the issue at hand, perhaps in terms of some guiding principles, but not as an instance of some overall scheme.[2]

From a "functional" point of view, a stable democratic process is considered more compatible with the pragmatic rather than the ideological orientations. Thus Gabriel Almond states that: "The particularisms and ideological tendencies in the party and interest group systems produce relatively low mobility of interest groups in the party system, and a relatively low potential for stable coalitions among political parties." [3]

In Indonesia, politics has been highly divisive. During the colonial rule, there were divisions between those who accepted cooperation with the Dutch authorities and those who condemned all forms of such cooperation; between those who sought to establish mass-based organizations and those who concentrated on "cadre" formation; between those who emphasized practical tasks of social and economic uplift and those who did not; and between those who emphasized the Javanese of Indonesia and those who did not. *The post*-independence divisions included those between the Communist supporters and anti-communists; Islamic politicians and secular nationalists; "liberal democrats" and supporters of "guided democracy"; "Javanism" and

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[1] For example, O. D. Corpus, *The Philippnies* (Englewood Cliffs, 1965) Jean Grossholtz, *Politics in the Philippines,* (Boston, 1964); Lucian Pye, "Southeast Asia," in Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, eds.) *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, 1960), G. Mc. Kahin, (ed.) *Government and Politics of Southeast Asia* (Ithaca, 1964).

[2] Sidney Verba, "Conclusion: Comparative Political Culture," in Pye and Verba, (eds.) *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton, 1965), p. 545.

[3] Almond, "Introduction· A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Almond and Coleman, *op. cit.,* p. 48.

anti-Javanism, etc. It has been characteristic of Indonesian politics that all these fragmented sectors have justified their respective positions on the basis of "comprehensive and explicit set of political values" (to borrow Verba's description) such as Marxism-Leninism, Islamic millenism or Pantja-sila. According to Herbert Feith, the nationalist movement failed to develop the type of organizational cohesion and machinery for the settlement of conflicts which existed in the Indian Congress Party and the Philippine Nacionalista Party, which can be explained by the ideological divisions among the Indonesian elite.[4]

In the Philippines, on the other hand, politics has been more or less consensual and basic ideological differences have been absent within the socio-economic elite that led and dominated the major parties in the country. O. D. Corpus points out that "many leading families used party affiliations only to promote their interests," and it was common for them to take out insurance against vicissitudes and perils of politics by dividing their affiliation between the two leading parties after Philippine independence.[5] James Coleman argues that, in the Philippines, "competing parties are instruments through which 'political brokers' endeavour to aggregate the largest possible number of interests,"[6] rather than through which comprehensive principles or political values are to be promoted. Differences in interests and opinions did not result in the destruction of the system as a whole as in Indonesia, and the "pragmatic" nature of Philippine politics is held responsible for its relative success in maintaining a reasonably stable two party system. The other side of the argument, is of course, that the "ideological" nature of Indonesian politics is responsible for its "immobilism" which resulted in the decline of constitutional democracy.

This is not to argue, however, that the pragmatic or non-ideological attitude among the political elite is invariably "functional" under all circumstances. The point is that, given the initial goal of constructing a democratic mechanism following their respective independence, Indonesia would have had a better chance of achieving that objective if her political elite had been less ideologically inclined, and that Philippine democracy would have had more difficulties if there had been strong ideological orientations among the political elite. These political styles do not exist in a vacuum, however. This essay thus proposes to identify the social and political factors that contributed to the shaping of the political elite in the two countries, and how these political styles in turn affected the political life of the respective countries.

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[4] Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constituitonal Democracy in Indonesia,* (Ithaca, 1962), p. 21.

[5] Corpus, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

[6] Coleman, "Conclusion: The Political Systems of the Developing Areas," in Almond and Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 567.

THE INDONESIAN ELITE

Political elite in developing countries generally hold high values in political and economic modernization. Whether they hold high values in modernization or not, most of them are inevitably involved in this process. The process of modernization involved in turn the task of mediating the gap that exists between the modern and the traditional sectors—a gap between the society's intellectuals and its common people; between urbanized, Westernized elites and the village-based, peasant masses, etc. Lucian Pye distinguishes between six different roles of the social and political elite in this "gap-bridging" process: the administrator, who emphasizes rational bureaucratic norms; the agitator, who awakens dormant demands; the amalgamate, who combines both old and new roles in one; the transmitter, who tends to represent only the new roles without seeking political influence for themselves; the ideological propagandist, who strives to establish a common ideology; and the political broker, who aggregates special interests.[7] It is true that few people actually belong exclusively to one or the other of the above categories, but rather in identifying the general traits of the leadership groups and to examine which group of people had more of the characteristics attributed to which category.

In most colonial societies of Asia and Africa, a predominant percentage of the first generation of political leadership was supplied by traditional elite families. In Indonesia, most of the native administrators until the beginning of the twentieth century came from the upper *prijaji* class. The exclusiveness of recruitment from the former elite class was a result of the educational policy of the Dutch authorities. According to Robert Van Niel:

> The Dutch government developed an interest in education for Indonesians about the middle of the 19th century. A few Indonesians from the highest elements of society were permitted to attend European primary schools which had existed exclusively in Java since 1816. In 1848, money was set aside for the first Javanese schools. These schools were designed to train scribes and administrators and drew their students exclusively from those *prijaji* families whose hereditary rights made them eligible for such positions.[8]

It was only under the "Ethical Policy" of the first decade of the twentieth century that educational facilities for Indonesians were considerably expanded partly to satisfy the growing aspiration for power of the *prijaji* and partly to meet the needs of the expanding governmental services. Enrollments in these schools were still limited mostly to sons of the *prijaji*.[9]

In Indonesia, the traditional aristocracy was not land-based but dependent upon government office. The fact that the Dutch colonial government

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[7] Pye, "Administrators, Agitators, and Brokers," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Fall, 1958).

[8] Robert van Niel, *The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite,* (Chicago, 1960), p. 27.

[9] *Ibid.,* pp. 177-8.

had decapitated the traditional royalty meant therefore that the status of *prijaji*, high or low, lost much of its meaning. Harry Benda points out:

> Deprived of (its) apex, and without entrenched hierarchies of social class, ... Javanese society (was) in effect rendered politically eliteless, reduced to undifferentiated peasantries.[10]

Consequently, the *prijaji* class lacked the means and inclination to turn to other forms of leadership in the society except through service in the colonial government. Furthermore, the growing number of educated *prijaji* sons coupled with the government's capacity not to employ all of them as well as their own unwillingness to serve, left a majority of them without a "stake" in colonial relationship itself. Benda argues that their aloofness from the colonial order stemmed from the fact that, as a group and as individuals, the educated elite did not *own* anything but their educationally acquired proficiency.[11] Although education was primarily limited to the *prijaji*, social origin became progressively far less significant and membership in the modern intelligentsia was no longer based on ascriptive but primarily on educational and functional criteria.

Having been denied or voluntarily refused service to the colonial government, and without means and willingness to engage in industrial and commercial enterpreneurial activities the only alternative was to restore leadership through political movement as "agitators." This group of intelligentsia saw the first chance of national movement upon the founding of the Sarekat Islam in 1912. Although its alleged objectives were the advancement of commercial interests and religious spirit, its distinctive political character was manifested by the powerful segment of the leadership consisting of Western tion within the colonial government structure. Another significant aspect of the movement was that although most of its leaders stood above intellectually the general level of Indonesians "almost none of them belonged to the best educated segment of Indonesian society."[12] These lesser-intellectual and semi-intellectual elite, including the military, were to control ultimately the Indonesian political scene over the better educated "administrative-oriented" elite. These secular elite subsequently took off their religious guise, which had been instrumental for the mass support, and realigned themselves with the army by creating such mass movements as the Communist Party (PKI) in 1920 and later the Indonesian National Movement (PNI) in 1927. The religious sector of the Sarekat Islam developed into the moderately left-wing Council of Indonesian Muslim Association (Masjumi-1943) and the right-wing orthodox Indonesian Association Party (PSII-1947).[13]

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[10] Harry Benda, "Political Elites in Colonial Southeast Asia: A Historical Analysis," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, (April, 1965), pp. 243-4.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 244.

