Asian Studies

THE INSTITUTE OF ASIAN STUDIES

Founded on an idea of the late President Ramon Magsaysay, the Institute of Asian Studies was established in 1955 as a separate unit of the University of the Philippines, to lend impetus and substance to the Philippines intellectual outlook on Asia. At the start it functioned to coordinate the Asian offerings or supporting disciplines in the arts and social sciences. Today, with augmented facilities and staff, and with the encouragement of the University President, Dr. Carlos P. Romulo, it is an active center for the sharing of insights and the results of research among Asian and non-Asian scholars, regarding Asia. It undertakes a varied publications program, of which this journal is a part. Primarily a research unit, the Institute also administers scholarships and a degree program leading to the Master of Arts in Asian Studies in each of the three areas of Asia: Southeast Asia, South Asia, and East Asia. The Philippines is treated as a special area. All four programs are expected to be in full operation within five years. The program of study is designed to provide advanced training in research on Asian cultures and social systems on the basis of an undergraduate concentration in the social sciences, humanities, or the arts, and seeks to develop an area or regional orientation, with an interdisciplinary approach as the primary mode of analysis.

ASIAN STUDIES

Volume IV, Number 2, August 1966

Josefa M. Saniel
Issue Editor

Asian Studies

August 1966 Volume IV, Number 2

CONTENTS Page

Asian Studies is published three times a year
April, August and December — for the
Institute of Asian Studies by
The University of the Philippines Press
Quezon City, Philippines

Please address —

* All manuscripts to the Program Coordinator, Institute of Asian Studies

* Correspondence on exchange to the Librarian, Institute of Asian Studies.

Correspondence on subscription to the University of the Philippines Press, U.P. Post Office Quezon City, Philippines

SUBSCRIPTIONS: ₱6.00 PER YEAR IN THE PHILIPPINES;
US$3.00 ELSEWHERE: SINGLE COPIES ₱2.50
IN THE PHILIPPINES: US$1.50 ABROAD.
BACK ISSUES FOR SOME NUMBERS ARE STILL AVAILABLE.

NINETEENTH CENTURY JAVA: AN ANALYSIS OF HISTORICAL SOURCES AND METHOD

ROBERT VAN NIEL

A FEW YEARS AGO, I STATED IN A BOOK REVIEW THAT THE new orientation for the writing of the history of Southeast Asia which places the people of Southeast Asia at the center of the narrative is now generally accepted.[1] It was my hope to move the profession on beyond the dispute about orientations and viewpoints of Southeast Asian history and into the actual process of producing the "new," or to use Smail's term, the "autonomous" historical writing for the area.[2] Despite the objections to the above statement made from one or two sources who felt that the old "colonial" or Europa-centered orientation was still very much alive and only awaiting the auspicious moment to again rear its head, I am inclined, upon reviewing Southeast Asian historical scholarship over the intervening years, to let it stand. In short, I am prepared to accept the fact that all serious historical scholarship related to Southeast Asia which is being, and will be, produced, will be oriented toward the particular society of Southeast Asia with which it deals, will seek to understand and interpret that society, and will relate the historical events to the developments of that society.

Having made this unequivocal testimonial, I hasten to add that I do not think the above-stated ideal has yet been realized, nor will it be easily accomplished. It does seem to me, however, that virtually all contemporary historians of Southeast Asia desire the production of this new style of historical scholarship about which so much has been said in recent years. The purpose of this paper is first, to discuss some of the methodological and technical problems involved in producing this new style history; second, to relate some of these theoretical factors to certain specific problems and considerations relative to the writing of nineteenth century Indonesian, specifically Javanese, history.

No one, to the best of my knowledge, has suggested that the new orientation for Southeast Asian historiography be based on anything but scientific principles of historical research. Scientific is perhaps a somewhat misplaced word when applied to the methods of the historian, but certainly it seems axiomatic that the methods of analyzing and evaluating historical sources, the careful and judicious formulation of generalizations, the inclusion of all relevant evidence, and the candid appraisal of lacunae and prejudices, as these have been developed in the historical tradition of the West during the past two centuries, lie at the root of what should be ideally practised. To this must be added the consideration cogently stated by Tom Harrison that the

[1] *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies,* Vol. 23 (1960-61), 200.

[2] John R. W. Smail, "On the Possibility of an Autonomous History of Modern Southeast Asia," *Journal of Southeast Asian History,* Vol. 2, No. 2 (1961), 72-102.

historian of Southeast Asia must have an understanding and strong appreciation of the peoples, or particular people, of Southeast Asia about whom he would write.[3] All historians must be able to read between the lines of their evidence, but for such an area as Southeast Asia where historical evidence is often scarce and one-sided, this is particularly necessary, and a deep understanding of the peoples is essential to this.

The principles of historical research as here stated are accepted today on a world-wide basis and are not the private property of the Western world. Well-written, brilliant historical writing is art—it always has been, and probably always will be—but it knows no racial or national limitations. The application of a new orientation to Southeast Asian history will in nowise guarantee high quality historical writing, but it will open avenues of research which will, hopefully, attract persons of all nations who are well-founded in the principles of historical scholarship and who will bring their genius to the task at hand. The next question is how to begin.

It is obviously easier to talk about the new orientation for Southeast Asian history than to produce it. The veritable trickle of historical studies in the past decade might be regarded as a dilemma in the application of the new orientation. The new orientation is more than merely changing a pro-colonial to an anti-colonial view,[4] nor does it mean excluding the Europeans from the historical narrative as if they had never affected Southeast Asia. To reduce the depth of the European impact is possible, but their total elimination is rather nonsensical. Neither the larger histories of Southeast Asia which have appeared recently,[5] nor the national histories have been able to accomplish the new orientation satisfactorily. The history of the last two or three hundred years is especially difficult to reorientate, for the actions of the Europeans seem so strongly deterministic of events. It is only when we turn to more detailed local studies, which rely upon fundamental source materials, and undertake the analysis and description of a smaller historical area—both in time and space—that we begin to discern the emergence of a new historical orientation.[6] The new approach, it seems, must be built from the ground up, not in reverse.

More extensive historical accounts—whether for all Southeast Asia or for a single country—must, of necessity, be based upon existing monographic material and secondary sources. These are the very materials which are considered outdated because they either incorporate a discarded point of view, or ask questions of the fundamental materials no longer considered valid. Yet, where else will one find the necessary assemblage of basic facts upon which to construct the narrative? Obviously nowhere. One can keep abreast of the latest research relative to one's area of interest, and incorporate new viewpoints into the narrative, when these seem to apply to the new orient-

[3] *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1962), 161, 165.

[4] Smail, *op. cit.*

[5] Particularly D. G. E. Hall, *A History of South-East Asia* (London, 1964, second edition), and John F. Cady, *Southeast Asia; Its Historical Development* (New York, 1964).

[6] One of the finest examples to appear is John R. W. Smail, *Bandung in the Early Revolution 1945-1946: A study in the social history of the Indonesian Revolution* (Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Monograph Series, 1964).

ation. Lacking these, one can apply sociological theories which seem to fill in interpretative concepts about Southeast Asian societies, or one can develop speculations premised upon emphathy and understanding of the particular people being studied. All these things have been done, and are being done, by historians, and each has obvious merit. In themselves, however, these are not sufficient. The historian lives uncomfortably with the theoretical generalization; his whole training and his approach to man in society demands specific evidence to reinforce his generalizations. For the historian, the reorientation of Southeast Asian historiography must be built on firm foundations, if it is to be consistent with the principles of his discipline.

To the historian, therefore, the present state of Southeast Asian historical scholarship calls for a return to the study of the primary sources of Southeast Asian history, and for their basic reinterpretation and re-evaluation. With new questions to ask of the sources and with interest in the local, minute developments within Southeast Asian communities, the historians will, hopefully, begin to produce studies which can serve as the basis for future extensive generalizations. The emphasis upon study of fundamental sources will hopefully encourage a search for new material, as yet untapped, but this is a hope for the future. The new orientation, meanwhile can be based in large measure upon already available sources. Most fundamental sources for Southeast Asian history have been subjected to only limited use and are certainly capable of yielding much new information. A deeper analysis of these materials will yield much that is pertinent to advancing the new orientation; the skill of the historian has a wide area in which to be tested. As new questions are asked of the material, new truths will appear.

Turning from the abstract to the concrete, I would like to give some indication of the application of the statements concerning re-evaluation of sources to the rewriting of nineteenth century Javanese history. What are the sources that could be used in producing local historical monographs of portions of Java, and what are some avenues that might be explored in the re-evaluation of these sources? These questions cannot receive full consideration here, but selective samplings should produce some suggestions that may stimulate thinking on this matter.

Indonesian or Javanese language sources concerned with the nineteenth century are not now known to be numerous, but even what is known has been little used in the writing of history. Drewes has indicated that the development of written history by Javanese in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has never yet been fully explored. Without being specific, he indicates that an indigenous historiography which has only been partly made available narrates events at least as far as the Java War (1825-30).[7] The *Babad Dipanagara,* mentioned by de Graaf and used in part by Louw, remains to be fully explored; what is known of it would indicate that it is a highly accurate account of the activities of Diponegoro.[8] Even beyond specifically

[7] G. W. J. Drewes, "Over werkelijke en vermeende geschiedschrijving in de Nieuwjavaansche litteratuur," *Djawa,* Vol. 19 (1939), 248.

[8] H. J. de Graaf, "Later Javanese Sources and Historiography," in *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography* edited by Soedjatmoko, *et. al.* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1965), 132-133. P. J. F. Louw en E. S. de Klerck, *De Java-Oorlog van* 1825-1830 (6 volumes; The Hague, 1894-1909).

historical accounts, however, there have never been full scale investigations into the Javanese primbons of the nineteenth century—personal accounts of particular events frequently with religious overtones. Nor have the nineteenth century Javanese efforts at reconstructing Javanese history or in editing certain *wajang* texts (such as the Serat Kanda), been evaluated and interpreted in the light of developments and attitudes of the time.[9] To the best of my knowledge, the court records and archives of the various successor states of Mataram in the nineteenth century have never been consulted or analyzed in the reconstruction of this history despite the fact that they are known to exist and are available in *toto* or in part.[10]

The extent and depth of the Javanese and Indonesian sources can only be surmised for there has been no exhaustive search for family records, local land records and administrative orders, diaries, and letters. At the moment, Western language sources for nineteenth century Javanese history are both more accessible and quantitatively larger. The reorientation and reconstruction of local Javanese history will have to proceed in large part from western language sources. Therefore, it is chiefly with these sources that the historian will have to undertake his re-evaluation and reinterpretation. It is with these sources that the remainder of this paper will be concerned.

For purposes of convenience in the ensuing discussion, I have divided western language source materials concerned with nineteenth century Java into six categories. These are: Published Government Documents, Unpublished Government Documents, Government Reports, Unpublished Personal Archives and Family Papers, Published Memoirs and Diaries, and Travel Accounts. These are rather loose categories which lay no claim to completeness nor exclusiveness.

The quantity of Published Government Documents concerned with nineteenth century Javanese history is extremely great. Most of these documents are in Dutch—as are most of the source materials listed hereafter—and many will deal with other parts of Indonesia too, but our immediate concern is with Java. Basic, of course, are official gazettes, state papers, and the like.[11] These have been provided with indices, cross-reference guides, and other useful devices to aid the scholar.[12] As is evident from the preceding note, most of these begin with the re-establishment of Dutch authority in Java in 1816. For the earlier years of the century, the latter volumes of de Jonge's work

[9] Drewes, *op. cit.*, 255.

[10] Portions of the archives of Jogjakarta have been microfilmed and are available to scholars in this form. The old archive of Modjokerto covering the first half of the nineteenth century is to be found in the manuscript collection of the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde in The Hague. The history of the royal of Madura which has been translated by W. Palmer van den Broek, *Tijdschrift van het Bataviaasche Genootschap,* XX (1871), 241ff., makes reference to events in Java during the 1830's.

[11] The official papers for the East Indies are: *Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indie* which commences in 1816; *Bijblad op het Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indie* starting in 1857; *Bataviasche Courant* running from 1816 to 1827 which then becomes the *Javasche Courant* from 1828; *Koloniaal Verslag* starting in 1849 as a portion of the *Handelingen van de Staten-Generaal;* and *Jaarcijfers voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden*: *Kolonien* which begin in 1891.

[12] Of particular use is J. Boudewijnse en G. H. van Soest, *De Indo-Nederlandsche Wetgeving: Staatsbladen van Nederlandsch Indie, bewerkt en met Aanteekeningen...* (23 vols.; Amsterdam, 1876-1924).

come up to 1811,[13] English reports are available for the years from 1811 to 1816,[14] and M. L. van Deventer and P. H. van der Kemp have extended the publication of government documents to cover the years from 1811 to 1820.[15] S. van Deventer has published selected documents relative to the agrarian system in Java; these extend beyond the middle of the century.[16] The official correspondence of such leading government figures as C. T. Elout, J. van den Bosch, J. C. Baud, and D. J. de Eerens has been published.[17] Moreover, a series of dissertations known collectively as the Utrecht Contributions to the History, Politics, the Economy of Netherlands India (Utrechtsche Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis, het Staatsrecht en de Economie van Nederlandsch-Indie—C. Gerretson en H. Westra—25 volumes), contain large numbers of documents in the form of appendices.[18] These documents are drawn from government archives and deal principally with nineteenth century problems. The *Tijdschrift voor Nederlansch Indie* (1838-1902) has published government documents of various sorts,[19] and still other documents can be found in the appendices to secondary accounts such as the works of Steyn Parve and Cornets de Groot.[20] The official advices of Snouck Hur-

[13] J. K. J. de Jonge, *De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost-Indie* (13 vols. & supplements; The Hague, 1862-1909). Especially useful for the nineteenth century is volume 13 which contains documents for the period 1799-1811 and the supplement to volume 13 which is subtitled "Documenten omtrent Herman Willem Daendels..." and was assembled by L. W. G. de Roo.

[14] In addition to materials available in the India Office, we have the invaluable records of T. S. Raffles, *The History of Java,* (2 vols.; London, 1817); *Substance of a Minute Recorded by Thos. Stamford Raffles* (London, 1814) and *Proclamations, Regulations, Advertisements, and Orders, printed and published in the Island of Java, by the British Government...* (3 vols.; Batavia, 1813-1816). Also Lady Sophia Raffles, *Memoir of the Life and Public Services of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles...* (London, 1830).

[15] M. L. van Deventer, *Het Nederlandsch Gezag over Java en Onderhoorigheden sedert 1811* (The Hague, 1891). The works of P. H. van der Kemp are too numerous to list here—they can be found in W. P. Coolhaas, *A Critical Survey of Studies on Dutch Colonial History* [Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Bibliographical Series No. 4] (The Hague, 1960), 86, 92, 93, 94 & 100.

[16] S. van Deventer, *Bijdragen tot de Kennis van het Landelijk Stelsel op Editor Java,* (3 vols.; Zalt-Bommel, 1865-6).

[17] P. J. Elout van Soeterwoude, *Bijdragen tot de kennis van het Koloniaal Beheer* (The Hague, 1851); *Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis van het Koloniaal Beheer* (The Hague, 1861), and *Bijdragen betrekkelijk Koloniale en andere aangelegenheden in den Road van State behandeld* (The Hague, 1874). J. J. Westendorp-Boerma, *Briefwisseling tussen J. van den Bosch en J. C. Baud 1829-1832* en *1834-1836,* 2 volumes (Utrecht, 1956). F. C. Gerretson & W. P. Coolhaas, *Particuliere Briefwisseling tussen J. van den Bosch en D. J. de Eerens 1834-184*J (Groningen, 1960).

[18] These are individual dissertations of students of the Utrecht University Indology program. They vary greatly in quality. The late Professor Gerretson influenced the conclusions of some of these with his conservative views. Of special interest for our purpose is the vast quantity of documentation reproduced in most of these dissertations.

[19] This journal became the organ of the liberal interests in colonial affairs, especially after 1849, when W. R. van Hoevell became more active in its management. It was generally opposed to government interference in the cultivations and other enterprises, and the documents it reproduced were designed to support its stand.

[20] D. C. Steijn Parve, *Het Koloniaal Monopoliestelsel getoetst ann geschiedenis en staatshuishoudkunde, nader toegelicht door den schrijver* (Zalt-Bommel, 1851). Appendix contains, among other documents, the Du Bus Colonization Report of 1827 and the reactions of Elout and Van den Bosch to it. J. P.

gronje which extend into the twentieth century have also been made public.[21] There is, as this incomplete listing will indicate, a wealth of readily available material for the historian.

It is, perhaps, not surprising that these published documents form the basis of many of the secondary works and have thus directly or indirectly found their way into most general accounts of nineteenth century history. But what is rather surprising is that most of the documents have been interpreted only once, namely in the particular publication or study in which they appear. It is as if these particular source materials are capable of conveying only one truth; once this truth has been extracted, they can be of no further use. Take, for example, the standard work of S. van Deventer on the agrarian system. Here we have three volumes of documents, meticulously cross referenced,[22] laced together with commentary and interpretation. The publication was undertaken at the behest of the government at a time when strong liberal views prevailed. As might be expected, the selection and interpretation of the documents are heavily biased against government enterprise in the agrarian sector of Javanese life. But if one reads only the documents without commentary, and particularly if one augments these with documents not published by van Deventer but now available in the archives, one could not only come to extremely different conclusions but also—and this is more pertinent to our particular interest—obtain information and insights into matters which did not interest the original compiler. Many of the documents of this collection are reports on local conditions, particularly relevant to the introduction of export crops. They contain information about local conditions and local reactions to the new cultivations which illuminate aspects of Javanese society. The documents have never been systematically restudied to see what information they might yield concerning Javanese life. One specific example, as illustration, may suffice: in a couple of pages dealing with rice cultivation (volume 2, pp. 733-737), the existing interpretation highlights the unwillingness of the government to encourage private enterprise in this sector of the economy, but totally left aside are interesting references in the documents to marketing techniques in the distribution of rice and to the expansion of rice growing terrain. These latter facets of information, if tied in with other shreds of evidence found in other documents, can serve to enlarge our understanding of specific conditions in areas of Java. It can hardly be expected that van Deventer's questions of a century ago would be the same as ours today, even overlooking his biases. New historical orientations will not, however, develop if we continue to accept the evaluations and interpretations of the past and do not return to the documents in an effort to squeeze new information from them. It is unfortunate that the interpretation of van Deventer have indirectly been conveyed into many of the stand-

---

Cornets de Groot van Kraaijenburg, *Over het beheer onzer Kolonien* (The Hague, 1862). Appended are documents concerning the census of 1861, the Van den Bosch Report of October 1830, and agricultural production statistics for Java from 1829 to 1861.

[21] E. Gobée and C. Adriaanse, *Ambtelijke Adviezen van C. Snouck Hurgronje, 1889-1936* (2 vols.; The Hague, 1957-1959).

[22] J. Boudewijnse, *Alphabetisch Overzicht van het werk van den Heer S. van Deventer Jszn....* (The Hague 1868).

ard western language accounts of nineteenth century Java;[23] it is doubly unfortunate that the questions with which he began his analysis and selection of the documents have not been fundamentally reconstructed and recast, in an effort to draw out information much more relevant to our present-day historical interest.

More challenging, and perhaps, even more extensive are the Unpublished Government Documents which emanated from the various branches of the Dutch colonial government. The Indonesian National Archives (Arsip Nasional) in Djakarta, houses unbelievable quantities of material, most of it related to eighteenth and nineteenth century affairs. Some of the materials situated in this archive are to be found also in the Netherlands, but the reports from local administrators and the records of local affairs were never sent back to the motherland by the colonial regime and are still in Djakarta, in so far as they still exist. These are precisely the materials that could be of great value in reconstructing local developments and attitudes. Unfortunately, however, the Indonesian government has not encouraged the use of these archival materials by either their own or foreign nationals.

The greatest quantity of unpublished archival materials presently available are in the Netherlands. The State Archives in The Hague (Rijksarchief) contain all nineteenth century papers of the former Ministry of Colonies.[24] This Colonial Archive contains all reports, letters, and decrees passing betwen the government in Batavia and the Ministry in the Hague. Normally, these are concerned with high level policy and personnel decisions, but frequently, the papers relevant to particular local matters were also forwarded, especially if a crisis had developed in a particular locality. This means that revealing materials are frequently buried in the midst of rather routine correspondence, and although indices and cross-references to the Colonial Archive will provide some guidelines, they do not list the specific contents of each folio. In this Archive are to be found such virtually unused items as the Cultivation Reports for the period from 1834 to 1851 (beginning in 1852 the information they contained was incorporated in the Koloniaal Verslag), the Memorials of Transfer available for the latter part of the century, some 150 boxes of Mail Reports covering the years from 1872 to 1900 and containing much material of local interest, and a scattering of General Accounts (Alegemeene Versla-gen) of various residencies in Java. Moreover, there are also such interesting items as an extensive multi-volume statistical compilation for the year 1836,[25] copies of all contracts and agreements closed between the colonial government and various Javanese rulers,[26] records of all action and deliberations

[23] See Robert Van Niel, "The Function of Landrent under the Cultivation System in Java," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, XXIII (May 1964), 357-375.

[24] The archive of the former Ministry of Colonies is situated in the Netherlands State Archives and is open to researchers for the entire nineteenth century. The materials through 1849 are housed in The Hague. Materials from 1850 through 1899 are located in the archival depot at Schaarsbergen. Materials from 1900 to the present are still in the archive of the Ministry which has been fused into the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It is generally possible to obtain permission to consult these later materials.

[25] J. M. van Beusischem, *Statistiek van Java en Madoera* (Colonial Archive, Folios 3042-3064.)

[26] Colonial Archive, Folios 2958-2962.

of the governors-general (both in council and outside council),[27] and the private correspondence between many of the governors-general and the respective Minister of Colonies.[28]

Taking one of these items for more specific treatment, we might say a few words about the General Accounts which the residents of Java submitted annually. These reports were designed to provide the government in Batavia with a report on the internal condition within each residency. An established outline of topics to be included in the report, tended to make these reports uniform in style; a desire to present only favorable information made many of these reports highly inaccurate appraisals of the actual condition within the residency. Many quips have been made about the content of some of these reports, and any historian using them would be well advised to take account of the hard facts of nineteenth century bureaucratic life in evaluating them. But these reports are far from being valueless for the reconstruction of local events. I have before me copies of the annual account of Pasuruan for 1832 by J. F. W. van Nes, and a five-year summary report of Rembang for 1844 to 1849 by L. W. C. Keuchenius, both of which are anything but man-pleasing in their appraisal of internal conditions, and which contain interesting accounts of local conditions among the little people and far-reaching proposals for change.[29] Here is to be found information which, if properly and sympathetically interpreted, could yield new insights into the life and development of the people of these particular areas of Java.

Turning next to Government Reports, we enter a rather familiar domain. Since these reports are generally available to the researcher, they have been used frequently by historians. Such reports as the final summation of the investigation of native rights to the soil,[30] the complete report of the investigation into the diminishing welfare (prosperity) of Java,[31] the report on government coffee cultivation,[32] the reports on village services,[33] the proposals for changes in the renting of lands by Javanese to foreigners,[34] and the raw economic statistics prepared by W.M.F. Mansvelt.[35] The conclusions

---

[27] Colonial Archive, Folios 2435-2765 and 2770-2890.

[28] Those already mentioned above, under Published Government Documents, were drawn from this archive. I have found the correspondence of J. J. Rochussen to be present in this archive, and have reason to believe that many other private and semi-official correspondences may be found there also.

[29] Algemeen Jaarlijksch-Verslag, Residentie Passorouang, 1832. K. I. T. L. V., Ms. No. 104. Korte Schets of Staat der Residentie Rembang. Colonial Archive, Folio 3066.

[30] *Eindresumé van het... Onderzoek naar de Rechten van den Inlander op den Grond op Java en Madoera...* (3 vols.; Batavia, 1876-1896).

[31] *Onderzoek naar de Mindere Welvaart der Inlandsche Bevolking op Java en Madoera* (9 vols. in 27 parts, Batavia, 1905-1912). [Under direction of H. E. Steinmetz.]

[32] *Gouvernements-Koffiecultuur: Rapport van de Staats-Commissie* (The Hague, 1889).

[33] F. Fokkens, *Eindresumé van het... Onderzoek naar de Verplichte Diensten der Inlandsche Bevolking op Java en Madoera,* 3 volumes (The Hague, 1901-1903), and C. J. Hasselman, *Eindverslag over het Onderzoek naar den druk der Dessadiensten op Java en Madoera* (Batavia, 1905).

[34] J. Mullenmeister, *Ontwerp-ordonnantie tot herziening der regelen omtrent de verhuring van grond door Inlanders aan niet-Inlanders op Java en Madoera...* (Batavia, 1895).

[35] Mansvelt published a series of short statistical studies through the Central

of these reports are generally well known, but much of the detailed information which they contain would be particularly susceptible to re-evaluation by a historian seeking to impose the new orientation on it. Many of these reports already have their raw information broken down into localized subheadings, thereby enhancing their usefulness for the researcher.

One example must again suffice. The Eindresume of the investigation into native rights to the soil contains detailed information about agrarian conditions in various parts of Java. The conclusions of the report which have been conveyed into the English language literature through Day's writings are only a partial reflection of the valuable insights which this report contains.[36] A full evaluation of the basic data contained in this report would be a painstaking process, but I have often thought it would be extremely rewarding, for many of its general conclusions were virtually predetermined by the biases of the time and have only a tangential relationship to the data. Furnivall, it might be noted, had reservations about aspects of the report,[37] and the later *adat* law studies provided much supplemental material on the subject of land rights.[38] Here is a report whose conclusions might well be challenged in many respects, but whose basic data can be invaluable to the reconstruction of historical narratives oriented to indigenous society.

Unpublished Personal Archives or Family Papers of individuals closely associated with affairs in Java during the nineteenth century, can often contain insights never found in official or governmental papers. It is to be hoped that more of these archives can be located and made available in the future; especially desirable would be the records of some Javanese families. Some of the Personal Archives known to me, and generally little used by historians, are the following. In the Koninklijke Bibliotheek in The Hague are to be found the family papers of J. P. Cornets de Groot van Kraaijenburg (1808-1878)[39] and L. W. C. Keucheninus (1822-1893).[40] The State Archives in the Hague contain numerous personal archives which contain material related to Java. The archives with which I have had some first hand contact and can vouch for the vast quantity of untapped material which they contain are of L. P. J. viscount du Bus de Gisignies, J. van den Bosch, and J. C. Baud. I am told there are others present here. The Koninklijke Instituut voor

---

Office for Statistics in Batavia; these studies seem to be little known among research scholars. Coolhaas, *A Critical Survey...* (*op. cit.*, p. 111), lists the titles which have appeared.

[36] C. Day, *The Policy and Administration of the Dutch in Java* (New York, 1904). Cf. note on p. 370 concerning refutation of L. W. C. van den Berg's concepts. It should, in all fairness, be noted that Day, pp. 4-5, accurately notes the methodological problem inherent in the use of the *Eindresume*, but does not heed his own advice when dealing with its evidence.

[37] J. S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy* (Cambridge, 1939). See especially Chapter I, 11-13.

[38] B. ter Haar, *Adat Law in Indonesia* (New York, 1948) provides a thoughtful discussion of the matter in Chapters 2, 3, and 4.

[39] D. J. H. ter Horst, *Overzicht van het Familie-Archief Cornets de Groot* (The Hague, 1940).

[40] Koninklijke Bibliotheek, Ms. No. 68 El-F17. Also in the K. B. relative to nineteenth century Java is the correspondence between Governor General Jacob and Minister of Colonies de Brauw (Ms. 76B57), the letters of R. L. van Andringa de Kempenaer (Ms. 131C42), and letters received by H. G. Nahuys van Burgst (Ms. 129E28).

Taal-, Landen Volkenkunde, also in The Hague, possesses a number of manuscripts in western languages which are, in large measure, the personal archives and family papers of individuals associated with the East Indies and especially with Java. The recently published catalogue of these manuscript holdings will provide the researcher with many tempting avenues of research, for here are to be found letters and reports of persons at all levels of the administration.[41] Other personal archives may be found in diverse places. The Alfred A. Reed Papers, recently described in the *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde,* are now housed at Yale University.[42] Others may be found in the archives of banking and commercial establishments in Amsterdam, in the economic historical archive in The Hague, and in the archives of such cities as New York and Boston.

What can one hope to find in these personal archives that might further our understanding of the indigenous historical developments in Java? Sometimes, as in the case of the Cornets de Groot papers, disappointingly little. But among the Baud papers, for instance, a great deal. Baud's papers contain records, reports, and letters about many local, specific events and situations in Java. Also the jottings and notations made by Baud during his tours of the island are included; these contain notes on his conversations with Javanese officials about conditions within their particular districts.[43] Here, in short, is a vast amount of information which must be evaluated with caution, but which can provide useful insights into local developments.

Published Memoirs and Reminiscences are fairly numerous for the nineteenth century. These were, for the most part, written by European administrators, doctors, military men, or entrepreneurs who felt compelled to tell the story of their experiences in The East. As might be suspected, many of these were written with ulterior motives—either to explain away blame or failure—or to castigate another individual, or to forward particular nations about colonial policy. It is understandable that these accounts must be used with the greatest possible caution, but this hardly explains why they have not been used at all for serious historical research. A quick survey of the published memoirs will produce a list of ten to fifteen books ranging from the four-volume work of Daendels (in explanation of his actions at the beginning of the century)[44] to the account of forty years of service by Pruys van der Hoeven at the end of the century.[45] Such books as Hasselman's account

---

[41] H. J. de Graaf, *Catalogus van de Handschriften in Westerse Talen toebehorende aan het Koninkliijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* (The Hague, 1963).

[42] R. Van Niel, "The Alfred A. Reed Papers," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde,* Vol. 120 (1964), 224-230.

[43] A few examples from the extensive Baud Archive must suffice here. Folio 391 contains Reports about the Residencies Preanger, Bagelen, Pekalongan, Banka, and Bantam in 1835. Folio 452 is a packet of Local Reports concerning the comparative advantages of rice cultivation with sugar and indigo in 1834. Folio 462 contains notations made on an inspection trip in 1834.

[44] *Staat der Nederlandsche Oostindische Bezittingen, onder het bestuur van den Gouverneur-Generaal Herman Willem Daendels . . . in de jaren 1808-1811* (4 vols.; The Hague, 1814).

[45] A. Pruys van der Hoeven, *Veertig jaren Indische dienst* (The Hague, 1894).

of his experiences in cochineal production and sugar cultivation [46] and Croneman's narrative of his experiences as a doctor in Java,[47] have information to contribute to our knowledge and understanding of Javanese society and its local alterations and developments. Here is certainly a source of information which historians will want to examine for their new orientation.

Finally, the Travel Accounts are sources of information; most of these were written by Europeans, but even one Chinese account has not been published.[48] A hasty and, admittedly, incomplete count turns up no less than twenty published travel accounts dealing in part or totally with Java during the nineteenth century. If these have been used by historians in the past, the fact is not evident. For the most part, they contribute little to our understanding of administration and government which were the chief concerns of colonial historians. Moreover, many of them are highly superficial descriptions of geographical wonders and ethnographic peculiarities noted by the untrained eye of the casual traveler. It is doubtful, therefore, that they will provide startlingly new information. But between the lines may well lie hidden bits of information which are useful. I have used Domis's notations on Pasuruan toward very useful ends in obtaining information on that part of Java in the early part of the century.[49] Even an account as fatuous and evangelical as that of van Rhijn, can provide interesting asides which help in developing the historian's image of the Javanese scene at the time. For instance, quite in passing, he tells of his experiences on a trip into Kadu which could serve as a stinging testimonial of the transportation services required of the population and enhance our understanding of the communications in that part of Java at that time.[50]

There is, probably, no point to be proved immediately by all this, for the proof will lie in the doing. It is my impression that as research progresses into these historical materials, our picture of Java's response to the West will change, for we will increasingly come to understand that the primary factors conditioning this response lay within Javanese society, and it is here that we must look for the rationale of this response. There is little doubt that the members of Javanese society were not making the high level decisions of the colonial government during the nineteenth century, and one cannot expect to find the strong features of this society emerging in this fashion. But it was within Javanese society that the response to the West was conditioned and that changes and alterations were occurring which determined the later forms and values of that society. One may well conclude that the strength of Javanese society lay in its flexibility; its ability, to use Coral Bell's simile,[51]

---

[46] B. R. P. Hasselman, *Mijne ervaring als fabriekant in de binnenlanden van Java* (The Hague, 1862).

[47] J. Groneman, *Bladen uit het Dagboek van een Indisch Geneesheer* (Groningen, 1864).

[48] Wang-Ta-Hai, *The Chinaman Abroad* (Shanghai, 1849).

[49] H. I. Domis, *De Residentie Passoeroeang op het Eiland Java* (The Hague, 1836).

[50] L. J. van Rhijn, *Reis door den Indischen Archipel, in het belang der Evangelische Zending* (Rotterdam, 1851), 120.

[51] Coral Bell, "A Look at the Record," from *The World Today*, London, reprinted in *Atlas, The Magazine of the World Press*, Vol. 9, No. 6 (June 1965), 330-333.

to behave like a sandbank among the currents pressing upon it from without—always present as a protean force, always indestructible, but always dispersing, reforming, changing shape, and adapting itself to the prevailing currents. To study the sandbanks of Southeast Asia, one must be conscious of their composition, and one must use all shreds of evidence which will tell something of the shape and form which they assumed at a given time in the past. Toward accomplishing this goal, the historian must seek out new evidence and must also re-evaluate and reinterpret all forms of already existing and already known evidence.

THE GOLDEN STORE OF HISTORY

REV. CONRAD MYRICK

THE USUAL PURPOSE OF THE HISTORIAN IS TO PRESENT and interpret persons and events of given periods and places. However, this article proposes to give an account of a depository of documents on Spanish Colonial history from 1492 until 1865, and to suggest its place in Philippine and Asian history. This depository is al *Archivo General de Indias de Sevilla,* which is an organ of the state of Spain, and at the same time an institution just as much Sevillan.[1] Yet, its treasured documents, which are regally housed in marble, stone and brick, do not belong exclusively to Spain or Sevilla. They also belong to the New World, to which the Philippines was joined, and to Asia—from Japan to the Moluccas spice islands—between which lie the Philippines. For more than three and three quarters centuries, these documents transmitted the testimony of life and rule between Spain and two continents, and the Asian east coasts and archipelagos.

All the later documents—which the Spanish Crown and Church had such propensity in writing, and the colonial administrators had an equal felicity in composing—are not in the Archive of Sevilla. After 1865, the colonial documents were deposited in Madrid, where the last ones were filed in 1898. There are many depositories in Spain which contain materials of the colonial period. In Madrid, there are the National Archive, the Library of the Royal Academy of History, the Palace Library, the Naval Museum and the Army Museum.

In Valladolid, there is the Archive of the Augustinian Friars, and near the city is the General Archive of Simancas. Also, the Archive of the Philippine Province of the Franciscans is in Pastrana. Together with these, there are many supplementary research centers. In addition, Spain has many valuable private historical collections, and many Spanish Universities have invaluable historical work. Yet, for all these, Charles E. Chapman correctly stated that the Archive in Sevilla is "practically inexhaustible in its wealth of materials on almost every conceivable subject in Spanish colonial administration and is the most valuable single archive on the field in existence."[2]

The Sevillan collection is further enriched with a multitude of individual documents wherein the writers felt the need to write and had the right to appeal to the King. For example, in Philippine history, when Don Miguel Lopez de Legaspi received orders to take an expedition to the Pacific Islands within Spanish limits, one order gave any member of the expedition the right to write to the King.[3] One of the early letters from Cebu to the

---

[1] José Maria de la Peña y Cámara, *Archivo General de Indias de Sevilla* (Valencia: 1958), 7.

[2] *Ibid.*, 65.

[3] *Colección de Utrafar,* II, Ch. XXI, 145-200.

King in 1565, was a request for more pay due to the high cost of living.[4] These documents include matters of life and death, of praise and blame, ambitions and humilities, statements of officials and appeals from subjects, natives, foreigners and allies. There were quarrels and peacemaking, documents on food and shelter, aggression and defense, on law and sacraments. They encompass the whole of life's way of affairs.

1. A New Age

Present world events are forcing a new appraisal of history. The world has been forced into an unsought unity by speed and nuclear power. One illustration, which shows the world's size in proportion to speed, can be seen in three different circles. In 1760, when the stagecoach travelled at five miles per hour, the world-circle was three inches in diameter. In 1850, when the railroads accelerated speed to fifty miles per hour, the world-circle shrank to two inches in diameter. In 1960, with commercial airlines travelling at 600 miles per hour, the world shrank to one-eighth of an inch in size.[5]

The speed of travel in 1760 was relatively no faster than travel in 1519. On this date, Fernando Magellan sailed from Sevilla, September twentieth; and Sebastian del Cano sailed back to Sevilla, arriving on September 8, 1522. They circled the globe for the first time at a speed of less than one mile per hour. Today, by air, one can go around the world in twelve days which could include eight twenty-four-hour rest stops. The average speed is some 86 miles per hour, which is 540 times faster than the first circumnavigation of the world.

This increase of speed and nuclear power has brought much good to our way of life, with opportunities literally unimagined in the other New Age when the world was found to be round and new continents were discovered under the Spanish banner. Nevertheless, this present, forced technological unity of the world without spiritual unity among its people, has brought it extreme dangers which cannot be removed until people begin to know themselves and sympathetically understand others. Also, positively, this same understanding is needed for living together in peace, common honesty and human dignity. The historian has a large responsibility in the achieving of this understanding. A knowledge of what, in world history, has caused our present world status, is a necessary first step toward present understanding; the need for it is immediate.

One of the more fortunate nations of the world, in regard to sources for its past, is the Philippines. In 1953, Professor H. Otley Beyer said that although a full history of pre-Spanish Philippine art and culture cannot be written, still much had been learned in archaeological findings of the past twenty-five years.[6] This statement was made 432 years after the first Spanish record was written about the Philippines. Since that statement, much has been done in the Philippine anthropology and archaeology, down to the pre-

---

[4] *Ibid.*, XXXII, 372.

[5] Sydney H. Zebel and Sidney Schwartz, *Past and Present, A World History* (New York: Macmillan, 1963), 374.

[6] Pedrito Reyes, *et al, Pictorial History of the Philippines* (Quezon City: Capitol Publishing Co., 1953), 44.

sent explorations of the Palawan Caves and the findings of the Calatagan excavations.[7] The sociological and cultural knowledge of the Philippines continues to increase through such organizations as the Institute of Philippine Culture at Ateneo de Manila and the Philippine Sociological Society. The dissemination of this knowledge is to be found in such well known journals as *Philippine Studies, Unitas, Philippine Sociological Review, Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review* and the journal of the University of the Philippines' Institute of Asian Studies, the *Asian Studies.* There are individual and specific books in all these fields, and academic theses are increasing in number at home and abroad. However, in mining terms, much of the above progress is still within the prospecting field and the future bids fair for a better understanding of the Philippine people through these fields, which are catching up with studies of Philippine history.

Explorations in the area of the history of the Philippines by such pioneer scholars as Emma Blair and Alexander Roberston, W. E. Retana and Pardo de Tavera, have served well their purposes, but they have not nearly exhausted Philippine historical resources.[8] In 1958, Professor Gregorio F. Zaide published in the *Sunday Times Magazine,* a series of articles on the theme of filling in the blank pages of Philippine history.[9] This author magnified the wealth of Filipiniana in the *Archivo General de la Nacion* in Mexico City. He said that of some 45,000,000 documents, about 7,500,000 are classified and in volumes arranged by ramos. In the *ramo de Filipinas,* there are sixty-three volumes.[10] In the next year, Dr. Domingo Abella wrote about his search for depositories abroad having Filipiniana.[11] He listed some twelve Spanish archives together with eight research centers, and he magnified the value of the Spanish archives, and especially of the one in Sevilla as the greatest source of Filipiniana. Likewise, the author listed the Vatican Archives and Vatican Library in Rome with supplementary research centers, and he also named depositories in England, Holland, France, Mexico, Cuba, Japan, Macao and the Republic of China. Then he emphasized, for the American period, the Library of Congress and the National Archives in Washington, D.C., as large depositories of Filipiniana, together with other public and academic collections. Such prospecting for historical primary sources have their value in bringing scholars up-to-date on where to search for materials. They help modernize the searchings of Blair and Robertson, Retana and Tavera.

---

[7] Robert B. Fox, "The Calatagan Excavations," *Philippine Studies,* VII, No. 3 (August 1959), Reprint.

[8] Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson (Eds.), *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898* (55 vols; Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1903). W. E. Retana, *Aparato Bibliográfico de la Historia General de Filipinas* (3 vols; Madrid: Successora de M. Minuesa de los Rios, 1906). T. H. Pardo de Tavera, *Biblioteca Filipina* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903).

[9] Gregorio F. Zaide, "Filling in the Blank Pages of Philippine History," *The Sunday Times Magazine,* July 27 and August 10, 1958.

[10] *Ibid.,* July 27, 1958, 13.

[11] Domingo Abella, "Filipiniana Treasures in Repositories Abroad," based on a paper for the Educational Conference of the Ateneo de Manila Centennial Celebration, Manila, November 21-22, 1959.

However, to use a mining figure, it has been well established that the mother lode—the primary belt of gold-bearing quartz in Philippine written history—is in Spain; and a second lode—equally important to the whole, but of lesser size, due to fewer years presence in the Island—is in the United States. But the immediate need is to bring to light the contents of these depositories in objective and critical appraisal. The student of Philipine History realizes that certain themes, as important as they are, have been worn smooth in the retelling, because certain collections in printed form are available for their contents, such as the familiar *Colleccion de America y Oceania* and *Colleccion de Ultramar.*[12] Yet, there are many gaps to fill in; for example, the first fifty years of the Nineteenth Century, to mention one of many.

2. Sevilla and History

For a reappraisal of what has been written in Philippine history and its Asian setting, and to continue adding chapters to this history, the place of priority is the Archive General of the Indies. The similarities of the place of Sevilla in the world-moving events and changing hegemony of the sixteenth century, and the strategic position of Manila in Asia today, are worth comparing.

There were two brilliant periods in the long history of Sevilla: the period from 1492 until 1600, and the period of 1808 to 1843. The first part of its history belonged to the marching forces of Phoenicians, Greeks, Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, and Sueves who cris-crossed each other. Engraved on the Jerez Gate are these words:

> Hercules built me; Julius Caesar surrounded
> me with walls and high towers; and the
> Holy King (Fernando II) took me... .[13]

From the eighth through the twelfth centuries, Sevilla was captured and populated by the Moors who raised the old city in greatness until it became the rival of Cordoba—its neighbor—140 kilometers to the east.[14] In the thirteenth century, the saintly King—Fernando III—took Sevilla from the Moors with the aid of Garci Perez de Vargas.[15] A new Christian community took over Sevilla and made it a powerful city. Then, under succeeding reigns, it became commercially important.

Such a long and arduous history created a people known as *Sevillanos,* whom St. Teresa de Jesus felt to be aggressive, evasive, rich, and unconcerned. The people, together with glistening white walls and intense heat, made the Avila saint and Carmelite foundress—from her higher, cooler, thin-

---

[12] *Colección de documentos inéditos relativos al descubrimiento, conquista y organización de las posesiones españolas en América y Oceania, Sacados, en su mayor parte, del Real Archivo de Indias* (42 Vols.; Madrid, 1864-1868). And *Colección de documentos inéditos relativos al descubrimiento, conquista y organización de las antiquas posesiones españolas de ultramar* (13 Vols.; Madrid, 1886-1887). Hereafter *Colección de América* and *Colección de Ultramar.*

[13] Marcel N. Schveitzer (Ed.), *Spain* (Paris: Hackette, 1961), 736-737.

[14] Ministerio de Obras Publicas, *España* (Madrid: 1962), 110.

[15] Schveitzer, *op. cit.,* 737.

ner, clearer air—say that there was something about Sevilla one could not explain.[16] She reacted like the old proverb which said that Sevilla either drives you away or swallows you up.[17]

St. Teresa had spoken about Sevilla in its most brilliant period of history. During this same period, Don Luis Zapata, 1526-1595, spoke of Sevilla as the best tract of land in Spain, with the largest Cathedral, the famous, *Alcaraz,* the *bodega* of olive oil, the customshouse, the Arsenal, the *Cabildo,* the Merchants' Exchange, the Shipyards and the Royal Audiencia.[18] And added to this, it was *la puerta del nuevo mundo,* the gateway of the New World.[19]

Another characteristic of the old city which did not go unrewarded, was loyalty. When King Alfonso (the Wise) was forced to fight his son—Sancho—who took his father's cities one by one, Sevilla remained loyal to the King. King Alfonso conferred on the city the title, *Muy noble, muy leal, muy heroica e invencible.*[20] The King also put the *Sevillano* loyalty in a riddle, which the people have kept through centuries, and have put it on their doors, railings, and stone facings until this day, which is in the shape of a monogram. Of the city, the King said, *No me ha dejado* ("It did not forsake me"). Place a parenthesis in this sentence thus, *no (me ha deja) do* and with an elision, the word is, *madeja,* which means a skein of thread. A skein of thread is generally in the shape of the figure 8, usually lying on its side. In each loop were placed the letters NO and DO, thus monograming *no (me ha deja) do.* As to a past characteristic of a people, or the meaning of a sign, historians have been able to notice the loss of that characteristic or the incomprehension of the sign of it in a different generation. In the case of the *Sevillano* today, he retains wonderful loyalty to his city and can recite perfectly the meaning of his ancient monogram.[21]

Sevilla became many things in that New Age of Discovery, and to St. Teresa and Don Luis Zapata, just as challenging and confusing as our own Atomic Space Age. Sevilla was the place where ship pilots were trained for going on undreamed-of distances across the world, where cartography changed its flat charts into a round world, where a university of merchants won a King's favor, where civil law unfolded the world's great single realm, and the Church spoke its soul.[22] From the front steps of the world's greatest gothic Cathedral, all the way around to the side at *Puerta de Pardon* which led into the Patio of Oranges, on the two steps of the *Casa de Contratacion,* and later, on the steps of the *Casa Lonja,* the comings and goings of soldiers, sailors, scribes, lawyers, prelates, friars, handi-craftsmen, gentlemen and merchants, formed the beating heart of the New World and an Asian archipelago, under the hard, blue Sevillan sky.

---

[16] Marcelle Auclair, *Teresa of Avila* (Garden City, New York: Image Books, 1959), 283.

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] Don Luis Zapata, "De cosas singulares de España" in Peña, *op. cit.,* 23.

[19] Peña, *op cit.,* 19. Rafael Laffón, *Sevilla* (Barcelona: Editorial Noguer, S.A., 1963), 45 and all in *Illustraciones.*

[20] Schveitzer, *op. cit.,* 737.

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] Peña, *op. cit.,* 25.

About four long blocks away from the Cathedral, which is the center of Sevilla, is the Tower of Gold—guardian of the Guadalquivir River. On the opposite bank, a little downstream, was the *Puerto de las Muelas,* from which sailed Columbus, Magallanes, Del Cano and thousands of others for the New World. But the seventh century demand for ships of greater tonnage began to take the commerce from Sevilla's inland port to Cadiz with its easily accessible and deep bay.[23]

The other brilliant period of Sevilla's history was from 1808 until 1843. But the part it played was for the Peninsula more than for the colonies. Sevilla rebelled against the French from 1808 until 1812. At this time, Napoleon found among the individualistic Spaniards such a unity of opposition—together with English armed pressure—that he was forced to withdraw from Spain. Then Sevilla took part in the Constitution movement, but later the *Cortes* founded there had to be moved to Cadiz. Sevilla revolted against the liberal Regent Espatero, which was a foretaste of the Carlist Wars and the struggle between Absolutists and Liberals. Sevilla showed that it could resist its enemies and be progressive, yet conserve its values.[24] A slow response to the Industrial Revolution and the Spanish War of Independence from Napoleon, which was followed by the colonial Wars of Independence from Spain, which in turn, were interlaced by the nation's Civil Wars, left Spain on the point of exhaustion. After 1898, there were no colonies left.

3. Manila and History

When Sevilla was the gateway to, and the place of, departure for the New World, Manila was at the end of it and was Spain's gateway to China and Japan. Like Sevilla, it was also favored by its King. Philip II, on June 21, 1575, at Madrid, confirmed the city's corporation and granted it the title of *Ynsigne y siempre leal ciudad de Manila:* "the distinguished and always loyal city of Manila."[25] Sevilla had two tests of survival; one, with the Moors; one, with the French. Manila had two equal tests and fared better than Sevilla, which fell to the Moors and was occupied for four centuries. Manila successfully resisted Limahong—the Chinese colonizing corsair—on St. Andrew's Day, 1574.[26] Sevilla was occupied by the French from 1808 until 1812, while Manila was occupied by the British from 1762 to 1764. Neither occupation was successful. The French withdrew from Spain, without accomplishing their purpose, but after occupying vast areas of the land. In 1762, the English forces—with their East India Company employers—took Manila during a late and troublesome typhoon season, and with comparatively light opposition from Manila. After they landed their Madiera wine and stores, their troubles began. They were able to occupy no land other than the Manila perimeter. They failed to collect the city's ransom, and were so hard pressed by Don Simon Anda's counteraction, that had not the Treaty of Paris in 1763

---

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] *Enciclopedia Universal Illustrada Europeo-Americana* (Barcelona: Hijos de J. Espasa, 1923), XXI, 1017-1032.

[25] *Colección America,* XXXIV, 68-70.

[26] Conrad Myrick, "The History of Manila from the Spanish Conquest until 1700" (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1961), 91-99. A Master of Arts Thesis.

permitted the English to withdraw in peace, their posture showed one ready for defeat.[27]

Both cities lived up to their royal mottoes of loyalty during their occupations, and Manila continued a Spanish colonial capital until 1898, when the Philippines was ceded to the United States. Then, it kept a Spanish-oriental character until World War II. On the other hand, and equally true, Sevilla has kept only a few specific Moorish monuments like *la Giralda* and the *Alcazar,* yet a flavor remains. Again, the two cities have Moslem similarities. The early Moslems holding Manila up until 1572, were not as advanced as the Almohades of Sevilla, and they left no monuments. They fell before Spanish conquistadors—Goiti, Legazpi and Salcedo—who opened Manila to the same world-moving and changing hegemony of the sixteenth century which made Sevilla the gateway to the New World.

Portuguese Macao—an enclave of Kwangtung Province in South China—and Manila, Philippines, presented to China and Japan the first stable centers of Western commerce and a hegemony which has now encircled most of the world. Macao has a continuous history from its foundation, as an open port of European trade, a haven for missionaries and a door to China, but it is now eclipsed by the nearby British Crown Colony of Hongkong, and for the moment, both continue to exist as they are with the tacit permission of Red China.[28]

On the other hand, the Philippines—spanning a gap between Taiwan and Borneo—and its capital of Manila being only 636 miles from Hongkong, is a natural crossroads for all Southeast Asia. Its island-geography grants it an independence which the mainland areas of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand do not have. Manila's location of sixteen degrees from the equator makes it a natural crossroad, not only for the east and west, but north and south. With China's aggressive military threat and the advent also of nuclear power, the Philippines is in a strategic position geographically in today's new age. In Southeast Asia, Manila could have thrust upon it the responsibility of world center for this area today, as Sevilla had thrust on it in the sixteenth century.

4. The House of Exchange

In today's new era, old Sevilla does not command so great a place as formerly. Yet, within its Archive, are the documents which could enlighten this area of Asia of its past, which could be of great assistance as it fits itself for the new age. There is yet much to be learned from those documents, in a house built for another purpose.

> The catholic and very high and powerful don Phelipe, Segundo, King of the Spains, commanded to make this exchange, at the expense of the corporation of the merchants. . . . Negociations in it began on the fourteenth day of the month of August in the year of 1598.

---

[27] The whole account is well covered in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, XLIX, and Great Britain, Record of Fort St. George *Manilha Consultations* (Madras: Government Press, 1940), I-IV, IX, X.

[28] *Geographical Dictionary* (Springfield, Mass: G. and C. Merian Co., 1959), 646.

This inscription is over the principal door of the building which now houses the Archive. It is conservatively carved in stone, without any ornamentation, which recalls that the Exchange was inaugurated when the grand King had begun his long and exemplary illness unto death, which came September 13, 1598, in the Escorial, a monument of his heart's desire.[29]

The merchants of Sevilla in the sixteenth century had no building in which to transact their various affairs and contracts. They used the steps of the Cathedral instead, which brought to the temple's doors the fabulous and exotic Indies.[30] For some reason, they did not hold the privilege of *consultado,* or tribune with rights to try and decide matters of navigation and trade, although Burgos—in the century before—had such rights on the exportation of wool.[31] Business was so brisk on the Cathedral steps and at the *Puerta del Perdon,* which had above it an elegant relief showing the Lord driving out the money-changers from the Temple, that it was disturbing to spiritualities. And when business—due either to volume or weather—got to the naves themselves, the canons and the Cathedral authorities protested at the intrusion. After pressure on the King, finally the "right of exchange" was granted to Sevilla, and permission was given to build a worthy house on a site of raised land at the middle of a triangle between the *Alcazar,* the *Casa de Contratacion,* and the opposite side of the Cathedral, from its famous steps.

The builder of the Exchange—the *Casa Lonja*—was Juan de Herrera, who had built the great, plain, granite parallelogram Monastery of San Lorenzo at El Escorial, for Philip II.[32] The Escorial style shows in the *Casa Lonja,* and it is completely different from the Gothic intricacies of the Cathedral and the forbidding walls of the *Alcazar.* It also has it own steps on the north and west sides.

This building is a palace worthy of the other great buildings around it and superior to all except the Cathedral and *Alcazar.* It has four equal sides of 56 meters each, with a spacious patio within, which has sides of 20 meters each.[33] It is two stories high with ceilings of great heights. There are eleven windows above and below on the four sides. The composition of the building is of brick, stone and marble; and the entrance is in keeping with the simple, *sencillo* exterior, but not lacing in grandeur. The entrance hall, the grand staircase, and great vestibule are Jaspers of Maron in rose and dark gray colors, the ceilings are vaulted and the wall-high windows on the patio sides are arched. It is a building which is noble in its severity and austere in its beauty. Such was the *Casa Lonja* of Sevilla. Its construction began in 1584 and terminated in 1598, one month before Philip II died.

With the inauguration of the *Casa Lonja,* Sevilla was at its zenith, but the seventeenth century had its demands even on the great. Sevilla was an inland port town, one hundred miles up the Guadalquivir River, a safe port on a noble and curving river. The new day demanded greater ships which needed the easier access of the ample and deep bay of Cadiz, although the

---

[29] Peña, *op. cit.,* 29.
[30] *Ibid.,* 25.
[31] *Ibid.,* 26.
[32] *Ibid.,* 29, and Luis Felipe Vivanco, *El Escorial* (Barcelona, Editorial Noguer, S. A., 1959), 8-11.
[33] *Ibid.,* 14.

town itself was narrow and constricted to a limited spit of land.[34] So after 1717, when the *Casa de Contratacion* was moved to Cadiz, almost all the commerce of the Indies followed and the merchants of Cadiz became world famous.[35]

Meanwhile, the administration of the colonies through the *Consejo Real y Supremo de las Indias* (the Royal and Supreme Council of the Indies) required multitudes of documents in order to answer every phase of overseas life and every intention of the Crown. These documents were read, summarized on the sides, noted and dated by successive hands until disposed of by the Council, or even by the King himself. Such a procedure helped the Council speed up its work, and today it helps the investigator to learn the general contents of a document before the whole text is read. Since, oftentimes, the Council referred back to past documents, it was necessary to file them. At first, the documents were kept in many places; then they were concentrated in Simancas. The castle of Simancas was safe, and, on the whole, dry; but it was a long way from the sealanes which gave the documents passage, and the ports wherein they were received. Nevertheless, it soon overflowed with documents.[36] So, in 1788, King Charles III set up the old *Casa Lonja* in Sevilla as the Archive of the Indies and their Asian dependents.

It was an aftermath and yet, a climax that the documents of the Council of the Indies, which administered the affairs of the world's vastest area of single rule, would be housed in the *Casa Lonja* in Sevilla—the center where so many of them first originated. Simancas and Madrid continued to keep in their depositories, the national archives; thus, for investigation of Spain's long and important history, these depositories are of prime importance. But for the Spanish Americas, the Philippines and its Asian setting, the Archive of the Indies is the most important single depository of documents in the world.[37]

5. The Archive of the Indies

Today, the Archive General of the Indies is surrounded by gardens and is the center around which is grouped the Cathedral, the *Alcazar,* the *Plaza Triumfo* and the Post Office. The building is set apart with its own steps and boundary stones, linked together by heavy iron chains. Its interior has two *salas* of investigation: one on the ground floor, facing the south side of the Cathedral, and is used in the summer; and the other, on the first floor facing the patio, and running east and west. The Archive has its own library of reference books and collections about the Indies and the Philippines. There is a *sala* for the director and offices for its administration.

The building is connected with telephone service, but it does not have electric lights. Work is done in the mornings and afternoons. Sevilla, on the whole, has fair, bright weather, but there are times when cloudy weather makes the investigator tie up his *legajo* and go home because it is too dark

---

[34] José M. Caballero Bonald, *Cádiz, Jerez y los Puertos* (Barcelona: Editorial Noguer, S. A., 1963), 7.
[35] Peña, *op. cit.*, 31.
[36] *Ibid.*, 41.
[37] *Ibid.*, 63.

to read. In the winter, there is steam heat, but the radiators—one in the director's *sala,* and two in the *Sala de Investigacion*—are rarely more than warm, giving what is called "background heat." During the winter rains, researchers can be seen working early or late in overcoats. But during Sevilla's hot summers, the heat in the ground floor sala is rarely a problem, and sometimes a pleasant breeze may make a *portero* close the window for fear of blowing the documents.

The first floor has three galleries of exposition, running on three sides with windows to the outside, and in which are priceless documents, plans, maps, historical objects, autographs and the signatures of Columbus, Magellan, Cortez, Philip II, and the papal bull and seal of Alexander VI which divided the world between Spain and Portugal. On the three sides of the inner court, both above and below, and in the *salas* of exposition, are the *estanterias,* or cases, built of new world mahogany and metal, housing the uniform *legajo* boxes containing the documents.

6. The Heart of the Matter

The documents themselves are, of course, the reason for the existence of the Archive of the Indies. The actual number of folios is unknown.[38] The director estimates, as a conservative count, that there are about 14,000,000 leaves *(hojas)* in all, both by individuals and the authorities, and the folios measure some 31 by 22 centimeters in size. If sheet were laid to sheet, they would form a ribbon of paper some 8,680 kilometers long, and would stretch from Sevilla to many points of the New World, for which they were written.

The Archive catalogues are general guides to the specific subjects desired. They list the section, for example, *Estado,* with the geographical group like *Filipinas;* then, include the years, like 1762-1824, with the number of *legajos,* for example, 44-47. This means that in the section on *States* for the *Philippines* between the years of 1762-1824, there are four *legajos* numbered 44,45,46, and 47. A *legajo* is a bundle of documents in which there are some 500 sheets, which need not be necessarily in order and may be of more than one subject. By filling in a simple form, the investigator can request the general *legajo* wherein he hopes to find his specific subject. The other divisions of classification have more to do with the archivists, such as the division of the *legajos* into 1. the *Consejo de Indias,* 2. *Secretarias de Despacho,* 3. *Casa de Contratacion,* 4. *Capitania General de Cuba,* and 5. *Secciones Facticias,* which include titles, maps and plans. There are 38,903 classified *legajos* in the Archive with 3,392 maps and plans. In addition to the Archive Catalogues, there are other guides and various descriptions which help locate more specific subjects within a given *legajo.* But the investigator always works with a *legajo,* as a unit—whether to copy one sentence or to study several pages—in order to keep the particular unit of documents together. Each *legajo* is signed for individually.

There are some 1,659 *legajos* and 224 maps and plans which are catalogued under *Filipinas.*[39] Many of these have never been opened by an investigator. Because of this, often times, small piles of sand, which dried the ink

[38] Peña, *op. cit.,* 73.
[39] *Ibid.,* 84, 99, 100, 102, 109, 115, 118, 120, 122, 127, 128, 130, 131, 144-145.

so long ago, accumulated on my table during my year's work there in Spanish-Philippine Colonial History, under the direction of the University of Sevilla. Beyond the actual count of *legajos* bearing the name Filipinas, there are Philippine documents uncounted in the Mexican *legajos,* and in many of the other related areas, like *Ultramar;* and also stray documents in other *legajos,* about which investigators willingly tell one another when one finds a document of particular interest to another.

7. The Investigator

The Archive of the Indies is not open to the public as such. Visitors must apply to see the Archive and must be accompanied by an official; and the investigator must apply and register in order to work there. It is a national archive, preserving documents intimate to Spain's history, but it is open to any serious researcher who presents references for work, and especially is it available to graduate students and professors. The visitor's opportunity to see the exhibitions is free, but the researcher's registration carries a small fee for his card. This entitles him to do research in all Spanish Archives for a period of one year.

