Asian Studies

VOLUME IV NO. 1 APRIL 1966

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ASIAN STUDIES

Volume IV, Number 1, April 1966

Josefa M. Saniel
Issue Editor

Asian Studies

April 1966 Volume IV, Number I

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Articles published in the Asian Studies
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Asian Studies is published three times a year
April, August and December — for the
Institute of Asian Studies by
The University of the Philippines Press
Quezon City, Philippines

Please address —

* All manuscripts to the Program
Coordinator, Institute of
Asian Studies

* Correspondence on exchange
to the Librarian, Institute of
Asian Studies.

* Correspondence on subscription
to the University of the Philippines Press,
U.P. Post Office
Quezon City, Philippines

SUBSCRIPTIONS: ₱6.00 PER YEAR IN THE PHILIPPINES;
US$3.00 ELSEWHERE; SINGLE COPIES ₱2.50
IN THE PHILIPPINES; US$1.50 ABROAD.
BACK ISSUES FOR SOME NUMBERS ARE STILL AVAILABLE.

FACTORS EXPLAINING THE DISPARATE PACE OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA AND JAPAN *

ALLAN B. COLE

Ito Hirobumi to Li Hung-chang in 1895, and Li's response:

Ten years ago when I was at Tientsin, I talked about reform with the Grand Secretary. Why is it that up to now not a single thing has been changed or reformed?

At that time when I heard you, sir, talking about that, I was overcome with admiration, and furthermore I deeply admired, sir, your having vigorously changed your customs in Japan so as to reach the present stage. Affairs in my country have been so confined by tradition that I could not accomplish what I desired.[1]

* * *

Cheng Kuan-ying, the scholarly compradore, c. 1895:

Look now, how is it that tiny Japan increasingly is benefiting [from commerce] while China for all its large size repeatedly has been distressed by it? The trouble stems merely from the lack of [competent] men who devote themselves to commercial [economic] matters. Responsibility for this lies both with the officials above and with the merchants below... .[2]

* * *

Sir Robert Hart in 1869:

To the mass of Chinese officials, the word improvement would convey no idea corresponding to that which is in the Western mind.[3]

* * *

IN OUR OWN TIME, THE EFFORTS OF NEW NATIONS TO HASTEN THEIR economic development and the spectacular campaigns of revolutionary China to break through traditional impediments into self-generative economic growth, have whetted interest in the earlier contrast between the pace of modernization in China and Japan. We have been learning anew how arduous and complex are the factors and processes involved. For they entail more than drastic technological and industrial advance—indeed, basic transformations affecting cultures, social structures—a panoply of institutions, ideological trends, and inevitably the emotional life of peoples adjusting to modern forces.

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* Paper submitted to the International Conference of Historians of Asia, held in Hong Kong in September, 1964.

1 Quoted in and by Ssu-yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, **Chinas Response to the West, A Documentary Survey 1839-1923** (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), 126; citing Wang Yun-sheng, **Liu-shih-nien lai Chung-kuo yu Jih-pen,** II, 261-262.

2 Quoted in, and by, Albert Feuerwerker, **China's Early Industrialization, Sheng Hsuam-huai (1844-1916) and Mandarin Enterprise** (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), 33; citing Cheng Kuan-ying, **Sheng-shih wei-yen** (Warnings to a Seemingly Prosperous Age), 1900 ed. 8 chuan, 5. lab.

3 Quoted in, and by, Mary C. Wright, **The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism, The T'ung Chih Restoration,** 1862-1874 (2nd ed.; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 64; citing Robert Hart, "Mr. Hart's Note on Chinese Matters," Peking, June 30, 1869, reprinted as Appendix II to Gumpach, **The Burlingame Mission,** 876-877.

That Japan was able to industrialize and rather extensively to remold its institutional life in little more than a generation, while China floundered through one frustrating phase of revolution after another, is well known. Scholars in a number of social disciplines—notably economics, sociology, social anthropology and psychology—have been enriching analytically the interpretations which have made the insights of historians more perceptive and sophisticated. This paper will coordinate and summarize the causal factors which explain discrepancies, particularly during early attempts at modernization by these two Asian neighbors. The gaining of cumulative momentum to the point of sustained economic dynamism has been likened to an airplane: it seems easy to cruise along at high altitude, but the engines are under most strain during take-off. Like students of aerodynamics, we shall be interested in propulsive forces, in factors of resistance, and in how factors fitted into patterns conducive to, or impeding progressive change.

Scholars from other social disciplines give increasing confirmation to the historical observation that trends toward technological and institutional change were set in motion considerably earlier in Tokugawa Japan than in China under the Ch'ing. The last great period of traditional equilibrium began to change significantly in Japan toward the end of the seventeenth century, and in China, about a century later. The disturbing new forces were mainly of endogenous origins in both countries but, in the nineteenth century, their tempos and the tensions they produced were accentuated by external challenges. This rise of disequilibrating forces was longer in Japan than in China and led earlier to the next phase of gestation. In Japan, this third stage lasted from approximately the coming of the Perry expedition to the early 1890's; in China, it became a significant trend after the T'aip'ing Rebellion and lasted until about 1953.

Breakthrough was achieved by the Japanese economy between 1894 and about 1916, but not in China until the Communists' first Five-Year Plan. Japan was able so soon to achieve self-sustained growth and the highest level of consumption and welfare in Asia, but this has not yet been fully accomplished by mainland China.[4] The Restorations in both these countries in the 1860's and early 'seventies had conservative aspects, but the emergent oligarchy in Japan was swiftly learning to make traditions and imperative changes reinforce each other; it was far from easy, and leaders were conscious of the hazards. They were willing to jettison the feudal system and plunge their own warrior class downward in order to strengthen their country and build their own power within the new system. It was more than four decades from the fall of the shogunate to the Chinese overthrow of their dynastic incubus, their old regime. Even then, there was not to be a smooth transition of authority in China facilitating other important transitions and giving purposeful direction to national development. Nationalism was well consolidated in Japan by then, but only slender groups in China had grasped the concept and its implications. So the Chinese Republic early developed fissions (many of them

[4] The phases here identified as to periods have been taken from J. K. Fairbank, A. Eckstein, and L. S. Yang, "Economic Change in Early Modern China: An Analytic Framework," Economic Development and Cultural Change, IX, No. 1 (October, 1960), 1-26.

from regional interests), was subverted by military and old-line official elements which threatened to renew the imperial cycle, but were repudiated without any strong authority and unified administration which could prevent the development of warlordism.

Meanwhile, the builders of a renovated Japan were building a unitary state with an effective central bureaucracy. Hierarchies, an emphasis on seniority, factionalism, and other vestiges of traditionalism and of feudalistic patterns persisted in the newly directed oligarchy and bureaucracy, but emphases were sufficiently functional to facilitate modernization. As in so many facets of Japanese and Chinese cultures to be discussed, there were contrasts in both degree and kind. There were features of Meiji bureaucracy which hampered modernization, but more progressive forces prevailed; in China, there was a glacial quality in the conservatism and high status of the gentry-oriented scholar-officialdom.

It was not that few efforts at modernization were made in China before 1911, but most of them were obstructed. On the contrary, Japan devised and enforced a uniform tax system able to meet governmental expenses, finance military establishments, invest in new industries, and develop what has come to be called a modern infra-structure. In China, fiscal administration had become more decentralized, more burdensome on the economic sectors where modernization should have been more encouraged. The central government was running annual deficits; the raising of more revenue during the dynasty's latter years was to amortize foreign loans and pay indemnities ensuing from military defeat rather than to provide capital for industrialization. The Japanese government became a vigorous pioneer in the building, equipping and operation of factories, mines, a merchant marine, as well as railway and telegraph lines. In and after 1881, it transferred many of these at low prices to private entrepreneurs. The dependence of Meiji enterprisers on bureaucracy, which discouraged the rapid emergence of independent capitalists on the earlier British model as a force for liberal politics, differed again significantly in degree from the exposure of would-be modern Chinese enterprisers to the supervision and exactions of what Weber called prebendary officials.

The same ideographs meaning "wealth and power" became slogans in both countries, but Japan proved to be more adaptable in important modes of institutional change.[5] Its leaders, and increasingly the public, came rather rapidly to realize that popular education and applied sciences from the test-tube to the locomotive were involved. Many Japanese students were sent abroad for specific learning and were employed rationally upon their return; on the part of China, this process was hesitant and fumbling. Young, Western-trained Chinese, for decades, often found it hard to obtain employment where their skills could be effectively used. Before the end of the last century, Japan's population had become one of the most literate in the world, but at the end of World War II, probably 70% of all Chinese could not yet read nor write.

[5] In his conclusion, Feuerwerker (op. cit., p. 242) writes: "... One institutional breakthrough is worth a dozen textile mills or shipping companies established within the framework of the traditional society and its system of values."

Other contrasts were numerous. The Meiji government instituted a Foreign Ministry in 1868 and included it in the first cabinet of 1885, but not until 1901 did China reluctantly establish such a modern department. The Japanese established their first legations abroad nineteen years after their first treaty, but it was a generation after China's first modern treaties that this was done. Codes of law in Japan were vigorously revised and, by 1899, that empire was rid of extraterritoriality; in China, the processes were much more halting, and legal sovereignty was not fully recovered until 1943. Japan had one never-amended, conservative constitution from 1889 to 1947, while China had no less than ten constitutions or drafts between 1912 and 1947. Japan developed a fully nationalized military system in the 1870's, but—though the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek made some progress in overcoming warlord autonomy—the process was not completed until the Communist seizure of nation-wide power. The full regaining of national sovereignty and initiative was achieved by Japan between 1894 and 1911, but not by China until after 1949. Indeed, almost simultaneously with its own emancipation from unequal treaties, Japan was able to share and extend non-reciprocal privileges in China, including for the first time Japanese-owned industries in Chinese treaty ports. Thus, Japan began to invest in China, to compete with, and contribute to, the depression of certain Chinese handicraft industries, and to encroach on mainland markets. The delay in Chinese modernization proved to be disastrous as markets for many commodities were preempted by foreign enterprises. Not only did conventional tariffs prevent China from protecting young industries; foreign producers on Chinese soil began to reduce even the low revenues from imports in the same categories, and opportunities for would-be modern Chinese enterpreneurs narrowed. Clearly, there were multipliers in both the successful and negatively in the obstructed patterns of modernization. But, when interrelated factors of economic growth were explained to Chinese officials, they tended to be impressed negatively, for they saw in such connections proof that one change would lead to another until the whole traditional economy and society would be undermined.

Why were Meiji leaders and their humbler countrymen able to create an institutional milieu for the new technology, to subordinate or bend the interests of family, class, faction and region to those of the nation and of modernization? And why was Chinese modernization so long frustrated? Perhaps answers to these questions will be suggestive as to factors which help to explain the varied performance of societies which more recently have been drawn into what Eric Hoffer has called "the ordeal of change."[6]

Geographical and certain gross historical factors may have been less telling than others to be discussed, but surely they were important. Tokugawa Japan was long secluded, but its islands were increasingly exposed to alien pressures and overseas opportunities. The sea is both an insulator and a highway. Moreover, Japan has three times as long a coastline as China and better harbors. Most of its people lived within a day's journey of the littoral; its hinterlands are limited and—despite more navigable rivers in the Chinese interior—inland Japan is for the most part more permeable. The Japanese

[6] **The Ordeal of Change** (New York: Harper and Row, 1963).

were, even before Perry, ethnically and culturally more homogeneous than their more numerous neighbors. Geography, like the organization of Japanese feudalism, encouraged a creative tension between partial centralization and competitive diversity.

Japan's position helps to explain why its inhabitants long were borrowers from the continent, thus developing habits and traditions of adjustability and interest in foreign cultures. Psychologically and materially, they have not been as self-sufficient as the Chinese. Indeed, under modern conditions, the paucity of their natural resources has compelled industrialization which, in turn, has impelled requisite technological and institutional changes. Japan's competitive position has allowed less traditional inefficiency. Ambivalence between conservatism and impressionability was encouraged by geography. But Japan was more proof against being overwhelmed from the continent than Britain and, in certain respects, crucial for our analysis of contrasts, the Japanese were much freer than the Koreans to modify or eschew aspects of Chinese institutions as acculturation proceeded. For example, though in and after the Nara period they repeatedly imitated the Chinese imperial bureaucracy, they never developed such a dominant one staffed by such a self-conscious official class based on the landed gentry and so thoroughly committed to Confucian ideology. The late continuance of feudalism in Japan itself attested to the considerable cultural autonomy of which that insular society was capable.

For Europeans, Americans and expansionists operating from India, Japan was at the end of the line and thus their impact was mitigated. The Japanese could observe the defeats of prestigious China by superior Western technology and draw prudent conclusions. The United States, which took the initiative in reopening relations with Japan, had a vast continent to people and develop; it sought no territorial aggrandizement in Asia.

In terms of pre-modern means of transportation, China was in some respects more isolated than Japan, however. Its self-image as the world hub fostered an ethnocentrism which is being reevaluated now that it has again been aroused. The Chinese "world culture" bred an outlook rather different from that of the Japanese. It was more complacent. Early Western visitors to Japan noted the vigor and curiosity of the Japanese; having just come from the China coast, they observed the differences. Even if there had been more prevalent innovative elites in China during the nineteenth century, the vastness and regional pluralism of their empire would have made it more difficult for changes to be diffused. Even today, the Communists—with their effective apparatus—have difficulties stemming, in part, from the bulk and complexity of China.

Because manifold revolutions such as basically occurred during the Meiji and Taisho reigns—and the one that recently has culminated in China—are accompanied by great tensions, it is significant that the transmission of legitimate authority was relatively smooth in Japan. Shogunal die-hards and rebellious peasants and **samurai** were quickly disciplined; loyalties were rapidly transferred to, and institutionalized in, the Emperor and nation. Japan had the advantage (for purposes of rapid change yet adequate stability) of an indigenous royal line the legitimacy of which stemmed from heredity, not popularly recognized or pragmatic mandate. Thus, the new oligarchy had a potent symbol and authority to check those who would interfere with drastic change and to justify effort toward a new order. In China, the Manchu dynasty had in some ways remained foreign and to its end pursued the strategy of divide-and-rule. Chinese nationalists, therefore, faced two ways until the Ch'ing, its privileged court, the eunuchs and nobility were overthrown.

From comparative analyses of techno-economically developing societies, some nine ingredients, or clusters of conditions conducive to innovative readiness for change,[7] have been derived and can be summarized as follows:

1. Predisposition toward such manifold changes is usually stronger, or, at least, the transition is smoother, where elements of the traditional elites have have suffered deterioration of their status, have experienced a period of partial alienation and withdrawal, have tended to reject the values of the dominant group or of the system, and tend to be receptive to changes as they seek ways to resolve problems and assert leadership in new modes. Of course, a new revolutionary elite—like the Chinese Communists—can arise, but this usually involves more turmoil and time. Innovators cannot very effectively be aliens (as, for example, Western enterprisers in Chinese treaty ports) because the larger society will tend to reject the new values and practices. Change is facilitated when led by an already respected group.[8] Readiness for change is also needed on the part of other strata which are to be important in the future processes of industrialization.

2. Not just exceptional instances but a trend of what might be called pre-modern technological innovativeness and readiness for industrial reorganization are prerequisites. This cannot occur unless a sufficient base of scientific and technological knowledge exists. The trend can be assisted by the availability of capital, usually from mercantile sources; it is frequently associated with developing business skills. It also requires enough socio-political freedom to permit deviant activity. When we come to compare and contrast the value systems of China and Japan, we shall note other conditions encouraging the development of innovative personalities.

3. The values and diffused functions of the traditional, solidary family in a society crossing the threshold into rapid modernization, will be in process of modification. Loyalty to family will be subordinated in more spheres to other allegiances, and this will have significance for nation-building, productive efficiency, as well as restraints on corruption and nepotism.

4. Required also are leading elements with a vision of the direction which their society should take both technically and in the development of new insti-

[7] These preconditions are, of course, determined in part by the nature of modern industrialism and the demands it makes on societies. It requires rational, universalistic, functionally specific relations; it emphasizes efficient rather than customary method, rational decisions rather than traditions, the pertinent abilities of persons rather than their situational statuses. Obligations and expectations involved in relations must be precisely defined. Cellular, self-sufficient social units must yield to closely interrelated ones. There is need for coordination and the development of new operative patterns by both the state and private organizations.

[8] See especially: Everett E. Hagen, "How Economic Growth Begins: A General Theory Applied to Japan," **The Public Opinion Quarterly**, XXII. No. 3 (Fall, 1958), 375-376, 379-383; and the same author's **On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins** (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1962), espec. chap. 14.

tutions—leaders committed to the new objectives and capable of controlling the pertinent means, including sufficient political power to attain aims and block opposition. They must be competent planners and, in implementing programs, to have command and the support of followers capable of responding in new directions: those who accept the new disciplines and organizations. It is particularly important that prime leaders have effective understandings and relations with locally influential elites.