[12] van Niel, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-4.

[13] *Ibid.*, also Benda, *The Crescent and Rising Sun* (The Hague, 1958). Thom Kerstiens, *New Elites in Asia and Africa* (New York, 1966).

This secular elite which was western-educated but not absorbed into the Dutch administration constituted the first modern challenge to the well-educated, administrative *prijaji* and the Dutch control. According to Benda:

> This "secular nationalist" leadership (led in the main by western educated intellectuals and drawing its inspiration from the libertarian and socialist ideologies of the West) endeavored to place itself at the helm of the political radicalism bequeathed to it by Islamic and in part Communist leadership on the late 1920's.[14]

However, this leadership suffered a rigorous suppression by the Dutch authorities and was deprived of its most vigorous leaders such as Sukarno because of the 1920's exile and imprisonment. It was not until the occupation of Indonesia by Japan that this group could hope for a revival. As the Japanese attempted to mobilize the Indonesians in the war on their side through this group, their position was enhanced as the recognized spokesman of Indonesian political life. Furthermore, a war of independence against the Dutch after the Japanese defeat needed precisely these men: leaders who could rally various sections of the population to full and active support of the struggle. Long-term ends with a grandiose design and all-encompassing promises which led to ideological appeals held priority over the solution of short-term and what may be called practical problems.

Therefore, it was rather surprising to find that the "administrative" group represented by Mohammad Hatta, the Vice-President of the wartime Republic of Indonesia still occupied an important position in the nationalist movement during the late 1940's to become the first prime minister of the independent Indonesian federal republic. However, these leaders are not to be identified with the conservatives of the old guard consisting of the traditional hereditary elite of nobles and administrators. Instead, they inherited the more practical but nationalistic tradition of Dr. Sumoto and Dr. Gunawan Mangunkusoimo of the Budi Utomo in the 1930's who aimed at doing what was necessary but attainable.[15] The wartime Republic continued to function as a single political entity despite the multifaceted conflict between the two groups—the other group being represented by Sukarno —largely because the latter as the Republic's president could maintain close personal cooperation with Hatta in the face of the Dutch who were their common enemy. The suicidal radicalism of the communists led by Musso and their collapse after the Madium revolt in 1948 also contributed to the Sukarno-Hatta solidarity. As indicated above, Hatta maintained his influence after the independence by heading the first (and his last, too) cabinet of the federal republic. During this period, Hatta's primary advantage was his acceptability to the Dutch negotiators as well as BFO states and his recognized leadership and contribution in the Round Table Conference with the Dutch.[16]

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[14] Benda, *The Crescent* . . . . p. 197.
[15] van Niel, *op. cit.*, p. 242.
[16] Feith, *The Decline* . . . . pp. 47-54.

As long as he was responsible for the governing of the Indonesian State, he tried to curb the excess of the political parties of the "solidarity makers" and in large measure succeeded in this attempt. As Feith points out, however, this "bifurcation of attitudes" toward the future between ideological appeals and administrative realism within the top leadership could not tolerate the preponderance of the latter for long. Hatta's successful claim derived from this usefulness and contribution to the new state under strain. Once independence has been achieved, and when the external challenge played no equally great role in generating solidarity among the Indonesian elite disintegration seemed inevitable and Hatta was no more a suitable man to cope with the situation. According to Feith, each of the "administrator" and the politician, or the "solidarity-maker" as he puts it, had a constituency. The latter was primarily supported by lesser educated former revolutionaries who had been shaken in their commitment to traditional values as a result of disruptive social change, but had not as yet found the security of an alternative set of values or positions. Since they sought to cope with their anguish through political involvement, politics—and perhaps politics alone—was a very important part of their life. The "administrator" was supported by those relatively better educated who were neither politically alienated nor expressive in their support. They were therefore relatively detached from political struggles as such. Both "constituencies" were concentrated in cities where political communication was most feasible. After the revolutionary war, the absence of the external stimulus made Hatta's authority extremely precarious; the lukewarm support he received from his relatively quiet constituency was hardly enough to enable it to withstand the onslaught of the "politicians" supported by the more vociferous and active section of the political public. The fact that the Nastier's cabinet, the first one under the unitary constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, was formed on the basis of political parties marked that Indonesian politics was now to be fought among the ideologically oriented political parties—each claiming and aiming at "party" solidarity.

The reasons for his abrupt shift in political style can be sought in the bifurcation of attitudes among the political elite—between those with ideological appeals and those with what might be called "bureaucratic realism." Here was a problem which has been perceptively pointed out by Pye: "the problem today in nation-building is that of relating the administrative and authoritative structures of government to political forces within the traditional societies."[17] What Indonesia lacked in this respect were what I would call the "middle-range politicians" (political broker) to whom politics would be seen primarily as a means to satisfying various specific and unambiguous interests of the society rather than as the ultimate goal in itself. It seems

[17] Pye, "The Political Context of National Development," in Irving Swerdlow, (ed.) *Development Administration,* (Syracuse, 1963), p. 31.

that there has never been any dearth of such politicians in independent Philippines.

Political Elite in the Philippines

The Philippine "politicians" should be distinguished from their Indonesian counterparts even if we have the same image. Feith calls the Indonesian type the "solidarity-makers." According to Feith, they are the leaders with integrative skills, skills in cultural mediation, symbol manipulation, and mass organization.

> What was important for them was not governing as a set of activities but government as an image. As they put it, the all-important thing was that government would be truly of "the people," and when they spoke of the "people," it was not as differentiated groups with particular sets of interests, but rather as an amorphous mass characterized by a set of value orientations. The 'solidarity makers' were in fact principally concerned that government should serve as fount of values it must have meaning. The meaning might be provided in traditional, nationalist, Islamic, or Communist terms.[18]

In contrast with the Indonesian "solidarity makers," the Philippine politicians are predominantly middle-range ones. Jean Grossholtz offers two characteristics of Philippine politics within the general framework which she describes as the "bargaining process": (1) the lack of clearly defined political roles and (2) the absence of universal interests.[19] Because of these characteristics, the Philippine system can provide rewards according to criteria that the interested Philippine population readily understands. According to her, this is done by the act of "brokerage" on the part of politicians. The explanation for this phenomenon can be sought in the traditional power relationships. In the Philippines, landlords have dominated rural community leadership in most areas. Their political power was originally derived from the feudalistic obligations that have traditionally been owed by tenants to landlords and from the latter's ability to retaliate against tenants who ignored tradition.[20] As a result, there existed specifically a Philippine ruling class composed of native and Chinese *mestizo* members, whose social status did not depend entirely upon a position in the government, in sharp contrast to their Indonesian counterpart. Having had nothing that could remotely be called a Filipino nation when Spain began its rule in the archipelago, the Philippine traditional elite did not lose their sources of power with the imposition of foreign rule. Especially under the American administration, the Chinese and Spanish mestizos as well as the traditional land-owning class were also able to use their capital to engage in industrial and commercial enterpreneurial activities. Carl Lande believes that this is largely a function of the effort of American colonial education to inculcate an achievement orientation

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[18] Feith, *The Decline* . . . . p. 118.
[19] Grossholtz, *op. cit.*, p. 171.
[20] David Wurfel, "The Philippines," in Kahin, *op. cit.*, p. 712.

among the Philippine population.[21] At the same time, Pye observed that even today, most of the enterpreneurs who have been introducing new enterprises come from the established families of Spanish days.[22] The politically active elite members were thus firmly rooted in a class that enjoyed wealth, and the same people continued to enjoy, under American rule, the privileges of acculturation, education as well as wealth. Accordingly, Philippine nationalism was primarily political, not socially radical. The nationalist leaders strove for political equality within the Spanish empire but they did not aim at destroying the social status quo as such. In addition, the American colonial rule, though it commenced with the destruction of the nationalist uprising turned into preparation for autonomy and independence. This, according to Benda, helped to consolidate the Philippine elite and to increase its landholdings; it also offered new commercial, and far-reaching educational and administrative opportunities.[23]

One of the remarkable aspects under the succeeding colonial rule was that the masses chose to be acquiescent to the continued domination of their former political superiors. The explanation can be sought in the existence of "actual" economic power on the part of the ruling class as well as in their general willingness to assume the culturally imposed obligations including financial, of paternalistic leadership. Property qualifications for suffrage in early American rule also ensured the continued dominance of the landed aristocracy.

