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THE PATTERN OF INDONESIAN MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT IN MALAYA

TUNKU SHAMSUL BAHRIN

IT IS A PRACTICE OF THOSE WRITING ON THE POPULATION of Malaya[1] to classify them as Malays, Chinese, Indians and Indonesians. This is the result of inadequate field knowledge. Whereas the term Malays is definitive in that it refers to an ethno-cultural group, the remaining three terms are not so for they have other connotations. Some have even used the terms Chinese, Indian and Indonesian communities without due recognition being given to the differences, both cultural and linguistic, that exist within each of them.[2]

It is the intention of this paper to show some of the differences that exist among the migrants, and their immediate descendants, from the political territory which is now the Republic of Indonesia. Emphasis will be given to the differences in the island-origins of these migrants, their general geographical distribution in Malaya, and finally, to an areal case study which will show the relative isolation of these various groups.

The Migrants — Their Island-origin and Pattern of Migration

In the 1947 Census of Malaya when a break-down of the Indonesian population in the country according to their various areas of origin was last made, the five islands from which the Indonesian migrants came were Java, Kalimantan, Sumatra, Bawean and Sulawesi, in that order of numerical importance (see Fig. 2). The total Indonesian population in Malaya was 309,150, consisting of 189,400 Javanese, 62,400 Banjarese, 26,300 Sumatrans, 20,400 Boyanese and 7,000 Bugis. The remainder were migrants from other parts of Indonesia.[3]

The Javanese community formed 60 per cent of the Indonesian population in Malaya. They were mostly padi-cultivators or rubber and coconut smallholders, only a few being engaged as estate labourers. In the early part

[1] In this paper the term Malaya refers to all the States in the Federation of Malaya including the present Republic of Singapore (See Figure 1).

[2] See M. Freedman, "The Growth of Plural Society in Malaya," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 2 (June 1960).

[3] For further information on the growth of the Indonesian population in Malaya, see Tunku Shamsul Bahrin "The Growth and Distribution of the Indonesian Population in Malaya," *Bijdragen Tot de Taal —, Land — En Volkenkunde*, deel 123 (January, 1967).



Figure 1. *The States of Malaya*



Figure 2. *Indonesian Migrations to Malaya*

of the development of plantation agriculture in Malaya, however, a comparatively high proportion of the Javanese came as contract labourers, many of whom after serving their terms settled in the country to work on their own smallholdings.[4] The bulk of the Javanese came from Central and East Java and very few of them from Sunda or Madura.

The Banjarese, who hailed from the immediate hinterland of Banjermasin in South Kalimantan, formed 20 per cent of the recorded Indonesian population in Malaya. Although the bulk of the Banjarese immigrants were rice-cultivators, a few of them were also engaged in growing rubber and coconuts on their own smallholdings.

The third numerous group were the Sumatrans, totalling 26,300 in number and forming just over 8 per cent of the Indonesian population in Malaya. The Sumatran population in Malaya can be sub-divided into a number of regional language groups or *suku-bangsas*, each originating from a different part of the island. The most numerous of these speech-groups were the Minangkabaus who formed over 40 per cent of the Sumatran population in Malaya. The Mandailings, whose number is not known, were reckoned to be next in numerical importance and they originaly came from Tapanuli, the southern portion of the Batak country. Ethnically they are part of the Batak people, and although the Bataks are mainly Christians, the majority of the Mandailings are Muslims. The Korinchis who totalled 2,400 in 1947 came from that part of Sumatra immediately to the south of the Minangkabau country. The other Sumatran groups came mainly from Acheh, Palembang and Jambi.

The Boyanese formed another distinct group in the Indonesian community in Malaya. They came from the tiny island of Bawean which lies about 65 miles north of Madura and they speak a language very closely related to that of the Madurese. In 1947, the total Boyanese population in Malaya was 20,400. The majority of these, except for the few hundreds working in the estates in Kota Tinggi district, worked as gardeners, drivers and grooms in the major urban centres in the country.

The Bugis from South Sulawesi formed the fifth largest Indonesian group in the country. Although they are reputed for their business and navigational abilities, the bulk of the Bugis in Malaya, like the majority of their fellow Indonesians here, were agricultural smallholders.

The Indonesian migrants, in order to reach Malaya, had to cross a stretch of the sea whose distance varied according to the island of origin and point of departure. The Bugis had to travel by sea for a number of days before landing in Malaya, whereas the Sumatrans from the East Coast districts needed only a few hours. However, since the majority of the Suma-

[4] See Tunku Shamsul Bahrin "Indonesian Labour in Malaya," *Kajian Ekonomi Malaysia*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (June, 1965).

tran immigrants in Malaya originated from the highland areas in Central Sumatra, they had to make an overland journey to the coast and port of departure. The Mandailings, for example, could either take the boat at Padang on the West Coast of Sumatra or at one of the East Coast ports of Si-Antar, Belawan or Medan. Even though Padang was the most convenient in terms of distance and transportation services, many of the Mandailing migrants used the East Coast ports. This was because the total cost of the journey by boat from Padang to any of the ports of entry in Malaya was more expensive than the total costs from any one of the East Coast ports. Since the majority of the migrants were peasants with little money, they even found it worthwhile, at least financially, to trek down to the East Coast ports. The large part of this overland journey had to be done by foot and river for modern transport services during the major period of the migration was non-existent. On arrival at the ports, the migrants had the choice of using either the many local crafts that made regular crossings across the Straits of Malacca or the more expensive steamships. A number of the Bugis were reported to have arrived in Singapore by means of their own native merchant-boats direct from Sulawesi. The Javanese and Boyanese migrants came to Malaya by steamships.

Many of the peasant-migrants had to sell part or all of their property to finance the journey. Others followed relatives, mostly earlier migrants, who paid their fares either in the form of a favour or an advance. On the other hand, the estate labour-migrants recruited to work in the various plantations in Malaya had nothing to worry about financing their journeys. According to their contract of service, the employers or their agents were obliged to pay, among other things, the entire cost of transportation from the place of recruitment to the place of employment.[5]

Another group of Indonesians, mainly Javanese, who did not have to worry about the finance of their transportation were, as we will call them, the "smallholding-labourers." In many respects, they were no different from the estate indentured labourers, except that they were bound by no special law of employment and they were mainly employed by rich Malay landowners. As yet very little is known about the size and nature of the employment of this particular group of immigrants. However, according to the sketchy and unverified field information, there existed, in the early decades of this century, among the Javanese community in Singapore a professional group of people known as "sheikhs."[6] The function performed

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] The writer has been unable to collect adequate information on the extent and functions of these "sheikhs." He has also been unable to determine the connection of these labour "sheikhs" with the pilgrim "sheikhs" who were responsible for making the necessary accommodation and travelling arrangements for intending pilgrims to Mecca. See also S. Husin Ali, *Social Stratification in Kampong Bagan,* monographs of the Malaysian Branch Royal Asiatic Society, 1964, pp. 29-31.

by the "sheikh" was to provide cheap Javanese labour to those Malay landowners who wanted to cultivate their land. Like the estate-employers, the "sheikh" requested professional recruiters or his own agents to send to Singapore the required number of labourers at the "sheikh's" expense. On arrival in Singapore, the immigrants were housed and fed by the "sheikh" until such time when he could transfer the "ownership" of these labourers to the landowners who would of course have to pay the entire costs of the importation and also the "sheikh's" commission. The agreement of employment was done only by mutual understanding and trust, and in most cases the labourer was fed and housed by the landowner. It was common practice for the labourer to be given as his own private property half of the land that he had cleared and cultivated.

In spite of their poverty, the departure of these migrants was always preceded by a small feast and the offering of prayers for a safe journey. The feasts and ceremonies that preceded the departure of the Korinchi emigrants were extremely elaborate. This was because for many of these migrants, the journey to Malaya was construed as a necessary first stage, at least from the economic point of view, of the pilgrimage to Mecca. This was especially true for the early Korinchi migrants.[7] As with most Muslims, the pilgrimage is an important occasion in the life of a person and thus has to be celebrated with due pomp and gaiety.

Before the advent of a good road and railway service in Malaya, the immigrants entered the country through a number of points, depending largely upon their destination. The Achinese, who invariably settled in northern Malaya, entered the country through Penang. The Sumatrans who migrated to Selangor, Perak and Negri Sembilan mostly came through Port Swettenham (Klang), Telok Anson and Malacca, respectively. Since the very beginning, however, Singapore had always been the major point of entry for the Indonesian immigrants.

The majority of the migrants came to Malaya direct from their home-villages. A few of them, however, migrated to other parts of Indonesia first, and thence to Malaya. The general pattern of this indirect-migration was that the Javanese and Banjarese, and a few Bugis too, migrated to the East Coast districts of Sumatra and after a time in wage labour crossed the Straits of Malacca to Malaya. The reasons behind this indirect movement were probably the dissatisfaction in Sumatra and the prospects of a better livelihood in Malaya. The majority of the Bugis indirect-migrants came via the various Bugis settlements in Kalimantan to Singapore and Johore.

On landing in Malaya those migrants who came on their own knew exactly where to go and the addresses of the persons from whom they could

[7] Opinion expressed by Dato Semarang bin Ahmad, Ketua Kampong of Sungai Lui (Ulu Langat District). He is a Korinchi immigrant.

expect some help and assistance. In most cases, they were either relatives or friends who had migrated earlier. Often it was the earlier migrants who invited and encouraged their friends and relatives to migrate to Malaya. These earlier migrants usually accomodated the new arrivals in their homes until such time as they were able to get a job or set up their own small-holdings.

One of the first things that the new arrival had to do was to find himself a piece of land that would provide him with a reasonabale income. Land acquisition in late 19th and early 20th century Malaya posed no difficulty at all. Land was abundant and free for the taking, and the large tracts of swampland being drained by the government could be settled and cultivated by the Indonesian immigrants. Land acquisition by means of block-application was both easy and common. All that the immigrants or their leaders had to do was to the ask for the chief's permission. Thus, Abdullah Hukom, a dynamic Korinchi leader in Kualu Lumpur, recollected that "I presented myself before Raja Laut for the purpose of applying for a piece of land for my people. Raja Laut gave me a letter authorising me to open up land in Pudu, and at the same time he appointed me as the official leader of that area with the title Penghulu Masjid."[8]

Although land would be easily acquired in the proper and accepted manner, there were also cases of land-acquisition by squatting. In fact, this was the simplest way of acquiring a piece of land. All that the immigrant had to do was to select an unoccupied piece of State land and to clear and cultivate it with whatever crop he thought best. Once the squatter had set up his house on it, then it was most difficult for the administration to eject him from the lot. In such circumstances, ejection could only be done through a proceeding in a court of law.[9] Land squatting by the Indonesian immigrants should, however, not be considered as a deliberate attempt on the part of these settlers to overlook the authority of the land office in Malaya. The explanation can probably be found in their concept of land-ownership. Many of them believed that the "person who cleared and cultivated an unoccupied piece of land had the sole right of ownership to it."[10]

Process of Opening up New Land

Once a piece of land has been acquired, the first thing that the settler had to do was to construct a shelter, a place to sleep and something that

[8] Abdullah Hukom, "Riwayat Kuala Lumpur 50 Tahun Dahulu," *Warta Ahad*, October 1935. The Selangor Annual Report of 1894 noted that "One of the Datoek Dagangs in Selangor (a Javanese) took up 600 acres of land around Klang and brought Javan se to work it."

[9] One such case of land squatting by a Javanese community in the district of Kuala Selangor was heard in a law-court in Kuala Lumpur as recently as 1962.

[10] Statement made by the District Officer of Ulu Langat (1962). A similar observation was made by Clark E. Cunningham among the Bataks in Sumatra. See his book, *The Post-War Migration of the Toba-Bataks to East Sumatra.*

would protect him from the sun and the rain. If his land was located close to an already established relative or friend, then he would normally live with him until it became very convenient for him to make a shelter of his own. The shelter, however, was nothing more than a hut, built from split bamboo and roofing-materials from the immediate surroundings. There was no need for the more sophisticated sawn-timber and planks. To put up this humble shelter would cost the settler relatively little. He would probably have to buy some of the simple equipment and nails but the rest of the essential building material could be procured, at little or no financial cost, from the surrounding jungles or swamps. It probably took less than a week for two settlers to erect such a shelter.

The next and more arduous task was to clear the jungle and undergrowth. Usually the trees were felled and burned. This phase of pioneering demanded a lot of hard work and patience from the settler. If the new area was settled by a single community, then the task of jungle clearing was usually accomplished on the basis of *gotong-royong* or mutual help. The failure or success of such mutual-assistance depended a great deal upon the solidarity of the group and the integrity of the leader.

In practice the settler did not attempt to clear all his land at once for the whole process of "felling, stumping and clearing of jungle from a four-acre lot is a very arduous task and one which takes the settler a few years to complete."[11] Normally the settler would clear only part of his land and plant it with dry rice, maize, bananas, etc., that would provide him sufficiently both with food and some cash for the initial pioneering years. While waiting for the harvest of the first crop, the immigrant settler would clear the remainder of his land.

Pioneer settlers in the coastal districts usually had to contend with the additional problem of drainage. In these districts much of the land was boggy and consisted of peat which could be very difficult to cultivate. The problems in the swampy areas were so acute that "some European purchasers of land in Klang district, alarmed by the peaty 'nature' of the soil, were allowed to exchange their blocks for corresponding areas selected elsewhere."[12] Be that as it may, the Banjarese and Javanese settlers along these coastal areas have done extremely well to overcome the problems of excess and brackish water. This was accomplished by either digging canals or constructing bunds, or often both, depending upon the nature of the problem and also on the type of crop planted. The use of coastal bund depended to a great extent on the seriousness of the incursions of the sea and also on the width or absence of a protective belt along the coast in relation to the pattern of

[11] Federated Malay States and Straits Settlements *Annual Report of the Drainage Irrigation Department for the Year 1937*, p. 16.

[12] *Annual Report for the State of Selangor for the Year 1896*, p. 13. The abandoned land was taken up and successfully cultivated by Javanese smallholders.

storm tracks and tides. However, it has been observed that coastal bunding is generally found in "those areas where padi is planted, and to lesser extent in the development of areas for coconut or other tree crops."[13] This is because an increase in the salt-water content of the soil is more injurious to the wet-padi crops than to coconut trees.

Drainage of the swamplands was accomplished either by digging canals to the sea, or as in most parts of coastal Johore, by widening and straightening the existing streams and their tributaries so that their function as a drainage system became more effective. Efficient as they were during low tides, these canals, during the periods of high tides, especially when accompanied by local downpours, failed to drain away the excess water and this usually led to flooding. In many cases, these canals, in the absence of any proper system of gates and locks, led to the funnelling of sea-water into the fields during high tides and this usually had destructive effects. It has been noticed that "this concentrated ingress of sea-water and the abrasive action of the tidal scour soon widened the drains permitting the sea-water to move to points much further inland than would have been possible under natural conditions."[14] In such circumstances, as already indicated, bunding would be a great help. Once established, the settlers could always appeal to the government for assistance to prevent their crops from being destroyed. One of the major areas where such help was given was Tanjong Karang where "in 1932, in order to arrest the rapid progress of deterioration which was threatening the entire cultivated area of 10,000 acres . . . a coastal bund 50 miles long"[15] was constructed.

Whilst it was common practice for the pioneer settlers to grow catch crops such as bananas, maize, tapioca, pineapples and vegetables, the main crop varied according to local soil conditions, the period of planting and also the customary practices of the community concerned. These factors might act either singly or collectively, and it is difficult to determine which was the most important. The part played by local soil conditions seems, however, to be more obvious. Thus, in areas where the soil was extremely peaty, rubber and coconut cultivation would be preferred to the cultivation of rice. But at the same time we must not overlook the fact that in some areas, the nature of the crop to be planted was specified by the government at the time of the issue of the land-grants. The same was true in the various irrigation areas, where the crop always prescribed was rice.

The factor of time was obvious when related to the rise and fall of the market-prices of certain products. Thus, in the 1880's and early 1890's when the price of coffee was extremely high, hundreds of Indonesian im-

[13] Observation expressed by L.A.P. Gosling to the writer in personal correspondence.
[14] Lim Joo Jock, "The Geography of Padi Growing in South-east Asia," unpublished Thesis, University of Oxford, 1957, p. 283.
[15] *Ibid*, p. 286.

migrant settlers were reported to have applied for land for the cultivation of coffee. After the decline in the price of coffee in 1896, this crop was abandoned and the settlers took to less expensive and more profitable forms of cultivation.[16] The effect of this drop in the market price of coffee on the agricultural geography of some of the districts in Malaya was illustrated in Batang, Padang. In 1895, the year prior to the beginning of the fall in the price of coffee, it was reported that "Batang Padang is the district in which Malays have made most progress with the cultivation of coffee and that a very large amount of coffee has been newly planted."[17] A few years later the agricultural interest of the migrant settlers in that area had shifted to coconut cultivation and 1899 alone "318 applications have been received, chiefly from foreign Malays, for smallholdings to be devoted to this cultivation."[18] After 1900, rubber and coconuts, especially the former, were the two major crops that were favoured by the Indonesian pioneer settlers.

The tendency for the immigrants to grow crops according to what they cultivated in their home districts in Indonesia is best exemplified by the Banjarese and Achinese communities in Malaya. The Banjarese, who were renowned for their cultivation of wet rice, have continued, wherever possible, to grow this crop. The Achinese immigrants in Yen district of Kedah attempted, at least in the beginning, to cultivate pepper, a popular crop in Acheh. According to information collected from the Achinese immigrants there, one of the first things that they grew on their land-lots was a tree called *dedap* (flame-of-the-forest), a plant that grew very easily and rapidly. The intention was to provide sufficient props for the pepper plants. But later they had to abandon pepper-growing for they found that the *dedaps* were not strong enough as props[19] and pepper tended to cause the fertility of the soil to deteriorate very rapidly. The third and probably the most important reason for the abandonment of pepper-growing was the high price of rubber. The relative ease in taking care of rubber plants as compared to pepper was also a factor.

The pioneering phase, covering the period from the time of arrival at the site to the time when the fields were completely cleared and the subsistence crops began to give regular harvests, usually lasted two or three years. This phase was relatively longer in the case of the rubber and coconut smallholders. In these pioneering ventures, there were mixed results. There were those who failed and thus decided to leave to try their luck elsewhere. Some of them even returned to Indonesia. In Kuala Langat district, it was reported that "much of the land opened by foreign Malays in 1888, assisted

[16] *Annual Report of the State of Perak for the Year 1897*, p. 3.
[17] *Annual Report for the State of Perak for the Year 1896*, p. 8.
[18] *Annual Report for the State of Perak for the Year 1900*, p. 4.
[19] View expressed during an interview with Nyak Gam, an Achinese immigrant in Yen. (1962)

by advances from the Government, has either been deserted or totally neglected and the District Officer thinks it hopeless to expect such immigrants to live by agriculture alone for several years after their arrival."[20] Bleak as this view may be, many of the settlers were successful and subsequently decided to settle permanently in this country.

Once the crops started to produce regular harvests, enabling the settlers to save some money, the immigrants began to set up better and more permanent houses. During the initial years in their cramped huts they had refrained from making more aesthetic homes mainly because of the lack of funds, and also because of the feeling of uncertainty during the experimental stage. They were ready to try their fortune elsewhere if their expectations were not realised and if they were not assured of regular crops.[21] In view of these uncertainties it was indeed only practical for the settlers not to have built their permanent houses immediately after acquiring their land.

Although some of the immigrants were accompanied by their families when they first arrived in Malaya, the majority of them came alone or with their male relatives and friends. The decision as to whether to bring their families as well depended on a number of factors, of which the most important was undoubtedly the availability of accommodation during their first few months in Malaya. However, the single male migrant had a number of advantages, particularly that of mobility. It was easier for a single person to be accommodated by a relative or friend than a whole family; and furthermore a single settler, if unsuccessful, could move around to other places and jobs more easily. Since the first few years of the pioneering period were usually difficult, both in terms of work and livelihood, it was preferable for the females and children to remain at home in Indonesia. After procuring a piece of land, cultivating it for a few years and saving some money, the settler usually decided to return home to visit his friends and relatives and to bring his family across to Malaya. His return to his original village usually aroused a great deal of excitement and curiosity. His fellow-villagers were normally impressed by the manner of his dress and the presents he brought home. Answers to inquiries about opportunities in Malaya were often so glowing and exaggerated, that his return to Malaya was accompanied not only by his family but also by other relatives and friends. Thus, it is commonly said that the more people went to Malaya, the more they encouraged others to go also.

One of the outcomes of the process described above was that the opportunities available in any one locality in Malaya were publicised in certain areas in Indonesia. This led to the occupation and settlement of the particular locality by the same group of people. As an example, the offers of

[20] Abstract of Proceedings of the Conference of Residents at Kuala Lumpur in 1907.
[21] *Annual Report for the State of Perak for the Year 1895*, p. 18.

land made by the Perak government in the Krian Irrigation Area, officially opened in 1906, were mainly known to the Banjarese and thus this area has been predominantly settled by this group of people. Hence the eventual effects of this "chain-migration" were to cause firstly the areal concentration of the various groups and secondly the establishment of settlements or communities based on dialect or speech groups. We will study the first tendency by examining the general distribution of the major Indonesian *suku-bangsas* in Malaya and the second by examining the establishement and development of villages in the Ulu Langat Valley of South East Selangor.

Distribution of Indonesians by Community Groups

The 1947 Javanese population in Malaya, as shown in Figure 3, was essentially a coastal community. They were mainly concentrated along the two stretches of the western coast of Malaya. Firstly, beginning with Pontian in the south, the density rose sharply northwards through the districts of Batu Pahat and Muar, and declined steeply along the coast of Malacca. The second stretch began with the district of Kuala Langat and extended northwards through the districts of Klang and Kuala Selangor, ended abruptly in the district of Lower Perak. Apart from these two coastal stretches, there was also a big concentration of Javanese in Singapore. Elsewhere they were relatively few and scattered. The Javanese population in Johore consisted mainly of coconut and rubber smallholders and, to a lesser extent, some of them were engaged in the cultivation of areca-nut and as labourers on the rubber estates. In the Kuala Selangor and Lower Perak districts the Javanese were essentially a rice-growing community. In Pahang, especially in the district of Kuantan, they were previously estate labourers but by 1947 the majority of them had changed to rice cultivation and rubber growing.

The Banjarese population in Malaya, like the Javanese, were also found along the coast (see Figure 4). In 1947 they showed three major concentrations. These were the district of Krian in the north, the two coastal districts astride the Sungai Bernam and the coastal parts of Batu Pahat in the south. In that year, nearly 93 per cent of the Banjarese population in Malaya were enumerated in the four above-mentioned districts. In the districts of Krian, Lower Perak and Kuala Selangor, the Banjarese were most numerous in the rice irrigation areas of Krian, Sungai Manik and Tanjong Karang, respectively. In the southern district of Batu Pahat, they were mainly engaged in the cultivation of rubber and coconuts on their own smallholdings.

The 1947 Sumatran population in Malaya were to be found largely in the various river valleys of the interior districts of Selangor and Perak. This indeed was, and still is, the most striking difference between their distribution and that of their Javanese, Banjarese and Bugis counterparts, who were



Figure 3. *Malaya: Distribution of Javanese, 1947*



Figure 4. *Malaya: Distribution of Banjarese and Sumatrans, 1947*

mainly coastal. This peculiar tendency of the Sumatrans to settle in the interior areas was mainly probably due, at least in the initial stages, to their economic pursuits and, to a lesser extent, to environment. This can probably be explained by their attempt to live in surroundings or environments evocative of their home areas which are mostly in the central parts of Sumatra. These two factors, however, were in many ways inter-related.

Whereas the majority of the Banjarese and Javanese immigrants came because of opportunities created by the expansion of agriculture, plantation or otherwise, the forerunners of the Sumatrans in Malaya were mainly petty miners and tradesmen. Their trading was perhaps largely confined to the Malays who had settled at the river mouths or along the river valleys. With the establishment of the early mining settlements, trade spread into the interior. The first Sumatran miners, through experience in Sumatra, selected their mining sites in the upper reaches of the various river valleys. These sites became the nuclei of later settlements. This pattern of settlement development can be exemplified by Ulu Langat, as described later. With the introduction of capital-intensive and mechanised mining operations which rendered their conservative and labour-intensive "lampan" methods obsolete, the Sumatrans turned to agriculture. Most of the Sumatrans in Malaya were Minangkabaus and Mandailings from the interior and highland areas of Sumatra where their agricultural techniques were suited to such environments. They had little experience if any, in draining swampy coastal areas and they found the narrow river valleys in the interior districts of western Malaya very suitable for their settlements based on agriculture.

Unlike the other Indonesian communities in Malaya, the Boyanese are to be found in the major towns with the biggest concentration in Singapore (see Figure 5). In fact, Singapore had always been the focus of Boyanese migration for the whole of Southeast Asia with the result that apart from Bawaean Island, Singapore has the largest Boyanese population. In Singapore, approximately 70 per cent of the 1947 Boyanese population were enumerated within the city, but the remaining 30 per cent could not be considered to be wholly rural either. On the Malayan mainland, a similar pattern existed. Thus in 1947 over 70 per cent of the Boyanese population in Selangor lived in Kuala Lumpur town, 82 per cent of the Boyanese in Perak were enumerated in Ipoh, and 97 per cent of those recorded in Penang were located in Georgetown. Only in Johore was the urban percentage of the Boyanese population below 50 per cent. This urban concentration of the Boyanese was related to their occupations. Although most of them were either farmers or fishermen in their home-island, in Malaya they were mainly drivers, peons, stable grooms, and gardeners. Most of these occupations were to be found in the more affluent urban areas.

As shown in Figure 5, the 1947 Bugis population in Malaya were to be found mainly in the coastal parts of the Batu Pahat and Pontian districts



Figure 5. *Distribution of Boyanese and Bugis, 1947*

and a few in Singapore. Whereas the majority of 19th century Bugis immigrants who were then residing predominantly in Singapore were traders and businessmen, the bulk of the Bugis in Johore were mainly agriculturists engaged in coconut and rubber growing.

Ulu Langat Valley: A Study of Indonesian Immigrant Settlements Based on Speech-group

The study of the development of Indonesian settlement in the Ulu Langat valley aims to show how these immigrants tend to set up their villages according to their dialect groups or *suku-bangsas.*

The valley under study is located in the upstream area of Sungai Langat, one of the five rivers that played a major role in the economic development of the State of Selangor during the 19th century. The Ulu Langat valley is about 15 miles long, stretching in a north-east direction from the point where the Kuala Lumpur-Singapore highway crosses the Langat River to the boundary separating Selangor from Pahang (see Figure 6). The width of the valley varies a great deal ranging from about two miles to approximately eight miles at its widest part. Like most of the river valleys in the interior of Malaya, it is typified by a narrow flat bottom which is flanked on both sides by steep slopes. The total cultivated area in the valley is approximately 18,500 acres, 16,000 acres of which belong to Malaysians, 2,000 to Chinese and the remainder mainly to Indian Chettiars.[22] Rubber occupies nearly 50 per cent of the total cultivated area and the rest is devoted to rice and fruit growing.

In 1955 this valley had a total population of approximately 10,000 people, consisting of 350 aborigines, 2,500 Chinese and the rest predominantly Malaysians.[23] Over 90 per cent of the Malaysian population in the valley were either direct immigrants from Sumatra and Java or descendants of such immigrants while the remaining few were the descendants of Malays from Rembau and Malacca.

The earliest known inhabitants of this valley were the aborigines who subsisted on hunting, shifting agriculture and the growing of fruit trees, mainly durians. These aborigines were pushed further and further into the upper parts of the valley by the influx of Indonesian settlers in the late 19th and early 20th century.

When the Indonesian immigrants first settled in this valley is not known exactly. However, some inferences can be made. According to local information, the earliest Sumatran settlers did not come direct to this valley. At first they went to Lenggeng, Mantin and Beranang, places lying between

[22] Laidin bin Alang Musa, "Background to the Ulu Langat Valley in Selangor," *Malayan Historical Journal,* Vol. 2, No. 1 (1955).
[23] *Ibid.*



Figure 6. *The Ulu Langat Valley*

Kajang and Seremban, and it was from these places that they moved into the Ulu Langat Valley. The Resident of Negri Sembilan, writing in 1897, stated that the Lenggeng valley "has been occupied by settlers from Minangkabau for about 30 years," [24] which means that it was settled *circa* 1868. We also know that during the Selangor Civil War (1866 to 1873) the Mandailing community in Ulu Langat was already big enough to create alarm among the British. From this scanty evidence, it can probably be deduced that the Sumatran immigrants first arrived in the valley during the 1860s.

[24] *Annual Report of the State of Negri Sembilan for the Year 1897*, p. 2.

Another fact in the development of settlement in this valley which is difficult to determine with certainty is which of the Sumatran communities were the first to settle in Ulu Langat. The Minangkabaus claimed that they were first, and the Mandailings made similar claims. It is most probable that they moved into the valley at approximately the same time.

However, one fact about the early settlement in the valley remained undisputed, namely that the early Sumatrans were mainly tin-miners. Most of them were engaged in small-scale mining called "lampan-mining." The intending prospector or miner had to seek permission from the local territorial chief to extract ore in the valley. Permission was easily obtained. All the miner had to pay was a mere sum of five dollars for the sole right of extracting and collecting tin from one of the many tributaries of Sungai Langat. The lease was usually for a period of one year but it could be renewed if required. The labour force needed in this form of mining was small and consisted mainly of "captured" aborigines. Some of the tributaries that were mined profitably were the Sungai Michu, Sungai Serai, Sungai Semungkis and Sungai Tekali, all of which formed the nuclei for the establishment of immigrant settlements later. Lampan-mining did not terminate in this valley until about 1920 and, even to this day, some of the mining sites are still visible. Three of the most famous sites named after their owners were called Lampan Datok Lateh (an immigrant of Rawa origin), Lampan Pa' Timun and Lampan Panglima Kiri.

Although it was tin-mining that attracted the Sumatran immigrants into the valley, the real peopling of the area was made by agriculturists who came during the 20th century. Local information attributed the rapid development of the area to a man called Dato Jalil, a Mandailing immigrant. Prior to his appointment as Penghulu of Ulu Langat in 1904, Jalil was a trader in the small town of Kajang. At the time of his appointment, the Penghulu had the authority to dispose of lands in his own *mukim*. Jalil, being a conscientious leader, was determined to see that the valley would grow prosperous and the only way that he knew was by attracting and giving land to settlers for cultivation. Being a Mandailing, he invited more people of his own kind, either immigrants directly from Sumatra or Mandailings who were already in Malaya to settle there. Most of the early settlers were engaged in the cultivation of rubber and rice, while others grew gambier, tobacco, pepper and coffee.

By 1914 nearly all the settlers in the valley, besides the aborigines, were either Mandailings or Minangkabaus. It was immediately after this date that the other Indonesian groups came into the valley. Most of the later arrivals

were Korinchis, Javanese and some Palembangs. These new settlers did not come direct from Indonesia but from other parts of Selangor. The nucleus of the Javanese community in Ulu Langat consisted of persons previously employed as estate labourers in and around Kajang. The Korinchis arrived from Kuala Lumpur and the Palembangs from Petaling also in Kuala Lumpur district.

This new urge from Jalil to invite non-Mandailing groups to the valley was the result of two complementary factors. Firstly, it arose from the fact that about that time he heard rumours that some Chinese were planning to apply for mining land in the valley. He was not in favour of having Chinese in his *mukim,* but so long as the existing settlers had sufficient land and there was still much unoccupied land left, he had neither reason nor authority to stop the Chinese from coming in. Recognizing the stipulation made in the Land Enactment of 1911, that once a piece of land "had been alienated for agricultural purposes under permanent title, no right to mine the same land shall be granted to any person except with the sanction of the Ruler of the State in Council," [25] he concluded that the only way to prevent the Chinese miners from settling in the valley was to invite as many Malaysian agriculturists as possible. There was insufficient time to invite more Mandailings from either Sumatra or elsewhere in Malaya, but he knew there were many other Indonesian immigrants in the vicinity of Kuala Lumpur who needed land.

Secondly, conditions at that time were such that events were moving in Jalil's favour. World War I had broken out and the supply of imported rice was greatly reduced with the immediate effect of raising the price of this commodity. Many of the Korinchi and Palembang immigrants in Kuala Lumpur who did not produce their own food were forced to find land suitable for rice cultivation. The war also led to the dismissal of a number of the Javanese labourers from the estates around Kajang. In view of these circumstances, Jalil did not find much difficulty in attracting settlers into his *mukim.* The Korinchis were alloted two sites, one at Sungai Gahal and the other at Sungai Lui.

Right from the start, the different groups were alloted different sites to establish their various settlements. The Palembangs and the Javanese were settled at Kuala Perdek and Kampong Jawa, respectively. This was done on purpose, and the two basic reasons for this segregation were cul-

[25] Section 12 of the *Land Enactment of the Federated Malay States, 1911.*

tural differences and administrative convenience. The Penghulu felt that even though the various communities belonged to the Malaysian race and the majority even hailed from the same island in Indonesia, each of them spoke their own language and possessed their own peculiar customs and ways of life. He must have thought that it would be to everybody's advantage that the various groups should remain separate from one another. To him, mixing would only lead to misunderstanding and friction.

This communal segregation was realistic and indeed desirable, from the administrative and organizational points of view. The pioneering phase was a difficult period, and this was especially so if work had to be done on an individual basis. Cooperation on the *gotong-royong* system was beneficial to all concerned and this was the common method of pioneering adopted by many of the communities in Ulu Langat. Land was not initially given to individuals but to the leaders of the various groups. Sub-division into individual lots was only done after the removal of the vegetation cover, and among the Korinchis after the crops had been planted. Under this system, the leader, in order to make sure that every one involved did his share of the work, had to command the respect and loyalty of all the members of the group, a position more readily achieved among members of his own community than among persons from different communities.

The same cooperation and loyalty was also essential in the day-to-day administration of the village. The administrative structure common throughout the State, and the whole country for that matter, required that each village was to have a head or leader through whom the *Penghulu* or the Government could reach every individual in the State. The village head, locally known as *Ketua Kampong,* should also be the chief spokesman for the village in all matters. The problems of nominating a leader that would be acceptable to the various sections of a plural and mixed community required no elaborations. In view of these problems and difficulties, it is quite understandable why Jalil encouraged the settlers to be organized along communal lines.

Once each site had been allocated to one particular group, more and more friends were invited and encouraged to take up land there. The rate of increase in the number of settlers in each village was rapid. Thus, Lubok Kelubi, which had only 13 families in 1911, had increased to 138 in 1962; and the 20 families that opened up Kampong Sungai Lui in 1916 had increased to 275 in 1962. The Korinchi settlement at Kuala Ponson, which was created in 1922 by Korinchis from other parts of the valley, had increased from 12 homesteads when it was first established to 34 in 1962.

The communal groupings of people according to village units in the Ulu Langat valley is summarised below:

Village	*Speech Group*
Bukit Raya	Minangkabau
Sungai Serai	Minangkabau
Dusun Nanding	Mandailing
Ulu Langat	Mandailing
Kampong Sungai Gahal	Korinchi
Kampong Sungai Semungkis	Korinchi
Kampong Rantau Panjang	Mandailing
Dusun Tua	Mandailing
Kuala Perdek	Palembang
Lubok Kelubi	Minangkabau
Kampong Kuala Ponson	Korinchi
Kampong Jawa	Javanese
Kamong Sungai Lui	Korinchi

There was even a tendency for people of the same speech group from different localities of the same cultural-area in Sumatra to set up different settlements. Thus, though Bukit Raya and Lubok Kelubi were both settled by Minangkabaus, the former was settled by Minangkabaus who hailed from the Batang Kapas area in West Coast Sumatra and the latter from Lubok Kaping in the sub-division of Bukit Tinggi.

Besides the above-named groups, there were also some Chinese, Indians and other Malaysians who were too few to establish their own villages, and thus had to join one of the bigger groups. The Malacca and Rembau Malays were found scattered in nearly all the villages in the valley, and a handful of immigrants from the Bilah area in East Coast Sumatra have chosen to settle with the Korinchis at Sungai Semungkis.

Recent events in the history of the valley have apparently caused some minor re-arrangements in the settlement and cultural-grouping patterns there. One of the obvious changes was the resettlement of the Minangkabaus from Bukit Raya on a site close to the junction of the Ulu Langat road and the main Kuala Lumpur-Singapore highway. This resettlement was effected in 1949, during the period of an emergency in Malaya, when an attempt was made by the Communist-terrorists to assassinate the *Penghulu*.[26] Also during the period of Emergency, the Government, in order to protect the less organised and isolated settlers from communist threats and atrocities, resettled a number of the Minangkabaus among the Korinchis in Kampong Sungai Lui. Recently, a land development scheme was started in the Sungai

[26] Laidin bin Alang Musa, *op. cit.*

Tekali area, and here, instead of the houses and settlers being divided according to speech-groups of the same Malaysian language, the division was made on the broader basis of race, namely, Malay, Chinese and Indian. However, it is most encouraging to note that regular contacts during the past forty years have tended to reduce the feeling of "differentness" among the various Indonesian communities in the Ulu Langat valley.

Innumerable examples of immigrant settlements based on speech or dialect groups can be found in other parts of Malaya. In his book *Riwayat Tanjong Malim,* Zainal Abidin observed that the various Rawa, Minangkabau, Kampar and Bugis communities set up their own communal villages in different localities in the vicinity of Tanjong Malim.[27] A field survey of the Bagan Serai Triangle in the Krian area revealed the "tendency of the Banjarese to live in clan-clusters rather than spread evenly among those Malays born in Malaya. True Malays predominate along the main roads, Banjarese in the interior along the parits (drains); along Parit Mahamat (the westernmost parit) all 69 households are Banjarese. The Banjarese along the main roads also show this characteristic. Only 30 Banjarese are in groups of less than three." [28] (See Figure 7.)

Urban Settlements

In the urban areas the Indonesians are not at all numerous. In 1947 only in three towns did the Indonesian population exceed 2,000 persons, namely in Kuala Lumpur, Johore Bahru and Singapore. The last with a total of 38,340 in 1957, is by far the most important. In the initial stages the Indonesian urban dwellers, like their rural counterparts, tended to have settlements based on regional or dialect groups. In many respects, these early urban settlements in Malaya were usually nothing more than overgrown rural villages. With the ensuing rapid changes in the structure of the Malayan towns, the pattern of the Indonesian urban settlements also underwent major changes. Today, except for some of the Javanese and Boyanese in Singapore city, the urban Indonesians in Malaya tend to distribute themselves among the various Malay settlements, thus forming an integral part of the urban Malay community.

The Boyanese in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore have created their own peculiar residential organization called "Pondok" or literally "hut" or "house." The Pondok is usually sub-divided into cubicles which are allocated to the various resident-members of the community. Each Pondok usually accommodates, on the average, a total of 50 families most of whom normally came from the same locality in Bawean. Local origin, however, is not the first

[27] Zainal Abidin Daud, *Riwayat Tanjong Malim,* Kuala Pilah, 1957, p. 52.
[28] E.H.G. Dobby, et al., "Padi Landscapes of Malaya," *Malayan Journal of Tropical Geography,* Vol. 6 (October, 1955).



Figure 7. *Bagan Serai Triangle (Krian)*

essential requirement of being accepted into the Pondoks. First and foremost, the applicant must be a Boyanese. His areal or local origin is often of secondary importance, sometimes not even taken into consideration. A Pondok is more than a place of residence; it is a social unit with its own established organization, regulations and code of conduct. In 1959 there were 67 such Pondoks in Singapore city.[29] In Kuala Lumpur, only the stable grooms and the unemployed Boyanese reside in the Pondok which is located near the Selangor Turf Club. The majority of those Boyanese who have found jobs outside the Turf Club have left the Pondok to settle in more agreeable surroundings among the local Malays.

Although the majority of the urban Indonesian immigrants in Malaya could not reside close to one another, the feeling of belonging together and of identifying themselves with their various islands of origin is not completely

[29] Abdullah bin Malim Baginda, "The Bovanese of Singapore," unpublished Thesis, University of Malaya (Singapore), 1959, p. 49.

lost. As an attempt to maintain this communal solidarity, the various island communities of the Indonesian population in Malaya have organized themselves into clubs and associations. Although the majority of these clubs are located in the towns, a number of Indonesians from the surrounding rural areas are known to have become members. But in spite of the fact that the subscription fees are very small, the total membership of the various communal associations has remained very small. In 1961, the Perkumpolan Jawa Peranakan Malaya (Local-born Javanese Assocation) could only claim a total paying-membership of 2,000, whereas the 1960 total membership of the Kesatuan Kebajikan Peranakan Sumatra (Selangor) consisted of 60 persons.[30] There is no evidence to indicate these there exists an association or society which is strictly Indonesian and not confined, in one way or other, to any particular island origin. These associations are strictly non-political, and they normally have identical aims and objectives, namely:

(1) To establish and foster relationship of brotherhood among its members; and

(2) To safeguard the welfare of its members, both worldly and spiritually.

Conclusion

From the above study, the following observations are obvious:

(1) That the migrants from the different Indonesian islands tend to settle in different parts of Malaya.

(2) That even within the same island-group they tend to congregate and settle according to narrower "cultural" divisions.

(3) That there is minimum interaction among them.

In view of the above observations it is probably no exaggeration to state that there is no such group as an Indonesian community in Malaya. What actually exist are just little communities of ethnic groups and sub-categories of people belonging to one "mother-nationality."

[30] On March 26, 1963, a few months after the Indonesian government's declaration of her "Confrontation" policy against the then prospective government of the Federation of Malaysia, *Utusan Melayu* carried an article stating that Inche Rashid bin Taha, the President of this Association, claimed for it a total membership of 25,000 persons. This claim, in the writer's opinion, is highly exaggerated. The 1947 total of the Sumatran population in Malaya was 26,300.

HACIENDA MAGNITUDE AND PHILIPPINE SUGAR CANE PRODUCTION *

NORMAN W. SCHUL

THERE ARE NUMEROUS CRITERIA WHICH MAY BE USED for determining the size of farm holding. Acreage or hectarage, the number of workers, the value of the investment, the number of draft animals, and the amount of mechanized equipment are frequently utilized. The most easily obtainable and accurate criterion common to all farms, however, is land. For this study, therefore, the number of hectares per hacienda is utilized for the analysis of the farm size differentials.

Farm magnitude varies interregionally as well as intraregionally. Farm size shows a regional differentiation from country to country and from place to place within a country.[1] Small and medium size farms predominate in most countries, but the meaning of these terms differs from country to country. Generally, small farms predominate in Asia and parts of Europe; medium size farms are characteristic of both North and South America, while large agricultural holdings are typical of Australia.

Internal differences of farm size are apparent in countries. These variations may be attributed to a variety of reasons. However, one of the more important reasons is the crop being raised—specific crops are generally associated with a particular unit area range. On the Victorias Plantation, for example, the monoculture of sugar cane will be indicated as having a very specific association with farms of a large magnitude. For this plantation's agricultural economy, approximately fifty percent of the sugar cane is produced by the large landholders or planters. Especially, the land units for Victorias sugar cane production are much larger than those growing rice in the Philippines.

* Field work was completed in a ten-month period, May, 1960, to March, 1961, supported by the Foreign Field Research Program, conducted by the Division of Earth Sciences, National Academy of Sciences—National Research Council, and financed by the Geography Branch Office of Naval Research, under contract Number—2300(09). This paper is partially based on the author's unpublished doctoral dissertation, "A Philippine Sugar Cane District: Spatial Phenomena Affecting Sugar Cane Production on the *Haciendas*," Syracuse University, Department of Geography, 1962. In the research for this paper, funds were made available by a grant from the University of North Carolina at Greensboro Research Council.

[1] David Grigg, "The Geography of Farm Size: A Preliminary Survey," *Economic Geography*, Vol. 42 (July, 1966), pp. 206-235.

There is a great diversity of opinion as to the proper size for sugar cane farms.[2] Some sugar cane farms in the world are divided into tracts of a few acres; but, the plantation and the hacienda dominate as the typical sugar cane producing units and usually exceed one hundred acres.

The hacienda can be considered as a large estate. It is applied, however, in the Philippine sugar cane economy to all farmsteads irrespective of their hectarage. Terminology most commonly used refers to those farms with several hundred hectares as "large" or "large planter" haciendas and the remaining farms as haciendas.

The Victorias Sugar Cane District

The Victorias Milling Company with over 27,000 hectares planted to sugar cane in the mid-1960s is one of the major sugar cane operations in the Philippines. Victorias occupies the northern lowland and adjacent foothill portion of Western Negros Island (See Figure 1, Study Area Inset). This area has a settlement pattern consisting of a series of nucleated communities. These agglomerated settlements contain farms or haciendas growing the sugar cane and a sugar mill or central which initially processes the cane in the form of raw brown or centrifugal sugar mainly for export to the United States. The central is the focal point for the sugar cane district and it establishes a viable economic unit for the plantation-type monocultural economy.

