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THE MILITARY AND NATION-BUILDING IN KOREA, BURMA AND PAKISTAN*

DAVID W. CHANG

THIS STUDY SEEKS TO INTRODUCE THE THESIS THAT THE MILITARY coup is crucial for the continuation and acceleration of nation-building in Asia and Africa. Many military coups have prevented either leftist takeover or conservative corruption in government. A review of the events which have culminated in military coups in Asia and Africa tend to support this thesis. This study, however, will be limited to coups in Korea, Burma and Pakistan, eventuating in the past two decades. But the task of nation-building and the necessity of change must first be elucidated.

I

It is not easy to define the nature of the revolutionary changes which have occurred in the developing areas. The task of nation-building in Asia and Africa during the last decade has been the subject of serious attention and sharp controversy. This enormous task has affected the more than 75 per cent of the world's population that occupies 60 per cent of the earth's land surface. The thrust of this new but difficult era for the underdeveloped peoples has come from a convergence of three factors: the end of Western imperialism and colonialism, the revolution of rising expectations, and the rivalry between communist and non-communist forces for political, economic and social control.[1] A vast literature — both descriptive and theoretical — has been accumulated on the nature, scope, and methods of nation-building and the problems of political integration, modernization, political culture, communication, and political leadership. The old, feudalistic societies must be transformed into new nations that are "independent," "cohesive," "politically organized" and "internally legitimate." Professor Karl W. Deutsch has pointed out the possibilities:[2]

* The author appreciates his discussions with Dr. Hy Sang Lee of Korea, the Chairman of our Economic Department, and Dr. Zillur Khan of Pakistan, a Fulbright scholar colleague of his. The research grant of WSU-O Board of Regents has been been helpful also.

[1] Robert E. Ward and Roy C. Macridis, *Comparative Asian Governments Series* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. vi.

[2] Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, *Nation-Building* (New York: Atherton Press, 1966), p. 3.

> Nation-building suggests an architectural or mechanical model. As a house can be built from timber, bricks, and mortar, in different patterns, dependence from its setting, and according to the choice, will, and power of its builders, so a nation can be built according to different plans, from various materials, rapidly or gradually, by different sequences of steps, and in partial independence from its environment.

Different political ideologies and political power blocs have emphasized various aspects, methods, orientations and end-products of this phenomenal undertaking. Some stress the "open society" approach — democratic socialism or free enterprise. Others, however, elect totalitarian methods and rigid central control. But the most essential element in successful nation-building must be the individual's commitment to the principle of collective solidarity against stagnation, corruption, feudalism and repression. During the past decades, a few nations such as Malaysia and Israel have made encouraging progress in this direction. The vast majority of the new nations in Asia and Africa, however, have lost their initial dynamism and have become pessimistic. Thus, in many cases, the military coup remains the last alternative to national disintegration or corruption. Many scholars now suggest that "an integrated national identity may be too ambitious a goal for the new nations . . . that their immediate task is the establishment of a strong governmental apparatus able to serve and control the population."[3] In Asia, in particular, Professor L. W. Pye reminds us, "the fundamental question in all Southeast Asia countries is whether they are going to be able to build the modern organizations necessary for maintaining all the activities associated with modern nationhood."[4] It is clear that without a modernized new social system, no government in any of the new states can perform its functions well. A new social system will require new experience in industrialization and massive conversion of the old structures into the modern ways of life on the part of the peoples of the developing countries. We are reminded not to expect rapid emergence of such a new social system in each of the new states. In the nation-building process, the forces for change are at war with those against it. The unsettling character of internal war within each new state has been carefully noted by Professor Chalmers Johnson who states:[5]

> . . . Between 1946 and 1959 alone, there occurred some 1,200 unequivocal instances of guerrilla war, organized terrorism, mutiny, coup d'etats, and so forth. Therefore, barring some unforeseen improvement in men's political judgment, the future of revolution seems assured.

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[3] *Ibid.*, p. 117.

[4] Lucian W. Pye, *Southeast Asia's Political Systems* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 77.

[5] Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 172.

A new social system will also depend on a long period of sustained social mobilization which itself may demonstrate, at least, some "eleven principal characteristics" in a state that is undergoing the process of social mobilization.[6] Professor Lucian Pye considers these characteristics of change in terms of six major crises of political development in the new states:[7] the identity crisis, the legitimacy crisis, the penetration crisis, the participation crisis, the integration crisis, and the distribution crisis.

In short, it is not easy to identify the complex political, social, economic, cultural, psychological and religious elements of change in a transitional society. The process of change is further complicated by a lack of human and material resources in the new states to facilitate the inevitable process of modernization so as to avoid chaos and disruption. Outside powers, in their own self-interests, within the cold war context, have further aggravated the already difficult task for each developing state in Asia and Africa. But without their assistance, the task of nation-building may be further impeded. The democratic institutions imported by Asian and African countries have largely failed for lack of political leadership. Many Asian and African political leaders have lost much of the optimism of a previous decade. This failure has led either to an immediate military takeover in some countries, or to the challenge, both covert and open, of left-wingers, in others. In some new states that have experienced neither a military coup nor leftwing subversion, a precarious civilian leadership has relied heavily on military loyalty and support.

The rising influence of the military does not, however, apply to the Latin American scene, where the military establishment is part of, or identifiable with, the existing political system and bureaucracy. The existing literature on Latin America supports this conclusion.[8] Latin American nations have developed during the past one hundred years a pattern of military intervention which is unique and therefore defies comparison with the role of the military in the new nations. Professor Janowitz clarifies the difference:[9]

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[6] Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *The American Political Science Review,* LV, No. 3 (September 1961), pp. 493-514. See also Wayne A. Wilcox, *Asia and United States Policy* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 39-40. The eleven characteristics are: (1) increased exposure to modern communications, (2) growth of mass media, (3) increase in formal political participation, (4) growth of literacy, (5) change of place of residence, (6) population growth, (7) decreasing percentage of work force in agriculture, (8) urbanization, (9) assimilation into the dominant cultural pattern, (10) growth of national income, and (11) growth of per capita income.

[7] Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), pp. 62-66.

[8] John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964) and Robert D. Putnam "Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latin America," *World Politics,* Vol. XX, No. 1, 1967, p. 87.

[9] Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. v.

> It appears at first glance that Latin American nations are also confronted with similar crises of civilian-military relations. But there are fundamental differences in the natural history of militarism in South America. The forms of military intervention represent more than a century of struggle and accommodation which has produced political institutions different from those found in the new nations.

II

The failure of the charismatic leaders and political parties naturally creates a leadership vacuum which is automatically filled by the modernized military profession at a time of leftist threat to the nation-building in which the military has a serious stake. Military coup has, therefore, become "a crucial institution and power bloc."[10] In many new states, military coups succeed because the people rarely question the legitimacy of the takeover, nor do they understand the super-imposed post-independence political elite leadership. Besides, political instability, pessimism and economic failure simply encourage the populace to accept austere discipline and a fresh change. Furthermore, the non-political generals and heroes are usually popular with the masses. A more basic explanation for staging a military coup seems to have been quite accurately put by Professor Morris Janowitz:[11]

> Changing technology creates new patterns of combat and thereby modifies organizational behavior in the military. The more complex the technology of warfare, the narrower are the differences between military and non-military establishments, because more officers have managerial and technical skills applicable to civilian enterprise.

With its control of the instruments of violence, free from political factionalism and regional interests, the military, identified also with national purpose, rural background, and urgent modernization, do not have a strong loyalty to the political elite of the upper class. It is, therefore, not difficult for the successful coup leaders to develop a wide mass political apparatus to consolidate their own political power. In explanation of the role that the military play in modern China, one specialist states that "the military stand out because in a disrupted society they represent the only effective organized element capable of competing for political power and formulating public policy."[12]

As political, social and economic crises accentuate and as frustration and disappointment continue to mount, the military becomes increasingly restless and moves toward the central task of nation-building. The Indonesian army, for example, acted to prevent the palace coup in 1965. The Philippine army in the early 1950's successfully wiped out the Huk rebellion and saved the nation's democratic institutions. South

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[10] *Ibid.*, p. vi.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 27.
[12] Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development, op. cit.*, p. 183.

Vietnam and Laos are awaiting the outcome of the military contest that will determine their future.

In the Middle East, the military is always prepared to effect a realignment of political forces. Among the African countries Algeria, Egypt, the Congo (Leopoldville), Sudan, Ghana, Nigeria and Dahomey are all presently experiencing or have recently experienced military rule.[13] It is no longer possible, therefore, to ignore the increasing role of the military in the task of nation-building.

The military leaders in the new states are best informed about the outside world and are extremely exposed to foreign influence through travel and military training abroad. They can compare and judge the success or failure of their own civilian government. They are, by origin, sensitive to the feelings of the rural population. Thus, they feel free to support, destroy, or replace the civilian leadership as they see fit. Those who have participated in the independence movement also look upon themselves as guardians of the territorial integrity of the nation. They have been the first to acquire organizational skills and technological capabilities. The military leaders are, therefore, most anxious to unite and develop national resources and new codes of social justice. But the military are short of the usual patience and cannot tolerate political and social chaos. They think more can be achieved through discipline and regimentation. Politicians, to the generals, are corrupt and deceptive, even though the military leaders and the civilian politicians may have the same objectives for their nation. They feel obliged to take over when the politicians fail to implement these objectives.

Recent events demonstrate that the military coup is useful only as a political makeshift. Most of the military regimes have not proved capable of governing for long terms. Democratic institutions and leadership in Malaysia and the Philippines have been largely free from the military influence. Other nations in Asia have relied in various degree on the military during crucial moments of national development. In Indonesia, for example, the military regime under the acting president, Suharto, has only recently launched the task of nation-building. The achievement of his regime cannot be evaluated at this early stage. Three earlier Asian military coups in Korea, Burma and Pakistan, on the other hand, have been identified with the task of nation-building and can, therefore, be studied for their contribution to the science of nation-building.

There seem to be several features common to all three coups. Each took place after one decade or longer of civilian rule. In each country, furthermore, the military had performed a necessary function in the initial stage of nation-building in presenting outright internal

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[13] ris Janowitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22 have detailed information in Table 2 f armed forces, level of spending in armament, etc.

revolt as in Burma (1948), or in defending a territorial claim as in the Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir (1947). It is interesting to observe that at the time of the coups in all three countries, there was no imminent threat of internal or external communist takeover of the civilian government. Furthermore, neither of the three countries had had any genuine experience with effective two-party politics. Nor had any of them effected significant economic progress. It is necessary, on the other hand, to note several dissimilarities. First of all, the Korean coup of May, 1961 was against the continuation of President Rhee's corruption, inefficiency and political factionalism, which had provoked a spontaneous student eruption stemming from a sense of frustration and hopelessness with regard to the Rhee regime.[14] The 1962 coup in Burma, however, was not at all preceded by massive student riot. The coup was at first hinted and later plotted by the army at the rank and file level. The proven leadership of General Ne Win was the best alternative to that of U Nu. In the case of Pakistan, the coup was undertaken by Ayub Khan, the Defense Minister and the top general of the army, who had been disenchanted by a power-hungry civilian leadership which for more than a decade and according to Ayub, had corrupted party politics through deception, had deepened the division between East and West Pakistan through ceaseless argument over the role of the Islamic religion in the new state and had threatened to destroy the unity achieved during the dispute with India over Kashmir. The senior generals who led the coups in Pakistan and Burma were men who had won national prestige and popularity, but the Korean, General Park, was little known and during the early days of the military regime had to share political leadership with other generals.

The increasing role of the military in the politics and development of new states should stimulate more research on the function of military coups. Case studies and empirical knowledge are needed to construct models and theories in order to predict, explain and control military coups. We need to know the general conditions under which they are effected, their aims and tactics, the type of leadership that they call forth, and the popular responses to them in Asian and African countries. For example, what are the shortcomings of the generals? And what part does a military coup play in the process of nation-building? Can a Latin American type of coup be prevented in Asia and Africa? If so, how to prevent it? Many other questions can be asked. The following pages will consider the highlights of the three Asian coups in the hope that a theory on the function of military coups in the new states may emerge.

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[14] William A. Douglas, "Korean Students and Politics," *Asian Survey*, Vol. III, No. 12 (December 1963), p. 586.

III

From August 15, 1948, the birthdate of the Republic of Korea, to April 28, 1960, when at the age of eighty-five, he rode through the streets of Seoul lined with cheering and weeping crowds, President Syngman Rhee guided the nation in his high-handed and stubborn way through various crises. The new republic, at the very start, was handicapped by a lack of industrial resources and other economic shortcomings, and by the problem of absorbing the refugees from North Korea. But not until early 1950, and "only then under heavy pressure from the United States, did Rhee come to grips with the serious inflation threatening his country."[15] While the President was consolidating his position during early years in office, the already faction-ridden legislative assembly was constantly fighting on behalf of landowners and other special interest groups. After more than 25 years of Japanese Imperialism, there was no awareness of and dedication to the new task of nation-building and modernization. Foremost in President Rhee's mind were two objectives: national unification on his own terms and a diplomatic settlement with Japan based on his own stiffening demands. Rhee's age, stubbornness, and strong suspicion of disloyalty alienated him from his cabinet members and the Korean people generally. His long tenure as president was best summarized as follows:[16]

> ... For Rhee time was rapidly running out. But in his hillside mansion Rhee worked in the morning, napped in the afternoon, and puttered in his garden. An appalling amount of his time was spent on trivia.... The R.O.K. cabinet met at varying intervals, but it was prone to go for long periods without meeting at all. It was characteristic of the Rhee administration that the cabinet had little function in policy-making: it merely listened to Rhee to expound it.

Finally, the rigging of the 1960 election touched off a student revolt against corruption, factionalism and in search for modernization and new leadership. The Korean army allowed Rhee to fall, apparently unwilling and perhaps unable to take over until 13 months after his fall. In the meantime the Democratic Party regime under Mr. John M. Chang tried but failed to provide a viable alternative to Rhee's misgovernment. The students, who were hopelessly divided in 1960, could not organize themselves into a sustaining political power, except in that spontaneous eruption of power in the street on April 19, 1960 as reported by Professor Douglas:[17]

> It was completely the students' show, for the adults merely stood on the sidewalks and applauded. The students surged down the streets, burning

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[15] Richard C. Allen, *Korea's Syngman Rhee*, (Tokyo, Japan: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1960), p. 105.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 219.

[17] William A. Douglas, "Korean Students and Politics," p. 585.

> police stations, invading the homes of rich Liberals (Rhee's political party), and converging on government buildings. The next day the army refused to move against the students, and within a few days Rhee resigned.

The only alternative, therefore, was the coup staged by a small number of young and dedicated generals on May 19, 1961. They were the best hope that South Korea would begin seriously to undertake the take of building a new nation in her own image. They were "determined to save their country from chaos, corruption, and communism." As recalled by President Park later, the purpose of the coup was to create:[18]

> The need for a great human revolution in Korea that would produce a basic change in national ethics and character; the liberation of Korea from poverty via a major developmental program; and the establishment of a welfare democracy free from the historic curses of corruption, factionalism, and class fixation.

The military Junta consisted of a 25-man Supreme Council of National Reconstruction (SCNR) under General Park Chung-hee. The SCNR abolished the existing constitution, disbanded political parties and suspended freedom of press and association. The military government arrested and sentenced 300 of 4,369 persons listed on an earlier blacklist.[19] During 1962, the Junta won the voters' approval of a new constitution which prepared the way for the May, 1963 election. The 4-1 margin by which the new constitution was approved, 20 months after the coup, was a strong indication that the voters apparently felt the military government represented their interests. This attitude was strengthened by the broad "social background of the cabinet ministers and SCNR members (serving) under the Military Government." This broadened participation sharply distinguished this government from all previous governments since 1948. In contrast to the Rhee and Chang regimes which were dominated by educators, professional politicians, career civil servants, and lawyers recruited from the upper classes, most of the post-coup leaders in the military government were sons of small landholders or laborers. The government's dedication to modernization and social mobilization was fully recognized by the Korean intellectuals:[20]

> The May Revolution of 1961 produced a rather drastic shift in the nature of political leadership. Younger military men came to power, many of them from very different backgrounds than had been traditional for post war leaders.... The future of Korea may well depend upon the emergence of such patterns. The obstacles to social mobility — both traditional and modern

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[18] Robert A. Scalapino, "Korea: The Politics of Change," *Asian Survey*, Vol. III. No. 1 (January, 1963), p. 31.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 33.

[20] Bal-Ho Hahn and Kyu-Taik Kim, "Korean Political Leaders (1952-1962): Their Social Origins and Skill," *Ibid.*, Vol. III, No. 17 (July 1963), p. 323.

> —must be removed, and all qualified persons must be eligible for active political life if the pressing problems of Korean society are to be seriously tackled, and if the confidence in government is to be fully established.

This same concern for social mobility must have haunted General Park before the May coup of 1961 as he himself recalled:[21]

> Especially painful has been our national suffering since the Liberation in 1945; in the course of the past 17 years, two corrupt and graft-ridden regimes created the basis of today's crisis, keynoted by a vicious circle of want and misery.
>
> But, I wonder, is there no way for national regeneration? Is there no way to mend our decayed national character and build a sound and democratic state? Is there not some way to accomplish a "human revolution," so that our people may stop telling lies, cast away the habits of sycophancy and indolence, and make a new start as industrious workers, carry out social reform, and build a country without paupers, a country of prosperity and affluence?

In short, he wanted to eliminate privileged class, political factionalism, and autocratic feudalism. In their places he pledged to provide social justice, economic equality, and human freedom. Democracy failed in Korea, he believed, because "we attempted to implant it while retaining semi-feudal forces." He justified his military coup, furthermore, as the last hope for Korea after 36 years of Japanese Imperial rule, 12 years of Rhee's dictatorship, and one year of chaos under the regime of John M. Chang. Park called his coup of May 1961 the "Surgical operation" for the emergence of "a new elite of capable and competent leaders from the younger generation to provide a new kind of government and administration."[22]

It is relevant to cite a few of the major achievements of President Park's last eight years in office. First of all, political power passed from the Rhee generation to the Junta generals during the first two years after the coup. The young leaders realized that political stability and economic progress would result only through a mass political party's pressing for various reforms. In the first national election of October 15, 1963, the anti-Junta "old politicians" reemerged to compete against Park's presidential candidacy. But he defeated the old forces in a very close but honest election.[23] Political stability during the next four years was highlighted by steady economic progress. President Park's new leadership seems to have replaced frustration with confidence. One writer has reported:[24]

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[21] President Chung-hee Park, *Our Nation's Path* (Seoul, Korea: Dong-A Publishing Co., 1962), p. 3.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 660.

[23] Chong-sik Lee, "Korea in Search of Stability," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (January 1964), p. 659 (Park won by 1.55% of popular votes — 156,028 votes out of some 10,081,200 valid votes cast).

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 660.

> The remarkable achievement of the first Five Year Plan (1962-66) gave the Korean people, for the first time, a sense of self-assurance and confidence. Defeatism and fatalistic pessimism, reinforced by years of frustration and misgovernment, have disappeared. Koreans have gained strength and a sense of pride in their realistic vision of becoming one of the most industrialized nations in Asia by 1971.

Thus, in the presidential election of May, 1967, Park easily defeated his chief opponent by 1,162,125 or 10.5% of the total votes.[25] The prestige of this "New Korea" is mounting. Korea has also been praised for the performance of her well-trained soldiers now fighting the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. South Korea's strong anti-communist stand and her effort to create a new Asian regional bloc have brought serious concern and fear to North Korea. Of all the achievements since the coup of 1961, economic progress and planning has been the most startling. Former U.S. Undersecretary of State, George W. Ball, who headed the U.S. Investment and Trade Exploratory Mission to Korea in March, 1967, said in Seoul:[26]

> Korea is a land where the yeast is working. What most impresses every American who comes to this beautiful country is a sense of vitality, a sense of determination, a feeling of surging strength, the persuasive confidence of a great country and a great people that have found their way toward progress.

The statistics of growth fully justify Mr. Ball's statement. Since 1962, for example, the gross national product has increased 8.5 per cent annually. Exports have gained by almost 50 per cent. Industrial annual production increases by 14 per cent. By 1971 self-sufficiency in food production may be achieved.[27] In short, economic progress seems to be nearing the take-off point. The Second Five-Year Plan is being carried out on schedule. The spirit of revival since the military coup has been expansive. Such a miraculous economic growth should be studied by policy-makers of all nations of similar size and with similar problems. Social scientists everywhere, especially in the United States, may find in Korea the key to progress in the new states of Asia and Africa.

Political stability and economic progress, however, may be interrupted or seriously reversed when the Democratic-Republican Party searches in 1971 for a popular and able candidate to replace President Park Chung-Lee, who is barred by the constitution from seeking a third term. The course of politics, especially the revival of the "old politics" of the Rhee era, may, in 1971 challenge the institutional stability and political charisma of the Park era. Whatever the long-term prospect

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[25] Soon Sung Cho, "Korea: Election Year" *Asian Survey*, Vol. 8, No. 1, (January 1968).

[26] Tristan E. Peplat, "Korea's Economic Growth Stirs Investors, Traders" *Korean Report*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (July-Sept. 1967), Embassy of Korea, Washington, D.C., p. 9.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

for the Korean people may be, South Korea will never revert completely to the pre-1961 era. The military coup has saved South Korea from hopelessness and put the country on the path of social mobilization and the task of nation-building. In his second inaugural address on July 1, 1967, President Park restated the nature of that task in these words:[28]

> Our enemies are poverty, corruption, and communism. . . . Poverty negates life, represses man's gifted talents to flower, and strangles his honesty, sincerity and originality; corruption paralyzes his conscience and encroaches upon fraternity; while communism deprives us of freedom, dignity, and conscience.

IV

In Burma, as elsewhere in the developing areas, the civilian government failed to solve the problems of nation-building. These problems are so general in nature that no immediate solution is possible. They are, as pointed out by Professor L. W. Pye,[29] "shortage of capital, absence of trained personnel, inadequate social and educational facilities, excessive population in relation to land, and grossly imperfect means for mobilizing both human and material resources." Burma's other difficulties must include conflicts between rural and urban areas, politicians and civil servants, communist insurrection and revolt by ethnic minority during the 12 years of civilian control.[30] The failure of party politics since 1956, especially after 1958, was further aggravated by Prime Minister U Nu's personal inability to translate his popular mandate in the 1960 election into positive authority. After the 1960 election, he became "the most popular Burmese political leader of all time and possessed greater potential influence than any other person or group, including the Army."[31] But he was unable even to resolve factional conflict within his Union Party. The Army, therefore, became increasingly restless. And finally, General Ne Win staged the coup of March 2, 1962 and assumed the task of protecting the country from the "greatly deteriorating conditions." The second most important leader of the coup, Brig. Aung Gyi, best expressed the concerns of the rank-and-file members of the army:[32]

> In Burma we had economic, religious, political crises, with the issue of federalism as the most important reason for the coup. . . . A small country like Burma cannot afford division. The states enjoy autonomy and the right of secession guaranted by the constitution, but if secession were to be exercised, small and independent Burma would sink like Laos and Vietnam.

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[28] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[29] Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building: Burma's Search for Identity*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. xv.

[30] *Ibid.*, Chapters 15, 16 and 17 on problems of search for new identity.

[31] Richard A. Butwell, *U Nu of Burma* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 245.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 241.

During the early 1950's the internal unity of AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League) was strong enough to meet the challenges of communist insurrection and the complaints of other political parties. However, after the 1956 election the strong influence of the National Unity Front (NUF) and other minor parties broke the personal charismatic leadership of U Nu. He was forced to resign temporarily the premiership in order to rebuild his party. His resignation was, perhaps, responsible for the formation of hostile factions in April, 1958. This split, therefore, reduced the parliamentary majority of the government and thus brought out the serious concerns from the army in 1958. Professor F. N. Trager wrote:[33]

> Several times during 1958, the Armed Forces, speaking through Commander-In-Chief Ne Win and his close associates, made it clear that they would assist any government to keep law and order, would impartially refrain from playing politics. General Ne Win warned both AFPFL factions against the use of violence, cautioned Prime Minister Nu against accepting parliamentary support from the communists, and rejected all attempts at inducting any of the surrendering rebels into the armed forces.

This candid willingness of the military to help caused U Nu, in 1958, to broadcast his invitation to General Ne Win to form a caretaker government which would remain in power until the elections, now postponed to April, 1959.

The personal integrity of General Ne Win and the military's concern for national unity made it very easy for politicians to accept the formation of a caretaker government by General Ne Win. His appointment of an all-civilian cabinet during the first six months confirmed their confidence. In "guarding the conditions for democracy,"[34] the Army achieved "a most respected position." Such a transfer of power was very unique. Generals do not usually win such confidence and respect from political parties. This could not have happened in either South Korea or Pakistan.

The coup of 1962 was acceptable because the leader of the coup, Ne Win, had an excellent record of achievement, including heroic contributions to win the civil war. The populace had full knowledge of General Ne Win who had been a close follower of Bogyoke Aung San, the George Washington of Burma. Ne Win had been Commander-In-Chief of the Army since 1949, Defense Minister, and Deputy Prime Minister in U Nu's cabinet. The caretaker government (1958-60) was unusually efficient and fully implemented its promises before relinquishing its powers in April, 1960, after the election of U Nu as premier.

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[33] Frank N. Trager, *Burma, From Kingdom to Republic* (New York: Frederick A. Fraeger, 1966), p. 172 and also both chapters 8 and 9 are most relevant to the coup.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 180.

This election made him immediately unchallengeable in the parliament.[35] As a result, democratic institutions failed again and the Burmese search for identity continued.

The crucial factor of the military coup on March 2, 1962, was, of course, a personal tragedy for U Nu. The coup was an indication of incompatibility between U Nu's ability to win a smashing election as a statesman, who unfortunately turned to traditionalism after the election, and his inability to reconcile conflicts among his followers. Premier U Nu's downfall was largely due to certain misguided policies. In particular, the adoption of Buddhism as the state religion and the promise of new statehood for the Arakanese and the Mons at the expense of national unity proved unacceptable to many of U Nu's own followers. On the other hand, lack of a firm and clear policy toward the insurrectionists, the communists, and his decision to resign as head of the Union Party became intolerable to the army officers. All these difficulties culminated in his reshuffling of the army, the closing of the National Defense College and the creation of a Central Intelligence Organization. Thus a showdown was in the making between U Nu and the Army. When, in 1962, the military coup came, "most articulate Burmese" responded with "reserved approval."[36] The leaders of the coup were well-known and respected by all political factions, especially since Ne Win's capabilities and integrity had already been demonstrated. The disillusionment with party politics, therefore, gave support to a military leadership that might once again reconcile the various political factions and then return Burma to civilian government.

Ne Win's government, however, proved somewhat disappointing. It neither fully succeeded in achieving a coalition party in the pattern of AFPFL nor has "the Burmese Way to Socialism" achieved the success expected during the seven years since the coup.[37] The Revolutionary Council has encouraged a Burmese way of life as "a revulsion from western ways." This might be the means to legitimatize or rationalize its power and leadership. Whether the Revolutionary Council will ultimately succeed in building "a single political community based on a Burmese culture" remains to be seen. The single united party conceived on the principle of democratic centralism has not been as successful as the Democratic-Republican Party built by General Park in South Korea. Ne Win himself publicly acknowledged that the economy was

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[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 186-87.

[36] John H. Badgley, "Burma's Military Government" in *Garrisons and Government: Politics and the Military in New States*, Wilson C. Williams (Ed.), (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1967), p. 171.

[37] For details and evaluation see the following: John Badgley, "Burma: The Nexus of Socialism and Two Political Traditions," *Asian Survey*, (February 1963) and Fred R. von der Mehden, "The Burmese Way to Socialism," *Ibid.*, (March, 1963), Vol. III No. 2.

still "in a mess" four years after the coup.[38] According to specialists on Burma, the Revolutionary Council has scored no dramatic success in any area.[39] It is still confronted with the problems posed by ethnic minorities, and insurrectionists, and the opposition of individual Buddhist Monks. However, signs for significant, if not dramatic, changes have appeared. One was Ne Win's visit to the United States in September, 1966. Another was the interest he showed in rejoining the Colombo powers in an effort to improve relations with the West.

Above all, the sudden crisis with Communist China since 1967 might have serious consequences in Burma's task of nation-building. The earlier hostility to foreigners has abated. As one specialist observed, "There can be no doubt that Burma is moving with increasing speed back into an international life that was temporarily rejected five years ago."[40]

Complete economic socialism, or total government management of the economy of the new nations, seems destined to failure. The economic stagnation of North Vietnam and North Korea appears in clear contrast to the bright mixed-economies of Malaysia, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea. Several factors may be responsible for the economic retardedness of Burma. First of all, the Revolutionary Council has pushed "the Burmese Way to Socialism" too far through rapid nationalization, which required far more managerial skill than the regime could provide. Secondly, by the same token, the Ne Win regime has neglected the theory of the "mixed economy" and the indispensable contribution that the private sector makes in stimulating economic growth and competition. Thirdly, the absence of political opposition to the regime has allowed the government to procrastinate in its revision of economic policies and to delay return to civilian rule. Fourthly, the continuation of communist insurgency and the separatist tendency of the ethnic minorities have made the continuation of the military rule and its economic policies easy to justify. In view of these factors, the current crisis with Peking has a much larger meaning to the Revolutionary Council and the people of Burma. They must now sense the urgent need for greater unity in the formulation of political as well as economic policy.

The military regime must also be evaluated in terms of its political role, particularly with respect to the preservation of national unity. The Ne Win regime may have adopted a wrong economic approach to modernization and nation-building. But it has, on the other hand,

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[38] *New York Times*, December 13, 1965.

[39] For details and evaluation see Josef Silverstein, "Burma: Ne Win's Revolution Reconsidered," *Asian Survey*, (Feb., 1966), pp. 95-102; and also Frank N. Tager, "Burma: 1967 — A Better Ending Than Beginning," *Ibid.*, (February, 1967), pp. 110-190.

[40] John H. Badgley, "Burma's China Crisis: The Choice Ahead," *Asian Survey*, (November, 1967), p. 757.

prevented a catastrophic sequence of events that threatened to develop from the political disunity which plagued the regime of Premier U Nu. The coup assured the majority of the people of an alternative to political chaos without significantly altering the democratic character of nation-building. As the military continues to weigh the balance for the forces of national integrity, the civilian leaders and the political groups of the nation find an opportunity to prepare themselves to take over more effectively the task of governing. Politics and politicians need time to heal old wounds and make compromises. Only then, can they organize themselves to meet the task imposed on them. Furthermore, law and order in the last seven years has never been seriously threatened. The life of the people has never been unnecessarily interfered with by the military regime. Clearly, what General Ne Win feared to happen and what he sought to preserve might have been fully carried out. But what he expected of his regime in the way of economic progress and political reform has not been accomplished. The military failed to achieve in Burma what General Park achieved in South Korea. What is most significant has been the fact that twice Burma has turned to the military for the maintenance of its national integrity in 1958, when it invited Ne Win to take over; and in 1962, when a military coup again put Ne Win in power with only the "reserved approval" of the nation.

Would other countries in Asia and Africa be able to avoid a period of military rule in the process of becoming modern nations and states, if national unity were threatened as happened in Burma? Political process in Laos, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia have, at one time or other, relied on the military for national survival when faced with internal threat. The military intervention, therefore, is clearly a "preventive alternative."[41] The crisis with China may help Ne Win now to achieve what he could not accomplish otherwise during the past seven years. In time of external challenge, it is often easy to unite internally. The Revolutionary Council has now the support to meet the crisis with Peking. As F. N. Frager has pointed out:[42]

> There is little doubt that the conduct of Communist China against the Revolutionary government of General Ne Win has brought a kind of closing-of-the-ranks in Burma. After having released some 5,000 detained political prisoners in October, 1957 — including an ex-president and several cabinet ministers — the Revolutionary Council at the end of February 1968 virtually completed the process of releasing detainees. All prominent political, military, ethnic and journalistic leaders and civil servants who had been under arrest — some since 1962 — were released. The "Shan Resistance Movement" by

[41] Guy J. Pauker, "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade," *World Politics*, Vol. II, (1959), pp. 325-45.

[42] Frank N. Trager, "Sino-Burmese Relations: The End of the Pauk Phaw Era," *Orbis*, Vol. XI, No. 4, (Winter 1968), p. 1052.

> its own testimony in opposition since 1958, publicly announced on March 4 "that it is now time for greater cooperation and understanding between the Shan and Burmese people" because of the renewed activities of the Burma Communist Party and its foreign backers.... This threat of a Communist takeover is, we feel, enormous and serious.

It may be significant to relate the lack of any spectacular achievement on the part of the Revolutionary Council to the lack of an external enemy that would create among the citizens a sense of national urgency and unite the citizens in support of their government. The coup of May, 1961, in South Korea, for example, was helped by the shadowy threat of North Korea. The tense struggle among the leaders of the Korean coup made urgent a rapid return to constitutional government with broad participation. The military coup in Pakistan did capitalize on the Kashmir crisis with India as an external threat to Pakistan's national integrity. In Burma, however, Ne Win's continuation of a neutralist foreign policy and his militant stand against all foreign influences have in isolating the nation, provided a false sense of security and a general complacency. Now Communist China has provided an external target for the Revolutionary Council to focus national attention and to rededicate the people to the task of nation-building. The anti-Burmese propaganda of China might further incite the people of Burma to action. For example, the New China News Agency said:[43]

> The reactionary Ne Win government has been sabotaging relations between China and Burma under the label of Burma-China Friendship. Now when class contradictions within Burma have become more acute, the reactionary Ne Win government's hostility toward China has become more exposed, and it finally embarked on the path of opposing China in an all-round way... last year (1966), the reactionary Burmese government... outrageously stirred up a nationwide anti-China and anti-Chinese campaign last June.

V

Pakistan never had a pre-colonial national history or identity of its own. From 1947 to 1958 the country suffered numerous changes and uncertainties. Political leadership of this infant nation took an early casualty in 1948 with the death of the Founding Father, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. Until 1958 political parties have waxed, waned and suffered eclipse. Political leaders have argued, intrigued and reduced each other to "impotence."[44] The country was essentially run by civil servants with the backing of the Army. The search for a national identity was complicated by the fact that inherent in the faith of Islam, to which the majority of the people belong, is the belief that "religion pervades

[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 1037-38.

[44] Keith Callard, *Pakistan, A Political Study* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), p. 5.

all aspects of life, private and public. Islam is a complete way of life."[45] The secular state is unacceptable to many orthodox Muslims. Other problems facing the nation during the first decade of its existence were the disparity between East and West Pakistan (in population, natural resources, and living standards), adoption of a national language, relations between the state and Islamic religion, and especially economic stagnation. In the view of General Mohammed Ayub Khan and many of his officers, the politicians "had brought the nation to the verge of disintegration." In one of his speeches, President Ayub Khan said:[46]

> These people had made politics a profession and democracy a toy to fondle with. Their only business was to misguide the people by making fiery speeches and raining empty slogans from time to time and acquire personal power.... Their only wish is that the same outmoded system should again return to the country wherein disruption, misguidedness, and selfishness should have their play....

Thus, the inevitable military coup that came on October 7, 1958, was hailed by the nation as a "peaceful revolution." The military brought an end to the parliamentary government. It dissolved all three legislatures, dismissed the cabinet, abrogated the 1956 constitution, abolished political parties, and eliminated the office of the Prime Minister. General Ayub Khan became Martial Law Chief Administrator. Twenty days later he became president and created a presidential cabinet. The entire country came under his personal (totalitarian) control until June 8, 1962. The new president proclaimed that his purpose was to "clean up the mess" and to "attack the problems of smuggling, blackmarketing, and corruption."[47] He also promised to give the country a workable new constitution for effective democracy as dictated by internal conditions.

The charismatic new leader retained the national integration formula as envisioned by the 1956 constitution. His new "constructive problem-solving approach to the political arena" was his emphasis on modernization. He was devoted to creating confidence among the people in the destiny of Pakistan. His immediate concern was to maximize the rate of economic growth.[48] Ayub ignored, at first, the need for a political party to carry out the long-term task of nation-building. He chose instead civil servants to execute his plans for economic growth. He recognized that the fate of the nation depended on solutions to

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[45] Robert T. Campbell, *Pakistan: Emerging Democracy* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1963), p. 8.

[46] Donald N. Wilber, *Pakistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture* (New Haven, Conn. Human Relations Area Files, Inc., Hraf Press, 1964), p. 231.

[47] Keith Callard and Richard S. Wheeler in *Major Governments of Asia*, George Mct. Kahin (Ed.), (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1963, Second Edition), p. 440.

[48] Talukder, Maniruzzaman, "National Integration and Political Development in Pakistan," Asian Survey, Vol. 7 (December, 1967), p. 878.

many problems concerning national integration and unity. Under Ayub, Land Reform, for example, was successfully accomplished.[49] The rural reconstruction program was able to attract massive participation of the people in each locale. The stagnant economy of the previous decade gave way to notable success. Average increase in GNP was 5.3 per cent for several years. This was twice the rate of the increase in population. He made it possible for per capita gross income to rise faster in East Pakistan than in West Pakistan, thus reversing their comparative growth rates. The same high rate of annual income was registered for East Pakistan in agriculture and manufacturing. Furthermore, the success of the Second Five-Year Plan (1960-65) has brought a large number of industrial enterprises to East Pakistan. In spite of the regionalism that has risen in recent years in opposition to the central government, the President has pressed ahead his third Five-Year Plan (1965-70) and narrowed the economic gap between East and West Pakistan. He took strict and authoritarian measures against "disruptionists" who interfered with national economic and cultural integration. Reforms have been made in education, public health, fiscal systems and law courts. The object of these reforms is to get the nation to initiate long-term development and "to achieve socio-economic growth in as short a time as possible."[50] For example, industrial growth can be measured by consumption of iron and steel, the demand for which has increased over 500 per cent between 1958 and 1964. During the same period the number of schools has increased by many thousands. New technical universities, professional colleges, and vocational schools were built as scheduled in recent years.

In contrast to Burma, Pakistan's economic planning has not followed a "dogmatic or doctrinaire" approach. Government investment has been heavy. Private enterprise has been fully supported and protected by the government. The President in 1964 boasted of the "healthy and cheerful contrast to the nearly bankrupt economy of five years ago."[51] He pledged "full political support to socio-economic planning." And thus he made economic growth the "primary goal" of all his efforts. The long range 20-year Perspective Plan (reaching 1980) included the following policy objectives:[52] (1) a tripling of GNP; (2) elimination of dependence on foreign assistance; (3) provision of full employment; (4) parity in per capita income of the two regions; (5) universal literacy. In short, this record of economic progress could not have been achieved without the political stability and preservation of law and

[49] George Mct. Kahin, (Ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 510-514.

[50] President Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Pakistan Perspective* (The Embassy of Pakistan, Washington, D.C., 1966), p. 83.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 91.

[52] Sandra Richard, "A View of Pakistan's Industrial Development," *Asian Survey*, Vol. V. (December 1965), p. 951.

order. The personal strength, persuasive power, and coercive pressure of President Ayub Khan, aided by democratic planning, have generated hope and confidence in the country's economic future.

President Ayub Khan showed a stern and determined commitment to the reform of political institutions. He was committed to the concept of "guided democracy" or "basic democracy," as he called it. He emphasized that "he was not satisfied with short term, makeshift political improvisations. Instead, his primary efforts would be directed toward the long-range system that could guide economic and social change."[53] Long before the October coup of 1958, he had developed his "definite ideas" for delivering the nation from a "chronic and devastating political instability." As early as 1954 when he served as defense minister, he issued a memorandum which "proposed a strong presidential system . . . a decentralized administrative system, and local development boards. Perhaps most interesting of all, were his comments on the electoral process. He did not disguise his distrust of universal suffrage."[54]

The new constitution President Ayub Khan presented to the nation in March, 1962, included many new features. It provided, as noted already, for a presidential form of government which gave enormous power to the President. The President is, for example, helped by a Council of Ministers who may not have any voting rights in the National Assembly. An electoral college of some 120,000 "elected members" would select the President.[55] The Ayub constitution reflected a serious distrust of political parties and public opinion. Until 1964, when the first amendment was passed by the National Assembly, it did not contain even a list of the fundamental rights of citizens. There was a gradual tendency, however, toward more institutional liberalism. For example, the President realized in recent years the need for a mass party and direct popular support if any strong regime is to survive normal political attack.[56] The new constitutional system in one sense, has brought government and the people much closer than before. As one specialist has pointed out:[57]

> Political life in Pakistan has reached the stage at which the people have begun to realize that they have power. The shock of Martial Law, the effort of the President to speak directly to the masses, the Basic Democracy elections and the functioning of the various councils . . . have all combined to extend political awareness and to bring into effective political community new elements. Neither the governments nor the bureaucracies, nor the parties can return completely to the old indifference to popular feelings.

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[53] Karl von Vorys, *Political Development in Pakistan* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. x.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. xii.

[55] Sushella Kaushik, "Constitution of Pakistan at Work," *Asian Survey*, Vol. III, (August 1963), p. 384.

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 387.

[57] George Mct. Kahin (Ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 504.

Despite the uncertain outcome of its experiment in government, Pakistan has demonstrated to the world that a military commander, if supported by the armed forces, can occupy the highest political office and put his supporters in policy-making positions. This experiment in government was largely a single general's personal effort.[58]

With unity at home either under martial law or the new constitution, President Ayub Khan was able to conduct a dynamic foreign policy to gain wider recognition and contact for Pakistan. This was achieved largely at the expense of good relations with the United States. Contrary to General Ne Win's deteriorating relations with China since 1967, President Ayub Khan created friendly relations with China. His regime also "displayed increasing resentment towards the United States for offering military aid to India against China."[59] Pakistan insisted that the Chinese danger was being unnecessarily overrated and that American aid to India would ultimately be used against Pakistan. Both China and the Soviet Union have recently improved their relations with Pakistan. Trade, economic aid and personal visits among them have all been increased. The Soviet Union, for example, scored a substantial achievement in bringing about the Tashkent Agreement over the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War.[60] This turnabout and new orientation in Pakistan's foreign policy might have been caused by numerous factors. But the official reason was the massive military build-up provided to India by the United States since 1962. Too proud to accept the status of American satellite, Pakistan, as one author concluded, "has been forced since 1962 to re-evaluate its foreign policy. Its overcommitment in military alliance with anti-communist powers created the paradoxical situation in which . . . Pakistan had to face across her long frontiers the world's three largest unfriendly nations without getting from her American ally any support. . . ."[61]

The foregoing pages have demonstrated the necessity of a military coup for the building of a modern Pakistan as Ayub Khan saw it in 1958. His achievements were acknowledged by the overwhelming vote of the people in the January 1965 presidential election. The combined opposition parties nominated the most venerable lady of the country, Miss Fatima Jinnah, the sister of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, as his opponent. He was accused of "dictatorship" during his six years in office. But he simply responded with citations of his record of achievements in various reforms and his theme "stability

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[58] Karl von Vorys, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

[59] Khalid B. Sayeed, "Pakistan's Constitutional Autocracy," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XXXVI. No. 4, (Winter 1963-64), p. 377.

[60] For full discussion see Mohammed Ahsen Chandri, "Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 6 (September 1966), pp. 492-500.

[61] George J. Lerski, "The Pakistan-American Alliance: A Reevaluation of the Past Decade," *Ibid.*, Vol. 8, (May 1968), p. 414

versus chaos." The final result of the election was a crushing defeat for Miss Jinnah.[62] In East Pakistan, and with "massive hold in (its) rural areas," the President won by an absolute majority of 52.9%. This victory implied, perhaps, the voters' perference for stability, modernization through reforms, and economic development. However, by 1969, the President's mass political party, the Pakistan Muslim League had apparently failed to integrate the political forces of the nation. Economic process did not prevent his downfall in March, 1969. Nation-building is apparently not a task for one man only. The masses must be won politically to prevent organized resistance. Unfortunately, after one decade of stability, Pakistan is now again under martial law and in search for a new political-institutional formula.

The resignation of President Ayub Khan came on March 25, 1969, after five months of student demonstrations in the streets of Pakistan. The students were for educational reform, but the President's political opponents escalated these demands to a challenge of the entire political system. The President's "basic democracy" was, to his opponents, no more than a disguise for personal dictatorship. In East Pakistan, army troops and demonstrators confronted each other with automatic weapons and bamboo sticks. At first, President Ayub Khan tried to calm the nation by cancelling the emergency regulations in force since 1965, by releasing political prisoners, and by trying to negotiate reforms with his opponents. The strongest of these was his former foreign minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who incited rioting and was violently anti-India. By the middle of February, 1969, the President announced his decision not to seek the presidency in the general election of January 1970. As reported by the *New York Times Magazine* on February 28, 1969, the President's difficulties were the results of his "reluctance to delegate authority." Among other charges were those of corruption. The real cause of the present crisis lay in the fact that the nation's small and divided political elite had been "shut out from power" by the President. Negotiations to end the bloody rioting were hopeless because no amount of concession on the part of the President would satisfy his opponents.

On March 26, 1969, the President resigned from office and turned over the government to the military, which might have caused the resignation in the first place. General Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan, as the newly appointed military dictator under martial law, immediately ended "the state of near anarchy." He promised to prepare for free elections without giving any time schedule. All strikes, demonstrations,

[62] See Sharifal-Majahid. "Pakistan's Presidential Elections," *Ibid.*, p. 292. (As reported Ayub received 62.7% and Miss Jinnah 36%. West Pakistan gave Ayub 73.3% and Miss Jinnah 26.7%. In the east wing, Ayub received 52.9% and Miss Jinnah 46.5%).

and political meetings have been banned. Nor is the press allowed to criticize the martial law regime. Military courts are being set up under martial law. The new strong man has appointed the chiefs of the Navy and Air Force as deputy martial law administrators. Yahya himself also became the new President under martial law.

Five months of nation-wide street rioting resulting in a new military rule have greatly retarded the task of nation-building. The fall of President Ayub Khan saw the end of his "basic democracy." A period of military regimentation will be followed by a struggle for new national leadership and a new constitutional framework. In his exercise of power, President Ayub Khan could not be accused by anyone of selfishness or a lack of dedication to his people. He was a man of austere dignity and grace. Under his regime the country made rapid economic progress. This could not have been possible without a decade of political stability. The concern for stability which brought him to power in 1958 was emphasized when he declared in a final broadcast to the nation that the situation in the country is fast deteriorating. Administrative institutions are being paralyzed.... The economy of the country has been crippled, factories are closing down and production is dwindling every day.

VI

The brief survey of certain pre-coup conditions to each country indicates a pattern of problems and frustrations arising from the failure of political parties and professional politicians. In each country the military was the only alternative to further chaos and deterioration. The military takeover was met with general approval by a majority of the population. In all three cases, the military leadership committed itself to sweeping reforms and with special emphasis on the welfare of the rural population. All military governments pledged themselves to sweeping economic changes as a major step in national reconstruction. The military regimes, on the whole, achieved much better results than could have been expected from civilian leadership. The military regimes accepted Western political institutions but adapted them to local political traditions or needs.

In all three countries, the military regimes acted swiftly and sometimes offered pragmatic concessions, such as an early return to a constitutional system and a restoration of political parties. But only belatedly did they recognize the need of creating their own political parties. In Korea and Pakistan the Junta leaders presented themselves as presidential candidates under their own new constitutions. Elections in each country were honestly guarded and properly held. The generals won the election on the basis of their reforms and economic achievements.

It can be assumed at this point that, in developing countries, the iron discipline and political stability of military rule are preferred by the people to the inefficiency and instability of democratic government. It may also be assumed that military leaders generally adhered to the pre-coup foreign policy objectives. Thus, they could easily gain diplomatic recognition from concerned foreign powers. One may observe further that the military regimes generally condemned left-wing influence in politics. Thus, military regimes in Asia and Africa can more easily become an ally of the Western democratic countries in the cold war context. Unlike the generals of the Middle East and Latin America, the military leaders of Asia and Africa are far more committed to reform and modernization in their dedication to nation-building. Military leaders seem more fearful of stagnation, deterioration, or national disintegration than any other group in a new nation. For this reason, the major nations in the world must guide and influence the nature and purpose of such military coups. But they ought not by direct interference foster conditions for armed revolt. It may be recalled that "Yankee Imperialism" was often connected with U.S. opposition to certain changes of government in Latin America during the 1920's, a kind of negative intervention.

In short, contemporary military coups in Asia and Africa may be regarded as providing necessary and tolerable periods of transition. The coup is a necessary link in the process of modernization. For the new nations, it seems far better to accept a military government that preserves law and order than to face radical subversives or guerrilla warfare of protracted duration. Greater popular participation in institutional development seems better provided under military than under cummunist rule. The military coups in Indonesia in 1965 and in Vietnam in 1963 may eventually provide still stronger justification for military rule as a necessary step in the process of nation-building in Asia. Ayub Khan's decision to resign as President of Pakistan, for example, shows that the military is not a permanent threat to the political development of new nations. One writer has observed:[63]

> Those organizational and professional qualities which make it possible for the military of a new nation to accumulate political power, and even to take over political power, are the same as those which limit its ability to rule effectively. Thus once political power has been achieved the military must develop mass political organization of a civilian type, or it must work out viable relations with civilian groups.

As a society becomes more modernized and articulate or differentiated, the military will not be able to take over the government and operate it directly. As a general rule, modern societies create a reliable military

[63] Morris Janowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

profession that usually cannot rule directly.[64] Today in Asia and Africa both military and civilian leaders are needed to carry out the task of nation-building. If the politicians fail, the generals step in when feasible. Should this interdependence become threatened as the result of political corruption or communist threat, the military will almost invariably stage its coup.[65]

In short, the three military governments in Korea, Burma, and Pakistan have demonstrated a pattern or sequence in the process of nation-building as follows:

1. After a decade or so following national independence, party politics had generally failed and was suspended and replaced in many states by the military governments. The new regimes generally embarked on an effective economic development program.
2. The military regimes would eventually realize the absolute need of a political party to run the country. Immediately after a military coup, the generals usually would promise a new and workable constitution and free election. Except in Burma, which has not completed the full cycle of the course, the generals have carried out their promises, offered themselves as civilian candidates and won the elections. Their political careers depended on their organizing strong political parties.
3. No military regimes have through the abuse of political power become so unpopular as the civilian governments which preceded them. They often staff their administrations from a broad base that includes younger men.
4. It may be necessary to think that national unity may depend on the military in Asia and Africa as a final alternative to communist takeover (as in Laos and Indonesia). The coup in each country came with no evidence of immediate and direct influence from the outside. In terms of new direction none of the military regimes moved the nation away from the task of nation-building as charted originally by the politicians. But they have simply made the task of nation-building more successful.