The American policy, through education of the population and cooperation with and cooperation of the traditional elite, succeeded in generating a high degree of agreement among the diverse sectors of the population as to the type of society and state in which they wished to live and as to the means of achieving these goals. Such an "agreement" among the leaders and followers also contributed to the continued dominance of the traditional elite.

Under the circumstances, even the Nacionalista Party, which openly dominated independence during their first campaign against the Federalistas, was neither radically nationalistic nor national in organizational terms. Corpus thus remarks:

> The founders of the Nacionalista Party were provincial political leaders gathered into an alliance that professed a national scope. When the elected delegates met for the opening of the Philippine Assembly in Manila, most of them were strangers meeting each other for the first time They were individual victors in separate provincial blocs, each bloc organized as an *entente* among family leaders pursuing or protecting momentarily harmonized interests. Their triumphs were their own, and not owed to a national organization.[24]

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[21] Carl Lande, "The Philippines," in Coleman, (ed.) *Education and Political Development* (Princeton, 1965), p. 327.

[22] Pye, in Almond and Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

[23] Benda, "Political Elite . . .," p. 250.

[24] Corpus, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

As in Indonesia, high education was an important factor to enter the political leadership under the American rule in the Philippines. Unlike in Indonesia, however, most of the influential leaders with economic and social resources chose to be engaged in "political" (party) and thus in brokerage activities rather than administrative activities. As the American encouragement of the establishment in 1900 of the Partido Federalista shows, the American approach in the Philippines was that the government was primarily to rest upon the politicians and not upon the administrators. As a result, the image of leadership that evolved in the Philippines was clearly that of the party-politicians who looked after the particular and specific interests of the society and later of the voters.

Thus, the economic basis of political power of the traditional elite and the tolerance by the American authority of party activities among the Filipinos, as well as the existence of opportunities in non-political areas, left positions in the government open for the educated yet second class leadership as well as people of relatively humble origin. Lande points out that the relative ease with which they were absorbed into the government and leadership position had the effect of depriving the common people of leaders dedicated exclusively to the interests of the common man.[25] The entry of large numbers of poor boys into such positions also has made the public service in the Philippines a middle class rather than an elite profession.[26] It can be further argued that such a situation deprived the lesser as well as highly educated of the incentive to resort to all-encompassing principles or radical ideologies as a guide to their political action.

The two preceeding sections show that, generally speaking, Indonesia and the Philippines developed two elite groups under the colonial rule: the "administrative" and "political" groups. The significant difference between the two countries is that while in Indonesia, the upper *prijaji* predominantly turned to administrative posts, their Philippine counterparts of *mestizos* became mostly "middle-range" politicians. The lesser *prijaji* and educated "poor boys" in Indonesia turned to politics, oppressed and frustrated. The educated lower principalia and poor boys in the Philippines turned to what we might call the middle class professions through the acquisition of new skills—public service, lawyers, teachers and others. In Indonesia, those holding administrative posts maintained high position and greater influence until the independence was achieved, but soon lost out to the "solidarity-makers" with ideological orientations. In the Philippines, however, the politicians invariably held the upperhand with the blessing of the American authorities during the colonial period and through continued personal ties and influence after independence. In Indonesia, the "ideological" parties and politicians soon developed a parliamentary deadlock and political *immobility*. In the Philip-

[25] Lande in Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 322.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 333.

pines, in the meantime, the unprincipled, self-interest oriented politicians would generate corruption in government and dissatisfaction among those who are not represented in the "bargaining process." The following section will deal with the implications and developments of those problems in the two respective countries and attempt to identify the socio-political factors that contributed to such developments.

THE MESSIAN AND THE PRINCIPLED POLITICIAN[27]

The inability to agree and compromise among the Indonesian parties produced no less than seven cabinets in office during the so-called "Liberal" period between 1949 and March 1957, with none of them staying in power for as long as two years. The virtual deadlock between the largest two parties, the Masjumi and PNI, neither of which even approached the size of a majority, enabled a large number of smaller parties to yield power in-between. In order for a cabinet to form a working majority during this period, it was necessary to include the representatives of many parties in one coalition. Sharp conflicts of primarily ideological nature frequently arose between the parties of the coalitions as well as between different sections inside these parties. Until about the end of 1955, the potentially most serious cleavage of all, the cultural and regional tension between Java and the Outer Islands had been kept in bounds by Hatta's symbolic participation in the so-called "dual leadership" with Sukarno as the vice-president. Sukarno presumably represented the Javanese aristocratic political culture of a greater intensity of nationalistic sentiment, greater inclination toward nativism and mysticism; Hatta represented the Islamic-enterpreneurial political culture more amendable to influences stemming from the West, of more pragmatic orientation, greater capacity of enterpreneurship and more sympathetic to socialist ideas rather than the Communist holism.[28]

> Electioneering, in fact, gave rise to a circular effect; party leaders had to emphasize their ideological positions to appeal to communal segments of the electorate. But by doing so they aggravated the division between these segments. And these ideologically reinforced divisions in society at large then sustained the newly sharpened cleavage in the political elite.[29]

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that little or nothing remained of consensus on the ends of the state, and almost all public organs had come to assume a partisan position. Split within the capital-city politicians and the ensuing coups and coup attempts throughout the Republic made the political situation highly untenable. The instability coupled with the Indonesian claim to West Irian provided a central leadership role for the "solidarity-maker" who would save the situation in the Bonapartist fashion, but on the basis of an ever higher and nobler principle.

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[27] This term is from Robert Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, 1963), p. 90.

[28] See Feith, *The Decline . . .* p. 32.

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 570-1.

By 1956-57, it appeared to President Sukarno that, given the popularity he enjoyed in Java and support by the Communists (who also claimed the grassroot support in rural Java) as well as the army's distrust of the party politicians, he was warranted and could afford a fundamental overhauling of the Indonesian politics.

Indonesian political scene until this time had been essentially elite-based. Parties were formed and power struggle was waged among and within the elite. The 1955 election was meant to be the first positive step toward the popularization of Indonesian politics. Even after the election, however, major political parties except the Communist lacked mass-based organizations and sought their support among primarily the more articulate "political public." Thus the Sukarno upheaval in 1957 which put an end to a "liberal party politics" was a major shift in political base from the urban elite to rural as well as urban masses. In this sense, the leaders of the army who provided the essential physical power to the Sukarno scheme, also shared the characteristics of the mass-oriented leadership group.

> In close contact with their troops, often especially in the regions outside Java, having to play the role of a civil leader, they were much nearer to the masses than the Western-educated elite who concentrated in Djakarta and played at politics.[30]

One of the most interesting aspects during this period was the popular support that Sukarno could mobilize by attacking the "liberal democracy." It is true that Sukarno's authority ultimately depended upon the coercive power that the military supplied. However, there are many indications that his appeals indeed had very widespread support.[31] One of the indications was that the army felt compelled to work with and under Sukarno who they thought supplied the major source of the regime's legitimacy.[32]

It appears that Sukarno's successful overthrow of the democratic process was aided by certain aspects of the Indonesian—particularly the rural Javanese—vulnerability to mystical and messianic appeals. Sukarno's proposals expressed in a speech before a gathering of Indonesian chief political and military leaders in February 1957 reflected his long standing personal political philosophy based on (1) the primacy of egalitarian mass democracy, modified by (2) the mystique of the supposedly specific Indonesian value—the Pantja-sila, for example— of which Sukarno was the chief formulator.[33] Such a proposal had profound appeals to the Javanese masses.