The Objective and Methodology

The basic question to be considered in this study is "How does hacienda magnitude affect the production of sugar cane measured in yield per hectare for Victorias Plantation?" The magnitude of the hacienda is considered in this study to be a significant factor based on yield of sugar cane per hectare. Haciendas indicate a tendency to categorize according to yield based on their hectarage. Analysis initially will be undertaken to cite reasons for the haciendas grouping according to yield-size characteristics. The variations in yield will be considered to be a result of both physical and cultural factors. This analysis of the spatial relationship, the explanation of the differences and similarities of sugar cane production for various hacienda size categories, constitutes the problem.

The analytical procedures utilized can be included into three phases: (1) library investigations in the United States, particularly at the Department of Agriculture Library, Washington, D.C.; (2) field survey in the

[2] Alden Cutshall, "The Philippine Sugar Industry: Status and Problems," *The Journal of Geography*, Vol. 60 (January, 1961), pp. 5-9; D. A. Maulit, "Farm Size Policy," *Philippine Agricultural Situation*, Vol. 3 (March, 1961), pp. 34-39; Robert E. Huke, "Sugar," *Shadows on the Land*, (Manila: Bookmark, 1963), pp. 297-321.



Figure 1. *Victorias plantation hacienda size quintiles. Sources: plan tation audit records of Victorias Milling Company; annual report and summary of raw factory operations, Victorias Milling Company, 1959; field research 1960-1961.*

Victorias Plantation and Negros Island during 1960-1961; and (3) cartographical and statistical analysis of the field findings. Empirical evidence is also utilized to a great extent.

Hacienda Magnitude

The magnitude of the hacienda is considered in this study to be one of the most important factors affecting yield per hectare. To enable analysis the haciendas have been divided into quintiles for examination according to their size differences and similarities. There is justification in utilizing quintile categories for analyzing the effect of hacienda magnitude upon production aspects. Five categories of sugar cane hacienda magnitude, based upon total hectares in each land unit, illustrate most adequately the importance of size. The categories chosen are based upon hectarage quintiles, namely: 1-13; 14-24; 25-64; 65-124; and 125 and above hectares. A total of 577 haciendas are analyzed in this study.

Table 1

HACIENDA SIZE GROUPINGS AND HECTARAGE FOR THE VICTORIAS PLANTATION [1]

Size Quintile	*Hectarage*	1900[2]	1918[3]	1949[4]	1960[5]
1	1 — 13	0	9	129	97
2	14 — 24	0	24	100	115
3	25 — 64	10	34	121	127
4	65 — 124	32	58	90	115
5	125 — Above	55	78	105	123
	Total Haciendas in the Plantation	97	203	545	577
	Total Hectares in the Plantation	16,736	28,746	37,193	37,665

[1] Haciendas have been grouped according to present day quintiles of the total haciendas in the Plantation. This table includes both operating and non-operating farms.

[2] Size and number of haciendas compiled from the following maps: Cadiz Cadastre, B. L. Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 196; Boundary and Index Map of Cadiz Cadastre, B. L. Case No. 196; Boundary and Index Manapla, GLRO Record No. 196; Boundary and Index Map of Saravia Cadastre, GLRO Record No. 196; and Boundary and Index Map of Victorias Cadastre, GLRO Record No. 196. (GLRO stands for General Land Registration Office.)

[3] Unpubl. MS. Cadastral Surveys of 1915 and 1916 as approved by the Director of Land; Sugar Plantation Audit Records of the Victorias Milling Company and North Negros Sugar Company, 1918.

[4] Unpubl. MS. "Annual Report and Summary of Raw Factory Operations, 1949-1950," Victorias Milling Company, Victorias, Negros Occidental, pp. 172-188.

[5] Unpubl MS. "Annual Report and Summary of Raw Factory Operations, 1959-1960," Victorias Milling Company, Victorias, Negros Occidental, pp. 184-196.

The magnitude characteristics utilized to explain the hacienda production patterns are based on yield per hectare for six criteria. These are as follows: (1) the historical factor; (2) the *lusoc* system; (3) equipment and field operations; (4) quota system; (5) transportation of the cane from the hacienda to the central; (6) the availability of credit. It should be indicated that other variables have importance for yield variations such as land tenure,[3] but only the above six are selected for analysis.

The Historical Factor

For the Victorias Plantation the haciendas have been increasing both in total number as well as areal extent. Table 1 indicates a significant fact is the numerical increase of haciendas for the years 1900, 1910, 1949, and 1960. A major trend for the plantation has been a rapid increase in the number of individual hacienda units.

The area occupied by the sugar cane haciendas, also, has been increasing as indicated by Table 1. In the earliest period around 1900, only 16,736 hectares compared to 37,665 hectares in 1960 were occupied by the sugar cane landholdings. Most of the haciendas in 1900 were located on the coastal margin and lowland sections of the plantation. The district has been gradually encroaching toward the more undulating interior of Negros. In the 1950's the plantation had become relatively stabilized in its areal extent. During recent years, however, additional expansion of hectarage toward the island's interior has taken place as new markets became available.

Sugar milling has progressed through three distinct occupance stages. The first, the middle 1800's to 1920, was the "self-contained" hacienda where a primitive sugar establishment, known as a muscovado mill, extracted the sugar from the cane produced on the farm. The processes were crude and sugar extraction was very inefficient.

The establishment of the centrals, one of the present-day Victorias mill site and another at the North Negros mill site (see Figure 1), followed in the 1920's. This era, 1920-1945, initiated the separation of the production and extraction stages in sugar cane agriculture for Victorias. Now sugar cane was only to be grown on the hacienda and sugar was to be extracted from the sugar cane stalks at the central.

The last occupance period, 1945 to the present, began soon after the Second World War when it was decided not to rebuild the destroyed mill of the North Negros Sugar Company and to reconstruct only Victorias Central. The amalgamation of the two districts into the present-day Victorias Plantation is the focal point of this study and represents the agricultural situation being considered.

[3] See the author's study, "A Philippine Sugar Cane Plantation: Land Tenure and Sugar Cane Production," *Economic Geography*, Vol. 43 (April, 1967), pp. 157-169.

The coastal lowland haciendas have been growing sugar cane for over one hundred years and are associated with the muscovado mill areas. By cartographical analysis of a map showing the muscovado mills being compared to a map depicting yield per hectare, it is found that all except ten of the ninety-seven muscovado mills are associated with the highest yielding haciendas. This provides evidence that the most fertile land for sugar cane cultivation was initially put into production.

Recent additions to the district have fringed the best land for sugar cane agriculture, most accessions being toward the interior of Negros. The mountain-foothill haciendas and the more undulating haciendas were developed for sugar cane planting in the 1930's. Some were not cultivated until after the Second World War. The clustering of the smaller haciendas in the district's interior periphery can be partially attributed to the homesteading promoted by the Philippine government in the 1930's. A limit of 16 hectares per person was initially applied to landholdings, explaining why so many farms in one size quintile (14-24 hectares) are found in the interior fringes of the plantation. Clustering of the haciendas according to size groupings can be observed in Figure 1. Subsequent land purchases and reorganizing of the haciendas by inheritance have somewhat altered this pattern.

Lusoc System

A discussion of the farming system associated with the Victorias Plantation must also be utilized for assisting in the explanation of the relationships of large yields per hectare with the larger haciendas. For the Victorias District the *lusoc* system is utilized. The *lusoc* system is the practice of planting sugar cane in a field immediately after a crop has been harvested. This implies that the haciendas with a larger hectarage will have more choice for aspects of sugar cane production than the smaller size hacienda. To illustrate the farming situation associated with various size haciendas, typical example of a small hacienda (less than 13 hectares), an average hacienda (25-64 hectares), and a large hacienda (greater than 125 hectares) are analyzed cartographically on Figure 2.

The small size hacienda portrayed (Figure 2, Inset A) has two contrasting situations for different months. The hacienda was first surveyed in November. At this time, the sugar cane was mature and ready to be harvested. Three months later, in February, this hacienda had a new sugar cane crop planted. It was indicated from field interviews that the sugar cane had been harvested from December to early February and a new crop had been planted in the latter part of February. The cropping system which characterizes a small hacienda indicated little choice in planting and harvesting. For all the plantation's haciendas next year's crop is customarily planted imme-



Figure 2. *Farming systems for various size haciendas and Victorias Railway. Sources: Hacienda subdivision maps of Victorias Milling Company; Victorias Milling Company railroad system map; field research 1960-1961.*

diately after harvesting a field. All sugar cane, therefore, on a small hacienda will be approximately the same age, which means that weather conditions or any natural phenomena adverse to sugar cane growing will likely affect the whole crop. Furthermore, the small hectarage of the landholding will result in the fields being very similar with respect to physical characteristics such as soil type, slope, and drainage.

An average size hacienda (25-64 hectares) is portrayed in Figure 2, Inset B. This farm was surveyed in June, and it was found that over seventy per cent of the sugar cane had been harvested in the crop year with approximately three months harvesting remaining. All except one field had already been planted to cane or was being ratooned, one field was being planted, an adjoining field was being harvested and twenty-five per cent of the cane was mature or maturing and was scheduled to be harvested on this crop year. A farm of this size will generally be harvested on a year-round basis using the *lusoc* cropping system. All of the various stages of the farm-

ing system—planting, harvesting, a portion of the farm in plant cane (next year's crop), and part of the hacienda in maturing cane (the crop ready to harvest or being harvested) will be found. The staggering of the stages of sugar cane cultivation is an advantage for the average size hacienda in obtaining a higher yield; the likelihood of a total crop failure from short term weather or other physical conditions adverse to sugar cane cultivation is minimized. Since the hacienda's fields will have sugar cane at varying stages of maturity, this means that the crop in different fields will have varying tolerances to adverse growing conditions.

The large size hacienda (greater than 125 hectares) is also illustrated in Figure 2, Inset C. It can be seen that more choice in sugar cane cultivation exists with increasing size of this hacienda compared to the other two categories, although the *lusoc* system is still used. This hacienda has three different portions blocked out for separate operations; land preparation, planting, and harvesting of the sugar cane were going on in three sections of the landholding. Also, a portion of the hacienda was in plant cane. The essential difference between this size hacienda and the average size landholding is the elaboration or multiplicity of operations. More cane fields exist on the larger haciendas. Year-round harvesting and planting of sugar cane will be found on a hacienda of this size. Since the hacienda will have various maturity stages for its sugar cane and several fields in similar maturity stages, the likelihood of a failure in overall yield is almost eliminated.

Cartographical analyses indicated that hacienda size is an important factor affecting the hacienda's yield per hectare. Table 2 provides a summary of yield per hectare and farm magnitude. The highest yields per hectare are associated with the larger landholdings. The haciendas producing large yields per hectare are in size quintiles 3, 4, and 5—haciendas exceeding 24 hectares. Those landholdings producing low yields per hectare are in size quintiles 1 and 2—haciendas having less than 25 hectares.

Haciendas producing particularly high yields per hectare are associated with the larger landholdings; this is indicated by comparing yield per hectare and hacienda size quintiles. This implies that economies of scale as they are related to the *lusoc* system are related to hacienda magnitude. Also, the large haciendas are generally associated with the portions of the district in which sugar cane was initially cultivated. It can be further inferred that inertia factors continue to operate for this area, since it continues to be the most productive land for sugar cane.

Table 2

YIELD PER HECTARE AND HACIENDA MAGNITUDE FOR VICTORIAS IN 1960[1]

Yield per Hectare in Piculs[2]	>125	101-125	76-100	51-75	<50
Size Quintile in Hectares	*Number of Haciendas*				
> 125	26	42	10	2	0
65 — 124	21	34	18	6	1
25 — 64	20	33	20	4	3
14 — 24	13	22	18	18	9
< 13	2	12	33	23	10

[1] Number of haciendas in each size quintile category and number in each yield per hectare category.

[2] The average yield per hectare in this crop year (1959-1960) was 117 piculs.

Equipment and Field Operations

This is the age of technological revolution in agriculture. Human power has been replaced by animal power with the latter being displaced by mechanical equipment. However, the latter revolution is only beginning in the Victorias Plantation. Humans and animals remain dominant sources of power.

Some Victorias sugar cane operations, such as land preparation, dominantly use mechanical power sources. Other tasks such as the cultivation and hauling of cane from the field to the railroad loading stations utilize animal power. The majority of the power is furnished by humans, particularly for weeding, planting, fertilizing, and harvesting. Nearly eighty per cent of the Victorias Plantation's labor inputs, measured in man-hours, are obtained from non-mechanical sources, primarily the man and the water buffalo or *carabao*. In fact, it probably will be years before mechanization will characterize this sugar cane area and a neo-plantation economy will be dominant.

The fact that animal, and especialy human power dominates, is contrary to general world conditions of sugar cane agriculture. Mechanization of field operations, from initial clearing of the land to transport of the harvested cane, is now commonplace.[4] Since the world picture of sugar cane farming has been toward the utilization of machinery, the following discussion of equipment and field operations associated with hacienda magnitude will indicate their importance to sugar yield.

The degree of mechanization increases with the size of the hacienda. Table 3 utilizes two factors to indicate that increased use of agricultural machinery tends with a greater unit of land: (1) the number and per cent of haciendas owning a tractor for each size category; and (2) the number and per cent of haciendas using the tractor for land preparation. Interpreting Table 3, it can be seen for categories 1 and 2 that ownership of mechanical equipment by individual haciendas is practically nil. Category 1 has only one hacienda owning a tractor, and this particular land unit was farmed in conjunction with three others. The 14-24 hectare haciendas exemplify what should be expected as to tractor ownership. It has ben found virtually impossible for a small size holding to afford the expense of purchasing a tractor. However, two distinctions exist between categories 1 and 2. Less than one fifth of the former category use tractors compared to over one half of the latter group. This can be explained in that fifty per cent of the 14-24 hectare haciendas are planted by one of the larger sugar cane planters who lease the holding and bring their tractor for land preparation. The remaining half are planted by people living on the land units. These are essentially "homestead" sugar cane farms and generally are occupied by first or second generation "pioneers," who cannot afford a tractor but still wish to work the land.

Table 3

NUMBER AND PER CENT OF MECHANIZED HACIENDAS

Size of Hacienda No. of Hectares Category/Hectarage		*Total No. Hda. Interviewed*	*Hdas. with Tractors No./Per Cent*		*Land Prep.*[1] *by Tractor No./Per Cent*	
(1)	1 — 13	22	1	4.5	3	13.6
(2)	14 — 24	19	0	0	10	52.6
(3)	25 — 64	34	12	35.3	27	79.4
(4)	65 — 124	36	23	63.9	28	77.8
(5)	125 — above	47	40	85.1	45	95.7
Total		158[2]	76		113	

[1] Some land preparation (ploughing and harrowing) may use carabao, but tractor is used for more than fifty per cent of each hacienda's area.

[2] Stratified random sample based upon the total number of haciendas existing in the District. A greater number of farms were interviewed in categories 3 through 5 because of the larger hectarage they occupy.

[4] A. C. Barnes, *Agriculture of Sugar Cane* (London: Leonard Hill, Ltd., 1953, p. 257.

Those haciendas having 25-64 hectares depict the situation of higher tractor ownership per hacienda with almost eight of ten land units using the tractor for land preparation. With only one third of the haciendas associated with tractor ownership, it is evident that these land units involve either rental from another planter or are farmed as part of several landholdings.

The next two size categories are the most mechanized. The haciendas with 65-124 hectares indicate that sixty per cent of the planters utilize a tractor. In category 3, eighty per cent use the tractor for land preparation. The largest haciendas, 125 and above hectares, represent the largest planters with eighty per cent owning a tractor, but almost all using the mechanical method of land preparation. In fact, the two large haciendas not using the tractor for land preparation were both mountain side holdings where rocks and steep slopes prevented utilization of tractors and plows.

The use of the tractor was found to result in much higher production than the utilization of the *carabao*. The sugar cane farmer, who utilizes the *carabao* for land preparation, usually produces less sugar cane per hectare than those utilizing the tractor. The negative relationship shown between *carabao* preparation and yield per hectare is indicated in Table 4. It is recognized that other factors, both cultural and physical, are related as well as interrelated to the type of power used for land preparation. It is considered that significant yield differences can be accounted for according to the method of land preparation.

Table 4

LAND PREPARATION AND YIELD PER HECTARE SUMMARY [1]

Yield per Hectare in Piculs	*Haciendas Using the Tractor*	*Haciendas Using the Carabao*
> 125	25	1
101 — 125	24	7
76 — 100	6	20
51 — 75	4	8
< 50	1	4

[1] Twenty-five per cent sample of operating haciendas.

The fact that large haciendas utilize mechanical equipment and small haciendas utilize animal power is a very significant factor in understanding yield differences. The expense of mechanical equipment is generally too great for a sugar cane planter who owns less than twenty-five hectares of

land. With the fact that yield per hectare is directly associated with the type of equipment utilized, it can be indicated that the size of the farm is a significant factor with respect to the yield of sugar cane.

The Quota System

The sugar quota's effect on the agricultural patterns of the Victorias plantation has a definite consequence on the yield characteristics for the individual haciendas. The production for overseas consumption dominates with approximately eighty per cent of the production being exported in most years. Almost all of the sugar is destined for the United States market.

The United States' sugar quota is not world-wide in its application. Normally, only certain sugar producing countries fall under its agreements. Each of these countries, such as the Philippines, receives a "pegged" market price for a specified amount of sugar. The amount the United States pays is substantially above the world market price, usually two to four times as high.

The quota systems initiation in 1934 coincided with the approval of the Philippine Independence Act or the Tydings-McDuffie Law, which created provisions for Philippine independence as well as allotting 850,000 long tons of sugar exports to the United States.[5] The Philippine Legislature, in compliance with the decision of the United States Congress, enacted "The Sugar Limitation Law," which declared the control system for sugar cane production on the haciendas.[6]

The allocation of the sugar quotas was based upon the average production of the three calendar years 1931, 1932, and 1933.[7] The distribution was based upon a coefficient of the total centrifugal sugar production of the Philippines, the per cent of total production for each milling district, and the per cent of each milling district's portion produced by each hacienda for the three calendar years. This enabled the apportionment as to the number of piculs, 139.44 pound units, per hacienda.

Philippine sugar production has been and continues to be geared to the country's quota requirements for the United States with a basic quota of 1,050,000 short tons, as well as Philippine domestic requirements and a non-specified world quota granted by the International Sugar Council. These tonnages are allocated by the Philippine Sugar Quota Administration to the Philippine sugar growers.

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[5] E. D. Hester, " Philippine Sugar Control," *Sugar News*, Vol. 17 (August, 1936), p. 325.

[6] Salvador S. Marcelo, "Philippine Sugar Laws, Rules, and Regulations," *Sugar News*, Vol. 28 (May, 1952) pp. 202-203.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 205-207.

The present export quotas of the district's haciendas were obtained by a variety of methods. A landholding's export quota may be attributed to: (1) the original allocation based upon its production in 1931-1933; (2) purchasing an export quota from one landholding and attaching it to another hacienda (export quotas can be purchased and sold the same as land[8]); (3) transferring the quota from one hacienda to another within the same milling district.

The export quota belongs to the quota holder and can be attached to a given hacienda or held as personal property without any land ownership.[9] Domestic quota is attached to the land and can only transfer with the land.[10]

Almost one half of the district's quota is held by twenty-eight planters. In 1960, there were approximately 450 sugar planters in the Victorias milling area, so this means that six per cent of the planters control nearly fifty per cent of the quota.[11] These twenty-eight planters control forty per cent of the hectarage and produce nearly half of the total sugar cane in the district. The district is controlled by a few of the largest planters since policy-making votes, especially the allocation of the *vagons* for transporting cane from the hacienda to the mill, are apportioned according to the quota. The remaining 422 planters average a few hundred piculs quota.

The allocation of the export quota would indicate that the manipulation and use of the quota is a governing factor as to sugar cane production for each hacienda. There were 567 registered haciendas in the district, but only 436 produced sugar cane for the 1958-1959 crop year.[12] The 131 non-producing haciendas lack an export quota, so the presence of the export quota appears to indicate whether a hacienda will have sugar production. There are widespread implications as to the effect of the quota system on the district's land use patterns. Certainly much less sugar cane would be grown here if the quota did not guarantee a market with a favorable price. The individualism of the farmer is basically eliminated in the choice of crop, as sugar cane brings in so much more money than other crops. The quota will be in existence until 1974 under present agreements.[13]

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[8] Actually the quota gives value to the land and rarely is a hacienda purchased without quota. Haciendas sell at so much per hectare, which is based upon the amount of export quota per hectare.

[9] Civil Case No. 12540, Republic of the Philippines, Court of First Instance, Manila. "Eduardo Suarez and Jose Narciso Versus Mount Arayat Sugar Company, Inc.," *Sugar News*, December, 1952, pp. 577-588.

[10] Personal communication, Carlos L. Locsin, Pres., Victorias Milling Co., 1961.

[11] Unpubl. MS. "List of Plantation Owners who have subsisting written milling contracts with the Victorias Milling Company as of June 17, 1960, showing their haciendas, its plantation audit numbers, and its corresponding sugar quota basic allotments for crop year 1959-1960" (31 typewritten sheets).

[12] Annua Report Victorias Milling Company, 1959.

[13] The Victorias Milling Company has an agreement with the planters affiliated with the Company for the period November 1, 1955 to October 31, 1974.

An artificial agricultural system is created under the quota system. The quota allocations for the haciendas are based upon production in the early 1930's when yields were less per hectare than the 117 piculs per hectare average in the 1960's. Since the total amount of the quota has only been slightly increased, it is logical to suspect that the planters are producing less sugar than possible. The quotas are too low for the present day production capabilities. Since other agricultural land use is disliked by the planters, the haciendas are utilized only partially or at the best quite inefficiently. For example, one hacienda administrator stated, ". . . the rice producing potential of the Victorias area has not even been discovered."[14] The simple truth of the matter can be summarized by stating that most of the sugar cane planters of the Victorias Plantation lack the courage to stop planting only sugar cane or think the profits from cane so rewarding that an attitude of "Why bother!" has developed. Many hectares of the Victorias area are not being utilized to their greatest potential — even when sugar cane occupies the whole portion of a field. In most years the quota and total production will not vary by more than a few thousand piculs. The hacienda's sugar production is geared to the quota.

Transportation

Transporting harvested cane from the field to the mill is the primary purpose of the centrals' railroad. With over 300 kilometers of trackage, the railroad connects most of the Victorias' haciendas to the mill (Figure 2, Inset D). The dominant function of the railroad is hauling harvested sugar cane to the mill, which accounts for nearly eighty-five per cent of the tonnage.

For Victorias, the exclusive use of the centrals' railroad for transporting cane to the mill is closely associated with hacienda magnitude and sugar cane production on the hacienda. The availability of railroad cars or *vagons* for hauling cane is a major factor related to sugar production.

The number of cars or *vagons* which are assigned, locally referred to as *repartos*, is undertaken by a planter's committee. This committee is primarily composed of the largest sugar cane planters in the district. Car assignment is theoretically based on need as well as upon available cars and the number of requests. However, a small planter may request cars but since he is not represented in the assigning group may not receive any or possibly insufficient cars for hauling his cane to the mill. It was generally observed that the larger planters essentially received their requests.

Hauling the cut cane from the field to the mill is a major factor to be considered in yield. Unnecessary delays in transporting the cane result in excessive sugar conversion and lower sucrose recovery in milling. There are

[14] Personal interview, Administrator, Hacienda Bayabas, 1960.

two particular places where stockpiling of cane may drastically reduce yields — the field and the mill yard. The initial place is the field itself, especially where there is a failure to mill the cane within twenty-four hours. Since cane has to be cut in anticipation of the availability of the railroad cars, the failure of sufficient cars to arrive for hauling the cane results in lower sucrose recovery and possible sugar conversion. The small planters' inability to have sufficient *vagons* for shipping their cane was observed, and it undoubtedly provides partial explanation for the lower yields per hectare on the small size haciendas.

Credit Availability

Credit or cash advances on a sugar crop is a major factor in sugar cane agriculture, especially for land preparation, planting, and fertilizer. A primary source of credit is from the Philippine National Bank. One bank official stated during field research that, "I won't give any equipment loans to haciendas with less than thirty hectares for sugar cane; from there to one hundred hectares I question the loan; over one hundred hectares, the loan is essentially automatic." The small planter is less available to command crop loans. Further importance to the allocation of credit is associated with export quota being associated with greater loan privileges than domestic sugar. Furthermore, the small planter may also not understand the need for obtaining loans for financing production. Many examples can be cited, but this case may be illustrated by the small planter who refused to borrow for fertilizer, even though he had no funds to purchase it, because he wanted to run the farm without outside interference. He later lost his farm. The large planter with a substantial export quota has definite credit advantages in sugar cane production.

Summary

To determine the spatial variation of sugar cane yield per hectare and its association with hacienda magnitude, the Victorias Plantation's haciendas have been studied. Sugar cane yield per hectare is closely related to hacienda magnitude. It has been found that as the hectarage of a hacienda increases, the yield per hectare generally increases. Lower yields per hectare are associated with the smaller farms, particularly those landholdings with with less than twenty-five hectares. The larger the hacienda the more likely its yield per hectare will approximate or exceed the district's average yield. Sugar cane yield per hectare, in general, corresponds closely to hacienda size.

Factors affecting yield per hectare are also closely interrelated to hacienda magnitude. The smaller farms are generally located in the district's more sloping portions which have the less fertile soils, resulting in lower

yield per hectare; the largest haciendas are generally located in the more fertile soils of the plantations lowland—the area where the muscovado mills were established. Planters of the larger haciendas can afford utilization of mechanical equipment, either rented or purchased, while the smaller planters, those having less than twenty-five hectares, generaly rely upon animal power. The *lusoc* system is more advantageous to the larger planters than to the smaller ones, the larger landholdings will have sugar cane in all stages of maturity so an overall failure in yield is minimized. Allocation of railroad cars or *vagons* by the planters is essentially weighted in favor of the large landholder. Credit can be obtained more readily by the larger planters, especially by the holders of a large export quota who have a guaranteed market, specifically to the United States, for their sugar output.

Over a period of time, the small Victorias sugar planter will probably be eliminated. The advantages accrued to the large planter landholding with respect to economies of scale seem to indicate continued domination of sugar output by a small percentage of the sugar planters on the Victorias Plantation. From this case study it can be indicated that for the economic development of the Philippines and for the sugar export economy, the magnitude of sugar cane landholdings is a factor which must be considered.

RELATIONSHIPS OF MUSICAL AND CULTURAL CONTRASTS IN JAVA AND BALI

FREDRIC LIEBERMAN

Contrasts of Music Style

JAVA AND BALI SHARE MANY BASIC MUSIC-STYLE ELEMENTS. The predominant instruments in both traditions are struck metal idiophones and idiophone sets, large ensemble performance is the ideal, and solo instrument traditions are rare. The same kind of tuning systems are found in both areas. Musical form is delineated by colotomic or interpunctuating instruments (gongs) while agogic instruments(drums) control the kinetics of flow; and the prevailing texture is that created by several musical levels, or strata, elaborating or abstracting a basic melody.

Music is primarily an adjunct to ritual, dance-drama, or puppetry, the literature of which derives from the Hindu epics Mahabharata and Ramayana. Despite these shared characteristics, the two music styles give decidedly differing impressions. Javanese music is refined, controlled, serene, intellectual, ". . . each note is so soft, so tender, so vaguely thrilling, so changing—but ah! how compelling, how bitterly beautiful: that is no tinkling of glass, of copper, or wood; it is the voices of men's souls that speak to me . . ." (Kartini 1964:50) Balinese music, on the other hand, is dynamic, lively, full of contrast and excitement, with ". . . a beauty that depends upon form and pattern and a vigour that springs from a rhythmic vitality both primitive and joyous." (DeZoute 1939:6)

The Javanese *gender,* a set of thin bronze keys suspended over tuned bamboo resonators, is struck with a round padded beater, producing a mellow sound of long duration; by way of contrast, the Balinese *gender* is struck with a hard wood beater, and is played in pairs tuned so as to create audible beats, producing a bright and shimmering sound. The instrument used to give signals and underline dance rhythms in Java is a woodblock (*keprak*); the same function in Bali is realized by a pair of small cymbals (*tjeng-tjeng*); again the dull-bright contrast. The Javanese *bonang* family (like the Filipino *kulintang*) has two Balinese counterparts, the *trompong* and the *rejong.* The *trompong,* like the *bonang,* is played by one man, and is relatively soft. Recently, however, the *trompong* was used by the famous dancer Mario as a dance-prop in his popular *kebyar* dance, and has therefore declined sharply in musical significance. The *rejong,* however, is played by four men, and

has been developing towards brilliance: ". . . the range and volume of the instrument have tripled and taken on the added function of supplying rhythmic-harmonic 'shock-waves'." (Hood 1963:456-57)

Contrasting the large *gamelan* orchestras of Java and Bali, one finds that the soft-playing instruments *gambang* (xylophone), *tjelempung* (zitcher), *rebab* (bowed lute), *suling* (vertical flute), and human voice, all present in Java, are either totally absent or relatively little-used in Bali. There is a larger number of ensemble types in Bali. In Java a single type of large *gamelan,* a fine set of instruments perhaps preserved in a royal court, acts as an ideal upon which the surrounding villages model less perfect and less complete ensembles. Major variants such as *gamelan munggang* or *gamelan sekati* are reserved for rare ritual occasions. However, Covarrubias lists thirteen different kinds of ensemble in regular use in Bali (1937:218-19).

The tuning systems in both Java and Bali are *pelog* and *slendro. Pelog* is more popular than *slendro* in Bali, while in Java there does not seem to be any clear preference. The exact pitches of the scales in both areas vary considerably, as the tuning systems are general principles rather than definite rules. The concept of mode, known in Java as *patet,* appears to be one of the most important elements of nearly every developed music system in the world (Western church modes, later major-minor, Arabic *maqam,* Persian *dastgah,* Indian *raga,* and various systems in China and Japan). In Java there is a clear notion as to the musical significance and effect of mode, but this subconscious knowledge of the musicians has not yet been articulated in theory. The Balinese do not seem to know about modal types, but McPhee postulates the implied existence of modal practice in *slendro* (1936:21).

Improvisatory elaboration of the main melody is basic to Javanese *gamelan* music. The performers operate within the guidelines and restrictions of *patet,* instinctively knowing which figurations are typical, possible, or appropriate to each *patet.* In Bali, however, improvisation does not exist. Lacking the powerful organizing factor of a conscious feeling for mode, improvisation becomes difficult and aimless. Also, in Balinese *gamelan* music, the elaborating instruments play in interlocking parts. "Balinese musicians seem to operate on the principle that if two players play interlocking parts as fast as possible . . . the result will be a performance twice as fast as either of them can play." (Hood 1963:455) Balinese figuration performed in this manner are often driving ostinati. Thus Balinese figuration technique, stressing precise rhythmic control, precludes the use of improvisation, and is more direct and potentially more dynamic than Javanese.

Perhaps the best summary of the above outlined contrasts is that of McPhee:

> Javanese gamelans have an incredibly soft, legato, velvet sound; the hammers and mallets that are used to strike the metallophones and gongs are padded so thickly as to eliminate all shock. Tempos are slow and stately, and there is little change in dynamics; the prevailing mood is one of untroubled calm and mystic serenity. Balinese music, on the other hand, is vigorous, rhythmic, explosive in quality; the gamelans sound bright and percussive; hard hammers of wood or horn are used for many instruments, and the thin clash of cymbals underlies every tone; only the great gongs are gently struck. While the classic calm of Javanese music and dance is never disturbed, music and dance in Bali is turbulent and dramatic, filled with contrast and bold effects. Javanese musicians find the music of Bali barbaric. Balinese complain that the music of Java "sends them to sleep." (1949:251)

Patterns of Cultural Variation

Wayang, the puppet theater, is a major element in both Javanese and Balinese society, important both as an integral part of many rituals and as a repository of tradition with overtones of ancestor-worship. In Bali, *wayang* is perfomed exclusively with flat leather puppets (*kulit*). Javanese variants exist with puppets of flat wood (*klitik*), round wood (*golek*), and with no puppets at all, in an extremely rare moribund tradition (*beber*) in which the scenes are painted on a long scroll which unrolls as the story is recited. The major Javanese form, however, is *wayang kulit. Wayang* is accompanied by a full *gamelan,* in Bali by four *gender.* The literature is largely drawn from the Mahabharata and the Ramayana, less popular being the indigenous culture-hero epics. In addition on special occasions (in Bali only), the story of Tjalanarong is performed. Balinese puppets are more realistic than the Javanese, which have become highly stylized. In fact, the Balinese puppets closely resemble the figures carved in bas-relief on old Hindu temples of East Java (McPhee 1936:3). The Javanese *wayang* performance is more formal than that of Bali, lasting through the night, which is divided into three periods, each period having a corresponding type of action and musical mode. The Balinese *wayang* performance differs greatly in length and structure from night to night because it is ". . . determined by the *dalang,* according to wages, enthusiasm of the audience, or the wish of the person who has engaged him." (McPhee 1936:3)

It seems clear that one can contrast dance movement in Java and Bali with the same terms as were found applicable for music, because in both societies dance movement and music are in close cooperation. Hence Javanese dance movement is controlled, deliberate, refined; Balinese, dynamic, angular, intensely expressive. There is a greater richness of dance forms and styles in Bali; and particularly notable are those ritualistic dance dramas which involve Rangda, the witch and the great beast Barong. These are of major import in Bali but do not exist in Java. Rangda is the queen of

witches (*leyak*), the personification of virulent evil, continually scheming to harm mankind. Barong is also a leader of demons, but of the *kala,* who are a mischievous and uncouth lot, but susceptible of propitiation. Thus Barong, having power over Rangda, is seen as a representative of "good" forces countering Rangda's "evil," and their ritual confrontation is a symbolic reenactment of the precarious balance of good and evil forces in this world. The continual ritual-dramatic defeat of Rangda is perhaps meant as sympathetic magic. In any event, it reinforces in the community conscience the sense of real need for the multitude of propitiatory rituals which characterize Balinese religious practice.

The masks used masked play genres in Java and Bali are compared by Wagner as follows: "Javanese art often displays a finesse, and at the same time a serene composure which . . . is elevated far above everything mundane. But the Balinese artist draws directly upon his own experience; his masks often represent changing human moods." (1959:204)

In Bali the social order is largely communal, stressing traditional law (*adat*) supervised by the entire adult male population of a community, a committee of the whole. This pattern encompasses other aspects of Balinese life, and there is thus a committee on rice paddies, a committee on ritual, etc. The social class structure superficially resembles that of traditional Hindu culture, with *brahmanas, ksatriyas, vaisyas,* and *sudras.* However, the *sudras,* or common people (about 95 per cent of the population), control their own affairs at the village level with little or no attempt at control by the hereditary nobility (*ksatriya, vaisya*). Balinese religion is an integration of Hindu-Buddhist and shamanist beliefs, characterized by a regular cycle of temple festivals featuring elaborate food-offerings and other ceremonies as needed for rites of passage, healing, or crisis situations. Music and dance play a major role in Balinese religion, as does trance. (See following discussion on trance.) Most temple business is conducted by a *sudra* lay-priest who doubles as temple janitor, while the learned *brahmana* priests are called upon only for occasional rites of major import, or nobility-sponsored ceremonies (e.g. consecrating a new house). Many of the finest *dalangs* are priests, but there is no prohibition against *dalangs* of other profession or caste. Persons of high caste receive the respect and courtesy of accepted social usage. These courtesies are dropped in the context of artistic activity (music or dance-drama), and in general the high castes would seem to have few prerogatives in Bali's peasant-dominated society.

Javanese society is tripartite, divided by the Javanese themselves into *abangan* (peasantry), *santri* (islamic, usually merchants), and *prijaji* (nobility and cultural elite). *Abangan* religion is similar to Balinese religion, though not nearly so elaborate, stressing community and built around the communal

offering of propitiation, the *slametan* feast. As in Balinese temple festivals, the *slametan* consists of the presentation (to the spirits) of specially-prepared ritual foods. Because the communal feeling does not spontaneously exist to any great extent in Java, *slametan* is typically given by private individuals rather than by villages or communities. The *abangan* who gives a *slametan,* therefore, will create an artificial community-by-proximity, inviting his immediate neighbors to the ritual feast, regardless of his normal social relationships with them: they are witnesses, not co-celebrants.

The *santri* stresses the unity of the islamic community, and all attendant ritual trappings of islamic law. The *santri* is not wholly isolated from the Hindu-Javanese tradition, however, as he acknowledges the (limited) import of the *wayang*, and admits the ancient *gamelan sekati* to the celebration of the holy week.

The *prijaji* element is the gentry of Java, today composed largely of white-collar workers and other educated professional people. *Prijaji* religion is an intellectualization of the basic elements of Hndu-Javanese tradition, giving elaborate symbolic and mystic interpretations to *wayang, gamelan*, etc. Certain elements of islamic practice are also congenial to *prijaji* mysticism, such as fasting, which fits in nicely with the *prijaji* stress on meditation and abstinence as a means towards acquisition of personal spiritual power. The *prijaji* element remains the repository of Javanese culture, despite its confrontation with (and acceptance of) western values: "The current (1954) *prijaji* culture-hero is the Sultan of Djokjakarta, who, it is said, behaves exctly like a conservative, mystic, traditional king within his palace and like a progressive, modern, Dutch-educated political leader outside of it." (Geertz 1960:237)

A custom which may help to preserve the concept of class distinction (and which certainly serves to articulate it) in Java and Bali is that of varying levels of language. Courtesy demands that one speak with a language of refinement equal to that of the person one is addressing. Thus a servant will address his master in the elaborate high Javanese (or Balinese), and will be answered in the low tongue. Though this principle operates similarly in Java and Bali, it seems that there are more levels in Java, capable of expressing subtler distinctions of rank than possible in Bali. Also current is the lingua franca Indonesian, which is increasingly more common in large urbanized areas. The classical languages, sanskrit, and kawi, are mastered only by the elite *prijaji* in Java, who thus maintain a measure of control over the classical literature and other cultural elements. In Bali knowledge of kawi is also limited. When dramas are presented in kawi, they must receive a running translation by comic characters (usually servants). A similar but more limited situation is found in the Japanese *no* drama, in which the story is explained during the "intermission" by a *kyogen*

(comic servant). In Bali the comic characters often tend to monopolize the the stage; in Java, though favorites, they are more clearly secondary. Another language in Java is Arabic, used—but not necessarily understood—by the *santri* in chanting the prayers of the islamic office.

Trance in Bali is a common phenomenon and an essential part of religion. Trance is believed to indicate possession by a spirit, and the entranced medium speaks with the spirit's voice, giving instructions for proper offerings or ceremonies, helping to heal or find lost objects. Entranced dancers are basic elements of several temple festivals, and *dalangs* giving particularly efficacious *wayangs*, may become entranced in the normal course of events. Trance, then, is a culturally valuable trait in Bali, and is an important shamanistic virtue, allowing communication with the spirits.

In Java, trance is the exception rather than the rule. In the *djaranan*, for instance, itinerant street-dancers become entranced while imitating a horse, providing some entertainment value, but little or no cultural or religious significance. There is no Javanese counterpart to the Balinese entranced temple dancers such as the *sanghyang*. The *abangan* folk-healer (*dukun*) does not normally use trance, but rather has definite training in traditional healing practice. On rare occasions an untrained person may become possessed by a spirit (*dukun tiban*) and may exhibit strong healing powers for a limited time, but will eventually lose these powers permanently. Even rarer is the possessed *dalang* (*dalang tiban*). Thus in Java trance is not a culturally valuable trait, indicating a lack of stress on traditional shamanistic practice.

In the foregoing sections, several elements of Javanese and Balinese culture have been compared and contrasted, and a basic pattern of order or contrast may be seen. Balinese culture appears less sophisticated than Javanese, more folk-like, primitive, direct. Javanese culture, on the other hand, stresses refinement, subtlety, and indirection.

Factors Leading to Patterns of Cultural Variation

The indigenous cultures of Java and Bali were brought under influence from India in the early centuries A.D., and we have no historical records from periods preceding the advent of Indian influence. Java and Bali were joined by politics and political marriages under various Hindu-Buddhist dynasties up to the eleventh century. Later the Madjapahit dynasty in Java renewed control over Bali. Madjapahit in Java was beset by the influence of Islam, and perhaps in reaction to this intellectual foreign importation the *prijaji* developed their highly nationalistic brand of mysticism. Islam did not extend its influence to any appreciable extent in Bali, however, and with the fall of Madjapahit in the fifteenth century, the Madjapahit nobility moved en

masse to Bali, bringing with them the traditions of Hindu-Buddhist culture. Certain elements of this tradition have been preserved in Bali. After Madjapahit, the cultures of Java and Bali, up to then more or less homogeneous, evolved along different lines. Western influence in Java dates from the seventeenth century; Bali, however, resisted complete Dutch control until early in the twentieth century. The Dutch in Java worked through the *prijaji*, thus reinforcing the power of the traditional government. In Bali the nobility gradualy lost its power and influence.

In Java the advent of Islam resulted in the formation of a tripartite society, Dutch control strengthening the leadership prerogatives of the traditional nobility. Thus in Java cultural patterns originating with the nobility filtered down to the peasantry and mixed with an influenced *abangan* values, the peasantry attempting to emulate the gentry, considering elite cultural values the national ideal, the quintessence of Javanism. This is the reason for the air of refinement permeating Javanese culture.

In Bali the imported nobility was less important; the nobleman was a power to be tolerated, not an ideal figure to be emulated. The basic cultural values originated with the community, hence their more popular character.

The Relationships Between Cultural Patterns and Music Style

The nature of the contrasting gentry-peasantry relationships in Java and Bali would seem to explain the differences of musical style. ". . . traditionally, the musicians in service of the Royal Courts of Central Java were palace servants. The music they composed and performed . . . enjoyed the highest evaluation not only by the elite for whom they performed, but also by all levels of society who emulated the same repertoire through the communal efforts of the village musicians performing on instruments of relatively poor quality." (Hood 1963a:3) By contrast, "one of the most famous orchestras in Bali is to be found in the remote mountain village of Selat, and the finest dancers of *legong* were in Saba, an unimportant little village hidden among the ricefields . . . The Balinese did not permit the centralization of the artistic knowledge in a special intellectual class."[13] (Covarrubias 1937:160-62)

The factors of preservation and change are present in Balinese and Javanese music history. The *rejong*, for instance, evolved from the shared proto-type (known from East Java temple reliefs) in different directions in Java toward the improvisatory *bonang*, in Bali toward the volatile four-man *rejong*. *Wayang* puppets were probably preserved better in Bali because of the realism and direct appeal of the traditional figures. In Java the urge towards refinement, and perhaps the influence of Islam, contributed to the evolution of more abstract and stylized figures. The reverse situation ap-

pears in relation to traditional tunes, which have probably been preserved better in the Royal Court manuscripts of Java than in the mercurial oral tradition of Bali.

Thus we see that differences of musical style in Java and Bali may be attributed to and justified by factors of preservation and change acting through time in the context of cultural patterns congenial to the individual spirits of each island society.

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THE PARTITION OF BRUNEI

LEIGH R. WRIGHT

THE POLITICAL MAP OF SOUTHEAST ASIA WAS DETERmined largely by imperialist interests and considerations of the last century. In most instances boundaries and demarcations of territories were terminal results of international rivalries involving two or more European powers, with infrequent consideration of the interests of indigenous states. In at least one area this principle does not apply, wholly. The boundaries of the states of eastern Malaysia, formerly British Borneo, are the result not so much of international rivalry as of the rivalry between Englishmen. This rivalry was centered, in the latter half of the 19th century, in commercial circles in Borneo and England, and in the highest ministries of government in Whitehall.

The details of this long contest between English gentlemen and their respective Bornean allies are obscure and little known by Asian historians for little research has been done on the area. Possibly fewer than half a dozen historians have looked at the relevant documents of the Colonial and Foreign Offices which contain the intriguing story of the formative period of the three states which are involved, Brunei, Sabah and Sarawak. Even fewer of these researchers have recorded and analysed in sufficient scholarly fashion the mass of correspondence, memoranda and minutes which tell of the decisions and agreements reached after lenghty and not infrequently heated controversy among the personalities who played roles in this bit of history.

Until the 1840's the future area of British Borneo was the nominal domain of the Sultan of Brunei. Brunei was by the 19th century one of those decaying Malay-Moslem states of Southeast Asia about which the historian Lennox Mills noted:

> The rule of the Malays was as weak as it was cruel and oppressive; individually brave, they were unable to prevent their state from crumbling to pieces before their eyes. . . The Malay nobles appear to have divided their time between intrigue and dissipation at Brunei Town, and the oppression of their Dayak subjects. . .[1]

[1] L.A. Mills, *British Malaya 1824-67*, Singapore, 1925 (republished by the Malay Branch Royal Asiatic Society, Singapore, 1960), p. 284.

The Sultan was unable to rule effectively beyond Brunei Town although there existed some respect for his title and leadership.

During the half century between 1840 and 1890 the domain of the sultan of Brunei shrank to one thirty-third its former size until it comprised nothing more than a tiny enclave surrounded by Sarawak and North Borneo, new states which between them nibbled away the sultan's territory until he could claim to be the sovereign of some 2,500 square miles of jungle, rivers and swampland.

It is the carving-up of the carcass of Brunei by Sarawak, North Borneo and the Colonial and Foreign Offices in London with which this paper will deal.