5. Success in this kind of revolutionary transition depends on entrepreneurial groups in being or incipiently available, enterprisers who are ideologically motivated to take advantage of new conditions which tend to multiply as an old order decays. They should not be excessively committed to tradition, nor to monopolistic privileges and limitations. Such types tend to reflect impetuses from an expanding money economy and commercialization of agriculture. In both China and Japan, there were some who—by involvement in the putting-out system—in the nineteenth century had come to the verge of factory production. Such business leaders have been readier for the dawn of industrialism when they have become familiar with proto-modern financial methods, have networks of rural supply, can rapidly respond to expanding domestic and foreign trade, and have strategic alliances with, but are not too dominated and despoiled by, regional elites and wielders of state power.

6. Industrialization is encouraged by, at least, available ingredients of a genuine nationalism in terms of attitudes, molding institutions, nation-wide markets, and a sense of community and of concensus, though one susceptible of transformation.

7. Another crucial precondition is government and administration with creative tensions between centralized authority and regional cum local autonomies. Effective communication between central planners and local implementers is needed, with accepted procedures for command and reporting. Industralization and other facets of modernization can be achieved more rapidly where governmental regulation penetrates deeply without smothering local initiatives and where there is a progress imbalance between factors making for continuous stability and opportunities for response to new conditions and forces. Optimally there should be a strong enough authority to preserve stability but sufficient dynamism to cast off traditional impediments and launch vigorously in the new direction.

8. As already indicated, there is needed the capacity to produce surpluses and the purposeful discipline to convert them into capital for both state and private investment in coordinated programs.

9. There may be other significant factors, but let us say here that finally, during the pre-dawn of industrialism, the impending transformation can be facilitated by the existence of peasant artisans whose traditional crafts have engendered "quickness of hand and eye, respect for tools and materials, and adaptation to an environment of moving parts." In societies like those of China, India and Japan—crowded before the industrial revolution—most transitional new factories were small enough to make these skills still relevant. The labor force also needs to be adjustable to new functional emphases and disciplines... After such a catalogue of preconditions, is it any wonder that

societies have shown and still exhibit a wide variety of responses to this relatively recent and pervasive trend centered on industrialization? In this perspective, Japanese society by 1860 was exceptionally precocious.

Without procrustean imposition of such theories, with others let us try to illumine the significance of similarities and contrasts in Chinese and Japanese experience during the processes of modernization. In the first place, the Japanese were keener pursuers of Western knowledge than were their continental neighbors. George Wong has shown that Chinese scholar-officialdom opposed Jesuit teachings, not only on grounds of religious prejudice but also from ethnocentrism and a comprehensive philosophical background. They even sensed threats to their class status and to the whole traditional system.[9] Their campaign against Western ideas culminated in the first half of the eighteenth century, shortly before Dutch studies began to gain momentum in Japan. By the time of Perry's arrival, there were no less than thirty-five centers of learning through Dutch sources extending from Nagasaki to Hokkaido, and eager Japanese were able to ask the American intruders whether an isthmian canal had been dug, and whether cannon seen on the "black ships" were of the Paixhans shelf-firing type. Being a borrowed philosophy, Confucianism seems not to have had as strong a confining grip on minds in Japan as in China. As in many (but not all) of the contrasts cited here, this was one of degree and yet is significant. More Japanese chose to stress the neo-Confucian doctrine favoring "the investigation of things." In their country, impiricism and pragmatic tendencies increasingly provided a rationale for important prerequisites of modernization.[10] Furthermore, the lower **samurai**, who were in an increasing economic bind as the feudal system declined, found in the championing of Dutch studies a relatively safe form of protest and a constructive way out. Artificial isolation apparently whetted Japanese curiosity about foreign affairs while Chinese self-satisfaction was more impervious.[11] The greater degree of pluralism in Japan permitted varied responses to Western learning and power,[12] but in China the stifling imperial bureaucracy and its Confucian "literocracy" were deterrents; when regionalism grew after the great mid-century rebellions, modernization was ineffectually attempted by Confucian satraps while Japan had already begun national planning and implementation.

Furthermore, institutional and technological changes were already in motion in Japan before the American expedition made demands. T.C. Smith points out that not just a few Japanese scholars but officials generally were already convinced of the potentialities of modern techniques. "By 1850,"

[9] George H. C. Wong, "China's Opposition to Western Science during Late Ming and Early Ch'ing," Isis, LIV, Pt. 1, No. 175 (1963), 29-49.

[10] Paper read by Harry Harootunian on "Social Values and Leadership in Late Tokugawa Thought," at the convention of the Association for Asian Studies, Washington, 1964.

[11] Thomas C. Smith, **Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan: Government Enterprise, 1868-1880** (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955), 1-4.

[12] A point made by Edwin O. Reischauer in "Modernization in Nineteenth-Century China and Japan," **Japan Quarterly**, X, No. 3 (July-September, 1963), 303. The **bakufu** and the western **tozama** fiefs had special considerations of economic factors and power for being innovative along modern lines. In addition to Sat-Cho-Hi-To fiefs, however, those of Echizen and Mito were astir.

he wrote, "Japan had gone through an apprenticeship that lay almost entirely in the future for China."[13] The Tokugawa **bakufu** was goaded into action along these lines not only by its responsibility for general defense but also by the activities of long-hostile and powerful western **han**. Where in China, even during the "self-strengthening" movement of the 'sixties and 'seventies, could scholar-officials have been found actually working in shipyards and foundries? Yet **samurai** on some of those fiefs were eagerly engaged in hand-soiling tasks.[14] Changes in the world view of, at least, some Japanese aristocrats—and increasingly of creative monks and artisans—gains in innovative qualities from an altered view of man's relation to his physical and social universe, began to stir during the late Heian period. Such currents seem to have affected less the common folk and highest strata than Japan's merchants, prosperous peasants, its lesser elite and that crucial medial element between castle towns and peasantry, the **goshi** (rustic **samurai**)—who were often village headmen—and their sons.

Examination of the motivative value systems in the two cultures help to explain why these changes were well under way in Japan but not in China before 1860. When Japanese came aboard foreign vessels or were sent abroad on missions after the first treaties, they were seen busily sketching the gadgets and machines which were novel to them. Their curiosity and graphic sense were aroused. On the contrary, when Yeh Ming-ch'en, Viceroy at Canton, was taken prisoner by the British and sent to Calcutta in 1858, officers sympathetic with his boredom asked if they could supply him with reading matter, whereupon he replied: "Long ago I memorized the Confucian classics, the only worthwhile literature." This attitude among Chinese changed long before 1949; after the Communist victory, thousands of Chinese students were busily sketching and studying in the Soviet Union. There had been a widespread change in values and attitudes, but considerably later than in Japan.

Founders of the Tokugawa regime did officially establish Confucianism, but their shogunate failed to develop a moral basis with the depth and hold attained in China. Three main factors account for this: the inculcation of this ideology by a scholar-officialdom more dominant in China; the more diffuse values, functions and claims of the Chinese family and clan; and the greater vitality of other-worldly Buddhist sects in Japan with significance for behavior in this life. The partial decentralization of feudalism affected all of these—preventing a hegemony by imperial officials and encouraging religious pluralism. Filial piety was a prime value in China; the body politic was a porous mass of autonomous family and village cells living mainly in an agricultural pattern which emphasized subsistant self-sufficiency more than in Japan.[15] In

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13 Op. cit., 3-4.

14 The quarter-size railway and train which Perry's expedition brought was studied by Japanese **samurai** and **daimyo** with the aid of, at least, one Dutch work on steam engineering so that soon they were themselves operating the new conveyance in Edo; by contrast, the first railway built near Shanghai was thought to offend the **feng shui** (forces of geomancy), to endanger humans and crops, so it was amputated and dumped on a beach in Taiwan.

15 One example of the difference in this respect was the period of mourning for parents which, in China unlike Japan, made provision for officials to leave their posts for as long as three years and retire to their family estates. Could there have been any

China, loyalty was not to a nation or even (with the exception of officials) to the imperial authority but to the Confucian way of life, and this matrix was basically incompatible with the nature and requirements of modernization. No transcendant sanctions prevailed in China, no clear and binding hierarchy of loyalties which could be turned to the service of modernization when elites altered the direction of policies. In Japan, however, loyalty usually supervened over filial reverence, so there were ethical sanctions for loyalty and obedience to non-sanguineous hierarchical superiors. The Chinese system encouraged strong identification with tradition, with the paternal image rather than emphasis on autonomy and achievement, on precedents, considerations of situational status, and on orthodox conservatism. These patterns were not lacking but were less firm, comprehensive and mutually reinforcing in Japan. In China, a humanistically intellectual life was even more highly esteemed than in Japan, and there was less interest in, and respect for, business, industrial and scientific pursuits. In China, men looked "up to the past," in the main, until a drastic revolution more recently shifted the emphasis to an industrialized, communistic future. Foreign advisers in Meiji Japan reported that leaders of modernization were reluctant to consider traditional precedents; so intent were they about the future.[16]

Along with stronger goal orientation in utilitarian directions—encouraged by the Japanese system of values—went a military elite, greater interest and pleasure in manual-technical activity, and keener interest in the nature and operations of man's physical environment and in the means for utilizing and even shaping material surroundings for human advantage. Emphasis on research, though gaining in Japan during the middle and late Tokugawa era, was less prominent in the T'ung-ch'eng school of Sung neo-Confucianism which prevailed in China from the Ch'ien Lung reign (1736-96) and was the main rationalizing source for Tseng Kuo-fan and other leaders of the T'ung Chih Restoration (1862-74). Neo-Confucianism separated moral values from material conditions—an outlook which Marxism reversed.[17]

There were still other factors which go far to explain why leading administrators and ordinary producers in Japan were predisposed to more rapid responses to modern science and capitalist industrialism, and why Japanese culture was probably more encouraging to innovative personalities. We have seen that the Confucian value system of the Chinese official-gentry-peasant society was antipathetic to non-handicraft technical innovation. Robert Bellah, using Weberian and Parsonian insights, has called attention to late Tokugawa preceptual currents, accepted especially in entrepreneurial circles, which accentuated ethical values already strong in the Japanese system: diligence, frugality, self-cultivation and-discipline, and the validity of accumulating and investing

more telling indication of relative emphasis on Confucian orthodoxy as compared with bureaucratic efficiency?

[16] Dr. Erwin Baelz, a German doctor called to the Imperial Medical Academy in Tokyo, observed in 1876 that "The Japanese have their eyes fixed exclusively on the future, and are impatient when a word is said of their past." See: William W. Lockwood, "Japan's Response to the West, the Contrast with China," **World Politics**, IX, No. 1 (October, 1956), 42; citing Baelz, **Awakening Japan** (New York, 1932), 17.

[17] Cf., Mary C. Wright, **The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism**, espec. 59-61.

wealth for the benefit of the family and of society.[18] Everett Hagen has, even more cogently, observed that a Protestant-like ethic in Japan, leading to efforts to make the earth a fruitful habitation, was

> associated not with a sense of guilt but rather with a sense of inadequacy and of shame at revealing it, and associated with a sharply contrasting religious dogma. This is persuasive evidence... that the religious dogma as such was not of central importance in the economic behavior, but rather as a reflection and rationalization of unconscious needs which are also the proximate causes of the economic performance.[19]

These ethical impulses were combined with the felt imperative to repay **on** (endless obligation to father-images), **giri** (maintaining personal honor by meeting lateral obligations), and **gimu** (executing obligations to society). With the possible exception of the first, these were much stronger and more structured patterns in Japanese than in Chinese motivation and behavior. Moreover, the more vigorous sects of Japanese Buddhism encouraged faith in abstract deities and were concerned with transcendance over evil. Yet, in the application of ethics, the Japanese have been known to be situational rather than absolute; their notable adjustability, if not opportunism, has been attributed in part to this. The more dominant and self-sufficient Confucian system on the continent was certainly more inhibitive of innovation and acceptance of change.

Bellah further asserts that China's system of values stressed the integration of its society-economy-government-ideologies.[20] Chinese government was a web of checks and balances; it penetrated little below the **hsien** (county) level, where the cellular structure of autonomous family and local interests prevailed. It was much harder for such a society than for a hierarchical, late-feudal society like Japan's to mobilize to meet the threats and complex challenges of modernism. Even though the Tokugawa consolidators and perpetuators had favored system integration along Confucian lines, other factors and forces—many of them with earlier roots and momentums—limited their success and, goaded by later external pressures, contributed to the demise of their order and to rapid modernization.

Even a glance at new nations in our day confirms the significance of effective leadership toward modernization. In China, after the great rebellions in the nineteenth century had been crushed, there were no disaffected strata both sufficiently alienated and capable of withdrawal and later of revisionist reassertion. After the defeats of T'aip'ing and Nien elites, this pattern did not recur until 1927-28 and after, when the Communists retreated to mountainous borderlands. The transition in leadership could be much more smoothly accomplished in Japan because of related changes long in progress and because traditional values and habits could be bent to the service of new changes. In Japan, too, there were groups which resisted change, but they were controlled by the powerful elements sponsoring renovation. The conservatism, dominance and inertia of Chinese scholar-officialdom were clearly demonstrated in the quashing of the Hundred Days' Reform in 1898. Only the rising military gov-

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[18] Robert N. Bellah, **Tokugawa Religion: The Values of Pre-Industrial Japan** (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press and The Falcon's Wing Press, 1957), espec. 51-177.
[19] **On the Theory of Social Change**, 348.
[20] **Op. cit.**, chaps. I, II and VII.

ernors could challenge this incubus, but even the more reformist of these warlords tended to reach accommodations with gentry-official elites, were usually regional rather than national in outlook, and had social and ideological biases which precluded the manifold imbalance required for successful modernization.

In contrast, the Meiji Restoration (which in essence was not a conservative restoration but illustrated how traditional values could be used to legitimize change) was accomplished by an alliance of lower **samurai**,[21] rural industrialists and both urban and **han** merchants. Would-be capitalists were unwilling to replace one feudal regime with another, and thus perpetuate restrictions on their enterprises; they seem to have been chiefly responsible for turning the movement into one to destroy the former system. They, with the new national military and the more modern bureaucrats, were to become the prime elites of the new Japan.[22] Yet most of them left one foot in the conservative countryside and sought a more efficient, enlightened authoritarianism. The peasantry provided a social base for the continued imposition of traditions on the whole people. So it was that Japan, whose Meiji system was fraught with problems for the future, could nevertheless—because of this rare blend of conservatism and progressivism—change so rapidly and rather smoothly, though not without severe tensions.

In Japan, hierarchy was a matter of ranked social statuses, and deference was attached to the office as much or more than to the incumbent. It was thus easier to appoint qualified persons with less preference than in China shown to clients, relatives and fellow townsmen. In Japan as, but even more than, in China, superior status entailed a strong sense of duty and downward obligation, which helped to pave the way for a leadership trained and responsible for duties. Moreover, the stronger loyalty ethic, the large measure of voluntary consent among lower ranks, the better communication and increasing mobility among strata in Japan, hastened the diffusion of new values, techniques and ideas—once progressive leadership had emerged. In China, the dominant scholar-official class—by education and status—was thoroughly committed to neo-Confucianism and its world view. Japanese elites enjoyed their statuses by virtue of heredity, not examinations. They were thus intellectually freer to reorient policies and, through patterns of loyalty and obligation, both to command and persuade their followers.

Some of the most striking contrasts between these two Asian neighbors was with respect to the status and activities of merchant-entrepreneurs and

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[21] Albert M. Craig is doubtless correct in writing in his "Choshu in the Meiji Restoration," **Harward Historical Monographs** XLVII (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961)—that population in the highest **samurai** ranks was thin, so that there is not much meaning in the low **samurai** background of much of the top Meiji leadership. Still, it is significant that top bracket **samurai** were deterred by their closeness to the feudal and **pro-bakufu** elites from leading in a new direction. Writers like Craig, Jansen and Sakai do see special significance in the renovative roles played by many **goshi**-headmen and their sons. Their being the lowest of the status-eroded **samurai** must have been significant.

[22] Interesting data and interpretations about the social backgrounds of 100 leading entrepreneurs of the Meiji-Taisho periods, 239 governmental official and political leaders, and 21 leaders in finance and trade, are provided by Miwa Ryoichi and Everett Hagen in the latter's **On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins,** 350-352.

the extent of proto-capitalist developments. Mercantile activitiy and profit-making were low in the traditional value systems of both countries, because of the agrarian emphasis in both. But the Chinese scholar-gentry were especially supercillious, suspicious, domineering and interventionary in relations with merchants. They sensed the danger that capitalistic development held for their more static equilibrium. There were also efforts, under the Tokugawa, to thwart mercantile assertiveness and periodically to cancel debts in the interests of the feudality. But, especially late in that period, Japanese merchants in practice set the pace and tone of urban life; they waxed in wealth, influence, and—especially in some fiefs and towns—in autonomy. As the feudal class and economic systems were undermined, the more affluent **chonin** bought **samurai** titles in a kind of black market, allowed **samurai** families to adopt some of their sons and, to an extent, intermarried with this elite. **Samurai** entrance into productive occupations also tended to lend more dignity to them.