It has been argued that popular support of the early Sarekat Islam, whose greatest growth was in the rural areas (particularly East Java) has

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[30] Kerstiens, *op. cit.*, p. 174.
[31] Feith, *The Decline . . .* p. 603.
[32] Daniel S. Vlev, "The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs*, (Winter, 1963), p. 353.
[33] Justus M. van der Kroef, "Guided Democracy in Indonesia," *Far Eastern Survey*, (August, 1957).

been won on a "mystical superstitious, specially pressured, religious basis."[34] Here the leadership took the form of an individual who,

> In the name of the Islamic messiah, in the name of the *ratu adil* (the proverbial prince whose coming will herald a better life for all), would direct the forces of discontent against some concrete objective.[35]

Justus van der Kroef argues that with the development of the first Javanese kingdoms, to which Hindu-Indian cultural influences gave added impetus, the concept that the ruler was the incarnation of supreme deity in his Hindu manifestation of Vishnu became generally accepted. The relationship between ruler and subject, according to van der Kroef, is not understood in terms of a particularized regional or national community or geographically determined society, but rather in terms of cosmic processes that transcend any locality, class, ethic or sub-ethic group.[36] The same author contends that the "realm of national Indonesian politics today offers continuous proof that the mystical and messianic traditions are very much alive." [37]

With his appeals to "unity and solidarity against 'free fight liberalism' renewal of the spirit of the Revolution, return to national personality, national strength and prestige," Sukarno seemed particularly adept in meeting the "messianic" demands of the Indonesian population. Sukarno could be a substitute for what David Apter calls the political religion in the new nations.[38]

Another factor that made these appeals more attractive would be the fact that the urban dwellers were in many ways torn out of the context of their traditional Indonesian life pattern. The problem of acculturation without substitute moral and sociological frames of references seems more or less universal among many of the former colonial societies. In Indonesia the degree of alienation and frustration was specially high as their expectations in material conditions, increased social status, and integrative leadership were not met at all. Here was a ready ground for a mob to be exploited by the mystical symbols of authority.

Thom Kerstiens argues in his *New Elite in Asia and Africa* that if the national hero becomes a dictator, he is likely to lose the support of a significant element of the population which would more than offset the advantages he has over an anti-democratic leader. At the same time, according to him, "the hero's (in the case of Nehru) popularity among the masses has been diminished because he is criticized from time to time in parliament or by the press.[39] I think, however, that this argument should be modified with

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[34] van Niel, *op. cit.*, p. 157.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 20.
[36] der Kroef, "Javanese Messianic Expectations: Their Origin and Cultural Context," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, (June, 1959), p. 304.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 320.
[38] David Apter, "Political Religion in the New Nations," in Clifford Gretz, (ed.), *Old States and New Societies*, (London, 1963).
[39] Kerstiens, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

the appropriate consideration of the cultural context. If the people actually wanted a messiah, he cannot be criticized "from time to time" without ceasing to be a messiah. The initial question remains unanswered. However, it seems reasonable to argue that having tried to pose as messiah Sukarno began to believe that he was indeed one. One thing seems to be certain: that it was Sukarno's own disposition toward personal power and against a parliamentary democracy that was responsible for the type of messianism and authoritarianism he introduced during the seven years of his guided democracy. The Indonesian case offers an example where the personal disposition of an individual leader has so much effect on that nation's political life as a whole.

At this point, I would like to examine the nature of choice offered to a dynamic leader in an "instrumentalistic" setting. I refer to Ramon Magsaysay's presidency in the Philippines between 1953 and 1957 which is widely considered to have been a dramatic attempt to *bridge the gap* that existed (and that still exists) between the political elite and the population. It has already been noted that, historically, the Philippine political leadership has been tied up with wealth, education and social prestige in the local community or region. Since the achievement of independence in 1946, the unprincipled nature of the political elite allowed the election of representatives and president to be determined almost entirely by the shifting alliances of personal factions and distribution of "pork barrel" among them. National issues or those concerning the low-class interest played little part.

By 1950 the politician's hunger for patronage and for pork barrel brought about a situation which generally deserved the charges made by leaders of the Huk movement; economy was fast deteriorating and hunger was widespread; corruption was all pervasive; the ballot was a mockery (especially under the Quirino administration); and the low class interest, especially the peasants, was largely ignored.[40] According to Jose Abueva,

> The spread of the Huk rebellion beyond central Luzon in 1949 and 1950 was symptomatic of the social economic and political gulf between the elite and the masses of the people.[41]

Despite the various forces at work behind the increased activities and programs aimed at alleviating sources of grievances in rural areas,[42] it was largely Magsaysay who was most instrumental in harnessing the peasant restiveness by "bringing the government closer to the people."

Two aspects are outstanding in the situation outlined above. In almost any other country in the general Southeast Asian region, the failure of the politicians to provide effective solutions to the nation's problems would have

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[40] William Pomeroy, "The Huk Movement in the Philippines," *Eastern World,* (September, 1964), p. 10.

[41] Jose Abueva, "Bridging the Gap Between the Elite and the People in the Philippines," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration,* (October, 1964).

[42] Abueva, *Focus on the Barrio,* (Manila, 1959), Chapter 2.

led to strong-man rule or rule by military junta. This did not happen. Secondly, the Huk movement, was generally programmatic in their demands. They consistently tried to come into and work within the existing political framework until all their hopes were trampled down by the successive administrations of Roxas and Quirino. This was a manifestation of the prevailing pragmatism among the Philippine population. In the case of Magsaysay's *democratic* leadership, two observations can be made; (1) The basis of political power has been so dispersed, and consequently there have been so many leaders of approximately equal puissance, that no one leader has had preeminent power status;[43] and (2) Magsaysay's personal commitment to democratic process preclude any exercise of power by authoritarian means. While these explanations remain generally valid, I think there is another important factor that should be considered in relation to Sukarno's position in his country. It is the general absence among the population of the need to derive religious satisfaction from the political life. About 90 percent of the Filipinos have been estimated as "Christians," and there is no evidence of the remnants of nativistic "folk" religion in the Philippines comparable to that in Java. The American administration was generally successful in separating religious expectations from politics. The state has never taken on the kind of "sacred characteristics" which, according to Apter, constitutes the main cause of a "political religion." No political leader in the Philippines has been, and probably could afford to be the "redeemer" in the manner of a Sukarno or Nkrumah. To Magsaysay, "social justice" did not mean "the establishment of an Indonesian ideology" or "return to national personality," but concrete programs of social reform. To him, "democracy" was not so much of "renewal of the spirit of the Revolution," or attack on the "hyper-intellectuals," but guaranteeing freer elections and the establishment of channels through which social demands could be transmitted. At the same time, it is doubtful if Magsaysay could have received the kind of support he did if he had adopted Sukarno's strategy of appealing to religious aspirations. Despite certain degree of the "father-image" he enjoyed among the rural population, his support came essentially from being a "common man" close to them rather than from being a remote "savior."

This leads to a discussion of another kind of elite, the "aspiring" elite. They largely overlap with the "administrators." However, the former category includes, in addition to the responsible administrators, successful professionals and modern businessmen whose strength lies in their support by fellow members, urban residents and awakened rural elements who look to them for progressive ideas and reforms. Abueva argues that these provided the bulk of crucial support that Magsaysay needed against the conservative traditional politicians. Firmly rocted in the society, they would act not only as a check on the aristocracy but also as a buffer and instrument between

[43] Corpus, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

the popular president and the people. Magsaysay's untimely death has marked a serious setback in their attempts to build the bridge between the masses and the leadership. With Magsaysay, however, a positive step was taken toward that direction. It should be noted that their ascendancy did not necessitate the destruction of the basic political order in the Philippines. "Pragmatism" on the part of both the traditional leadership and the masses seems to be an important factor in this relatively peaceful "transitional" process.