Needless to say, the language requirement is Spanish. English books in this field are growing, but the documents are in Spanish. A few are in Latin. The personnel is Spanish, and the hours and regulations are Spanish. Not only is a good reading knowledge of the language necessary, but equally necessary is the matter of paleography, the knowledge of antique writings. Any document from the fifteenth century to well into the eighteenth century, will require some knowledge of the various scripts of their particular century. Also, some knowledge is needed concerning the style and protocol of various documents, especially in the diplomatic portfolio. The involved signatures and *rubricas* or monograms and seals have direct bearing on the content of the document. Invocations, salutations, directions, dates, and *notas*—that is, side notations and dispositions—all come within the paleographic knowledge needed.[40]

Another thing which the investigator should be aware of are word changes, not only in spelling, but changes of meaning, and, in supplement, changes of grammatical structures. All these things are not insurmountable but, for those whose cradle tongue is not Spanish, constant references must be made to etymological dictionaries and fuller grammars than those for just a cursory knowledge of the language, such as the *Diccionario Etimologico Español e Hispanico* and *Real Academia Española, Gramatical de la Lengua Española.* The Archive staff and professional investigators are always willing to help in any difficulty if the investigator will ask. Otherwise, Spanish courtesy will never interfere with your work.

8. Back to the Purpose

The necessity of better knowing one's self as a first step toward understanding the world around us, is immediately necessary in this fast space and nuclear age today. Philippine scholarship is aware of this, and it is not

[40] The best work in this field is a double work by Don Antonio C. Floriano Cumbreño, Professor at the University of Oviedo, called *Curso General de Paleografía y Diplomática Españolas, Texto* (1) *y Selección Diplomática* (2) (Oviedo: 1946), all.

without efforts toward it. The advance of Philippine historical studies, since the beginning of this century, has not stopped, and new subjects and new periods, since the last documents were filed in Sevilla, have been developed. All these, for the good of historical research. However, Philippine historical work—in reappraising what has been written and in adding new chapters to that history—has only begun to utilize its richest source of primary documents which are deposited in the Archive General of the Indies in Sevilla, Spain.

With this as a premise, the need to exploit these documents is known. Two other factors are also known. First, the Sevillan Archive grants its treasures willingly to the researcher, and willingly assists him with his problems. Second, in this day, the opportunities for both educational programs and financial grants are world-wide, adequate, and obtainable for the earnest inquirer. Therefore, what remains is the individual's interest in this field.

It could be a rich experience for many of our historians to go to the gateway of the old world and learn. To bring back new knowledge and new understanding for our day would be even a richer experience.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abella, Domingo. "Filipiniana Treasures in Repositories Abroad." Manila: Ateneo de Manila Centennial Celebration, 1959. A printed brochure.

Auclair. Marcelle. *Teresa de Avila.* Garden City, New York: Image Books, 1959.

Blair, Emma Helen, and James Alexander Robertson (Eds.). *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898.* Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1903. 55 Volumes.

Caballero Bonald, José M. Cádiz, *Jerez y los Puertos.* Barcelona: Editorial Noguer, S.A. 1963.

Colección de documestos inéditos relativos el descubrimiento, conquista y organizacion de los possessiones españolas en America y Oceania, Sacados, en su mayor parte, del Real Archivo de Indias. Madrid: 1864-1868. 42 Volumes.

Colección de documentos inéditos relativos el descubrimiento, conquista y organizacion de las antiguas posesiones Españolas de ultramar. Madrid: 1886-1887. 13 Volumes.

Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada Europeo-Americana. Barcelona: Hijos de J. Espasa, 1923. Vol. XXI.

Foriano Cumbreño, Antonio C. Curso, *General de Paleografía, y Diplomática Españolas.* Texto. Oviedo: 1946

———————, Antonio C. Curso, *General de Paleografía. Selección Diplomatica.* Oviedo: 1946.

Fox Robert B. "The Calatagan Excavations," *Philippine Studies,* VII, No. 3, August, 1959. Reprint.

Great Britain, Records of Fort St. George, *Manilha Consultations,* Madras: Government Press, 1949. V-IV, IX, and X.

Laffón, Rafael. *Sevilla.* Barcelona: Editorial Noguer, S. A., 1963.

Myrick, Conrad. "The History of Manila from the Spanish Conquest until 1700." Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1961. A Master of Arts Thesis.

Peña y Cámara, José Maria de la. *Archivo General de Indias de Sevilla.* Valencia: 1958.

Retaña, W. E. *Aparato Bibliografico de la Historia General de Filipinas.* Madrid: Sucessora de Minuesa de los Rios, 1906. 3 Volumes.

Reyes, Pedrito, *et al. Pictorial History of the Philippines.* Quezon City: Capitol Publishing Co., 1953.

Schveitzer, Marcel N. (Ed.). *Spain.* Paris: Hackette, 1961.

The Sunday Times Magazine. Manila, July 27 and August 10, 1958. Supplement to *The Manila Times,* a daily newspaper.

Tavera, T. H. Pardo de. *Biblioteca Filipina.* Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903.

Vivanco, Felipe. *El Escorial.* Barcelona: Editorial Noguer. S. A., 1959.

Geographical Dictionary. Springfield, Mass: G. and C. Merriam Webster Co., 1959.

Zebel, Sydney H. and Sidney Schwartz. *Past and Present, A World History.* New York: Macmillan, 1963.

ON THE CHANGING ANGLO-SAXON IMAGE OF BURMA

EMANUEL SARKISYANZ

THE RENAISSANCE DEPARTURE FROM THE ROME-CENTRIC outlook of the Middle Ages opened West European minds to appreciation of exotic cultures and societies. By sixteenth century standards of sea-faring nations, the Asia which they discovered did not seem backward but advanced—even when the main purpose of observation and description was commercial prospecting. The earliest English traveller's report about Burma—the narrative of Fitch [1]—repeats the appreciation (probably, even the overestimation) for coastal Burma's capital, Pegu, found in earlier Italian and Portuguese reports about that maritime center.

It was not before the coming of the Industrial Revolution and the emergence of unmistakable superiority of British power, that the observers' own standards permitted the consideration of countries like Burma as backward and benighted. What is probably the last positive evaluation of the Burmese Empire by a British observer—the original Embassy Report of Symes—was written in 1795. But even in the early 1820's, the independent British merchant, Gouger, found it worth noticing that Burma's literacy rate was higher than that of Britain at that time.[2] Having been discouraged from trading in India because of the British East India Company's monopoly, he was pleased by the reception that he and his merchandise found at the Burmese Court. The British declaration of war on Burma in 1824, surprised this lone Englishman; it reduced him to the status of an "Interned Alien" in a Burmese prison, under almost subhuman conditions—the tropical counterpart of British prison situations of the time of Dickens. It was less the horrible experience that disappointed Gouger than did the loss of his private Burma market, a loss resulting precisely from the British victories in the war of 1824-1826. The Burmans appear as arrogant opponents and savage but brave—sometimes desperate—warriors in such British narratives as that of Snodgrass.[3]

The first Anglo-Burmese War cost the British East India Company more casualties than most of the Indian wars. Perhaps, its best known victim was the Baptist missionary, Adoniram Judson, of Sunday School fame. In 1812, he had come to Burma to preach the gospel of evangelical revivalism. Judson found the Burmese and their Court rather a tolerant but indifferent audience. The British declaration of war against Burma, however, made a martyr of this American missionary. Not understanding too well the difference between

---

[1] Ralph Fitch, "The Voyage of Mr. Ralph Fitch Merchant of London, to Ormuz and So to Goa in the East Indies, 1583 to 1591," in *Pinkerton's Voyages*, IX (London, 1811).

[2] Michael Symes, *An Account of An Embassy to the Kingdom of Ava* (London, 1809); Henry Gouger, *Personal Narratives of Two Years' Imprisonment in Burmah* (London, 1860).

[3] *J. J. Snodgrass, Narrative of the Burmese War* (London, 1827).

British and American speakers of English and knowing only that Judson had read about the impending British invasion without warning his host (the Burmese king) as well as learning that he had received remittances through a British merchant, the Burmese government mistook him for a spy. Judson suffered the horrors of imprisonment equal to those of Gouger. However, he was spared the fate of those taken, or mistaken for, spies during war time in modern countries. Yet, Judson was known to consider war as the best (if not the only) means to bring the blessings of Christianity and Civilization to benighted Burma whose capital he called the throne of the Prince of Darkness.[4] Yet, Burma studies are still indebted to Judson, (who acquired an enviable mastery of literary Burmese) for his Burmese-English Dictionary. Many of his missionary successors did not reach his intellectual caliber but have outdone him instead in zeal, a zest that made no fetish out of empathy or even tolerance. Thus, still at the beginning of our century, the Baptist missionary, Cochrane, gathered as "fruitage of fifteen years of war among the Burmese" that "the natives are so sodden in vice; so dull of head and slow of heart to understand and believe." [5] To such particular ministers of the Gospel, Buddhist monks as well as sculptors of Buddha statues appeared to be "emissaries of Satan" or else as the "Blight of Asia," who were "seemingly equal in intelligence to their graven images." With such particular standards, the message of Buddhism came to be described as "eternal death" and the state of the Buddhists as "utter darkness."

Comparably more understanding and tolerance for the Burmese was shown by some learned Catholic missionaries. The most remarkable of them was the Italian Sangermano, who lived in the country shortly before Judson, and left the most valuable Western account of early 19th century Burma.[6] In this tradition, the Catholic bishop Bigandet published, in the 1860's, an account of Buddhism as practised in Burma.[7] Its evaluation of the Buddhist monkhood, though by no means uncritical, is of high objectivity. Without departing from his dogmatic position, the author remained fair in his value judgments. To the same generation of scholarly observers of the Burmese scene, belonged the German ethnologist Adolf Bastian. While travelling in upper Burma during the 1850's, he was called by king Mindon to his court and was given, by royal command, instruction in the Burmese language—being expected, in return, to instruct the Burmese court physicians in modern medicine. Bastian had digests made from the Burmese Chronicle. Though his history is outdated, his communications from Mon sources retain some value, so do his direct observations of Burmese life. As an observer, this pioneer of German ethnology was in a position to throw light on the remarkable personality of Burma's penultimate king Mindon, with whom he debated about the ethics of self-defense. Though Anglo-Saxon historians of Burma usually

[4] Adoniram Judson, Letter of November 7, 1816 in F. Wayland, *The Memoir of the Life and Labor of Rev. Adoniram Judson* (Boston, 1853), I, 183.

[5] H. E. Cochrane, *Among the Burmans: A Record of Fifteen Years of Work and Fruitage* (New York, 1904), 157.

[6] Father Vincentius Sangermano, *A Description of the Burmese Empire* (Rome, 1833).

[7] *P. A. Bigandet, The Life or Legend of Gaudama the Buddha of the Burmese* (2 vols; Rangoon, 1866; London, 1880).

ignore Bastian, his accounts remain one of the main contemporary testimonies about Mindon's Burma.[8]

King Mindon, one of Burma's exemplary Buddhist rulers, was visited and characterized in a scholarly way by the British Colonel Yule, who accompanied the Embassy of British India's Governor-General to the Burmese court in 1855, under Phayre. Yule's *Mission to the Court of Ava,*[9] has been called the finest single British contribution to Burmese studies. However, Yule's reading was confined to European sources. In contrast, Phayre—Chief Commissioner of British Burma from 1862 to 1867—was an outstanding Burmese scholar, with an outlook high above the self-satisfied ethnocentrism of his contemporaries. Phayre's *History of Burma* (1883)[10] is mainly a political and military narrative and a record of violence, based on the Burmese royal chronicle which king Mindon gave the historical writer. Phayre's reconstruction of Arakanese chronology is still accepted. His image of Burmese history as a struggle of princes and peoples, with scant consideration for cultural and social dimensions, dominates Anglo-Saxon writing to the present. However, his standards have hardly been reached by subsequent British soldier-administrators, officials and merchants, who wrote about Burma as participants or apologists of the colonial establishment—an establishment about which Phayre had preferred not to write.

In contrast, Commissioner Crosthwaite thus described his achievements in suppressing Burmese resistance to the British Conquest:

> Weight was to be given to the *fait accompli* and to considerations of expediency rather than to those of abstract right or justice... . Unless men belonging to the village who were now dacoiting [resisting] surrendered within a fixed time, all their relations and sympathizers would be... removed to some distant place... . Many surrendered in order to save their people from being removed... .[11]

The bloodshed involved in the final British Conquest is merely glossed over in such British memoirs as White's "Civil Servant in Burma."[12] It largely consists of anecdotal episodes of inter-British colonial life. In spite of occasional glimpses of Burmese individuals, the Burmese people remain discreetly in the background—a kind of stage screen for accounts about routine activities of colonials. This is typical of the way the vast majority of the British living in Burma describe their experience in that country.

An exception to this pattern and, outstanding among the few British accounts of Burma, are the works of Scott. Against the background of rich military and administrative experience, he compiled much factual information in the *Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States.* The most important of Scott's numerous writings is *The Burman, His Life and Notions,* which appeared under the pseudonym of Shway Yoe and has been republished in many

---

[8] Adolf Bastian, "Reisen in Birma in den Jahren 1861-1862," *Die Volker des ostliehen Asien,* II (Leipzig, 1866).

[9] Sir Henry Yule, *A Narrative of the Mission to the Court of Ava* (London, 1855).

[10] Sir Arthur P. Phayre, *History of Burma... and Arakan* (London, 1883).

[11] Charles Crosthwaite, *Pacification of Burma* (London, 1912).

[12] H. T. White, *A Civil Servant in Burma* (London, 1913).

editions.[13] Remaining a classic of descriptive cultural anthropology from a time before there was such a discipline, it conveys a rich pageant of Burmese customs and beliefs on the eve of acculturation, following the British conquest. Shway Yoe presented his *Burman, His Life and Notions* with charming but unmistakable traits of childishness, primitivity and immaturity. Therefore, his work is considered, in present-day nationalistic Burma, as one not free of colonial bias.

The following generation of British readers of a traveller's account, romantically entitled *Peacocks and Pagoda,* already accepted being told that

> the average Englishman or American is slow to realize that an outlook different from his own is even possible; to bring him to see life through oriental eyes, though ever so dimly, is an achievement which fully justifies a certain amount of exaggeration.[14]

Such exaggerations may have been conveyed by Fielding-Hall, one of the most widely read British authors on Burma. This *fin de siecle* era was, in European intellectual life, a time of disappointment in Modern Civilization, Progress and Historical Christianity, a time when Europe developed self-doubts about her civilization and mission. Marxism, rationalist agnosticism (if not atheism) and Nietzschean attitudes, were challenging middle-class respectability and the liberal and missionary values by which Victorian empire building had been justifying itself. Rationalistic critique of the historical Christianity of the Churches affected Fielding-Hall, a colonial official serving in British Burma after its aggressive Pacification, a Burma whose Buddhism enchanted him. With emphatic sensitivity of the romantic, Fielding-Hall described the personality of the Burmese people in his book, *The Soul of a People,* the influence of which—on the reawakening of Burmese national consciousness—was not unlike that of the German romantic Herder's (1744-1803) cultural and political activization of Slavic nations in the nineteenth century:

> What was Buddhism doing? What help did it give to its believers in their extremity? It gave none. Think of a peasant lying there in the ghostly dim-lit fields waiting to attack us at the dawn. Where was his help? He thought, perhaps, of his king deported, his village invaded, his friends killed, himself reduced to the subject of a far-off queen. He would fight—yes, even though his faith told him not. There was no help there. His was no faith to strengthen his arm, to strengthen his aim, to be his shield in the hour of danger.
>
> If he died, if in the strife of the morning's fight he were to be killed, if a bullet were to still his heart, or a lance to pierce his chest, there was no hope for him of the glory of heaven. No, but every fear of hell, for he was sinning against the laws of righteousness— 'Thou shalt take no life.' There is no exception to that at all, not even for a patriot fighting for his country.
>
> And so the Burmese peasant had to fight his own fight in 1885 alone. His king was gone, his government broken up, he had no leaders. He had no god to stand beside him when he fired at the foreign invaders and when he lay a-dying with a bullet in his throat he had no one to open to him the gates of heaven.[15]

---

[13] Yoe Shway, *The Burman, His Life and Notions* (London, 1910); J. G. Scott, *Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States* (5 vols.; Rangoon, 1900).

[14] Paul Edmonds, *Peacocks and Pagoda* (London, 1924), 3-4.

[15] H. Fielding-Hall, *The Soul of a People* (London, 1903).

A poet's sensitivity and romantic empathy, enriched by unique scholarly knowledge, inspired the life work of Gordon Luce. Having originally come to Burma as a lecturer in English literature, he became captivated by the atmosphere of the Burmese Middle Ages and soon commanded the scholarly tools for penetration into the country's past, the literary and old Burmese, the Mon, Pali, and Chinese plus numerous tribal languages, and particularly the epigraphy made accessible through the activities of British Burma's Archaeological Department. It is due to Gordon Luce that medieval Burma of the Papan dynasty (1044-1287), previously treated by some colonial amateur antiquarians, has been opened to historical scholarship. His is the greatest single contribution that any Westerner has ever made to the knowledge of Burma. We owe a great majority of the research monographs on the history, sociology, economics, religion, anthropology, architecture and literature of old Burma to Gordon Luce—frequently cooperating with his Burmese brother-in-law, the Pali scholar, Pe Maung Tin. An example of their cooperation is a translation from the Mon inscription of king Alungsitthu (1131 A.D.):

> But I would build a causeway sheer athwart
> the river of Samsara, and all folk would speed
> Across until they reach the Blessed City.
> I myself would cross
> And drag the drowning over...
> Ay, myself tamed, I would tame the wilful;
> Comforted, comfort the timid;
> Wakened, wake the asleep;
> Cool, cool the burning;
> Freed, set free the bound;
> Tranquil and led by the good doctrines
> I would hatred calm.
> ... As the best of men,
> Forsaking worldly fame and worthless wealth,
> Fled, for he saw their meaning...
> So would I
> All worldly wealth forsaking draw me near
> Religion, and the threefold course ensue.
> ... Beholding man's distress I would put forth
> My energies and save men, spirits, worlds, from
> Seas of endless change.

Gordon Luce has thus formulated the feeling conveyed by monuments of Pagan:

> Though Alaungsithu's Cave is decked
> with prayer more sweet than lotus-scroll
> Though Damayan's great glooms reflect
> The terror of Narathu's soul.[16]
>
> This face a thousand thousand spires
> Called up along the plain and still
> With leaf of flaming gold it fires
> The crest of every tangled hill.

[16] The parricide Narathu (reigning 1167-1170) built the Damayan Pagoda.

Close-huddled fold and kings who dared
In myriad temples, mile on mile,
To soar beyond Samsara, spared

No palace room, no civil pile;
Impersonal, unseen, the fire
of life, whose tinder all things are,
Mid smoking jungle lifts its spire,
Where mind and matter writhe and jar.[17]

If Gordon Luce has opened Medieval Burma to historical scholarship, the novelist Maurice Collis has popularized Burmese historical and legendary themes among readers of fiction. Continuing a tradition which saw in the East a land of mystery and romance, Collis has reached a considerable audience which otherwise would have had no notion about Burma's past. His Burmese experience started in the field of law: Collis served as a magistrate in British Burma. But British colonial opinion forced him to resign because he had given an English driver, guilty of causing the death of a native in a traffic accident, the same sentence as had been received by a native motorist who had unintentionally caused fatal injury to a British pedestrian.

Burmese inequity, cruelty and arrogance, constitute a recurring refrain in Harvey's *History of Burma* which tends to be a subtle and indirect apology for the British conquerors of such a barbarous country: Burmese medieval *practices* are measured by the standards of Victorian *ethical theory* rather than by the practices of Henry VIII and other Tudors. Such bias is exemplified by Harvey's acceptance of a fantastic Portuguese report about a seventeenth century king of Arakan, sacrificing 6,000 human hearts, because some native gentlemen, of this author's acquaintance, told him that "the sacrifice is true to type, although they do not cite other instances..." [18] However, Harvey, who had a rich experience in Burma's colonial administration, did use as sources, not only the standard chronicles of the Burmese kings, but also a number of unpublished local chronicles in Burmese and Mon languages. He did have a command of literary Burmese which subsequent British and American experts did not take the trouble to acquire.

Professor D. G. E. Hall—the principal mid-twentieth century British authority on Burmese history—used for his primary research contributions not sources in the Burmese language but English and Dutch archival materials. His main contributions to knowledge deal with activities of the mercantilistic Dutch and British East India companies in Burma as well as with internal colonial policy correspondence between the British administrators themselves. In his short history of Burma,[19] 80 pages are devoted to 120 years of British and Burmese relationships and British rule over Burma. And 1,200 years of pre-British Burmese history are dealt with in almost the same space: 96 pages. His image of Burmese history is clearly Anglo-centric. In his book, *Europe*

[17] Gordon Luce and Pe Maung Tin, "Shwegugyi Pagoda Inscription"; Luce, "Greater Temples of Pagan," In *Burma Research Society, Fiftieth Anniversary Publications*, No. 2 (Rangoon, 1960), 382, 383, 176-178.

[18] G. E. Harvey, *History of Burma* (London, 1925).

[19] D. G. E. Hall, *Burma* (New York: Hutchinson's University Library, British Empire History Series, 1950).

and Burma,[20] published in 1945—on the eve of the liquidation of the British Empire—the Burmese chroniclers are compared to the propagandists of Dr. Goebbels: the Burmese chronicle is alleged to have explained the cessions of territory to the English (in 1826), not through military defeats, but through the Burmese king's compassion and generosity. The fact that there is no such passage in Burmese chronicles has been discovered only after this alleged "quotation" had served generations of Anglo-Saxon historians of Burma[21] for the debunking of a people which had resisted the Empire—without their having noticed that *if* such a passage had existed, it would have been an expression of the Buddhist ethos of an ideal ruler.

The religious and aesthetic dimensions of Burmese culture, as well as primary research in Burmese history, have been cultivated mainly through the Burma Research Society (founded in 1910). In its Journal have appeared most scholarly contributions to Burmese studies, including the pioneering writings of Gordon Luce and some of the monographs of John Furnivall who is the most learned of the Burma experts in the field of agrarian economy.

Furnivall had served in Burma under the Indian Civil Service up to the rank of District Commissioner. His outstanding contributions rest on his authoritative knowledge of Burmese agrarian problems. He had decisive influence on the introduction of socialistic—particularly Fabian—literature into post-Depression Burma. Although Furnivall's writings comprise topics like Burmese literature, folklore and religion, his outlook was that of an economist and, particularly, of an administrator who experienced and described the socially destructive impact of colonial relationships on Burmese society.[22] Yet, Furnivall's frame of reference was determined and limited by English utilitarian values. This socialist has felt that "the majority would not know what it would be voting for" and wanted the franchise to be restricted. For Burma, Furnivall desired the kind of regime that would "not give to the people what they want... but what they need."[23] He had little interest or appreciation for the Buddhist values of Burmese culture. Folk Buddhism was for him associated with "some religious fanatic's absurd propaganda." [24]

Similar attitudes of American Burma experts, like John Cady, seem to have been determined by a Baptist missionary background. The tradition of Baptist missionary education, as represented by the Judson College of Rangoon, cannot easily grant the existence of a living Buddhist source of Burmese cultural traditions as alternative to Protestant utilitarian values. But it does concede to its community and, by extension, to Burma the right to political independence. In John Cady's *History of Modern Burma,*[25] the author departs from earlier patterns of contrasting the achievements of British colonial rules with the cruelties and backwardness of pre-British Burma. He puts the colonial period into historical perspective, as a far reaching but passing episode in

[20] D. G. E. Hall, *Europe and Burma* (Oxford, 1946).
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] John Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice* (New York, 1956).
[23] Great Britain, *Burma Reforms Committee, Record of Evidence* (London, 1922), I, 4ff.; III, 219ff., 228ff., quoted by Cady in *A History of Modern Burma, (Ithaca, 1960)*, 226ff. and in J. S. Furnivall, *The Governance of Modern Burma* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950), x.
[24] *Ibid.*
[25] Cady, *op. cit.*

Burma's history. His book contains a reliable account of Burma's independence struggle. This cannot be said about the American Leroy Christian, who fell in the war against Japan: the latter's handbook—*Modern Burma*—[26] a descriptive presentation of the state of pre-war British Burma, underemphasizes the social disintegration brought about by colonial rule. Leroy Christian did not take the Burmese nationalists seriously enough. Events superseded such evaluations. The handbook which continues his *Modern Burma* is Hugh Tinker's *Union of Burma* which recalls, with sympathy and understanding, the rule of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League and of Prime Minister U Nu. While expressing appreciation for U Nu's Buddhist ethos, Tinker's liberal image of Burma is limited by his purely political categories. As to sources, he has been frequently satisfied with a Rangoon newspaper in the English language. Cultural factors in ideologies and even ethnological factors of Burmese nationality problems are passed over in an elegantly cavalier way.

Among the obstacles to more depth of perspective is the reluctance of Burmese informants to discuss political Buddhism as "too hot a subject" (or to speak about non-modern and non-rational spheres of Burmese culture) in order not to let their country appear "backward." Allegedly, such attitudes induced the destruction of some volumes of the Burma Research Society Journal. They certainly inspired attempts of censoring authorities to prevent the export of Burmese books on folk-beliefs. Against the long background of anti-Burmese European writing, there are pre-occupations that—if research by foreign scholars be allowed in Burma—might right the wrong. From these results, a notion has developed that research about Burma should wait until the Burmese themselves can produce it—such as the Burmese scholars Maung Maung, Htin Aung and Than Tun [27] have already done (the latter, precisely, in the "Humanities"). On the other hand, modern Burmese studies in America—as part of the so-called Area Studies—have developed into a preserve of social scientists, particularly the type of political scientists who consider cultural factors to be irrelevant abstractions and who are fully satisfied with descriptive treatment of outward political processes, starting with the 20th century.

One of the main pre-occupations of such social scientists' Area Studies is a search for political models. Thus, we are informed by Leach, that since the cultural patterns of the valley Burmans are determined by Indian models, the social patterns of the hill minority peoples must be understood in terms of Chinese models.[28] Another social scientist—Lucien Pye—has revealed how much of the Burmese political character is determined by tensions between patterns of Burmese infantile experience and the disciplinary experience of Buddhist monastery school education. Furthermore, Pye thinks that to have discovered the Burmese Buddhist's concern for the ultimate is to discover

[26] John Leroy Christian, *Modern Burma: A Survey of Political and Economic Development* (Toronto, 1942).

[27] Maung Maung, *Burma in the Family of Nations* (Amsterdam, 1956). Htin Aung, *Burmese Law Tales: Legal... Burmese folk-lore* (London, 1962). Than Tun, "Social Life in Burma, 1044-1287," *Journal of the Burma Research Society*, pts. i-ii, 37-47.

[28] Edmund Leach, "The Frontiers of Burma," in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, III, No. 1 (October, 1960), 51.

the concern for inherently "innocent things." Buddhist moralistic injunctions of Burmese statesmen, like U Nu, have "to his mind" something provocative. To Lucian Pye, "the Burmese insensitivity to the fact that their moralizing might be annoying to others suggests that such activities are designed less as a means of possibly controlling others than as a means of suggesting the innocence of their own intentions." [29] As seventeenth and eighteenth century Enlightenment notions about "Human Nature" die hard, cultural deviations from our own patterns have been interpreted as a sign of lack of sophistication in Burmese socialism—with its acceptance of Buddhist values.[30]

Much, if not most American research on Burma, has been performed or stimulated by experts, whose relationship with Burma began by some professional residence in that country, not by theoretical interest in it. Among the American economic advisers to the Burmese government, Walinsky has produced, from his experience, a valuable monograph about the problems of Burma's planned economy,[31] while Frank Trager contributed important works about Burma's welfare state programs.[32] Trager has also edited several symposia which show considerable understanding and sympathy for the Burmese view point. Even more are the Anglo-centric conventional images of Burmese history discarded in Dorothy Woodman's *Making of Modern Burma.* Not only does she not dwell on Burmese cruelties (in the Harvey tradition), but she actually goes out of her way to expose Victorian British methods of pressuring the remaining part of the independent Burmese kingdom into isolation from the outside world. Her revelations about the terroristic methods used by the British conquerors to break native resistance after 1885,[33] are based on the (otherwise forgotten) British contemporary reports of Grattan Geary [34] which have been confirmed by the diaries of the Russian visiting Indologist, Minayev.

An attempt to see and present modernity's impact on Burma's political ideas, in the context of its Buddhist cultural frame of reference, is made in Sarkisyanz's *Buddhist Backgrounds of the Burmese Revolution* (published outside the United States, in the Netherlands).[35] Its self-imposed limitations consist largely in its treatment of Buddhist impact, without much sociological consideration for the non-Buddhist animistic attitudes in Burmese culture, which have been examined through the anthropological field-work of Michael Mendelson.[36]

---

[29] L. Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building* (London, 1962).

[30] George Torten, "Buddhism and Socialism in Japan and Burma," *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* II, No. 3 (April, 1960), 297, 303.

[31] L. J. Walinsky, *Economic Development in Burma* (New York, 1962).

[32] Frank Trager (ed.), "Burma," *Human Relations Area Files* (New Haven, 1960); F. Trager, *Building a Welfare State in Burma, 1946-1956* (New York, 1958).

[33] Dorothy Woodman, *The Making of Modern Burma* (London, 1963).

[34] Grattan Geary, *Burma After the Conquest* (London, 1886).

[35] Emanuel Sarkisyanz, *Buddhist Backgrounds of the Burmese Revolution* (The Hague, 1965).

[36] Michael Mendelson, "A Messianic Association in Upper Burma," *Bulletin of the London School of Oriental and African Studies,* XXIV, pt. iii (1961).

Both approaches are still not typical, while "religious" materials continue being relegated to the "Humanities" and, as such, are given little consideration in Burmese (unlike the more advanced Indonesian) Area Studies. However, R. Smith's *Religion and Politics in Burma* represents a step away from such conventions. In it, even remote origins, like the development of Buddhist kingship in medieval Ceylon, are not ignored. But this book appeared only a few months ago.[37]

[37] R. Smith, *Religion and Politics in Burma* (Princeton, 1965).

CONCEPTS OF REALITY IN BUDDHIST THOUGHT

JOHN P. DRISCOLL

"ALL IS VOID," ANSWERED THE BUDDHA, WHEN QUERIED repeatedly by his followers about the nature of existence. In Buddhist scriptures, it is difficult to find expressions of reality, although there seems to be an abundant indication of unreality. "The Middle Way" suggested by the Buddha as the reasonable and intelligent path between sensualism and asceticism, indirectly explains through ethics, his concept of reality. It evolves logically from his teaching that earthly experience can—at best—be described as "unsatisfactoriness" (*dukkha*), arising from desire, which must ultimately be eliminated.

For some reason, it does not appear to be common knowledge among non-Buddhists, that their Buddhist brethren basically reject a metaphysical entity, such as Christians and Muslims ascribe to an omnipotent God. In classifying religions as theistic or atheistic, it would not be possible to include Buddhism in the former group, and it has little in common—ontologically speaking—with Islam, Christianity, Brahmanism or Sikhism. Many Buddhists do believe in certain non-earthly powers and accept a wide variety of "Celestial beings." Yet, all Buddhist thought shies away from consideration of a God-power, or of any conception of infinity based on an omnipotence. In attempting to establish basic tenets of Buddhism common to all schools, a Western Buddhist scholar, Col. H. S. Olcott, drafted in 1891 what he called the *Fourteen Fundamental Buddhist Beliefs.* These were considered acceptable by leaders in the various Buddhist areas of Japan, Burma, Ceylon, India, and ultimately, by the chief Lama of the Mongolian Buddhist Monasteries. The second of the basic beliefs makes clear the non-acceptance of God in the orthodox sense:

> The universe was evolved, nor created; and it functions according to law, not according to the caprice of any God.[1]

If, then, reality is not a state of being ordered by God, an all-powerful and omnipresent being, what is it? The Buddha's remark, "All is void," does not seem to satisfy completely our natural curiosity about who we are, why we are here, or where we are going. Could it have been meant as little more than a thought-provoking jibe at man's natural tendency to favor speculation about the future to the immediate task of self-improvement? Buddhist teachers today might answer in different words, but with a similar intent. After all, reality may not truly be of a nature which lends itself to analysis—except perhaps on the mundane level—and achieving super-mundane (ultimate) truth should come only after experience has been thoroughly analyzed.

In contrast to almost all other thinkers on the subject, who can usually

[1] Cf. Christmas Humphreys, *Buddhism* (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1962), 71.

be categorized as Monists (idealists, theists, traditionalists, etc.) or Pluralists (materialists, dualists, relativists, etc.), Buddha inspired the conviction that the fundamental reality is neither singular nor plural. At first we assume: if being is neither one, nor many; the answer must be *none* ("All is void"). Yet, carried to the logical conclusion, it is neither one, nor many, *nor* none. If ultimate reality (ultimate truth) is indeed both end and explanation, we are, in fact, describing Nirvana (Nibbana)—the state of complete understanding, the cessation of all desire (and consequent rebirth), the end of becoming, the clear air of comprehending reality.

The Middle Path in effect, calls for denial of every basic spiritual principal right along with the atheists, materialists and relativists. Like them, Buddha also denied a permanent state of after-life (except in the cycle of re-incarnation which must eventually be broken), and promise of future retribution of sins. Yet, we must not assume further commonality with the materialist camp, for he was quick to point out that any sensually-valued existence is basically vulgar. In fact, a "pleasure-is-good" approach, such as that held by the Epicureans, might even be evil, because such searching after comfort leads only to further searching after comfort; and in its wake, will come further desire, struggle, *dukkha.*

While the Buddha discards the materialist as selfish and debased, he is a little more sympathetic to the idealists, for he felt the various idealisms to be wrong in concept—harsh, and leading nowhere because of their over-emphasis on self-mortification. Of course, we are obligated to recognize the idealism of the Buddha's day as quite different from any average idealism of the Western world of the 19th or 20th century. The Buddha referred, we can safely assume, to the advanced asceticism which led to his own near-demise from hunger, his revised attitude being that there is no gain in forever striving to overcome the body by prayers, fasting, and other austerities, when that very effort and attention could just as well be invested in finding the path to Enlightenment.

With both idealism and materialism eliminated, along with concepts of one or some, it follows that the Middle Path between the two extremes indicates Buddhism to be more involved with mental orderliness than with any speculative postulations about reality. This insistence on mind improvement, rather than theory construction, has always been a main tenet of the religion, and has progressed to the view in Buddhist circles that the mind itself is not an entity but, in fact, only a *function.* But function, implying action and action-change, emphasizes the rather all pervasiveness of the Asian's concept of change. "He does not even consider," says Abegg, "that which is casually conditioned, and even continuous change is for him something organic, inasmuch as he sees it, for example, as a succession of generations." [2] Finally, the idea of continuous change is really cyclic, though we have to think of this circle as being sufficiently big to include the whole history of mankind and of the Cosmos.

---

[2] Abegg, L. *The Mind of East Asia* (London: Thames & Hudson Company), 1952.

"I leave you, I depart, relying on myself alone," said the Lord Buddha, about to pass away at the end of his long ministry. He evidently used this dramatic moment to remind his followers that he had no faith in any power external to his own thinking. This late-hour statement underlines, not only the Buddha's rejection of salvation through grace, but also his strong denial of his contemporaries' theories of determinism. In fact, he is quoted as describing any belief in a predestined existence as the "most pernicious of doctrines." [3]

Does not this casting out of predestination and determinism clash with the admonition to do away with becoming; to put out of thinking all desire? Not if we remember firmly that sovereignty of consciousness resides not in the will, but in being without a will; for *will* represents desire and desire is the source of all conflict, conquest and unhappiness. This brings to the surface, once more, that strange undercurrent of Buddhist philosophy—namely, its search—not for happiness, but instead, for a path away from *unhappiness.*

Perhaps, such an approach is truly as negative as its critics insist. On the other hand, it is more likely to be merely another way of achieving a familiar goal, possibly contentment. The highest good, the *summa bonum,* of Buddhism being Nirvana or Enlightenment, can we assume contentment here on earth must precede the ultimate of all contentments? "Life is a bridge, build no house upon it" goes the saying; such we must strictly avoid if we are to overcome self. Now we are running parallel to the highly important Christian ideal of self-immolation, for in both Christian and the Buddhist views, man seems obligated to "work out his own salvation" *from himself.*

Here, the parallel paths begin to separate as the contrast in views of "self" is considered. The Christian looks upon self as either mortal or immortal, or perhaps both, but never divorced from concepts of soul and the "image and likeness of God." The Buddhist thinks of self as his worst enemy in the practical sense, and as changing, if not unreal in the theoretical sense. It is merely an illusion stemming from desire and, because of mutation, can be neither permanent nor worthy of reconstitution. In fact, according to the doctrine of *Anatta,* or non-soul—as explained in the *Anattalakkhama Sutta*—not only is the self without permanent being, there is nothing which really merits the term "I". Put even stronger, the worst sin is the faith in self to survive as an identity in this life, or in, or after, any lives yet to come.

Anatta does not preclude our facing the value of judgment on the worth of Nirvana as a goal of a civilization. All civilizations have their concepts of a heaven, our state of being, perhaps we should say "quality of existence," different from the mundane. Whereas even the most primitive of cultures propagate such by folklore and the like, Buddhism, which dwells in a quite unprimitive culture, likes to think of itself as without a "Heaven" in the orthodox sense. Yet, for most Buddhist peoples, Nirvana constitutes a dream of peace, just as desirable as the Muslim or Judaic-Christian concept of another world, or paradise.

---

[3] Chas Moore, (ed.) *Philosophy and Culture, East & West* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1959), 195.

Desirability is about the extent of common characteristics in Buddhist and Theistic goals. If you asked a Muslim or a Christian his conception of a heavenly existence, he could quickly describe some state of being commensurate with the views of his sect. But ask a thinking Buddhist about his concept of Nirvana, and you are more apt to get a statement of what is it not than what it is. In the Scripture's words:

> If any teach Nirvana is to cease,
> Say unto such they lie.
> If any teach Nirvana is to live,
> Say unto such they err... .[4]

The poet hits upon a tender point in comparing Buddhist with non-Buddhist thoughts, for extinction, ceasing to be at all, is not truly the Buddhist way of thought about Nirvana. Rather it is a cessation of re-birth, desire for rebirth of becoming. In the end result, a person achieving Enlightenment will have discarded selfishness in all forms. Nirvana will be a "void" of self. This being indescribable, it is no wonder the Scriptural passage of the Buddha's own definition of Nirvana is as unclear as it is unlimited:

> There is, Brethren, a condition where there is neither earth nor water, nor fire, nor air, nor the sphere of infinite space, nor the sphere of infinite consciousness, nor the sphere of the void, nor the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception... that condition, Brethren, do I call neither a coming nor a going nor a standing still, nor a falling away nor a rising up; but it is without fixity, without mobility, without basis. It is the end of... an un-born, a not become, a not-made, a not-compounded.[5]

In this brief paragraph above, we note two "neithers" and thirteen "nors", as a clue to the basically negative approach to the Buddhist counterpart of Heaven. But, though the approach is not positive, it is nevertheless worthy of great contemplation, and is the subject of many Buddhist writings of a strangely contracting positive-action viewpoint. Although we cannot yet understand the nature of Enlightenment, we must recognize the basic premise of "void of self" as the goal, and the cultivation of this void, the path of life. When we are one day free from all bondage, Nirvana will be less inexpressible.

---

[4] *Udana*, Part VIII.
[5] *Pali Chanting Scripture* (Bangkok, Chalerm Panpadi, 1952), 145.

BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS SIAM, CAMBODIA, AND VIETNAM, 1842-1858 *

NICHOLAS TARLING

BRITISH POLICY AND THE REACTION TO BRITISH POLICY were significant factors in creating the political structure of nineteenth-century South-east Asia. Largely, they determined the position in that structure of Siam, of Vietnam, and of the intervening vassal remnant of Cambodia. Siam was more important in British policy than Vietnam, more important to British interests. But more fundamental in deciding the future of the two countries (on which the future of Cambodia also depended), was their reaction to British policy. Both sought to insure their political independence in the changing world of Southeast Asia. Their ruling groups chose differing means and thus enjoyed differing success.

At the time of the Crawfurd mission to Siam and Vietnam in 1822, the attitudes of the two governments did not seem very different. Both were jealous of the conquering English Company, and both sought to deflect its approaches—by treating in the tributary style of East Asian diplomacy and by implying that they could really deal only with the King of Great Britain—rather than meet the British more on British terms. Crawfurd's conclusions were somewhat similar in both cases: commerce with both countries should be carried on indirectly through Chinese junks. But he did recognize certain differences. The commercial importance of Vietnam, he thought, had been exaggerated; its political importance to the Indian Government was less. Siam, on the other hand, was (whether the Company ruled in India or not) "within the pale of our Indian diplomacy," [1] in view of British interests in the tributary states of northern Malaya and the British occupation of the Tenasserim provinces in the first Burma war. Not that this meant that there should be an envoy at Bangkok: such might only be a source of irritation. "The sea on one quarter, and impracticable mountains and forests on another, are barriers which, together with the fears and discretion of the Siamese Government, will in all likelihood preserve us long at peace with this people..."[2]

On the other hand, Crawfurd thought that the Royal Navy might be a vehicle for communication with Vietnam on the part of the British Government. A direct intercourse with the Crown would flatter the court at Hue and perhaps improve commercial relations.[3]

---

* This paper was read to Section E of the Hobart meeting of the Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science in August 1965.

[1] John Crawfurd, *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China*, Second ed., (London, 1830), i, 472.

[2] *Ibid.*, i, 472.

[3] *Ibid.*, i, 474-5.

Whether a diplomatic approach on the part of the royal government would (at the time of Crawfurd's mission) have produced a different reaction in either country is, perhaps, doubtful. In fact, for two decades, it was not attempted in either country, even the way Crawfurd suggested as a means of cutting into the Company's diplomatic monopoly. By the time it was attempted, Vietnam's reaction had, perhaps, been affected by unfortunate dealings with other western powers. On the other hand, Siam pursued (despite one major crisis) a different policy, setting out from a treaty made with the Company's envoy—Captain Henry Burney—in 1826. Siam had indeed been brought into closer touch with the British by common boundaries and by a busier trade, and had been impressed by the defeat of the neighboring Burmese.[4] But the most important factor in the differing reaction of Siam and Vietnam was their different history, and the different roles earlier Europeans had assumed in it. Siam had played off the predominant European power in past centuries by calling in countervailing powers. Vietnam had seen different European powers involved in her Civil War. Indeed, Minh-Mang's growing repression of Catholic missionary activities in the 1820's and 1830's was of political origin. The missionary Pigneau had aided Cia-Long, who had re-established an independent Vietnam: might not his dynasty and Vietnam's independence be challenged in a similar way? This consideration seems to qualify Crawfurd's optimism about royal missions—though it is inconclusive, since for years none were sent—and to be perhaps the major factor in the treatment of them when they were sent.

The Supreme Government in Calcutta had been doubtful about dispatching the Burney mission to Siam. It observed that

> All extension of our territorial possessions and political relations on the side of the Indo-Chinese nations is, with reference to the peculiar character of those states, to their decided jealousy of our power and ambition, and to their proximity to China, earnestly to be deprecated and declined as far as the course of events and the force of circumstances will permit... . Even the negotiation of treaties and positive engagements with the Siamese Government... may be regarded as open to serious objection lest any future violation of their conditions should impose upon us the necessity of resenting such breaches of contract... .[5]

Nevertheless, the mission had been sent, since in practice Siam was already involved in "political relations" with the British. Moreover, a treaty was signed, providing that British merchants might "buy and sell without the intervention of other persons," that rice exports and opium imports should be prohibited, and that a measurement duty of 1700 ticals per Siamese fathom should be levied. The treaty also partially conceded Siamese claims over the northern Malay states, especially Kedah.

The attempts of the Penang Government to rectify what it regarded as an unsatisfactory conclusion, led the Governor-General to reiterate that the proper policy towards the Siamese was "to endeavour to allay their jealousy of our ultimate views... and to derive from our connection with them every

---

[4] W. F. Vella, *Siam Under Rama III 1824-1851* (Locust Valley, 1957), 118, 121.

[5] G.-G.-in-Co. to Gov.-in-Co., 19th November 1824. *Straits Settlements Factory Records 99* (4th January 1825), India Office Library.

attainable degree of commercial advantage, by practising in our intercourse with them the utmost forbearance, temper, and moderation both in language and action...and...by faithfully and scrupulously observing the conditions of the treaty which fixes our future relations..... ."[6] The Company was anxious to retain its existing relations with China and its position in the Canton market and unwilling, therefore, to press upon Peking's Indo-Chinese "feudatories."

East Asian diplomacy was, along with direct British commerce with East Asia, still in the hands of the Company. If this fact obstructed diplomatic relations between Britain and the Indo-Chinese countries (and this is, it has been suggested, doubtful), that fact also meant that British policy in the area was restrained and cautious. Vietnam was left alone, left to become involved with the missionaries and their supporters, to become more isolationist than ever. Siam was handled in a restrained way that, no doubt, facilitated the adjustment in Thai policy marked by the treaty of 1826.

In 1834, the Company's monopoly of the China trade was brought to an end, and the British Government appointed a Superintendent of Trade there. Further changes followed, with the deterioration in Anglo-Chinese relations, the first Opium War, the annexation of Hong Kong, and the opening of Chinese ports under the treaty of Nanking. In the minds of some, this seemed to clear the way for a new policy towards the Indo-Chinese vassals. The inhibition of the Company's Chinese policy was removed; the vassals might follow their suzerain's example and admit commerce more freely; and the British Government would benefit by conducting direct relations with them. Among those who argued in this way, were Charles Gutzlaff, Chinese Secretary at Hong Kong, and Montgomery Martin, one-time Colonial Treasurer.

In Siam, some commercial development had ensued upon the treaty of 1826. Junks from Siam came to provide one of Singapore's more valuable trades and in addition, trade was built up at Bangkok by Europeans, especially by the Scot Robert Hunter, who had four vessels annually making voyages by the mid-1830's.[7] The duties were so heavy on square-rigged vessels, however, that most of the produce went to Singapore on Chinese and Siamese junks.[8] Furthermore, in the late 1830's and 1840's, the Siamese government extended the monopolistic system of tax-farming—for instance, in 1839 in the case of sugar—[9] while leading Siamese began trading in their own square-rigged vessels.[10]

More particularly, Hunter became involved in a quarrel with the Siamese government which, at the time of the British expedition to China, had ordered a steamer from him. When, after the expedition had safely returned to India, the government refused to buy it, Hunter sold it to Siam's enemy,

---

[6] G.-G.-to ov.-in-Co., 23rd July 1827. *S.S.F.R. 142* (6th September 1827).

[7] R. Adey Moore, "An Early British Merchant in Bangkok," *The Journal of the Siam Society*, XI, Pt. 2 (1914-5), 25.

[8] G.W. Earl, *The Eastern Seas* (London, 1837), 177.

[9] Neon Snidvongs, *The Development of Siamese Relations with Britain and France in the Reign of Maha Mongkut, 1851-1868* (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of London, 1961), 136.

[10] Vella, *op. cit.*, 128.

the Vietnamese.[11] As a result of the quarrel, Hunter promoted protests to the Indian Government about alleged infractions of the Burney treaty—for instance, a memorial of May 1843 protesting at the sugar monopoly—at a prohibition on teak exports, and at the excessive punishments inflicted for importing opium.[12]

The Indian Government declared that the monopoly did not violate the treaty: no interference was at present required.[13] A further memorial from Hunter urged action to secure some redress over the sugar monopoly and over the breach of the agreement to purchase his steamer, and to conclude a new arrangement with the Siamese replacing the heavy measurement duties: "the successes of Great Britain in China are fresh in their memory . . . ."[14] Governor Butterworth in the Straits Settlements thought that most of Hunter's complaints lacked substance, but that the Burney treaty should be revised.[15] The Court of Directors thought the British right of remonstrance against the sugar monopoly not clear enough to justify action.[16]

The Company was still cautious, still concerned about the risks of collision and war. If Siam was not now to be considered in relation to China, it could still be considered in relation to Burma and to India in general: it was still within the pale of Indian diplomacy. General political considerations operated against any disposition to rush to the defense of the commercial interests of the Bangkok merchants or the Straits Settlements. There was a treaty with Siam: it was best to avoid risking the bases of relations it settled even if the Siamese were said to be infringing particular clauses.

The Vietnamese Government had made liberal commercial promises to Crawfurd, but trade with Vietnam was in fact (as he had prophesied) to center largely on Singapore, involving junks and topes and also royal Vietnamese vessels. The Vietnamese Government indeed sought a monopoly by denying Cochin-Chinese sailors the right to carry arms, and so discouraging their enterprise by committing them to the Malay and Chinese pirates.[17] The attempted monopoly was much more a function than a cause of the Vietnamese policy of limited communication, and this Gutzlaff failed to realize.

In his memorandum of July 1845,[18] he pointed out that—despite their promises to Crawfurd—the Hue Government had, in fact, frustrated a direct intercourse with Vietnam. But he explained this by referring to "the cupidity of the Government to monopolize as much as possible all valuable articles and export them in its own bottoms..... ." He thought the Emperor might be persuaded to turn to free intercourse and to impose moderate duties

---

[11] Snidvongs, *op cit.*, 141. Moore, J.S.S., XI, Pt. 2, 33.
[12] *The Burney Papers* (Bangkok, 1910-14), IV, Pt. 2, 81-3.
[13] *Ibid.*, 106.
[14] *Ibid.*, 129-35.
[15] *Ibid.*, 160-6.
[16] Court to G.-G., 2nd January 1846. *F.O.17/150,* Public Record Office.
[17] Earl, *op. cit.*, 198.
[18] "Remarks upon the establishment of a Commercial Treaty with Siam, Annam (or Cochin China), Korea and Japan," 12th July 1845. *F.O.17/100.* Gutzlaff had been a missionary in W.F. Vella, *Origins of 'Survival Diplomacy' in Siam: Relations between Siam and the West, 1822-56* (Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of California, 1950), 40.

as a means of raising revenue. He was optimistic over the effect of appointing "an accredited Envoy from Her Majesty."

Such an envoy to Siam, Gutzlaff thought, might secure a revision of the commercial parts of the Burney treaty and put an end to monopolies. The political topics and territorial disputes he would consider "as foreign to his mission, and entirely unconnected with the affairs of the Home Government..... ." A consular agent might be appointed, and on his accession he could advise the heir presumptive, "a devoted friend to foreigners..... ."

Sir John Davis, the Superintendent in China, supported Gutzlaff's plan. The Foreign Office, despite Gutzlaff's attempt to divide off "the affairs of the Home Government" from those of India, referred it to the India Board.[19] The President thought the Burney treaty "sufficient for the objects of Trade and Friendship; and, at any rate, I should be inclined to doubt the policy of risking the advantages possessed under the present treaty, in the attempt to obtain greater advantages under a new engagement." With Vietnam, however, there was no treaty, there was no such risk, and a negotiation might be attempted; if successful there, the scheme might be extended to Siam. A provision should be included against internal monopolies.[20]

The Indian authorities were prepared for experiment beyond the pale of their diplomacy, in Vietnam. Here, British interests were sufficiently unimportant to allow a new approach. In the case of Siam, British interests were more important, and a new approach—originating in a dubious breach of the treaty—might only risk the existing relationship. Again, therefore, it was not a lack of British endeavor, deriving from a lack of interest, that promoted Vietnam's isolation. Indeed, in this case, the very lack of interest promoted a new endeavor, while the weight of British interest in Siam contributed to the caution among the Indian authorities whose advice the Foreign Office followed. A full power — though no royal letter from the Queen — was sent to Davis for negotiation with Vietnam.[21]

The India Board also opposed the Board of Trade's proposition to appoint a consular agent in Bangkok for the purpose of certifying that Siamese sugar was not slave-grown and could thus qualify for importation into Britain at new lower rates of duty. A City merchant (Parker Hammond) approached the Foreign Office and proposed the appointment of a Bangkok merchant (Daniel Brown) as consul, and the negotiation of a new treaty with Siam. The proposal was repeated later in 1846 and in 1847, but Hammond was told that the Government "had no occasion to avail themselves of his suggestion."[22]

Possibly, the interested merchants brought the matter before Sir James Brooke during his visit to England in October 1847-February 1848.[23] Brooke was at a peak in his career: the Foreign Office had appointed him

---

[19] Davis to Aberdeen, 1st August 1845. *F.O.17/107.* F.O. to India Board, 24th. November 845. *F.O.17/107.*

[20] Ripon to Aberdeen, 11th March, 1846. F.O. 17/117.

[21] Aberdeen to Davis, 18th March 1846. F.O. 17/108.

[22] Memo., 19th August 1848. *F.O.17/150.*

[23] The dates are from Sir S. Runciman, *The White Rajahs* (Cambridge, 1960), 88, 91.

Commissioner and Consul-General to the Sultan and Independent Chiefs in Borneo; he had concluded a treaty with Brunei and became Governor of the new colony of Labuan.

In August 1848, Hammond and Co. again alluded to the sugar monopoly in Bangkok and other alleged infractions of the Burney treaty, and suggested that, in view of the China war, a British remonstrance would be heeded by the Siamese court. The Governor of Labuan, it was said, would willingly endeavor to remedy the decline of trade and a new treaty might be made.[24] The India Board, duly consulted, still adhered to its views of 1846.[25] Attempts to by-pass the Indian authorities in seeking action at Bangkok were thus still unsuccessful.

Meanwhile, in Singapore, the Chamber of Commerce had taken the matter up. It tried the Governor-General first, complaining of monopolies as infringing the Burney treaty and of the measurement duties specified in the treaty as hindering competition with native craft, and protesting at arbitrary acts against British subjects. A new treaty should be made, establishing equitable duties, securing unrestricted trading, ending the prohibition on rice exports, and appointing a consul.[26]

Despairing of the Indian authorities, the merchants turned to the Royal Navy. In May, they called the Senior Naval Officer's attention to arbitrary proceedings against the firm of Silver, Brown and Co., whose exports to Singapore had allegedly been prohibited. They suggested his proceeding to Bangkok "to give protection to British Trade and persons, in any emergency which the unsettled state of affairs there may render necessary, and further to require that such arbitrary proceedings as above alluded to be put a stop to and guarded against hereafter." Perhaps, he might be able to put relations with Siam on a better footing, or take security for the faithful execution of the existing treaty. Commander Plumbridge took no action, so the Chamber turned to the Commander-in-Chief. Sir Francis Collier replied, in turn, that he must refer to the Admiralty. The Admiralty referred to the Foreign Office, the Foreign Office to the India Board, with predictable results.[27]

Meanwhile, in October, the Singapore Chamber followed up with a direct approach to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston. Its memorial urged the conclusion of a new treaty with Siam. It also wanted the conclusion of a treaty with Vietnam, to be negotiated by an envoy or commissioner in conjunction with the Commander-in-Chief.[28]

Davis' mission to Vietnam had, in fact, proved a failure. He had been unduly optimistic; his judgments had been mistaken. The most difficult part, he had argued, would be the abolition of the trade monopoly. One problem—"the absence of the Sovereign character in the Governor General"—had, however, been overcome. Furthermore, the French clash with

---

[24] Statement by Hammond and Co., 11th August 1848. *F.O.17/150.*
[25] India Board to F.O., 23rd August 1848, and enclosures. *F.O.17/150.*
[26] Chamber of Commerce to G.-G., 28th January 1848. *F.O.17/151.*
[27] Ker to Plumbridge, 17th April 1848; Ker to Collier, 21st August 1848 reply, s.d.; F.O. to India Board, 6th November 1848; reply, 13th November, 1848 *F.O.17/151.*
[28] Memorial, October 1848. *F.O.17/162.*

the Vietnamese at Tourane, early in 1847, might lead them by contrast to receive well the pacific British.[29] But, in fact, the clash — deriving, like an American clash two years previously, from the missionary issue — had redoubled the exclusionist policy towards all Europeans. The new Emperor Tu-Duc brought an end to the royal trade to the southward.[30] Certainly this did not increase the likelihood of a friendly reception, even to an envoy of the British Crown. Davis, in the event, got no further than Tourane and was not allowed to proceed to the capital. Nor were the presents exchanged.[31] What the India Board had seen as an experiment guiding the future course in Siam, proved a failure. Vietnam was thus included in Singapore's direct representations to the home government.

Acting in his retirement as agent for the Singapore merchants, Crawfurd brought their memorial before the Foreign Office. He felt, however, that "a formal, and consequently expensive Embassy to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China is not desirable, and that the most eligible course will consist in sending a couple of Steamers of light draught, under the case of an experienced, and discreet naval officer, being the bearer of a letter from her Majesty to the Sovereigns of the two countries, with one from the Secretary of State to their Ministers, but without any powers to negotiate."[32] This recommendation was perhaps, somewhat on the lines of his Vietnam recommendation of the 1820's, except that he had then considered Siam to be exclusively an Indian matter. Furthermore, Crawfurd favored a rather different approach to Siam in another recommendation of March 1849. The mission to Bangkok should be conducted by a naval officer, with two small war steamers. Their appearance would have a "wholesome" effect, especially as the Siamese knew of "our exemplary chastisement of the Chinese..... ." In Vietnam, on the other hand, the envoy should simply deliver a friendly letter "requesting a continuance and extension of the commercial intercourse between the two nations... ." One steamer would be best; "and here, not forgetting the untoward circumstances which attended the recent visit of a French Admiral, the less military display the better . . . ."[33]

Again, Palmerston referred to the India Board. The President admitted that a more liberal system in Siam and Vietnam would benefit British commerce. The attempt to secure it, however, would (he apprehended) "produce only embarrassment and loss. If, however, the mercantile community, and Her Majesty's Government, at their own cost, and after due deliberation are inclined to run the risk, I should not deem it my duty to press further upon Your Lordship the doubts to which I have referred." Not that Crawfurd's paper removed those doubts. In the case of Vietnam, even according to his analysis, a mission was either needless, or it would be "fruitless." As for Siam, Crawfurd's plan was not to negotiate a treaty, but simply "to show that the capital of Siam, with its palaces and temples, might be laid in ashes in a few hours, and to satisfy the Court that an illiberal commercial

[29] Davis to Palmerston, 4th October 1847. *F.O.17/130.*
[30] Note enclosed in Parkes to Hammond, 3rd August 1855. *F.O.17/236.*
[31] Davis to Palmerston, 26th, 30th October 1847. *F.O.17/130.*
[32] Crawfurd to Eddisbury, 26th December 1848. *F.O.17/151.*
[33] Notes in Crawfurd to Eddisbury, 1st March 1849. *F.O.17/161.*

policy cannot be preserved in with impunity... ."[34] The India Board thus grudgingly assented to a mission. But the Davis "experiment" had been a failure, and really the Board's objections now extended to Vietnam also.

The Foreign Office turned to the Board of Trade. The outcome was influenced by the activities of Montgomery Martin. In 1845, he had put in proposals similar to Gutzlaff's and, early in 1849, he had suggested a mission to Japan, Siam, Korea and Vietnam, emanating from the Queen's government, unconnected with Hong Kong, which (he argued) was "still viewed in the Countries adjacent to China as connected with the East India Company and their Indian Territories," since all the Governors, so far, had been Company servants. Subsequently, he promoted his plans in the manufacturing districts.

In August 1849, the Singapore Chamber sent a memorial to Palmerston, suggesting the appointment as negotiator in Siam and Vietnam of Brooke, who had lately concluded a treaty with Sulu.[35] This was, in turn, communicated to the India Board and the Board of Trade. The India Board referred to its earlier views. The Board of Trade declared that "the manufacturing districts in the North of England" were in favor of "an attempt to extend our commercial relations with Siam and Cochin China... ." Palmerston resolved to send Brooke on the mission.[36]

Diplomatic dealings with the "Indo-Chinese nations" had, during the 1840's, been considered in relation to China with which a revolution in relations had occurred. Official proposals had emanated from Hong Kong and instructions had been sent to the Superintendent. At the same time, however, the merchants in the Straits Settlements—still under Company rule—had been urging a more active policy in the Archipelago. They sought direct contacts with the home government and the appointment (under the Foreign Office) of a Superintendent of Trade similar to the one in China.

The home government had not gone as far as this. It, however, displayed an interest in Borneo, Sulu and the adjacent islands, and was disposed to use Brooke as some kind of Superintendent or Commissioner of Trade without actually giving him the title and thus, perhaps, worsening relations with the Dutch.[37] Merchants in Bangkok and Singapore and their connections in London had seen the possibility of employing the apparently successful Brooke in the Indo-Chinese countries. There, nothing had yet been effected, and, though probably not because of Martin's argument, the Foreign Office favored the arrangement.

The new Southeast Asian orientation of Indo-Chinese diplomacy did not, however, mean that Southeast Asian matters were fully considered in Brooke's instructions. They were concerned with negotiating commercial stipulations

---

[34] Memo in Labouchers to Palmerston, 10th January 1849. *F.O.17/161.*

[35] Memorial, 20th August 1849. *F.O.17/162.*

[36] Hobhouse to Palmerston, 10th November 1849; Board of Trade to F.O., 22nd November 1849. *F.O.17/163.*

[37] See the present author's paper, "The Superintendence of British Interests in South-east Asia in the Nineteenth Century," read at the Conference of Asian Historians, Hong Kong, 1964, and to be published in the *Journal Southeast Asian History* in 1966.

that might be compared to those with other "imperfectly civilized States," such as China and Turkey.[38] Nothing was said about the territorial relations with Burma and with the Malay states that had once made Crawfurd consider Siam purely an Indian concern. The India Board, grudgingly assenting to a mission, had grudged observations about its conduct.