It would be well initially to remind ourselves of the reasons for Britain's interest in Borneo in the 19th century. Whereas in the 18th century Britain had some commercial hopes for Borneo, as witness the establishment of an East India Company factory at Balambangan Island off the northern tip of Borneo, by the 19th century Britain's chief interest was strategic: to protect her commercial routes to China. In her attempts to protect her lines of empire through the South China Sea there were two major considerations which moved policy makers in London. Firstly, the location of suitable naval stations along the eastern flank of the sea, and secondly, the assumption of political control over such areas along the western and northern coasts of Borneo as would prevent those areas from falling to a European rival.

The degree of political control over coastal areas which was thought necessary to deter a potential rival depended to a great extent upon the nature of the rivalry. As long as relatively weak rivals such as Spain and the Dutch were the closest neighbors, in the Philippines and Indonesia respectively, the possession of the offshore island of Labuan and a consular treaty with the sultan of Brunei was thought sufficient. But as France moved into a colonial position on the opposite shores of the South China Sea at Saigon in 1860, and as the whole imperialist activity increased in tempo during the latter decades of the century, with Germans and Americans appearing ever more frequently in Southeast Asian waters, Britain moved to strengthen her political position in Borneo. She moved successively from reliance upon the weak colony of Labuan and the treaty with Brunei, to a declaration of a sphere-of-influence and, in 1888 to the status of protective power over northwest Borneo. After 1888 British Borneo was a part of the British empire for all practical purposes although enjoying a large measure of internal autonomy.

The degree of political control over the coast also depended upon the nature of colonial policy emanating from London. While "little Englanders" of the Manchester school dominated policy making, as they did during most of the century until the 1870's, there was considerable reluctance to become

overly involved in the politics of indigenous states, and certainly an abhorrence of an involvement which might lead to an assumption of administrative responsibilities in those states. Such involvement would undoubtedly be a drain on the treasury and would thus tend to negate the whole purpose of the British empire which was commercial profit, so thought the champions of the Manchester school.[2]

It was not then a rapid movement or growth of British influence from the offshore island of Labuan to firm political dominance over northern Borneo. It was rather a slow hesitant movement over a long period. As reluctant as the growth of influence was it can nevertheless be demonstrated that at each stage Britain successfully assumed, by diplomacy and by manipulation of her colonial officials, a position of strength commensurate with the potential power of her imperialist rivals—real or imagined.[3]

Having thus traced in a rudimentary way the bases for the British interest and presence in northern Borneo, and perhaps being forgiven for some oversimplification of a somewhat complex issue, we now turn to the major consideration of the theme, how Englishmen increased and improved upon their place in Borneo. We turn then to the internal political picture.

From 1805 when the East India Company abandoned the factory at Balambangan, until 1840 Britain had few contacts with Borneo. In August of that year James Brooke, a well-to-do English adventurer and former officer in a Bengal regiment, intervened in a rebellion on the Sarawak river in the southern-most part of the Sultanate of Brunei. He was instrumental in bringing an end to the conflict and in 1841 was given the government of Sarawak. Five years later Brooke received an outright cession of Sarawak, then only the area which roughly corresponds to the present first division, or province of that state. From then until his death in 1868 he ruled as a white prince, founding a dynasty of white rajas which was to last a century.

Brooke's arrival in Borneo coincided with growing demands by the merchants of Singapore for a British port on the northwest coast of Borneo. They argued that this was necessary as a defense against pirates and for the promotion of trade. From 1841 Brooke urged the British government to establish a naval station, colony or protectorate on the coast to forestall any other power from doing so. In 1845 Brooke was appointed diplomatic agent to Brunei and the following year he supervised the transfer of Labuan to Britain as a colony and became its first governor. In the meantime in 1847 he negotiated a consular treaty with the sultan. While the treaty pro-

[2] It must be added that such a feeling was strong among the Conservatives as well as the Liberals although "little Englanders" tended most frequently to be Radicals or Liberals. For a study of colonial policy see C.A. Bodelsen, *Studies in Mid Victorian Imperialism*, Copenhagen, 1924.

[3] For a study of the growth of British influence see L.R. Wright, "British Policy in the South China Sea Area with Special Reference to Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo 1860-1888," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1963.

vided for the usual mutual trading rights it sanctioned the cession of Labuan and, most importantly for Britain's political position in Borneo, it contained a permissory clause which placed some restrictions upon the sultan's conduct of foreign relations. It said in part in Article X,[4]

> . . . in order to avoid occasions of difference which might otherwise arise, His Highness the Sultan engages not to make any similar cession either of an island, or of any settlement on the mainland, in any part of his dominions, to any other nation, or to the subjects or citizens thereof, without the consent of Her Britannic Majesty.

Article X then formed the legal base of Britain's political position in Borneo. Possession of Labuan provided a base for the implmentation, after a fashion, of Article X. The implementation of Article X seemingly gave Britain an exclusive hand in northern Borneo. But Article X was not entirely a blessing to British officials. In the hands of a weak and corrupt government such as that of Brunei the British were never certain that the clause would not be abrogated. It was, for example, lightly passed over by the sultan on at least two occasions when territorial cessions were made to Americans and an Austrian.[5]

It behooved the British then to establish a fairly vigilant connection with the Sultan by means of H.M. Consul to Brunei who usually also served as governor of the colony of Labuan.

While the dual role of consul and governor should have worked to promote the greater political stature of Britain on the coast it frequently, in fact, promoted not an articulation of strong policy but a clouding of the whole issue of political control. The parochial concerns of the colonial administration of Labuan were not always compatible with the best interests of Britain vis-a-vis her power position on the eastern flank of the South China Sea.

The colony was established in 1848 as a naval and coaling station. It was hoped by some that it would become an entrepot for the Borneo coast and the Sulu Archipelago. Some optimistic persons compared it to Singapore in this respect. As a station Labuan was seldom used by ships of the Royal Navy. To be sure coaling facilities were provided at the port of Victoria. Kuching in Sarawak, however, was usually favored by naval officers for a stopping point in Borneo as it was more attractive and offered the refreshment of a larger English community. More than one governor of Labuan complained that the colony was ignored in favor of Kuching.

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[4] A copy of the treaty is to be found in W.G. Maxwell and W.S. Gibson, *Treaties and Engagements Affecting the Malay States and Borneo* (London, 1924), pp. 143-47.

[5] The grant to U.S. Consul C.L. Moses of a large tract in northern Borneo in 1865 and the grants to another American, Joseph Torrey, later to be U.S. Consul in Bangkok, in 1875; and the cession to Alfred Dent, an Englishman and Baron Gustav von Overbeck, an Austrian, in 1877.

In 1886 the coaling station was closed by the navy because of disuse. For long periods the supply of coal was not dependable. The island had rich sources of coal but the coal companies failed one after another. This was largely because of a shortage of labor. Borneo Malays were found to be unreliable workers. Sufficient numbers of Chinese laborers could not be attracted to the mines. And convict labor failed because the men refused to work underground.

Another reason for failure of coal operations was poor management. Managers were too frequently eager to show immediate and impressive progress by exploiting the surface coal and neglecting the longer and more tedious effort to win the deeper veins. During the period 1847 to 1880 four companies operated and failed one after the other . Each of the first three companies lost in the vicinity of £100,000. The fourth lost £150,000.

A fair amount of the commerce of Borneo and Sulu was attracted to Labuan where a small community of Chinese and Indian traders handled sago and jungle products. Most traders, however, found it convenient to by-pass Labuan because of the failure of the coal companies and its virtual abandonment by the navy. They traded directly to Singapore from Borneo and Sulu.

The colonial establishment of Labuan was always a modest one. From the beginning in 1848 the tendency of the Colonial Office in London was to cut back expenditures by reducing the number of officials. There were nine in the establishment in 1848. Over the years reductions came when officials after their tours were not replaced. Under Governor John Pope-Hennessy (1867 to 1871), there was a temporary reversal of this policy. He was able to badger the Colonial Office into appointing a full staff including a private secretary and an aide-de-camp for himself. By 1881 it had again been reduced, to five. It was a make-shift arrangement in which a former colonial surgeon was acting governor and also colonial secretary, auditor and police magistrate. The posts of colonial treasurer, surveyor-general, superintendent of convicts and harbor master were combined in one man. There was a colonial surgeon and an apothecary. The fifth European, a member of the Legislative Council and a judge in the general court, was also the Chief Superintendent of the British North Borneo Company.

After 1869 no imperial grants were sanctioned for Labuan and the establishment struggled along on its own meager resources. Britain's attitude toward her colony alternated between a desire to abandon the place because of its failures and hope for its eventual success. The fact is that Labuan could not be abandoned for fear of some other power taking it. The abandonment of Labuan would undermine Britain's influence in Brunei and hence her position on the coast. The sultan would have looked upon withdrawal from Labuan as a sign that Britain was losing interest in Borneo. He depended

upon the British as his defenders and for support for what small authority he continued to hold. If the British were lo leave Borneo it would behoove the sultan to look elsewhere for support. So because Britain could not abandon Labuan she wanted very much to believe in the success of the colony. In this she was aided by the governors who were naturally anxious to raise the standing of Labuan.

The governor of Labuan was, of course, responsible to the Colonial Office. In his capacity as consul-general to Brunei, however, he was instructed by and reported to the Foreign Office. These two principal cabinet ministries then were involved in the internal politics of Borneo. From the beginning there was a basic conflict of interests in the dual role. Indeed, when James Brooke occupied the two posts he played a triple role for he was, in his own right, the Raja of Sarawak. The difficulties which he faced in separating his various duties brought him into disfavor with official London and forced his relinquishment of the governorship and the consular office. The conflict of interests was never more apparent than in the relations between Labuan and Sarawak. And in these relations the conflict was most in evidence over the subject of Sarawak's annexation of Brunei territory.

Most of the governors beginning with George Edwardes in 1856 were hostile to Sarawak and jealous of Brooke's rule. T.F. Callaghan who succeeded Edwardes in 1861 opposed colonial status for Sarawak, a project which Raja Brooke had been promoting for twenty years. He thought Sarawak would be a liability to Britain because "like all Borneo it suffered from want of population and cultivation." Governor Hennessy had no liking for Sarawak or Raja Brooke whom he considered a vassal of the Sultan of Brunei. Although he professed considerable respect for James Brooke and even ordered official mourning at Labuan upon his death in 1868 Hennessy did not trust James' nephew and successor Raja Charles Brooke. He looked upon Charles' desire to annex Brunei territory as a challenge to Labuan and as a threat to his own prestige at Brunei.

Governor Bulwer, succeeding Hennessy in 1871, was even more opposed to Sarawak's expansion. Governors H.T. Ussher (1875) and C.C. [illegible] (1879) were more friendly to Sarawak. But in W.H. Treacher, who was acting governor and consul-general at intervals from 1877 to 1885, was found the greatest opponent to Sarawak interests and Brooke's ambitions. Treacher became an enthusiatic supporter of the British North Borneo Company and he opposed Raja Brooke's power in Borneo for all the reasons put forward by previous governors. But mainly he challenged Sarawak because Brooke opposed the company in North Borneo of which Treacher became governor in 1881.

Central to the conflict between the Sarawak rulers and other Englishmen in Borneo was the rivalry over Brunei territory and the contest for prestige and power on the coast. The rivalry over Brunei territory and the

eventual partition of the sultanate can be considered in two distinct periods or phases. The first, the period between 1840 and 1878, covering the early annexations, and before the advent of the British North Borneo Company, and the second, the period following 1878 which saw the final demarcation and settlement.

In the first period the two principal cabinet ministries involved in Bornean affairs were in general agreement on policy. Always conscious of Article X of the Brunei treaty, British policy and practice relied upon the dominance of British influence on the northwest coast. This meant to a large degree the influence which the consul had with the sultan's government. The ministries relied heavily upon their representative in Borneo and followed closely his recommendations. On several occasions Britain interfered in Brunei affairs to prevent the annexation of territory by Sarawak.[6]

Britain's refusal to allow Raja Brooke to annex territory northward of Sarawak was an attempt to prevent Sarawak from undercutting Labuan's position. Britain could not allow such competition so close to Labuan and Brunei. She could not allow an increase in the raja's influence at Brunei at the expense of the prestige of her representative, the governor and consul.

Sarawak annexed Brunei territory on two occasions before 1878. In 1853 she purchased northward to and including the district of the Rajang River. And in 1861 she purchased the five so-called sago rivers as far north as Kidurong Point. In neither instance was the consent of the British government requested nor reference made to Article X of the 1847 treaty. Neither did official London obstruct the annexations. But in 1868 when Raja Charles Brooke sought to purchase a further stretch of territory, to Baram Point, the Foreign Office, upon the advice of Governor Pope-Hennessy, applied Article X and refused Brunei permission to grant the territory to Brooke.[7] The Colonial Office concurred in this policy.

What were the various motives?

Brooke wanted Baram for a very practical reason. Sarawak people and Brunei subjects intermingled in the area of the upper reaches of the Baram and Rajang rivers. Friction often occurred between them, especially between Sarawak traders and Brunei Malays. It was difficult to settle these disputes or for innocent parties to receive redress because of the lack of control by the sultan over his territories. Raja Brooke wanted Baram because he saw

[6] Britain interfered also on two occasions, in 1846 and 1877, to help select the successor to the throne of Brunei and thus guarantee a pro-British orientation of the government of the sultanate.

[7] The Foreign Office had in 1863 recognized Sarawak as an independent principality. Thus for purposes of Article X of the treaty Britain could consider Brooke, although a British subject, the ruler of a foreign nation. Although this was a dubious interpretation it effectively obstructed Sarawak's annexation of Baram. See Wright, *British Policy* . . . Chap. IV, *passim*.

nothing but unrest and continual friction in a rich trading area as long as a weak sultan held nominal rule.

The Foreign Office shared Governor Hennessy's distrust of Charles Brooke. It disliked Brooke's tactics with the Sultan. Hennessy complained, for example, in 1871 that Raja Brooke, "that ill-tempered vassal," used threats to compel the sultan to accede to his demands. The sultan, Hennessy said, was a good and true friend of Britain and had done more for the cause of justice on the coast than all the well meaning officials of Sarawak had achieved in thirty years.

But what most deeply disturbed the Foreign Office were the indications of foreign interest in the area. As recently as 1865 an American company had purchased a tract of territory in northern Borneo.[8] The company failed within a year. The French were already heavily entrenched on the Indochina coast in Annam and Cambodia and were being observed with a great deal of apprehension by British officials.

Not only, then, did the Foreign Office obstruct Brooke's annexation of Baram, they developed their case one step further and took the occasion to declare the whole northwest coast a British sphere of influence. The Foreign Office saw no reason to arouse the suspicion of other powers by sponsoring territorial changes. Sarawak could not annex Baram.

The Colonial Office was in agreement with the Foreign Office on the Baram issue. Officials there were opposed to Sarawak's expansion not because of foreign threats but because of the supposed competition with Labuan. Although Labuan had not prospered, Governor Hennessy in 1868 was thought to be making progress in reforming the administration of the colony. The Colonial Office felt that Labuan had bright prospects in spite of some doubt concerning Hennessy's reports of the favorable commercial position of the colony.

In 1868 Brooke thus found himself opposed in his expansionist designs by a formidable combination of the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office and the Governor of Labuan. For the next ten years this combination held firm against Brooke's repeated attempts to annex Baram.[9] It was not a change in the international "balance" of power in the South China Sea which brought an end to Brooke's ostracism from official London but a change in the attitude of the Colonial Office toward its colony of Labuan. This change plus a new colonial project in northern Borneo formed the nucleus of the second phase of rivalry over Brunei which culminated in the partition of the sultanate.

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[8] The American Trading Company of Borneo headed by Consul C.L. Moses and Joseph Torrey. For an account of this intriguing enterprise see K.G. Tregonning, "American Activity in North Borneo, 1865-1881," in *Pacific Historical Review* (November 1954), and Wright, *op. cit.*, Chaps. IV and V.

[9] Brooke repeated his request to annex Baram in 1874, 1876 and 1878. See Wright, *British Policy* . . . Chap. IV.

The change of attitude toward Labuan at the Colonial Office was a slow process. It began with a change of personnel in the permanent staff. In 1870 Frederick Rogers, who for over a decade held the post of permanent undersecretary and who was a declared proponent of the Manchester philosophy, was succeeded by Robert Herbert, a Liberal and one time private secretary to William Gladstone. His assistant undersecretary was R.H. Meade who would succeed Herbert in 1892, and who had a similar background, as private secretary to Lord Granville. Neither Herbert nor Meade, though Liberals and despite their close past association with the Manchester school of thought on colonial policy, adhered to the philosophy of restricting colonial responsibilities which had so long dominated the Colonial Office. Together they brought fresh thinking to bear upon colonial problems.[10]

Coincidental with the change of personnel at the Colonial Office was the disclosure of the financial maladministration of Labuan by Governor Hennessy. During most of the 1870's whenever Labuan was discussed a mood of disappointment dominated the subject. There was sentiment in favor of drastic change for the colony. At one point the Colonial Office favored reducing the status of the colony to a penal settlement. At another its attachment to the colony of the Straits Settlement was seriously considered. In the end nothing was done further than allowing the process of attrition to continue. But after 1878 the Colonial Office never used Labuan as a pretext for opposing the expansion of Sarawak. When the failure of Labuan was at last recognized the basis for opposition to Raja Brooke was removed.

The Colonial Office *rapprochement* with the raja came about largely through the efforts of Governor Ussher during the latter half of the decade. To be sure the governor's first concern had been for Labuan. In the summer of 1876 he warned, as had governors before him, that Sarawak's expansion northward would injure Labuan's trade and prestige. But Ussher took the effort to establish friendly communications with Raja Brooke. This resulted at first in rather cautious praise of the raja's "firm and just" rule which had "saved some of the finest provinces in Borneo from anarchy and bloodshed." Eventually Ussher became convinced of the raja's sincere attempts to bring good government to the Borneo coast, and he wrote a long and complimentary report on Sarawak which impressed both Herbert and Meade. From this point onward suspicion of Brooke at the Colonial Office diminished.

The reversal of attitude was complete in 1878 and was influenced greatly by another development in Borneo. That development was the grant

[10] Recent authors have noted and discussed the personnel changes at the Colonial Office in the early 1870's and the "beginning of a new era" which those changes helped to bring about. See C.D. Cowan, *19th Century Malaya* (London 1961), Chap. IV, *passim;* and David M.L. Farr, *The Colonial Office and Canada, 1867-1887* (Toronto, 1955), Chap. 2, *passim*

by the Sultan of Brunei of northern Borneo to Baron Gustav von Overbeck, the Australian honorary consul in Hong Kong, and Alfred Dent of the London oriental trading firm of Dent and Company. This grant [11] which led to the founding of the state of North Borneo created a division among British officials concerned with Borneo.

Baron von Overbeck's mission to Brunei in the winter of 1877-78, which culminated in the grant, found Ussher on sick-leave in England and William H. Treacher acting for him as governor and consul. Ussher was in contact with the government in London, however, and warned that the grant to von Overbeck and Dent might endanger the British position. They were, he said, commercial adventurers in the project for profit and would sell their rights to the highest bidder, possibly a foreign power. [12]

Raja Brooke who had been trying to annex Brunei territory for ten years was incensed that so large an area of Brunei should be obtained so easily by strangers to the country. He complained, with some justification, that Acting Consul Treacher supported von Overbeck's project. He reminded the Foreign Office of its policy of opposing territorial changes on the coast. Governor Ussher and Raja Brooke joined in opposing the Dent-von Overbeck scheme and succeeded in gaining the sympathy of the Colonial Office. While British policy toward the project was to be decided at the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office in 1878 supported Raja Brooke when, in July, the Colonial Secretary, Michael Hicks-Beach, informed Lord Salisbury at the Foreign Office that Sarawak's request for Baram should be favored if any territorial changes in Borneo were contemplated. Undersecretary Herbert with no little sarcasm even suggested giving Raja Brooke Labuan as well. "For Baram," he wrote, "will bring Sarawak close up to our important island—failed in coal and failing in coin."

Dent and von Overbeck who formed the North Borneo Provisional Association applied for a royal charter as the British North Borneo Company. After much debate and scrutiny the charter was granted in November 1881. The fight for the charter, which was heavily supported by the Foreign Office from the first, involved the Colonial Office and Foreign Office in heated controversy over the disposal of Brunei territories. The Dent-von Overbeck project was the vehicle which finally moved the Foreign Office from opposition to Brooke's acquisition of Baram.

For years the Foreign Office had based their opposition upon rather tenuous grounds: Firstly, that any territorial changes would arouse the sus-

[11] For a detailed discussion of the grant and the political origins of North Borneo (Sabah) see Wright, *British Policy . . .*, Chap. IV and V, and L.R. Wright, "Historical Notes on the North Borneo Dispute," in *The Journal of Asian Studies* (May 1966), pp. 471-84.

[12] The grant was conditionally offered to certain parties in Vienna and Berlin upon the Baron's return to Europe.

picions of foreign powers; and secondly, that Sarawak itself was a foreign power and ought not to be allowed to intrude upon British influence in Brunei. As to the first, it must be remembered that Britain in 1868 had pronounced a sphere-of-interest over the whole of the northwest coast including Sarawak. If anything was calculated not to arouse international suspicions such an action as this was not the one. Further, Britain had in 1863 granted Sarawak recognition as an independent principality although the Foreign Office as late as 1876 insisted that because of a technicality Her Majesty had not recognized James Brooke as a sovereign prince.[13]

The studied ambiguity of the Foreign Office arguments ignored several important points in Britain's favor. First, that Sarawak was an English settlement and that there was not a shred of foreign influence in the principality in spite of Raja James Brooke's flirtation with French and Belgian connections prior to his death in 1868. Secondly, Raja Charles had declared on several occasions that wherever the Sarawak flag flew British interests would be paramount. The state was, in the 1870's, a flourishing English colonial enterprise.

With the advent of the Dent-von Overbeck scheme the Foreign Office decided to postpone a decision on Brooke's latest request for the annexation of Baram until the charter issue was decided.

The Colonial Office reservations about the Dent-von Overbeck scheme were based upon the contention that Raja Brooke had a better claim to northern Borneo than had the new syndicate. The colonial officials were suspicious of Baron von Overbeck's part in the scheme and the possibility that the cession would be sold to Germany or Austria. On this point the Foreign Office admitted that both Ussher and Treacher had said there was nothing to prevent the owners from transferring their cession to a foreign power. But, the Foreign Office argued, a charter giving ultimate control to Britain would prevent this. In the event the Colonial Secretary, Hicks-Beach, decided to press for government sanction of Brooke's annexation of Baram if the Foreign Office favoured the Dent-von Overbeck venture. Soon after granting the charter to the British North Borneo Company, Britain decided to allow Brooke to annex Baram. Thus it is seen that once it was decided to support North Borneo the Foreign Office could no longer sustain their argument against Brooke.

The loss of territory to Brunei was considerable. Sarawak gained a stretch of Brunei coastline of about 120 miles, with the hinterland and the indented river valleys included. The new state of North Borneo was formed from perhaps 25,000 square miles of Brunei territory with a coastline of

[13] The technicality: In appointing the first consul to Sarawak in 1864 the Foreign Office instructed him to apply for acceptance as consul from the "local authorities" instead of from the sovereign ruler, as was customary. See Wright, *British Policy . . .*, pp. 239-44; and Graham Irwin, *19th Century Borneo* (The Hague, 1955), p. 189.

some 500 miles stretching from Kimanis Bay, less than 100 miles northeast of Brunei Town, around the northern part of Borneo to the Sibuco River on the east coast. The state comprised a somewhat smaller area than the present state of Sabah. [14]

As to the attitude of Brunei toward the carving-up of its territory few of the rajas of Brunei Town objected. In general the temptation of a considerable monetary payment in-hand overrode any desire to retain nominal title to territories over which Brunei sultans had long since ceased to rule and from which little if any revenue was obtained. That the presence of the British colonial establishments in Borneo and the monetary payments to the sultanate tended to bolster-up a declining court and infuse it with superficial vigor was not lost upon the sultan and some of his rajas.

This was not to be the end of the dismemberment of Brunei, however. For hardly had the two states completed their respective annexations than they were seeking further territory. The keen competition which arose over the charter issue and Baram created a strong and bitter rivalry between the two states. The rivalry was evident not only in the respective prestige and influence of each at the court of Brunei, but among the advocates of each colony in England. North Borneo lured away some Sarawak officials for service in the north. To be sure in time most of these returned, while some of the recruits in North Borneo ended up under the employ of Raja Brooke. Both Sarawak and North Borneo retained agents to press their respective causes in Brunei Town and to report important intelligence about conditions there.

The attention of the two states was soon drawn to the area remaining to Brunei. It seems clear that both Raja Brooke and the North Borneo Company fully expected the demise of the sultanate and each was determined to claim as large a share as possible. Raja Brooke had, for example, as early as the summer of 1874 suggested that the whole of the Brunei sultate be placed under the administration of Sarawak as a protectorate.[15] And although this was a tactic in his long campaign to acquire Baram it indicated his ambition to stabilize and organize the government of the whole of the northwest coast under the control of the only viable government of Englishmen in the area, that of Sarawak. That there was little stability in Brunei or a guarantee of even a future viability for the sultanate was indicated by the ease with which concessions could be bought at Brunei with ready cash. In 1882 W.C. Cowie, an English trader and later to be managing

[14] The territory excluded several small river enclaves on the northwest coast northeastward of Brunei Town which were under the independent rule of river chieftains. These rivers were later annexed separately by individual agreements between the chartered company and the chiefs.

[15] Brooke to Lord Derby, 17 July 1874, in Foreign Office Borneo correspondence, series 12, volume 42 (FO 12/42) as cited in Wright, *British Policy . . .*, p. 222.

director of the British North Borneo Company in London, leased the mineral rights of Muara, a peninsula at the mouth of the Brunei River. The next year two more leases were sold by the aging Sultan Mumin. One and a half miles of coastline north of Brunei Bay went to one Lee Cheng Lan and included the "independent governing authority of the area." In July 1883 A.H. Everett, a former North Borneo employee, was granted the mineral rights of the Pandasan River. The following year he was granted the revenue rights as well.

As we have already noted the company's grant as far south as the Kimanis River was interrupted by several rivers belonging to independent chiefs and not included in the grants to Dent and von Overbeck. These rivers formed enclaves in company territory and became a problem to the company in its attempt to develop the area. Rebellious tribes as well as slavers and smugglers could operate in company territory from these areas. The Pandasan River was one of these enclaves. Its lease by Everett particularly irked the company officials because they suspected that Raja Brooke and Everett were in alliance and meant to restrict the company by controlling the enclaves and by preventing its approach to Brunei in any possible territorial aggrandizement soutward. They had good reason to suspect Everett and Brooke for Everett had in 1881 been established in Brunei Town as Brooke's agent and in 1882 had been offered the post of resident officer in Baram by the raja. Everett had been for some time petitioning the sultan for mineral rights in much of what remained of Brunei territory and when he succeeded in obtaining Pandasan he had also coveted several other unleased rivers. In 1885 Governor Treacher of North Borneo leased the Putaton district, north of Kimanis Bay, from its chief, to prevent Everett from going there.

The company found it necessary in order to protect its own interests in Brunei and on its southern frontier to engage in the scramble for Brunei territory. In 1883 North Borneo officials were instructed by the managing director of the company in London, Sir Rutherford Alcock, a former British consul in China, to negotiate for the cession of Brunei land bordering company territory. "We are eager," wrote Alcock, "to get a foothold in Brunei before the death of the present sultan." In June, North Borneo asked the aging sultan for the lease of the Klias Peninsula and the Padas River on the North of Brunei Bay. This was only a first step. What the company envisaged was the annexation of the five main rivers emptying into Brunei Bay. These were, from north to south, the Klias, Padas, Lawas, Trusan and Limbang. Alcock told the Colonial Office that the rivers of Brunei Bay "fall within our absorbing power." [16]

Early in 1884 Governor Treacher had again become acting governor of Labuan and consul upon the illness of Governor Leys. He reported to Lon-

[16] Alcock to Colonial Office, 8 May 1883 in FO 12/59.

don that the Limbang River, under proper management would be a rich district to the company. The Limbang, of which the Brunei River was an estuary, was perhaps the most fertile of the lands left to Brunei. The Brunei pengerans, however, extorted taxes and fines to an extreme degree so that by the 1880's the inhabitants of the river were more or less in revolt against Brunei. In June 1884, the Limbang people attacked and killed agents of the Pengeran Temenggong of Brunei who were extracting "taxes." Later they successfully defeated a small force under the pengeran himself and followed it up by moving on Brunei, where they attacked several houses on the outskirts. The sultan appealed to Acting Consul Treacher, who refused to intervene unless the sultan agreed to cease the arbitrary taxation of the Limbang people and promised in writing to limit taxes to a poll tax and 5 per cent *ad valorem* duty on gutta percha. The sultan reluctantly agreed, but while Treacher was in Limbang getting the agreement of the Limbang chiefs to the document, Brunei resorted to the only power it had to retaliate. It urged the Murut tribe of the Trusan River district to attack their old enemies, the Limbang people. Treacher was able to persuade the chiefs to sign the truce. The chiefs relied upon the English to hold the sultan to the agreement.

In October the Limbang chiefs were again threatening to attack Brunei and the sultan was powerless to prevent them. At this point Treacher arrived on board the British naval vessel *H.M.S. Pegasus,* and the visit of this warship had a quieting effect upon the situation. Brunei was upbraided for allowing the Muruts to attack Limbang while Treacher was negotiating the truce and he received an apology. At the same time the Padas-Klias cessions were offered to the company and Treacher accepted them. With an eye to Sarawak, Treacher had written into the Padas cession the stipulation that any prospective cession of Brunei territory would first be offered to the company. Just how binding such a restriction was would soon be evident.

Prior to this Treacher had suggested to the company a pact with Raja Brooke for the partition of Brunei, giving the company all Brunei territory to and including the Limbang River, and granting to Sarawak the land as far north as the Tutong River, about mid-way between Baram Point and Brunei Town. Such a plan would suit Alcock's ambitions for the company would in effect surround Brunei and control Brunei Bay while the raja would be stopped somewhat further south. Alcock had declared his interest in obtaining Cowie's lease of Muara and had also proposed to the Colonial Office an arangement for taking over Labuan for a period of three years. Had such plans been successful the instability of the area during the next few years would have been prevented. In the event only the offer of Muara was taken up. But not only did North Borneo feel it could develop the rivers of Brunei Bay better than could Sarawak, it also desired a control over what

would remain of the sultanate. Alcock hoped to do it by urging Britain to establish a protectorate over Brunei and appoint the company to administer it. Short of this he was prepared to propose the annexation of Brunei. But annexation he hoped would be only as a last resort to keep it from falling to Sarawak, for the company had its hands full of plans for the development of an already vast territory.

Events in Brunei moved rapidly. In December, the company's hopes were thwarted when Sarawak got ahead of them in a bid for the Limbang River. F.O. Maxwell, the senior resident of Sarawak, acting for Raja Brooke who was in England, went to Brunei to seek compensation for Sarawak traders who were killed by Muruts in the Trusan district. The old sultan and his regent Pengeran Temenggong offered to cede the Trusan River to Sarawak and Maxwell accepted. The Temenggong also offered Limbang. Maxwell accepted conditionally upon the raja's return. When Treacher heard of Maxwell's success in Brunei he fired off angry dispatches to the Foreign Office and to the company court of directors in London. He urged Alcock to press the Foreign Office to send him instructions. As acting consul he reminded Brunei that British permission must be granted to any cession of Brunei territory. He wrote to Alcock,

> I have strained every nerve to prevent any cession, using the agreement in the new Padas lease, with reference to submitting all offers of territory to the company in the first instance, as my principle card. It would be wearysome to relate all the steps I have taken with this object in view.[17]

Treacher had indeed been active. Under his direction, G.L. Davies, the company's west coast resident, became the company's agent in Brunei. With Maxwell and Everett acting for the raja, the rivalry for cessions reached a peak during December 1884.

In his dispatch to the Foreign Office Treacher said that Britain should decide whether Sarawak or North Borneo got Limbang. Baram, he said, formed a good boundary for Sarawak. Pending a decision he proposed that both Sarawak and North Borneo cease further negotiations for cessions. Sarawak deplored the action by Treacher of bringing North Borneo into the picture for Sarawak maintained that the company had never been offered either Trusan or Limbang.

The crisis over Limbang showed up the factionalism in Brunei. While the sultan was old, imbecile and weak, his pengerans, unable to protect themselves from the Limbang attacks, divided on the question as to the cession of the river. At the time of the Padas lease to North Borneo the

[17] Treacher to Alcock, 20 December 1884, in the British North Borneo Company Papers (BNBCoP), Colonial Office Library, as cited in Wright, *British Policy . . .*, p. 397. (The company papers are now in the Colonial Office collection of the Public Record Office, London.)

Temenggong had agreed to press for the cession if the company would loan him $25,000. When the company instead advanced $15,000 to the Pengeran di Gadong and Pengeran Bandahara in return for pushing the negotiations the Temenggong was angered. It was in this mood that the Temenggong ceded the Trusan Riven to Sarawak for $4,500 and also offered the Limbang as noted above. The old sultan and the di Gadong refused to agree to the Limbang grant. Thus while the Temenggong and the Bandahara favored Sarawak in this instance, the di Gadong sided with North Borneo. The latter depended for part of his income upon the company for he held certain hereditary rights in the Padas River and thus shared in the lease money from that district. It is interesting to note that in his official capacity as a Brunei raja the di Gadong was the keeper of the sultan's seal and regalia. When the Temenggong became regent in 1878. the di Gadong had refused to give up control of the seal. The seal was necessary for validating cession documents. It was while that di Gadong controlled the seal that W.C. Cowie had purchased the Muara governing rights. And the document was sealed without the Sultan's knowledge. [18]

But these alignments it must be understood were tenuous and depended in no small way on the monetary payments each rival could or was willing to offer to the Brunei pengerans. In addition both North Borneo and Sarawak used the threat of withholding payments for other leases in order to keep the Brunei rajas in a sympathetic mood.

It was the di Gadong's friendship and his control over the sultan which the company exploited in their attempt to gain the favored pósition in Brunei and to annex Limbang. Treacher instructed his agent Davies how to influence the pengeran and the sultan. "Maybe," he said, "we can get the government of Limbang, without actual cession" by inducing them to withhold their "chop" on the Trusan and Limbang cessions to Sarawak. Davies was to urge the sultan to write to the consul repudiating the cessions to Sarawak. At the same time Treacher pursuaded Maxwell to agree to cease negotiations in Brunei pending a decision from London.

With the Padas-Klias cessions to North Borneo and the Trusan-Limbang cessions to Sarawak to deal with, the British government was handed the complications of Brunei to unravel early in 1885. With the requests for the sanction of these cessions came also the company's proposal for a protectorate over Brunei. Both states protested against the cessions to the other. The agents of both were busy buying influence and advantage in Brunei Town. [19] Raja Brooke again complained of Treacher's triple role as

[18] See Treacher to Foreign Office, 13 May 1885 in FO 12/72.

[19] For examples, see the Davies-Treacher correspondence for December 1884 in BNBCoP. The company advanced to the di Gadong $15,000 for the Padas-Klias cessions; it offered $4,500 for the Limbang, plus $1,000 to the sultan's secretary if he could influence the cession, a $5,000 loan to the sultan, and a promise to Inche Mabo-

governor, acting consul and acting governor of Labuan. Indeed Treacher's interests were conflicting. He was freely sending to the company in London copies of his official correspondence with the British government.[20] He had negotiated the Padas cession to North Borneo while visiting Brunei in a British naval vessel as acting consul. When the raja pointed out that the cession was "negotiated under cover of the consular flag" Treacher remarked that the accusation was "too childish to call for refutation." In answer to a question in Parliament about Treacher's conflict of interest, the parliamentary undersecretary in the Colonial Office replied that the sultan was fully aware of the constitution of the North Borneo Company and of Treacher's role. In private Colonial Office officals were more candid. When some time later a gift of a rifle was presented to the sultan by Treacher as acting governor of Labuan, Meade, at the Colonial Office, remarked that "it may be difficult for the sultan to discriminate clearly between the acting governor of Labuan and the officer of the North Borneo Company as the giver of it."

The Colonial Office supported Raja Brooke's protest and pointed out to the Foreign Office Treacher's serious conflict of interest. Pauncefote agreed that there was a conflict but failed to see where Treacher had acted other than scrupulously in support of British interests. Treacher was assured of the confidence of the Foreign Office. This suggests that Pauncefote viewed company interests and British interests as one. Indeed the role of Pauncefote in support of the North Borneo venture from its inception is certain if not always clear. Even as early as 1878 when the Dent-von Overbeck cession was made Pauncefote was using his official position in the Foreign Office to promote the project.[21] Nevertheless the Colonial Office with Foreign Office approval soon began making arrangement for Governor Leys return to Borneo to relieve Treacher.

The company in London headed by Alcock and with sympathetic ear of Pauncefote and its man as acting consul was in better position than Sarawak to influence the government decision on the cessions and protectorate question. Alcock revived the fears of Sarawak's political instability and possibility of foreign influence in Sarawak. He used this argument to the

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met, the British Consulate writer, of a "good berth" in Limbang if the company got it. For Sarawak Everett was instructed to offer $7,000 to $8,000 for the Padas River; Maxwell got the Trusan for $4,500 plus a $13,000 advance to the Temenggong and the threat of withholding two years' worth of Sarawak cession money ($22,000).

[20] See for example Treacher to Alcock, 29 October, 10, 16 and 24 November 1884, and 7 March 1885, in BNBCoP. "I enclose you," he wrote to Alcock, "my draft of a report to the Foreign Office in full reliance that you will see that the Foreign Office does not become aware of my having done so." Alcock replied, that he could feel "quite at ease about the safe custody of the enclosures." (Private letter of Alcock to Treacher, 17 April 1885.)

[21] See Wright. *British Policy* . . . . Chaps. V and VI; and Irwin, *op. cit.*, p.204.

Foreign Office in official letters and in private notes to Pauncefote in attempts to prevent Sarawak's annexation of Brunei land. As for Sarawak Raja Brooke was frequently in England. During most of 1884 and 1885 Governor Leys was also at home. Both worked on government officials. Perhaps Sarawak's strongest card was the support she received at the Colonial Office for reasons already noted. Herbert pointed out to the Foreign Office the inaccuracy of Alcocks's allegations of the susceptibility of Sarawak to foreign pressure. For Raja Brooke had with the Baram cession agreed to be bound by a restrictive measure granting Britain a veto over any transfer of Sarawak territory. The Colonial Office actually favored transferring Labuan to Sarawak and allowing her to annex all of Brunei. "As far as the Colonial Office is concerned," wrote Meade, "we incline rather to the raja than to the company." As for Brunei and Labuan he said, "we tend to encourage their transfer to Sarawak in preference to the company." Herbert pointed out that Sarawak was sound financially while North Borneo would require an imperial grant to administer additional territory. There was a strong belief among officials that the North Borneo Company was headed for financial collapse because it had over extended its resources. If this happened Sarawak ought to be in a position to take over.[22]

On the immediate question of the cessions, however, the Colonial Office suggested that Britain approve them in line with the previous proposal for a partition. This was, after all, a partial partition. The Foreign Office agreed and notified Treacher that Britain would not object to the Brunei cessions of Padas-Klias to the North Borneo and of Trusan-Limbang to Sarawak.

At this point Brunei affairs became even more complicated. The raja began occupying the Trusan River. With his pending move into Limbang this now meant that Sarawak territory surrounded Brunei on three sides. Moreover it was now pointed out to the Foreign Office that the Trusan and Limbang districts were not contiguous and that in effect Brunei territory would be separated into two parts by Sarawak's possession of Limbang. Britain decided however to stand by her sanction of the cessions. The company as a retaliatory measure now negotiated with W.C. Cowie for the purchase of his rights in the Muara Peninsula. The company was attracted by the idea of establishing at Muara a coaling station for ships plying the South China Sea. In May 1885, the sultan approved of this transfer pending British sanction. This was almost the last official act of Sultan Mumin's reign. He died on the 29th of May and was succeeded by his regent the Pengeran Temenggong as Sultan Hasim.

[22] The Prime Minister Lord Derby agreed with the Colonial Office that Sarawak was the logical protector of Brunei because of its experience and financial stability. He wrote, "I think a Sarawak protectorate of what remains of Brunei might prove a good arrangement, but we need not now say so." See Minute of 28 March 1885 in Colonial Office Labuan series 144, vol. 60 (CO 144/60)

When the Foreign Office sent their approval of the cessions to North Borneo and Sarawak news of the Sultan's death had not reached London. The Foreign Office consequently did not know that the new Sultan was now bent upon a different policy. He had, for example, soon after assuming the throne reconsidered both the Limbang cession to Sarawak and the transfer of Muara to the company. A few weeks before the old sultan's death, in a burst of unanimity, the pengerans of Brunei had agreed among themselves not to cede any more Brunei territory.[23] The new sultan considered the grant of Muara to Cowie invalid because he, as regent, was not consulted at the time and because the di Gadong had sealed the cession without the knowledge of the old sultan. Britain was reluctant to force the transfer of Muara to the company against the sultan's wishes. Thus in spite of British sanction for the Limbang cession Sultan Hasim now refused to give up either Limbang to the raja or Muara to the company.

Yet there was strong sentiment in Britain in favor of settling the Brunei question because of the instability of the area and its vulnerability to foreign overtures. And the gradual absorption of Brunei by its neighboring states, as advocated by the Colonial Office, might be too dangerous a process. Foreign Secretary Lord Salisbury noted in October 1885:

> I agree to the proposal but I look with some apprehension to the Colonial Office plan of pressing the wreck of Brunei. Remember the new principles Bismarck has introduced into colonial politics. He might as likely as not seize the balance while we are awaiting to see it reach the proper stage of decay.[24]

The two principal ministries then evolved a compromise plan which had been proposed by Governor Leys. The Padas-Klias and Trusan-Limbang cessions would be confirmed, making Trusan the boundary between Sarawak and North Borneo. Simple political protectorates would be established over the three states of Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo. A special mission was taken dispatched to Borneo to observe conditions. Pauncefote wrote from the Foreign Office,

> . . . it appears to the Secretary of State that the authority of the British Crown is not defined with sufficient precision to obviate the risk of an attempt being made by some foreign power to obtain a footing in those regions.[25]

It was necessary to secure the British position, he continued,

> . . . not only from the magnitude of the commercial interests involved, but also from the strategical position of the territories in question. The remarkable activ-

[23] Despite this agreement Raja Brooke was able to persuade Sultan Hasim, by a loan of $40,000, not to cede territory to any party other than Sarawak or Britain.

[24] Minute of 24 October 1885 in FO 12/68.

[25] Pauncefote to the CO, 13 January 1887 in FO 12/75.

> ity which has been displayed during the last few years by some foreign states in the acquisition of colonies and new outlets for trade call for the utmost vigilance on the part of Her Majesty's Government, in order to avoid rival claims and encroachments in territories where British interests preponderate so largely as they do in that part of Borneo.

The Governor of the Straits Settlements, Frederick Weld, was entrusted with the Borneo mission. He was instructed to present the plant of settlement to the sultan. In Brunei Sultan Hasim, although urged to give up Limbang to Sarawak, declared his intention not to cede any more territory because of the raja's agreement. But he welcomed a British protectorate and asked for a resident. Both North Borneo and Sarawak agreed to the plan. Weld in his report recommended a protectorate for Brunei similar to those in the Malay states, with a resident-adviser to the sultan who would also administer Labuan. But London felt that Weld's insistence upon a resident and an administrative protectorate was financially impracticable. The treasury would not make available an imperial grant. A simple protectorate was agreed to although there were some last minute reservations. Lord Salisbury, noting that Sarawak and North Borneo were "rapidly crushing out" Brunei between them, wrote,

> I think we had better let them finish it, and make no agreement with the Sultan of Brunei which would stand in the way of a consummation which is inevitable and, on the whole, desirable.

Nevertheless the whole plan was adopted.

Thus in 1888 Britain negotiated protectorates with all three states. As the extension of both Sarawak and North Borneo into Brunei territory had already been agreed, the final settlement of the Brunei problem was substantially as the plan had been given to Weld. Two rivers south of Brunei, Belait and Tutong, as well as the Brunei River and Muara remained under the sultan. Though British permission for the cession of Limbang stood on the record it remained nominally under the sultan. In practice, the chiefs of Limbang were independent until 1890 when they placed themselves under the rule of Raja Brooke and he annexed the district. Contrary to Herbert's prediction the sultan did not readily accept the cession of Limbang.

The agreements provided for no interference with the internal affairs of the states. The important provision, however, gave Britain control over their foreign relations.

Summary

By the latter half of the 19th century Brunei was in the last stages of decline. Her sultan and ministers competed with each other for wealth to

be had by making cessions. Enriching themselves was the main motive in their respective roles in the partition of the state. But another motive gradually appeared. The rapid dismemberment of Brunei alarmed the old sultan and his heir. Thus the continued existence of Brunei became a motive for a different attitude. How much this could stand against the offer of ready money was seen later when in 1890 Brooke annexed Limbang and offered the sultan $6,000 a year. Sultan Hasim refused the payment. It was used to develop the Limbang district.