Therefore, one may conclude that the military government is an effective and constructive alternative to chaos, corruption or leftist threat. The military coup is, at least temporarily, a necessary or unavoidable measure for many new nations during their transitional period of modernization and social mobilization.

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[64] Wilson C. McWilliams, *Garrisons and Government* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1967), p. 37.

[65] Morris Janowitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11, (In the chart he has described five models of civilian-military relations into which he divided some 43 new states in Asia, Africa and the Middle East).

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE REGIME: EXPANSION VS. CONSOLIDATION

ALLAN SPITZ

I

A CAREFUL READING OF THE OFFICIAL LITERATURE OF THE NORTH VIETNAM regime indicates three specific goals. These are consistently expressed as: (1) the achievement of Socialism and Communism in North Vietnam, indicated by the consolidation of the position of the Communist Party in the North; (2) the achievement of national liberation and independence for South Vietnam and the elimination of the American "imperialist" presence; and (3) the achievement of reunification of the fatherland and the buildup of Socialism and Communism in a reunited Vietnam.

An understanding of the order of priorities of these goals in the minds of the North Vietnamese leadership is vital both to an understanding of the role that the North is playing in the war in South Vietnam and to an intelligent development of policy for the United States to follow. It is a thesis of this paper that North Vietnam's principal shortrun goal is the consolidation of the position of the Communist Party and the movement toward Socialism and Communism in that country.

Douglas Pike has attempted to extract from the massive flow of North Vietnamese statements on the Revolution, South Vietnam, and the National Liberation Front, a paraphrase of the northern view of the north-south relationship.[1] A summary of Pike's paraphrase would run as follows: "Vietnam is one country, the destinies of the north and the south are intimately linked. All of Vietnam is engaged in a revolution that commenced in August of 1945 and continues today. However, the Revolution has advanced to different stages in the north and the south. South Vietnam is undergoing a national democratic revolution to overthrow the American imperialists and their puppet, the bastard government of Thieu and Ky. The north is engaged in its socialist revolution, the movement toward consolidation of the Communist position. Each Vietnamese must contribute to the Revolution; each must perform his revolutionary task. We in the north have our own revolutionary tasks; they in the south have theirs. North and south

[1] Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966), p. 321.

morally support one another and are of one mind, one revolutionary spirit, but because each must be self-supporting, the north cannot assume the burden of liberating the south. That burden rests with the National Liberation Front. However, if and when aid to our compatriots in the south becomes necessary, we will give any assistance needed unstintingly, insofar as we are able."

The current responsibilities of the north to the south, as stated by General Vo Nguyen Giap in September of 1967, in a series of articles printed in *Quan Doi Nhan Dan* and *Nhan Dan*,[2] are "...those of a large rear toward a large frontline".[3] The conclusion to be drawn is that regardless of the ideological, technical, material, or manpower assistance flowing from the north to the south, the north regards the national liberation of the south as primarily a southern responsibility.

If it is possible to infer anything at all about the priority ranking of a group of professed goals from their relative stated positions, two fairly typical statements by General Giap are most interesting:

> The present glorious and heavy tasks of the north which have been set forth by our Party, government, and President Ho, are: simultaneously to perform production and combat; to pool human and material resources; to contribute toward defeating the enemy's war of destruction against the north; determinedly to step up production under all war circumstances, *to support the southern revolution whole heartedly and to the best of our ability;* and at the same time, to take precautionary measures against the U.S. imperialists' schemes to expand the limited war all over the country.[4]

Noting that the U.S. efforts in South Vietnam and the "destructive" air war against the north have left the entire country in a struggle for survival, Giap states:

> This situation calls forth for our people throughout the country a common duty: to unite the entire people and make both north and south stand shoulder to shoulder in intensifying the great patriotic war and in being determined to fight to vanquish the U.S. aggressors in order to protect the north, *liberate the south, and advance toward reunification of the fatherland.*[5]

Those who examine North Vietnamese references to the unity of all Vietnamese people, the solemn promises to assist in every way possible the struggle of the south, and the rabid denunciations of "American imperialist aggression", and conclude that the north will stop at nothing to secure the shortrun liberation of the south and the reunification of Vietnam, I believe, are overlooking a vital element implicit in the above passage. Evidence indicates that exhortations to

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[2] General Vo Nguyen Giap, *Big Victory, Great Task* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968).

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 106.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

"unite the entire people" immediately "in intensifying the great patriotic war" are pleas for unity of mind, will and revolutionary zeal. The north fulfills much of its responsibility to the cause of national liberation of the south and the *eventual* reunification of north and south by maintaining, through indoctrination and propaganda, moral and ideological support for the southern cause among the people of the north, and by assuring the revolutionaries in the south of that unshakable support. It cannot be maintained that the ideological goal, unity of mind and spirit, which is immediate and primary, is the same thing as unification of north and south Vietnam which is not immediate, but long range, and which would be primary were it not for an overriding concern in the north for the progress of the socialist revolution.

With this as an introduction, attention can now be focused on ideology and organization within the North Vietnamese military and on the role of the political-military cadre. This will be a descriptive treatment, using articles from *Quan Doi Nhan Dan* from 1964 to 1967, serialized by the Joint Publications Research Service. The conclusions from this study that are applicable to the thesis will be examined in the third section.

II

Organization and Ideology in the North Vietnamese Military

Communist doctrine dictates that the role of the military involves more than merely the physical security of the nation, particularly when that nation is experiencing a socialist revolution in which the Communist Party is attempting to consolidate its leadership position.

> War is a continuation of politics.... Therefore the fighting goal of any army is to serve the political line and direction from which it derives.[6]
>
> There never has been a war which did not have some political purpose and aim, and there has never been an army which has not had a class nature and political relationship to the overall objectives of the society in question.[7]

Working as the "tool of the people's revolution", the army of the Republic of North Vietnam must wage an internal, ideological war on behalf of its own Communist Party. It must work toward the consolidation of Party leadership. At the same time, it must maintain a level of combat readiness sufficient to protect the land, people, and strategic targets from U.S. air attack. Further, the army must at all times be prepared to launch a defensive battle against an anticipated escalation of the U.S. effort in the form of a massive land invasion.

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[6] Lt. General Song Hao, "Party Leadership in the Army is the Source of Victory in the Armed Struggle", *Nhan Dan*, December 18, 1964, JPRS 28408 (6392A-37 #136) pp. 10-24.

[7] *Ibid.*

The necessity of prosecuting a political-ideological struggle to consolidate the position of the Communist Party shapes the Party military line, the "political line" which the army serves. That line is handed down from the highest echelons of Party leadership, through the Military Central Committee, to every cadre and Party member at whatever organizational level. An attempt will be made to identify and describe the principal elements of the military line during the period 1964-1967.

People's War, People's Army

Like Maoism in China, North Vietnamese Communist doctrine relies heavily on the will and power of the masses. "For the people, the army serves" is the operating slogan and "total reason for the existence of the army".[8] General Giap, North Vietnam's Defense Minister, was instrumental in propagating the concept of people's war, people's army. Since the army is viewed as the agent and tool of the people's revolution, the enemies of the people are the enemies against whom the efforts of the military are directed.

The most visible "enemy of the Vietnamese people" is U.S. imperialism, and this is the propaganda line used to maintain "revolutionary zeal." But the "people" have internal enemies, and the army must lead the battle on this front as well.

> Our enemy is the landlord class which is working for the imperialists and feudalists to occupy our country. Beyond that, the enemy is the capitalist exploitive system.[9]

Periodically, there is a "teaching" drive in North Vietnam to remind the people of who their enemies really are. After such a drive in the Right Bank Military Zone in May, 1964, it was announced that "Fighters and cadres came to realize that past miseries had been caused by imperialists, feudalists, and other exploiting classes."[10] At nearly the same time, in the 4th Military Zone, a resolution of the Zone Party Committee reminded cadres and soldiers of their duties in this internal, ideological war.

> Each cadre, Party member, and fighter is asked to: 1) use positive revolutionary spirit to vanquish the negative rightist tendencies; 2) use alertness and combat readiness to win over pacifist thinking; and 3) use the positive revolutionary spirit of Marxism-Leninism to triumph over modern revisionist influences.[11]

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[8] *Ibid.*

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] Le Trang, "Right Bank Military Zone Teaches Class Consciousness", *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, May 26, 1964, JPRS 25487 (16165) pp. 3-4.

[11] Nguyen Dam, "A Resolution of the 4th Military Zone Party Committee" *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, May 23, 1964, JPRS 25487 (16165) pp. 1-2.

The concept of people's war, people's army demands complete reliance on the people, in theory. In practice, the relationship between the military and the masses is not so straightforward. The armed forces have been termed the "agrico-industrial armed forces."[12] One of the principles of the people's army is that the military assist the people in maintaining agricultural and industrial production, while the people carry part of the burden of maintaining a defense network around the villages and strategic installations.[13] Local self-defense troops are considered to be one of the three elements of the total military structure, along with the main body of regular troops, and the part-time militiamen.[14] However, the responsibility for coordinating the efforts of the regular troops and the local forces rests with the "grass roots" cadres attached to the military units. This type of coordinated effort is part and parcel of the concept of "arming the people to fight alongside the troops."[15]

The "reliance" on the masses mentioned above, a key element in Giap's concept, is reliance of a specific type. It is reliance not to lose the revolutionary spirit; reliance to obey completely and enthusiastically the Party line; and in the military sphere, it is reliance to "solve concrete difficulties over concrete preparations for battle."[16] In other words, the people are relied upon to dig the trenches, install and man small anti-aircraft installations, secure the village when under attack, and so on.

The overriding concern of the regime in North Vietnam, as in any Communist nation at a similar revolutionary stage, is to maintain a high-pitched hatred of the class enemies, and a high revolutionary spirit. Those responsible for maintaining this spirit, both among the people in the villages and among the troops, are the cadres. In May of 1964, there was a widespread "teaching and propaganda drive to promote ideology", for the purpose of "heightening the class viewpoint and revolutionary fighting will."[17] Within the 4th Military Zone, at least, this drive was aimed at improving the quality of the cadres. "... To successfully arouse the masses, we must arouse the ... cadres."[18]

Within the framework of the people's war, people's army, Communist doctrine emphasizes the power and will of the masses which must be aroused and maintained at a high level for the revolution

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[12] Le Trang, JPRS 25487 (16165) pp. 3-4.

[13] General Le Quang Hoa, "Ideological Work in Present Fighting Situation". *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, June 14, 1965, JPRS 31216 (14479-36 #194)pp. 3-9.

[14] Colonel Dang Si Nguyen, "Application of Understanding of Party Military Line to Actual Combat Conditions in Military Zone 4", *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, April 22-24, 1965, JPRS (11050-34 #177) pp. 5-11.

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] General Le Quang Hoa, JPRS (14479-36 #194) pp. 3-9.

[17] Nguyen Dam, JPRS 25487 (16165) pp. 1-2.

[18] *Ibid.*

to proceed. The coordination of efforts between the military and the masses is crucial. The people must provide the will and manpower to carry out the military line of the Party developed at the top Party hierarchy. The key to the system, the link between top level Party leadership and the masses (including non-Party military) is the cadre — the man of many responsibilities. His role will be examined later. Attention will now be focused on the second element of the North Vietnamese Party military line.

The Class Nature of the War

> Awareness of the proletarian class is the foundation of the Party's ideological education and political training. Only through this awareness can the army absorb Marxism-Leninism and "develop the revolutionary positiveness of the working class."[19]

Communist doctrine maintains that the working class, the industrial proletariat, of which the Party is the vanguard, will be the dominant force in the revolutionary process. In North Vietnam, there are few in the industrial proletariat class; most of the country is inhabited by rural peasants. Lest the Communist Party become the vanguard of a non-existent force, the Ho Chi Minh regime attempts to instill in all of the people — worker, peasant, and soldier — the "spirit" of the working class and an "awareness" of the proletariat position. The Party maintains that awareness of the contradictions between the exploiter and exploited, "awareness" of the evils that the American imperialists will perpetrate if they are victorious,[20] "awareness" of past miseries under the feudalists, and present blessings under Ho Chi Minh, and the comparison between the two,[21] are essential to the cause of the revolution.

It was mentioned earlier that war is regarded in North Vietnam as the extension of politics. In doctrine, there are two kinds of politics in any society, the politics of the exploitive class, and the politics of the working or exploited class.[22] The North Vietnamese leadership regards their two-front war as a political war against the exploitive imperialist, capitalist system that the United States is attempting to impose on all of Vietnam on the one hand, and against the feudalist, landlord class remnants of the many decades of western capitalist rule in their own country, on the other. Only by being aware of the class nature of the war on both fronts, so the argument goes, can the North Vietnamese hope to eliminate the exploitive elements from their society, and conquer the exploitive forces from outside the country.

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[19] Lt. General Song Hao, JPRS 28408 (6392A-37 #136) pp. 10-24.
[20] Huu Hoc, "Party Leadership and Military Training", *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, May 21, 1964, JPRS 25671 (16349) p. 7.
[21] Le Trang JPRS 25487 (16165) pp. 3-4.
[22] Lt. General Song Hao, JPRS 28408 (6392A-37 #136) pp. 10-24.

It is difficult to determine whether "class awareness" or "ardent revolutionary spirit" is supposed to come first. On the one hand, Le Trang argues that the revolutionary duties of soldiers and the people demand a high spirit; the kind of spirit which makes one willing to sacrifice himself for the class interest. He maintains that the basis of this spirit is the degree of revolutionary and class awakening. When that degree of class hatred and class awakening is achieved, then the proper revolutionary fighting spirit will emerge.[23] On the other hand, Lt. General Song Hao notes that there are many peasants and petit bourgeoisie within the army, and few workers. "The peasants", he argues, "have an ardent spirit but lack clear and penetrating awareness of the proletariat."[24] Pursuing this matter a little further, General Song Hao clouds the issue again by stating later in his article: "The peasant must and can constitute the majority force in our army, and they, above all, find it easy to distinguish the enemy of the people."[25]

Whichever comes first, there are constant exhortations to greater heights of class awareness and to greater degrees of revolutionary zeal. A proper level of awareness can accomplish remarkable feats. Because of successful efforts to "raise ideological and political awareness", one regiment was reportedly able to reduce its percentage of unserviceable weapons from 30% in 1961, to 1% in 1963.[26] On the other hand, lack of class awareness can lead to grave evils, such as overestimation and worship of the power of weapons and contempt for the masses,[27] or to poor firing while engaged in anti-aircraft activities.[28]

There are numerous devices by which class awareness and revolutionary zeal are maintained. General exhortative propaganda is perhaps the most common (for example, the messages read to the troops from President Ho periodically, and the official Party newspapers such as *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*). Other devices, generally implemented by cadres, are concerted efforts to raise the hatred of the U.S. and the "determination to fight and to win", primarily by keeping the troops occupied in some propaganda or indoctrination effort (for example, self-criticism, posting newspapers on walls, folk-singing, reading newspapers, and so on).[29] Another common device for maintaining revolutionary fervor is the "emulation drive", an officially proclaimed competitive

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[23] Le Trang, JPRS 25487 (16165) pp. 3-4.
[24] Lt. General Song Hao, JPRS 28408 (6392A-37 #136) p. 17.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 23.
[26] Huu Hoc, JPRS 25671 (16349) p. 7.
[27] Hoang Phuong, "Grasping Party Military Doctrine in Combat Training", *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, March 23, 1965, JPRS 29876 (9314-30 #116) pp. 36-42.
[28] Quang Hoa, "A Day in the Life of a Political Officer", *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, May 16, 1967, JPRS 41721 (12659-45 #203) pp. 12-16.
[29] Brig. General Le Quang Hoa, "How Company Political Officers Conduct Ideological Work", *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, July 11-14, 1965, JPRS 31675 (16375-36 #204) pp. 5-16.

effort to excel in the performance of given revolutionary tasks. Recognition of outstanding performance usually takes the form of special appellations or awards to units or individuals, followed by exhortations to "emulate" that performance. Such drives are usually of a somewhat lengthy nature, perhaps one or two months. In June of 1967, there was an emulation drive to "raise the number of U.S. planes shot down to 2,000."[30] Also in June of 1967, a policy of "reporting and evaluating achievements" was instituted. The purposes of requesting individuals to report their own concrete achievements and those of others were: (1) to develop positive, self-vigilant spirit; (2) to summarize individual experiences in the past 2 years; and (3) to exchange experiences.[31] Each unit was to organize the reporting of achievements, and to sponsor achievement celebrations.

By raising the revolutionary fervor of the people, a number of undesirable tendencies will be eliminated. Concern is repeatedly expressed over the existence of "bystanding and negative attitudes". Criticism meetings attempt to purge any doubts about the correctness of the Party line and to instill the desired level of revolutionary zeal and hatred of the exploitive class.[32] Such forces as "individualism", "negativism", and "liberalism" are viewed as dangerous tendencies showing a lack of fervor. In concrete terms such tendencies allegedly lead to the unwillingness to sacrifice all for the revolution, and desires to seek peace.[33]

In summary, the concept of the people's war, people's army is grounded upon respect for the masses. However, it is the continuing responsibility of cadres and Party officials to see to it that the masses — meaning the "people" in the Maoist sense — maintain a sufficiently high level of class awareness, coupled with revolutionary fervor and hatred of the capitalist exploitive system, to insure the progress of the socialist revolution in the north and support for the national liberation effort in the south. The type of thought control needed to realize this goal demands both a viable ideological foundation and an effective system of organization. An element of North Vietnamese doctrine is that the entire revolutionary effort is under the direction of the Communist Party.

The Absolute Nature of Communist Party Leadership

The key to the success of the revolution is to maintain the absolute leadership of the Communist Party in all areas.

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[30] Unsigned article, "The Armed Forces Organize Reporting and Evaluating of Achievements", *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, June 3, 1967, JPRS 41893 (14211-42 #212) pp. 41-43.

[31] *Ibid.*

[32] Le Trang, JPRS 25487 (16165) p. 3.

[33] Lt. General Song Hao, JPRS 28408 (6392A-37 #136) pp. 10-24.

> The absolute leadership of the Party is the most decisive factor in successfully completing every mission of building up the combat readiness of the armed forces.[34]

It is important to understand what is meant by the use of the term "leadership" at each of the two levels at which it may be exerted. The first level is the top policy making level of the Party. Leadership at this level is exercised by President Ho, the Politburo, and the Party Central Committee, and is of the decision-policy making type. Decisions made at the highest Party levels filter down to the various second level Party committees, Party members, and cadres. It is thus possible to characterize the "leadership" exercised by *all* Party committees below the Central Committee as leadership of a non-decision-policy making type.

The leadership exercised by the top-level bodies is the essence of the centralization aspect of the concept of democratic centralism, the key ideological-organizational principle of the Party as a whole and of the Party within the military organization. The democratic aspect of democratic centralism is implemented through the "leadership" exercised at all levels below the top, and is most clearly in force at the lowest Party level, which in the military organization is the company Party branch and the Party branch committee.[35]

At the secondary level, leadership in the Party means: (1) instilling a high spirit of combat; (2) steadily believing in victory; (3) fully understanding the views of higher echelons; (4) implementing established policies properly; and (5) developing the idea of a high level of discipline.[36] An example of this type of leadership is the activity of a Party cell committee within a battalion on a search and destroy mission. The spirit had declined, according to reports, and the Secretary of the Party cell called a 20-minute meeting of the cell. The Party cell issued the following statement:

> We are tired and hungry, but the enemy we are chasing is also tired and hungry. We are a revolutionary army, determined to conquer hunger and exhaustion in order to defeat the enemy.[37]

Clearly, the principal leadership activity at the secondary level is education and indoctrination; attempting to maintain the zeal both within the Party military organization and among the masses.[38] Interestingly enough, one of the secondary level leadership functions exercised by unit Party chapter committees is to solve the problem of

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[34] Huu Loc, JPRS 25671 (16349) p. 7.
[35] Brig. General Le Quang Hoa. JPRS 31675 (16375-36 #204) p. 5-16.
[36] Nguyen Van Thanh, "The Work of Battalion Party Cells in Combat", *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, February 25-26, 1965, JPRS (7848-27 #155) pp. 11-22.
[37] *Ibid.*
[38] Huu Loc, JPRS 25671 (16349) p. 7.

educating the Party military organization and the masses in the absolute nature of Party leadership.

> One factor that cannot be omitted in manifesting the leadership of the Party committee is that it must concentrate on consolidating the Party cells, making them the unified and united leadership faction of the companies, and the basic strength of the Party.[39]

Party leadership at the company, regimental, or battalion level is held responsible for the success or failure of any task. In 1963, a regiment overcame the tendency to rely too much on new weapons and equipment through effective Party leadership. That regiment, as reported by *Quan Doi Nhan Dan,* "completed its mission" while on maneuvers with "70% of the previous year's weapons and equipment."[40]

The operational principle attending the democratic aspect of democratic centralism is known as "collective leadership". In practice, it means that discussion and ratification of a policy decision made at the top is accomplished by a "collective"; the composition of which changes with the circumstance. In a combat situation, collective leadership may be exercised by a "small collectivity" (e.g. the branch committee at the company level, or even the highest Party official directly responsible for the actions of the branch).[41] In non-combat situations, collective leadership is exercised by "large collectivities" (e.g. the Party branch membership or the cell membership).[42] It is admitted that in any given unit, collective leadership may not be possible in certain combat situations. In such cases, the unit chief is responsible for his actions and decision to the immediate collectivity — commissar, committee, or Party chapter.[43]

An important distinction made in the operation of collective leadership is between discussion and execution. Discussion of policies established at the top, as stated earlier, is an example of collective leadership or democracy. Execution of the directive issued at the top and ratified by the collectivity is the responsibility of the appropriate unit chief and is an example of centralism.[44] There apparently have been some problems created when unit chiefs issued orders to the soldiers and people in order to execute a directive coming from the collectivity. In January, 1965, an article in *Quan Doi Nhan Dan* stressed that the execution of a Party directive by a unit chief is not a decentralization

[39] *Ibid.*
[40] *Ibid.*
[41] Lt. General Song Hao, "Party Building Line and Task of Our Army Today", *Quan Doi Nhan Dan,* January 14, 1965 JPRS 29220 (7848-27 #150) pp. 1-10.
[42] *Ibid.*
[43] *Ibid.*
[44] Vuang Thua Vu, "The Importance of Following Order", *Quan Doi Nhan Dan,* May 19, 1964, JPRS 25671 (16349) p. 1.

relation. "... To execute a unit chief's order is not to obey an order from an individual, but to implement a Party resolution."[45]

Within the military, the Party cadre is a unique individual. He is responsible for maintaining the revolutionary zeal of the troops and the people; he must remind the Party chapter in a given unit that the collective leadership exercised by them must always be in tune with the Party line determined at the top; he is responsible for morale and for the efficient combat operations of his unit; and he must implement the training program for the troops determined by the higher echelons. A brief look at some specific examples of cadre activities will provide an idea of his functions.

The Role of the Political Cadre in the Military Unit

An important function of the cadre is to set an example for the troops in maintaining high revolutionary spirits. Cadres in one unit on a training mission in June of 1965 set an example by marching along with the company while nursing sore and bleeding feet and dysentery. The Party branch "realized that the exemplary role of cadres is the most effective measure to encourage our soldiers to fulfill their duties."[46]

The political cadre functions on the battlefield as a prod to greater zeal, and more efficient operation. In May, 1967, a political cadre with an anti-aircraft battalion was in a bunker during an American air attack. During a lull in the fighting, he made a statement to the troops: "Can you see that column of smoke over there? That was caused by an American bomb and it is our village that is burning. We must fire accurately and shoot down the Americans in order to avenge our compatriots."[47] In the same battle, the political cadre was alert to stem overoptimism of the troops after they shot down an American plane. The cadre sent orders to them: "We fire well, but we must also stay alert, maintain order, and be ready to fight the enemy when he reappears." Previously, the cadre had announced an emulation campaign to "discover the target" and initiated a competitive effort between observers and artillerymen to discover the attacking planes as they made their passes. The soldiers stood on their fortifications and made speeches on determination to fight and to win.[48]

Because of the nature of Communist ideology, and its demand on the spirit and mind of its adherents, the questions of morale and revolutionary zeal are vital. There is evidence that the primary respon-

[45] Lt. General Song Hao, JPRS 29220 (7848-27 #150) pp. 1-10.
[46] Vuong Xuong Le, "Good Examples Are Orders Without Words", *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, June 13, 1965, JPRS 31216 (14479-37 #194) pp. 27-28.
[47] Quang Hoa, JPRS 41721 (12659-45 #203) pp. 12-16.
[48] *Ibid.*

sibility for maintaining that peculiar type of Communist morale falls on the political cadre, and is supported by the pronouncements of the unit Party chapters.

III

A Reevaluation

The purpose of this paper has been to present evidence that the North Vietnamese leadership regards their own socialist revolution as the primary immediate goal. This does not at all mean that national liberation for South Vietnam and reunification of the north and the south are not important goals. However, if a choice had to be made in the north of pursuing only one goal for the time being, that goal would be the continued consolidation of the Communist dictatorship in the north. The body of this paper has presented some evidence supporting this conclusion which will be summarized below.

The position of the military in North Vietnam, engaged both in an offensive ideological war against negativism, revisionism, and the remaining feudalist tendencies in the north, and a self-defensive war against U.S. air attacks, makes morale a crucial problem. The type of morale which Communist ideology demands is difficult to maintain. There must be intensive propaganda and indoctrination in order to sustain a will to victory among the troops. From the tenor of the articles coming from Hanoi between 1964 and 1967, there is evidence that the primary concern at that time was maintenance of sufficient revolutionary zeal to fight the enemies of the people at home.

The constant exhortations to greater class awareness, the constant use of emulation drives, and the great role of the political cadres indicate that the position of the Communist Party is not consolidated sufficiently to allow the regime to focus its attention on the southern war of national liberation.

There is continuous emphasis upon the importance of Party leadership in achieving the goals of the revolution. A conclusion which can be drawn from the flood of material from Hanoi is that the country has led to concern for consolidation.

If any projection can be made from the 1964-1967 period to the present time, it might be that continued instability of Communist Party leadership, the pressure of the air war in the north, possible pressure from the Soviet Union to find a solution to the Vietnam war, have led either to a willingness to achieve a negotiated settlement at Paris to allow time to consolidate, or an attempt to use a feigned willingness to bargain as a ploy to get the U.S. to the peace table and then discredit them in the eyes of the world, and particularly in the eyes of the people of North Vietnam.

At any rate, the situation is much too complex to arrive at a simple answer. What this paper has attempted to accomplish is to present evidence supporting a particular interpretation of the north's position in relation to South Vietnam.

THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF INDONESIAN IRREDENTISM

KWA CHONG GUAN

I

AT A SEMINAR OF SENIOR NAVAL OFFICIALS ON AUGUST 4TH 1965 the then Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Achmad Yani declared that "our defense system must cover all of Southeast Asia", that the Indonesian kingdoms had maintained hegemony over Southeast Asia for centuries through control of the seas, and ended by saying that "the Indonesian nation and people will not ignore the decisions of history, and it has been my conclusion since 1963 that at some time the Indonesian Navy will take over the role of the United States Seventh Fleet and the British Far Eastern Fleet in Southeast Asia."[1] The desultory remarks which follow are an attempt to clarify and document a case where perception and knowledge of the past are helping to shape contemporary political patterns, a case in which past history is an active partner in making new history. We will not so much be concerned with the extent to which a knowledge of Indonesia's past will be enlightening in understanding and explaining her present policies, much less in predicting her future policies as with watching the interplay between history and formulation of public opinion.

The case for Indonesian irredentism is forcefully presented in the writings of former Deputy First Minister and Minister of Information, the late Professor Muhammad Yamin[2] who had in no uncertain terms argued that "Indonesia is the rightful heir to all the former territories of *nusantara*." For Yamin the *nusantara* comprises the eight island groups of Sumatra, Malaya, Borneo, Java, Celebes, Lesser Sundas, Moluccas and West New Guinea. The point to be made is that Yamin is not alone in maintaining such aspirations. *Ipso facto*, he is merely documentating a theory prevalent among Indonesian nationalists that the rising tide of European colonialism in the sixteenth century

[1] Quoted by Seymour Topping in *The New York Times*, August 25th 1965.

[2] See for example, his "A Legal and Historical Review of Indonesia's Sovereignty over the Ages." *Dewan Nasional* (Sept. 1958), p. 19; *Sumpah Indonesia Raya* (Djakarta: N. V. Nusantara, n.d. ca. 1956), p. 34; also his somewhat romanticized biography *Gajah Mada pahlawan persatuan Nusantara* (Djakarta: Bali Pustaka, 1953) and his doctoral dissertation *Tatanegara Majapahit*, 7 vol. (Djakarta: Jajasa Prapantja, 1962).

submerged a Golden Era in Indonesian history which is only being re-exposed today with the ebb of European power in the region.

Such aspirations and hopes were categorically expressed in the meetings of the Badan Penjelidek Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Indonesia's Independence) which was established by the Gunseikan (Head of the Japanese Military Administration) on March 1st 1945. It was at the plenary session of 31st May that Yamin enunciated his guiding principles that led him to associate the eight island groups listed above with the People's State of Indonesia. The first is ethnic in origin, claiming "that the areas which should be included in Indonesian territory are those which have given birth to Indonesian people;" the second is geopolitical, in that "it should be our aim to preserve our territorial integrity, that is, we must be prepared to preserve with all consequence every inch of our own land, and, at the same time, not wish for even the size of a palm of other people's territory." In the light of these principles Yamin then goes on to discuss in some detail the territorial limits of Indonesia, arguing, for example, that "from a geopolitical point of view Malaya represents a bridge for any power in Indo-China to proceed towards Indonesia. Vice-versa the same peninsula has in the past provided a bridge for powers in Indonesia to cross over to the Asian continent. It forms a natural bridge between the China Sea, Java Sea and the Indian Ocean. The Straits of Malacca provides a passage to our islands while the Malay peninsula forms the neck of our archipelago. To separate Malaya from the rest of Indonesia amounts to deliberately weakening from the outset the position of the People's State of Indonesia in her international relations." In conclusion Yamin said that "our satisfaction in determining the limits and the territory of our State will be further heightened if our views can be supported by documentary evidence." These are, according to Yamin, the list of thirty-six place names after the colophon and Javanese postscript of the *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai*[3] and the fourteenth century Javanese court poem the *Nagarakertagama* written by the Buddhist Priest Prapanca.

Sukarno at the same meeting declared that "I am in full agreement with the stand taken by my colleague Mr. Yamin, who said

[3] There are three lists of place-names after the text, the first two to localities referred to in the text and the third to the places claimed in part three of the text as having been conquered by Majapahit. The only copy of the text still extant was made for Sir Stamford Raffles in 1814 and it would seem that these lists were compiled on Raffles' instructions, for similar lists do not occur in contemporary Malay texts. C. A. Gibson-Hill (quoted by A. H. Hill in his romanisation and translation of the text published in *Journal of the Malayan Branch Royal Asiatic Society*, XXX, No. 2 [1960], 207, n. 202) argues that this list of Majapahit dependencies is a late interpolation on the grounds that a number of place-names are anachronisms.

yesterday that neither on moral grounds nor on the grounds of international law are we obliged to be the inheritors of the Dutch. In discussing the territory of Indonesia, we do so fully realising that it is in the interest of our motherland that we should not be the inheritors of the Dutch, as we are not bound by any moral obligations to the Dutch." So with regard to Malaya Sukarno felt that "Indonesia will not become strong and secure unless the whole of the Straits of Malacca is in our hands." Sukarno closed his speech with the following invocation:

> God in His wisdom has mapped out this earth. Everyone looking at the world map will understand what God has ordained as is shown on the map. God has determined that certain parts of the world should form single units — the British Isles as one, and likewise the Hellenic islands, and India surrounded by the ocean below and the Himalayas above. God has also determined on the map which He has created that the Japanese isles should form one single unit. And when I look at the islands situated between Asia and Australia and between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, I understand that they are meant to form a single entity.

In the voting that followed only nineteen of the sixty-six Committee members voted for the motion that the frontiers of the Republic of Indonesia follow that of the Netherlands East Indies, the other thirty-nine voted that it include the former Dutch Indies with the addition of Malaya, North Borneo, New Guinea, Timor and the adjacent islands.[4]

These aspirations were submerged but not forgotten in the turbulent years that followed independence. The West Irian crisis is testimony to the vitality of these concepts. Left unresolved at the 1949 Round Table Conference, the West Irian issue was to plague Indonesian-Dutch relations for the next thirteen years. But it was not until Sukarno inaugurated his concept of "Guided Democracy" in 1957 with the installation of a National Council and Cabinet responsible to him that there was a systematic build up of pressure on the issue, culminating in an agreement in 1962 where Indonesia was to take over the territory after a brief period of United Nations administration. The ease with which West Irian had been acquired made Sukarno and his colleagues drunk with ideas and hopes of empire. Yamin had already earlier declared that "when the national flag flies over Kotabaru [the new name for the capital Hollandia] Indonesia will be the chief guardian of the Pacific Ocean."[5] Sukarno proceeded to unilaterally rename the Indian Ocean the Indonesian Ocean and babbled of a past when Indonesian influence

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[4] The proceedings of this body have been edited by M. Yamin, *Naskah-persiapan undang-undang dasar 1945, disiarkam dengan dibubuhti tjatatan* I (Djakarta: Jajasan Prapantja, 1959), pp. 126-141, 201-214. It must be pointed out that not all the members, among whom Muhammad Hatta and Haji Agus Salim, were swayed by these emotional arguments. Their calls for moderation however were unheeded.

[5] *North Borneo News & Sabah Times*, April 9, 1962.

stretched from Madagascar to the Easter Islands. This bears echoes of Yamin's hopes expressed some years earlier of an "Austronesian Confederation", of a confederation of the three M's — Melaka, Mataram and Malolos [Philippines] — nations originating from a common stock and possessing an identical culture.[6]

Afterwards, West Irian Indonesia, for various reasons, turned her attention to Malaysia, opposing the Federation on the grounds that it was a neocolonist plot designed to keep British imperialist forces in the region, encircling Indonesia, hindering and endangering her development and security. It is significant to note that Sukarno and Yamin have been very careful to deny efforts at territorial aggrandizement. Yamin has stressed that Borneo, Timor and Malaya are not fields for expansion, rather, they are to be regarded as lost territories that should be restored to their rightful owners.

II

What is this Golden Era of Indonesian history that three hundred years of Dutch rule drowned? To summarize in a few vignettes some of the dynamics of Indonesian history.

The political gravity of island Southeast Asia has, throughout its history, been centred on two core regions: central Java and Southeastern Sumatra. In these ecologically contrasting regions two dynamically opposed political systems developed. Along the riparian coast of southeastern Sumatra there was forged a thalassic geopolitical pattern which bears similarities to that of medieval maritime Europe. It was a pattern in which political power was organised in units of sea rather than land, where the control of one or two strategic ports would be sufficient to establish military hegemony, and political influence was asserted through alliances rather than conquest. It was a pattern which applied equally well to the small units which revolved around the minor channels as well as to the major empires situated astride the main trade routes. An agglomeration of attap huts on poles and rafts and house-boats situated in the swampy delta of a river mouth surrounded on three sides by mangrove would probably constitute the capital of the thalassocracy, from which tentacles stretched out to monopolise the trade through the control of a number of satellite ports. The political structure of the city probably centred on an aristocratic community whose power lay in the control of a powerful navy to enforce its monopoly of trade, on the ability to amass wealth from personal trade, levies on transit trade, war and plunder. There was a cosmopolitan population of merchants and traders engaged in the small

[6] Antara, Oct. 2, 1959; United Press, Oct. 5, 1959, quoted in Arnold C. Brackman, *Southeast Asia's Second Front: The power struggle in the Malay archipelago* (Lond.: Pall Mall, 1966), p. 318.

time peddling of luxury articles and probably a small burgeoisie with substantial financial resources partaking of bulk trading.

In complete contrast to this outward looking, worldly *weltanschauung* we have in the ecologically undifferentiated plains of central Java an irrigation-based agrarian society with a *weltanschauung* that is inward looking, otherworldly, devoting its labor towards the erection and maintenance of ceremonial and temple centres where great art is rendered monumentally, with their governing officials and organised priesthoods.

Central to the political system of these inland agrarian hydraulic societies was the structure of kingship. Whatever factors, sociological, psychological or anthropological, one may wish to draw upon in explaining the veneration of the monarch, the facts are that in pre-literate Southeast Asia around the beginning of the Christian Era, as in other contemporary pre-literate societies, there was a desire to be at peace with the universe, a drive towards the preservation of social forms and the maintenance of a social equilibrium and its restoration if it was in any way disarranged. To this end we have a belief in the parallelism between macrocosmos and microcosmos, which was manifest in the architectural layout of the capital and monuments and the organisation and expansion of the realm in symmetrical patterns. There is, therefore, a preoccupation with magic numbers and number sets and the organisation of socal structure in metric sets.

For example, Dutch archaeologist N. J. Krom has argued that the four rows of 284 minor temples surrounding the three main sanctuaries dedicated to Shiva, Vishnu and Brahma that make up the Chandi Lara Djonggang complex at Prambanan might correspond to the various administrative divisions of the realm, the temple complex as a whole being therefore, both a royal mausoleum and a state sanctuary. Then again, the Majapahit *kraton* as reconstructed from the descriptions in the *Nagarakertagama*, comprised a large public square, the *alun-alun*, in the centre of the town, round which, arranged in a definite pattern as dictated by cosmomagical principles, are the main buildings. But more than that, as Robert Heine-Geldern has argued, the Barabudur, the Bayon and certain other Southeast Asian architectural edifices, as for example, the Balinese *padmasana*, or throne of god, form a category of architectural complexes which have not only been laid out according to cosmomagical principles, but are supposed to be located in the centre of the universe, a model of the universe.

It was here, at these monuments, which were believed to be the seat, the symbol of the God or deceased kinsman, that the latter could be most easily contacted by the king. For it was believed that the God/deceased kinsman assumed the identity of that corporeal entity

to influence the behavior and lives of the members of the society. Thus the Barabudur, the Khmer temple-mountain, came to symbolise not only the total cosmos, more than that, it came to be a substitute body for the God or ancestor. For the king this role of mediator between the worlds of men and of the gods was a step towards his own deification. For from being a link between the gods and his fellowmen to becoming a representative of the gods and eventually assuming their functions, to end by ultimately becoming a God himself are but very small steps that a number of monarchs took.[7]

And it was towards the support and maintenance of these cult and temple centres that the economy of the realm was geared to. It was towards the support of the god-king and his retinue that the taxes in rice went and it was towards the erection and conservation of the monuments that corvée labor was directed to. Whatever trade there was in such a self-sufficient economy was probably carried on by a few foreigners under the influence and direction of the bureaucracy for the benefit of the court.

The rules and norms governing inter-state relations were derived from the Indian manuals on statecraft, as for example, the *Arthashatra*, the *Mahabharata* and *Ramayana* and the *Manu Dharmashatra*. Central to Indian political theory as contained in these texts was the *mandala* theory in which states attempted to preserve and extend their security and power through various means with a view to establishing a conical hierarchy of friends and foes. The aim was to establish round the state a series of concentric circles of enemies and neutrals or allies on the basis of their power and policy towards the state. Under such conditions the criterion between friend and foe, superior and weaker states, was a question of who paid tribute to whom. And in the final analysis, this was dependent upon the personality of the ruling god-king. For in these pre-modern political systems the monarch was only supreme in the *nayaragung* or crown lands. Outside of them the actual ruler was the provincial governor, be he a member of the native landed nobility or of the concerning royal family or an appointed official. Their duties were to render homage and tribute to the god-king who was simply *prinus inter pores*, and to provide labor and military assistance when summoned; otherwise they were left very much to their own devices. The god-king on his part went on periodical inspection tours to impress on the provincial governors and local population his powers and occasionally despatched a military force to calm

[7] J. C. van Leur first noted this dichotomy in his 1934 doctoral dissertation *Eenige beschouwingen betreffende den ouden Aziatischen handel* (Middelburg: G. W. den Boer, 1934) K'o Tsung-yüan, "Studies on the Sacral Kingship in Early Southeast Asia," *Journal of the Historical Society, University of Singapore* (1967/68), 21-45.

down any provincial governor who was shouting too loudly about independence.[8]

There is throughout Indonesian history a perennial struggle between these two centres of political gravity for the hegemony of the *nusantara.* However, the floodlights of the historian have as yet not been able to dispel the darkness of early Indonesian history sufficiently to illuminate the nature and course of this conflict clearly. We can but only sketch the broad outlines of this history which does not begin till the late seventh century with the rise to power of the Shrivijayan thalassocracy. Whatever her origins, her rise to power may be traced to the sea nomads who made their coast the essential link between the Indian Ocean and China at a time when the restoration of order in China under the Sui and T'ang dynasties revived the Chinese market and the demand for west Asian products, which a temporary trade recession in the Persian Gulf when the Arabs were dismantling the Sassanid empire left unfulfilled, thus increasing the value of Indonesian products which were foisted upon the Chinese as West Asian products. It was to secure this trade that Shrivijaya launched an expansionist programme which is documentated in her inscriptions describing the raids she essayed against competing harbour principalities in the Melaka Straits.

We start our charting of Javanese history with a 732 SC central Javanese inscription that commemorates the erection of a *lingga* by a King Sañjaya, who is thus a Saivit and according to other sources, a prince of the Mataram Royal House. His successor, however, is described as being "an ornament of the Shailendra dynasty". The implications, as epigraphist J.G. de Casparis has drawn out, are that we have here the emergence of a new dynasty, the Buddhistic Shailendras, "king of mountain", who drove the reigning dynasty of Sañjaya, architects of the monuments on the Dieng plateau, to eastern Java. Whatever the dispute about their birthplace, to the Shailendras are attributed the erection of the Buddhist monuments of central Java, notably the Barabudur. But in 832 SC the Sañjaya dynasty returned to central Java with one of their members marrying into the Sailendra house to eject the Shailendra heir Balaputra who flees to Shrivijaya to marry a Shrivijayan princess to become the ruler of that state.

The Hindu monuments of Prambaban are a testimony to the revival of Hindu influence in central Java and power of the new dynasty. After 932, under Sindok, the capital shifted to the eastern interior of Java, from where the ruling house was able to develop a trade network with the eastern part of the archipelago. Whatever the causes

[8] B. J. O. Schricke, "The Native Rulers", and "Ruler and Realm in early Java", in his *Indonesian Sociological Studies,* 2 vol., Selected studies on Indonesia, 2 & 3 (den Haag/Bandung: van Hoeve, 1955).

of the shift — Krom and others have suggested that it was fear of a Shrivijayan attempt to reassert Shailendra rule in central Java, while B. Schrieke has tabled geographical reasons — by 990 under Dharmavamsa she decided to challenge Shrivijaya by invading her. Shrivijaya counter-invaded in 1007, destroying the Javanese *kraton* and killing Dharmavamsa. The designated heir Erlangga was, however, not able to take any positive steps towards ending the interacine warfare among the petty chieftains until the Chola raid on Shrivijaya in 1030 temporarily terminated the latter's threat to eastern Java. After this an uneasy equilibrium exists between these two powers, Shrivijaya dominating the western half of the archipelago, and Mataram the eastern half.

Up to now our sources for the reconstruction of Java's past have been mainly epigraphical, but after the tenth century we have a growing volume of literary sources whose interpretation is highly problematic. Pre-war scholars assumed that a textual weeding out of the more obvious fantasies and myths would reveal the substratum of facts upon which these chronicles were based. But Dutch linguist C. C. Berg in a bold *renversement* of Javanese historiography questions whether the account that remains after this stripping away of myths is an accurate one. Berg argues that we cannot read these sources through Western eyes, rather, we must read them the way they were meant to be read, view them as specific cultural manifestations and components of the culture that gave birth to them. "The main question is again and again: why did the man write his book and why did he write it thus?" And if we were to "re-think" the thoughts of the Javanese priests who wrote these texts we find that these texts had a magical function: to legitimize and justify the contemporary political scene, to provide the reigning regime with a genealogy that justifies their being in power. The texts therefore had an optive, wish-fulfilment character, describing events that should have happened, not events that did happen.

According to the texts, Erlangga, before his death, divided the realm between his two sons. It fell to ken Angrok, born of a peasant woman as an incarnation of Vishnu, the son of Brahma, adopted by Shiva, to reunite the realm. Angrok obtains power by murdering the ruler of Tumapel and marrying his widow ken Dedes, a Mahayanist priestess whose power resided in her flaming genitals. It is her sons

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[9] N. J. Krom, *Hindoe-Javaansche geschiedenis*, 2de druk ('s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1931); Purbatjaraka, *Riwajat Indonesia* I (Djakarta: Jajsasan Pembangunan, 1951); G. Coedès, *Les etats Hindouises d'Indochine et d'Indonesie* (Paris: de Boccard, 1964).

[10] Berg's contributions lie scattered in the journal *Indonesië* and other Dutch serials. See his summaries in "Javanese historiography — a synopsis of its evolution", in D. G. E. Hall, *Historians of South East Asia*, Historical writing on the peoples of Asia (Lond.: Oxford, 1961), pp. 13-23 and "The Javanese picture of the past," in Soedjatmoko, *et al.*, eds., *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography* (Ithaca: Cornell, 1965), pp. 87-118.

who carry on the line. But this union is not successful and it fell on her great-grandson Kertanagara to attempt the task by installing an image of Aksobhya in the cemetery of Wurare where Bhanada, the priest whom Erlangga assigned to divide the kingdom, lived, in order to nullify his powers. But despite all this and other efforts the union remained uncertain. It was left to Hyam Wuruk, the son of Kertanagara's daughter Rajapatni, with the advice of his prime minister Gadjah Mada, to reunify the realm.

Berg in characteristic fashion castigates all this.[11] He argues that since the texts sing praises of Erlangga and could thus be construed as attempts to establish his legitimacy as king, we may infer that Erlangga was an ursurper. It is these elaborate stories and genealogies which start from Sindok about Erlangga that go to form the foundation of the biography of Vijaya, founder of Majapahit, in the *Pararaton*. In this same text Kertanagara, the last king of the Singhasari house started by ken Angrok and Vijaya's predecessor, is painted as a drunken debauchee. But the *Nagarakertagama* paints a glowing picture of him. Berg's interpretation is that he was working towards the unification of the *nusantara* through the establishment of a sacred confederacy by means of his supernatural powers, won through practising the rites of kalacakra tantra. Ideas about the unification of the *nusantara* became dormant after the death of Kertanagara at the hands of the Mongol invaders of 1292, until they were resuscitated by Gadjah Mada. Although Gadjah Mada agreed with Kertanagara in aim, he disagreed in method and there was a suspension of Kertanagara's pacifist policy in favour of a militaristic one which eventually, according to the *Nagarakertagama*, brought the better part of the *nusantara* under Javanese suzerainty.

This is the Golden Age of their history that Indonesian nationalists dream about. Yamin's eulogisms on Majapahit as found in his biography of Gadjah Mada and in his doctoral thesis may be taken to be typical of the images Indonesians have of their past. For example, Sanusi Pané in his textbook for secondary schools writes that "its [Majapahit's] Golden Age during the days of Rajasanegara and Gadjah Mada can be compared to the time during which Europe was beginning to free herself from feudalism. At that time cities were formed while trade and handicraft grew in importance."[12]

In the matter of the limit of the empire, Berg has demonstrated[13] that the list of Majapahit's dependencies in *cantos* 13-16 of the *Naga-*

[11] See especially his *Herkomst, vorm en functie der Middeljavaanse rijksdelingstheorie*, Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wesenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, N.R., deel 59, No. 1 (Amsterdam: N. V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgev., 1953).

[12] Pané, *Serjarah Indonesia*, I (Djakarta: Perpustakaan Perguruan, 1950), p. 116.

[13] Berg, "De Sadeng Oorlog en de mythe van Groot Majapahit," *Indonesië*, V (1951), 385-422.

rakertagama is a myth, a sum total of the geographical knowledge of the day, not of the extent of the empire as Yamin would have us believe, for that, according to Berg was limited to east Java, Madura and Bali. However from what we have said in the previous section, there could have been a certain amount of acknowledgment of Majapahit supremacy by the various harbour principalities, perhaps even Shrivijaya. For Majapahit did attempt to extract some form of acknowledgment of suzerainty and this is attested to by a report in the Ming Annals of an abortive attempt by Shrivijaya to establish direct relations with China that came to grief at the hands of Majapahit's military forces. As Wertheim summarizes the issues, "the modern state of Indonesia has as little relationship to early Majapahit as present day 'Smaller Europe' to the medieval Roman kingdom of Charlemagne, the only real link being in either case a powerful political myth." And so the misunderstood verses of a fourteenth century court panegyrist become the basis of a not to be misunderstood foreign policy of a modern nation.[13a]

It would be interesting to explore how this misunderstanding, this myth of a Golden Age of Indonesian history, developed and is maintained. For what we have here is a theory which has, in the terminology of Karl Popper, been falsified, but is still maintained and believed in. What we have here is a case of "a subjectivity [that] is not extinguished in the objectivity of something purely factual, but in the objectivity of communal perception — perception on the part of a community which man seeks after if he does not find himself already within it; for truth is that which links us to another", to quote Karl Jaspers.[14] We might say that Indonesian historiography is in the throes of a revolution, where not only the old theories, but also the very norms, standards and criteria for the writing of objective history have been overthrown; but the new concepts and theories and norms emerging from this revolutionary reformulation of the old traditions have not been accepted by all.[15]

This revolution was launched by Dutch socio-economist J. C. van Leur in his 1935 doctoral dissertation where he applied Weberian concepts and theories to the analysis of Indonesian history. In this dis-

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[13a] W. F. Wertheim, "The Sociological Approach," in Soedjatmoko, et al, eds., *An Introduction to Indonesian historiography*, p. 350.

[14] Jaspers, *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte* (München: R. Piper, 1950), p. 10.