The Indonesian "functional" elite which would be comparable to the Philippine "aspiring" elite had to travel a different course. Their decisive defeat by the ideological politicians early in the fifties has already been mentioned. It appeared as if their role would be completely eclipsed with Sukarno's victory in 1958. Given the divisive nature of Indonesian politics, however, the group would have better chance of functioning under Sukarno than under "party politics." It could have been possible for them to act as "instrumental leaders" who would reform and renovate with the legitimacy supplied by a charismatic and expressive leader. Such seems to be the position and role of the administrative leaders under De Gaulle's Fifth Republic in France. It needed the innovating and instrumental mind of the leader, however, "messianic" he may have appeared on surface. As Apter suggests, however, no political-religious regime can successfully justify its policy failures without damaging the religious aspect. Sukarno failed (and perhaps did not attempt) to detach himself from mundane policy-making. The next logical step would be a government based primarily on the physical forces. The crucial question here would be how effectively the "functional" elite (now no more to be limited to the administrators) would be able to exert their instrumental and innovative influence under the system of coercive authority. When they can do this to a considerable extent, we may expect the system would more easily move along from sheer coercion as well as messianism and pork barrelism.

I have one final comment about the "functional-aspiring elite." It seems reasonable to argue that these elite and their middle class cohorts constitute the most crucial element in the success of democratic progress in modernizing societies. It is not possible, however, to predict how "functional" they would be for the democratic process in the *longer* run.

GENERAL ARTEMIO RICARTE y GARCIA: A FILIPINO NATIONALIST

MARIA PILAR S. LUNA

AS A RESULT OF THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, especially during the early 1900's, a number of social movements emerged. While some took the form of apocalyptic expressions, others developed into social banditry and still others appeared as nationalistic movements. They developed in an attempt to show their strong defiance against the government established by the United States in the Philippines.

While a majority of the Filipinos belonging to the intelligent, propertied and educated class cooperated heartily with the authorities, a good number of people proved to be irreconcilable. One of them is General Artemio Ricarte y Garcia — "an iron-willed man who defied the Americans down to his last breath,"[1] a patriot who is "the living body, the flesh and blood of the Filipino heroes who chose hardships, misfortune and death to subjugation."[2]

The movement he organized assumed nationalistic forms. It cannot be classified as social banditry because in the first place it was not reformist; rather, it was revolutionary in the sense that it did not accept the general framework of the established government. Instead it insisted that the established government must be fundamentally transformed.[3] In the second place, its aim was not vengeance on the rich. Neither did it assume the characteristics of an agrarian movement. Nor did Ricarte in any of his pamphlets declare or state anything about having a "New Jerusalem" or of worshipping a supposedly reincarnation of a saint or God for that matter. Though it cannot be denied that the membership was extensive only among the lower and more ignorant classes of the people, it was a truly nationalistic endeavor to overthrow the American government.

Born of poor parents in 1866 in Batac, Ilocos Norte, Ricarte had to work his way through school successfully earning the Certificate of Maestro de Instruccion Primaria from the Escuela Memorial in Ermita. One of the first members of the Katipunan, he held the position of treasurer of the Balangay ng mga Anak Bayan Mapagtiis (the Katipunan name of Francisco de Malabon). He fought during the Battle of San Francisco de Malabon, one

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[1] Ben Cailles Unson, "An Exile Bares His Heart," *Kislap-Graphic,* XXV (August 27, 1958), p. 32.

[2] Editorial, "An Offer of Russia to Ricarte If He Returns," *Herald* (July 28, 1938).

[3] See Eric Hobsbawn, *Primitive Rebels.* New York: Frederick Praeger Publisher, 1959, pp. 10-11. Differentiation between a reformist and a revolutionary.

of the earliest skirmishes between the Filipinos and Spanish forces during the revolution. Throughout the tumultous years of the Filipino-Hispano hostilities, Ricarte, popularly known then as the Vibora (snake),[4] was always on the forefront leading the Filipino forces. A brigadier-general of the Katipunan under the Magdiwang Council, he consequently occupied the position of Captain-General of the reorganized revolutionary government controlled by the Magdalo Council. He held this position until the time of the signing of the Pact of Biak-na-Bato on December 14, 1897.

Ricarte's encounter with the Americans began with the American occupation of Manila. As early as 1898 he was known to be very much outspoken with regards American intentions over the Philippines. He entertained suspicion and distrust in America's promise to help the Filipinos obtain their freedom from the Spaniards. He even warned General Emilio Aguinaldo saying that the Americans are a more dangerous enemy than the Spaniards. It did not take a long time though to prove his doubts. Soon Fil-American hostilities broke out and American occupied Manila became the target of operations of the Philippine Revolutionary forces.

General Ricarte at this point deemed it necessary to attack Manila and to gain control of it. And to make the attack successful and effective, he issued two circular letters, one dated July 12, 1899 calling for contributions and the other dated October 13 of the same year appealing to the Filipino people to rise in arms against the United States.[5] This was followed by another letter dated January 2, 1900 addressed to the Lieutenant General who was commanding south of Luzon wherein Ricarte explained that the only way of attaining the liberty and independence of the Filipinos is to strike the blow in the city of Manila because once it is taken the Filipinos shall be able to dominate the suburbs and as the foreigners live in it the Filipinos shall be forced to have direct relations with them. . . " with our heads nobly erect we can demand what we want of them and of the enemy because the first (American) will have to submit to our authority. . ."[6]

Two months after the circulars were passed Ricarte carried out his attack. With a group of Filipino soldiers, he managed to sneak into the city. Unfortunately, the Americans captured him at Paco Bridge. He was detained at the military prison in Anda Street in Intramuros and tried for spying behind American lines. On January 7, 1901 he was deported to Guam together with some revolucionarios. In 1902 with the capture of General Emilio Agui-

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[4] "He took the name Vibora as his nom de guerre, inspired according to him by the off-verse in the New Testament (Matt. 10:16) "Behold I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves; Be ye therefore wise as serpents and harmless as doves." Leopoldo R. Serrano, "The Misunderstood Patriot and Vibora" *Philippine Herald Magazine,* July 26, 1958.

[5] *Memoirs of General Artemio Ricarte,* National Heroes Commission, Manila, 1961. Appendix L Police Record of Artemio Ricarte.

[6] *Ibid.* Appendix D—Unsigned Draft of a Letter in regard to the attack in Manila in 1900, found among the papers of Ricarte.

naldo and the consequent fall of the Malolos Government all Filipino prisoners and exiles who took their oath of allegiance to the United States were pardoned and sent home. Two of the Filipino exiles however remained adamant: Ricarte and Mabini. Both refused to go back to the Philippines if the price was taking the oath of allegiance to the American Government. In 1903 the two were taken back to Manila. Upon reaching Manila Bay, however, the American authorities did not allow them to leave the ship unless they first took the oath of allegiance. True to his words, General Ricarte refused to take the oath but the Sublime Paralytic, then a very sick man said to Ricarte "Allow me to take the oath that I may see our homeland before I die. I feel that I have only a short while more to live, and if I go with you, I would just be a burden"[7] and so Mabini took his oath. Meanwhile, the authorities transferred Ricarte to another ship bound for Hongkong where he stayed for another ten months.

But his deportation served only to arouse in him more strongly the desire to free the Philippines from the clutches of the American government. He kept himself abreast with international events especially those pertaining to the Philippines. The Russo-Japanese war over Port Arthur which was then at its height interested him very much. Ricarte believed that a war between these countries would be of great advantage to the Oriental countries most especially to the Philippines in its struggle for independence. He opined that a Russo-Japanese war would signify the rise of all Oriental peoples against the West and believed that the Philippines should take the opportunity not only to gain her independence but to take a part in the great struggle for Oriental emancipation.[8]

While in Hongkong he kept also in close touch with the Hongkong Junta founded by Aguinaldo and with the other Filipinos. When the Katipunan Abuluyan was founded Ricarte was unanimously elected as its president.

On May 1903 a certain Manuel Ruiz Prin of Manila arrived in Hongkong. He introduced himself to the Filipinos there as a representative of the Filipino people and given authority by a so-called Universal Republic of Philippine Democracy to deal with foreign countries regarding the independence of the Philippines. Ruiz it seemed asked Ricarte to introduce him to the other Filipinos in Hongkong. Whether Ruiz was a crook or not Ricarte nevertheless believed in his sincerity and intentions. And since they shared the same cause they worked hand in hand.