As we have seen the various rajas allied themselves with the most lucrative proposition of the moment presented by Davies and Everett, the agents of North Borneo and Sarawak respectively. Raja Brooke of Sarawak had ambitions to rule all of northern Borneo. The company interfered with these plans and so Brooke increased the pace of his movement northward by pressing for now part, now all of Brunei. The company at first was content with its large cession. But under the energetic administration of Treacher it decided to oppose Brooke's advance and itself developed an absorption policy toward Brunei. Britain's objective was to prevent an opening for a foreign footing in northern Borneo and to secure her own dominant position there as an imperial power. This involved stabilizing the political situation by settling the rival claims of Sarawak and North Borneo; delineating the boundaries of the three states; and placing the relations between each one and Britain on a regulated basis by establishing simple political protectorates.

It is quite clear that both the Colonial and Foreign Offices fully expected Brunei to be completly absorbed by her neighbors. Nothing in the protectorate agreements stood in the way. When Raja Brooke annexed Limbang it was not surprising then that Britain raised no protest. Brunei remains, a small enclave surrounded by Sarawak, the result of the 19th century rivalry of Englishmen with mixed commercial and political motives. Lawas River, the last district to change hands, was ceded by the company to Raja Brooke in 1905.

CHINESE STRATEGY AND INTENT DURING THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE

DONALD R. HETZNER

THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER CONFLICT OF 1962 PROVIDES A detailed representation of Peking's military political strategy in Asia. Unorthodox in the Western sense, Peking's tactics are the result of geographic location and historic imperialism, now structured around a framework of Maoist military-political principles. Any doubt as to the effectiveness of limited war must be revised after a critical examination of the territorial and political gains Mainland China has obtained at India's expense.

I. 1962—The Sino-Indian Border

After several years of methodically altering the alignment of the Sino-Indian border by surreptitious encroachments, countered only by Indian paramilitary movements along the frontier, Chinese forces crossed the existing *de facto* borders of India's Ladakh and North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) on September 8, 1962. In the following weeks Chinese military action increased until it was on a large enough scale to warrant being termed an outright invasion. On November 21, Peking declared that it would unilaterally implement peace proposal made by Chou En-lai on October 24, and withdraw its troops from the line of conflict.[1] However, the Chinese note made it clear that this was less a truce than a demand for surrender without formalities. In effect, the note expanded and redefined the existing conflict to include India's prestige as a "non-aligned" nation, shifted the blame for a possible continuation of hostilities onto New Delhi's shoulders, and equated any attempt on India's part to escalate the conflict as an indication of subservience to imperialism and colonialism.

Following the cease-fire both countries indicated their acceptance of the Colombo Proposals as presented and clarified by six Afro-Asian nations (Ceylon, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic and Ghana). China, however, precluded any stable border settlement by declaring that it had reached an agreement with Pakistan regarding the alignment of the border between Sinkiang and that part of Kashmir occupied by Pakistan. This tentative agreement was announced on December 27, 1962, the very

[1] "Statement given by the Chinese Government, 21 November 1962," *White Paper VIII* (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1963), pp. 17-21.

day that negotiations between India and Pakistan over the question of Kashmir were to begin at Rawalpindi. By March 2, 1963, when the Sino-Pakistan Agreement was finalized at Peking, it was apparent that China had successfully dominated all phases of the border dispute and settled the frontier alignment on its own terms. By deft military maneuvers Peking forced India out of strategic positions on the border and, through even more adroit diplomatic ploys nullified the Colombo Proposals and settled the Kashmir/Tibet-Sinkiang border with negligible interference from India. The border conflict with China proved that, in India's case, the theory of non-alignment and aloofness from power politics did not correspond with the realities of contemporary politics. In 1962-1963, it became apparent that a third power block of non-aligned nations, with India as its tacitly accepted leader, had little influence in dealing with the "new imperialism" of Peking.

II. China's Posture on the Border

The Chinese version of the Sino-Indian boundary is, for the most part, supported by evidence that is lacking in quantity and quality. However, there can be no doubt that China does have some valid claims to areas in both the Eastern and Western Sectors. In the Eastern Sector Tibetan authorities collected taxes and appointed officials in several tribal areas, located south of the McMahon Line, until 1945; after that date the British occupied Monyul, Loyul, and Walong, formerly administered from Lhasa, and ended Tibetan hegemony in the sector. Chinese claims in the Western Sector are based on much firmer evidence. Official Indian maps have shown the entire Aksai Chin region of Ladakh as being undefined in relation to Tibet.[2] Furthermore, Prime Minister Nehru condemned British aggression in Tibet so many times and in such detail that he undercut India's rights of succession in the area. Also, India, by admitting that there was a definite dispute over the alignment of the border and by indicating its willingness to discuss *minor rectifications* of the boundary, in effect conceded that China did have definite claims in the area. However, if the Chinese section of the *Report of the Officials . . . On the Boundary Question* is read as containing proof of Chinese claims in these two areas, then these claims are definitely not proven but rather are stated as a unilateral point of view and not supported by verifiable sources.[3]

The Middle Sector of the border posed no problem to either side between 1951-62 since no major forces were deployed along its boundary and the only area actually in dispute was Barahoti/Wu-Je. Chinese claims in this area are not based directly on historical data but rather on a dispute

[2] India, *70-Mile Political Map of India—First Edition* (Survey of India, 1950).
[3] India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question* (New Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1962)

with India over the geographical relationship of this area to the Tunjun La Pass. A joint demarcation survey and a withdrawal of troops from the immediate area of the border would most likely have settled the delimitation of the frontier, if these actions had taken place at any time between May 1951, and September 1962.

Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal can all be considered as integral and strategic sections of India's border with China. Nevertheless, in regard to the border war of 1962, it is possible to eliminate them from the consideration of the over-all armed conflict situation, even though it has been reported that these three countries, together with Ladakh, form "the four teeth with which the Chinese will grind their way to the Southern Seas." [4] On occasion China has stated that it considers that Sikkim/Tibet border as being demarcated by the Calcutta (1890), Lhasa (1904), and Peking (1906) Conventions and other international agreements, both preceding and subsequent to these conventions. Chinese incursions into these areas seem to be designed merely to distract New De'hi's attention. [5] In regard to the border between Bhutan and Tibet, even though it is undemarcated, there were few, if any, military incursions by Chinese personnel into territory claimed by Bhutan between the years 1954-1963. Nepal settled its border, and in so doing withdrew from the steadily deteriorating border situation by signing a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with China in April 1960. [6] This was followed by a further strengthening of the frontier when King Mahendra visited Peking in October 1961 and signed a boundary treaty that, significantly, contained a provision allowing the Chinese to build a road from Lhasa, Tibet to Kathmandu, Nepal.

Therefore, it can be stated that the area of greatest conflict was, and is, in the Ladakh region of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In the other two sectors there was some agreement as to the general limits of the borders of Tibet and India, but in the Aksai Chin region of Ladakh, there was no agreement whatsoever as to what constituted the limits of India and Tibet or, for that matter, whether India or Pakistan was the legal sovereign power in Baltistan and Gilgit Agency regions of Jammu/Kashmir. There was no question, however,that in 1961-62 Indian troops were patroling up to the Chinese line of control south of the Karakorum Pass and, in doing so, menacing an area that China considered vital to its national interests.

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[4] P. C. Chakravarti, *India's China Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), p. 148.

[5] Geroge Knox Osborn III, "Sino-Indian Border Conflicts: Historical Background and Recent Developments," (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1963), p. 255.

[6] China, *New Development in Friendly Relations Between China and Nepal* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960).

III. China's Territorial Ambitions

The Chinese territorial claims that helped precipitate the border conflict are of only momentary significance when compared to traditional expansionism as promulgated by the conception of China as the "Middle Kingdom". This view of China as the center of the world and distributor of culture has led the Chinese in past eras to expand their borders and influence outward over large areas of Asia. This Chinese hegemony has, in the past, extended outward to Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Burma, Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Korea, Taiwan, and the Sulu Islands. Although these states were cut away from Imperial China during periods of weakness and were seemingly lost forever, all modern Chinese leaders have considered these areas to be irrevocably an integral part of China.

The establishment of the People's Republic of China, and the growth of the first strong central government since the late eighteenth century made it possible for China to take its first steps toward regaining paramount influence in its former subject areas. In the contemporary society Mao-Tse-tung's view that "it is the immediate task of China to regain all our lost territories" [7] has now been coupled with workable Maoist principles concerning the expansion of the class struggle (and China's prestige) into those areas once ruled by Imperial China. This combination of Maoist principles and China's growing strength gradually gave rise to a situation in which Peking was able to proclaim itself, at some expense to Russia, as the preeminent power in Asia.

It would seem that China's first step in proving its new strength was to plan the re-establishment of control over former dominions. This, however, required careful calculation during the 1950's as any effort to regain influence in the north would probably evoke retribution by Russia; and, still smarting from the Korean War, China appeared unwilling to challenge the United States in Southeast Asia until a preponderance of power was established by the Communist bloc. Thus, the least dangerous course, in addition to reinforcing Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia, was to establish a central control over conquered Tibet and face a relatively weak India across its border.

Once established in control of Tibet, and subsequently having had India recognize the area as the Tibet Region of China, [8] Peking was faced with the problem of securing its newly won prize against an Indian Government friendly to the Dalai Lama and Tibetan autonomy in general. To accomplish this, particularly after the Lhasa riots in 1959, China attempted to ex-

[7] Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (New York: The Modern Library, 1944), p. 96.

[8] In reference to the 1954 "Agreement Between The Republic of India and The People's Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of China and India, April 29, 1954, "*White Paper I* (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1963), pp. 98-101.

tend the so-called "Bamboo Curtain" to the outer limits of any area over which modern Tibet wielded authority. To insure the effectiveness of this security measure, it was necessary to seal the border, render it defensible, and to guard the communications network connecting Sinkiang and Tibet with China.

The Application of Chinese Power

It became imperative to gain the co-operation of the minority groups living along the Sino-Indian border in order to seal Tibet from outside influences. The Chinese used two approaches to this problem: They promoted the idea of a federation of the small Himalayan border states and simultaneously attempted to carry on border negotiations with Sikkim and Bhutan—succeeding with Nepal; and they carried on a program of infiltration, combined with a propaganda campaign, in the tribal areas along the frontier. At the same time that subversive activities were being instituted, the border regions of Tibet were further strengthened by an influx of men and materials introduced through a newly constructed communications network centering on the Sinkiang-Tibet Highway.

By the end of 1961 India was faced with a Chinese stronghold in Tibet that was effectively sealed from outside observation and interference. When this secrecy within Tibet was coupled with the well-known facts of the militancy of Chinese Communist ideology, China's historical expansionism, and its encouragement of aggressive actions in Southeast Asia, the Indian Government was forced to react by building up its military forces along the border to order to take "effective action to recover the lost territories." Chinese reaction to the Indian build-up probably could have been predicted before the troop movements began. The Chinese regarded the security of Tibet and the sanctity of Ladakh as vital to the national interests of China, since these areas serve to protect China's vital Sinkiang Province from threats emanating from the South and West and provide a base for national expansion.

As the territorial limits of China expanded, and were in turn threatened, chauvinistic-ideological factions in China began to demand the maintenance of a militant guard over China's national interests; this included the continuation of territorial expansion, the undercutting of "national bourgeoisie" influence in Asia, and the countering of the universalism of Russia and the United States. These three security measures set China and India on a collision course that was to culminate in the warfare on the Sino-Indian border.

Peking's Evaluation of India

Mao Tse-tung's reference to the "running dogs of imperialism" was expanded upon 1962 in order to charge that:

> The Nehru government has substituted reactionary nationalism for the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution, and tied up ever more closely with the imperialist and feudal forces. . . . But the class nature and economic status of the Indian big bourgeoisie and big landlords determine that the Nehru government depends on and serves imperialism more and more.[9]

This equation of India with the Western World was further strengthened by a compilation of facts and figures that purported to show, and perhaps did, that India was becoming economically dependent on the West — in particular the United States. *Renmin Ribao* reached the conclusion that:

> India's foreign debt burden grows heavier and heavier, and it becomes more and more difficult for India to extricate itself from its economic dependence on foreign monopoly capital. . . . What is different from the past is that U.S. imperialism is gradually taking over British imperialism's monopoly position in India.[10]

Thus, India was regarded by the Chinese not only as a power in her own right, but also as an area into which China's most implacable enemy, the United States had extensive and valued interests. Given this view of India and the seeming efforts of Premier Khrushchev to reach a detente with the Western Powers, it is likely that Peking not only resented China's non-involvement in great power negotiations but saw these negotiations as a threat to continued Chinese growth. China was now forced to secure its strategic border areas, but to do it in such a manner that a possible conflict could be limited to the two principals—China and India.

It was a reasonably safe assumption that India would not call on outside help (Russian and/or American) as this would shatter the respectability of India's non-aligned status. India's reluctance to call for help would, in turn, allow Peking to establish the nature, extent, area, and manner of settling the alignment of the disputed regions. The advantage to China of keeping non-Asian powers out of the continent, and thus to enable it to establish full-sway over its weaker neighbors, has been ably commented on by P. C. Chakravarti:

> The balance in Asia today is maintained by non-Asian forces operating on the Asian scene. It is not, therefore, in the interest of India nor of other free Asian nations to call upon those forces to leave Asia to itself, thus creating a

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[9] "More on Nehru's Philosophy in the Light of the Sino-Indian Boundary Question," *The Sino-Indian Boundary Question*, p. 109.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 111-112.

> power vacuum which Communist China alone can fill. Nothing will please Peking better than an Asian Monroe Doctrine.[11]

Presumably this was the very reason that China insisted for years that negotiations on a border settlement must start on the basis of the status quo (the "line of actual control"); China would be left in possession of recently acquired territory while negotiations proceeded, no third party would be involved, and by surreptitious incursions the line of control could be altered almost at will.

IV. Indian Policy during the Boundary Dispute

Considering her vulnerability along the Sino-Indian border, possibly the most reasonable thing India could have done was to negotiate on the basis of the "line of actual control". Bearing its weak military position along the frontier in mind, India could have entered upon negotiations and at the same time gradually reinforced its military positions behind the roving border patrols. This would have given India a stronger bargaining position and, if the troops were held back from the border, it would not have aroused China. However, it is not unlikely that Prime Minister Nehru believed that an Indian initiative near the border would provoke the Chinese and upset the implementation of India's domestic policies. Thus, it was better to protract the conflict through endless diplomatic correspondence and an unswerving posture as to what constituted India's borders. Because the Indian Government pursued this policy, China strengthened the border of Tibet so that when India finally realized that Tibet was an armed camp and began to reinforce the frontier, it was too late; the additional troops merely spurred China into action.

The other course open to India was to settle the boundary question by accepting the *de facto* boundary in Aksai Chin (an area vital to China) and receive recognition of the McMahon Line (a strategic defense point to India) in return. This proposal had been implied in a letter from Chou En-lai to Prime Minister Nehru in 1959 and then more clearly stated at the Delhi Summit in 1960. Although the letter proceeded to the point in a round-about manner, the Delhi Summit made it obvious that China would exchange claims in the Eastern Sector for a free title to the Aksai Chin Region of Ladakh.[12] Though the loss of the barren Aksai Chin would pose no disadvantage to India and a non-disputed border along the McMahon Line would serve to protect the non-defensible sub-morraine region formed by the Plain of Assam, India could not accept this proposal. To maintain the country's ter-

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[11] Chakravarti, *op. cit.*, p. 159; by limiting any conflict to a point where it is confined to China and another Asian country or countries, China is pursuing a limited Monroe Doctrine, as they are settling issues on their own initiative.

[12] "Letter from the Prime Minister of China to the Prime Minister of India, 23 January 1959," *White Paper I*, pp. 52-54.

ritorial integrity, the sum total of the lands ruled during British Raj, which passed into the Congress Party's hands, had to remain inviolate. To lose control of any section through barter or negotiations, that is, in any manner aside from a military seizure, would mean that to the eyes of the populace and the world-at-large India was not a fit successor to the British Raj. The Indians therefore committed themselves to a course of action that eventually led to a clash with a major power, a conflict that not only wasted national resources but in the end allowed China to gain the coveted Aksai Chin.

V. Chinese Intentions

Even though China had definite claims to several areas occupied by India, it seems unlikely to assume that Peking was provoked over Indian refusals to extend credence to the evidence offered by Peking in support of its territorial demands. For eight years China and India played a diplomatic game of charge and counter-charge, expanded and redefined the terms and language of the conflict, and participated in completely partisan negotiations. A longe term discourse of this nature, where the rules of the game are observed, does not give rise to military conflict; usually it represents a jockeying for a favorable position in order to obtain some benefit from tenuous claims. It also seems unwarranted to assume that China occupied Indian territory in order to spread Communism or to create a situation which both humiliated and drained the resources of India. The forcible acquisition of territory is neither the best way in which to spread an ideal and/or a political system nor is it in harmony with Peking's political-military strategy.

In itself, the desire to humiliate and at the same time pauperize India by exposing its weakness in comparison to China and forcing an increase in defense spending seems unreasonable. This does not preclude saying that China did not welcome any and all benefits that accrued as a result of the venture. However, these several side effects, all of which Peking obviously desired, were not in themselves valuable enough to warrant risking an open break with India (and possibly Russia), endangering its posture as a "peace loving" nation, or causing a general war. Nevertheless, after the border warfare in 1962, India did lose the capacity to mediate between China and the West or, for that matter, to mediate between Peking and any nation. As a result, India lost most of its power to act as head of various International Control Commissions—particularly those in Cambodia and Laos. There can also be no doubt that since October 1962, India has given priority to defense needs along the Tibetan and Pakistani borders, and because of the cost in manpower, equipment, and the drain on the economy, it is now unable to halt or obstruct any additional Chinese encroachments in Southeast Asia that directly affect India.

It also seems unlikely to assume that China wished to provoke an armed clash with India and/or any other country on the Tibetan border if it could

possibly be avoided. For several years Peking pursued a course of action aimed at a pacific settlement of the border, providing that New Delhi met some minimum demands. Chou En-lai's letter to Prime Minister Nehru and the Delhi Summit talks tacitly stated these minimum demands which, in essence, meant Chinese control of Aksai Chin in return for giving India clear title to the NEFA.[13] This barter had a clear precedent in the Sino-Burmese Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-aggression, a situation in which China had been able to adjust a controversial border by effecting an exchange of disputed territory.[14] However, any exchange made on the basis of transfering the NEFA claims in return for a free title to Aksai Chin did not guarantee that a stable, contiguous border would not be used by Peking as a staging area, a shield for guerrilla actions, or a base for propaganda activities. These facts notwithstanding, Peking did offer a barter with India that expanded upon an already dangerous precedent, that is, they offered to alienate a section of territory regarded by them (leaders and populace) as irrevocably an integral part of China. The most plausible reason for this concession was that it centered around the inadvisability of entering a military conflict with the then acknowledged leader of the non-aligned bloc, particularly when it had a population of 450 million, a modern army, and was in a better position to threaten Tibet than China was to invade India.

Strategic Considerations

There can be no doubt that China considered the disputed border regions, the Aksai Chin in particular, not only as an indisputable part of the *irredenta* but also as essential to the protection to the eastern provinces and, in turn, a necessary factor for continued national growth. Traditional expansionism and the concept of "Middle Kingdom" demands that modern leaders regain the lost territories, as their continued alienation amounted to nothing less than "National humiliation."[15] This "National humiliation," in itself a rather nebulous term, is reinforced by a completely pragmatic view of strategic needs, the power that can be wielded by exploiting common cultural bonds, and a typical Marxian tenet — that they (Marxists) have discovered, understood, and applied the laws of history.

Historically, Kashmir has been a seat of power in Central Asia. During, and since, the period of the Kushan Empire, this general area has been the crossroads of Asia.[16] In this region the Aksai Chin is of particular value to China because it provides easy access to Tibet and Sinkiang by way of the Sinkiang-Tibet Highway; affords a staging area in any possible future conflict

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] China, *A Victory for the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence,* (Peking: Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, 1960).

[15] Chiang Kai-shek, *China's Destiny* (New York: Roy Publishers, 1947), p. 34.

[16] This is not in reference to Ladakh in particular but rather to the area directly north that includes Kashgar and Khotan.

with India; and by virtue of its location, it could become not only a vital area for screening activities in Tibet but for extending influence outward into Iran and Russia's Central Asian Republics.

Geopolitically, Tibet, Sinkiang, and Ladakh all form a portion of Sir Halford MacKinder's Heartland or Pivot Area, the possession of which could give the sovereign power access to Africa and Eurasia. This Asian Pivot has become even more valuable to the possessor, as MacKinder's dictum—"Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; Who rules the World Island commands the World."—might well appeal to any country anxious to become a major world power.[17] There are now two major powers which are logically bound to compete for control of this area—Russia and China. Russia holds control in the west and north but is blocked to the south by Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, a highly nationalistic United Arab Republic, and Western supported Turkey and Israel. China, on the other hand, has gradually secured control of the Asian portion the Pivot Area at the expense of Russia. Viewed in this light, it is not unlikely that China considered the Aksai Chin Region of Ladakh—after securing it through surreptitious incursions between 1954-1962—irreplaceable.[18]

Even though the Aksai Chin region is essential for the protection of China's Tibet and the implementation of further expansionist policies in Inner Asia, it does not appear probable that China had any intention of promoting more than a limited conflict in reaction to Indian troop concentrations in Ladakh and the NEFA. This conflict was intended to be a quick, decisive action to secure an already occupied, strategic area. The Chinese had troop concentrations in Tibet that were well equipped and acclimated to the high altitudes in the contested areas; these facts would most likely have assured victory in battles waged on a much larger scale. If a full-scale invasion had been planned, the starting date would not have been in the cold pre-winter months of September-October, nor would the Chinese have complicated their logistics problems (transportation difficulties at high altitudes and the scarcity of food and war materials in Tibet) by precipitating simultaneous actions on two fronts. In view of the terrain along the Sino-Indian border, had Peking planned a massive invasion it would have been much more logical for the Chinese to have grouped forces along the McMahon Line in order to penetrate quickly and deeply into the NEFA and then, after co-ordinating and re-forming, to overrun the Plain of Assam. Meanwhile, a holding action could have been waged in Ladakh until India was compelled to withdraw troops in order to reinforce the less-defensible, and more critical, sub-morraine

[17] Sir Halford MacKinder, "Geographical Pivot of History," a lecture delivered to the Royal Geographical Society, London, in 1904, (Royal Geographical Society: London), quoted in Helmut G. Challis, *China: Confucian and Communist* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1959), p. 474.

[18] Werner Levi, "The Sino-Indian Border War," *Current History,* XLV (September, 1963), pp. 136-143.

regions in the Eastern Sector. Viewed in this perspective, the facts of the conflict all point to the conclusion that the Chinese offensive was never intended to be more than limited in scope and time—serving to secure an area that was ultimately to provide a basic step toward the implementation of evolving, wide-range goals.[19]

A Speculative Model for Further Study

At this point it might be noted that an analysis of Peking's hot-cold attitude between the years 1954-1962 might well provide further insights into the cause of the Sino-Indian border conflict. As a hypothesis, it could be assumed that China was attempting to expand upon its domestic practice of establishing Pavlovian responses (stimulus substitution) by varying the amount and application of stimuli used in the conduct of negotiations in order to establish a *limited* neurotic pattern to Indian responses. The application of psychological techniques has been the hallmark of the Communist countries, Russia in particular, for the past eighteen years. However, in the sphere of international politics, it has been applied over such a wide area that all but the immediate effects were dissipated.[20] Thus, it could be assumed that Peking, in refining the technique, limited the area and increased the amount of stimuli. For example, China entered into the *Panch Sheel* agreement in 1954, immediately broke its provisions, and then began peaceful negotiations that were intermittently broken by armed conflicts. The next step screened Tibet and kept the Indian government on edge by leaving them in doubt as to what the movements along the border meant, whom they were directed toward, and exactly how large they were. Finally, the quick assault and the unilateral cease-fire left New Delhi in a quandary as to just what China was attempting to accomplish.

In total, the entire eight years of the boundary question could have been structured not only to secure the strategic Aksai Chin but as an *en vitro* experiment in applying psychological pressure. The above is all, of necessity, within the realm of speculation. However, there can be no doubt that China followed a hard-soft line, took the decision as to war or peace as well as the areas and length of the conflict out of Indian hands, and determined the "reality" of the conflict. As a result, India relaxes during the winter but tensely awaits renewed attacks in the spring—large scale attacks that never materialize.

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[19] For a further discussion of mainland China's use of time and weapons control refer to: W.F.K. Thompson, "When Two Empires Meet," *Survival,* V (March-April 1963), p. 79-80.

[20] Ferreus (Stefan T. Possony), "Communist Psychological Warfare," *Orbis,* I (Spring, 1957), pp. 97-121, reprinted in, Robert Strausz-Hupe *et al*, *Protracted Conflict,* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 201-229.

VI. Structured Conflict

In line with traditional Chinese expansionism, Communist China began a program in 1949 that was designed to regain the areas lost during what it terms the "Old Democratic-Revolutionary Era." The establishment of a strong central government and a resultant growth in economic power gave Peking the strength with which to implement this goal. During this formative period, any possible expansion to the north was blocked by Russia and partially halted in the south by the United States; factors that left Tibet as the least dangerous area into which expansion was feasible. In addition, Tibet was an area to which Peking had definite legal claims under the provisions of the Simla Agreement. After re-establishing suzerainty over Tibet in 1950, a concerted effort was made to assure absolute control over Lhasa. Subsequently, the 1954 Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between China and India, because it recognized the area as the Tibet Region of China, served to establish the area as an irrevocable section of Mainland China.

To maintain their control over Tibet, the Chinese initiated a program in 1954 to seal the border, render it defensible, and protect the communications network connecting Sinkiang with Tibet. To assure that these measures were effective, the boundaries of Tibet were extended to include the areas over which Lhasa had claims by virtue of administration, custom, or usage; these outer limits were then considered as being the strategic boundaries of China. This held particularly true for the Aksai Chin region, as it formed not only a portion of the Asian Pivot Area but also contained the vital Aksai Chin Road—both necessary ingredients for further expansion to the west and north.

It can be assumed that the above area was irreplaceable to China since it was the one portion of the *irredenta* that had truly coalesced. By 1962 Peking was beginning to feel external pressures not only from the Sino-Soviet dialogue but also from the direction of New Delhi. Statements by Prime Minister Nehru to the effect that it had become necessary to "free" India (Ladakh and the NEFA) of Chinese troops, and Krishna Menon's that "they (India) would fight to the last man and last gun" virtually precluded any further attempts at peaceful negotiation.[21] Also, military posts were matched at nearly a one-to-one ratio along the actual line of control in Ladakh; a fact most likely considered by China to be a menace to its continued national growth. Because of Peking's ideological debate with Russia and the extent of United States interests in India, it became imperative to move quickly and directly but at the same time to keep the area and scope of the conflict limited. In this way India was not likely to appeal for help from either of the two super powers, and China could pursue a policy of quick gain through

[21] "Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, 20 October 1962," *White Paper VII*, p. 123.

limited warfare. Subsequently, attacks were mounted at the height of the Cuban missile crisis not only in the Aksai Chin but deep into the NEFA and Barahoti/Wu-Je. Then, after the unilateral cease-fire was implemented by the Chinese, they altered the terms of the cease-fire and the Colombo Proposals in such a manner that India would be held responsible for any resumption of hostilities. The Chinese troops then quietly withdrew from the NEFA and consolidated their control in Ladakh. As the total result of the conflict, China secured the vital Aksai Chin in exchange for the NEFA—a trade that was the duplicate of Chou En-lai's proposal.

Seen in the above context, it is possible to assume that the Sino-Indian border war was waged to secure immediate objectives—the security of Tibet and unchallenged control of the Aksai Chin region. The Indian troop movements during 1962 menaced these areas, and Peking reacted by staging an open clash that allowed it to set the time, area, and scope of the hostilities. The conflict itself must, however, be viewed as an intermediate step taken by China in its progress toward securing long range goals—gradual expansion toward the West and Southeast, a militant countering of the universalism of the United States and Russia, and the exclusion of all but the Maoist version of communist thought from the emerging and underdeveloped nations. Thus, the border conflict of 1962 can be considered as a temporary, albeit explosive, episode in what seems certain to be a protracted struggle for dominance of Asia.

THE CONVERSION OF THE ALANI BY THE FRANCISCAN MISSIONARIES IN CHINA IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

FRANK W. IKLE

THESE NOTES DEAL WITH ONE PHASE OF THE MISSIONARY activities of the Franciscans in China during the Mongol period, namely, the conversion of the people of the Alani to the Roman church.[1] This particular event was selected in order to raise some questions regarding the general problem of conversion and of the motivations involved in the acceptance of a higher religion.

When describing the conversion of Northern Europe to Christianity after the fall of Rome, most historians tend to agree that Christianity conquered not only because it came as a higher religion, but also because it represented a superior civilization and a superior political power. Christianity in crossing the Alps as a higher religion seemed to offer to the barbarian greater supernatural help, since it was dogmatically formulated, efficiently organized, and spread by the burning missionary zeal of the early Christian Church. Representing the surviving culture of the civilized world, it was offered with authority as a finished system to simple people. Finally, and perhaps most decisively, Christianity came as the representative of Rome, with all the prestige and power of the empire. Christianity north of the Alps appealed first of all to kings, the strong and the free. It seems conversion meant primarily a political decision to the barbarian kings, as in the case of Clovis.

The idea that conversion is primarily due to the impact of a superior[2] civilization and political power is also well supported outside the Roman church. The case of Vladimir and Kievan Russia represents an excellent example. Measured against the importance of Byzantium as a political and cultural power and terminal of the great Dnieper River trade route, Islam, Rome, and Judaism were all rejected in favor of Greek Orthodoxy. This decision involved objective and careful weighing of the alternatives. The Chronicle of Nestor tells of the impression St. Sophia made that "we did not know whether we were on heaven or on earth—such was the splendor."

[1] Franciscan activities in China are treated at length by K.S.Latourette in his *History of Christian Missions in China,* as well as by A.C. Moule in *Christians in China Before the Year 1550.*

[2] Superior here is used not as value judgment, but as index of material culture.

This splendor obviously meant more to Vladimir than merely Greek liturgy and ritual.

Another instance is that of the Khazars. This trading state on the lower Volga comprised a mixture of Turks and Hunno-Bulgar tribes and controlled the flow of commerce between the Volga, the Caspian, the Caucasus, and the Near and Middle East. It was exposed to the influence of Islam from the South and that of Christianity from the West. The Khazar Kagan, after lengthy consideration, decided to embrace Judaism, since it appeared as a neutral faith, carrying with it no political threat, as did the other two rival faiths. Here is a case of conversion along political lines, selecting the politically least dangerous of creeds, while yet gaining cultural advantages.

In a study of the work of the Franciscan missionaries in China during the Yuan period, it is clear that the gains of the Roman church were almost exclusively confined to non-Chinese (foreigners such as a few Mongols, Onguts, and above all, those people known as the Alani). To the Chinese, as is well known, Christianity made no appeal, since it furnished neither a more highly developed system of religion (able to replace the Chinese trinity of Confucianism, Buddhism and the Way), nor did it represent a superior civilization. Political power, of course, was totally lacking.

The real success of the Friars remained limited to the mass conversion of the Alani, who, numbering about twenty to thirty thousand, were brought into the Nicaean fold largely through the efforts of John of Montecorvino. What was its appeal, and for what reasons was Christianity accepted by them? What stage of cultural, religious, and social development had been reached, so that the Franciscan effort found ready response?

The Alani, an Indo-European tribe, entered the steppes between the Urals and the Caspian from Central Asia, in the wake of the Sarmatian invasions of the 3rd century B.C.[3] There is some belief that they were related to the Yueh-chi, or at least had some connections with them. At first they seem to have occupied the area east of the Sea of Azov, and the Kuban basin; later they are to be found in the foothills of the Northern Caucasus, as mentioned by both Pliny and Seneca.

Some tribes of the Alani joined the Suevii and the Vandals during the time of the great barbarian invasions, and passed with the Vandals through Gaul and Spain into North Africa (419 A.D.). For those Alani who remained in the Caucasus, contacts with the Eastern Empire became increasingly frequent and close. Leo the Isaurian in particular supported them by subsidies, in line with the traditional Byzantine diplomacy. The political and cultural attraction of Constantinople resulted, one is tempted to say almost

[3] For a description of the early history of the Alani see: *Dictionnaire d'Histoire et de Geographie Ecclesiastique* (Paris 1912), Vol I, pp. 1334-1338, and also R. Blechsteiner, "Das Volk der Alanen," *Berichte des Forschungsinstituts für Osten und Orient* (Vienna 1918), Vol. II, pp. 4-16.

inevitably, in the coming of Christianity. They were converted to Greek Orthodoxy under the Patriarchate of Nicholas Mysticos (first quarter 10th century). This conversion proved to be short lived, the Alani renouncing Christianity by 940, if Masudi the Arab historian is to be believed.[4] The final conversion to the Greek church took place only as late as the very early part of the 13th century. Christianity then could not have had time to penetrate very deeply before the Alani were forcibly expelled from the Caucasus and transplanted across Asia by the Mongols, thereby losing all connection with the Byzantine state and patriarchate. Between this second conversion and the coming of the Mongols not more than 30 years could have elapsed. The first contacts of the Alani with the Mongols occurred in 1223 when the Mongol expedition of Subotai and Chebe fought its way across the Caucasus to invade the Kipchak territory in Southern Russia, to punish that tribe for its alliance with the Sultan of Khvarezm who had been utterly defeated by the Mongols in 1220. A battle was fought between the Mongols, the Alani and other Caucasian tribes, and the Mongols forced their way through the mountain passes. But the Alani were not decisively conquered until the time of Subotai's great expedition into the South Russian steppes and Eastern Europe, 1235 to 1252. It seems that the Alani submitted to the overlordship of the Mongols by 1236.[5] The chiefs surrendered to Mangu, and were given titles by the Mongols and ordered to serve with their people as auxiliary troops.[6] About 30,000 mounted horsemen called Asu or A-lan-a-ssu under a chief called Nieh-ku-la (very likely Nicholas) were sent into Central Asia. At first they were stationed at Karakorum, but later they saw service in the role of bodyguards as well as in that of auxiliary troops under Kublai Khan in his conquest of the state of Nanchao in 1253. And subsequently they were employed in the war against Sung China. We possess a number of biographies of Alani chieftains in the *Yüan shih;* they seemed to have enjoyed privileged positions at the Mongol court, presumably because they had yielded peacefully, and probably also because many Alani were excellent craftsmen, skilled in armor-making, a long established tradition of the Caucasian mountaineers.[7]

Alani princes commanded exclusively Alani troops, which were organized in units of 1,000. The *Yüan shih* contains a number of references regarding appointments to the rank of chiliarchs by Alani chieftains. Marco Polo also referred to the services rendered by them to Kublai Khan. Alani bodyguards are first mentioned in 1237 at Karakorum, and they seemed to be rapidly increasing in numbers thereafter, continuing to exist as late as 1330.

[4] Masudi as quoted in C. Rambaud, *Constantin Porphyrogenete*, p. 525.
[5] E. Bretschneider, *Medieval Researches*, p. 294.
[6] R. Grousset, *Histoire de l'Extreme-Orient*, p. 466.
[7] L. Olschki, *Guillaume Boucher*, p. 8.

While serving the Mongol Khans, the Alani rapidly lost touch with the Greek clergy. Rubruquis, that intrepid traveler, knew the Alani as Aas, or Akas, and noticed that they were Greek Orthodox Christians using Greek books and Greek priests.[8] He stated, however, that at the time of his visit to Karakorum in 1256, the Alani were "Christians of Eastern rites who had not seen the sacrament since their capture." This seems a bit surprising at first, given the well known fact of the Mongol policy of religious toleration. Although the Mongols supported all religions for political reasons, support was not given in the same degree. The Mongols drew the line at importing priests, or being interested in maintaining religious connections for one of the conquered people, if that people proved to be not more than a small and unimportant minority in the Empire. Assuredly, in the case of the Alani, there did not exist the same political necessity as in case of the Chinese or Persians. On the other hand, the Mongols did show some interest in the Christian West. Although they had requested and facilitated the travel of Franciscans to China, they had done so because they hoped to learn something from them about the European world, and not because they desired to become converts. Christianity could not furnish to them the cultural and political strength which Islam gave to the Ilkhanate, or Buddhism to the Yuan rulers.

But, and this is the most interesting point in the history of the Franciscans in the Far East, their coming did result in the reconversion of the Alani. Friar John of Montecorvino achieved his greatest success in about 1318, when, as the Franciscan source has it: "certain good Christians who are called Alani, receiving pay from the most great king for 20,000 persons, themselves and their families have joined Brother John. And he supports them and preaches."[9] Montecorvino was born in Southern Italy in 1246, and entered the Order of the Minor Friars in 1272. He was active at the court of the Eastern emperor, Michael Paleologus, and was a missionary in Asia Minor and Armenia until 1289 when he returned to Rome with a letter from Argun, the Mongol ruler of the Persian Ilkhanate, to request the pope to send some Catholic missionaries to Kublai Khan. The pope, Nicholas IV, entrusted Montecorvino with this mission and he left Rome in 1289 with letters to Kublai Khan and to Argun, accompanied by one Dominican who died enroute, and an Italian merchant, Peter of Lucalongo. Travelling by sea from Persia to India where he stayed well over a year, he reached China in 1294, shortly after the death of Kublai Khan. He won the favor of the new Emperor Timur, after overcoming considerable Nestorian opposition, and in 1300 Montecorvino built a church in Khanbaliq (the city of the Khan), Kublai's new capital city in China on the site of present day Peking.[10]

[8] W. W. Rockhill, *William of Rubruquis*, p. 213.

[9] Letter of Peregrine of Castille, Franciscan Friar, 30 December 1318, given in A.C. Moule, *New China Review* (December 1920), pp. 538-44.

[10] L. Olschki, *Marco Polo's Precursors*, p. 74.

A letter from Montecorvino dated 8 January 1305, states:

> I have built a church in the City of Khanbaliq, where the king has his chief residence. And this I completed six years ago; and I also made a belltower there, and put three bells in it. (unam ecclesiam edificauj in ciuitate Cambaliech ubj est ꝑre cipua residemtia regis quam ante sex annos conpleuj. ubj etiam feci campanile et ibj tres campanas posuj.)[11]

Until 1306 Montecorvino had the help of only one other Friar, Arnold of Cologne, but the report of his successes, conveyed to Rome by Friar Thomas of Tolentino, created great interest, and Pope Clement V decided to support actively the misionary work at the far corner of the world. Montecorvino was able to be consecrated archbishop (summus archiescopus) with a diocese embracing the bishoprics of Zaiton, Almaliq, Saraia, Tana, Kaffa in the Crimea and Kumuk.[12] He was installed in that position in 1307, and it was this Catholic archbishop who succeeded in the conversion of the Alani to the Roman faith.

The personality of Montecorvino himself must have made a deep and lasting impression upon the Alani chiefs. His knowledge of the "Linguam Tartaricham" (undoubtedly Mongolian rather than Chinese) must have aided his success, but it is also interesting to speculate upon the events which preceded the actual conversion. Did some of the Alani leaders come to see Montecorvino, or did he go out and convert them solely by his own effort? What sort of an appeal was made by him, and what selected from the Christian heritage as being particularly responsive to the needs of this specific group? What was the way in which this selection of elements was presented to them? Even though the Alani may have been ready and eager to accept the Christian doctrine, this conversion is a great tribute to the character and personality of Montecorvino, placing him in the first ranks of great missionaries. His work may well be compared to that of Raymond Lull, the other outstanding missionary of the Avignon papacy who worked among the Saracens.

The letter of the chiefs of the Alani to the pope in 1336 and the letter of the Yuan emperor Togham Timur (1333-1368) to the pope in which he requested him to accept his recommendation of the Alani as the pope's "Christian Sons" give evidence of the esteem in which Montecorvino was held by them, and are witness to the fact that his success was partially due to the nobility of his character:

> Let this moreover be known to your Holiness, that for a long time we were instructed in the Catholic faith, and wholesomely governed and very much conforted [*sic*] by your Legate Brother John, a valiant, holy and capable man,

[11] *MSS Latin 5006*, Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris; as printed in A.C. Moule, *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society* (1914), pp. 533-599.

[12] F.E.A. Krause, *Geschichte Ostasiens* p. 353

> who nevertheless died eight years ago. In which years we have been without a governor and without spiritual consolation. . . Wherefore we beseech your Holiness to send us a good, capable and wise legate who may care for our souls; and that he come quickly, because we fare ill without a head, without instruction, and without consolation.[13]

It appears then that about 20,000 Alani, deprived of contact with the Greek church, turned eagerly to the church of Rome when its representative in China offered them an opportunity to continue in the Christian faith. It is true that this Franciscan success did not last for any length of time. The Alani were soon again deprived of Christian contacts, and were expelled together with the Mongols from China with the fall of the Yuan in 1368. It is probable that the Asiatic Alani were assimilated with the Mongols; a Mongol tribe of the name of Assod, or Asod, which appears for the first time in 1399, may well have constituted the Alani remnant.

The conversion of this people by the Franciscan in 1318 remains as a most interesting problem within the general question of conversion. Here is a people who exchange the Greek church for that of Rome, being at the utmost distance from both, and living in an entirely different cultural and political sphere. The Franciscans did not represent superior political power, nor did they appear in China as bearer of a superior civilization. Why then did this conversion take place?

I think it is possible to suggest at least one reason for the reconversion of the Alani to Roman Catholicism. The Alani had been exposed to the Greek church at one particular stage in their cultural history, and had experienced the civilizing and political advantages which Christianity gave to a people with whom it came into contact. This exposure probably did not have time to penetrate deeply, yet the impression must have been considerable enough to create a feeling of the need for renewed Christian values when the occasion presented itself. For when the Alani were deprived of the spiritual leadership emanating from Byzantium, and were transplanted into China, they sought for and found another Christian creed of a high order among the Franciscans. The short span of time during which the Alani had been subject to Greek Orthodoxy was just long enough to create a new demand for the Christian creed, but not so long as to create a barrier against Catholicism. Significantly enough, the Alani had bypassed the Nestorian Christians who flourished in Karakorum. Nestorianism represented considerable political influence among the Mongols and Onguts, but had itself been corrupted in Central Asia, leaning heavily towards Shamanism.

The salient feature of the reconversion of the Alani by John of Montecorvino was that religion was again accepted to satisfy strictly spiritual

[13] A. C. Moule, "The Minor Friars in China," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (January 1917), pp. 1-36.

needs; superior culture and political power played little if any role. The Franciscans were successful precisely because the Alani had arrived at a particular stage in their cultural development and found themselves in the very special position of having been transported across Asia and deprived of contact with Byzantium. Christianity, which, if one accepts the general thesis of conversion, had originally been accepted by them for reasons of culture and political considerations, had achieved sufficient penetration among the Alani to create a genuine thirst for its spiritual values.

Certainly the history of the Alani in the years between 1210-1320 is most interesting. They were exposed to a great number of political, social, religious, and cultural influences, ranging from a close relationship with Byzantium through the Mongol conquest to residence in China and the influence of Franciscan missionaries. In conclusion, I think that the study of the work of the Franciscans seems of particular value since it affords insight into the processes by which a religion is accepted. The case of the Alani seems to suggest that Religion is at first accepted in accordance with the previous formula because it brings with it superior civilization and represents political power; however, after a certain period of time these two conditions are considerably less influential, and religion seems to create a genuine appeal along spiritual lines. It seems to me that a study of this kind of a transitional process can be of particular satisfaction to the historian.

THE FAILURE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL DEMOCRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

by K. G. TREGONNING

IN EXAMINING THE REASON FOR THE UNDOUBTED FAILURE of development and democracy in the countries of Southeast Asia it is necessary to notice the changes (the social changes above all) that have occurred in this region in the last hundred years. A hundred years ago the societies of Southeast Asia had an attitude of mind which had been typical of Europe at an earlier period, an attitude of acceptance. Southeast Asia in the 19th century was very much a traditional society. There were, and there had been for centuries, outside contacts and clashes, but these were never sufficient to shake, let alone break, the traditional way of life. The mysteries and miseries of that life were accepted apathetically by people with eyes and minds traditionally blinkered into believing that what had been must be, and that life and society could not be altered.

A traditional society can be very strong, it can hold together through millenia provided that there is no major attack upon it; and it is possible to trace back many features of this traditional way of life for hundreds of years.

Of course in Southeast Asia these traditional patterns varied from country to country. The structure of a traditional Malay State for example differed considerably from that say, of Ava, while there was the world of difference between the government of a Borneo tribe and the sophisticated administration of Vietnam. But despite these differences, each and every one of them was a traditional society, accepting what had gone before, unchanging in nearly everything.

The capital city was often the only city, a royal town situated deep in the centre of its agricultural lands. Rice growing was the main crop, and the padi fields marched right up to the city's edge. Padi growing placed a very great social value on conformity. All the procedures for its successful cultivation had been evolved centuries earlier. The best way to secure a good crop was to do exactly as had been done before. The innovator, the experimenter, was socially objectionable. The emphasis was perpetually on conformity, producing an obedient society.