[15] Thomas Khun, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, II, No. 2 (Chicago: University Press, 1962). Khun's argument is that science (and here we might include history) progresses through a series of revolutions, where the orthodox theories (paradigms he calls them) are found inadequate in the explanation of new phenomena or in new circumstances and situations and are overthrown in favour of new paradigms that explain the recalcitrant phenomena or the old phenomena better than the orthodox theories.

sertation he attacked the bastions of orthodox colonial history, exposing as myth their interpretation of the past four hundred years of Indonesian history as colonial history, a history of the Dutch overseas, for, as he questions, "both Speelman and the Company were rising in the Indonesian world by means of a hard struggle with the existing powers. Why then, does more light not fall on that world?" And it was this mythical archipelago ruled by the Dutch East India Company until the late eighteenth century from Java that Krom used as his model for the reconstruction of the limits of Majapahit when he there was not a trace of [Dutch] influence, however slight. These wrote that "there is no need to doubt the position of Majapahit as the only major power in the archipelago and generally recognized suzerain over the island territory under its control . . . the picture we obtain of the extent of Javanese authority [is] nevertheless clear: it controlled the archipelago through an area approximately the same as the Dutch at present." And in a later work he wrote that "the authority of Majapahit [reached] approximately as far as that of the Netherlands East Indies at present but with the addition of the Malay Peninsula."[16]

The Dutch international jurist G. R. Resink has submitted this picture of a Netherlands East Indies that stretched to the southern Celebes and covered western Java to a legal analysis. He irrefutably demonstrates that up to and into the twentieth century Batavia's relations with many of the Outer Islands amounted to no more than international relations, not internal administration. What is more, the Dutch officials at Batavia were fully aware of this. In his 1907 memorandum *Politiek beleid en bestuurszorg in de buitenbezittingen* [Political Policy and Administrative Activity in the Outlying Possessions], Colonial Minister H. Colijn wrote that "there were parts [of the archipelago] where were those parts of the archipelago where unrestricted self-government still prevailed, and with which we maintained no relations, or if so, only incidentally; those parts which according to received opinion did not legally constitute a part of the Netherlands Indies" — these parts included central Sumatra, central Borneo, central Celebes and the petty states on Flores and Sumba. So, as Resink points out, in following

[16] Krom, *Hindoe-Javaansche geschiedenis*, p. 418; "Het Hindoe-Javaanse-Tijdperk," in F. W. Stapel, *Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië*, dl. I (Amsterdam: Joost v.d. Vandel, 1938), p. 278, 283. The translation by Terdjemahan Arif Effendi of the latter work into Indonesian *Zaman Hindu*, Pustaka Sardjana, V (Djakarta, P. T. Pembangunan, 1954), where we find, *inter alia*, "dat de Archipel inderdaad Javaansche is gemaakt [The Archipelago was indeed made Javanese]" being rendered as "bahwa Nusantara benarlah dimasukkan kedalam kekuasaan Djawa", which to a reader familiar with Dutch, but not with Krom's text, would be associated with "the archipelago being under the power of Java"; or "buitenbezittingen [outlying possessions]" translated by "daerah milik diluar Djawa", which one would associate more with absolute possession, has not served to straighten matters.

the older legal and colonial historians Krom had constructed too grandiose an image of the authority exercised by the Netherlands East Indies Government in the period of outlying possessions and dependencies prior to 1910 for a model of Majapahit's territorial limits.[17]

The call for a total re-writing of Indonesian history from a nationalistic perspective has served to further fossilize this image and model. The extra-Indonesian approach to Indonesian social sciences—associated with scholars like Hendrik Kern in linguistics, Snouck Hurgronje in culture and H. T. Colenbrander in history at the turn of the century—that gave way to regiocentric perspectives which emphasized the Indonesian elements and their assimilation and transformation of foreign influences, are associated with the names of C. van Vollenhoven in *adat* law, W. H. Rassers in anthropology, Berg in linguistics and Krom and W. Stutterheim in archaeology. It was van Leur who converted these regiocentric perspectives into an Indocentric perspective that has come to be associated with the names of G. W. Locher, W. F. Wertheim, Resink and B. Vlekke.[18]

The nascent nationalism among the Indonesian elite of the 1920's abandoned its aim of working towards the improvement of the economic condition of the Indonesian people with the founding of the Parti Nasional Indonesia which set its goal as independence through national struggle. In attempting to stimulate a national consciousness and build up a national identity among the masses, national leaders such as Sukarno, utilized the results of researches by Dutch scholars into their past, and in so doing pushed the Indocentric perspective to its *reductio ad adsurdum*. For whereas van Leu swung the extra-Indonesia perspective 180° round to place on a par the European and Indonesian powers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Indonesian scholars such as Sanusi and Armijm Pané and Yamin swung the perspective back another 180° to a nation-centric, ethno-centric view of history in which the native powers move into the limelight while the Europeans are unceremoniously shoved into the background, if not off the stage completely.[19] Accompanying this is the trend to glorify the pre-European

[17] Resink's publications are scattered through various Dutch serials. But see his summary "The Significance of the History of International Law in Indonesia," in Soedjatmoko, *et al.*, eds., *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography*, pp. 359-379. Colijn's 1907 memorandum is quoted from Resink, "Een cadens van Colijn," Indonesië, X, No. 3 (June 1957), 2. Resink's remarks on Krom are found in his "Onafhankelijk vorsten, rijken en landen in Indonesië tussen 1850 en 1910," *Indonesië*, IX (1956), 288 and in more detail at "Uit het stof van een beeldenstorm," *Indonesië*, IX (1956), 434.

[18] C. C. Berg, "Metamorphose der cultuurwetenschappen in Indonesië gedurende de laatste halve eeuw," *Oriëntatie*, XIV (Nov. 1948), 42-49.

[19] See in this instance, Bambang Oetomo, "Some remarks on modern Indonesian historiography," in Hall, ed., *Historians of South East Asia*, pp. 73-84. The question is whether this perspective of history will become the dominant one, whether pre-Copernicanism will reign in Indonesian historiography. See in this respect Locher's views in his "Inleidende beschouwingen over de ontmoeting van

past, as for example, by Yamin and Armijn Pané. What dictates writing and research are not the norms of scientific research, but Ideological Absolutes. Under such scholars, in the words of Resink, the "old outlook takes on a new meaning, and it in turn creates a new past."[20]

IV

However, the survival of these myths in Indonesian ideology is evidence of deep schisms within the society. To the Javanese with his strong ethnocentric perspective of history, which a Java-centric pattern of colonial administration served to emphasize, Majapahit is the first historic "Indonesian unitary state", a symbol of Indonesian political grandeur and cultural renaissance. But to other Indonesians all this stinks of a political and cultural imperialism, of a Javanese domination of the *nusantara,* which as Berg has demonstrated, is indicative, not of insular Southeast Asia as assumed in the everyday spoken language, but, in old Javanese proper, refers to the outer islands, foreign countries, as viewed from Java. And the critic, poet and essayist Bujang Saleh expressed such feelings when he wrote that "the illusionary greatness of Majapahit cannot form a strong bond of unity for our people at this time. On the contrary, it even harms national unity, for people from other regions will feel that the greatness of their own regional history is being denigrated."[21] To be sure, this preaching of a mystical political unity is part of the modernization of Javanese cultural traditions to include, *inter alia,* concepts of modern collectivism as derived from Marxism, nationalism and the anti-Islam attitudes present in Javanese culture. It is the clash of this revived Javanism with the cultural traditions of the provinces that forms one of the sources of disunity in modern Indonesia.[22]

Oost en West in Indonesië," *Indonesië,* II (1948-49), 411-428, 538-555, and compare this with the proceedings of the 1957 Seminar on Indonesian history at Gadjah Mada University where the initial steps towards the unravelling of the theoretical issues involved in the writing of "National History" were taken — *Laporan seminar Sedjarah; pada tanggal 14 s/d Desember 1957 di Jogjakarta* (Jojakarta: Universitas Gadjah Mada, 1958).

[20] Pané, "Indonesia di Asia Selatan: Sedjarah Indonesia sampai ± 1600," *Indonesia, Madjalah Kebudajaan,* II (1951), 1-36. Resink, "Tussen de mythen: Van koloniale naar nationale geschiedschrijving," *De Nieuwe Stem,* VII, No. 6 (1952), 351.

[21] Saleh, "Mitos sebagai madat dan pengenalan diri sebagai tjambuk: Tjatatan tentang Majapahit," *Siasat: Warta Sepekan,* X, No. 468 (30 May 1956), 25-25, translated as "De mythe als Opium en Zelfkennis als Zweep: Notities omtrent Majapahit," *Indonesië,* IX (1956), 449-452. Berg is quoted from his "De Geschiedenis van Pril Majapahit I, Het mysterie van de vier dochters van Kertanagara," *Indonesië,* IV (1950-51), 512.

[22] On this modernisation, see Clifford Geertz, "Ritual and Social Change: A Javanese Example," *American Anthropologist,* LIX (1957), 32-54. On these schisms, which in the final analysis, boils down to ecological differences, deriving from an ecosystem founded on swidden agriculture and an ecosystem founded on sawah agriculture, and the consequent differing social systems and economies founded

But the question is why and how, despite what we have pointed out above, is this myth of a Golden Era in Indonesian history being maintained? To quote Sukarno, "first we point out to the people that they have a glorious past, secondly we intensify the notion among our people that the present time is dark, and the third we show them the promising, pure, and luminous future and how to get there." To this end he has propounded a "revolutionary ideology" which calls for a fundamental restructuring of Indonesian politics, economics and society through violence. It is an ideology whose central theme, to quote Donald Weatherbee, is its "Indonesian-ness [so] giving authority a justification that ideologically proceed from an indigenous and historically uninterrupted political dynamics."[23]

The role of Indonesian foreign policy in this ideology, according to former Foreign Minister Subandrio, is to "carry out the objectives of the Revolution in the international sphere and . . . to ensure that the Revolution is not obstructed from without." So, Sukarno has declared of Indonesian foreign policy that "we are not neutral; we are not passive spectators of the events happening in the world, we are not without principles, we are not without a standpoint. We do not conduct the independent policy for the sake of 'washing our hands clean', not just in a defensive way, not in an apologetic way. We are active, we have our own principles, we do have a standpoint! Our principles are clearly Pantja Sila; our standpoint is actively aimed at world peace and prosperity, actively aimed at the friendship of all nations, actively aimed at abolishing 'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme', actively opposed to, and hitting hard at, all forms of imperialism and colonialism wherever they occur."[24] The sum total of all this verbiage is that for Sukarno, Indonesia's foreign policy must work towards the elimination of the Old Established Forces — OLDEFO — and the creation of a new international order dominated by the Newly Established Forces — NEFO — led by Indonesia.

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on them, see the works emerging from the MIT "Modjokuto Project", especially the works of Clifford Geertz, "Religious Belief and Economic Behavior in a Central Javanese Town: Some preliminary considerations," *Economic Development & Cultural Change*, IV (1956), 134-158; *The Religion of Java* (Free Press, 1960); *Peddlers and Princess. Social Change and Economic Modernization in Two Indonesian towns* (Chicago Univ. Press, 1963) and *Agricultural Involution, The Processes of Ecological Change in Indonesia*. Assoc. Asian Stud., Monogr. & Papers, XI (Berkeley: Univ. California Press, 1963).

[23] Weatherbee, *Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno's Indonesian Revolution*, Yale University, Southeast Asia Stud., Monogr. Ser. VIII (New Haven: Yale, 1966), p. 88.

[24] Subandrio, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (Information Division, Embassy of Indonesia in Washington, n.d. [repr. from *Le Monde* May 1964]). Sukarno is quoted from his Independence Day Address of August 17th 1959, "The Political Manifesto," published in his *Toward Freedom and the Dignity of Man* (Djakarta: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1961).

The point to be made is that because of her size and economic potential, Indonesia has tended to over-rate her importance and exaggerate her role in international politics. It is this inflated self-assessment that probably is at the foundation of her disinterest in closer regional co-operation and her resignation from the United Nations in 1965. For ranking high in Sukarno's hierarchy of priorities was the leadership of NEFO and Indonesia's role as a bulwark against the OLDEFO in Southeast Asia. For Bung Karno apparently believed that the more important was the crusade against the British and American imperialists who encircled Indonesia, threatening to stifle her development and obstructing her from playing her designated role of leader in the region. Under such circumstances, "the function of the myth of empire is to reinforce tendencies already present in Indonesian politics and to lend an aura of reality to the Indonesian image of themselves."[25]

Such a self-image and world view originated with the group of leaders whom Herbert Feith classifies as the "solidarity makers." As opposed to the "administrators" like Hatta, Natsir, Sukiman and Wilopo, who possess the administrative, technical, legal and foreign language skills required to run the distinctive apparatus of a modern state, the solidarity makers, with Sukarno as an example, were "skilled as mediators between groups at different levels of modernity and political effectiveness, as mass organizers and as manipulators of integrative symbols." As Feith points out, up to the collapse of the Wilopo Cabinet in June 1953, the Government had been dominated by the administrators who had some success in tackling the nation's problems, but they failed to build up the foundation of support among the masses, as the solidarity makers did. After them the Government is dominated by the solidarity makers who turn their attention towards the fashioning of adventurous foreign policies, and the formulation of revolutionary ideologies, pre-occupations which are manifest in the agitational campaigns for the acquisition of West Irian, the erection of national monuments and the maintenance of an oversized army.[26] But the solidarity makers went out of office with the October 1965 Coup, and the administrators are back under the leadership of Nasution and Suharto. The question now is whether, and if so, to what extent, the legacy of the solidarity makers lives on and whether the irredentist ideals infused into the Indonesian people by the solidarity makers are still alive.

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[25] Weatherbee, "Indonesia and Malaysia: Confrontations in Southeast Asia," *Orbis*, VII (1963), 343.

[26] Feith, *The Decline of Constitution Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell, 1962), pp. 113 *et seq.* Also his contribution "The Dynamics of Guided Democracy," in Ruth McVey, ed., *Indonesia*, Survey of World Cultures, 12 (New Haven: Yale, 1963).

THE MANOLAY CULT: THE GENESIS AND DISSOLUTION OF MILLENARIAN SENTIMENTS AMONG THE ISNEG OF NORTHERN LUZON

JOHN E. SMART

FOR TWO YEARS, APPROXIMATELY 1937-1939, A MAJORITY OF THE FAMILIES in the isolated Isneg settlement of Kabuwan neglected their mountain rice fields.[1] During this period, community feasts, prompted by the hope that the people from *Untò* (a place somewhere over the sky) would attend, were held nearly every night.[2] The conviction reigned that, should *Enoy, Eyu, Patungágan* and any other *Untò* people choose to come, the dead ancestors would *manolay* (return to life) and believers would acquire *gamog* (the power to conceive of and simultaneously to experience the fulfilment of a material wish, in this case, an unending supply of food and drink) and obtain the services of *Kindingan* (the invincible spirit of the old people of Kabuwan). When possessed, *Kindingan* enabled a single Kabuwan man to fight and kill all the people in an enemy hamlet. Finally, after the expected *rendezvous* with the *Untò* people, everyone would lead an everlasting, labour-free existence, devoted to continuous *sayam* (a celebration characterized by dancing, drinking and the killing of, at least, one pig and one dog for food).

Two years later, when the *Manolay* cult subsided, the Kabuwan rice granaries were empty; most of the settlement's pigs, dogs, and chickens had been butchered; a large portion of the community's accumulated wealth of valuable beads, Chinese pottery, and Ilocano blankets had been exchanged for rice, and some men were forced to labour in the neighboring settlements for their family's daily ration. Despite

[1] See Morice Vanoverbergh, C.I.C.M., "The Isneg" *Publications of the Catholic Anthropological Conference* 3 (1932): 15-25, for the derivation of the name Isneg and its subsequent use as a generic term for Luzon's northernmost mountain people. In this paper, the actual names of the settlements, Kabuwan, Agingan and Nakatan are not utilized.

[2] The orthography is based on G. Richard Roe, "Isneg Spelling," *Philippine Journal for Language Teaching* 4 (1966): 66-71. His article was written to assist literate Isneg to spell their own language. Roe, a trained linguist with the Summer Institute of Linguistics, has been collecting data in the Isneg *barrio* of Dibagat, since 1956. The alphabet contains the following letters: consonants, *b, d, g, k, l, m, n, ng, p, r, s, t, w, y;* glottal stops, ˋ, _; vowels, *a, e, i, o, u.* Long vowels are spelled with an acute accent over them. As *e* and *o* are long, no accent is used. In a sequence of vowels without glottal stop, *w* and *y* are written between them, as two separate syllables are clearly heard. Double consonants also indicate a syllable boundary. The few exceptions to this spelling schema reflect regional variation between Dibagat and Agingan. For example, *h* is often used instead of *g*.

the prolonged outbreak of *Manolay* practices in Kabuwan, other Isneg settlements were less acutely affected.

The evolution of what could be termed a "mild millenarian climate" in the subprovince of Apayao and its more trenchant history in one Isneg region is the subject of this paper. The data have been arranged to highlight the contextual relationships which appear most relevant to the cult's genesis and eventual dissolution. The ideology of the cult is related to certain "traditional" Isneg myths and beliefs. The description is, of course, subject to the inaccuracy of detail and changes of perspective inherent in the thirty-year time lapse between the outset of the cult and the recent fieldwork period, at which time the factual material was collected.[3]

A.F.C. Wallace (1956:265) defined a "revitalization movement" as "a deliberate, organized, and conscious effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture." Implicit in the desire to "revitalize" collective existence is a deepening sense of inadequacy regarding the efficiency of the old socio-cultural system. The many types of "revitalization movement", ranging from quiet preparations for messianic deliverance to violent revolution, are, in general, responses to varying levels of social and economic stress. They may, as in the case of the *Manolay* cult, evolve from the disruption of a relatively autonomous social system, during the course of its domination and administration by "outsiders". Guided by this general framework, the first section of the paper considers the historical context of the cult, with specific attention paid to the "traditional" life of the Isneg people and the character of alien contact they experienced with Spanish missionaries and soldiers, lowland Filipino people, and government officials appointed during the American period. Of these contacts, the more pervasive impact of the American administration stands out as the primary catalytic agent in the emergence of the cult.

At this point, a note of warning, cautioning against too complete a reliance on an "anxiety and insecurity" framework for analysis, might be usefully quoted. In a report following an international conference on religious movements, Sylvia Thrupp (1962:17) remarked:

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[3] This research, extending over the period from February, 1967, to January, 1968, was sponsored by a University of Western Australia Post-graduate Award. During the field work in the Philippines, my wife and I were assisted by good friends at the Summer Institute of Linguistics, the United Church of Christ of the Philippines, St. Luke's Episcopal Seminary, the Anthropological Division of the National Museum, the Department of Anthropology and the Institute of Asian Studies at the University of the Philippines. I wish to thank many residents of Apayao on whose hospitality we so much depended. I am indebted to my post-graduate supervisor, Professor R. M. Berndt of The University of Western Australia. Also, during the execution of the research project, I benefited from the professional advice of Professor M. A. Jaspan of the University of Hull and Professor K. O. L. Burridge of the University of British Columbia. Dr. C. H. Berndt made many useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

> By the same reasoning it follows that our modern obsession with the themes of anxiety and insecurity should not be projected, without good supporting evidence, into the interpretation of millennial movements. A belief that the end of the world is imminent may cause excitement and call for certain decisive actions, without any spirit of anxiety. It follows also that we need not insist on finding special occasions of insecurity in the social situations in which the movements arise.

At the same time, the social "frustration" and political upheaval preceding the appearance of the *Manolay* cult, cannot be discounted. On close examination, a good deal of historical evidence as well as certain aspects of the *Manolay* ideology strongly support the cult's classification as a "revitalization movement". There are several mitigating factors which help to account for the relatively ephemeral and hesitant commitment of many Isneg to this religious movement.

Whereas alien contact may generate an environment conducive to cult formation, the specific content of such activity is selected from the ideational and social patterns available, at that time, to the society under consideration. In the case of the *Manolay* cult, the reliance of the Isneg participants on their old myths and practices, the relevant components of which are examined in the second section, highlights the contextual relationships most decisive to the cult's development. Despite centuries of intermittent Isneg contact with Spaniards and Spanish-enculturated lowlanders and, at a later stage, some thirty years of American administration, the *Manolay* goals and prescriptions for the attainment of these goals were, almost exclusively, drawn from an assemblage of seemingly pre-Spanish beliefs, the millenarian aspects of which had lain dormant until their activation by the social "frustrations" prevailing during the American period.

In this respect, the *Manolay* cult contrasts markedly with indigenous religious movements reported in other parts of Luzon: for example, the *Guardia de Honor* sect which flourished in the Ilocos provinces and Cordillera foothills. This movement, as well as the Aglipayan (Filipino Independent) Church, were most conspicuous in the interval which witnessed the erosion of Spanish control and the establishment of the sovereignty of the United States. These movements were highly nationalistic and, at the same time, consciously syncretic and "vitalistic".[4] In their programs, the long period of intensive Spanish colonialization

[4] In the literature on the subject, there are a number of terms used to denote the different emphases found in the ideology of religious movements. This paper follows Anthony Wallace's definitions in "Revitalization Movements: Some Theoretical Considerations for Their Comparative Study," *American Anthropologist* 58 (1956): 267. "Nativistic" implies the "elimination of alien persons, customs, values, and/or material"; "revivalistic" refers to the restoration of customs and values from a by-gone era; "vitalistic" denotes the importation of alien elements into the new religious vision. A "millenarian" wish is a desire for a complete "world transformation engineered by the supernatural" and "messianic" points to the participation of a divine saviour in such a transformation.

was readily apparent. The rejection of this foreign domination was, particularly in the case of the Aglipayan Church, coupled with an organization and creed that was closely modelled on the Roman Catholic Church.

During this same period, in Luzon's interior, the *Sapilada* religion gained adherents among the Igorot groups around Bontoc. As described by Eggan and Pacyaya (1962), this religion, which is still viable in some Bontoc communities, was essentially an "accommodation", an amalgam of certain Igorot practices with lowland Christian culture. Pedro Degan, the movement's charismatic prophet, had, on a number of occasions, visited the Ilocos provinces and his personal beliefs were inspired through contact with members of the *Guardia de Honor* sect. After his conversion, Degan called for his followers to abandon their "pagan" beliefs and to worship God. Despite the severity of these instructions, the *Sapilada* "commandments", in fact, urged only slight modifications in the important Igorot life-crises and agricultural ritual and feasts.

Although such a conviction was not, in general, held around Bontoc, the Keesings (1934:231-232) found, in some Lepanto villages, a *Sapilada* belief in the return of the culture-hero, *Lumawig*. Similarly, the Kabuwan Isneg had faith in an impending visit from the *Untò* hero, *Enoy*. Likewise, Eggan and Pacyaya (1962:106-107) remarked that, in some communities, agricultural activities were suspended and the people waited for the miraculous appearance of food. Although *Sapilada* leaders were still, at the time of the *Manolay* cult, recruiting members around Bontoc, there does not appear to have been any direct transmission of such ideas into Apayao. More probably, the similarities between the movements are a product of shared mythical and social traditions rather than a recent diffusion of ideas from the Central Cordillera or the Ilocos provinces.

Like the *Sapilada* religion, the *Manolay* cult did not develop the explicitly anti-foreign attitudes characteristic of the *Guardia de Honor* sect, the leaders of which were involved in the revolution against Spain. On the other hand, the *Sapilada* ideology was a conscious "adjustment", an attempt to combine rituals from the old culture with newer Christian practices. Eggan and Pacyaya (1962:111) have noted the continuing difficulties of such a task.

> As Christianization of the larger centers of Besao and Sagada progressed, the Sapiladans came to be considered backward and ignorant — often called *moról*, an Ilocano term for "foolish" or "demented". As the division between pagan and Christian became sharper, the Sapilada members fell between — accepted by neither.

Nevertheless, contemporary *Sapilada* leaders have been equal to this challenge and, at present, their creed and ritual are closely modelled

on Christian practices. This initial "accommodation" and progressive "Christianization" of the *Sapilada* movement distinguishes it most clearly from the *Manolay* cult which, by contrast, was almost exclusively revivalistic and, to a lesser degree, nativistic in its orientation.

During the American regime, Luzon's central provinces were the stage for a series of tenant uprisings. The leaders of the *Colorum, Sakdal,* and *Tangulan* movements called for an end to the injustices of taxation and landlordism, independence from the United States, and the establishment of the Filipino Independent Church as the supreme religious body in the country. These political aspirations were, in many districts, infused with messianic and millenarian beliefs. For example, in the province of Tarlac, the *Colorums* (Guerrero 1967:66) awaited the resurrection of the Philippine national hero, Jose Rizal, and Felipe Salvador, a notorious bandit. In the municipality of Tayug in Pangasinan, another group of *Colorums* (Guerrero 1967:75), in an effort to issue in the millennium, killed two Philippine Constabulary officers. Although these movements closely corresponded, in terms of time, with the *Manolay* cult, they share few contextual parallels. The Central Luzon uprisings drew their inspiration from an enitrely dissimilar social, economic, and political environment.

As outlined in the third section, the outward spread of the *Manolay* cult from one Isneg settlement throughout most of mountainous Apayao demonstrates how firmly its leadership and ritual were anchored in the local community. At this stage, regional autonomy had not been subverted, despite increasing inter-regional participation in municipal projects and the settlement of old disputes through "peace-pact" negotiation.[5] This locality emphasis, coupled with the cult's ideological conservatism, alienated many of those Isneg whose world view had expanded under the influence of the mission, the schools, the constabulary and the local administration. One might suppose that, had a charismatic leader, like Degan, emerged from this more widely experienced group and, had a program of "accommodation", similar to the *Sapilada* religion, been instituted, the *Manolay* cult would possibly have enjoyed a longer and more widespread popularity. On the other hand, such a supposition most probably overrates pre-war Apayao's potential for sustaining a more progressive and vitalistic movement.

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[5] Edward Dozier (*Mountain Arbiters* [Arizona: The University of Arizona Press, 1966], p. 212) describes the "peace-pact" as extension of the "adjudication system already employed to deal with intraregional, intra-kindred problems" into the settlement of inter-regional disputes. The agreement is concluded at a feast characterized by boasting, debate, and compensatory payments. The integrity of the pact is vouched for by a respected and often feared leader from each region. Among the Isneg, "peace-pacts" served to ease interpersonal relations in Kabugao and to protect people travelling in formerly hostile regions. The Isneg "peace-pacts" have never been as elaborate or as politically important as their Kalinga counterparts.

Generally, it could be said that cult movements are pretty fair indicators of the rate and direction of social change in a particular locality. The conspicuous absence of syncretic elements, a most prominent feature of the Kabuwan cult, suggests, not only a conscious rejection of alien forms, but also, a relatively undiminished familiarity with old, pre-Spanish socio-cultural traditions. In other words, even as recently as 1940, many Isneg were still able to envision a social identity, comparatively free from alien influence. The content of the *Manolay* cult attests to the continued social isolation of many Isneg communities, despite centuries of sporadic Spanish contact and almost three decades of intensive American administration.

It should be noted that the *Manolay* ideology was, in addition to being revivalistic, millenarian as well. David Aberle (1962:214) has outlined the type of social predicament which might give rise to such an orientation.

> I would suggest that the deprivations which form the background for the movement (millenarian) not only involve the sense of blockage to which I have referred earlier, which leads to resort to supernaturalism, but also the sense of a social order which cannot be reconstituted to yield the satisfactions desired. The millenarian ideology justifies the removal of the participants from that social order, by reassuring them that the order itself will not long continue, and frees them to indulge in phantasy about the ideal society, or to attempt to build it in isolation or through violent attempts against the existing order. The millenarian ideology justifies withdrawal, and that is its functional significance.

Denied satisfactory participation in the new order, *Manolay* believers reasurred themselves regarding the meaningfulness of their former pattern of existence. At the same time, the cult's millenarian aspects, as Aberle has pointed out, indicate certain Isneg doubts about the adequacy of the old social order. Their continued subordination under the American administration and the subsequent erosion and incomplete replacement of their "traditional" values and practices encouraged a dilemma, to which withdrawal provided a temporary solution. Elements found in their pre-Spanish mythical and religious "representations" furnished the ingredients for a relatively convincing millenarian hope.

Before commencing with the description of the *Manolay* cult, the nature of the field data is briefly considered. This historical reconstruction is based on observations and informants' reports gathered by my wife and myself during a continuous seven months' residence in the isolated Isneg region of Agingan in the Kalinga-Apayao municipality of Kabugao.[6] This particular "settlement area" was, at the time of the

[6] The trip from Manila to Agingan necessitated a twelve-hour bus ride to Laoag, the capital of Ilocos Norte; a further bus trip, via the Philippine Rabbit Line, over an often impassable dirt road to the northern Cagayan village of

fieldwork, populated by 380 persons and is roughly divided into three major "hamlet clusters"; Agingan (167), Kabuwan (94), and Nakatan (129). The Agingan "settlement area" takes its name from the largest "hamlet cluster".[3] Nakatan is not considered in this *Manolay* description. This settlement is a recent amalgam of families from Agingan and Kabuwan who, after the war, moved downstream to secure claims to the more highly valued tracts of flat land. At that time, the provincial government stipulated that legal land title required both an official "land declaration" and the planting of fruit and coffee trees.

The accuracy of this description is necessarily circumscribed by the thirty year time-lapse as well as the place of residence of my primary informants. To clarify the latter point, during the fieldwork period we lived in the settlement of Agingan which closely borders the settlement of Kabuwan. The people of Agingan attended the *Manolay* celebrations but, unlike their Kabuwan neighbors, they did not neglect their rice fields. In general, the Agingan cult was less energetic and pervasive. However, in Kabuwan itself, I experienced great difficulty in eliciting information about *Manolay* practices. A legacy of shame, prompted by the "superstitious" complexion of these beliefs in the light of mission and school teachings, prevented open discussion of this subject. A second factor contributing to their reluctance was a sense of guilt, during the *Manolay* period, through the transgression of certain social and sexual norms. On the other hand, my Agingan informants expressed themselves freely about the *Manolay* celebrations.

Also, as seven months was not long enough to attain a real fluency in the local language, I relied primarily on informants who spoke some English. This restriction limited the depth at which I could question the oldest participants in the *Manolay* cult.[5] Despite these

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Lucban: a day's motored-canoe ride up over the rapids of the Apayao-Abulug River to the municipal headquarters at Kabugao and then a one day's hike south, requiring sixteen river crossings, to Agingan at the base of Mount Wayan.

[3] The geo-political terminology used in this paper is as follows: A group of contiguous houses is called a hamlet or *sitio* (Spanish). A set of hamlets, each hamlet being within a relatively short walking distance from the others, is referred to as a "hamlet cluster" or settlement. There may be a number of hamlet clusters in what Felix Keesing ("The Isneg: Shifting Cultivation of the Northern Philippines," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 18 [1962]: 3) called a "settlement area" a category designating a closely related population occupying a relatively large area along the Apayao-Abulug River, the Matalag River or their tributaries. During his 1932 field trip to the subprovince of Apayao, Keesing counted 46 such "settlement areas". This same tract of land is presently divided into approximately 30 Isneg *barrio* (Spanish), the smallest modern political unit. The municipality of Kabugao, for example, contains 17 *barrios* of which Agingan is one. In some of these divisions, two or more of Keesing's settlement areas have been incorporated into one *barrio*. In this paper, the terms, region, *barrio*, and settlement area are used synonymously.

[5] Since 1917, there has been in Agingan an American-modelled elementary school, using English as the medium of instruction. I was therefore able, in most cases, to converse quite satisfactorily combining Isneg and English.



FIG. 1. SUBPROVINCE OF APAYAO

handicaps, a variety of sources substantiated the major features of the cult.

Social and Historical Context

The Isneg people, numbering approximately 14,230, are located primarily in the mountain municipalities of Kabugao and Bayag in the newly incorporated Kalinga-Apayao Province.[9] The majority of them dwell in scattered settlements along the upper reaches of the Apayao-Abulug River which drains northward through a lowland strip of Cagayan into the Babuyan Channel. One thousand or so Isneg reside along the Baren River, one of the major tributaries of the Matalag River, in the Kalinga-Apayao municipality of Conner. The Matalag River flows eastward, joining first the Chico River and then the Cagayan del Rio.

Linguistic and cultural variations mark the different Isneg regions. Father Morice Vanoverbergh (1932:13), a pioneer Catholic missionary in the area, tentatively divided the Isneg language into two major and three minor dialects, the most important of which were what he referred to as the *O* and *Bo* dialects.[10] The *Bo* dialect is spoken along the Matalag River as well as in the northern barrios of Dagara, Maragat, Lenneng, and importantly in the context of this analysis, Agingan. A 1965 study by Dyen, while substantiating Vanoverbergh's categories, further distinguished between the major dialects by labelling them separate languages. The division, in this case, was based on the percentage of shared "homosemantic cognates" in a series of basic word lists compiled by Elmer Wolfenden and William Oates of the Summer Institute of Linguistics. During my own fieldwork, I found differences in marriage custom, folklore, and death ritual which, among other items, appeared to parallel the linguistic distinctions.

Kabuwan and Agingan are neighbouring hamlet clusters along the southern-most Apayao River tributary, the Nagbayyugan. Because the Nagbayyugan is, for the most part, unnavigable, the Agingan Isneg do not participate in the extensive river trade and travel, characteristic of inter-settlement activity along the main branch of the Apayao River. *Nagbayyugan* refers to "the path along which enemy heads are displayed in bamboo containers", and the use of this word to denote the Agingan region indicates the type of hostility which existed, before pacification, between the various Isneg settlement areas. The continued warfare between Agingan and the Apayao River settlements encouraged

[9] An additional 20 percent has been added to the total Isneg population as the 1960 census of the Philippines (Mountain Province, Vol. 1, Part I, Table 15). During the years 1960 to 1967, the Philippine population has increased at an estimated rate of 3.2 per cent per year. The number of people in the *barrio* of Agingan grew by 21.8 per cent during this interval.

[10] *Ô* and *bô* are variants for the Isneg affirmative particle, "yes."

the development of an extensive "no-man's land". This area has, since the end of the Japanese occupation, been populated by settlers from along the Apayao River and is known as the *barrio* of Budduat.

Despite the greater number of social similarities with the Matalag River Isneg, the people of the Agingan region have, through increased downstream trade and their inclusion in the municipality of Kabugao, been drawn into a closer relationship with the Apayao River Isneg. Some of the Kabuwan people have resisted this trend and preferred to barter their tobacco and coffee in the village of Hanhan along the Matalag River. On the other hand, the Agingan families almost always trade in Kabugao.

These trade preferences point to certain historical circumstances which, in my opinion, help to account for Kabuwan's greater receptivity to *Manolay* ideology. According to older informants, the Kabuwan people, the region's first settlers, moved into the area from the south. Formerly, they resided in a number of closely related settlements, but, during the last hundred years, a series of epidemics sharply reduced their numbers. In 1917, under pressure from the provincial government, these scattered hamlets combined at Kabuwan, a location within walking distance of the new primary school recently opened in the nearby hamlet cluster of Agingan.

The settlements of Kabuwan and Agingan are related, not by fission, but by fusion. The first Agingan families came, possibly as war refugees, from a number of neighbouring regions. They made, it was said, a peace-pact with the original settlers. A *ludag* (a long wooden drum with a deer-skin drumhead) and a *sinublan* (a metal tub used for brewing sugar cane wine) were exchanged for the privilege of making rice fields downstream from Kabuwan. Since this time, the Agingan population has increased, relative to the number of people in Kabuwan. During the Spanish period, Agingan, in order to increase its strength in war, welcomed migrants fleeing from sickness, famine, and war devastation in other regions, including those located along the main branch of the Apayao River. They have not, over the course of time, been so severely depopulated by typhoid, diphtheria, and smallpox.

The differences in origin and development have helped, despite their alliance during the days of inter-settlement warfare and a long history of intermarriage, to stamp these two communities with markedly different social temperaments. In Kabuwan, there is a distinctively more insular, introverted, and conservative climate of opinion. The Kabuwan people are, relative to their Agingan neighbours, awkward and hesistant in their relationships with outsiders. Through the years, they have shown a general reluctance to participate in social activities and employment outside the region.

In addition to my own impressions, several indices reflect the extent of Kabuwan's continued social isolation. For example, a peace-pact requires that each participant settlement provide a feast in honour of the other pact holder. Agingan has fulfilled its peace-pact obligations with Madatag, Dibagat, Baliwanan, Alisit, Dalawwas, Bulu, Ampaw, Katablangan (Matalag River) and Nabuwangan (Matalag River). On the other hand, Kabuwan has on only one occasion accepted an invitation to a peace-pact celebration outside the region. Kabuwan leaders completed a peace-pact with Nabuwangan, a Matalag River settlement, but failed to finish negotiations with the Apayao River regions of Kumao, Dibagat, and Baliwanan.

As indicated in Table I, a larger number of Agingan men have either served in the Armed Forces or Philippine Constabulary or attained a high educational standard. These achievements tend, of course, to broaden an individual's perspectives. In Isneg settlements, the opinions of such men are generally highly regarded. Although there are several cases of duplication, i.e., a man with army experience, a high school diploma, and a teaching certificate, each person is included under only one category. Table Ia. tests the statistical significance of this index. Both tables include Kabuwan and Agingan men living in Nakatan.

TABLE I

ADULT MALES (OVER SIXTEEN YEARS OF AGE) WITH A HIGHER DEGREE OR ARMY EXPERIENCE

Outside Experience	*Agingan*	*Kabuwan*
1. Army Veterans	6 (5)	2 (2)
2. Presently Enlisted in the Philippine Constabulary or Armed Forces	4 (2)	--
3. High School Diploma	7 (4)	1 (1)
4. Teacher College Certificate	6 (4)	—
5. University Diploma	1	--
Totals	24	3

(—) shows the number presently resident in the *barrio* of Agingan.

TABLE Ia

CHI SQUARE TEST OF ADULT MALES WITH A HIGHER DEGREE OR ARMY EXPERIENCE

	With Experience	*Without Experience*	*Totals*
Agingan	24	44	68
Kabuwan	3	55	58
Totals	27	99	126

x^2 (Using Yates' Correction) = 15.12, $p < .01$

In general, Kabuwan people are reluctant to establish social relationships outside the region. A comparison of inter-settlement marriages highlights their decidedly more insular attitude. Several Kabuwan informants expressed a preference for settlement endogamy. This same sentiment was not so resolutely articulated in Agingan. Table II shows that, in terms of inter-settlement marriage, the difference between Kabuwan and Agingan is statistically significant. The twelve marriages contracted between members of the two settlements themselves are not considered in this table.

TABLE II

CHI SQUARE TEST OF SETTLEMENT ENDOGAMY

	Both Marriage Partners from the Same Settlement	*One Marriage Partner from Outside the Agingan Region*	*Totals*
Agingan	22	29	51
Kabuwan	23	11	34
Totals	45	40	85

x^2 (Using Yate's Correction) = 3.98, $p < .05$

Another variable, emerging from the examination of Kabuwan's inter-settlement marriages, re-emphasizes their difference in the formation of outside relationships. Table III indicates that most of the marriages contracted outside Kabuwan have involved a Kabuwan girl. In Agingan, this pattern is reversed. As a rule, young men take the initiative in courtship. An ardent suitor may regularly travel many miles over dark, slippery mountain trails to visit his girlfriend. These figures show that, in the majority of the cases, the Kabuwan partner has played the more passive role in such marriage arrangements. The Kabuwan *bagbagú* (unmarried men) are extremely shy and hesitate to court girls outside their settlement. They resent the Agingan *bagbagú* who go to Kabuwan almost every night and who, in the past, have successfully courted some of Kabuwan's most highly regarded young ladies. Table III includes the twelve marriages negotiated between the two settlements.

TABLE III

INTER-SETTLEMENT MARRIAGE CONSIDERED IN TERMS OF THE SEX OF THE SETTLEMENT PARTNER

	Men who have Married Outside the Settlement	*Women who have Married Outside the Settlement*	*Totals*
Agingan	27	14	41
Kabuwan	7	16	23
Totals	31	30	64

x^2 (Using Yates' Correction) = 6.07, $p < .02$

A final index for demonstrating the relative social isolation of Kabuwan, relative to Agingan, is the number of resident *pakiyan* (persons from outside who, after marriage, make their home in the settlement). In the context of this analysis, *pakiyan* represent external opinion and attitudes available within the local community. Of the thirteen *pakiyan* in the *barrio* of Agingan, twelve or 92.3% are married to persons from the settlement of Agingan. There is only one *pakiyan* with a Kabuwan spouse. Importantly, two of Agingan's *pakiyan* are not Isneg, but Ilocano lowlanders. The cultural influence of the Ilocano people on the Isneg will be considered later in the paper.

Informants' reports confirm the assumption that the "social forces" shaping Kabuwan's insularity, as reflected in their reluctance to negotiate peace-pacts, the endogamous character of Kabuwan marriages, their relative lack of *pakiyan*, the timidity of Kabuwan *baghagi*, and the disinterest in either education or the armed forces, were in operation thirty years ago. Tentatively, I suggest that Kabuwan's relative depopulation through epidemics, their inclusion in an Apayao River municipality despite closer linguistic and cultural similarities with the Matalag River Isneg, and, finally, Kabuwan's secondary social and political position in respect to their more prosperous and gregarious Agingan neighbours were important "enabling conditions" for the growth of Kabuwan's inward-looking and conservative outlook. Such an atmosphere, it seems reasonable to assume, would have intensified a "sense of blockage" regarding the expectation of satisfactory participation in the new social order. At the same time, their continued social isolation would, despite mission, school, and administration teachings to the contrary, have reinforced the "reality" of the old myths and beliefs. These circumstances helped, in my opinion, to generate a "forceful" and "immediate" millenarian climate, the presence of which explains, in part, Kabuwan's more compulsive acceptance of the Manolay cult.

Stability and Change

Two "traditional" systems, one unchanged and the other eliminated as a result of American administration, stand out in their influence on the nature of the *Manolay* movement. Firstly, the agricultural system is noteworthy for its stability through centuries of culture contact. The Isneg, unlike the southern Cordillera peoples, practice subsistence, slash and burn, dry rice cultivation on the forested sides of the mountains. Their sparse population density, coupled with befitting climatic and altitudinal conditions, have made the *kaingin* system hard to replace in terms of economic self-sufficiency.[11] The rice diet is supplemented by

[11] For a detailed account of Isneg and Kalinga dry rice cultivation, see William Henry Scott, "A Preliminary Report on Upland Rice in Northern Luzon," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 14 (1958): 87-105 and Morice Vanoverbergh

vegetables, both wild and cultivated, a variety of fruit, fish, wild birds and game, and the occasional dog, pig, or chicken, killed for feasting. Cash cropping is limited to a small field of tobacco or a stand of coffee trees. The income so derived is used to buy clothes, blankets, clay pots, salt, sugar and tinned fish from the Ilocano shopkeepers in Kabugao. Prior to the establishment of the administrative centre in Kabugao, the Isneg made, under the protection of *mengal* (proven headhunters), regular trading expeditions to the Ilocos provinces and Cagayan. On these occasions, beeswax, bamboo baskets, honey and tobacco were bartered with the lowlanders.

The continued success of the Isneg agricultural system and the social adequacy of supplementary forms of livelihood exclude, in the context of this analysis, a reliance on "economic deprivation" as a necessary "enabling condition" for the emergence of the *Manolay* cult. Such a framework has, of course, been extensively used in the description of religious movements in other parts of the world. Even today *kaingin* farming in Apayao is, according to the two Ilocano *pakiyan* in Agingan, preferable to the disadvantages of tenancy, landlordism and poverty, accompaniments of the more productive "wet rice" agriculture, as it is practiced in some areas of the lowlands.

Dry rice cultivation has proved a most stable anchor to Isneg social organization. With its structural ascendancy reinforced through participation in the *kaingin* system, the conjugal family has remained the most constant form of corporate grouping. Each family is responsible for a rice field and, during planting and harvesting, members leave the more permanent settlements along the river to reside together near the rice. The children assist their parents until marriage, at which time they usually cultivate independent rice fields. The initial residence, virilor uxorilocal, of a married couple is determined at a marriage negotiation between the respective families. Formerly, a number of married children might have lived with a single set of parents in a large permanent dwelling, but today it is more common for a husband and wife, especially after the birth of a few children, to establish independent residence. Older parents may attach themselves to one of these families.

The shifting of the nuclear family in response to the pressures of dry rice cultivation coupled with the residential disruptions following marriage, death, and migration, imparts to Isneg social organization a highly mobile character. Within each settlement area, the independent families interact in a relatively loose cooperative network, based on ties of kinship and residence. No social groupings override the sovereignty of the family.

Through the years, this pattern has resisted the imposition of more tightly structured or stratified forms of political or economic organization. The viability of the independent family in the agricultural system most

probably would have retarded any developments in this direction. The more sophisticated leadership and organizational structures present in the *Sapilada, Guardia de Honor* and Aglipayan Church movements, in contrast to those that developed in the *Manolay* cult, promoted continuity and strengthened the inter-regional appeal of their religious programs.

While stability has characterized the economic system, Isneg political relationships have changed radically. At the turn of the century, the Isneg were avid headhunters. Fear of reprisal mitigated the familial independence and dispersed residence pattern fostered by the agricultural system. Rice fields were usually contiguous and settlements were more centralized. At that time, the road to leadership was open to those men best able to secure the gruesome fruits of war. Methods of killing and decapitating an enemy were ranked as reflecting different degrees of bravery. The respect so gained was a prerequisite to political influence. *Mengal* (proven headhunters) would voice their opinions and demand personal recognition in fiery speeches and chants given at the community feasts.

Successful headhunters supplemented their prestige through the accumulation of old Chinese pottery, acquired through inheritance, marriage and indemnity payments, and tobacco trade with the lowlanders. Land was abundant and its ownership was not an important pre-requisite for leadership.

Headhunting encouraged greater regional cohesion and created the need for a loose political superstructure. Importantly, it also validated and was validated by a highly expressive complex of belief, myth, spirit communication and feasting. In this system, a primary function of the local *anito* (nature spirits) was to protect warriors and to warn the settlement of an impending enemy attack. Rituals and stories praising the strength and bravery of the *mengal* were the focal points of most celebrations. Like the Kalinga (Dozier 1966:201-202), Isneg headhunting was not specifically tied to fertility or community welfare. War trophies were sought primarily to avenge a previous raid or death and to secure personal influence and prestige.

Through the suppression of inter-settlement warfare, the American administration wrought a major change in the orientation of Isneg life. At the same time, such time-tied responses disappear slowly, and many of the beliefs and values directly and indirectly associated with headhunting seem to have retained a persuasive influence over the mind and emotions of many Isneg. The excitement and self-confidence aroused by the renewal of these old rituals in the *Manolay* cult may very well have dispelled, if only temporarily, some of the doubt, restlessness, and confusion attending alien domination, the details of which are outlined in the next three sub-sections.

Spanish Missionaries and Soldiers

There are no written reports of the Isneg pre-dating the Spanish conquest of northern Luzon. One of the earliest descriptions of the region is contained in an account (Keesing 1962b:14-15) of a 1572 expedition by Juan de Salcedo and 25 soldiers around Luzon's north coast and eventually, after some delay, down the east coast. Catholic missionaries and *encomenderos,* tribute collectors, soon followed. Missions were founded along both the Apayao-Abulug and Matalag river systems. The people of the Nagbayyugan, the river tributary on which Kabuwan and Agingan are located, were mentioned in mission reports from the northern and eastern sides of the Cordillera and, as this area lies midway between these two points of penetration, mission activity along both these rivers is considered in this paper. These early records present an account of the Isneg, which is consistent in many ways with the life patterns observed today.[12]

On the Cagayan side, the first Spanish colonists met some stiff opposition. A 1594 document (Keesing 1962b:224) described the Cagayan villages of Taban and Tuao as "subdued" by the Spanish soldeirs. Yet, within a few years, the villagers retaliated. Diego Aduarte (Keesing 1962b:224-225) reported that by 1604, "the outrages of those who took tribute from them were so great that they enraged the natives and obliged them to take up arms, to the great loss of the Spaniards." Despite the hostilities, by 1612, Dominican church centres were established at Tabang, Piat, and Tuao along the Chico River and, in 1617, a fourth was opened at Malaweg along the Matalag River.[13]

Throughout the Spanish period, Malaweg served as a trading centre for the mountain Isneg. The village was cited in the *Bangkilat* stories which I collected in Kabuwan. *Bangkilat,* an indefatigable headhunter and important culture hero, was supposed to have forced the people of Malaweg to build him a stone house — a clear reference, in this case, to Spanish architecture.[14]

C.I.C.M. "The Isneg Farmer," *Publications of the Catholic Anthropological Conference* 3 (1941): 281-386.

[12] Translations of the writings of Diego Aduarte (1640) and Fray Benito de Mena Salazar (1742), early Dominican Order historians, as well as other relevant mission and government records are found in E. H. Blair and J. A. Robertson's 54 volume-record of Philippine historical documents, *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803.* Felix Keesing drew heavily from this source in compiling his book, *The Ethnohistory of Northern Luzon* (California: Stanford University Press, 1962). My description of mission penetration into Apayao is primarily based on the work of Felix Keesing, Morice Vanoverbergh, and Henry Geeroms.

[13] In the early part of this century, Malaweg was renamed Rizal.

[14] In one episode, *Bangkilat* challenged and defeated Lightning in a foot race. *Kilat* is an Isneg word for "lightning."

In 1693, the Santa Cruz mission was established by Fray Joseph Galfaroso further up the Matalag River at Gumpat.[15] Fray Benito de Mena Salazar (Keesing 1962b:227) reported that Galfaroso "made various entrances through the neighboring mountains in search of heathens who lived in them, in order to lure them to the bosom of our holy faith. These mountains are rough and broken, and the heathen who inhabit them are brave, and give the Christian villages much to do with their continual raids and assaults with which they keep them terrified." He also mentioned that Galfaroso had gathered fugitive Christians and new converts from the Isneg "rancheria of Nabbayugan", a reference to the Agingan settlement area.

In 1718, there was a wide-spread Cagayan uprising against the Spanish authorities. As this revolt included the villages at Malaweg, the Santa Cruz mission was deserted. Yet references to this mission in ecclesiastical surveys between 1738 and 1754 attest to its revival. According to Vanoverbergh (1932:30), this religious centre, marking the deepest Spanish penetration of Apayao from the Cagayan side, was probably abandoned by the early 19th century.[16]

A somewhat similar pattern of sporadic penetration and indigenous resistance extended along the Apayao-Abulug River. In 1595, a Dominican mission was founded at Abulug, a seaport at the mouth of the river. Seventeen years later, a church was dedicated at Pudtol to Our Lady of the Rosary. Being 17 miles inland, it was built like a fortress and housed, along with the Dominican father, a garrison of soldiers. Within the same decade, a third mission was established at Kapinatan, still another eight miles upstream from Pudtol.