The Foreign Office did not send out royal letters for Brooke to deliver. However, so far as Siam went, he thought this might aid him "in maintaining the high and firm position which is necessary to take with Indo-Chinese Nations. . . ."[39] In fact, he did not intend to attempt the negotiation of a detailed treaty, merely to pave "the way for a more frequent and friendly communication. . . ."[40] The old king must shortly die and a new order would ensue with the accession of the heir presumptive, Mongkut.[41] The *Sphinx*—the larger of the two steamers accompanying the mission—stuck on the bar of the Menam on its arrival from Singapore in August. Brooke's secretary, Spenser St. John, was to attribute to this the failure of the mission.[42] But Rama III was set against any invasion of Siamese customs and traditions: he tried to turn to account not only Brooke's lack of a royal letter, but also the fact that he came on the part of the royal government, while there was already a treaty with the Company.[43] Brooke agreed to put his proposals into writing. These were then summarily rejected.[44]

Brooke declared that the mission had been slighted and recommended that "amicable communications with the Siamese Government should cease till their feeling of hostility shall have been corrected. . . ."[45] The Burney treaty had been infringed and British subjects had been outraged. Decisive measures were called for: reparations and a new treaty should be demanded; and, if refused, "a force should be present immediately to enforce them by a rapid destruction of the defenses of the river, which would place us in possession of the Capital and by restoring us to our proper position of command, retrieve the past and ensure peace for the future, with all its advantages of a growing and most important commerce. . . ."[46] Mongkut would be placed on the throne. "At the same time the Malayan States (particularly Kedah) may be placed on a footing to save them from the oppressions they are now subjected to. . . ."[47]

As for Vietnam, Brooke had, on receiving the instructions, written to suggest that a royal letter and presents should be sent out for him to deliver

---

[38] Palmerston to Brooke, 18th December 1849. *F.O.69/1.*

[39] Brooke to Palmerston, 5th March 1850. *F.O.69/1.*

[40] Brooke to Palmerston, 2nd July 1850. *F.O.69/1.*

[41] Brooke to Stuart, 17th June 1850. John S. Templer, ed., *The Private Letters of Sir James Brooke* (London, 1853), ii, 304.

[42] S. St. John, *The Life of Sir James Brooke* (Edinburgh and London, 1879), 222.

[43] Vella, *Siam under Rama III,* 135-6.

[44] N. Tarling, "Siam and Sir James Brooke," *The Journal of the Siam Society,* XLVIII, Pt. 2 (November 1960), 52, 54-5.

[45] Brooke's Journal. *F.O.*69/1.

[46] Brooke to Palmerston, 5th October 1850. *F.O.*69/1.

[47] Brooke to Palmerston, 5th October 1850, confidential. *F.O.69/1.*

No presents were sent out by the Foreign Office, but a letter was forwarded.[48] In fact, Brooke did not attempt the mission. Instead, he declared that Cambodia was

> the Keystone of our policy in these countries,—the King of that ancient Kingdom is ready to throw himself under the protection of any European nation, who will save him from his implacable enemies, the Siamese and Cochin Chinese. A Treaty with this monarch at the same time that we act against Siam might be made. His independence guaranteed. The remnants of his fine Kingdom preserved; and a profitable trade opened. The Cochin Chinese might then be properly approached by questioning their right to interrupt the ingress and egress of British trade into Cambodia. The example of Siam—our friendship with Cambodia. The determined attitude (not Treaty seeking) would soon open Cambodia to our commerce and induce the Cochin Chinese to waive their objections to intercourse...

The Vietnamese were interfering with the trade at Kampot, and this would be the basis of an approach to them.[49]

The Singapore Chamber of Commerce had declared in June that trade with Siam, except by Siamese vessels, was "all but extinct," and suggested "that no course of proceedings short of actual hostilities can now or hereafter place our relations with that country in a worse position than that in which they now are." Brooke should be accompanied by an imposing force.[50] After Brooke's failure, the Chamber was divided as to future policy.

One group of memorialists thought that "a more advantageous treaty than the one at present in force cannot be concluded with the existing Government, unless by means which they would be unwilling to see employed." Singapore supplied Bangkok with British manufactures. This trade went on in the hands of Bangkok Chinese, "and while the present pernicious revenue system pursued by the Siamese Government continues, your Memorialists entertain strong doubts whether any attempt to force this trade into other hands and into other channels, would in any degree tend to improve or extend British commercial relations with Siam... ." The commercial difficulties were "not to be attributed to any petty attempt to interrupt British Commerce or evade the existing Treaty, but seem entirely connected with the internal administration of the Government, which no treaty, however, skillfully framed, could possibly remedy, nor anything else, short of a complete change in the policy of the Government regarding the mode of levying and collecting the revenues... ." The question should rest "until a change of Government and policy take place, when peaceful negotiations may be resumed with better hopes of success... ." A warlike demonstration might "convulse the whole Kingdom, put a stop for years to all trade, and perhaps ultimately render the establishment of British power in the Country indispensable... ."[51] The *Singapore Free Press* thought the aim here was

---

[48] Brooke to Palmerston, 6th March 1850; F.O. to Brooke, 22nd June, 2nd July 1850. *F.O.69/1.*

[49] As footnote 47.

[50] Logan to Brooke, 14th June 1850. *F.O.69/1.*

[51] Memorial by Boustead and Co., and others to Palmerston, 1850. *Singapore Free Press,* 17th January 1851.

> to suggest the expediency of confining the trade with Siam to Singapore, and the discontinuance of the attempt to prosecute a direct trade with that country, recommending in effect that the provisions of the existing treaty should be suffered to fall into disuse, and all preceding violations of it, and injuries to British subjects, quietly winked at. This course, although it might tend to the temporary advantage of the Memorialists, does not appear to us to be that best suited for upholding the respect due to the British nation, or for assuring the ultimate advantage of British trade with Siam... .[52]

Other memorialists indeed rejected the view as inconsistent with the previous views of the Chamber. If direct intercourse ceased, Singapore might derive some partial and uncertain benefit. But, even if Singapore's interests were alone to be considered, "we entertain no doubt whatever that, if our intercourse" with Siam "is fairly and freely opened up, the geographical position and other advantages enjoyed by Singapore must, under any circumstances, secure for it a very considerable portion of the Siam Trade, and we have no apprehension that, from such a Trade, left to find its natural channel, Singapore must ever be largely benefited... ."[53] Crawfurd noted these differing views and later saw the Foreign Secretary.[54]

Palmerston did not, in fact, follow Brooke's recommendations.[55] No doubt, this was not because he was sympathetic to the notion that Siamese trade might be confined to Singapore (as Crawfurd had thought back in the 1820's). Such narrow Straits Settlements views were unlikely to be endorsed at home. Indeed, the views of the second group of memorialists were, on this point, ultimately to prove more realistic. Generally, there were these tensions in the Singapore position: to some extent, its prosperity depended on the undeveloped character of Southeast Asian trade; development, the opening of new ports and routes, might threaten its dominance; but it could still hope for a substantial share of an expanded trade.[56]

More relevant, perhaps, to the nature of the decision in London — on which there seem to be no official memoranda to offer guidance — was the proposal of the first group of memorialists to await a change of government and policy, rather than to resort to warlike demonstration. This sort of view not only suited certain commercial interests involved in the indirect trade: it was consonant with the trend of British policy towards Siam as so far conducted by the Indian authorities and the India Board. It was important, Brooke had been told, "that if your efforts should not succeed, they should at least leave things as they are, and should not expose us to the alternative of submitting to fresh affront, or of undertaking an expensive operation to punish insult... ."[57]

---

[52] *Singapore Free Press*, 24th January 1851.

[53] Hamilton, Gray and Co. and others to Palmerston, received 19th. December 1850. *F.O.69/2.*

[54] Crawfurd to Stanley, 21st December 1850. *F.O.69/2.* Crawfurd to Derby, 25th March 1852. *F.O.97/368.*

[55] Palmerston to Brooke, 6th February 1851. *F.O.69/3.*

[56] On the development of Singapore's trade, see Wong Lin Ken, "The Trade of Singapore, 1819-69," *Journal of the Malayan Branch Royal Asiatic Society*, XXXIII, Pt. 4 (December 1960), and Chiang Hai Ding, *A History of Straits Settlements Foreign Trade*, 1870-1915 (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, 1963).

[57] As footnote 38.

The India Board had opposed any negotiation that might risk relations with a marcher territory for a doubtful advantage. The Foreign Office had finally secured its grudging assent to the mission, but had inherited some of its unwillingness to engage in political adventure. Furthermore, it was widely held—as by Gutzlaff, so, as first, by Brooke—that the accession of a new king in Siam would bring a more liberal policy. Anglo-Thai relations would broaden down from the Burney precedent: their narrowing was only temporary, and was not a cause for violent interruption. In the case of Vietnam, there was nothing to resent, though Brooke had suggested an approach based on the interruption of trade at Kampot. There was also nothing to interrupt.

It is not clear what, if anything, he intended by so doing, but Palmerston did seek further information about Kampot. Crawfurd had pointed to its trade with Singapore in Chinese junks and small square-rigged vessels: it could become an entrepot for distributing British manufactures, and "at the same time check the exclusive commercial policy of the Siamese."[58] Some information was later received from Governor Butterworth, who drew upon Catholic missionaries.

> The King of Cambodia is now hemmed in between two rival and powerful Potentates, who would readily resent any supposed offense, with a view of seizing upon some coveted portion of his territory, which would in all probability have long since been divided between them, but for the advantage of having a neutral and powerless State, so well situated for settling their disputes, and making war upon each other without injury to their own immediate subjects. Doubtless the King of Cambodia would gladly and gratefully place himself under the protection of any European Power that would guarantee him protection against the Siamese and Cochin Chinese; but to make a treaty with him independent of the guarantee would tend only to increase his difficulties, without offering the smallest benefit to the contracting party. . . .

The trade at Kampot—one of the few remaining ports—could "never be considerable, in consequence of the main entrance to the country, the Mekong. . ., with all its feeders flowing into the Sea through the territory of Cochin China. . ." The country, too, had been devastated by recent Siam-Vietnam wars. Thus, "without the aid of Great Britain, Kampot or any other port in Cambodia, can never become a commercial Emporium."[59] The Governor quoted an article in the *Singapore Free Press*. The Cambodians, it suggested, sought to use intervals of peace in the Siam-Vietnam wars to develop intercourse with outside nations. The trade at Kampot which they sought to foster was imperilled by pirates (hence the use of vessels of European construction). "Here is a point where the wedge might be inserted, that would open the interior of the Indo-Chinese Peninsula to British Commerce, as the great River of the Cambodians traverses its entire length and even affords communication into the heart of Siam. . . ."

Another number of the *Press* (also published in August 1850) had pointed out the presence in Singapore of an employee of the King of Cam-

---

[58] Crawfurd to Stanley, 21st December 1850. *F.O.69/2.*

[59] Butterworth to Secretary, 20th May 1851. *F.O.17/185.* Cf his analysis to Vella's, *Siam under Rama III,* 107-8.

bodia during the preceding months. His real purpose, it was thought, was "to solicit the assistance of the authorities in suppressing piracy . . . and thus to render the intercourse with the Port more free and open. . . ." Surely, Britain would not so neglect her interests, the paper continued, "as to refuse the proffered friendship, especially as it will afford her a favorable opportunity of renewing that system which led to the establishment of the British name in the East, that of protecting the weak from the oppression of the powerful. . . ."[60]

Before this information had reached the Foreign Office, Palmerston had heard of a rumored Cambodian proposal for a political connection.[61] Butterworth, in turn, reported on this. He declared that "no overtures have been made to me, either directly or indirectly, to test the feelings of the British Authorities, relative to a Treaty of friendship." Constantine Monteiro, a confidential agent of the King, had shown him (Butterworth) his instructions the previous year, but they were not of a political nature, "and finding that he had fallen into the hands of the Editors of the Local Journals, I did not even seek an interview with him. . . ." The King's request for protection against the Chinese pirates notwithstanding, he had communicated to the Commander-in-Chief, and the *Semiramis* had been sent up in November.[62] In addition, it may be added, an unofficial gesture was made. The commercial firm of D' Almeida sent the *Pantaloon* to Kampot, with the Danish adventurer, L. V. Helms, as supercargo.[63]

According to a Cambodian chronicle for 1849, three Europeans came to trade—"Evang, Williams, and Hillomes." Subsequently the King sent two envoys to Singapore with a letter to "Joachim" instructed to ask the French for an alliance to facilitate commerce.[64] This, it has been argued, is really a reference to the Monteiro mission of the following year, concerned with the English.[65] Indeed, if "Hillomes" is Helms, not only the date but the order of events is mistaken, though "Joachim" may be identifiable with one of the D'Almeidas.[66]

On the other hand, it is not impossible that the Cambodians—supposedly seeking intercourse with European powers—sought contacts with the French, and this may be all that the alleged proposal of an alliance meant. Equally, nothing may have been said of alliance in communications with the English authorities. But the proposal to cooperate against the pirates had been accepted, and, while they certainly did exist in the Gulf of Siam, the presence

---

[60] *S.F.P.*, 23rd, 30th August 1850.

[61] It was mentioned in an interview with Hammond. Hammond to Palmerston, 19th May 1851. *F.O.97/185.*

[62] Butterworth to Secretary, 21st August 1851, and enclosures. *F.O.17/185.*

[63] L. V. Helms, *Pioneering in the Far East* (London, 1882), 95-108.

[64] A. B. de Villemereuil, ed., *Explorations et Missions de Doudart de Lagrée* (Paris, 1883), 355.

[65] C. Meyniard, *Le Second Empire en Indo-Chine (Siam-Cambodge-Annam) : L'ouverture de Siam au commerce et la convention du Cambodge* (Paris, 1891), 360-1.

[66] Joaquin was the eldest son of the founder of the firm, José d'Almeida, who died in 1850. C. A. Gibson-Hill, "George Samuel Windsor Earl", *Journal of the Malayan Branch Royal Asiatic Society,* XXXII, Pt. 1 (May 1959), 109n.

of the *Semiramis* off Kampot could undoubtedly also be of political significance. The newspaper had indeed associated the two: protecting the weak traders from the powerful pirates, and protecting the weak Cambodians from their powerful neighbors, were connected operations.

Whatever the local officials may have hoped or tried to do, with their limited authority and indirect means,[67] it is clear that Monteiro's presence in Singapore before Brooke left on his mission must have influenced the recommendations he ultimately made in the hope that the home Government might break away from the traditions of Indian diplomacy in the area.[68] The recommendations were not followed, and nothing came of the Kampot inquiries. But Palmerston was prepared to send Brooke on a new mission to Siam when news arrived in mid-1851 of Rama III's death and Mongkut's accession. Mongkut, however, wanted the mission postponed till after the funeral.[69]

In March 1852, Lord Malmesbury, the new Foreign Secretary, asked if Brooke were ready to leave for Bangkok.[70] Brooke said he wished to stay longer in England for the sake of his health; he also declared that reforms were in progress in Siam, and recommended that the mission should await their completion.[71] The *Singapore Free Press* attributed some of the reforms—which included the establishment of an opium farm and a modification of the prohibition on exporting rice—to the contracts made by Brooke on his visit.[72] A reduction of the measurement duties it attributed to the representations of Helms, who had visited Bangkok.[73]

Crawfurd urged that these reforms were arguments against the negotiation of a new treaty. He had always opposed a treaty, he said. "I am quite satisfied that it will be a wiser policy to encourage the spontaneous development which is now in progress, than to shackle a barbarous power by express stipulations. . . ." Better than a mission would be a friendly correspondence between the Siamese ministers and the Governors of Singapore and Labuan. "Too busy an interference" might in fact risk the power of a liberal sovereign, for there was a powerful party opposed to reform. Crawfurd did not, perhaps, strengthen his case by declaring that this was the view of the Chinese merchants, who had "nearly the whole foreign trade and navigation . . . in their hands. . . . ." [74] But the India Board, again consulted by the Foreign Office, agreed with Crawfurd.[75]

---

[67] In 1853 H. M. S. Bitteth was sent from Singapore to convoy the junks to Kampot. The Siamese government complained that its visit caused some alarm in villages round the Gulf. N. Tarling, *Piracy and Politics in the Malay World* (Sydney, Melbourne, Canberra; Singapore, 1963), 215, 219.

[68] The statement, made in Tarling, *J. S. S.*, XLVIII, Pt. 2, p. 61, that Monteiro was sent to Singapore when the King heard of the failure of the Brooke mission is clearly mistaken.

[69] Brooke to Palmerston, 24th August 1851; *F.O.* to Brooke, 29th August 1851; Memo by Brooke, 18th September 1851. *F.O.69/3.*

[70] Addington to Brooke, 23rd March 1852. *F.O.97/368.*

[71] Brooke to Addington, 24th March 1852, two letters, *F.O.97/368.*

[72] *S. F. P.*, 4th July 1851. Cf. Snidvongs, *op. cit.*, 184.

[73] *S. F. P.*, 29th August 1851.

[74] Crawfurd to Derby, 25th March 1852, *F.O.97/368.*

[75] Herries to Malmesbury, 28th May, 16th June 1852. *F.O.97/368.*

One reason for Brooke's staying in England had been that he wished to meet the attacks on his policy in Borneo and the Archipelago. The controversy made it difficult for the Foreign Office to do anything more over the mission to Siam.[76] Some plan was being prepared, whereby Brooke was to leave his Labuan post, but to have greater scope as Commissioner, and to go again to Siam. In November, he dropped the Governorship,[77] but before the rest of the operation had been completed, the Government again changed.

Early in February 1853, the question of the Siam mission was brought up. Lord John Russell, the new Foreign Secretary, thought Crawfurd's arguments against it probably conclusive.[78] Shortly after, he interviewed Brooke. Brooke urged that the "jealousy" of the Siamese government was "not excited by intercourse and... not allayed by non-intercourse... ."It was "of a permanent character, arising out of the constant territorial aggrandisement of the East India Company... ." In the first Burma war, a mission had been sent: why not during the second?[79] But the India Board remained opposed to a mission, and Brooke was left with his consular appointment. Shortly after, indeed, the Coalition Government assented to an inquiry into Brooke's proceedings in Borneo.[80]

Brooke's position as "Commissioner" in the Archipelago at large had been informal. But the change of policy his removal implied, did not produce an outcry, since the pressures of the 1840's for a forward policy there had lessened. So far as the mainland was concerned, on the other hand, the commercial interests had not lost sight of the opportunities Gutzlaff and Martin had pointed out and, with the appointment of a new Superintendent of Trade at Hong Kong in 1854, the Foreign Office—reverting to its Davis policy—took the opportunity to give Sir John Bowring powers and instructions to negotiate when feasible with Siam, Vietnam and Japan.[81] The instructions, like Brooke's, did not cover any of the territorial matters that might be expected to emerge in negotiations with Siam.

Unable to go to Japan with a respectable armament, Bowring attempted the easier assignment in Siam first.[82] Aided by the diplomacy of his son (John) and of the Consul at Amoy (Harry Parkes), by the presence of the quaintly-christened sloop *Rattler,* by Siamese knowledge of Burma's fate,[83] and by the statesmanship of the new chief minister or Kralahom, Bowring rapidly secured the treaty of 18th April 1855.[84]

---

[76] Memo by Addington, 4th February 1853. *F.O.97/368.*
[77] Tarling, *J. S. S.*, XLVIII, Pt. 2, 66.
[78] Minute, 5th February 1853. *F.O.97/368.*
[79] Brooke to Russell, 8th February 1853. *F.O.12/13.*
[80] Tarling, *J. S. S.*, XLVIII, Pt. 2, 70.
[81] Clarendon to Bowring, 13th February 1854. *F.O.17/210.*
[82] Bowring to Clarendon, 8th September 1854. *F.O.17/216.* W. B. Beasley, *Great Britain and the Opening of Japan 1834-1858* (London, *1951*), 98-102.
[83] G. F. Bartle, "Sir John Bowring and the Chinese and Siamese Commercial Treaties," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library,* XLIV, No. 2 (March 1962), 305.
[84] For an account of the mission, see N. Tarling, "The mission of Sir John Bowring to Siam," *The Journal of the Siam Society,* L, Pt. 2 (December 1962), 91-118.

The treaty, as Bowring told his son (Edgar), brought Siam "into the bright fields of hope and peaceful commerce. . . ."[85] It displaced the measurement duties and monopolies by a system of export and import duties, opened the rice trade, and provided for the appointment of a consul and for extra-territorial jurisdiction.[86] But for Siam, the "bright fields of hope" were political as well as commercial. The Siamese had again come to terms with the predominant power in Asia and so, had given themselves a guarantee for the future. Of this, they were aware.

To some extent, the French and Americans were acting with the British in China, and there was a reference in the discussions to their sending missions to Siam also. The Kralahom said he was glad Bowring had arrived first, for the Siamese "had trusted that he would be the pioneer of the new relations to be opened between them and the West, as they could then count upon such arrangements being concluded as would both be satisfactory to Siam, and sufficient to meet the demands that might hereafter be made by other of the Western Powers. . . ."[87]

Parkes took the treaty home, and returned in 1856, charged with the delivery of letters and presents from Queen Victoria, and with securing the further definition of some of the clauses, in particular, those relating to consular jurisdiction and to the modification of the Burney treaty.[88] Parkes was less enthusiastic about the Kralahom than Bowring had been and more inclined to work with Mongkut; in any case, there was—during 1856—a coolness between them, and the Kralahom was taking little part in public affairs. It was upon the First King, therefore, that Parkes relied in negotiating (despite some conservative opposition) the additional agreement of May 1856. This defined consular jurisdiction and met most of the other British requirements, including a demand to specify the taxation due from Siamese subjects and thus, under article 4 of the Bowring treaty, from the British residents also. The negotiations in fact set the legal and taxation systems of Siam much in the shape they retained till the end of the century, when the system of consular jurisdiction (more especially its application to Asian proteges of the European powers) became a spur to the Europeanization of the judicial administration and to codification,[89] and when the Siamese, seeking expanded revenue resources, sought to acquire tariff autonomy.[90]

In the course of the negotiations, Parkes made much use of the royal letter. He was the first envoy to bring from England.[91] It helped him to move

---

[85] Bowring to E. Bowring, 13th April 1855. *English Mss. 1228/125,* John Rylands Library, Manchester.

[86] For the text, see J. Bowring, *The Kingdom and People of Siam* (London, 1857), ii, 214-26.

[87] Enclosure No. 15 in Bowring to Clarendon, 28th April 1855. *F.O.17/229.*

[88] On Parkes' mission, see an article by the present author, "Harry Parkes' Negotiations in Bangkok in 1856," to be published in *The Journal of the Siam Society* in 1965.

[89] See Detchard Vongkomolshet, *The Administrative, Judicial and Financial Reforms of King Chulatongkorn 1868-1910* (Unpublished M. A. thesis, Cornell University, 1958), 159ff.

[90] See J. C. Ingram, *Economic Change in Thailand since 1850* (Stanford, 1955), 177-8.

[91] Bowring did not have a letter, despite H. G. Quaritch Wales, *Siamese State Ceremonies. Their history and function* (London, 1931), 180.

his steamer, the *Auckland,* up to Bangkok, and to open and improve his communication with Mongkut. The letter, Parkes said, "touched his heart and flattered his ambition." [92] In fact, the King's ambition, and the object of the concessions he made, was to secure the recognition of Siam as an independent state on a parity with European nations. The letter marked the achievement of this, he believed. It was something both Bangkok and Hue had looked for in 1822. The object then had been to evade such concessions, to assume at least a parity without coming to terms. The policy of Siam had changed, and the major concessions of the 1850's built upon the change. In Vietnam, there had been no such change: on the contrary.

As might have been anticipated, some Indian points had come up in the discussions of 1855, and Bowring had referred them to the Governor-General. These included the definition of the Kra boundary with British Burma, and also the status of Kedah, a Malay state whose position was defined in some detail in article 13 of the Burney treaty, but which the Siamese thought could now be simply declared a tributary. Governor Blundell, Butterworth's successor in the Straits Settlements, thought articles 12 and 14 more important, as they provided in a measure for the independence of other Malay states, Perak, Selangor, Trengganu and Kelantan.[93] The matter was referred to England, where India House officials noted "the inconvenience if not hazard of officers of Her Majesty's Government entering into treaties with states and countries connected [with] tho' not absolutely subject to India, independently of the Government of India. . . ."[94] The issue did not come up in the Parkes discussions—as a result all the relevant Burney articles remained in force—and the Governor-General, to whom the Court referred it back, did nothing. But, in practice, the position was changed by the Bowring treaty.

Diplomacy could no longer be purely "Indian." The Governors in the Straits Settlements, like Blundell regarding them as more or less independent, had often dealt directly with the tributary states, even Kedah. With the appointment of a consul at Bangkok, this became more difficult, and after the reaction against Governor Cavenagh's bombardment of Trengganu in 1862, there was a disposition to recognize Thai claims there and in Kelantan, as well as in Kedah.[95] British intervention occurred in Perak and Selangor in 1874, and so, in territorial, as in commercial matters, a new stage was reached in the relationship of Siam and the West that endured till the turn of the century. But their claims in Cambodia—also mentioned by the Siamese in their 1855 Kedah proposal—were affected by the relations of Vietnam and the West.

Bowring had found the Siamese anxious that he should also go to Hue. It was a matter of maintaining Siam's prestige among its neighbors. Among these, Burma—truncated by the second war with Britain—was no longer

---

[92] Parkes to Clarendon, 22nd May 1856. *F.O.69/5.*

[93] Tarling, *J. S. S.*, L, Pt. 2, 111-2.

[94] Note on Court to G.-G.-in-Co., India Political, 1st October 1856, No. 36. *Despatches to India and Bengal,* C, 329, India Office Library.

[95] N. Tarling, "British Policy in the Malay Peninsula and Archipelago, 1824-1871," *Journal of the Malayan Branch Royal Asiatic Society,* XXX, Pt. 3 (October 1957), 69-74, 80-3.

a great power. But Siam and Vietnam were rivals and joint suzerains of Laos and Cambodia.[96] Bowring did indeed plan to go to Vietnam. He decided, however, to announce his purpose first. The reception afforded the announcement would enable him to judge whether he should go alone, as to Bangkok, or await the French and U.S. envoys. They might prove an embarrassment, especially if the reception were favorable.[97]

In September Bowring sent the *Rattler* to Tourane with Thomas Wade —the Acting Chinese Secretary—to carry his communication to the court of Hue.[98] But at Tourane, Wade was told that the letter could go to the capital only if, after inspection, it proved to contain nothing objectionable, and that Wade could not go under any circumstances. In the event, the letter was not delivered at all.[99] "It is obvious," wrote Bowring, "that the policy of the Cochin Chinese will continue to be that of repudiating the advances of foreigners, so long as foreigners can be kept in positions too remote to cause any anxiety. . . ." He thought that a direct approach to Hue with some ships of war might secure a treaty.[100] These were not at once available, but he told Montigny, the French envoy, that he could inform Tu-Duc that he intended to come.[101] Bowring had indeed said that the outcome of the Wade mission would decide the question of cooperation with other European powers.

The Superintendent had revived French interest in Siam by communicating his treaty, and he had also suggested, after the Wade mission, that Montigny's credentials should extend to Vietnam.[102] Montigny secured a treaty on the English lines in Bangkok. Then, departing from his instructions, he attempted a *coup* in Cambodia, where he sought to establish French protection, but came up against Siamese opposition.[103] Meanwhile, the *Catinat* had been sent to Tourane to announce the arrival of the envoy. Again, a French ship became involved in conflict with the Vietnamese.[104] By the time Montigny arrived in January 1857, the *Catinate* had left, and his negotiations made no progress. The failure of the envoy worsened the treatment of the missionaries and precipitated the intervention which Napoleon III had come to favor.[105]

The new crisis in China had led to Bowring's replacement there by the appointment of Lord Elgin as High Commissioner in April 1857.[106] Bowring told his son (Edgar) that he looked to Siam *"proudly* in my hours of gloom. . .

---

[96] Snidvongs, *op. cit.*, pp. 275-6.

[97] Bowring to Clarendon, 7th May 1855, two letters. *F.O.17/229.*

[98] Bowring to Clarendon, 6th September 1855. *F.O.17/233.*

[99] Wade to Bowring, 17th September 1855. *F.O.17/233.* A fuller account of the Wade mission, as also of the earlier mission of Sir John Davis, will appear in the present author's "British Relations with Vietnam, 1822-1858," to be published in the *Journal of the Malaysian Branch Royal Asiatic Society* in 1966.

[100] Bowring to Clarendon, 8th October 1855. *F.O.17/233.*

[101] H. Cordier, "La politique coloniale de la France au début du second empire (Indo-Chine, 1852-1858)," *T'oung Pao,* Series 2, X(1909), 311.

[102] J. F. Cady, *The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia* (Ithaca, 1954), 144-5. Clarendon to Cowley, 18th February 1856. *F.O.27/1109.*

[103] Cady, *op. cit.*, 149-52.

[104] H. Cordier, "La France et la Cochin Chine, 1852-1858: La Mission du *Catinat* á Tourane (1856)," *T'oung Pao,* Series 2, VII (1906), 497-505.

[105] Cady, *op. cit.*, 154-5, 178 ff.

[106] W. C. Costin, *Great Britain and China 1833-1860* (Oxford, 1937), 231.

Kampot is also becoming a very important place and I must try to get a Treaty with Cambodia—now that China is taken from me (I do not complain) I hope I shall do the rest of the work—Cambodia-Cochin China-Korea-Japan —we must open them all. . . ."[107] In fact, shortly after, Bowring heard that he was prohibited from leaving Hong Kong during Elgin's tour.[108] So he saw the French expedition to Vietnam of 1858—which he had in some sense set in motion—from a distance and inactively. He thought the French, by setting themselves up in Cochin China, might embarrass themselves and the British and threaten Siam and Cambodia. But, on the whole, he laid most emphasis on the embarrassment they would cause themselves.

The fact was that Vietnam had established no commercial and political relationship with the predominant power in Asia which thus felt no great concern over its future. In part this was because Vietnam offered fewer commercial attractions than Siam and no similar territorial points of contact. But this had not prevented—indeed in one case it had stimulated—the dispatch of diplomatic missions, none of which had been welcomed by the Vietnamese. Their attitude to the mild British approaches was no doubt affected by the more violent activities of other Western powers; but their reaction to European contacts had long been different from Siam's. The rejection of the Wade mission led Bowring to foster and associate himself with the French venture, and more or less eliminated the final chance of Vietnam's establishing a prior relationship with Britain.

Established in Cochin China, the French were in 1863 to enter direct negotiations with Cambodia. Admiral La Grandiere felt free to move at the expense of the Siamese, as Anglo-Thai relations had been strained by the Trengganu bombardment. A Cambodian emissary—significantly echoing the statements of 1850—said how important it was for the French flag to fly in Cambodian waters, to destroy piracy and restore commerce. A treaty then signed at Udong in August gave Cambodia French protection.[109] The India Office, consulted by the Foreign Office, felt that, so long as French proceedings did not interfere with the independence of Siam, they could be regarded without anxiety.[110] In 1867, Siam gave up her claims over Cambodia in return for the provinces of Battambang and Angkor. Another part of the pattern of relations between Siam and the West was set till the turn of the century.

---

[107] Bowring to E. Bowring, 6th June 1857. *English Mss. 1228/185.*

[108] G. F. Bartle, "Sir John Bowring and the *Arrow* War in China," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, XLIII, No. 2 (March 1961), 310.

[109] B. L. Evans, *The Attitudes and Policies of Great Britain and China towards French Expansion in Cochin China, Cambodia, Annam, and Tongking 1858-83* (Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of London, 1961), 68-69.

[110] *Ibid.*, 101.

DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE: AN APPRAISAL OF THAILAND'S RECENT EXPERIENCE

PRACHOOM CHOMCHAI

SINCE THAILAND IS BY NO MEANS A CLOSED ECONOMY, IT can naturally be expected that serious attempts made at developing the country will make themselves felt on her external trade and that, at the same time, whatever changes brought about in her external trade will have repercussions on the domestic economy. This paper is a modest attempt to assess the impact of Thailand's first National Economic Development Plan (1961-1966) on her foreign trade and payments position and to analyze the long-run prospects of the economy in the light of recent trends in her external trade.

In 1951, the first year for which a reliable estimate of Thailand's national income is available,[1] her exports amounted to 4,413 million baht while her national income stood at 25,340 million baht. Exports thus constituted about 17.4% of national income. The relationship between exports and national income in more recent years is shown in the following table:

Table 1. Thailand's Exports and National Income 1955-1963

Year	Exports (million baht)	National Income (million baht)	Exports (expressed as percentage of National Income)
1955	7,121	34,828	20.4
1956	6,923	36,457	19.0
1957	7,540	36,838	20.5
1958	6,447	38,270	16.8
1959	7,560	41,893	18.1
1960	8,614	47,683	17.8
1961	9,997	50,068	19.9
1962	9,529	54,536	17.5
1963	9,676	57,863 *	15.7
1964	12,339		

* Preliminary

Sources: Department of Customs, *Annual Statement of Foreign Trade of Thailand,* 1964 and Office of National Economic Development Board, *op. cit.*

It appears from the figures that between 1951 and 1963, despite some fluctuations, the relative importance of exports has changed very little. If anything, it may even have declined, though it must be noted that the national

[1] Office of the National Economic Development Board, *National Income Statistics of Thailand,* 1964 edition.

income figure for 1963 is only preliminary. In other words, it is roughly correct to say that Thailand at present is as dependent on exports as she was in 1951.

Though the target was not set at first, in the Second Phase of the National Economic Development Plan (1964-1966), it is envisaged that the value of exports will increase at the rate of 4% per annum. It is against the background of this general objective that recent performance of exports must be viewed.

It is clear that from 1955 to 1960, export value grew at an average rate of about 4% per annum, despite the setback of 1958 when a combination of circumstances, largely beyond Thailand's control, reduced her export value by as much as 4%. On the other hand, during the Plan period, for which complete data are available only up to 1964, export value has grown at an average rate of about 7% per annum, the small setback of 1962 being more than made up for by the substantial gain of 28% in 1964. In view of this, the target set by the plan for the annual rate of increase in export earnings of 4% is unnecessarily modest.

Of course, it would be rash to attribute better over-all performance in export earnings (during the Plan period) to deliberate planning efforts alone, since this depends on demand and supply conditions both at home and abroad. In a sense, supply conditions for exportable agricultural products at home are as difficult to control as their demand and supply situation abroad. Moreover, a careful scrutiny of the figures reveals that export value recovered substantially, even before the Plan period, as is borne out by the performance of 1959 and 1960. It may well be that the Plan period has gained simply from the momentum of the recovery from the 1958 "dip" as the figure for 1961 suggests. When viewed in this light, the Plan period so far, has had nothing to show for except 1964, when the rate of growth of export value exceeded that for any other year since 1955. When it is also remembered that development efforts will take time to make their impact felt on export performance; 1964 is a rosy indicator for the future. Indeed, figures available for the first seven months of 1965 compare favorably with the corresponding ones of 1964. A final judgment on this will, however, have to be reserved until a clear trend emerges over a number of years.

Underlying the export performance is the gradual diversification of Thailand's export base, which normally insures that losses sustained in some export commodities are compensated for by gains in others. Table 2, which follows, gives the relative importance of major export commodities over the period extending from 1955 to 1964.

Table 2. Major Export Commodities, 1955-1964.
(Expressed as percentages of total export value)

Year	Rice	Rubber	Tin	Maize	Tapioca Products	Teak	Jute & Kenaf	Sugar	Others
1955	44.0	25.6	6.1	1.1	0.7*	3.7	...	...	18.8
1956	41.2	22.0	7.4	1.4	1.3*	4.4	...	...	22.3
1957	48.0	18.7	7.0	1.0	1.8	3.4	...	...	20.1

* flour only

1958	46.0	20.5	3.9	2.8	3.0	3.7	1.0	...	19.1
1959	36.5	31.0	5.7	3.3	2.9	3.2	1.1	...	16.3
1960	29.8	30.0	6.2	6.4	3.4	4.1	2.6	...	17.5
1961	36.0	21.4	6.2	6.0	4.5	2.5	6.3	...	17.1
1962	34.0	22.1	7.2	5.3	4.4	1.8	6.1	...	19.1
1963	35.4	19.7	7.7	8.5	4.5	1.4	3.7	1.2	17.9
1964	35.5	16.7	7.8	10.5	5.3	1.5	4.0	1.7	17.0

... negligible
Source: Department of Customs.

Traditional major export commodities are (in descending order of importance): rice, rubber, tin and teak. The relative importance of rice, rubber and teak has declined markedly over the years, while tin has more or less retained its former position. The rise of maize to the fourth rank in 1959 and the third in 1960 and, as from 1963 onwards, deserves particular notice. Similarly, the greater relative importance of tapioca products and jute and kenaf, as compared to teak, as from 1961 onwards, indicates a clear trend towards diversification of Thailand's export base. A newcomer which has appeared on the scene only recently is sugar, whose long-term prospects are still uncertain.

Percentages should not, however, blind us to the reality of the absolute figures. Despite the reduced relative importance of rice, export earnings from it reached in 1964 a new post-war peak which was even higher than that of 1953. Similarly, earnings from tin export in 1964 was a post-war record. It is true, of course, that the export value of rubber and teak has, so far, failed to reach their peak of 1960.

Obviously, there must have been changes in the domestic economy responsible for the gradual diversification of Thailand's export base. In this connection, it is worthy of note that Thailand still remains essentially an agricultural country; for, while the contribution of agriculture to gross national product was 35.1% in 1963 as compared to 50.1% in 1951, the relative share of manufacturing industry in 1963 was 11.7% as against 10.3% in 1951. A significant gain in transport and communication has been recorded, its share in gross national product being 8.5% in 1963 as compared to 3.1% in 1951. This is understandable in view of the stimulus given by development efforts and export expansion to transport service in particular. Development efforts themselves have partly assisted in the process of agricultural diversification, since remote areas of cultivation have been linked up with market areas, especially Bangkok—the exporting center—by means of newly constructed roads and highways.

It is clear from Table 3 that a gradual process of agricultural diversification has taken place in the Thai economy during the past fourteen years or so. Rubber, chilli, vegetables and, to a less extent, fruits, have declined in relative importance, while paddy, coconut, sugar cane, maize, groundnut, tapioca, kenaf and kapok (most of which are the sources of fairly new export commodities) have gained in relative terms. Among those that have declined in relative importance, only rubber is significant—from the point of view of exports—and it is worthy to note that, in absolute terms, the value of

Table 3. Composition of Gross Domestic Product Originating from Agricultural Crops, 1951-1963.

(Expressed as percentages of total value of gross domestic product)

Year	Paddy	Rubber	Coco-nut	Sugar cane	Maize	Ground nut	Tapioca	Kenaf	Kapok	Chilli	Vege-table	Fruits	Others
1951	45.0	19.4	5.3	1.1	...	1.3	...	...	—	3.9	5.9	15.9	2.2
1952	49.6	13.2	6.1	1.4	...	1.7	...	...	—	3.5	4.8	16.6	3.1
1953	50.4	8.3	5.8	1.6	...	2.5	...	...	—	2.8	5.5	19.3	3.8
1954	39.2	11.2	7.6	2.5	...	3.0	...	...	—	2.9	6.3	22.5	4.8
1955	43.3	14.5	7.9	2.4	...	2.2	...	...	—	1.4	5.3	18.6	4.4
1956	45.0	11.6	8.3	3.3	1.0	1.9	...	...	—	1.2	5.3	18.7	3.7
1957	33.1	11.7	10.3	3.6	1.0	3.3	...	...	3.6	2.1	5.9	20.7	5.0
1958	38.7	8.5	7.7	3.0	1.2	2.7	...	...	3.6	...	6.2	21.9	6.5
1959	35.2	12.7	9.1	3.4	1.6	2.4	1.2	...	2.4	1.1	5.6	19.7	5.6
1960	35.0	11.3	7.2	2.9	2.8	3.3	1.4	2.9	3.8	2.1	4.9	17.2	5.2
1961	38.5	8.9	5.1	2.2	3.3	1.8	2.3	6.1	2.0	2.1	4.9	17.3	5.5
1962	46.8	7.3	4.2	1.7	3.0	1.8	4.1	1.4	1.1	2.1	4.8	15.9	5.7
1963	47.6	6.9	5.9	2.1	4.2	1.6	2.5	1.7	1.2	2.7	4.5	15.4	3.7

Source: Office of National Economics Development Board, *op. cit.*

... = Negligible

rubber produced, though not its quantity, has declined. Indeed, the acreage planted to rubber as well as the area which can be tapped has increased significantly in recent years, but its average value has so declined that the value of output has not reached the 1951 figure.[2] Among those that have gained in relative importance, the case of paddy is curious, since its share was on a downward trend up to 1957 and then made a surprising recovery. In absolute terms, both its harvested area and total output have, in recent years, increased along with productivity per acre, and thus, its falling share in total export value (noted above) can only be attributed to relative difficulties in selling to world markets and to pressure of domestic demands. In the same category as rice, the production of maize, tapioca and kenaf has responded to export demands, especially since 1960, though the stimulus given to domestic production of agricultural crops has not necessarily originated from export markets alone. Sugar cane, for instance, was grown to feed sugar mills designed originally for domestic needs: it was not until 1962 that fairly substantial amounts of sugar were exported. Included in the "others" column is cotton which has also gained in relative importance owing to the efforts the country has been making in developing its textile industry.

Export performance has been due, not only to gradual diversification of its base, but also to favorable terms of trade prevailing in recent years. Table 4 gives the relevant data pertaining to this.

Table 4. Thailand's Terms of Trade, 1956-1964 (1958 = 100)

Year	Unit Value of Export	Unit Value of Imports	Quantity of Exports	Net Barter terms of Trade	Income of Trade*
1956	98.16	100.68	109.27	97.49	106
1957	97.52	103.34	119.78	94.37	112
1958	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100
1959	105.85	98.72	110.86	107.22	119
1960	109.08	100.40	122.58	108.65	133
1961	106.07	101.70	146.30	104.30	153
1962	104.31	95.54	141.80	109.18	154
1963	102.59	94.47	146.41	108.59	158
1964	103.43	94.63	185.18	109.30	201

* Calculated from official figures contained in this table.

Source: Bank of Thailand.

It is clear from Table 4 that the net barter terms of trade—a measure of relative export and import unit values—have been favorable to Thailand in recent years, simply because export prices have, on the average, risen faster than those of import. As far as export unit value is concerned, it must be noted that its favorable movement is not a separate phenomenon from, but is a manifestation of, the gradual process of diversification of Thailand's export base to the extent that this affects the supply side of world commodity

[2] Both the export value and quantity of rubber, nonetheless, increased between 1951 and 1963. While rubber output is meant almost entirely for export, the decline in value of total output between 1951 and 1963 must be due partly to the fact that exports are from stock as well as from current production and partly to the posibility that the GDP figures are based on domestic prices rather than f.o.b. export prices.

markets. No attempt has, of course, been made here to systematically trace movements of the net barter terms of trade up to 1951. It can, however, easily be seen that, by relating this more recent series of data (1958=100) to those of earlier years (1953=100), 1964 was a great improvement on the Korean War peak year of 1951, 106 being derived as the net barter terms of trade for 1964 as compared with the figure of 82 (1953=100) for 1951. The same holds true for the index of quantity of exports, 212 being the figure derived for 1964 as compared with that of 106 for 1951 (1953=100). Of course, all these assume that the construction of the two indices with two different base years is such as to allow a simple adjustment to a common base year.

Even more substantial gain is seen when the "income terms of trade," which also take into account movements in the quantity of exports, are examined. This is due to the fact that the quantity of exports has increased much faster than their unit value, thereby expanding the "capacity to import." In a sense, to regard the income terms of trade as a measure of the capacity to import may be sound practice, provided that there is no inflow of grants and capital. In the case of Thailand in recent years, however, the income terms of trade alone do not give a fair indication of her "capacity to import" largely because there has been a substantial inflow of grants and capital not to mention additional invisible earnings.

Table 5. Thailand's Balance of Payments, 1956-1964 *
(millions of baht).

	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
A. Goods, Services & Private Transfer Payments	-512	-968	-1,672	-1,358	-729	149	-1,348	-2,286	-1,104
B. Private Capital Movements	66	54	99	233	228	756	1,506	1,614	1,505
C. Official Capital Movements and Transfer Payments	798	1,142	719	1,033	902	545	795	1,025	785
D. Net Errors and Omissions	-54	-69	452	219	618	196	342	596	1,251
E. Total	298	159	-402	132	1,019	1,646	1,295	949	1,437

* Rearranged and adjusted.
Source: Bank of Thailand.

From 1951 to 1964 (detailed figures are not shown in Table 4 for the years preceding 1956), Thailand's balance payments on current account was almost always in deficit, though when official grants and capital movements are taken into account, the total balance of payments was almost always favorable, the exceptions being 1953, 1954 and 1958.[3]

It is clear from an analysis of the balance of payments that Thailand has been assisted largely by official capital movements, official transfer pay-

[3] Actually, the balance of payments in 1959 is seen to be passive only when the quota contribution to the I.M.F. (171 million baht) is taken into account. However, if this is left out of the picture, there appears a favorable balance of 132 million baht.

ments and an inflow of private capital. Official capital has consisted largely of grants whose magnitude seems to have shown an unsteady trend. Private capital inflow, on the other hand, has been on a rising trend and since 1961, has been quantitatively much more important than official capital. Indeed, Thailand claims to be one of the very few countries in South East Asia which is able to attract more and more foreign private capital. It is not often realized that Thailand can be independent of foreign aid, if the present trend of such capital inflow should persist, even though she continues to import goods which are now donated. Of course, the long-run effect of repatriation of capital, interest, and profits on the balance of payments is quite another matter.

The need for compensating capital movements arises out of the basic problem of trade imbalance. Between 1951 and 1964, export value rose at the average annual rate of about 8% while import value rose at a higher average annual rate of 11%. Thus, even though there was a small positive balance of about 700 million baht in 1951, there emerged a trade gap as time went on. Part of increasing imports was, of course, connected with the efforts of the government to engender economic development, as is clear from the changing import structure revealed by the following table.

Table 6. Composition of Thailand's Imports, 1951-1963.
(Percentage distribution of total value)

Year	Consumption Goods		Materials Chiefly for Consumption Goods	Materials Chiefly for Capital Goods	Capital Goods
	Food	Others			
1951	13.6	45.4	9.4	6.5	25.1
1952	13.1	39.6	8.8	7.9	30.6
1953	10.5	38.0	9.1	8.0	34.3
1954	9.6	38.3	10.1	8.6	33.4
1955	8.5	40.3	11.3	9.2	30.7
1956	8.7	47.7	12.0	8.9	32.7
1957	8.2	33.5	12.2	10.6	35.5
1958	9.6	31.5	12.3	10.6	36.0
1959	8.2	33.0	12.6	9.8	36.4
1960	8.2	31.0	12.1	11.1	37.6
1961	7.6	31.7	13.9	10.1	36.7
1962	6.6	29.4	13.8	10.4	39.8
1963	6.4	25.6	14.3	10.1	44.2

Sources: *United Nations, Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East,* 1963 and 1964.

Owing to the tremendous amount of work involved in calculating the percentage distribution of import value over the last 13 years or so directly from trade returns, resort has to be made to ECAFE statistics in Table 6. They show that, over the years, materials chiefly for capital goods, and capital goods taken together increased their share from almost one-third to over half of the total import value with the result that the combined share of consumption goods and materials chiefly for consumption goods, declined

substantially. The share of materials chiefly for consumption goods alone, however, rose largely because of the fact that as the process of import substitution and industrialization gathered momentum, more and more intermediate products were required for domestic production of consumption goods.

With due respect paid to the utility of ECAFE's activity in collating and disseminating such statistics, the inherent difficulty involved in practical assortment of import items into consumption and capital goods, must not be lost sight of. Take the case of "transport equipment": it is not easy, merely by looking at the figures alone, to segregate vehicles destined primarily for consumption from those meant to be used chiefly as an aid to production. The Office of the NEDB in its *National Income Statistics* (1964 edition) publishes data related to the *net* imports of capital goods at current prices, which appear to show that, while such imports have increased its relative importance, their share was much smaller than ECAFE figures suggest. For instance, the share for 1963 appears to have been only 37%. It must be pointed out that the discrepancy is due, not so much to the fact that Thailand may export some capital goods, but to differences in practical classification of consumption and capital goods.

What is worthy of note is that, as imports changed its structure, the average propensity to import also increased from about 15% in 1961 to about 22% in 1963. It can safely be inferred that the marginal propensity to import has also been rising, since the average figure cannot rise unless the marginal one does so. Herein lies the long-run danger to the balance of payments of Thailand; for if development efforts succeed in raising national income, this may push up the marginal propensity to import further. This is probable, particularly because additional income generated may not be able to find its outlets merely in domestic products, especially if development works in the direction of making income distribution more unequal and additional income is spent on luxury or semi-luxury goods not produced at home. It will be unfortunate if economic development brings about difficulties in the balance of payments, especially if the inflow of private and official capital drops from the level obtaining in recent years. It may well be true, of course, that should foreign aid cease or decline significantly, both the marginal and average propensity to import may drop, owing to the forced curtailment of imports of capital goods. In other words, it may well be argued that, should the favorable trend in the capital account be reversed, Thailand can simply accept the necessity of development at a slower rate and thereby avoid balance of payments crises. Whether this is politically wise is quite another matter.

The author's own feeling is that, in such an event, the pressure on the balance of payments may force the Government to change its exchange rate to facilitate the process of adjustment. It is not clear whether a search for an "equilibrium" rate is meaningful in the dynamic circumstances of international trade. Before the Second World War, the rate of exchange was 11 baht to 1 pound sterling; after it, this was fixed at 60 baht to 1 pound sterling. Yang[4] attempts to work out an "equilibrium" rate of exchange which

[4] *A Multiple Exchange Rate System — An Appraisal of Thailand's Experience, 1946-1955*, 28-29.

a formula derived from the purchasing power parity theory and arrives at the rate of 60 baht to 1 pound sterling, which is very close to the actual rate set by the government in 1945.[5] More recently, after having joined the I.M.F. in 1949, Thailand decided in 1963 to meet her obligation, under IV.1 of the Articles of Agreement, by setting the par value of the baht at 0.0427245 grams of fine gold or US$0.4808. In other words, 20.80 baht would officially be equal to US$1 as from 20 October 1963, a few days after the date of declaration of the par value. The reasons why Thailand had delayed for so long in meeting this obligations to the I.M.F. and in choosing that particular date as the right moment, are clear from the government communique:

> Thailand has been a member of this organization [I.M.F.] since 1949... but has not so far fixed an initial par value for the baht, seeing that monetary conditions since the end of Second World War has not yet returned to normal. Thailand employed a multiple exchange rate system from 1947 to 1955, when the exchange rate was unified and since then only the free market rate has been in use. During the past five years, the internal monetary situation has been satisfactory... . The exchange rate during this period has enjoyed a great degree of stability... .

In fact, declaration of the par value was a formal recognition of what had persisted *de jure* for several years. The point that the present author wishes to emphasize is that there is no guarantee that this rate of exchange is the "equilibrium" one, whatever is meant by the term, and that should there be unfavorable changes in the level of inflow of private capital and official grants, pressure will develop for the devaluation of the baht from its present official rate of exchange. Of, course, this will, among other things, have serious repercussions on the Thai level of living and welfare, at any rate, in the short run.

[5] The price indices for the United Kingdom and Thailand in 1945 (1938=100) were respectively 152 and 905. The formula used is thus:

$$1 \text{ pound sterling} = \frac{11 \times 905}{1 \times 152} = 66 \text{ baht.}$$

CITY SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

HAMZAH SENDUT

WHEN THE TOWNS AND CITIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN countries are arranged by rank and size of population, they form a distribution which is characterized by the largest city being generally many times the size of the second largest city. Above a certain designated size, the distribution shows this large city with many small towns and a deficiency of towns of intermediate sizes. Such a pattern is observed to be regular, for when the frequency of occurrence of city-sizes in a particular country is compared with that of another, the two frequencies show similar features. On further examination, it is found that there is an exception to this general rule and there does seem to be a need, therefore, to study this variation as well as to review the pattern of city-size distributions with respect to other Southeast Asian countries. Such an investigation is the aim of this paper which, for purposes of analysis, will focus on individual countries such as Malaysia (including Singapore), Thailand, Burma, Philippines and Indonesia while the countries of North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are combined to form a single case.

The method of study is to arrange the cities of these countries above the threshold criterion of 10,000 people,[1] into seven size-classes and examine the frequency distribution so found. The frequency of occurrences is then arithmetically transformed into cumulative percentages and, when plotted on a special kind of graph paper called the log-normal probability paper, should assume identifiable graph patterns (Figures 1 and 2). According to previous theoretical investigations upon which this study is heavily dependent,[2] the city-size distribution that fits into a straight line or approximates a straight line is a log-normal city-size distribution; the distribution that does not take the form of a straight line but approximates the shape of an inverted capital "L", is the primate city-size distribution. Without using the log-normal probability paper, however, these patterns may also be detected from the manner the percentage cumulation is proceeded over the chosen size-classes for, where the cumulation is gradual, the city-size distribution may approximate log-normalcy; where the cumulation is less gradual and steep, the primacy pattern prevails. Other patterns are variations which tend either to approach normalcy or to depart from primacy.

---

[1] In spite of its limitations, this figure was adopted in order to provide international comparison between countries of Southeast Asia. The term "town" in this paper is interchangeable with "city" and although the population size of the towns and cities under discussion are approximate only, the basic patterns of city-size distributions are generally accurate.

[2] See, for instance, Brian J. L. Berry, City-Size Distribution and Economic Development, *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, IX (July 1961), 573-587.



FIGURE 1: CITY SIZE DISTRIBUTIONS IN MALAYSIA/SINGAPORE, INDO-CHINA AND INDONESIA



FIGURE 2: CITY SIZE DISTRIBUTIONS IN THAILAND AND PHILIPPINES

Malaysia: Log-Normal City-Size Distribution

A table illustrating the distribution of towns and cities in Malaysia and Singapore was prepared and the figures relating to the number of towns and cities in the country were transformed arithmetically into cumulative percentages (Table 1).

Table 1: Distribution of Cities in Malaysia and Singapore (1957).

Size of Population (i)	No. of Cities (ii)	Cumulative Percentage (iii)	Cities
10,000-20,000	16	39.0	Bentong, Dungun, Jinjang, Kulim, Batu Gajah, Kuala Kangsar, Kuala Pilah, Guntong, Pasir Pinji, Segamat, Petaling Jaya, Raub, Sungei Siput, Temerloh, Serdang Baharu, Tawau.
20,000-50,000	15	75.6	Taiping, Butterworth, Batu Pahat, Muar, Kota Bharu, T. Anson, Kluang, Kuala Trengganu, Bukit Mertajam, Kampar, Kuantan, Sungei Patani, Ayer Item, Jesselton, Sandakan.
50,000-100,000	6	90.2	Klang, Johore Bahru, Malacca, Alor Star, Seremban, Kuching.
100,000-250,000	2	95.1	Georgetown, Ipoh.
250,000-500,000	1	97.6	Kuala Lumpur
500,000-1,000,000	1	99.9	Singapore City.
Total	41		

When arranged into this frequency, the distribution pattern of Malaysian cities appears to conform to a system which is characterized by many small towns, a lesser number of medium size cities and slightly fewer large cities. The cumulative percentages in column (iii) when plotted on a log-normal probability paper closely approximates a straight line, indicating that the distribution of cities in Malaysia and Singapore in 1957 was approximately log-normal. This pattern is a clear departure from the oft-quoted generalization about primate cities dominating the urbanization pattern of Southeast Asian countries.[3] While it does not attain perfect linearity, it shows a frequency

[3] This is implied in D. W. Fryer's paper entitled, "The Million City in Southeast Asia," *Geographical Review*, XLIII, No. 4 (October 1953), 474-494; see also the paper by N. S. Ginsburg, "The Great City in Southeast Asia," *American Journal of Sociology*, XL (March 1955), 455-462.

distribution which does not appear to be markedly dissimilar from the expected distribution of city sizes.[4] A comparison of columns (ii) and (iii) in Table 2 illustrates the similarity of the two distributions and emphasizes the prevailing log-normal city-size distribution in Malaysia and Singapore.

Table 2. Distribution of Cities
(observed and theoretical)

Size of Population	Actual No. of Cities in 1957 (ii)	Theoretical No. of Cities in 1957 (iii)
10,000-20,000	16	22
20,000-50,000	15	7
50,000-100,000	6	4
100,000-250,000	2	2
250,000-500,000	1	1
500,000-1,000,000	1	1
	41	37

The log-normal distribution when related to urban development represents a total pattern that has been obtained for the country as a whole and, by approximating a straight line, it appears to indicate a high rate of urbanization whose processes are governed by infinitely many random factors. Included in the matrix are factors that are identifiable with the development of large-size cities, those with medium-size towns and yet, others with small towns and large villages. This is not to suggest that they are clear-cut in each case for, in fact, almost all factors of urbanization permeate through these groups affecting cities and towns of all sizes. However, the big cities have particularly benefited from being entrepot ports for local materials and imported manufactured goods from established European and American markets. For instance, the entrepot trade of Singapore which stands at the top of the hierarchy (Table 1), has flourished because of the favorable location of its harbor as well as its excellent port facilities; the long tradition of trade; shipping and banking; the skill of its traders and operators, together with the existence of innumerable auxiliary services which have grown with trade, and a progressive institutional setting coupled with a strong propensity on the part of the immigrant population to improve their material standard of living.

[4] The expected distribution of city sizes for Malaysia and other countries referred to in this paper was constructed from the equation:

$$\frac{f(i)}{f(i\text{-}1)} = \frac{i-1}{1+i}$$

where f(i) is the number of cities of population i;
f(1) is the number of cities with populations of 10,000-20,000;
f(2) is the number of cities with between 20,000 and 50,000 population;
f(3) is the number of cities with between 50,000 and 100,000 population, etc.

For further clarification of this formula, see B. J. L. Brian, Alternate Explanations of Urban Rank-Size Relationships, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers,* XLVIII (March 1958), 83-91.

The widespread introduction of the money economy followed by the discovery of tin-ore; the production of natural rubber; massive immigration of Chinese, Indians and Indonesians, following the consolidation of British interests in Malaysia before the Second World War; a concomitant development of railway, road and air network as well as telecommunication, emphasized the status of Ipoh and many other towns as central urban places of a high order. Kuala Lumpur is a unique example in this respect because ever since 1859 (when it was selected as a mining, trading and administrative center), it has grown rapidly, especially after the independence of Malaya in 1957, to become not only an educational and religious center but also a center for modern medicine.[5] As the political Capital of the newly-created sovereign State of Malaysia, it provides functions similar to those of Washington D.C. in the United States of America, with Singapore functioning as the New York City of the Malaysian region. In the case of those cities with a population between 50,000 to 100,000 people, Klang became the fifth largest city as a result of its amalgamation with Port Swettenham (the outport of Kuala Lumpur). The rapid rise of 93.4 per cent for the city of Johore Bharu between 1947 and 1957 reflected, in part, its importance as a satellite of Singapore City.

The growth and number of towns of the smaller sizes such as Jinjang, Pasir Pinji, Guntong, Segamat, Sungei Siput and Serdang, among others, have been subject to a different set of centripetal forces. Prominent in recent times was the Emergency or the anti-terrorist war between 1948 to 1960 when about half-a-million rural people were physically removed into compact villages which grew into settlements with urban characteristics. Of the 440 villages created by this process, three settlements had a population of more than 10,000 people each.[6] For instance, Jinjang, non-existent before this scheme began, had an estimated population of 13,000 people in 1954. Since then, it expanded to contain about 30,000 people in 1964, making it almost the same size as Petaling Jaya, Malaysia's first new town. Other rural people, who escaped resettlement, sought the security of many existing towns and cities, swelling their population considerably. The transfer of the capital of Sabah (North Borneo) from Sandakan to Jesselton, however, caused an increase of population of the latter at a rate faster than that of the former.

In addition to resettlement, the number and size of small towns also increased as a result of a force that assumed significance only after the Second World War. Rural-urban migration caused a rapid diminution of the ratio of the rural people as compared with the urban population with the result that small towns generally experience accelerated growth. Though both large and intermediate size towns continued to grow, they have grown slower than the smaller-towns.[7] The problem of townward migration was sufficiently serious to impel the government to embark upon a massive rural reconstruction program in order to give the rural community its due importance, provide

---

[5] Hamzah-Sendut, "The Structure of Kuala Lumpur," *Town Planning Review*, XXXV (July 1965), 125-138.

[6] Hamzah-Sendut, "Resettlement Villages in Malaya," *Geography*, XLVII (January 1962), 41-46.

[7] Hamzah-Sendut, "Patterns of Urbanization in Malaya," *Journal of Tropical Geography*, XVI (October 1962), 114-130.

sound economic foundations or rural livelihood and improve rural-living conditions comparable to urban living conditions.

Townward migration also affects towns and cities of intermediate sizes as, for example, the town of Kota Baharu where a sample survey indicated an increase of 10,000 people through this process during the decade from 1947 to 1957 thus swelling its current population to about 45,000 people. On the other hand, the population of Kuching in Sarawak has been stimulated by a large immigration of Chinese from Singapore and Hong Kong as a result of increased demands for labor and the expansion of food marketing possibilities. Other towns in this group rose into prominence because of their port activities that service local shipping such as Telok Anson, Batu Pahat, Muar and Butterworth. Kuantan showed a population rise of 186 per cent during the decade after 1947 because it replaced another town as a political capital of an administrative area; because of such government action, this town assumed a regional importance and a high rank in the distribution of cities in the country.