In November or early in December 1903 they founded a committee called the Universal Republic of Philippine Democracy with the following as officers and members: President, Rafael de Leon; Secretary, F. G. Rivera; and members: Primitivo Artacho, Roman Francisco, Luis Santos, Mauro

[7] Guillermo Andaya, "How Ricarte Almost Revived the Revolution," *Philippine Free Press,* Jan. 30, 1960.

[8] E. del Rosario, "General Artemio Ricarte," *Philippine Review,* 11, June, 1944.

Resurrecion, Petronilo Perez, S. Oligarion, Elias Morales and one Concepcion. The main objective was to secure the independence of the Philippines.[9] Prior to the formation of this committee, however, Ricarte has been issuing orders (dated September 1903) as director in behalf of a government which he called Gobierno Triunvirato Dictatorial Filipino, the nature of which was purely military. Under this government each province was to have a military governor with the rank of Brigadier General, Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, or Major according to the importance of the province. Its main objective was the attainment of the independence of the Philippines.[10] To achieve this goal, Ricarte found it necessary to come back to the Philippines to start a revolution to overthrow the United States Government. He expressed this desire to the committee but it was opposed on the ground that it was a very risky plan. But Ricarte determined as he was proceeded with his plan and on December 23, 1903 arrived in the Philippines secretly as a stowaway in a British freighter.

Immediately after his arrival in the Philippines Ricarte started to work. He issued a proclamation under the seal of the Republica Universal Democrata Filipina announcing his arrival in the Philippines and at the same time called upon his Filipino brothers to rise in arms against the United States government and its policy of the "Philippines for the Filipinos" which is "nothing more than a delusion nicely covered with attractive clothes".[11] Together with this proclamation Ricarte issued a circular stating certain military penal laws.[12] He also contacted persons who could help him carry out his plans. Jose Muñoz, Mauro Reyes, Felix Almarines, Lauro San Jose, Juan Evangelista and Modesto Victorino were among those who visited General Ricarte and with whom he discussed the military organization initiated by him. Hoping to find assistance from the former revolucionarios, he visited General Emilio Aguinaldo. Much to his disappointment, the first President of the Republic replied that he did not wish to take part in the revolution. He also sought General Pio del Pilar in Pandacan who appeared to be willing to cooperate with Ricarte but turned out to be a turncoat. By this time, his presence became known to the American authorities prompting them to conduct a search all over the city. However some of the Filipino agents deputized to find Ricarte side-tracked his American pursuers and counselled Ricarte instead to return to Hongkong and to leave Manila immediately. But Ricarte dedicated to his goal continued seeking out for his friends like Gregorio Aglipay and Isabelo de los Reyes. Again his conference with

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[9] *Memoirs, op. cit.* Appendix K—Stenographic report of an interrogation put to Artemio Ricarte in the presence of Captain W. S. Grove and Lieutenant Calderon of the Philippine Constabulary, Chief C. H. Trowbridge and Assistant Chief Carl Hard of the City Secret Service of Manila.

[10] *Memoirs, op. cit.* Appendix H—Gobierno Triunvirato Dictatorial Filipino.

[11] *Memoirs, op. cit.* Appendix I—Proclamation of Artemio Ricarte announcing his arrival in the islands.

[12] *Ibid.*

them brought only another disappointment as both tried to dissuade him from carrying out his plans picturing the situation of the country knowing that the people would not respond favorably. They seemed to be contented with the American set-up of government. He also tried to seek help from Dr. Dominador Gomez who, like the others, advised him to go back to Hongkong. Dr. Gomez opined that with the doctrine that Taft had set up which is the "Philippines for the Filipinos," the independence of the Philippines would be achieved in three or four years without the necessity of a bloody or armed revolution thus it would be better for Ricarte to go back to Hongkong.

Since he could expect no help from these people, he decided to go to the north hoping to get some support. But before he left, he counselled L. S. Jose, F Almarines, M. Victorino, and J. Evangelista not to discontinue from organizing revolutionary regiments. To build up their hopes and confidence, Ricarte gave them some pamphlets entitled: Nuestra Bandera "Outline of the Plan of Organization and Insignia of the Army". Embodied in this pamphlet was the scheme of government which Ricarte planned to establish in the Philippines with the overthrow of the American Government. Formulated by Manuel Ruiz Prin, it is outlined as follows: "The government was to be known as the Gobierno Provisional Revolucionario. Its officers were to be a President, Secretaries, and sub-secretaries of War, Finance, Foreign Affairs and Interior. The archipelago was to be divided into states with Manila as the federal capital. Each state was to be allowed three delegates and two senators to the Federal Congress. Certain fundamental laws were to be declared federal such as: abolition of death penalty, abolition of all prisons and penitentiaries, death penalty for treason, espionage,, robbery, rape and insubordination, establishment of universal suffrage, establishment of a jury system, abolition of taking of oaths, freedom of emigration and others. For military purposes the country was to be divided into 8 districts each having a politico-military governor who should have the rank of a secretary who should also be a brigadier general. Assisting him would be 6 councilors with the rank of colonel and a secretary with the rank of major. The central government was to be formed as follows: a president who should also be lieutenant general; 6 councilors, two fiscals, eight military judges, one secretary, two secretaries, twenty-five sub-secretaries.[13] Contained too in the pamphlet was an exposition of the crimes committed in the Philippines by the United States and a demand for recognition as belligerents.[14] Ricarte also gave them copies of the proclamation he signed (dated December 25, 1903) while in Hongkong printed with the seal of the Democrata Universal Republica Supreme Headquarters and the "Proclamation to the Filipino People" signed by Mr. Ruiz Prin in Hongkong dated September 15, 1903.

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[13] *Memoirs, op. cit.* Appendix G—Ricarte's Scheme of Government.
[14] *Memoirs, Ibid.*

Blank copies of appointment signed by Mr. Manuel Ruiz as president and Ricarte as Vice-President of the above mentioned government were also distributed. The appointments were of two classes: one of generals and field officers and others for officers.

Starting from Pasay, Ricarte went to Marilao, Bulacan, Cabiao, Nueva Ecija and Pampanga. In Pampanga he met a certin Nicolas Calvo who was a former officer during the insurrection and later a corporal in the constabulary under the American government. Calvo and his soldiers agreed to join the revolt and so upon their return to Vigan where they were permanently stationed, they laid out the plans for the uprising. As planned, they seized the barracks and secured a number of arms. Calvo liberated the prisoners in the jail, armed them and left with his detachment. Unfortunately the Constabulary caught them. Some of those arrested were sentenced to death while others to forty years imprisonment and a fine of $10,000.[15]

After his unsuccessful campaign in the north Ricarte decided to come back to Manila where he conferred with Aurelio Tolentino, a Tagalog playwright known for his plays which depicted the Philippines' struggle for independence from the United States. Tolentino by this time had earned already the ire of the Americans. Tolentino like the others did not consider the plans of Ricarte as wise since the people seemed contented with the governmental set-up set by the United States. He even suggested to Ricarte to submit himself to the authorities. Later, however, Tolentino joined hands with Ricarte. His plays were declared seditious and therefore were censured for public performance.

Aside from Tolentino, Ricarte sought too the help of General Macario Sakay, president of the Katipunan Katagalugan.[16] He at once proved to be willing to cooperate with Ricarte. However, the two soon parted ways due to disagreement over the legitimacy of each other's authority—that is—as head of the Republic of the Philippines. Moreover, Ricarte much to the dismay of Sakay appointed Tolentino as dictator of the Gobierno Triunvirato Dictatorial.

And so Ricarte and Tolentino began their work by filling in military commissions and distributing them in Manila. They wrote also letters to E. Aguinaldo, P. Lichauco, P. Ocampo and others. But they began to be disgruntled when the people on whom they depended so much for a successful revolution were not sympathetic to their cause. It became evident to

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[15] "Report of Secretary of Commerce and Police," in *Report of the Philippine Commission* (1904), p. 425.