Aduarte's account (Keesing 1962b:187) of early mission work in Luzon's extreme north opened with the statement, "Land was ruined not only by the continuous war which villages all wage with one another, but still more by the settled peace which they had all made with the devil." In his description (Keesing 1962b:189) of the religious practices of the newly contacted people, he mentioned a belief that "their deceased fathers and ancestors must return to life in this world." Felix Keesing who, in the early 1930's, carried out three weeks' fieldwork in Apayao interpreted this statement as "apparently referring to the wandering and visitations of ghosts of the dead, . . . rather than any idea

[15] There has been some controversy about the exact founding date of the Santa Cruz mission. For further details, see Keesing, *The Ethnohistory of Northern Luzon*, p. 227; Vanoverbergh, "The Isneg," p. 30; and Geeroms, "Former Spanish Missions in the Cordillera (N. Luzon) — I," *Saint Louis Quarterly* 3 (1965): 17-56.

[16] Father Morice Vanoverbergh was the first resident missionary in Kabugao. He remained in Apayao from 1925 to 1932. Despite the fact that many of his personal records were destroyed in an American bombing raid during World War II, he has published extensively on the Isneg. When I asked Father Vanoverbergh about his interest in the Isneg, he said, "How can a person bring religion or change religion, if he does not thoroughly understand the beliefs and customs of the people with whom he is working?"

of reincarnation." This passing reference by Aduarte and the possibility of its misinterpretation by Keesing assume greater importance in my later discussion of the content of the *Manolay* cult.

Aduarte's portrayal demonstrated a close ethnic relationship between these early lowland groups and the mountain Isneg. Such similarities lend support to Keesing's thesis that in fact there were, in the Apayao interior, no permanent residents until after the Spanish conquest of the north coast. He believed that the ancestors of the present mountain Isneg were most probably *remontados* (runaways) escaping Spanish domination in the lowlands. In a reference to the Malaweg mission on the Cagayan side, Keesing (1962b:226) noted, "It is a fair assumption that the mission fathers, in establishing Malaueg as a base, were following in the wake of refugees who had fled up the river in the face of the initial Spanish pressures and control."

Keesing (1962b:333) supported this suggestion by citing the possible influence of the *remontados* on Isneg culture.

> The richness of their trade goods, the place given to maize and tobacco growing, their use of the wooden boat, which looks to be of Spanish origin, and their substantial and distinctively architectured housing are among cultural elements which suggest that they (the *remontados*) could have brought into Apayao a Spanish-influenced tradition. It must be recognized, however, that such elements could have been adopted or adapted in the later centuries.

Spanish documents also provide evidence on the migration of substantial numbers of lowland peoples into the mountains. Nevertheless, in the light of my own investigation, Keesing's thesis remains inconclusive and, at the present time, difficult to substantiate further. As regards post-Spanish migration and the *Manolay* cult, it can at least be said that "escape into the mountains" was, for large numbers of people, no longer a feasible alternative to alien domination during the American administration.

The early mission records point to innumerable cases where the "heathen" overtly resisted the "good intentions" of the Catholic fathers. Aduarte (Keesing 1962b:191) wrote that when the missionaries entered the north coastal village of Pata,

> Not a single person . . . desired to receive the faith. The devil had kept them prejudiced against it — by threats which he uttered (through the mouth of a sorceress named Fulangan) and by telling them that their ancestors would return and would be greatly grieved to find them under a different law from that which they had followed.

Notable in this passage is another reference to the impending return of the dead ancestors. The hostility of the female shamans is also mentioned. Among the Isneg, women are almost solely responsible for spirit communication. As women have far less opportunity than men for experience outside the settlement area, the central position of the

female shamans in the *Manolay* cult may have helped to inspire its highly conservative ideology.

Trouble also brewed upstream where the missionaries attempted to resettle Isneg around the church. When the father and lay brother at Kapinatan refused to allow three men to visit their former village, the men decapitated the lay brother and seriously wounded the father. Following this incident, many of the Kapinatan people went downstream and burned the church in Pudtol. Again in 1639, the Pudtol mission was overrun and twenty soldiers were massacred.

In some instances, the missionaries were notably successful. According to Salazar (Keesing 1962b:197), in 1684 Fray Pedro Ximenez returned to Pudtol and, on one occasion, negotiated the peaceful settlement of a dispute involving a murder committed by a man from the Agingan region. At this stage, the Dominican fathers pushed further upstream and Vanoverbergh (1932:32) describes the founding of a church at Nagsimbanan, an Isneg settlement truly centered in the mountains. Fray Benito de Mena Salazar (Keesing 1962b:198) noted that the membership in this church exceeded one thousand and three hundred converts, the number of which was "opportunely increased by an epidemic of smallpox . . . . . which led to many baptisms."

Salazar's comment draws attention to the close relationship between sickness and the adoption of Christian ritual. Through the centuries, the Isneg have been particularly susceptible to the ravages of malaria, dysentery, bacterial pneumonia and tuberculosis. They have, periodically, suffered through smallpox, diphtheria, influenza and typhoid epidemics. Vanoverbergh (1932:55) felt that Apayao was one of the most unhealthy districts in the Philippines. Consequently, a most important duty of the spirit mediums has been the "prognostication" and "cure" of sickness. It is highly probable that the "great eagerness" with which the Isneg learned the prayers and baptism ritual of the Catholic fathers was inspired by such an association. As the Christian religion, in itself, proved a no better remedy for these difficulties, the *Manolay* leaders were able to argue more convincingly that the epidemics and crop failures of the 1920's and 30's were due to a widespread neglect of the teachings of the "old people" and the welfare of the *anito*.

Despite its initial popularity, the Nagsimbanan mission was shortlived and, in the face of continued Isneg hostility, the other upstream churches at Pudtol and Kapinatan were abandoned by 1769. There was an attempt in 1891 to reopen the Pudtol mission, but, among other misfortunes, the servants of the missionaries were killed by Isneg headhunters.

In 1890-91, as part of a general campaign by the Spanish authorities to pacify Luzon's mountain peoples, the Cordillera ranges were apportioned into a number of politico-military jurisdictions. Apayao was divided

into the northern Comandancia of Apayaos with a resident commander at Kapinatan, the western Comandancia of Cabagaoan with its headquarters in the coastal town of Laoag, and, in the east, the Comandancia of Itaves with its centre at Magaogao in Cagayan. During this period, a number of punitive expeditions were sent into Apayao. In 1888 Schadenberg, a German scholar who travelled through northwest Apayao, described a particularly brutal encounter where 16 Isneg leaders were shot after the Spanish commander had invited them to a feast. Immediately following this incident, the Isneg retaliated by slaughtering a party of 24 Ilocano traders. As this decade was also disrupted by widespread Filipino resistance to the Spanish government, and Spain's eventual relinquishment of the Philippine Islands to the United States, the new administrative program never went beyond the initial stages.

In retrospect, the Spanish efforts to pacify and convert the Isneg were only minimally successful. Mission records from both the northern and eastern foothills attest to continued Isneg hostility, throughout the Spanish period. At no stage were these mountain people subject to the intensive colonization experienced in the lowlands where, today, Spanish socio-cultural patterns remain immediately apparent. Even when the Spanish, during the last decades of their administration, renewed their efforts to subdue the mountain populations, the Isneg, unlike the peoples further south, were, by and large, undisturbed.

Economically, although the demand for tobacco increased, Isneg agriculture remained near the subsistence level.[17] They were never financially exploited like the Cagayan people, who, during the administration of the Royal tobacco monopoly, were flogged, fined and forced to plant tobacco. The presence of alluvial gold did not, as in the south-central sections of the Cordillera, stimulate Spanish control or provide for the Isneg a supplementary form of livelihood.

Politically, headhunting continued unabated. The program of resettlement near the missions did not have any permanent effect. A dispersed hamlet system, yielding to a closer settlement on occasions of more intensive inter-settlement warfare remained the Isneg norm. Religiously, the continuing pressures of headhunting, dry rice cultivation, sickness and famine appear, despite the heroic efforts of the pioneer Catholic fathers, to have firmly anchored most of the old beliefs and rituals.

Felix Keesing (1962b:333) suggested that tobacco trade, the wooden boat and a distinctive architecture were indicative of the influence of the Spanish on Isneg culture. On the other hand, the Isneg, whether a former lowland population which retreated into the interior after Spanish

[17] Tobacco, particularly that which is grown along the Binuan tributary of the Apayao-Abulug River, is noted for its high quality. In the lowlands, all tobacco from the Kabugao district is known as Binuan tobacco.

control or a pre-Spanish mountain people, appear to have, through a combination of physical isolation and enmity, successfully escaped and resisted most of the more conspicuous Spanish forms. Many of their beliefs and practices are decidedly pre-Spanish in orientation. Similarly, the Isneg did not experience so acutely the upheaval of the Spanish period and its aftermath, circumstances which, in other parts of northern Luzon, served to inspire the *Guardia de Honor* and *Sapilada* religions. During these times, there remained the opportunity for a relatively independent and self-sufficient life in the Apayao interior. Unlike these other movements, the pre-conditions for the *Manolay* cult must be sought almost exclusively in the American period.

Ilocano Expansion

A dramatic phenomenon in the social history of northern Luzon has been the continued physical and cultural expansion of the Ilocano people. Migrating from their home along Luzon's northwest coast, large numbers of Ilocano families, particularly in the last hundred years, have successfully settled along the north coast and in the Cagayan Valley. To a large extent, they have absorbed less numerous peoples like the Ibanag and Itavi, lowland groups with which the Isneg have a close linguistic and ethnic affinity.

Throughout the Spanish period and possibly before, the Isneg have traded with the Ilocano. At certain times of the year, large parties of Ilocano traders moved through the mountain settlements. At other times, groups of Isneg, under the protection of *mengal*, hiked to lowland villages to procure salt, sugar, cloth, and Chinese pottery. Despite this contact, hostility and isolation in the mountain environment has shielded Isneg culture from extensive Ilocanozation.

Before pacification, the Isneg, through raids and burning, limited the Ilocano advance into the Apayao interior. For example, as late as 1895, Keesing (n.d.b.:9) noted a particularly savage Isneg raid on a north coast military post whose specific function had been to protect Ilocano settlers. An unpublished constabulary account of this incident reported that 138 soldiers were killed.

This type of retaliation was suppressed by the American administration and, after 1910, direct Isneg contact with the Ilocano sharply increased. They were appointed as sub-provincial officials and, at the same time, increasing numbers of Ilocano fishermen, farmers, and lumbermen were able to push inland up the northern river valleys. The 1922 census figures (Keesing n.d.b.:17) for the sub-province included 361 Christian lowlanders and, by 1932, the number had grown to 2,926. In 1939, there were 6,353 Ilocano settlers in the Apayao municipality of Luna alone.

Today, the lower municipalities of Luna, Pudtol, and Flora are populated almost exclusively by Ilocano migrants; while the western sector of Bayag and the eastern sector of Conner are also primarily Ilocano. Most Isneg understand the Ilocano language and Ilocano "ways" are increasingly popular. A number of Ilocano families, mostly traders and government officials, live in Kabugao and two Ilocano men are presently married in the settlement of Agingan.

The mountain Isneg were not, like the Ibanag and the Itavi, overrun by Ilocano settlers. At the same time, the presence of these was ensured through the appointment of Ilocano officials in the American administration. A number of Ilocano tax collectors, school teachers, and constables were stationed in the sub-provincial capital of Kabugao. In his 1933 visit to Apayao, Felix Keesing (n.d.a.:9) found Kabugao "a modern oasis of Christian Filipino culture in a mountain and jungle wilderness". From this balance of power, so to speak, the Isneg reaped a certain sense of inferiority regarding their personal status and culture. Vanoverbergh (1936:174) summarized the Isneg position.

> They are supposed to be inferior to the Christians in many respects, they themselves believe so, and the Christians do not fail to impress it upon their mind through word and deed: an Iloko or Kagayan has not respect for an Isneg.

The "status deprivation" fostered during the "occupation" of Apayao by Ilocano officials, would have been one of the more important "irritants", inspiring the *Manolay* effort to "revitalize" Isneg social life. On the other hand, the language and life style of these two peoples are, in many respects, similar. For this reason, intermarriage is not uncommon. A number of the Ilocano school teachers have stayed in Kabugao. The fact that the Ilocano officials were easily emulated and their positions were open to Isneg may have eased some of the ethnic tension, characteristic of this pre-war period.

The American Administration

In 1898, the United States won colonial control over the Philippine Islands. At first, particularly in the nearby Ilocos provinces, the American occupation forces encountered stiff resistance from Filipino freedom fighters whose cause had attracted numerous adherents in the last decades of the Spanish regime. The *Guardia de Honor* and Aglipayan Church movements were closely tied to this widespread resentment with foreign domination.

In 1907, an expeditionary force under American officers burned a village along the Apayao-Abulug River and overcame an ill-organized Isneg resistance. This short struggle with the Isneg was not, like the lowland opposition, inspired by nationalistic sentiments.

In 1910, Apayao was incorporated as a sub-province of the Mountain Province, a large mountainous division that included most of the so-called "non-Christian tribes of northern Luzon". The first sub-provincial capital was located at Tawit, an Isneg settlement along the lower Apayao-Abulug River and Don Blas Villamor, the first Lieutenant Governor of Apayao, was annually provided with ₱10,000 for the purchase of beads and clothes for the Isneg. Despite such efforts at reconciliation, there were over the next five years various clashes between the Isneg and the Philippine Constabulary, a national police force staffed primarily by lowland Filipino soldiers. According to the Keesings (1934:87), a number of Isneg families attempted to escape this new jurisdiction by fleeing westward into the Ilocos Norte and Abra mountains. As late as 1913, Tawit itself was attacked by a band of Isneg infuriated by the large number of Ilocano, who, taking advantage of the new government's protection, were settling along the lower Apayao-Abulug River. These clashes with the Constabulary helped convince most Isneg of the futility of physical resistance.

In 1916, in order to centralize administrative control, the sub-provincial capital was moved to Kabugao in the heart of the Isneg domain. Here, a company of 40 soldiers, including newly recruited Isneg, maintained order. The Constabulary soon became a dominant force in Isneg social and political life. They quickly interceded in quarrels which, in the past, had resulted in revenge expeditions. An official report (Keesing 1950:11) of 1931 referred to the Kabugao constabulary as the "agent of all Bureaus, peace maker, sanitary inspector, agricultural agent, local judge, educational agent" and, in fact, "like a god". After the retirement of Norman G. Connor, the successor to Don Blas Villamor, the Lieutenant Governor's position was, with one exception, held until 1937 by a series of constabulary officers.

Given high priority in the American government's list of objectives was the preparation of the Philippines for self-government. As a result, seven American-modelled elementary schools were, by 1917, scattered throughout the Kabugao district. The English language was the recognized medium of instruction and the curriculum focused on a study of "the three R's", American history, sanitation, and democratic procedures.. A four-grade primary school was located in Agingan and the families residing in the most distant hamlets were forced to move closer to the school.

In thes sparsely populated regions, the Ilocano teacher proved a most potent force for change. Their influence was particularly effective among members of the younger generation, some of whom, because of the great distances between their homes and the school, were forced to remain at or near the teacher's quarters for 5 days each week. In a comment on the attitude of the Ilocano schoolmasters toward Isneg religious beliefs, Vanoverbergh (1936:173) remarked, "The teachers,

being Christians, have no sympathy with what they call the superstitutions and ridiculous practices of the Isneg". The high status of the school teacher would have intensified the impact of such sentiments.

For many families, compulsory school attendance proved a severe hardship. Particularly in the case of women, this requirement disrupted the family work pattern. Mothers, who were expected to care for their children, complete domestic chores, as well as assume responsibility for the planting and harvesting of rice, were deprived of the full-time assistance of their young, unmarried daughters. The Constabulary arrested and extracted free labour from those parents who were unwilling to send their children to school.

Other ordinances (Claveria 1964) enacted by the American administration included the following: the payment of a road tax by each family head through the contribution of his labour in the construction of horse trails, the cultivation by each family of at least 100 coffee trees, the building of an outside toilet for each permanent residence, a compulsory smallpox inoculation, and the contribution of materials and time to the building and maintenance of *barrio* schools. With negligible success, the authorities also tried to encourage the people to change from dry rice to the more productive "wet rice" cultivation.

During his residence in Kabugao, Father Vanoverbergh (1936:82) found that the Isneg were reluctant to comply with these new restrictions.

> It is true that actually the Government often interferes with the native customs of the Isneg, and in many cases it could not very well do otherwise, but the latter consider it as alien and regard its ways as entirely contrary to their traditions; they would most certainly like to get rid of it at the first opportunity. The Isneg submit of course, as the constabulary is supposed to be mostly wide awake, but they generally do so very reluctantly and often under protest; occasionally they even disobey, and sometimes not without reason, especially in cases of interference with their traditional family life.

In 1919, the first Ilocano shopkeeper set up business in Kabugao and, six years later, a Belgian order of Catholic fathers opened their Kabugao mission. In that same year, the Apayao Christian Mission Society, a Protestant organization in Laoag, sent permanent workers to Namaltugan and Bayag. Although these 20th century missionaries did not have to confront the open hostility faced by the early Spanish fathers, their endeavours have been retarded by Apayao's widely dispersed population and extremely rugged physical conditions. Slippery mountain trails, and rivers which often reach flood level within a few hours, make travelling dangerous. The climate is unhealthy and one report (Vandaele 1953) from the Kabugao mission complained that "their cottages were so frail that they even trembled whenever a father was attacked with malaria." Vanoverbergh (1932:54) wryly noted, "If Apayao may be

called a paradise, a further qualification is absolutely necessary: if it be Eden, it is Eden after the Fall."

During these early years, the sub-province of Apayao was divided into 7 municipal districts. In those municipalities where Isneg predominated, the Lieutenant Governor appointed them to the offices of president and councilor. An Ilocano was always chosen for the position of secretary-treasurer. The first president of Kabugao was Manel Rogrog, an old warrior who attended to his duties attired in an Isneg G-string. The representative from the *barrio* of Agingan was the renowned head-hunter, Lappas. In 1928, many of these offices were filled by general election. Although the sub-provincial officials were generally Ilocano, the inclusion of influential and tradition oriented Isneg at the local level may have deprived the *Manolay* cult of men, who, had they been excluded from *barrio* and municipal decisions, might have rallied a strong opposition to the new restrictions and provided the *Manolay* movement with a more effective leadership.

The 1930's offered no new environmental condition to which the appearance of the Manolay cult can be directly linked.[18] Despite the obstacles encountered in the supervision of a widely scattered population, the Constabulary continued their enforcement of the new restrictions. As men from the different Apayao regions were trading and working on public projects in Kabugao, peace-pacts were arranged to discourage a renewal of the old rivalries. A few Isneg elementary school students, including one from Kabuwan and one from Agingan, were given government scholarships to complete their high school training outside Apayao. The World Depression had no serious repercussions in Kabugao, as the salaries of the teachers and the soldiers as well as the price of tobacco were unaffected. Locust swarms devastated the rice crops in a few regions and there was a fairly widespread, but not acute, food shortage.

Only one incident can be traced to the outbreak of cult activity, and that was the appearance of a female *Manolay* prophet in the hamlet cluster of Madduang on the Dagara River. It was reported that she travelled from region to region, urging a stricter observation of the old customs. *Manolay* celebrations usually followed her arrival in a settlement. The restrictions and dissatisfactions accumulated over some twenty years of American administration had, in conjunction with the dislocations associated with natural disasters like epidemics and famine, paved the way, in my opinion, for the sudden spread of her convictions through the Isneg districts of the sub-province.[19]

[18] This observation is based solely on informants' reports. All municipal records for the period 1928-1941 were burned, following the Japanese occupation of Kabugao.

[19] I have not, as yet, been able to locate a report on cult activity along the Matalag River in the municipality of Conner.

The outbreak of the Second World War coincided with a decline in cult activity. Kabugao was occupied for a year by a Japanese regiment and the Isneg were called upon to supply the invaders with rice and livestock. During this time, an Isneg guerilla force was organized under a U.S. Army captain who had escaped the American surrender on Bataan. Although little fighting ocurred in Apayao iself, a number of Isneg fought with the American and Philippine forces in the Cagayan valley and in the mountains to the south. These wartime disruptions provided an important diversion to *Manolay* beliefs and practices.

Immediately following the war, the Philippines gained political independence from the United States. In 1948, Rev. Louis Saunders of an evangelical Protestant sect, The Disciples of Christ, opened Kabugao's first high school, the Apayao Christian Academy. Two years later, church rivalry prompted the Catholic mission to start its own high school, Our Blessed Lady of Lourdes. A 1948 Deputy Governor's Report summarized the impact of the missions and the schools.

> With the group of old men and women, their traditional customs are strictly adhered, as in marriage ceremony, death and burial and superstitious beliefs in any undertaking. The younger generations presently adopt distinct change of living conditions achieved through contact with the Christian elements and educational instruction in the schools.

A number of army veterans completed a high school diploma and teaching certificate on the G.I. Bill of Rights. The war years also awakened Isneg men to opportunities in outside employment such as mining, plantation work, schools, government offices and the Philippine Armed Forces and Constabulary. While not eliminating the possibility of a revival of *Manolay* activity, the presence of these more widely experienced and literate individuals would have restricted the movement's reliance on the ultra-conservative ideology espoused in the pre-war *Manolay* cult.

As Apayao is a vast, sparsely populated sub-province, its needs have been neglected by the various post-war Philippine administrations. As yet, there is no hospital or even qualified doctor in the mountains. No government incentives have been provided to increase or change agricultural production. The road, started from the lowlands 42 years ago, is still a full day's hike from Kabugao. During the last two decades, the slow pace of change has allowed for social adjustments relatively free of the millenarian sentiments characteristic of the *Manolay* period.[20]

[20] Father Leo van der Winkle of the Kabugao mission told me of one isolated hamlet near Bayag where the residents still observe *Manolay* ritual. Their leader is known as "King of the Manolay." They believe that, after death, the human spirit becomes an *anito* which, at certain celebrations, returns to visit the living. Their activities did not, to his knowledge, include a millenarian expectation.

Ideological Context

The ideology of the *Manolay* cult was almost exclusively derived from the profusion of conceptually unrelated "representations" which occupy what might be termed the "invisible world" of the Isneg. In this realm one finds stories and beliefs about the culture heroes like *Bangkilat*, the people in *Untò* (a place somewhere over the sky), a variety of *anito* (nature spirits), *balangobang* (partially decomposed corpses which return for visits within a few weeks after burial), *kaduduwa* (the invisible form of the human spirit after death), *Kutau:* (the spirit who stands at the entrance to the realm of the dead), *kanyau:* (prohibitions that must be observed to prevent misfortune) and a variety of omens, portending good luck or impending disaster. These conceptions were and, to a lesser degree, still are relied on for warning, protection, explanation, entertainment, and assistance in a number of different social contexts.

For example, *kanyau:* apply to almost every activity but, are observed most strictly during the rice harvest. At this time, men do not cut firewood for fear that the harvest may also be cut down by either a typhoon or the wild pigs. Families do not visit each other during the first week of harvest. The most important *kanyau:* surround the activities of the *manggáyat* (the woman who ritually harvests the first rice in each field). The *manggáyat* will not clean a *kandero* (cooking pot), as the rice birds will eat the harvest. She must not eat from a slippery, glazed plate, as it is believed that the rice would be difficult to hold. The *manggáyat* should not eat *bagoong* (a rotten fish delicacy that is bottled in the lowlands). If she were to eat this fish, her feet, like the *bagoong*, would acquire a bad odour and become too painful for her to continue with the harvest.

Unlike the other Cordillera peoples, the Isneg do not have "deities" in their religious pantheon. Their "invisible world" is, on the other hand, populated by a multitude of *anito*. During a *balásang* (cooperative work party), the pig or dog meat, supplied by the host, is usually shared with the *Pilay* (spirits of the rice). In cases of sickness, childlessness, and feasting, the local *anito*, residing in nearby rocks, trees, and streams, are invited to possess the *galiopag* (female spirit mediums). At these times, the *anito* may advise a remedy for the illness or chastise the people for their forgetfulness. During the headhunting era, the local spirits were believed to protect the community. Others accompanied the warriors on their raids. At feasts today, when a pig or dog is butchered, some of the blood along with *basi* (sugar cane wine) is set aside for the *anito*.

An important feature of Isneg supernatural belief is its emphasis on locality. Each settlement, and each individual hamlet is inhabited

by a unique assortment of *anito*. The more distinctive parts of the local landscape and the practice of certain social customs are related to the actions of an *anito* or a legendary figure associated with that particular region. The local character of these myths and religious images may, in part, account for the uneven appeal of *Manolay* ritual in the various Apayao settlements. A truly inter-regional cult ideology did not develop.

Among the "representations" available in the Isneg "invisible world", the *Untò* stories assumed a central position in Manolay ideology. The themes, stressed in the *Untò* narratives, date back to early Spanish and probably pre-Spanish times. The most prominent *Manolay* beliefs are reflected in the *Untò* stories. These conceptions were, of course, in the context of the *Manolay* cult distorted and modified to substantiate the "reality" of the approaching millennium.

Untò, like Apayao, was divided into a number of friendly and hostile hamlet clusters but, unlike Apayao, these settlements were inhabited by very weird and wonderful people whose interests were focused primarily on headhunting, courting, and feasting. Some *Untò* people, like *Baliling*, were rich. The roof of *Baliling's* house, for example, was made of honey bees; its walls were the wings of *babuyan* birds, and the floor was composed of row upon row of the most valuable beads. Other characters in *Untò* were exceptionally greedy, beautiful or brave. *Gonay* was a girl of ravishing beauty — except that her feet were like those of a deer. Whenever *Gonay* danced, her hooves destroyed the bamboo floor. *Edul*, another *Untò* figure, used human excrement for hair oil and camote tops for perfume. When *Edul* courted a lady, he would ask her if she liked the way he smelled. The young ladies were forced to reply in the affirmative for fear that *Edul* might cut them with his *aliwa* (head axe).

During the fieldwork period, I recorded many stories about *Untò*. For this paper, I have selected four short excerpts, containing elements which were incorporated into the *Manolay* ideology. The first selection relates how the people in Kabuwan first learned about *Untò*. The second tells about *Enoy's* theft of the invincible spirit, *Kindingan*, whom the people sought to retrieve during the *Manolay* celebrations. The last two stories describe magical powers which, during the *Manolay* period, the Kabuwan and Agingan people hoped that, like their *Untò* counterparts, they too could possess.

The Coming of Inhanungan

Inhanungan, with one nipple over her heart, came down from *Untò*. She told a long story about *Enoy, Eyu, Patungágan* and other *Untò* people. She said that, if she finished her story, the people in Kabuwan could talk about *Untò* only when they *agsayam* (make a feast). Basingallan, a

very wise man, grabbed the nipple of *Inhanungan*. When she tried to hide it under her arm or behind her back, Basingallan would see it and grab it. *Inhanungan* grew tired of hiding her nipple and so she returned to *Untò* without finishing her story. For this reason, the people can now tell the Untò story anytime, without needing to butcher a pig and a dog, which would be a great hardship.

Enoy and the Kindingan

After the flood, *Enoy* (the principal character in the Kabuwan *Untò* stories) came down to Kabuwan.[21] He was accompanied by *Patungágan, Ohà*, and *Eyu*. Upon their arrival, they made a *peldap* (small feast) on a large rock in Gunidan.[22] Near the rock, the stream was very noisy, but when *Patungágan* scolded it saying, "Samyu!" (You are noisy!), the rapids became calm. At this feast *Enoy* became jealous of the *kindingan* (the powerful spirit of Kabuwan which enable one man fearlessly to fight and single-handedly to kill all the people in an enemy hamlet). *Enoy's* own spirit, *Ambongan*, was very greedy and gave *Enoy* no rest. *Enoy* had always to share his food with the hungry *Ambongan*. He, therefore, decided to exchange *Ambongan* for *Kindingan*. *Enoy* dropped *Ambongan* near the settlement of Dagara and went back to *Untò* with the *Kindingan* inside a *balitu* (small white squash), which he decorated red, blue, and white like a native shirt.[23] He also took the *Tahahogay* (a tree which bears beautiful beads as its fruit) and the *Sumpaga* (ever-lasting flowers). Upon his return, *Enoy*, with the aid of *Kindingan*, was able to fight and kill many people in *Untò*.

Eyu and Gamog

At night, *Enoy* would court *Eyu*, the daughter of *Patungágan*, and, as he sat near her sleeping mat, he would offer her *boyo* (a mixture of betel nut, lime and *gawad* leaves which, when chewed, acts as a mild stimulant). If *Eyu* took the *boyo*, it meant that she would accept *Enoy's*

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[21] This reference to a flood concerns a story about the origin of the Kabuwan people. During a great deluge a few people, the ancestors of the present population, were able to escape by taking refuge on Mt. Wayan, the highest mountain in the vicinity. Flood tales are common to most of the Cordillera peoples and are also an important folk motif among the Atayal of Formosa (See Edward Norbeck *Folklore of the Atayal of Formosa and the Mountain Tribes of Luzon* [University of Michigan], p. 7.)

[22] I have hiked out to this rock. On its top there is a large, circular indentation which is said to be *Enoy's gansa* (dance gong) that he played during his visit to Gunidan. A long, slender vein of quartz crosses the rock. This vein was the *abag* (male G-string) of *Patungagan*.

[23] At present, *Ambongan* is said to reside in a large rock near the Isneg settlement area of Dagara. The greedy *Ambongan* is held responsible for heavy rains and flash floods and, if the Dagara people do not place sufficient food and corn at the base of this stone, the rain will not stop and the rivers will remain impassable. It was reported that, when a Catholic priest visited the rock of *Ambongan*, he became very sick.

love; if she did not take the *boyo*, she would subsequently reject him. *Enoy* also courted *Umlaw*. But, in the case of *Umlaw*, when *Enoy* returned from a raid with enemy heads and wanted to *agsayam*, *Umlaw* was forced to exchange all their valuable beads and jars for sufficient rice and *basi* to feed the people. *Eyu*, on the other hand, had *gamog* (the power to conceive of and simultaneously to experience the fulfilment of a material wish). When *Eyu* gave rice and *basi* to one person, everyone received food and drink. When feasting at the house of *Eyu*, *Enoy* could invite all the people from the neighbouring *Untò* settlements of *Sibsibbi*, *Dagapan*, and *Katabakuwan*. At these celebrations, *Enoy* would get drunk and go again to court *Umlaw*. *Eyu* would get angry and so would *Enoy*. *Enoy* would separate from her, but, as he could never find another woman like her, he would always marry *Eyu* again.[24]

Enoy and Manolay

Baliling gave *Enoy* a wonderful *alíwa* (head axe). With this weapon, *Enoy* was able to kill all the people in an enemy hamlet. When he struck their houses with the *alíwa*, they would burst into flame. *Enoy* would also set fire to the nearby river.[25] Although *Enoy* was the bravest and strongest man in *Untò*, he was sometimes defeated. His more successful opponents included *Egal* who, aided by an iron skin, was able to sleep comfortably in the middle of a fire and *Epngaw* who used to prepare *tuba* (a poison fruit used to stupefy fish) and, saying it was *basi*, gave it to *Enoy*. On such occasions, *Enoy* would die. But, if the people beat a *gansa* (dance gong) loudly near his head, *Enoy* was always able to *manolay* (return to life).

It must be emphasized that the narratives, which I have categorized as *Untò* stories, vary widely from region to region. Otto Scheerer (1928:421) collected a story about *Untò* in Talifugo, an Isneg settlement along the Matalag River. Yet, there are no references to *Untò* in the texts collected along the Apayao River by Vanoverbergh (1955) and Wilson (1947). However, in the course of my fieldwork, I found that the Apayao River people were conversant with this theme.

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[24] Vanoverbergh ("Religion and Magic among the Isneg," *Anthropos* 48 [1953]: 568) wrote about the power of *amúg*, which the school children translated as "miracle". It was said that the old shamans would *magamúg* (perform *amúg*) by dropping a single kernel of rice into a large cooking pot. After boiling, the pot would be filled to the brim with cooked rice. Norbeck (*Folklore*, p. 6) noted that the "magic appearance of food and the requisites for living" was a very widespread Luzon folk motif.

[25] As this story was being told, a Kabuwan woman asked me, "Do the American people have anyone who can burn water?" When I replied that they did not, she said, "We have people here who can do things that the Americans cannot do." At the time, I felt that her defensive attitude signalled a certain sense of inferiority regarding Isneg culture. In the 1950's, this type of discouragement may have been, in part, responsible for the Kabuwan commitment to the "reality" of *Enoy* and his abilities.

On the other hand, *Enoy* is a familiar figure in the folk tales translated by Vanoverbergh (1955:29, 65, 66, 80, 81, 82, 87, 105, 106, 107, 108, 131, 132), but, he does not appear in the lead role that he occupies in the Kabuwan stories. *Enoy's* name may, however, be a misleading indice as, even in Kabuwan, he is also known as *Tankilu, Dèwanan* or *Awagan;* while *Eyu* was sometimes called *Abaw, Kasingagan* or *Aginduwan.*

In his article, "Isneg Tales", Vanoverbergh (1955:27) translated the Isneg word, *manolay,* as "to make men". In another reference (1953:90), he spoke about the confidence which some Isneg have in the power of *manolay,* an ability which was, in the municipality of Bayag, possessed by the female spirit, *Bilunàyan.*

> *Bilunayan,* a female spirit, who lives in the sky and gives the power of making men (*manolay*) to people who are able to see her. She herself also resuscitates the dead, but a husband, for instance, whose wife comes back to life, finds her to be his sister. The Isneg believe in this power of making men, as may be seen from what happened to some Bayag men who, some years ago, went to *Pindayan,* a day's journey upstream from Bayag, in order to try their luck at this business. When their efforts proved futile, they started quarrelling and finally rushed at one another with their head-axes, leaving at least two men dead on the field.

These regional comparisons are further complicated by the wide scope existing for individual innovation. Informants stressed that each story teller modified the composition to suit his or her needs. Yet, despite the individual and regional variation in the Isneg oral tradition, underlying similarities of theme are readily apparent. The *Manolay* ideas about a magical appearance of food and drink, a sky world, and the resurrection of the dead appear in all regions. Edward Norbeck (1950:6-12) tabulated a number of such folktale themes which are shared throughout the Cordillera.

A noteworthy Isneg exception to the mythical and religious traditions of Luzon's mountain peoples is the absence of a creator-protector deity. Among the neighbouring Kalinga, Tinguian, and Bontoc, the deities, *Kabunian, Kadaklan* and *Lumawig,* command central positions in their respective religious pantheons. These figures, as William Henry Scott (1966:137) has pointed out, should not be considered as being similar to the monotheistic conception of a supreme deity. They share the stage with a whole host of ancestor and sky spirits.

These particular Cordillera concepts appear to have different derivations. *Kabunian,* for example, is a widely used classificatory term which in different parts of the mountains has a variety of meanings. According to Jules DeRaedt (1964:309), it may refer to "either the sky, as the abode of some of the deities, or to one or more of the higher deities, or to all spirits." Fred Eggan (194:1-18) felt that *Kadaklan* may have been mo-

delled on an Ilocano version of the Spanish deity, *Apo Dios*. On the other hand, there is good evidence (Scott 1966:142) to show that *Lumawig* is "a culture hero turned god." In old Cordillera myths, *Lumawig* has appeared in a variety of roles, as a hunter, a warrior, an ancestor spirit, "the first man to live in an area," and one among many inhabitants of a sky world. Formerly, *Lumawig* played an important part in head-hunting and, at present, is believed to be influential in the obtainment of a good harvest as well as in community welfare.

Among the Isneg, neither culture heroes like *Bangkilat* nor any of the *Untò* people have had such a consequential involvement in community life. In this respect, the *Manolay* doctrine, requiring the appearance of *Enoy* for the inauguration of the millennium, may have been a tentative step, similar in some respects to the deification of *Lumawig*, toward the formation of a deity-concept within the old mythical and religious framework. The story about the theft of the *Kindingan* may also have been a recent innovation, justifying *Enoy's* "new type" of participation in Kabuwan affairs as well as giving expression to a common revitalization theme, the discrepancy between a memory of former strength and a condition of relative deprivation.

Norman Cohn (1962:42) has suggested that the "promise of a future age of bliss" within the traditional religious world-view is an "indispensable basis for a millenarian faith". He continues,

> It seems that in societies — such as that of ancient Greece — where the religious world-view has no place for such fantasy, millenarism cannot develop. Where on the other hand such a fantasy is familiar it can sometimes be given the immediacy and particularity necessary to convert it into an effective millenarian ideology.

While not prominent in the *Untò* stories, such a "promise" appears in the Isneg belief about the journey and final state of the *kaduduwa* (the invisible form of the human spirit after death).

The Realm of Kutaw

When a person dies, *Kutaw* prepares his weapons. He hides dry leaves and *gansa* (dance gongs) in the sugar cane near his house. All *kaduduwa* must pass through the sugar cane of *Kutaw*. When *Kutaw's* dogs hear the rustle of the leaves and the rattle of the *gansa*, they bark. The daughter of *Kutaw*, *Magluma* (an Isneg word meaning "to rot"), comes to meet the recently arrived *kaduduwa*. Unless the *kaduduwa's* clothes are rotten, *Magluma* will not let it pass. She also looks to see if the *kaduduwa* is tattooed. If there is no tattoo, *Kutaw* cuts off the *kaduduwa's* arms, using them to stir a large pot of boiling *bayang* (meat or vegetable eaten with rice). *Kutaw* spears a person who has stolen property or courted another man's wife. Such a *kaduduwa* returns to

make his or her family sick. After sleeping a few years with *Magluma*, the *kaduduwa* enters the house of *Kutaw*, where it enjoys an ever-lasting *sayam*.

There are minor regional variations on this theme. Vanoverbergh (1938:227-236) described *Kutaw* as a boatman who transported *kaduduwa* across a great pond to *Aglalannawan*, the realm of the dead. Upon their arrival in *Aglalannawan*, a place known as *Tagtaggayan* in Bayag, the *kaduduwa* "live a happy life." Those persons not acceptable to *Kutaw* remain in a state of temporary privation on the far shore of the great pond. But eventually, according to Vanoverbergh (1938:231), "all *kaduduwa* in the end attain perfect bliss."

The widespread, although somewhat vague Isneg belief about the "happy life" of the kaduduwa appears to fulfill Cohn's condition, regarding the "promise of a future age of bliss" in the traditional religious world-view. It is often true that millenarian thinking is characterized by "fantasies of impending doom," belief in a catastrophe that will obliterate the old way of life. Interestingly enough, although Vanoverbergh (1953:91) found a Bayag prophecy about a universal deluge "in which all men and trees will perish," this type of prediction was not utilized by the Kabuwan adherents of the *Manolay* cult.

Manolay concepts like the resurrection of the dead, the coming of *Enoy*, and the advent of millennium bear a striking resemblance to parallel tenets in the Christian religion. In some situations investigators of religious movements have with some confidence, linked Christian proselytizing with the outbreak of millenarian sentiments. Certainly, in the case of the *Manolay* cult, the influence of the Catholic fathers in the Apayao foothills and the more intensive missionary contact during the American period cannot be overlooked or minimized. Yet, the obvious congruence of these *Manolay* ideas with the traditional Isneg systems of folklore and religion, as well as very early Spanish references like Diego Aduarte's 1640 description (Keesing 1962:189) of an Isneg belief that "their deceased fathers and ancestors must return to life in this world," lend convincing support to a position which reduces the direct impact of Christian teaching and stresses the importance of pre-Spanish traditions in the development of the *Manolay* ideology.

At the same time, it is most difficult to assess the "indirect effect" of mission work on the Isneg. Mircea Eliade (1962:139-143) has made the point that, in Christianity, people "rediscover" their old eschatological myths. Christian prophecies like those that tell of the imminent arrival of Christ, the resurrection of the dead, and an everlasting life in the Kingdom of Heaven awaken in them "the most profound echo", leading to a renewed interest in the millenarian elements which, in the case of the Isneg, were available in their traditional religious system.

The Spread of the Manolay Cult

During the years immediately preceding the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, the *Manolay* cult appeared in most Isneg settlements. Reports on the length of *Manolay* observances in different regions vary from three weeks to one year. These *Manolay* celebrations were marked by continuous feasting and dancing, at which time efforts were made by the spirit mediums to communicate with the *Unto* people.

In the Apayao River settlement of Tawit, it was said people beat their drums until the earth started to bleed. Unfortunately, a small boy sneezed (sneezing is a bad omen) and the bleeding stopped. An informant from the hamlet cluster of Magapta claimed that he put a firecracker under the house in which a *Manolay* feast was in progress. Following the explosion, the old shaman died but she was able to *manolay* (return to life), when, as in the example set by *Enoy*, the *gansa* were beaten near her head.

One of the first *Manolay* prophets was an old woman from the *situo* of Madduwang, north of Dagara. She urged the observation of the old *kanyaw* and predicted the arrival of the *Unto* people with the magical powers of *manolay* and *gamog*. While some people conscientiously obeyed her instructions; others attended the meetings simply to satisfy their curiosity. Another group regarded cult activity as "superstition" and refused to take part in the ritual. To my knowledge, in no other settlement did cult commitment reach the degree of unanimity found in Kabuwan.

In conformity with the old religious traditions, women played an important part in the articulatioin of *Manolay* aims and goals. To a greater extent than men, who had, by contrast, an opportunity for participation in the new social order, the female shamans may have felt threatened by the growing indifference toward the old beliefs and values. Even during the Spanish period, these women resisted religious change. Diego Aduarte (Keesing 1962b:247) has recorded the great animosity with which the "priestesses" greeted the arrival of the Spanish missionaries. The conservatism of the *Manolay* ideology may, in part, be attributed to their leadership.

In some instances, a profit motive may have been associated with *Manolay* ritual. When people joined the cult, they were, in a few regions, expected to give some form of property like a Chinese plate or an Ilocano blanket. This is also the custom when a *gahopag* (spirit medium) performs a curing rite. Nevertheless, it was reported that certain *Manolay* leaders were able to amass a considerable amount of property.

One informant from Agingan told about a *Manolay* meeting in Musimut.In this case, the shaman waved a handkerchief and suddenly

produced a valuable string of beads, supposedly plucked from the *Tahahogay*, an *Unto* tree on which beads grow like fruit. The woman asked if anyone would buy the beads. When no one offered, she said, "I will return these beads to the *Unto* people" and the beads disappeared. Magical performances such as this one convinced many people of the power of the cult. At the time, my informant said that he believed he himself might become a young bachelor again.

The spirit mediums insisted that the *Manolay* beliefs were more powerful than Christianity. The *Unto* stories helped to substantiate this claim. During the *Manolay* celebrations all participants were given and used the names of the *Unto* people. This requirement was an obvious counterpoise to Christian baptism ritual; for, by this time, a number of Isneg had been baptised and many more had been given or had assumed a Christian name. In their description of the spread of the cult, informants sometimes referred to the shamans as "priests" and the *Manolay* meetings as "services". One man said, "It was just like Christianity, only the old woman didn't have a Bible".

From such remarks, it could be inferred that the *Manolay* cult represented, for many Isneg, an indigenous alternative to the teachings of the Catholic fathers. Participation in the cult helped to counter some of the status resentments experienced in their relationships with the Catholic and Protestant missionaries as well as with the Ilocano administrators, soldiers, and school teachers. Although the *Manolay* cult was not distinguished by an explicitly anti-foreign program, such descriptions, along with requirements like the wearing of the traditional *abag* (male G-string), are suggestive of the conflicts which account for its appearance.

The conspicuous absence of syncretic or vitalistic elements in the cult's ideology and ritual also lends support to this interpretation. Unlike the *Sapilada* movement, there were no flag poles, military drill, prayers, or written commandments. There was a renewed interest in, rather than a rejection of, the older supposedly "pagan" practices. This fact, in my opinion, points to a conscious exclusion of alien elements, the success of which is indicative of the relatively short period that the Isneg had been subject to intensive alien contact.

The Kabuwan Cult

The initial outbreak of *Manolay* activity in Kabuwan was spontaneous and not directly stimulated by an outside prophet. During a *sayam*, the people heard the sound of a falling coconut tree. Suddenly, a young lady named Pilarateg began to *mamilpig* (shake due to spirit possession). She spoke with the voice of a spirit, saying, "I am *Kindingan*". *Kindingan*, as noted earlier, was the powerful spirit stolen

from the people of Kabuwan by *Enoy*. Pilarateg advise the people to kill a dog and a pig, drink *basi,* and eat rice. There would be, she said, no need to harvest the rice, as soon they would be endowed with the power of *gamog*. If rice were required, they need only say, "We want rice" and it would appear.

From the time of the possession of Pilarateg, feasting and spirit communication continued in Kabuwan for two years. At the evening celebrations, each family would contribute a share from the surplus rice in their granary. The unharvested rice was left to rot in the mountain fields. Children were prohibited by their parents from attending the small primary school in Agingan.

On a few occasions, the Kabuwan people hiked out to Gunidan in the hope of wresting *Enoy's gansa* and *Patungagan's abag* from the rock, described earlier in this paper. Countless animals were butchered at Gunidan and people, holding roosters over their heads, danced in circles, entreating *Enoy* to bring back the *Kindingan*. Rituals were also performed at other meaningful sites around Kabuwan. Such activities demonstrate how closely the *Manolay* cult was bound to local environment and belief.

A sharpened bamboo fortification, similar in many respects to those built before pacification, was erected on the path leading to Kabuwan.[26] Heavy stones, which would be released at the touch of a rattan trigger, were suspended over the hamlet's entrance. Kabuwan men fashioned *kalasag* (wooden shields) and, as some felt possessed by *Kindingan,* they planned to raid a Matalag River settlement. Five attempts were made to leave Kabuwan, but, on each occasion, a *balsit* bird was seen flying from right to left (a very bad omen) and the men returned. As preparation for headhunting was not, to my knowledge, typical of the *Manolay* cult in the Apayao River settlements, its appearance in Kabuwan signals a lingering Isneg interest in inter-community warfare and hints at a causal relationship between the elimination of this form of alien opposition and the "sense of blockage" which gave rise to the millenarian wish.

Although work in the rice fields did not stop, there were also *Manolay* celebrations in the neighbouring settlement of Agingan. At one stage, the father of the present school teacher organized a feast at which a white pig, a white dog, and a white rooster were killed. Blankets were hung over rattan and bamboo supports, forming an enclosed corridor between the participating houses. *Enoy* was invited, but, as a small child sneezed (a bad omen), he did not come. It was said that should *Enoy* arrive, all non-believers would be changed into animals. Such negative inducements are indicative of the lack of

[26] Informants reported that fortification-building was not the custom of the Apayao River Isneg.

consensus which, in fact, typified the *Manolay* commitment in many Isneg *barrio*.

Government and school officials attempted to suppress the cult. As the children did not attend classes, the Agingan school teacher, an Ilocano, had to go to Kabuwan to fetch them. He shot down the stones suspended over the hamlet's entrance. Later, the Philippine Constabulary investigated cult activity in Kabuwan and the men from this community had to report in Kabugao to the municipal mayor's office for interrogation and the usual punishment, contribution of free labour on a municipal project.

The end of the Kabuwan cult seemed to approximate closely the outbreak of the war. At this time, a number of Kabuwan families were in need of food and men were forced to work for sustenance in the fields of their Agingan neighbours. Since then, there has been no sustained renewal of *Manolay* beliefs, although spirit communication continues and, at night, stories are still told about the *Unto* people.

Summary

The aim of this paper has been to describe the content and context of the *Manolay* cult and, at the same time, to suggest those events and socio-cultural relationships which were most relevant to the cult's genesis and eventual dissolution. With some reservation, it was decided to use a "revitalization movement" framework for analysis. Within this context, the *Manolay* cult appears to have evolved primarily as a response to the confusion and restriction that the Isneg exprienced during the American administration of Apayao. The suppression of inter-community warfare, for example, eliminated a hitherto successful method for resisting alien interference. Headhunting was also a cornerstone of Isneg expressive culture and the rationale underlying their political structure. Defeat and supervision by a constabulary of lowland soldiers, compulsory school attendance, and the payment of taxes through the provision of free labour on municipal roads and trails further challenged the status conceptions of a formerly highly independent people. Attacks on the local beliefs and "superstitions" by the self-assured Ilocano school teachers and Christian missionaries highlighted the inadequacies in the old life style. At the same time, many Isneg had only a hesitant and incomplete comprehension of the satisfactions available in the new system. Throughout this period of change, they faced the usual environmental harassments of sickness, epidemic, and famine. The *Manolay* ideology justified, if only temporarily, their removal from these uncomfortable circumstances.

On the other hand, the so-called "deprivations" of the American period should not be over-emphasized. Except in the more isolated

Isneg settlements, commitment to the *Manolay* cult was, in fact, both irregular and short-lived. The "sense of blockage", prompting the cult's evolution, may have been tempered by such considerations as the receptivity of the younger genration to mission aned school teachings, the long Isneg experience with alien ideas, the environmental restraints limiting close constabulary supervision, the relatively liberal and unexploitive character of American control, and the initiative granted to influential Isneg in the enactment and enforcement of the new restrictions. The war experience terminated the cult's remaining appeal.

At no time were the Isneg confronted with an acute awareness of their material disadvantage. Indigenous labour and resources were not, as in parts of the world where millenarian movements have flourished, subsided, and reappeared, callously exploited to the profit of the outsider. The continued efficacy of dry rice cultivation preserved the economic independence of the conjugal family. Small scale coffee and tobacco production allowed the purchase of foodstuffs, clothing, and certain manufactured goods from the Ilocano shopkeepers in Kabugao. Unfortunately, the social consequences of the shift to a more efficient, market-oriented mode of agricultural production, still face the Isneg.

The consequently "mild millenarian climate" triggered cult commitments of varying intensity. In Kabuwan, the cult continued for two years, while, in Magapta, an Apayao River settlement, the interest in *Manolay* celebrations waned after a few months. Earlier in this paper, I suggested that the political "marginality" of the Agingan region, prompted by its former hostility toward the Apayao River people, their exclusion from Apayao River boat travel, and closer linguistic and ethnic ties with the Matalag River Isneg, played a part in the duration, vigour and locality-emphasis of the Kabuwan cult.