However, as these towns were developed, some other towns declined in importance. This was particularly the case with the city of Malacca which was once a regional capital for trade, exporting tin, gold and spices to foreign markets, and importing textiles and other goods from India and China, until it was overshadowed and reduced in importance (both as a capital town and a port) by Penang and later, by Singapore. The population of Seremban was depressed because it was partitioned, for administrative purposes, resulting in the division of the town into two urban units: Seremban town itself and Rasah. On the other hand, other towns such as Alor Star and Kuala Trengganu have not attracted large population increases due to their unfavorable location in areas which have limited commercial attributes. Besides, rice production and fishing which form the mainstay of the economic structure of their hinterland are labor intensive and cannot, therefore, support a large number of urban residents. Moreover, there was little tradition impelling the indigenous Malays who inhabit these areas to live in towns and cities.

Thus, the interplay of these factors (already elaborated) and other causes of urbanization (with none particularly dominant) acting in diverse ways, has resulted in the log-normal pattern of city-size distribution in the country. While inducing the expansion of the large cities, these factors have also accelerated the growth and number of middle and small-size cities.

Log-normalcy Variations

North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, combined together, have a city-size distribution which, though indicating primacy, has undertones of approaching log-normalcy similar to that of Malaysia and Singapore (Table 3). Not only is this distribution characterized by the increasing emergence of smaller towns, of which there were 26 in 1960. The number of such towns will be more pronounced, following South Vietnam's measures to resettle rural dwellers into 7,200 agrovilles [8] but it is also dominated by the "million"

[8] Joseph J. Zasloff, "Rural Settlement in South Vietnam: the Agroville Program," *Pacific Affairs*, XXV (Winter 1962/1963), 327-340; see also Milton E. Osborne, "Strategic Hamlets in South Vietnam," No. 55 (April 1965) Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, 20-41.

city of Saigon-Cholon which is three times the size of Hanoi in North Vietnam and five times that of Phnom Penh in Cambodia. As the graph indicates, there is a clear deficiency of towns and cities of intermediate sizes which reflects the unsettled conditions of the whole area. Here, urbanization has been initiated by a host of variable forces upon which the population distribution between urban and rural areas is determined.

Table 3: Combined city-size distribution of North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, 1960.

City-size	No. of cities	Cumulative Percentage	Cities
10,000-20,000	16	50.0	Auang Nai, Lao Cai, Nam Dinh, Dong Hoi, Vung Tau, Rach Gia, Kampot, Pursat, Bien Hoa, Can Tho, Binh Dinh, Savannakhet, Pakse, Kon Tum, Xien Khouang, Hoa Binh.
20,000-50,000	10	81.2	Vientiane, Dalat, Than Hoa, Hoi An Song Lai, Vinh, Luang Prabang, Battambang, Strung Treng, Nha Trang.
50,000-100,000	2	87.5	Hoe, Torane.
100,000-250,000	1	90.6	Haiphong
250,000-500,000	1	93.7	Phnom Penh
500,000-1,000,000	1	96.8	Hanoi
Over 1,000,000	1	99.9	Saigon-Cholon
	32		

Dislocation of population, following political unrest, has added to the population of existing large towns, besides stimulating the creation of suburban areas within close proximity of the older established and large urban centers like Saigon-Cholon, Phnom Penh and Hanoi. Because of their location, these small "enclaves" have restricted growth and invariably exerted little competition on the large cities. Saigon's rise to primacy has been largely due to its coalescence with Cholon, its strategic location in relation to the Mekong Delta, and also the enlargement of its economic base through its multi-functional role in commerce, administration and industry. Although it enjoys its current position of primacy, other capital cities in the peninsula (like Hanoi) which are generally prevalent in a politically disturbed area, rival or even exceed it in numerical dominance.

Townward migration, on the other hand, is in part a consequence of population growth in the rural areas. Hence, the operation of centrifugal forces has been dictated by low agricultural productivity, advanced fragmentation of land, high physiologic density, as well as the lack of security arising from frequent warfare and ceaseless brigandage. Another contributory factor is the general absence of a tradition of statehood which characterizes Laos. This, together with the prevalence of diverse ethnic groups, provides a disunifying force working against population consolidation in the rural areas.

With exception of a few towns located in the uplands, the majority of the small towns border the coast and have a seaboard frontage. The former represents an outgrowth of nucleated settlements established by the French to serve their needs for local produce and cheap manual labor. The inhibitive topographic features of the uplands do not, however, contribute a commensurate economic basis for population growth so that these towns tend to remain small in size. On the other hand, coastal towns such as Dong Hoi, Hoi An, Quang Nai, Binh Dinh, Song Cau, Nha Trang, Vung Tau and Rach Gia, have characteristic locations where adverse factors are largely minimized and, therefore, conducive to development and growth. They do not, however, rival the large towns whose promotion to state capitals in their respective areas gave them additional advantage. Moreover, many of these regional capitals have investments in industry; with the expansion of their economic base, they should continue to dominate in population numbers.

At the top of the hierarchy is Saigon-Cholon which gained development impetus from its strategic location as a gateway for the region. Founded in 1859, it had its early basis as a riverine city and tidal port on the right bank of the Saigon river, 50 miles from the open sea. The opening of canals made it an important rice port; with further growth uninterrupted by wars and limited by international boundaries, Saigon-Cholon should have a multinational orientation to serve a large economic hinterland extending into Laos and Cambodia.

Two towns, however, may provide competition for dominance in the region. Hanoi—with its industrial framework based on distilling and brewing, the manufacture of tobacco, pottery and earthenware, metal work, jewellery and silk industries—should impel greater urbanization to such an extent that it may challenge the supremacy of Saigon-Cholon. Another competitor is the capital and chief town of Cambodia. Centrally located at the foci of the nation's road system, Phnom Penh's position is enhanced by its accessibility to ocean-going vessels along the Mekong. As the focus and national center, it shows characteristics of a primate city dominating other cities, towns and large villages in Cambodia.

Another city size distribution that is approaching log-normalcy is that provided by Indonesia (Table 4).

Table 4: City Size Distribution in Indonesia, 1961 [9]

Population Size	Actual No. of cities	Theoretical No. of cities	Cumulative Percentage
10,000-20,000	3	30	5.2
20,000-50,000	16	10	32.4
50,000-100,000	17	5	61.4
100,000-250,000	13	3	85.4
250,000-500,000	6	2	95.6
500,000-1,000,000	2	1	97.8
Over 1,000,000	2	1	100.0
	59	52	

It is to be noted also that Indonesia's city-size distribution is characterized by relatively fewer cities of small population as compared with those of above 50,000 people. This is because "the smaller the town, the slower in general their rate of growth." In contrast, the big cities are fast growing cities, many of which showed population increases of over 4.6 per cent per annum since 1931. Ten of these cities had over 100,000 population; six cities between 50,000 to 100,000 population and eleven cities were with a population varying from 20,000 to 50,000 people. Only three cities, with a population between 10,000 to 20,000 people, showed increases above 4.6 per cent per annum.

There are two cities with over a million inhabitants in Indonesia; possibly Bandung, with a population of 972,566 people in 1961, may be the third "millionaire" city in view of its importance as a major transportation, communication and higher educational center. Unlike Bangkok and Manila, Djakarta (2,973,052 persons) has never been a primate city dominating the nation's major economic, political, administrative, higher educational and technical functions. Surabaya, the second largest city (1,007,945 persons), is a major port and had had a substantial amount of import-export commerce and industry while being the nation's most important naval station. In addition, Bogor is not only renowned for its tropical plant research institutions but also the Presidential palace. Cities such as Medan, Palembang in Sumatra, Pontianak and Bandjarmasin in Kalimantan, Manado and Makassar in Sulawesi, act as multi-purpose regional centers. Djakarta, therefore, is less than three times as large as the next largest city and not much larger than the regional centers. Thus, Indonesia as a whole, exhibits the log-normal distribution of city-size characteristic of Malaysia, in particular, and of some developed countries. This pattern contrasts with that of Thailand, the Philippines and Burma where the primacy of Rangoon is unmistakable.

[9] Figures for this table were obtained from Tan Goantiang, "Growth of Cities in Indonesia 1930-1961" *Tijdschrift*, LVI (Mei-June 1965), 103-108; see Pauline D. Milone, "Contemporary Urbanization in Indonesia," *Asian Survey*, IV (August 1964), 1000-1012.

Primacy Distribution

A clear contrast to the prevailing pattern of city-size distribution in Malaysia and Singapore, Indonesia and Indo-China, is provided by Thailand [10] whose distribution indicates a simple case of primacy characterized by the dominance of one large city, a clear deficiency of towns in the intermediate sizes, and a relatively many smaller towns (Table 5).

Table 5: Distribution of Towns in Thailand (1960)

Population Size	Actual No. of Towns in 1960	Theoretical No. of towns in 1960	Cumulative percentage
10,000-20,000	40	31	65.5
20,000-50,000	19	11	96.6
50,000-100,000	1	6	98.2
100,000-250,000	—	4	98.2
250,000-1,000,000	—	2	98.2
Over 1,000,000	1	3	99.9
	61	57	

This pattern—when plotted on the log-normal probability paper—will show an inverted L-shaped graph that denotes a heavy concentration of cities of small size and the dominance of a huge primate city. With a population of about 1.7 million people (including Thonburi), Bangkok is twenty-six times the size of Chiengmai, the second largest city in Thailand. Its "bigness" may further be emphasized by means of a primacy index[11] and comparing this index with that for Kuala Lumpur and Djakarta (Table 4). It is clear that even when the total population of the four largest cities in the country is viewed against that of Bangkok, the latter is still larger by 9.6 times as compared with Kuala Lumpur which is only 0.62 times the total population of Penang, Ipoh, Klang and Johor Baharu.

Table 6: Comparative Primary Indices

City	2-city Index	3-city Index	4-city Index	5-city Index
Bangkok (1960)	26.15	15.88	12.07	9.6
Jakarta (1961)	2.95	1.50	1.11	1.04
Singapore (1957)	2.88	1.65	1.35	1.21
Kuala Lumpur (1957)	1.35	0.88	0.72	0.62

Bangkok's dominance over Chiengmai and other towns in Thailand may be explained by the physical topography in which it is located. The geographi-

[10] Larry Sternstein, "A Critique of Thai Population Data," *Pacific Viewpoint*, VI (May 1965), 15-38.

[11] The simple index is the ratio of the population of the first city to that of the second city: $1 = \frac{P_1}{P_2}$ where 1 is the index of primacy, P1 is the population of the first city, and P2 is the population of the second city. A four-city index is $\frac{P1}{P_2 + P_3 + P_4}$

cal focus of the whole country being towards the lower Menam-Chao Praya plain, emphasizes its importance as the chief export port for Thai rice and its being a capital city attracts a long surplus population from the rural areas while drawing in large external economies from its export and tourist trade. Other towns in the country are not strategically located for they lie in areas of subsistence—agricultural activities which lack vital factors for urban development. Thus, because of their isolation, such towns as Chengmai Nan, Lampong, Uttaradth, Makhon Sawan, Chunpon, Pukhet and Songkhla, function only as local centers, serving their immediate population without ever being strong contenders for primacy.

Like those of Thailand, the cities of Burma [12] also show the primacy pattern which is characterized by one large city with an approximate population of 774,676 (1958), an absence of towns between 250,000 to 500,000 people, four towns between 50,000 to 250,000 people and forty nine small towns (Table 7).

Table 7: Distribution of Cities in Burma (1958)

Population Size	No. of Cities	Total Population
10,000-20,000	26	367,018
20,000-50,000	23	655,318
50,000-100,000	2	139,877
100,000-250,000	2	251,047
250,000-500,000	—	—
500,000-1,000,000	1	774,676
	54	2,186,936

At the top of the hierarchy is Rangoon which is about four times larger than Mandalay and almost eight times the size of Moulmein, the second and third largest cities in the country respectively, while at the same time containing 35 per cent of the total population living in cities of over 10,000 people. With rural-urban migration from adjoining deltaic areas and the development of inland waterways, transport and road communications which focus on lower Burma, Rangoon's population is expected to increase to $1\frac{1}{4}$ million people by 1983 thus increasing its lead over other towns which generally show limited growth. For instance, even with further industrialization and improved roads and railways, Mandalay's future population is estimated to be no more than 250,000 people during the same year.

With reference to the Philippines [13] the primacy pattern is characterized by the city of Manila dominating over twenty-five or more cities of smaller population size (Table 8).

---

[12] V. Antolic, "Town Planning in Burma," TAO/BUR/31 (Restricted), Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, 1960.

[13] Much of the information in this section was gleaned from Preliminary Report on Housing Needs, the People's Homesite and Housing—United Nations Survey, Manila (1963); and D. J. Dwyer, "The Problem of In-Migration and Squatter Settlement in Asian Cities," *Asian Studies*, II (August 1964), 145-169.

Table 8: City Size Distribution in the Philippines, 1957

Population Size	No. of Towns	Cumulative percentage
10,000-20,000	15	57.7
20,000-50,000	4	73.1
50,000-100,000	2	80.8
100,000-250,000	4	96.2
250,000-500,000	—	96.2
500,000-1,000,000	—	96.2
Over 1,000,000	1	99.9
	26	

The causes underlying such a distribution may be attributed to a matrix of historical, locational, economic and political advantages of the capital city in relation to the development of the country as a whole. Particularly significant is the fact that Manila is spreading outwards in all directions beyond its official boundary so as to create one conurbation referred to as Greater



FIGURE 3: GROWTH OF METROPOLITAN MANILA

Manila. This spread occurred mainly after the Second World War when, among other areas, the Gonzales Estate in Caloocan (1963), Sta. Mesa Heights in Quezon City (1956), Forbes Park in Makati (1963), and San Roque in Pasay (1946), were fully established. By incorporating seventeen municipalities, Greater Manila grew in size from 1.4 million people in 1948 to about 3 million people in 1962. With massive rural-urban migration caused partly by distress and poverty in the outer islands, and the growth of industry and increasing government functions in the city, its population is expected to rise to 5.4 million people in 1980 (Figure 3). Concomitant with this growth is the development of shack settlements which, in a sense, represents a heavy waste of economic resources (apart from land resources), for the value of the materials from which these shacks are made cost more than ₱75 million. To a considerable extent, Greater Manila is, therefore, typical of the personality and problems faced by the primate cities of Southeast Asia.

Conclusion

From these cases, it is observed that the distributions of cities in Indonesia and Malaysia are approximately log-normal in contrast with the primate city-size distributions of Thailand, the Philippines and Burma, where there are many small towns followed by a general deficiency of towns of intermediate sizes and then a single primate city. The distribution for the Indo-Chinese peninsula is a variation which departs from primacy approaching the log-normal city-size distribution. There is no evidence, however, that primate city-size distributions would evolve into the other types of city-size distribution. It is, however, clear that the two basic patterns reflect underlying forces of urban development of varying intensity. While the log-normal distribution implies many forces acting in diverse ways, the primacy distribution appears to suggest strong and dominant forces of urbanization focused upon only one large city. There is no simple correlation between each type of distribution and such variables as average national income, levels of economic development and ethnic homogeneity of population, although it should be stressed that further research is essential before urban phenomenon of Southeast Asian countries can be adequately described.

The implications of these patterns should also be worth studying but much more data on urban development on Southeast Asia are necessary before they can be analyzed in detail. Although some fundamental facts may be obtained from national censuses, background documentation in its diverse aspects relating to urbanization and city growth, is much to be desired. For the present, the analysis on the social, economic and city-planning implications of these phenomena must necessarily be confined primarily to broad generalizations.

MALAYSIA: HER NATIONAL UNITY AND THE PAN-INDONESIAN MOVEMENT

DIETER KRAUSE

THERE ARE, OF COURSE, MANY DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF THE problem of national unity in Malaysia. Every country, especially in "developing areas," has its own particular difficulties in becoming and remaining a nation. In Malaysia, there are perhaps more disuniting factors than in any other Asian country. Because the Federation of Malaysia is a highly artificial country, divided by its heterogeneous components, criticism is not so much directed at the form of government but at the actual existence of the state.

There is no need to restate the immense problems of Malaysia's plural society which threaten to divide the country and retard (if not prevent) Malaysia from becoming a unified nation. A great deal of work has already been done on these problems. Every scholar, engaged on socio-political research in Malaysia, is confronted with an explosive situation and cannot disregard it. Over and above the racial composition of the country—the prime source of national disunity—there are other mainsprings of diversity and heterogeneity —cultural, economic, historical and ideological.

There is one precondition which is vital to the achievement of Malaysia's national unity: the joining together of the Malays themselves to form a solid bloc of action and ideology; without it, there will be no national feeling in Malaysia. This is an aspect that has been overlooked or dismissed by most British scholars.

The Malays are generally known to be peaceful, easy-going people who were (and still are) very much attached to Britain. This is true of the majority of the Malays. On the other hand, there is a minority to whom this description does not apply: to the anti-British pan-Indonesian movement. The movement came into being between the two world wars. Two phenomena caused its emergence. On the one hand, an ideological (racial and historical) element; on the other, the contributing factors of Islamic modernism, Indonesian nationalism, and Malaya's nascent plural society.

The history of the pan-Indonesian movement in Malaya can be divided into four stages:

1. The transformation of a latent and potential idea into organized action based on party structure.
2. The period of Malaya's occupation by the Japanese and the role played by the pan-Indonesian movement during that time.
3. The attempts of the movement, over a period of less than three years, to build a progressive Malayan state in close relation to Indonesia. It also sees the beginning of the movements, rapid decline because of the Emergency Regulations.
4. The fourth and last stage is marked by a revival of the movement in the Malaysian territories as a reaction to the creation of Malaysia.

Within the scope of this paper, it is impossible to analyze in detail each of the four stages. It will, therefore, concentrate on some aspects of the emergence and the development of the movement, in order to show that the pan-Indonesian concept is deeply rooted in the history of Malaya.

In June 1937, the first genuine nationalist party of Malaya was started in Kuala Lumpur, then the capital of the Federated Malay States. It was named "Kesatuan Melayu Muda" (KMM) or the "Union of Progressive Malays"; it had an original membership of about 150. The initiative in founding the party came from Ibrahim bin Haji Yaacob, still one of the most zealous advocates of the pan-Indonesian concept. The co-founders and members of the party were (almost without exception) teachers, journalists, and writers who had not received any English education. Many of them were second or first generation immigrants from Indonesia.

The KMM served (so to speak) as a basis for the frustrated Malay intelligentsia who opposed the *status quo* in their country. As a newly emerging cultural middle-class of Malay descent, they were not only in opposition to British colonialism but also to the traditional Malay aristocracy, which identified itself with the *status quo*. Thirdly, they were hostile to the Malayan Chinese who, supported by the Kuomintang, had tried "to convert Malaya into the nineteenth province of China." [1]

Owing to the fact that the overwhelming majority of the Malays were peasants and fishermen, and held aloof in their conservatism from the socio-political dynamics of change and the nationalist movements around them, the KMM found itself in political isolation: a group of intellectuals who could find no fertile soil for their aims in their country.

The program of the KMM demanded a socialist and republican Malaya that would attain independence within a free *Indonesia Raya* (Greater Indonesia). Because of the political situation in Malaya at that time, there was no channel for the realization of these political ends, except through the Indonesian nationalism propagated by the Sukarno-led *Partai Nasional Indonesia.* No wonder, therefore, that many of the later KMM leaders had been overseas members of the *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (PNI) as early as 1927. The whole program of the KMM was based on the conviction that, for racial, cultural, and historical reasons, the archipelago belonged together and should, therefore, become one political unit.

In the course of the archipelago's history, migrations occurred again and again, for the most part, because of population pressure, economic needs or political oppression. The Malay peninsula experienced two great waves of migration of Indonesian people: those of the Minangkabau from Sumatra's west coast, and of the Bugis from South-Celebes. In the 11th century, the Minangkabau arrived and settled in what they called Negri Sembilan (Nine States). The loose confederation of Negri Sembilan was ruled by a prince from the royal family of West Sumatra until the 18th century. Only at the beginning of the 19th century did they found their own royal dynasty.

At the end of the 17th century, a second wave of migrants consisting of the Bugis, settled in the region of what is now Selangor. They played quite

[1] I. K. Agastja (Ibrahim Yaacob's pseudonym), *Sedjarah dan Perdjuangan di-Malaya* (Jogjakarta 1951), 72.

an important role in the history of the west coast of Malaya. In the early 18th century, they became very influential in the Sultanate of Johore; at about 1740, they set up the Sultanate of Selangor under a separate dynasty.

There were migrations to Malaya again and again, partly on an individual, partly on a collective level. Many of the migrants returned to their original homes; others—though settling permanently in Malaya—avoided absorption by the Malays by retaining their own traditions. Most of them, however, were accepted by the Malays as integral members of their own community and have since been completely assimilated. Since the west coast of Malaya was the region favored by immigrants, it is there, today, where Malay communities are largely intermingled with people from the whole archipelago.

It is clear that a census of Indonesian immigrants is difficult. Nevertheless, the colonial administration in 1931 and 1947 produced statistics about the percentage of immigrant Indonesians; these give some information about the situation at the time of the emergence of the pan-Indonesian movement. Statistical data indicate that in 1931, in the four western states—Perak, Selangor, Johore and Singapore—recent Indonesian immigrants who were not yet assimilated, numbered almost 40% of the Malays. Most of the immigrants consisted of Javanese, Boyanese, Bugis, Banjarese, Minangkabau, Batak and other people from Sumatra.

The Malays did not oppose this influx from the archipelago because it was a counterweight to the very high numbers of Chinese and Indian immigrants. The Indonesia immigrants were considered as subjects of the ruler, in the same position as the Malays; they were defined as "a person belonging to the Malay race or any Malaysian race, who habitually speaks the Malay language or any Malaysian language and professes the Muslim Religion." [2] These migrations, together with the fact that Indonesian immigrants received legal status in Malaya, strengthened the feeling that the whole race belonged together and that they must unite against political and economic oppression by other races.

Another significant factor in the emergence of the pan-Indonesian movement was the historical consciousness of the Malays. The historical pattern of pre-colonial kingdoms was considered as a model for the political demand for the unification of all the territories of the archipelago ruled by different colonial powers. Although the kingdom of Malacca included only parts of Sumatra and Malaya in the 15th century, the borders of influence of the kingdom of Shrivijaya in the 9th and that of Majapahit in the 14th century, are supposed to have been nearly identical with the present territories of Indonesia and Malaysia.

The question of the borders of influence of these Indonesian kingdoms has often been discussed, mainly by Dutch scholars, but no unanimous conclusion has been reached. The attempt of Coedes to sketch a coherent picture of Shrivijaya, based on Chinese travel books and a few fragments of archaeological discoveries, suffers from the difficulty of a correct identification of geographical terms. It thus remains hypothetical. Shivijaya evades the historian almost completely, and disappears in the dark of early history. But there are two works of Indonesian historiography that give some information about

[2] Definition to be found in several state constitutions of Malaya.

Majapahit's range of power. These are *Negarakertagama,* composed in 1365 by Prapanca (a poet at the court of Majapahit) and *Pararaton,* of unknown origin but probably from the 16th century. Both books glorify the power and greatness of Majapahit, of which all the territories of the archipelago were said to have been direct or indirect dependencies. Because of the existence of these historiographical accounts, their view was also the prevailing opinion among the scholars until the research of the Dutch historian C. C. Berg who doubted the trustworthiness of the alleged facts given in *Negarakertagama* and *Pararaton.* Berg imputes to them a more or less mythical-sacral meaning and thinks that historical facts were arbitrarily manipulated for this purpose. Other sources, however, confirm a great deal of the data of *Negarakertagama* and *Pararaton.* There is no generally accepted opinion, therefore, about the problem. As Bernard Vlekke says: "... mythological concepts and historical facts are inextricably interwoven in these Javanese 'history books'." [3]

It is hardly of such concern here, whether or not Malaya had been part of Majapahit or Shrivijaya. What is important, however, is the question of the nationalist interpretation of the existence of the kingdoms; *i.e.,* what were the political conclusions the pan-Indonesian movement drew from its knowledge and interpretation of the history of these autochthonous and powerful kingdoms?

To begin with, it has to be stated that (irrespective of Dutch research) King Kertenagara of Singhasari (1268-1292) and Gajah Mada (1331-1364)—*patih* or prime minister of Majapahit—are still remembered by the Indonesians as statesmen who consciously created an Indonesian empire, with Java as its center. When in 1894 the *Negarakertagama* was discovered, it gave strong support to the oral tradition of the Indonesians concerning the glory and greatness of Majapahit. In 1945, in the course of a debate discussing the future boundaries of an independent Indonesia, Muhammad Yamin, Sukarno and others, pleaded for frontiers based on the *Negarakertagama,* ". . . which clearly shows that Indonesia comprises Sumatra, Java and Madura, the smaller Sundas, Borneo, Celebes, the Molukkas and Ambon, the peninsula of Malaya, Timor and West Irian, and that there is no change in our opinion of today. This is the fatherland of Indonesia... in these 600 years there has been no change in our feeling and thinking." [4] This supposed historical unity is highly glorified by the pan-Indonesian movement, exemplified by the following words: "I dedicate this book to all Malaysian people in order to nourish again the seed of unity until the holy heritage of Shrivijaya and Majapahit can return into the womb of our people and country . . . ." [5] Moreover, from this belief in the historical unity of pre-colonial times, the pan-Indonesian movement in Malaya derived the claim to legitimacy for its party and program.

The progressive pan-Indonesian movement was given a party structure only in 1937, after a preparatory period of self-expression in journalism and literature for about ten years. But this decade of preparation showed clearly

---

[3] Bernard H. M. Vlekke, *Nusantara, a history of Indonesia* (5th imp.; Djakarta, 1961), 59.

[4] Muhammad Yamin, *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945* (Djakarta: Djilid Pertama, 1959), 135.

[5] Ibrahim Yaacob, *Nusa dan Bangsa Melayu* (Djakarta, 1951).

that pro-Indonesian anti-colonialism was confined merely to the emerging middle-class of a Malay intelligentsia and that it had no appeal to the Malay peasantry. This was due to the fact that the structure of Malay society remained intact—a fact still more evident as one went further east in the peninsula. In spite of the introduction of a money economy and western jurisdiction, in spite of the structural breakdown of the formerly self-sufficient and almost isolated village communities, the socio-economic balance of Malay society remained almost untouched.

The preservation of the society's equilibrium was due to the exclusive employment of Indian and Chinese labor for the economic opening-up of the country, and to the fact that no claim was made to the soil which was already being cultivated by the Malays. The contrary was true of Java where the Dutch—in the course of the liberal period of their colonial policy, under their so-called culture system—laid the entire burden of economic development on the shoulders of the peasantry. It meant imposed changes in the socio-economic structure of Javanese society, and it finally shattered its traditional pattern. On the other hand, it also led to xenophobic rebellions, which soon merged into a broad nationalist movement—the *Sarikat Islam.* Moreover, an increasingly eschatological atmosphere at the turn of the century encouraged revolutionary tendencies in Java, and helped to increase communist activity in the second decade.

In Malaya, however, there was neither a dissatisfied peasantry under population pressure nor a Malay middle-class. Pre-nationalist movements of an escapist or social-revolutionary kind, which might have created revolutionary atmosphere, did not therefore occur. The dynamic element, when it appeared in Malaya, was mainly in the economic and political sector; it affected only the British and the Chinese, *i.e.,* the Malays were unaffected. It was the Islamic reform movement and the question of the relationship between religion and a modern order of society which became the center of discussion. For more than two decades, it made the headlines in the Malay press. It shows how much Malay society was stirred up over the problem of interpreting Islam, even if the outcome was a victory for extreme traditionalism.

The modernists never succeeded in finding a political outlet for their movement, and while they laid stress on the desirability of religious unity, it was the nationalists and anti-colonialists who emphasized the pan-Indonesian movement as the basis for the political unit of the archipelago. Islamic modernism in Malaya paved the way for the emergence of the pan-Indonesian movement primarily by breaking century-old taboos.

Thus, towards the end of the third decade of this century, the first phase of an attempt to emancipate the Malays by means of religion, came to an end. This phase was determined by Islamic modernism. At the turn of the third to the fourth decade, the growing consciousness of the Malay's isolated situation, together with a gloomy prospect in view, began to assume a clear political shape in a radical, secular pan-Indonesian movement in which Islamic modernism had no part. It was largely the result of the strong influence of Indonesian nationalism.

Accordingly, the KMM, and Ibrahim Yaacob himself, defined the party again and again as leading and representing the "proletariat." But this was

only a theoretical claim until after the war, when the movement tried to win over parts of the peasantry in order to secure a larger following. Indeed, the members of the KMM were mainly from the *ra'ayat,* and they retained their ties with their forbears.

Two main factors promoted the emergence of a Malay cultural middle-class: firstly, the above-mentioned Islamic reform movement, initiated mainly by the Malayan Arabs; and, secondly, the activities of a first generation of immigrants from Indonesia. In addition, some of the students and graduates of the Agricultural College at Serdang, the Technical College and the Trade School in Kuala Lumpur, joined the emerging intelligentsia of schoolteachers, writers and journalists. According to Ibrahim Yaacob, it was only after much pressure from the students of these schools that a nationalist party was founded. Thus the *Kesatuan Melayu Muda* came into being.

The main founders of the party were Ibrahim bin Haji Yaacob, Ishak bin Haji Muhammad, Hassan bin Haji Manan, Abdul Karim Rashid, Muhammad Isa bin Mahmud, Onan Siradj and Mustapha bin Haji Hussein. Ibrahim Yaacob, together with Muhammad Isa bin Mahmud, Hasaan bin Haji Manan and Abdul Karim Rashid, had already founded, in 1929, a socialist and pro-Indonesian secret society in the Sultan Idris Teacher's Training College of Tanjong Malim. Ishak bin Haji Muhammad joined the party through his literary and journalistic activity. Onan Siradj and Mustapha bin Haji Hussein were chairmen of the pro-Indonesian student unions of the Technical College in Kuala Lumpur and the Agricultural College in Serdang, respectively.

Ibrahim Yaacob and Ishak bin Haji Muhammad, the party's two most influential leaders, were of families who had lived in Malaya for generations; on the other hand, they were always conscious that their ancestors came from other parts of the archipelago. The other co-founders and important leaders of the KMM are said to have been second generation immigrants from Indonesia. To what extent the party's following consisted of first generation immigrants from Indonesia cannot be ascertained. But, in view of the fact that up to 40% of the Malay population in some of the west coast states had recently immigrated from Indonesia, it is probable that a good deal of the growing following of the KMM were "Indonesians." There was a continuous movement of Indonesian people between Malaya and Indonesia in the thirties.[6] Immigrants and workers from the overpopulated parts of the Dutch East Indies were welcomed by the Malays in order to weigh the racial balance in favor of the Malays as against the Chinese and Indians.

It was only after the second World War, and with the growing ideological split between Malaya and Indonesia, that the KMM's partial Indonesian following became suspect. The definition of a Malay as a subject of the ruler ("a person belonging to the Malay race or any Malaysian race who habitually speaks the Malay language or any Malaysian language and professes the Muslim Religion") shows clearly the underlying sentiment of belonging racially together despite regional differences. According to Silcock and Ungku Aziz. "The Malays owed allegiance territorially to their own Sultans. Culturally their allegiance was to Islam, and more specifically to the maritime branch

more than 100,000.

[6] Between 1935 and 1939, the yearly migration of Indonesian laborers totaled

of it speaking Malaysian languages and having a common tradition of culture, trade, and inter-marriage among the royal families, extending along the coasts of Malaya, Sumatra, Borneo and parts of Java and other islands. Malaya itself was a political accident of British rule . . . ."[7]

The real fear of the pan-Indonesian movement was that out of the "political accident" a lasting division of the archipelago would develop. With this fear, the vision of an isolated and hopelessly backward Malay population arose, deprived of power by the Chinese on their own soil. As early as 1930, the *Majallah Guru* (Teacher's Magazine) cited the pessimistic prediction of Arnold Toynbee, who maintained that "the race for wealth and power remains between the British and the Chinese. The prize will fall to those who can stand the climate and other geographical conditions of the country. But I have not the slightest doubt of the conclusion of this peaceful race: the Chinese will win." And he carries on: "A truly significant mark that the British Empire can leave in Malaya when she withdraws is the transformation of this country into the nineteenth province of China." [8]

The gloomy vision that the Chinese would "convert their (the Malay) race into an aboriginal stock and their culture into a museum piece" [9] led the KMM to cooperate to some extent with the pro-British Malays, for both movements shared the fear of Chinese predominance. Ibrahim Yaacob, for example, helped to found the pro-British associations of Selangor and Pahang in 1937 and 1938, and Ishak bin Haji Muhammad in 1938-1939 held the office of General Secretary of the *Kesatuan Melayu Singapura* (The Singapore Malay Union). They both wrote articles for the government-supported *Utusan Melayu* (Malay Messenger). However, the predominance in these associations of the "nonchalant attitude of the western educated Malay group who seemed to us so contented with basking in the feudal moon and in the colonial sun," [10] led to the KMM's retreat from the pro-British movement and to a more hostile attitude towards the aristocracy and the British. The failure of the attempt to enter into an agreement with the Malay associations (under the control of the aristocracy) in order to combat the increase of Chinese influence, had serious consequences for the future history of Malaya. Henceforth, Malay society was split politically into a conservative movement which was dominated by the aristocracy and attached to the British, and into the pan-Indonesian, anti-colonialistic and republican opposition movement which could only envisage the survival of the Malays in some form of close relationship with Indonesian nationalism. (The groups in between—for example, the people around Onn bin Jaafar—had no real influence.) Both political formations had almost no connection with the peasantry which remained apolitical and loyal to their respective Sultans.

Although the KMM never worked out or published a detailed party program, its outline emerged in various literary and journalistic publications.

---

[7] T. H. Silcock and Ungku Aziz, "Nationalism in Malaya," in William Holland (ed.), *Asian Nationalism and the West, a Symposium Based on Documents and Reports of the Eleventh Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations* (New York, 1953), 279.

[8] Majallah Guru (March 1930), 47-48.

[9] T. H. Silcock and Ungku Aziz, *op. cit.*, 286.

[10] Ishak bin Haji Muhammad, "Autobiography" (unfinished and unpublished manuscript, 1959), 11-12.

In defending itself against the reproach that it had a "mixed-up ideology," the KMM took a clear political stand, although without ever setting it out in a manifesto. The most important points were as follows:

1. A clearly anti-Chinese attitude.
2. Anti-colonialism in general, specifically an anti-British attitude.
3. Republicanism.
4. Socialism.
5. Struggle for Malaya's political independence within a free Greater Indonesia.
6. Non-cooperation with the colonial government.

There was a second opportunity to heal the political split between the Malays. On April 1, 1946, the Malayan Union was established. This new form of government, characterized by a liberal policy of citizenship and the loss of sovereignty by the Malay Sultans, aroused unusually strong protests among the Malay conservatives. In March 1946, forty-one of the political associations already in existence, merged to form the "United Malays National Organization" (UMNO) in order to demonstrate a Malay-wide opposition against the new form of government, which was thought to deprive the Malays of most of their former privileges. The "Malay Nationalist Party" (MNP), successor of the KMM, was also represented at a historic congress in Kuala Lumpur. For the MNP, it meant participation in the great coalition of Malay nationalism although denying also in a sense their own avowed aims. The reasons for the MNP's decision were:

1. The republican and pro-Indonesia nature of the MNP, together with the suspicion that it was directed by the Malayan Communists, made the party somewhat unpopular. In view of the great success of the UMNO, the MNP was in danger of falling into isolation.
2. It was the intention of the MNP to make use of the favorable circumstance of this unique protest of all Malays against Great Britain, thereby hoping to be able to press the UMNO into a permanent anti-British policy by virtue of the influence the MNP could exercise within the UMNO.
3. Finally, it was another attempt to overcome the dangerous disunion of the Malays in order to find a common formula for the moulding of future policy. That the MNP was prepared to compromise in this can be seen from their later rejection of the idea of a republican Malayan state so as to preserve the Sultans as constitutional monarchs.

The impossibility of cooperation between MNP and UMNO soon became apparent. In June 1946, it was already clear that the British would submit to UMNO demands in order to avoid the possibility that the party might move to the left. Its demands were for little more than the reinstallation of the Sultans as sovereigns of their respective states and for a drastic reduction of the rights of non-Malays to citizenship. It was clear that the UMNO had struggled for nothing more than the restoration of the *status quo ante,* thus pursuing a reactionary racial policy.

On June 29, 1946, the inevitable happened. The MNP's leader, Dr. Burhanuddin, and his delegation walked out of the congress in Ipoh when it was unable to reach agreement on what the UMNO's symbol should be. The MNP insisted on acceptance of the Indonesian national colors; the majority of the assembled delegations pleaded for a flag which would symbolize the power of the Sultans. Disagreement over the design of the flag was, of course, only

the superficial reason for the split. The real reason lay in the insurmountable differences which divided the two parties of Malay nationalism. The split that was effected on that day meant certainly a temporary split, if not a final end of a common policy among the Malays of the peninsula. For the MNP, as for most national movements in Asia, leftism was a *sine qua non* for the achievement of national consciousness.

There were always two ideologies to which the pan-Indonesian movement owed loyalty: the concept of pan-Indonesia and anti-colonialism the latter tending towards a belief in socialism as a nation-building force. Thus, after its split with the UMNO, the MNP joined with several non-Malay political parties in an inter-racial coalition for the achievement of an independent Malaya. The amalgamation with Indonesia as a historical necessity remained the most important objective of the party's program. But its realization had to be postponed because it was not feasible at the time. The party's activity was now directed primarily towards independence for Malaya as a separate unit. Dr. Burhanuddin clearly stated what the party had in mind: "We have a three part program: first, to demand self-government for Malaya, then form a Malay independent government, and at that time we will decide the third stage—the amalgamation with the Indonesian Republic. Time will tell how long it will take. Everything depends upon the surrounding political situation. If it is not favor, it will take years . . . ."[11] Partly out of conviction, partly because of tactical demands, therefore, the MNP joined the non-Malay left wing parties in order to create a counterweight to the conservative forces of the country. This inter-racial alliance produced a draft constitution of a high standard, which, had it been introduced, could have paved the way for a democratic and self-governing Malayan nation.

It is a tragedy of Malayan post-war history that the policy of the moderate parties represented in this inter-racial coalition—especially the MDU, the MIC and the MNP, with their idealistic attempt to work for a democratic order which would overcome racial tensions—was never allowed to become effective. It was wrecked by the two extreme parties: the right-radical Malay UMNO, and the left-radical Chinese MCP (Malayan Communist Party). The moment when a nation-building binding force might have been created, passed disregarded. There had never been an opportunity like this before.

In 1948, all the parties of a left wing outlook were outlawed under the emergency regulations. The MNP delegated the organization of the party to Ibrahim bin Haji Yaacob, who, after the war, had settled in Indonesia and had become an Indonesian citizen. He was given "the full right to carry on the Malay's national movement outside the country, that is, in Indonesia."[12] On June 27, 1950, he founded the successor-party of the MNP, the *Kesatuan Malaya Merdeka* (Association For A Free Malaya). In his words, the party's objective was "to keep the flame of anti-colonialism and the ideal of a Greater Indonesia alive."[13] Ibrahim pursued this mission in two ways. First, by organizing a pan-Indonesian underground movement in Malaya, Singapore, Sa-

[11] "The MNP—by Them, unpublished series of articles concerning the MNP, n.d., to be found in the archives of the *Straits Times*, Kuala Lumpur, 4.
[12] Ibrahim Yaacob, *Sekitar Malaya Merdeka* (Djakarta, 1957), 42.
[13] Interview with Ibrahim Yaacob in November, 1962.

rawak and Brunei; secondly, by perpetual appeals to Indonesian public opinion, and especially to the Sukarno-led Government, not to lose sight of the pan-Indonesian concept.

Today, in 1965, the realization of the pan-Indonesian concept depends on an enormous number of inter-dependent factors, which cannot be even approximately analyzed here. However, some of the problems of importance in this connection can be mentioned. The decisive question is: to what extent will Malaysia succeed in keeping the existing balance of power between Chinese and Malays and in reducing internal tensions and racial differences in this plural society so that it will become a nation? This again will depend on how far all the ethnic groups are prepared to be loyal to the new state. In this respect, it is questionable whether the present ruling alliance as an advocate of a free market economy, dependent on and patronized by the British Government, will be able to attract this loyalty. Will it be possible for a Malaysian free market economy to survive, surrounded by the communist and socialist systems of neighboring countries?

The problem is closely connected also with the long-term foreign policy of Malaysia. The present dependence on Great Britain in defense matters cannot last forever. But while disengagement by Great Britain in this region might perhaps lessen Malaysia's present isolation within Southeast Asia, it would also leave a power vacuum which could easily become the object of Chinese or Indonesian expansion. Yet, so long as Great Britain is militarily engaged in Malaysia, the loyalty of the anti-colonialist, pan-Indonesian movement goes to Indonesia and seeks to undermine Malaysia by legal and illegal means.

Moreover, as long as Sukarno is able to hold together his heterogeneous state, supported by the Indonesian communists and the armed forces, Javanese centralism will remain a constant threat to the security of Malaysia. Yet there is reason to believe that the centripetal forces in the pan-Indonesian concept (which run together in Java) are strongly concentrated in the person of Sukarno. A possible change in the leadership of the Indonesian Government would have unpredictable consequences for the whole archipelago, but they are likely to assist autonomous aspirations.

The Maphilindo project, which was first proclaimed by the President of the Philippines, Diosdado Macapagal, is wholly unacceptable to the present Malaysian Government. It was probably never taken very seriously by Macapagal himself. For the present, a voluntary federation of the three countries is unthinkable. The realization of the concept of pan-Indonesia, therefore, in regard to the amalgamation of Malaysia and Indonesia, can be accomplished only by force. Because of its policy of rearmament, Indonesia is now in a position to give military support to the pan-Indonesian movement in Malaysia And since Sukarno will avoid open conflict with Great Britain, the pan-Indonesian movement is the only instrument available to him that is committed to the realization of a greater Indonesia.

WEST IRIAN: POPULATION PATTERNS AND PROBLEMS

GOTTFRIED OOSTERWAL

ON MAY 1, 1963, WEST IRIAN—THE FORMER NETHERLANDS New Guinea—came under Indonesian Administration. Formerly a part of the Netherlands East Indies, West Irian remained under Dutch control when the rest of that former colony became an independent nation: Indonesia (1949). The sharp dispute between Holland and Indonesia on West New Guinea that later followed, was finally settled in 1962. A United Nations resolution was then adopted: beginning May 1, 1963, Indonesia would have the control over West Irian. At the same time, Indonesia promised that by 1969, the people of West Irian—under the supervision of the United Nations—could freely determine their future political status. For this reason alone, a study on West Irian population seems to be justified.

There are other reasons besides: from 1950 to 1962, tremendous changes have taken place in West Irian which strongly affected the traditional population patterns and trends. Little or nothing has been published in English about them. Some of these population problems and trends moreover, are very similar to those in the rest of Asia and hence, important for comparative research. Since many of these problems—compared with the rest of Asia are in their initial phase only, a deeper knowledge might help those responsible for the welfare of the people concerned, to take proper actions while it is still time to do so.

The people of West Irian have commonly been called Papuas, the origin of which name remains in the dark. Some believe that the name Papua, which has been used by early Spanish discoverers in the 16th century, refers to the wooly, crispy hair of the people. It is, indeed, a remarkable characteristic. Others have suggested that the name might find its origin in a yell of early Papuan male rowers. Among other theories, the name Papua was said to mean "slave" in some of the east Indonesian islands, from where raiders came to West Irian to get their slaves. For that reason, at least, two of the (former) political parties in West Irian fervently worked for the abolition of the name Papua. They, with others, preferred the name New Guinea, the name given to the island in 1545 by the Spaniard, Yñigo Ortiz de Rates, because of its apparent similarities to Guinea on the West coast of Africa: similar climate and flora; similarities also in the physical appearance of the people.

At the conference of Malino (1946), a young Papuan delegate—Frans Kasiepo—all of a sudden suggested to change the name New Guinea into Irian, a name never heard of before. Kasiepo himself, learned about the name when he was a student at the School of National Civil Officers at Biak. An old woman—helping out in the school kitchen—replied to Kasiepo's question on how the people from Biak referred to the main island of New Guinea: "We say Irian" (Land of Birth; homeland). One of the reasons why the Dutch Government later rejected that name was because the word Irian



Sketch Map of West Irian

has so many different meanings in the various languages of the island. In the Southwest for instance, the word means: "People that are highly exalted," whereas in the key-islands, the word "ivi" stands for "slave" and "irian" for a "gang of slaves." Later, the name Irian was used by Indonesia as a symbol of the liberation of the Papuas from the Dutch. The names New Guinea and Papua then served as reminders of colonialism and imperialism; Irian came to stand for freedom.[1]

The Traditional Patterns

Whatever the name used—Papua, Irian or New Guinea—the choice of one name to refer to all of the 715,000 inhabitants of West Irian, was rather misleading. It suggests a unity that, in fact, did not exist. Besides differences in physical appearance, it was *the great cultural diversity that formed a special characteristic of the population of West Irian.* It is well, therefore, to speak about the traditional patterns rather than about one single pattern.

Compared with other areas of Asia, the population patterns of West Irian, as a whole, show a few common characteristics which make them stand out as a unit. There are, first of all, *the very small number of people* and *the very low density of population.* Table 1 gives a comparison of West Irian's area, population and density with those of other areas of Asia, excluding Hong Kong and Singapore, with a density of 7,237 and 6,750, respectively.

Table 1: Comparative figures on the density of population in Asia.[2]

Country	Areas (sq. miles)	Population (000)	Density (sq. mi.)
Burma	261,789	22,342	79
Cambodia	88,780	4,952	72
Ceylon	25,332	10,167	379
China	3,769,000	646,500	178
Federation of Malaya	50,690	7,137	132
India	1,221,880	441,631	345
Indonesia	735,865	96,750	161[3]
Japan	142,688	94,870	655
Korea (South)	34,427	26,354	676
Laos	91,000	1,850	20
Philippines	115,758	29,698	237
Taiwan	13,886	11,302	764
Vietnam (South)	65,000	14,520	209
West Irian	160,000	715	4.5

[1] This refers also to the eastern half of the island, still under Australian jurisdiction. The former Dutch part is, therefore, referred to as *West* Irian, while the territory of New Guinea and Papua, the northern and southern half of the Australian part of the island respectively, are referred to as *East* Irian, still a "terra irredenta."

[2] W. Stanley Rycroft and Myrtle M. Clemmer, *A factual study of Asia* (New York, 1963), 15.

[3] Of those 715,000, about 475,000 were under direct government control. Another 75,000 had had some contact with the administration or the missions, while an estimated number of about 165,000 people had never been in contact yet with the administration or missionary societies.

The picture above is already clear enough: West Irian, with only 715,000 inhabitants—in size, a bit larger than Japan (95 million inhabitants) and the Philippines (30 million inhabitants)—seems to be a "land without people." There were no urban centers, nor large concentrations of people before the 1950's. *The traditional pattern was that of people living in a very large number of small and very small, commonly widely scattered and isolated local units.*

From the few (reliable) statistics available before 1951,[4] it seems evident that those widely scattered small communities were rather static: the death rate being as high (or here and there, even higher) than the birth rate. The latter may be estimated between 40 to 50 (per thousand).[5] These small settlements differed in size and in form. In the interior, the majority of the settlements counted less than 75 inhabitants. In certain areas, those settlements can best be characterized as homesteads: a few scattered single extended-family houses. Often, even one or two single houses are found in the jungle where only one or two nuclear families live at a day's or more walking distance from the nearest settlement.

Along the coast, villages were, on the whole, a bit bigger. But even there, the majority (65-70%) counted less than 150 inhabitants. These differences in size between the settlements on the coast and in the interior are closely related to the natural environment: the possibilities and patterns of food production, and the level of peoples' technical civilization. Generally, the coastal areas offered greater possibilities for a varied food supply (sago, taro, cassava, coconut, fish) and contacts with the neighboring groups than the more hilly and mountainous interior (sago, sweet potatoes). Yet, on the whole—and this is another common characteristic—the natural environment in West Irian is very unfavorable and rather hostile to human occupation: high precipitation, very poor soils (eroded and depleted), the area (80%) covered with dense, tropical rain forests and, in the south, large swampy areas. Often, this geologically young area is struck by earthquakes and landslides. Malaria was number one in the list of disease and one which has been highly endemic. Pneumonia and yaws took their toll as well. Often, the birthrates could not keep pace with the high mortality rate. In fact, many reports on various areas make mention of the fact that the population is becoming extinct. Wars, cannibalism and infanticide added to the high mortality caused by shortage of food and diseases. A functional interdependence seems to exist between this unfavorable natural milieu, the very low level of technical civilization, the small number of people, and the typical patterns of widely scattered independent small communities, with their differences in culture and social organization.

---

[4] Since 1951, the Netherlands administration has published statistics on the population of West Irian in its annual reports to the United Nations (Charter 73 E). The last report refers to the situation in 1961. Before 1951, data on population patterns, birth rates, mortality rates, trends, and the like, may be found in (mimeographed) administrative reports, in mission reports, in official exploration reports, and, incidentally, in a few scientific publications.

[5] These figures are comparable to the traditional birth rates in Asian countries before 1920. Though the average birth rates have been far from uniform, "for the combined area of South-east Asia the birth rate in the 1920's and 1930's... seems to have averaged about 45 per thousand." W. Stanley Rycroft and Myrtle M. Clemmer, *op. cit.*, 27-35.

This ecological approach of the population patterns of West Irian is still accentuated by a third common characteristic: *its long time isolation.* This refers to the external as well as to the internal situation. Before the Second World War, West Irian was the "land that time forgot." Besides the work of the missions, little or nothing was done to break that isolation. West Irian had practically no contact with the rest of the (Asian) world. This was apparently also the case prior to its discovery by the Portuguese in 1512. West Irian remained untouched by the large migrations in South and East Asia. It remained outside the influence of the former great empires in the Far East. It had no contact with the great cultures and remained outside the sphere of the great Asian religions. Only a few bronze adzes found in recent years seem to indicate that the Dong Son cultures, at a time, touched the north of West Irian. Along the north coast—here and there—Melanesian influences can be traced; in the extreme western part of the island, influences from East Indonesia (Tidore) are reflected in the material culture and political organization. As a result, no large immigrations developed a more dynamic population pattern.

There was no contact with other (higher) cultures that would stimulate or develop a technology, no contact that would enable the people to make a better living *(i.e.,* rice culture) and allow for larger concentration of people, another division of labor, and the like. Under these circumstances, specialists on West Irian agree that the local groups—especially in the interior—could not be bigger than about 70 people. Every increase would disturb ecological equilibrium. In large areas of the interior, a density of 1 to 2 per square miles was already a maximum. "Land without people" seems to be a rather misleading statement, therefore, since in many areas a density of 4 means already an overpopulation, resulting in infanticide or the abandoning of the old members of the group. The widely scattered, independent local community, on the other hand, is the people's "response" to their natural and cultural "challenge." It seems to be an adaptation to, and best suited for, the marginal situation in which they live.

The strong isolation applies also to the internal situation in West Irian. Swamps, mountain ridges, a high incidence of accidents, and long distances, did not stimulate an intensive contact between the widely scattered groups. The small community, therefore, was a world of its own. It was an autonomous, independent unit with strong ingroup-outgroup feelings. Local endogamy was after favored, making the small local group a consanguine group, where every member—in more than one way—can trace his blood relations with the others, as well. In case of conflict, village solidarity was considered more important than family ties. On the whole, relationships with other "people" (for many of these small communities referred to themselves as "we, the people") varied from suspicious tolerance to open hostility. Contacts between the peoples consisted of (mute) trade and barter, common religious ceremonies, wars and cannibalistic raids. One does not exclude the other.

Large political or family associations are very rare. Even clans, sibs or lineages are generally absent or rather vague, even though a mythical relationship between the groups, often speaking the same language, was recognized. And if—in a few cases—larger units did occur, the organizational ties

were rather loose and flexible. The nuclear family formed the basis of the traditional Papuan society. The strong individualism of the Papuans fits very well into this atomistic structure of the population pattern.

No doubt, it is this isolation that strongly contributed to the great cultural diversity on the West Irian scene: differences in language, social organization, religion and mythology. It is no wonder that cultural anthropologists in New Guinea have attached a great significance to community research. The study of the small community has been basic in the understanding of the cultural diversity as well as the typical aspects of the social structure and organization in West Irian.[6]

The New Era

At a time when the value of a colony was determined by the presence of "precious spices," minerals and the opportunities for large plantations and trade, it is understandable that the Dutch did not show great interest in West Irian, where they were not available. This indifferent attitude of the Dutch towards West Irian did not change with the adoption—in the second half of the 19th century—of the "ethical colonial policy" (the policy of administering a colony for the benefit of the colony itself). The more active administration at the end of the 19th century, was mainly the result of the "imperialistic activities" of the British and the Germans in the eastern half of New Guinea. In the Southwest, Merauke was founded (1902); in the West, Fak-Fak (1898); in the North, Manokwari (1898); and, close to the border of the former German part of New Guinea, Hollandia (1910), now Sukarnopura. The second World War, all of a sudden, brought an end to the isolation of West New Guinea.

A notable exception during those years of disinterest was the work of the Protestant and Roman Catholic missions. The first Protestant missionaries—Ottow and Geissler—set foot on West Irian (Geelvink Bay area) in 1855. About five decades later, the first Roman Catholic missionaries started their work in the south. Though it took many years before their work yielded fruit, in a number of areas, it definitely brought about (great) changes in traditional culture and society and largely affected the traditional population patterns. A real new era, however, started after 1950, when the Netherlands East Indies became an independent nation (Indonesia) and only West New Guinea remained under Dutch control as a self-governing territory.[7]

The effects on the traditional population patterns were noted everywhere and, all times, the same. Though, on the one hand, in some respects these contacts with the West did tend to smooth out the differences between the various patterns, on the other hand, they caused a still greater variety and differentiation: the contracts differed in nature, form as well as intensity, and the element of time is rather important. This does not only refer to the duration of the contact (some areas have been under the Ad-

[6] Anthropological Research in Netherlands New Guinea since 1950. The Bureau of Native Affairs, Hollandia, *The Oceanic Monographs*, no. 10 (Sydney, 1959).

[7] Article 2 of the charter said that the status of West New Guinea would be defined later at negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Those negotiations failed, however.

ministration for over fifty years now, whereas others have just been opened or have not had any contact with the Administration or missions at all) but also to the years in which the first contact took place. Moreover, the various cultures reacted differently to the contacts with the West and varying areas also differed in their opportunities for development—physically as well as culturally. It has to be borne in mind, therefore, that often, opposite effects were the result of Western contacts and that many of those effects and trends to be mentioned here, often apply to limited areas only.

One of the most striking changes brought about after 1950 are the larger concentrations of population in West Irian: small Administrative stations soon developed into towns and small-scale urban centers. The rapidly expanding departments of the Administration attracted large numbers of national workers. Bigger and smaller contractor companies, business concerns, trading societies, and others soon gave employment to thousands of Papuans. A number of the other young Papuans soon became attracted by the city life with its entertainments, riches and opportunities. In 1956, over 26,000 Papuans were employed in administrative (65%) and private (35%) jobs, as against less than 5,000 in 1950. About 20,000 of those employed, lived and worked in the new urban centers.[8] The town of Hollandia, for instance, grew from an Administrative station with less than 10 Europeans and a couple of hundred Papuans in 1940, to a big urban center in 1959 with over 7,000 Papuans, about 8,000 Europeans and 1,200 Asians. Figures of the other urban centers are shown, in Table 2.

Table 2: Comparative Population Figures of Urban Centers in West Irian

	Hollandia (Sukarnopura) 1951-1959	Biak 1951-1959	Merauke 1951-1960	Manokwari 1952-1957	Fak-Fak 1952-1959
Papuans	1306-7058	1452-4019	434-2427	4027-12577	466-1090
European	5281-8488	349-2747	163- 850	2125- 2265	159- 258
Asian	4451189	280- 475	1505-2712	234- 397	673- 980
Total	7032-16735	2081-7241	2102-5989	6375-15239	1298-2328

These immigrants largely consisted of males in the age group of 18-35 years. The result was, of course, a rather large surplus of males in the productive age groups in those urban centers. Special dormitory camps were built where bachelors from all over West Irian lived together. If anything, it was this living together of so many different people that helped to break down traditional cultural barriers and to establish a notion of greater unity. The schools in these urban centers attracted another group of young men (and girls) most of whom lived in school dormitories.

For those immigrants who brought their families with them, special laborer-villages were built. It is this definite housing policy that prevented, in West Irian, the growth of slums known in other areas of Asia. Of course, there were enough of the other problems created by the sudden change to a money-economy and the accelerated process of urbanization.

[8] Unless stated otherwise, these and other figures are taken from the official annual reports to the United Nations.

The typical demographic aspect of these new centers then was: a very large group of young people and people in the productive age group, with a very great surplus of males. On the whole, the mortality rate was very low, also because of the intensive medical campaigns to free these centers from malaria, pneumonia, tuberculosis; the good (free) medical care; regular inspection, and the like. Because of this, and the large number of young families, the surplus of births (as well as the birth rate) was very high. The trend, therefore, was an accelerated growth of these urban centers. The Dutch Administration tried to check and to regulate the emigration to the urban centers by labor licenses and housing policies. Moreover, special community-development projects were started to create work opportunities and to give the population in the expulsion areas, opportunities to make money through cash crops.

These expulsion areas presented quite a different picture from that in the urban centers: the young emigrated, whereas the older people stayed behind. Or the men went, leaving the women at home in the villages. In some of these expulsion areas—notably along the northern coast, east of Sarmi—a considerable depopulation was the result. In some of these villages, the population consisted of over 70% women. The percentage of old people was very high. No wonder the birth rate dropped considerably and the mortality rate often increased to over 50. The emigration of the (young) men caused other special problems: all the work, especially the very heavy work of food production, now rested on the women alone. They also had to take care of the children and the old. Marriages were postponed and sexual relations changed, and not always for the better.

A larger concentration of the population was also the result of definite administrative and mission policies. The widely scattered, rather unstable small communities, certainly did not promote an intensive administration. It took civil officers months to visit the people under their jurisdiction. Medical campaigns were hardly possible, since many of these semi-nomadic people changed their abodes every two or three months. One could hardly expect the missions to establish a school in those villages or send an evangelist there. Often, those local units had no more than 4-6 children of school age. Hence, the policy to merge a number of these small local units into bigger ones. Often, totally new villages had to be built, usually along the rivers to make them also more accessible. In some areas, this policy indeed resulted in a larger concentration of the population. The total number of villages decreased, while the number of villages with 150 inhabitants or more, increased. In 1961, the 440,000 Papuans, under direct administration, lived in about 2,900 villages. In the interior, 80% of those villages had still less than 150 inhabitants, and over 50% had less than 70. In the coastal areas, 25% of the village counted between 150 and 300 inhabitants, and only 27% of the total population lived in villages with less than 150 inhabitants. In that same year, over 6% of the total population of West Irian already lived in urban centers which did not exist before 1950.

The fact, however, that in 1961, 70% of all the villages in New Guinea (in the interior even 80%) still counted less than 150 inhabitants, shows

that this policy of merging villages into larger units, was not a success everywhere. It just caused too many problems. People had been living too long in isolation. Every village—a world of its own—mistrusted the other and the fear of sorcery *(suangi:* black magic) was always present. Morever, disputes immediately arose about property rights. Often, the newly built villages were at too great a distance from the *sago* groves. A larger concentration of people just broke the ecological equilibrium. People became either dependent on imported goods (rice and canned fish) for which they had no money, or they starved. Hunger and death, together with diseases, made people accuse each other of sorcery; soon, the larger units split again into smaller ones. In some areas, however, the desire for a school—the symbol of the strongly desired progress—everywhere in West Irian—was so great that former hostile people forgot about their feuds and disputes and voluntarily built large, new villages around a school and/or a church.[9]

Closely connected with this development into larger concentrations has been another change: *the (strong) natural growth of the population,* especially in those areas which have been, for a long time or very intensively, under Dutch Administration: Biak (Schouten-islands), the Sentani area (near Sukarnopura). The latter, because of its easy accessibility, became the pilot project of almost every medieval campaign. People, moreover, have had plenty of food and have shared all the advantages of those living in the urban centers *(i.e.)* work opportunities; medical care and others). The result was a tremendous and very rapid decrease of the mortality rate. In a few years, it dropped from about 35 in 1950 to 17 in 1960. During the same period, the birth rate showed (slight) increase to about 50 per thousand. A real population explosion was the result. As long as these areas were exceptions in West Irian, they did not create serious problems. The men found employment in the expanding urban centers. In Sentani there was plenty of land available. This was not the case, however, in the Biak area, and the result was that a number of people had to emigrate, most of them to Hollandia. Later, the production of cocoa for the world market offered some relief. But when, in 1962, work opportunities in the urban centers almost disappeared and the cocoa production rapidly decreased because of political developments, the population pressure became very serious, as is still the case at present.

In the course of the years, Biak and Sentani did not remain few isolated examples. They became the signs of a general trend in large parts of West Irian. By 1962, anti-malaria campaigns had covered over 60% of the malaria-infected areas, or 300,000 people.[10] The same holds true for the anti-yaws campaigns, which practically eradicated the disease from the whole area under Administration. Very exact figures on all areas are not available. But in Sentani, the percentage of the malaria-infected infants dropped within one year from 80% to 8%. The mortality rate dropped considerably in all of these areas, whereas the birth rate remained the same, or even increased. Fortunately, from 1950 to 1962, the economic development of West Irian kept pace with the rapidly growing population. In 1961, the Dutch Government in

[9] See G. Oosterwal, *Die Papua* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, 1963), 105-110.