Officials in China farmed out governmental enterprises to private interests, but where in China were there conditions comparable to the indebtedness of many **samurai** and **daimyo** to merchant lenders, and the turning over of financial management of whole fiefs to merchants? It was partly through such influence that Japanese merchants were able to augment their autonomy. In China, so much prestige was attached to ownership of land and to the holding of official rank and office that there was a serious flight of capital and talent in the form of merchant investments in land as well as the purchase of rank and the expensive education of businessmen's sons for bureaucracy. In Japan the energies of such enterprisers tended to be more concentrated in their own economic sphere by the greater difficulty of purchasing land or of entering the nobility. There were many more Japanese than Chinese between 1860 and 1928 who contributed outside of government to the modernization of their country.

The centralization of Japanese feudalism in the late sixteenth century reduced the autonomy of merchants, guilds and monasteries in matters of trade, but on some shogunal estates, there continued to be certain cities and towns where commercial freedoms were considerable; this was also true of some of the **han**. By Tokugawa times, most guilds had become companies, but restrictive monopolies were common in both Japan and China. As a money economy and the commercialization of agriculture advanced in Japan more markedly than in China, there rose from among prosperous peasants (including goshi-headmen types), landlords and rural moneylenders, a class of **han** (later prefectural) enterprisers who were less bound by traditional restraints. They were quicker to seize opportunities presented by the rapidly expanding domestic and later foreign markets. The later **zaibatsu** and entrepreneurs of lesser scope were more often the most successful of these elements rather than from among the traditional monopoly merchants. Such capitalists also led in developing the putting-out system into the early factory stage of production. It was in its limitation of the regulatory and interventionary fiat of the central shogunate that Japan's feudal matrix, with its competitive interests, made an inadvertent contribution to the rise of capitalism. Japanese administration was less centralized, less uniform, less atomized than the Chinese system.

Much has been written about the dependence of Japanese business interests on, and their alliance with, the Meiji oligarchic bureaucracy. This became less pronounced after 1881, however, and early in the present century big business in Japan became a somewhat autonomous political force. Especially after 1890, Japanese interest groups developed a more modern pluralism.

There was also some gain in entrepreneurial activities in China during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but central bureaucracy was much more intact and dominant there. The attitudes of scholar-officials were those of taxers and squeezers more than of developers. They continued to regard entrepreneurs as their competitors for control over agricultural surpluses. They could and commonly did regulate within licensing procedures, intervened, sometimes confiscated, and levied exactions. Thus, they curbed capital accumulation, innovation, and functional efficiency in economic fields. Business operators were obliged to seek official protection rather than to enjoy that of impartial law. When, following the great rebellions, neo-Confucian gentry-officials like Tseng Kuo-fan, Li Hung-chang and Tso Tsung-t'ang fostered a superficial modernization according to such slogans as "self-strengthening" and "Western instruments for utility, Chinese principles as the essence," theirs was a genuinely conservative Restoration (1862-74). All of the modern-type enterprises which they encouraged to buttress their regional power were according to the **kuan-tu shang-pan** pattern, which is to say: "official supervision and mercantile management." Some gentry capital was attracted from agriculture, rural usury, and pawnshops into some of these ventures; officials, the government, and especially comprador capitalists also invested. The last mentioned were forerunners of the bureaucratic capitalists of the Republican and Nationalist eras. They were assimilated to the traditional official system and usually had purchased formal official titles and ranks. As investors also in traditional enterprises, land and real estate, they were, in addition, assimilated to the gentry. Maladministration and subordination to political considerations, in the end, caused the failure of all these enterprises.[23] The successful application of modern science to productivity under dynamic capitalism was as unlikely in conjunction with Chinese official hegemony as in Japan under a feudal aristocracy which drained off most agricultural surpluses. Both of these incubuses had to be overthrown, but, because the new forces were further advanced in Japan, the new departure was made there four decades earlier and much more purposefully.

There were a number of other factors in Japan's favor as its society adjusted to modern conditions. Certain ideological and organizational trends during the Tokugawa period enabled Japan to cross the threshold quickly into a true nationalism of attitudes and institutions. The growth of population, urbanization, and the **sankin kotai** system, which required that **daimyo** leave their families in Edo and spend alternate years there themselves, helped to develop a national market in a fuller sense than obtained in China. In Japan, the practices and services of trade and finance were more highly developed. The considerable penetration of government under the shogunate became much

[23] Cf., Albert Feuerwerker, **China's Early Industrialization, Sheng Hsuan-huai (1844-1916) and Mandarin Enterprise** (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), espec. chaps. 1-3, 7.

deeper than China's, once the feudal structure was swept away. Thus, for example, in fields such as the export of raw silk, the government encouraged the organization of producers' and exporters' organizations through which standards for graded qualities could be established and enforced. So, although Chinese silks had a headstart, their sale abroad was fairly soon overtaken by the Japanese product. Commercialized farming and wage labor for two centuries in Japan had prepared peasants, who were illegally migrating to the cities, to respond to new relationships in pursuit of monetary incentives. Primogeniture in Japan, not in China, tended to keep patrimonies intact, to provide modest capital for small-and medium-scale enterprises, and to encourage activities in addition to those associated with agriculture by younger sons.

In conclusion, we confront the question whether Japan's riper preparation and readier adaptation to modern conditions was principally from earlier and further historical development of the many trends already mentioned, or did Tokugawa culture differ in essentially determinative respects from that of China, and in ways which facilitated modernization. A sociologist has devoted a whole volume in an attempt to demonstrate that mid-nineteenth century Japanese civilization was more like that of Western Europe, as occidental feudalism waned and reawakening advanced, than it resembled that of China from which it has absorbed so much.[24] Although in my opinion he exaggeratedly makes many a difference in degree appear to be in kind, and despite important differences between the civilizations of Japan and Western Europe, I am inclined to agree with his general conclusion. Japan's feudal legacy, like that of Europe, probably contained in foetal form some of the institutional preparation for making the transition to a modern society—more than did China's rigidly orthodox and dominant bureaucracy. Japan's martial traditions evidently contributed to rapid acceptance of modern militarism and an emphasis on building a strong army and navy. Its ethical system, tempered in its feudal age and including a high sense of honor and unlimited sacrifice for liege or ideals, also had pertinence. A strong national consciousness from as early as the thirteenth century had, long before 1854, combined with feudal loyalty to form a genuine patriotism. This was quickly shifted from **daimyo or shogun** to Emperor, and from **han** to nation. The strong Japanese sense of legal and contractual rights, including those pertaining to property, could more easily be transformed along Western lines, including acceptance of the principle of equality of individuals before uniform law. We have noted the greater protection which feudalism afforded Japanese entrepreneurs. Probably the Japanese family institution was more like those in Western Europe than like those of China or India. And the **chonin** were in some crucial respects more like their bourgeois contemporaries in the West.[25] In trying to analyze change in vast social universes, there are doubtless aspects and correlations which elude us, but the salient contrasts between China and Japan as they strove to adjust to the impact of modernism are clear and impressive.

[24] Norman Jacobs, **The Origin of Modern Capitalism and Eastern Asia** (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1958).

[25] Cf., Edwin O. Reschauer, "Japanese Feudalism," in Rushton Coulborn, ed., **Feudalism in History** (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), espec. 46-48.

OBSTACLES TO MISSIONARY SUCCESS IN NINETEENTH CENTURY CHINA

ELLSWORTH C. CARLSON

ALTHOUGH THE FOREIGN MISSIONARY AND TRADER IN MID-19TH century China tended to go their separate ways, they had one thing in common: both were excited by the challenge of China's vast population. The trader was inspired by the prospect of selling his goods to hundreds of millions of customers. The missionary saw the same hundreds of millions as lost souls, in need of the gospel of salvation. Over the decades that followed the opening of China in 1842, both the trader and the missionary tried to reach the Chinese masses. Neither found the Chinese very receptive. The growth of the China trade fell far short of the trader's dream. The missionary found, in the words of the parable, that his seed was falling on rocky ground.

The unwillingness of most Chinese to accept Christianity can hardly be attributed to lack of effort on the missionaries' part. During the nineteenth century, the various missionary societies responded to the challenge of China's unconverted millions with great energy and devotion. The number of Protestant missionaries (including wives of missionaries) at work in China grew from 81 in 1858 to 189 in 1864; 436 in 1874; 618 in 1881, and 1926 in 1889. Altogether, more than 2,500 Protestant missionaries had come to the China field by 1889. By the end of the century, however, Protestant Christian converts were still counted only in tens of thousands, not hundreds of millions. Latourette puts the number of Protestant Christians in 1889 at 37,287.[1]

The question why Protestant missions in China were not more successful is exceedingly difficult to get at. Looking at the problem theologically, some troubled missionaries confessed their inability to comprehend why an "outpouring of the Holy Spirit" had been withheld. For a modern scholar to produce a thorough understanding of the problem would require all of the insights and skills of the sociologist and the psychologist, and it would have to be based on a thorough understanding of cultural differences between China and the West at a particular time in history. The present modest effort is based on the hope that some partial insights may come from an intensive study of the available evidence of what the missionaries did, observed, and thought at a single important center of missionary work in China over a period of several decades. The place chosen is Foochow in Fukien province. Foochow was an important administrative center, being the city where the Governor of Fukien and the Governor-General of Fukien and Chekiang were located. As a center of prefectural and provincial examinations, and the residence of a large number of gentry, it was a major cultural center. It was one of the five ports opened to foreign commerce and residents (pursuant to the Treaty of Nanking) and

[1] All statistics in this paragraph are from Kenneth Scott Latourette, **A History of Christian Missions in China** (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929), 405-406, 479.

was, accordingly, one of the earlier centers of Protestant work in China. Protestant mission in Foochow began in 1847, and the present article, which is part of a larger study, deals with the period from 1847-1880.[2]

Three Protestant missionary societies worked in Foochow in the decades following the opening of the port. The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (the Congregationalist Society) and the American Methodists came in 1847, and the Church Missionary Society (Church of England) followed in 1850. During the first four years of missionary work in Foochow, some twenty-seven missionaries—including wives—arrived at the port. By 1860, the total number of missionaries who had come to Foochow reached fifty, of whom twenty-four remained in the work.[3]

Although this quite large force of workers began their work with great enthusiasm, they found before long that their task was terribly difficult. As foreigners, they were something of a curiosity and they attracted attention. Curious people visited their homes and came into their chapels. The astounding fact about early missionary work in Foochow, however, is that it took the missionaries nine years to win their first convert. It was not until 1856 that the American Board baptized its first convert;[4] the first Methodist baptism came a year later;[5] the CMS did not baptize anyone until 1861.[6] The slowness of results was hard for the missionaries to bear. One wrote that the lack of converts "humbles us in the dust."[7] Another found the fact "rather depressing,"[8] and still another confessed that at times his "weak faith" led him "almost to despondancy."[9] Eventually, the Foochow missions enjoyed some modest successes, but there would seem to be no doubt about the fact that mission work in Foochow was extremely difficult. Why?

The difficulties which the missionaries faced in their efforts to convert the Chinese had many dimensions. At the outset of the work in Foochow, an immense task of adjustment to a new environment and of preparation for the work which they had come to do, absorbed much of the time and effort of

2 The author of the present article hopes to publish a book on Protestant Missions in Foochow, 1847-1880, in the near future.

3 Statistics given in this paragraph will be closely documented in my forthcoming book. Main sources for the data are Wade Crawford Barclay, **History of Methodist Missions**, Part II; The Methodist Episcopal Church 1845-1939, Vol. III; **Widening Horizons 1845-95** (New York: Board of Missions of the Methodist Church, 1957), 367-380; **Reports of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions**, published in Boston by the Board; **Missionary Herald** (to be cited below simply as **Herald**), published by the American Board in Boston; **Church Missionary Record** (to be referred to below simply as **Record**) published by the Church Missionary Society in London; Eugene Stock, **The Story of the Fuh-kien Mission of the Church Missionary Society** (3rd. ed.; London, 1891), **passim.**

4 C. C. Baldwin's letter of April 14, 1856 quoted in Herald (September, 1856), 52.283.

5 **Thirty-ninth Annual Report of the Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church for the Year 1857** (New York, 1858), 43-49; also Mr. Robert S. Maclay's letter of July 1, 1857, **Missionary Advocate** (January, 1858), 13.77. Hereafter, the annual reports of the Methodist board will be referred to as **Reports-ME**; the **Missionary Advocate** as MA.

6 **Record** (November, 1861), 32.356, 357.

7 R. S. Maclay, quoted in **MA** (May, 1853), 8.11.

8 Isaac W. Wiley, quoted in **Christian Advocate** (May 6, 1852), 27.75. **The Christian Advocate** will be cited below simply as **CA.**

9 L. B. Peet's letter of June 6, 1859, **Herald** (October, 1859), 55.297, 298.

the missionaries and, therefore, constituted a great obstacle to achievement of missionary goals. Problems of adjustment and preparation were not peculiar to Foochow missionaries (or China missionaries). But it would probably be fair to say that such problems were more serious in Foochow (and China) than in some other parts of the world. The early Foochow missionaries spent a large proportion of their time solving the elementary physical problems of existence: obtaining property, building houses, training servants, learning to function in a different climate, adjusting to different food. These problems were not easily solved. Almost invariably, missionary attempts to obtain property aroused opposition from potential neighbors and from others opposed to missionary work. This was particularly true within the walled city of Foochow; it was true to a lesser extent in the Nant'ai suburb which extended southward from the city to the banks of the Min River.[10] In the early years, the missionaries spent tremendous amounts of time negotiating for the rent or purchase of properties, supervising the erection of houses, and looking after their maintenance. The adjustment to life in Foochow was not easy, even in fairly comfortable houses. The missionaries were quite easy victims to malaria, dysentery, cholera, tuberculosis, and other diseases. The letters of the missionaries show an almost constant preoccupation with matters of health. By 1860, ten of the fifty missionaries who had come to Foochow had died there, or had died elsewhere from sickness contracted there, and several of the missionary families had buried children in the mission cemetery.[11]

Learning the Foochow dialect of the Chinese language was a tremendous task—really a never-ending one—for each of the early misionaries. It was not just a matter of being able to talk about the material necessities of life. The missionary had to prepare himself to present ideas and concepts that were foreign to Chinese culture without being misunderstood, and to do so with pronunciation and idiom that would not bring ridicule from Chinese listeners, whose culture gave high value to correct and elegant use of language. Finding the words and figures of speech that would enable the missionary to communicate concepts that had no close Chinese equivalent, was a tremendous problem. One of the American Board missionaries wrote home that

> Their language is but a visible expression of their thoughts, and as such has not a single word which contains a perfectly Christian idea. Hence we have not only to preach to those who are spiritually dead, but we are obliged at present to make use of a medium of communication... which is fraught with darkness and error. The consequence is that we often seem to ourselves as well as to our hearers to be only speaking into the air.[12]

The long argument among the missionaries over which term to use for God, **shen** or **shang-ti**, was only the best known instance of the difficulty of learn-

[10] One instance of this kind of opposition is described in my article, "The Wu-shih-shan Incident of 1878" in **A Festschrift for Frederick B. Artz**, ed. by David H. Pinkney and Theodore Ropp (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1964), 72-97. A large number of other cases will be cited in my forthcoming book on the Foochow missionaries.

[11] See my forthcoming book on the Foochow missionaries.

[12] Letter by Lyman Peet, dated February 7, 1852, located in the archives of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions at the Houghton Library, Harvard University, 16.3.3(2), No. 343. This source will be cited below as ABC.

ing how to express Christian concepts in the Chinese language.[13] In the early decades of missionary work in Foochow, a large proportion of the missionaries' time was spent in their studies, improving their command of the language, and translating and improving translations of the scriptures into both classical and colloquial Chinese. Some of the missionaries never really became competent enough with the language to enable them to do effective work. When they did achieve sufficient competence with the language, it was only after long preparation which took time that could not be devoted to the central tasks of missionary work.