However, the regional framework for analysis, while heuristic on one level, does not adequately account for the differences in cult activity between the neighbouring hamlet clusters of Kabuwan and Agingan. This dissimilarity highlights the potential for divergent social development in one Isneg region. Diverse origins, a relative population increase, and a history of more extensive interaction both along the Apayao River outside Apayao (Tables I, Ia, II, and III), helped to equip the Agingan people with greater social confidence and a more flexible world-view. In contrast, the Kabuwan people were socially isolated, introspective and conservative. Such attitudes could have exaggerated the "sense of blockage" responsible for their prolonged religious experimentation.

The absence of intensive alien contact during the Spanish period as well as a conscious exclusion of Ilocano, Spanish and American influence accounts, in part, for the preponderance of indigenous symbols in the *Manolay* ideology. In this respect, the *Manolay* cult contrasts with

the "accommodative" *Sapilada* sect in the Central Cordillera and the "vitalistic" *Guardia de Honor* in the lowland Ilocos provinces. Continued regional autonomy and the leadership of female shamans also restricted developments in this direction.

Finally, a dilemma similar to that which faced the Isneg during the American administration of Apayao need not necessarily give way to millenarian activity. Yet, traditional beliefs in the return of the ancestors, the extraordinary powers of *manolay* and *gamog*, and the prospects of an everlasting *sayam* at the house of *Kutaw*, gave "immediacy" and "reality" to this type of vision. It is possible that the Isneg experience with Christianity awakened their interest in the millenarian aspects of their own religious thought.

The social, political, and economic diversity of northern Luzon's mountain populations and their differential exposure to alien contact offer a unique opportunity for ethnographers to record and compare the subtle relationships between religious commitment and social change. In such circumstances, underlying patterns of thought, not readily available for observation, are sometimes quite dramatically revealed. Recent studies in this area by Edward Dozier (1966), Jules DeRaedt (1964), Fred Eggan and Alfredo Pacyaya (1962), Phyllis Flattery (1968) and William Henry Scott (1966) demonstrate the exciting potential for continued research on this subject. It is hoped that this account of the *Manolay* cult will stimulate further perspectives in the description of the sociocultural dynamics of the Cordillera peoples.

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A PROTO-POLITICAL PEASANT MOVEMENT IN THE SPANISH PHILIPPINES: THE *COFRADIA DE SAN JOSE* AND THE TAYABAS REBELLION OF 1841 *

DAVID SWEET

A LOOK AT THE STANDARD TEXTBOOKS OF PHILIPPINE HISTORY CAN GIVE an unwary reader the idea that it all really began with the Cavite Mutiny of 1872. The history of the Islands before that time is barely sketched in — the lifeless annals of bureaucracy in an insignificant backwater of the Spanish Empire. It is a history in which Filipinos rarely make an appearance, and which is therefore apparently not thought to be a subject of much potential interest to Filipino students today. This is unfortunate, if history is important for filling in the details of a national self-conception and self-respect, because it leaves the Filipino people with very little of it. There are presumably people still alive today who were growing up at the time of the Cavite Mutiny.

There was, of course, a great deal of Filipino history before 1872, and even before the arrival of Spanish colonialism with Legaspi in 1571.[1] The problem for social historians is how to write the Filipinos, and in particular the Filipino peasants (the great majority of Filipinos at any time in history), into it. This is a difficult task, because of the scarcity of archival resources and the primitive stage of such auxiliary studies as the history of land use, historical archeology and historical demography. But there are some elementary jobs of conventional historical research which can be done with materials available in libraries, and which ought to be done as soon as possible to lay the ground for more ambitious projects.

The easy way to "write the peasants into history" is to write about their revolts, those brief moments in which the inarticulate and unnoticed "objects" of history become its outspoken and undeniable subjects. There are documents concerning such events. Rebellions, or at least the problems of suppressing them, were matters the colonial

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* This is the second draft of an article intended for publication. I will be very grateful if readers can find the time to return to me in writing their detailed criticisms and suggestions regarding any aspect of it.

[1] A useful introduction to the colonial secondary literature on Philippine revolts is [Pedro Murillo Velarde, et al.] "Insurrections by Filipinos in the Seventeenth Century," in Blair & Robertson, *The Philippine Islands*, Vol. 38, pp. 87-240. See also the index to the same series under "Insurrections" in Vol. 54.


SOUTH CENTRAL LUZON CA.1840
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MANILA BAY
PASIG
LAMON BAY
LAGUNA DE BAY
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MT. BANAHAW
LUCBAN
S. PABLO
MT. SAN CRISTOBAL
ALITAO
TAYABAS
PAGBILAO
LAGUNA DE TAAL
TIAONG
SARIAYA
ISABANG
TAYABAS
BATANGAS
TAYABAS BAY
MINDORO
MARINDUQUE
0 5 10 15 20

authorities usually took the trouble to write reports about. Unlike most of the doings of peasants, moreover, revolts were unique events with causes and implications for the future which can be speculated about today by a historian with a conventional kit of concepts. A case in point is the violent outbreak which took place in the southern part of the Province of Tayabas (Quezon) in 1841, under the leadership of a charismatic Tagalog religious leader named Apolinario de la Cruz.

Apolinario is mentioned briefly in the standard histories, as a distant precursor of the 1896 Revolution; but whereas the Spanish colonial historians expanded considerably upon his career as a dangerous aberration and threat to the public order, more recent writers have been content to characterize it as little more than a curiosity. The story of the Tayabas rebellion merits closer examination and more sympathetic analysis than it has received. It is a story which is full of indications that even in the "dark ages" of the Colony, the Filipino people had a dynamic cultural and institutional life of their own, in which the processes of social change operated to a considerable degree independently of the projects and purposes of the Spanish authorities.

The Philippine Islands have a rich tradition of "primitive rebellion"[2] dating from the sporadic anti-colonial revolts of the 17th and 18th centuries, which includes a variety of millenarian manifestations and widespread banditry, and culminates in the well-known 20th-century movements of the Aglipayan Church, Sakdalism and the Hukbalahap guerrillas. Most of this activity seems to have been concentrated in the tenant-farmed "rice bowl" of central Luzon, in the overpopulated coastal plain of Ilocos, and in the frontier areas of northern Luzon and Mindanao. The movement with which this study is concerned took place, however, in a region which had neither an oppressed landless peasantry nor a pagan or Muslim population resisting the inroads of Christianity and modernization — a region which has at no other time in history been distinguished as a focus of popular resistance.

Southern Tayabas and Laguna provinces are located in the mountainous region of south central Luzon, to the south and east of the Laguna

[2] "Primitive rebels" is the term applied by Eric Hobsbawm in a book with the same title (Manchester, 1959) to a variety of proto-revolutionary popular resistance movements in pre-modern Europe, ranging from banditry through millennialism to Luddite machine-wrecking. It is in no sense derogatory, and on the contrary implied movements which are rational and progressive in essence, however "unrealistic" they may appear in their goals or the means chosen to achieve them.

[3] There is some question about the existence of important bandit activity in Tayabas. David Sturtevant includes neither Tayabas nor Laguna in his list of the main *tulisán* areas of the 19th century. "Philippine Social Structure and Its Relation to Agrarian Unrest" (unpub. Ph.D. Stanford, 1958), pp. 111-12. Another writer suggests, however, that there were enough bandits on the slopes of Mounts San Cristóbal and Banahao between Laguna and Tayabas to justify the construction of a military post for protection against them (at Tambalan, near Majayjay) in 1833. Juan Palazón, *Majayjay (How a Town Came into Being)* (Manila, 1964), p. 179.

de Bay (see map at end of paper). In the period with which we are concerned, their Tagalog-speaking inhabitants were for the most part hard-working peasant proprietors, growing dry rice on tiny hill farms and reasonably prosperous. There was a rich tradition of cooperative activity and communal recreation through *turmuhan* spontaneous work groups, the tightly-knit extended family and *compadrazgo* networks. The region was relatively underpopulated, and free of the exploitative systems of absentee landlordism and debt-bondage to *caciques* which were beginning to establish themselves on the central plain. Unlike the farmers of the Cagayan Valley tobacco country, they were free of any obligation to produce specific crops for delivery to an abusive government monopoly. There were no extensive "friar lands." The peasants raised cattle and grew some wheat and maize, cacao, coffee, sugar cane, coconuts and fruits and vegetables in addition to rice; they engaged in small-scale cottage industry and exported limited quantities of grain and other produce to the larger towns of the vicinity. Transportation was exceedingly difficult, however, since the few roads were impassable in the long rainy season. The markets for most products were at a great distance, and road tolls were prohibitively high. The result was that there was not much profitable commerce outside the region. [4]

The principal complaints of these peasants in the early 19th century seem to have been forced labor and taxes, and a series of annoying rather than truly oppressive government economic regulations. There were small obligatory deliveries of produce for the maintenance of civil and ecclesiastical officials, which were paid for at fixed rates which took no account of fluctuations in market value — or which might not be paid for at all. A conflict between Spanish and traditional land law meant that people were discouraged from clearing the land for cultivation, and that cleared land might be abandoned and reclaimed by the forest because of the uncertainty of Western-style title to it. It is possible that on a small scale Tayabas was expriencing the breakdown of communal land rights and incursion of private property which has contributed so mightily to the exacerbation of rural social tensions in Latin America during the past century (e.g. Mexico beginning in the 1860's). An old prohibition of the killing of cows and carabaos

[4] Fray Bartolomé Galán. "Informe sobre la provincia de Tayabas" (1823). (Ms. in Newberry Library, Chicago). For the contrast between this situation and that prevailing in Central Luzon, see the good summary of the socio-economic system of the latter area during the 19th century in Sturtevant, "Philippine Social Structure...," pp. 85-104. Notes on the communal traditions of the Tagalogs in Sturtevant, pp. 38-39. The population of the province must have been about 32,000. A compilation of fragmentary census data gives 54,000 for Tayabas in 1877, when it contained about 1% of the total population of the Islands. In 1840, the total population was 3,219,000. José Montero y Vidal, *Historia general de Filipinas desde el descubrimiento de dichas islas hasta nuestros dias*, Vol. 3 (Madrid, 1895), p. 156.

(dating from the time when cattle were being introduced into the Islands) discouraged people from breeding any but beef cattle — with the result that the carabaos indispensable for cultivation were so expensive that the poorer peasants could not afford them. [5]

An additional irritant in the early 1840's was the government's determined effort to oblige all Filipinos to adopt regular surnames for administrative purposes. The Tagalogs had been made to abandon their Tagalog surnames when converted to Christianity in the 17th and 17th centuries, and had since taken to using Christian saints' names, or words from the liturgical vocabulary, indiscriminately fore and aft. The same names might be used by members of different families, and different names within the same family, which was confusing to the authorities. [6]

The peasants of Tayabas and Laguna, like all other adult rural Filipinos in those days (except the perhaps five per cent who were *cabezas de barangay* or *gobernadorcillos* and their families, retired soldiers, more than sixty years of age, or descended from individuals granted exemptions for outstanding service to the colonial regime), were subject to an elaborate set of taxes, levied annualy upon each nuclear family and payable in cash or in kind: ten *reales* in tribute or poll-tax; one *real* in tithe (*diezmo predial*) for the maintenance of the Church hierarchy (virtually a branch of the government in the Spanish colonies); three *reales* in church dues (*sanctorum*) for the maintenance of the local priest and church building; one real for the village treasury (*caja de comunidad*); and 40 days of labor service (*polo*), remissable for 3 pesos (24 reales). [7] In addition, labor service might be exacted by the village priest whenever he chose — and the priest might have the peasant who protested against any such arbitrary imposition flogged publicly. [8] The total tax burden of nearly five pesos must have re-

[5] Galán, who claims that peasants without carabao might be driven to stealing to support their families. Juan de Plasencia noted in the 16th century that Tagalog farmers who cleared land were entitled to the harvests taken from it, whether or not they were members of the barangay to which the land belonged. This traditional law was gradually giving away even then to Spanish notions of private property in land. "Customs of the Tagalogs" in Blair & Robertson, Vol. 7.

[6] Palazón, p. 122. A list of members of the Cofradía de San José, the religious organization with which this paper is concerned, shows that all of the members used the by then traditional system of naming themselves: Isidro de Santa Rosa, Apolinario de la Cruz, etc. Unfortunately, it is not clear from Palazón's account whether the government pressure for Western-style surnames was applied *before* 1840 so that this usage might be interpreted as a symbol of defiance of the "modernizing" authorities. It is one of Hobsbawm's major points that the eruption of liberal, modernizing "Jacobin" reforms which threaten traditional institutions has frequently been the major cause of millennarian movements among peasants. *Primitive Rebels*, p. 67.

[7] Manuel Buzeta y Felipe Bravo, *Diccionario geográfico, estadístico, histórico, de las Islas Filipinas*, Vol. 2 (Manila, 1851), pp. 129-30, 133.

[8] Palazón, pp. 21-22. Priests were omnipresent in the province. There were 15 of them in 17 townships, or about one for every 2,000 people. See table in Buzeta, Vol. 2, appendix, and Note 3 above. Cf. approximately one priest for

presented a substantial portion of the annual income of the average upland rice farmer [9] — and a heavy drain on his fund of working days not required for farming.

The collection of taxes was performed by the provincial governments through their appointed *cabezas de barangay,* and was the occasion for serious abuses. A critic of the colonial administration wrote in 1842 that the taxes had traditionally been paid in kind (that is to say, in manpower) because of the fact that cash was seldom available to most families. By limiting the kinds of produce receivable, moreover, the government could channel agricultural productivity into the directions it thought suitable. But the commodities received had for the most part to be sold by the government to produce revenue, and this opened the door to graft. Provincial governors commonly deflated the official cash values assigned to produce collected from the taxpayers, so as to obtain merchandise worth two or three times the established rate of tribute. Then they sold the accumulated stores, and paid the smallest amounts they could get away with into the Treasury at Manila. In effect, it was a system of tax-farming to members of the official Spanish colonial service. A royal order of 1835 guaranteed the peasants that tribute commodities would be received at full market value, but in 1840 there was apparently still no sign of its being put into effect. [10]

As the costs of government (and of storing produce) increased in the 19th century, pressure began to be applied from Manila for the

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every 1,000 Catholics in the U.S. or every 10,000 in Mexico today. All of the towns indicated on the map at the end of the paper were "pueblos" with resident priests and *gobernadorcillos* at approximately the time of the rebellion. Francisco Coello de Portugal y Quesada, annotated map of the "Islas Filipinas" in *Atlas de España y sus Posesiones de Ultramar* (Madrid, 1852).

[9] It is difficult to establish the real value of the *peso* for Tayabas peasants in 1840. Galán gives figures for the peso value of annual rice production which permit the very hazardous calculation that five *cavanes* (ca. 600 lbs.) of unhusked *palay* were worth about 3 pesos. Modern upland rice cultivation will produce about 20 cavanes to the hectare, which may be taken as a maximum figure for the probable annual production of a single family's swidden operation in the period in question. (José Endriga, personal communication, February, 1969). On that basis, five peso in taxes would represent just under half the value of an average annual rice crop — very heavy taxation indeed, and a figure which suggests that most peasants must have worked off their *polo* obligations rather than paying the three pesos. On the other hand, a travel account for ca. 1850 suggests that common laborers in Manila were being paid a quarter of a "dollar" a day — if the "dollar" is a peso, two *reales* — and that this was enough to keep one man in food for two to three days. This permits the equally hazardous calculation that in the urban setting, 5 pesos might have been roughly equivalent to two weeks' food budget for a family of five. Robert MacMicking, *Recollections of Manila and the Philippines during* 1848, 1849 *and* 1850 (London, 1852), p. 150.

[10] Sinibaldo de Mas y Sans, *Informe sobre el estado de las Islas Filipinas en 1842* (2 vols.; Madrid, 1842), Vol. 2 (chapter on taxes), p. 14. Europeans and European *mestizos* paid no tribute; Chinese and Chinese *mestizos* paid at least twice as much as Filipinos, and more if they were wealthy. Also, Buzeta Vol. I, pp. 129-30.

payment of taxes in cash. At first glance, this was an opportunity for relief of the peasants from local extortion. It may, indeed, have been desirable from the point of view of a province which had a ready market for cash sales of its products, but it must have occasioned considerable hardship in subsistence farming areas such as Tayabas. The general tendency toward monetization of the rural economy of which the policy was a part can only have accentuated the frustrations of those who had little to sell. By 1841, Tayabas was the only province in the Philippines which continued to pay all of its tribute in kind.[11]

The tribute in those years was paid in caulking material derived from coconut palms which the peasants of Tayabas had been obliged to plant some years earlier, and which had been the subject of disgruntlement since the palm grew wild almost everywhere else in the Islands and the plantations occupied land which might better have been planted to rice. The caulking was used by the government shipyards at Cavite. But beginning in the late 1830's, the shipyards were overstocked with it and complained that it could not be stored over long periods because of the climate.[12] There is no record of the impact of this development on Tayabas — but it may be surmised that it led to some disaffection. Hundreds of acres were given over to coconut trees whose products could not be sold, and (in part because of this misallocation) the cash for paying tribute was scarcer than elsewhere.

Apolinario de la Cruz was a young Tagalog from Lucban in Southern Tayabas, a town with exceptionally poor farmland whose people were famous in the region for their enterprise as traders and which included more "rich men" than any other town in the province.[13] Born in 1815 of peasant parents, he received a religious primary education and went to Manila to seek admission to the priesthood some time around 1830. As a Filipino, he could not qualify for the novitiate of any monastic order, but was accepted as a lay brother at the Hospital of San Juan de Diós — a 250-year-old charitable institution run by Spanish friars for the benefit of indigent Spaniards.[14] In such an environment, he must have experienced discrimination frequently. A contemporary described him as a "quiet, sober, unobtrusive young man, exhibiting nothing of the hero or the adventurer."[15] The humble *donado* picked up scraps of Biblical and

[11] Mas y Sans, Vol. 2 (chapter on taxes), p. 16; Buzeta Vol. I, pp. 131-2. The monetization of tribute payments was nearly complete by 1850.

[12] Buzeta Vol. I, pp. 132-33.

[13] Galán. There is a suggestion in this document that some of the "rich men" may have been Chinese *mestizos*. If this can be established, it may be a factor in explaining the ethnic exclusiveness of the Cofradía.

[14] Buzeta, Vol. I, pp. 165.

[15] Sir John Bowring, *The Philippine Islands* (London, 1859), p. 70, quoting Sinibaldo de Mas y Sans, who claimed to have known Apolinario when he was hospitalized for a time at San Juan de Diós.

theological knowledge by listening to the sermons at church, and in time seemed to have become an accomplished lay preacher.[16]

It was while he served in his menial capacity at the hospital that Apolinario helped organize a group of 19 Catholic laymen, friends from Tayabas who settled in the poor suburbs of the capital, into the Hermandad de la Archi-Cofradìa del Glorioso Señor San José y de la Virgen del Rosario (Brotherhood of the Great Sodality of the Glorious Lord Saint Joseph and of the Virgin of the Rosary). The members attended Mass together, and were expected to obey certain rules of moral conduct in their everyday lives, among which was the saying of seven Our Fathers and seven Hail Marys each day.[17] Associations of this kind, concerned exclusively with devotional and charitable activities, were a normal feature of popular religious life in the Spanish colonies.

What distinguished the Cofradía de San José from most others in the Philippines was the extraordinary degree of authority which Apolinario managed to achieve within it, the absence of any supervision of its affairs by a Spanish priest, the exclusion of Spaniards and *mestizos* from membership, and the fact that in later years the membership was not limited to a single locality. Soon after its founding, the organization applied to the Archbishop of Manila for recognition as a legitimate lay brotherhood, but was informed that no license was necessary so long as it remained small and made no use of the Holy Sacraments (that is, did not usurp the functions of the ordained priesthood) in its gatherings.[18] Lacking any political objective or orientation, the brotherhood was able to continue unnoticed by the authorities for several years after its founding. During that time, however, it developed an atmosphere of secrecy, an administrative centralization and a degree of loyalty in the membership which were bound to arouse suspicion when its affairs became public.

Beginning in 1839 or 1840, the Cofradía moved into a stage of rapid expansion. The reasons for this have not yet been made clear. Trusted representatives of the Founder were sent out to the villages of Tayabas and neighboring Laguna and Batangas provinces to recruit members. Each was charged with signing up twelve people, who would pay one *real* a month in membership dues. The man who achieved this became a leader (*cabecilla*) of the new local unit, and a member of the governing

[16] Gregorio Zaide, *Philippine Political and Cultural History*, Vol. I (Manila, 1957), p. 364. Zaide gives Apolinario's birth date as July 31, 1815 in the barrio of Pandak, Lucban. This suggests that someone has uncovered the prophet's baptismal record, but no reference is cited for the information.

[17] Apolinario de la Cruz, "Declaración de...," *La Política de España en Filipinas* Año 2, No. 32 (1892), pp. 113-14. Matta puts the founding of the Cofradía in 1832, when Apolinario was 17 years of age. Most sources assume that he was the founder, but normal practice would have been for a priest to perform that function.

[18] Cruz, p. 114.

council of the brotherhood. Council members had one vote for every twelve people recruited; in the mature organization, the most influential *cabecillas* had four votes each. Dues were used to pay the expenses of a monthly local gathering, with the supplies being forwarded by courier to headquarters in Manila — a circumstance which later led cynical observers to the conclusion that the Cofradia was nothing but an elaborate means of collecting money from the guillible peasants.[19]

Meetings were held on the 19th of every month, when the members would come together to hear a high Mass in honor of San Jose sponsored by the organization. Afterwards, they would retire to a private house to say the Rosary, hear a reading of inspirational letters and directives from Brother Apolinario (Manong Pule, as he was called familiarly in Tagalog),[20] and enjoy a community supper. The meetings were peaceful, but conducted entirely in Tagalog and open only to members. They were kept as inconspicuous as possible, to avoid alarming the authorities.[21]

A major set of questions which needs to be answered with regard to this movement has to do with its ritual and ideological content. None of the presently available documents refers to this crucial matter at all, except to qualify the cofrades as "superstitious," and all that can be said about the subject at this stage is in the nature of hypothesis. The cult was certainly not strictly "nativistic" or anti-Christian; it was syncretic. Some very indirect and fragmentary evidence of the folk religion which was probably practiced by the members is available from recent ethnography of the immediate region. Despite four centuries of unremitting Catholic religious indoctrination and the predominance of foreign priests in local community life, some very heterodox practices survived intact — and have only begun to disappear with the spread of secular public education after World War II. Among them are ritual formulae for the propitiation of evil spirits, such as the use of *anting-anting* amulets (among which some of the most efficacious are fragments broken off of church images and furnishings) or the recitation of Latin liturgical phrases possessed of supernatural powers; and the use of pagan alongside Christian images in home worship.[22] The followers of Apolinario de la Cruz were illiterate or semi-literate peasants and tradesmen who professed, it seems reasonable to suppose, a syncretism which Christian rituals and beliefs served to *supplement* rather than to replace completely

[19] Cruz, p. 114. The view that the Cofradía was a "con game" is put forth by Montero y Vidal, Vol. 3, p. 37; Felipe Govantes *Compendio de historia de Filipinas* (Manila, 1877), p. 378; and Juan Manuel de la Matta, "Apolinario de la Cruz. Relación en que se da cuenta de haber estallado la conspiración en Tayabas" (November 16, 1841) (Ms. in Newberry Library, Chicago).

[20] Palazón, p. 162.

[21] Fray Manuel Sancho, "Relación expresiva de los principales acontecimientos de la titulada Confradía de San José..." (Ms. copy in Newberry Library, Chicago), pp. 14-17.

[22] Fermin Dichoso, "Some Superstitious Beliefs and Practices in Laguna, Philippines," *Anthropos* 62 (1967): 61-67.

their traditional ones. This perspective will allow us to conceive of the development of the Cofradía de San José, with exotic practices in a conventional framework, as a gradual and moderate shift in the *emphases* of religious behavior and belief, rather than as the violent and heretical break with Catholicism which is suggested by the Spanish clerical sources.

The center of the Cofradía's activities seems to have been Lucban, Apolinario's home town, where by April of 1840 as many as 500 people from several nearby *pueblos* were gathering for the monthly celebration. The members were mostly married couples and single women (recruitment seems to have depended largely on appeals to female piety, and a few women even served as *cabecillas*). Meetings were held at the home of Francisco de los Santos (Cabeza Isco Paminta), an ex-*cabeza de barangay* who had been in trouble with the law a few years earlier when he and his wife were found conducting secret devotional sessions in honor of the Virgin of Antipolo in their home. The leader and secretary-treasurer of the group was an articulate younger man from Majayjay in Laguna Province named Octavio Ignacio de San Jorge, who claimed complete authority over the assemblage as Apolinario's official representative.[23]

Among the Founder's acquaintances in Manila were a well-to-do Creole[24] businessman, Domingo de Rojas, and his confessor, a Filipino secular priest named Ciriaco de los Santos. The nature of his relationship with these advisers remains a mystery. It is possible that Manong Pule was in touch through them with the circles of Filipino intellectuals who were just beginning to talk about the possibility of a separation from Spain. Padre Ciriaco in particular is a mysterious figure, who was associated from the start with the Cofradía, apparently served as its treasurer as well as spiritual counsellor, and must have shared the exasperation of the Filipino clergy in general with the discriminatory policies of the Spanish-dominated Church hierarchy — but no connection between the Cofradía and the "Independence Party" has ever been firmly established. It seems likely that if the dissidents in the capital were aware of the existence of Apolinario and his new sect, they would have been

[23] Sancho, p. 70. The participation of women in the direction of religious life was apparently traditional in Tagalog society. Plasencia, p. 191, describes pre-christian rituals performed by priestesses. The same writer contributes to clearing up the mystery about how a group of several hundred people might have congregated at the home of a single family in a small town. Traditional Tagalog religion involved no permanent temple constructions; rather, religious festivals were held in large temporary structures built onto a chief's house — with the help of which the house itself was made into a temple. Plasencia, p. 186.

[24] This term is derived from Latin American usage, where it means "European born in the colonies." Philippine-born Spaniards were known as "Filipinos" in colonial parlance during some periods (although Sinibaldo de Mas y Sans uses "Filipino" for the natives of the Islands and "Filipino español" for the Creoles), while the Tagalogs and Visayans, etc. were referred to as "indios." "Filipino" is used in this paper in its 20th-century sense.

pleased to encourage it as a potential thorn in the side of the colonial Church and government structures. They were not, however, responsible for its existence.[25]

In 1840, Padre Santos advised Apolinario to seek official recognition once again for the growing Cofradía, as a means of avoiding unnecessary conflicts with the local authorities in Laguna and Tayabas. With the priest's help, a respectful application was submitted to the Bishop. When this was, at length, denied, the Cofradía employed a team of lawyers retained by Rojas to state its case to the Audiencia (supreme council of government) at Manila. Explaining the legitimate and peaceful nature of the organization, they requested authorization to continue expanding it. The Audiencia considered the case and passed it to the Governor of the Islands for consultation, but took no action regarding it.

This attempt to legalize its operations seems to have been the origin, paradoxically enough, of the Cofradía's difficulties with the law. When Governor Oraá was given the particulars of the case, his suspicion was aroused by the clause which excluded Spaniards and *mestizos* from the Brotherhood. On his recommendation, the leader was dismissed summarily from his post at the Hospital de San Juan de Diós. When summoned to appear for questioning, Apolinario went into hiding in Manila to avoid arrest, and thus became an outlaw.[26] In these circumstances, the government moved fast; Padre Ciriaco was arrested and jailed, along with other members resident in the capital. These people "failed to provide the authorities with a clear idea of the nature and objectives of the Cofradia, but did make clear the necessity of suppressing it." An order went out to the provinces for the apprehension of all *cabecillas*.

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[25] Palazón, 160-61; Matta, "Relación..." Mas y Sans, who lived in Manila in the period just prior to the revolt, doubts that any rebellion of "indios" can have enjoyed substantial support from the Creoles of the capital. His basis for this judgment is the view that if the Creoles ever thought of independence, it was with themselves as heirs to the peninsular authority and the Filipinos and *mestizos* continuing in their status as tributaries. They therefore viewed any manifestation of popular political activity with alarm. Cf. the attitude of the wealthy Filipinos to the Guardia de Honor movement in Pangasinan in the early months of the U.S. occupation, when the peasants were fighting the new colonial oppressor and the caciques were at pains to make a rapid adjustment to the new circumstances. David Sturtevant, "Guardia de Honor: Revitalization within the Revolution" *Asian Studies* (Manila) 4, 2 (1966), pp. 312-52. A frequent assumption regarding the political activities of dissidents in the Spanish colonies was that they were closely tied to freemasonry, but a recent study has pointed out that subversive movement was non-existent in the Catholic Philippines until after 1850. John N. Schumacher, S.J. "Philippine Masonry to 1890" *Asian Studies* 4, 2 (1966): 323-42. Nevertheless, there was certainly widespread disaffection with the regime in Manila during the period. Matta and Mas y Sans, both informed political observers, are primarily concerned with a decline of the prestige of the government due to its poverty and corruption and to the incompetence of the peninsular (and especially, in their view, the Filipino) secular clergy. Both complain of the growing "insolence" and disloyalty of all classes in the capital, and feel that any sort of rebellion represents a serious threat to a tottering regime.

[26] Govantes, 378-9; Matta, "Relación..."

These events occurred during the summer of 1841.[27] In the meantime, the Bishop had set his own mechanism into action against the group.

The principal Catholic hierarch of Tayabas province was the parish priest of the provincial capital. In September of 1840, he received instructions to look into Apolinario and his pretended Cofradía, which he passed on to the curate of Lucban, Friar Manuel Sancho. The curate replied that he was astonished to discover that any such potentially subversive activities were taking place in his jurisdiction, and dismayed to find that he had been performing a monthly Mass financed by the same Cofradía. Thereafter, he refused dutifully to say the Mass (at a sacrifice of 11 pesos a month in income).[28] On the eve of October 19, the priest set out with the *gobernadorcillo* of Lucbán and several leading citizens, and made a raid on Isco Paminta's house. They arrested 243 people and confiscated the cash box, along with some incriminating letters from Manong Pule, and two large oil paintings of the Leader done in the style of popular images of the saints (with Apolinario in postures of piety surrounded by conventional religious symbols), which had been used in the religious ceremonies of the Cofradía. These paintings, and the file of the Cofradía's correspondence in Tagalog which were captured with them, may still exist in the archive which houses the papers of the Franciscan friars of Tayabas. If they are ever found, they ought to provide material for one of the very few "inside histories" of a cofradía or any other kind of popular proto-political movement which have ever been written.

Next day, both the priest and the *gobernadorcillo* reported these developments to the Governor, Joaquín Ortega, a 26-year-old military officer of apparently liberal leanings. Ortega replied that the functionaries of Lucban had exceeded their authority, that any activities of a religious brotherhood were matters of concern to the ecclesiastical authorities only, and that they should release the unfortunate *cofrades* without delay.

Father Sancho was presumably anxious to clear himself of responsibility for the fact that the suspicious organization had gotten so firm a footing in his parish and with his tacit connivance. His letters show him at exceedingly great pains to awaken the authorities to the danger which the Cofradía represented, and are undoubtedly full of exaggeration — but they are invaluable sources of information nevertheless. The priest complained that the membership of the group was growing rapidly as a result of the Governor's leniency (certainly less of a factor in fact than the hostile attitude of the Church!). The leaders, certain of eventual recognition by the authorities, were threatening anyone who got in their way. Those who withdrew from membership were treated with public

[27] Montero y Vidal, 37-8; Sancho, p. 2-3.
[28] Sancho, p. 14.

disdain by the *cofrades*, and sometimes made to fear bodily harm. He pointed out that "all of our revolution have had their origins in these secret night meetings" and insisted (although he neglected to cite any specific statement in evidence) that the captured letters from Apolinario revealed clearly their subversive intentions. In the fall of 1840, the Bishop had issued an order of excommunication against the *cofrades*, which Father Sancho had posted in Tagalog in all the barrios of Lucban — but they continued collecting their monthly dues from several hundreds or even thousands of people. Apolinario had decreed that no local leader would share in his "ultimate victory" if he failed to fulfill his quota of new memberships.[29]

The two most serious infractions from Sancho's point of view seem to have been the collection of dues (at one *real* a month, *three times* as much as the peasants normally gave to the Church), and the arrogation of priestly prerogatives. The fund-raising seemed to him to be a violation even of civil law, and he pointed out that the Cofradía was collecting even more than the outrageous monthly *real* by levying fines of as much as 12 *reales* (1.5 pesos) for infractions of its many rules. Brother Apolinario was promising grace and indulgences to his followers as if he were an ordained priest, and claiming that non-members would be denied entrance to Heaven.[30] Its was a serious enough charge, moreover, that the Cofradía represented 500 or more like-minded people who were meeting secretly and without priestly supervision.

Governor Ortega finally acceded to the curate's insistent requests by instructing the *gobernadorcillo* of Lucban to cooperate in stamping out the Cofradía. Early in 1841, in view of the hostility of both the priest and the *gobernadorcillo,* the Brotherhood transferred its monthly meetings to Majayjay, just across the border in Laguna province. Father Sancho informed the priest there (an extremely unpopular figure for his abuses of the privilege of recruiting labor service without pay),[31] and both curates continued to press for decisive intervention by the civil and ecclesiastical authorities. The meetings nevertheless continued to be held in Majayjay for several months, until the order came from Manila that the Cofradía was to be suppressed and its leaders arrested.

Then, on September 19, 1841, the priest and *gobernadorcillo* of Majayjay made a raid on an evening meeting like the one carried out the previous year in Lucban. The *cofrades* seem to have been warned in advance by some of the Filipino constables who were employed for the purpose, and most of them got away — but the raiders did capture several leaders, and a second lot of correspondence which was sufficient to bring Octavio de San Jorge, his parents and several others to trial. One of the

[29] Sancho, pp. 4-18, 69.
[30] Sancho, pp. 8-11, 64-65, 71.
[31] Palazón, p. 133.

letters revealed Apolinario's hiding-place in Manila, and the government moved promptly to have him arrested there.[32]

The situation was coming to a head, and it was unfortunate from the government's point of view that Governor Ortega chose those very days to make a trip to Manila. He neglected to round up the local leaders of the Cofradía before he left, and committed the serious political mistake of leaving the government of the province in the hands of a Filipino assistant whose loyalty to Spain could not be counted on in the circumstances. This was the *gobernadorcillo* of Tayabas, whose wife was a member of the Cofradía, and who was himself apparently not energetic in his opposition to it. The military contingent in the province, of which the *gobernadorcillo* took charge, consisted in a few dozen Filipino soldiers without battle experience.

At this propitious moment Apolinario, who had managed to avoid the police in Manila, escaped from the capital and came by boat at night to the town of Bay. There he was met by an armed group of the principal leaders of the Cofradía, now also outlaws fleeing for their lives. Their first order of business was to find a place at which to gather the faithful for a *novenario* — nine days of prayer and religious purification with which to brace themselves for the approaching conflict. Rather than risk travelling through Majayjay and Lucban where their enemies were prepared for them, they made a forced march around the western slopes of Mt. San Cristóbal through San Pablo, Tiaong and Sariaya and appeared on October 21, 1841 at the barrio of Isabang near Tayabas.[33] The Cofradía was successful in:

> communicating this fact with incredible speed, and with the prestige of the Founder drawing a large number of people of all sexes, ages and conditions, converting that solitary place within a few hours into a large and bustling encampment.[34]

The number of people who assembled in the first couple of days was about 3,000 — including perhaps 2,000 men armed with lances and a few rifles. Within a week, the number seems to have doubled.[35]

Many of the faithful gathered at Isabang were women, the most "fanatical" of Apolinario's followers, of whom it was said later that they had been given the task of crucifying all the Spaniards who fell into their hands when the rebellion was victorious. Many of the men there had been recruited by their wives, and the story was told of one man, not a member, who had to go to the camp to beg his wife and family to return home with him — and was barely able to escape with his children. These rumors were written down after the fact, and may

[32] Sancho, pp. 12-14.
[33] Matta; Govantes, p. 379; Sancho, pp. 15-19.
[34] Sancho, pp. 55-6.
[35] Matta.

have been entirely unfounded. The unquestioned reality behind them is, however, astonishing enough — that an apparently innocuous association of local Catholic laymen's groups was transformed into a militant rebel army by a process which took place on such short notice as to be almost spontaneous.

Manong Pule's objective seems to have been to occupy the town of Tayabas and hold his *novenario* in the church there. To this end, he opened negotiations with the *gobernadorcillo* and acting governor. The transfer might have been arranged peacefully and quickly, given the size of the rebel force, had it not been for the vigorous opposition of the leading citizens of the town (who were afraid of looting) and of the parish priest, the same man who had forwarded the Bishops's orders to Lucban the year before. This staunch defender of the status quo refused to hear of any negotiations with the rebels, and assured the *gobernadorcillo* that the central government was bound to take military measures promptly to suppress such an unlawful gathering. Somehow, the *gobernadorcillo* managed to persuade Apolinario to refrain from attacking immediately and wait until the proper preparations could be made for the entry of the cofrades.[36]

Returning from Manila on October 22nd, Governor Ortega was informed of these happenings and hastened to Tayabas to pull together a small army of constables and some *cabezas de barangay* who happened to be present with a contingent of *polo* laborers. While preparing for the defense of the town, he sent the cofrades an offer of amnesty if they would disband immediately. Apolinario, encouraged by his initial success in mobilizing supporters, refused. Ortega was then obliged to attack. On the 23rd, he went forth with some three hundred men to find the more numerous rebels full of enthusiasm for a fight. Firing some shots from small cannon in an effort to frighten them away, he succeeded only in terrifying his own troops — some of whom returned hastily to Tayabas while others went over to the rebels. The Governor was left alone on the field, where the *cofrades* captured and killed him, stripped his body of weapons and insignia, and refused to give him Christian burial. To guarantee that Ortega would not be returned to the town and buried, it was said that they had left his body in the care of a party of pagan Aetas (Negritos) who had come down from the mountain to join the fray.[37]

Victorious in the first skirmish, Apolinario and his followers withdrew to a more strategic location at a place called Alitao — a large open field between two rivers in the forested country up against the base of Mt. San Cristobal. There they fortified themselves behind a double palisade in which they placed the cannon captured from Ortega's party.

[36] Montero y Vidal, pp. 40-41.
[37] Sancho, pp. 19-26; Montero y Vidal, pp. 41-3.

The field was criss-crossed with hastily dug canals to provide water to every location and make it difficult to march across. In the center, they built a large palm-thatched chapel of bamboo, the inside walls of which were hung with colorful hangings and religious paintings, where Manong Pule presided over the "mysterious prayer sessions and ceremonies" of the *novenario*. The Leader was installed in a small house beside the chapel, where he spent his time in "luxurious" retirement, jealously protected by an honor guard of trusted followers and served by a group of "good-looking young girls, married and single, who took turns looking after his every need and pleasure." He allowed himself to be seen by the faithful, whose huts were spread out on either side of his own, only at certain times of day, at which he would hold court with great ceremony. No one, not even his principal lieutenant, a man called Purgatorio who was charged with preparing the defense of the place, could see him without prior permission.[38]

When news of the death of Governor Ortega reached the Governor of Laguna, he dispatched the few dozen soldiers at his disposal and sent an urgent request to Manila for a proper military expedition to put down the insurrection. The troops from Laguna reached Tayabas with great difficulty on the 26th; it was the middle of the rainy season, and the roads were almost impassable. The rebels saw them arrive from the higher ground of Alitao, but made no move against such a pitiful force. Another small group arrived the same day, and the reinforcements met with the community leaders of the provincial capital to plan for some kind of a defense against the attack they were sure was forthcoming. They rounded up the terrorized inhabitants, established watches and sent a party to reconnoiter the rebel encampment. In the meantime, the military commander of the province, who had been ill for the several crucial days previous, was named interim Governor. A message from Manila informed him that 300 troops were on their way over the mountains, while another large force would come around by sea to land in Pagbilao, and so cut off any possible route of escape to the rebels.

The commander offered a second amnesty to the *cofrades* (all but Apolinario and his principal *cabecillas*), promising the complete destruction of anyone who failed to take advantage of it. He had the decree published in Tagalog, sent to the camp at Alitao and posted in all the towns of the vicinity. Manong Pule read this document aloud in his camp amid general laughter, and then scratched it up and burned it public. He replied that he was ready for the Spaniards, and that his followers were spoiling for a fight. In the meantime, the government forces were reinforced by peasant volunteers from the region who

[38] Sancho, pp. 38-39, 54. Matta notes that the reference to pretty girls in attendance on Apolinario was only a rumor.

were not members of the Cofradia and who seem to have been anxious at the apparent breakdown of law and order.[39]

The soldiers were ready for battle on th 31st, and moved out to Alitao that night "along roads they had to travel single file with mud up to their waists." At dawn they were attacked by the *cofrades*, waving a red flag (instead of the white one which had been displayed at the entrance to their camp), and fighting "with more vigor and enthusiasm than military know-how and prudence." It later emerged that they had been convinced by the leadership of the Cofradía that bullets would not harm them, and that in the heat of the battle Apolinario would cause the earth to open and swallow the enemy forces. Within a short time, the rebels were driven back into their camp, where they defended themselves stubbornly. At a crucial moment, they were joined by a party of Aetas from the mountain, who contributed substantially to the struggle by showering the Spaniards with a steady rain of spears and arrows.[40]

This participation of contingents of Negrito tribesmen in the rebellion is one of the fascinating and unexplained aspects of the story. No evidence has appeared of any proselytizing by Apolinario's followers among the Aetas, and the traditional relationship between the lowland "civilized" rice farmers and the pagan mountain people of the Philippines — occasional aggression, mutual distrust and limited trade — would seem not to be readily conducive to such an alliance.[41] On the other hand, lowland rebels taking refuge in the mountains might be forced to come to terms with the "aborigines", as happened with the Magindanao Moros of the Cotabato Valley when they were forced into intimate contact with the Tiruray tribesmen after the Spanish conquest of the 1860's.[42] A hypothesis to explain the Negrito participation is that the groups on Mt. San Cristóbal learned of the revolt through their trade contacts in Lucban, and simply decided to come down and join the fun of trouncing the Spaniards. Whatever the cause, the result was a curious combination of "primary" with "secondary" resistance to the colonial regime, and a rare instance of the participation of a "primitive" people in the struggles of the peasant people which has displaced them.

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[39] Matta.

[40] Sancho, pp. 26-48. Belief in their miraculous invulnerability has been a common characteristic of "primitive rebels" all over the world. For several earlier Philippine examples of it, see Murillo Velarde, *passim*.

[41] Plasencia, p. 195, observes that when any 16th-century Aeta died, the rest of the tribe considered it their duty to kill a lowlander in compensation — and would dispatch the first innocent passer-by they came across. The Negritos with whom he was acquainted were presumably the ancestors of the very groups who joined forces with the Cofradía, since Plasencia's missionary career was spent just across the mountain in Laguna province.

[42] Christopher Lutz, unpublished paper. Madison, 1969.

At length, the rebel palisades were breached and the soldiers entered the camp with fixed bayonets, followed by cavalry swinging sabers. The *cofrades* defended the ground house by house, particularly those charged with protecting Apolinario's person — who died to a man defending the empty house from which the Leader had managed to escape. After four hours of combat, several hundred rebels were dead (there is no record of the government casualties), and many more (including a majority of women and children) were taken prisoner. The remainder were able to escape into the forests up the side of the mountain, assisted by a terrible thunderstorm which broke at the critical moment. The Spaniards did not pursue them, for fear of ambushes in the forest, and spent the night on the field harrassed at intervals by groups of Aetas and *cofrades*. Next morning, they returned to Tayabas with the prisoners, released the women and children and shot most of the men. The rebellion of ten days' duration had been entirely suppressed.[43]

Manong Pule spent the night after the battle alone in the forest. The surviving *cofrades* were apparently disgusted with him because he had failed to provide the promised miracle of the opening of the earth. Purgatorio was said to have broken into his retreat at the height of the battle, threatening to kill him on the spot if he did not intervene. Next morning, Apolinario set out for the house of one of his ex-followers in Sariaya. When he got there, the owner went out ostensibly to get something to eat, and returned with four other erstwhile *cofrades* who captured Apolinario, tied him up, and delivered him to the local police. On November 3rd he was taken to Tayabas, interrogated, and sentenced summarily to be shot the following morning. It was reported that he had "revealed plans and named the persons whose blind instrument he had been," made his last confession to a priest, and then gone to his execution in a dignified manner without signs of repentance.[44] His body was dismembered, in keeping with ancient Spanish colonial practice, and parts of its displayed in the villages of the province for several months afterward as a macabre warning to others.[45]

The effort to explain and "justify" the Tayabas rebellion by relating it causally to subsequent events in the movement toward Philippine independence runs into serious difficulties. The rebellion was taken very seriously by the government in its own day. In the secret reports to Madrid prepared by Sinibaldo de Mas y Sans in 1842 and Juan Manuel de la Matta in 1834, it figures prominently as a symptom of grave political and social unrest. Mas goes as far as to say that had it spread to other provinces, the colonial government might have been toppled

[43] Sancho, pp. 39-48.
[44] Sancho, pp. 48-55.
[45] Sturtevant, "Philippine Social Structure...," p. 117.

in a week.[46] But the threat did not materialize, and the rule of the Spaniards was secure for another half-century.

As a result of Apolinario's revelations to the military tribunal, the Creole businessman Domingo de Rojas was sent to jail and died there. Later, he was absolved by the courts of any responsibility in the affair.[47] The three lawyers who had taken the Brotherhood's case to the Audiencia were also brought to trial.[48] So far, no historian seems to have looked into the records of the judicial inquiries into the operations and relationships of the Cofradía in Manila, or the trials of the leaders arrested before the rebellion. Those documents would almost certainly provide material for an interesting chapter in the protohistory of the Independence Movement, but it is unlikely that they would open a trail leading straight onward to the Cavite martyrs or the Katipunan.

The news of the revolts and of Apolinario's execution caused much grumbling among the soldiers of a regiment from Tayabas garrisoned at Malate near Manila, which included relatives of some of the rebels killed at Alitao. Under the leadership of a Sergeant Samaniego, these troops mutinied in January of 1843, killed some European officers and marched on to the Santiago Fortress in the capital — where they were easily defeated by the loyal troops from other provinces.[49] Samaniego and the other leaders were executed, and their brief rebellion seems to have had no more immediate repercussions than the movements in Tayabas. Having taken place 14 months after the defeat at Alitao, moreover, it cannot be explained entirely as a direct result of Apolinario's revolt.

An effort has been made in the 20th century to establish the Tayabas rebellion as the direct antecedent of a series of curious nonconformist sect movements in different parts of the Islands which have been given the name of *Colorum*. According to this version, the survivors of Alitao took refuge in the forested slopes of Mts. San Cristóbal and Banahao where they established a peaceful New Jerusalem which was tolerated or ignored by the colonial authorities during the remainder of the Spanish period. The members gave picturesque biblical names to the rocks and caves, streams and waterfalls of their mountain haven, and after a few years were able to support themselves on the alms left by pilgrims from all over Luzon. They called each other "brother" and "sister," and their standard salutation was "Ave María Purísima,"

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[46] Sinibaldo de Mas y Sans, *Informe sobre el estado de las Islas Filipinas en 1842. III: Política Interior.* (Manila, 1963), *passim;* and Juan Manuel de la Matta, "Matta's Report, 1843," in B&R 52, pp. 91-111, *passim.*

[47] Govantes, p. 381. This author defends Domingo de Rojas with the argument that he was "rich and honorable" and a good Spaniard, the victim of Apolinario's calumnies — which to a modern student is less than satisfactory evidence that he was not an active supporter of the Cofradía.

[48] Matta, "Relación. . ."

[49] Govantes, 379-80; Zaide, p. 365; Matta "Report," pp. 91-93.

to which the reply was "Sin pecado concebida" (conceived without sin). The name Colorum, first applied to this sect, was apparently derived from a corruption of the liturgical phrase, "per omnia secula seculorum." Pilgrims to Mt. San Cristóbal are assumed to have spread the cult to other areas, where it established itself under other names, e.g .the Guardia de Honor of Pangasinan and neighboring areas of northern Luzon, which played a major role in the (counter-revolutionary) mobilization of the peasants at the time of the 1896 Revolution. [50]

Fascinating though this possibility is, the connection is altogether tenuous. The several 20th-century "Colorum" outbreaks have no clear-cut identification with the *Colorums* of Mt. San Cristobal — most of them took place on other islands — and they differ widely in specific ideologies and purposes. David Sturtevant accepted the connection in the dissertation cited previously, but in a recent article on the Guardia de Honor makes no mention of it. The Guardia, as he describes it, had its origin in the work of Dominican friars in Pangasinan some years later than the revolt in Tayabas. [51] Whatever the facts in the case maybe, the American writer who reported the amazing continuity in folk tradition offers no documentation whatsoever for his assertions. [52]

For the present, therefore, it is a more fruitful exercise to discuss the Tayabas rebellion as an event of interest in itself than to try to establish it as a cause of later events. It is perhaps the isolated and mysterious character of the rebellion, together with a holdover from the Spanish historians' view of Apolinario as a swindler and his followers as fanatics, which is responsible for the movement's having been slighted in books of Philippine history. In the context of a search for the "origins of national independence," the Tayabas rebellion must seem embarrassingly futile and "irrational."

What follows is an effort to analyze and explain the Cofradía de San José and its revolt in ways which are suggested by the growing modern literature on "primitive rebels" among peasant and indigenous populations in other colonial areas of the world. It is no part of my purpose to contribute to the general theoretical discussion of such movements; for that reason, I will for the most part avoid using the jargon or referring in detail to the conceptual frameworks advanced by particular writers. The "theoretical" section of the list of sources at the end of the paper lists the writings which have been most helpful to me in understanding the rebellion in Tayabas.

Perhaps the most important thing to be said about the Cofradía de San José is that it was a genuine movement. It was a conscious

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[50] Robert G. Woods, "The Strange Story of the Colorum Sect," *Asia* 32 (1932), pp. 450-53.

[51] David Sturtevant, "Guardia de Honor: Revitalization within the Revolution", *Asian Studies* (Manila) 4, 2 (1966), pp. 342-52.