[10] K. Groenewegen and D. J. van de Kaa, *Nieuw-Guinea als gebied voor demografische onderzoekingen,* pt. 1 (The Hague, 1964), 67-68.

vested 81 million guilders (1 D. Guilder=U.S. $0.28), while another 131 million were received from the Common Market development funds. However, after 1962, that development was rather brought to an end. In many areas, the work opportunities disappeared. Transportation caused considerable problems and many products could no longer be sold in the world market. In 1956, private employees gave work to about 9,000 Papuans. In 1962, this number dropped to less than 1,500, at a time the demand was more than doubled.

Every acculturative action leads to unforeseen and, often, unwanted reactions. This has been the case in West Irian. Among them, in relation to the topic under discussion, are the following:

a. **Epidemic diseases.** With the coming of people from the West, a number of new diseases appeared in the scene to which the Papuan population had no (natural) resistance. In some areas, these epidemic diseases were disastrous. In the Geelvink-Bay-area, it was small-pox which, at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, caused a great mortality among the people. The Southwestern part of West Irian (Merauke) was struck, in the beginning of this century, by an epidemic of venereal disease. As a result, whole villages were depopulated. In others, 25-40% of the population was affected by this murderous disease, which so rapidly spread among the Marind-Anim tribes because of their ritual sexual practices and customs. The same area was later struck by an epidemic of influenza. In a rather short time, hundreds of people were killed. From 1915 to 1925, the population decreased by 30-40% or more. The epidemics of influenza were not limited to the Southwestern part of West Irian. They occurred repeatedly in the North and in the West, together with such diseases as whooping cough, dysentery and even polio. In general, it may be stated, that before the new era really started (1950), the population was static or (gradually) became extinct. The population explosion in many areas, after 1950, has been a very remarkable change.

b. **Decrease of birth rate and the process of masculinization.** The process of acculturation in West Irian is largely a one-sided affair. The West appears as the constant factor, whereas the Papuan society is radically changed. Wars and cannibalism are no longer allowed. New material riches are being introduced which made the few products of their own culture worthless in their eyes. Schools and mission work have helped to change people's world views and religions. The whole society often, has become disrupted: the women's burden became heavier than before, and the men lost their occupations and main interests. Boredom, feelings of emptiness, and a spiritual vacuum have often been the result. And since life has become meaningless, a decrease in the fertility rate could have resulted. For it is remarkable that, in quite a number of areas in West New Guinea, the birth rates dropped—sometimes even considerably. The Papuans, themselves, have ascribed the phenomenon to what they described: "We have left the ways of our ancestors." There is good hope, however, that this demographic phenomenon is only transitory in nature. Other areas which showed the same trend a number of years ago, when they first came into contact with the West (Biak), now have a growing population.

More serious, and still a demographic phenomenon that puzzles us, is the process of masculinization that is reported in quite a number of areas in West Irian. Statistics for West Irian, as a whole, already show a remarkable large surplus of males. A number of explanations have been given, which, however, seem to be of limited application. Mistakes in the census figures and estimates have been assumed. Others emphasized socio-cultural causes, such as abortion, infanticide, adoption, and the like. The suggestion has been made [11] that, in certain areas, the number of males have always outranked the number of girls. However, because of the greater mortality among the male population—as a result of permanent wars, raids, and cannibalism—this surplus no longer existed in the higher age groups. When wars and the like, disappeared after the contact with the West, the higher birth rate of males at first continued and made for the process of masculinization. However, this explanation might hold true only for those areas where a permanent state of war and cannibalism prevailed.

The trend still continues in a number of areas. The physician, Van der Hoeven,[12] states that there were 128 men to 100 women among the tribes investigated in Western Sarmi. For the age groups of 0-15 years, Van der Hoeven gives the ratio of girls to boys as 100 to 143. "So there is," he states, "an enormous surplus of boys at birth, which decreases at a higher age, but which is still noteworthy at old age." This trend is also reported from areas in West Irian which are not yet (or barely) under the control of the Administration.

The Papuans, themselves, explain this demographic phenomenon as follows: "We have left the ways of our ancestor," thus relating the phenomenon to the coming of the West to West Irian. That relationship seems to exist indeed, but it does not offer an all-sufficient explanation yet. The process of masculinization presents a number of problems to the native societies. It not only threatens them with extinction, it disrupts social life as well. In the Tor area, for instance, there are villages where 40% or more of the men in the marriageable age have to remain unmarried. In the course of the years, a new social group has come into existence, consisting only of those bachelors-out-of-sheer-necessity. The group, with a strong *esprit de corps,* has found its own functions in native society. It is a response to the typical demographic situation.[13] But the situation is unbearable. The bachelors therefore, have been leaving their villages to live in the more urbanized areas, where they hope to find food, work, and a wife. In many areas, this migration of the bachelors has led to a strong depopulation. There is good hope, however, that this process is of a transitory nature. In other areas which manifested the same trend a few decades ago, the equilibrium in the sex ratios has been restored and a rather large surplus of births is now reported. The latter trend will gradually become the general feature of the population of West Irian.

c. **A splitting and greater spread of the villages.** Before the penetration of the "pax neerlandica" in quite a few areas of West Irian, a more or less

[11] G. Oosterwal, *People of the Tor* (Assen, 1961), 40-45, 206-210.

[12] J. van der Hoeven, "Verslag van een mislukte toernee naar de Mamberamo, van 2-16 december, 1950," (Mimeographed report).

[13] G. Oosterwal, "The position of the bachelor in the Upper Tor Territory," *American Anthropologist* (1959), 829-839.

permanent state of war (hot or cold) prevailed. For reasons of safety and better defense, people in these areas often united into larger villages. When this situation changed—notably after the 1950—the influence of the Administration was felt far beyond the territory under direct control; people no longer felt the need of living together. A number of villages split into smaller units. This tendency strongly opposed the administrative and mission policies. But this individualism has been one of the reasons why, after so many years, a policy of larger concentrations of the population has yielded so little result in many areas.

Unfortunately, the political situation in West Irian has also brought an end to the trend of larger concentrations along the coastal areas. After 1962, most work opportunities disappeared. People had to leave the urban centers again and went back to their respective villages where they could more easily obtain food. In 1958, the town of Sorong had a population of over 6,000 Papuans, 1,800 Europeans, and 5,000 Asians. In 1962, there were already less than 3,000 Papuans; the year after, this number still dropped considerably. The same trend was reported from the other urban areas and towns where work opportunities no longer were available.

Perspectives

The population of West Irian is "on the way." The isolation was broken; the traditional static population patterns became dynamic and open. The development is not the same everywhere and even opposite trends are reported. But West Irian is everywhere in transition. This implies the setting of a goal, if one does not like to let it fall into chaos. Political unrest and instability, however, have not favored a "smooth" transition and the setting of such a goal. The immediate result of the intensive administration, after 1950, was a growing notion of unity among the Papuan population. And unity has been a necessity to reach such a goal. "Development," "progress," "a new era," have been the common goals everywhere in the island. The true character of, and the means how, to reach these goals, differ however. Some visualize the coming of a "millennium," when sickness and death will be no more and the people will have plenty of food as well as all the riches of the Europeans. Ancestors are expected to come (soon) with shiploads full of "cargo," bringing also the dead, which will mark the beginning of the true new era. All foreigners—white or colored—will be driven away by these ancestors, who will be the true authorities, henceforth. Other groups have been emphasizing more the economic development which will end the crises of transition as well as stress the political means to reach that end. A strong nationalism is inherent in all of these movements; it emphasizes the common goal of all the people of West Irian: to be masters in their own house.

THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN THE HISTORY OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE*

CESAR ADIB MAJUL

I

WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE, THE Filipinos find themselves in the difficult but exciting process of progressively welding themselves into a national community. Clearly, the granting of citizenship and other rights to a group of people living within a definite territory does not immediately create a national community, but such political characteristics do help to hasten its eventual formation. No national community is possible without consciousness of itself. This consciousness cannot be considered as something developed overnight, as it is usually the result of a long historical process as well as a constellation of expectations and aspirations of a people. A national community is, as it were, always in a process of becoming: that is, its members are trying to become more and more of a national community. Consequently, a people in the process of integrating themselves into a national community will search for further elements of common identity. On such element is the possession of a national tradition. Another is the existence of a common set of aspirations and expectations related to one another by a common ideology; or, in the absence of this, at least an agreement on how such an ideology is to be created or determined.

Now, no national tradition is by definition possible without the possession of a common history. It is a history cherised and treasured as an account of the development of a people or peoples in the process of becoming a national community. By common consent among most Filipinos, some of the regional revolts against Spain, the Philippine Revolution, and the precepts and ideas of persons elevated as national heroes constitute significant events that have entered into the composition of the Filipino national tradition. The fact that some of our scholars today are still discussing whether or not certain events are to be emphasized in the history of the birth of the Filipino people is merely a symptom that Filipinos are still in the search for further elements of national identity.

At present there are more than two million Moslems in the Philippine South with all the attributes of Philippine citizenship. Since it appears that everyone would like these Moslems to consider themselves Filipinos, it is understandable why there is a demand that they adopt, as their own history as Filipinos, the above mentioned significant events. It is to be noted that such events are closely related to or identified with the struggle against Spanish colonial domination. Since this is the case, the problem can be raised as to whether the struggles of the Moslems of the South against Spanish attempts to conquer them can also be taken as part of the general struggle of the native inhabitants of the Philippine Archipelago against not only Spanish do-

* A paper prepared for the Silver Jubilee of the Philippine National Historical Society. August 7, 1966.

mination but Western imperialism as well. If the Philippine Revolution is to be regarded not only as a movement of some Christian natives against Spanish rule, but of the Filipino people in their attempts at freedom, then there is no reason why the more than three hundred years of struggle of the Moslems of the South against Spain and resistance against pressure from other Western powers, cannot, in the same light, also be considered as part of the Filipino struggle for freedom. To put it in another way, both parallel struggles can be considered as a movement of racially and ethnically related peoples in the Archipelago that have helped to bring about the present situation where they find themselves trying to integrate into a single nation of Filipinos.

The implications of this is that the struggle of the Moslems in the South against any form of Western dominance is to be interpreted as an expression of their patriotism and love for the soil of their birth. Consequently, their outstanding leaders and heroes are to be honored as persons who helped bring about the formation of the national community.

At this point, we should recourse to a distinction between what might be called "The history of events in the Philippines" and "The history of the development of the Filipino national community." In the latter, not every event recorded in the former is necessarily significant to it. It is well known that many events in the Philippines have dealt with the internecine quarrels and squabbles between Spanish colonial officers and ecclesiastical officials or with institution affecting them solely. As long as these events did not appreciably affect the development of a national consciousness, they need not be emphasized in the second type of history. But, indeed, all events that helped bring about a greater consciousness of race, the universalization of expectations, a greater desire for independence, and a concerted opposition to foreign domination, will belong to the second. Certainly, almost up to the end of the nineteenth century, there was no such thing as a Filipino people in the sense we now understand it. It is well known that the Christian natives of the Archipelago generally came to be called "Indios," and the Moslems of the South "Moros." But there are many historical factors which have contributed to the progressive transformation of the "Indio" and "Moro" into Filipinos belonging to a national community. This process, not unaccompanied by conflict, has been gradual but inevitable.

II

In the writing of the history of the development of the Filipino national community, either in the form of a textbook or as an attempt to recapture the past with the view of understanding the present as well as to plot a direction for the future, the student of Philippine History is faced with the problem of how to deal with the growth and decline of the sultanates of the Moslem South. He is faced at least with two alternatives or opposing techniques, namely, either to deal with them as insignificant but nevertheless interesting chapters in the development of the national community or to deal with them as integral parts in the history of the development of the national community. The second approach interprets the struggle between the Spaniards and the Moslem sultanates as part of the history of Filipino struggle for freedom and, therefore, as an essential factor that helped bring about increasing possibilities for eventual independence of the people of

the Archipelago. Such an alternative assumes that the struggle of the Moslems was essentially one against Western colonialism and imperialism. However, from the historical point of view, this approach is complex since such a struggle was essentially part of a wider Malaysian struggle against European commercial infiltration and eventual colonial domination. In brief, the struggle of the Moslems of the Philippine South against Spain and resistance against other Western powers is simply an aspect of the wider Malaysian struggle against Western Imperialism in the whole of Malaysian.[1]

That most of the present textbooks on Philippine History lean closer to the first alternative is understandable and certainly unavoidable to a great extent. First of all, most of the data our writers possess about the history of the Moslem South originated from Spanish sources. These sources are generally classifiable into two groups: those originating from Spanish colonial officials and those from the pen of Spanish ecclesiastics or missionaries. Spanish colonial officials were able to gather a great deal of statistics regarding the economic and military resources of the Moslems, their dealing with British and Dutch traders, etc.; but all these data were collected and viewed with the final objective of transforming the Moslems in the South from members of independent principalities into loyal subjects of the Spanish King. Crude attempts in the nineteenth century to understand their institutions were initiated to discover means of facilitating the problem of conquest. In the case of Spanish missionaries, data about population, beliefs, customs, etc., were gathered and disseminated among ecclesiastical circles with the aim of discovering the effective means to evangelize the Moslems and convert them into Catholicism.

The consequence is that the modern scholar exposed to all these cannot help but, albeit unwittingly, utilize the point of view of the authors of his only available sources to the extent of using their very language — a language not purely descriptive but colored by prejudice or value premises. This situation is understandable, for even if a scholar is inspired by intellectual curiosity or academic interest, he is apt to take over the perspective of the author of his sources in the absence of an original or alternative perspective. As mentioned earlier, some nineteenth century Spanish historians did look at the Moslem principalities of the South as an area to be conquered — an irritant to the colonial administration of the Philippine Archipelago. Other Spanish historians saw these principalities as populated by a people steeped in error and perversely refusing to see the light of what was conceived as the truth faith. Sometimes, even if the historian was not a priest, as long as he was deeply committed to the Catholic Faith or believed that the Christianization of the Moslems would make it easier for them to be integrated into the colonial body politic, he almost took the stand of the friar historian or writer. However, during the last few decades of Spanish rule in the Philippines, a couple of Spanish military writers had voiced a radically different approach.

Any modern Filipino historian, still following the principle voiced by some Spaniards of the last century that the Catholic religion is an essential

[1] The term Malaysia is used in a geographical sense. It includes Indonesia, the Federation of Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines.

element in the "national integrity" of the Philippines or that the Philippines is a Christian nation, will naturally look at the Moslems of the South as those "other Filipinos" who have not played an important role in the building of our growing national community. Such an attitude is clearly based on the premises that the Catholic religion is one of if not the basic element for identification in the Filipino national community; a concept presently unacceptable on legal and historical grounds. I hope that I am not exaggerating in having made the above digression; and if I had done so, it is simply on account of my desire to make a point.

In all fairness to some of the textbooks that have come about in the last couple of decades, allow me to note that space is sometimes alloted to the coming of Islam to the Philippines, the bravery of the Moslem warriors and their resistance, the birth of Moslem leadership as well as some admiration for them. These occupy a few paragraphs, and the coming of Islamic influences are dealt with in the same manner as the coming of Indian, Chinese and Japanese influences before Spain's arrival. This situation may be partially due to lack of available data or sheer ignorance, and stems to a great extent from the lack of a dialogue between the people of the North and the South.

This lack of communication is of two sorts. The development of a Christian culture among the peoples of Luzon and the Visayas, with the parallel intensification of Islamic institutions and consciousness of the Moslems, has helped to make them strangers to each other in spite of cultural affinities and geographical proximity. The other kind of lack of communication and understanding has come about because of the deliberate colonial Spanish policy to keep the two peoples divided. This was effected by making native Christian soldiers from Luzon and the Visayas fight the Moslems and thus extend the frontiers of the Spanish Empire. To increase the enthusiasm of the native soldiers, their Catholicism was emphasized as the factor that made all the difference. The Christian was, in effect, still fighting the Moor. In this manner, the Christian and Moslem natives of the Philippine Archipelago were made to continue the war of the Crusades which, having begun in the Mediterranean area, had shifted to the tropical regions of Malaysia. As long as the natives of both sides had no conception of a Filipino nationality, and as long as their identifying factors were their religion and diverse political loyalties, one group loyal to the Spanish King and his religious beliefs, the other to their own sultans and religious beliefs, their killing of one another was understandable and unavoidable. The ones who mainly profited from the struggle were the colonial masters. But history has its ironies: out of such conflicts emerged the existence of two peoples, joined by ancient cultural ties, with their fates thrust into each other to form a common destiny.

It is to be remembered that one of these peoples were natives who had been colonized and Christianized, while the other was not one of these. To refuse to take the history of the latter as an integral part of the history of the national community is in effect to assert that the proper history of the national community is that only of a conquered people, while the history of the unconquered people is to be dismissed. As it were, with the context of

Spanish colonial history, the freedom, valor, and independence of the Moslems were held against them; while in the history of our national community, these are ignored. The answer to this is that a history need not always be that of a conquered or unconquered people exclusively.

I have prepared a brief outline, along chronological lines, of the most salient points of the history of the Moslem sultanates of the Philippines South. Points of contact with Spanish colonial history of the Philippines are mentioned. But just as important are contacts with the neighboring peoples in Malaysia. It will be noted that the early history of the Moslem South is part of a wider field, that is, the history of Malaysia during its Islamization process as a concomitant of its participation in the international trade under Moslem control. This is the first stage in periodication. The second and third stages refer to the fragmentation of Malaysia with the coming of Western European commercial, religious and colonial penetration. The fourth and fifth stages represent the progressive isolation of the Moslem sultanates from the general stream of Malaysian history and exemplifies greater efforts of Spain to incorporate them into the affairs of the Philippine Archipelago. The fates of the Christian natives and Moslem natives of the Philippine Archipelago have been drawn closer together. The last stage refers to the decline of some sultanates and gradual disappearance of others as well as the eventual integration of all the inhabitants of the Philippines into a unitary state. The latter history of the Philippine Moslems then becomes significant only in relation to their Christian brothers and neighbors in the Philippine Archipelago. Their historical isolation from the rest of Malaysia is completed.

The following outline is presented to textbook writers for them to discover elements in the history of the Moslems which can be incorporated in the history of the Filipino people. It can also serve as an outline for a more specialized study of the history of the Moslem South and is thus offered to young Filipino Moslem scholars interested in such a study. It is not a comprehensive outline but its merits lie in a new interpretation exemplified by a system of periodication not yet fully experimented with but full of possibilities.

III

There are at least two approaches to the study of the early history of the sultanates of the Moslem South principally those of Sulu and Magindanao. A first approach is to lay emphasis on their political development along dynastic lines and the development of their indigenous institutions, while treating their relations with neighboring principalities as constituting their foreign relations. The second approach views the sultanates as part of a wider constellation of sultanates and principalities, a veritable Malaysian *dar-ul-Islam*. The first approach will no doubt bring about a great deal of important and interesting data, but such an approach tends to view the development of the sultanates as if they were relatively isolated phenomena. The second approach, on the other hand, incorporates the data of the first approach but views the development of the sultanates of the South as instances of the general spread of Islam in Malaysia. It, therefore, views the Philippine Archipelago merely as a geographical extension of the Malaysian

Archipelago and the next logical area for Islamic expansion together with or after the Islamization of Borneo, the Celebes and the Moluccas. Facts demonstrate that Islamic influences from Borneo and Sulu were beginning to shed root in Luzon during the first half of the sixteenth century. Not long after, Islam was being strengthened in Mindanao from Sulu as well as from the Moluccas.

The spread of Islam in the Malaysian Archipelago is indeed a legitimate field of inquiry;[2] but such a complex phenomena must not be looked at as a mere spread of a few theological principles or religious beliefs and rituals made possible by a handful of enthusiastic missionaries. The spread of Islam had represented an interplay of political, economic, psychological and social causes and factors together with their ideological concomitants. Furthermore, the attractive characteristics of Islam as such, as well as its ability to satisfy new needs brought about by rapid economic changes due to the nature of the international trade at that time, must also be considered.

The second approach is valuable and applicable to at least a couple of centuries before and after the coming of European powers to Malaysia. If this approach is acceptable, then a system of periodization can be formulated and presented in the following stages, which will be divided into various phases. Such divisions are not to be interpreted as rigid historial demarcations, but as a continuous process conventionally categorized into stages to make the history of the sultanates more intelligible and to emphasize historical incidents believed to be significant.

I. The first stage represents the conception of Malaysia as a constellation of sultanates and principalities exemplifying different stages in Islamization. It covers the period from the end of the 13th century to the end of the 15th century.

This stage portrays sultans, port-kings, minor chieftains, etc., participating in various degrees and intensities in the international trade from the Red Sea to the China Sea, a trade that was under the control of Moslem traders, principally Arabs, Indians and Persians. Many of the Malaysian ports served as sources of articles of trade and as clearing houses. A more direct participation of Sulu in this international trade can be traced to the arrival of Arab traders around the end of the ninth century or the beginning of the tenth century, not long after they were ousted from the China trade in 878 during the T'ang dynasty. After a prohibitive policy of the Chinese against Arab and other Moslem traders, Kalah in the Malay Archipelago became for some time the last port of call for them. However, due to the persistent demand for Chinese products in Arab lands either for domestic use or reexportation to other lands in the Mediterranean, the Arab traders made efforts to get at Chinese products. It was then that they learned or discovered a new route starting from Borneo then passing through Sulu, Palawan, Luzon, up to Formosa and the South of Japan where Chinese products were available. Even after the middle of the tenth century during the Sung

[2] For the validity of dealing with the Islamization of Malaysia from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century as an important periodization in Malaysian history, cf. Syed Hussein Al-Atas, "Reconstruction of Malaysian History," *Revue du Sud-est Asiatique*, No. 3, 1963.

Dynasty, when the Moslem traders were allowed once more to frequent the ports of South China and the old route through the coast of Indochina began to be utilized again, the new route was still used since the traders became acquainted either with new products or better sources of old products. However, it is clear that the use of this new or second route does not necessarily imply the Islamization of either Borneo or Sulu. It only suggests the presence of Moslem traders in Sulu and, therefore, its more direct participation in the international trade. Sulu had started to become a clearing house for products which its intrepid sailors brought from the more outlying islands.

The following are important phases of the first stage:

a. The coming to Sulu of Arab traders, who performed missionary activities during the end of the 13th century and the beginning of the 14th century. At this time there is evidence of a trading colony in Sulu consisting at least of transient Moslems traders. This is the phase of the coming of the *Makhdumin* (Arabic Singular: *makdum*). The first seeds of Islam were sowed by them.

b. Increasing participation of Chinese traders in the Sulu trade. Traditional accounts claim that Chinese Moslem traders had accompanied or competed with Arab traders. Eventually, competition and other factors made the Chinese displace Arab traders in the second route.

c. The coming of Sumatran Islamic influences and political institutions during the end of the fourteenth century. This phase is represented in the Sulu tarsilas by the coming of Rajah Baguinda Ali with ministers and soldiers who arrived in Sulu and established a principality.

d. Sulu's official contacts with the Celestial throne 1417-1424. At least three "tributes" were sent.

e. The establishment of the sultanate in Sulu around the middle of the fifteenth century under the Sherif Abu Bakr, an Arab who had travelled extensively in Malaysia. The establishment of the sultanate assumes that a great number of the coastal inhabitants of Sulu had become Moslems and therefore responsive to such as Islamic institution. It also shows their acquaintance with some Islamic jurisprudential elements especially those which asserted the right of an Arab, more especially a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, to rule non-Arab Moslems. The Sheriff Abu Bakr initiated attempts to convert the inhabitants of the interior of Sulu (*Buranuns*) and is believed to have been successful. The coastal peoples and those of the interior of Sulu became slowly integrated into a political community under a central authority.

f. The coming of Islam to the Cotabato basin and its consequent spread to the Lanao area during the end of the fifteenth century. This is signified in the Mindanao tarsilas by the coming of the Sherif Muhammed Kabungsuwan, an Arab-Malay from Malaya, as well as a couple of Arab predecessors claimed to have been also sherifs and of which one returned to Sumatra.

g. The increase of Islamic influences in Sulu and Mindanao through greater maritime contacts with Malacca, Java and Borneo, and the occasional visits of Moslem traders and missionaries from Arab and Indian lands.

II. The second stage represents the coming of Western European Imperialism and Colonialization during the 16th and 17th centuries to Malaysia.

This stage represents the destruction of the Arab and/or Moslem monopoly of the international trade in Southeast Asia as a consequence of the coming of the Portuguese and the defeat of Arab fleets in Socotra (1507), Diu (1513), etc. The Portuguese and Spaniards came in the sixteenth century

not only to extend the possessions of their sovereigns but to spread Catholicism. In the same manner that they had the consciousness of coming from Christian lands and had a religious mission, the Moslems of Malaysia had a consciousness of their Islamic faith and of the integrity of *dar-ul-Islam*. It would be a fallacy to maintain that on account of the different stages of Islamization in the various parts of Malaysia there was no such conception. Actually, by this time Islam was well rooted in Acheh, Malacca, parts of Java, Brunei and Sulu. From a very important point of view, Islam constituted the only ideology that resisted and combatted Western Imperialism and Colonialism, and Christianity. Early Portuguese and Spanish authors had looked at their arrival in Malaysia as the continuance of the Crusader's war between Christians and Moslems. It will be recalled that the fall of Malacca in 1511 was less than two decades after the fall of the Moorish kingdom in Granada. The Turkish menace to Europe had also increased after their conquest of Constantinople, while the coming of the Portuguese to Malaysia had followed their wars in North Africa against the Moslems.

The important phases of the second stage can be summarized as follows:

a. The coming of the Portuguese and their disruption of the Moslem international trade control. The fall of Malacca to them in 1511, with the consequence that the center of power of Malaysian Moslems shifted from Malacca to Acheh in northern Sumatra. Dutch commercial interests in Java and other parts of the East Indies in the 1590's.

b. The coming of a Christian religious and economic threat brought about a deliberate attempts at Islamic missionary activities on the uncommitted parts of Malaysia who were either Hindu, pagan, etc. This time the missionary activities were initiated by Malaysians themselves, principally Javanese, accompanied occasionally by Arab zealots. Many port kings became Moslems; Ambon 1515, Banjermasin 1520, Mataram 1525, Bantam 1527, Sambas, Bima, and Macassar in 1600, etc.[3]

c. The rise of Brunei as a commercial power, its dynastic alliances with Sulu, and its greater participation in the trade of the Philippine Archipelago. By the second half of the sixteenth century, Manila was already ruled by members of the Bornean aristocracy. This signified the beginnings of the Islamization of the area around Manila Bay. Beginnings of Bornean missionary activities in Batangas and other parts of the Philippines during the last quarter of the sixteenth century.

d. By the last quarter of the sixteenth century, there began a greater consolidation of the possessions of the Sulu sultan from the northeastern part of Borneo to parts of Zamboanga, including the islands of Taguima (Basilan) and Tawi-Tawi.

e. At the same time the consolidation of the "sultanates" of Magindanao and Buayan is begun. Dynastic relations between them as well as with the Moluccas, principally Ternate. Coming of Moslem missionaries and functionaries from Ternate to Mindanao.

f. Fall of Manila as a Moslem principality in 1571. Spanish attacks on Brunei in 1578 and 1581 and first attack on Sulu in 1578. Treaty between the Sulu Sultan and Spaniards on June 14, 1578.

g. Conflicts between Spaniards and Magindanaos in 1579, 1596, etc. Spanish attempts to colonize Mindanao.

[3] At this point a study of Bertram Schrieke's theory that the spread of Islam in Malaysia was accelerated by the coming of Western powers is imperative.

h. Spanish expeditions to the Moluccas: 1982, 1585, 1593 and 1603. The expeditions can be interpreted not only as attempts to check Dutch ambitions in the area or to extend Spanish territories but also as attempts to isolate Moslems in the Philippine Archipelago and cut off sources of human and material aid to them from the Moluccas. Conversely, the temporary neutralization of the Magindanaos was sought to facilitate the conquest of the Moluccas.

III. The third stage represents the gradual fragmentation of the Malaysian *dar-ul-Islam* under the spheres of different colonial powers. It is a stage of great resistance and counterattacks against the West which were mainly unsuccessful. The rise of Acheh as a great Moslem power failed to dislodge the Portuguese in Malacca. Javanese resistance against the Dutch commercial ambitions had weakened. Brunei's eclipse as a commercial power had begun. Brunei's missionary activities in Batangas, etc. had ceased. The fall of Luzon and the Visayas to the Spaniards and the destruction of Moslem pockets of resistance in Mindoro and other islands signified that the northeast expansion of Islam to the furthest end of the Malaysian Archipelago had been checked. Islam's furthest limit would then be in its outposts in Sulu and in Mindanao. The following phases are important:

a. The contest for the control of Luzon and the Visayas between the Spaniards and the Moslems. This refers to at least two events: The first represents the 1589 attempts at alliance between the Brunei, Sulu and Magindanao sultanates with the disgruntled aristocracy of Manila and Tondo (now under Spanish rule) to dislodge Spaniards from the Philippine Archipelago. Desperate attempts to get Japanese help did not materialize. Significance of the Magat Salamat Conspiracy. The second event refers to the so-called piratical raids initiated by the Magindanaos with Sulu and Ternate help from 1599 to 1603. Blood compact between Magindanaos under Buisan and Leyte datus against Spain. Failure of the ultimate aim of such large scale raids.

b. The decline of the "sultanate" of Buayan around 1619 in favor of the Magindanao sultanate under the redoubtable Sultan Dipatuan Kuderat whose powers extended up to the Maranao regions. Cagayan de Oro becomes tributary to him in 1622 and Selangani in 1626. Kuderat's assumption of the title of Sultan. After his death in 1671 the decline of the Magindanao sultanate began and slowly broke up into various minor sultanates. Spanish presence in Mindanao frustrated the natural course of events for the gradual integration of various minor Moslem principalities under one centralized authority.

c. Spanish conquest of the Moluccas in 1606 cut off aid to the Moslems of the Philippines from the farther south. Further isolation of Moslems in the Philippines. Sulu and Magindanao sought for Dutch alliance in 1614. Increase of Moslem raids in 1616, 1625, etc.

d. The system of divide and rule of the Western colonial powers. Sultanates and principalities made to fight each other. In the Philippines, Christianized natives made to fight Moslems as well as to extend Spanish possessions. Spaniards persistently tried to foster dissensions between Buayan and Magindanao. Nevertheless, dynastic or commercial rivalries between Western powers at home and abroad brought to Malaysia. This explains Dutch aid to Sulu, Magindanao, and Ternate Moslems in their resistance against Spanish rule. The eventual frustration of Dutch ambitions in the Philippines also implied further dependence of Moslems in the Philippines on their own resources. Establishment of Spanish fort in Zamboanga in 1635. Continued raids on Spanish held territories by Moslem alliances.

e. The expeditions of Governor General Corcuera to Mindanao in 1637 and Sulu in 1638. Lanao expedition of 1639. The temporary character of Spanish victories. Fall of Jolo on January 4, 1638. Transfer of Sultan's capital to Tawi-Tawi in 1639. The long rule of Sultan Muwallil Wasit I (Rajah Bongsu) from around 1614 to 1648. His alliances with Macassar in 1638. Alliance with the Dutch in 1644. Treaty between Spain and Sulu on April 14, 1646. The evacuation of Zamboanga in 1662. The Sulu and Magindanao sultans as independent as before.

f. The inability of Sulu to expand or extract tribute from up North led it to look further westward in the Island of Borneo for its tributary expansion. On account of intervention in Brunei's dynastic wars, the Sulu Sultan's territories in Borneo extended further West to the Kimanis river in North Borneo around 1690. By the end of the seventeenth century during the reign of Sahab-ud-Din, the power of the Sulu sultan extended from parts of Zamboanga to the Kimanis river in the northern part of the islands of Borneo.

IV. The fourth stage refers to the attempts of the Sulus to regain part of their former glory during the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century. Around 1700 there were dynastic quarrels between Sulu and Magindanao and the Sulus tried to exercise some dominion over the Cotabato and Zamboanga regions. During this state there were strong attempts on the part of the Moslem sultanates to recapture their ancient commercial glory. The English tried to have a foothold in Sulu territory to exercise a greater hold on their China trade. A few salient events are listed below:

a. A modest resumption of Sulu trade with China initiated during the reign of the sultan Sahabud-Din around 1700. Badar-Din I's missions to China in 1726 and 1727.

b. Attempts of Badar-ud-Din I for peaceful commercial relations with Manila. Treaty of December 19, 1726.

c. The so-called piratical raids during this time and earlier can be interpreted as a source of income to make up for the loss of participation in the international trade and the former trade wtih China. The raids were also meant to weaken Spanish resources which were used to subject the Moslems. Of importance too was that they were also intended to intimidate Christian natives used by Spaniards to conquer the Moslems. Moslem attack on Palawan, the Calamianes, etc., under Datu Sabdula (Nasar-ud-Din) in the 1730's. The significance of these attacks is that they partially satisfied the expectations of the Sulus for strong leadership during a time when there was a dynastic rivalry for the sultanate.

d. The difference of character and rule of the two brothers A'zim-ud-Din I (1735-1748) and Muiz-ud-Din (1748-1763). The former believed that he could keep his throne and help Sulu with friendly relations with Spain and by the granting of concessions to Spaniards. Accepting the fact of the meager resources of the Sulus and their relative isolation from other Moslem principalities now under the domination of other Western powers, A'zim-ud-Din I believed that Sulu's progress could be the result of the strengthening of the institution of the sultanate and other Islamic institutions together with commercial and political relations with Spain and other lands. His attempts at commercial relations with China. His "tribute" to China in 1743. Muiz-ud-Din (Datu Bantilan), on the other hand, believed that such independence could be maintained by the closer relations with English who could be considered as sources of material aid against persistent Spanish aims at domination. He even toyed with the idea of contacting the

Ottoman sultan at Istanbul for possible aid to help maintain Sulu's independence. Bantilan's conception of dar-ul-Islam though relatively of place at that time reflects his Islamic consciousness. In 1754, he almost asked for Chinese protection. Muiz-ud-Din reign witnessed an increase of Moro depredations on the Bicol Regions, Mindoro, the Manila area, etc.

e. Relative peaceful relations between Sulu and Spain from the reign of Sultan Muhamad Israel (1774-1778) to Sultan Sharaf-ud-Din (1791-1808). Modest commercial prosperity for Sulu.

V. The decline of the sultanates. The decline already manifested earlier becomes more manifestly rapid by the middle of the nineteenth century onwards. Badar-ud-Din's earlier failure to capture Zamboanga in 1719 not long after its refortification by the Spaniards revealed Sulu's weakness. Badar-ud-Din's alliance with the Magindanaos and negotiations to patch divisive elements between Sulus and Magindanaos around 1720 to make another try at Zamboanga was not very effective. Greater pressure from Spaniards to assert their sovereignty in Sulu. Sulu was then being pushed into the vortex of conflicting and rival ambitions of Western powers which spelled doom to its independent existence as a small principality that had ceased to have place in a rapidly changing world condition. A few of the significant events are as follows:

a. The commercial ambitions of the English exemplified in the cession of Balambagan and the first cession of the North Borneo territories of the Sulu Sultan to them in the 1760's. Destruction of Balambangan in 1775 by the Sulus under the leadership of the royal datu Teteng. French commercial ambitions shown by their desire to purchase the island of Basilan from Sultan Pulalun (1842-1862) in 1844 and 1845.

b. Spanish use of steam war vessels in 1848 enabled them to gradually gain mastery of the Sulu Sea. The destruction of the power of the Balangingi Samals and forcible deportation of survivors in 1848 by the Spanish.

c. Spanish expedition to Davao in 1848. Oyanguren versus the Sulu Datu Bago.

d. The visit of James Brooke, the British consul general at Borneo and governor of Labuan, to Sulu in 1849. The inking of a political and commercial pact between Great Britain and Sulu (although never confirmed) revealed the attempts of Sulus to play one European power against another. Fear of rival Western powers in Sulu alarmed the Spaniards who now desire more than ever to subjugate Sulu.

e. Spanish fear of and reaction to the ambitions of the British and French as well as the persistence of piratical raids culminated in the Spanish expeditions against Sulu and the capture of Jolo in 1851 under the leadership of Governor General Urbiztondo. Treaty with the Sulus on April 30, 1851. Sulus interpreted the treaty as one of friendly relations while Spaniards considered it Sulu's acceptance of Spanish sovereignty.

f. The Spanish expeditions of 1876 and capture of Jolo. Establishment of a permanent outpost in Jolo. The January 1878 cession of Sulu's North Borneo possessions to a British Company by the Sulu Sultan. Treaty of July 26, 1878 with the Spaniards. Extension of Spanish power to other islands. Spanish intervention in Sulu affairs even in dynastic quarrels, etc. Rule of Jamal-ul-A'zam (1862-1881).

g. The rise of the *juramentados*. Significance of such an event is that organized resistance under the Sultan had failed. Responsibility for the integrity of *dar-ul-Islam* had become an individual one.

h. Change of official Spanish policy: the transformation of the Moslems in the Philippine Archipelago into loyal Spanish subjects rather than converting them into Catholicism.

i. The 1885 Protocol between Great Britain, Spain and Germany agreed that Sulu belonged to the Spanish sphere of sovereignty.

j. The 1891 Weyler Campaign in Cotabato. The 1895 Blanco's campaign in Lanao. The *juramentado* institution among the Magindanaos.

VI. The Philippine Revolution and the American Occupation.

a. The leaders of the Revolution considered the Moslems of the South as Filipinos bound with them by racial ties, ancient historical relations, and geographical propinquity. The Manifesto of the Hongkong Junta in 1898 declared that Filipinos were made to fight the Moros in Mindanao and Sulu who "in reality are our brothers, like us fighting for their independence." Aguinaldo's Message to Congress on January 1, 1899 proposed that the government be empowered to "negotiate with the Moros of Jolo and Mindanao for purposes of establishing national solidarity upon the basis of a real federation with absolute respect for their beliefs and traditions."

b. The Bates Treaty with the Sulu Sultan in 1899.

c. The defeat of sporadic uprisings against American Occupation and the futility of the battles of Bud Bajo (1906) and Bud Bagsak (1913).

d. Sultan Jamal-ul-Kiram's formal abdication of political power in 1915 (Carpenter's Agreement). Moslem representation in the Philippine Government.

e. The role of Moro resistance against the Japanese Occupation.

f. The independence of the Philippines on July 4, 1946. All Filipino Moslems with rights of citizenship. Their responsibility in building the national community and the responsibility of others towards them. The increased secularization of Philippine society.

Anyone with some acquaintance with the history of events in Sulu and Mindanao will easily notice the incomplete character of the above outline. Actually, there has been no intention at comprehensiveness. It is hoped that most of the important events were included. However, to one desiring to avoid a purely chronological narration, these events can only be significant in terms of the social and political institutions of the Moslem of the South as well as the economic structure of their society. It is indispensable to possess a good background of classical Islamic beliefs, practices, and institutions, over and above a knowledge of those indigenous or pre-Islamic elements shared by the Moslems of the Philippines with other Malaysian peoples. With such a background it is possible to appreciate the results of the impact of Islam on such indigenous elements. For example, the *juramentado* upsurge in the 1880's cannot be fully understood except with the knowledge of the Sultan's failure to prevent a non-Moslem power from controlling a land asserted to have been part of *dar-ul-Islam*. That the responsibility for the defense of such a territory had shifted from a duly constituted authority to that of an individual is only significant if elements of Islamic jurisprudence are considered. Likewise, the general lack of Sulu adherence to treaties entered between their Sultan and Spanish authorities can be better understood in terms of the relations between the Sultan and the datus or traditional chiefs. This in turn requires knowledge of Sulu traditions re-

garding the coming of the Sherif-ul-Hashim, reputed to have established himself as first sultan of Sulu, his commitments with the datus, the principles of dynastic succession, the division of territorial authority, etc. Moreover, the dynastic relations between the different sultans of Mindanao and their claims to rule and exact tribute are to some extent based on appeals to Islamic law and traditions.

For the first two stages in the outline there must be further recourse to additional local tarsilas other than those already published. One must also be continually alert to tarsilas that are slowly coming to light from Borneo and the Indonesian islands from the south of Mindanao. However, it is imperative to develop a technique to evaluate such tarsilas in order to render them of historical value. A comparative study of the local tarsilas is essential, and a great deal of some of them can be checked against Spanish, English and Dutch sources. The value of some tarsilas, especially those that present an enumeration of the sultans of Sulu, is that they do not only reveal the most salient characteristics of the personality of the sultans but also what the Sulus considered the most important historical event of their reign. Negatively speaking, the differences among tarsilas, relative to certain omissions, reveal dynastic rivalries and even certain Sulu models for dynastic successions. But further research into primary sources in the Spanish, British and Dutch Archives is indispensable. However, without the virtue of tolerance and the ability to emancipate oneself from unexamined premises, historical empathy for the struggles of the Moslems of the South, and an uncompromising desire to understand, nothing can be accomplished.

The history of the Moslems of the Philippine South and the lives of their sultans are not devoid of an epic character. That a great deal of cruelty, tears and suffering have followed the wake of their depredations and persistent struggle against aims to conquer them is not to be denied; but these are merely responses to similar inflictions upon them. In all life-and-death struggles, no contestant has a monopoly of virtue or vice. Yet the foe had observed the invariant bravery, stoicism in defeat, and, in general, magnanimity in the moment of Muslim victory. What had not been easily conceded to them is that such behavior could have stemmed from their basic Islamic belief, that there is a universal prescription for behavior and that man ought to try to approximate it. Indeed, in the further search for national identity one of our largest minorities in the Philippines can contribute a great deal.

LUNSAY: SONG-DANCE OF THE JAMA MAPUN OF SULU

ERIC CASIÑO

IN THE WIDE WATERS BETWEEN BORNEO, PALAWAN, AND Jolo is an oasis of an island known as Cagayan de Sulu.[1] The native people of this island call themselves *Jama Mapun;* their island, *Tana Mapuan;* their language *Pelun Mapun.* Literally, "Jama" means "man or people," hence *Jama Mapun* means "people of Mapun." These people, like the Taosugs and Samals of Sulu, are Muslim Filipinos; they have been Islamized for many years but, like the Christian Filipinos, they retain much of their traditional practices and customs. One of these customs, which may go back to their pre-Islamic past, is a popular community dance called **lunsay.**

The *lunsay,* to be more exact, is a song-and-dance; the participants sing and dance at the same time. Lasting the entire night, the **lunsay** is the most popular social activity and form of entertainment among the *Jama Mapun,* particularly during wedding celebrations. To an outsider unfamiliar with the dance, the *lunsay* may seem too long, too monotonous, and too tiring. But the observer easily changes his impression about the dance as soon as he sees the genuine enjoyment in the faces of both participants and spectators. In a simple society like that of the *Jama Mapun,* such a social event as the *lunsay* combines the functions of a movie, a nightclub, and a teen-agers' party in an urban society. Hence, its great popularity. But, aside from its multi-facted social function, the *lunsay,* in itself, is an attractive and intricate dance that could rank with the best among the choreographic and musical traditions of the Philippines.

The following description of a *lunsay* came out of an actual performance observed by the author in *Duhul Batu,* a barrio on the northern tip of Cagayan de Sulu on the night of June 11, 1963. But the samples of *lunsay* verses were recorded later (June 30 of the same year), from the dictation of Mrs. Jamahilan Bandulan of barrio *Dundunay;* her husband, Councilor Bandulan Aming, helped in the translation. My thanks naturally goes to them and to my *Jama Mapun* friends for their help and hospitality.

An essential element of the *lunsay* is the sound of clicking bamboo floors, under the impact of dancing feet struck in punctuated, unified cadences. To obtain this effect, a second set of bamboo flooring is laid crosswise over the original bamboo floor of the house. Both sets of split-bamboo flooring consist of bamboo strips—one and a half inch wide, tied side by side with rattan or some other native vine. The second set is laid in such a way that the striking surfaces are the hard, shiny, outer skin of the bamboo; in the *Duhul*

[1] Cagayan de Sulu is some 120 km. north, northeast of Sandakan, Borneo; 220 km. southeast of Balabac, Palawan; 300 km. west, northwest of Jolo; and 400 km. directly west of Zamboanga City.

Batu performance, the entire house floor measured approximately 20 feet square. Over the center of the floor, a kerosene lamp was hung. The *lunsay* is an all night affair.

Before touching on the dance itself, a word should be said about the time element. The *lunsay* literally lasts the whole night. It is a marathon of a dance, a sheer astonishment to twist-strained city dwellers. The one I observed lasted from 8:00 o'clock at night to 6:00 o'clock in the morning. Just how the dancers managed to sustain their vigor and interest, I can only wonder.

The *lunsay* is a group dance. Essentially, it is a coil or spiral of hand-holding dancers. This string of dancers—one end of which are male and the other, female—can be lengthened or shortened as dancers join in or drop out. If there are only a few dancers, they take the form of a circle; if many, the dancers form themselves into a spiral, with the females occupying the inner coil. In a circle, the links between the male-end and the female-end normally do not hold hands directly; they may use a handkerchief, a stick, or a piece of string.

A clockwise and a counterclockwise movement characterizes the **lunsay.** The clockwise movement goes with a slow tempo and long plaintive songs; the counterclockwise, with fast, vigorous steps and accelerated singing. There is an alternation of movements manifesting the mood of the dancers: now, the slow clockwise (step-left) movement; then, the lively countermovement (step-right), then back again to the restful tempo. This alternation of the quiet and the quick goes on through the night of a lonely island.

With the dancers having taken circular positions, the dance starts invariably with the slow movement. The boys first intone a *lunsay* verse like

Pilambuy kadudunan, (Let me describe you,
pinudji pinuhunan. my maiden friend.)

Then the girls repeat and reecho the tune but in different, appropriate words, something like this:

Daa nadu pudji na, (Describe me not,
adat na tahati na. I'm still unknown to you.)

Both sides continue this answering-back-and-forth for some time, varying their verses and answers, until the change of movement is signalled by a new verse and a new tune from any of the male dancers; sometimes, the signal comes from the girls. But while the dancers are engaged in the slow, rhythmical movement, with everybody step-dancing to the left, the plaintive re-echoing of melodies and meaningful words (to the *Mapuns* if not to the observer) creates a strange air of incantation. When this has been carried on for sometime, and an enchanting effect begins to suffuse the participants, then someone among the boys decides it is time to move in the opposite direction with a faster beat. A new tune is intoned, and there is a braking effect in the string of dancers as each orients himself or herself to a new direction. The shift is not sudden but gradual, like the easy speed buildup of a starting train. But

the subtle beginning towards a new tempo and tune is clearly manifest in the dancers' poise and mood. Everybody now is stepping to the right. There is a new upsurge of life, a rising tide of enthusiasm and awakening. In no time, the circling coil swings into a hearty tempo, the boys' feet-beat breaking now and then into double tempo. Soon, a violent enthusiastic movement develops and vibrates thru the undulating line of singing bodies; the boys erupt into a sustained double beat, their singing reaching higher peaks of volume and speed, and the girls responding properly in beautiful rhythmic, swinging steps—their responses re-echoing harmoniously. The whole floor and the entire house vibrate to this vehement but controlled display of enthusiasm for life. Like the rise and fall of a mighty wave, the *lunsay* subsides also from its peak and resumes the initial restful melody. And so it goes on through the night. The joy of the dancers is reflected in the faces of the spectators who sit and squat around, smiling with approval and pleasure.

The most common occasion for the performance of a *lunsay* is a wedding celebration or *ngawin.* On the night of the wedding, the newly married couple are displayed in their finery to the admiring gazes of visitors and relatives. Several times during this night of display, the bride and the groom change their colorful wedding costumes into other brilliant ones for the entertainment of those around. Food and drink are never lacking. Meanwhile, in another part of the house, the favorite *lunsay* is held for those who prefer dancing to bride-and-bridegroom-gazing. Sometimes also, a *lunsay* will be organized for special occasions when, for instance, there is a newcomer or visitor in the community. This was the case in *Duhul Batu.*

The usual theme of the *lunsay* is the most popular theme the world over: love. The boy desires the girl; the girl responds coyly and favorably, or coldly but politely. All throughout the songs, the characteristic indirectness of Filipinos is noticeable. Seldom is the second person used as a form of address; responses are voiced in the third person. In the following examples of *lunsay* verses, the English translation is arbitrarily free and direct. I was more interested in getting implied meaning of the verses than the literal rendition which would convey the spirit of the songs less. Examples of the *lunsay* songs given here are but a fraction of the total number of verses that could actually be recorded from a whole night of singing. There are six types of songs, depending on the number of verses in each song. There are songs with two, four, six, eight, ten, and twelve verses. Only three types are given here. A study and analysis of their melody patterns still awaits a tape recording of these beautiful songs.

The *Jama Mapun* continue to live in their home island, *Tana Mapun* or Cagayan de Sulu, and they continue to dance and sing their *lunsay.* It should please all Filipinos to know that the Bayanihan and other dance troupes have more treasures in the South awaiting them. It will not be long before the choreographic genius and musical soul of our leading Filipino artists will transform and develop the *lunsay* into the level of the *singkil* or the *pagdiwata.*

Sample verses from the lunsay song of the Jama Mapun: Kalang Dua (2-verse songs)

	MAPUN	ENGLISH
lal:*	Pilambuy kadudunan pinudji pinuhunan	Let me describe you, my maiden friend.
dan:*	daa nadu pudji na adat sa tahati na	Describe me not, I'm still unknown to you.
lal:	pilambuy dudun kasi pinuhunan pinudji	Let me praise you, my lady friend.
dan:	daa nuda sipat na nia tahati adat na	Judge me not, I'm still a stranger to you.
lal:	pilambuy ku Subidan pinudji binaidan	Let me extol you, my cherished friend.
dan:	bong ko doman nanipat ngadji nadu ko adat	Know me first, before speaking of me.
lal:	pilambuy ikomayang nia lagu pinahayang	Your long, wavy hair stays moist in the sun.
dan:	daa du ko kiaka kaam boho sikita	Ask not about a girl you have just met.
lal:	pilambuy patta haut pinuhunan sinabbut	Let me describe you, you with a graceful form.
dan:	daa du kiaka Minu kaam boho sittemu	Ask her not, my dear man, you have just met her.
lal:	pilambuy ayad patta pinuhunan inanda	Let me look at you, you with the fair form.
dan:	daa du kiaka Nakay boho-boho sumampay	Ask her not, my dear man, you are yet a stranger.
lal:	pilambuy lalisedung pinuhunan pinatung	Let me gaze at you, you with the perfect form.
dan:	daa kiaka Andu boho-boho dumunggu	Ask her not, my poor man, you are yet a stranger.
lal:	pilambuy andu-andu pinuhunan nidunggu	Let me come near you, sweet little friend.

* "lal" and "dan" refer to "lalla" and "danda" meaning male and female respectively.

dan:	daa kiaka kailu boho sampay song pitu	Ask not, my dear man, you are but new here.
lal:	pilambuy baransutsi pinuhunan inidji	Let me tease you, you with the spotless form.
dan:	daa kiaka alat boho sampay palahat	Ask not, you anxious man, you are new to the place.
lal:	pilambuy tuan-tuan pinuhunan binustan	Let me observe you, my royal friend.
dan:	daa kiaka dudun boho sampay pakandang	Ask not, my dear man, you are stranger to the house.
lal:	pilambuy lalitingkat pinuhunan manlahat	Let me take you from this place you with the graceful gait.
dan:	daa kiaka dudun boho sampay pamapun	Ask not, my dear friend, you are a newcomer to *Mapun.*
lal:	bong dadi ni dudun na sinuna bay isun na	If it pleases you, my friend, let us renew our promises.
dan:	sa na dadi intu na maopakkat balahu na	Think no more of them, our promises are no more.
lal:	bong dadi kaadian sinuna pagjanjian	If it pleases you, my friend, let us renew the bond of friendship.
dan:	sa na dadi suna na maopakkat balasa na	Think no more of it, our promise has been broken.
lal:	bong dadi ni sahabat sinuna maopakkat	If it pleases you, dear friend, our friendship has since faded.
dan:	daa suna adina baluba na janji na	Ask me no more, my young friend our friendship has since faded.
lal:	bong dadi na ni iya maopakkat sinuna	If it pleases you, let me remind you of our love.
dan:	daa suna Calunan baluba pagisunan	Ask me no more, my friend, our love is now dead and faded.
lal:	bong dadi na ningka-u maopakkat inintu	If it pleases you, let us rekindle our love.
dan:	daa suna Minu na maopakkat balahu na	Ask me no more, dear man, our love has now vanished.

lal:	bong dadi na ni malak maopakkat tinampak	If it pleases you, lovely friend, let the world know of our love.
dan:	daa suna diyang na maopakkat hilang na	Ask me no more, my dear man, our love is now lost.
lal:	bong dadi na mahambug maopakkat tinanug	If it pleases you, lovely friend, let all know of our friendship.
dan:	daa suna lubay na maopakkat lungay na	Ask me no more, my friend, our friendship has been lost.
lal:	bong dadi ni papagan maopakkat tinanyagan	If it pleases you, my friend, let us proclaim our vows.
dan:	daa suna subid na maopakkat gaib na	Ask me no more, my dear man, our vows have been since forgotten.
lal:	bong dadi na ni nandung maopakkat sinunsung	If it pleases you, my dear, let us realize our promises.
dan:	daan suna mangkis na maopakkat magkinis na	Ask me no more, sweet friend, they are changed and are no longer.

Kalang Mpat (4-verse songs)

lal:	bana bong bay tagna na kau kinakasihan bo biatnaa nia na me lumut pinandihan	It is true once I did love you but all that now is forgotten love is gone like dirt washed clean from the body.
dan:	andu inay talasa kumala kadudunan dem bua-bua saba balubah pagisunan	Alas what can we do my good friend we can only but be resigned to promises unfulfilled.
lal:	bana bong bay tagna na kau ni puadjantung bo biatnaa nia me lumut pinastung	It is true in days gone by you were in my heart now all that is past carried away like leaves in a stream.
dan:	kamaduhung ginanta sa dadi pagidjian saba dem bua-bua balubah pagjanjian	It is fate, willed by the gods let us not quarrel over it let us accept and be resigned to promises unfulfilled.
lal:	bagay bongsi tadjunjung junjung ku man alatan pinagbulihan langgung minsan by subahatan	If I may plead with you I beg of you, my dear, let's try to be one again redeem our broken love.

dan:	kumaduhung sakkat na daa na upama na bong luu subahat na ule langgung maha na	As we have drifted apart cease now from your striving once the bond is broken reunion is hard and vain.
lal:	bagay bongsi tadjungjung junjung ku man usba na pinagbulihan langgung kau-kau kadana	If I may plead with you let me beg from your elders let us once again unite perchance fate had made you mine.
dan:	bila luu niat na tat-tap na iniakin pasampay palahat na balangkali pangantin	If you have the desire remember and bear in mind you must come and visit my place perchance we may be fated to be one.
lal:	umanat niawalihan pam-man kadudunan langgung pinagbulihan bong luu kampunan	Message of love I'll send message to my beloved if perchance there is a way to our sought for union.
dan:	sumping salimayu na sabihan nu niaku minsan pooy tuyo na aud na le magjatu	Flower of *salimayu* tell what I say even how much he tries hard is the sought for union.
lal:	umanat niawalihan pasampayun kakasi langgung pinagbulihan balangkali kawasa	Message of love I'll send may it reach her I'll cease not from striving perchance she may be mine.
dan:	bongku sumping Dalanjang sabihan nu adi na kuk-ku ginanta kumbong bila nudang janji na	Bud of the *Dalanjang* tell him, the young one, perhaps we are fated to be one if it was decreed to be thus.
lal:	umanat niawalihan pasampayun kakasi langgung pinagbulihan ginanta balangkali	Message of love I'll send may it reach my beloved I'll seek for that union perchance we are fated.
dan:	bongku sumping bantali kannaun dium atoy kau-kau ginanta patli maka siintan nakoy	*Bud of the Bantali* impress it in his heart perhaps we are fated to be one union with the precious one.
lal:	ya alla tulungan tulungan do sungga na minsan sobot langgungun langgungun me tagna na	O Allah I seek your help help thou the lovely flower although it is difficult to join join us as before.

dan:	minsan pooy akka na	However clever you may be
	saba na ko sinubid	be resigned, my dear man,
	bong sa ndang kara na	if you are not my fate
	aud na ule lumbid	vain is the sought for union.
lal:	ase na humalum na	Long ago I did love you
	ningane kabiasa	you were my former friend
	ni baoy tagna pagum na	you were my first love
	taggana sa kawasa	now I am no longer the master.
dan:	insap no ko kumala	Keep this in mind, my dear man,
	ningkaam kabiasa	although you were my acquaintance
	saba dem bua-bua	you can only be resigned
	bong do sa na kawasa	if you are not my fated master.

Kalang Nnum (6-verse song)

lal:	(or dan:)	
	tinulun kalang mpat	From the lonely heart emerges
	ni dium susa atoy	the four-verse songs
	kaam sa makadalam	it's up to you to think
	papendoy ko mandapat	as long as we are alive
	helum man sa gimatey	you must learn to ponder
	agama bangsa Islam	the religion of Islam
	kalang mpat tinulun	Sing the four-verse song
	sabihan nu niaku	tell me, my precious one,
	kumala budiman na	be of good cheer
	pandapat pahapun	so that life may flourish in you
	mudi jasa tumimbu	and your mind
	bo sa sasat iman na	will be at peace
	kalang mpat hinantung	The four-verse song was
	by binabasa mapun	sung in the *Mapun* tongue
	pamintangan ni bangsa	a lesson to our people
	lunna-a ko mamintang	a lesson to learn from
	kapandoy nulun-nulun	to create and do
	oy-oy tilaw ta	whatever you wish
	bilasut pamintangan	If its precepts you learn not
	nia gi tanto biat na	unsure yet of its teaching
	lupa gi manakin	you can yet be excused from caring
	bong talangga pantangan	if you disobey the commandments
	luu gi subahat na	punishment still awaits you
	hansu nia takapin	your life will be torn to pieces
		nothing will remain.

BAPTISM AND "BISAYANIZATION" AMONG THE MANDAYA OF EASTERN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES

A. A. YENGOYAN

EASTERN MINDANAO IS OCCUPIED BY A NUMBER OF "TRIbal" groups which are markedly different from the Islamic populations of southern and central Mindanao, although close similarities are present with other non-Islamic groups in central and western Mindanao, such as the Bukidnon and the Subanun. One of the major groups of eastern Mindanao is the Mandaya who occupy the foothills and mountain areas of eastern Davao province and Surigao del Sur. Although earlier accounts [1] indicate that the Mandaya were one of the most powerful warring groups in eastern Mindanao, with the decline and disappearance of the *bagani*[2] complex during the 1920's, the Mandaya today are scattered throughout their ancestral areas subsisting on rice, corn, and tuber cultivation and occasionally, the commercial production of abaca.

The aim of this short paper is to discuss the conceptualization and process of religious conversion to Christian faiths as viewed by the Mandaya. The initial step, and usually the only step, in conversion to Christianity is baptism—the spiritual re-birth of one's soul for ultimate destiny to other supernatural spheres. To practically all Christian missionaries working in eastern Mindanao, baptism ideally represents only the first step toward a Christian life. In reality, most missionaries (especially those whose churches are short in numbers) recognize that the odds of following up on all natives who are baptized are limited. Thus, people are baptized with little or no religious instruction and with the minimum hope that, at least, a few Mandaya families will reach advanced levels of religious instruction. The dilemma to many a missionary on the remote east coast of Mindanao is: "Shall I or shall I not baptize segments of the aboriginal population although they may never acquire further religious instruction, or will ever be seen again?"

Religious conversion to Christianity and Islam is not a recent phenomenon. Contact with the Spanish on the eastern Mindanao coast dates back to the 1840's and 1850's during which time the Spaniards aimed at establishing military posts to counteract the spread of the Moro into Davao Gulf, Mati, and towns along the Eastern Coast. Catholic missionaries moved southward on the east coast establishing churches and missions at important military and population centers, such as Caraga. Spanish southward expansion also occurred on the lower Agusan River drainage towards Compostela and what is now Monkayo. Garvan [3] summarizes the steps of Christianization in the

[1] See F. Cole, "The Wild Tribes of Davao District," *Field Museum of Natural History,* XII, No. 2 (1913). See also J. M. Garvan, "The Manobos of Mindanao," *Memoirs of the National Academy of Science,* XXIII (1913), 1-251.

[2] A warrior chief and charismatic leader who distinguishes himself by killing a given number of people in warfare and raids.

[3] Garvam, *op. cit.,* 241-250.

lower and upper Agusan areas among the Manobo and the Agusan valley branch of the Mandaya. During the period 1877-1898, some 50,000 natives of different tribal origins were converted to Christianity.[4] The Christian populations of the Agusan Valley are referred to as *conquista.* Jesuits constituted majority of missionaries during the late Spanish phase and only recently have other Catholic orders and Protestant churches been relatively active.

The spread and conversion to Islam was more important in the Davao Gulf region and areas in southern Davao and Cotabato. However, Islamized Mandaya are found on the north shores and interior areas of Mayo Bay in what is presently known as Lucatan. Evidently, these east coast Islamized Mandaya are not new converts since Garvan [5] notes that "In Mati and its vicinity, I believe there are a comparatively large number of Moros or Mohammedanized Mandaya" during the period, 1905-1910, when Garvan was in eastern Mindanao.