As the missionaries undertook the task for which they had come to Foochow, they had to cope not only with resistance and unresponsiveness, but also with outright hostility and opposition, particularly from the Chinese gentry. In other words, the missionary task was not just to persuade China's millions, but also to counter the influence of opponents who were determined to prevent the spread of Christianity in China. The present study started with the assumption that opposition to Christianity in the 19th century was probably something that was generated out of the frictions between missionaries and the Chinese with whom they came in contact—or something that developed anew after the intermission that had separated the great Jesuit mission of the 17th and 18th centuries from the revival of missionary work in the 19th century. The fact is that the opposition was there when the missionaries arrived, and it did not need to be aroused. It was rooted, no doubt, in that pervasive, stubborn "culturalism"—a strong pride in the Chinese cultural heritage, paralleled by something approaching contempt for the "barbarians"—that had been so prevalent in China, particularly among the gentry, for hundreds of years. What has been called the "anti-Christian movement" is well described by Paul Cohen in his recent book, **China and Christianity**.[14] Hostility to Christianity showed up most clearly in an extensive anti-Christian literature, notably the **Pi-hsieh chi-shih** (a record of facts to ward off heterodoxy), which labeled Christianity as "heterodox," and accused the Christians of all sorts of immoralities.[15]

The history of Protestant missions in Foochow confirms the reality of the "anti-Christian movement," and this movement must be counted as one of the important obstacles to missionary success in Foochow. Foochow had its anti-Christian literature, most importantly a book entitled **She-ying-lou shih-hua**, which was published in 1851. The author, a second degree holder named Lin Chang-e, was reported to be a relative of Lin Tse-hsu, whose efforts to stop the opium trade had precipitated the Opium War. According to the British Consul, the book was widely distributed among students who came to Foochow in 1851 to take civil service examinations. The book contained many of the standard charges against Christianity. The foreign religion destroyed morals. Men and women gathered together in the churches for immoral purposes. The Christians renounced ancestor worship. Christian tracts were written in a foolish style; they denounced Confucius and Mencius; and they were

[13] This controversy raged for decades. See the **Chinese Recorder, passim.**
[14] Paul A. Cohen, **China and Christianity** (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963).
[15] **Ibid.,** 45-59.

full of other false ideas. The missionaries paid people to become Christians; some people became Christians because of poverty, but men of conscience were repelled by the heterodox faith. The missionaries took the eyes from the dead.[16]

Opposition to Christianity and missionaries took many other forms. Mention has already been made of gentry efforts to prevent the missionaries from acquiring property, especially within the walled city of Foochow. In 1850 the gentry and some officials brought great pressure on the Foochow authorities to evict the Church Missionary Society from its premises on Wu-shih-shan (Black Stone Hill), and it was only the strong support of the British consular authorities that prevented them from succeeding.[17] In 1867, one of the CMS missionaries reported that a "gentry anti-Christian association" was working to prevent the missionaries from acquiring property. "The streets are at this moment placarded with notices, threatening most extreme measures against any who shall dare sell or rent houses in the city to 'barbarian men.' "[18] In 1878 opponents of missionary work in Foochow resorted to violence—the burning of a new mission school building—in the course of a successful effort to force the CMS missionaries to leave Wu-shih-shan.[19] After the second treaty settlement of 1860, the missionaries extended their work to the south, west, and north of Foochow. In the "outstations," particularly in the larger district and prefectural cities, the missions encountered opposition comparable to that in Foochow. In the great prefectural cities of Yen-p'ing and Chieng-ning, opposition was so great that for two decades the missionaries were unable to make any substantial headway; missionaries were expelled and their chapels were destroyed.[20]

Even when the missionary (with the help of the consul) acquired the property he needed and managed to exercise his right to preach Christianity provided in the treaties, the fact that he was a foreigner teaching a foreign religion was still an obstacle to overcome. He had to contend with the view that barbarians should learn from the Middle Kingdom instead of spreading their own corrupt doctrines. C. C. Baldwin of the American Board—one of the more scholarly missionaries in Foochow—wrote of having encountered "inveterate prejudices against foreigners, all strengthened by a consciousness of immeasurable superiority to surrounding barbarous races..."[21] In making the point that Christian doctrines could not possibly be true, an educated

16 The original text of the **She-ying-lou shih-hua** has not been located. The book was discussed at some length in two dispatches from the British Consul in Foochow, Mr Walker, to the Governor of Hong Kong, Mr. Bonham. These dispatches are in the Foreign Office correspondence in the Public Record Office in London: Walker's dispatch of 10 December 1851, F.O.228/128 and his dispatch No. 4 of 8 January 1852, F.O.228/144. See also Mr. R. S. Maclay's journal for October 25, 1852, MA (April, 1852), 8.3 and a letter of June 12, 1853 from a CMS missionary, Mr. W. Welton, to the American Board missionary, Stephen Johnson, forwarded with Johnson's letter of June 19, 1852 to the American Board, ABC 16.3.3(2), No. 308.

17 See Carlson on "The Wu-shih-shan Incident...," op. cit., 75-78.

18 Report by John R. Wolfe (CMS) quoted in the **Church Misionary Review** (July 1, 1867), 18.217. This periodical, known during part of its lifetime as the **Church Missionary Intelligencer,** will be cited below simply as CMS.

19 See Carlson on "The Wu-shih-shan Incident...," **op. cit.,** particularly pages 85-90.

20 See my forthcoming book on the Foochow missionaries.

21 **Herald** (March, 1862), 58.83.

Chinese with whom McCaw of the CMS was conversing asked, "How is it that our great Confucius never knew them nor taught them." [22] One interesting manifestation of the contempt which the gentry had for the missionaries and their religion was the unwillingness of some of the educated Chinese (whom the missionaries employed to teach them the language) to be seen publicly in their company.[23]

In speaking of Chinese contempt for the missionaries, some mention must also be made of the opium trade. Foochow, like other cities on the southern coast, imported and consumed great quantities of opium, brought to the port by foreign ships. The fact that Englishmen and Americans brought opium to Foochow was deeply resented by many Chinese and served to strengthen the Chinese conviction that these men from afar were in fact contemptible barbarians. The missionaries faced no easy task in persuading the Chinese that there was a distinction to be made between opium traders and missionaries. Making the distinction was all the more difficult because of missionary dependence on the opium traders in the early years. For a short time after his arrival in Foochow—via opium ship—the first Protestant missionary in Foochow (Stephen Johnson of the American Board) lived with an opium captain; one of the first houses acquired by the missionaries was one formerly occupied by an opium captain. For a number of years, the misisonaries had to visit the opium ships outside the harbor in order to get their foreign drafts changed into silver dollars.[24]

As they went about their lives and work in Foochow, the missionaries were never allowed to forget the opium trade; their letters and diaries give abundant reason to believe that Chinese resentment against the foreigner's opium was a major obstacle to Chinese acceptance of the foreigner's religion. In 1852, Mr. Welton—one of the English missionaries—wrote that the opium trade "is attaching such a stigma to the English name and character that some of us... would almost be glad not to be known as such..." He went on to report that he often faced the rebuff, "Why do you bring us opium?" [25] In 1855, another English missionary—Mr. McCaw—wrote that his Chinese teacher was "continually seeking an opportunity of bringing forward the question of opium and English merchants." [26] Mr. Peet of the American Board wrote in 1856 that

> No questions have been more frequently put to me by the people of this place during my sojourn among them than those which relate to the subject of opium. Is it not brought from your country? Are not your Jesus Christ's men engaged in selling it to us? [27]

As late as 1877, Mr. Wolfe of the CMS wrote

> God knows how often and often is our message of peace and salvation contemptuously thrown back in our face with the scornful remark, "You destroy us

[22] **Record** (December, 1857), 28.370.

[23] See, for example, R. S. Maclay's report of September 26, 1856, quoted in **MA** (March, 1857), 12.89.

[24] Johnson's letter of January 8, 1847, **ABC**, 16.3.3(2), No. 290; Johnson's letter of October 4, 1847, **ABC**, 16.3.3(2), No. 297.

[25] **CMS** (December, 1852), 3.274.

[26] **Record** (February, 1856), 27.40.

[27] Peet's letter of January 28, 1856, **ABC**, 16.3.3(2), No. 358.

> with your opium, and now you insult us with your offer of peace and salvation." How often and often are our best efforts as missionaries rendered abortive amongst this people by the knowledge that we belong to the country which forces the opium traffic upon China! [28]

It was not only by bringing opium to Foochow that the misionaries' countrymen embarrassed them. One of the missionaries reported that the Chinese with whom he conversed in his chapel, told him about foreigners who "keep mistresses and seem to be very wicked." [29] Another missionary deplored the business which foreign residents of Foochow gave to the Cantonese prostitutes who followed the foreigners to the port.[30]

The quickness of the Chinese to point out the moral shortcomings of the foreigners, leads us to one of the more paradoxical aspects of the position of the missionaries in China. They had come to China with a deep sense of the depravity of man. They were convinced that hundreds of millions of Chinese were perishing and were, therefore, in dire need of knowledge of Christianity through which they could be saved.[31] But the Chinese to whom they addressed their message of salvation were less impressed with their own sinfulness than with the immorality of Englishmen and Americans. Just how this Chinese lack of a sense of sin is to be explained is not a question that the present writer feels qualified to answer. When scholars become able to answer this question, what they say will doubtless be somewhat more complicated than the explanation offered by an American diplomatic historian when he says that "The Chinese had no sense of sin for the simple reason that he actually lived up to the ideals set before him..." [32]

Whether we are able to explain it or not, there is hardly room for doubt about the fact that many Chinese to whom the missionaries preached, did not feel "totally depraved" or in need of ransom lest they perish. The first missionary to work in Foochow, Stephen Johnson, reported that "Perhaps there are no people on earth who have more of self-complacency, and less sense of sin, than the Chinese." [33] The CMS missionary, Mr. Wolfe, complained in his journal of the difficulty he had in getting across the idea of universal sinfulness.[34] Mr. McCaw's frustrations in the same endeavor show up in his comment

> ...when I repeat, with all of my energy of speech, the blessings of heaven and the misery of hell, until wearied, the only response frequently is, 'Is not his shirt very white?' 'How many feet of cloth makes your coat?' [35]

Even those Chinese who accepted Christianity, appear to have been somewhat lacking in their sense of sin. Mr. Baldwin of the American Board wrote that

[28] CMS (November, 1877), 28.666.

[29] C. C. Baldwin's letter of May 21, 1855, ABC, 16.3.3(2), No. 185.

[30] Diary entries of Charles Hartwell for May 7, 8, and 10, 1856, ABC, 67.

[31] Mr. Cummings of the American Board wrote of Foochow's "six hundred thousand inhabitants, all of whom are hurrying rapidly to a wretched eternity..." **Herald** (July, 1849), 45.222.

[32] Paul A. Varg, **Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats** (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1958), 28.

[33] His letter of January 1, 1850, ABC, 16.3.3(2), No. 140.

[34] Extracts from his journal covering the period from November, 1866 to January, 1867, sent to the **CMS** under the heading "Visit to the Cities of Hokiang, Lienkong, and Lo Ngong," archives of the Church Missionary Society, Salisbury Square, London.

[35] McCaw's journal entry for March 18, 1857, **Record** (December, 1857), 28.368.

what the Chinese Christians "seem most to lack is a soul-penetrating sense of sinfulness." [36]

One of the common complaints of both Chinese and Western critics of the missionaries is that they offered material inducements to those they were trying to convert. They are charged with offering jobs or other financial advantage to those Chinese who were low enough to become "rice Christians," and with offering support to converts (through their influence with the consuls) in their lawsuits. The missionaries themselves expressed concern lest some Chinese had become Christians in the hope that they would get some economic advantage.[37] At one point, Mr. Cribb of the CMS wrote indignantly about evidence he had found that one of the Chinese helpers had been attracting people into the church by holding out promises of help in lawsuits.[38] In the record of missionary work in Foochow, however, it is quite clear that the missionaries did not consciously offer financial gain or other unworthy inducements. On the contrary, they turned away many applicants for baptism when it became known that they were not sincere believers. One of the more dramatic illustrations of this came fairly early in the Foochow career of Stephen Johnson. At one point, Johnson wrote quite hopefully and enthusiastically about a fairly large group of people in a village near Foochow (who seemed to be earnestly interested in Christianity) had come to Johnson's chapel, and had invited him to preach in their village. Not long afterward, however, he had to report that the villagers' interest in Christianity had been based on the expectation that they would be paid for becoming Christians; on being informed in no uncertain terms that they could not expect any payment, they stopped coming to hear Johnson preach.[39] Other reports of Chinese who lost interest because of the unwillingness of the missionaries to assure them of money or jobs, were very common in the correspondence of the Foochow missionaries,[40] as were reports of excommunication of church members who were discovered to be insincere in their profession of Christianity. The fact that there were "rice Christians" only proved that the missionaries could make mistakes in judging the motivation of those who sought baptism.

What is really astounding about the work of the Foochow missionaries is not that they made it easy for Chinese to become Christians, but—on the contrary—that they made it so difficult. If there was one obstacle to missionary success in Foochow which stood out above the others (at least on the basis of what is to be learned from missionary sources) it was the almost prohibitive demands that the missionaries made upon those who were thinking of becoming Christians. The Chinese who became a Christian in the mid-nineteenth century was not just called upon to accept a set of beliefs and attend worship services. He was called upon to change his whole manner of life. The Foochow Protestant missionaries came very close to asserting that "Unless you become as a foreigner, you shall not enter the Kingdom of Heaven."

[36] Herald (May, 1858), 54.134.
[37] See Peet's letter of October 5, 1869, ABC, 16.3.5(1), No. 217.
[38] See his letter of September 21, 1870, CMS archives.
[39] Herald (July, 1849), 45.221-22; Johnson's letter of January 10, 1848, ABC, 16.3.3 (2), No. 302.
[40] See, for example, Mr. Lloyd's annual letter for 1880, CMS (August, 1881), 32.477 or Mr. Fearnley's journal for June, 1859, CMS archives.

Looking at what the missionaries demanded, one can hardly wonder that Chinese hesitated to become Christians. Nor can one wonder that modern Chinese nationalists have accused the missionaries of "cultural imperialism."

There is something quite puzzling about the point that has just been made. Most of the Foochow missionaries would have agreed with Griffith John that they had come to China

> not to develope [sic] the resources of the country, not for the advancement of commerce, not for the mere promotion of civilization; but to do battle with the powers of darkness, to save men from sin, and conquer China for Christ.[41]

In the correspondence of the Foochow missionaries, there is scarcely any sign of interest in the projects of Westernization that were going on at the Foochow Arsenal. If the misionaries were interested only in saving men from sin, how was it that their demands on their converts were so broad?

Part of the explanation lies in the missionary's insistence that the Christian religion which offered salvation was "absolute and exclusive truth." [42] The corollary was that Chinese religions were false and to be rejected. The convert was required to shun all forms of "idolatry." Among other things, this meant that he was to refuse to contribute to the support of Chinese temples and religious processions and festivals. As Alexander Michie puts it, at the end of the century, the missionaries' "attitude toward Chinese ethics, philosophy, and religion is that of war to the knife. In order to build the Christian Church they require the site to be cleared." [43] Mr. Wolfe of the CMS mission in Foochow wrote that as Christianity "openly avows its determination to expel by moral force every rival system from the altars of the nation, it naturally at first seems strange and presumptuous in its claims to this people." [44] This "war to the knife" is in sharp contrast with the tolerance of the Jesuit mission in China in the seventeenth century.[45]

From the perspective of an increasingly secularized Western culture, it might be argued that rejection of Chinese religion and acceptance of Christianity need not have drastically affected the convert's participation in other aspects of Chinese society and culture. It clearly did, however. One of the main reasons would appear to be that everywhere they looked the missionaries saw idolatry, heathenism, evil, and superstition.[46] Mr. R. S. Maclay of the Methodist Board wrote

> Do we speak to our neighbour, he is a worshipper of an abominable idol. Do we meet an acquaintance in the street, he is just returning from some idolatrous ceremony. Does a stranger salute and address us in the language of kindness, our experience teaches us he desires money. Does a friend call to see us, a Pagan sits

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[41] This quotation is from an address made by Mr. John under the title "The Holy Spirit in Connection with our Work," **Records of the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of China, held at Shanghai, May 10-24, 1877** (Shanghai: Presbyterian Mission Press, 1878), 32.

[42] Mr. Wolfe of the CMS asserted that Christianity claimed openly "to be absolute and exclusive truth." Letter of April 1870, CMS archives.

[43] Alexander Michie, **Missionaries in China** (London: Edward Stanford, 1891), 35, 36.

[44] Mr. Wolfe's letter of April, 1870, CMS archives.

[45] See Arnold H. Rowbotham, **Missionary and Mandarin: The Jesuits at the Court of China** (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1942).

[46] It would be easy to cite dozens of missionary expressions of a disdainful attitude toward things Chinese.

> at my side. Do we look around for instruction or sympathy, to whom shall we address our petition? Oh! there is a desolateness in life here which nothing but the grace of God can render tolerable.[47]

Many other comparable expressions of missionary disdain for things Chinese could be cited. Given this kind of attitude toward things Chinese, it is, perhaps, not too surprising that the missionaries desired—consciously or unconsciously—that the convert should shake off those things which were regarded as idolatrous, heathen, evil, and superstitious. The missionaries assumed that when their converts accepted the offer of salvation which had been revealed by Christ, they should become new persons. Even though they continued to eat Chinese food, wear Chinese clothes, and live in Chinese houses, the converts were under quite heavy pressure to adopt a manner of life that was foreign.