[16] Upon the Capture of General Emilio Aguinaldo by the United States Army on 1901 and his consequent taking of the oath of allegiance to the U.S., Sakay assumed the leadership as head of the Republic of the Philippines which he called the Katipunan Katagalugan included all the barrios, towns and provinces of the Philippines . . . that is, Jolo, Mindanao, Visayas, the Ilokos and other places which are truly Tagalog. See Antonio K. Abad, *General Macario L. Sakay: Was He a Bandit or a Patriot.* Manila: J. B. Feliciano and Sons Printers-Publishers, 1955.

both that they must either surrender to the authorities and suffer the consequences of their acts, or they must do as others had done and join the bands of outlaws and await death from starvation or capture by the constabulary.[17] For this reason Tolentino decided to pave the way for surrender and wrote a long and threatening letter to the Governor General demanding a solution of the problem favorable to Ricarte and himself and to others connected with the conspiracy, picturing the fearful alternative of "bloody revolution" should the demand not be complied with.[18] After patiently waiting in vain for a reply, they decided to separate ways to gain probably more followers—Tolentino to Camarines Norte and Ricarte to Mariveles.

Ricarte's campaign began to alarm the authorities. For this reason, a reward of ₱2,500 was offered for his capture. To make himself less conspicuous and to be able to carry out his strategy Ricarte worked as a laborer in the American arsenal in Mariveles, Bataan. He planned to seize the firearms and ammunitions in the arsenal. Unfortunately he got sick. After recovery, he worked again and this time as a clerk at the Justice of the Peace office in Mariveles under the assumed name of Jose Garcia. A second misfortune however befell him. The clerk of court where he was working turned out to be a Filipino spy and through him the authorities learned of Ricarte's presence in the town. Thus on May 29, 1904 the American troopers captured him. Found guilty the court sentenced him to one and a half years imprisonment for illegal possession of firearms and six years with a fine of ₱10,000 for rebellion. On June 7, 1904 he started his prison term at Bilibid prison.

Although his movement did not cause serious disturbances his capture had the effect of quieting certain restlessness among the people in the province adjacent to Manila.[19] But while there was this restlessness, the authorities ascertained at this point that the people were not sympathetic to Ricarte's movement and that they were not prepared for another revolution neither did they desire one.[20]

While in prison, Ricarte was visited by various American government officials as well as newspaper correspondents. One English journalist then working for the *Cablenews* by the name of William Watson took the opportunity of interviewing Ricarte about the Katipunan. Out of a series of interviews, Ricarte's "Apuntes Historicos de la Insurreccion por los Associados al Kamahalmahalan Kataastaasan Katipunan nang Mga Anak Ng Bayan Contra El Gobierno Español En Las Islas Filipinas" was

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17 *Memoirs, op. cit.* Appendix N—The Christmas Eve Fiasco and a Brief Outline of the Ricarte and other similar movements from the time of the breaking up of the Insurrection of 1899-1901, p. 187.

18 *Ibid.*

19 "Report of Secretary of Commerce and Police," in *Report of the Philippine Commission* (1904).

20 *Ibid.*

born.[21] The American officials who visited him took turns in persuading him to take the oath of allegiance to the United States. Ricarte however firmly refused to do so, sticking to a pledge he made which is to unceasingly defy the United States government.[22]

While the American authorities reported that Ricarte was given very good treatment as a prisoner, Ricarte related quite the opposite. In an interview with P. R. Verzosa, he revealed that for years he was a living dead in his prison cell. In his bartolina or solitary confinement he had nobody to talk to except the rats and the cockroaches. He was prohibited from opening his own letters or writing them and forbidden too to receive visitors except the Americans.[23] But despite this pitiful condition Ricarte survived because of his strong will and determination to fight the American government. He did everything to keep himself physically well. At one time though his mental and physical resistance weakened and he almost suffered a breakdown.[24]

On June, 1910 at the expiration of his prison term, Ricarte found himself still in prison. And it was only through the efforts of Atty. Mariano Legaspi Florendo that the authorities released him a few days after. As he took a few steps away from the prison gate an American agent approached him and extended a supposed invitation of the Governor General for him to go to Malacañang. Feeling confident Ricarte went with him. The agent brought him instead to the office of the General Collector of Custom, Col. H.B. McCoy who pressured him to take the oath of allegiance. Given only two hours to decide, Ricarte pleaded to be given forty eight days to do so as he wished to see first his family. To quote 'anim na taon wala akong malay sa nangyayari rito sa Maynila at pagdaka ako'y pahahalikin ninyo sa bandila — anim na taong nagdusa na ako at ngayon ay panibagong pahirap na naman."[25] But despite this pleadings, McCoy just proved to be stern. Thus Ricarte still undaunted by his harrowing six-year imprisonment refused to take the oath. On that same day he was banished to Hongkong with no money and clothes except for the one he wore.[26] The inconsiderateness of the authorities served only to intensify his eternal hatred for the Americans strengthening thereby more deeply the pledge he made.

For four years (1910-1915) he lived in Hongkong. There he initiated the publication of a fortnightly newspaper "El Grito del Presente." But on March 1916 the Secretary of Commerce and Police excluded it from Philippine mails thus causing the death of the newspaper. He also formulated

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[21] Memoirs, *op. cit.* p. XXI and Letter to Jose P. Santos, dated October 24, 1932 in *Unpublished letters of Artemio Ricarte to Jose P. Santos,* I.

[22] Letter to J. P. Santos dated Oct. 24, 1932.

[23] Memoirs, *op. cit.*, p. XXI. See also P. R. Verzosa, *General Artemio Ricarte: Kung Bakit Hindi Siya Humalik sa Bandilang Americano.* Tokyo, 1926.

[24] Letter to J. P. Santos, *Ibid.*

[25] P. R. Verzosa, *Ibid.*

[26] *Ibid.*

a constitution which indicated not only his desire to change the name of the Philippines but to have his proposed government supersede any that might be established in the Philippines. The government he conceived to have is as follows:

> In all the territory comprised by the Rizaline Islands there shall be established a Revolutionary Government directed by chiefs of the Liberating Army which shall exercise its functions until it is recognized by the government of the United States of North America and the absolute 'independence of the Rizaline Islands to be proclaimed to all the world by it.' [27]
>
> The object and ends of this Revolutionary Government which it shall endeavor to carry out are as follows:
>
> a. To overthrow quickly and by whatever means, the present foreign government, in order to establish in the Rizaline Islands the true and honorable Government of the People and for the People.'
> b. To respect the laws and provisions approved by the Revolutionary Government and to make them respected, hence, it must endeavor to secure the reign of real justice in all the Rizaline Islands. . . .[28]
>
> The Supreme Government of the Rizaline Republic shall be composed of Three Powers, to wit: [29]
>
> First ..... Executive Power
> Second ..... Advisory Power
> Third ..... Judicial Power
>
> The Captain General of the Revolutionary Army shall be the President of this Power, and the Lieutenant General of the Island of Luzon shall be the Vice-President.[30]
>
> The Advisory Power shall be composed of a number of members twice that of the number of districts, according to the division of the Rizaline Islands into zones . . .[31] One of the duties of this power shall be to cooperate with the Captain General of the Revolutionary Army in his efforts to discover efficacious means to overthrow the American Government in all the Rizaline Islands as soon as possible.[32]
>
> The Judicial Power which shall be the Supreme Tribunal of the Rizaline Republic, is the only one that has authority to enforce the compliance of all Soldiers of Honor with all the laws and regulations relative to the progress and development of the "golden ideal" of the Rizaline Islahds.[33] The President of this Power will be the Lieutenant General of the Revolutionary Army in command of the Visayan Islands.[34]
>
> The Revolutionary Army will be constituted by the union of all natives of the Rizaline Islands[35] and for purposes of the organization of the troops, the Rizaline Islands shall be divided into six zones.

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[27] Memoirs, *op. cit.*, Appendix M—Constitution of the Revolutionary Government in the Rizaline Islands which are to be erected into a nation with the name of Rizaline Republic. Chap. II, Art. 5.
[28] *Ibid.* Chap. II, Art. 16.
[29] *Ibid.* Chap. II, Art. 17.
[30] *Ibid.* Chap. III, Art. 18.
[31] *Ibid.* Chap. VI, Art. 28.
[32] *Ibid.* Chap. VI, Art. 32, Sec.—a.
[33] *Ibid.* Chap. VII, Art. 35.
[34] *Ibid.* Chap. VII, Art. 36.
[35] *Ibid.* Chap. VIII, Art. 46.