[52] Woods, *passim*.

and purposeful effort by a group of Filipinos to recapture from the Spaniard the initiative in shaping the pattern of life and the direction of social change in the country. It achieved a board membership, integrating people from many different communities who had not previously been associated in any joint undertaking. It developed an organizational structure, with efficient communications between its hierarchical levels and between local units. It survived over an extended period of time, and it commanded a great intensity of commitment in its members. It was not a spontaneous or inexplicable outburst of passions; neither was it the result of a conspiracy of urban agitators.

Such a movement could only occur among a people subject to severe deprivation — a people chronically frustrated in the effort to achieve what it thought of as the normal satisfactions of life. A thorough study of the Cofradía de San José will have to take account of the nature of that deprivation for the peasants of Laguna and Tayabas in the early 19th century. What can be suggested on the basis of what we know about life for people of low socio-economic status in those areas of the colony is that the deprivation was not a matter of absolute starvation, or of extreme and unpredictable violence at the hands of the authorities. Rather, it must have been a chronic experience of humiliation and of discouragement from the practice of traditional customs, combined with exasperation at having to pay heavy taxes and labor dues to a government which made itself felt principally by imposing economic restrictions. A factor may have been the growth of the economic power of the Chinese *mestizos;* another, the increasing arbitrariness and a morality of the country clergy. The element of frustration in these disabilities was undoubtedly more important than the element of physical suffering. The peasantry sensed the inadequacy of its traditional procedures and frames of reference for dealing effectively with the changing colonial society to which it was subject (for coming to live more comfortably within it), and was prepared to seek a new "way."

In such circumstances, what was required for a movement to get underway was a leader who could articulate the problems of the mass and propose the beginnings of a dignified solution to them. We need know no more about Apolinario de la Cruz than is known today, to assert that he was such a person, and that he was able to attract and mobilize supporters because he preached a convincing message of redemption to the Tagalog peasantry. The doctrine was a primitive one in the sense that it was not based on a "scientific" understanding of the social system and the root causes of the dissatisfactions of the people, and that it sought an escape from deprivation in separateness and religious purification rather than in political action. But it may be characterized as proto-political rather than as a political, because it derived from a determination to bring about the kind of a change in

the conditions of life which in the long run could only be achieved by political means. There is no reason to suppose that had the movement survived and spread, its leadership would not have responded to the need for a more secular and developmental program of action.

The religious character of the movement was a strength, rather than a weakness. It was its very other-worldliness which gave it organizational and revolutionary potential. The peasants were politically helpless and had no experience of politics. There was no area other than religious activity in which they could express the creative impulse to determine the quality and conditions of their own lives. A religious organization might be tolerated, moreover, in an authoritarian society which had no place for popular secular organizations of any kind. The religious mode facilitated communication between leaders and followers, and allowed the creation of new forms of authority, new statuses, new avenues of mobility, new definitions of legitimacy — a "practice run" in organization to build the basis for a viable movement. It was also a bridge between past and future, on which traditional behavior could be experienced in new contexts, and old ideas invested with new meanings.

The Spanish commentators saw the Cofradía as an exotic, aberrant and disruptive phenomenon, which they could explain only as a result of the manipulation of an ignorant and fanatical peasantry by a self-seeking agitator. From the perspective of at least a few thousand peasants in Tayabas, it was a convincing and liberating alternative to a painful existence and an opportunity to join the throng of the followers of a true prophet. It was the difference in attitude between those hostile to change and those receptive to it. Had Apolinario's teachings been exotic to the peasants, they would not have followed him. Had he not helped people to live more satisfying lives they would not have continued to support him in defiance of a decree of excommunication and the active opposition of their priests and *gobernadorcillos*.

In the autonomous stage of its development, when the Cofradía was able to function without interference from the authorities, the indications are that it grew steadily and functioned "rationally." Its organization and activities were directed to the pursuit of the limited goal of creating within the Church a satisfactory environment for religious expression, free of the prejudices and restrictive presence of foreigners, and in which a Filipino leadership could function without handicaps. It avoided the kinds of confrontation with the vested interests from which it could not hope to emerge unscathed. By the middle of 1840, however, under increasing pressure from the civil and ecclesiastical authorities, the movement seems to have begun to conceive broader goals. What these were with regard to specific institutions in society (the peninsular clergy, the tribute and forced labor systems,

the Chinese business interests, etc.) is not yet known, but, the mood was clearly one of defiance rather than withdrawal. Very possibly, the *cofrades* were moving in the direction of political opposition. As things turned out, there was no time to formulate a program.

The explosion and rapid elimination of the Cofradía was the result not of Apolinario's policies, but of an extreme outside provocation and an apocalyptic response. Within a matter of a few weeks the leaders, who had been confident of obtaining official recognition for their organization and presumably looked forward to institutionalization and steady growth, became hunted outlaws. The situation in southern Tayabas and Laguna (where in some municipalities their followers must have been the majority of the population) seemed propitious for making the kind of a stand from which they could demand recognition. They underestimated the military power of the government, and they were greatly encouraged by the numbers of people who flocked to the camps at Isabang and Alitao. The millennarian vision of a God concerned for the safety and prosperity of the Tagalogs did the rest.

Mas y Sans and Matta agreed that the Tayabas rebellion had represented a serious threat to the government of the colony, and that had the *cofrades* chosen to split up and spread out into the provinces rather than attempting an ill-timed revolt, they might have been successful. But they were mistaken. The fundamental determination to recapture the initiative in social change was present with the followers of Apolinario de la Cruz, as was the capacity to organize and proselytize. But the mode of understanding reality was still only proto-political; it was magical as well as instrumental. When the power of a State which the Brothers only half understood and could not conceive of replacing was deployed against them, their only recourse was supernatural. The magic failed; the prophet lost his power, and there was not yet a program and a broad-based, indoctrinated apostolate which could survive him. The next leader of the people would have to start again from the beginning.

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BUDDHISM AND STATE IN CEYLON BEFORE THE ADVENT OF THE PORTUGUESE

DR. (MRS.) URMILA PHADNIS *

INTRODUCTION

HISTORICALLY SPEAKING, BUDDHISM CAN CLAIM TO BE THE FIRST missionary religion in the world. In fact, its messianic purpose was expressly declared nearly five centuries before Christ when, soon after his enlightenment, the Buddha himself exhorted his disciples to "preach the truth" and spread the gospel "out of compassion for the world, for the good . . . for the welfare of gods and men."[1]

However, it was during the reign of emperor Asoka (269-232 B.C.) that Buddhism — till then a regional faith — spread beyond the Indian peninsula to many countries of Asia to the extent that at one time, it was in a position to influence the lives of nearly one fifth of the whole human race.

Resuscitated nearly two centuries after its inception and considerably changed in its 'inner structure'[2] due to competition with other sorteriologies in India, Buddhism was introduced in Ceylon in the third century B.C. The absence of any organised religion in island at that time, the charisma of the Buddhist monks, and the royal patronage which Buddhism received from the beginning were some of the major reasons for its quick propagation.[3]

Ceylon was one of the first countries in Asia to come under the sway of Buddhism and to assimilate its essential characteristics in evolving the island's culture and civilisation. In fact, so all pervasive has been the influence of Buddhism in Ceylon that the recorded history of traditional Ceylon is virtually the history of Ceylonese Buddhism. Under such a setting it was natural that religious and political authorities were not only close but often drew sustenance from each other. This paper is an attempt to describe the emerging pattern of Buddhism-State inter-

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[1] G.P. Malalasekera, *2500 Years of Buddhism* (Colombo, n.d.)

[2] Max Weber, *The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism* (Hans Gerth and Don Martindale trans., Illinois, 1958), pp. 233-47. Also refer to Sukumar Dutt, *Buddhist Monks and Monasteries of India: Their History and Contribution to Indian Culture* (London, 1962).

[3] G.C. Mendis, *The Early History of Ceylon or the Indian Period of Ceylon History* (Colombo, 1949), pp. 13-14.

action during the first two thousand years of the recorded history of Ceylon.

Religious Syncretism in Ceylon

In India, Buddhism was almost absorbed in Hinduism but in Ceylon Theravada Buddhism continued to be the state religion for more than a millennium; in the process it absorbed within its fold aspects of magical animism, Mahayanism as well as lay Hinduism without either compromising with its basic tenets or with its predominant status in the religious system.[4]

In its canonical form Theravada Buddhism has been a cause of annoyance to scholars who tried to find a general and cross culturally valid definition of religion. Durkheim, for instance, refuted Frazer's minimal definition of religion being "the belief in spiritual beings" solely on the ground of Theravada Buddhism in which according to him the 'idea of God' was absent, or at least played a minor role. Even Max Weber, while describing "ancient" Buddhism in his classical works on Religion in India, wondered as to whether a system of "ethics without God" could be called a "religion."[5] Elsewhere, Max Weber commenting on the highly individualistic nature of Buddhism went to the extent of concluding that there was no nexus between Buddhist ideology and social action.[6]

Taking Buddhism as a religious system of thought and simply in historical development of Buddhism in Ceylon and elsewhere indicates its canonical context, these views might perhaps be entertained but the canonical Buddhism as only one aspect of the religious system of Theravada Buddhist societies. In all these countries two religious systems — canonical and lay — existed side by side which were "kept clearly apart in theory and served by different religious specialists" but were used by the laity simultaneously and were viewed by them as "complementary and interdependent."[7] The situation is no different today: in fact it is this dualism of the Buddhist system that has facilitated its sustenance to a considerable extent.

This dualism seemed to be inevitable once the religion of 'cultured professional monks" was made the religion of the people.[8] Salvation —

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[4] Michael M. Ames, "Magical-Animism and Buddhism: A Structural Analysis of the Sinhalese Religious System." *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 33, June 1964, pp. 21-49.

[5] Hans Dieter Evers, "Buddha and the Seven Gods: The Dual Organization of a Temple in Central Ceylon", *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3, May 1968, p. 511.

[6] Quoted in E. Sarkisyanz. *Buddhist Background of the Burmese Revolution* (The Hague, 1965), p. 37 and pp. 240-41.

[7] Evers, n. 5, p. 511.

[8] Weber, n. 2, pp. 204-56.

the final goal — was not possible for everybody but merit making was the nearest possible way to achieve salvation (*Nirvanaya*). The more the merit was earned, the better were the chances of salvation. In other words, while the philosophical doctrines of Ceylonese Buddhism gave it abstract orientation and emphasised the other-worldly goal i.e. salvation, its popular aspect led to an emphasis on the importance of immediate and more practical goal of merit making in this world as a step towards salvation. And this accumulation of meritorious deeds could be achieved no better by the laity than by giving alms, grants and endowments to the monks. The more holy the monk was, the more meritorious it was to give alms to him. Perhaps this was one of the motivating factors for the masses and the elite to give their best to the monks and the monasteries.

The implications of this were obvious. No doubt there were some hermit monks (*Vanavasin*) who lived in jungles, meditated in the caves and kept themselves secluded from the varied trappings of society. But their number at no time was big. Once the religion became the state religion and thereby the religion of the people it was natural that preaching to the laity would become a more pressing and immediate duty for many monks than exclusive meditation in seclusion. Consequently, the number of monks who lived very near or in the village (*Gramvasins*) and were actually involved in village life was bound to be large. In other words, thanks to the continuous royal patronage, notwithstanding the individualistic character of Buddhist cosmology, in Ceylon it gradually yielded to the societal needs. The debate over the superiority of learning over meditation in Ceylon as early as 1 century B.C. and the recognition of the superiority of the former over the latter[9] was one of the more obvious manifestations of the socialising character of Buddhism. So was the veneration of the relics of Buddha, the construction of stupas in which relics were preserved as well as the worship of Buddhist images.

In the process of becoming the Bahujanya — religion of the people — Buddhism not only adapted itself to local needs but also exploited the local gods and indigenous customs for its propagation. In Ceylon, one of the instances in this context was that of the *Pirith* ceremony one aspect of which was to exorcise evil spirits and to that extent was a substitute for the charms to which the people were already accustomed. However, the monks used the form of ritual to chant certain texts of Pali canons which explained the significance of the Buddhist code of ethics in the day to day life of the laity.[10]

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[9] Walpola Rahula. *History of Buddhism in Ceylon: The Anuradhapura Period 3rd Century B.C. to 1st Century A.D.* (Colombo, 1956), pp. 157-61.

[10] Ibid., pp. 278-80. Wilhelm Geiger. *Culture of Ceylon in Mediaeval Times* (ed., Heinz Bechert. Wiesbaden, 1960), pp. 173-4. Also see Mendis, n. 3, p. 10.

Historical Evolution of the Monk-Fraternities (Nikayas)

During the first two centuries of its advent in Ceylon the *Mahavihara* (great monastery), founded by Bhikku Mahinda almost immediately after the introduction of Buddhism in Ceylon, held the position of a national church with a hierarchical structure in which all the monasteries (*Viharas*) in the island owed ecclesiastical allegiance to it and were virtually affiliated to it "more or less as its branches."[11] The absence of authority in the cosomology of Buddhism coupled with the canonical justification of schism did not however facilitate the continuation of its monolithic position for long. Thus, by the fourth century A.D. the power and status of *Mahavihara* as the "national church" was already challenged by the Jetavana and Abhayagiri viharas which were founded by the dissident monks from the *Mahavihara*.[12] In due course, several groups of religious institutions conforming to various sects, congregations or fraternities emerged due to doctrinal or personal differences. All of them however followed the rules and constitution common to all. This was significant: though Sangha was a self-governing democratic body, it had no power to prescribe new laws that contradicted the teaching of the founder. The precepts of Buddha were declared to be the pattern and guidance for all laws for the regulation of the conduct of the monks. This gave some sort of uniformity to the organisation, structure and function of the various fraternities. The popularity and power of these subjects or fraternities varied depending on the historical context, the charisma of their leaders, as well as their influence over the king.

The internal organisation of the Sangha closely reflected the ideological principles of Buddhism inasmuch as it vested authority in learning: its organisational structure closely formed the pattern of the democratic state of the Buddhist republics of the era. By the thirteenth century the supreme head of the Sangha, called Mahasami or Nayaka (and at times *Sangha Raja*); next to him were two dignitaries called

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[11] Rahula, n. 9, p. 303.

[12] Ibid. The Abhayagiri vihara came into being by virtue of the fact that king Vatthagamini (29-17 BC) and his generals donated the vihara to a particular monk named Mahatissa. This donation was resented by the monks of Mahavihara who might have considered this act as an encroachment on the exclusive prestige and authority enjoyed by the Mahavihara till then. Consequently the monk was charged with an offence of vihaya — frequenting the families of laymen — and was expelled. A disciple of Mahatissa raised objection to this charge and he in turn was also expelled. Consequently, this monk left Mahavihara along with his large number of followers to live in the new vihara.

The Jetavana vihara owed its inception to king Mahasena who, having been angry with Mahavihara patronised another sect called Sagalia sect and donated the Jetavana vihara to a senior monk of this sect. C. W. Nicholas and S. Paranavitana, *A Concise History of Ceylon: From the Earliest Times to the Arrival of the Portuguese in 1505* (Colombo, 1961), pp. 111-12.

Mahatheras who were in charge of the fraternities dwelling in towns and village (*Gramavasins*) and forests (*Vanavasins*) respectively. Lower down in the hierarchy were the heads of the organisations into which the order was divided, and of the various colleges.[13]

Caste in Buddhism: A Prop to Status Quo?

Through Buddhism did act as a leaven to develop new intellectual perspectives, it did not bring about any revolutionary change in the social organisation of traditional Ceylon. To illustrate, though caste had no sanction in Buddhism, it continued to remain an integral part of the Ceylonese social system. In fact, one might further argue that the Buddhist concepts of *Karma* (action) and rebirth,[14] in a way, provided an explanatory justification for the stratification of the Ceylonese society based on caste. Was not the fact of a person being born as a Goyigama, i.e. the high caste, the result of his past actions (*karma*) in earlier births? Once the basic factor of his ascriptive status was explained in Buddhist terms it followed that the low caste people also accept their social status on the same ground. The rulers thus were born to rule by virtue of their past *karma* and the ruled to submit to their present position. An acceptance of such a state of affairs was bound to facilitate maintenance of the *status quo* in the Ceylonese social structure.

Criteria for Recruitment of the Monks

This was however part of the story. Recruitment to the Buddhist priesthood, at least doctrinally, was open to every one irrespective of his ascriptive status. A low caste monk for instance could, at any time, join priesthood and thereby receive the deference due to the robe. But here again a question arises: No doubt a low caste man could be a monk but could he attain the highest positions in the hierachy of the Sangha? Canonical Buddhism did not recognise any hierarchy amongst the monks except the one based on learning. With the emergence of various monasteries and sects, though the canonical criteria of learning remained a dominant factor in determining the Sangha hierarchy, it did not seem to be the sole criteria. How important was the factor of caste in Sangha hierarchy is a point on which virtually no data is available. As an anachronism in Buddhist tenets even if it was a factor to reckon with at times, it had to be covert.[15] Furthermore, in a

[13] Ibid., p. 329. Also see Rahula, n. 9, pp. 169-72.

[14] For a general understanding of the basic tenets of the Theravada Buddhism, refer to various papers in Kenneth Morgan, ed., *The Path of Buddha* (New York, 1957) and Narada Mahathera, *Buddhism in a Nutshell* (Colombo, 1954).

[15] Even today, the question on which the monks show reticence is about their caste. The reason given is that once a person renounces lay life, these distinctions are meaningless and irrelevant.

society the high caste (i.e. Goyigamas) being also the most numerous caste, might have been a factor blurring if not mitigating the caste considerations. But the compulsions inherent in the social system in Ceylon leads one to infer that while there might be some exceptions, by and large, perhaps the highest position in the Sangha hierarchy went to the high caste people.

A passage in Wilhelm Geiger's celebrated work on the culture of mediaeval Ceylon is relevant in this context. Referring to the various attempts made by the kings to invigorate the Buddhist church, the author, quoting Mahavamsa, (the foremost historical chronicle of Ceylon) maintains: "From the sixteenth century the stress is laid on the fact that the candidates were born in the noble houses" and were 'sons of good families' (*Kulputra*).[16] One wonders whether the situation would have been any different earlier. Besides, it was a belief that giving a son to the Sangha was one of the most meritorious deed. In view of the preponderant number of the Goyigama as the most numerous caste[17] it is also probable that in traditional Ceylon there were many more high caste monks with better credence and opportunities (at least by birth) to compete for a position in a religious hierarchical structure, than the low caste monks.

Bases of the Monk's Power in Ceylon

Whatever be the social background of the monks there is no doubt that their vestment itself conferred upon them certain status and power in the Ceylonese social system. The sources of their power were canonical as well as non-canonical. To begin with, unlike the other religions, the *Sangha*, defined as the "associated brotherhood of Buddhist monks," formed an organic part of Buddhism itself. The three sacred symbols — the triple gem which every laity had to invoke were "I take refuge in Buddha, I take refuge in the *Dhamma* (doctrine) and I take refuge in the Sangha (monk fraternity)." As the dominant status group in the religious system, the monks "set the standard of legitimacy for all religious ideas held by the Sinhalese"[18] and evoked deference from other groups. Initially this deference was derived from their skill function as sole interpreter of the supernatural. In due course, their increasing involvement in social activities brought about ramification to their position in a variety of ways in the Ceylonese society. The social role of the monks as educators, doctors and counsellors to the rulers and the ruled became more and more significant.

[16] Geiger, n. 10, p. 205.

[17] For an exhaustive account on the Sinhalese caste organisation see Bryce Ryan, *Caste in Modern Ceylon* (New Jersey, Brunswick, 1953).

[18] Ames, n. 4, pp. 21-2.

Not only this, the monks comprised a sector which had to its credit several pioneering efforts in various fields. Sinhalese script, for instance, derived as it was from Pali, was mainly shaped by the monks. It was they who taught people the art of writing. Sinhalese painters and sculpturists were mostly monks who evolved their theme around Buddha. Sinhalese architecture evolved around stupas and monasteries which were the abode of the monks.[19] Apart from being the centre for worship and meditation, the monasteries were also the centres of cultural activity and transmitted cultural traditions. The intellectual and social contribution of Buddha's followers was felt all over Ceylon for virtually every village had a Buddhist temple. The charisma of Buddha thus, to use Max-Weber's phrase, was gradually 'routinised' in the island.

Besides the social resources the clergy also derived power through the royal patronage. Moreover, rulers like Dutugemunu in his battle cry "not for kingdom but for Buddhism," against the Tamil ruler virtually fused Buddhism with the Sinhalese national identity. At his request the monks accompanied his army "since the sight of the Bhikkhus is both blessing and protection for us."[20]

Apart from lending political support to the monks' activities, many rulers also secured for them the sanction of state machinery to look after the extensive and lucrative landholdings which were endowed to the Sangha. In these landholdings the royal endowments had a lion's share.[21] These temple landholdings, administered by the monks and laity and worked by slaves and tenants made some of the temples very rich. No doubt the monks, committed to a life of poverty, were simply trustees of the rich monasteries[22] still, their position as trustees itself was an important source of power.

Sources of Weakness of the Priesthood

Conversely, some of the sources of monk's power had also certain vitiating features. To begin with, the handling of temple estates by the monks, at times of crisis in particular, made him so worldly as to affect his image as a renunciator. This was bound to impinge on his social base of power.

Besides, the individualistic nature and autonomous character of canonical Buddhism[23] coupled with recognition of schism as "constitu-

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[19] For the contribution of the monks in the culture and civilisation of Ceylon see Nicholas and Paranavitana, n. 13, pp. 116-21; G.P. Malalasekera, *The Pali Literature of Ceylon* (London, 1928); Martin Wickremasinghe, *Sinhalese Literature* (E.R. Saratchandra trans., Colombo, 1949) and Mendis, n. 3, pp. 14-16.

[20] Rahula, n. 9, pp. 79-80.

[21] Ibid., pp. 135-52.

[22] Kotagama Washissara Thero, *Velavita Saranankara and the Revival of Buddhism in Ceylon* (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, London, 1961).

[23] Buddha himself said in the Mahavagga — "Now, look you Kalamas, do not be led by reports, or traditions, or hearsay. Be not led by the authority of religious

tional" provided it was based on "honest differences"[24] was another factor thwarting to some extent the evolution of an organised Buddhist church. As time passed, the Monk community was divided into many sects. One might appreciate Rev. Rahula's comment on the dissension in the *Sangha* in the context of its evolution during the first few centuries as "not a symptom of decay and degeneration, but a sign of movement and progress,"[25] but it is difficult to sustain this view throughout this period. Besides, dynamism, often, did not synchronise with stability, organisation and consolidation of the Sangha. One also wonders whether an organised Buddhist church was ever the goal of its founder. Whatever be the explanation there is no doubt that throughout this period the emergence of various fraternities and the intense rivalries between some of them was a limitation on the Sangha's power.

One of the redeeming factors in this context was monarchy. As the temporal Head of Buddhism, some of the rulers did try to unify and resuscitate the Sangha. But here again, if the royal patronage could promote the unification of the various sects, it could also be instrumental in creating or perpetuating the division. Coexistence with all the sects was not the policy of *all* the Sinhalese rulers. In fact some of them strengthened one sect as a counterpoise to the power of another. "Serious affliction," for instance, "was suffered by the Therevadins who had their residence in the Mahavihara during the reign of Mahasena, 334-362, who favoured the Abhayagiri monastery at the expense of Mahavihara."[26] In other cases support to one or the other sect was given by the rulers as a prop to their power. In the sixth century the heretic sects were favoured by the rulers "possibly because they were more tolerant of their misdeeds than the Theravadins."[27] Finally, advent of rulers belonging to other faiths, also affected the power of the Sangha. During the rule of Magha (from Malaya) in the thirteenth century for instance, the monasteries were ravaged and plundered.[28] The political disintegration of the country also led to the disintegration of the monk-community. However, while the civil wars affected the Sangha partially, foreign invasions affected it totally.

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text, nor by mere logic or inference, nor by considering appearances, nor by delight in speculative opinions, nor by seeming possibilities, nor by the ideas. This is our teacher." Christian Humphreys, *The Wisdom of Buddhism* (London, 1960) p. 71. In other words, the Bhikkhus were bound neither by "any vow of obedience to a higher supreme authority, nor by a creedal statement, nor by rituals." Ibid. The obedience expected of the Bhikkhu was to the Dhamma and to his seniors in the Sangha he simply owed a respectful submission. B. Ananda Maitreya Nayaka Thero, "Buddhism in Theravada Countries" in Morgan, n. 14, p. 125.

[24] Dutt, n. 2, p. 84.

[25] Rahula, n. 9, p. 85.

[26] Geiger, n. 10, p. 208 and Rahula, n. 9, pp. 93-6. The dates of the rulers of the period for which they ruled vary in Rahula's book and Paranavitara's list.

[27] Geiger, n. 10, p. 210.

[28] Nicholas and Paranavitana, n. 12, pp. 277-8.

Buddhism and the State

Redemption of Ceylon from foreign domination during this period as well as later was a political goal the religious undertones of which were no less significant. Ceylon was not considered to be just an island but the land destined to be the citadel of Theravada Buddhism that had to be saved by the Sinhalese rulers from foreign onslaughts. The Buddhist chronicles — the major source of the history of this period (and written by the monks) — emphasized time and again this special destiny of the Sinhalese kings as the chosen guardian and savior of Buddhism.

If the Sangha found a source of powerful support in the king, it also wielded tremendous power over the kingship by holding the sacral resources of power. In a society saturated with religious values the interaction of the monk community and the kingship was not only close but also diffused. The nature and significance of this interaction in the maintenance of a dynamic equilibrium in the Ceylonese social system could perhaps be best appraised by a brief analysis of the sources, structure and functions of political authority in traditional Ceylon.

Political Authority in Traditional Ceylon: The Bases

Traditional Ceylon had monarchical form of government with the king as the repository of political power and authority. This was the case with the Sinhalese principalities as well as with the Tamil kingdom in the north which came into being in the thirteenth century.

As in the case of other traditional monarchical states, kingship in Ceylon was based on theological assumptions. As such, it was logical that the main sources of political authority were derived from religious precepts as well as from traditions. The Hindu and Buddhist doctrine of *karma* provided a major *rationale* for the authority of the ruler over his subjects. The theory of causation while explaining and justifying the exalted position of the king implied the allegiance of the less favoured towards him. Religious values thus legitimated the status structure.

Besides the doctrine of *karma*, tradition had it that a king had to be a Buddhist. Many Tamil rulers professed Buddhist faith, observed Buddhist customs and supported Buddhism. Later, under the Mahayanist influence in Ceylon, it was believed that the king had not only to be Buddhist but also a Bodisattva (one who had gained sufficient merit and was destined to achieve Buddhahood).[29] It was maintained that both the Buddha and the *Chakravarty* — universal emperor — were identified by the thirty-two marks on their body.[30] While one remained in the

[29] Rahula, n. 9, p. 62.

[30] In the later period it was maintained that the ruler was Bodhisattva. This affirmation reflects the influence of Mahayana over theravadins for while the prota-

temporal world to rule, the other renounced the material world to be the conqueror of the other world — the spiritual. Despite their different domains both headed for the same goal — Buddhahood. As the representative of God on earth the king had 'charisma' and was endowed with supernatural powers. Kingship as such was divinely sanctioned[31] popular traditions as these lent powerful support to the authority of the king.

As regards the people, the Sangha was symbolished by its religious relics. Whosoever, for instance, had Buddha's tooth relic and alms bowl had the allegiance of the people. In later times, the possession of these relics was considered essential for the popular recognition of kingship.

The fact that according to the customary law of the island, a ruler was deemed to be legitimate only if he was a Buddhist, emphasised the dominant position of religion *vis-a-vis* state. One might as well say that the ruler's position and role as the promoter and defender of Buddhism confirmed his legitimacy. The ritualisation of the coronation ceremony during this period further reflected the growing importance of the religious institutions *vis-a-vis* the kingship. Originally a secular affair, with the growing prestige of the Sangha, the ceremony was recognised only if it was sanctioned by the "Mahasangha" and performed in the vihara itself. This was crucial "for, since the King's charisma was qualified by the absence of a strict rule of succession by hereditary right, the coronation did more than simply cap an acknowledged claim to the throne. Legitimacy was created by the ritual, not merely confirmed. Thus the movement of the coronation from unconsecrated public space into the sacred grounds of the temple reflects the Sangha's authority as a prime of political force which conferred the kingship."[32]

Sangha and the Succession

Apart from the ritual of coronation shifting to the monastery and thereby symbolising the authority of the Sangha, individual monks seemed to play a significant role in the political game of succession. This happened at different levels and in different ways. As advisors to the court, their opinion and consent was sought by the ruler as well as his counsellors on policy matters and often it had a salutary effect on the decision making process. Several rulers, for instance, decided the ques-

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gonists of Hinayana knew only one Bodhisattva, according to Mahayana the way to Buddhaship was open to everyone. Geiger, n. 10, pp. 210-11. Also see Ralph Pieris, *Sinhalese Social Organization: The Kandyan Period* (Colombo, 1956), p. 10.

[31] Ibid., p. 11.

[32] Arnold L. Green, "Sangha and King: The Structure of Authority in Mediaeval Ceylon" (Cyclostyled Paper read at a symposium on Problems in the sociology of Theravada Buddhism at the tenth Pacific Congress, Honolulu, 22 August 1961, p. 6.

tion of succession only after consulting the eminent monks[33] and having obtained their consent.

However, there were also cases where the monks were directly and actively involved in enthroning the ruler. Some of them are mentioned as active participants in the palace intrigues.[34] These kingmakers "went to the extent of selecting princes for the throne and supporting favourites even to the extent of violating the laws of succession."[35]

Besides influencing the succession of rulers the monks also acted as mediators in royal disputes[36] and in few cases, even cast off their robes to enter the battlefield and later ascend the throne in the interests of religion and state.[37]

The importance ascribed to Buddhism and Buddihst monks in body politic was not merely the result of a conscious or concerted effort on the part of either party but a reflection of the basic characteristics of a value system in which religious ideas held precedence over the others. Thus, offer of the kingdoms by rulers to the Buddha *Sasana* was symbolic gesture to indicate that the state was run for Buddhism.[38] In exercising the duty as defender and protector of Buddhism the kings had a full-fledged department to promote religious activities. They levied taxes for the maintenance of Sangha and endowed lavish grants in the form of paddy lands, forests and gardens. Lay managerial and working staff became necessary to administer the lands because the monks were prohibited from either carrying on business or doing menial work. As such, these religious endowments, usually referred to as Buddhist temporalities,

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[33] e.g. after the death of Saddha Tissa (59 B.C.), the royal councillors with approval of the Sangha, consecrated the prince Thullathana sa king. Vijayabahu (1055-1114 A.C.) decided to enthrone Jayabhhu in conformity with the advice of the Bhikkhus. After his demise his sister invited the high dignitaries and eminent monks to a conference to decide the question of succession. Again Parakramabahu II (1236-1271 A.D.) conferred the throne on the eldest son in accordance with the advice of the monks. Rahula, n. 9, pp. 69-71.

[34] In his thesis Rev. Dr. Wachissara gives several illustrations of this type. According to him, "The Mahanama Thera was the chief organiser of Dhatusena's campaign against the Tamils.... Thera Nanda accompanied the three princes Sanghabodhi, Sanghatissa, and Gothabhaya from Mahivangana to Anuradhapur with the express intention of enthroning the Princes on the thrones of Rajarata. Parakramabahu IV ascended the throne with the unstinted support of Vidagama Thera. Rajavalia refers to the Machiavellian tactics of this Thera who was responsible for the death of Alakeswara in order to make Parakkrama Bahu the King of Kotte. Washissara, n. 22, p. 76.

[35] Rahula, n. 9, p. 69.

[36] Ibid., p. 82 and Geiger, n. 10, p. 130.

[37] Ibid., pp. 99 and 101.

[38] e.g. Devanamapiyatissa offered his kingship to the Mahabodhi. Duttagamini is reported to have bestowed the kingdom of Ceylon on the *Sasana* five times — each time for seven days. King Tissa offered the Kingdom of Ceylon to Kala Buddharakkhita as a gift for his sermon. Sirimeghavanna offered the whole kingdom to the Tooth Relic. Moggalana I, after his victory over his brother Kassapa, went to the Mahavihara and offered state-parasol, the symbol of kingship, but it was duly returned. Aggabodhi II, after the restoration of Thuparama, offered the whole country to the thupa. Rahula, n. 9, p. 75.

were governed by rules and regulations "laid down by the king with the approval of the Sangha" and were administered by the state officials.[39] However, the inability of the Sangha to administer its temporal affairs, by itself made its action "subject to the proximate authority of the King."[40] In other words, in the position of the ruler as the defender of faith lay the king's strongest source of power over the faith.

King the Purifier of the Sangha

Implicit in his position as the protector of Religion lay the King's jural authority over ecclesiastical affairs of the Sangha. Thus it was the duty of the state "to suppress by law or expulsion of undesirable heretical elements that stained the purity of the *Sasana*."[41] In order to guard the Sangha against corruption from within, the kings set up ecclesiastical courts to enforce monastic discipline and to take action against heretic monks.[42] At times he himself acted as a judge over religious disputes.[43] The kings also invited learned Bhikkhus to prepare a code of religion and to help edit commentaries as well as Suttas[44] and finally to hold courts where there could be a thorough discussion on the basic tenets of Buddhism. Often the kings actively participated in such conferences and some of them even went to the extent of preaching and exhorting the Bhikkhus to keep the pristine purity of the Religion.[45]

King the Unifier and Resuscitator of the Sangha

Besides, rulers like Parakkramabahu I (1153-1586) also tried to unify the *Tayo-nikaya* (Three Sects). However, by providing one platform for discussion and discourses to all the three fraternities, the king succeeded in unifying it after more than a thousand years.[46] Finally, the King resuscitated the Sangha at times when it completely broke down as an Order. According to the Vinaya, the higher ordination of upasampada ceremony necessitated the presence of five learned *theras* (senior monks) and at times, even five theras could not be found. Under such circumstances,

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[39] Ibid., p. 72.

[40] Green, n. 32, p. 5.

[41] Rahula, n. 9, p. 67.

[42] Nicholas and Paranavitana, n. 12, p. 263 and pp. 328-9; Geiger, n. 10, p. 206 and B.C. Law, *A Manual of Buddhistic Historical Traditions* (Calcutta, 1941), pp. 42-43.

[43] Rahula, n. 9, p. 68.

[44] Ibid. e.g. Mahinda IV, 10th century, entrusted the learned Thera Dhanmamitta with the commentary on the Abhidhamma; King Parakramabahu II brought several Bhikkhus to Ceylon from Cola well versed in the tripitaka. Geiger, n. 10, p. 205.

[45] This is reported of Moggallana I, about the year 500, of Kumaradhatusena, 6th century, of Moggallana III, 7th century, of Aggabodhi VII, 8th century, of Sena II, 9th century, of Kassapa IV, 896-913, of Kassapa V, 10th century, of Bhuvanekabahu V, 14th century and of Kittisirirajasiha 18th century. Geiger, n. 10, p. 205.

[46] Nicholas, n. 12, p. 263.

the rulers reinforced it by inviting learned monks from other theravada countries, like Burma, India and Thailand. Special assemblies were held under royal patronage for the admission of monks for higher ordination and the King himself "had to approve the higher appointments of the Order."[47]

Conclusion

Traditional Ceylonese society derived its ideological orientations almost solely from the doctrinal precepts that were then prevalent in the north of the Indian sub-continent. Introduced in the island as early as the third century B.C. Buddhism, confronted with a tribal religion initially and Hinduism in its later phase, subsumed both. This capacity to absorb change, was in the main, due to a sustained state patronage for more than thousand years. During this period Buddhism had gained sufficiently strong roots and found a wide base to withstand alien pressures of the later period. The intellectual professional monks, by their pioneering contributions in various socio-cultural fields had created enough resources to make people rally round religion. Besides, the monks, as preachers, social workers and teachers seemed to be the most effective communicating elite of the era. As learning was the monopoly of religion, religious values and symbols predominated the cultural orientations of society and provided the mores for its socio-cultural integration.

It is significant to note in this context that notwithstanding the close relationship of the religious and political institutions, both maintained some sort of distinctiveness. In other words, though the king had an important role to play in the Buddhist hierarchy, the religious hierarchical structure was distinct from that of the political hierarchy. However, the line of demarcation was always a faint one in terms of royal and priestly functions. Furthermore, although, the deification of kingship was incompatible with pure Buddhism, kingship in practice was not secularised. On the other hand, the Buddhist priesthood, though not a part of ruling elite in Ceylon still, by virtue of its power potential, turned out to be a "parallel, intertwined elite."[48] "The Sangha and State," to quote Green, were "connected by a mesh of cross cutting ties that did

[47] Bhikkhus were brought on the invitation of Vijayabahu in 1065 from Ramanna, by Vimala Dharma II in 1696 from Arakan (D.B. Jayatilata, "Sinhalese embassies to Arakan," *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society (Ceylon Branch)*, 35(93): 1940: pp. 1-6 and by Vijayaraja Singha and Kirti Siri Raja Singha from Siam in 1740 and 1750 respectivey. The present Siam Nikaya traces its origin to this. P.E. Pieris gives a very interesting account of King Kirti Siri's embassy to Siam in his article "An Account of King Siri's embassy to Siam in 1672 Saka (1750 A.D.)" in *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society (Ceylon Branch)*, 18(54): 1903, pp. 17-47. This account in fact is a translation of *Vimana Wastuva* by Ratanpala Sthavira. Also see Geiger, n. 10, pp. 198 and 203-5.

[48] Marshal R. Singer. *The Emerging Elite: A Story of Political Leadership in Ceylon* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1964), p. 19.

not differentiate their respective areas of authority but rather superimposed them. The result was not a separation but a broad complex fusion in which the jurisdiction of each party was partial, constricted and in a real sense confounded."[49]

This mutual interdependence of Sangha and State could be explained in terms of the stakes of both the parties in sustaining such a state of affairs. The final goal for the monk as well as the monarch was no doubt salvation but the immediate identical goals which both the Sangha and the monarchy had set was the welfare and moral amelioration of the people. Conflict of any sorts — social, economic, political or ideological — affected the equation between the religious and political institutions. What was desired by both in this context was the maintenance of a stable *status quo* society. Buddhist doctrine of *karma* gave a further support to this idea of *status quo* for, any challenge to the then existing social order must mean a challenge to the Buddhist doctrine of *karma*.

Political coordination and religious organisation, however, did not always go side by side. Emphasis on individualism in Buddhism seemed to cushion the impact of the *karma* doctrine to some extent. This was however more a part of monk ethics, not the lay ethics. In the temples of course there were revolts leading to the establishment of new sects. Inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral dissensions created tensions and led to conflicts resolutions of which seemed to be possible only under a strong ruler.

On the other hand, the rulers of Ceylon, in the process of mobilising their resources, seemed to be fully conscious of the force of the Dhamma and Sangha as the locus of social as well as secular legitimacy. Thus, soon after coming to power they built or repaired monasteries, held grand religious festivals and bestowed lavish grants on the Sangha. These endowments served a two-fold purpose — religious as well as political; the support of the Sangha delivered goods in this life as well as in the life to come. Apart from legitimising the authority of the kings the monks helped in rallying the masses through their religious, educational and cultural activities. "They helped the king to rule the country in peace. It was the duty of the bhikkhus according to the Vinaya to side with the kings." The kings found a powerful means of propaganda in the Sangha who had close contact with the people and great influence over them. Using their influence over the masses the monks lent "support to the king who, in return, looked after their interests. It was a matter of mutual understanding, though it was never explicitly stated."[50]

This pattern of relationship between the religion and political institutions came under a heavy strain when there were political upheavals in

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[49] Green, n. 32, p. 10.
[50] Rahula, n. 9, pp. 75-6.

the island. Political disintegration of the country inevitably affected the monastic organisations as was evident from the outcome of the frequent invasions from South Indian kingdoms during the Polonnaruva period (11th to 16th century A.D.). Dynastic disputes leading to civil wars as well as foreign invasions appeared to have reached a phase far beyond the influence of the Sangha and also beyond the strength of the local political authority to control, even if some of them were occasionally strong rulers. During this period the three fraternities seemed to have disappeared and the Sangha reverted to the old categories of the village fraternity and jungle fraternity. The great monasteries were abandoned, religious endowments were expropriated and indiscipline and decadence within the Sangha increased. The disturbed political conditions blurred the common destiny which the monarchy and the Sangha had evolved by tradition but was not altogether effaced. A further blow to this historical continuity occurred with the advent of the European powers who not only challenged the local political authority but also the indigenous religion when they imported christianity in the island.

THE LABOUR FORCE OF SARAWAK IN 1960

BY SAW SWEE-HOOK AND CHENG SIOK-HWA

INTRODUCTION

IN 1960 A SECOND CENSUS OF POPULATION WAS HELD IN SARAWAK FOLLOWING the first Census which was held in 1947. In the 1960 Census, data on the labour force were collected since such statistics have generally been recognised as of great importance to the Government in its work of planning economic development and the provision and maintenance of social service; and to business organisations in helping them to study markets and locate sources of labour supply. In the case of Sarawak the population census is the only reliable and comprehensive source of statistics on the labour force of the country.

One of the main objectives in conducting a census of population is to ascertain the size and structure of the economically active population, defined as that part of the population currently available for work in producing and distributing economic goods and services. In the 1960 Census of Sarawak the total population 15 years age and over was classified into two broad categories: those who were economically active and those who were economically inactive. Although large numbers of children below the age of 15 help in the work of their families they were excluded from the economically active population since it is generally accepted that 15 years should form the demarcation line and since information on the part-time work of children is not considered to be particularly useful.

The method used in defining the two broad categories of economically active and economically inactive persons was based on the gainful worker approach. Gainful workers are defined as those over 15 years of age, whether employed or not at the time of the census, who *usually* have an occupation from which they earned money or its equivalent, or who took part in producing marketable goods and services. This approach has two advantages over the labour force approach in that it requires less complex census questions and instructions and the data collected are less affected by temporary conditions at the time of enumeration.

The labour force thus identified was tabulated with occupation, industry and occupational status. According to definition, occupation refers to the kind of work a person does, for example, a clerk or a

farmer. In the case of people doing more than one kind of work, it was stated that, "If in the last 12 months the person has two or more jobs at different times (for example, rice farming and collecting jungle produce) or if he does two or more jobs at the same time (for instance, one in the morning and one in the afternoon) enter the job which has produced most income, whether in cash or goods, during those 12 months."[1] In the case of part-time work, enumerators were instructed as follows: "If in the last 12 months the person has worked one-third or more of the normal time (whether every day, or at different periods in the year) enter the person as doing that job. If he/she worked less than one-third enter as Student or Home Housework. A retired person may work two hours a day in an office; as this is about one-third of the usual working hours enter his job and not 'Retired'."[2]

Industry relates to the economic activity of the place of employment or business of the worker, e.g., agriculture, building construction, or banking institution. It has been described as the trade or business in which a person is working and carries on the occupation. The same occupation may be found in several industries, for example, a clerk may work in the tin industry, or for the government, or in an advertising agency. On the other hand, the same industry may include several occupations, for example, in the rice industry there are farmers, millers, importers, retailers, and so on.

The third question refers to occupational status, or in other words, class of worker. There are four categories, namely, employer, employee, own account worker and family worker. An employer is defined as a person who operates his own enterprise with one or more paid employees other than members of his own household. A person who merely engages domestic servants is not an employer. An employee is a person who works for an employer other than a member of his own household and receives wages in cash or in kind. An own account worker or self-employed worker is a person who does not engage an employee in his own enterprise. A family worker is defined as a person who works with or without pay in an enterprise operated by another member of his own household.

Economic Activity Rates

The total number of persons enumerated in the 1960 Census was 744,529, of which 413,433 persons or 56 per cent were 15 years of age and over. Of this total number of persons aged 15 and over, 71 per cent were economically active and conversely 29 per cent economically inactive. Among the males the economically active group accounted for

[1] L. W. Jones, *Report on the Census of Population of Sarawak, 1960*, Kuching: Government Printing Office, 1962, p. 105.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 105.

89 per cent while among the females aged 15 and over, 53 per cent were economically active. Due mainly to the large number of women who work the proportion of the economically active population to total population is comparatively high.

Of the economically inactive persons, about 70 per cent were home houseworkers and the remaining 30 per cent were shared almost equally among children, retired persons and others. Not surprisingly, of the home householders about 98 per cent were women.

The simplest index used in the analysis of the labour force is the crude economic activity rate which is defined as the percentage of the labour force to the total population of all ages. This crude economic activity rate indicates the proportion of the population who provides the labour upon which the economic life of the country depends, and it also gives an idea as to the magnitude of the dependency burden which the labour force has to bear. For Sarawak, the crude economic activity rate is about 40 per cent which means that in every one hundred persons sixty persons depend on the labour of forty persons for their maintenance. This rate is rather low compared with Japan, India, the United States and Thailand which have higher rates, (i.e. they have a larger proportion of their population in the labour force than was the case of Sarawak.) However, compared with Malaya, which has a rate of about 35 per cent in 1957, Sarawak's dependency burden is lighter.

The crude economic activity rate of males is always higher than that of the females. This is because women's work, though sometimes requiring a larger output of effort as in housekeeping and the nurture of children, is not considered "gainful employment" in census or survey returns and therefore they are not considered to be economically active. Though increasing, wage labour by women is still not very common in most countries, especially in the rural sections. The extent of the difference between the rate for males and the rate for females depends on social and cultural factors besides economic ones. The conventional attitude is that women should look after the home and the children while the men go out to work. This attitude is only modified through education and other social factors. Another reason for the low rate for women is that the veriety of jobs open to women is less than that available to men due in a few cases to their physical limitation, but due mainly to attitudes and prejudices regarding the suitability of women for certain jobs.

A finer index for the measurement of the extent of economic participation than the crude economic activity rate is the age-specific economic activity rate. The crude economic activity rate is very much affected by the age structure as well as the sex structure of the working population. For instance, a population with a high proportion of persons in the working ages will show a high crude economic activity rate. On

the other hand, the age-specific economic activity rate overcomes this problem by indicating the percentage of working population to the total population in a given age group, usually a quiquennial age group.

TABLE 1

AGE-SPECIFIC ECONOMIC ACTIVITY RATES BY SEX AND AGE GROUP, 1960

Age Group	Male	Female	Total
15 - 19	70.9	58.4	64.4
20 - 24	93.6	55.7	73.3
25 - 29	97.8	56.2	75.1
30 - 34	98.4	56.6	77.6
33 - 39	98.3	59.1	78.9
40 - 44	97.8	58.3	78.7
45 - 49	97.1	56.0	78.4
50 - 54	95.0	50.3	74.7
55 - 59	90.1	43.4	70.4
60 - 64	72.9	31.6	56.8
65 - 69	67.9	22.5	46.5
70 - 74	49.5	14.2	32.3
75 and over	34.1	7.8	20.6

Table 1 shows the schedule of the age-specific economic activity rates. The shape and pattern of such a schedule are determined to a large extent by cultural and economic factors which determine also the extent of the gaps between the rates for males and females at every age group. The rates for women depend a great deal on the general attitude of the people towards working women. The schedule for females drops from ages 20 to 29 due to the large number of women who withdraw from the labour force on becoming maried and/or bearing children. After the age of 30 the rate increases till the peak is reached in the 35-39 age group, after which the rate declines steadily. The drop is less abrupt because most of the women, particularly those from the indigenous communities, are engaged in agricultural occupations. From the age of 15 to 50 the rate hovers between 55 and 60 per cent. In the case of the males, the rate is consistently higher than that of the females and between the ages of 20 and 59 the rate is more than 90 per cent, reaching the peak of 98.4 per cent in the age group 30-34 years.

INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE

There are three broad industrial groups into which the economically active population can be classified, namely, primary, secondary and tertiary. Primary industries are defined to include agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing, and mining and quarrying; secondary industries include manufacturing, and building and construction; and tertiary in-

dustries include commerce, transport and communications, electricity, water supply and sanitary services, services (business, personal and recreational) and government.

TABLE 2

DISTRIBUTION OF LABOUR FORCE BY THREE BROAD INDUSTRIAL GROUPS, 1960.

Industrial Group	Number			Per Cent		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Primary	138,650	103,355	242,005	75.3	93.9	82.2
Secondary	14,697	1,416	16,113	7.9	1.3	5.5
Tertiary	30,867	5,300	36,167	16.8	4.8	12.3
Total	184,214	110,071	294,285	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 2 shows the industrial distribution of the labour force and the pattern of manpower resources utilization in Sarawak. A large percentage, over 80 per cent, are engaged in primary industries of which agriculture predominates. This high proportion of the labour force in agriculture, together with the large proportion of children under 15 years of age, confirm the well-known fact that Sarawak is underdeveloped economically. The proportion in the near future will depend to a large extent on the rate of population growth and the rate of industrialisation.

Only 5.5 per cent or 17,000 of the labour force are engaged in secondary industries of which manufacturing (accounting for 3.9 per cent while building and construction accounted for 1.6 per cent) is the most important. This figure is very low indeed compared with the 1957 figures of 9.8 per cent for Malaya and 19.7 per cent for Singapore. The proportion of the labour force engaged in tertiary industries is 12.3 per cent, more than double that engaged in secondary industries. This pattern of distribution in which primary industries absorbed a very large majority while secondary industries are quite insignificant is even more marked in the case of the female labour force. 93.9 per cent of women workers are in primary industries while only 1.3 per cent are in secondary industries. The vast proportion of women find gainful employment mainly in agriculture.

OCCUPATIONAL PATTERN

Table 3 shows the pattern of occupational distribution of the working population in 1960. This classification by occupation is another way of presenting the economic characteristics of the population. The two classifications, one by industry, the other by occupation, overlap to some extent; for instance, the number of agricultural workers and

fishermen correspond very closely to the number of workers engaged in agricultural and fishing industries respectively.

The predominant occupations as revealed in Table 3 are agriculture, forestry and fishing. 81.5 per cent of the labour force are engaged as agricultural and forestry workers, fishermen, hunters and trappers. The remaining one-fifth of the economically active population are scattered among the other occupations.

TABLE 3

DISTRIBUTION OF LABOUR FORCE BY SEX AND OCCUPATION, 1960.