Probably, the most important single illustration of the sweeping generalizations made in the previous paragraphs, was the insistence of the missionaries that their converts stop participating in the traditional ancestral rites. In some instances, the converts even had to give up or destroy the ancestral tablets. Since the family system was at the heart of Chinese society and culture, and the ancestral rites were the most important ritual expression of the value attached to the family, the convert (who turned his back on the ancestral rites) had already moved a long way toward becoming foreign rather than Chinese. The step was a very difficult one for the would-be Christian to take; some simply could not do it. According to Justus Doolittle,[48] the convert who took the step was

> sure to receive insults, reproach, and persecution from family relatives and hitherto personal friends. He always suffers in his reputation and in his business and property.

Wolfe of the CMS reported that he had frequently heard people say, as they left his chapel, "What a pity this Christianity does not tolerate the ancestral tablets." [49] At least, one missionary drove home the point that ancestors should not be worshipped by teaching that the ancestors were "sinners exposed to the endless wrath of a holy God." [50] The ancestral rites were not the only thing about the traditional family system that was affected by becoming a Christian. Hartwell of the American Board wrote as follows about the preaching of a Chinese catechist: "Ho Ching spoke for an hour on duties of children to parents and parents to children. He tore the Chinese maxims all to pieces." [51]

For the Christian convert, the most important moments and decisions of life became sacramental and were celebrated in the church and within the Christian community. If he was not already married, he was expected to be married to a Christian woman and to be married within the church and

[47] His letter of April 24, 1849 CA (September 27, 1849), 24.154.

[48] Justus Doolittle (American Board Missionary in Foochow), **Social Life of the Chinese** (London: Sampson, Low, Son and Marston, 1868), 606.

[49] Wolfe's report for 1866, CMS archives.

[50] Johnson's letter of January 1, 1850, **Herald** (June, 1850), 46.189.

[51] His diary entry for June 1, 1872, **ABC**, 67.

according to Christian rites.[52] He was not allowed to take a concubine; if he already had one, he was required to give her up.[53] The missionaries did battle with the dowry system which was regarded as tantamount to "buying" a wife.[54] When death came, the funeral was Christian. To quote a description of the funeral of the wife of a Chinese catechist, "Those parts of the usual ceremonies connected with dressing the corpse and preparing the coffin, which were heathenish and sinful, were of course dispensed with." [55]

Although becoming a Christian sometimes led to employment by the missionaries as catechists,[56] teachers, or servants, for others, it might mean actual or threatened unemployment. The person employed in an occupation tainted with idolatry or heathenism, such as in the manufacture of incense burned before idols, or in an immoral occupation, such as the sale of opium, might be denied baptism until the objectionable occupation was given up.[57] The root of other occupational problems of Christian converts was the requirement that they observe the sabbath. There were occasions when the requirement of sabbath observance appears to have been what kept inquirers from becoming Christians.[58] In many cases, Christians who failed to keep the sabbath were excommunicated.[59]

In general, the missionaries found it very difficult to compromise with the Chinese way of life. On one occasion, Mr. Walker of the American Board complained that even earnest Christians thought "They must be allowed to obey in Chinese fashion, which is to beat down a little, and, as a matter of course, give only a part of what is asked." Walker was very disapproving, suggesting that to "beat down a little" was comparable to "tinkering with a watch." "Much more God has made his law just right, and it would be folly for us to try to tinker it." [60]

The cost of accepting Christian baptism was made even greater by the fact that the person who managed to carry out the difficult feat of breaking away from many traditional ties and patterns of life was also subjected to reprisals from the society from which he broke. At the very least, he could expect ridicule. Mr. Wolfe wrote that after one of the CMS Chinese catechists preached in the chapel, he "was much abused, called a foreigner, i.e., a foreign

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[52] See, for example, C. C. Baldwin's letter of December 31, 1856, ABC, 16.3.3(2), No. 193, and Mr. Gibson's letter of December 31, 1857, MA (June, 1858), 14.18.

[53] See, for example, Mr. Lloyd's letter in **CMS** (August, 1881), 32.475.

[54] S. L. Baldwin's report on the Methodist annual conference for 1873 CA (December 11, 1873), 48.396.

[55] **Herald** (January, 1858), 54.29.

[56] Converts who became catechists were sometimes taunted with the words, "You eat Jesus's rice, and you speak Jesus's words."

[57] For example, in a letter of January 11, 1865, Wolfe writes about a convert having to give up his business in connection with idolatrous temples, **Record** (April, 1865), 36.98. Similar circumstances are described by Maclay in his letter of January 5, 1858, MA (June, 1859), 15.19 and by Lloyd in **CMS** (August, 1881), 32.479-80.

[58] See for example, Peet's letter of August 9, 1869, **Herald** (December, 1869), 65.416; also the letter from native helpers, forwarded by C. C. Baldwin with his letter of November 8, 1866, **Herald** (March, 1867), 63.75-76; also Peet's letter of August 9, 1869, ABC, 16.35(1), No 216.

[59] For example, see Lloyds report for 1879, **CMS** archives.

[60] **Herald** (June, 1886), 82.226.

child or bastard." [61] Hu Yong-mi, one of the Methodist helpers wrote of fears which he had had in his younger days that he would meet an acquaintance who would ridicule him when he went to church with his brother.[62] An elderly man employed by the American Board told Mr. Peet that there were people in Foochow who were convinced of the truth of Christianity but were unwilling to acknowledge the fact openly lest they be ridiculed.[63]

It would appear that in a substantial proportion of cases, the convert could expect to suffer the anger of his family. Mr. Martin of the Methodist mission wrote of one convert that "it was hard for him to be told by his widowed mother that he had no respect for the memory of his father, that he had no filial piety to her as her son..."[64] In another case, Mr. Peet wrote that an inquirer

> meets with the most violent opposition from all his relatives, and his uncles threaten him if he professes Christianity and unites with the church that they will take away all his land inherited from his father and deprive him of all other means of getting a living so far as they may be able.[65]

The threat of disinheritance appears to have been a real one. Mr. Woodin of the American Board wrote of a man who was "unwilling to become a Christian for fear he would not be able to inherit family property." [66] Chinese helpers employed by one mission wrote of the concern of inquirers "lest their clansmen usurp possession of their common patrimony." [67]

Becoming a Christian could also result in loss of status and prestige. A man who became an ordained priest in the CMS mission lost his honorary official rank at the time he became a Christian. The magistrate who brought about the man's loss of rank charged him with being a "propagator of heterodoxy." [68] Another CMS convert with a graduate degree lost the scholars who had been in his school.[69]

Persecution of converts took many other forms. In the records of missionary activity in Foochow and its outstations, there are dozens of instances in which converts suffered destruction or loss of their property, bodily injury, arrest, and social ostracism.[70]

In summary, on the basis of the missionary record, it appears that there were serious obstacles to missionary success in the nineteenth century: the missionaries' problems of adjustment and preparation; Chinese hostility, based on "culturalism," to the missionaries' presence and work; their hearers' lack of a sense of their sinfulness and need for salvation; the great price that the

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[61] Extracts from journal on "Visit to the Cities of Hokchiang, Lienkong, and Lo Ngong," November 1866 — January 1867, CMS archives.

[62] Hu Yong Mi, **The Way of the Faith Illustrated** (Chicago: Student Missionary Campaign Library, 1896), 36.

[63] Mr. Johnson's report of July 1, 1852, **Herald** (December, 1852), 48.378.

[64] Mr. C. R. Martin's letter of September 23, 1860, **MA** (February, 1861), 16.82.

[65] Peet's letter of March 8, 1866, **ABC**, 16.3.5(2), No. 202.

[66] Mr. Woodin's letter of January 28, 1875, **ABC**, 16.3.5(2).

[67] Letter forwarded to the American Board by C. C. Baldwin, with his letter of November 8, 1866, **Herald** (March, 1867), 63.75.

[68] Mr. Wolfe's annual report for 1877, **CMS** archives: R. W. Stewart's report for 1878, quoted by Eugene Stock, **The Story of the Fuh-kien Mission**, 265.

[69] G. Smith's letter of July 4, 1861, CMS archives.

[70] Many instances of such persecution will be fully documented in my forthcoming book.

convert had to pay on becoming a Christian; and the reprisals which Chinese society inflicted upon converts.

If there is any substantial validity to this analysis, it would seem to follow that the missionaries would have had least success in those situations in which these factors were especially strong and that such successes as they had would have come mainly in those situations in which these factors were less strong. The facts seem to support this hypothesis. The missionaries made few converts in the main cultural and political centers in Fukien: the provincial city of Foochow and the larger prefectural and district cities like Yen-p'ing, Chien-ning, and Lo-yuan. Missionary successes came mainly in the rural areas, away from the urban strongholds of Chinese cultural pride. Converts were most frequently won among poor, unsophisticated people in the country who had least to lose as they became foreign and faced the danger of reprisals, from their countrymen. Success mounted when the missions were able to make extensive use of Chinese catechists. Even though the Chinese helper might be ridiculed for "eating the foreigners' rice and speaking the foreigners' words," and even though the helper had become foreign in many respects in the eyes of his fellow countrymen, the obstacles which stood in his way were not as great as those which the missionary himself faced. At the very least, the fact he was a native speaker of Chinese made him more able than the missionary to explain Christianity in language understandable to his hearers. Foreign as he was, the Chinese catechist did not arouse as much hostility based on "culturalism" as the missionaries themselves. The missionaries agreed that a large part of their limited success was attributable to the work of the Chinese catechists.

A NEW CONCEPT OF LAW. A STUDY OF DR. SUN YAT-SEN'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY *

SHIA-LING LIU

IMMANUEL KANT ONCE REMARKED THAT THE JURIST IS STILL ENDlessly searching for the definition of the concept of law. Sir Frederick Pollock has stated also that while a student in a law school would not hesitate to define the concept of real estate in an examination, a serious jurist would take his time to answer the superficially simple question: "what is law"? After a careful study of the philosophy of law in a historical perspective, Friedrich found it difficult to select from "among the mass of available materials and viewpoints" a meaningful summary.[1] Apparently up to the present, there is no universally accepted definition of law; paradoxically, the more one studies, the more one finds it difficult to define the concept of law.

Based on his fundamental philosophy of **San Min Chu I** (**The Three Principles of the People**), Dr. Sun Yat-sen had tried to develop a new concept of law. Since the main purpose of **San Min Chu I** was to solve the three categories of all problems in a society—national, political, and social—accordingly, the new concept of law derived from this basic philosophy would also be expected to work satisfactorily in solving present day problems. Being well versed in both Western and Chinese thinking, Dr. Sun was able to develop a new concept of law which characteristically coincided with other aspects of his political philosophy.[2] Dr. Sun was, however, more a political thinker, and his philosophical reflections upon the general foundations of law are more implied than expressed. The essence of his new concept of law could, however, be easily summarized as (1) theory of social service; (2) interweaving of **Ch'ing**, **li**, and law; (3) **li** as a part of law.

Theory of Social Service

First, his new concept of law is based on a theory of social service. To him, law is a kind of mandatory norm which regulates man's daily life in a society. It varies in form and substance from time to time and from place to place according to kinds of people and life in the society. Thus, law—whether flexible or strict—is a social product. It can be changed or modified at will by the people. Based on a "social cathexis," the legal system of a society is centered around a basic underlying concept in a given time. Historically, as society evolves, the legal system varies. The evolution of the cathexis of the legal system, according to Dr. Sun, may be explained primarily in three chro-

* The author wants to thank Dr. Chester A. Newland, Director, Department of Government, North Texas State University, for his valuable suggestions and criticisms in the preparation of this short paper.

1 Carl Joachim Friedrich, **The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective** (1963), ix.

2 Shia-ling Liu, "Theory of the State in Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Political Philosophy," **Chinese Culture** (March, 1960), 32-72.

nological periods: the period of individual obligation, the period of individual rights, and the period of social service.[3]

In the primitive totem, as well as in a relatively advanced feudal society, the basis of the legal system is dependent on the underlying principle of individual obligations. Those who were subdued by war, conquest, or otherwise, were treated as slaves or serfs. The lives of those slaves or serfs were under the whims of the masters, the lords, and ultimately the king. Although the lords were obligated for the protection of life of the serfs, these obligations were not more than measures of safeguards taken by a person over his own properties. Under this legal system, individual obligations or services were demanded one-sidedly upon those who were subdued. For those who were subdued, no rights, individually or as a group, were ever emphasized or demanded. Under the feudal hierarchy, the seemingly complicated lord-vassal feudal relationship could be simply explained by this basic principle. The manorial system of the Middle Ages as the prevailing economic system at the time was crystallized on the same legal foundation. This system prevails even in the modern period. For the purpose of acquiring wealth based on labor of others, the ruling classes in the imperialist countries institutionalized a uniform pattern to guarantee the permanence of the social situation at home and abroad. In spite of all the "noble testimony" to the contrary, the so-called proletariat dictatorship in the Communist countries is simply a political system of personal, or at the best, group exploitation based on the legal principle of individual obligation in the name of social service to the state.

With the introduction of the doctrine of the "inalienable, indivisible, infallible and indestructible natural rights" by Locke and Rousseau in the eighteenth century, a modern concept of law emerged in which individualism is glorified. As a result, the substance of law changed from the principal of individual obligations to the principle of individual rights. It was asserted that man was born with the natural rights of "life, liberty, and estate" or property. Each individual is entitled to such innate rights which must be respected by others and the society. The concept of law at this period was consequently based on this principle of individual rights. As an individual, one must insist upon his freedom to exercise such rights and at same time he may also insist that others respect his rights. However, with a view of sustaining the rights of each individual, it was found necessary to put certain limitations upon each individual in his exercising of such rights. The theory of social contract as advocated by Rousseau and Locke may seem to be the logical answer to the paradox.

The theory of social contract presumed the existence of individual rights prior to the creation of society and professed the protection of such rights after its organization. By way of a political contract following the initial social contract, a government is thus set up with the authority to see that individual rights are well protected and mutually respected in the society. Based upon this legal concept, the right of private property is therefore inviolable. Freedom of contract, unlimited right to inheritance and the like are the contents or substance of all civil codes. All legal protections under such legal

[3] Shia-ling Liu, "Law and Society," **Culture Herald** (Nanking, Dec. 7, 1946), 30-33.

system would be for the protection of individual rights. Government is necessary only to the extent that it enhances individual rights. Individuals are socially obligated only to the extent that it is necessary for the protection of their own rights. Locke expressed the underlying idea very well when he used the natural rights of man to preserve himself and to support all political and legal order and moreover to participate in the founding and molding of a legal and political order which satisfies him.

Locke's theory of law, as based upon individual rights, was generally accepted by some leading thinkers of his time. From a slightly different point of view, Bentham lent support to the same theory. His celebrated principle of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" used man's self-interest rather than man's natural rights as the basis of law.[4] The constitutional principle of separation of powers associated with Montesquieu, the famous document of Declaration of Independence penned by Jefferson, and the Bill of Rights incorporated in the U.S. Constitution bore strong testimony to the general acceptance of the individualistic concept of law. This relatively simple concept of law was indeed a stabilizing force in a relatively simple society at the early modern period. According to Dr. Sun, however, social interaction became too complex for the individualistic legal system to cope with, as a result of the Industrial Revolution. Artificially created social stratification began to appear and the equilibrium of modern society was threatened. As a reaction to the agitation of Marxism, a new and socially oriented legal theory began to take shape and to develop in France and Germany which has a direct bearing upon the legal theory of Dr. Sun.[5]

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Rudolhp von Ihering of Germany tried to substitute the idea of individual interest with the idea of social interest as the foundation of law. To his way of thinking, there are two major interests: the interest of the individual and the interest of the community or society. The first is the egoistic purpose of self-preservation. The second is the social purpose, "a sentiment of the ethical meaning of individual existence": that man is "meant to serve mankind." This side of human purposiveness is called ethical self-preservation.[6] Consequently, human institutions are to be explained by their purposes, not by their causes. We find the conditions for a legal system of society only when individual egoism has been transformed into a social egoism—that is, where social ends are desired in, and for, themselves.[7] Although Ihering puts "I" at the center of social order, he nevertheless rejects pure egoism as too one-sided. In synthesizing, he develops the doctrine of "a coincidence of purposes," which is the realization of the principle "of liking of one's own purpose with the interests of others."[8] The law is therefore made for the masses rather than for any individual, yet it coincidently takes care of the interests of individuals in the end. The law is a means to an end, and the end is not primarily the right of individuals but the interest of society. "Thus the law recognizes property rights only in so far

[4] George H. Sabine, **A History of Political Theory** (1950), 653.
[5] C. H. Mei, **Introduction to Jurisprudence** (1955), 30.
[6] Friedrich, **op. cit.**, 157.
[7] Francis W. Coker, **Recent Political Thought** (1936), 527.
[8] Friedrich, **op. cit.**, 156.

as the exercise of such rights promoted the social welfare. When law fails to satisfy human needs it should, like other human institutions, be changed by deliberate human effort. Laws, then, are the rules which men in society apply to their political agencies for the purpose of guaranteeing the conditions necessary for the life and welfare of society."[9] It is, therefore, not the purpose of law to emphasize so much the protection of individual rights but to harmonize the interests of society as a whole. Similarly, Roscoe Pound[10] founded his theory of law also upon social interests. "The task is one of satisfying claims of demands with the least of friction and the least waste, whereby the means of satisfaction may be made to go as far as possible."[11] To him, the law must strike a balance between social and individual interests, and the theory of law must consider not only the making of law but the administration as well.