With the gradual diminishing of warfare and the raiding-vengeance pattern as instituted around the *bagani* complex, Mandaya social structure, at least in upper Caraga and Manay, was integrated at the family-household organizational level. With economic activities based on the shifting cultivation of dry rice and tubers, the focal unit of activity must be a small, highly mobile social group. Family-household units are not only adaptive to ecological and economic requirements of upland dry rice cultivation where new swiddens are cleaned and planted yearly, but are also units of interaction with a market economy.[6] Current relationships between abaca-cultivating Mandaya and coastal markets also stress family-household independence at least in most distributive aspects of marketing.[7] Since most family groupings in the abaca cultivating areas are productive units and are dependent on coastal markets for consumption goods and commercial items the marketing of abaca by small independent units is accomplished.[8]

As the "peasantization" process continues among the abaca-cultivating Mandaya, certain cultural changes occur. The influx of new elements such as transistor radios, "state-side" clothing, galvanized sheet metal roofs commonly known as the "G. I. Sheet," sewing machines, and so forth create further demands of the local population on the outside market and what it implies. Children are sent to high schools in Manay, Mati, and occasionally Davao City. The role and importance of a formal education is recognized not only in learning the basics of reading and writing, but in an understanding of what the dominant Bisayan ways of life are, how they operate, what they mean, and how they are acquired.

While Mandaya culture—in its organizational aspects—had adapted to the commercial production and marketing of abaca, marked changes have not

---

[4] *Ibid.,* 8.

[5] *Ibid.,* 7.

[6] A. A. Yengoyan, "Aspects of Ecological Succession among Mandaya Populations in Eastern Davao Province, Philippines," Papers of the Michigan Academy of Science, *Arts, and Letters,* L (1965), 437-443.

[7] A. A. Yengoyan, "Environment, Shifting Cultivation and Social Organization among the Mandaya of Eastern Mindanao, Philippines" (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Dept. of Anthropology, University of Chicago, 1963).

[8] E. R. Wolf, "Type of Latin American Peasantry: A Preliminary Discussion," *American Anthropologist,* LVII (1955), 452-471.

occurred on the structural level. However, contact with coastal "Bisayans" and other members of dominant Philippine religional groups, has brought about changes in self-identification in regards to groups and networks external to the Mandaya. As increasing contact with external populations continues, one gradually assumes and acquires certain behavioral patterns which are only manifest in dealing with non-Mandaya populations in the widening socio-economic framework. Involvement in social groupings such as community work operations, fiestas, ritual co-sponsorship, barrio political activity, and liaison men for the two major political parties, provide a number of channels by which a Mandaya may participate in the traditional lowland Bisayan sub-culture. Such flexibility in mobility is partially accountable to the absence of any formal social or kin groupings besides the family-household structure.

The major obstacle in interacting with, and being accepted by, the lowland Bisayan populations is the connotation which lowlanders possess about uplanders. In general, Christians and Muslims regard uplanders or pagan groups as backward, unsophisticated, and superstition-bound people. In most areas, the lowland peoples readily take advantage of upland groups by obtaining lands which are not titled or reneging on agreements concerning commercial transactions.

In upper Manay and Caraga, those segments of the Mandaya which are involved in abaca production, recognize the necessity of being a "Bisayan," at least, when interacting with the coastal populations. Externally, this is easily accomplished by changes in apparel, the cutting of one's hair and the exclusive use of Bisayan, which is the *lingua franca.* However, external changes are only the first step in the uplanders transition into the coastal Bisayan population.

The Mandaya also recognize that all Bisayans are baptized and are Christians. This close association between baptism and being a Bisayan is most important in the interaction of the upland Mandaya with coastal populations. In cases where the Mandaya discussed the meaning and role of baptism, nearly eighty per cent felt that one became a Bisayan through baptism. The idea of spiritual rejuvenation, which is commonly connected with baptism, was seldom realized as being crucial, nor at times was it recognized. The high rate of Mandaya going to a coastal mission or church, being baptized, and returning as "Bisayans" attests to this fact.

Being a Bisayan to the Mandaya, at least in interaction with the coastal people, connotes that the Mandaya are on an equal status with the coastal Bisayans. Whereas the foothill Mandaya, who are involved in the production and marketing of abaca and are in close contact with the coastal groups, become baptized as means of acquiring and assuming the status of Bisayan, the interior upland rice-cultivating Mandaya are seldom involved in direct interaction with coastal populations.

The process of "Bisayanization" through baptisms is not new nor does it occur only among the abaca cultivators. Most coastal groups are actually Mandaya populations whose conversion dates back to the late Spanish period or the early American era. In such cases, when one is asked, "what are you?", the common reply is "A Bisayan." Upon further inquiry as to what Bisayan Island one is from or where his parents or grandparents were from, the usual

findings are that as far as one is able to trace descent, all lineal kin were born in a given locality in eastern Davao or Surigao del Sur. Ultimately, the basis on which one calls himself a Bisayan is baptism.

Not only does one become a Bisayan by changes in clothing, hair style and baptism, but also by active participation in a social framework which is part of the "mainstream of Philippine Culture." A Bisayan is one who is fully aware of the national life, one who knows the "ins and outs" of business, politics and society, and is able to take part in political, social, and religious organizations and activities characteristic of lowland Philippine culture. For a Mandaya who is gradually coming into the sphere of Philippine economic activity, it is necessary to acquire lowland cultural patterns and attitudes.

Thus, the Christian baptism to a Mandaya signifies a partial change in reference group structure. In dealing with non-Mandaya, a baptized Mandaya calls himself a Bisayan, uses Bisayan as the *lingua franca,* and selectively manifests activity in lowland Philippine culture. In the foothills, one is a Mandaya, speaks Mandaya, and partakes in all the social and religious aspects of Mandaya social structure.

In summary, Christian baptism is the key to participation in lowland Bisayan culture. Whereas many missionaries may assume that the number of baptisms is a measure of one's success, the crucial problem is to investigate what baptism signifies among those who undergo such an event. How widespread is this practice, is not known to the author though it may be hypothesized that in cases where contact between the dominant lowland culture and various non-Christian upland groups is characterized by sporadic interaction, an absence of continuous one-way contact between a dominant and subordinate culture, and where agents for cultural transmission are few, one may find cases, such as the Mandaya, where reference group structure and changes allow an individual to partially participate in two networks of social activity with minimum amount of conflict.

PHILIPPINE MASONRY TO 1890

JOHN N. SCHUMACHER, S.J.

THE MASONIC LODGES SERVED AS CENTERS FOR MANY OF the Liberal conspiracies in Spain against clerical and reactionary governments during the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century,[1] and Masonry played a considerable part in the emancipation of the Spanish-American republics.[2] In Cuba, too, Masonic influence was strong in the insurrections of the second half of the nineteenth century.[3] It might be expected then, that in a society far more theocratic in nature than those mentioned — as was the nineteenth century Philippines — that Masonry would play a considerable role in any nationalist movement. This was because of its anti-clerical orientation and because of the opportunity its secrecy allowed for clandestine activity. It is a fact that almost every Filipino nationalist leader of the Propaganda Period was at one time or another a Mason. But the role of Masonry in the nationalist movement and in the Revolution which followed it, has, it seems, frequently been exaggerated and misinterpreted by the friends of Masonry as well as by its enemies. Particularly the writing of the Friars and Jesuits of the Revolutionary period (both published works and private correspondence) are wont to see Masons in every corner.[4] Books have not been lacking,

---

1 See Antonio Ballesteros y Beretta, *Historia de España y su influencia en la historia universal* (2nd ed.; Barcelona: Salvat, 1943 ff.), X, 183-184; Gerald Brenan, *Spanish Labyrinth* (2nd ed.; Cambridge: University Press, 1950), 206-208. Books such as Eduardo Comín Colomer, *La Masonería en España (Apuntes para una interpretación masónica de la historia patria)* (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1944) and the annotated edition by Mauricio Carlavilla of Miguel Morayta's *Masonería española. Páginas de su historia* (Madrid: Nos, 1956), are almost psychotic in their monomania for finding Masonry at every turn of Spanish history from the early nineteenth century to the present. In the original edition of Morayta's book, the latter details the part of Masonry in Spanish history until 1868, likewise with exaggeration, but favorably, of course, to Masonry.

2 Salvador de Madariaga, *The Fall of the Spanish Empire* (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1948), 254-262, 338-339; John Francis Bannon, S.J., and Peter Masten Dunne, S.J., *Latin America: An Historical Survey* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1947), 406, 409.

3 Luis Martín y de Castro, *La masonería en la Isla de Cuba y los Grandes Orientes de España* (Guantanamo, 1890); Francisco J. Ponte Domínguez, *La masonería en la independencia de Cuba* (Habana, 1954).

4 The Jesuit correspondence preserved in the Archivo de la Provincia de Tarragona de la Compañía de Jesús (henceforth AT), located in the Colegio de San Francisco de Borja, San Cugat del Vallés (Barcelona), Spain, is full of references to "la gente del mandil," "los trabajos del mallete," "la influencia del triángulo," etc. Some of this reappears in the works of Father Pablo Pastells, S.J., *La masonización de Filipinas. Rizal y su obra* (Barcelona, 1897) and *Misión de la Compañía de Jesús de Filipinas en el siglo XIX* (3 vols.; Barcelona, 1916). Some other works, among many, which attribute almost everything concerned with the Filipino nationalist movement and the Revolution to Masonry are: Eduardo Navarro, O.S.A. *Filipinas: estudios de algunos asuntos de actualidad* (Madrid, 1897); Jose M. del Castillo y Jiménez, *El Katipunan ó el filibusterismo en Filipinas* (Madrid, 1897); Manuel Sastrón, *La insurrección en Filipinas y Guerra Hispano-Americana en el Archipiélago* (Madrid, 1901).

even in recent times, which see the entire last two decades of the nineteenth century in the Philippines, in terms of a Masonic plot, obeying orders from the Supreme Council of Charleston, in order to strip Spain of her last overseas provinces.[5] On the other hand, while Masonic works written by Spaniards try to exculpate Masonry from any part in the Philippine Revolution, those by Filipino Masons have often seemed to make Masonry the chief moving force behind the Revolution. There is need, then, of a serious historical study of the real role of Masonry among the Filipino nationalists.

The chief problem in making such an objective study of the role of Masonry has been, of course, the lack of sufficient documentation. The late Teodoro M. Kalaw, himself a past Grand Master of Philippine Masonry, possessed a collection of Masonic documents, on which his book[6] (till now the only available history of Philippine Masonry) seems largely to have been based. However, Kalaw did not give adequate references to his documents in writing his book; in any case, the collection seems to have been destroyed during the past war.[7] In this scarcity of documentation, the discovery of a number of authentic Masonic records from the Filipino lodges—both in Spain and in the Philippines—is of considerable importance. These documents were found among those confiscated from the Spanish lodges by the Spanish Nationalist forces as they occupied Republician territory during the civil war of 1936-1939, and were gathered together by the government agency known as the Delegacion Nacional de Servicios Documentales.[8] Undoubtedly, the archive of this body contains extensive documentation on Spanish Masonry, though I was assured that most of it dealt with the twentieth century. Among the records, however, were a few folders containing some scattered Philippine documentation. Though the records are clearly incomplete and somewhat haphazard, they throw considerable light on the early organization of Masonry in the Philippines and or the Filipino lodges in Spain. With the aid of these documents, this article proposes to attempt a new reconstruction of the role of Masonry during the early part of the Propaganda Period, one made, it is hoped, without the intention either of glorifying this role or disparaging it, but merely of establishing the basic facts, as a first step toward an over-all evaluation.

---

[5] Comín Colomer, *op. cit.*, 275, 284-288, 311, and *passim*; Carlavilla, *op. cit.*, 26, 398, and *passim*. The prototype of these works was Mauricio, *La gran traición* (Barcelona, 1899). Both Comín and Carlavilla are violently anti-semitic also.

[6] Teodoro M. Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry*, trans. and ed. Frederic H. Stevens and Antonio Amechazurra (Manila, 1956). In spite of some valuable information, the book suffers from the way its assertions are documented. For it is frequently difficult to tell whether Kalaw's statements are based on his authentic documents or on other less reliable accounts. Moreover, the book is an edifying history in the worst hagiographical tradition, and includes long excerpts from Masonic exhortations to virtue and considerable pious rhetoric together with its factual material.

[7] Kalaw, *op. cit.*, 221, n. 4.

[8] The Archive of the Delegación (henceforth referred to as ADN) is located in Salamanca. I was able to locate these documents through the kind help of the late Don Luis Sala Balust, Professor of Ecclesiastical History at the Pontifical University of Salamanca, and was permitted to consult the Archive, not yet open to general research, through the kind permission and generous assistance of the Director, Don Pedro Ulibarri. To both men I am grateful.

Early Masonry in the Philippines

Apart from some vague reports of British Masonic lodges during the occupation of Manila in 1762-1764,[9] the first lodges set up in Manila seem to date from mid-1850's, formed among Spanish army officers in the Philippines, followed by others among the foreign merchants.[10] It is claimed also that sometime before 1872, there were some Filipinos admitted to a lodge in the Pandacan district of Manila, but these apparently were among those exiled in the aftermath of the insurrection of 1872.[11] If any Filipinos did remain in the lodges, they were eliminated in the reorganization which took place under the auspices of the Gran Oriente de España in 1874. The Philippine Masonic lodges remained completely European in their membership until Filipino lodges were introduced in 1891 by Filipino Masons returning from Spain after being initiated there.[12] There is indeed mention of an invitation being extended in 1884 to all *indios* and *mestizos* who "..... knew how to read and write and had a responsible position, provided they loved Spain and had a definite religion."[13] If such an invitation was ever made, which

---

[9] Kalaw, *op. cit.*, 1.

[10] *Ibid.*, 9-11. There is some inconsistency in the date given by Kalaw here, and he appears to have used conflicting testimony from different sources. The principal source for this chapter in Kalaw, though he only occasionally cites him, is Nicolás Díaz y Pérez, in the works cited in n. 11. Kalaw also once cites Vital Fité, *Las desdichas de la patria* (Madrid, 1899), but this author's treatment of Masonry is entirely taken from Díaz y Pérez, though rarely crediting him, even when transcribing whole paragraphs. Among the initiates of one of the foreign lodges was Jacobo Zóbel de Zangróniz, whom Kalaw (p. 10) notes as "the first Filipino Mason initiated in the Islands." Zóbel, however, was the son of a German father and a Spanish mother, and though born in the Philippines, had been educated in Germany. As a German by culture, he joined a predominantly German lodge. There is an extensive biographical sketch of Zóbel by E. Hubner, "Jacobo Zóbel de Zangróniz. Ein Lebensbild aus der jungsten Vergangenheit der philippinischen Inseln," *Deutche Rundschau* XC (1897), 420-445; XCI (1897), 35-51.

[11] Kalaw, *op. cit.*, 11, apparently in dependence on Francisco-Engracio Vergara [Antonio María Regidor], *La Masonería en Filipinas* (Paris, 1896), 10-13. Nicolás Díaz y Pérez, "La francasonería en Filipinas," *La Epoca* (Madrid) 31 Agosto 1896, however, denies that there were any Filipino Masons before 1884. (This article forms the basis for what is said of Philippine Masonry in the pamphlet by his son, Viriato Díaz-Pérez, *Los Frailes de Filipinas* (Madrid, 1904), 20. Though Nicolás had earlier been prominent in Masonry in Spain, he had been inactive since 1885 and seems to have had no contact with Masonry at the time he wrote "Díaz y Pérez, Nicolás," in Lorenzo Frau Abrines and Rosendo Arús Arderiu, *Diccionario enciclopédico de la Masonería*, 2nd ed. rev., (3 vols.; Buenos Aires, 1947), I, 315. Juan Utor y Fernández, *Masones y ultramontanos* (Manila, 1899) denies that any Masonry existed in the Philippines before 1873, and declares that at least until 1886 no native Filipino was initiated in the Philippines (46, 51-53, 59). Utor had likewise held high positions in Masonry, having brought about the union of various lodges under the Gran Oriente de España in 1875, when he became Gran Maestro Adjunto. ("Utor Fernández, Juan," Frau Arús, II, 851-852. Both Díaz-Pérez' and Utor's pamphlets are anti-Friar polemic tracts and though their authors could well have had considerable knowledge of early Philippine Masonry, both have a number of unreliable or clearly false statements which make it difficult to know to what extent they can be relied on.

[12] Kalaw, *op. cit.*, 11-16, but the story is somewhat confused. Navarro, 239 places the elimination of Filipinos from the lodges somewhat later.

[13] Kalaw, *op. cit.*, 17, summarizing Díaz-Pérez, *op. cit.*, 19. The statement is repeated in "Historia esquemática de la masonería filipina," *Latomia* III (1933), 126; but the article seems to depend on Kalaw's book (in the earlier Spanish edition). *Latomia* was a Masonic publication of Madrid.

is more than doubtful, it received no acceptance except from Jose A. Ramos. Ramos had, however, been initiated in London, and was, moreover, a Spanish *mestizo* married to an English wife.[14] In the extant lists of lodge members from 1884, the only one identifiable as a Filipino is Ramos, affiliated to the lodge *Luz de Oriente.* In 1887 Ramos again appears as one of the founders of the lodge *Constancia* likewise in Manila, in which all members are explicitly noted as Europeans, with the exception of Ramos, denominated "Philippine Spaniard" (*espanol filipino*).[15] Therefore, with the possible, but unsubstantiated, exception of the short period in the 1870's, it would seem that no pure-blooded Filipinos *(indios)* had been initiated into Masonry before the first Filipino lodges were formed in Spain.

Early Filipino Masons in Spain

The fact that Masonry in the Philippines had not, at this time, opened its doors to Filipinos, perhaps helps to explain the readiness of Filipino students in Europe to join the Masonic lodges there where the race barrier did not prevent them. The first clear evidence of Filipino participation in Masonry that I have found is the membership of Rafael Del-Pan, a *creole.*[16] whose father—Jose Felipe del Pan—was a long-time prominent Spanish resident of the Philippines and publisher of the Manila newspaper *La Oceania Española.*[17] The elder del Pan was a member of one of the Masonic lodges of Manila,[18] and this, no doubt, brought the son to be the first of the Filipino student group in Madrid to join Masonry, though it is not clear just when he did so. In April 1886, however, Del-Pan appears—already possessing the eighteenth

---

[14] Kalaw (*op. cit.*, 17) cites a letter of Morayta of 1916, addressed to himself, asserting that the doors of Masonry were only opened to Filipinos in 1889. For Ramos' initiation in London, see Antonio Regidor, *El pleito de los Filipinos contra los Frailes* (Madrid, 1901), 6. (This pamphlet is a translation by Isabelo de los Reyes of an interview given by Regidor to *The Independent* of New York, February 7, 1901.) Also, E. Arsenio Manuel, *Dictionary of Philippine Biography* (Quezon City, 1955), I, 355, basing himself on Ramos' unpublished memoirs.

[15] ADN, legajo 219-A[1].

[16] I refer to Del-Pan as a Filipino, even though he was by blood a Spaniard, since he always seems to have considered himself a Filipino, and associated himself with the other Filipinos involved in the Propaganda movement, while other creoles, like Antonio Regidor, the Azcárragas, etc., though born in the Philippines also, considered themselves primarily Spaniards, and later remained in Europe. At a time of transition like the late 19th century, when the Filipino nation did not yet exist as such, but the idea of Filipino nationality was already evolving, the criterion of self-identification seems to me to be the most useful for distinguishing between Filipinos and Spaniards among those of European blood born in the country.

[17] For biographical details of José Felipe del Pan, who seems always to have concealed his Masonic affiliation, and never exhibited any anti-clericalism, see W. E. Retana, *Aparato bibliográfico de la historia general de Filipinas* (3 vols.; Madrid, 1906), III, No. 4483, 1570. According to Retana, when Rafael succeeded his father as publisher of *La Oceanía Española* a radical change in policy took place, as far as that was then possible in the Philippines

[18] His name appears as affiliated with the lodge "Lealtad" of the Gran Oriente de España in a list which should be dated from the 1870's, probably 1874, since some of the other lodges on the list are still in process of formation (ADN, legajo 219-A[1]).

degree—as one of the founders of a lodge called "Solidaridad."[19] Of the other seven founders, two were Peninsular Spaniards, three were Cubans, one a Puerto Rican, and one other Filipino—Ricardo Ayllon.[20] Shortly after the foundation of the lodge *Solidaridad,* two other Filipinos—Evaristo Aguirre and Julio Lorente—[21] also joined; a large proportion of those initiated in succeeding months were either Cubans or Puerto Ricans.[22]

There are several indications that this lodge, largely made up of students from Spain's overseas provinces, was the work of Miguel Morayta. At least one of the founders—a Puerto Rican named Herminio Diaz—was a member of Morayta's own lodge, "Hijos del Progreso." Moreover, Morayta himself is listed as an honorary member of lodge "Solidaridad," with the title of "Honorary Worshipful Master," the highest honorary title that that lodge could give. Finally, though founded in April 1886, the lodge had little life until the following September. It seems to have passed through an early crisis when all but two of those members holding higher degrees withdrew, leaving only a handful of new adepts. When, however, the reorganization and *apertura de trabajos* took place the following September, the first invitation to a joint session went to Morayta's "Hijos del Progreso."

The surviving records of the lodge indicate that it led a rather languid life. Del-Pan and Aguirre had both withdrawn before the end of 1886; in general, there had been a large turn-over of members. Graciano Lopez Jaena, apparently already initiated a Mason in 1882 in the lodge "Porvenir" but long inactive, affiliated with the lodge "Solidaridad" in April 1887.[23] One

---

[19] In the charter for the lodge "Solidaridad," signed by Manuel Becerra as Grand Master of the Gran Oriente de España, and dated March 30, 1886, Alfredo Sánchez-Ossorio is named as Worshipful Master; Modesto Fonseca, Senior Warden; and Antonio Berenguer, Junior Warden. The records of the lodge, however, date its foundation from April 4, 1886, with Sánchez-Ossorio as Worshipful Master, but Berenguer has become Senior Warden, and Del-Pan is listed as Junior Warden, apparently through the withdrawal of Fonseca, whose name does not appear either among the founders or the members of the lodge (ADN, legajo 736, expediente 11).

[20] I have not been able to find any further information on Ricardo Ayllon, who held the eighteenth degree, and who withdrew to return to the Philippines before October 15, 1886, as did Del-Pan. Ayllon's name does not appear in any other document of the Filipinos in Spain prior to 1886, nor does he appear connected with nationalist activity in any way afterwards.

[21] Aguirre and Llorente were both students at the University of Madrid, and close friends and classmates of Rizal from the Ateneo. Both were active in the Filipino colony during these years, especially in the Filipino newspaper *España en Filipinas.*

[22] Of the thirty-three members initiated or affiliated up till the end of October 1886, ten were Cubans, two Puerto Ricans, four Filipinos, and one was from Martinique. The rest were presumably Peninsular Spaniards, since their place of origin is not usually noted (ADN, legajo 736, expediente 11).

[23] From López Jaena's documents, as found in these records, it seems that he had joined the lodge "Solidaridad" at its founding on April 5, 1886, but because he lacked the necessary document of withdrawal in good standing (*plancha de quite*) from his former lodge, he did not take the oath and become formally affiliated with "Solidaridad" until April 4, 1887. ("Expediente del h.·. Bolivar, prof.·. Graciano López, gr.·.3", *ibid.*) The article on López Jaena in the *Encyclopedia of the Philippines,* ed. Zoilo M. Galang; 2nd ed.; III, 241, declares that he was initiated in the lodge "Porvenir" in Madrid in 1882. Though no source is given, it seems that this should be accepted in the absence of any contrary information, and since it fits well with other known facts. In this

month later, however, the majority of members of the lodge, including all the Cubans, voted to join with certain other lodges to form a new lodge: "Luz de Mantua" No. 1. Among them, the only Filipino was Lopez Jaena. With this, the lodge "Solidaridad" apparently ceased to exist until it was revived as an all-Filipino lodge a few years later.[24] Though the Filipinos never formed more than a handful in the early lodge."Solidaridad," the importance of the episode is the introduction of Masonry among the Filipino colony in Madrid, and even more, the fact that these contacts were established under the aegis of Miguel Morayta, who was to play a significant role in Filipino Masonry for the next thirty years until his death.

The Lodge "Revolucion"

The first predominantly Filipino lodge, however, was to be founded in Barcelona in April 1889, under the title "Revolucion." [25] The initiative seems to have come from a former Spanish army officer, Celso Mir Deas,[26] who, while in the Philippines, had married a Filipina. Mir Deas was at this time, active in Republican circles in Barcelona, especially as a journalist on the republician newspaper, *El Pueblo Soberano*.[27] The original members of the lodge were Mir, Lopez Jaena, Marcelo H. del Pilar, Mariano Ponce, Jose Ma. Panganiban, Juan Jose Cañarte, and Justo Argudin. These latter two were Cubans; Cañarte had been collaborating with the Filipino newspaper

---

case, of course, López Jaena may have been prior to Del-Pan in joining Masonry.

[24] ADN, leg. 736, exp. 11. Seventeen members are listed as voting for the fusion of the lodges. It is not clear whether these are simply the affirmative votes, or whether they are all that were left in the lodge at this time. To judge from the other records of withdrawals, dismissals, and initiations, it would seem that there was a minority of dissenters, among whom was Llorente. This is confirmed by the fact that Lorente in 1890 would propose the reconstitution of the lodge "Solidaridad" rather than any other, on the grounds that he was a member of it, something he could hardly have said if he had withdrawn prior to the fusion.

[25] The records of the lodge, apparently incomplete, are found in ADN, leg. 620, exp. 14. Though Kalaw (*op. cit.*, 20) gives the date of the charter as April 1, 1889, the meeting to petition affiliation was not held till April 2, so Kalaw is in error.

[26] A letter found in AT from a Barcelona Jesuit, Father Antonio Codo, to the Provincial, Father Juan Ricart, who had recently come from the Philippines, casts light on the origin of the lodge:

> "Another reason which has moved me to write to your Reverence is to inform you, as I promised,... of the name of that active propagator of Masonry, a former military man in the Philippines, of whom I spoke to your Reverence shortly before leaving here. His name is Celso Mir... They have finally founded the lodge of which I spoke to your Reverence with the title of 'La Revolucion'.
>
> "This Celso is a very active collaborator and propagandist who promises money and protection to the uncautious who allow themselves to be initiated; he is trying to revive in this lodge the statutes which have fallen into disuse in the others, of assassinating the traitor who makes known its secrets. For this reason, and because of having roundly refused to sign a certain document which they presented to him, it will be difficult for me to acquire other information from the man who favored me with this."

Though the letter is dated June 23, 1889, it is clear that the lodge had been founded some time before, and planned earlier. For Codo mentions that he had not written about the matter sooner, because he did not consider it important.

[27] From a friend and supporter of the Filipinos, Mir was eventually to become their bitter enemy because of the articles of Antonio Luna in *La Soli-*

La Solidaridad for a few issues just before this time.[28] Lopez Jaena was elected Worshipful Master; Argudin, Senior Warden; Mir, Junior Warden; Del Pilar, Orator; and Cañarte, Secretary. Immediately upon its organization, the lodge petitioned Morayta, who had founded the new federation—Gran Oriente Espanol—a few months earlier, recognizing the Masonic legality of Morayta's federation[29] and petitioning affiliation for the lodge "Revolucion."[30] Just two weeks later, Morayta made a trip from Madrid to Barcelona, where he was honored by the Filipino colony with a banquet. It was at this time that Del Pilar made his first contacts with Morayta, from which would spring a close association and friendship between the two men, with Del Pilar eventually coming to hold a high position in Spanish Masonry, and with Morayta lending his collaboration to the Filipino campaign.

The details of the foundation of the lodge "Revolucion" are not completely clear. The records begin with April 2, 1889, as may be seen from the document cited above. However, though this communication with Morayta may well signalize the beginning of the lodge, it might also merely signify the move of a pre-existing lodge to affiliate with Morayta, who had recently won over various Masonic rivals and succeeded in uniting under himself the Gran Oriente Español. Marcelo del Pilar already appears in the records of April 2 as holding the third degree. Since, as we have seen, it is extremely unlikely that he was initiated before leaving the Philippines, his initiation must have taken place sometime within the three months after his arrival in Barcelona on January 1, 1889. Two possibilities, therefore, present themselves: either Del Pilar had, sometime during those three months, joined another Masonic lodge and, at the beginning of April—together with Lopez Jaena, Mir Deas, and others—had withdrawn from his original lodge to form "Revolucion" and affiliate with Morayta; or perhaps, "Revolucion" had already been formed sometime earlier (between January and April) and that it was only at this time that its records begin to appear among those of the Gran Oriente Español, since it was only then that the already existing lodge would have affiliated with Morayta.

The surviving records of the lodge "Revolucion" for the year 1889 show that most of the Filipinos in Barcelona soon joined the lodge, and that

---

daridad satirizing Spanish foibles. He eventually denounced them to the police who raided the house of Ponce in Barcelona in search of subversive literature, in December 1889. *La Solidaridad* published a separate supplement on December 15, 1889, giving the Filipino side of the story. For biographical data on Mir, see Joan Givanel i Mas, *Materials per a la bibliografia de la premsa barcelonesa (1881-1890)* (Barcelona, 1933), 97-98.

[28] *La Solidaridad* I, 5 (15 Abril 1889), 52-53; I, 7 (15 Mayo 1889), 77-78.

[29] In 1888 after a series of schisms and re-combinations following the resignation of Manuel Becerra as Grand Master in 1886, Morayta had been defeated in an election of the new federation. He protested the election and broke with the Gran Oriente Nacional, recently formed. Followed by apparently the larger number of lodges, he then formed the Gran Oriente Español on January 9, 1889. (These facts are taken from a source friendly to Morayta, Frau-Arús, III, 457-459, but the hostile account, favoring the Gran Oriente Nacional, to be found in Martín y de Castro,, 89-91, agrees as to the substantial fact.)

[30] The first meeting, the minutes of which accompany the petition (ADN, leg. 620, exp. 14), took place on April 2, 1889, and the petition bears the same date. The meeting was held at Rambla Canaletas, 2, 3º, which was the home of Del Pilar, Ponce, and López Jaena at this time, and the publishing office of *La Solidaridad.*

these Filipinos rapidly ascended to the higher degrees of Masonry. In addition to those listed above, other Filipinos who joined during 1889 included Santiago Icasiano, Ariston Bautista, Galicano Apacible, Damaso Ponce, Ramon Imperial, Agustin Blanco, Domingo Marcelo Cortes, and Teodoro Sandico. By August 30, Del Pilar and Mariano Ponce had reached the eighteenth degree; Bautista, the fourteenth. On September 17, Mir Deas, Argudin, Apacible and Panganiban, were proposed for the thirtieth degree; Icasiano, Damaso Ponce, and Imperial, for the eighteenth. Though the records are incomplete, it seems very likely that Del Pilar and Mariano Ponce had likewise reached the thirtieth degree by this time, inasmuch as they had been co-founders with the others proposed for the thirtieth degree, and had begun with them in the same degree. Certainly, by 1890, both men already held the thirtieth degree in the Madrid lodge "Solidaridad," though there is no record among the documents of that lodge of their promotion, indicating that it must have taken place while they were still affiliated with "Revolucion."

When compared with the rate at which men were promoted to higher degrees in other lodges, this rapidity seems rather extraordinary. It could perhaps be attributed to a desire, on the part of Morayta, to build up the new lodges quickly, so as to consolidate the still shaky position of his federation, or possibly also to financial considerations. But, without completely excluding either of these possibilities, it would seem to be the desire of the Filipinos, particularly Del Pilar, to rise to positions in Masonry where they could make use of their Masonic relationships more effectively for their political purposes in the Philippines.[31] Certainly, whatever may have been the motivation of Morayta or of Mir Deas, Del Pilar intended to make use of Masonry in his campaign to destroy the power of the Friars in the Philippines, as will be seen in the following section.

Masonry and the Filipino Anti-Friar Campaign

Two instances of this use of Masonic influence by Del Pilar may be cited, which give an insight into the strategy he proposed in his campaign for Europe. The first of these was the sponsorship by Del Pilar and his associates of Manrique Alonso Lallave, a renegade Friar from the Philippines who had turned Protestant, and in 1889 returned to Manila to open a Protestant chapel there.[32] Lallave had been a Dominican parish priest of the town of Urdaneta, Pangasinan. He had been one of those who attempted to take advantage of the short-lived decree of Segismundo Moret in 1870, authorizing the exclaustration of Friars in the Philippines. Dismissed from the Dominican Order for this and other grave charges, he had been expelled from

[31] Though there are fees recorded for each advance in degree, they do not seem to be excessive amounts, usually ten or fifteen pesetas for each promotion. In any case, it is likely that Del Pilar would have considered the money well-spent for the political connections thus afforded him. Later Morayta would be charged with having opened Masonry to Filipinos to the detriment of Spain, merely out of pecuniary considerations. There is a certain amount of evidence for this charge with regard to the founding of lodges in the Philippines, but at least at this point the charge does not seem to be substantiated.

[32] The data on Lallave and his activities is taken from the biographical article "Lallave, Manrique Alonso," Frau-Arús, I, 614-615, and from the information contained in the letters of Del Pilar cited below.

the Philippines by the government of General Rafael Izquierdo.[33] On his return to Spain, he had published a diatribe against the Friars, entitled *Los Frailes en Filipinas*[34] in which he accused them of every imaginable crime, and demanded the dissolution of the Orders. The pamphlet is full of the most manifest falsehoods and exaggerations, recklessly giving figures, for example, on the enormous wealth of the Friars, which admittedly had no proof for them at all. But the author was by no means a friend or defender of the rights of the Filipinos. In the light of the sponsorship given by Del Pilar to Lallave's pamphlet and to the man's activities as well, it is interesting to note such passage as the following, in which Lallave denies all ability to Filipinos and insults them in a way worthy of the worst of the detractors of the race combatted by Rizal and others:

> ... There you will not find that magnificient brilliance of intelligence... nor will you discover there in the works of men the graphic expressions of the power of their will; you will see only lowness, small-mindedness, fear, servilism in execution, poverty of will in every respect, and degradation of the intelligence. That people still lacks poetry; as yet it has not invented a song—rather its songs and its harmonies are the harmonies and the songs of the savages!...[35]

Even worse are his remarks about the Filipinos being "... liars by their very nature....."[36] and his chapter on public morality, where he denies all sense of morality to the entire race, men and women.[37]

Despite all this, Del Pilar now proposes in his campaign to destroy the influence of the Friars in the Philippines, to cooperate with Lallave and other elements in Spanish political life who were sponsoring him, notably the ex-revolutionary, former Grand Master of the Gran Oriente de España, Manuel Becerra, now Overseas Minister in the Liberal Cabinet of Sagasta.[38] The entire term of office of Becerra was a continuous threat to the Church in the Philippines, though few of his projects ever succeeded in winning cabinet approval, even from the anti-clerical government of Sagasta. In an early circular to the Governor-General, he ostentatiously called on the latter to favor the work of the religious orders in the Philippines, but went on to say that he must not forget

> ... that in the territory of that jurisdiction there are Europeans, Asiatics, and Americans who profess different religions. All these should be respected in their

---

[33] The account of Lallave's dismissal from the Dominicans and expulsion from the Philippines with three companions, parish priests of towns in Pangasinan, is in the Archivo Histórico Nacional in Madrid, Sección de Ultramar, leg. 2223, "Sobre expulsión de las Islas Filipinas de los Religiosos de la Orden de Sto. Domingo, Fr. José Ma. Isla, Fr. Nicolás Manrique Alonso, Fr. Joaquín Palacios y Fr. Remigio Zapico." All had been found guilty by their Order of a number of serious charges. The documents show on the one hand the possibility of serious abuses on the part of Friar parish priests, and on the other hand, the stern measures taken by their Order to expel members who had shown themselves unworthy. It reflects little credit on Del Pilar, however, to have made use of such a man against the Friars.

[34] Manrique Alonso Lallave, *Los frailes en Filipinas* (Madrid, 1872).

[35] *Ibid.*, 44. This translation, and subsequent ones, are mine.

[36] *Ibid.*, 48.

[37] *Ibid.*, 53-57.

[38] For Becerra's Masonic career, see Frau-Arús, III, 457. His ecclesiastical projects are narrated, and attacked, in Pastells, *Misión*, 176-182.

> beliefs and in their worship, as they have been ever since the wise Laws of the Indies were first laid down. . . .[39]

Beneath this seemingly innocuous statement, apparently simply reiterating ordinary Philippine practice, there was a hidden plan. The key to the plan is the phrase "in their worship" which gave an opening for freedom of worship, something never heretofore permitted in the Philippines. Del Pilar, in a letter to Pedro Serrano Laktaw, pointed out that he considered this to be:

> . . . the gravest threat that can be made under current legislation against the theocratic power. Becerra cannot descend to details. The question is whether we know how to develop its potentialities.

He goes on to explain how he proposes to do so:

> Under protection of that circular, you have coming to you there in person, in body and soul, your Manrique Lallave, now a Protestant pastor. The government will not be able to prosecute him, since he is protected by the circular. If he succeeds in making proselytes, an exposition will be presented to the government with 300,000 signatures in demand of greater tolerance and even of freedom of worship. This latter is still a remote possibility, but even toleration is already a great step against the monastic power. As to their expulsion, you know already that we cannot hope for this from the government; we have to do it ourselves.[40]

He then counsels Serrano to aid Lallave clandestinely with the assistance of Doroteo Cortes and Jose Ramos. In a letter to Teodoro Sandico a few weeks later, he urges him to work with Serrano in helping Lallave, ". . . because here you have the unfolding of one of the plans of Becerra . . . . ."[41]

In his letter to Doroteo Cortes, contemporaneous with that to Serrano, Del Pilar gives some idea of his relationship to Becerra in this matter.

> Senor Manrique Lallave and his companions are going there to carry on some business which they will explain to you. Believing their interests to be antagonistic to those of certain monopolizers of the country, I would wish that, on your part and that of your friends, you would bestow every kind of protection on them, being assured that these gentlemen and the elements on whom they depend, with whom we are in complete understanding, are disposed to render us service in return.[42]

The plan did not prosper, however, since Lallave contracted a fever a few weeks after his arrival in Manila, and after two weeks of sickness, died.[43]

---

[39] Text in the newspaper *El Día* (Madrid), 19 Enero 1889.

[40] Carmelo [Del Pilar] to P. Ikazama [Pedro Serrano Laktaw], 3 Mayo 1889, *Epistolario de Marcelo H. del Pilar* (2 vols.; Manila, 1955-1958), I, 112. The editor of the *Epistolario* wrongly identifies P. Ikazama as Pedro Icasiano instead of Serrano. To demonstrate that Serrano is the addressee cannot be undertaken here, but has been done in my doctoral dissertation, *The Filipino Nationalists Propaganda Campaign in Spain, 1880-1899,* from Georgetown University, published on microfilm with University Microfilms (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1965), 251-252.

[41] Piping Dilát [Del Pilar] to Teófilo Codisan [Teodoro Sandico], 30 Mayo 1889, *Epistolario,* I, 161.

[42] Marcelo H. del Pilar to Doroteo Cortés, 1 Mayo 1889, *ibid.,* 106.

[43] R. O. Serna [Pedro Serrano] to Marcelo H. del Pilar, 21 Junio 1889, *ibid.,* 178. There is a more detailed account in "Correo de Filipinas," *El Día* (Madrid), 2 Agosto 1889. These two contemporary accounts, both of them from sources hostile to the Friars, make clear that there is absolutely nothing to the charge, often made in later anti-Friar writings, that Lallave was poisoned by the Friars. Rather, he contracted a fever, and died after two weeks.

All this raises the question as to who were "the elements on which they depend," with whom Del Pilar was "in complete understanding," and who were disposed to render him reciprocal services in return for his cooperation with Lallave's anti-Catholic project. Two possible answers offer themselves: a group of Protestants, or one of Masons. The first of these seems highly improbable, since the scattered Protestants in Spain at this time were scarcely in a position to do anything for Del Pilar and his associates that would justify the phrase "disposed to render us service in return." Moreover, it is known that shortly before this time, Lallave, who had been a Presbyterian in Sevilla from 1874 to 1888, was deprived of his pastorate by his church in the latter year, because of accusations made against him, and reduced to such a precarious economic situation that he was scarcely able to support his wife and numerous children. It is hardly likely that his church, even if it were disposed to undertake such a project, would, after having deprived him of his pastorate for alleged bad conduct, have entrusted him with a new mission in the Philippines.[44]

There is, however, a great deal of evidence which points to Lallave's support being Masonic, specifically, from the Gran Oriente Español, headed by Morayta. Lallave had been a very active Mason for many years, had published a number of Masonic works, and was editor of the Masonic journal *Taller* from its foundation. Having first been a member of the lodge "Numantina" of the Gran Oriente Lusitano Unido, he had helped found the Gran Logia Simbolica Independiente Española in 1881, where he was Gran Orador. He had likewise founded the lodge "Numancia," of which he was Worshipful Master. With this background, Lallave was certainly no stranger to Becerra or to Morayta, since he was active in Masonic circles right up to the period in question, and in circles friendly to those of Morayta and Becerra.[45]

In addition to this Masonic affiliation of Lallave, the consideration of a few dates would seem clearly to point to Morayta and the Gran Oriente Español being the sponsor of Lallave. Del Pilar's letter to Serrano and Cortes in favor of Lallave are dated May 1, 1889. On the preceding April 2, the lodge "Revolucion" had petitioned Morayta for affiliation with the Gran Oriente Español.[46] Two weeks later, on April 16, Morayta arrived in Barcelona. During the period of his stay, it is clear from Del Pilar's letters, that the latter had several conferences with Morayta, the details of which he does not divulge, besides the public banquet which the Filipino colony offered.[47] As will be seen below, it is from precisely this time that Morayta showed himself active in behalf of the Filipinos, and that Del Pilar seems to have taken his final decision to go to Madrid and centralize his organization there

[44] For the situation of Protestantism in Spain at this time, see Ballesteros, XII, 97-98. For Lallave's relations with the Presbyterian Church, see Frau-Arús, I, 614-615.

[45] *Ibid.* The clearest evidence that Lallave must have been closely connected with Morayta is the laudatory article on him, to which reference is here made. For the *Diccionario*, first published by Frau in 1891, is highly biased in favor of Morayta and his associates, so that prominent Masons of other federations, and even the federations themselves, are simply ignored, or even attacked bitterly.

[46] ADN, leg. 620, esp. 14.

[47] Marcelo H. del Pilar to Ka Dato [Deodato Arellano], 17 Abril 1889, *Epistolario*, I, 97; 2 Mayo 1889, *ibid.*, 107-110.

in conjunction with the former. If Morayta proposed to Del Pilar that the Filipino group should aid Lallave, the first opportunity for Del Pilar to recommend that course to his friends in Manila would have been precisely when he did write, at the beginning of May when the next mail boat would have been leaving for the Philippines. As a matter of fact, it is in this same mail that he writes to his brother-in-law, Deodato Arellano, concerning his meeting with Morayta. All this circumstantial evidence is not, perhaps, absolutely conclusive, but the convergence of so many known facts, and the absence of any alternative hypothesis for the sponsoring organization which Del Pilar's letters refer to, give as much certainty as can be expected here.

The other side of this relationship of reciprocal assistance between Masonry and the Filipino nationalists which Del Pilar counted on, may be seen in another project he undertook as a result of the conferences between him and Morayta. At the banquet in honor of Morayta, the Filipinos and their Spanish friends drew up an exposition to the Overseas Minister Becerra, petitioning parliamentary representation for the Philippines, abolition of the censorship, and prohibition of administrative deportation.[48] A few weeks later, Del Pilar wrote to Rizal, who seems to have joined Masonry sometime earlier:[49]

> ... If you can take advantage of the support of the "Gran Familia," now is the time. For Becerra belongs to it, and besides, this oppressive measure [administrative deportation] affects its prestige and good name, since it is its own members and its friends who are subject to this persecution.[50]

Rizal, however, was unwilling to make use of Masonic influence, since he declared that he did not want "... to owe the tranquility of the Philippines to anyone except the forces of the country itself..... ."[51] Del Pilar was undismayed, and without communicating anything further to Rizal, began to campaign among other Masonic lodges to obtain their support for a petition to Sagasta, the Prime Minister, and to Becerra—both of them, Masons—against permitting administrative deportation in the Philippines.[52] On July 2, 1889, Lopez Jaena, as Worshipful Master of the lodge "Revolucion" forwarded to Morayta two copies of an exposition making this petition, signed by various lodges not only of the Gran Oriente Español, but also of other "obediences." He asked in an official letter that Morayta see to it that these expositions be placed in the hands of the Ministers to whom they were addressed.

In another confidential, unofficial letter, which accompanied these documents, he offered the activity of the lodge "Revolucion" in securing the cooperation of lodges outside the Gran Oriente Español as a proof of the Ma-

---

[48] *Ibid.*, 103-104.

[49] I hope to treat the complicated and somewhat obscure question of when and where Rizal was initiated into Masonry in a separate article. In any case, he was not a member of either the lodge "Revolucion," or of the lodge "Solidaridad" in the period considered in this article.

[50] To Laong Laan [Rizal], 18 Mayo 1889, *Epistolario*, I, 127.

[51] Felipeno [Del Pilar] to Ikazama [Serrano], 27 Junio 1889, *ibid.*, 192.

[52] *Ibid.* After telling that the exposition was to be presented, Del Pilar continues: "... Los peticionarios no somos nosotros, sino otras entidades sociales... Ese Ramos lo entenderá mejor." The reference to Ramos is intended to convey the information that the "entidades sociales" in question are Masonic lodges. Elsewhere in his effort to use cryptic language, guarding against pos-

sonic zeal of the Filipinos, pointing out that this might well be a first step in bringing more lodges under Morayta's leadership. In return for this service, he asked to be rewarded with the thirtieth degree, without having to make a formal request.[53] In spite of the letter of Lopez Jaena, however, it seems clear from the correspondence of Del Pilar cited above, that it was the latter who was behind the whole move, though undoubtedly the political and Masonic contacts of Lopez Jaena were largely instrumental in making the move possible.[54]

The incident is interesting as an example of what Del Pilar hoped to accomplish through Masonry, and as an indication of the close relationship with Morayta which he was nurturing from this time. However, there is no evidence that anything was actually accomplished by these Masonic petitions as far as achieving their object is concerned. Becerra was already embarked on a program of radical reforms for the Philippines, which was meeting extensive opposition, and though he might well have supported the object of the Filipino petition, he was not in a position to propose more new reforms at this time. Sagasta was not willing to compromise himself at any time for the sake of Becerra's projects, and would scarcely have allowed himself to be led into reforms in the Philippines which many considered likely to weaken Spanish control, simply because of lobbying from Masonic lodges.[55]

After September, the records show an increase of non-Filipino members in the lodge, and a corresponding decrease in Filipino activity, no doubt due to the plans of Del Pilar to transfer operations to Madrid. Sandico, Bautista, Damaso Ponce, and perhaps Apacible, all moved to Madrid about this time, as did Del Pilar, with Mariano Ponce soon to follow. Since Panganiban already had only months to live, all the Filipinos who had shown themselves active in the lodge "Revolucion," with the exception of Lopez Jaena, were now gone. The latter resigned as Worshipful Master at the end of November, and there is no mention of the few remaining Filipino members in the other extant records for the months after November, only of Spaniards and Cubans. The last records of the lodge "Revolucion" date from June 1890.[56]

However, though "Revolucion" ceased to exist as a predominantly Filipino lodge, the associations of the nationalist movement under the leadership of Del Pilar with Spanish Masonry had only begun. Once the reorganization

---

sible opening of the mail by the authorities in Manila, Del Pilar speaks of Masonry as "la familia de Pepe Ramos" (*Epistolario*, I, 186). This use of Ramos' name to designate Masonry is further confirmation that Ramos was the only Filipino initiated into Masonry in Manila at this time.

[53] ADN, leg. 620, exp. 14.

[54] Later, when both López Jaena and Rizal were at odds with Del Pilar, the first would write to the second: "... Yo he sido para ellos, al llegar aquí a España, todo: yo les he hecho algo, yo les he presentado a las sociedades, a los personajes políticos..." (Graciano—Rizal, 15 Octubre 1891, *Epistolario Rizalino* [5 vols.; Manila, 1930-1938], III, 252).

[55] As a matter of fact, the Sagasta ministry never sanctioned Becerra's projects, and when the ministry fell a year and a half later, they were withdrawn by his successor. Even the laudatory article on Sagasta in Frau-Arús (II, 661-662) admits: "... Although an old and tried Freemason, Brother Sagasta took very little part in Masonic affairs....", and though he was persuaded to take the highest post in the Gran Oriente de España in 1876, he resigned it as soon as he had the opportunity to form a cabinet in 1881.

[56] ADN, leg. 620, exp. 14.

in Madrid was underway, a new lodge would be established and the part of Masonry in the activities of the Filipino nationalists would be expanded. But this is another story. The study of the documents for the period up to 1890 has, at least, it is hoped, shed new light on the origins of Philippine Masonry and the course it took until the end of its first phase.

GUARDIA DE HONOR: REVITALIZATION WITHIN THE REVOLUTION

DAVID R. STURTEVANT *

OUT OF THE STRIFE-TORN YEARS FROM 1892 TO 1902 emerged a series of contradictory social forces. The decade of discord in the Philippines—like similar upheavals elsewhere—produced intense, sometimes bitter, rivalries. *Ilustrados* and *Katipuneros,* Catholics and Aglipayans, Manileños and *provincianos,* landlords and tenants, regionalists and nationalists, pro- and anti-Americans, all contended for control of the truncated revolution. Because of their direct bearing on the development of contemporary Filipino nationalism, these factions have monopolized the attention of historians.

Often overlooked in the evaluations of rival claims to leadership is a sub-plot of provincial protest which had little or no relevance to the nerve-fraying drama in Manila, Kawit, and Malolos. While real and aspiring members of the elite jockeyed for prominent positions in the center of the revolutionary stage, and defiant young protagonists addressed themselves to the awesome tasks of nation building against the ominous backdrop of well-armed foreign troops disembarking in Manila Bay, rustic players acted out a far different scenario in remote barrios. The politically cognizant rallied to Aguinaldo, Mabini, and the men of Malolos. But many villagers followed charismatic local leaders into a series of "New Jerusalem." The anarchistic goals of the religious rebels were antithetical to the objectives of their more sophisticated contemporaries. Spanish friars, Filipino nationalists, and American conquerors found little in common. They did, however, agree on one point: all of them dismissed the bucolic experiments as gross examples of *bundok* heresy, crude superstition, primitive fanaticism, or worse.[1] Students of the period have unconsciously underlined those turn-of-the-century interpretations by ignoring the provocative innovations of provincial redeemers.

In neglecting these popular expressions, scholars have missed an opportunity to gain insights into the dynamics of rural discord in the Philippines. This is not an oversight limited to Filipinos or to foreign students of Philippine affairs. It is an intellectual "set" which threatens systematic inquiry into the social history of Southeast Asia. In the December issue of *Asian Studies* Professor Harry Benda pointed out the documentary and conceptual difficul-

* The author is examining a series of religio-political expressions in the Philippines under a Fulbright research grant for 1965-66. This article represents a preliminary report of findings on one movement. It is primarily descriptive rather than interpretative. Since materials are still being collected, please regard it as a tentative first look at the *Guardia de Honor.* Gratitude is extended to the Joint Committee of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council for a grant to Washington, D.C. during the summer of 1963. United States records on the *Guardia* were examined at that time. Neither the ACLS-SSRC nor the United States Education Foundation in the Philippines, however, is responsible for any of the views or conclusions expressed.

[1] The literal Tagalog translation of *bundok* is mountain.

ties that plague the examination of agrarian movements in this part of the world.[2] A kind of "conspiracy of silence," as he so aptly put it, shields the peasantry from the historian's curiosity.[3] The student of rural unrest must work from frustratingly small and scattered fragments in his effort to reconstruct the elements of the Little Tradition. Despite the difficulties, the rewards make the quest worthwhile. Benda's stimulating essay reveals some of the potential results. Implied within it is a rough continuum of increasingly sophisticated dissent throughout the region. At one end, was the "gentle anarchism" of the Samin Movement in nineteenth century Java; at the other, the "city-oriented" but peasant-based protest of the *Sakdalistas* on the eve of the Commonwealth's inaugural in the Philippines.[4] Between the two lie many forms and variations of agrarian unrest.

What prevails among the peasantry of Southeast Asia applies also to the broader context of mankind. Human beings under conditions of extreme or sustained stress—such as conquest, forced acculturation, rapid socio-economic change or breakdown—frequently become involved in what, at first sight, appears to be highly eccentric or exotic group behavior. A growing body of anthropological, sociological, and historical scholarship in Europe and the United States addresses itself to phenomena of this general type.[5] Among the bewilderingly numerous terms in the emerging vocabulary designed to describe and explain such manifestations are the following: "cargo cults," "chiliastic movements," "charismatic movements," "millenarian movements," "nativistic movements," "religious revivalism," "social movements," "sect formation," and others.[6] In an effort to eliminate semantic confusion and to evolve a

[2] Harry J. Benda, "Peasant Movements in Southeast Asia," *Asian Studies,* III (1959).

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] See D. R. Sturtevant, "Sakdalism and Philippine Radicalism," *Journal of Asian Studies,* XXI (1962), 199-215.

[5] Mountainous sociological and anthropological literature on the subject assumes almost Himalayan proportions. Most helpful to historians entering the field are works by Redfield; see, for example, *The Primitive World and Its Transformations* (Ithaca, New York, 1953), and "Peasant Society and Culture," in *The Little Community and Peasant Society and Culture* (Chicago, 1960). A pioneering sociological formulation was presented by R. D. Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process," *Social Forces,* XXVIII (1950), 270-79. J. W. Vander Zander significantly modified the Hopper thesis in "Resistance and Social Movements," *Social Forces,* XXXVII (1959), 312-15. Specific studies are too numerous to mention. For guidance, see Benda's footnote on the subject *loc. cit.* A provocative essay on movements in a neighboring nation was produced by J. M. Van der Kroef in "Javanese Messianic Expectations: Their Origin and Cultural Context," *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* I (1959), 299-322. The most stimulating historical treatments are: Norman Cohn, *In Pursuit of the Millenium: Revolutionary Messianism in Medieval and Reformation Europe and Its Bearing on Modern Totalitarian Movements* (London, 1962); E. J. Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (New York, 1963); and V. Lanternari, *The Religions of the Oppressed: A Study of Modern Messianic Cults,* tr. by Liza Sergio (New York, 1963).

[6] The historian who ventures into the inviting land of sect analysis enters a territory considered sacrosanct by behavioral scientists. See "Book Review: The Religions of the Oppressed," *Current Anthropology,* Vl (1965), 447-65. The animated international discussion of Professor Lanternari's book by fifteen specialists, reveals the vitality of this field of inquiry. Another glimpse of the proliferating literature can be gained by scanning the review article's bibliography, 464-65.

theoretical basis for uniform analysis, Professor Anthony F. C. Wallace evolved the concept of "revitalization" and outlined the stages through which such expressions seem to pass.[7]

Since his "constructs" undergird this short study, their meaning together with the processes they involve must be clarified. Wallace defines stress as a "condition in which some part, or the whole, of the social organism is threatened with serious damage."[8] Under these circumstances begins what some sociologists call the "milling process"—increasing disorientation and a corresponding, often confused, quest for solutions.[9] Revitalization movements appear at this juncture. He defines revitalization as a "deliberate, organized, conscious effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture."[10] Innovations of this kind run the gauntlet from extremely naive and "unrealistic" millenarianism, to sophisticated and "realistic" secular formulations. Whatever their pattern, from a strictly cultural viewpoint, they constitute highly creative endeavors to cope with a hostile world.[11]

If they fit the "unrealistic" category—as does the subject of this paper—they usually involve a charismatic prophet who is in regular contact with a "supernatural pseudo-community."[12] Principal aides of the leader, and in many cases the bulk of their followers, become involved in similar psychological experiences. Hallucinatory states become widespread, sometimes contagious, and a kind of other wordly convulsion sweeps the membership. Propelled by mounting irrationality, the leaders and some of the followers often take the next logical if unfortunate step: they "become" the guardian spirit or spirits.[13] Once the social seizure is established along these lines, the aberration must run its course. If the redeemer's doctrines and his disciples' conduct seriously challenge the values of the larger society, those who exercise authority suppress and, when possible, eliminate the movement.

With the inevitable tribal prostrations to the tyranny of terms completed, the major work of this paper can be undertaken. It will consist of a preliminary inquiry into the *Guardia de Honor,* an intricate revitalization effort which swept northern Luzon at the turn of the century. Its brief but highly checkered career created a unanimity of dismay among deeply discordant elements. Clerics were reduced to anxious tongue clucking. Nationalists cried counter revolution and treason. Americans fumbled and mumbled in puritanical bewilderment. The movement which forged this strange consensus will be analyzed in regard to (1) Catholic origins, (2) relations with the revolutionary regime, (3) relations with the Americans, (4) internal structure, (5) overt demise and probable survival as a secret society.

The organization made its appearance under thoroughly prosaic circumstances. Founded by Dominican fathers sometime in the middle of the nine-

[7] Anthony F. C. Wallace, "Revitalization Movements," *American Anthropologist,* LVIII (1956), 264-81. Wallace's carefully designed rubric is used here because it generates less semantic heat than other descriptive terms.
[8] *Ibid.,* 265.
[9] Hopper, *loc. cit.,* 271.
[10] Wallace, *loc. cit.,* 265.
[11] Redfield, *Primitive World,* 51.
[12] Wallace, *loc. cit.,* 273.
[13] *Ibid.*

teenth century, its purpose was to instill devotion for the Virgin among lay members.[14] Known as the *Guardia de Honor de Maria,* the confraternity flourished in Pangasinan and continguous provinces. Originally designed to provide a devout escort for the Virgin's image during sacred processions, the society grew beyond its inceptors' expectations and gradually assumed more complex responsibilities. By 1877, the size of its membership justified division into regional and local units for more effective work among the village laity.

To this point, the *Guardia's* development followed an orthodox pattern. The revolutionary tide of the 1890's, however, shattered the Dominican's conservative handiwork. When the flood crested, it left a ruin of religiously-oriented fragments which local artisans combined into a ramshackle radicalism unrecognizable to the society's original architects and builders. The genesis of the transformation came when curates attempted to use the confraternity's influence to counter propaganda and organization work by *Katipuneros.*[15] With the rise of revolutionary fortunes, many clerics in Pangasinan were arrested by provincial leaders of the new regime. Others (some assisted by members of the *Guardia),* escaped and fled to the Order's sanctuaries in Manila. Abandoned parishioners blamed the revolutionaries for the disappearance of their spiritual guides. Dynamic provincial leaders—perhaps spurred on and assisted covertly by Dominicans in the distant metropolis—organized a counter movement which soon assumed regional proportions.[16]

Storm signals started to flutter in the tense time of waiting, from October 1898 through January 1899. While Aguinaldo and his aides attempted to deal with the ever-increasing threat of hostilities with the United States, ominous rumbles of an approaching Jacquerie began to reverberate across the plains and through the mountains to the north. Reports from provincial authorities portrayed a highly disturbing pattern of spreading disorder. Highwaymen, brigands, and irregular military units appeared in ever-widening circles emanating from Pangasinan. Prominent families, together with barrios and administrative centers loyal to the new government, came under sporadic attack.[17] By late November and early December 1898, peace and order in the provinces of La Union, Pangasinan, and Tarlac had deteriorated to the danger point. Nationalist leaders grumbled over counter-revolutionary tendencies and complained to Aguinaldo of "treason on the part of our troops and civilians."[18]

---

[14] United States, National Archives, J. R. M. Taylor (comp.), *The Philippine Insurrection against the United States,* galley proofs in five volumes (Washington, D. C., 1906), I, 45; cited hereafter as Taylor, *Insurgent Records.*

[15] James Le Roy, *Philippine Life in Town and Country* (New York, 1905), 129.

[16] United States, War Department, Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Compilation of Philippine Insurgent Records: Telegraphic Correspondence of Emilio Aguinaldo, July 15, 1898, to February 28, 1899, Annotated* (Washington, 1903), 36; cited hereafter as BIA, *Compilation.* A footnote describes the career of a *Guardia* leader in Tarlac Province. It is based on Joaquin D. Duran, *Episodias de la Revolucion Filipina* (Manila, 1901).

[17] General Macabulos to Aguinaldo, November 30, 1898. BIA, *Compilation,* 30.

[18] General Pio del Pilar to Aguinaldo, December 4, 1898. BIA *Compilations,* 31.