Occupation	Number			Per Cent		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Professional, Technical and Related Workers	4,530	1,690	6,220	2.5	1.5	2.1
Administrative, Executive and Managerial Workers	989	21	1,010	0.5	0	0.3
Clerical Workers	3,890	496	4,386	2.1	0.4	1.5
Sales Workers	10,740	1,108	11,848	5.8	1.0	4.0
Agricultural Workers, Forestry Workers, Fishermen, Hunters and Trappers	136,247	103,581	239,828	74.0	94.1	81.5
Miners, Quarrymen, and Related Workers	178	1	179	0.1	0	0.1
Workers in Transport and Communication Occupations	4,191	64	4,255	2.3	0.1	1.4
Craftsmen, Production Process Workers and Labourers not classified elsewhere	18,641	1,287	19,928	10.1	1.2	6.8
Service, Sports, Entertainment and Recreation Workers	4,808	1,823	6,631	2.6	1.7	2.3
Total	184,214	110,071	294,285	100.0	100.0	100.0

Comparing males with females, it can be seen that females work mainly as agricultural workers, forestry workers, and so on. This group accounts for 94.1 per cent of the female working force. Two groups of occupations are almost completely monopolised by men, namely the administrative, executive and managerial occupations which had only 21 women compared with 989 men; and the mining and quarrying occupations which reported only 1 female compared with 178 males.

Within the category of agricultural workers, forestry workers, etc. about 80 per cent or 190,000 of the workers worked on smallholdings

while most of the remainder, about 38,000 were rubber tappers. Forestry work claimed about 5,000 persons while just over 4,000 persons gave their main occupation as fishing. This last figure is rather deceptive with regard to the total amount of labour put into fishing due to the large number of persons who take up fishing as a secondary occupation depending on the seasons and the weather. 71 per cent of the workers in agriculture, about 170,000 persons, are engaged in growing rice or mainly rice.

Occupational Status

About 80 per cent of the working population are own-account workers and family workers (35 and 45 per cent respectively). This stresses the importance of the family concern which in most cases consists of a farm. Only one-fifth of the working population are employees while employers account for only 1.1 per cent of the total working population.

TABLE 4

Distribution of Labour Force by Sex, Occupational Status, 1960

Status	Number			Per Cent		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Employer	3,022	137	3,159	1.6	0.1	1.1
Employee	48,053	8,736	56,789	26.1	7.9	19.3
Own Account Worker	92,189	10,103	102,292	50.1	9.2	34.7
Family Worker	40,950	91,095	132,045	22.2	82.8	44.9
Total	184,214	110,071	294,285	100.0	100.0	100.0

The pattern of distribution differs somewhat for males and females. Most of the women were family workers (83 per cent) while most of the men were own account workers (50 per cent); and 26 per cent of the working men were employees while 22 per cent were family workers. Only 9 per cent of the women were own account workers and about 8 per cent were employees. Employers of the female sex are rare indeed, accounting for only 0.1 per cent compared with 1.6 per cent for the men.

Table 5 gives detailed figures for the distribution of the labour force by occupation and occupational status. About 3,000 persons were employers, of which nearly half are engaged as sales workers, the largest category. The largest number of employees were found among agricultural workers, forestry workers, fishermen, hunters and trappers (16,700), and craftsmen, production process workers and labourers (16,800). In both the case of own account workers and family workers, the majority was found in the agricultural workers, etc. category. This reflected the importance of agriculture and agricultural pursuits in Sa-

rawak. Except for the sales workers category and the agricultural workers, etc. category, employees accounted for the largest proportion of the working population in all the listed groups of occupations. A large proportion of the employees were government employees.

TABLE 5

DISTRIBUTION OF LABOUR FORCE BY OCCUPATION AND OCCUPATIONAL STATUS, 1960

Occupation	Own Account			
	Employer	Employee	Worker	Family Worker
Professional, Technical and Related Workers	45	5,930	219	26
Administrative, Executive and Managerial Workers	223	665	104	18
Clerical Workers	34	4,295	38	19
Sales Workers	1,475	3,575	4,899	1,899
Agricultural Workers, Forestry Workers, Fishermen, Hunters and Trappers	527	16,712	93,470	129,119
Miners, Quarrymen and Related Workers	3	104	51	21
Workers in Transport and Communications Occupations	59	3,589	575	32
Craftsmen, Production Process Workers and Labourers not classified elsewhere	466	16,824	2,037	601
Service, Sport, Entertainment and Recreation Workers	327	5,095	899	310
Total	3,159	56,789	102,292	132,045

THE CHINESE IN THE PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION

PHILIP GINSBERG

LITTLE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN WRITTEN ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE Philippine Chinese in the revolution, or its effects upon them. Yet the Chinese played an integral, if sometimes ambivalent, part in the upheaval around the turn of the century, and the relation of the Chinese community to those among whom they lived was profoundly affected.

The careful, detailed study of all aspects of this situation remains as an interesting challenge to scholars with access to Spanish and Philippine documents. But English-language sources provide many clues to the direction such investigation might take, and the following is an attempt to present some of the conclusions derived from a survey of these sources, offered as a modest introduction, in the nature of an appetizer, to a neglected subject.

DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-CHINESE PREJUDICE

After the expulsion of the bulk of the Chinese population by the Spanish in 1766, a period of relative stability in Chinese-Spanish relations followed. The Chinese were limited to about 5,000 in a total population of around 3 million, enough to carry out the economic functions in trade and the crafts the Spanish found essential, but not enough to be a threat physically.[1] After the turn of the century, the Philippines moved gradually from a subsistence to an export economy, and around the middle of the nineteenth century, the Spanish conceived a desire to further develop the Philippine economy. The Chinese were seen as a key element in this development, and once more immigration was encouraged. By the 1880's the Chinese population had soared to nearly 100,000.[2] As the Chinese were freed of restraints on immigration and mobility with the country, they spread through the Philippines, displacing many of the mestizos[3] who dominated wholesale and retail

[1] Edgar Wickberg, *The Chinese in Philippine Life*, 1850-1898, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965) pp. 146, 147.

[2] *Report of the Philippine Commission to the President (1900)* Vol. II, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900) p. 442; Edgar Wickberg, "The Chinese Mestizo in Philippine History," *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, March, 1964, p. 90.

[3] "Mestizo" will be used to mean "Chinese Mestizo," i.e. one with a mixture of Chinese and native Filipino ancestry, usually through a Chinese male and a native woman, originally. The term "Spanish mestizo" will be used to specify the corresponding mixture of Spanish and native blood.

trade, driving them into landholding and the production and gathering of export crops. Less well-to-do *mestizos* took up crafts and other trades more like those of the native Filipino than those of the Chinese.

Before this unprecedented immigration in the mid-nineteenth century, most of the few Chinese in the Philippines had clustered around the several urban Spanish settlements, notably Manila, to which they provided trade goods and services neither the natives nor the Spaniards could or would provide. In a predominantly rural native population, few thus had much contact with the Chinese, and conflict was further minimized by the fact that the Chinese rarely performed services that were also performed by the natives. Though the Filipinos generally supported the Spanish against the Chinese, what anti-Chinese sentiment existed appears to have been related to the natives' cultural identification with the Spanish, such as it was, in connection with Catholicism, and not to economic conflict. [4]

But as immigration grew and the Chinese took advantage of their new mobility within the country to spread into Luzon and to some of the southern islands, they became distinctly more noticeable. From 1847 to the 1880's, the total population increased by a factor of less than two, while the 100,000 or so Chinese, still less than two per cent of the population, were 15 times as numerous in the 1880's as they had been 40 years earlier. Everywhere they moved into new fields becoming coolies and coolie-brokers, wholesalers and retailers, artisans and exporters. And everywhere the Chinese competed, usually with great success, against those who had taken advantage of their absence after 1766 to carve out their own places in the Philippine economy. As noted above, they took over retailing from the mestizos. They competed for manual labor as coolies against the growing urban class of natives in Manila; and even the increasing flow of Spaniards, attracted from the homeland by the prospect of taking a share of the great growth, came into conflict with the skilled and aggressive Chinese businessman. Now for the first time the anti-Chinese feeling grew from an economic base and became nationwide. [5]

A cholera epidemic in 1879, in which the highly mobile Chinese were suspected of having acted as carriers, and perhaps an attempt by the Spanish to use the Chinese as scapegoats in the face of growing rebelliousness among the natives, may have contributed to anti-Chinese feeling as well, along with the economic depression in Manila in the 1880's. By the eve of the revolution in 1896, a group of merchants and manufacturers in Manila was petitioning the Spanish government for a suspension of Chinese immigration and asking that they be barred from

[4] Edgar Wickberg, "Early Chinese Economic Influence in the Philippines, 1850-1898," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XXXV, No. 3, Fall, 1962, pp. 276, 277.
[5] Ibid., pp. 278-285; Wickberg, *The Chinese*, pp. 147-150.

manufacturing and commerce. Their views, they said, ". . . they believe to be an echo of the people."[6] No one wanted to see all the Chinese leave, an exporter resident 24 years in Manila told the first Philippine Commission as war went on a few years later: "Everybody wants his own Chinaman, but I don't think they generally make good citizens."[7]

And among those who shared this view, not the least convinced were many of the Chinese mestizos, descendants of immigrants who had faced similar prejudice a generation or two before, now members of a new class that took for its own Catholic and Hispanicized values that perpetuated that prejudice. ". . . as Filipino nationalism developed, the leaders who declaimed against the Chinese most violently had almost invariably Chinese blood in their veins."[8]

Feelings Toward the Chinese in the Revolution

When the revolution began in August 1896, the Chinese in Manila were immediately concerned for the safety of Chinese laborers working with the Spanish army, and stories circulated in Manila that the revolutionaries intended to kill all Spaniards and all Chinese.[9] The American commander intercepted and forwaded to Washington a document purporting to be from a high insurgent official, addressed to his troops and instructing them that only Philippine families should be spared, all others, of whatever race, to be "exterminated without any compassion after the extermination of the [Spanish] Army of Occupation."[10] The document was widely circulated as proof of the insurgents' disregard of the standards of civilized warfare, and it was only somewhat later that its authenticity was shown to be suspect.[11]

In fact, Emilio Aguinaldo, with one eye on the rest of the world in hopes that support for the uprising would be forthcoming, was at great pains to discourage any act that would reflect on his government's ability to maintain order. Shortly after Admiral Dewey had defeated the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay in May, 1898, Aguinaldo issued his first major proclamation. He called on his people to justify American support (which he still believed at that point was for Philippine independence rather than American interest) by refraining from pillage and robbery. "The lives and properties of all foreigners shall be respected,

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[6] Quoted in *Report of the Philippine Commission to the President (1900)* Vols. I, III, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901), (in U.S. Senate Documents, No. 138, 56th Cong., 1st Sess.), p. 152.

[7] *Report*, Vol. 55, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

[8] Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*, (Oxford: Orford University Press, 1951), p. 625.

[9] Wickberg, *The Chinese*, p. 232.

[10] Quoted in E. S. Otis, *Annual Report of Major General E. S. Otis*, (June, 1898-August, 1899), (Manila, P.I., 1899), p. 182.

[11] *Facts About the Filipinos*, Vols. I-X, (Boston: Philippine Information Society, May 1-Sept. 15, 1901), Vol. I, No. 6, July 15, 1901, p. 36.

including in this denomination the Chinese and all Spaniards who have not directly or indirectly contributed to the bearing of arms against us," he wrote.[12] Aguinaldo's hand-written instructions to bolo-carrying troops in Manila the following January, a month before fighting broke out between the Filipinos and Americans, included a similar warning, mentioning the Chinese specifically.[13] Even the constitution of the "Revolutionary Government," promulgated in June, 1898, included a specific provision against robbery and arson, of which the Chinese and the Spanish religious were the most prominent victims, though without mentioning either group by name.[14]

The political documents of the revolutionaries seemed to reveal the gradual growth of an idea of citizenship independent of race in the republic-to-be. The Tagalog proclamation of 1897 called for "legal equality for all persons,"[15] and looked forward to a government in which "the most able, the most worthy in virtue and talent, may take part *without distinction of birth, fortune, or race.*" The constitution promulgated in January, 1899, by the first representative congress of the revolutionaries, provided for citizenship as "Filipino"for foreigners obtaining certificates of naturalization, and also for those establishing residence for two years in one place, "having an open abode and known mode of living, and contributing to all the charges of the nation"[16] not particularly exclusive standards, even for the often-mobile Chinese. A number of the provisions for civil rights (protection against unlawful search, arrest, etc.) specifically included in their coverage "foreign residents" as well as the constitutionally defined "Filipino."

Nevertheless, there was ample reason for one contemporary observer to note that "under a native government the lot of the Chinese is not likely to be a happy one."[17] In view of the widespread economic conflict between the Chinese and all classes of Filipinos, it is logical that the revolutionaries would consider trying to stem the immigration that led to the conflict. Aguinaldo, en route home from the exile in Hong Kong that followed the truce with the Spanish in 1897, stopped off in Singapore. On the basis of an interview with the revolutionary leader, the *Singapore Free Press* in May, 1898, under the heading, "Aguinaldo's Policy," included a provision that under an independent government with temporary American protection "safeguards [be] enacted against

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[12] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, No. 3, p. 93.
[13] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, No. 6, p. 36.
[14] John Foreman, *The Philippine Islands*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899), pp. 599-606, quoted in.
[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 542, 543.
[16] Quoted in *Communications between the executive departments of the Government and Aguinaldo*, etc., Senate Document No. 208, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., (in Senate Docs., 1st Sess., 56th Cong., Vol. XII, 1899-1900, No. 3854), p. 108.
[17] Foreman, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

an influx of Chinese aliens who would compete with the industrial population of the country."[18]

Where the revolutionary leadership, dealing with the Chinese more or less in the astract, could afford a certain degree of benevolence, the common people might be expected to react somewhat differently. The native Filipino laborer, beginning to develop a sense of the nationalism that had been at first confined to the upper, educated class, used to seeing the Chinese holding a central position in labor and commerce and apparently prospering, suddenly conscious that what he is learning to value as his heritage the Chinese has always rejected—this Filipino revolutionary may in fact have thought, as the wealthy and powerful Chinese businessman Carlos Palanca (Tan Quien-sien) told the Philippine Commission, that the Chinese should "cut off their queues and join" the revolution.[19] In any case, the violence against the Chinese which began almost from the first minutes of the revolution was probably more an expression of old antagonisms given new license by unsettled conditions, than an expression of revolutionary policy, either encouraged or condoned by the leadership. It would be understandable, however, if the distinction were lost on those Chinese unfortunate enough to be its victims.

Thus, the great expansion and spread of the Chinese population in the second half of the nineteenth century laid the base for a kind of anti-Chinese sentiment different from what had existed before, based now on conomic rivalry. These sentiments were common within the classes that provided both the leadership and the rank-and-file of the revolution.

Yet in the formal programs and declarations of the revolution there was little of the institutionalized anti-Chinese expression one might expect. The Spanish friars, whose extensive role in civic and social matters provided much of the stimulus to revolution, probably seemed the more logical focus for the rising sentiments of nationalism, when a personalized enemy was needed for ideological or psychological reasons.

In addition, the Chinese benefited from the attempts of the revolutionary leaders to prevent civil violence as part of an effort to create an overall impression of order and control in hopes of securing recognition for their government from other nations. It seems likely that the rhetoric of the leadership, which included a number of general statements of universal equality, helped prevent the kind of systematic slaughter of Chinese that the natives had participated in under the Spanish in previous centuries. Given the prevailing sentiment among the revolutionaries, such massacres might well have been repeated during the revolution if any encouragement from the higher leadership had been

[18] Quoted in *Facts*, Vol. I, No. 2, May 15, 1901, p. 16.
[19] *Report*, Vol. II, p. 278.

forthcoming. Nevertheless, even without official legitimation, violence born of prejudice and conflict claimed many Chinese as its victims, as we shall see in more detail.

Chinese Attitudes Toward Others

Many Chinese in the Philippines had found it expedient to secure Spanish protection. Tan Quien-sien became a Catholic under the patronage of Col. Carlos Palanca y Gutierrez, and Francisco Osorio, father of the mestizo revolutionary martyr, Francisco Osorio, was one of many Chinese who took Spanish citizenship.[20] This (earnestness) of civic and cultural loyalty to Spain facilitated the business dealings to which active Chinese merchants naturally aspired. Palanca served as a sort of Spanish representative in the Chinese community, which he dominated through most of his life, overseeing tax collection and intervening with the authorities on behalf of Chinese involved with the law.[21] Osorio procured supplies for the Spanish arsenal at Cavite.[22]

Such activities, no doubt multiplied many times by the participation of other members of the Chinese community, put the Chinese in a somewhat compromised position when it came to considering supporting the revolutionaries. In addition, even among those Chinese most closely allied with the Spanish there were limits to the commitment to Spanish culture; increasing numbers of Manila Chinese toward the end of the century, for example, sent their children back to China to be educated (including Palanca himself, whose mestizo son became a Confucian scholar.) "The more Chinese one became, the more likely one was to challenge Spanish claims of cultural superiority with like claims of one's own."[23]

As the revolution went on, the attitude of the Chinese, their military neutrality by then confirmed by non-participation, was probably typified by Palanca's statement to the Philippine Commission: business was slow, especially for coolies; "As soon as everything is settled there will be more work and they will be able to get more." The 8,000 to 10,000 coolies in Manila's Chinese population of 40,000 to 50,000, though many were employed by the Americans, may well have looked forward to the end of the revolution.[24] General Otis judged that the Chinese favored stable government to facilitate trade, and lacked any patriotic inclinations, a combination which rendered their conduct "anomalous." "Within our

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[20] Wickberg, *The Chinese*, pp. 199, 200, and F. N. P. 156.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 200.

[22] Arsenio E. Manuel, *Dictionary of Philippine Biography*, (Quezon City: Filipiniana Publications, 1955) pp. 296-298.

[23] Wickberg, *The Chinese*, pp. 148, 168, 200.

[24] *Report* I, pp. 153, 154; *Report* II, p. 442. The estimate of the number of coolies was given the commission by the Chinese sugar exporter and general importer, A.R.M. Ongeakwe, a 22-year resident of Manila. (*Report* II, p. 219).

military lines they are ardent friends of the Americans," he wrote, "and beyond, a good many are apparently active insurgents." [25]

In Manila, however, a working relationship was quickly established between the Chinese and the American troops, who were moved from the center of the city after a few days to occupy and protect Binondo, the seat of Chinese commerce in Manila. Chinese small business did a brisk trade with the American innocents abroad, supplying all the necessities of life, including souvenir hats and relics from burned-out churches. [26] Bigger businessmen as well were quick to take the opportunity to serve the Americans in some of the same ways they had served the Spanish. It would not have escaped them that the American force was larger, and as the months passed, richer than the relatively small Spanish garrison had ever been. The Manila Chinese businessman, A.R.M. Ongcakwe, confirmed for the Philippine Commission that the Chinese community was "very friendly" to the United States. [27]

As time went by, Chinese reservations about the Spanish way of life must have been reinforced by the precipitous decline of Spanish power, first in the face of the surprisingly determined and effective revolutionary forces, and later before the onslaught of the Americans, whose numbers and wealth at such a distance from their own shores signified their arrival as a full-scale world power.

Many among the Chinese masses had felt directly or observed first-hand the anger of the native Filipino masses, with whom they were in direct economic competition, expressed in revolutionary violence, and some Chinese were certainly conscious of the growing alienation from their Chinese heritage of many Chinese mestizos among the revolutionaries. Their own alienation from revolutionary politics provided the Chinese with the conditions for a neutrality that made possible commerce with both sides; and all commerce, disrupted by wartime conditions, would be facilitated by the restoration of order. The Americans, in addition to being the most likly force to restore such order, were a major new source of business and employment.

The Chinese and the Revolution

Business. The ubiquitous Carlos Palanca (Tan Quien-sien) would almost seem to have been at the dock when the American forces arrived.

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[25] Otis., *op. cit.*, p. 57. General Otis may well have confused, or lumped together, Chinese and mestizos. It should be kept in mind that to a non-professional or careless observer the distinction between a Chinese mestizo who lived and worked with Chinese, and a full-blooded Chinese, would not be apparent. To some, presumably, a mestizo living and working among Filipinos might still seem a Chinese.

[26] Foreman, *op. cit.*, pp. 400, 621; William Thaddeus Sexton, *Soldiers in the Sun*, (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1939), p. 54; Frederick Funston, *Memories of Two Wars*, (New York; Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914), p. 209.

[27] *Report*, II., p. 219.

He built the Americans their first set of rattan-and-bamboo barracks, at a cost of $32,000. They were pleased sufficiently to contract for another set, this time at $42,000; the cost of materials had gone up, the quartermaster said.[28] This was not, however, Palanca's first commercial effort of the revolution. When Aguinaldo was setting up his revolutionary government, Palanca approached a friend of the insurgent leader about the possibility of an opium monopoly.[29]

Palanca was not alone among Chinese (and certainly mestizos, as well) doing what must have been profitable business with the Americans. The quartermaster paid $30,000 for steam launches named Lee Fat, Kar Shun, and Com King.[30] Buildings were needed to house American troops and their equipment; almost a quarter of the monthly rentals of $18,000 went to Chinese or mestizos.[31]

Certainly one of the largest war-time business stimulated by the arrival of the Americans was the supplying of labor. The Americans decided early to hire labor almost entirely by contract, and the Chinese coolie-brokers had available disciplined and industrious gangs of workers ready for hiring.[32] More than 108,000 was spent in the 10 months ending in June, 1899, for the hiring of coolie and native labor, the equivalent of 270,000 man-days at the common rate of 40 cents a day (some of it probably went for carabao-cart drivers, at more than $1 a day). A large part of this money must have gone into the pockets of Chinese coolie-brokers, as well as the coolies themselves.

The carters transported supplies and ammunition from the Cavite arsenal to troops at the front. Others unloaded coal, worked as boatmen and litter-bearers, and served as laborers repairing the railroad from Manila to Malolos. Before a bridge could be constructed to carry an engine to the other side of the river, coolies pushed railroad trains loaded with supplies for troops in San Fernando. Surveying their efforts both as skilled and unskilled workers, the quartermaster said, "... it is difficult to see what could be done without the Chinese...."

Wearing tags so the Americans could keep track of them, many of the laborers serving at the front must have come under fire regularly, from almost the beginning of the fighting. Danger and difficult conditons in the field were not the only unpleasant aspects of the war they endured; an American officer with the "disagreeable job" of burying the dead found a quartermaster with Chinese laborers to take it off his

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[28] Otis, *op. cit.*, appendix D, pp. 62, 64.

[29] Jose Alejandrino, *The Price of Freedom* (Manila, 1949), pp. 227, 228, cited by Wickberg, *The Chinese*, p. 201.

[30] Otis, *op. cit.*, appendix D, p. 69. Only the names of the vessels indicate probable, not confirmed, Chinese ownership.

[31] By name. Otis., *op. cit.*, appendix D. pp. 35, 36.

[32] Except where otherwise noted, details of the following discussion are from the Depot Quartermaster's annual report, in Otis, appendix D, pp. 5-67.

hands.[33] And the contract to clean cesspools and remove sewerage from the American quarters was held, of course, by the Chinese. In such unheralded ways, and innumberable others, did the lowly Chinese immigrant make possible the prosecution of the war, and added to the fortunes of some of his predecessors as immigrants.

Chinese were also involved on the revolutionary side, though generally on a smaller scale. Some collected lead scraps, including beer-bottle seals, melted them into bars, and sold them to the revolutionaries, who cast them into desperately needed rifle ammunition.[34] Others made bolos for the more primitively equipped revolutionary forces, until the American provost-marshall intervened.[35] Chinese also provided the manual labor to build a large part of the extensive system of trenches the insurgents built around Manila before fighting began with the Americans.[36]

Military. Against the background of general Chinese neutrality, commercial service to the Americans, and small-scale or at most forced contribution to the revolutionary cause, the extraordinary career of Hou A-p'ao, leader of the Manila Triad Society, stands out in stark contrast. When the revolution began against the Spanish in 1896, the Triad Society (*T'ien Ti Hui*) under Hou A-p'ao came into the open for the first time; Hou offered himself and 3,000 supporters to General Aguinaldo to fight the Spanish.[37]

Hou, who was said to have married a sister of Aguinaldo,[38] was active as a military leader against the Spanish (though it is not clear whether any signficant number of other Chinese fought in the revolution), and went to Hong Kong with Aguinaldo after the truce with the fading Spanish regime at the end of 1897. When fighting resumed against the Americans a little more than a year later he returned to the Philippines with Aguinaldo, cut off his queue, and led force in Albay province until well into 1900, when it became obvious the revolution could not succeed. General Otis called him "one of the ablest insurgent general officers,"[39] and he set up a foundry in Cavite to supply the revolutionary forces, but it was as a fund-raiser that he was best known. He ranged through Albay (now Legaspi) soliciting (some said extorting) contributions from the residents, including many Chinese. Over five months in a town of 13,000 he raised $8,000, at least half or probably all of which was

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[33] Funston, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

[34] James A. LeRoy, *The Americans in the Philippines,* Vol. I, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, the Riverside Press Cambridge, 1914), p. 244; Memorandum of a[n American] Secret Agent," quoted in *Facts,* Vol. I, No. 10, Sept. 15, 1901, pp. 23, 24.

[35] Otis., *op. cit.*, p. 117.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

[37] Wickberg, *The Chinese,* p. 202.

[38] *Report* II, p. 19.

[39] *Ibid.*, appendix, Exhibit 1, p. 423.

contributed by Chinese residents. In a later five-month period he sent the revolution treasury, it was said, some $200,000.[40]

It was as neutrals, seeking business opportunities on both sides, that the Chinese played their major role in the revolution, a role which grew when the Americans arrived. As contractor and entrepreneur, as laborer and carter, the Chinese made it possible for the Americans to fight a type of war to which they were not well-adapted, in a strange and debilitating climate. The Chinese came under fire and did many of the war's dirtiest jobs; but they did them not out of any interest in the politics of the revolution, but in the hope of reaching the goal of financial security that had brought them to the Philippines in the first place. The advent of the Americans was greeted by the Chinese not mainly for any political reasons, but because it held out a possibility of the peace and vigorous resumption of commerce which were prerequisite to that financial security.

The career of Huo A-p'ao is notable in this context because it seems to have been unique for a Chinese. It made him part of a revolution which often, though more in the violence it allowed than in the violence it directed, took the Chinese as its victim. He became, as Wickberg says, [41] "not a Chinese leader, but a Filipino leader;" this was at a time when to be a "Filipino leader" was either to encourage or to tolerate, by inclination or by necessity, the expression of anti-Chinese sentiments. Under these conditions few other Chinese chose to take the course Huo followed.

Prejudice, Violence, and the Chinese Reaction

Murder, Extortion, Flight. It is characteristic that in the opening days of the revolution against the Spanish, Chinese were among the first victims; in the first 10 days of fighting, before the Spanish governor-general had even signed a declaration of war on the rebels, a number of Chinese were waylaid and killed in the outskirts of Manila.[42] Mobs in Camarines and Bulacan slaughtered Chinese, 30 in one town, 20 in another, sometimes on the orders of insurgent commanders, sometimes apparently on their own initiative. In the Visayan island of Samar, an insurgent general ordered all Chinese killed in a number of coastal towns. Itinerant Chinese traders moving through the interior disappeared.[43] An American businessman, asked by a member of the Philippine Commission how he would deal with Chinese when fighting subsided, said,

[40] LeRoy, Vol. II, p. 101, F.N.
[41] Wickberg, *The Chinese*, p. 203.
[42] LeRoy, Vol. I, p. 90.
[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 101-102; LeRoy, Vol. II, p. 186; Otis, pp. 54-55; Dean C. Worcester, *The Philippines, Past and Present*, (Vols. I, II) (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1914), Vol. I, p. 214.

"I don't know how many will be left when this war is over." [44] Carlos Palanca closed one Commission meeting with the gruesome story of a Chinese cloth-peddler stabbed and beaten to death in a provincial town, and appealed for protection by the provost-marshall. [45]

Other Chinese kept their lives but became victims of various forms of extortion. Chinese storekeepers in Bikol were forced to pay $75,000 for the return of their property. Others in Albay province were made to "contribute" cloth for uniforms and provisions, in additon to $5,000. Nevertheless, General Paua complained a week later that the insurgents had killed 13 Chinese, wounded 19 more, and "ruined a number of others." [46] The Chinese suffered from the Spanish as well: provincial governors and parish priests had numerous suspects arrested, often indiscriminately, and shipped from all over the country to Manila, where they were unloaded onto the docks in cargo nets like bales of abaca. More than 4,000 prisoners (including a number of prominent mestizos, and probably some Chinese) filled the jails to overflowing. [47]

Although they suffered widespread looting and destruction, the Manila Chinese merchants escaped what would have been the devastating effects of the American bombardment of the city; the Binondo section was undamaged by the shelling. The Iloilo merchants were similarly fortunate, though not necessarily because of a petition they submitted to General Otis. Rather, the Americans didn't find it necessary to bombard the city; the insurgents, fleeing as the Americans landed, set fire to the native section of the city, but the "foreign inhabitants" were spared. [48] Others were not so lucky: after the Chinese had been driven from their section of Cebu, it was bombarded by a cruiser, caught fire, and was "totally destroyed;" undisciplined insurgent troops in the northern Luzon commercial center of Tuguegarao inflicted "incalculable" losses on the Chinese merchants.[49] Bandits, too, (although the distinction between "bandits" and "insurgents" was lost on many observers and difficult to make in many cases), robbed numerous other Chinese. [50]

In the face of such unbridled force, against which the Spanish, even if they had wanted to, could not protect them, many Chinese fled.

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[44] *Report* II, p. 89.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 277.

[46] LeRoy, Vol. I, pp. 279, 338; *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 172; Worcester, p. 214.

[47] Charles Burke Elliott, *The Philippines — To the End of the Military Regime*, (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1916), p. 193; Foreman, p. 522.

[48] Moorfield Story and Marcial P. Lichauco, *The Conquest of the Philippines by the United States*, 1898-1925, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, The Knickerbocker Press, 1926), p. 130; Foreman, p. 616; *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain and Conditions Growing Out of the Same, Including the Insurrection in The Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition, Between the Adjutant-General of the Army and Military Commanders...* (April 15, 1898, to July 30, 1902), 2 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902), Vol. II, p. 903.

[49] Foreman, pp. 551-553; Worcester, p. 176.

[50] W. Cameron Forbes, *The Philippine Islands*, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1928), Vol. I, p. 223; Worcester, p. 162.

They converged on Manila in large numbers; many of those who could afford it went on to Hong Kong, and among the most wealthy, some went to Europe and elsewhere. A British firm running steamer service charged $8 for passage to Hong Kong before the battle of Manila Bay, $50 for cabins. After the Americans wiped out the Spanish fleet and war seemed imminent between the revolutionaries and the Americans, the cost of deck passage went up to $20-30, and cabins were $125. In the first four months of fighting, 5,000 Chinese went to Hong Kong, some five per cent of the entire Chinese population. [51]

Growth of "National Consciousness." As the effectiveness of social institutions declined along with Spanish power in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the Chinese were thrown increasingly on their own resources. Broadly based organization developed within the Chinese community to perform new functions for its residents, where before only the secret societies and clan or commercial groups had functioned. Community-wide charitable projects were begun; later a Chinese cemetery and hospital were built to fill needs the larger community was either unable or unwilling to fill for the Spanish were increasingly unable to protect them, drove the Chinese to think more of protecting themselves. As the sense of what Wickberg calls "national consciousness" developed (as opposed to nationalism directed toward China) within the community, it was paralleled by a growing sense of "Chineseness." Many Chinese, as we have seen, sent their mestizo children to China to be educated, and there was a growing tendency to think of China as a homeland.

The Chinese of Manila came to look to the Ch'ing administration for protection, requesting periodically in the last two decades of the century that a consulate be established or that gunboats be sent for their protection. Community leaders developed political relations with the Ch'ing, and when the outbreak of the revolution in 1896 brought an increase in anti-Chinese incidents, the question arose again. China asked that Great Britain be made agent for the Philippine Chinese; the Spanish agreed. The British then negotiated with the Spanish or revolutionaries for redress of Chinese complaints. After the Americans entered the picture, the Chinese communicated directly with Washington. When fighting began in February, 1899, the Chinese government asked the Americans for protection for Chinese in the Philippines; later it interceded on behalf of a shipload of Chinese from Amoy who had run afoul of the exclusion laws hastily imposed by the military administration. [52] The revolution served to speed and consolidate the sinifica-

[51] Wickberg, *The Chinese*, p. 119; Foreman, pp. 518, 575, 585; *Report* II, Testimony of William A. Daland.

[52] *Correspondence*, Vol. II, pp. 901, 1073.

tion and identification with China that had begun in the latter part of the century. [53]

Disruption in Business

As in most wars, there were times and places during the revolution at which business continued as usual, or perhaps even better than usual. Despite the fears of some foreign officials, trade in Manila continued in full swing in the early month of the war, through the end of 1896. During their short interregnum control of the port, the revolutionaries were restrained from interfering with trade by the considerable duties they collected; the same was true in Iloilo, where direct trade continued with Singapore and the China coast, as well as Manila, from where ships were also sent to the nearby ports. In much of this trade the Chinese, as brokers and distributors on all levels, participated. The disruption of coastwise trade by the war distorted demand in some areas, a situation which a Chinese merchant with substantial stock or good connections would be in good position to take advantage of. Another sort of trader in a good position to seize such opportunity was the smuggler; he was often Chinese. The inflation that came with the war must have affected a wide range of commodities; the price of an *arroba* of *vino del piez,* the wine made from the sap of the nipa palm, went from about 60 cents before the war to $1.87 later; distilling *vino del piez* was an activity dominated by the Chinese.[54] Such effects of the war were felt nowhere more strongly than in the rice industry, which Chinese also dominated. The disruption of shipping and the distorted demand made trade in rice, the major staple of the Philippine diet, an area of vast opportunity. Chinese rice traders, already strongly placed in the business, were able to collect export products and deliver rice throughout the Philippines, even under wartime conditions; fortunes were made between 1896 and 1902, and the Chinese probably emerged even more dominant in the rice trader than before. [55]

As we have seen, however, the disruptive effects of the war on trade, and especially on those Chinese participating in it, were not limited to the disruption of supplies and the distortion of demand. Revolutionaries looted and destroyed Chinese businesses; bandits robbed them and threatened their owners. Large merchants and the wealthy were made victims of extortion; small merchants, trekking through the interior with their goods on their backs, disappeared forever. Many Chinese, including some who formed vital links in the highly articulated

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[53] Except where noted the discussion above of the growth of "national consciousness" is based upon Wickberg, *The Chinese*, pp. 147, 168, 203-204, 232.

[54] Foreman, p. 526; Otis, p. 117; *Facts*, Vol. I, No. 5, July 1, 1901, pp. 17-19; *Facts*, Vol. I, No. 8, Aug. 15, 1901, p. 33; *Report* II, p. 271; Frederic H. Sawyer, *The Inhabitants of the Philippines*, (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, and Company, Ltd., 1900), p. 161.

[55] Wickberg, *The Chinese*, p. 103.

Chinese commercial operations, fled to Manila or left the country. Many businesses were affected by the absence of clientele or labor: the opium business disintegrated in the two years before the Americans put an end to it entirely; Chinese-run iron mines in Bulacan closed down.[56] On the basis of the limited but suggestive specific evidence available, Wickberg concludes, ". . . it is likely that the Philippine revolution caused a breakdown of many of the economic networks built up by the Philippine Chinese, systems which had to be rebuilt after order was restored." [57]

The Chinese and the American Government

The Chinese for the most part had good reason to welcome the American regime. Among the first actions of the Americans was the suspension of the bulk of the special taxes the Spanish had relied on for revenue, including a special tax on Chinese.[58] The gradual re-establishment of order made it possible to begin reconstructing the commercial life of the country and their own mechanisms of participation in it. The American philosophy of government, quite different from that of the Spaniards, created an approximation of free-enterprise equality in the economy that gave free rein to the Chinese skills and energies. The need for bribery was reduced by such measures as open bidding on contracts; the establishment of a civil service reduced the role of personal relations in securing protection and other services. Probably no other element in the Islands has profited more directly [than the Chinese] from the changes that have been wrought there since 1898," Hayden concluded, [59] more than four decades later.

Nevertheless, American policy did not welcome the Chinese. When the Americans occupied Manila three months after the Battle of Manila Bay, Chinese who had left the country began returning. General Otis, probably influenced by the American experience on the West Coast and the resulting exclusion laws a few decades before, and perhaps by the sentiments of American businessmen in the Philippines, applied the United States law against Chinese immigration a month later. The Chinese consul in Hong Kong was notified that only Chinese who could prove previous residence in the Philippines would be admitted. The only immigrants to be admitted were teachers, students, merchants, Chinese officials, or "travelers for curiosity or pleasure;" registration procedures for visitors and immigrants, always lax under the Spanish, were to be tightened.[60]

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[56] *Report* II, p. 272.
[57] Wickberg, *The Chinese*, p. 123.
[58] Otis, appendix Q., p. 2.
[59] Joseph Ralston Hayden, *The Philippines, A Study in National Development*, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1942), p. 695.
[60] Elliott, pp. 438-439; Foreman, p. 622; *Correspondence*, Vol. II, pp. 791, 1074; Otis, pp. 24, 54-56.

The "Chinese question" was one of the central issues for the Philippine Commission, which arrived in late 1899 to prepare for the post-war period. The Commission heard witnesses who for the most part advocated exclusion of the Chinese. In 1902 Congress extended the United States law to cover the Philippines, continuing the policy of exclusion General Otis had initiated earlier under military authority.

The effects of the American exclusion policies are not clear. From 1889 and 1893, records of Chinese arrivals and departures showed an excess of 36,250 arrivals. From 1899 to 1903, American records showed an increase of only 8,624.[61] The first census under American occupation found 40,000 Chinese in the Philippines in 1903, a very large decrease from the 100,000 generally accepted as the Chinese population before the war,[62] though perhaps acceptable as accurate in view of the exodus of each new generation into the mestizo-Filipino group, as well as the flight inspired by the revolution. In any case, by 1909 the Chinese population was 120,000, an increase whatever its size, probably due primarily to illegal entry through Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago in the south and the tip of Luzon in the north.[63]

Summary

The revolution in the Philippines came at a decisive time in the history of the Philippine Chinese. The Chinese, when the revolution came, were simultaneously moving toward a degree of economic success unmatched by any they had achieved before and experiencing a social isolation and prejudice of a new kind from the society within which they lived. They compensated for this isolation by developing social mechanisms of protection and a sense of their special identity as Chinese, but in the process they held themselves apart from the rising sentiment of nationalism and the political ideas, with their roots in the West, that fuelled the new century's first popular revolution in the East.

Their participation in the revolution itself reflected these developments. Unlike the *mestizos,* whose growing economic and cultural identification with the native Filipino put them often on the side of the revolution, the Chinese, increasingly conscious of an identity that was essentially alien to the Philippines, were seen increasingly as alien by Filipinos. And as "aliens," they began to feel violent expressions of the resentment that was an element, though not a crucial one, of the new self-conscious Filipino political and cultural identity. Thus their participation in the revolution was characteristic of their separateness; though there were exceptions, the Chinese were politically neutral. Their participation in the revolution was an extension of their partici-

[61] Purcell, p. 621.
[62] Wickberg, "The Chinese Mestizo," p. 90; *Report* II, p. 442.
[63] Purcell, p. 625.

pation in the life of the Philippines, as an essential and ubiquitous element in economic and commercial activities.

The new economic atmosphere created by the Americans, even while the war continued, proved particularly congenial to the Chinese, who recovered quickly from the depradations of war and reestablished their disproportionate influence in the commerce of the Philippines. In spite of the restrictions on immigration set up by the Americans, the Chinese community grew and prospered. They benefited by the change from a paternalistic and personalistic government to the more universalistic administration of the Americans, which reduced the need for bribery and personal connection and provided new economic links with the United States that spurred the economy.

It is, of course, impossible to say what might have happened to the Chinese and the Chinese mestizos without the revolution; perhaps the same outcome would have proceeded more slowly from a more placid development of the Philippines. The revolution accelerated a process that had already begun, the Philippine Chinese becoming more Chinese, the Philippine Chinese mestizo becoming a Filipino, until today, as Purcell says, ". . . the Filipino politician who finds himself impelled to declare that 'something must be done about the Chinese' is very likely to proclaim by his eyes and by the bone structure of his face that one or more of his ancestors was Chinese." [64]

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[64] *Ibid.*, p. 634.

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THE CHINESE IN THE PHILIPPINES AND THE CHINESE REVOLUTION OF 1911

ANTONIO S. TAN

SINCE THE TURN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AS A RESULT OF THE development of modern Chinese nationalism which had a strong impact on the Chinese abroad, the Overseas Chinese had been linked with important political movements in China, and they had played an important role in many of them, particularly by helping to finance Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary activities.

Sun Yat-sen, recognizing the contributions of the Overseas Chinese to the revolution of 1911, referred to them as "Ko-ming chi-mu,"* the mother of the Chinese Revolution.

No account of the early revolutionary activities of Sun Yat-sen can be considered complete without mentioning the part played by the Chinese in the Philippines. What, specifically, was their role? Let us put the question.

As a result of China's disastrous defeat in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895, a movement for avenging the national humiliation and self-strengthening sprang up among the Chinese people. This culminated in the work of two great leaders, K'ang Yu-wei and Sun Yat-sen. K'ang led a group of young liberal-minded scholars who aimed to introduce modern constitutional reforms within the Manchu framework in order to save the tottering Ch'ing (the dynastic name of the Manchu), while Sun formed a revolutionary party, both in China and abroad, which sought to replace the decadent Manchu dynasty and the imperial system with a republican government.

The young Kuang Hsu emperor proved receptive to the ideas of K'ang Yu-wei, the reformer. In the summer of 1898 in what came to be known as the "Hundred Days of Reforms," the emperor issued edict after edict based on the program spelled out by K'ang Yu-wei: introduce changes in the then existing industrial institutional educational, agricultural, military, and political systems.[1] Reforms along this line which would have paved the way for the modernization of China aroused a storm of opposition from those who by conviction or interest were tied to the old order. The arch conservative, empress dowager

* A Glossary of Chinese terms will be found at the end of the article.

[1] For details of the Reform Movement see Cameron E. Meredith, *The Reform Movement in China* 1898-1912. (London: Oxford University Press, 1931).

Tsu Hsi, with military support launched a counter attack, put the Kuang Hsu emperor under house arrest, declared herself regent, and abrogated all his edicts. Six of the reformers were executed in Peking. The leading figures of the reform movement, K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao fled overseas to carry out their reformist ideas.[2] In the meantime, Sun who had organized the Hsing Chung Hui (Revive China Society) executed an armed uprising in Canton in 1895 which proved abortive. With a price on his head, he too, was forced to go abroad. Thus began his long flight, sixteen years of wandering among the Overseas China which was to end with the successful revolution of 1911.[3]

The political developments which took place in China had their repercussions among the overseas Chinese who now possessed the wealth to take action. Both the reformers and the revolutionaries, and the Manchus, launched a vigorous competition for the allegiance and support of the Chinese abroad.

While taking refuge in Japan, K'ang and his followers organized the Pao Huang Hui (Protect the Emperor Society), the aim of which was ostensibly to save the liberal-minded emperor from the hands of the ultra-conservatives and reactionaries around the empress-dowager. Branches of the Protect the Emperor Society were quickly founded in the Chinese communities in Hawaii, the United States, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Australia, South America and other places.

Meanwhile Sun was equally active in cultivating friendship abroad and looking for a base upon which to stage armed uprising in China. In 1899 while Sun was in Tokyo he turned his attention to the Philippines after meeting with Mariano Ponce. In 1898 General Emilio Aguinaldo commissioned Ponce to buy arms in Japan. Sun was soon enthused over the prospect for action in the Philippines. In his view a friendly Philippine Republic would provide an ideal base from which to launch revolutionary uprising in China. Sun and Ponce agreed that the Chinese revolutionaries would help the Filipinos fight for independence for the Philippines, and the Philippine revolutionary government in turn would help the Chinese revolutionaries fight the Manchus. Shipment of the arms procured for Aguinaldo began the following year. The first shipment met an accident on its way to the Philippines and was sunk. Undaunted by the setback, Sun tried to procure another shipment of arms for his Filipino friends. But he met another reversal. This time the Japanese government placed a ban on the exportation of arms because of its reluctance to antagonize the Americans who had occupied the Philippines.[4] The failure of Sun to establish initial contact with

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[2] See *Ibid.*

[3] See Cheng Yin-fen, *Kuo-fu tsai hai-wai* (Sun Yat-sen abroad). (Taipei, 1959).

[4] For detailed information concerning the role of Sun Yat-sen in the procurement of arm supplies for the Filipino revolutionists see Feng Tzu-yu *Ko-ming i-shih*

the Philippines on an on-going basis plus the reluctance of the local Chinese at this time to give their support to the more extreme revolutionary party gave the Protect the Emperor Society initial advantage in local Chinese politics. Thus the close of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century saw the reformists enjoying considerable popularity owing to the great literary reputation of K'ang Yu-wei and of his disciple and successor, Liang Chi-ch'ao.

The Reformist and Constitutional Monarchy Movement in Manila

While the Chinese in the Philippines were responding uncertainly to the revolutionary movement in China, K'ang and Liang's reformist and constitutional monarchy movement began to stir the local Chinese. A branch of the Protect the Emperor Society was organized in Cavite in 1899 and shortly moved its headquarters to Manila.[5] In about the same year, Pan Shu-fan, a local Cantonese, started a paper called I-yu Hsin-pao, an organ to enlist support for the reformists and to awaken the Chinese community to the perilous plight of China. In 1900 the paper was renamed Min-i-pao, under the same management and for the same purpose.[6]

In the Chinese community in Manila, as in Overseas Chinese communities in America and Southeast Asia, the followers of K'ang and Sun battled with words and sometimes with their fists for the allegiance of Overseas Chinese. For a while, K'ang's party had more influence, threatening to drive Sun's supporters into oblivion. In 1905 Hsu Ch'in, a lieutenant of K'ang and Liang, arrived in Manila with the object of establishing a Hsien Cheng Hui, or Constitutional Society, and the reformers again became active. After the Russo-Japanese war of 1904, the Imperial Court was compelled to adopt the reform program of 1898, and the followers of K'ang began to agitate for a liberal constitution like that of England and the Protect the Emperor Society was later known as the Constitutional Society, in view of the fact that those reformists stood for the establishment of a limited or constitutional monarchy. The challenge of the reformists at times sparked the fire of revolution in the revolutionary ranks. When in 1905 Hsu Ch'in held

(Reminiscences of the Revolution: Taipei, 1953) Vol. IV, pp. 80-81; Marius B. Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954) pp. 69-73; Mariano Ponce, *Sun Yat-sen, the Founder of the Republic of* China (Manila: Filipino-Chinese Cultural Foundation, Inc., 1965).

[5] Ch'en Hsiao-yu, (ed.,) *Fei-lu-pin yu hua-ch'iao shih-chi ta-kuan* (Philippine Chinese Chronicle 2 vols. (Manila, 1948). Vol. II, pp. she 5, 21.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. she 3; Yen Wen-ch'u, San-shih nien-lai fei-tao hua-ch'iao pao-chi shih yeh (The Chinese Press in the Philippines in the past thirty years) in *Hsiao Lusung hua-ch'iao chung-hsi hsieh-hsiao san-shih chou-nien chi-nien K'an* (Thirtieth Anniversary, Commemorative Publication Anglo-Chinese school) (Manila, 1929). Chap. 39, p. 2; Liu Lang "Fei-hua hsin-wen ch'u-pan shih-yeh ti chin-che" (The present state of Philippine Chinese newspapers), *The Philippine Chinese year Book* 1964-1965 (Manila, 1966), part IV, p. 055.

a meeting at the Manila Cantonese Association to organize a branch of the Constitutional Society the still few but active revolutionary followers tried to disrupt the proceedings.[7] They yelled down Hsu Ch'in as he was extolling the virtue of a constitutional monarchy and accused him of deceiving the local Chinese. The verbal quarrel showed at least the extent of animosities between the two political groups. They stirred and divided the Chinese community into rival factions. The Chinese Consul General Su Jui-chu even tried to put pressure to bear on the Manila authorities to disband the revolutionary group. Lacking a newspaper organ to disseminate their own ideas, the revolutionary adherents made use of the Hong Kong papers such as the Chung-kuo Jih-pao, China Daily, a paper which was circulated in Manila, to mount their own attack against the constitutional monarchists.[8] The time was not, however, ripe for the propagation of revolutionary activity. The local Chinese feelings for a radical movement was neither sufficiently strong nor sufficiently widespread, then. The revolutionists had to contend also with the Manchu propaganda activities abroad.

The Manchu Emissaries

Close on the heels of the reformers came the Manchu emissaries. The Manchu government which had realized the potentialities of the Overseas Chinese communities as rich sources of political and economic support now initiated an active campaign to win the loyalty and tap the wealth of the Chinese in Southeast Asia.

In 1904 a Manchu emissary, a former magistrate of Fukien province, arrived in Manila. He was designated to investigate conditions of the Overseas Chinese community.[9] He was followed in 1905 by a mission headed by the senior secretary and the second class secretary of the Chinese Imperial Board of Commerce. The mission was purely commercial, which had as its purpose the promotion of Philippine-Chinese trade.[10]

More dramatic, however, was the visit of a high Chinese official in 1907. He was Yang-Shih-ch'i, the Junior Vice President of the Ministry of Agriculture, industry and Trade. He arrived in November bearing

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[7] Chung-hua min-kuo k'ai-kuo wu-shih-nien pien-tsuan wei-yuan-hui (Historical materials of the Republic of China for the past fifty years, Executive Committee) (Comp.) Ko-ming chih chang-tao yu fa-chan (the beginning and development of the Chinese Revolution) (Taipei, 1965), Vol. II, p. 752; Feng Tzu-yu, *Hua-ch'iao Ko-ming k'ai-kuo shih* (History of the Overseas Chinese in the Founding of the Chinese Republic) (Taipei, 1953), p. 118; *Ibid, Ko-ming i-shih, op. cit.*, Vol. IV. pp. 180-181, Ch'en Chung-shan "Nan-yang hua-ch'iao i ko-ming chih nu-li (The effort of the Nanayang Overseas Chinese in the Chinese Revolution) *Nan-yang Yen-chiu* (Nan-yang Studies) Vol. III, no. 1, 1930), p. 19.