This society was a hierarchical one, with peasants and courtiers. There were few middle class people, for there was little trade; the coastline was deserted and each State was virtually entire unto itself, existing on a subsistence economy. The peasants grew the padi and the courtiers flocked

around the royal ruler. The capital town then was not a place of industry, nor a port, but was an inland centre, an integral part of the agricultural environment. Early descriptions of Ayuthia, Ava, Angkor and other early capitals, even Hue on the coast, all give clearly this picture of a royal city in a static unchanging countryside, where a court protected a traditional faith and carried out traditional administrative functions above an obedient peasantry.

However, there were exceptions to this. Malacca was a bustling sea port before the 19th century; and in its inter-continental contacts and tolerant multi-racialism it represented the modern ocean port far more than a traditional royal centre. Another exception is provided in the early history of Java, where a number of States emerged. There were inland kingdoms based on wet rice production, were hierarchical and possessed a capital where ruler and religion (but never commerce) were situated. These inland kingdoms were static, traditional societies as with other states elsewhere in Southeast Asia. In contrast however there were a number of coastal commercial States based on maritime power. Sri Vijaya, although in Sumatra, is typical of these. Also the harbours of north Java produced a number of small sea-port States. As J. D. Legge says in his book *Indonesia,* "the maritime principalities were cosmopolitan in character and of necessity demonstrated a degree of social equality and tolerance that contrasted sharply with the hierarchy of the land-based kingdoms."[1] He adds that there was "fluctuating tension between the two types."

These small ports were exceptions to the general rule. They lacked the strength that inter-continental trade in great quantity brings, and did not survive. They were merely small ports around an Asian Mediterranean, and it was not until the 19th century that some of static agricultural States of Southeast Asia received a sustained blow, delivered in the first instance by Europeans operating in particular through ocean ports.

Throughout the 19th century the European trader developed the foothold he had secured earlier on unwanted swamp or deserted island. No established society stopped him, no traditional ruler checked him. Calcutta, Rangoon, Penang, Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai and other ocean ports gradually developed more and more clearly as new phenomena. Particularly was this marked after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Suddenly the west and east were brought very much closer together. From that date Europe spread out over Southeast Asia; and a European dominance, directed through these ports, came to be exercised over nearly all of the area.

The "westernization" or, better the "modernization" of Southeast Asia that began with the Suez Canal, was brought by restless Europeans, but it

[1] James D. Legge, *Indonesia* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 29.

became an attitude that was readily accepted by an increasing number of Asians. A hundred years ago it was a marked characteristic only of the European to try always to change things. In their own societies, in Europe, they never left the situation as it was. In their attempts to make life better for themselves or for the next generation, the Europeans were constantly, appallingly, active. The social ideal of acceptance or even contentment was not for them. That ideal had vanished long before. By the 19th century the dominant ideal was development. The critical mind and the inquiring spirit was prized, while traditional beliefs and traditional authority were challenged everywhere and overthrown.

Increasingly, this new dogma of development was accepted by Asians, particularly those in the port cities. Here the static society of the interior did not exist. Indeed, a marked feature of the ocean ports has been their history of social change. The power of the traditional inland ruler was scarely felt, if at all, and none of the social pressures to conform, as faced the young padi planter, faced the young man in these new port-cities. Not merely was he free from the agricultural environment (Singapore was outstanding in this respect), but also he was in most cases an immigrant, who had escaped from both parental control and the social conventions and rigidity of the unchanging village of his homeland. Further, in most cases, the sea port was cosmopolitan, and the power of the established religious order of the interior was also necessarily dissipated.

Thus social mobility became commonplace in these cosmopolitan cities, and those that succeeded were those who sought out, in an individualistic way, the possibilities of success offered by changing circumstances. Unfettered by tradition, these Asians became not merely socially egalitarian and economically advanced, but also politically anti-colonial. The role of the port is essential in understanding the political history of modern Southeast Asia. It would be inconceivable to narrate Burmese nationalism, for example, without referring to the leading role of Rangoon, or Indonesia without Djakarta. In each country circumstances were different, because the sea port had established a different balance.

Where the sea port did not exist, as in Thailand and Cambodia,[2] the royal city-capital and the traditional power remained. Elsewhere the greater impact of outside ideas in the port and its readiness to adapt and change to meet the changing circumstances established it as the leader of its country, and confirmed it as the new capital of a developing society.

The primary response of the nationalists of 20th century Southeast Asia to the European imperialists was to demand from them the political

[2] In this respect it is interesting to speculate on the political and sociological effects of the establishment of Cambodia's first ocean port, at Sihanoukville, and the breaking of the bar at the mouth of the Menam in 1951, permitting ocean-going vessels to move up to Bangkok for the first time.

institutions these Europeans had established over them. Everywhere this has been achieved. The secondary response was a demand for a developing society. A "new modern economic order to replace the inherited one" [3] was increasingly desired. The dogma of the West was accepted by an urban minority of the East, and the conflicts that now exist in Southeast Asian States establish this as one of the major problems of nation building; for these internal conflicts exist precisely because modernizing minorities everywhere are attempting to challenge and transform these still traditional societies.

In the anti-colonial movements only an educated elite was involved, and the struggle was a mere episode in history. It is now over. A new elite has replaced the old, and in some cases it is dangerously traditional. One pyramid of power has been replaced by another. Those at the base of the pyramid are still the same. In this continuing conflict between a traditional society sanctified by custom and religion and a modern world of development, all Southeast Asia is involved, not merely an elite. It is not a mere episode, either. Nearly all will be participants for a very long time.

The idea of modernization has come to be accepted by many in Southeast Asia, and if its implementation is far slower than they hoped for, to many others the results of what that modernization is actually producing are most distasteful. It is not easy for men to concede that their ancestral values are inadequate and to abandon them for an alien system. There have been violent protests by traditionalists against the doctrines of the modernists. In some cases, as the economic development process has emanated from Europe, it has been possible to halt or delay this by enlisting a still vigorous anti-imperialist emotionalism. In other places the established and traditional authorities, of religion or state, have endeavoured to delay or thwart modernizing moves initiated by a less traditional urban leadership. Examples of this are the Church in the Philippines and the State in Cambodia. The strength of the traditionalists, despite the modernizing leadership in the port-cities, is still very strong (particularly in those countries governed by inland capitals) and factors making for a retardation of development, consequently, are numerous. These factors make for major conflicts in Southeast Asia.

The economic development of the State however is increasingly hoped for and indeed expected. Mass education is one major factor assisting in that expectation. Hardly any traditional leader can withstand the demand for education, and even if it is watered down and made as innocuous as possible, it still produces this result. Education produces dissatisfaction. Dissastisfaction or discontent is the key to change. As a result, as Maurice Zinkin has

[3] Edward Shills in *Old Societies & New States*, ed. by C. Geertz (New York, Free Press, 1963), p. 2.

said in his still useful study, "economic development has therefore become in almost all the countries of Asia the dominating question of the day."[4]

Urbanization is another factor working against the traditionalist. Many efforts are made in Malaysia and elsewhere, to keep the peasant on the land, even though in terms of agricultural efficiency there may be too many on the land already. These efforts merely delay and in no material way divert this major phenomenon. Once in the town, the break with traditional authority becomes ever more clear and the desire for development greater. It is a characteristic of traditional or conservative leadership to suspect "the urban masses," and no wonder, for coupled with the demand for economic development there also occurs a demand for social justice. This demand takes the form of political action and urban-based political parties invariably are opposed to traditional authority. Such authority can only remain in power if it accepts development as its major responsibility in nation building.

Moving outwards from the cities of Southeast Asia (and particularly the ocean ports) a psychological revolution is convincing the peasant that he does not have to be poor. It is possible to be prosperous. His country need not be one of the undeveloped areas of the world. Some people in it are wealthy, and he at least could be better off. The political move to oust the colonialists is over, and its experience seems to have little relevance to this economic issue. More and more, he is discontented; he wants hospitals, schools and a developing nation.

This new attitude, this implied readiness to accept new values, imposes a new responsibility upon the political leadership. If this demand for development is not met, then in all probability those leaders will have to go. A nation must be built, or else revolution will come. The downfall of U Nu in Burma is an example. However (and here many feel that the political leadership in many Southeast Asian countries has failed to respond to the implication) dissatisfaction with the past in itself will not produce a new State. A change of attitude is not sufficient. The people have to be willing to take the necessary steps, positive, active and in many cases unpleasant steps, to secure development. But it is encumbrant upon the leaders to show clearly what those steps are. The pattern of procedure, the willingness to work, to save, to invest, must be hammered home. The whole new pattern of values must be reiterated, and shown to be the ideal of the political elite. This is the responsibility of the Government. A leadership must be given. Unpleasant things must be said. The Government should set the tone, and maintain it, and drag the traditionally minded people away from beliefs, actions and attitudes that retard development. In public, speech after speech, this elite should drive home the often unpalatable truths, and (far more than

[4] Maurice Zinkin, *Development for Free Asia* (London, Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 3.

in the developed nations where this attitude is already accepted) it should always lead. In particular, the political leaders must put more emphasis on work, and less on leisure; less on contentment, and more on development. Otherwise it will never come, under their aegis, and a discontented people may seek other ways of securing that goal.

The role of the politician in the development of the State, in this task of nation building, is vital. He has an awareness of man's deepest instincts lacking in an economist. No economic growth, no nation building is possible unless an entrepreneurial class can be produced, men with initiative, vigour and capital. But this class is powerless, unless it can work with a political elite that has the power and the will to provide a policy framework and a general community acceptance of developmental ideals favourable for the exercise of entrepreneurial talents, whether in the public or the private sector. And in this position, it is the politician, far beter than the economist, who can infuse this people with the awareness that old prejudices, old attitude, both secular and religious, stand in the way of such nation building. It is a basic task of the political leader to have them follow him and accept the necessary implications of hard work, savings, encouragement to the entrepreneur, economically wise investment and the rest which can ensure the building of a nation.

This basic task, in my opinion, has not been accepted with sufficient verve and responsibility by many political leaders in Southeast Asia. Singapore is an almost solitary exception. The acceptance of the ideal of hard work in particular has not become a reality and Southeast Asia suffers because of this. With too much emphasis on other aspects of their position, many political leaders have failed to move their people in the way that economic growth demands. They have failed to provide leadership. The failure of economic growth in Southeast Asia, desired so fervently by the people, is a political failure.

There are many other problems affecting nation building in Southeast Asia. I feel that those concerned with the feelings attached to economic growth are the most important and, as a consequence, I have devoted the major part of this essay to them. Nevertheless, I would like to submit for examination three other problems involved in nation building, all part of the struggle towards a modern society in a situation in which the population of the area involved is neither modern nor a single society.

The complexity, the plurality, of its society is a problem Malaysia shares with Burma, Indonesia with the Philippines, Thailand with Vietnam. Only in Cambodia is there a basically homogeneous population. Elsewhere the boundaries of the new State embrace a number of races, speaking different languages, worshipping different gods, and trying to preserve their distinction from one another. One major problem is to have these peoples think more

of their State and less of their race, and at the same time to have the dominant elite in Burma, Malaysia and elsewhere accept that integration does not mean assimilation, that solidarity is different from hegemony and that diversity need not be a force of disruption but a stimulus and an asset. Communalism demands statesmanship, for latent conflict is an inevitable consequence of the structure of a plural society. Hostile prejudices are part of the cultural equipment of us all. The challenge of communalism (perhaps in Malaysia above all, where political and economic power are not both concentrated in the hands of any single community) demands that these prejudices be suppressed, the situation controlled, and that political realities be accepted.[5]

Nation building in Southeast Asia faces the associated problem of regionalism. National minority races in particular, grouped in one area, communally different, are apt to regard the central government as hardly less alien, and possibly more insensitive, than the colonial government it has replaced. The latter had endeavoured, often, merely to keep the peace and preserve the status quo. The new government, in many cases inexperienced, was a rude surprise. The Shan States of Burma, Sarawak in Malaysia, the Moslems in the Philippines, the Hill Tribes of Vietnam, all have responded with a regional animosity towards the hegemony of the new States.

Peculiar to Malaysian nation building has been the problem of Singapore. The ocean port has been thrust out and separated from its natural hinterland. The founder of the Malayan Chinese Association, Tan Cheng Lock, many years ago, said "this separation of the two States is unfortunate, and will without doubt be terminated one day in favour of a single united Malayan State."[6] This problem, however, besides reflecting the clash between the ocean port and the inland capital, is linked inextricably (as these problems often are) to the communal problem and to that of regionalism as well. Only the overriding and effective demand for economic growth will solve it.

In this basic problem of economic growth in nation building, the question of democracy in Southeast Asia has merely a peripheral interest. It has been a failure. The introduction of it to this area came very belatedly, except in the Philippines, and as a method of political representation it did not long survive the withdrawal of the imperialist powers. In those countries where it was introduced the western educated elite formed parties which were modelled, in an unadventurous way, on the Western image. But political theories and parties in the West had evolved out of a whole inter-connected history of politics and life in an environment totally different from Southeast Asia. Why should that have relevance to Asia? In Asian countries these political parties (excluding the Chinese Communist Party) endeavoured

[5] *Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya* by K.J. Ratman (OUP, 1965) provides an excellent study of this issue.

[6] Malayan Chinese Association (M.C.A.) memorandum to the Singapore Constitutional Commission, 1953, p. 1.

merely to reproduce the slogans and policies of the West, without attempting to re-think their position in terms of their own environment. Their failure to become indigenous was disguised when the major cry was independence, but once that had been achieved the political leaders soon found that their inability to adapt themselves made them impotent. They withered and died. Where are the Asian political parties of ten years ago? Where is democracy?

A parliamentary system survives in the Philippines because it has become Filipinized, with characteristics that are now indigenous. It may well continue, provided that economic growth ensues. It has survived so far in Malaysia (and one could add in India) not because it has any basic roots but because it does not yet inhibit the exercise of power by the ruling class. As soon as real opposition to this dominance emerges through the medium of democratic procedures, and a possible new government begins to be seen, the desire to abandon democracy and probably parliamentary institutions as well will certainly increase. The desire could well become irresistible. As a goal, democracy is expendable, whereas economic growth is not. No Asian country has a fundamental belief that democracy has any superior moral virtue, and I can not imagine anywhere in Southeast Asia that an alternative government, replacing the interest now in power, would be permitted by democratic processes.

Even now, the concept of a loyal opposition, where it exists at all, has a tenuous life, and political criticism is often bitterly resented as treason. More and more the one party system can be expected to be adopted, as possibly more acceptable to those holding power as an institution likely to preserve that power and to assist (if in competent hands) in solving the problems of nation building. Some aspects of democracy may function inside that institution, or it may become increasingly authoritarian. In different parts of Southeast Asia, both are possibilities; but in any assessment of democracy as a political method and development as a political goal the former has far less validity and far less indigenous life among the countries of Southeast Asia.

In Europe, the particular role played by political democracy in the modernization of that area, and the progress of equality, has been such a central theme that democracy and modernization (development, if you like) have seemed synonymous. But this particular role has been the result of starting from a particular cultural base. The European traditional heritage played a basic part in this development, in the shaping of democracy and the progress of equality.

There is no reason to expect democracy to evolve out of the modernization of Southeast Asia, for of course its process of modernization will also be shaped and conditioned by its very different traditional heritage. Egalitarian politics may well continue to crowd the sea ports in particular, and

increasingly control the urban areas; but political democracy need not develop from them. Political institutions, more logically, may well evolve shaped by the influence of the traditional past of Southeast Asia. The path taken towards modernization and development involves increasing contacts with the developed nations in particular, and this too will affect political developments; but until a political system really acceptable to the modernizers has been established, the problems of nation building and growth in Southeast Asia, and the spectre of insecurity and instability, will continue.

HUMAN PROBLEMS IN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

JAN BODO SPERLING

Introduction

THIS PAPER IS LARGELY BASED ON EXPERIENCE WITH Indian and German technicians working and living together in Rourkela, India.

In the 1950s, in the jungles of the State of Orissa, about 270 miles west of Calcutta, the small village of Rourkela was selected to become the site for one of the new large steel plants of modern India. From 1957 to 1962 in this entirely rural area of northern Orissa, amidst wooded hills and a predominantly tribal population, large numbers of Indian and German engineers and technicians were jointly engaged in the erection of the 1-million-tons steel plant of Rourkela.

This paper concerns itself with selected aspects of overall studies of the social, psychological, socio-economic, managerial, and technical problems experienced while planning, erecting, and operating Rourkela Steel Plant.[1] The paper is mainly concerned with the difficulties experienced by German technicians and their families while working and living in India. It fits into the growing number of empirical studies (particularly carried out in the U.S.) on the type, performance and experience of persons from highly industrialized countries who take up assignments overseas in connection with Technical Assistance projects. What is the experience of these people who as a rule have to live in a strange cultural environment for a limited span of time? What are the main problems deriving from their cross-cultural relation with the local population, especially with their counterparts, with their colleagues at work? How do they adapt to the strange environment and which are the main factors impeding or favouring this adaptation? What were their expectations before they came to India, before they reached their destination Rourkela, and what in particular was the pre-view of their role at work? How did these expectations compare with reality? Had the technicians undergone any special orientation and briefing anticipating problems in their assignment? These are the questions which this paper endeavors to deal with in view of finding answers and conclusions.

[1] Klaus Roeh, *Rourkela als Testfall*, Hamburg (Weltarchiv), 1967; Jan Bodo Sperling, *Die Rourkela-Deutschen*, Stuttgart, 1965; Jan Bodo Sperling, *Rourkela*, Bonn (Eichholz), 1963.

The years from 1957 to 1961 were the main years of construction of the Rourkela plant. Thereafter most of the plant's unit were complete. During this period most of the Germans in Rourkela consisted of the construction personnel and their families. After the first units had been commissioned some of the construction personnel were relieved and replaced by the operation and maintenance personnel. The latter remained for a longer period of time, and some are still there.

For the years 1958-1962 the statistics on Germans in Rourkela are as follows:

Year [2]	*Men*	*Women* [3]	*Children*
1958	615	80	54
1959	1,210	250	110
1960	640	220	176
1961	408	112	80
1962	254	148	116

The majority of personnel held 18-months contracts; some stayed for a longer span of time, some (usually specialists in a narrow technical field who were needed only for particular tasks) came out for a few months stay only. Thus there was a strong fluctuation among the Germans at Rourkela which means that since the short-term assignments by far outnumbered those exceeding 18 months, actually more individual Germans stayed in Rourkela during all those years than the above table indicates.

The bulk of the German personnel in Rourkela consisted of engineers (generally not exceeding 10%) and technicians (fitters, operators, foremen etc.). The figures show that there was a growing tendency to send personnel with their families; the average age of the men (over a period of five years) was 34, that of the women, 32. During the first years construction personnel were slightly younger (and included more bachelors), while operation personnel of the years 1961-1962 and thereafter were older and usually married.

The field study upon which this paper is based was conducted during a four-year stay at Rourkela. While living with the German personnel the author had ample opportunity to study their performance, the difficulties they experienced, and the manifold problems of their relations with the Indian partner. Many data were collected in hundreds of casual conversations, during a great number of individual and group discussions, and from planned interviews—with Germans as well as with Indians.

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[2] For all the years the figures given are mid-year figures.

[3] Most of them wives; only a small number of women and girls were employees (secretaries, teachers, medical personnel, etc.).

Recent studies on the "art of overseasmanship" [4] depict the experiences of western Technical Assistance personnel in the strange environments of foreign countries as "cross-cultural" phenomena. The western technician (or expert) embarked on the assignment of a Technical Assistance project in a developing country overseas has "crossed the culture bars" [5] and most of the difficulties he might experience are believed to be consequences of the two different cultures meeting, converging or even conflicting. Some authors consider the patterns generic to the intersections of societies to be a new development on the way to the ONE WORLD and call this complex of patterns the "third culture"—defined broadly "as the behaviour patterns created, shared, and learned by men of different societies who are in the process of relating their societies, or sections thereof, to each other." [6] To follow this system in connection with the case of Rourkela this would mean having to refer to the cultural patterns of those Indians regularly interacting with Germans as "the first culture" and to the set of patterns incorporated in the "Rourkela Germans" as "the second culture." These three different sets of culture patterns will, however, not explicitly be made use of in this paper. It seems, in the case of Germans and Indians in Rourkela, it might be more fitting to speak of the "disposition of the Germans," the "disposition of the Indians" and of the "situational factors."

Disposition of Germans

As already mentioned the German personnel in Rourkela mainly consisted of two different categories: construction personnel and operation and maintenance personnel. Part of the differences between these two categories was to be noticed in their motivations to go abroad as well as in their professional background. Fitters (the majority of construction personnel) are men used to short- and medium-term assignments to different sites even in foreign countries; operators (the majority of operation and maintenance personnel) as a rule come from stationary jobs in Germany and more often than not had no experience of working in a foreign country.

It was found that men of both categories showed personal and professional peculiarities which, although most definitely highly appreciated at home,

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[4] Harlan Cleveland and Gerard J. Mangone, *The Art of Overseasmanship*, Syracuse, 1957.

[5] John D. Montgomery, "Crossing the Culture Bars: An Approach to the Training of American Technicians for Overseas Assignments," *World Politics*, July 1961, pp. 544-560.

[6] John and Ruth Useem and John Donoghue, "Men in the Middle of the Third Culture: The Roles of American and Non-Western People in Cross-Cultural Administration," *Human Organization*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Fall 1963), pp. 169-179.
See also: John Useem, "The Community of Man: A Study in the Third Culture," *The Centennial Review*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Fall 1963), pp. 481-498.

in the environment of Rourkela turned out to be problematic. Here, for example, must be listed: 1) the tendency to consider and to treat a particular difficulty as "a problem sui generis," a problem as such; 2) to accept only perfect solutions, perfect methods and perfect results as years ago while still apprentices they had been instructed to do as an inherent part of master craftsmanship; 3) a certain blindness to the merits of indigenous traditional working methods; and 4) a tendency to over-emphasize the "teacher's role" in one's own performance in the firm belief of having the only access to the proper "know-how." All this boils down to what has been observed in many Technical Assistance projects: the personnel from the industrialized country tend to superimpose—mostly subconsciously—patterns of thought and action-plans that run counter to traditions and habits of those with whom they have been sent to cooperate. Professionalism and perfectionism turn out to be the weak points.[7] In Rourkela this particularly applied to the group of fitters. Their main task being building and assembling of parts under the pressure of tightly timed contracts, of the impatience of their Indian customers and of unforseeable organizational, climatic or other difficulties, they above all wanted to get on with the construction work and often did not even have the time to reflect upon ways and means most fruitful for their Indian counterparts or personnel. For the operators later on this was much easier; here the problem did not arise to the same extent.

Another dispositional factor of the Germans that made dealings with local population less easy was their tendency to rush things instead of tolerating a gradual development and accepting the Indian "day after to-morrow" phrase according to local practice, i.e. *any* time in the future. Apart from the time factor this certainly is a matter of temperament, tolerance and experience. The Western (particularly US-American) concept of the man-made world where everything is "makable" certainly does not always harmonize with the more contemplative way many Indians prefer to look at things. Intolerance and impatience lead to irritation on the part of the Germans, an irritation which often tends to affect a person's whole attitude towards the people whom he considers to be the cause of his irritation. This may unintentionally be amplified by certain peculiarities of Western technicians, e.g. to accompany hard work with swearing of all kinds, a custom that is practically unknown and even despised in India. In Rourkela it was found that after a while a number of "good old German swear words" were well-known to a great many Indian counterparts. It was also observed that the rather direct, sometimes even rough approach of Germans towards their (Indian) colleagues, though not meant to be offensive at all, caused dislike and resentment. Indians who never had had the opportunity to witness

[7] Charles Hendry, *The Role of Groups in World Reconstruction* (New York 1952), p 180.

the rough interpersonal communication and atmosphere which is customary in a factory or at a site in Germany often misinterpreted the attitude and manners they were facing in their German partners in Rourkela.

Similar observations apply to the German habit of ending a day of hard labour with one or more glasses of beer or whisky. Many Indians—themselves teetotaller—in Rourkela did not look too sympathetically at their German colleagues' oft-celebrated custom of spending their "Feierabend" (evening after work) sitting around a table covered with beer bottles, singing and chanting loudly and thus disturbing other people in the neighbourhood. Whatever dislikes, misunderstandings and misinterpretations arose from such dispositional factors of the Germans they all tended to be taken over-seriously and in fact were generally over-emphasized because language problems prevented them from being explained and easily overcome. The majority of the German technicians spoke little or no English. Their language capacity was usually sufficient to get along with their Indian colleagues at work, where signs, symbols and demonstration worked to mutual satisfaction. However, when it came to conversation or even to a point where different opinions, or different conceptions had to be reconciled, or when misunderstandings needed explanations communication failed entirely. This proves that in Technical Assistance the "working knowledge" of a language does not only mean that it should make successful work possible in a foreign country; it should in fact include the technical assistant's ability to communicate generally with the local population. Without this communication in the broadest sense of the word the technical assistant will find it almost impossible to adjust to local conditions and to adapt his "know-how" to new environments—both being vital preconditions for the success of his mission —for Germans in Rourkela as well as for any technical assistant in any country.[8]

While dealing with the dispositional factors a last but nevertheless very important group must be mentioned: that of stereotypes and prejudices. Unfortunately everybody has stereotypes. It starts with overgeneralizations: *the* Indians as such do not exist. An Indian from the north for example may differ from an Indian from the south as much as a Sicilian differs from a Swede. The same applies to so-called national characteristics. And still everybody is inclined to say, "The indians are. . ." (then follows a list of characteristics according to the speaker's stereotype). The technical assistant coming to the country of his assignment carries such stereotypes—and he is usually not inclined to permit personal experience to revise his stereotyped preconcept of that country and its people. The reason being that prior to his arrival the stereotypes formed his expectations and the picture he had of

[8] Yonah Alexander, *International Technical Assistance Experts, A Case Study of of the UN Experience* (New York, Washington, London, 1966), p. 173.

what he was going to see. He rested in this sort of concept and this gave him comfort and security and that makes the stereotypes extremely rigid as can be observed in practice. The stereotypes may be called "second hand stereotypes" because they are based on second hand information. The German who set out to work in Rourkela based his (stereotyped) concept of "the Indians" on other people's experiences (magazine articles, stories he heard from colleagues, television, etc.). These—whether true or not, he could not judge —he picked up and amalgamated into an unduly generalized picture which he carried with him on his assignment to India. The picture proved to be fairly incorrect and did not compare with reality. Since, however, such stereotyped pictures or concepts in spite of being far from resembling reality tend to withstand revisions on the basis of direct first hand information (for reasons mentioned above) and they become an obstacle to adjustment to the environment. This poses a problem to everybody going to a foreign country, but the more so if the respective country is what might be considered to be an "exotic" country (seen from the visitor's point of view) on which the information and knowledge is less well-founded or even non-existent.

All that has been said so far on the dispositional factors of the Germans in Rourkela and technical assistants in general must be seen in the context of the necessity of briefing, information, orientation, etc., for persons going on "cross-cultural assignments." In the case of the Germans who were sent to Rourkela nothing had been done to ease the dispositional factors some of which have been mentioned here. No special preparation had been given to them to gear these factors to the particular situation they were to face in their duty station in India. Suggestions as to how this could have been done or should be done in future cases will be dealt with in the final chapter of this paper.

Disposition of Indians

The Indian population of Rourkela and vicinity resembles something like a cross-section of the Indian people in general, particularly since the work of the steel plant had caused an immediate influx of labour from many parts of the country. Their dispositional factors only shall be dealt with here as far as they were of importance to the relationship between Indians and Germans.

Most striking, from the point of view of the Germans, was the reserved, sometimes cold or even hostile attitude with which many Indians in Rourkela approached their German partners. Most Germans had expected to be received as friends and to be welcomed accordingly; they did not understand the ambivalent attitude of a great number of Indians towards Technical Assistance in general and aid from a Western country in particular. They did

not know enough about the historic and especially the colonial background of India and its people to realize that this past had created fear towards economic and political dependency, mistrust, nationalism, envy and many other sentiments still prevailing in many Indians of the present generation. As a consequence Indians often appeared to be arrogant, claiming superiority on the grounds of their cultural heritage—and at the same time seemed to be suffering from an inferiority complex. The mixture of these extremes puzzled the Germans and made understanding difficult. Whereas the Germans—as discussed earlier—behaved in a rather rough, straight-forward manner, often stepping on other people's toes, their Indian counterparts tended to be extremely sensitive at one moment and at the next they could be "assertive, even vain and arrogant," as it has been put by the Indian professor of Sociology, Narain, in his recent analysis of the Indian character.[9] Whereas the Germans frequently overemphasized their belief in success and material progress and pointedly demonstrated how "to get things done" without much cultural empathy or patience, the Indians showed a tremendous amount of patience but very little perseverance. The above mentioned author, Narain, explains this disposition of Indians: "Torn between his own and western culture, an Indian is precariously poised, unsure of any position, unable to give his whole-hearted commitment to any thing longing for a synthesis of both." [10] It is not surprising that this obvious difference between the two dispositions caused problems for mutual understanding and cooperation.

The "Situational Factors"

A recent study on Americans in Technical Assistance [11] suggests that the "culture shock" which occurs quite often in "cross-cultural" relations is minimal and of short duration compared to the "role shock" experienced by a technical assistant from a Western society while working in a developing country. Although this is probably true the far reaching—often subconscious —consequences of initial (cultural) shock situations should not be underestimated. To find out more about both cultural shock and role shock it is not only important to evaluate the *dispositions* of the two partners concerned but also to focus strongly on the particular *situation* in which these two groups meet. Knowledge of the situational factors which determined the daily life atmosphere of Germans and Indians in Rourkela were of course manifold and numerous.

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[9] Dhirendra Narain, "Indian National Character in The Twentieth Century," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* Vol. 370 (March 1967), p. 127.

[10] *Ibid,* p. 128.

[11] Francis C. Byrnes, *Americans in Technical Assistance: A Study of Attitudes and Responses to their Role Abroad,* New York, Washington, London, 1965.

For instance all the aspects of climate and acclimatization are of importance in this connection; living conditions, housing, and servants play a significant role; special problems of bachelor life, social activities of the Germans and Indians, the question of how to spend leisure time and what to do about school children—all these issues should be looked at while scrutinizing situational factors. As this paper cannot cope with all these aspects in detail, a few issues have been selected to be presented here, issues that are of particular interest because they have been found to be a hindrance to acclimatization and adjustment of the Germans as well as an impediment to harmony and mutual understanding between Indians and Germans in their cooperation.

There is the general experience that in industrially less developed countries technical know-how is above all lacking in middle-level manpower. This also applied to the Rourkela situation. Whereas highly qualified Indian engineers with outstanding university background were available there was a shortage of engineers with long-standing experience in the practical day-to-day work of a steel plant. And there was an even greater shortage of experienced skilled technicians and foremen. Consequently most of the foreman posts had to be filed with Indian university-trained engineers working side by side with German technicians who usually had a lot of practical experience but no academic background. The immediate result was that from the educational point of view those Indians felt considerably superior to their German counterparts whereas those Germans—although lacking a university background and, as a rule, even high school education—proved to be more than a match for their Indian colleagues on the grounds of their long-standing experience in steel making. This entirely different level of education and even social standing was a causal factor of constant disharmonies and misunderstandings in many individual cases. No doubt this is not unique to the Rourkela case but poses a problem in general for a great number of Technical Assistance projects in many countries.

The entirely new and strange environment was another important situational factor for the Germans in Rourkela. Almost everything was different from what they were used to at home: climate, trees, flowers, colour of soil, animals, insects, diseases, people and their way of life, their habits, religion, customs, taboos—everything was alien, disturbing or even frightening. Maybe Germans are particularly susceptible to home-sickness and therefore the "exotic" environment of Rourkela impressed them beyond the average. Home-sickness found its expression in songs and poems written by Germans in Rourkela to praise their home country, the city or village they came from, their girl friend or family at home and—also—to point out the difficulties and the stresses they had to endure in this place far away from Germany. This situational factor "home-sickness caused by exoticism" must be considered

important because it prevented those suffering from it from being sympathetical or at least positively interested in their host country, in the place and the people of their present duty station. If, however, technical assistants do not endeavour to take interest in the new environment they find themselves in the host country, they will hardly be able to adjust fully to strange and difficult conditions; they are liable to fail in their mission.

During the very first years of the German colony of Rourkela it was felt that a certain situation of loneliness and seclusion on the part of the Germans could be overcome by allowing many fitters to take their wives with them to India. The increasing number of women in fact improved the morale within the German colony. On the other hand it was soon found out that the German wives were more susceptible to suffer from a number of negative effects the situational factors provided. The wives who, as a rule, came directly from German homes and were used to smoothly running households equipped with the most modern gadgets found it difficult to adjust to the less perfect surroundings. The fact that all of a sudden they were released from household work by local servants did not improve this situation; they had, on the contrary, too much time to themselves while their husbands were working at site and they spent the time gossipping with each other or—even worse—sitting about not knowing how to kill the time. Thus they could not help concentrating on what occupied or troubled them most: the frequent power breakdowns that made air-conditioners stop, the shortage of water, the nonavailability of the kind of food they were used to, the heat, the monsoon, the rice-flies, the scorpions, the snakes, the constant danger of catching dysentery, and many other things. Thus the wives in many cases turned out to be a liability rather than a stabilizing factor. Again it must be mentioned that this observation seems to apply to technical assistants in general.

Cleveland reports similar observations and says in this context about the US-American technical assistant's wife: ". . . in many cases she will make or break her husband's career." [12] Other authors stress similar findings and some even add that often the arrival of the technical assistants' wives stop the man from further contacts with the local population—an observation that fits also into older reports on Europeans working overseas: "Whatever may have been the reason, it appears to be true that when the European women joined their men. . . the community withdrew into itself. . ." [13] In Rourkela this withdrawal could not be noted for the simple reason that due

[12] Harlan Cleveland, "The Pretty Americans: How Wives Behave Overseas," *Harper's Magazine*, March 1959, p. 31.

[13] Leslie H. Palmer, "Indonesia and the Dutch," London, New York, Kuala Lumpur, 1962. p. 33. See also: Percival Spear, *The Nabobs,* London, 1963, p. 140; Han Suyin, *Der Wind ist mein Kleid,* Frankfurt, 1957, p. 64; Lily Abegg, "Knigge fuer Asien," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* 22, July 1961.

to lack of language knowledge and difference in social standing between the majority of the counterparts, "free mixing" was mainly restricted to a few German engineer families (who spoke English and had social relations with Indian families) whose social contacts as a rule included their wives.

The situation the Germans found themselves in at Rourkela showed that the previously mentioned difference between fitters and operators also had a distinctive functional side to it. Fitters whose main job was to assemble the parts their companies had sent over from Germany and thus erect the plant were more judged by their *performance,* whereas the operators who were sent to assist the Indian personnel to run the plant and show them how to pick up know-how and experience in steelmaking were mostly judged by their skill to get these things across to their counterparts, which is above all a matter of communication. This differentiation according to functional characteristics of the mission to be fulfilled bears upon important aspects of recruitment and training/orientation of technical assistants in general.[14] Experience in Rourkela and elsewhere proves that technical know-how, knowledge, craftsmanship, skill, and professional perfection do not suffice to make an ideal technical assistant; outstanding performance must equally include many human qualities. Probably many technical assistants are judged more by their performance as an understanding mature human being than by technical expertise. Those whose main task lies in the field of transferring know-how are above all evaluated by their knowledge and skill in communication.

Communication in the broadest meaning of the term also applies to the relations the technical assistants have with the local population outside the work sphere. Here the example of Rourkela showed that this is particularly difficult if there is a large group of foreign technical assistants, especially if circumstances favour isolation of this group. In Rourkela where the German community started off in a camp-like situation, as there was no settlement except the old village of Rourkela at the time of the first arrivals, the growing number of Germans made them cling together and thus an in-group/out-group situation was created. The more Germans arrived the more they tried to gear living conditions to a way of life with which they were familiar. "Little Germany ideas" were turned into reality and thus for many of them the "we-feelings" of the in-group and the "they-feelings" towards the Indian out-group were stronger than any possible interest they might have taken in the environment of the foreign country and its people. Although this unfortunate development may have been favourably influenced by a number of factors which could perhaps be considered typical for Rourkela/India and the Germans in this particular situation, it appears to be well known from

[14] See: John Ohly, "Planning Future Joint Programs," *Human Organization,* Vol. 21, No. 2 (Summer 1962), pp. 137-153.

other experiences too, as numerous reports and case studies seem to prove.[15] That such situational factors do not only occur in connection with assignments in what is termed a developing country is demonstrated impressively in a novel dealing with the in-group/out-group situation brought about by personnel of a U.S. air base in Europe.[16]

Briefing, Orientation and Training of Technical Assistance Experts

What can be done for technical assistants to overcome these problems and difficulties posed by dispositional and situational factors in their assignments?

Apart from a number of self-evident preconditions to be fulfilled in the process of recruitment there must be a briefing, orientation or training program for Technical Assistance experts prior to their taking up new assignments in a developing country. This requires a well-planned syllabus based on the wide range of experience and knowledge so far gathered in many projects of Technical Assistance all over the world.[17]

Such a syllabus should start with language training, which is most essential, particularly for those who are going to be in a pre-dominantly teaching or instructing capacity (technician-advisor, etc.). Efficient language teaching in Technical Assistance should be based on the latest techniques available, combining film-strips or slides with classroom teaching and taped repetitions in an experienced language laboratory. For languages posing specific pronunciation difficulties the "oreille method" [18] may be used as an extraordinary aid for conditioning the ear to unfamiliar phonetics and enabling the trainee to hear frequencies typical in that language, which the human ear would normally not register. This language training should be carefully planned against the background of future assignment and the country of assignment. Such an "area-study" or "background-study" approach is particularly important since it familiarizes with certain termini technici, local expressions, etc., and avoids unnecessary burdensome vocabulary. This implies that language training is at the same time used as an additional instrument of orientation. Following this pattern trainees without any advance knowledge of the language

[15] Karl Heinz Pfeffer and Muneer Ahmad, *Die Ausländerkolonie in Lahore-Pakistan,* Hamburg (Deutsches Orient Institut), 1966. See also: D.H. Radler, "Our National Talent for Offending People," *Harpers Magazine,* August 1961, pp. 63-70; John C. Caldwell, *Lets Visit Americans Overseas,* New York, The John Day-Co., 1958; Harlan Cleveland et al., *The Overseas Americans,* New York, Toronto, London, 1960.

[16] John Masters, *Fandango Rock,* London, 1961.

[17] See for instance: Robert J. Foster, *Examples of Cross-Cultural Problems Encountered by Americans Working Overseas: An Instructor's Handbook,* Alexandria, Virginia (George Washington University, Human Resources Research Office), 1965.

[18] The "oreille-method" is presently used by the American College, University of Tours, by SHAPE, and by the Ecole Normale Superieur de St. Cloud and others.

can be expected to master normal situations of life in the area of their future assignment after a two weeks course only.[19]

Language training in Technical Assistance is, however, not only a means of orientation and communication. It is equally important as an instrument of empathy: even a few words of a local language will open many doors for the Technical Assistance expert because the local population will consider this as a tribute to their way of life, their country and their culture.

Apart from language training the general orientation for Technical Assistance experts should incorporate:

1. Thorough briefing on (mostly administrative) matters concerning all dealings between the expert in the field and his agency at home;
2. Detailed information on the project and related objects;
3. Overall-knowledge on the people and the country of his assignment;
4. An introduction to the specific problems of cross-cultural nature (field relationship);
5. Advice on medical and hygiene matters; and
6. Methodology for reporting and preparation for "de-briefing" after the assignment, for the sake of transference of experience.

There should be no "left-handedness" about the implementation of such a training program; even more experienced trainees should clearly be made to understand that the program is of outstanding importance for *all* the trainees because the outcome in many cases may "make or break their mission."

There is no doubt that a thorough briefing, orientating, and training of Technical Assistance personnel prior to their taking up assignments in developing countries could help considerably to improve their performance and ability to communicate. And yet this is by no means an easy task. In the case of the Germans in Rourkela, the German authorities responsible for recruiting and sending the personnel at that time did not have sufficient experience with such a vast project to be able to foresee the manifold implications this would bring about. Consequently there was hardly any briefing or training involved. The majority of the Germans who came to India had little or no fundamental information about the country or the people they were going to assist in their work. A well known German journalist who once visited them in Rourkela reported on their life and work in the jungles of Orissa: ". . . there they sit and play cards, the young fitters from the 'Kohlenpott' [industrial district around the river Ruhr in West-Germany]. Their companies and the governments concerned unfortunately

[19] Hans Josef Vermeer *et al.*, *Sprache und Entwicklungshilfe,* Heidelberg (Julius Groos), 1963, p. 76.

omitted to tell them where they are. . ." [20] And another author remarks: "The German fitters failed to appreciate that things in Rourkela were not the same as in the Ruhr. . . Nobody had taken the trouble to tell them the difference in customs, deriving from century-old tradition." [21]

In other Technical Assistance projects the problem may not always be lack of experience on the part of the agency sending unprepared personnel but the extreme shortage of the needed specialists. These experts are difficult to find and expensive, too. In many instances the demand seems to exert such a pressure on the agencies concerned that there appears to be no possibility to allow these men to undergo a thorough but time-consuming period of briefing and orientation. The agencies simply hope that previous personal experience and above all the technical and human qualification the particular men are supposed to possess will ultimately make their mission a success; and it must be admitted that in many cases this has come true. The number of failures, however, does not allow us to neglect the fact that well-prepared orientation and training geared to give the trainees the necessary detailed background for their particular assignment (including information on the country and the people who are to become their hosts, their counterparts and their colleagues), will be of utmost value for their performance as well as for their personal well-being and therefore for the success of their mission on the whole.

[20] Carl Weiss, "Im Indischen Ruhrgebiet rauchen deutsche Schlote, *Deutsche Zeitung*, 14, November 1959.

[21] Joseph Maria Hunck, *India To-morrow· Pattern of Indo-German Future*, Düsseldorf, 1963, p. 97.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS OBTACLES

PETER JABCKE

IF WE DRAW UP A SCALE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES based on per-capita-income, Afghanistan is at the end of this scale.[1] Despite the considerable effort undertaken during the past ten years to strengthen its economic development the economy of Afghanistan remains unchanged. This article deals with the economic situation in Afghanistan today; the reasons which are responsible for its lag in development compared to other developing nations, and with the special obstacles this country faces. To make these factors clearer, the reader may consider a general description of Afghanistan.

The Country

Afghanistan is a landlocked country sharing common borders with the USSR, China, Pakistan and Iran.[2] Its nearest harbor accessible, about 1,000 km. away from the main industrial areas of the country, is in Karachi, Pakistan. Afghanistan is a mountainous country in which 90 per cent of the surface lies more than 600 meters above sea-level and 43 per cent lies even higher than 1,800 meters. Four major rivers cross the country. They are fed by the eternal snow from the mountains whose heights reach up to 7,000 meters. The rivers are mostly unregulated. In spring melted snows from the mountains overflow the rivers, thus flooding their deltas, while in summer they often completely dry up.

Where irrigation is possible, as in river-valleys, in the northern plains and in the middle South-West (around Kandahar) the countryside is green and fertile. In between there are arid and semi-arid zones. Cultivated land surface *is estimated* to be about 10 per cent of the total arable land and about 10 per cent pasture grounds.[3] As the geological survey of the country is not yet finished, it is difficult to estimate the extent of the mineral resources in this mountainous country. Besides iron-ore, natural gas, and hard coal,

[1] Per-capita income in Afghanistan is estimated to be about 75 US$.

[2] In regard to Afghanistan's geography see J. Humlum, *La géographie de l'Afghanistan*. Kopenhagen, 1959.

[3] E. Rhein and A.G. Ghaussy, *Die Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Afghanistans 1880-1965*, Opladen, 1966, p. 10.

gold [4], silver, chromium, zinc, lead, rubies, and lapis lazuli have been discovered. But their commercial quantity is still uncertain to guarantee worthwhile exploitation. Estimates of the population of this country of 650,000 square-kilometers vary between 8.5 and 15 million. The UN estimate is 13.8 million [5], including about 2 million nomads. Only 9.3 per cent of the population are living in places with more than 10,000 inhabitants.[6] The four biggest cities are Kabul, the capital of the country, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-i-Sharif. Depending on the ecological conditions of the country, the density of population varies from area to area. In the more fertile eastern part there are about 40 men per square-kilometer in contrast to about 15 on the average. The population is far from homogeneous either ethnologically or linguistically, and people vary to some extent in religious beliefs. Ethnologically three groups are to be differentiated: Iranians (Pushtuns and Tajiks), Turkmongols (Uzbeks, Hazaras, Turkomans), and Indians (Nuristanis, Sikhs, Hindus, etc.).[7] The Pushtuns are by far the most numerous, constituting more than 50 per cent of the total population. The second biggest group are the Tajiks. The common language is Persian, or Farsi (Dari) as it is called there. But the official language is Pushtun. The Pushtuns are numerically and politically the most influential group. Most of the people believe in the Sunnite of Islam. Only the Hazaras and great parts of the Tajiks are adherents of the Shi'a sect. [8]

To complete the picture, we may glance at the country's history. Until modern times it has been a transit-country, was invaded, and found its form as a state of Afghan only in the eighteenth century.[9] Along with foreign rulers the religions were changed, till in the seventh century A.D. the whole country was converted to Islam by the invading Arabs. None of the waves of conquest, which flooded the country during the course of the centuries, damaged it as much as that of the Mongols. In the thirteenth century it was heavily devastated by Genghis Khan and in the fourteenth century by Tamerlane. Thoroughly planned and executed irrigation systems, which had turned the arid land into a fertile garden, were completely destroyed, and the beginnings of agriculture on a higher level of culture were nipped in the bud.