Dr. Sun was in agreement with Ihering, Pound, and other sociological jurists when he observed:[12]

> Society progresses through the adjustment of major economic interests rather than through the clash of interests. If most of the economic interests of society be harmonized, the majority of people will benefit and society will progress. The reason why we want to make these adjustments is simply because of the living problem. From ancient times until now man has exerted his energies in order to maintain his existence. And mankind's struggle for continuous existence has been the reason for society's unceasing development, the law of social progress."

Dr. Sun, however, went a step further in his advocacy of a new concept of law. While Ihering stressed social interest, Stammler emphasized "social ideal," Holmes, Pound, and others elaborated on "sociological jurisprudence,"[13] Dr. Sun pointed out the positive function of law. His theory not only stressed the importance of social interest or social life as the basis of law, it also generated an activist doctrine which emphasized the importance of social service to be rendered by all concerned within a society. This is not simply the "sociological jurisprudence" but a theory of social service or social obligation of people.[14] With respect to this idea, Dr. Sun asserted:[15]

> Every one should make service, not exploitation, his aim. Those with greater intelligence and ability should serve thousands and tens of thousands to the limit of their power and make thousands and tens of thousands happy. Those with less intelligence and ability should serve tens and hundreds to the limit of their power and make tens and hundreds happy. The saying: 'The skillful are the slaves of the stupid' is just this principle. Those who have neither intelligence nor ability should each nevertheless, serve one another to the limit of their individual power

[9] Coker, **op. cit.**, 527.

[10] Roscoe Pound has been a legal adviser to the Chinese National Government in Nanking. He was in China in the summer of 1946 and from September, 1947 to November, 1948 when the Communist take-over was eminent. He showed high respect for Dr. Sun's political and legal concepts and offered valuable suggestions in Chinese legal reform. Cf. K. S. Hsia's partially published diary in memory of Profesor Pound, **Central Daily News** (Taipei, July 18, 1964), 1.

[11] Roscoe Pound, **Law and Morals**, McNair Lectures, 1923.

[12] Sun Yat-sen, **San Min Chu I**, translated by Frank W. Price, 391-392.

[13] Coker, **op. cit.**, 539 and notes.

[14] This concept of people in Dr. Sun's theory should not be confused with the Communist phraseology of people as in "People's Democracy" or "People's Dictatorship." To Dr. Sun, the concept of people includes **all** the people, rich or poor, not just the "proletariat" or the "party functionaries" alone.

[15] Price, **op. cit.**, 245.

and make one another happy. In this way, although men may vary in natural intelligence and ability, yet, as moral ideals and the spirit of service, prevail, they will certainly become more and more equal. This is the essence of quality.

This passage carries three significant aspects: first, every one should make service, not exploitation, his aim; second, the amount of service is based on the individual's level of intelligence and ability. The more intelligent or able a person is, the more service he should render—this is in essence, the principle of progressive service. Third, the purpose of the principle of progressive service is to remedy the inequality of natural endowment of individuals in order to achieve real equality.

Similar to the theory of sociological jurists, the new concept of law advanced by Dr. Sun would de-emphasize the importance of individual rights and it would stress the importance of social interests. However, there is a significant difference between Dr. Sun's theory and the principles of sociological jurisprudence. While sociological jurisprudence still retains individual end as the main goal of society, Dr. Sun would exalt the corporate political community above individuals, as the state, being the representative of the people as a whole, is different from the multitude of individuals.[16] Consequently, the application of the principle of progressive service is to the society and not to any individual or a privileged group of individuals. It would harmonize social life and advance social interest as a whole.

The difference between the theory of Ihering and that of Dr. Sun is likewise significant. While Ihering emphasized individual egoism as the major motivating force in achieving the social goal and has to use the principle of quid pro quo in achieving it, Dr. Sun stressed natural human sympathy and the sense of social duty in the Confucianist tradition as the basic psychological foundation of law and justice. In this respect, Dr. Sun's theory also presents a sharp contrast to the doctrine of Social Darwinism and Marxism.

According to Dr. Sun, Social Darwinism is wrong because of its misapplication of the theory of natural selection to the progress of human evolution, which is the governing principle of the plants and animals, but not of the human species. On the other hand, Marxism is also wrong. Dr Sun asserted that Marx himself is only a social pathologist, not a social psychologist, because his assumption that class struggle is the cause of social progress puts the cart before the horse. On the contrary, observed Dr. Sun,[17]

Since man entered the stage of civilization he has been instinctively following the principle of cooperation to attain the end of evolution... What is the end of human evolution. It is, as Confucius said, 'When the Great Principle (of Truth) prevails, the whole world rests on a common trusteeship' as well as what Jesus said, 'Thy will be done on earth as it is in Heaven.'

Aside from the psychological basis nf law, Dr. Sun, like Leon Duguit, accepts the theory of social solidarity as the sociological foundation of law and regards law as the rules of conduct actually controlling men who live in society. Its obligations arise not only from having been commanded, so to speak, by one's conscience or self-consciousness but also directly from the

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[16] Shia-ling Liu, "Theory of the State in Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Political Philosophy," op. cit., 63-69.

[17] Cited by Wei Yung, The Cult of Dr. Sun, 92.

necessities of social life. Even though man may realize the value of law as evolved from ethics, however, the fact that man lives in society and must so live in order to survive, reinforces the importance of such rules of conduct. Such rules may be entered into by different means, either by social contract as asserted by Rousseau, Locke, or Hobbes, or by command of the sovereign state or rulers. The fact is that if the advantages of social life are to be maintained, certain rules must be observed: otherwise society disintegrates. Men are naturally conscious of these rules and are impelled by self-interest or conscience to obey them. They are instinctively aware (or learn naturally from experience) that they have common needs and desires which can be satisfied only by living together; that they have diverse capabilities, as a consequence of which, their several needs can be satisfied only by an exchange of service; that, in short, they live longer and suffer less in association with other men. This fact constitutes social solidarity or social interdependence. The whole of law can be reduced to three general rules: respect all acts determined by the end of social solidarity; abstain from acts determined by any contrary ends; do everything possible to develop that solidarity. This kind of social relationship based upon mutual sympathy and upon the feeling of duty or even necessity arising from it, according to Tonnies, would lie hidden, which could be called the "natural law of community."[18] This system of law would, in every one of its institutions, express the principles of solidarity within the community and of the immediately interdependence of rights and duties.

Aside from such a built-in enforcing element, Dr. Sun recognizes that these rules must have some objectively enforcible guaranty. While the principle of social solidarity provides the necessity for the observance of such rules, this socially enforcible guaranty need not be just a simple system of organized coercion. Being predominantly influenced by the Confucianist tradition, Dr. Sun rejected the doctrines advocated by the Chinese Legalists. To him, the sanction of law is primarily ethical and psychological, resting in each individual's awareness of the social approval or reprobation of his conduct according to its conformity or non-conformity to fundamental social rules. Since this type of law is motivated by the common good of the people, it would not permit any disparity between law and morality. Thus, Dr. Sun emphasized the discipline of the mind in the true tradition of Confucianism.[19] As a matter of fact, one of his noted works **Sun-Wen Doctrine** is based wholly on this premise.[20]

Therefore, in the new concept of law, ideas such as "right" and "freedom" must be redefined. The concept of "right" is different from the one based on the individualistic legal system. Under an individualistic legal system, "right" is divine, inviolable, and inalienable which could be exercised at the discretion of individuals with the least possible limitation from any external authority or source. The idea of "right" under the new concept is

[18] Cited by Rudolf Herberle in "The Sociological System of Ferdinand Tonnies: Community and Society," ed. by Harry E. Barnes, **An Introduction to the History of Sociology** (1948), 227-248.

[19] Wei Yung, **op. cit.**, chapter V.

[20] Sun Yat-sen, **Collected Writings**, Part IV.

conditional, relative. It is never absolute and could be exercised only in the interest of furthering the social solidarity or social cohesion desired by society, in general, as visualized to a certain extent by the individual concerned.

Individuals work for the advancement of social solidarity out of necessity and through self-realization. Individual conduct is governed by the rules of law based on the principle of social solidarity. In advancing social solidarity, individuals as well as the society have the "right" to limit those acts which are adverse to the harmony of society. In this sense, the idea of "right" is no more than a sort of "power" exercised collectively and in the interest of the society to prohibit or to prevent adverse acts from taking place. In other words, such "rights" are only instruments in bringing about the best of the individual in order to serve the people, to further the interest of society, and to advance the solidarity of that society. There is no "right" other than the "right" to serve. However, such "right" is still limited by the law of the society.

This new concept of "right" eventually led Dr. Sun to remark that "there is no natural right, there are only revolutionary rights."[21] However, this position did not lead him to conclude, as the Marxist did, that there is no necessity to provide for, or to protect, individual rights. His contention is only that individual service should take precedence over individual rights. In other words, the law should protect such rights which work for the advancement of social solidarity but not those which work only for the purpose of advancing one's self-interest at the expense of the society. In determining such goals, Dr. Sun, unlike the Marxists, favored democratic process and he actually introduced the doctrine of "distinction between power and capacity" as against the idea of "separation of powers" in the West to balance interests of individuals and society.[22]

The same principle applies to "freedom" as well. With the purpose of advancing social solidarity, the law provides that, within certain limits, individuals may exercise their free will in doing what they choose to do. In this sense, "freedom" may be considered as a part of individual rights. However, such individual freedom would serve its meaningful purpose only when it furthers the social solidarity or, as with Russell, social cohesion. This concept differs sharply with the individualistic idea of unlimited or unlimitable freedom. This so-called freedom is, therefore, the "freedom" to serve humanity or the "freedom" to advance social solidarity.

Under this new concept, the so-called "private ownership" of property could also be explained in terms of limited freedom rather than absolute "right." Because of personal ownership, the individual may have "freedom" to dispose of his private property with the purpose to further the interest of society as a whole. As with Charmont,[23] Dr. Sun argued that ownership of property creates for the owner as many obligations as rights by the mere fact of his ownership, and not by any undertaking or any fault on his part, he incurs liabilities: to his employees and to the public. Basically, the ownership of an individual to a certain property is merely coincidental. The added

[21] Price, **op. cit.**, 180.
[22] Shia-ling Liu, **op. cit.**, 69-72.
[23] Joseph Charmont, **Modern Legal Philosophy**, chapter VII.

value to privately owned property is "the benefit of social life." Therefore, it should not be claimed by the owner alone, but rather, it should be shared by the public as a whole. Consequently, Dr. Sun, in his Principle of Social Welfare (or of People's Livelihood), devised a practical scheme by which the owner is entitled to the original value of the land as self-reported, while the added value to the land is afforded to the public.[24] In the same manner, the progressive taxation system and the usually burdensome inheritance tax rate, as institutionalized in the United States today, could be fully and philosophically justified.

Incidentally, as Dr. Sun was highly influenced by the German and French sociological jurists, his doctrine of social service was not without any historical roots in the Chinese legal system. The Miscellaneous Codes of the Law of T'ang (618-907 A.D.), for instance, stipulated that "in case of a fire, those who could report and did not and those who could have terminated the fire and did not, be punished in the third degree for accidental fire."[25] It also stipulated that "in case of robbery and murder in the neighborhood, those who reported and did not render assistance be punished by 100 heavy blows; those who have heard and did not render assistance be punished at the next degree."[26] The underlying principle of such provisions is a crytallization of the doctrine of social obligation which seems to be odd and strange under the individualistic legal system.

Interweaving of "Ch'ing," "Li," and Law.

The second ingredient of Dr. Sun's new concept of law is the interweaving of **ch'ing**, **li**, and law. In the final analysis, there are two major schools regarding the nature of law. One school maintains that there is an unwritten, divinely or naturally appointed law-universal in application and immutable in time, which is normative. The other school rejects the natural law doctrine of such absolute, universal, and unalterable rules of law, and maintains that there is a written, humanly decreed law — limited in application to the boundaries of particular communities and changing within any community with changing conditions. The ultimate sanctions of the law are either the habits, opinions, and emotions of the body of the people, or the improvement of human welfare and happiness in a given community or, as with the positivists, the penalties which either legislatures or courts lay down. The new concept of law advanced by Dr. Sun is a synthesis of these two major schools.

According to Dr. Sun, the legal system is based on the social solidarity of any given society, yet it could be modified according to the free will of the people within that society. It is real, positive, and rational. As with Stammler, the right law is "natural law with variable content."[27] This universal standard is, however, only a formal measure of the law. The actual content of right law varies infinitely. To use the proper Chinese expression, the law is the embodiment of **ch'ing** and **li**. The former, concerns the proper relationships of the people and feelings toward each other; the latter, concerns the

[24] Price, op. cit., 435.
[25] D. H. Mei, op. cit., 25.
[26] Ibid., 26.
[27] Coker, op. cit., 529.

rationale of the subject matter in point of its logical consequences or implications. The first point is best illustrated by an old Chinese proverb that "the law is not outside human feelings." The interweaving of **ch'ing**, **li**, and law is best expressed in the frequently quoted statement: "Eternal reason, national law, and human feelings." Chu Hsi, the 12th century St. Thomas of China, used to say that "nature is nothing else than law."[28] It means that law is not outside of nature or against nature.

As a consequence of human nature, personal considerations should be granted in the application of law. It is, therefore, inconceivable for a father to testify against his children, a husband against his wife, a brother against another brother, or vice versa, in court proceedings. According to Dr. Sun, socialization is human nature. Since the beginning of time, individuals have lived in groups, and the life of the group is the life of the individual. Until the life of the group is well protected, individual development is impossible.

Among human groups, there is a certain set of common norms which governs the interactions between one individual and another, and between the individual and the group; otherwise, group life is impossible. Such set of norms could be either the mores or the laws of the society. As the group grew from families to villages, and from villages to a nation, the function of moral codes and the law tended to be increasingly important. The power to sustain the enforcement of the law is usually the government within a given body. Thus, Dr. Sun believed that morality and law share the same origin, perform the function, and differ only in the mode of their enforcement. Law is therefore derived from **ch'ing** and **li**, not outside of them.

In amplifying the doctrine of Dr. Sun, President Chiang once remarked that "the reason why human beings are different from, and superior to, the animals and the reason why human beings can continuously work for their own advancement and their own evolution is that human beings have feelings, observe law and possess reasoning power. Feelings, law, and reason are the three essential and necessary ingredients which sustain the existence of human beings and promote human evolution. None of the three is dispensable. Accordingly, in the **Three Principles of the People** (as advocated by Dr. Sun), the Principle of Nationalism is based on feelings, the Principle of Democracy is based on law, and the Principle of People's Livelihood is based on reason. Thus, the **Three Principles of the People** is more adequate than any other doctrine in solving contemporary problems.[29]

In most cases, law coincides with morality. Morality is based on the feelings (**ch'ing**), following the reason (**li**). Accordingly, **ch'ing** and **li** must be channelled into law in order to obtain justice. The law must be in accordance with **ch'ing** and **li** in order to be practicable. Once of the most noted Chinese legalists—Lu Shih Wu (**ca.** 300 B.C.)—said that "law is codified according to the eternal principles of right or divine reason and human feelings," and that "law is the unavodiable feelings."[30] In the same manner, a modern jurist also stressed the ethical aspect of law when he said that "ethical

[28] Chu Hsi, "Philosophy of Human Nature," quoted by W. Durant in **Our Oriental Heritage** (1954), 732.

[29] Chiang Kai-shek, **Collected Works**, I, chapter 4.

[30] C. C. Chang, "Law and Morality," **Chinese Culture** (May, 1960)6.

consideration of justice which is the end and purpose of all civil laws than one can exclude the vital air from his room and live."[31] The new concept of law, as advocated by Dr. Sun, as with other noted jurists, is therefore interwoven with a heavy dash of morality which is different from the concept of law under individualism based mainly on the self-interest of individuals.[32]

"Li" as a Part of Law.