[8] Feng Tzu-yu, *Ko-ming i-shih, op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 275-276.

[9] *The Manila Times*, May 23, 1904.

[10] *Ibid.*, August 24, 1905.

the title of Imperial Commissioner. To add to the visitor's prestige the Chinese government provided him with an imposing suite and a cruiser. [11] His announced aim was to study the economic conditions of the Philippines, to give comfort to the Chinese communities overseas, and to gather information on the conditions of the Chinese subjects living abroad. [12] The vessel, a second class cruiser carrying 439 smartly uniformed Chinese was described as "modern" and "scrupulously" clean. [13]

At the turn of the century it was the custom of many states to send fleets on a world cruise in order "to show the flag."* Such naval cruisers were calculated to impress foreign governments and in the case of empire, "to show colonists that the mother country had not forgotten them." [14] The Manchu dynasty which had seen the showing of many foreign flags in its own ports adopted this technique in a further effort to strengthen the ties between the Overseas Chinese and the homeland. Thus, in 1907 the cruiser Hai-ch'i, then the pride of the Imperial Chinese Navy, was commissioned to accompany Yang Shi-ch'i. In anticipation of the arrival of the warship, Chinese in Manila who had been kept informed of the impending visit for weeks, had decorated their places of residence in honor of the commissioner and the complement of the ship. At that time, the local Chinese felt proud. The arrival of the mission fired the enthusiasm of the Chinese for closer political relation with the fatherland, even though power was still in the hands of the Manchus. Referring to this visit, a Manila Press caught the spirit of national feeling of the local Chinese magnified as they made a minute investigation of the pride of the Chinese navy:

> Chinatown was out in force yesterday, paying homage to the dragon ensign flying from the stern of His Imperial Majesty's cruiser Hai-ch'i now anchored in the inner basin.
>
> The deck of the Hai-ch'i, from early morn until dusk, yesterday, swarmed with Chinese visitors. Distinctions of caste were not in evidence, the humble coolie elbowing with the merchant prince in the best of fellowship and many were with the exclamation of wonderment and pride accompanying the minute examination of the modern armaments and appliances of the trim fighting craft. A patriotic calle Rosario dry goods merchant, lost in admiration of one of the big eight-inch guns, pulled a tape measure from his pocket and proceeded to ascertain the length of the barrel. "Seven yards and a half,"

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[11] Ch'en Hsiao-yu, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. she 6, 22.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. she 22; *The Manila Times,* September 26, 1907, October 30, 1907, November 6, 7, 1907.

[13] *The Cablenews-American,* November 12, 1907.

* To remind the Japanese that the United States had the second largest fleet (theirs was fifth), and to convince them that it was prepared for any contingency, Roosevelt adopted the spectacular plan for sending the entire American battleship fleet around the world.

[14] Lea Williams, *Overseas Chinese Nationalism: The Genesis of the Pan-Chinese Movement in Indonesia,* 1900-1916 (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), p.162.

> he announced with a bland smile and the crowd gasped in amazement at the big machine designed to deal death and destruction to the enemies of his Majesty Kuang Hsu and of the Empire.[15]

During its stay in Manila, the members of the mission were officially received by the Governor General of the islands,[16] were wined and dined by a Chinese millionaire, Mariano Limjap, in a mammoth reception that included the cosmopolitan crowd,[17] and entertained by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce.[18] The humbler class of Chinese, not to be outdone in "patriotism by their more fortunate compatriots," presented the crew of the ship with many delicacies not included in the "ration of His Imperial Majesty's blue jackets."[19]

While the Chinese came far and wide to see the proud sight of a modern warship manned entirely by smartly uniformed Chinese, the visiting emissaries were busy creating closer political and commercial ties with the local Chinese leaders. After receiving the overwhelming enthusiastic greeting in Manila, the ship then steamed on to other ports of Southeast Asia. One of the first results of Yang Shi-ch'i's visit to Manila was the appointment of his brother Yang Shi-chun, as Consul General in Manila in 1908.[20] Another tangible result of his visit was the appearance of the Chinese daily, the Ching-to Hsin-wen in 1908.[21] It was in the midst of their jubilation over the proud Hai-ch'i in November, 1907, when a local daily the *El Commercio* displayed antagonism to the Chinese expression and enthusiasm and pride in their naval power. For days the *El Commercio* in a series of articles ridiculed the Chinese Man-of-War as having been made of "western" steel and "Chinese" tin that would break apart at the first enemy salvo. Having come of age, the Chinese community leaders considered the "ridicule" as a national insult, thus putting their country's honor at stake. With ₱8,000 capital subscribed to by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, they decided to put up an organ of public opinion; there had been no Chinese newspaper since the *Min-i pao* folded in 1903. The *Ching-to Times* founded in 1908 was considered exceedingly serious in tone. In consonance with the public opinion then prevailing in the homeland, the paper spared no effort in inspiring the Chinese in the Philippines with

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[15] *The Manila Times*, November 9, 1907.

[16] *The Cablenews-American*, November 12, 1907.

[17] *Ibid.*, November 14, 1907.

[18] Huang Hsiao-t'sang, *Fei-lu-pin min-li-la chung-hua shang hui san shih chou-nien chi-nien k'an* (Thirtieth Anniversary, Commemorative Publications, Manila Chinese Chamber of Commerce) (Manila, 1936), p. chia 56.

[19] *The Manila Times*, November 15, 1907.

[20] *Ibid.*, June 16, 1908.

[21] Ch'en Hsiao-yu, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. she 6; Liu Lang "Fei-hua hsin-wen ch'u-pan shih-yeh ti chin-che" *op. cit.*, Part IV, p. 56 Liu Chi-t'ien, "Fei-lu-pin hua-ch'iao pao-yeh shih" (A History of Philippine Chinese Press) in Kao Hsin, Chang Hsi-Che, (eds.), *Hua-ch'iao Shih-lun chi* (Collected essays on Overseas Chinese) (Taipei, 1963), pp. 111-112.

a more intense interest in the political reform and agitation then being carried on in China.

The year 1908 saw additional Manchu missions to the Philippines. In March a representative of the Viceroy of Liang-Kuang and an officer of the Imperial Army College in Canton visited Manila.[22] In May the Imperial Government dispatched a special commissioner to inquire into the immigration and living conditions of the Chinese in the Philippines and Samoa.[23]

The proclamation of the Chinese citizenship law of 1909 whereby all overseas Chinese were claimed as citizens of China, irrespective of their place of birth, was another move calculated to bind the Chinese abroad to the homeland, in a political sense.[24] It is interesting to note that in April, 1910, the Imperial Government in Peking sent the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines 20 volumes of the newly approved law on Chinese citizenship.[25]

The pre-war publications of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce indicated that up to the eve of the Chinese revolution of 1911 the Manchu Imperial Government maintained various ties with the local Chinese Chamber of Commerce through the medium of the Nung Kung Shang Pu or the ministry of agriculture, commerce and industry. The Manchu progress toward the constitutional reform were continuously communicated to the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. Likewise, the Chinese in the Philippines were kept informed by the same ministry of the commercial and educational undertaking of the Manchu government.[26]

The attempt of the Manchu Government to win the allegiance of the Overseas Chinese by showing a solicitous concern over their condition was clearly revealed in a memorial Commissioner Yang Shih-ch'i submitted to the throne:

> Your Minister in whatever place he visited by sea or land proclaimed your majesties' great grace to the Chinese colonists and inquired particularly regarding the circumstance of their sojourn, their occupation, their number, and whether they were well treated by the foreign governments under which they lived. The result of this investigation I now reverently submit to their majesties, the Empress Dowager and the Emperor...
>
> Your Minister rode everywhere through packed streets, passed by homes where incense was burned and where doorways hung banner and coloured lantern all these being taken of the people's joy at your majesty's clemency. Whenever the memorialist visited a city he proposed to the schools, guildhalls and public buildings, and addressed the people extolling the virtues,

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[22] *The Manila Times*, March 6, 1908.
[23] *Ibid.*, May 26, 1908.
[24] Tsai Chutung, "The Chinese nationality law, 1909", *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. III (1910), pp. 404-411.
[25] Huang Hsiao-t'sang, *op. cit.*, p. chia 57.
[26] *Ibid.*, pp. chia, 56-58.

excellence of the Imperial Majesties the Empress Dowager and the Emperor, filling us with enthusiasm that the sound of their applause seemed like the rambling of thunder. Even foreigners on looking at these scenes showed by the altered expression of their faces, how deeply they were impressed.[27]

It is important to ask at this juncture why during this period the reformists and the Manchu government appeared able to command the allegiance of the Overseas Chinese.

Before 1898 the reform movement under the leadership of K'ang Yu-wei directed its appeal to the gentry scholar officials in China but after the coup d'etat of September 21, 1898, efforts were made to get the support of Overseas Chinese majority of whom were engaged in mercantile activities. Although the scholar class had traditionally deprecated the merchant as a class (merchants had been held in low esteem in a Confucian society based on agriculture and governed by scholars) political conditions and economic considerations dictated that they cultivate the allegiance of Overseas Chinese in the struggle for the control of the destiny of China. In a sense, the merchant was simultaneously devalued and needed. In turn the Overseas Chinese although most were illiterate had great respect for the scholar-official from home and were easily won by prominent reformers and Manchu officials.[28] In Imperial China, with its Confucian scale of values it was the successful scholar-official, not the successful businessman, who represented the highest ideal. The Overseas Chinese had tried to live by this tradition almost wherever they had settled. So strong, indeed, was the Confucian ethic that the merchant who were well-to-do often assimilated themselves to the gentry class by giving their sons the Confucian education which, via the examination, could lead to a government career. And sometimes the well-to-do Overseas Chinese "bought" from the the Imperial Government the "right to the status of Mandarin," and portraits of their suitably adorned persons hanging in the family homes "contradicted the other evidences of their humble origin and lack of education.[29] Indeed, the high value set on education and the respect accorded to members of the literati by Overseas Chinese was cited by Hu Han-min, Sun's revolutionary colleague, as a major obstacle

[27] The Memorial to the Throne is translated in "Memorial Report of Commissioner Yang Shih-chi in Visit to Investigate Condition of Chinese in the Philippines, Indo-China, Siam, etc., to the throne, March 18, 1908," in file 370/190. Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, National Archives and Records Service Washington, D.C.

[28] Huang Fu-luan, *Hua-ch'iao yu chung-kuo ko-ming* (The Overseas Chinese and the Chinese Revolution) (Taipei, 1963), pp. 63, 81; It is interesting to note that there were about 70,000 Pao Huang Hui members in Overseas Chinese Communities. See K'ang Yu-wei "The hostility of China," *The World's Work*, Vol. XII (May-October, 1906) p. 2489.

[29] Maurice Freedman, "Colonial law and Chinese society," *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland.*" Vol. LXXX Parts I and II (1950), p. 118.

in winning the allegiance of the overseas Chinese in the early years of the revolutionary movement. Many years later when he reminisced on his fund raising campaign in Southeast Asia he pointed out that Manchu visitors or scholar-officials from China distinguished by title, grade, degree or other official rank invariably became the focus of attention, respect and cordial welcome.[30] To the wealthy merchants abroad, K'ang Yu-wei was the emperor's tutor, a scholar of renowned reputation. K'ang and Liang went to Southeast Asia during their years of political exile, their reputation as scholars and reformers had preceeded them. For this reason, a good many of Philippine Chinese thought that they were safer in supporting K'ang Yu-wei than they would be supporting Sun Yat-sen.

To the Overseas Chinese, K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and their followers were "only in temporary disgrace and only temporarily out of power." The scheming and vicious Dowager would not live forever; at her death the Kuang Hsu emperor would be liberated, he would recall K'ang, the reformists would rule the empire. This hope had been kept actively alive by the propaganda works of the Protect the Emperor Society. In a statement issued in 1900 urging the Chinese abroad to unite for cooperative enterprises, K'ang declared:

> A society must be formed to save the Emperor. He who has loved and cared for us, must be assisted to regain his rightful authority and ancestral throne in order that the four hundred million of our people may be saved from an impending doom.[31]

Thus, the Manila Chinese community deeply mourned the death of Emperor Kuang Hsu when news of his demise reached Manila. On the ninth of November, 1908, the Emperor Kuang Hsu died and on the next day the Empress Dowager. In many circles the opinion was expressed that the old Empress so hated her nephew and so feared the possibility of his gaining the throne and overthrowing her policy that she had seen to it that he should die before she did. Under the suspices of the Imperial Chinese Consul the Manila Chinese community gathered solemnly to pay necrological homage to the departed spirit of their "good emperor" Kuang Hsu in all the "formalities of a formal age."

> The leading Chinese merchants expressed sorrow that the emperor had passed away at such an early age and said that they had hoped that if the august dowager must be gathered to her father in the fullness of age, that the emperor, who was but 36 years old, would be spared to reign and institute some of the reforms in favor of the masses which he had urged at the time he was deposed by the dowager..[32]

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[30] See "Hu Han-min," chiang-shu nan-yang hua-ch'iao ko-ming chi ching-kuo" (An exposition of the participation of the Nan-yang Overseas Chinese in the revolution) in Feng Tzu-yu, *Ko-ming -i-shih, op. cit.*, Vol. V p. 206-240, especially pp. 231-232.

[31] Quoted in the "political parties in China: the political reformists," *The People's Tribune* (November 1, 1933), p. 350.

[32] *The Cablenews-American,* November 17, 1908.

Therefore, to give money to K'ang would seem to these calculating businessmen a good investment in future influence. The attitude of the wealthy Chinese abroad toward the revolutionary group was entirely different. Sun Yat-sen was poor, unknown, proscribed, not a scholar in the traditional sense (Sun was western educated) certainly not a "gentleman with a good name." The revolutionaries appeared to them as "desperados," "robbers," and "bandits" out to cheat the people, as the Protect the Emperor Society and the Manchus made them appear. Given this attitude, the Overseas Chinese who were very proud and zealous of their good name felt honored to associate with the constitutional monarchists who came mostly from the scholar class than with Sun and his followers who were described as "robbers."

Again, the overseas Chinese did not think that the revolutionary movement had gone far enough to warrant their support.[33] It is said that when Sun's partisans in Southeast Asia went about collecting money for the revolution, the rich merchants said, "If you can guarantee that the Revolution would be successful, then we shall give money but not otherwise."[34] Sun's influence was among the shopkeepers, the laborers, the coolies, and the younger merchants.

Another reason why the most opulent Chinese in the Philippines did not support Sun Yet-sen is because of their belief that he would plunge China into a long war, such as the Taiping rebellion (1850-1864) which would cause their families in China to suffer, break up their business abroad, and bring them bankruptcy and ruin.[35] As it is, the well-to-do class, as a whole, looked with mistrust on the avowed aim of the revolutionists.[36]

Many Overseas Chinese asserted that they should not support Sun for though they were safe overseas, their families in China were not. One of the greatest drawbacks in Sun's revolutionary movement overseas appears to be the Overseas Chinese fear of reprisals that hang like a Damocles sword on their relatives in China. They feared that the Manchu agents and constitutional monarchists in their midst would send reports to authorities in Peking.[37] Thus overseas revolutionaries asked themselves constantly, "If I help Dr. Sun, will my family in China be

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[33] See Paul Linebarger, *The Gospel of Chung Shan* (Paris: Brentano, 1932), pp. 29-30. Linebarger's interest in the Chinese revolution was aroused when as judge in the Philippines in the early 1900's he learned that his cook was an ardent Sun follower.

[34] Han Suyin, *The Crippled Tree* (London: Jonathan Cape 1965), p. 171; Hu Han-min, *op. cit.*, p. 236-237. Ch'en Chung-shan, "Nan-yang hua-chi'iao i koming chih nu-li", *op. cit.*

[35] Linebarger, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

[36] E.J. Dillon, "The Chinese revolutionist-in-chief," *Contemporary Review,* Vol. 101 (1912), p. 277.

[37] Linebarger, op. cit., pp. 18,30; see also Alexander Macleod, *Pigtails and Gold Dust* (Idaho, The Caxton Press, 1947), p. 147.

put in jeopardy by the Manchus?" [38] This apprehension over threat of reprisals was vividly reaffirmed in late 1911 by a proclamation issued by the Chinese Minister at Washington (who had jurisdiction over the Manila Chinese Consulate General) prohibiting the Chinese in the Philippines,

> From having to do with the patriotic society under severe penalty that their families and distant relatives in China would be arrested and beheaded.[39]

It is belived by 1908 that Yang Shi-ch'i, th Imperial Commissioner who visited Manila late in 1907 was here actually to "discover and deal with anti-Manchu rebels."[40]

Finally, in addition to the missions sent abroad by the Manchu government in its waning days calculated to strengthen the political and economic ties with the homeland, K'ang was admired by those who combined loyalty to the dynasty with a patriotic longing to see their country honored among the nations of the world. Among the Chinese in the Philippines there were many who were still loyal to the imperial institution. The emperor — a son of Heaven — was accepted, taken for granted, and he was regarded from afar with something like religious awe. Again the Monarchy not the nation was the traditional focus of loyalty. Loyalty was to the throne whether occupied by a Son of Heaven of Chinese origin or by a barbarian of foreign origin. As Chinese they cannot but look upon the Monarchy as the national symbol of China. In the thousands of years which it spanned, the Monarchy as a symbol had been deeply rooted in the consciousness and emotions of the people. "The peasant needed his son of heaven who — even if he was of foreign race — was the mediator between heaven and mankind and thus responsible for the weather." The Emperor being the son of heaven, and by implication, the Father of the Empire, had a right to the respect, veneration and worship of his children.

Until the eve of the Manchu dynasty, therefore, the Philippine Chinese still observed the emperor's day in great style. On his birthday, commercial houses in Manila's China-town displayed "flags and light on the outside and joss inside."[41] Merchants fired off firecrackers by "special permission of the municipal board." [42] In particular, the emperor's birthday in November 1907 was an event to be remembered by local Chinese. His day in that year concided with the visit in Manila of the Chinese Imperial Commissioner on board the cruiser, Hai-Ch'i.

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[38] Linebarger, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

[39] *The Manila Times*, November 2, 1911.

[40] *The Cablenews-American*, March 12, 1908; Yang Chen-hsien "Chung-kuo, hou-ch'iao cheng-t'se chi ti-shan" in *Hsiao Lu-sung Hua-ch'iao chung-hsi hsueh-hsiao wu-shih chou-nien k'an* (Anglo-Chinese School, 1899-1949 Golden Jubilee) (Manila, 1949), p. 331; *Chung-hsing jih-pao* September 5, 1907.

[41] *The Cablenews-American*, August 6, 1907.

[42] *Ibid.*

On November 15, the Commodore and his crew received their countrymen aboard the ship.

> All the unchartered launches in the bay were used to carry patriotic Chinese back and forth. The Consulate itself was brightly decorated with yellow banners and dragon ensign, and a large number of Manila Chinese, rich and poor, performed the rites prescribed for proper observance of their emperor's birthday.[43]

Ritual and pageantry uplifted the people on such great occasion with the remembrance of their past and the timeliness of their institutions and gave them a sense of stability and pride.

As late as 1910 the Chinese community was still celebrating and toasting their emperor's natal day with solemnity. The expression of loyalty to their imperial symbol militated against, if not hindered, the works of the revolutionists in the Philippines.

The Revolutionists in the Philippines

It is ironical to note that the Philippines which loomed large in the plan of Sun Yat-sen as a possible staging area for revolutionary uprising in China was the last area in Southeast Asia to see the inauguration of the T'ung Meng Hui or Common Alliance Society. This Society Sun founded in Tokyo in 1905 was not formally organized in Manila until early 1911.[44] As early as 1903 certain revolutionary tracts such as Tsou Jung's "Revolutionary Army" may have filtered into the Philippines,[45] for it had been spread among Chinese elsewhere, especially in Singapore. During the 1904-1905 period certain revolutionary organs published in Hongkong had also reached the Chinese in the Philippines.[46] In 1906 Go Ki Kiu a local Chinese supporter of the revolutionary movement had circulated issues of the Min Pao published by the T'ung Meng Hui in Tokyo.[47] The comparatively late establishment of the revolutionary organization in Manila is usually explained by the obstacles presented by the application of the Chinese exclusion law to the Philippines. The strict enforcement of the exclusion law, it was alleged, hampered and caused inconvenience to the travel of revolutionary conspirators to and fro, between China and the Philippines.[48]

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[43] *Ibid.*, November 16, 1907.

[44] Tsai Kuei-sheng, "Kuo-fu yu fei-lu pin hua-ch'iao." (Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese in the Philippines) *Kuang Li Pao Chuang-k'an wu-shih-hsi chou-nien* (The Kong Li Po fifty fourth anniversary issue, 1965), p. 85; Huang Chen-wu, *op. cit.*, p. 42; Feng Tzu-yu, *Hua-ch'iao ko-ming k'ai-kuo shih, op. cit.*, p. 118; *Chung-hua min-kuo wu-shih nien wen-hsien, op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 751.

[45] Tasi Kuei-sheng, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

[46] Feng Tzu-yu, *Ko-ming i-shih, op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 180; Ch'en Hsiao-yu, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. ch'iao 13.

[47] Ch'en Hsiao-yu, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. ch'iao 13.

[48] See Huang Chen-wu, hua-ch'iao yu chung-kuo ko-ming (The Overseas Chinese and the Chinese Revolution) (Hong Kong, 1955).

Up to about 1907-1908 for reasons already indicated elsewhere above, the revolutionaries had been unable to gain large followings. Most Chinese were then not willing to join any revolutionary or radical group. The word revolution was equated with rebellion (Chao-fan) by the overseas Chinese. And the word rebellion struck terror in their hearts. It was only after the revolutionaries had carried out a protracted revolutionary propaganda in the Philippines for several years that the T'ung Meng Hui began to gain followers.

The acknowledged leader of the revolutionary followers in Manila was Dr. Tee Han Kee whose background singularly fitted him for this role. A native of Amoy, Fukien, when he attended the Hongkong Medical College in the late 1880's and early 1890's he became associated with Sun Yat-Sen. In the early 1900's he came to the Philippines to practice medicine and to carry out revolutionary work with the local Chinese. Because he was one of the few who had undergone training in modern medicine he was readily appointed by the American authorities as medical inspector of the Bureau of Health for the Chinese, a position he held for some twenty years.[49] Regarded as one of the vanguards in "leading the march of western civilization" among the Chinese in the Philippines, Dr. Tee Han Kee, together with Huang Hai Shan was the first to cut off the queue and discard the traditional Chinese garb in May, 1906.[50] Though they were congratulated by their American and European friends for this bold act they were scorned and teased by their fellow countrymen. Another active revolutionary in Manila was Yang Hao-lu, son of the founder of the Chinese pioneer press in the Philippines, the Hua Pao founded in 1888. At the age of twenty he went to Japan to study at Waseda University. There he was infected with revolutionary fervor. In 1903 he joined the anti-Russian Volunteer Corps. This volunteer Corps was organized in Japan by Chinese students to fight against the Russian occupation of Manchuria. He returned to the Philippines shortly after the Japanese Government clamped down on the revolutionary activities of Overseas Chinese students in Japan. It was he who in 1905 led some revolutionary adherents in disrupting the effort of Hsu Ch'in to organize a Constitutional Monarchial Society at the Manila Cantonese Association.[51] Just as Hsu Ch'in was delivering a speech before an audience at th Cantonese Club, pointing to the urgency and logic of a constitutional monarchy, Yang Hao-lu with some followers, barged in, took over the rostrum, and accused the K'ang Yu-wei group of deceiving the Chinese.

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[49] Fei-lu-pin hua-ch'iao ming-jen shih-luch pien chi-she (ed.), *Fei-lu-pin hua-ch'iao ming-jen shih-luch* (Who's who in the Chinese Community in the Philippines) (Shanghai, 1931), p. 13; Huang Hsiao-t'sang, *op. cit.*, p. chia 169!

[50] *The Manila Times*, May 14, 1906.

[51] Feng Tzu-yu, *Ko-ming i-shih, op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 275 Vol. IV; p. 180; *Chung-hua min-kuo k'ai-kuo wu-shih nien wen-shien, op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 751.

By 1908 the Manila press was taking special note of the "rebellious mood" now pervading the local Chinese against the constituted authorities in China.[52] While the Chinese community owed allegiance to the Kuang Hsu emperor whom they regarded as modern and progressive they paid no loyalty to the Empress Dowager. The paper hinted of the local Chinese financial contribution to the movement against the dynasty.

In 1908 the arrival of Yang Shih Chun as new Chinese Consul-General in Manila gave the revolutionaries the opportunity to launch an attack against the Manchu through the person of the consular official who lacked the customary polish of a mandarin. Though a Chinese, he was an official in the service of the Manchu government. His ignorance of diplomatic etiquette and social amenities caused the local revolutionary propagandists to bitterly attack him through the medium of Chinese revolutionary organs in Hong Kong. Like the Manchu dynasty which he represented, he was described as old-fashioned, corrupt and a disgrace to the Chinese.[53]

By 1908 it was generally believed that the Imperial Commissioner, Yang Shih-ch'i who visited in the Philippines and other parts of Southeast Asia in the previous year ostensibly to study the economic conditions of countries visited, was actually on a spying trip: to observe the activities of the revolutionists in the overseas Chinese communities. What he achieved is not known. But the following from a Canton dispatch explained the matter further:

> The attention of the Peking Government has been drawn to the fact that the laboring class of Chinese in Hong Kong, Macao, Straits settlements, Netherland Indies and other places are influenced by certain rebel leaders and are moving against the Peking government. The condition of affairs, it is stated, has been confirmed by Yang Shi-ch'i, the imperial Chinese commissioner, who was recently on a trip down south and as a consequence of this confirmation the Peking authorities here dispatched instructions to the Chinese Consul General in Singapore and Manila, requesting them to endeavor to dispel the rebellious feeling now prevailing. Similar incidents here also reached Canton and the Viceroy of Canton has been instructed to communicate with the various magistrates under his jurisdiction to deal with the laboring classes accordingly. It is also stated that this unrest is responsible for the desire of the Chinese government to establish consulates in the Netherland Indies.[54]

The revolutionary activities in the Philippines took a step forward in 1909 with the formation of the Shu Pao She or reading club, in Cavite. The club was shortly transferred to Manila. This type of reading club was founded by young agitators who through pamphlets, newspapers,

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[52] *The Cableneus-American* March 12, 1908.
[53] Feng Tzu-yu, *Ko-ming i-shih, op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 276.
[54] *The Cableneus-American,* March 12, 1908.

and public lectures sought to awaken the Philippine Chinese to the need of revolution. Other branches followed suit in various parts of the islands.[55] Books, magazines, and newspapers were made available to members who are mostly young men, and in this way revolutionary thoughts were disseminated. These study clubs were later reorganized as branches of the Kuomintang party.

In the spring-summer of 1911, the arrival of Li Ch'i of the Hong kong T'ung Meng Hui paved the way for the organization of a similar branch in Manila. Under his guidance and supervision the revolutionaries in Manila set up the party structure. Dr Tee Han Kee who had been energetically leading the revolutionary movement was elected chairman of the local T'ung Meng Hui.[56]

The Philippine Chinese and the Revolution of 1911

On October 9, 1911, a follower of Sun Yat-sen, one of the heroic and desperate "Dare-to-Die" who had harrassed the imperial government for years, was working over a bomb in Wuchang. The bomb exploded accidentally, the secret storage of munitions was discovered; the next day, in the ensuing turmoil, the Republic of China was born. Double Ten Day, (October 10, 1911) has since been celebrated as the Chinese National Day.

Revolution always causes reverberation far beyond borders, and the shock waves of the Chinese republican revolution were felt wherever there were Chinese communities. The outbreak of the Revolution was the signal for an extraordinary demonstration of enthusiasm by the Philippine Chinese. The news of victory gave impetus to the collection of funds. The cutting of the queue, the badge of Manchu domination, was the occasion for a general holiday. It is reported that barbers of the city were kept busy shearing the locks of the rebel sympathizers.[57]

In different Chinese stores and restaurants, placards giving accounts of the battle were posted and they became the center of animated groups discussing the course of the war. As political events in China were growing more and more exciting and unconfirmed reports of revolutionary activities at home reached the islands in rapid succession, the Chinese in Manila then began to look at the newspapers as an indispensable means of informing themselves reliably of what was happening at home. Lacking a paper of their own (the *Ching-to Times* folded for financial reasons in 1909) the local Chinese depended on the Manila papers for news. Every afternoon as the *Manila Times* papers went to press, a score of Chinese gathered about the news room eager

[55] Ch'en Hsiao-yu, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. she 23.
[56] Tsai Kuei-sheng, *op. cit.*, p. 85; Feng Tzu-yu, *Ko-ming i-shih, op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 154.
[57] *The Manila Times*, October 20, 1911.

to purchase the first copy of the press.[58] To meet the urgent need of the day the *Kong Li Po,* hastily published as a news bulletin in late 1911, came to light in 1912, the first year of the Chinese republic. This paper now considered the doyen of Chinese dailies in the Philippines was founded with the special object of propagating the revolutionary cause. The organ was put up with a capital of ₱10,000 subscribed to by the Chinese merchants, at the instance of Dr. Tee Han Kee.[59]

As the news of armed uprisings reached Manila, special performances were given by the reading club at the Manila Grand Opera House for the purpose of raising funds for the revolutionary coffers. Dr. Tee Han Kee, the leading revolutionary supporter in Manila, was easily the star of the play, appearing in the role of Sun Yat-sen.[60] One of the scenes staged told of the killing of the Tartar general by Wen Sheng-t'sai an Overseas Chinese in Malaya. Impressed by the speeches that Sun Yat-Sen made while traveling in the South Seas Wen then went back to Canton in 1910 intending to assassinate Li Chun, then provincial commander-in-chief of the Kwangtung Navy, and who had been singled out as an executioner of many revolutionaries. Wen failed to kill Li Chun but he was arrested and executed for having killed General Fu Ch'i another important official in Kwangtung.[61] Another scene showed the attempt of Chinese girls to carry bombs into the city of Canton and the entry of the revolutionaries into the city. The scene was the cause of great enthusiasm and when "the flag of young China was raised over the bodies of fallen Tartars, it was moments before the house subsided."[62] The play was preceded by patriotic addresses by a number of speakers among whom were three women who "wrought" the house into a high pitch of patriotic fervor. The general tone of the speeches were descriptive of the alleged abuses committed by the Manchus against the Chinese. The speakers portrayed the way in which Chinese were handicapped in their own country by corrupt officials. The American and the French governments were cited as examples of what can be brought about by revolt. They stressed that the only way to keep China from being divided among the powers was to overthrow the Manchu role. At the close of the speeches, Dr. Tee Han Kee came to the front of the stage accompanied by two assistants, and unfurling the flag of the revolution called for three cheers. For several moments the house was in an uproar, the mass of people who had

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[58] *Ibid.*, November 6, 1911.

[59] Yen Wen-ch'u, "Shan-shih-nien-lai fei-tao hua-ch'iao pao-chi shih-yeh", *op. cit.*, Chapter 39, p. 3, Ch'en Hsiao-yu, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. she 3, Liu Lang, *op. cit.*, p. 056.

[60] *The Manila Times*, October 14, 1911.

[61] Huang Chen-wu, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18.

[62] *The Manila Times*, October 14, 1911.

gathered to witness the staging of the great tragedy surged backward and forward and shouted themselves hoarse.[63]

On October 15, the second production of the play was re-enacted.[64] This was followed by a third performance on November 7.[65] During both performances, several thousand Chinese crowded the Opera House to the doors. The dramatic scenes infected thousands of Chinese with the revolutionary germ.

> Every reference to the revolutionary movement was greeted with the wildest enthusiasm and when the flag of the revolution was waved as a climax to a patriotic outburst, the very rafters of the Opera House shook with cheering.[66]

The anti-Manchu slogan, fan-Ch'ing fu-Ming oppose the Ch'ing, restore the Ming, invented by anti-Manchu secret societies throughout the Ch'ing dynasty was appropriated by the revolutionaries and was soon taken up by a vast number of Chinese. Although the Manchu emperors were as Chinese * as the Hanoverian Kings became English, with the development of a new revolutionary movement in China, spreading the concept of democratic responsible government to replace the Manchu absolutism, and the old imperial-bureaucratic system this "national" appeal became of special significance. (For though the Manchu emperors had became entirely sinified, all over China the privileged position of the Manchu people and the existence of Manchu garrisons were a perpetual reminder that the empire had been usurped by foreigners.) Both the Taipings and the Triads aiming at respectively a Christian dynasty and the restoration of the Ming (the last Chinese dynasty succeeded by the Manchu) had emphasized the "alien" nature of the Manchu dynasty in relation to the Han people, i.e., Chinese, and this line of propaganda was carried on by the later revolutionists. Their propaganda left only two deep impressions. One was that they were against the Manchus and the other is that they took pride in the glorious heritage left by their Han ancestors.

By harping on the theme that the Chinese were being oppressed by a racial minority against their own interest, and that the Manchu readily acquiesced to foreign aggression as a means of maintaining their power and special privileges, they became discredited in the eyes of the Chinese people. They were such obvious targets, and on two counts, as usurper of the Chinese powers and as ruler of China in a bleak

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[63] *The Cablenews-American* October 14, 1911.
[64] *The Manila Times*, October 16, 1911.
[65] *Ibid.*, November 8, 1911.
[66] *Ibid.*, October 16, 1911.

* The Manchus who ruled China from 1644 to 1911 were a non-Chinese people of different habit, language, and culture. Yet, they succeeded in maintaining their power by traditional Confucian means for as long a period as any Chinese dynasty.

age of national degradation. This kind of propaganda produced tremendous affect and it was mainly this which raised the storm of revolution in China.

The Chinese revolutionary followers in the Philippines also harped on the theme of the struggle, broadly speaking, of the Chinese people against the Manchu, alien in race. Dr. Tee Han Kee thundered:

> The Manchu is doomed! This is the voice of China. It has been growing in volume for years, and at least it has made itself heard over the civilized world. We have failed ten times already — we will do it all over. The Chinese of today, for the Manchu are not Chinese, will not be satisfied until the Manchu is overthrown and an intelligent government has been established. ... the breaking point is past, China had endured all that she can, and now is the time for a government of the people, for the people, and by the people. They have kept us down, have trained us in ignorance with the iron hand, so that their rotten dynasty might stand on their loot, for ten thousand years.
>
> ... We have been kept down by the people who called themselves Chinese, the Manchus. Their history is written in blood.... The time has come to wipe out the stain.
>
> We don't want an empire, but a republic. We owe it to the world and to ourselves. When China has become better this world will benefit, and around the little nucleus that will be formed at the realization of our object, will spread out a great land, filled with happy Chinese who for the first time in centuries will have tasted sweet liberty, the right of every man....[67]

The Chinese were now in sympathy with the revolutionary movement, and contributed their financial bit to its support. For one thing the tension between wanting to be modern and fear of reprisals on relatives back home if they supported the revolutionaries had come to an end. Every Chinese resident in the Philippines was asked to contribute his quota to the cause of the revolution."[68] As the preponderance of the Chinese in the Philippines were Fukienese and Cantonese, i.e., of the southern stock, the response had been generous. The reason is not far to seek. The Fukienese, together with their southern neighbor, the Cantonese had been called the Anglo-Saxon of China, and there can be no doubt that they are more active, more independent, more self-reliant, than those living in the north, and west of China.[69] The Cantonese, in particular, have historically been the most bellicose people in China.[70] While slighter physically than their compatriots farther north, they were more fiery in temperament. It was therefore no accident that the Cantonese though defeated, put up the only effective

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[67] *Ibid.*, October 21, 1911.

[68] *Ibid.*, November, 6, 1911.

[69] Marshall Broomshall, *The Chinese Empire: "A General Summary Survey,"* (London: Morgan and Scott, 1907), p. 54.

[70] Frederic Wakeman Jr., *Stranger at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China,* 1839-1861. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 57-58.

defense of Canton during the Opium War. Nor was it an accident that the Taiping Rebellion, the first internal disturbance in China inspired by the West has its inception in the Canton Area, and the City was lkewise the cradle of the Republican Revolution of 1911 that was led by Sun Yat-sen, himself a Cantonese.

Within China proper there was throughout the period of the Manchu dynasty a deep cleavage between North and South in relation to the central government at Peking.[71] This was particularly true for the Canton region. The anti-Manchu feeling in the South had its roots in history:

> Who could forget the eleven-month siege of Canton in 1650, when the Tartar troops finally battered down the walls with cannon and killed over one hundred thousand in a brutal blood bath of revenge and fury? These popular memories did not die early. In fact, anti-Manchu revolutionaries like Sun Yat-sen felt that hatred of the Ch'ing formed the essence of the Triads' ideology.[72]

Thus, though the Manchus may have occupied Northern China without meeting the least resistance they conquered the south by force and only after a long hard bitter struggle. This fact determined the later history of the dynasty and explained the differing attitude of the northern and southern Chinese towards the Manchu dynasty. After the 1911 Revolution, Canton remained the base of Sun Yat-sen and his republican faction later known as the Nationalists, during a long series of civil wars that were, roughly between New China and Old China.

Let us then return to the fund raising campaign. By October 18, 1911, ₱77,000 had been remitted to the revolutionaries of China.[73] Between October 11 and early November, 1911, ₱300,000 had been contributed for the cause of the republican revolution;[74] of these amounts ₱52,000 had been raised at the three performances in the Grand Opera House.[75] Those who had hitherto looked upon the revolution as treason and avoided it like a plague were now somewhat reconciled as to the inevitable. We now find wealthy merchants as zealous contributors. Guillermo Cu-Unjieng, President of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce for 1904-1906, personally donated ₱5,000 to the Revolutionary Army coffer when news of the Wuchang uprising reached Manila in mid-October, 1911.[76] Another wealthy merchant, Jose Velasco Chua gave ₱1,000 for the same cause.[77] A donation in the amount of ₱18,000 was raised in a 2-day Chinese charity bazaar sale

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[71] C.P. Fitzgerald, *China: A Short Cultural History* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954), p. 535.

[72] Wakeman, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

[73] *The Cablenews-American*, October 18, 1991.

[74] *Ibid.*, November 9, 1911; *The Manila Times*, November 4, 1911.

[75] *The Manila Times*, October 16, 1911; *The Cablenews-American*, November 9, 1911.

[76] Huang Hsiao-t'sang, *op. cit.*, p. chia 159.

[77] *Fei-lu-pin hua-ch'iao ming-jen shih-lueh, op. cit.*, p. 23.

under the auspices of the Manila Chinese young men and women patriotic groups for the relief of those Chinese rendered destitute by the floods and drought during the 1911 revolution.[78]

On October 22, the Manila Reading Club, the organization responsible for the revolutionary propaganda in the city, held a meeting attended by a thousand Chinese. The meeting was called by Dr. Tee Han Kee to introduce a number of fellow revolutionists who all made speeches calling for the destruction of the Manchu dynasty. The speakers were listened to eagerly, and it is said, the magic word "revolution," set the house mad with enthusiasm. In particular, Dr. Tee Han Kee took the opportunity to denounce Yuan Shih-k'ai. (In 1898 Yuan Shih-k'ai had been the instrument which the Empress Dowager had used to overthrow the reformers and the Kuang Hsu Emperor. The betrayal won the eternal hatred of Kuang Hsu's brother, Prince Chun, who in 1909 became regent. In January 1909 the Prince dismissed Yuan from all his posts. To meet the emergency created by the revolt of October 1911, the Prince swallowed his pride. He recalled Yuan from forced retirement to take command of the punitive expedition against the rebels because Yuan, the strong man of the last years of the Empress Dowager rule, had organized the nearest thing to a modern Army.) In a fiery speech that carried the audience to its feet, Dr. Tee Han Kee said:

> Yuan Shi-k'ai, the man without shame, the Chinese who came like a dog, when he was called, and who has sold his soul of what was once Chinese, to the rotting dynasty of Manchus.[79]

Not only did the Overseas Chinese in the Philippines contribute their wealth to the revolution but they also shed their blood for it. Paul Linebarger, an American judge in the Philippines in the early years of the 1900's, in one of his works on Sun Yat-sen told the story of the revolutionary exploits of his cook whom he affectionately called Ah Po. One day Ah Po had come to him and asked for a month's leave. He confided that he had been sent for to help Sun Yat-sen. The judge gave the leave but the cook did not return for many months. When he did come back he was emaciated and scarred as from battle. But he was more enthusiastic than ever about the revolution, although his efforts had failed, and he had been caught by the government police, imprisoned, beaten and robbed of his possessions. It was this incident, which led Judge Linebarger to Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese revolutionary movement.[80]

Ah Po was not the only Chinese who participated in the revolutionary uprising. Ty Kong Tin, son of a local Chinese merchant, joined the

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[78] *The Manila Times*, August 12, 1912.
[79] *Ibid.*, October 23, 1911.
[80] Lineberger, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-10.

revolutionary soldiers in the capture of Ch'uan-chou from the Imperial troops in the 1911 revolution.[81] It is said that as many as 900 Chinese left for China to assist in the government in October 1911.[82] Meanwhile, a drill team was organized from among Manila Chinese businessmen for training under the manual of arms. Instruction was given the men by a Chinese, formerly an officer of the Japanese Army. Beginning with a handful of enthusiasts the number swelled to over a hundred by the end of October.[83] It was reported many of Manila's prominent Chinese were the most enthusiastic members of the drill team and were taking more interest in the present proceedings than at any previous stage of the revolution.

The early days of 1912 saw the Chinese in Manila in a state of jubilation over the information that Peking had capitulated and that a provisional republic had been proclaimed by edict of the imperial regent of China. One local paper reported the gala day in festive mood:

> Bright colored five barrel flags* of the new Chinese republic floated from all the buildings of the Chinese quarter of the city, yesterday, and were hung in front of the shops of Chinese merchants on the Escolta and Rosario, while the happy celestials celebrated . . . riding, cheering through the city in automobile and special street cars, decorated with the colors of the new born nation.[84]

In May 1912, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce put its final seal of approval on the Chinese Republic and the Consul General of the New government at Peking acted as the presiding officer at the annual meeting of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in the city.[85]

In August, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce upon instruction from the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture sent a delegate in the person of Benito Siy Cong Bieng a prominent local Chinese merchant to Peking to confer on matters coming within the scope of the ministry.[86] In November-December, the same chamber of commerce, on instructions of the President of the new Republic, unanimously elected Shih-Chi-hua as observer to the National Assembly.[87] He was described as being a merchant of large means, polished to a high degree, and possessing a perfect knowledge of the Mandarin language.

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[81] *The Cablenews-American*, May 30, 1912.
[82] *Ibid.*, October 18, 1911.
[83] *The Manila Times*, November 2, 1911.
* Five stripes — a color for each of the five people who swore allegiance to it: red for the Chinese, yellow for the Manchus, blue for the Mongolian, white for the Moslems, black for the Tibetan.
[84] *The Cablenews-American*, February 16, 1912.
[85] *The Manila Times*, May 9, 1912.
[86] *Ibid.*, August 21, 1912; Huang Hsiao-t'sang, *op. cit.*, p. chia 59.
[87] *The Manila Times*, November 27, December 13, 1912; Huang Hsiao-t'sang, *op. cit.*, p. chia 59.

The fact that the Chinese abroad had before and after the fall of the Manchu regime contributed generously financially or otherwise, toward the successful establishment of the Republic of China automatically raised their status in the opinion of the Chinese Republic. The young republic recognizing the significance of the role which the overseas Chinese had played in the revolution, stipulated in the provisional constitution of August 10, 1912 that six senators out of a total 214 be selected from among the Chinese overseas. [88]

Recognition of services performed in connection with the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty, and the establishment of the Chinese Republic came in 1913 to three of Manila's leading Chinese citizens, two residents of Cebu, and one of Iloilo. They were Dr. Tee Han Kee, Jose Velasco Chua, and Ty Chuaco, the latter two prominent Chinese merchants of Manila; Uy Ma Guan honorary consular representative of Cebu, Uy Suy Cum also of Cebu; and Yap Seng honorary consular representative of Iloilo. All were awarded with the order of "Chia ho" for meritorious services to the Republic of China. [89]

Perhaps it is relevant to this point to analyze the reasons which led to the Philippine Chinese to support the revolutionaries. There were many factors which help to explain the trend toward support of the revolutionary and republican movement. Among the Overseas Chinese who became acquainted with modern political institutions abroad and who best understood the strength of the West, many were anxious to have China modernized. Those subjected to modern education were provided with a new yardstick for measuring the inadequacies of Chinese institutions. This was brought home by Dr. Tee Han Kee when he said:

> This is the twentieth century, the Chinese no longer believe that the emperor is the son of Heaven. We have been patient and tried all means to no end, until at last, with our trained men who have been sent abroad to learn modern ideas, and who through their light of intelligence have seen the horror of the uncivilized Manchu rule, our great struggle has come.[90]

Sun Yat-sen's influence on the overseas Chinese developed from the fact that he knew how to utilize the existing revolutionary potential of Overseas Chinese as well as to give a newer and greater meaning to the anti-dynastic conception. The decadent Manchu regime had become unpopular. Instead of being the object of loyalty, it had now became the target of racial hatred. They "flocked to the standard" of the Republic because they had been stirred up by skillfully conducted propaganda to take part in the noble work of "sweeping away the hated

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[88] Chu Hsiu-hsieh et. al. (eds.) *Hua-ch'iao Chi* (The Chinese Abroad) (Taipei, 1964), p. 524, Feng Tzu-yu, *Hua-ch'iao ko-ming k'ai-kuo shih, op. cit.*, pp. 121-122.
[89] *The Manila Times*, May 24, 1913.
[90] *Ibid.*, October 21, 1911.

foreign domination." A Manila Chinese resident explained why the Chinese were eager to help the revolutionists:

> Chinese people were fighting to a finish. They will not give up until the corrupt government which is a blot upon and disgrace to the empire is torn from its hold, and a new and a cleaner administration takes its place.[91]

With the decline of the Manchu government, the influence of K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao also declined. As the years rolled on, the program of a constitutional monarchy proved too conservative for the time and it lost to Sun Yat-sen the leadership of the movement to create a modern China. The death of the Kuang Hsu emperor in 1908 was a final blow to constitutional monarchy movement of Kang and Liang. When the progressive emperor died, "the main hope of the monarchial reformers was destroyed."[92] The Overseas Chinese, already split over the issue of reform and revolution, now gave their support to the more radical course. The future rode with Sun Yat-sen. His movement losing impetus, K'ang devoted himself more and more to the exposition of the "Confucian religion" and became increasingly conservative, out of touch with modern currents.

When the revolution seemed capable of winning the political and military battle, the Philippine Chinese support of the revolutionists was fairly generous. By October of 1911, the revolutionists had enough success to attract those who wanted to be on the winning side. No longer seeing in the Manchus or reformers as likely candidates for power in China, their logical deduction led them to cast their lot with the revolutionists.

Finally, the Overseas Chinese realized that their fate as alien residents abroad was somehow linked to the future of their homeland. They felt that the causes of their low status were numerous and varied, and often highly complex in nature, yet they realized at the same time that the greatest of all these was the weak home government. They realized that foreigners felt no awe for a weak nation and soon came to the conclusion that they could win respect only through a resurgence of the Chinese nation itself. It was this vision that impelled them to cast their lot with Sun Yat-sen in his struggle "to bring China into the modern World" and "to gain for her an equal and honored place in the family of nations."[93] According to Dr. Tee Han Kee in fighting the Manchus, the Chinese revolutionists had but one object: "to free China from the oppression and give her a place in the world as a

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[91] *Ibid.*, October 16, 1911.

[92] C.P. Fitzgerald, *The Third China: The Chinese Communities in Southeast Asia* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1965) p. 21.

[93] Shao Chuan Leng and Norman D. Palmer, *Sun Yat-sen and Communism* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 9.

power."[94] The vision of a Chinese nation, "united, wealthy, powerful, and internationally respected," came to be that of all Chinese immigrants, as some one aptly puts it:

> Chinese in exile wove a dream against the toil and outrages of their daily lives. The smiling laundryman, the sweating coolie or the railroad work gang, and the silk-robed magnate each comforted himself in adversity and rejoiced with greater zest in his seasons of joy because he was a Chinese, born of a race far above the rest of mankind. The determination that their superiority must be universally acknowledged led the overseas Chinese into a radical political movement.[95]

In effect, without the financial support, the ardor, the undying faith and the sacrificing spirit of the Overseas Chinese, including those in the Philippines, the Republic of China might not have been established so soon. In calling the attention of his fellow countrymen at home to the important role played by the Chinese abroad, Sun Yat-sen coined the expression: "Hua-ch'iao wei ko-ming chi-mu," the Overseas Chinese are the mother of the Chinese Revolution!

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[94] *The Manila Times*. October 21, 1911.

[95] Robert S. Elegant, *The Center of the World* (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1964), p. 96.

A GLOSSARY OF CHINESE NAMES AND TERMS

Chao-fan	(造反)
Chia-ho	(嘉禾)
Ching-to Hsin-wen	(警鐸新文)
Chua Han-huan	(蔡咸煥)
Chung-kuo jih-pao	(中國日報)
Cu Unjieng	(邱允衡)
F'an-Ch'ing fu-Ming	(反清復明)
Fu Ch'i	(孚琦)
Go Ki Kiu	(吳記球)
Hai-ch'i	(海圻)
Hsien Cheng Hui	(憲政會)
Hsing Chung Hui	(興中會)
Hsu Ch'in	(徐勤)
Hua Pao	(華報)
Huang Hai Shan	(黃海山)
I-yu Hsin-pao	(益友新報)
Ko-ming	(革命)
Ko-ming chun	(革命軍)
Ko-ming chi-mu	(革命之母)

Kong Li Po	(公理報)
Li Ch'i	(李其)
Li Chun	(李準)
Min-i pao	(民益報)
Min Pao	(民報)
Nung Shang Pu	(農商報)
Pan Shu-fan	(潘庶蕃)
Pao Huang Hui	(保皇會)
Shih Chi-hua	(施至華)
Shu Pao She	(書報社)
Siy Cong Bieng	(施光銘)
Su Jui-chu	(蘇銳釗)
Tee Han Kee	(鄭漢淇)
Tsou Jung	(鄒容)
Tung Meng Hui	(同盟會)
Ty Kong Tin	(鄭孔珍)
Wen Sheng-t'sai	(溫生才)
Yang Hao-lu	(楊豪侶)
Yang Shih-ch'i	(楊士琦)
Yang Shih-chun	(楊士鈞)

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