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[4] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* vom 28.12.1966.

[5] *UN Statistical Yearbook 1961,* New York, 1962, p. 112.

[6] E. Rhein and A.G. Ghaussy, *op.cit.,* p. 14.

[7] Max Klimburg, *Afghanistan. Das Land im historischen Spannungsfeld Mittelasiens.* Bd. 4/Or., Orient-Okzident-Reihe der Osterreichischen UNESCO-Kommission, Wien, 1966, p. 106.

[8] *Ibid.,* p 106-107.

[9] In regard to Afghan history see Donald N. Wilber, *Afghanistan, Its People, Its Society, Its Culture,* New Haven, 1962; and W.K. Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan, A Study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia,* London, New York, Toronto, Second Edition, 1962; and Max Klimburg, *op. cit.*

After the first half of the eighteenth century something like a national state existed. The Monguls ruling at Delhi and the Persians in the west had weakened in their long fights over territorial claims in Afghanistan so that the Pushtuns, living in the east and the south, saw their chance to extend west. In 1747 the first Afghan nation was *founded* in Kandahar. Tribal affairs and quarrels over succession to the throne made it impossible even now for the country to become quiet. The only succession to the throne which took place without friction was that of Zahir Shah whose father, Nadir Shah, was assassinated in 1933.

Afghanistan has never been a colony of a foreign power. In two wars the British tried to bring it under their rule, in order to have better control of their Indian "north-west-frontier." But the fierce and war-like attitude of the Afghans, in the main the Pushtuns, prevented any lasting occupation. Only in respect to their foreign relations were the Afghans forced to accept a form of British regimentation. The consequence of this was that the country's borders were fixed in negotiations between the British and Afghanistan's neighboring countries. Only the infamous south-eastern border (the north-west-frontier of British India) was agreed upon directly between the British and the Afghans. In 1919, after a third war against the British in which the latter were militarily successful, King Amanullah gained in the negotiations that followed the full sovereignty of his country as well as in the field of foreign policy.

Today Afghanistan's foreign policy is distinguished by strict neutrality. Its relation with the eastern and the western blocs are as good as those with the countries of the so-called third world. In spite of extensive economic and technical aid from both political blocs, Afghanistan succumbed neither to the pressure of the USA nor that of the USSR to commit itself to a closer liaison with either. Only with neighboring Pakistan was there some trouble in the recent past which was made worse by its position as a landlocked country. But at least at the moment these differences can be considered as temporarily settled.

Social and Political Structure

Afghanistan is an agrarian country. This fact is of vital importance for its social, political, and economic structures. It was already mentioned that only 9.3 per cent of the population are living in places with more than 10,000 inhabitants. Of the working population 75.5 per cent draw their income from agriculture.[10] In this predominantly agrarian society life runs according to traditional patterns.

[10] *Survey of Progress, 1964-65,* Ministry of Planning, Department of Statistics & Research, August 1965, p. 13. Against this see: E. Rhein and A.G. Ghaussy, *op. cit.*, which gives the percentage as 85%.

Society in Afghanistan can be regarded as individualistic in the sense that the individualism is related to the family as the lowest unit of society.[11] In the family as well as in the next greater units the social order is determined by severe patriarchal patterns. Of course this traditional behavior influences the economic mentality. "The single person adopts the habits of life, the technic of work and the views of his parents without being allowed to criticize them."[12] Beyond any question, this is the consequence of the strict observance of the Islamic dogmas. To possess material goods is not a virtue, but rather to be wise, pious, bold and just, to grant hospitality and to have a great number of intelligent sons[13] are considered desirable.

The same picture is shown if one tries to set up a scale of professions according to their social prestige.[14] The mullahs have the highest reputation, and only after them come the big landowners or tribal leaders. The scale continues with free peasants, tenants, artisans, and small merchants. At the end of the scale are the discriminated members of society, the blacksmiths and barbers. This fixed social structure where the beginning of a vertical mobility is to be noticed only in single cases runs throughout the country. Only in Kabul, which is the real center of the country, are there already great changes to be noticed. But by no means is this fact astonishing when one keeps in mind the low standard of education. About 90 per cent of the population are still illiterates. Even in the bigger towns it is estimated that not more than about 20 per cent of the population can read and write.[15] In spite of great efforts of the government to modernize education in the country the Koran-school still prevails.

The political structure is also largely influenced by the above-mentioned social order and by the low standard of education. "For a simple man it seems [that he is] to be excluded to take over political responsibility, [and that] he is not even in a position to imagine the tasks of a politician."[16] In rural areas the political power is still held today mainly by tribal leaders who in general give their subleaders participation in decision making. But it seems that the political interest does not reach beyond the problems of the individual region.[17]

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[11] Donald N. Wilber, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

[12] E Rhein and A.G. Ghaussy, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] Karl Otto Hondrich, "Verfassungsentwicklung, politische Stabilität und sozialer Wandel. Die Modernisierung des traditionellen politischen Systems in Afghanistan," *Verfassung und Verfassungswirklichkeit, Jahrbuch, Jahrgang 1966,* Köln und Opladen, 1967. p. 208.

[15] E. Rhein and A.G. Ghaussy, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

[16] Karl Otto Hondrich, *Die Leute im Norden Afghanistans. Mentalität und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, Schmollers Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft,* Bd. 85, I, Berlin, 1965, pp. 199-222.

[17] *Ibid.*

This attitude explains the fact that till today there was no pressure that forced the social and political structure to be changed. In Afghanistan the development in all spheres of life had been introduced from above. The first serious attempts were undertaken by King Amanullah (1919-1928). These efforts were, however, made too drastically. The pressure of the conservatives—in main the mullahs—was great, and as an indirect consequence King Amanullah in 1928 lost his throne and went into exile.[18] Under the rule of Nadir Shah, the father of the present king, the country got its first written constitution (1932). Nadir learned from the lesson of his predecessor and undertook modernization very cautiously. Because of this, the new constitution was so framed that there were no major drives towards modernization and dynamism of the country and its population. The executives were authorized by the king, while jurisdiction was still ruled by the *sharia* (law resulting from the Koran's exegesis). The work of parliament and senate, which were partly elected free and partly nominated by the king, consisted in the main in approving the laws which were passed by the king and the government. Real influence on what happened had only the *loya jirga,* for in this assembly besides the members of parliament and senate there were primarily the landowners and tribal leaders.[19] But this *loya jirga* only assembled in case of really important state affairs (e.g. throne change, constitutional questions, etc.). That the activity of the *loya jirga* was not really of progressive nature is quite clear if one considers the already-mentioned mentality of the nobles in the provinces.

In 1964 the country was given a new constitution. In this new constitution the form of the state was called constitutional monarchy. The members of the royal family are now excluded from any participation in executive, legislative, and jurisdictive functions. Freedom of expression of opinion was granted, and the constitution of political parties was allowed. Parliament and senate shall be elected by free, general, secret, and direct ballots. A secular and independent jurisdiction shall create the frame of security that is condition *sine qua non* for each development; and as a precondition for this, the codification of the law is underway. Though all forward-minded forces of the country took part in this important reform work, it cannot be said that the change was started by pressure from below. Without any doubt the king himself had decided to give his country this new constitution and he too determined the moment of adoption. By the right to choose the Premier himself the king has saved for himself an important source of influence.

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[18] See Donald N. Wilber, *op. cit.*, W.K. Fraser-Tytler, *op. cit.;* and Max Klimburg *op. cit.*

[19] Max Klimburg, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

The Economic Situation of Afghanistan

As in nearly all countries undergoing development, Afghanistan lacks a statistical survey of the country. Since the size of the population is not certain and the gross national product is only roughly estimated, all statements on the general economic situation are really meaningless. It is sufficient to notice that the per-capita-income probably is about 75 US$ and that more than 77 per cent of the whole population are in the agricultural sector as already mentioned. Compared to this there are only 3.2 per cent said to be industrial workers, which include also those working in the construction sector, geological survey, and the transport and communication sectors. In 1964 there were only 20,000 employed in direct industrial occupations.[21]

Related to this the value added in the single economic sector is estimated as follows: agriculture, 70 per cent; service sector, 18 per cent; handicraft production, 10 per cent; and mining, 2 per cent. The share of industry in the sense of the word is estimated to be 3 per cent.[22] All statements of the income utilization are contradictory. It is estimated that the quota of investment during the last years was more than 10 per cent of the gross national product. But these investments were financed two third from abroad.[23] The volume of the Afghan budget had a rapid growth during the past twenty years.[24] Expenditure increased more than twentyfold, from 400 million up to 8.7 billion Afghanis. Compared to this, the growth of income was only tenfold from 319 million up to 3.8 billion Afghanis. This means that today the deficit is bigger than the whole government income. The gap is filled by foreign aid and deficit financing. The small state income is the consequence of a tax system that is on the one hand by no means adapted to the development efforts of the country and on the other hand is due to a completely inefficient method of levying taxes. Until now customs duties and indirect taxes sum up to more than 50 per cent of the whole state revenue.[25] The deficit financing led to an increase in prices, mainly after 1963/64, for the supply of goods in the country could not keep up at the same measure. At the same time, the free market exchange quotation of the Afghani fell in exchange to the US dollar as the deficit financing naturally created new income. This appeared in the market as a demand for import goods.[26]

There exists no official Afghan wage statistic at all. It can be taken as a fact that at least in the country the wage payment is made mainly by natural products. In 1962 the monthly salary of a state minister was said

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[21] Ministry of Planning, Department of Statistics & Research, *Survey of Progress 1692-64*, Kabul/Afghanistan, August 1964, p. 28.
[22] These data are taken from a private report.
[23] E. Rhein and A.G. Ghaussy, *op. cit.*, p. 165.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 158.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 161.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 155.

to have been about US$ 50. Questioning the students of a middle-management-school about the income level of different professional branches, typically the profession of industrial worker, was not quoted at all. The students were able to give information on the income of porters, servants, merchants, artisans, medical doctors, etc., but they had no idea at all about the income-level of industrial workers.

The portion of government expenditure for economic development increased steadily during the concluded two five-year-plans. From 1957-58 to 1964-65, increase in expenditure was nearly fourfold and amounted to more than 60 per cent of the whole government expenditure.[27] Private investment in both plants was negligibly small, a fact that is to be traced back to a wave of turning private estates into state property even before the beginning of the first plan. Since the main part of the investment during the operation of both plans went into the traffic and communications sector, the increase in production in the other sectors was relatively small. During the operation of the first plan 50 per cent of the development expenditure went into infrastructure projects, 26 per cent into industrialization, 12.6 per cent into agriculture, and only 6 per cent into education.[28] This was slightly changed in the second plan where the distribution was as follows: transport and communication projects, 35.5 per cent; industries and mining, 34.7 per cent; agriculture and irrigation, 17.6 per cent; education and other projects, 13.6 per cent.[29]

Whether the preferential treatment of the infrastructure in this proportion was right is difficult to judge. At least it is to be considered that Afghanistan is a landlocked country without navigable rivers and without a railway system. Whether the traffic in a foreseeable time will develop to a density for which the constructed roads were built seems to be dubious. The profit of these huge investments in infrastructure depends only on the extent and pace of the related productive investments.

The Afghan agricultural sector is by far a subsistence economy. Only products that need further treatment like karakul furs, wool, cotton, oilseed, sugar beet, and fruit go into the market.[30] Agricultural products which are the main victuals of the population, like wheat, maize, barley, rice and vegetables, only appear in the market in the urban areas.

About 40 per cent of the Afghan export today still consists of products of cattle breeding.[31] In main they are karakul furs, wool (as carpets), and skins. Besides sheep and goats, which add up to about 80 per cent of the whole number of livestock, there are donkeys, horses, cows and camels.

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[27] *Ibid.*, p. 159.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 29.
[29] *The Kabul Times Annual 1967*, The Kabul Times Publishing Agency, 1967, p. 70.
[30] E. Rhein and A.G. Ghaussy, *op. cit.*, p. 39.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 49.

During the first two plans neither the agriculture nor the cattle breeding were sufficiently promoted in relation to their economic importance. Since the provided financial resources at most were used for cultivation of new land, it is not surprising that the productivity in the agricultural sector was not increased very much. Especially in one case, the Hilmand Valley Project, it is openly admitted as a failure. Moreover, precisely for the Hilmand project were larger resources provided during both plans than for all other agricultural projects taken together. Therefore during the period 1956-1964 only for a few agricultural products was the increase in production more than 20 per cent.[32]

Until now no major effort has been undertaken for the improvement of cattle-breeding in spite of its great importance for export. It is evident that, with the existing low standard of education and the traditional patterns of behavior in the country, all measures aimed at the increase of production are extraordinarily difficult to realize. But far more difficult are the eventual revision of the existing land-lease and the execution of land reform. Things like these are not heard of in Afghanistan at the moment.

Only 20,000 industrial workers are working in 72 plants,[33] while 14 textile factories employ more than 50 per cent of all industrial workers. The rest are divided in nutrition, car repairing, coal mining, construction, electricity, and some others. The difficulty in the process of industrialization in Afghanistan is to be seen in the instance of a fruit and juice canning factory in Kandahar, which was established some years back with foreign assistance. At the given low Afghan wage standard the products were too expensive for the home market. Export of the goods did not succeed for the Afghans had had no experience at all in the field of export, and the government had no export promotion to help this young industry. The factory could not even sell the production of the first season and production was stopped.

In the course of history Afghanistan has played a not unimportant role as transit country. This position was lost because the traffic conditions in the country were too bad.

Up to the beginning of the first five year plan, Afghanistan's balance of trade—though in all very small—was positive. The export products were and still are raw cotton, dried fruit, karakul furs, and carpets.[34] But the Afghans did not succeed in increasing their export in the same amount as their imports increased in consequence of the development policy. In 1963-64 total export was US$ 69 million compared to an import of US$ 125.7 million.[35] The main partners of Afghanistan's foreign trade today are USSR, USA,

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 199.
[33] *Survey of Progress 1962-64, op. cit.*, p. 28.
[34] E. Rhein and A.G. Ghaussy, *op. cit.*, p. 102.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 101.

and India.[36] As in any other underdeveloped country, the expansion of foreign trade will be of striking importance for further economic growth in Afghanistan. Whether it shall be preferable to promote export or to emphasize import-substitution shall be discussed later on.

Meanwhile, a glance at the educational standard in Afghanistan is in order for it is of fundamental importance to a country like this. Official reports are impressive. At the beginning of the first plan 1956-57 there were 800 schools with 4,000 teachers and 126,000 pupils. At the end of the second plan 1963-64 there were 1,860 schools, with 7,615 teachers and about 250,000 pupils.[37] Compared to an estimated population of 13.8 million only 2 per cent of the total population attend school. Teacher training is imperfect. Furthermore, it is difficult to find teachers for the village schools, for the living conditions in the countryside naturally are bad and the social prestige of teachers is not very high. The government tries to improve the situation by increasing the salaries and arranging "teacher's day" and teacher training courses during vacation.

The country has two universities. The university of the capital, Kabul, has all faculties. The other university at Djallabad was founded only recently and at the moment consists only of a faculty of medicine. The number of students is about 3,300.[38] In the economics faculty, the students after four years of study get a degree that in international standard is equal to the Bachelor of Arts (BA). In cooperation with universities of industrialized countries Afghanistan tries to increase the scientific level of the universities.

Obstacles to the Economic Development in Afghanistan

No doubt, in terms of its economic development Afghanistan has not reached as far as its neighboring countries. This is the consequence of several factors, some of which are closely related. Namely: impending factors on account of the natural resources of the country; factors resulting from the development policy practiced up to now; and—not least the main reason for the low standard of economic development—the late start of a conscious development policy. This is due to a social structure that is more static in Afghanistan than in other countries undergoing development.

The Natural Obstacles

The mountainous surface of the country certainly hinders the increase in the agricultural production far more than, for instance, in India or Pakistan. The margin of production could be increased by improved technics of

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 204.
[37] Ernst Reiner, "Neuere statistische Angaben zu Afghanistan," *Petermanss geographische Mitteilungen*, Heft 4, 1966, Gotha 1966, p. 306.
[38] The Kabul Times Publishing Agency, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

agriculture, the use of fertilizers, or a better kind of cattle-breeding, but these are of course far from being accomplished in Afghanistan. The extension of cultivable land is strongly limited by the topography. The failures in the execution of the Hilmand Valley Project show impressively what problems can arise.

With regard to the natural resources it is said that "sufficient resources and energy are available for the establishment of a home industry as well as for export chances in the mining industry." [39] Indeed in the search for oil, gas was found and is delivered today to the USSR. But it is not considered at all for local consumption. The simultaneous development of the natural resources and the establishment of a related home industry may well exceed the Afghan capital potentiality for a number of years, even if there would be broad-minded aid from other countries. The chances for the export of mining products do not seem to be especially favorable for the geographic position of Afghanistan places it at a disadvantage.

Regarding its position as a landlocked country, it is believed that this will have still stronger effects in the future, for the exchange with the world markets will further grow. Since planes and lorries are the biggest transportation units, the cost structure will always be burdened by the transportation cost and the ability to compete in the export markets will be reduced. The extension of the road net and the air lines and airports can bring no fundamental change.

The Development Policy

For more than two five-year-plans, most of the investment went into the infrastructure sector. For some time the extremely high part played by not directly productive investments has been unpleasantly felt in the rising cost of living. If stronger inflationary trends in the future are to be avoided, more attention must be paid to directly productive investment. Famine which is widespread in India is not known in Afghanistan. But in spite of this, the rising imports of wheat show that the country's provision of foodstuffs is no longer sufficient. To keep this situation from getting worse, the future policy of investment must be aimed at increasing the agricultural production. Should this aim be gained in the recent future, which seems to be urgently necessary, it would be advisable to drop costly projects of land cultivation. The use of fertilizers, improvement of the seeds, and modern methods in cattle-breeding and utilization certainly allow faster increased output in the agricultural sector.

In the field of industrialization the situation seems to be similar. Investments for new export products, for instance from the mining sector, demand

[39] E. Rhein and A. G. Ghaussy, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

an extremely high capital input and have normally long gestation periods till the production can be started. A comparable low capital input is only necessary to improve the quality of the traditional export products, so that they would be more competitive in the world market and could gain more profits.[40] Beyond this the industrialization of the country should be aimed at import substitution to provide the population better and to lower at the same time foreign trade imbalance. The fact that canned fruits, which were too expensive compared to the low income level, found no demand, does not mean that there are no other products which cannot be produced and sold in the country. Besides victuals there are also textiles, clothing, shoes, and other simple consumer goods like bicycles, lamps, electric heaters, etc.

The Late Start and the Traditional Way of Life

From Afghans it is to be heard that by reason of the similarity of their country to Switzerland, primarily in relation to the natural resources, it would be reasonable to take this country as a model for the Afghan development. Since the major part of Afghanistan's landscape is extraordinarily beautiful and further there are many archaeological spots (most of them are unexcavated) the similarity to Switzerland can be extended to the field of tourism too. But the development of Afghanistan has not yet really started and any similarity with the modern Switzerland is nowhere to be found.

As to the reason for the late start of conscious development of the country it is said that the wars against the British developed in the population hostility towards foreigners. It is affirmed by others that the conservative priesthood consciously agitated a policy of closing the country to hinder the invasion of modern ideas. Which of these reasons are right, cannot be decided here. The fact is that Afghanistan like Nepal and Ethiopia lag far behind other countries undergoing development because of its long, total seclusion from the world.

This fact of being a latecomer is a sufficient obstacle. For example, the market entrance for each new-comer is a far more difficult position than the normal competition for those who are already in the market. But it seems to be more striking that largely because of the long seclusion of the country the social system is completely traditional and hinders the Afghans from creating a positive outlook towards development.

Still today Afghanistan's social structure is equal to the symptoms of a static society as described by Prof. Behrendt.[41] The social classes of society are hierarchically organized, supported by religion and tradition. The

[40] Today skins and hides are exported to the USA semi-processed, for the Afghan methods of tanning do not satisfy the US standards.

[41] Richard F. Behrendt, *Soziale Strategie für Entwicklungsländer,* Entwurf einer Entwicklungssoziologie, Frankfurt a. Main, 1965, p. 144.

level of income and education depends on social and work status, and not on efficiency. The importance of primary groups (e. g., family, clan, tribe) is stronger than that of the comprehensive social structures and the relations to state or nation are weak. The structure within the primary groups is patriarchal. The subsistence economy can be estimated to be more important than the market economy. The middle-class (moneyed and educated) is unimportant.

Only in three points does the picture of Afghanistan differ from that of static societies. With regard to feudalism, which never completely took over, there exists a relatively strong free peasant class. Beyond this the way of life of Afghan feudal lords is usually so modest that outwardly it differs very little from that of their tenants' or from that of a free peasants'. So there is hardly any cause for social revolt due to feudalism. Also today, after the new constitution, the order of rule cannot be called authoritative or monarchist-absolutistic. Today Afghanistan is a constitutional monarchy. In addition, at least *de jure,* the law is no longer a part of religion and tradition but is secular.

These two last points are to be considered as the transfer to a dynamic society. But, indeed, to force the economic development to go faster the dynamization of all fields of the society is necessary. This readiness for development means that men develop aims of their own (voluntarism), instead of the up to now executed determinism that they demand more of life, and that they change their value-systems and, accordingly, their patterns of life from the traditional ones. If necessary they will have to overstep the bounds of family or tribe and, at least in certain fields of life, they will have to put rationality above belief and tradition.

In weighing the different factors which hinder the economic development of Afghanistan one comes to the conclusion that its structure of society with its negative influence on the readiness for development of the single man is the main obstacle. The unfavorable conditions caused by the geographical position and the natural conditions of the country are not to be ignored, but might be mitigated with technological help. But first it is necessary to gain the ability to use the technique. The obstacle of being a latecomer can be surmounted by doubled efforts. Therefore it is necessary to develop this attitude of readiness towards development.

Apparently in Afghanistan these facts are well known today. More and more during recent years articles of enlightening nature appear in the country's press, which aim to make the population more active in the process of development. Unfortunately today the effect is not very great, because of the low standard of education.

The dangers of the process of dynamization seem to have been recognized too. Not without reason is the development of democracy executed cautiously and slowly. The reforms introduced from above are intended to come before the demands from below. In case social demands are made faster than progress can be made, dangers, of political troubles will arise, a situation that is to be seen in several Near Eastern countries. In such a case economic development would again, and possibly even more, be hindered by those political quarrels.

OCCUPATIONAL CHOICES AND MOBILITY ORIENTATION AMONG LEBANESE COLLEGE STUDENTS

GEORGE H. WEIGHTMAN
and
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Summary

American research has indicated that the occupational choice and mobility orientation of a study group are closely associated with the group's socio-economic background, value orientations, and personality characteristics. In order to provide insights into the socio-psychological factors underlying occupational choices and mobility orientations in a cross-cultural context, a modified version of an American schedule was administered to a sample of one hundred twenty-two Lebanese male students at the American University of Beirut. The findings, with one notable exception, paralleled the findings of an earlier American study. Parental economic status and educational background as well as the respondents' value orientations and personality characteristics were found to have a significant influence on the pattern of occupational choice and mobility expectation in the sample group.

Introduction

THIS STUDY SOUGHT TO TEST THE HYPOTHESIS THAT occupational choice and mobility orientation of Lebanese college students at the American University of Beirut are closely associated with their socio-economic background and their socio-cultural values. [1] For a verification of this hypothesis, data were collected by an interview schedule administered to a random sample of one hunderd twenty-two male Lebanese students at the American University of Beirut in the spring of 1960.

From the methodological and theoretical points of view, the significance of this study lies in the attempt at a modified replication in the Lebanese cultural context of a similar analysis undertaken in America and analyzed by Morris Rosenberg. [2] The interview schedule used in the Lebanese study

[1] Acknowledgements for reading and offering generous advice are due V. Goldkind and C. Heller.

[2] Morris Rosenberg, *Occupations and Values* (Glencoe, Free Press, 1957). Rosenberg's typologies and analysis provided the foundation for our own research and analysis.

constituted a modified version of the questionnaire used in the American study. For a considerable part of the conceptual framework, this present research is indebted to the formulations of Rosenberg. Throughout this analysis, repeated parallels and comparisons will be made with his findings.

Universe and Sample

The universe for this study consisted of all the Lebanese male students who had had at least two years of college education at the American University of Beirut during the academic year 1959-60. The total number of cases in the universe was 447, distributed among the six schools of the University. (The entire student population of this coeducational and quite ethnically heterogeneous university in 1950-60 was 2,661. Lebanese nationals constitute less than a third of the total enrollment.) Though it is important to note that this universe of college students cannot be regarded as representative of all of Lebanese society, this group—given the structure of Lebanese society—will occupy many of the socially prestigeful positions in the future and will considerably shape the expectations and values of other elements in Lebanon.

A random sample modified to allow for adequate statistical comparison was selected from this universe. The interview period extended for eight weeks. There was no loss in the original selection of one hundred twenty-two cases. All interviews were conducted by one of the investigators, Miss Siham Faik Adham, in English.

In the sample, there were 107 Arab Lebanese and 15 Lebanese of Armenian origins. In the religious breakdown, there were 83 Christians (chiefly Orthodox and Catholic) and 39 non-Christians (i.e., Sunnites, Shiites, and Druze). Although the American University of Beirut is regarded as a "rich man's school," many of the sample group acknowledge a relatively low financial position—even by urban Lebanese standards. [3]

Family Socio-Economic Background and Occupational Choice, Mobility, and Motivation

Given the familistic orientation of Lebanese society, one may expect family socio-economic background to influence the pattern of occupational choice and desire for mobility in the sample group. We hypothesized that

[3] The specific breakdown of reported income of father:
8 under 4,800 Lebanese pounds
31 between 4.800 and 9,600
38 between 9,600 and 15,000
24 between 15,000 and 25,000
14 between 25,000 and 40,000
7 more than 40,000
At the time of our study 3.12 Lebanese pounds equalled one dollar.

the higher the socio-economic status of the respondent's family, the more likely is the respondent to choose high status occupations. In the study, occupational and desire for mobility expectations were related to such indices of socio-economic status as stated yearly income of father and the educational attainment of both parents.

As shown in Table I, students whose fathers are said to have a high annual income level (by Lebanese standards) tend to select occupations which are generally regarded (at least in Lebanese society) as highly lucrative. These occupations include medicine, engineering and government service. On the other hand, a much larger proportion (48%) of the lower economic levels tend to select less lucrative occupations such as agriculture, teaching, or business which includes many clerical posts. Chi square tests indicate that the association between father's income and son's choice of occupation is not likely a result of mere chance. The computation of Yule's Q (.673) also supports such a conclusion. Thus, we may infer that those of more limited family means have more limited socio-economic expectations. This finding is in agreement with Rosenberg's conclusions on the same subject.[4] However, it must be pointed out and, indeed, stressed that the Lebanese sample viewed government service in a very different light than the American sample. (Undoubtedly this reflects different societal views of the functions and nature of government service.)

TABLE I

FATHER'S INCOME AND STUDENT'S CHOICE OF OCCUPATION

Student's Choice of Occupation	Father's Income: Up to 15,000 Lebanese £ Number	Percent	Over 15,000 Lebanese £ Number	Percent
(High Status-Lucrative Position)				
Medicine, Engineering and Government Service	43	52	33	85
(Low Status—Limited Position)				
Agriculture, Teaching, and Business	40	48	6	15
Total	83	100	39	100

dif. = 1 $x^2 = 12.19$

N = 122 $P < .001$

Yule's Q. = .673

[4] Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

As indicated in Table II, family educational background is significantly related to respondent's expectation of occupational choice. It is important moreover to observe that mother's educational background (Gamma = .5846) seems to be more crucial in patterning the occupational choice of the son than is that of the father's (Gamma = .4166). Given the patriarchal, patrilineal nature of Lebanese society, mothers are closer to their children than the fathers who generally spend the largest part of their time in activities outside the home. In addition, the educational attainment of one's mother may be a more effective single indicator of socio-economic status. In the Middle Eastern context, only the higher status groups educated their women until very recently. Indeed, in rural Lebanon, especially among the Muslims, such a pattern is still quite marked.

TABLE II

PARENTAL EDUCATION AND STUDENT'S CHOICE OF OCCUPATION

	Father's Education						Mother's Education					
	Elementary		High School		College		Elementary		High School		College	
Student's Choice	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
(High Status—Lucrative)												
Medicine, Engineering and Government Service	16	44	26	63	34	76	24	43	39	76	13	87
(Low Status—Limited)												
Agriculture, Teaching, Business	20	56	15	37	11	24	32	57	12	24	2	13
Total	36	100	41	100	45	100	56	100	51	100	15	100
	d.f. = 2 N. = 122		x^2 = 8.1 P < .02				d.f. = 2 N. = 122		x^2 = 17.05 P < .001			
	Gamma = .4166						Gamma = .5846					

In order to analyze the economic expectations of the study group, it is appropriate to consider mobility not only with reference to some general societal standard, irrespective of where the respondent started, but also in terms of the expectations of surpassing one's own father. Thus, two dimensions of mobility have been taken into consideration. The first relates mobility to an absolute standard of income. The second relates mobility expectations to the economic position of the respondent's family—whether higher or lower than that of the father. Reflecting similar findings of Ro-

senberg,[5] Table III indicates that if mobility is defined in terms of the expectation to acquire a great deal of money in terms of some absolute social standard (Part A), then the wealthier students have greater mobility expectations. However, if mobility is defined in terms of an expectation of surpassing one's family (Part B), then the poorer students have greater mobility expectations.

TABLE III

A. FATHER'S INCOME AND STUDENT'S FUTURE EARNINGS EXPECTATIONS

Student's Expected Earnings in Ten Years	Father's Income: Up to 15,000 *Number*	*Percent*	Over 15,000 *Number*	*Percent*
Over 15,000	31	37	35	90
Up to 15,000	52	63	4	10
Total	83	100	39	100

N. = 122 $x^2 = 29.32$
d.f. = 1 $P < .001$

B. FATHER'S INCOME AND STUDENT'S EXPECTED STANDARD OF LIVING

Expectations Compared with Family's	Father's Income: Up to 15,000 *Number*	*Percent*	Over 15,000 *Number*	*Perecent*
Higher	63	76	8	21
About Same	20	24	24	61
Lower	....	....	7	18
Total	83	100	39	100

d.f. = 2 $x^2 = 39.32$
N. = 122 $P < .001$

When mobility expectations are related to parental educational background (Table IV), the pattern previously described persists. It appears that the wealthier students are more likely to expect to be upwardly mobile in an absolute monetary sense (Part A), but when students were asked how they expect their own future standard of living to compare with that of their families of orientation (Part B), students from the poorer families tend to expect to surpass their families' standard of living, whereas those from wealthier families do not. Thus, the richer expect to do better, but relative to the high standards already maintained by their parents, the expectations will not markedly represent a departure from the pattern already achieved by their parents. These data highlight the importance of specifying clearly the base upon which mobility expectations derive. Moreover,

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 53-4 and 60.

Table IV again notes that the mother's educational background is even a a more crucial indicator of status differences than that of the father's.

It can be seen from Tables V and VI that not only are the students from the higher socio-economic status groups more likely to expect to earn a good deal of money, but more of them are likely to possess values that emphasize extrinsic rewards. Similarly, the higher status students are more likely than the lower status students to stress status and prestige as important occupational values. In other words, as with the American findings of Rosenberg, [6] there is a marked relationship between family socio-economic

TABLE IV

A. PARENTAL EDUCATION AND STUDENT'S EXPECTED INCOME

Student's Expected Income in Ten Years	Father's Education						Mother's Education					
	Elementary		High School		College		Elementary		High School		College	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Over 15,000	10	28	27	66	29	64	21	37	32	63	13	86
Up to 15,000	26	72	14	34	16	36	35	63	19	37	2	14
Total	36	100	41	100	45	100	56	100	51	100	15	100
	d. f. = 2 N. = 122		x^2 = 14.23 P. < .001				d. f. = 2 N. = 122		x^2 = 14.12 P. < .01			

B. PARENTAL EDUCATION AND STUDENT'S EXPECTED STANDARD OF LIVING

Expectation Compared With Family's	Father's Education						Mother's Education					
	Elementary		High School		College		Elementary		High School		College	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Higher	29	81	29	71	13	29	40	71	29	57	2	13
About Same	7	19	9	22	28	62	16	29	19	37	9	60
Lower	---	---	3	7	4	9	....	....	3	6	4	27
Total	36	100	41	100	45	100	56	100	51	100	13	100
	d. f. = 4 N. = 122		x^2 = 27.39				d. f. = 4 N. = 122		x^2 = 28.38			

[6] *Ibid.*, p.58.

TABLE V

FATHER'S INCOME AND STUDENT'S OCCUPATIONAL VALUES

	Father's Income			
	Up to 15,000		Over 15,000	
Occupational Values	*Number*	*Percent*	*Number*	*Percent*
Money:				
Number Ranked High	22	26	29	74
Number Ranked Medium or Low	61	74	10	26
Total	83	100	39	100
	d. f. = 1		$x^2 = 24.92$	
	N. = 122		$L^s < .001$	

	Father's Income			
	Up to 15,000		Over 15,000	
	Number	*Percent*	*Number*	*Percent*
Status:				
Number Ranked High	26	31	23	59
Number Ranked Medium or Low	57	69	16	41
Total	83	100	39	100
	d. f. = 1		$x^2 = 8.43$	
	N. = 122		$L^s < .01$	

position and the respondent's desire for economic advancement. Again, in Table VI, we see that the educational attainment of the mother provides a more significant contrast in the patterns of the status groups than does the educational attainment of the father.

Value Orientations and the Choice of Occupation

The process of weighing various occupational alternatives involves the elimination of some occupations which are deemed inappropriate for an individual of a certain social class or of a certain personality type. In addition, some ocupations are unsuited for individuals who hold certain value orientations. It is of interest to find out to what extent these "value effects" might manifest themselves in the occupational choices of the sample group.

As in the Rosenberg study, the socio-cultural values were those which stressed: (1) interpersonal relations, (2) self expression, or (3) extrinsic reward, i.e., monetary rewards. Table VII indicates that the same proportion (46%) of those expressing interest in medicine and teaching stressed interpersonal values. Similar findings by Rosenberg[7] led him to group

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

TABLE VI
PARENTAL EDUCATIONAL AND STUDENT'S OCCUPATIONAL VALUES

	Father's Education						Mother's Education					
	Elementary		High School		College		Elementary		High School		College	
Occupational Values	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Money:												
Number Ranked High	9	25	16	39	26	58	14	25	27	53	10	67
Number Ranked Medium or Low	27	75	25	61	19	42	42	95	24	47	5	33
Total	36	100	41	100	45	100	56	100	51	100	15	100
	d. f. = 2 $x^2 = 9.00$						d. f. = 2 $x^2 = 12.89$					
	N. = 122						N. = 122					

	Father's Education						Mother's Education					
	Elementary		High School		College		Elementary		High School		College	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Status:												
Number Ranked High	13	36	14	34	22	49	16	29	25	49	8	53
Number Ranked Medium or Low	23	74	27	66	23	51	40	71	26	51	7	47
Total	36	100	41	100	45	100	56	100	51	100	15	100
	d. f. = 2 $x^2 = 2.28$						d. f. = 2 $x^2 = 5.85$					
	N. = 122						N. = 122					

teaching and medicine in the same set of occupations. However, Table VII and Rosenberg's own findings [8] indicate a marked contrast among those who prefer medicine and those who prefer teaching with respect to emphasis on self-expression (about the same proportion as for interpersonal relations among future teachers) and an extrinsic reward (a very poor third among those expressing an interest in teaching). Therefore, they will be considered separately in a later discussion of personality types and occupation choice. (See Table VIII.)

Government service, medicine, and engineering are generally regarded in the Lebanese society as productive sources of monetary reward. Most of the students (73%) who chose the field of government work, and more

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

than a third (35%) of those students expressing interest in medicine or engineering, stressed extrinsic rewards as a major occupational value. Significantly, the American study of Rosenberg did not observe this marked association between choice of government service and concern with monetary rewards.[9] The unusually high association between selection of government service and emphasis on extrinsic rewards undoubtedly results from the pervasive theme in the Lebanese culture which confers high status upon those occupying positions in government work. This pattern of great expectations for security, high prestige, and lucrative rewards, so pervasive in the Lebanese culture today can be dated back into the Turkish and French colonial traditions.

Another manner in which occupational values tend to delimit or channel the occupational choice of the sample group is revealed by the observation that a majority (54%) of both those choosing the fields of agriculture and engineering stress the value of self-expression as a major reward to be derived from one's occupation. Almost as many (47%) of those choosing teaching express a similar preference. The fields of engineering, agriculture, and teaching are generally believed to provide an opportunity for considerable self-expression. In general, these findings emphasize the close association between occupational choices of the sample group and the socio-cultural values held by this group. It is apparent that different occupations have structural qualities which enhance the satisfaction of certain values.

TABLE VII

VALUE ORIENTATION AND OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE

	Medicine		Engineering		Agriculture		Business		Government Service		Teaching	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Interpersonal Relations	15	46	3	10	5	24	6	38	2	13	7	47
Extrinsic Rewards	12	36	10	36	5	13	5	31	11	74	1	6
Self-Expression	6	18	15	54	8	53	5	31	2	13	7	47
Total	33	100	28	100	15	100	16	100	15	100	15	100

d. f. = 10 x^2 = 28.80

N. = 122

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

Personality Characteristics and Occupational Choice

Personality factors operate upon the individual in such a way that they are crucially related to occupation preferences. In this study, personality is defined as the types of behavior an individual manifests in his relations to others. Horney, through her clinical investigations, arrived at a classification of three types: those who "move toward" people; those who "move away" from people; and those who "move against" people. In his study, Rosenberg refers to those who "move toward" as the *compliant type,* those who "move away" as the *detached type,* and those who "move against" as the *aggressive type.*[10] Replicating his analysis in the Lebanese context, we have chosen to utilize his operational concepts.

Table VIII indicates that almost half (40%) of those students choosing the field of medicine show compliant personality characteristics. This is in sharp contrast to those students who choose the field of engineering. Only 10% of prospective engineers may be defined as compliant personality types. In addition, compliant personality traits are characteristic of many students (40%) preferring the field of teaching. However, students choosing the fields of medicine and teaching differ markedly with respect to the distribution among the sample group of aggressive and detached personality characteristics.

The majority (67%) of those students who selected the field of government service as their prospective career tend to show aggressive personality characteristics. Similar patterns on a somewhat reduced scale are represented among those choosing medicine (30%) and engineering (43%). Conversely, students planning to enter the field of agriculture manifest the greatest extent of detached personality characteristics. Not too surprisingly this detached personality type is well represented among those indicating an interest in engineering (47%). Nevertheless, one might question how appropriate such a personality type might be in the teaching profession despite its ample representation (47%).[11] In expressing value preferences, a similar proportion of those interested in teaching emphasized self-expression over interpersonal relations or extrinsic rewards. Is it possible that in Lebanon, and perhaps elsewhere, a personality type is attracted to teaching which may not be compatible with the necessary interpersonal aspects of that career?

Summary and Conclusion

The present study has focused on the socio-cultural factors underlying occupational choices and mobility orientations of a random sample of male

[10] *Ibid.,* p. 41.

[11] Comparisons with Rosenberg in this area of inquiry are difficult. His published findings do not explicitly enumerate in this area of discussion government service, engineering, or agriculture. In addition, he groups medicine and teaching.

TABLE VIII

PERSONALITY TYPOLOGY AND THE CHOICE OF OCCUPATIONAL AREA

	Medicine		Engineering		Agriculture		Business		Government Service		Teaching	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Compliant	16	48	3	10	5	24	4	24	3	20	6	40
Aggressive	13	39	12	43	2	13	6	38	10	67	2	13
Detached	4	13	13	47	8	53	6	38	2	13	7	47
Total	33	100	28	100	15	100	16	100	15	100	15	100

d. f. = 10 $\quad$ $x^2 = 30.42$
N. = 122

Lebanese students at the American University of Beiruit in 1960. Given the familistic orientation of Lebanese society, it was anticipated that family socio-economic background would influence the patterns of occupation choice and desire for mobility in the sample group. It was further hypothesized that the higher the socio-economic status of the respondent's family, the greater would be the respondent's expectations in occupational choice and desire for high status. Chi square tests consistently revealed significant relations supporting this hypothesis. Students coming from superior socio-economic backgrounds tended more to choose high-status lucrative occupations and to expect to be upwardly mobile than those coming from more limited socio-economic backgrounds. However, relative to their families' restricted status, those of humble origin expected some advancement.

As in Rosenberg's earlier study of an American college sample, the findings indicate that certain occupational values and personality characteristics tend to channel or delimit the occupational choices of the sample group. However, in the American study, the marked relation between preference for government service and emphasis on extrinsic rewards was not observed. Such a high association in the Lebanese context graphically depicts the realities of present government operation in the Levant. This pattern enshrined during Turkish and French colonial rule may be changing, but security, prestige, and monetary rewards are still popularly associated with government service.

AN ACCOUNT OF ANCIENT INDIAN GRAMMATICAL STUDIES DOWN TO PATANJALI'S MAHABHASYA*: TWO TRADITIONS

E. DE GUZMAN ORARA

IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT INDIAN GRAMMARIANS from Panini onward were primarily concerned with *bhasa,* the living or current speech, because pre-Paninean grammarians were essentially, if not entirely, dedicated to the task of preserving from loss or change the text of the sacred Vedas. The former were thus secular grammarians; the latter, theological ones. This distinction in purpose or principle of work serves as a useful criterion in determining the historical strata of Indian grammatical studies. By their distinctive ends, the earlier phase may well be called Vedic grammatical studies; the later phase, Sanskrit grammatical studies. It should not, however, be thought that there is an absolute division in time between these two periods, because some of the rescensions we have of *sutras* on Vedic grammar, like the *Unadi Sutra,* belong to the post-Paninean period. This historical view should be taken rather as an attempt at distinguishing at least two "atmospheres" of general attitude towards grammatical studies in early India down to Patanjali, the commentator of Panini, who virtually marks the end of a line of great Indian grammarians.

From this distinction, it is clear why the content of the earlier phase should have been, as it was, the language of the religious literature of the Vedas, while that of the later should be the language and literature of the cultured few (*sistah*) which has become distinct from the Vedic as well as from that of the great masses of the people. In style, however, these distinct studies do not show any particular qualities which can be taken as added criteria for their distinction, the style of the *Nirukta* of Yaska (who is considerably older than Panini) being in the general form of the much later Sanskrit prose and that of Panini's *Astadhyayi* being of the same style as that of the rest of the *Vedanga Sutras,* which are older than it and belong to the earlier persuasion of grammatical studies.

The earliest extant evidence of grammatical studies in India is the *samhita* (verse) text of the *Rgveda,* which already is an impressive monument

* Entirely dispensed with in this paper are the standard ICO diacritical marks on the roman transliteration of the Sanskrit *nagari,* on account of the unavailability of a number of these at this issue's printers.—*Editors.*

of phonological knowledge. The grammatical studies that went into the making of the *samhita* are indicated by the *padapatha* or Vedic word-text, in which the euphonically combined Vedic hymns were analyzed into their component parts, i.e., into words unmodified by Vedic phonetics. While its obvious motive (like that of the rest of the *pathas*: the *kramapatha*, the *jatapatha* and *ghanapatha*) was to safeguard the sacred text from change, it also succeeded in pushing back the *samhita* text to a probably even earlier form of itself and in giving a basis for future studies by the theological grammarians. The time separating the *samhita* text from the *padapatha* is not much. This is believed to be so because, although the latter already has "undoubted misinterpretations and misunderstandings" of the former, it is older than the *Aitareya Aranyaka,* Yaska, and the *Rgveda Pratisakhya.* The *padapatha's* place in the history of Vedic literature should then be sometime a little after the composition of the *samhita* text, together with the *Brahmanas* but before the advent of the *Aranyakas,* the *Upanisads,* Yaska, and the *Pratisakhyas,* in that order. Following Professor Macdonell's conjecture (HSL, p. 50· please see "References" below), as this seems reasonable, this period could have been a little after 600 B.C.

The *Brahmanas,* although not in their older portions, already deal with points about the number of syllables in a word or a group of words in the *samhita.* These do not agree with the *samhita* version, due to the phonetic contraction rules already applied in it.

In the "appendices" of the Vedas, i.e., the *Aranyakas* and *Upanisads,* grammatical studies have grown some more, for here we have technical terms for certain groups of letters as well as elaborate phonetic rules to govern the sacred text. Also, the names of earlier theological grammarians are mentioned here for the first time.