Written on March 31, 1913, Ricarte had this constitution printed and distributed among his followers in Manila.

Being at a far distance, he entrusted the plan of the uprising in the Philippines to his organizers Rufino Vicente, Timoteo Cariaga, Tomas Enrile, Manuel Delgado and others. They circulated in the provinces of Rizal, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, Tayabas, Iloilo and Antique selling certificates of ranks from Lieutenant to Colonel with prices ranging from fifty centavos to ten pesos each. They argued that the selling of commissions would give them the opportunity to get in on the ground floor so that when independence or an insurrection should come, the Ricarte army would be in control and the class of people it represented would be in a position then to equalize the distribution of the wealth of the country.[36] The "army corps" was composed mostly of people coming from the lower and more ignorant classes. An oath-bound society, it made use of the pacto de sangre patterned after that of the Katipunan.

For the implementation of his plans, Ricarte divided the entire archipelago into zones or subdivisions each under the command of generals, colonels, majors etc., to be in charge of the recruitment, enlistment and raising of funds. He even had the plans for the defense of Corregidor Islands laid out. This is revealed in a cablegram from the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department addressed to the Secretary of War, Washington dated February 17, 1913. It read as follows:

> Harry W. Bandholtz, through Constabulary Secret Service, has captured complete most recent plans, accurately showing location and fields of fire of all batteries Corregidor Islands, adjacent Islands, and many military maps Manila and vicinity, about to be sent to Ricarte Hongkong.[37]

All of Ricarte's plans, however, were thwarted with an immature uprising which occurred on December 24, 1914 in the Botanical Garden of Manila and in Navotas, Rizal. It was undoubtedly due to the rash and uncontrollable leadership of one Timoteo Cariaga, a fugitive from justice on the charge of homicide and naturally a desperate man.[38] It appeared probable that the people aside from being misled by promises of support which did not seem forthcoming grew also impatient with the postponement of the date fixed for disorder.

According to the report of Captain George H. Seaver, Chief of Police of the City of Manila, the insurrectos were to gather at the Botanical Garden from eight to twelve o'clock on the night of December 24, 1914. On the appointed day, some one hundred fifty to two hundred Filipinos gathered at the Mehan Botanical Garden. They were instructed to march to

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[36] "Report of the Secretary of Commerce and Police," in *Report of the Philippine Commission* (1914), pp. 178-179.

[37] Cablegram to Secretary of War, Washington from Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, (February 17, 1913).

[38] "Report of the Governor-General," in *Report of the Philippine Commission*, 1914, pp. 44-45.

U.S. army posts and stations and to seize the arms and ammunition and then to raid the Insular Treasury and seize the money. Three "army corps" were organized. "Capt." Eduardo Adajar, a cook, headed the first army corps which gathered in the Mehan Garden. They awaited for the firing of a gun, the signal for the attack of the Cuartel de España on the Walled City. Having armed themselves they were to march to Fort McKinley. The signal did not however come. Instead the police came and quietly broke up the gathering. Those arrested yielded their weapons, daggers, anting-anting, military commissions, Katipunan flag and the commissions and orders signed by the Ricarte organization.

The second "army corps" gathered at Luneta awaiting for Timoteo Cariaga but who for some reasons failed to show up. Only the "army corps" placed under the command of "Major" Antonio Laureano was able to carry out partly the instructions. At the firing of guns which they mistook to be the signal, his men started for the municipal building. Laureano secured a revolver and two sabres and took the captain of the municipal police as prisoner. They also attempted to open the safe but in vain. Mariano Melendres, the Provincial Governor of Rizal and one of the prisoners of Laureano related to the Governor-General that he (Melendres) asked in vain to be liberated.[39]

Aside from these uprisings, there were posted in walls of tiendas Tagalog proclamations signed by Timoteo Cariaga and M.O. Delgado, Subcommander of Manila Zone, with the emblem of the Revolutionary Army of the Philippines. The proclamation incited the people to awake and draw once more the terrible bolo of revolution.

Having found among the prisoners commissions and orders signed by the Ricarte organization, the American authorities immediately linked Ricarte's name to the December uprising. This was however the last known serious disturbance linked to his name.

Meanwhile with the outbreak of the first world war, the British became suspicious of the political exiles in Hongkong. They feared that these exiles were encouraging the move to expel the British from India. For this reason, they brought Ricarte to Shanghai. But upon arrival there, the American authorities arrested and jailed Ricarte for flimsy reasons. Later upon the instructions of the consul, they released him. Looking for another loophole, the Americans arrested Ricarte for the second time on a charge of vagrancy and ordered him to be taken back to Manila. But El Vibora managed to escape and boarded an English ship as a stowaway. The British however discovered him and this time jailed him for one month. By this time, his wife, Agueda Esteban, managed to secure ship passage for two for Japan. Taking this opportunity to free himself from the clutches of the Americans, Ricarte and his wife sailed for Japan; first

[39] Memoirs, *op. cit.* Appendix N, pp. 158-160.

to Moji, later to Tokyo and finally settled in Yokohama. In Japan the couple set up a small restaurant named Karihan Cafe at 149 Yamashita-cho.

His twenty six years of self-exile in Japan did not change at all his hopes and affections for the Philippines. In fact his restaurant became a mecca to Filipinos abroad. Many of his countrymen especially the members of the Philippine Independent Missions stopped at his restaurant to seek his views on Philippine independence. One of the issues concerned with Philippine independence that interested him very much was the Hare-Hawes - Cutting Bill. For him the bill was like a sweet-coated pill in the sense that while on the surface the bill purported to grant independence, it actually would strangulate the Filipinos' aspiration for a true economic as well as political independence.[40] For this reason he deemed it wise for the Philippine Legislature to examine and study the bill seriously.

General Ricarte also carried considerable correspondence with his countrymen in the Philippines like Jose P. Santos. A reading of his letters would reveal his undying nationalism. In one of them Ricarte informed Santos of his membership in the "Bagong Katipunan" an organization which aimed to attain the "Golden Ideal" of the Filipinos.[41] In another, he advocated for changing the name of the Philippines to Luvimin -(Luzon, Visayas, Mindanao) and some of the cities to be named after our national heroes.

Neither did Ricarte change his attitude towards the Americans. In an interview with Verzosa, he said that he will go home to the Philippines only if she is no longer tied to the chains of the United States.[42] In fact even at the age of 73 he still refused to come back despite the invitation given to him by the Philippine National Assembly through a resolution wherein they offered to give him a pension of ₱100 a month. President Manuel Luis Quezon even personally asked him to return to the Philippines. But to all these persuasions Ricarte had only one answer; that is, he is anxious to go back but there is a great obstacle that stands in the way and that is the necessity of swearing allegiance to the American flag.[43]

During the Second World War, however, Ricarte became a "misunderstood patriot" and this was due to his collaboration activities with the Japanese. He fought with the Japanese because he sincerely believed that the Philippines would secure her independence with the help of the Japanese.

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40 Stand in the Hare-Hawes Cutting Bill, in *General Ricarte's Articles and Essays,* January 23, 1933; and "Views on Why the Hare-Hawes Cutting Bill Should Not be Decided by a Plebiscite But By the Philippine Legislature," *Ibid.*

41 Letter to J. P. Santos dated January 2, 1931 in *Unpublished Letters of Artemio Ricarte to Jose P. Santos,* I.

42 P. R. Verzosa, *General Artemio Ricarte . . .*

43 Editorial "An Offer of Pension to Ricarte If He Returns," In *Philippine Herald,* July 28, 1938.

But whatever Ricarte did during the Japanese occupation history will vindicate him as a man who stood by his principles—a patriot who preferred the difficult life of an exile in Japan to surrender to the Americans whom he sincerely believed, merely supplanted Spanish tyranny and deprived the Filipinos of their bitterly fought for freedom.[44]

[44] Jose Quirino, "I Talked With Ricarte Before He Died," *Kislap-Graphic,* XXX, December 4, 1963.

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