The third ingredient of Dr. Sun's new concept of law is that he regards li[33] as a part of law. Based on its form, there are two kinds of law. One, is what has been precisely stated; the other, is what has been enforced informally. The first is usually formulated or proclaimed according to formal legal procedures by legislative body or other legally competitive agencies. Since the end of the Chou Dynasty (1122-222 B.C.), such laws were in existence in China. Tsu Ch'an codified the **Criminal Code** and Li K'uei wrote the **Six Chapters on Legal Institutes.** These were the beginning of formally written Chinese law.[34] However, according to legal history in China, the formally written law is only a part of the law which was binding upon the people. In addition to the written law, there is the ever significant substance of law which is **li.** Although in the early period of Chinese history, the legalists and the Confucianists had sharply disagreed as to the origin and function of law and **li.** Confucius said: "guide the people with political measures and control or regulate them by the threat of punishment, and the people will try to keep out of jail, but will have no sense of honor or shame. Guide the people by virtue and control or regulate them by **li**, and the people will have a sense of honor and respect."[35] In the Book of Etiquette (or **li**) it was asserted that "**li** does not apply to the common people, and punishment cannot be imposed on officials with the rank of **ta fu.**"[36] The basic difference between **li** and law is that "**li** forbids trespasses before they are committed whereas law punishes criminal acts after their commission."[37]

However, ever since the time of Confucius, the coordination or alteration of **li** and law had been started. As Prime Minister of Lu, Confucius himself ordered the execution of Shao Cheng-mow and defended his action eloquently against his disciples' questioning. He once said that "if **li** and **yueh** do not flourish, punishments are not likely to be just right. If punishments are not just right, the people will not know what to do." [38] In speaking of **li**, **yueh**, and punishment in the shame breath, Confucius was worrying that punishments imposed by the authorities might not be justifiable. Even if they were,

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[31] C. H. Dillion, "Laws and Jurisprudence of England and America," 18, quoted by Pound, **Harvard Law Review**, XXVII, 731.

[32] It should be noted that the Western concept came to be combined with a plural conception of society in which the scope of law is limited. Morality, in short, which is still considered to be far above the law in the U. S. Government, is but one social institution. Other social organizations and even single individuals define morality while government and law do not.

[33] This is not to be confused with **li** discussed in the previous section. These two words sound alike in Chinese, yet the meaning are quite different.

[34] Mei, **op. cit.**, 56.

[35] Chang, **op. cit.**, 5.

[36] **Ibid.**, 9.

[37] **Ibid.**, 4.

[38] Chang, **op. cit.**, 14.

he was still in favor of using **li** and **yueh** as instruments of government to buttress the rule of it.

Tung Chung-shu, one of the eminent Confucianist scholars in the time of Emperor Wu (140-87 B.C.) of the Han Dynasty, maintained as traditional and classifical position in the interrelationship of the law and **li**. On the one hand, he held theoretically that one can dispense with punishment or moral persuasion and put sole reliance on the other. On the other hand, he also made judicial judgments on the basis of the principles enunciated in **The Book of Spring Autumn** and interpreted laws in the light of Confucianist classical teachings. It was he who at once steeped himself in Confucianism and administered the affairs of state in accordance with law. It was also he who built a bridge between rule by moral persuasion and rule by law and reconciled the teachings of Confucianism with those of the legalists.

Following this tradition, Dr. Sun emphasized the intermixing of **li** and and law. According to him, **li** is something that regulates our ethical relations; it is designed to curb the excessive natural desires of man; and it helps us to cultivate moral habits. In essence, **li** is a form of social control which operates to prevent evil from happening rather than punishment after occurrence. In this regard, the Chinese concept of **li** is not unlike the Western concept of natural law that prevailed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As most of the legal concepts in the Western world have their origin from natural law, most modern Chinese legal concepts have also originated from well developed concepts of both **li** and law and are now applied to all the people regardless of their social or official status.

In summary, Dr. Sun's new concept of law is based on (1) his theory of social service, (2) the interweaving of **ch'ing, li,** and law and (3) **li** as an essential part of law. In fact, his theory is a synthesis of progressive western legal concept and traditional Chinese ethical system. In a country which had never been exposed to the Western legal system, his acceptance of sociological foundation of law is indeed new and revolutionary. His theory of progressive social service went even a step further than sociological jurisprudence by emphasizing the traditional Chinese virtue of self-sacrifice in serving mankind. In the interweaving of national law with eternal reason (**li**) and human feeling (**ch'ing**), he has at one stroke defined the idea of justice, explained the desirability of rule by law over the rule by man, and provided justification for revolution if and when law is anti-reason and anti-nature. In the incorporation of **li** (etiquette) with law, he settled once and for all the age-old arguments between the Confucianists and Legalists, by giving law a much broader meaning than mere punishment which, in all respects, is in full agreement with his new concept. Although Dr. Sun was more of a political thinker, yet his philosophical reflections on the concept of law are more than implied throughout his major works. This short paper is an attempt to examine some of the essence of his theory in the hope that more scholarly endeavors will be taken to explore the richness of this legal philosophy, probably most desirable in the modern Orient.

SAMURAI CONVERSION: THE CASE OF KUMAMOTO

George E. Moore

IN THE SPRING OF 1876, REVEREND J. D. DAVIS — A TEACHER AT the recently opened Doshisha School in Kyoto—received a letter from Captain L. L. Janes, of whom he had never heard. The letter asked for help regarding a group of young **samurai** whom Captain Janes had converted to Protestant Christianity. Even on the surface, the adoption of Christianity (so characteristically Western) by **samurai** is intriguing. A close examination of that conversion will help to make clear some of the processes of cultural interaction; it will provide significant insight into the process of Japan's modernization.

The appearance of Perry at Uraga in 1853 and the increasing pressure by European powers upon Japan in the years following, threw Japan—and particularly the **samurai** class—into a state of profound turmoil. This turmoil manifested itself in what at, first sight, appears to be increasingly aberrational behavior on the part of the **samurai**, especially those in the southern and western domains. Some broke the laws closing the country and traveled to Europe and America to learn Western ways. Others risked their lives and reputations to study with foreigners in the treaty ports. Masterless **samurai** "patriots" roamed Edo and Kyoto and supported their beliefs through intimidation and assassination. Some actually abandoned their feudal lords; others began to talk of superseding the Tokugawa house; while still others argued for the reform of outmoded laws no longer viable under new conditions. Reactions to Western pressure ranged between extremes, but it was essentially of a positive nature. The **samurai** sought to do something: to take some action. He acted partly because his status had deteriorated, partly because he saw opportunities to improve himself, partly because of his concern with Japan's defense posture, but also because he was a **samurai**, with the soldier ethos of action (even irrational and hasty action). His actions showed a wide spectrum of behavior; conversion to Christianity was but an extreme example of such behavior.

The turmoil of the nation in the '50s and '60s was reflected within the domains as well. This was no less true of Kumamoto Domain than it was of any other. Kumamoto was rich, populous, and ruled by a lord enfeoffed by Iemitsu. Hosokawa, while indebted to the Tokugawa, was nonetheless an "outside" lord and his **samurai** shared much in common with those of Satsuma, Choshu and Tosa, who provided the leadership of the new Meiji government. Within the ranks of the **samurai** families who formed the domain government of Kumamoto were many shades of political opinion, and the struggles for supremacy in the council were often fierce. At the moment when the new Meiji government was formed, the conservative faction was in control and refused to support the forces creating the new national government. Kumamoto's failure denied to her **samurai** opportunities to servè there.

At the time, this did not appear to be a serious problem, for one son of Kumamoto had become a powerful voice among the new leadership and attained a high place in the central government. He was Yokoi Shonan, one of the truly influential thinkers preceding the Restoration. Shonan displayed prodigious talent as a student of Confucianism, but early abandoned official Chu Hsi as lacking in substance. After some time in Edo, he returned to Kumamoto and opened a school where he encouraged real or practical learning, hence **Jitsugaku,** in opposition to the arts and letters which orthodox Confucian education then required. His school attracted large numbers and his **Jitsugaku** Party became very influential in Kumamoto. Shonan came to advocate unlimited intercourse with foreign countries and sent two of his nephews to Rutgers College. For imagined advocacy of Christianity, he was assassinated by "patriots" in Kyoto, and Kumamoto found itself with absolutely no entree into the new central government.[1]

The failure of the conservative faction and the succession of a new domain lord sympathetic with Shonan's views, gave control of the domain government to the **Jitsugaku** supporters of Shonan. They decided to establish a school for Western learning by means of which young **samurai** could be prepared to compete for positions in the new government for the glory and honor of Kumamoto. Domain funds were allocated and an examination system established to select the brightest scholars. Although examinations were opened to all classes, the overwhelming majority of students selected came from the **samurai** class. All of them had studied the Chinese lessons which then made up the curriculum of the **samurai** schools, most of them under **Jitsugaku** Party teachers.[2] Although copies of the examination are not extant, the examiners undoubtedly sought those qualities which to them represented the best in the **samurai** ethos.

The students brought with them to the new school (called **Yogakko**) a combination of values made up of elements of Confucianism, especially that of Wang Yang-ming, which accorded more closely with **Jitsugaku** ideas, and **Bushido**—a system of ethical behavior for the **samurai**—and perhaps Zen Buddhism, as it permeated the culture of the **samurai.** It is fair to assume then that the **Yogakko** students were good scholars, versed in the Chinese classics, leavened with a strong dose of **Jitsugaku** pragmatism, steeped in the **samurai** tradition of loyalty, filial piety, class consciousness, self-confidence and trust in intuitive knowledge.

The authorities planned a school for Western learning but they were also concerned about maintaining the martial traditions in which Kumamoto prided itself. The master of the school—the lord made it clear—must not be "a

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[1] Imanaka Kanshi, "Yokoi Shonan no Jitsugaku to Yogaku," **Kirisutokyo Shakai Mondai Kenkyu,** No. 4 (March, 1961), 8-23. See also Kosaka Masaaki, **Japanese Thought in the Meiji Era** (Tokyo, 1958), translated by David Abosch, 32-35.

[2] The influence of Yokoi Shonan upon the decision to establish the school and upon the thinking of those who established it was significant. In a sense, Shonan's ideas represented a departure from orthodoxy in response to the times. **Jitsugaku** was still rooted in Confucianism, but its practicality and its emphasis upon pragmatism made it a stage which could lead to more radical behavior.

farmer, a mechanic, or a merchant: a military man was what was wanted."[3] The school must resemble what Westerners might term a military academy. Nor should this desire seem odd. The training of the **samurai** bore some resemblance to that in a military academy. Students spent half of each day studying the Chinese classics and the remainder in military exercises. From the beginning of the Tokugawa period **bun** and **bu** were considered to be the two wheels of **samurai** education. Not only did Kumamoto want an officer to instruct its young men, there was also a hint of using his talents more directly if warfare should break out among the elements then jockeying for power.[4]

The Kumamoto officials then approached Reverend Guido Verbeck to find a schoolmaster to fit their requirements.[5] Verbeck wrote to his mission board secretary, J.M. Ferris in New York, who in turn got in touch with a well known missionary—Henry Scudder, then pastor of a church in San Francisco. Ferris must have known that Scudder's daughter had recently married a young ex-Union army officer named L. L. Janes who, Ferris felt, to be just the person to teach in Kumamoto. The offer was made and accepted; word reached Kumamoto; Councilor Nonoguchi Tameyoshi—the official in charge of the school—was dispatched to Edo with a suitable retinue to conduct Janes and his family south.

Not much is known of Janes until he entered West Point.[6] He was born in 1837 in New Philadelphia (Ohio), the son of a Presbyterian elder and a mother whose father had helped found the town. New Philadelphia was still something of a frontier town and the amenities of life were few. Presbyterians were rooted in puritanism. They believed in education, especially for their clergy, and their concept of full membership in the church body demanded rigorous catechetic training.

There was in frontier religion, however, a strong streak of revivalism which contrasted with the severely rational puritanism of Presbyterians. Revivals, in fact, contradicted much of that puritanism. It was anti-intellectual,

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[3] Kozaki Hiromichi, **Reminescences of Seventy Years** (Tokyo, 1933) translated by Kozaki Nariaki, 11. For information about the **Yogakko**, I have relied for source material on this work together with Watase Tsunekichi, **Ebina Danjo Sensei** (Tokyo, 1938) and Saba Wataru, **Uemura Masahisa to sono Jidai** (Tokyo, 1937), I (hereafter **Uemura**). The best secondary study of the **Yogakko** is Sugii Mutsuro's excellent **Kumamoto Yogakko** in Nos. 4 (March, 1961) and 7 (April, 1963) of **Kiristukyo Shakai Mondai Kenkyu**, 24-42 and 143-237, respectively.

[4] See page 153 of the second part of Sugii's article cited above, which reproduces the contract signed by Janes upon landing. Article 2 of the contract states, "When employed in military matters, [Janes] salary will be reviewed."

[5] The contact was made through one of Shonan's nephews who had studied with Verbeck in Nagasaki before going to Rutgers and had been forced to return from America because of illness. He was instrumental in getting the **Yogakko** established, but died before it opened.

[6] Biographical data on Janes is sparse. I have consulted his military file in the **Records of the Adjutant General, Record Group 94**, "Appointment, Commission and Personal File Regarding Leroy L. Janes," and his Pension File cited XC 2682-526, both from the National Archives of the United States. Further information regarding his military service can be examined in George W. Cullum **Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U. S. Military Academy, etc.**, II, 544, and in the **Official Register of the Officers and Cadets of the U. S. Military Academy at West Point, N. Y.** for the years of his service as a cadet and instructor. There is also an excellent attempt to collect biographical and bibliographical data on Janes in **Kindai Bungaku Kenkyu Sosho**, X, 91-137, published by Joshi Digaku in Tokyo.

highly emotional, and in effect offered salvation instantly upon the sinner's recognition of his own sinfulness and his throwing himself upon the mercy and saving grace of God. "Believe, and ye shall be saved," taught the revivalist. There were enough Biblical precedents to cause most Presbyterians to accept the revival, to say nothing of the opportunity for emotional expression normally denied in religion and life.[7]

After a brief period studying law, Janes received an appointment to the U.S. Military Academy. He was always near the bottom of his class academically and earned a large number of demerits in his last two years. When the Civil War began, his class was graduated early and Janes was commissioned a second lieutenant of artillery. After training troops in Washington, D. C., he saw some action in the Shenandoah campaigns of 1862, but spent the next year as a staff officer. During the last two years of the war, he taught infantry and artillery tactics at the Military Academy and was then posted to Fort Stevens, Oregon, as its commander. By early 1868, he had tired of the peacetime army and resigned. He later said that peacetime soldiering was useless and frustrating and that was why he had abandoned it.[8] In January 1869, he married Dr. Scudder's daughter in San Francisco and became closely associated with that missionary family.

Janes received the offer to teach in Kumamoto in the spring of 1871 and began to consider the kind of school which he should operate. For a model, he took Thomas Arnold's Rugby School in England and acquainted himself with its form and essence through a study of Arnold's life written by Dean Stanley. Boarding ship in San Francisco, Janes and his family landed in Yokohama in August 1871, taking with him a strong streak of American pragmatism and of American post-Civil War nationalism.

After signing a contract with Councillor Nonoguchi, Janes was escorted to Kumamoto and set about establishing the school, its rules and regulations and its curriculum. He administered the school, taught all subjects to all students, and supervised every detail of its operation. He was the school. The students lived in dormitories and their lives were severely circumscribed. The school's operations were patterned after Rugby and the strict regimen after the Military Academy. Janes was austere, self-disciplined and always carried himself like a soldier. He awoke early, began the day's activities early, and demanded a great deal from his students. He did not take a single vacation away from Kumamoto.[9] He refused to learn Japanese, which made his students' task extraordinarily difficult. Yet, he took a deep interest in each

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[7] My understanding of mid-nineteenth century American religion is based primarily upon Smith, Hirlie Shelton, Robert T. Handy and Lefferts A. Loetscher, **American Christianity: An Historical Interpretation with Representative Documents** (New York, 1963), II, 1820-1961. I have also consulted Bernard Weisberger's **They Gathered at the River** (Boston, 1958).

[8] At least, that is what he told his students, according to one of them, Ebina Danjo. **Kindai Bungaku Kenkyu Sosho**, X, 93. The truth seems to be that Janes was asked to resign from the army because he was losing his sanity. An investigation was conducted of his behavior at Fort Stevens which attributed his loss of sanity to the death of his first wife and to "religious excitement." Memorandum of the Adjutant General's Office, dated 13 December 1866, in Janes' personal file from the **Records of the Adjustant General**, cited above.

[9] Kozaki, **op. cit.**, 12-14.

boy and, as he was the only instructor, he and his students became well acquainted indeed.[10]

What did the **Yogakko** seem like from the students' point of view? The language and study materials were foreign like the instructor. The entire environment and experience were strange.[11] Yet, there must have been much that struck a familiar note. First, the **samurai** accepted booklearning as a necessary part of their equipment as loyal **samurai**. These students—having been selected from the best of the young domain scholars—were not adverse to diligent study.[12] Further, Janes' pedagogical techniques were not so far removed from those of the masters of the domain school. Rote memory, rotating recitation and lectures were common to both. Subject matter differed, of course, but even the more practical subjects could be accepted in the light of the influence of Shonan's **Jitsugaku.**

Highly motivated, able, in constant contact with Janes, it is not too difficult to see why many of the **Yogakko** students came under his influence. Even in his person, he had many of the qualities which **samurai** so admired. With these qualities, Janes brought that fund of knowledge which the students, their families, and the domain authorities were convinced would catapult Kumamoto into the arena of national affairs.