Coming now to the *sutra* portion of Vedic writings. These are the *Vedangas* or "limbs" of the Veda. There are six classes of these, but two (*kalpa,* ceremonial, and *jyotisa,* astronomy) are not at all concerned with grammatical studies. The four are *siksa* or phonetics, *chandas* or metre, *nirukta* or etymology, and *vyakarana* or grammar. As a whole, they were meant to help the Veda-student in correctly reciting and interpreting the Vedic texts. As such, they arose from the needs of the religious activity of the Vedic Indian, but, as we shall see, at least one (*vyakarana*) branched out into an intensive study of the *bhasa* or spoken version of the ancient religious language. This last, although belonging temporally somewhere in the middle of the *sutra* period, really starts a different era of grammatical studies in early India, making, as it were, the big jump between religious grammatical studies and secular grammatical studies.

Works which have the title *siksa* are now known to be only late additions to the *Brahmanas*. The *Brahmanas* themselves, however, as we have seen, deal with Vedic phonetics. But the works which best represent this *Vedanga* are the *Pratisakhyas*. The objective of this last is to work out in full the relationship between the *samhita* and the *padapatha*, thus producing a thorough, well-ordered account of euphonic combination in the Vedas, as well as a reliable guide for the reciter of Vedic mantras. There are four of such *pratisakhyas* known today: one belongs to the *Rgveda*, another to the *Atharvaveda*, and two to the *Yajurveda* (one attached to *Vajasaneyi Samhita*,[1] the other to *Taittiriya Samhita*). The *Samaveda*, because already written as a song (*saman*) should be sung, does not have need for a *pratisakhya*, which is so called because "intended for the use of each respective branch (*sakha*) of the Vedas" (Macdonell, HSL, p. 268). The word *siksa* itself is already mentioned in the *Taittiriya Aranyaka* (VII, 1), and there is meant to deal with letters, accents, quantity, pronunciation, and euphonic rules.

Of the *Vedanga chandas*, there is a *Chandah Sutra* by Pingala, which claims the title of *Vedanga*, but which is, like the *siksa* treatises, now known as a late supplement. Although it also treats of Vedic prosody, it is actually the standard work on post-Vedic prosody, being mainly concerned with the latter. The subject of Vedic metres is already mentioned in the *Brahmanas*, though here blurred by frequent mystical allusions, while in the *samhitas*,

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[1] *Vajasaneyi pratisakhya*, xii, 5:
namakhyatam upasargo nipatas catvary ahuh padajatani sabdah/
tan nama yenabhidadhati sattvam tad akhyatam yena bhavam sa dhatuh //
prabhy a para nir dur anu vy upapa sam pari prati ny aty adhi sud avapi/
upasarga vimsatir arthavacakah sahetarabhyam itare nipatah //
kriyavacakam akhyatam upasargo visesakrt /
sattvabhidhayakam nama nipatah padapuranah //
nipatanam arthavasan nipatanad anarthakanam itare ca sarthakah /
neyamta ity asti samkhyeha vanmaye mitaksare capy amitaksare ca ye //

"Grammarians speak of the noun (*nama*), the verb (*akhyata*), the preposition (*upasarga*), and the particle (*nipata*) as the four classes of words. The noun is that by which an entity is designated, a verb that by which a becoming is designated; this (latter) is called a root (*dhatu*). There are twenty prepositions—*pra, abhi, a, para, nis, dus, anu, vi, upa, apa, sam, pari, prati, ni, ati, adhi, su, ud, ava,* and *api*—and these acquire meaning when joined with nouns or verbs. The rest of the words are the particles. The verb expresses an action; the preposition defines it; the noun designates an entity; the particles are but expletives. There are, however, besides the particles which have no meaning, others which have, for we see that some particles are used on account of their sense; but it is impossible to say how many there are of each class, whether they are used in measured or in prose diction." Cf. Muller, *HASL*, pp. 161-162.

Also in the *Pratisakhya* of Katyayana, i, 27:
tinkrttaddhita catustaya samasah sabdam ayam //
"Verbs with their conjugational terminations, nouns with their primary nominal suffixes; nouns with their secondary nominal suffixes, and the four kinds of compounds, —these constitute language." Cf. Muller, *HASL*, pp. 163-164.

names are found which are later seen as technical terms of metres. In the *Aranyakas* and *Upanisads* entire chapters are devoted to this subject. But, like the story of the *Vedanga siksa,* it is only in the *sutra* period when a systematic accounting of this subject is made. These are found in the *Sankhayana Srauta Sutra* (VII, 27), in the last three *patalas* or sections of the *Rgveda Pratisakhya,* in the *Nidana Sutra* of the *Samaveda,* and in two *anukramanis* or metrical Vedic indices (a section each) of Katyayana.

It is when we turn to *nirukta* and *vyakarana* that we find the usual ingredients of grammar dealt with. As it has turned out, in both *Vedangas* only one work survives to represent the *Vedanga,* having, it seems, superseded all of the similar treatises preceding it: for *nirukta,* Yaska's work by that name, and for *vyakarana,* Panini's *Astadhyayi.* In these two fields, which are concerned with strict grammar, there are two distinct pictures clearly discernible; the *Nirukta* appears at the end of a line of etymological works which are exclusively concerned with Vedic words; the *Astadhyayi,* although also appearing at such a point relative to Vedic grammatical treatises, really stands at the beginning of Sanskrit grammar works. If we can agree to combine these two *Vedangas* into what we usually call "grammar," and knowing that Yaska is the older of the two in this (the *sutra*) period of early Indian grammatical studies, we can, I think, take Yaska as "the last of the Vedic grammarians" known to us and Panini as "the first of the Sanskrit grammarians".

It is noteworthy that the *padapathas* already indicate a good measure of grammatical analysis of words, that, later, the *Brahmanas* mention grammatical terms like *vibhakti* or case-form and *vrsan* or masculine, and that, later still historically, more of such references are seen in the *Aranyakas* and the *Upanisads.* At the time of Yaska not only have the four parts of speech been distinguished from one another (this process of distinction rather than word-analysis may have been the original meaning of *vyakarana*) and the verb and noun stems and affixes been recognized, but also elaborate doctrines on the origin of nouns were being discussed. On the latter, Yaska decided to hold the doctrine of the verbal origin of nouns, and Panini followed him in this.[2]

[2] On this, Yaska has a vigorous, quite up-to-date argument, which Professor Muller (HASL, pp. 164-168) translates in full: "Sakatayana maintains that nouns are derived from verbs, and there is an universal agreement of all Etymologists (Nairukta) on this point. Gargya, on the contrary and some of the grammarians say, not all (nouns are derived from verbs). For first, if the accent and formation were regular in all nouns and agreed entirely with the appellative power (of the root), nouns such as *go* (cow), *asva* (horse)), *purusha* (man), would be in themselves intelligible. Secondly, if all nouns were derived from verbs. then if anyone performed an action, he would, as a subject, be called in the same manner. For instance, if *asva,* horse were derived from *as,* to get through, then anyone who got through a certain distance, would have to be called *asva,* horse. If *trina,* grass, were derived from *trid,* to pierce,

Yaska's *Nirukta* explains in fourteen books (two being later additions) the so-called *Nighantus* which are collections of rare or ambiguous Vedic words, adapted for the teaching purposes of the Brahmins of the time. There were five of these before him—three of synonyms, one of especially difficult words, and the fifth of the Vedic gods. In treating of these etymologically, he uses as examples many *samhitas,* mostly *Rgvedic.* The *Nirukta* employs Sanskrit prose of the classical type, and is thereby probably the earliest example of Sanskrit prose.

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then whatever pierces would have to be called *trina.* Thirdly, if all nouns were derived from verbs, then everything would take as many names as there are qualities belonging to it. A pillar, for instance, which is now called *sthuna,* might be called *daresaya,* hole-rest, because it rests in a hole; or *sanjani,* joiner, because there are beams joined to it. Fourthly, people would call things in such a manner that the meaning of nouns might be at least intelligibile, whatever the regular formation may be by which the actions of these things are supposed to be expressed. Instead of *purusha,* man, which is supposed to be formed from *purisaya,* dwelling in the body, they would say *purisaya,* body-dweller; instead of *asva,* horse, *ashtri,* pervader; instead of *trina,* grass, *tardana,* piercer. Fifthly, after a noun has been formed, these etymologists begin to discuss it, and say for instance that the earth is called *prithivi,* broad, from *prathana,* stretching. But, who stretched it, and what was his resting-place while he stretched the earth? Sixthly, where the meaning cannot be discovered, no modification of the root yielding any proper signification, Sakatayana has actually taken whole verbs, and put together the halves of two distinct words. For instance, in order to form *satva,* true, he puts together the causal of *i,* to go, which begins with *ya,* as the latter half, and the participle of *as,* to be, which begins with *sa.* Lastly, it is well known, that beings come before being, and it is therefore impossible to derive the names of beings which come first, from being which comes after.

"Now all this arguing," 'Yaska continues,' "is totally wrong. For however all this may be, first, with regard to what was said, namely, that, if Sakatayana's opinion were right, all words would be significative, this we consider no objection, because we shall show that they are all significative. With regard to the second point, our answer is, that we see as a matter of fact that it is not so, but that of a number of people who perform the same action, some only take a certain name, and others do not. Not everyone that shapes a thing is called *takshan,* a shaper, but only the carpenter. Not everyone that walks about is called a *parivrajaka,* but only a religious mendicant. Not everything that enlivens is called *jivana,* but only the sap of a sugar cane. Not everything that is born of Bhumi (earth) is called *Bhumija,* but only the planet Mars (*angaraka*). And the same remark serves also as an answer to the third objection. With regard to the fourth objection, we reply, we did not make these words, we only have to explain them; and there are also some nouns of rare occurrence, which you, grammarians, derive by means of krit suffixes, and which are liable to exactly the same objection. For who could tell, without some help from etymologists, that some of the words in the Aikapadika-chapter mean what they do mean? *Vratati* is derived by you from *vrinati,* he elects, but it signifies a garland. The same applies to your grammatical derivations of such words as *damunas, jatya, atnara, jagaruka, darvihomin.* In answer to the fifth question we say, Of course we can discuss the etymological meaning of such words only as have been formed. And as to the questions, who stretched the earth, and what was his resting-place, all we can say is, that our eyes tell us that the earth is broad and even though it has not been stretched out by others, yet all men speak as they see. With respect to the sixth objection, we admit, that he who combines words without thereby arriving at their proper meaning, is to be blamed. But this blame attaches to the individual etymologist, not to the science of etymology. As to the last objection, we must again appeal to the facts of the case. Some words are derived from qualities, though qualities may be later than subjects, others not."

Panini's *Astadhyayi* has about 4,000 terse *sutras* which, as the name implies, are presented in eight books. These treat of technical terms and rules of interpretation (1), nouns in composition and case relations (2), the adding of suffixes to roots (3) and to nouns (4,5), accent and changes of sound in word-formation (6,7), and the word in the sentence (8). The underlying principle of Panini's grammar is, as we have seen, that nouns are derived from verbs. This work is extremely difficult to follow, because it is clearly meant for students of grammar who already know the language and have only to be reminded which is vulgar and otherwise, and also because of its unswerving determination for brevity. Thus Max Muller (SG, pp. ix-x) cites the example of a labyrinth of rules and exceptions governing the aorist form of the verb root *jagr* "to awake" which goes through nine changes in all, inspiring a grammarian to immortalize the linguistic phenomenon in a couplet! [3] Like the other two great grammarians who followed him (Katyayana and Patanjali), Panini made *bhasa* the subject of his grammar. In working out his linguistic doctrine (of nouns being derived from verbs) on the speech of the cultured of his day, he had recourse to the *Unadi* list of affixes or assumed invisible affixes. He employs diverse methods to secure brevity, algebraic formulae to stand for words being the chief of them. Others are "pregnant use" of the cases, the employment of "leading rules," etc. [4] Panini's date is uncertain, but this may be placed with some degree of probability in the middle of the fourth century B.C., based on its relative position with the time of Yaska, Katyayana, and Patanjali and the probable duration of time between them. He was later than Yaska, and came before Katyayana (c. 250-200 B.C.) and Patanjali (c. 150 B.C.). He was a native of Salatura, near the modern Atak, where Hiuen Tsang claims to have seen a statue to his memory. Daksi was his mother. Tradition says he was killed by a lion.

Katyavana's *Varttikas,* some 1,245 sutras of which have been preserved in Patanjali's *Mahabhasya,* present critical annotations of Panini's grammar. These would seem quite fair if one assumes that a considerable time must have elapsed between Katyayana and Panini to bring about appre-

[3] The couplet runs thus:
guno vrddhir guno vrddhih pratisedho vikalpanam /
punar vrddhir nisedho 'to yan purvah praptavo nava //
"Guna, vrddhi, guna, vrddhi, prohibition, option, again vrddhi, and then exception —these, with the change of r into a semivowel in the first instance, are the nine results." See Muller, *SG,* p. x.

[4] An example of the combination of the "pregnant use" of the cases and the employment of "leading rules" is I, 4, 23: *Karake.* Meaning roughly: "on the special relation to a word expressing an action, which is to be understood in the aphorisms which follow." *Karaka,* "case-relation" is here in the locative case, and as such is to be construed briefly as "On Case-relation". *Karake,* being at the head of a number of rules on case-relations, is to be taken as an *adhikara,* a leading rule. It introduces a whole subject.

ciable changes in usage. This is the main reason for placing Katyayana a century or more removed from Panini. On the same account, it would appear that Patanjali is little removed from Katyayana. Katyayana adds to or subtracts from the scope of the Paninean rules by examining earlier criticisms on these (he was not the first to question Panini's grammar), accepting or rejecting these criticisms based on present usage. The identification of Katyayana with a Vararuci to whom many works are ascribed, including the Prakrit grammar *Prakrtaprakasa*, has not been proved, but Patanjali identifies Katyayana as a southerner.

Patanjali's *Mahabhasya* criticizes Katyayana's criticisms, and many times defends Panini; but it also criticizes and explains other Paninean rules. Besides Katyayana's *Varttikas* and other *Varttika* verses which may not be Katyayana's, Patañjali had before him some *karikas* or memorial verses which may have been by many people, including himself, and works by Vyadi, Vajapyayana, Pauskarasadi, Konikaputra, and Gonardiya. The method of the *Mahabhasya* is simple but lively stylistically, with questions like "What?" and "How?" being posed and resolved; introducing current proverbs and references to daily social life, it is a veritable "source of information for religious and social history as well as for literature" (Keith, HSL, p. 428).[5] Although his date is still in dispute, relative to his predecessors he may safely, though tentatively, be placed c. 150 B.C. He is believed to have been the embodiment of the thousand-headed serpent of time *Sesa,* which is Visnu's resting-place in his slumber. He is also believed to be identical with the author of the *Yoga Sutras,* but at least the grammatical slips by the latter have not at all contributed towards a reasonable identity between the two writers.

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[5] Professor Keith, to illustrate this point, quotes and translates the following from the *Mahabhasya*:

apanya ity ucyate tatredam na sidhyati Civah Skando Vicakha iti. kim karanam? Mauryair hiranyarthibhir arcah prakalpitah. bhavet tasu na syat. yas tv etah samprati puiarthas tasu bhavisyati.

'"The difficulty is raised, with regard to Panini's proviso that images are not to be vendible, that on this doctrine the forms Civa, Skanda, and Vicakha, are incorrect. Why is that? Because the Mauryas, in their greed for money, used as means images of the gods (i.e. they bartered them, so that the forms should be Civaka, etc.). (Final answer.) Very well, granted that the rule for dropping *ka* does not apply to those images of the Mauryas; still as regards images now used for purposes of worship it does apply."'

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DUTCH RELATIONS WITH THE PHILIPPINES: A SURVEY OF SOURCES IN THE GENERAL STATE ARCHIVES, THE HAGUE, NETHERLANDS

M. P. H. ROESSINGH

Introduction

FEW ASIAN COUNTRIES CAN BOAST OF A SOURCE PUBLICATION comparable with *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898,* as regards the wide scope of the work and the minuteness of its annotations.[1] Not only printed sources we find here in an English translation, but also a great number of documents selected from Spanish and other archives.

Vol. 53, "Bibliography", contains surveys of manuscripts, partly published in the foregoing volumes, and also an enumeration of the diverse archives and libraries which hold important documentary material. Dutch institutions have not been studied for this purpose, but there are some remarks about the location of material in the Netherlands. Under "Other European Collections" we read: "A letter from the Director of the Netherlands archives at the Hague reports that there is no distinctive section of the archives devoted to the Philippine MSS. Most of the papers are written in the Dutch language, and many treat of the Dutch expeditions to the Orient and the Dutch Oriental possessions. It is quite probable that many MSS of the East Indies contain references to the Philippines."[2] Indeed the archives of the United East Indies Company are very rich in documents relating to the Philippines, but these are hidden for the most part between papers treating the Dutch East Indies proper. For the period up to 1800 the collection of foreign maps is also interesting, whereas the archives of the Ministries of the Colonies and of Foreign Affairs from the period of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (1813- . . .) comprise some materials relating to the Sulu Archipelago.

This article is meant as an implement to facilitate investigation of these sources. The emphasis has been laid on an important part of the VOC-archives, viz. the huge series Letters and Appendices sent over from the

[1] E. H. Blair, J. A. Robertson and E. G. Bourne, ed. Cf. for full title the Bibliography, and for abbreviations the List, below.

[2] *Op cit.,* vol. LIII, p. 9.

Indies. The General Despatches from the Indies, included in this series, have been published in part, and some monographs were based on them to a large extent, therefore an annotated bibliography of these publications — as forming an important "entrance" to the archives—precedes the survey proper. For a survey of sources relating to the Philippines in other Dutch institutions I refer to my forthcoming *Guide to the sources in the Netherlands for the history of Latin America,* to be published under the auspices of the UNESCO and of the International Council on Archives. In the following lines I shall try to give an adequate summary of the nature and extent of Dutch-Philippine relations and of the organization of the Dutch East Indies Company.

At the end of the 16th century Dutch overseas enterprise turned to direct trade with the Far East, mainly to fetch the valuable spices. The revolt of the Netherlands against Spain resulted in Spanish and Portuguese ports being closed to Dutch shipping, and this, combined with the conquest of the international port of Antwerp in the Southern Netherlands, greatly stimulated trade, shipbuilding and investigation of new sea-routes in the Northern provinces. Between 1595 and 1601 fourteen fleets with a total of 65 ships were despatched to the Indies by several groups of merchants in cities like Amsterdam, Middelburg and Delft. One of these fleets, comprising four ships, stood under command of Olivier van Noort of Rotterdam. In April 1598 this fleet left the Netherlands; by way of the Strait of Magalhaes van Noort sailed to the Indies and arrived with two ships at the Ladrones in September, 1600. In November he cruised off Manila to prey upon the silver galleon from Acapulco and the richly laden Chinese junks. As appears from his journal, Van Noort saw very clearly the importance for Philippine economy of the silver imports from Acapulco on the one hand, and of the Chinese trade on the other: "These Islands in themselves do not possess any treasures, but the Chinese trade is most valuable; these Chinese sail to all places to perform their trade, and act very subtle in this business."[3]

The position of the Dutch merchants trading in the Indies was strengthened considerably in 1602, when the several so-called Early Companies were amalgamated into a United East Indies Company with a charter granted by the States-General of the Dutch Republic. The central management, "Heren Zeventien" (Gentlemen Seventeen) was composed of representatives of the

[3] Journal of Van Noort, ed. J. W. Ijzerman, 1st vol., p. 113. This edition forms vols. XXVII and XXVIII of the Works, published by the Linschoten Society. The aim of this society is the publication of the original and unabridged text of rare or unpublished Dutch travels by sea and land and geographical accounts. Vols. XLVII and LXV (see Bibliography: van SPILBERGEN and *Nassausche Vloot*) are also of importance for the Philippines. See for a descriptive index of the Society's editions: *Tresoor*, and for contemporary printed travel accounts the bibliographies by TIELE. The archives of the "Early Companies" from 1594-1603 (printed inventory by R. Bijlsma, The Hague, 1927) do not contain documents of importance for Philippine history.

six Chambers, the most important of which were those of Amsterdam and Middelburg. A Governor-General with his Council headed the government in the Indies. In 1619 the Governor-General Jan Pieterszoon Coen founded Batavia, the "general rendez-vous", from which place the various trading posts in Asia were run and communications with the home country were maintained.

Although the power of the VOC increased steadily during the 17th century, to reach its height around 1700, the organization both in the home country and in Asia was not altered fundamentally before the end of the Dutch Republic in 1795. In 1800 it was formally dissolved, its rights and properties were taken over by the state.

Especially during the first half of the 17th century the spice-growing regions were of paramount importance for the Dutch. Here they encountered the Portuguese and the Spanish, the latter being their neighbours on the small island of Ternate up to 1663. As a means to expel the Spanish an attack on their most important base in the Philippines lay at hand. A blockade of Manila, if possible combined with the capture of a silver galleon, thus served a threefold purpose: the weakening of the Spanish empire, reinforcement of the Company's commercial position with the indispensable silver and the diversion of the Chinese junks to the Dutch factories.

Between 1609 and 1648 — when the Treaty of Munster was concluded between Spain and the Netherlands—some twenty-five Company fleets were despatched to Philippine waters, either from Batavia, the Moluccan Islands, or from the Dutch factories in Formosa and Japan. They never succeeded in taking a silver-laden galleon from Acapulco, although several times it was a near miss (for instance in 1620). The capture of Chinese junks off Manila formed a part of the scheme to divert the Chinese trade to the Dutch factories. To this end, Chinese harbours (a.o Macao) were also blockaded and in 1624 the factory in Formosa was set up. During the period 1624-1662 (in 1662 the fortress Zeelandia was lost to the Chinese rebel Chêng Ch'êng-kung) the Dutch attracted a considerable amount of Chinese imports and exports. That this had a startling effect on the authorities at Manila is proven by the fact that they occupied Ki-Lung at the Northern tip of Formosa and Tan-Sui on the East coast of 1626, just to check a further advance of their heretical enemies. Ki-Lung was taken by the Dutch in 1642, but in Philippine waters the VOC was less successful. After the fall of Malacca in 1641, the attention of the Batavian authorities was once more focused on the crippling of the Manila trade. To achieve this end, they tried it all at once: the interception of a galleon, the capture of as much junks as possible, the blockade of Manila and the performing of raids in different parts of the archipelago. This splitup of the Dutch forces

gave the Spanish an opportunity to deal with their enemy one by one, and although the Company was superior as regards the number of ships, it never scored a decisive victory during the five campaigns of 1644-1648. On the other hand, Spanish chroniclers and even modern Philippine historians [4] exaggerated this failure because the Dutch did not conquer Manila even when the city was almost defenseless, but, apart from some occasional wishful thinking [5] and highly theoretical "speculations" [6] the occupation of Manila, let alone of the entire archipelago, was never seriously considered. On the contrary, Governor-General Anthonie van Diemen and his Council emphaticaly rejected such an undertaking. [7]

Although the 5th article of the Treaty of Munster (1648) stipulated that the Spanish should keep their trade relations in the East Indies without being allowed to extend them, and although the same article forbade the Dutch to frequent Spanish harbours, the Company nevertheless tried to get a hand in the Manila-Acapulco trade. The Directors in 1657 made a proposal to the Spanish ambassador about the trade relations between Manila and Batavia and even suggested to bring spices, etc. to America in Dutch ships. After some deliberation the Spanish government refused, just as English offers of this kind were turned down. [8] Official regulations, however, are one thing, everyday practice is quite another. The Dutch soon learned that they could trade freely at Manila, provided that ships, crew, permits etc. were not discernible as being of Dutch origin. Moreover, they could attract Manila merchants to Batavia and Malacca to supply them with much-coveted Ceylon cinnamon, a monopoly product of the VOC. Apart from occasional interruptions, for instance during the War of the Spanish Succession, this trade continued until the end of the 18th century. For this reason the Directors did not press their point too much when they protested against the activities of the Royal Philippine Company in 1732 and again in 1765 and 1785. The Batavia-Manila trade must not be disturbed by this quarrel.[9]

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[4] Thus Gregorio F. Zaide, *Philippine Political and Cultural History*, I, p. 268.

[5] Thus Governor-General Pieter Both in a General Despatch to Gentlemen Seventeen, 26th July 1612. *Generale Missiven* I, p. 17. P. Both thought that the Filipinos would welcome the Dutch as their liberators from the tyrannical Spaniards. From the same period dates the advice of Apollonius Schotte, a captain of the VOC in the Moluccas, who wanted to take strongholds in the Philippines, in order to cut off the supply lines of the Spanish forces in the Spice Islands. His "discours" was printed as an annex to the Journal of Van Spilbergen. (See above.)

[6] Cf. Collection van Hoorn-vanRiebeeck, inv. nr. 42, below.

[7] *Generale Missiven* II, p. 173. 12 December 1642. If the Company would occupy the Philippines, the cost would outgrow the profit, Van Diemen told the Directors.

[8] Cf. S. D. Quiason, *English Country Trade*, pp. 17-24.

[9] Cf. W. L. Schurz, *The Manila Galleon*, App. I: "The Royal Philippine Company", and Arch. VOC, inv.nrs. 4464/ij6 and ee4, below.

Before 1648 the VOC repeatedly tried to realize a cooperation between its forces and those of the diverse Mindanao princes against Spain, and also intervened between these rulers when internal disputes flared up on the island. Lack of necessary naval force thwarted a common action, and moreover the reliability of the most important ruler, residing near Simoay [10], was doubted. At first the Dutch entertained high expectations of the trade in slaves, wax, gold and tortoise-shells that could be carried on with Mindanao. Yet no factory was founded here, because the successive Sultans continually rejected the proposals of the Company to this end. Although they welcomed both Dutch and English traders in their lands, at the time they feared to lose their independence when the VOC should settle at Mindanao, and also foresaw Spanish intervention. (For this reason — fear of Dutch expansion — the Sultan on the other hand encouraged the English to build a factory when the latter visited Mindanao in the 1680's; see QUIASON, p. 116-118.)

The princes of the Sangihe-Island were akin to the Mindanao rulers and possessed some portions of Southern Mindanao. Since 1677 these princes were vassals of the Company and in 1688 the King of Kandhar (N.-Sangihe Islands) yielded his possessions to the Dutch. [11] The actual situation did not change much by this, because the Company only held legal titles without exercising authority on the spot. (With the exception of Palmas, see below.)

In the 1680's several English ships visited the islands; [12] the Dutch feared that the English would use Mindanao as a base from whence they could ensconce themselves in the Spice Islands. Therefore, the Company repeatedly sent expeditions to Mindanao to thwart such efforts and to seek the Sultan's friendship. (Or, occassionally, threaten him: see OB 1691 XIX.) The governing principle of policy towards Mindanao in the following century was: to keep other nations out and to promote trade within certain limitations. Freeburghers [13] of Ternate were permitted to engage in this trade, and likewise the inhabitants of Mindanao were attracted to Ternate to sell their merchandise, but the trade in spices was strictly forbidden. Correspondence between the native princes of Ternate and Mindanao was kept under close control and if the Dutch detected a violation of the rules, harsh measures were taken. [14] The VOC also tried to check a possible Spanish advance: as the news about the foundation of the Royal Philippine Company arrived at Batavia in 1733, the "Bonneratte" went to the islands of Sarangani (at the Southern tip of Mindanao) to erect two stone pillars

[10] Simoay lies at Illano Bay, 7° 20' N.Lat., 124° 10' E.Long.

[11] Cf. OB 1690 V, below.

[12] Cf. Quiason, *op cit.*, Chapter V: "The Early Trade Relations of the East India Company with Mindanao and Sulu".

[13] Freeburghers mostly were former servants of the Company, who held a license for trade on a restricted number of ports in Asia.

[14] Cf. OB 1722 XII, below.

with the company mark on it. This was to show that the territory belonged to the VOC according to the treaty with the King of Kandhar. During this expedition another Dutch ship, the "Langerak", was taken by the Spanish. [15]

Almost two centuries later, the treaty with the King of Kandhar again came to the foreground when a dispute arose between the United States of America and the Kingdom of the Netherlands respecting sovereignty over the small island of Palmas (Miangas), lying to the south of Mindanao. The Netherlands could prove that "this sovereignty arose out of conventions entered into with the native princes of the Islands of Sangi . . . establishing the sovereignty of the Netherlands over the territories of these princes, including Palmas (or Miangas)".[16]

The earliest relations with the Sulu Archipelago also appear in the light of the struggle against Spain. When Laurens Reael, the Dutch Governor of the Moluccas, attacked Panay and Cebu in 1614, the envoys of Sulu and Mindanao wanted to conclude a treaty with the Dutch against the common enemy. "Those of Solock are civil people, speaking the Malay language well", remarked Reael. [17] An effective cooperation did not take place for the moment. In 1642, an envoy of the Sultan of Sulu visited Batavia with a request for help against the Spanish, but not until 1645 the VOC sent two yatchs of the Moluccan fleet to N.E.-Borneo, to size up the situation. The auxiliary forces promised by the sultan did not show up and after bombarding the Spanish fort at Sulu for three days the ships sailed away to Batavia. In 1646, the Sultans of Sulu and Mindanao made peace with the Spanish. Relations with Sulu in the following years were only transitory. The Batavian authorities thought that it would be wiser to attract Sulunese ships to Makassar or Batavia and to obtain this way the pearls, tortoise-shells and other merchandise than to send Company ships to the islands: the long wait for sufficient cargo would make this an uneconomic procedure. The increased interest of the Dutch in the Sulu Islands after about 1760 was the result of the English presence in this area. [18] Just like a century previously at Mindanao, the Company saw its monopoly position in danger and dispatched several missions to Sulu to investigate this matter. It also tried to establish a closer alliance with the Sultan or at least to induce him to take a neutral position.

The expanding piracy became a problem already in the 18th century and led to a Dutch punitive expedition in 1848, during which the capital of Sulu was bombarded. The strength of Sulu was in no way broken by this action. Although a second expedition was considered necessary, the

[15] Cf. OB 1735 VI, 1736 III, 1737 III, below, and Godée Molsbergen.
[16] *Arbitral Award*, p. 15, 41, 50; see also OB 1702 II, below.
[17] Cited Van Dijk, p. 219.

Dutch government did not take this step but confined itself to the role of an observer during the military operations and diplomatic negotiations which led to the subjection of Sulu to Spain and the renunciation of the sovereignty over N.E. Borneo.

List of abbreviations

BKI	— Bijdragen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (Contributions of the Royal Institute for Linguistics, Geography and Ethnology).
B & R	— Blair & Robertson, *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898.*
GG	— Gouverneur-Generaal (Governor-General at Batavia).
GGRR	— Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden (van Indië). (Governor-General and Councillors (of the Indies).
GPh	— Governor of the Philippines.
GTern	— Governor of Ternate.
K.A. . . .	— Koloniaal Archief . . . (Colonial Archives . .) The Signature preceding the numbers of items in the VOC-archives.
OB	— Uit Indië Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren (Letters and appendices sent over from the Indies).
R.G.P.	— Riiks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën (State Historical Publications).
T.B.G.	— Tijdschrift van het Koninklik Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen (Review of the Royal Batavian Society of Arts and Sciences).
VOC	— Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (United East Indies Company).
VROA	— Verslagen omtrent 's-Riiks Oude Archieven (Reports concerning the Old State Archives).

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N.B. Pieter van Dam, the Company's lawyer, wrote his description between 1693 and 1701 for the use of the Directors. The manuscript is deposited in the archives of the VOC. In the second book, part 2, Van Dam described the Moluccas with Mindanao (2nd chapter) and the Philippine Islands in general (22nd chapter). (R.G.P. nr. 74, pp. 46-51, 787-807). The material for this work was mainly derived from the Company's archives. Van Dam also used a Dutch translation of William Dampier's travels, and several Spanish authors.

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For resolutions, etc. concerning the Royal Philippine Company, see Archives of VOC, inv.nrs. 4464/ij6, 4464/ee4.

— Lokethas Admiralty, 41, 42: Papers relating to the journey of the Nassau fleet, 1623-1626. Cf. *Nassausche vloot* (bibl.).

— Inv.nr. 12454 (formerly nr. 3285): Register of instructions and memoranda; on fol. 13 et seq.: Instruction for the commander of the Nassau fleet, with annexes, a.o. memoranda relating to the Philippines. Fol. 63-64: Description of Manila, Mindanao, etc., by Joris Adriaenssen, who sailed with captain Anthonis Anthonisz. van Culenborg in 1598, became a captive of the Spanish at Tidoire and was brought to Manila. Written at Rotterdam, 1614 July 28. Fol. 64-66 = Memoir about the location of-, and the relative distance between several places in the Philippines. No date. Fol. 88-96: Sailing directions from Brazil to Panama and from there to the Philippines. No date. A list of the annexes has been printed in van DAM, *R.G.P.* 68, p. 540 note 1, and in *Nassausche Vloot* p. 115-117. The same manuscripts are also found in Acquisitions 1st section General State Archives, 1866 A VIc.

Archives of the United East India Company, 1602-1796.

Inventory in manuscript, printed inventory in preparation.

For a survey of the archives as a whole, cf. MEILINK-ROELOFSZ. The archives of "Heren XVII" (the central management) and of the Chamber Amsterdam have been combined. This is the most important part. With respect to our subject, the following series may be mentioned briefly:

— Resolutions of the Gentlemen XVII, 1602-1796. With indexes.

— Id. Chamber Amsterdam.

— Registers of outgoing letters from the XVII and the Chamber Amsterdam to the Indies, 1614-1795. With indexes.

N.B. Detailed indexes. These letters are of interest especially to trace the Director's policy with regard to the VOC trade with Manila.

— Papers relating to the earliest voyages, 1602-1614, comprising the voyage under Pieter Willemsz. Verhoeff, 1607-1612; subsection: Papers relating to the squadron under command of vice-admiral Francois Wittert.

N.B. Francois Wittert was sent by Verhoeff from Bantam to Makassar and to Moluccas with four ships in Febr. 1609. In Sept. 1609

he sailed from Ternate to the Philippines. K.A. 961-17: Original letters from Francois Wittert to Gijsbert Gijsbertsz., captain, and Pieter Segersz., merchant, in the yacht "D Pauw", Februari 20 – 1610 April 8. 8 items. K.A. 961-18: Copies of letters from Pieter Segersz. to Francois Wittert and Victor Sprinckel, head of the VOC-factory at Patani. March 25 – 1610 May 18. 3 items.

— Resolutions of the Governor-General and Councillors of the Indies, 1613-1791. (Partly in CB). With indexes.

N.B. Cf. *Realia.*

— Secret resolutions of the same, 1756-179. With tables of contents.

N.B. Before 1756 secret resolutions were inserted in OB, and sometimes in the ordinary resolutions.

— Daily records of Batavia Castle.

N.B. Cf. *Dagregisters.*

— Batavian outgoing letterbook, 1621-1792: Copies of letters sent GGRR to Directors of outposts; instructions given to commanders of fleets, letters to foreign rulers, etc. With tables of contents, arranged according to the names of the outposts. Letters to Manila etc. can be found under the heading "Batavia".

— Letters and appendices sent over from the Indies to the "Heren XVII" and the Chamber Amsterdam, 1607-1795. 2908 vols. (Abbreviated as: "*OB*": Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren"). Cf. MEILINK-ROELOFSZ, pp. 173-4: "Although it was 1610 before a central authority was established in the Indies, during the 19th century the documents ranging from 1607 to 1614 ceased to be classified under the headings of the fleets and were arranged instead according to the offices in which they had originated. . . By this arrangement these documents link up with the series of letters and papers from the Indies beginning in 1614 compiled by the United Company's Amsterdam office from the papers which arrived there each from the Indies and were classified topographically within the course of that year. The records for any given year include, in the first place, one or more of the so-called "original general missives" from Governor-General and Council to Gentlemen Seventeen. The rest of the documents must be considered as annexes to these general reports. . . At the beginning of the 17th century the number worked out at about 3 or 4 volumes per annum, but in the 18th century it increased to some 30 or 40 volumes per annum. Lists of letters and other documents, partly compiled at the time, exist for both series (1607-1614 and 1614-1795). Since these lists are incomplete after 1661, new ones are now being compiled for the rest of the volumes — a labour which at the present day, has advanced as far as c. 1740. (In 1967: as far as c. 1750. M.P.H.R.). The lists alone already run into thousands of pages but they are, of course, the keys to this treasure house of source material." Cf. also *Bouwstoffen; Coen; Generale Missiven; Opkomst.*

The following list contains descriptions of documents in the OB, drawn up on the basis of the abovementioned lists of contents in each volume. Therefore many data which are hidden in letters and reports of a more general nature must have been overlooked. For this material, a possible investigator will have to check the indexes of the source publications and monographs mentioned in the bibliography. The records mentioned below may also serve as a starting-point for further research in correspondence, etc., close-

ly connected with it, for instance in letters from the Governor of Ternate to GGRR, following a report about Mindanao. To save printing-space, K.A.-numbers have been omitted. (In the new printed inventory these numbers will not be used anyhow.) Most volumes are paginated or foliated consecutively. If this is not the case, the heading under which the item may be found, is mentioned, e.g., "Batavia", "Taiwan" (Formosa), "Malacca", "Ternate". Thus, "1626 IV, Taiwan, 243-4" means: Letters etc. sent over from the Indies, *received in the Netherlands* in 1626, fourth volume, section Taiwan, folio (or page) 243 and 244.

If not mentioned otherwise, the records are copies, written in Dutch.

1607-1613 II Patani § 3 (not paginated): Resolution taken by the ship's council of "De Pauw", captain Gijsbert Gijsbertz. and merchant Pieter Segersz., concerning the voyage from the Philippines to Patani, 1610 April 25. 3 fols.

N.B. Cf. Papers relating to the earliest voyages, 1602-1614, mentioned above.

Letters from Pieter Segersz. to Jacques l'Hermite at Bantam, about Dutch successes in Philippine waters, June 18 and 1610 November 2. 8 fols.

1617 III, 8. Letter from Don Juan de Silva, GPh., to the King of Johor, dated "28 de Febrero 1616". Spanish.

1618 I, 143-144. Letter from Jan Dircksz. Lam, at the Bay of Manila, to GG Laurens Reael, in the Moluccas, 1617 February 11.

Id., 145-154. Resolutions taken by Lam during the expedition to the Philippines, 1616 September 23 – 1617 February 9.

Id., 155-162, 238-241. Propositions and statement by Don Juan de Silva, GPh., before the Audienca at Manila, concerning the most advantageous use of the Spanish Armada against the Dutch, 1616 January 12. With critical remarks by Don Juan Alvareda Brecamonte, fiscal of the Spanish King. Printed Spanish text with Dutch ms. translation.

N.B. The Spanish text in SLOOS, Appendix II.

1618 II, 8-9. Letter from the vice-commander Claes Martensz. 't Hovelinck to the GG about the battle in Philippine waters under command of Jan Dircksz. Lam. (c. May 1617).

1618 III, 127-131. Cargo list of six Chinese junks, captured in Philippine waters in 1617 April, which were received by Jacques Specx, head of the Dutch factory at Hirado (Japan) on 1617 October 12.

Id., 213-214. Letter from C.M. 't Hovelinck to the GG, as 1618 III, 89.

Id., 283-289. Letter from J.D. Lam, at the Bay of Manila, to the GG, 1617 October 11.

Id., 290-291. Letter from J.D. Lam to the GG, as 1618 I, 143-4.

Id., 292-298. Resolutions taken by J.D. Lam and the ship's council during the expedition to the Philippines, April 14-15, April 24 – 1617 September 26.

Id., 299-314. Verdicts pronounced by the same, 1616 September 24-1617 October 8.

Id., 335-342. Proposition and statement as 1618 I, 155-162. Dutch translation. Clean copy.

1619 II, 353. List of Dutch prisoners at Manila, who were still alive on September 3rd, 1617.

1621 I, 211-212. Letter from Willem Jansen Roose, one of the Dutch prisoners at Manila, to the GG, 1619 December 8.

1621 II, 372. Report about the Spanish naval force in the Philippines, by Vincent Romeyn van Lieswijck, who left Manila 1st August (1620).

1622 I, 207. Resolutions taken by the combined English-Dutch Council of Defense about the resumption of the expeditions against the Philippines, 1621 June 30.

Id., 233. Resolutions as above, in a different redaction but with the same contents.

1622 II, 186-197. Spanish-Dutch agreement about the prisoners of war on both sides; Spanish, two copies. Lists of Spanish prisoners in the Dutch Moluccas-Spanish, two copies — and of Dutch prisoners in Manila and in the galleys; Spanish and Dutch. 1621 July.

1623 I, 297-299. List of victuals aboard the "Swaen", equipped for an expedition to the Philippines. (1621-1622).

Id., 300-301. Musterroll of the "Swaen", manned by a mixed English-Dutch crew. (Cf. 1622 I, 207).

Id., 302-303. List of equipment destined to go aboard the "Swaen", delivered in Japan by the VOC and the English East India Company.

Id., 317-325. Debentures and account of the money which the Spanish alleged to have advanced to the Dutch prisoners at Manila, 15th December 1621.

Id., 360-361. Instruction for the uppermerchant Christiaen Fransz., destined to Mindanao with the ship "De Hont". 1621 September 22.

1624 II, 279-284. Letters from the Spanish Governor at Ternate and from the Dutch prisoners to the Dutch Governor at Ternate; List of Dutch and English prisoners, brought from Manila to Spanish Ternate; Letter from the Spanish Governor of Ternate to the King of Ternate; Letter from the old king of Ternate, at Manila, to his son and other noblemen at Ternate. 1623 May.

1626 IV, Taiwan, 243-4. Letter from the commander and uppermerchant Pieter Jansz. Muyser, in the ship "Het Wapen van Seelandt" off the West Coast of Luzon, to GG. 1625 May 22.

Id., 247-249. Letter from Jan Pietersz. Reus, captain of the "Orange", off the West coast of Luzon, to the Governor of Taiwan Martinus Sonck, 1625 May 24.

Id., 317-332. Logbook of the expedition from Taiwan to the Bay of Manila and the West coast of Luzon, with the ships "'t Wapen van Seelandt", "Noorthollant" and "Orange" and the yachts "Den Haen", "Fortuyn" and "Victoria", under command of P.J. Muyser, January 27 – 1625 May 22.

Id., 357-359. Logbook of the voyage with the yacht "Victoria" from Taiwan to Manila during the absence of the fleet, January 27 – 1625 February 26.

Id., 369-372. Verdicts pronounced by Pieter Muyser and his council, 1625 March 12-24.

Id., 375-384. Letter from P.J. Muyser to the Governor of Taiwan, Martinus Sonck, 1625 May 22.

1630 II, 97-116. Report about the voyage to Mindanao by Daniel Ottens, fiscal at Ternate, 1628 August 30 – 1628 November 18. With sketch-maps between the text.

N.B. To this report belongs the map nr. 298 (see Map Collection, below). A second copy of the report in this vol., fol. 454-476.

1632 I, 552-554. Report about the Spanish fortification at Ki-Lung (Taiwan), based on information supplied by escaped Filipinos. (no date).

N.B. A second copy in 1632 II, 344-5.

1633 II, 165. Letter from the Sultan of Mindanao to GTern., (1632).

N.B. The Sultan sends a "bhaar" (c. 375 pounds) of wax as a present, and asks for delivery of a piece of cannon with ammunition, sundry textiles and two pieces of tapestry, with quotation of prices.

1636 II, 514-524. Extract of the log-book held by captain Lambert Jeronumusz. of the yacht "Texel", bound for Cabo del Espiritu Santo and the Pescadores, May 1 – 1635 July 27.

1637 II, 790-791. Statement by a certain Bastiaan Leenwa. born at Manila, about the silver-galleons. (1636).

N.B. This Leenwa deserted to the Dutch at Ternate, after sailing on the Manila-Acapulco route for some years.

1639 II, 237-238. Letter from the Sultan of Mindanao to GTern., Jan van Broeckum. Received 1638 May 19.

N.B. The Sultan asks for help against the Spanish who have taken Zamboanga.

Id., 547-565. Papers deriving from the Danish yacht "Corsoer", from Tranquebar (India), bound for Manila, taken by the Dutch near Malacca. 1638.

1641 IV, 172-179. Report concerning the Chinese rebellion in the Philippines, 1639 November 20 – 1640 March 2.

Id., 180-181. Intercepted Portuguese and Spanish letters, a.o. from Jeronimo da Breu at Macao to Antonio Vaz Pinto at Malacca, 1640 October 17: "The Spanish at Manila are doing us more harm than the Dutch; they take our merchandise for a price that suits them best." Fray Diego de Santa Maria, at Manila, to the Prior, president of the convent of St. Paulo at Sevilla, 1640 May 10: "The Chinese rebellion put us in great peril. There were 40,000 rebels, of whom 30,000 were killed."

N.B. Cf. B. & R., XXIX, p. 249: between 22.000 and 24.000 Chinese were killed; ZAIDE, I, p. 281 note 56 cites diverse writers who gave different estimates of the Chinese losses.

1643 III, 396-435. Log-books of the yachts "Wijdenes", "Zantfoort", "Waterhont" en "Lillo", concerning the cruise near Cabo del Espiritu Santo and Manila, February-July 1642.

1644 III, sequel, 576-7. Cargo lists of two Chinese junks captured by the Dutch off the Luzon coast, 1643 June – July.

Id., 578. List of merchandise, loaded by the VOC-factory at Taiwan in the junk of a Chinese interpreter, who is leaving Cagayan (N.-Luzon) to trade in gold. 1643 May 26.