Christmas brought the gift of chaos. Simultaneous uprisings plunged Tarlac into near anarchy. Urgent telegrams jamming the wires to General Aguinaldo's headquarter in Cavite described widespread "criminal" activities by hands of *"tulisanes."*[19] A *cordon sanitaire* was hastily thrown around the feverish province in an effort to isolate the infection. Reinforcements rushed north by rail to initiate martial law and to pacify the restless populace. Tarlaqueños remained under a state of siege throughout the month of January 1899. Efforts by the regime to withdraw detachments for strategic redeployment against the Americans proved futile. Within hours after the abandonment of a *poblacion,* poised guerillas fell upon the defenseless town to sack government buildings, destroy records, and attack leading citizens. The struggle quickly assumed the character of civil war. In a revealing message, the administrative head of Tarlac captured the fears of the provincial *principales.* "Many rich people here," he telegraphed Aguinaldo, "urgently ask the creation of a...body of volunteers...formed of trustworthy and prominent persons...for the pursuit of robbers and to fight the Americans if necessary. We have the money," he concluded optimistically, "and only need rifles."[20]

Aguinaldo used a more cautious approach. He tried to tranquilize the area through a dual policy of attraction and coercion. Neither element worked. Rural rowdies stole his velvet glove and parried his mailed fist. That a religious under-current propelled the rebellious forces was quickly discerned by those in charge of pacification. One troubleshooter suggested that Bishop Aglipay be sent "to quiet Tarlac."[21] Surging peasants, however, could not be stilled by either nationalistic bishops or bullets. When amnesties failed to turn the tide of discord, members of the burgeoning movement were proscribed, hunted down, and killed.[22] But the organization continued to grow and flourish. Leaders of the dissenters began to call themselves "Brigadier Generals."[23] They applied, moreover, a ruthless counter policy of terror against government efforts to drain away their reservoir of popular support. By the end of February 1899, the trouble had assumed the proportions of a general peasant uprising. San Carlos, Pangasinan, for example, requested military detachments to defend its 23,000 inhabitants from the assaults of "those who call themselves the discontented or oppressed and Guards of Honor."[24]

The Dominicans' carefully nurtured plant had borne unpredictably bitter fruit. Within a year, further mutations produced an ugly, self-propagating specimen which even the friar horticulturists came to regard as a noxious weed. After the outbreak of Filipino-American hostilities, provincial authorities turned from peace-keeping activities to the more pressing duties created by the advancing outlanders. United States troops, concentrating on Aguinaldo's ragged but defiant legions, paid little heed to the religious peculiarities proliferating around them. Late in 1899, however, when forward elements reached the warm plains and humid foothills of Pangasinan, the problem

[19] See telegrams to Aguinaldo, BIA, *Compilation,* 35-7.
[20] Provincial Chief of Tarlac to Aguinaldo, December 28, 1898. BIA, *Compilation,* 41-2.
[21] Secretary of Agriculture to Aguinaldo, December 28, 1898. BIA, *Compilation,* 37.
[22] Taylor, *Insurgent Records,* 45.
[23] *Ibid.*
[24] *Ibid.*

could no longer be ignored. A lush undergrowth of religious dissent covered the province. From the thriving seedbed, thick runners of discord twisted north, east, and south into La Union, Ilocos Sur, Nueva Ecija, Zambales, and Tarlac.

The contagion caused the Americans as much, if not more, difficulty than it had Aguinaldo. General Elwell S. Otis, the bemused commander of "pacification" forces in the Philippines, grasped neither the military nor social realities confronting his field officers. Weaned on the Anglo-Saxon sportsmanship of the War Between the States and shaped by the primitive clarities of Indian campaigns on the frontier, he regarded the "strange fanaticism" swirling through Luzon as but another streak of oriental perversity.[25] "Self-declared prophets," complained the disgruntled Otis to his superiors, "were revealing and proclaiming new creeds... quite markedly variable in origin and nature."[26] The general considered the malady to be essentially inexplicable. He fell back, therefore, on a tried and tested American approach. Assuming the sects were based on the pecuniary motives of their leaders, he ordered a crackdown. Subordinates wrested an established redeemer from the arms of devout converts in Calumpit, Bulacan and threw him behind bars for "illegal money exactions from the more ignorant natives."[27] After taking the first step toward confining the epidemic, the general consulted local diagnosticians. Manila's "educated Filipinos" proved to be uneasy. They spoke apprehensively about the increase of... fanatical sects," and warned Otis that difficulty might be experienced "in handling them if they were permitted to follow their inclinations."[28] The general found no answers; but he concluded his ponderous observations with a provocative remark: "Whatever the cause, the fact disturbed the Roman Catholic clergy and was the subject of much animated discussion."[29]

While Otis conducted righteous opinion surveys and priests buzzed sanctimoniously over the American commander's heretical findings, General Arthur MacArthur sought the focus of dissent. Patrols reconnoitering Pangasinan's intricate village network found a variety of secular and sacred eccentricities, but the strangest encounter was a thriving community of ten thousand people where a slumbering barrio of five hundred was supposed to be. Cabaruan, which one scandalized American called, an "ill-starred town of religious fanatics and vulgar thieves," had been discovered by the outside world.[30] With a tactician's directness, MacArthur moved to eradicate the conglomeration of cultists. Hastily concentrated infantry occupied the place after a brief and practically bloodless skirmish. Shortly thereafter, a relieved General Otis received complete telegraphic information on the action's objective:

> Cabaruan is... located some eight miles east of Malasiqui... It has been selected as the rendezvous of a fanatical religious organization of some kind and people from surrounding towns and barrios forced to assemble there... . The fana-

[25] *Report of Major General E. S. Otis: September, 1899 to May 5, 1900* (Washington, 1900), 142.
[26] *Ibid.*
[27] *Ibid.*
[28] *Ibid.*
[29] *Ibid.*, 143.
[30] James Le Roy, *The Americans in the Philippines*, II (Boston, 1914), 302.

> tics are also robbers and murderers, and have recently committed the most cruel depredations on surrounding towns, especially Malasiqui, where nine murders have been committed within the last few weeks. . . . The. . . people there have been ordered home and in a few days it is hoped that the excitement that has kept this part of Pangasinan in an uproar. . . will subside. . . . Precisely how the religious and robber elements are combined I have not yet been able to ascertain, but it is a fact. . . that this part of Pangasinan has been terrorized by these people—the large town of Malasiqui being almost entirely depopulated. . . The importance of this day's work cannot be overestimated.[31]

General MacArthur's modest conclusion proved wrong. The "day's work" exerted about as much influence over the course of affairs in Pangasinan, as the nationalists' proclamation of martial law had worked on events the year before in Tarlac.

MacArthur galloped off to resolve other pressing difficulties leaving regimental officers to grapple with the complexities of Cabaruan. Early in 1900, they stationed an infantry company in the town to oversee the gradual dispersal of its residents. But the inhabitants did not fade away. The tumult subsided. Sectarians devoted more energy to marathon prayer sessions and correspondingly less to terrorizing neighboring settlements.[32] Even the population leveled off around the ten thousand mark. With peace seemingly restored, the small garrison withdrew. Baffled officers in Dagupan headquarters instituted a wary surveillance of the troublesome community. Any hope that genuine stability might develop proved ephemereal. The soldiers, departure signalled a fresh outburst of perplexing growth. Within a year, ten thousand more people migrated to Cabaruan.[33] A new, heartier variety of religious dissent had apparently sprung up in Pangasinan.

The ominous revival constituted an additional source of frustration to military personnel overburdened with occupation duties in a large and populous province. Patrols visited Cabaruan regularly. Their sketchy reports revealed a series of mystifying contradictions.[34] The town was unusually clean and well laid out. Major streets radiated from the plaza like spokes on a wagon wheel. Each thoroughfare, together with the section through which it passed, was named after one of the twelve apostles. A personable young man, addicted to glittering top-boots and ornate uniforms, presided over the destinies of the devout and disciplined population. He was assisted by twelve efficient lieutenants. These encouraging aspects, however, were cancelled by some highly discouraging circumstances. Cabaruan's burgeoning population manifested all the trappings of rural prosperity, but the town lacked any visible

---

[31] Otis, *op. cit.*, 143.

[32] Dean C. Worcester, *The Philippine Past and Present*, II (New York, 1914), 944.

[33] Katherine Mayo, *The Isles of Fear: Truth About the Philippines* (New York, 1925), 181. Miss Mayo's book was probably the most "objectionable" collection of "objective" observations written during the 1920's. But her short description of Cabaruan was based on the account of an American officer stationed in Dagupan during the years, 1899-1902. If her remarks are stripped of their Kiplingesque veneer they reveal interesting details on the *Guardia*.

[34] United States, War Department, *Report* 1900 (Washington, 1901). See I, Part 8, "Reports from Colonel J. F. Bell, Commander, Thirty-Sixth Infantry, U. S. V., to Adjutant-General Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, 331-335. Cited hereafter as *Bell Reports*.

means of support.[35] Few, if any, people worked. They made little effort, for example, to cultivate the surrounding countryside. Furthermore, detachments returning to Dagupan, inevitably picked up disturbing rumors concerning Cabaruan. Inhabitants of surrounding communities regarded the place with ill-concealed terror. They complained of chronic criminality and whispered of sordid and sadistic rites.[36]

Headquarters doubled efforts to unravel the enigma. Suspicious American majors attempted to take the town's leaders by surprise. The new approaches produced no concrete evidence of wrongdoing, but they led to an entertaining cat-and-mouse game between Cabaruan and the United States Army. Patrol patterns were radically and constantly changed. When this failed, small veteran detachments made their way to the community *via* the most devious routes. Vigilant residents of Cabaruan's extensive environs, however, always discovered the interlopers. They notified messengers who, in turn, set into motion a unique alarm system. Within moments after receiving word of the patrol's approach, the ever-alert Cabaruan brass band—drums rolling, cymbals crashing, and trumpets blaring—was marching out to greet the dismayed troops. When musicians and military met, the bandsmen wheeled smartly, and triumphantly led the embarrassed Americans through orderly throngs of smiling residents to the *plaza* where they were graciously welcomed by town officials.[37] Incidents of this type led some Manila Americans to chide the Pangasinan regiment for the "Cabaruan fiasco."[38]

Intelligence and legal officers in Dagupan, however, were not as naive as Cabaruan and Manila believed. While patiently awaiting the accumulation of irrefutable testimony, they compiled a quantity of revealing information on the mysterious town. The manifestation confronting them represented something far more complicated that simple superstition or religious racketeering. The specific problem of Cabaruan was linked to the amorphous and seemingly all-pervasive hysteria which anxious villagers called *"Guardia de Honor."* A lemming-like migration was underway in the north. Peasant families from surrounding provinces, particularly La Union and Ilocos Sur, arrived every day in Cabaruan.[39] For a people conditioned to servile acceptance of clerical and proprietary authority, the mass movement constituted a courageous act of spontaneous protest. The pattern of rebellion was devastatingly simple. When the harvest was gathered, farm couples packed up children, pitiful belongings, and poultry; seized the landowner's *palay,* livestock, and carabao; joined like-minded neighbors; and began the liberating trek to the promised land. On arrival, they deposited confiscated rice and

[35] Mayo, *op. cit.,* 182.

[36] The rumors led the commander in Dagupan to observe, "I am convinced that the conditions of affairs at Cabaruan are unhealthy and need some corrective action before a time of possible crisis arrives," *Bell Reports,* 332.

[37] Mayo, *op. cit.,* 181.

[38] "...on my recent trip through Pangasinan I passed and met... dozens of families who said they had come from... La Union and Ilocos Sur, on their way, with carabao, carts, and other domestic belongings to... Cabaruan." *Bell Reports,* 333.

[39] "Some of them are accused of taking all the palay, which their land produced, away with them... (thereby robbing the proprietor.. of his share of the crop), together with the carabao which belonged to the proprietor of the land." *Ibid.*

animals in communal granaries and pens. This seemingly limitless bounty added to the impressive booty collected during terroristic raids on neighboring areas, produced a cornucopian atmosphere verging on perpetual *fiesta.* The town was living parasitically on a large portion of the agricultural yield of at least three provinces.[40] The place virtually reeked with the heady aroma of social revolution.

The peculiar political organization of the community posed greater analytical problems. Ostensibly anarchistic, the town was not chaotic. Opposition to external authority—whether clerical, national, or colonial—was balanced by rigid internal subjection to paternalistic figures. The resplendant headman and his uniformed aides were more than polite dandies. They directed a rigid, *pure* theocracy. Surrounding them was a discipline-producing halo of holiness. A publicity-shunning individual, known simply as Baltazar, had founded the town in 1897. Many residents believed him to be "God Almighty." Antonio Valdez, the glittering headman; Gregorio Claveria, his principal aide; and Maria de la Cruz, their constant companion; were worshiped respectively as "Jesus Christ," the "Holy Ghost," and the "Virgin Mary." The twelve lieutenants were reverently regarded as the "Savior's Apostles."[41] Such an omnipotent assemblage made anything seem possible. A developing sense of invincibility powered Cabaruan's gathering momentum.

While there were apparently no apocalyptic pronouncements, the euphoric behavior of the community indicated that the millenium was at hand. Mass elation of such magnitude can be attributed to few factors other than collective anticipation experienced by the elect on the eve of a final reckoning. The corrupt world would be transformed. Justice would replace oppression. If they conceived of the new era in simple terms, utterly incomprehensible to their more sophisticated contemporaries, it was because they were uncomplicated men and women. Pre-political rural folk seldom aspire to an affluent utopia. They "conceive of the good society as a just sharing of austerity rather than a dream of riches for all."[42] While awaiting retribution, it was the responsibility of the predestined to strike down perpetrators of evil. Blacklists of sinners, particularly landowners and apostates, were compiled. True believers convinced themselves that when the great day came, lands of those marked for extinction would be divided among the members of the organization. Cabaruan's wide-ranging raiders, accordingly, did not strike in a hit-or-miss fashion. They preyed specifically on those obviously unfit to enter "the chosen kingdom of the *Guardia de Honor.*"[43]

The town's impossible "economy" bothered regimental officers in Dagupan more than its unorthodox "theology."[44] The soaring population quickly

---

[40] Mayo, *op. cit.,* 182. After the movement had been suppressed, a member of the Philippine Commission observed, "On a trip to Lingayen I saw the persons who had impersonated God, the Son, and the Virgin Mary in a provincial jail." Worcester, *op. cit.,* 944.

[41] Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels,* 82.

[42] United States, War Department, *Report 1901* (Washington, 1902), I, Part 3, "Report of Brigadier General J. H. Smith, U.S.A.," 114. Cited hereafter as *Smith Reports.*

[43] "This religious fanaticism might be harmless if it did lead its ignorant followers to the adoption of harmful views concerning rights of property and other material things." *Bell Reports,* 333.

[44] *Ibid.,* 334.

consumed confiscated provisions from Cabaruan's communal *bodegas* and bamboo corrals. Mounting pressure to meet the imminent crisis produced two equilibrium-shattering results. On the one hand, disputes over the acquisition and distribution of food shook the doctrinal unity of the leaders. A disgruntled lesser prophet led a minor hegira to Santa Ana, a barrio of Asingan town.[45] There, he established a new spiritual refuge. Ilocanos fleeing personal wildernesses could now choose between rival lands of milk and honey. Santa Ana quickly became a full-blown reflection of Cabaruan. By March 1, 1901, ten thousand people had collected in the "New Jerusalem." On the other hand, Cabaruan passed the economic point of no return. Still absorbing droves of ecstatic pilgrims, it achieved a peak population of twenty-five thousand early in 1901. The resulting frantic quest for food led terroristic bands to modify their tactics. Specific attacks on selected *principales* were supplemented with an ever-increasing number of random assaults on humble outsiders. Small farmers who had tacitly supported and secretly enjoyed *Guardia* activities directed at the rich, turned against the movement when it unleased its righteous fury on the poor.[46]

With mounting waves of terror sweeping Pangasinan's sectarian sea, aroused officers in Dagupan moved to still the turbulence. Judgment Day came, but not in the vague fraternal form envisioned by members of the *Guardia.* It materialized suddenly and overpoweringly in blue uniforms, bristling bayonets, and a provost marshall. On March 3, 1901, Cabaruan and Santa Ana were occupied by infantry battalions. Ruthlessly efficient platoons sought out the "'Trinity" and the "Virgin." The omnipotent trio and their charismatic handmaiden were arrested, shackled, and blasphemously marched off to an army stockade in Urdaneta. Shortly thereafter, they were unceremoniously joined by twelve dispirited apostles.[47] With their redeemers in chains, the budding self-confidence of Cabaruan's inhabitants withered to traditional subservience. By nightfall, the first crestfallen *tao* were preparing for humiliating returns to their old communities.

The dreary diaspora took several months. March and April saw the counter-migration reach its depressing peak under the persistent prodding of American soldiers. A hard core of faithful remained in the dusty ruins of Cabaruan to await the military tribunal's decision. The Court declared Antonio Valdez and Gregorio Claveria guilty on multiple counts of murder and terrorism. It sentenced them to death. Other leaders, found guilty of aiding and abetting the activities of the headmen, received long prison terms. On June 1, 1901, in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Valdez and Claveria were publicly hanged.[48] "Jesus" and the "Holy Ghost" were dead. So, apparently, was the *Guardia de Honor.*

It all seemed over. Cabaruan and Santa Ana dwindled back to sleeping settlements, dreaming fitfully of bygone notoriety. Ilocanos went home or—if that grim alternative seemed too unbearable—joined their ubiquitous broth-

---

[45] Silent villagers became extremely vocal early in 1901 providing clear proof of widespread murder and terrorism to American authorities in Dagupan. Mayo, *op. cit.,* 182-83.

[46] *Smith Reports,* 114.

[47] *Smith Reports,* 118.

[48] Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels.* 91.

ers in other parts of the Philippines. Except for those who had painfully felt its wrath, or those who had been temporarily transformed by its delirious aspirations, the contagion was forgotten almost as quickly as it had appeared. The patterns followed the classic model of shattered peasant movements throughout the world. Defeat breeds despair. When the frenzy subsides, observed a compassionate student of European protests, nothing is left "but the small group of... true believers, and a dispirited mass waiting for the next great moment. And if that small group should be dispersed—by death, or emigration, or the systematic attention of the police, nothing at all remains except a bitter consciousness of defeat."[49]

Filipino farmers, however, have a tenacious hold on hope. The spark of revitalization survived. Remnants of the old organization formed a secret society which kept the spectre of Cabaruan alive. When the army withdrew from Pangasinan, neophyte provincial officials and green constabularymen had to deal with a treacherous undercurrent of peasant anarchism which surfaced from time to time in small, violent upheavals. A minor uprising occurred in Natividad in 1903.[50] Similar incidents of diminishing intensity continued for another seven years. After 1919, the records of the Argus-eyed Constabulary no longer mention the *Guardia de Honor.* Anonymity, however, did not necessarily mean extinction. The 1920's witnessed the appearance of a new generation of religious rebels. *Colorum* agonies reminiscent of the *Guardia's* birthpangs plagued Central and Northern Luzon. In January 1931, they reached climax in the uprising at Tayug, Pangasinan. Thirty years stand between the two expressions. But less than twenty miles divided the *Guardia's* Cabaruan, and the *Colorum's* Tayug.

Both manifestations—together with a score of other obscure rural protests—deserve the respectful attention of scholars. Within them lie the outlines of the Little Tradition in the Philippines. Had such a widespread and persistent movement as the *Guardia* appeared at another juncture, it would have received undivided post-mortem concentration from the historical fraternity. Occuring in 1880, it would probably have been classified as embryonic popular nationalism. Flaring in 1920, it would very likely have been interpreted as an unsophisticated but heroic gesture to achieve social justice. It rose and fell, however, at the century's turn. As a consequence, it disappeared in the violent cross currents of the Revolution and the Filipino-American War. By ignoring it, historians have consigned the mysterious town and its wonderfully-defiant resident to the limbo of lunatics and lost causes. They deserved a better fate.

---

[49] See "Report of the Governor of the Province of Pangasinan," in *Report of the Philippine Commission, 1904,* Part I, 583

[50] *Annual Report of the Director of Constabulary, 1909* (Manila, 1910), 6.

LEONARD WOOD: HIS FIRST YEAR AS GOVERNOR GENERAL 1921-1922 *

MICHAEL ONORATO

FORTY-FIVE YEARS AGO THIS OCTOBER 15, LEONARD WOOD became the seventh American governor general of the Philippine Islands. At the insistence of President Harding, as well as many Filipino and American leaders, he agreed to accept the post for one year.[1] In that year, it was expected that he would clean up the debris left by the "New Era" of Francis Burton Harrison. He would stay a year and then return home to a position at the University of Pennsylvania. As provost of that great university, he would have ample opportunity to repair his political fortunes. Yet, he was to remain in the Philippines for six long years.

His first year has been characterized as one of harmony and cooperation. But this was hardly true. Leonard Wood would find it impossible to get the government out of business. He would also find himself enmeshed in the backwash of the Quezon-Osmeña rift. Still, in comparison to what had been anticipated by many Americans and Filipinos, that first year was very calm. Compared to the years that followed the cabinet crisis of 1923, that first year was very harmonious.[2]

I

Leonard Wood was under no illusion as to any supposed honor his government bestowed upon him when it urged him to be governor general. He was aware that he was jeopardizing his reputation by becoming chief executive of the Philippines so soon after the publication of the Wood-Forbes Report. Earlier in the year, he had told Resident Commissioner Jaime C. de Veyra that the Filipino people would have every right to be angry with any commission that scrutinized them. Moreover, he pointed out that the next governor general would find things difficult after the publication of a commission's report. Yet, Wood had always put service to his country above personal interests.[3]

---

* The research was made possible with the support of a grant from the American Philosophical Society in 1964.

[1] It was with even greater reluctance that Wood headed the joint mission with W. Cameron Forbes. See M. Onorato, "The Wood-Forbes Mission," *Philippine Historical Bulletin*, VIII (March, 1964), 1-19.

[2] For an analysis of the Cabinet Crisis, see M. Onorato, "Governor General Leonard Wood, Manuel L. Quezon, and the Cabinet Crisis of July 17, 1923," in a forthcoming Quezon number of the *Philippine Historical Bulletin*.

[3] Leonard Wood to Albert R. Brunker, Personal, June 30, 1922, *Papers of Leonard Wood* (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.) Box 159; Jaime C. de Veyra to Osmeña, Strictly Confidential cable, February 19, 1921, *Papers of Manuel Luis Quezon* (Quezoniana Collection, National Library, Manila); Victor G. Heiser, *An American Doctor's Odyssey* (Seventeenth imp.; New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1937), 419f.

The Filipino leaders, therefore, accepted Wood with mixed emotions. They were curious and anxious, especially in the light of his Report.[4] His message to the Legislature, however, put them at ease. His willingness to work with the leaders prompted the *Philippines Herald* (October 18, 1921) to say

> It is clear, therefore, that the new chief executive deserves nothing but the loyal support of all because he has nothing but the interest of all in his program of government.

The Legislature was quick to pass a resolution of support. As Rafael Palma put it to ex-Governor Harrison in 1924, the leadership was willing to support Wood in the hope that he would further Filipino autonomy.[5]

Some of the Americans in the Philippines felt that Wood had remained behind to reverse the course set by the Harrison administration. They were rudely jolted by his refusal to play their game.[6] Moreover, his decision to retain the Council of State, as well as those men who had served in Harrison's cabinet, infuriated many Americans. In fact, by the time of the cabinet crisis, Wood had lost the respect of most of the American community. They believed that he had knuckled under to Quezon and Osmeña.[7]

II

On September 19, 1921, Secretary of War John W. Weeks instructed Wood to remove the Philippine government from the businesses that it had acquired during the "New Era." He was to do this quickly but with little loss to the government. In the event that he could not negotiate the immediate sale of those enterprises, he was to see that the government's investment was safeguarded by efficient and competent management.[8]

In March 1922, the Board of Control which was composed of the Governor General, Osmeña and Quezon, decided that the Manila Railroad should be placed under private management. The railroad was to be leased to the J. G. White Company (New York) for a seven per cent return based on the net income. Moreover, the proposed lease had safeguards which were designed to protect the people from exploitation. But Quezon and Osmeña soon found fault with the plan. With an eye on the general election in June, they were

---

[4] Gregorio F. Zaide, *The Philippines Since the British Invasion* (Manila: Philippine Education Co., 1949), 259; Maximo M. Kalaw, "The Political Problems That Confront Governor-General Wood," *Philippines Herald* (Manila), October 19, 1921, 4.

[5] Palma to Harrison, April 24, 1924, *Papers of Francis Burton Harrison* (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.)

[6] Walter Wilgus, "Cleaning up the Philippines," *Review of Reviews*, 76 (August, 1927), 149.

[7] Colin MacRae Hoskins to Harrison, February 17, 1922, James Ross to Harrison, March 3, 1923, Ernest Westerhouse to Harrison, July 4, 1923, *Harrison Papers;* Camilo Osias, "A Year of Governor Wood's Administration," in Quezon and Osias, *Governor-General Wood and the Filipino Cause* (Manila: Manila Book Co., 1924), 83. Wood, in fact, believed that the Council of State served as a link between the legislative and executive branches of government. See Wood to Secretary of War Weeks, November 1, 1922, *Wood Papers*, Box 158.

[8] Weeks to Wood, September 19, 1921, *Wood Papers*, Box 158. For a Filipino scholar's view of Woods efforts to comply with Week's directive, see Jose P. Apostol, *The Economic Policy of the Philippine Government: Ownership and Operation of Business* (Manila: University of the Philippines, 1927), 93-101.

worried over possible political repercussions. In an effort to save them from any embarrassment, Wood suggested that the Board of Control permit the railroad's Board of Directors to appoint a manager which could be either an individual or a corporation.[9] But when they rejected this suggestion, Wood left it to them to decide what they would do with the MRR.[10] As a result, the railroad was never leased nor sold.

At the same time he was discussing the future of the MRR, Wood was looking at the Philippine National Bank. On April 29, the Board of Control agreed that the PNB should liquidate its holdings as quickly as possible. There were to be no further loans to sugar centrals unless money was needed to facilitate the shipment of crops. The Bank was not to be permitted to risk its depositors' funds in the form of long-term, non-liquid loans. The PNB was to be converted to an agricultural bank as soon as it was feasible.[11]

The general manager of the PNB, E. W. Wilson, had other ideas. Along with many Filipinos, he had become convinced that his bank had a definite banking role to play in the development of the Philippines.[12] Finally, the Board of Control, together with the Bank's Board of Directors, called for his resignation because of his refusal to follow their directives.[13] Yet, the fight that Wilson and others had put up, together with the refusal of Osmeña and Quezon to stand by their earlier decision, meant that the PNB was saved. In May 1923, Wood informed Washington that the Bank would remain a regular commercial institution. It would be administered, however, along more conservative and safe lines.[14]

During 1922, Wood suggested the sale of several sugar centrals that owed the PNB some $18,500,000 in unpaid loans. In February 1923, Salvador Laguda, Secretary of Commerce and Communications, suggested—with Quezon's backing—that the government sell only those centrals still hopelessly in debt. Thus, some protection would be afforded those centrals which might otherwise have been forced to compete with the marginal bank-supported sugar centrals. However, at the last moment, Quezon decided against the sales and Wood, once again, acquiesced.[15]

---

[9] March 10, 12, April 8, 1922, *Wood Diary*, Box 16.

[10] May 9, 1922, *Wood Diary*, Box 16. According to the general manager of the Philippine National Bank, Osmeña and Quezon kept dodging the issue of the railroad whenever Wood tried to bring the matter to their attention. See E. W. Wilson to Harrison, Personal and Confidential, July 14, 1922, *Harrison Papers*.

[11] Wood to E. W. Wilson, April 29, 1922, *Wood Diary*, Box 16.

[12] May 16, December 13, 1922, *Wood Diary*, Boxes 16, 17; Wood to Weeks, August 31, 1922, *ibid.*, Box 17.

[13] January 12, March 28, April 6, 1923, *Wood Diary*, Box 18. An interesting facet of Wilson's stewardship of the PNB is the fact that the Filipino leadership turned on him despite his efforts to save the Bank from closure. See Wilson to Harrison, May 20, 1924, *Harrison Papers*, Box 47. After the cabinet crisis, E. W. Wilson was redeemed—he became an outstanding American banker. See Alfredo Samson, "Too much 'Government by Army Officers' caused the Break," *Philippine Press Bulletin*, V (August, 1923), 2. When he resigned from the Bank, his resignation hardly caused a ripple in the Manila press. This was, no doubt, because the politicians wanted him, an American, out of the Bank.

[14] Wood to General Frank McIntyre, cable, May 19, 1923, *Wood Cablegram Book*, Box 189.

[15] January 20, 1923, *Wood Diary*, Box 18; Apostol, 97.

Despite his inability to carry out the instructions of Secretary Weeks, Wood did everything to get honest and competent management for the government businesses. Because of his determination to keep politics out of the administration of the government enterprises, the PNB and MRR, together with several of the other businesses, began to show some profit before Wood's death.[16]

III

In spite of the several setbacks he sustained, Wood was satisfied with the overall cooperation given him by the leaders during his first year in office. While the Quezon-Osmeña rift caused some of the government's plans to be set aside, he was still pleased with the progress made.[17]

During that first year, his request for government economy resulted in the budget being reduced from $52,000,000 to $37,500,000. This was done without any curtailment of public works, school construction or public health services. At the Philippine government's urgent request, the United States Congress permitted a further increase in the debt limit of the Philippine Islands. This was the second time in two years that Congress raised the limit of indebtedness.[18] As a result of these bond issues, the peso slowly moved back to par. This caused Camilo Osias to write:

> One of the greatest services for which Governor Wood must be given unstinted praise is his determination to stabilize credit... This is a national problem which merits the backing of every patriotic man and, making allowances for honest differences of opinion, Governor Wood should be given active support in this to the very last day of his service in the Philippines whenever that day will be.[19]

By June 1923, the Legal Reserve Fund of the government was restored. There was now gold behind the peso. Economy was the watchword that first year. Wood was satisfied with the confidence placed in the government by the people and their leaders, especially since his administration was forced to increase the national debt.[20]

The successes of that first year did not revolve only about fiscal matters. Rinderpest—the dread cattle disease—was curbed. The courts regained the confidence of the people. Efficiency, honesty and competence were restored to the insular government. Public health became a matter of serious concern to the legislators. At the behest of Governor General Wood, who had been

---

[16] Raymond L. Buell, "Philippine Independence," *Foreign Policy Association Information Service,* VI (April 30, 1930), 66.

[17] Wood to Guy Murchie, September 20, 1922, Wood to Elihu Root, November 11, 1922, *Wood Papers,* Boxes 160, 162.

[18] For the congressional debate relative to increasing the debt limit, see *Congressional Record,* 62, pt. 6 (May 5, 1922), 6408, 6418-6421, 6423.

[19] Osias, pp. 87-88. As Osias wrote his article, it was believed that Wood's departure for the States was imminent. Because of the praise he gave Wood, Osias was sharply criticized. See Osias to Harrison, April 12, 1923, *Harrison Papers.*

[20] Wood to Brunker, May 12, 1922, *Wood Papers;* Wood to Brunker, Personal, June 30, 1922, *loc. cit.;* Wood to Root, November 11, 1922, *loc. cit.; Philippines Herald* (Manila), June 10, 1923, 1.

a doctor, the first national child welfare congress was held in December 1921.[21]

The leper colony at Culion came under the sympathetic eye of Leonard Wood. At his request, the Legislature appropriated $500,000 for treatment and research at Culion. In September 1922, he wrote that his efforts for the lepers were worth all the anxiety and loneliness he endured since taking office.[22]

IV

His efforts to sell the government businesses were not the only instances where Wood found himself caught up in the whirlwind of Philippine politics. As a result of the Quezon-Osmeña rift of 1921-1922, he found his constitutional authority challenged by Quezon and his followers.

Within three weeks of assuming office, Governor General Wood became the focus of a political attack. Like all his predecessors, he had sought the advice of Sergio Osmeña concerning some appointments. It was established practice. In fact, W. Cameron Forbes advised Wood to seek Osmeña's counsel.[23] As the speaker of the Philippine Assembly (and later the House of Representatives) and as president of the Nacionalista party, Osmeña was the logical choice as advisor to the governors-general since 1907. By 1921, however, Osmeña's iron grip on the Legislature was waning. By turning to the Speaker, Wood had antagonized Quezon's followers in the Senate. Since the Senators had the power of confirmation, they felt that Wood should have consulted them.[24] The furor died down when the *Philippines Herald* (November 4, 1921) reported that Wood had promised to discuss appointments in the future with the legislative heads of both houses. This tempest in the Legislature was symptomatic of the growing antipathy between Manuel Quezon and the Speaker.

The second discordant note was sounded in March 1922. As a consequence of the split in the Nacionalista party, only five bills came out of the regular session of the Legislature. Because of the fiscal needs of the government, Wood proclaimed an extra session. Osmeña, however, asked the Governor General if the Legislature might be permitted during the special session to consider those private bills which had been passed by one house, but not by the other, during the regular session.[25] Wood gave the necessary consent as a gesture of goodwill and cooperation.[26] When the extra session

[21] Walter Robb, "Wood's Philippines After One Year's Work," *Outlook*, 133 (January 31, 1923), 220. Writing in 1925, Dr. Frank C. Laubach considered the child congress to be Wood's greatest achievement in the Philippines. See *The People of the Philippines* (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1925), 425.

[22] Wood to Murchi, September 20, 1922, *loc. cit.* Soon after the cabinet crisis of 1923, Wood was ridiculed for his efforts on behalf of the lepers. See *Philippines Herald* (Manila), July 28, 1923, 8.

[23] Forbes to Wood, October 5, 1921, *Papers of General Frank R. McCoy* (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.), Box 28.

[24] *Philippines Herald* (Manila), November 3, 1921, 1-2.

[25] February 6, 1922, *Wood Diary*, Box 16; Wood to Osmeña, February 14, 1922, *ibid.*, Box 16.

[26] Wood to Secretary of War Weeks, Confidential, March 31, 1922, *Wood Papers*, Box 162.

adjourned, the government's measures, save one, had been enacted and quickly signed into law.

As for the private bills, some fifty were sent up to the Governor General for his signature. Wood, however, felt obliged to veto sixteen of them. One bill wanted to void the new assessment law upon which the budget was based. The other vetoed measures were either poorly worded, obviously political in nature, or ill-advised in view of the financial crisis in the Philippines.[27]

Immediately, Wood became the target of attack. Maximo M. Kalaw, writing in the *Philippines Herald* (March 19, 1922), accused Wood of destroying the Jones Act through his misuse of the veto power. Since the governor general was not elected by the Filipino people, his vetoes were wrong unless suggested and supported by the people themselves. Kalaw pointed to Harrison's refusal to veto any measure, especially after he had been attacked by the politicians for having dared to use the veto power. Thus, Harrison turned down only five measures. On March 31, 1922, the *Philippines Herald* carried another article by Kalaw. Having learned that Wood vetoed all sixteen bills upon advise of his cabinet, Kalaw argued that the Governor General should have sought legislative advice since the Legislature alone reflects the will of the people. The cabinet, he pointed out, while Filipino except for the vice-governor who served as secretary of education, was nevertheless part of the executive branch; and since Wood did not consider the cabinet as responsible to the Legislature, the vetoes were not the result of the people's will as expressed through their Legislature. What Professor Kalaw probably did not know was that Wood had consulted with Quezon as to the merits of the vetoed bills.[28] It might have been interesting to see how Kalaw would have continued his line of reasoning.

On March 27, *La Nacion*—the Democrata party organ—asked why the Governor General was being attacked for his use of the veto power. Harrison, by his lack of control, brought ruin upon the country; Wood, because he meant to do his duty, was being abused. (Curiously enough, *La Nacion*—a year later—bitterly abused Wood for supposedly knuckling under to Quezon.) Moreover, the newspaper continued, he had informed the Legislature why he could not sign those sixteen bills. This was more than the Senate was willing to do when he sent in his appointments for confirmation.

In the course of the controversy, the *Philippines Herald* (March 26, 1922) published[29] an editorial cartoon which showed Governor General Wood murdering a Filipina, who represented Filipino autonomy, with a two-

---

[27] March 10, 1922, *Wood Diary*, Box 16; Wood to Weeks, Confidential, March 31, 1922, *loc. cit.*; J. Ralston Hayden, *The Philippines, A Study in National Development* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1950), 220-221.

[28] March 10, 1922, *Wood Diary*, Box 16.

[29] On March 29, the publisher, Conrado Benitez, apologized to Wood for the cartoon. He admitted, however, that the cartoon did captivate the editors. This, in spite of the fact that the cartoon did not reflect the paper's attitude toward Wood. See Conrado Benitez to Wood, March 29, 1922, *Wood Papers*, Box 159. The day before, in a public apology, the paper stated that the cartoon did not represent an actuality but rather a possibility. The paper went on to say that a caption which would have conveyed this meaning had been foolishly

edged dagger entitled "veto power." Since Wood refused to become excited over the cartoon,[30] the furor among the American community in Manila died down.[31] Wood's use of the veto power, which he exercised throughout his six years of service, has left him open to the charge of being an autocrat.[32] He was hardly what he has been painted.

On November 9, the Filipino cabinet members called Wood to a meeting. They demanded to know if they were responsible to him or the Legislature. It was really a question for which they already knew the answer. But Senate President Manuel Quezon had just summoned them to his office to suggest that they force the issue of cabinet responsibility. Wood told them that the Jones Act made them his secretaries; that he had been increasing the measure of their initiative and responsibility; that his predecessor's acquiescense resulted in chaos; that they could go before the Legislature if summoned provided that he was first informed. (The governor general had the right, in cases of public security, of refusing to grant the legislators the right of questioning cabinet members on the floor of the Legislature.) Wood, finally, told them their personal alternative was to protest—to Congress for having created the existing system of government—or else resign.

Annoyed at this attempt to provoke an incident, Wood summoned Quezon and his protegee, Speaker Manuel Roxas, to his office. During their meeting, Quezon alluded to the spirit of the Jones Act which, he asserted, placed policy-making power solely in the hands of the Legislature. When Wood pointed out that the organic act gave the governor general a role in policy-planning, the Senate President changed his tack and asked why both branches of the government could not work in harmony. Wood agreed. He went on to say that this had been their first argument since he assumed office. He continued by pointing out that it was discourteous, if not highly irregular, for him—the Senate President—to have summoned the cabinet to his office.

---

omitted. See *Philippines Herald* (Manila) March 28, 1922, 1, 5. Wood, however, learned that friends of the paper had urged the editors to claim that a modifying caption had been deleted. They were also to point out that the cartoon was not intended as an insult. See Philippine Constabulary Intelligence Report, March 28, 1922, *Wood Papers*, Box 162. The most reasonable explanation for the cartoon, with or without the modifying caption, was stated by Benitez; the cartoon simply captivated the editors. Cf. General Carlos P. Romulo, *I Walked with Heroes* (New York: Avon Book, 1961), 123.

[30] Wood was on an inspection tour when he learned of the incident and the commotion it was causing among the American community in Manila. See Franks to Wood, radiogram, March 26, 1922, *Wood Diary*, Box 16. He urged his office to prevent any further American outbursts as soon as the message was received. See Wood to Franks, radiogram, March 28, 1922, *ibid.*, Box 16.

[31] The American reaction in Manila gave Charles E. Russell, who, for many years, had been in the pay of the Washington office of the Philippine Press Bureau, an opportunity to criticize the use of the veto power. See "Philippines: Independent or Vassal?," *The Nation*, 114 (April 26, 1922), 487-488.

[32] Wood realized that his use of the veto power would be misinterpreted. However, the Legislature, by its last hour enactments, allowed no time for a bill to be sent back for modification. As soon as the session ended, the Legislature adjourned. Had there been time for revision, some of the bills that Wood was forced to veto might have become law. See Wood to Weeks, Confidential, March 31, 1922, *loc. cit.*; *Congressional Record*, 67, pt. 5 (March 5, 1926), 5091 (Underhill).

The conference ended on a note of reconciliation and pledges of friendship and cooperation. Wood had shown Quezon that he meant to adhere to the Jones Act. Yet, he demonstrated his willingness to achieve harmony. The Senate President, for his part, had shown his ability to cause trouble for Wood.[33] The next day, the *Philippines Herald* (November 10, 1922) accused the Governor General of taking too much power unto himself. The following day, the newspapers carried Quezon's denial of trouble between himself and Wood.

V

The efforts made that first year to restore Philippine fiscal stability, to repair the damages caused by the "New Era," and to revivify the Philippines, were not those of Leonard Wood alone. What he wanted to do that year was to make the Filipinos conscious of their nationhood and responsibilities toward each other. As one of Wood's critics put it: "if all the things were done... that the newspapers have said would be done by Governor Wood, he would be able to establish the Millenium in the Islands."[34] This publicity was what Wood wanted; he felt that the ordinary individual had been left in ignorance too long by the politicians.[35] As J. Ralston Hayden has so well stated: the political leaders had merely to oppose Governor General Wood and none of the accomplishments of that first year would have happened. The Legislature had merely to refuse the enactment of the government's legislative program.[36] In fact, it can be said that Wood's entire six years in Malacañan, regardless of what critics have written,[37] would have been a complete and total failure had it not been for the cooperation of the political leaders, whether openly or otherwise.[38] Even the support he received from Washington, would not have been enough to explain the achievements of six years. Those who claim that Wood *restored* honesty, efficiency and competence in the government service, as well as doing so many other fine things, miss the mark: the Jones Act made it constitutionally impossible for

---

[33] November 9, 1922, *Wood Diary*, Box 17. Wood felt that Quezon's attempt to provoke a fight was somehow connected with the Democratic victory in the American off-year election. See Wood to McIntyre, cable, November 13, 1922, Wood to McIntyre, Confidential, cable, November 17, 1922, *Wood Cablegram Book, loc. cit.*

[34] Wilson to Harrison, Personal and Confidential, July 14, 1922, *Harrison Papers*. During the Parliamentary Mission (1922), Quezon and Osmeña urged that Wood allow them to share the glory of the achievements that had been accomplished. See Memorandum for the Secretary of War, Confidential, June 14, 1922, *The Papers of Warren G. Harding* (The Ohio State Museum, Columbus).

[35] Wood to Murchie, September 30, 1922, *Wood Papers*, Box 160, Wood to Luther Parker, Personal, November 16, 1923, *ibid.*, Box 166.

[36] Dean C. Worcester and J. Ralston Hayden, *The Philippines Past and Present* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1930), 759.

[37] For the typical view of Wood and his "lack" of success in the Philippines, see Grael Grunder and William Livezey, *The Philippines and the United States* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951), 182.

[38] Cf. Worcester and Hayden, 769; Hayden, 183; Henry L. Stimson, "Future Philippine Policy Under the Jones Act.," *Foreign Affairs*, V (April, 1927), 469; Pedro de la Llana, *A Book of Comment and Criticism* (Manila: n. p., 1926), 50.

him to work alone. Whatever successes there were that first year, or at any time, must be attributed to Quezon, Osmeña and Roxas, as well as to Leonard Wood.[39]

The political leaders cooperated with Wood that first year, as they did later on, because they appreciated his desire to help the Filipino people. Moreover, Governor General Wood simply refused that first year, as he did throughout his six years, to let anything stand between him and the leaders. Wherever possible, he yielded.

On December 3, 1922, Wood cabled his resignation as provost of the University of Pennsylvania to the trustees of that institution. He regretted that he had to forego the pleasure of working with his country's youth. But he had an unfinished task in the Philippines.[40] There was so much that had to be done before he could leave. He believed that if the government could present a four-year program to the Legislature and have it enacted, then his job was finished.[41] His job was never finished. Continuous political strife among the leaders would prevent Leonard Wood from ever realizing his dream.

[39] The old cliche that Wood was incapable of "government by compadres" is a by-product of Quezon's public anti-Wood stance resulting from the cabinet crisis. Nothing made the Democrata party more furious than Wood's close working relationship with Quezon (despite ups and downs) from 1921 until Wood's death.

[40] Wood to Chairman, Board of Trustee, cable, December 3, 1922, *Wood Cablegram Book*, Box 189.

[41] Wood to Forbes, December 7, 1922, *Wood Papers*, Box 160.

THE AMERICAN MINORITY IN THE PHILIPPINES DURING THE PREWAR COMMONWEALTH PERIOD

GERALD E. WHEELER

A POPULAR IMAGE OF THE AMERICAN MINORITY IN THE Philippines during the prewar Commonwealth Period is easily conjured by using the phrase "Manila Americans." For the reader in the Philippines or one who has been to Manila since World War II, this brings to mind Forbes Park, Makati, San Lorenzo Village, compounds, security guards, and the American School. For the prewar period counterparts: Pasay, Taft Avenue, Ermita, and the American Chamber of Commerce. We call this a popular image, or stereotype, because this is the way many contemporary writers characterized the Americans, and this is the picture we have of them in historical literature. Senator Harry B. Hawes, long associated with Philippine affairs, sponsor of independence legislation, counsel to Manuel Quezon's government, and American lobbyist for the Philippine Sugar Association, helped to create one image of the American community. He did not coin the phrase, but he described the "Manila American" cuttingly in his pro-independence tract, *Philippine Uncertainty:*

> 'Manila Americans' are unconsciously doing more than any other group to bring independence. Leading the fight against it by their disregard or open contempt for the Filipino's pride of race and by their covert attacks on his character and capacity, they are promoting solidarity among the natives and advertising, by their hostile activities, the very cause they so stubbornly and unfairly oppose.[1]

This was 1932. Ten years later, Florence Horn, in her popularly written Philippine travelogue—*Orphans of the Pacific*—opened a chapter on "Americans" with the comment:

> Americans in Manila are like Americans in Mexico City and Americans in Maracaibo and Hong Kong and Rio de Janeiro. They build for themselves a barricaded American life wherever they are. They insulate themselves as thoroughly as possible against the life of the country they are in... They grouse continually about petty inconveniences, and berate this miserable native bitterly and endlessly... The American women heartily despise the Filipinos.[2]

Twenty years after Miss Horn's exegesis on the foibles of the "Manila American," Carlos P. Romulo penned his autobiographical *I Walked with Heroes.* A minor theme that runs through the book is Romulo's, and the Filipino's sensitiveness to the color issue in Filipino-American relations. The Manila Americans are pictured as types that excluded Romulo from their clubs and at a later date would pass up wounded Filipino soldiers on Bataan to give preference to injured white Americans.[3]

---

[1] Harry B. Hawes, *Philippine Uncertainty* (New York, 1932), 97.

[2] Florence Horn, *Orphans of the Pacific, The Philippines* (New York, 1941), 90-91.

[3] General Carlos P. Romulo, *I Walked with Heroes* (New York: Avon Books, 1961), 74-76, 88-91, 103-05, 160-61.

Without belaboring the point further, we can generalize that the historical picture of the American minority has been based on casual accounts and a small amount of autobiographical literature by Americans and Filipinos. Not much has been done in depth. The more scholarly books have dealt with such themes as economic legislation, party movements, independence crusades, and the Japanese occupation, but not with this powerful minority within Philippine society. The University of the Philippines textbook by Teodoro Agoncillo and Oscar Alfonso describes, in a most indirect way, the American community in terms of its "Negative Results" on the Filipinos. Because of the Americans, the Filipinos learned dirty politics, developed a taste for "stateside" food and wares, acquired a fondness for gangster movies, rejected the philosophers, became materialistic, and have been saddled ever since with a colonial mentality. This catalogue of criticism in Agoncillo and Alfonso's *A Short History of the Filipino People* (1960) culminates the chapter on the "Results of the American Occupation." It represents a University professor's indictment of the American community. To that observer the Americans of the Commonwealth Period were political-minded, materialistic, anti-intellectual, and economically self-seeking.[4]

Aside from the visceral response that rises naturally in an American from reading the Agoncillo and Alfonso text, this historian must raise another protest. The foregoing descriptions are terribly oversimplified. Eight or nine thousand Americans simply cannot be squeezed into these generalizations. Not even the economic or political elites among them can be so easily typed. Within the limits of this article we cannot possibly draw the "true picture" of the American community; but it may be useful to discuss its diversity.

The census of 1939 revealed that 8,709 Americans, excluding the military forces, were resident in the Philippines. They were distributed from the Cagayan Valley to Sulu, but some 5,149 were concentrated in the City of Manila and neighboring Rizal Province. More than half of all Americans (4,687) were children, dependents, retirees, or individuals otherwise "non-gainfully employed." By census classification, the 4,022 "gainfully employed" American citizens fell into these larger groups:[5]

Agricultural workers or managers	174
Domestic and hotel workers	127
Professionals	764
Clergy, religious workers, professors, teachers	527
Public servants	187
Manufacturing owners, managers, workers	463
Clerical	311
Trade (wholesale or retail) owners, managers, workers	691
Mining and quarrying owners, managers, workers	349
Transportation, forestry, and other industries	429
	4,022

[4] Teodoro A. Agoncillo and Oscar M. Alfonso, *A Short History of the Filipino People* (Diliman: University of the Philippines Press, 1960), 445-7.

[5] Commonwealth of the Philippines, Bureau of the Census, *Census of 1939* (4 vols.; Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1941). For convenience in tabulation, the author has combined several census categories.

As can be seen, more than half (2,253) of all working Americans were connected with business enterprises; but a significant minority (527) was teaching in the country's schools or was in missionary activity. One might assume that the very diversity of their occupations and scattered locations helped to reduce uniformity of viewpoint in these people.

Approached in another way, it may be observed that Americans were present in all but three (Batanes, Marinduque, Romblon) of the Philippine provinces. In many ways they were a much more "visible" minority in a rural province than the 3,191 Americans who were swamped by the 623,492 residents of Manila. Because they were so few in most provinces, and because of the nature of their occupations, Americans did not compete with the Filipinos and did not arouse animosities as easily as their countrymen in Manila. By 1922, ex-Governor General Francis B. Harrison was quite aware that his fellow Americans had trod on many toes in the capital, but he also commented that "In the provinces the relations between the two races are even better than in Manila . . . ." [6] Perhaps the 340 teachers, clergy, and religious workers outside Manila helped to develop that "image" in the provinces that has come down to us today. It is tempting to conjecture that Filipino loyalty to America, in the provinces during World War II, would never have existed had the "Manila American" stereotype prevailed throughout the archipelago.

When we turn from the realm of census figures to that of ideas, we can observe that on very few subjects of political, economic, social, or military content was there unanimity in the thinking of the American minority of the Commonwealth Period. An examination of a few items can demonstrate this.

From the spring of 1936, until the Japanese broke through the beach defenses of Luzon, six years later, President Quezon's military adviser and his staff argued that the Philippines could repulse a Japanese invasion. In fact, General Douglas MacArthur's 1936 plan for the development of a Philippine Army was built on this premise.[7] MacArthur was joined in his optimism by Major General L. R. Holbrook, the Commanding General of U.S. Army forces in the Philippines.[8] These views were in direct contradiction to those expressed, three years before, by Brigadier General S. D. Embick who designed the Manila Harbor defense and Major General E. E. Booth who held Holbrook's position. Embick and Booth did not believe the Philippines could be defended against Japan and merely hoped Manila Harbor could be held.[9]

---

[6] Francis Burton Harrison, *The Corner-Stone of Philippine Independence: A Narrative of Seven Years* (New York, 1922), 273-4.

[7] Office of the Commonwealth President, *Report on National Defense in the Philippines* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1936), 52 pp. General MacArthur submitted the *Report* to President Quezon on April 27, 1936; Quezon submitted the *Report* to the National Assembly on June 18, 1936. See also *Manila Daily Bulletin*, August 5, 1936.

[8] Major General L. R. Holbrook to General Malin Craig, Manila, July 27 and August 6, 1936 in Record Group 94, file AG 660.2 Phil. Dept. (8/6/36), U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C. (Hereafter cited as RG 94, file AG —, USNA.)

[9] Mark Skinner Watson, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), 414-15.

While not saying so to the Filipinos, General MacArthur wrote to General Malin Craig, Chief of Staff U. S. Army, that his expectations for defending the Philippines rested on the United States providing "a practically impregnable defense for the Islands." [10] But these provisions were never made; in fact, the area of defense in the Philippines was reduced to holding Manila Bay. MacArthur and Holbrook were informed in October 1937, a year after the Philippine National Defense Act was put into operation, that strengthening of the Philippines would depend on "availability of funds," and there would be no enlargement of material and forces except to meet the Manila Harbor defense needs.[11] By January of 1938, the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, was resigned to the fact that the Islands could not be initially defended against a Japanese assault and therefore the United States Pacific Fleet would not steam to the relief of the Filipinos at the outbreak of war.[12] On the other hand, in October, 1938, Rear Admiral G. J. Meyers, the Commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District (Philippines), urged High Commissioner Paul McNutt to press for expansion of Cavite into a major naval base that would be impregnable to Japanese attack. Such a base, the admiral reasoned, would cause the Japanese to abandon any plans to assault the Philippines.[13] As must be expected, the indecision on this basic question of Philippine defense became a problem for all in the American community. Those who wanted America to stay in the Philippines believed the country could be defended; those who wanted the United States to abandon its imperial commitments were pessimistic about the Commonwealth's chances of military survival. There was no "American point of view" on the subject.

In the vital area of economic relationships between the United States and the Philippine Commonwealth, there were stronger differences of viewpoint among the High Commissioners and their staffs than existed in the American community. Both the American Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines advocated a continuing preferential relationship, on a free-trade basis if possible.[14] Except for a few theoretical-

---

[10] General Douglas MacArthur to General Malin Craig, Manila, July 9, 1936, RG 94, file AG 093.5 Phil. Isl. (7/9/36), USNA.

[11] Memoranda between U.S. Army Chief of Staff and His Assistant, Washington, D.C., September 17, 1937, October 19, 1937, RG 94, file 660.2 Phil. Dept., USNA.

[12] Admiral Harry E. Yarnell to Admiral C. C. Bloch, Shanghai, January 21, 1938, Harry E. Yarnell MSS, U.S. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (Hereafter cited as Yarnell MSS, USLC.)

[13] Rear Admiral G. J. Meyers to High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt, Cavite, October 3, 1938, Yarnell MSS, USLC.

[14] The Economic Adviser, Department of State, wrote a memorandum in February, 1935, in which he noted: "The Philippine-American Trade Association was recently formed primarily for the purpose of securing continued trade preferences between the Philippines and the United States, no matter what the political solution of their relationship might be." Memorandum of the Economic Adviser, February 9, 1935 in RG 57, Department of State, file 811b.01/24½, USNA. (Hereafter cited as D/S file —, USNA.) See also *The Tribune* (Manila), May 26, 1940: "Indefinite continuation of free trade relations between the United States and the Philippines... was unanimously urged in a resolution adopted by businessmen at the closing luncheon yesterday of the National For-

minded Americans and the militantly nationalistic "Young Philippines" movement, led by Wenceslao Q. Vinzons, there was little dissent from this point of view in 1935.[15] As early as August, 1934, a steering committee of Filipino and American businessmen was headed by Horace B. Pond, of the Pacific Commercial Company of the Philippines, to "sell" the United States on the advantages of continuing free-trade between it and the Commonwealth.[16] High Commissioner Frank Murphy pressed these views during his 1936 visit to Washington and quickly came into conflict with the Interdepartmental Committee on the Philippines.[17] This government Committee studied American economic foreign policy as it related to Philippine planning, and it had arrived at the position "that the United States should not continue a preferential commercial relationship with the Philippines after independence." [18] The Committee's reasons were rooted in a policy decision arrived at in February, 1936:

> The United States Government has made the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment the cornerstone of its commercial policy. The United States is not only repeatedly proclaiming the wisdom of this principle but it is actively endeavoring to extend its application by persuading other nations to adhere to it.[19]

Obviously, preferences to an independent Philippines would make it difficult to convince the British that they should abandon their empire preferences system.

When Murphy was succeeded by Paul V. McNutt in July, 1937, the High Commissioner's Office continued its support for a long term preferential relationship.[20] It is quite possible that McNutt's sympathy here, along with his poker playing acumen, helped to close the breach that had opened between him and President Quezon during his first months in Manila. But McNutt's support was soon replaced by High Commissioner Francis B. Sayre's coolness toward continued preferences. As an Assistant Secretary of State, and Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Philippines, Sayre became convinced that the extension of preferences to the Philippines would be

---

eign Trade Week celebration under the auspices of the American Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines."

[15] "Memorial to the United States Congressional Mission,... by W. Q. Vinzons, December 26, 1934," (leaflet) Manuel L. Quezon MSS, National Library, Ermita, Manila. (Hereafter cited as Quezon MSS.)

[16] Memorandum by the Economic Adviser, September 7, 1934, D/S file 611.11b3/23, USNA.

[17] Minutes of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Philippines, July 23, 1936, D/S file 611.11b3/203, USNA. See also *The Mindanao Herald* (Zamboanga), September 26, 1936.

[18] The Interdepartmental Committee on the Philippines had a membership which included representatives from the State Department, War Department, Navy Department, Commerce Department, Treasury Department, Agriculture Department, and the U.S. Tariff Commission. Minutes of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Philippines, February 24, 1936, D/S file 611.11b3/160, USNA.

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] Assistant Secretary of State Francis B. Sayre to President F. D. Roosevelt, Washington, October 28, 1938, D/S file 611.11b3/238B, USNA. In this letter Sayre noted that High Commissioner McNutt proposed a broadening of Philippine preferences in the American market and a lengthening past 1946 of this relationship.

harmful to it. He felt that such a policy would cause Filipinos to delay badly needed diversification of their economy. He realized that no Filipino would close down an industry as long as he had a guaranteed profitable market in America. Upon arrival in Manila, as High Commissioner, in August, 1939, Sayre wasted no time in stating his belief that the Filipinos must diversify their industries and markets in order to survive the imposition of American duties applied on a non-preferential basis.[21] While many Filipino entrepreneurs were disturbed by these views, the American business community in Manila was outraged. The new High Commissioner was reversing all that Murphy and McNutt had stood for.

The differences among the High Commissioners on the subject of American economic policy toward the Philippines were matched by equally strong differences concerning the exercise of their powers. Most accounts of High Commissioner Murphy stress the point that he was *simpatico* when it came to Filipinos. Socially, he was gregarious and entertained Filipinos with ease and sincerity. He left the impression of governing so lightly that he had almost abandoned his responsibilities.[22] His relationship with Manuel Quezon was so cordial that the Philippine President-Elect felt free to write a memorandum for him outlining the powers which he believed the High Commissioner should be given. To Quezon, the High Commisisoner was to be a ceremonial figure that observed, reported, but did not interfere.[23] Apparently, Murphy performed to the satisfaction of most Filipinos.

Paul V. McNutt saw things differently and this was to be even truer of Francis B. Sayre. The handsome Indianan determined quite early that he would be no figurehead. Recognizing this after a brief meeting with McNutt in Washington in early 1937, President Quezon drafted a memorandum to President Roosevelt (which he did not send) in which he asked that the High Commissioner's powers be severely curtailed—by act of Congress if necessary.[24] Once in Manila, McNutt worked hard to establish the primacy of his position and in the process titillated the foreign community and upset Quezon's staff enormously. But in the end, even though he stressed the powers he possessed rather than his limits, the High Commissioner established a friendly working relationship with Quezon.[25] In contrast, "Frank" Sayre

---

[21] Sayre's speech to the American Chamber of Commerce was reported in *The Tribune* (Manila), November 16, 1939. Also: "Two mouths—McNutt and Sayre," (ed.) *Philippines Magazine* (November, 1939), 443-4.

[22] Manuel Luis Quezon, *The Good Fight* (New York, 1946), 149-50. For a view hostile to Murphy's performance, see William H. Anderson, *The Philippine Problem* (New York, 1939), 162-5. The most recent political biography of Murphy notes that he was more concerned about the prerogatives of his office and the sovereignty of the United States than appeared in the newspapers. See Richard D. Lunt, *The High Ministry of Government: The Political Career of Frank Murphy* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1965), 83-122.

[23] M. L. Quezon to Frank Murphy, Manila, November 2, 1935, in U.S. Department of the Interior, Division of Territories and Island Possessions, Miscellaneous Records Box 11, U. S. National Archives. (Hereafter cited as D/I: Box 11.)

[24] (Proposed) Letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt from President Quezon, New York City, March 15, 1937, Quezon MSS.

[25] Anderson, *loc. cit.;* Theodore Friend, *Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines, 1929-1946* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965), 186-188. For Quezon's staff's comments on McNutt, see marginalia and

neither accepted nor was he accepted by the Philippine President. As Assistant Secretary of State and Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Philippines, Sayre had become almost too knowledgeable about Quezon and his government.[26] The evidence suggests that he had come to the personal conclusion that his job would be to tame the Philippine President; it was inevitable that relations between the men would be badly strained. The breaking point came in late 1940 when Sayre insisted, over Quezon's heated protests, that President Roosevelt could veto the Philippine constitutional amendments of 1939 if he chose to do so. Quezon believed, incorrectly, that the Higher Commissioner was attempting indirectly to exercise his own veto.[27] By mid-1941 the fiery Filipino was working assiduously to have Sayre replaced by Frank Murphy.[28] Again, the conclusion is perfectly obvious, there was no standard interpretation of the High Commissioner's role; each American approached the position quite differently.

When we turn to the subject of American investments in the Philippines, two points are worth noting: American and Filipino interests were often the same; and American interests often stood in conflict with those of their fellow countrymen. The sugar industry provides some interesting examples in this area. Americans participated in the sugar refining industry through ownership of *centrales,* though probably not more than 24 per cent of the refining production was in their control during the years 1935-41. Because of this participation, Americans, of necessity, were interested in sugar import quotas that were being established by the American Congress and, therefore, contributed heavily to the leadership and founding of the Philippine Sugar Association's lobby in Washington. And, with the other *centralistas,* they suffered—not always in silence—as Quezon played politics with the independence movement.[29] Americans also owned cane fields, belonged to

---

attached memoranda to the carbon copy of "Quarterly Report of the U.S. High Commissioner, Covering the Period April 1—June 30, 1937," Quezon MSS.

[26] *The Tribune* paid Sayre a backhanded compliment when it predicted that he would not be appointed High Commissioner. "It is almost traditional that in choosing a governor general or a high commissioner for the Philippines America has seldom if ever given the post to the man who appeared to be the most logical choice. Mr. Sayre is the most logical choice today." *The Tribune* (Manila), July 13, 1939.

[27] Memorandum of a conversation by Sayre with President Quezon, Manila, September 12, 1940, D/I: Box 3, USNA. Quezon stated his objections to High Commissioners meddling in Philippine government affairs in a letter to an old friend. He was referring to McNutt, but his attitude was the same toward Sayre. "As a matter of principle, there is no more reason for the Federal Government to intervene in purely domestic affairs in the Philippines as there is for them to interfere in [affairs of the American states]. . . . The choice of the High Commissioner is affected by American politics and experience both in the past and the present shows that the person chosen may not be equal to the responsibilities placed upon him. It is simply an outrage to assume that any green American can come to the Philippines and know more as to how the Philippines should be governed than the man chosen by our own people. . . ." M. L. Quezon to Roy Howard, San Francisco, California, July 23, 1937, Quezon MSS.

[28] J. M. Elizalde to M. L. Quezon (radiogram), Washington, June 13, 1941; M. L. Quezon to J. M. Elizalde, Manila, June 16, 1941, Quezon MSS.

[29] The best coverage of this topic is in Theodore Friend, "The Philippine Sugar Industry and the Politics of Independence, 1929-1935," *Journal of Asian Studies,* XXII:2 (February, 1963), 179-92. See also Grayson L. Kirk, *Philippine*

the Confederacion de Asociaciones y Plantadores de Caña Dulce, and fought the *centralistas* for a larger share of the milling profits. Americans possessed both milling and planting interests when they lent money. Unfortunately for Americans and Filipinos alike, who earned heavily from the *centrales,* President Quezon leaned to the side of the planters—they controlled more votes than the *centralistas.*[30]

Finally, at the political level, Americans in the Philippines normally followed the lead of their political parties at home when it came to Philippine affairs. In 1936, Democrats and Republicans called for improvements to the Tydings-McDuffie Act. The Republican Party convention in Manila passed resolutions that displayed regrets that the independence bill had ever been passed; the Democrats were silent in this area.[31] In 1940, the Republicans supported "re-examination" of the independence question; the Democrats said the re-examination issue should not be raised by the national party.[32] Generally speaking, the Republican Party adherents among the Americans in the Philippines were regretful and resentful that the Philippine Commonwealth was moving down the road to final independence; the Democrats, when speaking as party members, kept their mouths closed on this sensitive issue.

If we now shift our attention to another area, and examine a few of the problems that troubled the American minority in these years of transition, we can get another measure of this alien community. We can start with the broad generalization that these were tension-filled years for many Americans and the inevitable result of them was a deepening rift between American and Filipino. One might almost picture the American community as being akin to Mathew Arnold's traveller who found himself

> Wandering between two worlds, one dead,
> The other powerless to be born,
> With nowhere yet to rest my head,
> Like these, on earth I wait forlorn.

The Filipinos were not exactly the Carthusian monks simply waiting out their time till inevitable death; yet, many Americans and Filipinos were sure economic disaster would ultimately end the Commonwealth experience.[33]

Independence (New York, 1936), 63-7. Florence Horn discusses some of the personalities in the industry in her *Orphans of the Pacific,* 239-256.

[30] Quezon's deference to the planters, in opposition to the *centralistas,* was clearly displayed in a series of cables to Vice President Osmeña during 1939 when Osmeña was in Washington pressing for passage of the Tydings-Kocialkowski Act. M. L. Quezon to S. Osmeña, Manila, January 18, 1939; S. Osmeña to M. L. Quezon, Washington, June 16, 1939, Quezon MSS. For an insight into the conflict between Quezon and the Philippine Sugar Association, see George H. Fairchild to M. L. Quezon, Manila, June 13, 1940, Quezon MSS.

[31] "Republican and Democratic Unanimity" (ed.), *Philippines Magazine* (April, 1936), 178.

[32] "Philippine Republicans and Re-Examination," *Philippines Magazine* (May, 1940), 174. See also the May 1940 report of the Foreign Service Officer attached to the High Commissioner's staff: D/S file 811b.00 Gen Condits/14, Manila, June 12, 1940, USNA.

[33] The Philippine periodicals were fairly consistent in their forecasts of economic troubles for an independent Philippines. A. V. H. Hartendorp early complained about the Tydings-McDuffie Act: "American and Filipino officials both had had to put the best face on the matter they could while carrying out

It takes no great amount of historical imagination to recognize the mass insecurity that beset many Americans as they lived through the Commonwealth Period. The Philippine Constitution and the Tydings-McDuffie Act protected their economic interests during the transition period, but the Constitution could easily be amended once the republic was established in 1946.[34] In 1939, two constitutional amendments passed the National Assembly. They abandoned the unicameral experiment and changed the presidential tenure from one six-year term to a maximum of two consecutive four-year terms. Some feared that nationalization of alien industries could just as easily be authorized by further amending the Philippine Constitution. During the years 1936 to 1941, President Quezon turned often to the theme of reducing alien control over Philippine economic life. He was probably never more popular with the masses than when he spoke against alien retailers on the fourth anniversary of the Commonwealth:

> I do not wish to stop foreign merchants from engaging in the wholesale trade; but it is now high time that *sari-sari* stores are placed in the hands of Filipinos... . Do you know that under the present circumstances we, as a people, could be starved to death by operators of the *sari-sari* stores?... No people would ever consent to having their daily life's necessities remain in the hand of foreigners.
>
> I am determined to remedy, by proper and legal procedure, such a flaw in our economic situation. I wil exert my best efforts to put the country's retail business in Filipino hands... .[35]

While Quezon's most direct charges and recommendations were aimed at the Chinese and Japanese minorities engaged in the retail trade industry, all foreigners—Americans included—recognized that such ideas, expanded to include wholesale merchants or other types of economic endeavor, could be used against them as well.

---

the law... even if it is a bad law." "They know that if the terms of this brutal law are literally carried out that the country will collapse economically and politically long before the ten-year period of slow strangulation is ended." "The Inauguration of the Commonwealth" (ed), *Philippines Magazine* (November, 1935), 539. The Commonwealth Association's monthly magazine was equally gloomy in its predictions: "The economic provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Law hang lke the sword of Damocles over the heads of the Filipino people... ." *The Commonwealth Advocate* (September, 1935), 7-10. The *American Chamber of Commerce Journal* was similarly pessimistic, but a bit more discreet in saying so.

[34] At the beginning of the Commonwealth Period, Americans and Filipinos alike tended to trust Quezon when it came to protecting their economic interests. Gradually this trust weakened. *New York Times* reporter Robert Aura Smith noted this in several articles: *New York Times*, November 10, 1935; May 17, 1936. Full confidence was shown by the Filipino-oriented *Philippine Journal of Commerce*, see editorial "Facing the Future with Confidence" (March, 1934), 16. Some Americans put more faith in their high commissioners: *New York Times*, March 8, 1936.

[35] In 1939 President Quezon was most active in pressing for legislation that would nationalize the retail trade industry in the Philippines. National Assembly Bill 943 of 1939 was designed to accomplish this end, but it would have violated most of America's commercial treaties. "Memorandum written for Mr. Richard Ely, Manila, May 2, 1939," carbon in Quezon MSS. A rousing speech, supporting a retail trade act, was delivered by Quezon in November, 1939. "Accomplishments of the Commonwealth and Government Aid to Philippine Industries and Business, November 15, 1939," *Messages of the President, V*, 211-16.

If some Americans believed they would be protected by a *laissez-faire* spirit among the Filipinos, they were disabused of this idea early in the Commonwealth Period. At the inauguration of the National Economic Council on March 30, 1936, Quezon concluded his talk with this comment:

> Every member of the Council is free to express his opinion honestly and frankly... There is only one limitation to your freedom of opinion. Anyone who believes in good faith, as a matter of principle in the economic philosophy of *laissez-faire*, or in the inherent unfitness of a government to own and operate an industry or any business enterprise has no place in a council created by law and under a constitution that professes an entirely opposite theory.[36]

It was obvious to all that the Commonwealth would not be a replica of the *laissez-faire* American state of the 1920's; and the steady increase in the number of government corporations in the following years made this point abundantly clear.[37] By the end of 1940, with the passage of the Emergency Powers Act, which implied the power to seize private businesses for emergency purposes, Americans in Manila and in Washington began to suspect Quezon of harboring dictatorship ambitions.[38]

Turning to another group, considerably lower on the socio-economic scale, we discover that during the years 1935 to 1937, American pensioners of the Philippine government began to worry about their financial security. The pension structure that dated from 1922 had proved to be actuarially unsound and the government planned to terminate pensions by lump-sum redemptions.[39] The concept of pensions was still essentially alien to Filipinos of the 1930's, and the discarding of an uneconomical system by Commonwealth Act 187 in 1937 seemed eminently sound. Protests from those affected were met by Quezon's counter-charges that the Americans were ingrates. When several American officials in Washington pressured Quezon in the name of the pensioners, he assured them that were any American truly impoverished, he could seek relief from the Philippine National Assembly.[40] Pensions were not considered necessary for Filipinos; by tradition, the elderly were absorbed by their families.

---

[36] "Speech of the President of the Philippines Delivered at the First Meeting of the National Economic Council, Manila, March 30, 1936," (typescript) Quezon MSS. See also Manuel L. Quezon, "Government Leadership in Production," *Philippine Journal of Commerce* (May, 1936), 5, 32.

[37] In his first message to the National Assembly, President Quezon promised that the government would enter business fields where private capital was slow to press ahead. Commonwealth of the Philippines, *Message of His Excellency Manuel L. Quezon to the National Assembly, December 18, 1935* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1935), 9-10.

[38] Suspicions of Quezon by High Commissioner Sayre and government officials in Washington can be found in D/S file 811b.001 Quezon/146, August 15, 1940, USNA. Quezon understood the nature of Sayre's suspicions and deeply resented them. See his letter: M. L. Quezon to F. B. Sayre, Baguio, April 7, 1941, Quezon MSS.

[39] J. Weldon Jones (Insular Auditor) to M. L. Quezon, Manila, November 5, 1935, Quezon MSS; "Press Conference, Manila, September 4, 1936" (typescript), Quezon MSS.

[40] Senator Millard Tydings to M. L. Quezon, Washington, March 11, 1937; Brigadier General Charles Burnett to M. L. Quezon, Washington, July 22, 1937; (draft) M. L. Quezon to Charles Burnett, [July 22-28, 1937]; M. L. Quezon to Charles Burnett, At Sea, July 28, 1937; Col. James S.V. Ord. to M. L. Quezon, Pittsburgh, Pa., August 17, 1937, Quezon MSS.

Quezon's attitude toward pensions was symptomatic of a deeper cause for the development of distrust of him by the American community. He was, as Dr. Theodore Friend has so admirably stated recently, a charismatic leader. He had the sense of subject, timing, and control that made his leadership, at all times, real and exciting to the Filipinos.[41] But excitement for his countrymen often meant deepest anxiety for the Americans. For example, take the spring of 1937. While junketing in America, President Quezon electrified the Filipinos by calling for independence in 1939 or 1940, if Congress would not improve the Tydings-McDuffie Act. This was a political gambit. First reactions were found in the plummeting stock prices on the big board in Manila. The morale of the American business community in Manila plunged with the stocks. Soon, the political nature of the move was recognized, but many Americans and Filipinos had been badly shaken. The movement, in the Philippines, to re-examine the independence decision dates from these months.[42]

More disturbing than Quezon's impetuosity to many of the American minority was his championing of policies decidedly at variance with traditional American views. Peacetime conscription for Filipinos was vigorously defended by the Philippine President during his 1937 trip abroad. A good many Americans in the Islands recognized the menace of Japan and the need to build national defenses, but many more saw the call for conscription as a means of building a private army to back a dictatorship.[43] In 1940, a more centralized control of public education was instituted by the National Assembly at the call of Quezon; again, this was a move that contrasted strongly with the American traditions of local control of education, and suspicion of any central government move to control the minds of the young.[44] In 1937, and again in 1940, President Quezon spoke in favor of stricter curbs on individual liberty as a means of better serving the state. More conservative Americans and Filipinos must have shuddered when they read Quezon's address to a University of the Philippines convocation in July, 1940:

---

[41] Theodore Friend, "Manuel Quezon: Charismatic Conservative," *Paper No. 34* (mimeographed) *of Proceedings of the International Conference on Asian History,* Hong Kong, August 30-September 5, 1964; see also Friend's *Between Two Empires,* 50-53.

[42] See the author's "The Movement to Reverse Philippine Independence," *Pacific Historical Review,* XXXIII:2 (May, 1964), 172-6.

[43] President Quezon was badly upset by James S. Allen's article, "Manuel Quezon—Philippine Dictator," *The Nation* (March 20, 1937), 320-22. In his speech to the Foreign Policy Association, Quezon answered criticisms of Philippine military conscription: "I can understand an American protest against conscription. With all due respect to you, let me tell you, I am afraid that your conception of liberty is not altogether right. A proper conception of liberty is the performance of duty to nation. It is because you are giving too much importance to the freedom of the individual to do as he pleases as against the interests of the state that you are suffering from the evils that you are suffering today in this country... In our constitution [which] we gave our people, the first duty of the citizen is to serve the state." "Proceedings of the Foreign Policy Association Luncheon, Hotel Astor, New York City, April 3, 1937," (typescript), Quezon MSS. See also *New York Times,* April 4, 1937.

[44] "Message to the National Assembly, Manila, July 5, 1940" (typescript) Quezon MSS. As early as February, 1935, Quezon spoke of the government's responsibility to supervise and regulate education in order to instill "moral character" and develop nationalism in the country's youth. "Address before the University of the Philippines, Manila, February 12, 1935" (typescript) Quezon MSS.

> The second slogan that must be thrown overboard is the theory that in a democracy individual liberty must not be restricted. Liberty is, of course, one of the most precious natural rights of man. But civilization has made progress only at the expense of individual liberty. . . .

While later explanations developed that he was thinking of self-restraints and constitutional restrictions, Americans were uneasy.[45] And in 1939 and 1940, the Philippine President directly challenged the value or utility of competing political parties.[46] From the viewpoint of the American, deeply devoted to the two-party system and ignorant of Philippine history, Don Manuel was paving a broad road to political dictatorship. The uneasiness of an American minority, which had never understood Philippine culture, is understandable; the lack of concern among the Filipinos was equally understandable.

In summation, three points seem to be worth re-statement:

(1) The American minority in the Philippines during the Commonwealth Period was not a simple monolithic society. The "Proconsuls" and their aides had largely departed when government under the Jones Act was terminated on November 15, 1935. The remaining Americans were deeply involved in a large number of Phil-American enterprises as well as in some purely American ventures. This forced the Americans to be as diverse as their Filipino associates.

(2) The American community was uneasy and insecure in this traditional period; at times, their behavior showed it. The years of imperial control had not turned the Filipino into a "Brown American"; and those Americans who stayed in the Islands were constantly reacting to the "un-American" economic and political ideas expounded by the Filipinos.

(3) It cannot be denied that there were many insufferably "Ugly Americans" in the Commonwealth Period; but this same group also included, among it, Otley Beyer, Luther Bewley, A. V. H. Hartendorp, and the fabulous Sam Gaches and many more quiet Americans who left their impress on Rizal's "Perla del mar de oriente."

---

[45] "Proceedings of the Foreign Policy Association Luncheon, Hotel Astor, New York City, April 3, 1937" (typescript) Quezon MSS. In the spring of 1936, in a speech at the Philippine Military Academy in Baguio, Quezon noted: "The Constitution of the Philippines entirely reverses this political philosophy. Under our Constitution what is paramount is not 'individuals'; it is the good of the State, not the good of the individual that must prevail." Quoted in E. D. Hester, "Outline of Our Recent Political and Trade Relations with the Philippine Commonwealth," *Annals* (March, 1943), 81.

[46] In his 1939 birthday broadcast from Malacañan, Quezon commented: "The theory that there can be no true democracy without political parties and that the existence of such parties is essential in popular government, is groundless and finds no justification in sound principles of government." "Birthday Speech of President Quezon, Manila, August 19, 1939" (typescript) Quezon MSS. At the University of the Philippines in July, 1940, Quezon was even blunter: "The first fetish we must discard is the discredited theory that democracy cannot exist without political parties. In the very nature of things, the struggle for power between contending political parties creates partisan spirit, and partisan spirit is incompatible with good government." "Speech at University of the Philippines, Manila, July 16, 1940" (typescript) Quezon MSS.

FOOD AND POPULATION PROBLEMS IN THE PHILIPPINES

NATHANIEL B. TABLANTE

THE WORLD TODAY IS FACED WITH A MYRIAD OF PROBlems arising from conflicts in color, race and ideologies, as well as by problems inherent in the quest for economic development. One of the most important problems affecting national effort to enhance economic and social development, which has merited global attention, is that which concerns the relation between food and population growth.

Regardless of the stage of development attained, the people in any country have to contend with the food problem, be it in terms of increasing the available food supply to meet the expanding requirements of a rapidly growing population, or in terms of disposing food surpluses in the most efficient and favorable means possible. Indeed, the food problem is an ancient one. A study of the history of the human race will reveal that the food problem has always been associated with the story of mankind itself. It is a fact that the advancement of man's society from its primitive to its modern stage today has largely been based on the adequacy of food to meet, not only the minimal requirements for normal health and activity, but also to permit the emancipation of man from purely food-producing activities to other types of productive endeavor.

Despite recent advances made in science and technology, there are some countries in the world—particularly in Asia and in Latin America—which continue to suffer from recurring food shortages, hunger, starvation and malnutrition. These countries can be considered as Malthusian areas, where the very rapid rate of growth of the population tends to outrun the capacity to produce food. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, it is estimated that at least half of the world's population is chronically hungry, malnourished or undernourished, and about three-fourths of Asia's almost two billion people do not get three square meals a day, much less a well-balanced diet. A scientist from Ceylon once stated that one of the biggest blunders committed in their country was their effective control of malaria because it resulted in more people thriving in misery. A medical scientist remarked that medical advances in India merely prolonged a life of poverty and discontent. Such a frustrated outlook of life stems from the inability of food production to keep pace with population growth.

In the Philippines, the problem of food-population balance is also a major problem. Estimated at about 31.9 million, the total population of the country is reportedly increasing at the rate of 3.29 per cent a year,[1] equivalent to about one million annual population increase or approximately two

[1] B.T. Oñate, "Population and Food Requirements: Philippines," Family Planning Workshop, College of Agriculture, University of the Philippines, October 29, 1965.

babies born every minute. At this rate of growth, our population is expected to double in 30 years. The Inter-Agency Committee on Demography projected the population of the Philippines to 58.1 million in 1980. This projection is based on a rapidly declining mortality and high fertility rates.[2] Population density was 78 persons per square kilometer in 1957 and 98 persons in 1962; by 1980, this is expected to increase to 194 persons per square kilometer.

On the other hand, an official of the National Economic Council stated that in terms of food supply, the present rate of population increase suggests the need of "a yearly additional requirement of 422,720 metric tons of food distributed as follows: rice, 96,112 metric tons or 1.5 million cavans; corn, 24,028 metric tons or 450,000 cavans; starchy roots and tubers, 25,830 metric tons; sugar and syrups, 11,490 metric tons; vegetables, 54,070 metric tons; meat and poultry, 24,930 metric tons; eggs, 5,900 metric tons; milk and milk products, 59,330 metric tons; fish, 29,270 metric tons; and fats and oils, 10,350 metric tons." [3]

The relationship between net food supply available for consumption and the recommended food allowances for different food groups is shown in Table 1. In these relationships, total available supply is made up of domestic production plus imports minus exports, while net supply for consumption is computed by deducting from the available supply the quantities used for seeds, feed, amount due to extraction rate and others. The figures in Table 1 indicate that the supply for consumption is adequate for energy foods in the Philippines, such as cereals, roots and tubers, but inadequate in the protein foods such as meat products, milk, eggs, fish and fish products. For all foods, the sufficiency ratio of the Philippines is only 78%.

Table 1. Net Food Supply and Recommended Allowance in Grams per Capita per Day by Food Groups, Philippines.

Food Group	Total Net Supply for Consumption (1963)	Recommended Allowance (1961-1965)	Sufficiency Ratio per cent
Total	941.0	1,210.1	78
Cereals	347.2	329.2	105
Roots and tubers	111.1	70.8	157
Sugars and syrups	49.6	31.5	157
Pulses and nuts	43.4	17.1	254
Vegetables	85.0	148.2	57
Fruits	110.1	206.0	53
Meat Products	39.2	68.3	57
Milk and milk products	30.8	162.6	19
Eggs	6.9	16.1	42
Fish and fish products	57.8	80.2	72
Fats and oils	7.5	28.4	26

Source: Burton T. Oñate, "Population and Food Requirements: Philippines," Family Planning Workshop, College of Agriculture, U.P., October 29, 1965.

[2] Oñate, *op. cit.*

[3] Andres M. Mane, "Food Economics," *Philippine Journal of Nutrition*, XVI, No. 2 (April-June, 1963).

Oñate [4] reported in his study that in 1963, the total available supply of foods totalled 11,342 thousand metric tons, about 7 per cent of which was accounted for by imports. In the same year, the available supply of cereals was 4,600 thousand metric tons. Of this quantity, domestic production accounted for about 3,900 thousand metric tons (or 85 per cent) while imports accounted for 700 thousand metric tons (or about 15 per cent). For rice alone, total importations for the 20-month period (from January, 1964 to August, 1965) amounted to 672,693 metric tons valued at ₱310 million.

According to the Director of Animal Industry,[5] the total national requirements of meat and meat products of 24 million consumers in 1962 was 792 million kilograms. Local production provided only 226.5 million kilograms. Including imports, the total available meat supply was 248 million kilograms, or a shortage of about 540 kilos. Per-capita meat consumption is estimated at 10.3 kilos a year, whereas the recommended requirement (according to the Food Balance Sheet [6]) is 33 kilos per person per year. On a per-capita basis, the shortage is equal to 22.7 kilograms a year. Using the ratio of 16.2% beef, 63.4% pork, 14.4% poultry and 6.0% all other meats of the different meat animals slaughtered and consumed in the Philippines, the country's total shortage in meat and meat products may be broken down into 81 million kilograms of beef, 317 million kilos of pork, 72 million kilos of poultry, and 30 million kilos of other meats. In terms of head of animals, this meat shortage would consist of 578 thousand heads of cattle, 7,432 thousand pigs, 36,000 thousand chickens, and an undetermined number of other animals for the 30 million kilograms of all other meats.

The same source indicated that the egg shortage is about 5.94 grams per person a day or 136.6 million grams a day or 50 billion grams per year for the 24 million people. At an average weight of 50 grams per egg, the total shortage for one year is equivalent to about one billion eggs. At present, our per-capita egg consumption is only about one-seventh of an egg a day, or one egg per week.

In the case of milk, local production amounts to 6.8 million kilograms, whereas total consumption is placed at 109.3 million kilos. The average per-capita milk consumption is estimated at 12.45 grams per day or 4.54 kilograms a year. The requirement is 200 grams per person per day or about 73 kilos per person per annum. Our total milk shortage, therefore, would amount to 68.46 kilos per person for one year, or 1,643 million kilos a year for 24 million consumers.

It is evident from the foregoing that the Philippines' domestic food production has been inadequate to meet the requirements of the fast-growing population. The country has had to resort to importations of huge quantities of foodstuffs to augment its food supply. This practice tends to divert the use of valuable foreign exchange to consumption purposes from capital-accumulation uses, and serves further as a disincentive to increasing agricul-

[4] Oñate, *op. cit.*

[5] As reported in N.B. Tablante, "Food Production, Storage and Distribution in the Amelioration of Foods and Nutrition Problems." (Mimeographed, April 3, 1962).

[6] Tablante, *op. cit.*

tural production. While transfers of food from surplus areas of the world (i.e., imports) can help alleviate our food problem, this method does not provide the lasting solution.

The farmers in the Philippines have not been able to increase food production to levels adequate to meet consumption requirements of the large population because of the interplay of several factors.[7] The area of land they farm is small; they follow a mono-culture, one-crop system of farming because they are dependent mostly on rain; their farms are inefficiently organized and labor is not productively employed for many months of the year. Lacking capital to acquire the necessary agricultural inputs, they are generally limited in employing improved technology and modern farm practices. Furthermore, the value systems and attitudes of the farmers [8] as well as political decisions affecting agriculture in general,[9] have tended to serve as barriers to increased food production.

The basic causes of low production and low productivity in agriculture indicate that the Philippines designs her policies such that they will assist, boldly and creatively, in the reorganization of the weak or inefficient segments of her rural economy; that her policy-makers be able to discriminate among the most critical factors involved in increasing food production. All these, viewed in terms of the country's chronic food shortage resulting, not only from a lack of physical potential, but also from a conglomeration of economic, social, technological and institutional factors.

Increasing the food supply (particularly through domestic production) is one of the means to solve the Philippine food-population imbalance and is essential to its rapid economic development. It is hardly possible to expect the country to progress rapidly while facing serious food shortages, augmented largely by importations. In any country—particularly a developing country—an abundant food supply is conducive to high labor productivity and low-cost industrial production. The President of the Philippine Association of Nutrition remarked that hunger has many faces, including undernutrition, decreased labor efficiency, lowered resistance to diseases and to the stresses of day-to-day living, irrational behavior and social degeneration, and recession in physical and mental fitness on the part of the youth who will, in the future, render the decisions in nation-building.[10]

It is, however, unwise to increase the domestic production of the Philippines by borrowing the approach used by well-developed nations as they faced similar problems during earlier stages of their development. True, these nations may have been at the same stage of economic development as the Philippines is today, but conditions then were also different. For one thing, the main approach used by these countries to the problem of increasing food production, was to increase the area of land planted to food crops; since

---

[7] See N.B. Tablante, "Problems of Agricultural Productivity in the Philippines." Paper read at the First Session, Philippine Executive Academy, March 15, 1965 (Mimeographed).

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] Eufronio O. Carrasco, "The Many Faces of Hunger." *Philippine Journal of Nutrition*, XVI, No. 2 (April-June, 1963).

areas of available lands were extensive. In contrast, there is very limited opportunity for Filipinos to increase their country's land area. However, while the Philippines lacks a fund of large areas of land for cultivation, it has a fund of technological knowledge, accumulated from the research experience of the economically developed countries, to be used to advantage.

Secondly, there is also a difference in rate of population growth. The population of the Philippines is growing much more rapidly than those of the advanced countries today, during a period of economic development comparable to that of contemporary Philippines. Therefore, the greatest hope of the Philippines for increasing domestic food production lies, not so much with expanding the area, but on increasing yields per unit area and increasing the rates of production per animal. According to a staff economist in the United States Department of Agriculture, the yield-raising method of increasing food output is a much more difficult process than the area-expanding method. The former involves a number of preconditions and incentives for successful implementation, such as (1) a reasonably high level of literacy to facilitate the steady flow of new knowledge from research institutions to the farms; (2) capital to acquire yield-raising agricultural inputs; (3) market orientation of the farm output; (4) a strong and adequate non-agricultural supporting cast which provides the agricultural sector with goods and services for farm operations; and (5) favorable prices for farm products.[11]

Even with the use of the present physical area of land devoted to agriculture (or even less), the size of the productive unit for food production can be increased substantially by using more capital in relation to land. The prospects for augmenting productivity in food production become bright when the additional capital used is translated into more efficient techniques and practices. These additional inputs may take the form of more fertilizers, the use of agricultural chemicals to control pests, diseases and weeds, the use of better seeds and stock as well as more efficient tools and equipment and other improved farm practices.

The Filipino farmers have to be encouraged to use more and more of the right kind and amount of fertilizers. Continuous single-cropping, erosion and excessive leaching have depleted much of the country's soils of their fertility. Less than 10 per cent of its 3.3 million hectares of rice lands are fertilized. Consequently, average yields per hectare have remained at low levels. It can generally be said that the Filipino farmers use three kilos of nitrogen, five kilos of phosphorous and three kilos of potassium per hectare, compared to 85, 57, and 62 kilos, respectively, in Japan where rice yields average about 95 cavans per hectare. Low-yielding varieties of crops, and animals with relatively low rates of output, have to be replaced with high producers.

The most sensitive and critical of the inputs, which have to be provided in great number in order to accelerate the increase in food production, are: *irrigation* in the case of food crops, and *feed* in the case of livestock

[11] Lester R. Brown, "Population Growth, Food Needs and Production Problems," World Population and Food Supplies, 1980. American Society of Agronomy Publication No. 6. (February, 1965).

and poultry. Irrigation makes for the diversification of agriculture. In Taiwan, for example, two crops of rice—a vegetable crop and a green manure crop—can be annually grown on the same piece of land because of adequate irrigation and proper management of water resources. The beneficent effects of fertilizers, weed control, plant protection, improved seeds and modern production techniques, as well as farm management practices, become operative when good and dependable irrigation facilities are available all the year round.

With irrigation, the institution of means for achieving greater efficiency in food crop production becomes feasible. If an additional 800,000 hectares of rice lands in the Philippines could be irrigated to make the total irrigated land area equal to 1,000,000 hectares, the country could easily meet the rice requirements of a rapidly growing population. Moreover, the balance of 2.3 million hectares could be released for the production of other food, feed and export crops.

If high-quality feed is made available to Filipino farmers at low cost, the Filipino farm families would be encouraged to raise livestock, pigs and poultry, even on a small scale. It is needless to mention that livestock enterprises help to increase farm incomes, enable the utilization of farm labor that would otherwise be idle, help build up the soil, convert farm wastes and by-products into quality foods, and above all, provide the people with nutritious food and balanced diets.

Adequate price incentives is imperative, if the Filipino farmers are to be encouraged to commercialize farming, and hence move away from a kitchen-oriented type of agriculture. The assurance of a price for agricultural products —high enough to attract the greater efforts of farmers heretofore not applied or exerted—is one of the greatest incentives that can be offered. For the profit motive is still a strong force in man's productive effort.

A remunerative price incentive will give farmers the necessary purchasing power with which they could translate their desires into effective demands for goods and services required for both production and consumption activities. This incentive of a high price for agricultural food commodities should, however, be supported by policies that will promote and protect local producers, and by institutional reforms in credit, marketing, land tenure as well as community organizations promotion. Improvements in storage, processing, packaging, distribution and other marketing services also offer possibilities for ameliorating our food and nutrition problems.

Actually, there are two principal alternative approaches to the food-population problem: to produce more food, or to produce less people. The ideal situation, of course, is to use both, *i.e.,* more food and less mouths to feed. Thus far, increasing the food output has been considered.

On a long-range basis, family planning can be an effective tool in reducing the load of feeding an expanding population. Taiwan, Pakistan and other countries with high population pressures on the land, have started to adopt family planning as a means to arrest population growth rate, and it has so far proved effective. The method chiefly in demand in Taiwan is an intra-uterine device known as the Lippes Loop which can be worn continuously and comfortably. The whole program is related as closely as possible

to mother-and-child health and child-spacing objectives. It is estimated that, allowing for removals, five loops will decrease birth by one per year. Other sound methods of family planning could also be encouraged. All these methods could result in an estimated drop of the annual rate of population increase in Taiwan to 3 per cent or less than 2 per cent by 1970.[12]

Under the concept of family planning, parents—especially newlyweds—could be made to understand the significance of responsible parenthood and to realize the economic and social obligations of having more children than they can afford to support. Guided to plan their family to the level of their capacities, they would be able to provide all their children with adequate necessities, comforts and other amenities of life which make for a high standard of living. Much of the problems of poverty, disease and illiteracy in most countries of Asia, could have been minimized, if parents were taught family planning. Family planning and other preventive checks on population growth, however, have to be instituted and carried out within the context of the social and cultural backgrounds of the people.

It is reasonable to expect that in the Philippines, the demand for more and better foods will continue to rise as a result of increasing population and increasing income levels of the people. Whether or not the Philippines will face the challenge of the population-food balance, so that the Filipino people will enjoy a decent and continuously rising level of living, remains to be seen.

[12] S. C. Hsieh, "Economic Aspect of Population Problems," (Paper read, at the Family Planning Workshop, College of Agriculture, University of the Philippines, October 29, 1965, unpublished).

IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1965 PHILIPPINE ELECTION: THE VIEW FROM AMERICA

MARTIN MEADOWS

SINCE WORLD WAR II, THE FOCUS OF INTERNATIONAL CONcern over the possibility of a "hot war" has shifted from one part of the world to another. Europe, the Middle East, Africa—each area has been viewed, at one time or another, as the most likely source of an incident that could lead to a direct confrontation between the communist and non-communist alliance systems. In recent years, Asia has been looked upon as the "key to the cold war." More specifically, Southeast Asia, in particular, has gained the unenviable distinction of being generally regarded as the most crucial arena in world politics. There are good reasons for such a judgment: in the last half of 1965 alone, for example, unsettling occurrences in the area included the continuing Indonesian-Malaysian dispute, the secession of Singapore from the Federation of Malaysia, and the upheaval in Indonesia. International attention, meanwhile, remained centered on the struggle in Vietnam, which "escalated" tremendously in 1965 and which threatens to embroil Cambodia and Laos in 1966.

The only bright spot, in the whole of Southeast Asia, is the Philippines, which appears to be immune to the many and varied difficulties that have afflicted its neighbors. Even the Philippines, however, has began to worry some students of international affairs (mainly Americans). For instance, American officialdom was upset by certain actions taken by the Macapagal administration—such as the claim to North Borneo and the "flirtation" with Indonesian President Sukarno. Furthermore, many Americans were alarmed by the wave of so-called "anti-Americanism" in the Philippines during 1964-1965, and they have been further disturbed by reports (in the American press, at any rate) of an alleged resurgence of the long dormant communist-led Huk movement. Nevertheless, the Philippines is usually considered by advocates of Western-style democracy as the country having the most stable government of the many states which have become independent since World War II. Certainly, it has been the most trouble-free country in all of Southeast Asia, at least, since the Huk threat was quelled early in the 1950's.

The Philippine reputation as a stable, democratic government and growing political maturity, was strengthened by the presidential election of November 9, 1965. Not only was the campaign relatively peaceful, but the voting resulted in a popular mandate for a change of administration—a change which was carried out in the customary orderly manner, at the end of 1965. The outcome of the election appeared to be encouraging for the United States as well, because it enhances the Philippine reputation as the "showcase of democracy" in Asia; more immediately, because the new President-Ferdinand E. Marcos—is considered to be friendly to the United States. This is a crucial point, in view of the important American military bases and other

facilities in the Philippines, which is strategically located with respect to Southeast Asia, currently the world's leading tinder-box.

But the 1965 election can be interpreted in a much less optimistic light. Indeed, a closer look at the election results reveals some disturbing possibilities for the future—disturbing from the standpoint of both the Philippines and the United States. The principal purpose of this paper is to examine these possibilities, and this requires an analysis of the *implications* of the election rather than of the election itself (although the latter subject will not be ignored). Another point to note here is that this study concentrates on those aspects of the 1965 election that would be of chief interest to Americans. Such an approach should help give Philippine readers better insight into the American perspective and should also indicate the increasingly significant position of the Philippines in Southeast Asia generally, and in United States foreign policy, in particular. To achieve these objectives, this account focuses on the implications of the 1965 election as they relate to (1) the prospects for the future of democratic government in the Philippines, and (2) United States interests, *vis-a-vis* both the Philippines and Southeast Asia.

I

In considering the implications of the 1965 election for the future of Philippine government, it would be appropriate (keeping in mind that this is being approached from the viewpoint of an American observer) to begin with a brief look at the Huk movement, which, as noted, has been attracting a growing amount of attention in the American press. The official Philippine view—at least, as enunciated by Philippine military intelligence sources—by implication, disputes the notion of an insurgent revival. According to these sources, the Huks are in bad shape, in terms of both numbers and morale, and their condition is not improving. If this interpretation is correct, how does it fit in with reports of Huk revival?

Actually, the official position seems to admit that Huk activities have intensified lately, but this is attributed to a Huk attempt to keep morale from sagging and to maintain their reputation in the *barrios* of Central Luzon. According to this explanation, the Huks are engaging only in acts of banditry, not in the kind of campaign that heralded the start of Vietcong activities in Vietnam, for example. Is the official view of the status of the Huk movement valid? Or is it possible, on the other hand, that the Huk revival—at least, in part—reflects an attempt to take advantage of several recent developments, including strained Philippine-American relations, growing Philippine nationalism, the situation in Vietnam, and the condition of the Philippine economy?

In attempting to answer this and to assess Huk prospects for the future, it is necessary to consider the basic question confronting any insurgent movement: what kind and what amount of support, external and internal, might the Huks reasonably expect to receive if they were able to launch large-scale operations? Under present conditions, they would receive very little support, according to most observers. Insofar as internal support is

concerned, one factor stands out above all others: the Filipino people are strongly attached to the democratic ideology. At the present time (and this qualifying phrase is important), Filipinos are deeply committed to the techniques and processes as well as the objectives of democracy. As for external support, any Philippine insurgent movement is further handicapped by the factor of geography. Because of its location, the country is relatively invulnerable to external sources of support for internal subversion. This was one reason why it was possible to stop the Huks in the 1950's; in contrast with the situation in Vietnam today, the rebels could neither receive substantial aid from abroad, nor take refuge in neighboring states. The consequences of this geographic element, moreover, are not limited to the matter of rebel contacts with foreign sources of assistance. It could be argued, for instance, that there is an inverse correlation between communist fortunes in Southeast Asia, and the extent of Filipino support for the Huks. That is, the more successful are communist-led movements on mainland Asia, the more intense becomes the Filipino sense of unity and concern over communism—and vice versa. While the Philippines is not unique in this respect, the policies it has pursued as a result of this situation are quite different from those adopted by many other states not so favored by geography, such as, say, Cambodia.

In brief, it is largely because of the factors described above that the Philippines, thus far, has been able to withstand the efforts of Huk insurgents, and has not adopted a policy of accommodating itself to communist encroachments or threats in nearby areas (including Indonesia, prior to the recent upheaval there, at any rate). As a matter of fact, the Philippines has acted more militantly—and at times more absurdly—in demonstrating its hostility to communism than even the United States. The Philippines has followed a rigid policy of avoiding all contacts—diplomatic and otherwise—with communist nations, including the Soviet Union. The attitude on which this posture is based, furthermore, is not limited to Philippine officialdom (which, some would argue, has no option but to follow the United States line in foreign policy matters); it is held by most Filipinos (though they would not necessarily agree with some of its extreme manifestations, such as the government's refusal, a few years ago, to allow a Yugoslavian basketball team to participate in an international tournament in Manila).

Thus, the Huk movement faces serious obstacles in the Philippines, under present conditions. But Huk prospects are not entirely bleak, for a number of reasons. First, it should be noted that the geographic element is a limiting but not a determining influence—that is, its effects on the fate of the Huks are less important than, and are subordinate to, those of the internal factors. And these domestic factors—such as the Filipino belief in democracy and hostility toward communism—are not necessarily immutable. They require for their continued existence certain reinforcing conditions; but such conditions seem to be absent from the Philippine scene. Indeed, there are indications that the Filipino's patience and optimism—for which he is justly famed and renowned—are starting to fray at the edges. If this judgment is correct, it raises another question: what conditions are responsible for this development? In more general terms, what considerations might provoke the Filipino people to alter their pro-democratic and pro-Western orientation? To

answer this requires an examination of the state of the Philippine economy, which—in the long run—could prove to be the principal ally of the Huks or of any other insurgent movement in the Islands.

II

An analysis of the Philippine economy could produce optimistic or pessimistic conclusions, depending on which side of the picture is emphasized. On the positive side of the ledger, there is no doubt that the Filipino people are better off today as a whole than at any time since they became independent. This improvment is measurable—both quantitatively and qualitatively—that is, in terms of (1) a consistent and steady rate of economic growth (which has averaged about 5 per cent annually over the past decade), and (2) a decreasing dependence on the agricultural sector and the growing importance of the industrial sector. On balance, the long-run economic outlook for the Philippines is encouraging, particularly in view of the country's record of political stability and the emergence of an ambitious and energetic class of young entrepreneurs. As I have noted elsewhere, "The Philippines has been progressing steadily and, moreover, has been doing so within the framework of an essentially free enterprise economic system and a stable democratic political system." [1]

The fact remains, however, that the defeat of President Diosdado Macapagal—in the view of virtually every commentator on the 1965 election—can be attributed almost exclusively to Filipino dissatisfaction with economic conditions in the islands. What is the basis for that dissatisfaction, and what are its implications? To answer this, it is necessary to stress the pessimistic side of the picture at this point. For the above description of the Philippine economy leaves some fundamental questions unanswered. Is economic improvement occurring rapidly enough to satisfy most Filipinos and to reinforce their prevailing values? Has this improvement affected all segments of Philippine society? Unfortunately, the answers are no.

Without going into details, the reasons for such an answer are indicated by the following survey. The Philippine economy is characterized by the existence of gross disparities, along social as well as geographic lines. There is a geographic or "vertical" cleavage in that industrial development, thus far, has been confined chiefly to the urban areas. This has resulted in a number of undesirable consequences: for example, the median annual income of non-agricultural workers is about seven times as great as that of agricultural workers (and the Huk problem, of course, basically is an agrarian problem). The discrepancy is even more marked in terms of the social or "horizontal" cleavage. A very small minority of the population, for instance, receives more than half of all income earned in the Philippines. In more general terms, the Philippine middle class—though growing absolutely and proportionately—still constitutes less than 15 per cent of the population, compared with a lower class of more than 80 per cent of the population. Attempts to carry out economic reforms, needless to say, are opposed by the "haves." This is

[1] See my article on the Philippine economy in the *Washington Post's* "Pacific World" section, June 6, 1965, F 6.

particularly true with regard to land reform. These and other factors that cannot be discussed here—such as the high rate of unemployment and underemployment, inflation, and so on—are all relevant to the Huk problem as well as to the prevailing discontent, throughout the country, with economic conditions.

In addition to all these, the Philippines faces the problem of population growth. From the standpoint of economic development, this may well be the country's single most important problem. The population is growing at an annual rate of 3.3 per cent; this is one of the highest rates in the world, and it adds one million persons to the population yearly. There is no need to belabor this familiar refrain. One thing is worth noting, however (as pointed out by famed demographer Frank Lorimer in a talk at the University of the Philippines early in 1965): if Philippine birth and fertility rates continue at their present levels for 80 years, the Filipino population will equal India's present population of some 480 million.

The preceding description of Philippine economic conditions was not intended to criticize or downgrade the country's efforts in the economic sphere, but rather to indicate the potentially explosive nature of the socio-economic environment in which the Huk movement finds itself. The above account also suggests some answers to the question as to the prospects for democracy in the Philippines. It is widely believed that the possibility of a successful Huk rebellion—that is, one with general popular support, at least, among the peasantry (and one with which the United States does not interfere)—is ruled out by such factors as the Filipino belief in, and commitment to, democracy. This view overlooks two points. First, the Huks (who almost succeeded once) simply need manpower and sympathizers, not ideological converts. Second, the Philippines seems not much closer to a solution of its ancient agrarian problems today than it was at the height of the Huk insurrection. Given the prevailing economic conditions in the country, the Huk threat cannot be dismissed lightly—from a long-range standpoint (speaking in terms of, let us say, the post-1970 period). Indeed, the paradoxical fact is that, although the Huk movement supposedly is now at its lowest point ever, the potential threat to Philippine democracy is perhaps graver than it has ever been, and it is becoming increasingly more serious. This conclusion is supported by an analysis of the results of the 1965 election and its implications, to which we now turn.

In the context of the conditions described above, it is not difficult to explain the defeat of President Macapagal. This defeat occurred despite the facts that (1) Macapagal had at his disposal all the powers and resources of one of the most powerful democratic leaders in the world (in terms of formal and informal powers), and that (2) most of the events that took place during the campaign (such as the formation of a third party, the endorsement of Marcos by the Iglesia ni Cristo, and so forth) supposedly should have benefited the incumbent. It can only be concluded that the Filipino people in 1965 were, as noted earlier, completely dissatisfied with the country's economic status.

Both sides sought to take advantage of this attitude, but—of course—the Nacionalistas were in a better position to do so. As usual, the opposition campaign was based on an attack on the administration's record, especially in economic affairs, and on the claim that it could do a better job of running the country (without actually specifying, however, in other than general terms, how it proposed to do this). As for the Liberals, one of their main campaign themes was the argument that the opposition was to blame for the nation's economic ills. As Macapagal explained it, the Nacionalistas had controlled the Senate throughout his term of office and had refused to cooperate with him in implementing his Five-Year Socio-Economic Program; the only solution to this obstruction, he concluded, was to re-elect him and this time give the Liberals control of both houses of Congress. But this approach, in effect, admitted that the administration's record was not what it should have been, as the opposition argued.

In short, there was really only one dominant "issue" during the 1965 election campaign, and the only question was whether the voters would accept Macapagal's rationale or the promises of the opposition to do better. The widespread attitude of discontent was quite apparent during the year-long campaign and, indeed, even before then—so apparent that it was possible to conclude an analysis of the 1963 senatorial elections with this statement: "An examination of the 1963 campaign and its results justifies the conclusion that, unless the administration can begin to make some progress in improving the lot of the average Filipino, President Macapagal and the Liberal Party will encounter considerable difficulty in the 1965 election." [2]

What implications can be drawn from the 1965 election? It could be argued, as noted at the outset of this paper, that the outcome of the election further strengthened democracy in the Philippines. But this is a short-range outlook; to answer in terms of the long run, two other questions must be considered. First, what are the prospects that the Marcos administration will do any better than the Macapagal administration (or any earlier one, for that matter) in improving economic conditions? President Marcos is regarded as a strong and domineering politician; it is possible, therefore, that he might be able to provide the necessary leadership to accomplish much while he is in office. On the other hand, even the late and now legendary Ramon Magsaysay was able to make little headway in implementing his reform programs in the face of determined opposition by vested interest. Based on the record of the past and the realities of the present, then, most observers agree that there is likely to be little change in the *status quo* in the foreseeable future.

If this assessment is correct, a second question becomes all-important: what are the prospects that the Filipino people will continue to tolerate this kind of situation? Is their optimism unlimited and unquenchable? If not, when will they finally abandon their faith in the democratic process and select other means to achieve their ends? There are signs that Filipinos are rapidly losing patience with the brand of political leadership they have endured for some two decades and with the choice—or rather lack of one—

[2] The quotation is from my article, "Challenge to the 'New Era' in Philippine Politics," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXVII (Fall, 1964), 306.

presented by the two major political parties. It was in response to this growing discontent that a third party—the Party for Philippine Progress—was organized in mid-1965. The PPP campaign stressed the similarity of the major parties and their subservience to the vested interests. Yet, despite this essentially negative approach and the many formidable handicaps facing minor parties in Philippine politics, it is significant that most Filipinos whom I questioned during the campaign, stated that their first choice was PPP presidential candidate Raul Manglapus; they added, however, that they would probably not vote for him because the PPP had no chance to win and they did not want to waste their votes. Admittedly, this type of response is not a new one in the Philippines, where third parties have been involved in several previous presidential elections. Nevertheless, it appeared to be much more widespread than ever in 1965. Indeed, it may not be too far-fetched to speculate that, although he eventually received a surprisingly small percentage of the vote, Manglapus might have been elected President if all Filipinos had voted in accordance with their first preferences.

All this is not to imply that the Philippines soon will experience a *coup d'etat* or some similar upheaval. In the immediate future, Filipinos probably will continue to follow democratic techniques in expressing their discontent. But their voting patterns may begin to reflect their dissatisfaction; it is likely, for instance, that they will react against the repeated failures of the two major parties to improve economic conditions and will begin to give growing support, in forthcoming elections, to third-party movements such as the PPP. In the long run, however, Filipino recourse to democratic procedures will become increasingly less likely unless there is evidence that the present system can perform satisfactorily.

There is general agreement, as noted earlier, that the economic factor was primarily responsible for Macapagal's downfall; not everyone, however, would draw such pessimistic conclusions from the outcome of the 1965 election. Many would dispute these conclusions on the ground that Macapagal's defeat was not at all unusual or expected in the light of Philippine political history. According to this argument, no Philippine President has ever managed to win re-election, so that Macapagal's case is nothing out of the ordinary. This fact received much emphasis in every account of the 1965 election, and justifiably so, for it is indeed remarkable. On the other hand, this position overlooks a significant fact—one which supports the view that Filipino patience is fading: the 1965 election was the first one in Philippine history in which an administration party failed to win the opportunity to serve two consecutive terms in control of the presidency. In brief, then, the long-run implications of the election for the future of Philippine democracy are not at all encouraging.

IV

We turn now to a consideration of the implications of the 1965 election for the United States. Here, it is also necessary to distinguish between the likely immediate consequences and the long-range possibilities. As far as the immediate future is concerned, it appears that American interests (both economic and foreign policy interests) were not adversely affected by the outcome of the election, as the following account indicates.

It is widely believed in the Philippines that no serious presidential aspirant can afford to antagonize the United States, for this would mean that American "support" would go to friendlier candidates. Whether or not this view is correct, American interests did not face an especially difficult choice in the 1965 campaign, for neither Macapagal nor Marcos—nor Manglapus, for that matter—was thought to be hostile to the United States. It is true that Macapagal started his term as President on a highly nationalistic note. Among other things, he changed the date of Independence Day from July 4 to June 12; cancelled a scheduled trip to the United States when the American Congress failed to pass a bill providing for war damage payments to the Philippines; pursued the Philippine claim to North Borneo despite American disapproval; and appeared to be on increasingly friendly terms with President Sukarno at a time when the latter's public statements were becoming highly anti-American. Toward the latter part of Macapagal's term in office, however, it became evident—in view of the Vietnam crisis, the growing strength of the Indonesian Communist Party, and the Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation—that the Philippines could not act as independently as it had been. As a result, the Macapagal administration played a very "reasonable" role (from the American standpoint) during the 1964-1965 period, when relations between the two countries became greatly strained. This proved to be disappointing to the more extreme nationalists in the islands, but these elements were unable to find any solace in the position of the Nacionalista presidential candidate, who also followed a cautious, non-committal line on the subject of Philippine-American relations. Thus, the 1965 election presented American interests with less of a clear choice between candidates than did a number of earlier elections (such as that of 1953).

If there was any American favoritism during the campaign, it might seem, on the surface, that Macapagal should have benefited from it. For one thing, he had already proven himself to be "reliable" whereas Marcos was something of an unknown quality, at least, by comparison. For another, Americans might have been suspicious of Marcos because his campaign supporters included the extreme nationalist groups in the Philippines, including those advocating Philippine adoption of a policy of neutralism and the elimination of American bases in the islands. Nor was Marcos helped any by the fact that the Nacionalista Party opposed a Macapagal-backed proposal that Congress approve the dispatch to Vietnam of Filipino engineering and combat battalions. This opposition, based on the ground that it would be better to send non-combat social-action teams to Vietnam, helped kill the proposal during the 1965 session of Congress.

On balance, therefore, Marcos might have appeared to be less "pro-American" than Macapagal; at least, some of the Marcos supporters tried to give this impression. Conversely, the latter accused Macapagal of having sold out to the United States, citing as evidence the President's trip to America in October 1964, his failure to insist on full implementation of the Retail Trade Nationalization Act, and his apparent reluctance to press for revision of the various Philippine-American military pacts. Thus, if American interests played any role in the 1965 campaign, it would seem that Marcos should have been at a disadvantage in this regard. On the other hand, soon after

his victory, Marcos came out with a statement that he intended to follow the pro-American policies of his predecessor. This raised the possibility that American interests might have reached some kind of understanding with Marcos prior to the election as, in fact, some Manila journalists hinted after the election. In any event, it is unlikely that there will be any sudden changes in Philippine foreign policy in the near future, at least, where American foreign policy objectives are directly concerned.

Because of the recent wave of "anti-Americanism" that received so much publicity in the United States, some people might attack the preceding conclusion. But it is not difficult to refute any such attack. In the first place, it is erroneous and misleading to apply the term "anti-Americanism" to events which essentially reflect growing Philippine nationalism. Frequently this nationalism, or "pro-Filipinism" as some prefer to call it, is directed at American targets, but this is unavoidable for a number of reasons: (1) virtually the only targets available for this emergent nationalism are American interest and their representatives; (2) Philippine manifestations of nationalism normally are not destructive but are aimed at rectifying grievances and inequities stemming from various aspects of Philippine-American relations; and (3) Americans have a lamentable tendency to regard critics of American actions or policies as hostile if not communist-inspired.

In the second place, the recent displays of Philippine nationalism—whether motivated by anti-American sentiment or not—result from the combination of a number of factors quite unrelated to the influence of communist agent, regardless of what the American press has to say. These factors include the following: (1) although Filipinos are dissatisfied with their nation's rate of economic development, nevertheless, the Philippines has progressed economically to such an extent that it now feels able to protest vigorously against the remnants of its colonial past, such as the 1946 "parity amendment" to the Philippine Constitution and the 1954 Laurel-Langley Trade Agreement; (2) as noted above, Filipinos strongly resent the various inequities contained in commercial, trade and military treaties between the two countries; and (3) also involved is a psychological reaction, on the part of Filipinos, against their dependence on the United States for defense against external aggression; this dependence has become more obvious (with the emergence of threats in Indonesia and Vietnam) precisely at a time when Philippine nationalism has been growing, thus arousing more tension and irritation than ever.

Because of all the above-mentioned elements, it would be risky to state categorically that the Philippines in the near future (that is, in the period up to 1970) will not make decisions which American officials would oppose. To make such a statement would commit the error of taking the Philippines for granted, an American habit which Filipinos find most distasteful. Thus, it would be unwise to rule out the possibility that the Philippines, for instance, might adopt a neutralist foreign policy by 1970. Admittedly, this is unlikely, for most Filipinos—aside from being committed ideologically to democracy—do not deceive themselves as to the nature of communism or as to their country's vulnerability to external aggression in the absence of United States military power. The point is that a Philippine swing to neutral-

ism, if this occurs in the near future, would be chiefly attributable to American actions and policies, which have done so much to provoke "anti-Americanism" in the islands in recent years. This view is supported by an analysis of the developments that led to strained Philippine-American relations during 1964-1965. Much of the responsibility for that situation was directly and unequivocally traceable to obvious and avoidable errors of omission and commission on the part of United States policy-makers. In brief, if Philippine nationalism contains any significant element of "anti-Americanism," much of this sentiment derives, not from "irrational" Filipino attitudes toward the United States nor from Communist influence, but from American treatment of the Philippines.[3]

Not long after the communist takeover of mainland China, the noted English political scientist and historian, Denis Brogan, commented on an American tendency to believe that significant happenings in international politics are dependent primarily on United States actions, or lack of them. This is illustrated, for example, by the old and familiar claim that the United States "lost" China to the Communists. I do not think that the preceding argument is based on what Brogan called the "illusion of American omnipotence." The Philippines is not China, and it should be recognized by all concerned that the Philippines and the United States do have a "special relationship" (though it may be rather one-sided, as many Filipinos feel). In this context, then, there is some validity in maintaining that the United States might "lose" the Philippines in the short run.

Turning now to an examination of the long-run implications of the 1965 election for American interests, we find that, from this standpoint, the situation is quite different. There are two main reasons. First, there is a much greater possibility that the Philippines will go neutralist in the long run —that is, in the post-1970 period—than in the near future. Second, such an occurrence would result principally from internal Philippine developments rather than from United States actions. These conclusions are based, of course, on the earlier analysis of the implications of the 1965 election for the future of democratic government in the Philippines. As was argued above, there is a distinct likelihood that, in the absence of definite economic progress in the next few years, the Philippine record of political stability will be cut short and that the country will join the ranks of the uncommitted nations.

While this would not necessarily be "bad" for the Philippines, it would confront the United States with certain obvious problems affecting its whole Asian foreign policy. Indeed, it would pose a grave threat to the American position in Vietnam. It is not absurd, as some might think, to talk about the Vietnam struggle in terms of the post-1970 period, for, according to all reports, the Vietcong and North Vietnam are prepared to continue the conflict as long as necessary to drive out the "imperialist aggressors," even if this takes another twenty years or more. It is essential, therefore, for American foreign policy-makers to think in terms of the long run, particularly with regard to strategically located countries like the Philippines.

[3] See my article, "Recent Developments in Philippine-American Relations: A Case Study in Emergent Nationalism," *Asian Survey*, V (June, 1965), 305-318. (Also reprinted in the American Embassy's Manila publication, *The American Journal*, December 1965.)

In summary, there are a number of ominous undertones implicit in the outcome of the 1965 election. The implications of the election, for both the Philippines and the United States, are clearly dangerous. This is a disturbing and pessimistic interpretation, but it does not do violence to the available evidence. It is also a bluntly-phrased interpretation, but deliberately so. It is prompted by the hope that it will help spur immediate Philippine action, and American cooperation, in the task of promoting the urgently-needed reforms for the situation which the average Filipino has endured optimistically and patiently for so long.

CONTRIBUTORS

ERIC CASIÑO is junior anthropologist of the Division of Anthropology, Philippine National Museum. He has undertaken a number of field trips to Cagayan de Sulu.

PRACHOOM CHOMCHAI is Associate Professor of Political Economy, Chulalongkorn University. He has written a number of articles not only on Thailand's economy but also on the country's history and culture.

JOHN P. DRISCOLL is Professor of Education, UNESCO Asian Institute for Teacher Education. He became interested in Buddhism while serving in Thailand (1964-1965) where he undertook considerable research in Buddhist libraries and monasteries.

DIETER KRAUSE recently got his Ph.D. degree and has been associated with the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute in Freiburg, Germany. In 1962-1963, he went to Malaysia and Indonesia to undertake research for his dissertation covering the pan-Indonesian concept and its movement in Malaya and Singapore, 1937-1962.

DEAN CESAR ADIB MAJUL has been a scholar on Islam in the Philippines. He is a professor of Philosophy and Political Science at the University of the Philippines.

MARTIN MEADOWS is Associate Professor in the School of Government, American University. Born in the Philippines where he lived for many years, he returned in 1964-1965 as Visiting Fulbright lecturer at the Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines.

REV. CONRAD MYRICK is Professor of History at St. Andrew's Seminary, Quezon City, Philippines. In 1964-1965, he did graduate studies at the University of Sevilla and researched at the Archives of Sevilla.

MICHAEL P. ONORATO is Assistant Professor of History, California State College at Fullerton. In 1963-1964, he was Visiting Professor at the Graduate School of the Ateneo de Manila University. While in the Philippines, he researched on Leonard Wood and other topics related to Philippine history.

GOTTFRIED OOSTERWAL is Professor of Religion at the School of Graduate Studies, Philippine Union College. At present on leave from the College, he is a Visiting Professor at the Department of Behavioral Sciences, Andrews University, Michigan.

EMANUEL SARKISYANZ is Professor of Political Science, Freiburg University, West Germany. He has written a number of articles on Burma.

JOHN N. SCHUMACHER, S.J., is Professor of History at the Loyola House of Studies. In 1962-1963, he was in Spain, under a Fulbright grant, to research in Philippine history, specifically, on the Filipino Nationalists' propaganda campaign in Europe, 1880-1895, the subject of his doctoral dissertation.

HENZAH SENDUT is Associate Professor in Urban Studies and Acting Chairman of the Department of Geography, University of Malaya. Until re-

cently, he served as United Nations Adviser on urbanization and urban development at the Bureau of Social Affairs, United Nations, New York.

DAVID R. STURTEVANT is Associate Professor of History at Muskigun College, New Concord, Ohio. In 1965-1966, he was Fulbright Research Fellow and Visiting Professor at the Institute of Asian Studies, University of the Philippines. While in the Philippines, he continued his research on agrarian unrest in the Philippines, 1890-1942.

NATHANIEL B. TABLANTE is Professor of Agricultural Economics at the University of the Philippines where he is also Budget Director. He has written a number of articles on Philippine economy and Philippine economic development.

NICHOLAS TARLING is Associate Professor at the Department of History, University of Auckland, New Zealand. He has written two books: *Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in the Malay World, 1780-1824* and *Piracy and Politics in the Malay World.*

ROBERT VAN NIEL is Professor of History, University of Hawaii. He has written a book entitled *The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite* and other articles on Indonesia as well as Southeast Asia as a region of study.

GERALD E. WHEELER is Professor of History, San Jose State College in California. In 1963-1964, he was a Fulbright-Hays lecturer at the University of the Philippines and the Lyceum of the Philippines.

ARAM A. YENGOYAN is Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of Michigan. In 1960-1962, and again in May-August 1965, he undertook field work in the Mandaya area of eastern Davao province, Philippines.

INSTITUTE OF ASIAN STUDIES STAFF

RUBEN SANTOS CUYUGAN, Ph.D., Professor of Sociology, and IAS Director

JOSEFA M. SANIEL, Ph.D., Associate Professor in East Asian Studies, and IAS Program Coordinator

JUAN R. FRANCISCO, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Indology

JUSTUS VAN der KROEF, Ph.D., Visiting Professor in Indonesian Studies

PARALUMAN S. ASPILLERA, Assistant Professor of Philippine Studies

ANTONIO TAN, Assistant Professor in Chinese Studies

SILVINO V. EPISTOLA, Instructor in Japanese Language and Literature *

EMMANUEL G. ORARA,** Instructor in Hindu and Buddhistic Philosophy

AURORA ROXAS-LIM, Instructor in Oriental Arts

AJIT SINGH RYE,** Instructor in Contemporary Indian Studies

J. ELISEO ROCAMORA, Instructor in Indonesian Studies *

SALUD CARREON-BUÑAG, Instructor in Malaysian Studies

GIDEON C. T. HSU, Professorial Lecturer in Chinese Language

YUKIHIRO YAMADA, Colombo Plan Visiting Lecturer in Japanese Language

BEULAH D. NUVAL, Librarian and in-charge of gifts and exchange of IAS publications

ANDRES I. FERNANDEZ, Managing Editor, *Lipunan;* Editor, *Asian Studies Newsletter;* IAS Senior Administrative Assistant

Research Assistants: R. CONCEPCION, C. PABALAN, G. PAGARIGAN, E. RAMOS, N. RECTO, N. SORIANO, A. YÑIGUEZ.

---

* On study leave abroad
** On local study leave

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
INSTITUTE OF ASIAN STUDIES
Quezon City, Philippines