1645 I, 486-8, 491-5. Instruction for the chiefmate Symon Cornelisz. and the ship's council of the junks, cruising off Manila, with letters from Symon Cornelisz. to Maximiliaen le Maire, Governor of Taiwan, April 14, May 10, May 16, 1644.

1645 II, sequel, 715-718. Lists of merchandise captured off Manila by commander Marten Gerritsz. de Vries and uppermerchant Hendrik Steen, July 25, October 19, 1645.

Id., 750-751. Letter from Hendrik Steen to the Governor of Taiwan Francois Caron. 1645 May 12.

Id., 757-758. Letter from M.G. de Vries to the Governor of Taiwan, 1645 August 6.

1646 II, 206-208. Instruction for captain Lucas Albertsz., for a voyage to N.E.-Borneo with yachts "Venlo" and "Haring", to fight the Spanish in cooperation with the Sultan of Sulu. 1645 March 25.

1647, II, 182-6, 454-69, 470-9, 498-597, 617-23. Correspondence between Batavian authorities and the VOC-fleet in Philippine waters, resolutions taken by the ship's council, orders given to or issued by the commander M.G. de Vries. January – October, 1646.

1648 I, sequel, 385-9. Instructions for the yacht "Popkensburgh" and the fly-boat "Den Os", leaving Batavia for Manila 11th and 24th September 1647.

1648 II, sequel, 459-85, 488-93. Correspondence between Batavian authorities and the

VOC-fleet in Philippine waters under command of M.G. de Vries, 1647 June-October.
1649 II, sequel, 424-5. Instruction for the yacht "Waterhont", bound for Manila. 1647 November 15.

Id., 427-8. Letter to M.G. de Vries, sailing off Manila, 1647 November 15.

Id., 474-6. Letter from Abel Jansz. Tasman and his council, sailing off Albay (S.-Luzon) to Governor & Council of Taiwan. 1648 August.

1669 I, 904-905. Letter from GGRR to Gentlemen XVII about the arrest of the GPh Don Diego de Salcedo by a party of malcontent Spanish at the instigations of the Inquisition. De Salcedo was accused of having maintained friendly relations with the Dutch. He asks the Company to deliver his letters to the Queen of Spain and to his brother Don Luis Salcedo at Brussels. GGRR thought it proper to grant this request. 1669 February 28.

Id., 906-907. Extract from a letter from the Governor of Malacca to GGRR, concerning Company's trade with Chinese junks between Malacca and Manila, and the fate of Don Diego de Salcedo. 1669 January 27.

Id., 908-9. Letter from the GPh Don Diego de Salcedo to GGRR, 1669 January 7. In Latin.

1676 I, 331-2. Memoir about the private trade at Batavia, from – and to Macao, Quinam, Tonkin, Manila, etc., carried on by Batavian freeburghers, Chinese, Macao merchants etc., during 1675.

1680 VI, 309-310. Report by the freeburgher of Ternate Pieter Tiedes about his conversation on the 2nd December 1678 with Prince Maulana ("Radja Coudaij"), a brother of the Sultan of Mindanao Braghman Corolat. 1679 September 4.

1688 VII, 195. Instruction issued by GTern to the second mate Barend Brouwer regarding the mission to Mindanao with the sloop of the Amboinese freeburger capt. Johum Engel. 1687 October 9. (Recte: 1686).

Id., 196-7. Report by R. Brouwer about his voyage to Mindanao and about the English trade on that island. 1687 March 13.

Id., 197-8. Letter from the Sultan of Mindanao to the Sultan of Ternate. Translated from Malay into Dutch. 1686 January.

Id., 198-200. Letter from captain Ch. Swan, of the English ship "The Cygnet", to GTern., written at Mindanao, 1687 February 16/26.

Id., 200-202. Musterroll of the "Cygnet", Mindanao, 1687 February 14/24.

1690 V, 324-5. Deed of conveyance of certain regions on the Southern coast of Mindanao to the VOC by the King of Kandhar (Sangihe-Islands). 1688 September 10.

Id., 328-339. Letters from the Sultan of Mindanao to the late GTern., Joan Hendrick Tim, and to the Sultan of Ternate. Received 1689 August 18.

Id., 339-349. Report by the undersurgeon Pieter de Abreuw about his voyage to Mindanao, June 22 – 1689 August 18.

1691 XIX; Resolutions, instructions, reports, deeds, etc. marked K-Q, V-IJ, (together 350 pages) deriving from the Dutch factory at Ternate, about relations with Mindanao, the presence of the English on that island, the voyage of the English ship "The Cygnet" across the Pacific, (with letters from the crew of "The Cygnet") etc., partly in English. 1687-1689. With copies of some older records.

With copies of some older records.

"no. 14" (2 pages). Letter from the late GTern. J.H.Thim to the Sultan of Mindanao, 1689 July 11.

N.B. "If the Sultan does not adhere to the contract concluded with the VOC some years ago, i.e. to exclude Europeans from Min-

danao, the Company will devastate his land," Thim warns. (About the existence of such a contract no other evidence has been found as yet.)

"no. 19". Deed of conveyance as in 1690 V, 324-5.

1692 VIII, 397-9. Statement made by Johannes Eduarts, merchant of the VOC at Negapatnam (Coromandel Coast) about the (illicit) private trade carried on by Company officials from the Coromandel Coast to Manila during the past years. 1691 October 2.

1692 XI, 358-60. Letters from the Portuguese Francisco Da Silva Enriquez, at Manila, to GGRR. Dated 1689 November 15, received 1691 April 25.

N.B. Complaints about customs at the port of Malacca.

1692 XIII, 572-3. Statement, made October 27, 1691, by an Indian merchant about the quarrel at Banjer (S.-E.Sumatra) between 4 ships from Macao and one from Manila. Both parties demanded preference on the pepper market. The Macao ships drove their competitor away, but they on their turn were expelled by soldiers of the King of Palembang.

1693 III, 560-574. Two extracts from Ternatan daily records 1691 October 10, containing the interrogation of Chinese merchants about their visit of Mindanao in 1687 and about the English ship from Madras "The Mindanao Merchant". With interrogation at Batavia of two Indian sailors, former crewmembers of "The Mindanao Merchant", 1692 December 23.

1693 IV, 275-8. Letter from GPh Don Fausto Cruzat y Gongora to GGRR, 1693 January 31.

N.B. GPh sends a ship to Batavia to buy anchors and asks for delivery of a letter in Spain by way of the Company's return fleet.

1693 XVI, 501-504.Letter from the Sultan of Mindanao to the GG, received at Ternate July 22, 1691.

Id., 504-506. Four letters from the Sultan and court officials of Mindanao to the "Captain of the Malay" (? Possibly Capitanlaoet = Admiral) at Ternate.

1694 XVI, Malacca, 155-6. Letter as 1693 IV, 275-8.

Id., 177-8. Papers about the Manila ship "Nostra Signora de Bonaviste" under command of Don Bernardo d'Andaya, bound for Bengal but sent back by the Dutch Governor of Malacca because Spanish traffic with the West of Asia is contrary to the 5th article of the Treaty of Munster, according to the Dutch.

N.B. Cf. Introduction, and OB 1755 I, 138-140.

1695 XII, 3rd part, "no. 11". (fol. 1-22). Instruction for the undermerchant Pieter Alsteijn and the ensign David Haak for a voyage to Mindanao, the Sangihe and Talaud-Islands. (c. October 1693, copied 1694 July 26).

N.B. Another copy in OB 1695 XIV, 408-415.

Id., "no. 12" (fol. 1-27, 1-268). Log-book of this voyage, preceded by a register of marginal notes. 1693 October 21 – 1694 March 24.

Id., "no. 13" (fol. 1-123). Report concerning this voyage, 1693 October 21 – 1694 March 24.

N.B. Another copy in OB 1695 XIV, 415-481.

1696 IX, Malacca, 18-20, 79, 213-214. Correspondence between GPh, GGRR and the Governor of Malacca about the delivery of letters in Spain by the Company. 1694-1695.

1700 II, 1083-1102. Reports by the Councillors of the Indies Joannes Cops, the former GTern Cornelis van der Duijn, the captain Meijndert de Roij and the mer-

chant Jacob Claese, dealing with Mindanao and other islands in the Eastern provinces. 1700 January 26.

1701 X, 87-93. Letter from the Sultan of Mindanao to the GG, written at Simoay, 1699 November 16.

N.B. The Sultan gives notice of the death of his eldest brother on July 6, 1699, after which he succeeded in all the dignities.

Id., 96-126. Report by captain Cornelis Claesz. Silver concerning the intended voyage with the sloop "De Lastdrager" from Ternate to Menado (Celebes), the drifting away to Mindanao and his experiences there, May 2 – 1699 December 17.

Id., 207. Written advice by three captains concerning an intended voyage to Mindanao. 1700 May 19.

Id., 267-270. Letter from the GTern Salomon Lesage to the Sultan of Mindanao, 1700 June 15.

Id., 270-281. Instruction for captain Paulus de Brievings and ensign Jacob Cloeck, regarding their voyage from Ternate to Mindanao, 1700 June 15.

1702 II, 649-837. Log-book by De Brievings and Cloeck about the voyage from Ternate to Mindanao, the Talaud-islands and the "the Islands of Meangij" with the ships "De Bije", "Larijcque" and "De Peer", 1700 June 15-1701 January 14. With annexes. To this Log-book belongs a map; see Map. Coll. nr. 299.

N.B. "Meangij" = Miangas (Palmas), cf. *Arbitral Award,* p. 50.

1702 VIII, 241-266. Instruction for the merchant David van Petersom and the undermerchant Jan Walraven de la Fontaine, regarding their voyage from Ternate to Mindanao, etc. 1701 August 29.

Id., 280-283. Letter from the GTern Roselaer to the Sultan of Mindanao, 1701 August 29.

1703 III, 241-628. Log-book by David van Peterson and Jan Walraven de la Fontaine about their voyage to Mindanao etc., 1701 August 30-1702 April 20.

1703 XII, Ternate, 175-6. Letter from the Sultan of Mindanao to the Sultan of Ternate, dated "20 Rabionlachir 1113", received at Ternate April 19, 1702.

Id., 321-323. Id., to the GG, received at Batavia September 21, 1702.

Id., 586-589. Extract from the daily record held at Ternate, 1702 June 29, containing a statement by captain Michiel Caspar Cornelis Bouka about his drifting away to Mindanao — together with the King of Tabukan (Sangihe-Islands) — and their stay on that island from 1701 July 9 – 1701 December 3.

1704 III, 1299-1304. Report containing the interrogation at Batavia of a Portuguese merchant from Macao and the crew of a Chinese junk, who arrived from Macao, about the state of affairs in the Philippines. 1704 January 18.

1704 VIII, Ternate, 163-165. Letters from the Sultan of Mindanao to the King of Tabukan (Sangihe-Islands) and to the native schoolmaster at Tabukan about the exchange of presents and the maintenance of friendly relations. 1703 March 28, received at Ternate June 11, 1703.

Id., 363-394. Instruction for the undermerchant Sebastiaen Keller and the bookkeeper Abraham Stuyt regarding their voyage from Ternate to Mindanao, the Talaud-Islands, etc. 1703 August 4.

Id., 394-401. Letter from the GTern Roselaer to the "young Emperor" Djamaludin at Mindanao, 1703 August 4.

1705 IV, 1932-2107. Diaries kept by Carel van der Hagen and five others who fled from Batavia to Manila and thence by canoe to Japan, 1699-1704. With a report about the situation in the Philippines and two maps of the bay and the town of Manila.

N.B. The maps in Map Collection nrs. 296-297.

1705 IX, Makassar, 414-415. Letter from the Sultan of Mindanao to the Governor of Makassar, Willem de Roo. Dated "27 Safhar 1115". Received October 16, 1704.

N.B. The Sultan sends a present for the maintenance of friendly relations.

1706 XIV, 1-2. Letter from the Sultan of Mindanao Djalaludin to the GG. Written in the court at Salangan, 1st May 1705, received at Batavia 1705 September 11. The Sultan asks for two pieces of cannon, calibre 8 pounds, to be paid with wax or Spanish reals.

Id., 2-4. Letter from the envoy of the Sultan, handed over September 17, 1705, about the change of government in 1702, when Sultan Mulana was succeeded by Sultan Djalaludin. The latter asks the VOC for help.

1707 XII, 269-443. Report by Lieut. Jacob Cloeck and assistant Nicolaas Ploos van Amstel about the mission to Mindanao, September 4 – 1705 December 8.

Id., 838-847. Letters from the Sultan of Mindanao, Jamaludin, his brother Prince Tubu Tubu and the sabandhar Mataram to GRTern., dated "10 Sabaan 1114", received at Ternate 1705 December 18.

1708 II, 783-784. Letter from GTern Jacob Claese to the Sultan of Mindanao, Jamaludin. 1707 May 14.

*1708 VIII*B, 69-73, 306-311. Correspondence between the Sultan of Mindanao, Jamaludin, the "young King" Manameth and several Company officials. (1706-1707).

1709 IV, 1857-8. Extracts of resolutions taken by GGRR, February 13 and 15, 1709, about the sloop of the Portuguese Matheo Pereira from Manila, who drifted off to Batavia because of bad weather. After examination of the passport, issued by GPh. for the trade between Manila and Siam, M. Pereira got permission to sell his cargo —tobacco, leather, cowries and Spanish reals—in Batavia.

1709 X, 341-357. Letters from the Sultan of Mindanao, Jamaludin, and from the sabandhar of Mindanao to several Company officials. (1708).

1710 XI, fol. C-D. Letter from "Paduka Radja Mudah Djafarsadik" to the GG, dated "23 Tsafar 1109" (1119?), received at Batavia 1709 July 15.

1712 XI, Ternate, 1-5, 197-216. Three letters from the Sultan of Mindanao, Jamaludin, the Prince Sjah Bunga and the sabandhar Mataram, to GGRR; four letters, intercepted by the Dutch, from the Sultan of Mindanao to GPh., Don Pedro Gomo de Gorena; the Governor of Cavite, Don Francisco de Atienza Ibanes; and Don Joachim de Eginia. (1710).

N.B. The Sultan writes that his young brother, Radjah Mudah Mulana (Djafarsadik) has revolted against him.

1713 XIII, Ternate, 129-135. Letter from the "young King" Djafarsadik to GGRR, dated "27 Rabionlachir 1123", received 1712 September 28.

Id., 170-171. Letter from GTern to the sabandhar of Mindanao, 1712 August 23.

1715 IX, Ternate, 104-114, 189-192, 233-237. Papers concerning the yachts sent out from Ternate to intercept vessels from Mindanao which are carrying on illicit trade with Ternate. 1714 May-July.

1716 V, 2140-2141. Statement given at Batavia by the Portuguese captain Manuel Pereira Ramos about the state of affairs in the Philippines. 1716 January 12.

1716 X, Ternate II, 87-96. Reports about the visitation of vessels from Mindanao, *1714* October 4, May 13 and July 3, 1715.

Id., Ternate III, 1-2. Letter from the Sultan of Mindanao, Jamaludin, to GGRR, received August 22, 1715.

1717 V, 2472-2474. Report about the cargo brought from Manila to Batavia by the Portuguese captain Manuel Pereira Ramos, 1717 February 1.

N.B. With the ship of M.P.Ramos the son of the GPh, Don Joan de Torralba y Balcalsar, arrived at Batavia. By way of exception he got permission to travel to Spain via the Netherlands with a VOC-ship. (Cf. resolution GGRR February 2, 1717).

1717 XI, Ternate, 13-15. Report by the freeburgher of Ternate Reynier Breneur about his stay at Manila. 1717 January 31.

1718 IV, 1734-5. Letter from the GPh to the GG, about the mission of de Angulo (see below) and the delivery of letters in Spain by a VOC-ship. 1718 February 15.

1719 III, 865-867. Lists of merchandise, bought from—or sold to—the Manila ships at Batavia, a.o. anchors, ropes and ammunition sold to the Spanish general Don Fernando de Angulo. 1717-1718

N.B. Many volumes comprise lists of merchandise, bought from—or sold to—foreign traders at Batavia; these were not all checked, but may contain information about Manila trade.

1719 V, 1995-2000. Letters from the GPh, Don Fernando Manuel de Bustillo Bustamente y Rueda, and from the Governor of the castle S. Felipe and member of the Council of Justice at Cavite, Don Atanasio Ferz. de Guevara, to GGRR, 1719 January 16. Spanish texts with Dutch translations.

N.B. The GPh requests that two Spanish soldiers be sent to Spain with VOC-ships, and if possible, will be allowed to return in the same way; also he sends letters to be delivered in Spain. De Guevara requests the remittance of 8000 reals to Spain.

Id., 1993-1994. Resolutions taken by GGRR February 17 and 21, 1719: The above-mentioned requests are not granted. Only the letters will be delivered.

1720 II, 1033B. List of merchandise, bought from—or sold to—the Manila ships at Batavia, 1718-1719.

N.B. Cf. OB 1719 III, N.B.

1720 IV, 2089-2090. Letter from GPh Don Julian Ignacio de Velasco to GG, 1720 January 17. The GPh requests the delivery of a chest with papers in Spain. The papers relate to the fraud committed by the late GPh, Don Fernandino Bustamente. GGRR grant this request.

1721 III, 1473-1480. Letter from the Sultan of Sulu, Muhammed Badrudin, at Batavia June 6, 1720. The Sultan wants to establish trade relations.

1722 XII, Ternate, 1-9. Copy of the preceding letter from Sulu.

Id., 238. Letter from native officials of Ternate to Prince Tubu Tubu of Mindanao, intercepted by the Sultan of Ternate and sent to the Dutch governor. (1720).

N.B. Concerns the smuggling of cloves to Ternate.

Id., 369. Report about the execution of three Ternatan noblemen by the Dutch, 1720 August 10.

1723 XIV, Ternate II, 1-6. Letter from the "young King" of Mindanao, Muda Mulana Djafarsadik, to the GG, dated "23 Radjab 1134", received at Batavia September 5, 1722; i.a. information about the relations with the Spanish at Zamboanga.

1725 XII, Ternate, 87-89. Letter from GTern to the King of Kandhar (Sangihe), 1724 March 30. GTern advises the King to cooperate with the other kings of the Singihe-Islands in the expulsion of the "Vultures of Damnation", the pirates of Mangindana (Sulu-archipelago).

Id., 90-92. Letter from GTern to the Sultan of Mindanao, Jamaludin, 1724 May 8. GTern thanks for information (see 144-149 below) that the vice-king Djafarsadik plots with the Spanish against the VOC and the Sangihe Kings.

Id., 144-149. Letter from the Sultan of Mindanao, Jamaludin, to GTern, dated "26 Djumadil Awal 113?" or 1724 February 22.

1725 XII, Ternate I, 244-261. Letters from the Sultan of Sulu to GG, GGRR and the sabandhar of Batavia, dated "13 Radjah 1137", received at Batavia 1725 August 29 and September 3. The Sultan professes his friendship, sends presents and wants to buy guns and ammunition. GGRR reply (Batavian Outgoing Letterbook K.A. 881, fol. 801-804, 1725 October 20) that the Company does not dispose of a type of cannon—of exceptional length—as ordered by the Sultan.

1727 XV, 564. Letter from the "young King" Djafarsadik to GTern, received at Batavia October 20, 1726. Djafarsadik reports that the Sultan Jamaludin cooperates with the Sultan of Sulu against the Spanish: Djafarsadik himself stays neutral, in accordance with the orders of the GG of 1725.

1728 IV, 2040-2044. Statement made by the Portuguese captain Jeronimo de Sousa at Batavia 1727 April 4, about economic affairs at Manila, the Acapulco trade, etc.

1728 XVI, 330-345. Three letters from the "young King" Djafarsadik to GGRR, received in 1727 September. Djafarsadik professes his allegiance to the Company and reports about his struggle with Jamaludin, who is allied with the Sultan of Sulu.

1731 VII, 4622-6. Letter from the Dutch commander at Tabukan (Sangihe-Islands) to the GTern, 1730 May 29, about the visit of an envoy of the Sultan of Mindanao, asking for free trade; with resolution taken by the Council of Ternate and a letter to the commander of Tabukan, containing a negative reply to this request, 1730 August 4.

1733 XXXII, 921-5. Statements by two inhabitants of Mindanao, captured by a Dutch patrol at Tomacallang (Celebes). 1732 July 11.

Id., 938. Report about the present from the Sultan of Mindanao to the Company: 177 pounds of wax, 40 pounds of tortoise-shell, and 10 iron pots. 1732 August 20.

1735 VI, 3605-3623. Papers relating to the capture of the VOC-sloop "Langerak" by the Spanish near Simoay at Mindanao in 1733. February–March 1735.

N.B. Cf. GODÉE MOLSBERGEN, and OB 1736 III, V, OB 1737 III, below.

1736 II, 764. List of merchandise, bought from—or sold to—foreign traders at Batavia, i.a. from Manila. 1734 September 1-1735 August 31.

N.B. Cf. OB 1719 III, N.B.

1736 III, 1261-1311, 1370-1. Papers concerning the expedition to Manila under command of Hermanus de Vrij, to claim the damages caused by the Spanish in capturing the VOC-sloop "Langerak". 1735 February-October.

N.B. Cf. GODÉE MOLSBERGEN, and OB 1735 VI.

1736 V, 1866-1874, 2260-2263. The same, 1735 July-December.

1736 VIII, 3288-3290, 3308-3309. Letter from GPh Don Fernando Valdes Tamon to GG, 1736 February 4, about the wreckage of the galiot "De Uitvlucht" in Philippine waters, with some appendices.

1736 XX, 675. Letter from the native schoolmaster at Tabukan (Sangihe-Islands) about the capture of the "Langerak". 1734 February 11.

N.B. Cf. OB 1735 VI.

1736 XXII, Malacca, 1st part, 81-87. Report by Hans Knuts, former sailor of the "Lange ak", about the capture of that sloop by the Spanish in October 1733, his captivity in the Philippines and his escape from Manila in February 1735. 1735 March 19.
1737 III, 1008-1016. Secret instruction issued by the GTern to Jan van Ingen, commander of the sloop "Langerak", about his mission to Mindanao. 1733 July 30.
Id., 1017-1019. Letter from GGRR to GPh Don Fernando Valdes Tamon, about the VOC-ships "Uitvlucht" and "Langerak". 1736 May 19.
1737 VIII, 3021-3025. Interrogation of a sailor of the sloop " 't Wijnglas", which ship had been plundered by inhabitants of Mindanao. 1737 March 22.
Id., 3026-3028. Letter from GPh to GG about this affair. 1737 February 10.
1738 II, 1005-1006. List as OB 1736 II, 764. 1736 September 1-1737 August 31.

N.B. Cf. OB 1719 III, N.B.

1738 IV, 1947-1960. Report by the Director-General of the Trade, about the trade between Manila and Batavia, Bengal, Coromandel and Malakka. 1738 January 21. With annexes.
1738 V, 1961-2. Letter from the Governor of Malacca to the GG about the trade of Manila merchants at Malacca. 1737 December 12.
1739 XIX, Ternate, 375. Letter from the Sultan of Mindanao, Jamaludin, to GGRR, dated "Radjab 1149", received at Batavia June 12, 1738, about the capture of the VOC-sloop "Langerak" by the Spanish (cf. OB 1735 VI) and about the succession on the throne by his son Mohammed Amirudin.
1743 II, 1003-1004. Report drawn up at Batavia December 5, 1742 by the first mate Manuel Correa of the Ship "Nossa Sra. de Rosaire" from Manila, which ship was captured by the English ship "Duke of Dorset" in June 1741.
1744 I, 122-3. Letter from Don Juan de la Fuentes, at Manila, to the late Director-General of the Trade, Herman van Suchtelen, 1743 February 27. Spanish text with Dutch translation.

N.B. Concerns a consignment of patterns for "gorgoran" (a silk fabric with thick threads) to be made in Europe on behalf of De la Fuentes. To this end he remitted 3000 pesos to the VOC. The patterns sent in 1740 got lost.

1745 IV, 1581-1691. Papers concerning the mision of the merchant Jan Louis de Win to Manila, to inquire after the possibility of VOC-trade with Spanish America. 1744.

N.B. Cf. GERHARD, GIJSBERTI HODENPIJL (1917).

1746 IV, 1823-1830. Letters from GPh and from the marquess de la Salinas to the GG, G.W. van Imhoff, about Dutch efforts to trade with Spanish America (See OB 1745 IV). 1745 October–1746 February.
1750 XIV, 221-3, 232-6. Letters from the Sultan of Mindanao, Muhammed Shah Amiludin, to GGRR, dated "5 Djumadilachir 1160" and "21 Djumadilachit 1660" (recte: 1160), received at Batavia March 3 and December 15, 1749.

N.B. The Sultan informs GGRR that he succeeded his father Jamaludin and also the young Sultan Djafarsadik on the throne. He requests a mission of the VOC to Mindanao.

1751 XVII, 509-530. Papers concerning the mission from Ternate to Sarangani and Mindanao, 1750.
1755 I, 138-140. Statements made by three Armenian merchants at Batavia, 1754 September 29, about the traffic of English, Danish, French and Spanish ships—mainly with Armenian supercarga's—between Manila and various ports in India, which traffic

is thought by the Dutch to be incompatible with the 5th article of the Treaty of Munster concluded between Spain and the Netherlands in 1648.

N.B. Cf. Introduction, and OB 1694 XVI, 177-8.

1756 IV, 1268-1278. Extract from the so-called "boomboek" (port register) of Malakka with information about foreign ships that called at Malakka during their voyage from or to Manila, for the period January 1740–February 1755; with statements made by Armenian merchants about this traffic, Batavia 1755 July 17. (See OB 1755 I, 138-140).

N.B. In the period 1740-1755 some 55 Manila traders visited Malacca, mostly English and French ships from Madras or Pondicherry. In OB from c. 1695–1740 these registers (also called "sabandhar (harbourmaster) books") of Malacca can be found, with detailed information about the shipping between Asian ports by way of Malacca. Many of them give particulars about trade with Manila. For the years before and after this period one has to consult the Malaccan daily records.

1758 IV, 1015-1038. Letter from GPh to GG, 1757 March 15, in reply to the letter from GG to GPh, 1755 August 22, about the trade between Manila and the West of Asia. Latin text with Dutch translation.

N.B. Cf. OB 1755 I, 138-140.

1759 VI, 1250-1261. Passport given by the GPh, Don Pedro Manuel de Arandia, to Don Joseph Maroto, Armenian captain of the sloop "Nostra Señora de la Soledad y San Francisco de las Lagrimas" for a voyage from Manila to Coromandel. 1759 January 31. Copy in Spanish, with Dutch translation. With musterroll of the sloop.

1762 VI, 1870-1873. Contracts concluded between Sultan Bantilan of Sulu and Alexander Dalrymple, acting on behalf of the English East India Company. 1761 January 28. Translations from English and Malay into Dutch.

1762 XXV, no. 2, 156-7. Resolution taken by GTern concerning two fishermen from "the hamlet of Bisaya" (N.-Mindanao?) who landed on Ternate. GRTern decide that these men will be brought to Batavia.

1763 II, 667. Proclamation, issued by GGRR, prohibiting the Dutch to buy subjects of the Spanish King who have been enslaved by the inhabitants of Sulu and Mindanao. 1763 June 16.

1763 V, 1822-1826. Report about the surrender of Manila to the English in 1762. Dutch translation from the English.

N.B. Written below: "In accordance with the report received from Malacca."

1765 XXV, 34, 162, 220. Resolutions taken by GTern about the surrender of Manila and about the necessity to improve the relations with Mindanao. 1763 October 31, 1764 May-June.

1767 I, 328-330. Letter from GGRR to Don Joan de Casens, commander of the Spanish warship "Buen Consejo", being a protest against the presence of this ship in Indian waters. 1766 July 15.

N.B. Cf. SCHURZ, App. I: "The Royal Philippine Company", and the Introduction, above.

1767 VI, 2063-2095. Report by Fray Joseph Ascarate, "del sagrado Orden de Predicadores, Procurador General de su Provincia de el Santissimo Rosario en estas Islas", concerning an inquiry among a dozen government officials, priests, etc. about the use of the indigenous language, Tagalog, in the divine service and religious education.

All informants state that Tagalog is widely used for this purpose. Manila, February 14, 1767. Original Spanish text on stamped paper, 67 pages.

N.B. This report most probably has been addressed to the government in Spain and would be sent thither by way of the VOC-returnfleet (Cf. OB 1718 IV, 1719 V, 1720 IV). The ship that carried the papers, the "Vrouwe Elisabeth Dorothea", left Batavia on May 16th, 1767, and arrived at the Dutch coast near the hamlet of Petten on November 27th. During the night a violent gale arose from the northwest and the ship was smashed to pieces. Only six sailors survived this calamity, and most of the cargo was lost. Obviously the report in question—torn and waterstained, though yet readable—became separated from the other papers destined for Spain and the Directors without more ado combined it with the few Dutch records salvaged from the wreck. (Particulars about the wreckage in K.A. 405, Resolutions Chamber Amsterdam, Sunday, November 29th, 1767, et seq.).

1769 VII, 3046-3051. Letter from Don Joan de Casens to GG, 1768 December 9. In Spanish, French and Dutch.

N.B. Cf. OB 1767 I.

1770 I, 282-4. Letter from de Casens to the harbourmaster of Batavia, 1769 January 17. With annexes.

1773 II, 786-794. Papers relating to the establishment of the English at Balambangan and their relations with neighbouring islands, i.a. the Sulu Archipelago. 1766-1773.

1775 XXIX, Ternate, fol. 93-102. Part of a secret letter from GTern to GGRR, 1774 May 17, about a mission to the Sulu Archipelago (see below) and about foreign intruders—mainly English and French—in the Spice area.

17 6 XXII, Ternate, nr. 31. Report, log-book and secret log-book of the mission from Ternate to Sulu to investigate the extent of the English penetration in this area. September 18-November 24, 1774. 31 pages.

1777 XIX, Ternate, nr. 26. Log-book of the interrupted mission from Ternate to Sulu, September-December 1775. 40 pages

Id., nr. 27. Log-book of the mission from Ternate to the Sangihe- and Talaud-Islands i.a. to collect information about the relation of these islands with Mindanao. 1775 November-1776 March. 53 pages

1778 VI. 2060-2080. Papers relating to the arrival of the ship "Notre Dame de la Consolacion" from Manila at Batavia, 1777 February 21. In French, Spanish and Dutch.

1779 V, 1835-6. Letter from the GG to the GPh, Don Pedro Sarrio, 1778 May 1. The GG expresses his gratitude for the return of two soldiers of the VOC from Ternate, who were captured by inhabitants of Mindanao and handed over to the Spanish.

1781 XXIII. Ternate (not paginated). Secret log-book of a mission as mentioned above OB 1777 XIX nr. 27. 1779 October-1780 March. 115 pages.

1790 XXXIX, Ternate, nr. 22 Letters from GRTern to the Sultan of Mindanao and to the "King" of Malurang and Saringani, residing at Malurang. 1788 September 25. 6 pages. GTern write that there will be no further Dutch missions to Mindanao, and that the Company will take up arms against the pirates. The "King" of Malurang is reminded of the treaty of commerce and friendship, concluded July 9, 1787.

N.B. Cf. OB 1790 XLVI, below.

1790 XLVI, Ternate, 1-17. Secret resolutions taken by GRTern on September 23, 1788, about letters from the Sultan of Mindanao to GTern January 11, 1788 and about the

Dutch mission to the "King" of Malurang and the sultan of Mindanao in 1788. GRTern conclude that the Mindanao pirates continuously violate the treaty of 1787 and decide to write letters as mentioned above, OB 1790 XXXIX.

N.B. Cf. also *Corpus*, vol. VI, p. 592-5.

K.A. 1707 A-I. Papers deriving from the lawyer of the Company, Pieter van Dam, i.a. the manuscript of his "Beschrijvinge van de Oost-Indische Compagnie" (Description of the East Indies Company), 9 vols.

N.B. Cf. DAM, Pieter van.

K.A. 446 L-Q. Dutch translations of treaties concluded with Asian rulers, 1596-1791. 7 vols.

N.B. Cf. *Corpus*.

– Individual documents, i.a.

K.A...4464 ij6, 4464 *ee4*: Papers on the relations between the VOC and Spain with regard to the founding of a Spanish Company to trade with the Philippines via the Cape of Good Hope.1732–1786. 2 bundles.

N.B. The Dutch repeatedly protested against the actions of the Royal Philippine Company on the ground that by the 5th article of the Treaty of Munster this trade was forbidden. Cf. also OB 1755 I.

K.A. 4464 ee6: Letters from the Resident of the VOC at Riouw, D.Ruhdé, to the Governor of Malacca concerning the conquest of the island by Sulu pirates. 1787 1 folder.

N.B. With a note by Commisioner S.C.Nederburgh about the reconquest of Riouw by the VOC.

K.A. 4464 T11: Dutch translation of a Spanish memoir about the Dutch settlement at Formosa and about the necessity to build a Spanish fortification on the island with a view to the maintenance of the Chinese-Manila trade (c. 1624). 1 item.

Collection van Hoorn-van Riebeeck

Inventory in ms., suppl. inventory with introduction *VROA* 1925, pp. 74-79.
Papers deriving from the Governors-General Johan van Hoorn (1704-1709) and Abraham van Riebeeck (1709-1713).

Inv.nr. 42: "Speculatiën over de Philippinse eylanden" (Speculations on the Philippine Islands). Anonymous, c. 1705. 1 quire.

N.B. Memorandum on the possibility of capturing the Philippines and the consequent advantages. The arguments pro et contra are interlaced with various data about Philippine trade, economics, religious affairs, administration etc.

General State Archives, 2nd section

(Archives of the central state organs since the foundation of the unified state in 1795).

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1813-1870

Inventories in *VROA* 1918, 1921, 1923 and in ms., with introductions and alphabetical registers.

Inv.nr 3268: Correspondence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs with the Ministers of Naval and Colonial Affairs, the British envoy and the Dutch envoy in Madrid about combatting piracy in the Sulu Archipelago. With annotation: "the rights claimed by Spain and England in connexion with the Sulu Islands and the matter of checking piracy", and with a survey of the transactions pertaining to the Sulu Islands and piracy. 1849-1860; 1862-1868. Partly in English. 1 bundle.

N.B. Cf. Introduction, and GREGORY, IRWIN, JANSEN, ROBIDÉ van der AA. This bundle contains a letter from captain J. Stanton—commander of an English surveying-vessel—to captain Becher R.N., Hydrographic Office, Admiralty, of September 27th, 1862, about "Illanoon piracy": "The Illanoon pirates are principally natives of the Solo Archipelago and Island of Mindanao". Stanton describes the pirate's vessels, the crews, their fighting tactics and the measures taken by English and Dutch patrol boats. (ad exh. 21 okt. 1862 nr. 4).

Netherlands Legation in Spain, inv.nr. 217: Correspondence about the government of the Philippine Islands. 1863. In Dutch, English, French and Spanish. 1 folder.

Archives of the Ministry of the Colonies, 1814-1900
First part: 1814-1849

Inventory in ms., There are detailed indexes to the various series of correspondence, departmental minutes etc. With regard to the Philippines, information can be found under the heading: "Zeeroverijen van inwoners van Magindanao en Solo" (Piracy of inhabitants of Mindanao and Sulu).

Inv.nrs. 1393, 2597, 2669, 2675, 2692, 2703, 2710, 4351: Papers relating to the combat of Mindanao and Sulu piracy, the missions of the Resident of Timor, van den Dungen Gronovius and Lieutenant-Captain van Braam Houckgeest, to the Sultan of Sulu, the declaration of war on Sulu (1848) and the Spanish claims on the Sulu Archipelago. 1839-1849. With copies of older records (VOC, 18th century).

General State Archives; Map Collections

The collection of maps of seas and countries pertaining to other continents was described by P.A.Leupe (1 vol., The Hague, 1867; index in ms.) and in a supplementary volume by S.P. l'Honoré Naber (The Hague, 1914; with index). Wth one exception (nr. 294) the maps described below are in manuscript; for printed atlases of Dutch origin, showing the Philippines on one or more maps of Asia—of which the General State Archives possess but a few—see QUIRINO. The collection of maps belonging to the Ministry of Naval Affairs, now in the General State Archives, contains a good many printed maps of the Philippines, drawn by the British Hydrographical Office during the nineteenth century (Inventory by P.A.Leupe; the Hague, 1872; with index). Since the calculation of Longitude was still very faulty during the 17th and 18th centuries, the maps only give information about the Latitude of the depicted area. In many instances the scale has been shown by a measuring-line with the inscription. "Duytsche meylen 15 voor een graadt": Fifteen German miles to a degree

(of Latitude). From this information I deduced an approximate scale expressed in a proportional number.

Several maps show the non-existent island of San Juan; cf. QUIRINO, p. 71: ". . .An imaginary island supposedly located northeast of Mindanao, first drawn by Herrera in 1601 and copied assiduously by Sanson, Tirion, Coronelli, Hondius, Janssonius, du Val, Dudley (1646), etc. . ."

Inv.nr. 288: Map of the Chinese Sea and a part of the Chinese Coast, from Japan to Borneo and from Siam to the Ladrones, 36 degr. N.Lat.-1 degr. S.Lat., scale c. 1:5.-500.000, ms. on parchment, 75 x 94 cm. dated: 1687. Drawn by Joan Jansz. Blaeu, cartographer of the VOC, Chamber Amsterdam. 1673-1705.

Inv.nr 289: As nr. 288, 36 degr. N.Lat.–2 degr. S.Lat., scale c. 1:5.500.000, ms. on parchment, 81 x 98 cm., no date, not signed. (c. 1690).

Inv.nr. 290: As nr. 288, 34 degr. N.Lat.–1 degr. N.Lat., scale c. 1: 7.400.000, ms. on paper with printed compass-lines, 51 x 72 cm., no date, not signed. (c. 1690).

Inv.nr. 291: Map of the Northern part of the Chinese Sea, and the coasts of South China, Indo-hina, etc., with Southern Formosa and Northern Luzon, 24 degr. N.Lat–14 degr. N.Lat., scale c. 1:700.000, ms. on paper, 66,5 x 46 cm., 3 sheets. c. 1650.

Inv nr. 292: Map of the northern part of the Indonesian Archipelago, from Sumatra up to Japan; showing the Philippines, Borneo, Celebes, etc. 37 degr. N.Lat-2 degr. S.Lat., scale c. 1:5.500.000, ms. on parchment. 82 x 97 cm. 1717.

N.B. Incompletely drawn and faded; of the Philippines, only Luzon, Palawan and Mindanao are visible. Cf. inv.nr. 345.

Inv.nr. 293: Map of the islands to the north and northeast of Halmaheira, up to Japan, showing a part of the east coast of Mindanao, San Juan, Samar and Albay. 36 degr. N.Lat.–2 degr. N.Lat., scale c. 1:7.500.000, ms. on parchment, 52 x 63 cm., c. 1650.

Inv.nr. 294: Map of the southern part of the Philippine Islands, with a description of the islands in French. The routes followed by Magellan in 1521 and by the galleons sailing every year to Acapulco have been put in with comment in Spanish and French. 5 13 degr. N.Lat., 136-145 degr. E.Long., scale c. 1:2.000.000, copper engraving on paper, 47 x 54 cm. In the upper right hand corner: "No. II". 18th century.

N.B. This is the second sheet of a copy of Father Pedro Murillo Velarde's "Carta Hydrographica. . ." of 1734, probably the copy by G.H Lowitz, published by J.B.Homan, Neurenberg, 1759-1760. Cf. QUIRINO, p. 91.

Inv.nr. 295: Map of the Bay of Manila. Copper engraving on paper, 29 x 37,5 cm. 18th century.

Inv.nr. 296: Map of the Bay of Manila, ms. on paper, 41 x 53 cm.
N.B. = OB 1705 IV, fol. 2106.

Inv.nr. 297: Ground-plan of the castle St. Jago and the town of Manila. Ms. on paper, 52,5 x 51, 5 cm.
N.B. = OB 1705 IV, fol. 2107.

Inv.nr. 298: Three maps of some bays at Mindanao, 5-7 degr. N.Lat. and 7-7 degr. 40 min. N.Lat. Mss on paper, by Daniel Ottensz., 1628, 16,5 x 17 cm. each.
N.B. = OB 1630 II, fols. 101, 103, 110.

Inv.nr. 299: Map of the Bay of Simoay, the "Bay of Soegoeroe" (= Polloc Bay) and "Varkenseiland" ("Pig's Island"; = Bongo Island). With views of Bongo Island. Ms. on paper, 47 x 65 cm.

N.B. = OB 1702 II, fol. 838, annex to log-book fol. 649-837.

Inv.nr. 343: Map of the Indonesian Archipelago, a part of the Chinese Sea, and the southern Philippines up to Panay and the Passage of Santa Clara. 11 degr. 50 min. N.Lat.–11 degr. S.Lat., scale c. 1:3.300.000, ms. on parchment, 83 x 97 cm., c. 1670.

Inv.nr. 345: Map of a part of the Indonesian Archipelago, from the Straits of Sunda to the Gulf of Siam, showing the islands to the east of Sumatra up to Halmaheira, and to the north, up to Mindanao. 11 degr. 40 min. N.Lat.–12 degr. S.Lat., scale c. 1:3.500.000, ms. on parchment, 82 x 97 cm.; 1717.

N.B. Incompletely drawn and faded; the coastlines of Mindanao are clearly visible. Place-names are faded. Cf. inv.nr. 292.

Inv.nr. 461: Map of the north coast and part of the east coast of Celebes, the Sangihe- and Talaud-Islands, the south coast of Mindanao, Ternate, Tidor, etc. 9 degr. 10 min. N.Lat.-0 degr. 20 min. S.Lat., scale c. 1:1000.000, ms. on paper, 102 x 73 cm.; c. 1700.

Inv.nr. 462: As inv.nr. 461, scale c. 1:2,000.000, ms. on paper, 52 x 74 cm.; c. 1700

Suppl. inv.nr. 132: Map of the northern part of the Chinese Sea, showing the coast of South China, Indo China etc., the west coast of Formosa and the northwest coast of Luzon. Scale c. 1:735.000, ms. on parchment, 73 x 98 cm., signed "1658 J.N."

Suppl. inv.nr. 137: Map of the east coast of the Philippines, Halmaheira, the north coast of New Guinea and the Ladrones, drawn at Batavia 1644 September 1, signed Abel Tasman. With drawn and written sailing directions about the course to follow in case of interception of the galleons from Acapulco. Scale c. 1:2.780.000, ms. on paper, pasted on linen, 74 x 108 cm. Copy of a ms. map in the library of the University of Utrecht.

Suppl. inv.nr. 156: Atlas, "Ligtended Zeefakkel, off de geheele Oost-Indische Waterweereldt" (Lighting Sea-Torch, or, the whole East Indian Water-World). Ms. on paper, two vols., by Gerrit de Haan, chief cartographer at Batavia from 1747 to 1769. The first volume is dated 1760.

Vol. I, map nr. 12: Map of the Pacific, with a portion of the China coast, Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, California and New Spain, to Acapulco southward. Scale c. 1:9.250.000, 66,5 x 156 cm.

Vol. I, map nr. 13: Map of the Philippines, with the Sangihe- and Talaud-Islands, scale c. 1:1.250.000, 100 x 140 cm. With inset: Manila Bay and Laguna de Bay, scale c. 1:300.000, 45 x 52 cm.

Vol. I, map nr. 14: Manila Bay. With colored drawings of buildings at Manila and Cavite, out of scale. Scale c. 1:75.000, 102 x 125 cm.

Suppl. inv. 619: Collection of 116 maps and views of the East and West Indies, for the most part water-colours dating from the second half of the 17th century; the so-called "Atlas-Vingboons". ("J. Vinckeboons" is mentioned as the engraver of nr. 32) Cf. WIEDER, p. 9-26; p. 9: "These maps, plans and views have been copied from originals in the archives of the East India Company. The originals are nearly all now lost."

nr. 9: Map of the Philippines. Scale c. 1:2.150.000, colored ms., similar to the map (copper-engraving) in VALENTIJN I, p. 148. 47 x 69 cm. With soundings, anchorages and many Dutch place-names. Cylindrical projection. WIEDER, p. 11: "We are unable to indicate any Spanish map of that period or earlier showing such a de-

tailed and comparatively exact representation of the Philippine Islands". See also WIEDER, p. 12 and plate 7, and QUIRINO, p. 84 and plate 27.

nr. 40: View of the Castle at Cavite from the seaside. Colored ms., 29 x 40 cm. Cf. WIEDER, p. 23.

nr 69: Bird's-eye view of Manila from the seaside. Colored ms., 45 x 64 cm. Similar to the view (copper engraving) in VALENTIJN, I p. 154; this engraving has been roproduced in B. & R. XXVI, p. 23, XLII, p. 147. See also WIEDER, p. 19 and plate 20, and QUIRINO, 84.

nr. 70: Map of Manila Bay, colored ms., without scale, 46 x 65 cm. Similar to the copper engraving in VALENTIJN, I, p. 152. Cf. WIEDER, p. 25, QUIRINO, p. 84.

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