As time went by, certain students began to show decided superiority. When a new class entered in 1872, Janes, unable to instruct everyone, transferred some of the burden of teaching to them. This, too, was consonant with the method of the **samurai** school. Others could not meet the academic mark or misbehaved, and Janes ruthlessly weeded out both—a Rugby dictum.

As the students improved in their ability to grasp and understand the English language, they began to be influenced by Janes' beliefs and thought. Most of the students in the first two classes—those whom Janes influenced most profoundly—had planned to become Ministers and Councilors in the new government in Tokyo: an ambition perfectly in accord with, and limited by, their social class and rank. Under Janes' instruction, the students gradually came to accept alternative possibilities in engineering, mining, manufacturing and the like. Student acceptance of the possibility of economic activity should not be attributed so much to Janes' charismatic guidance as to the willingness of the **samurai** as a class to undertake much that had been forbidden under the old order. What Janes said was what many **samurai** had discovered.

Time further isolated the students from any influence outside the school. Confucian instruction was limited to Sundays. Instruction in the martial arts ceased. The students, to a remarkable degree, were under the influence of Janes and they gradually transferred to him their respect as their teacher. Their youth made the transfer easier. The values developed by their **samurai**

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[10] Uemura, **op. cit.**, 516. Also Kozaki, **op. cit.**, 12.

[11] One of Janes' students, Tokutomi Soho, mentions glass windows, meat and bread and shelves for beds. "...Within [the school] American life went on." Uemura, **op. cit.**, 509.

[12] The selection process by examination, fairly rigid at first, slackened badly toward the end. Tokutomi mentions that over half of the students in his class had been admitted without qualifying. Even in the first class, some were admitted without examination. Kozaki was excused because the examiner knew of his excellence at the domain school.

environment continued to operate. Their military training and ethos made the object of loyalty the one who was most significant in their lives; but Janes, in these circumstances, absorbed the filial loyalty demanded by their Confucian ethic, as well.[13]

What must be understood is that the gradual separation of some Yogakko students from their heritage was the product of their school environment, rather than a result of the pressures upon their class in a modernizing Japan. Like most of their class in this period, they were anxious to explore new possibilities, to seek new avenues to whatever goals they set themselves. The students entered the Yogakko with vigor and enthusiasm. Without losing either, they left the mainstream, diverted by Janes. But the diversion was not sharp or sudden; there was no feeling of being suddenly cast adrift, but a gradual steady moving away which required no essential modification of their value system.

Toward the end of his third year in Kumamoto (or the beginning of his fourth), Janes suggested that there was more to Western culture than the secular education which the students were then receiving. He told them that in religion would be found the essence of the West and the reasons for its strength, superiority and success. Janes then said that he would conduct Bible study and prayer meetings in his quarters for those who might wish to discover Christianity.

Naturally enough, not all the students elected to hear Janes. Inability to understand him tended to limit those who attended to the better upperclassmen. Antagonism to Christianity and the hated Bible kept most away.[14] Curiosity brought some, but others left because Janes appeared ridiculous to them. There began to be a grouping of students into two elements: those who favored Janes, succeeded under him, and were interested in Christianity; those who opposed Janes, were generally less apt in English, and were violently opposed to Christianity.

Janes' brand of religion—that mixture of puritanism and revivalism—tended to emphasize the emotional, rather than the intellectual. In this respect, Janes was simply exhibiting a form of religious behavior which, by this time, was common in the American Protestant denominations and was supremely manifested by Henry Ward Beecher, whom Janes admired.[15] Upon those students studying Christianity with him, however, Janes' behavior was most influential. He was a man of ethical thought and behavior, who had won their respect as a teacher. The intensity of his prayers, his obvious concern for the welfare of them and of Japan, the Christian concern with their salvation: all these, moved them profoundly. In Janes' religion, many of his students found a new (and to them a higher) loyalty. By the winter of 1875, a kind of revival spirit began to take hold of this group. A condition of intense excitement developed, fed by Janes' exhortations.[16] In this state, a group of about thirty-

[13] Another student, Kanamori Tsurin, wrote that Janes "was truly a teacher who loved us; like a father he thought of us." Uemura, op. cit., 517.

[14] Loc. cit.

[15] Ibid., 521.

[16] Kozaki remembered that "some, on those cold winter days bathed in freezing water in order, as they said, to strengthen their faith." Kozaki, op. cit., 19. See also Uemura, op. cit., 518. Very samurai.

five climbed Mt. Hanaoka outside the city of Kumamoto, and pledged themselves to the defense of their new faith. They also declared that patriotism required them to proselytize the nation: to this, they should devote their lives. After consultation with Davis of Doshisha, Janes baptized twenty-two of them on 3 April 1876, and celebrated the Lord's Supper.[17]

By this time, of course, the converts had become alienated—in a sense—from their traditional society. This became painfully apparent when the incident on Mt. Hanaoka became known. Many converts were summarily removed from the school by their families and subjected to severe persecution. The widow of Shonan and mother of Yokoi Tokio threatened to commit suicide. The father of Yoshida Sakuya threatened to behead him. The famous **Jitsugaku** teacher, Takezaki Sado, came to persuade Kanamori Tsurin to abandon his new faith and failed, whereupon he was locked up in solitary confinement. The school, itself, was closed by the authorities in the summer of 1876 and Janes left for Osaka, where he was employed for a short time in a government school teaching science.

What is fascinating about the persecutions, however, is not so much that a surprising number resisted, or that some—like Tokutomi Soho—succumbed. It is their behavior, under persecution, that is revealing. Yokoi Tokio decided to commit suicide with his mother because he could not abide the thought of his mother going to hell while he went to heaven. Yoshida said that he could think of no better way to die than at his father's hands. Kanamori asked the great teacher why he would not allow investigation of Christianity when he had urged the investigation of all things in his teaching.[18] In each case, the convert responded in traditional terms, not in a rejection of that tradition. The values which sustained them in persecution were **samurai** values: stoicism in the face of adversity, loyalty to the lord, ethical behavior and dedication, and so on. In the **samurai** code, the lord took precedence over the father.

The conversion process as recorded by one of Janes' students, Kozaki Hiromichi, is interesting. Kozaki was not one of the Hanaoka covenanters and seems to have arrived at his faith after considerably more agony than the others. He began as a Confucian and "stood on the words of the **Analects**, 'The study of strange doctrines is indeed injurious,' and opposed the study of Christianity." [19] He had been trained in the orthodox Chu Hsi Confucianism of the domain school, but under the influence of the **Jitsugaku** teacher, Takezaki, he moved towards the philosophy of Wang Yang-ming. Takezaki, he remembered, as lecturing with great earnestness, "his words seemed to well up from the very depths of his heart—so much so, in fact, that the audience was invariably impressed." [20]

[17] Uemura, **op. cit.**, 519. The anti-Janes party met at the same time on the same date in the park of the Suizen Temple in opposition. Among them was one Yokoi Tokiyoshi, a kinsman of Shonan and of the convert Yokoi Tokio. **Ibid.**, 520.

[18] See Kozaki, **op. cit.**, 21-23 and Uemura, **op. cit.**, 502-508.

[19] Kozaki, **op. cit.**, 18-19.

[20] **Ibid.**, 33. Tokutomi, at 13—some seven years junior to Kozaki—remembered Takezaki's lectures: "Truly, they did not stir my soul." Uemura, **op. cit.**, 513. Later, he referred to them as "moldy." **Ibid.**, 514.

As Janes' meetings progressed, Kozaki was persuaded to attend.

> At the first meeting I attended, what struck me most forcibly was Captain Janes' prayer. Fundamentally opposed as I was to such religious practices, once I heard him pray I could not help being powerfully impressed. While all the others were attentively listening with bowed heads, I alone kept my eyes open and gazed at him to see the way he prayed. His face was glowing with earnestness, and the words he used in praying for those present, for men in general, and for Japan and the world grow gradually more and more fervent till I, cold and obstinate though I was, could not help being most deeply impressed.[21]

Then began a period of intense study of Christianity. Yet, Kozaki was faced with a dilemma: the rationalism of his Confucian training rebelled against his becoming a Christian; "yet to turn away from Christianity and be content with Confucianism would leave my spirit of inquiry unsatisfied. This dilemma so wrought on me that I had a nervous breakdown." So he went to Janes for help. Janes said, "as a horse or dog however wise cannot comprehend man's mind, and similarly an ignorant or small man cannot understand the conduct of the learned and wise, even so man can in no wise know the holy will of the omniscient and almighty, the supremely good and supremely loving God. With such words," continued Kozaki, "did he take away the veil from my eyes. Upon my return home that night I had a great awakening..." [22]

From this time on Kozaki progressed in faith and Janes baptized him with the others. Kozaki claimed that the staunchness of his faith grew not only out of the time and thought and mental anguish spent in becoming a Christian, but also out of his Confucian heritage. He compared himself to the Biblical Paul, who was proud of his pre-Christian faith. Citing Christ's statement that he had come to fulfill, not abrogate the law, Kozaki claimed that, "we embraced Christianity, because we believed that it fulfills the spirit and real import of Confucianism." [23]

There may be some doubt as to the validity of Kozaki's notion that Christianity was the fulfillment of Confucianism. In another way, however, it may be significant. Combined with the military urge to action, and Zen concepts of truth through enlightenment, the Wang Yang-ming emphasis on intuitive knowledge may have been the intellectual and emotional framework which, when combined with Janes' apocalyptic faith and revealed religion, made conversion possible, given the conditions then obtaining at the **Yogakko**. This explanation does no violence to the value system of either party. It does help in understanding the process of conversion, without resorting to explanations of initial alienation and search for alternatives on the part of the converts.

The **Yogakko** converts were young **samurai**, part and parcel of the domain elite. In the parlous '70s, a group of men from this elite, seeking positively to overcome an initial disadvantage, established a school by means of which family and domain fortunes could be advanced. That they chose this way indicates, not a feeling of frustration over events beyond their control,

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21 Kozaki, op. cit., 35-36.

22 **Ibid.**, 37. In the Japanese edition of his Reminiscences, Kozaki used the term **satori** or sudden enlightenment, a key concept in Zen Buddhism.

23 **Ibid.**, 39.

but an active effort to correct a bad situation. Into this project the young students threw themselves with remarkable energy. They were eager and talented, and their efforts had the full weight of parental and family approval behind them. In fact, upon their success lay the hopes of them all. They were full of youthful vitality, optimism and idealism. Janes channeled this energy in a new direction. His converts believed that they had a new and better way to which they could commit themselves in service to their nation and her people. That they had accepted the hated and feared religion, aroused great resentment from families who had wagered all on the future of their offspring and who felt betrayed by them.[24] But the converts saw themselves as now prepared to better lead their nation to new and greater opportunities.

The conversion of **samurai** to Protestant Christianity was admittedly an extreme response to the West. But if the converts did not seek Christianity to compensate for a felt alienation from their families and society, then their behavior is generally similar to that of other **samurai** of the period who were in various ways actively responding to the crisis imposed by the West. The converts were **samurai** and, therefore, shared with their class a common educational and social background, military training in youth, search for opportunity for achievement in the unsettled conditions of the time, and above all, a desire for action. They believed in loyalty, courage and hard work. They were strongly conscious of their class and its heritage.

All during the Tokugawa era, the task of the **samurai** class was the governing of the domain and the maintenance of internal stability and peace. Form and order were, therefore, the goals and the system was sustained with remarkable strength. The power of the **samurai** class was not challenged. With the coming of the West, that power was challenged in military terms; the new tasks became the defense of the country, which was of course the **raison d'etre** of the class, and the restoration of power, if not to the whole class, at least, to those who could achieve it. To these ends, the **samurai** immediately began an active search for means. Their restless and vigorous search took many paths and Christianity was but one of them.

The conversion of the Kumamoto Band, as Janes' converts came to be called, can be seen then as part of the process of breakdown and renewal. Like most **samurai,** they were conscious of the importance of the goals and willing to experiment in ways to achieve them. The coincidence of Janes and the **Yogakko** drew them into a radical response which but more clearly illuminates the nature of the **samurai** reaction to the West.

This response must be recognized and understood if the modernization of Japan is to be seen as something more than an accident. The **samurai** class never lost its power until the changes its leadership was willing to make, disintegrated it. Even then, it led and dominated Japan for a generation during which modernization took place. Regardless of the preconditions which may have existed, **samurai** leadership made modernization possible.

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[24] Curiously enough, some of the mothers who persecuted their sons most severely became themselves converts. Both the mothers of Yokoi and Tokutomi became Christian. Even the wife of the great **Jitsugaku** teacher, Takezaki, was converted. Uemura **op. cit.,** 515.

MEIJI BUDDHISM: RELIGION AND PATRIOTISM

MINORU KIYOTA

State Shintoism and Buddhist Persecution.

THAT THE MEIJI RESTORATION WAS BROUGHT ABOUT BY A COMbination of forces (such as the development of commerce, industry and capitalism) which were united under the slogan of the Restoration of Imperial Rule which, in turn, was concocted by the students of the Hirata School of Shintoism under the impending atmosphere of Western encroachment to the Far East, meant that the character of the Meiji government was, to a large extent, influenced by Shinto ideology geared to inculcate nationalism. That the political idealism of Shintoism constituted an all out revivalism of a pre-historic society, meant that the new government represented not merely a transformation of power from the **samurai** government of the Tokugawas to the Emperor, but the establishment of a theocracy based on the dogma of the divinity of the Emperor around which nationalism gathered forces. Shintoism, having resigned itself to playing a minor role under the Tokugawas, now entertained ambitions of restoring its ancient prestige and asserting its authority over Buddhism—its major foe in the game of power politics.

As one of its seven executive offices, the new government established the Office of Shinto Affairs [1] on January 17, 1868. Its functions were: to disseminate the policy of the state, to advance the idea of the unity of state and Shintoism, and to propagate the Shinto way of life, rooted in the mythological ambiguity of the **Kojiki** and **Nihon Shoki**. As means of restoring the purity of Shintoism—undefiled by Buddhist elements—the Shinto-Buddhist Separation Policy was announced on March 17, 1868 and enforced the following month under the authority of the Office of Shinto Affairs.

The separation policy was not of the kind that aimed to challenge the rational basis of the **honji-suijaku theory** [2] (Shinto-Buddhist syncretic theory). It represented efforts, on the part of the Shintoists, to expel Buddhist priests, who heretofore assumed social and economic prominence within the Shinto-

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[1] The Office of Shinto Affairs (**Shingi-kan**) was originally established sometime between 673 and 686, at which time it was empowered to perform the rites and ceremonies dedicated to the gods of heaven and earth, and charged with administering Shinto shrines, Shinto priests, and their parishioners; its Office was held either by the Nakatomi or the Inbe clans. In the Meiji period, the Office was revived and dominated by students of the Hirata school, such as Kamei Korekane (1822-1884), Fukuba Bisei (1832-1907), Hirata Kanetane (1801-1882), etc.

[2] Although information concerning the **honji-suijaku** theory can be observed in the Nara literature, its theory contributed in developing syncretic institutions during the late Heian and Kamakura periods; it was organized, however, into a system of doctrine during the Edo period and became the dominant popular belief then. The influence of Shinto-Buddhist syncretism can be observed in most concrete form in the architecture of Shinto-Buddhist shrines, a good example being the Nikko shrine. Shinto-Buddhist shrines incorporated the ceremonial instruments and practices of Shingon Mikkyo Buddhism and chanted Mikkyo sutras. Shinto-Buddhist syncretism added religious depth to the simple "doctrine" of Shintoism but it also adulterated the purity of native belief and institutions.

Buddhist shrines and temples, and to realize a greater secular authority of which they were deprived under the Tokugawas. Measures were taken to strip off Buddhist titles, such as Bodhisattva, Kannon, and the like, from Shinto deities. Even Buddhist statues and ceremonial instruments kept in the Imperial palace, were removed and Buddhist rites traditionally observed there were replaced by those of Shintosim.

In enforcing the Separation Policy, the Meiji government repeatedly made itself known that the policy was not designed to exterminate Buddhism but to restore the two religions into their original and distinct forms. Nevertheless, the Meiji government—anxious to revive the ancient society of theocracy—lost sight of the significance of the new era and failed to bring about what might have been an enlightened program of religious reform. That the Meiji Restoration was promoted under the propelling forces of theocracy, meant that whether the government willed it or not, the Separation Policy was pregnant with elements that were to kindle the fire of anti-Buddhist sentiments. It was carried beyond the conceptual realm of restoring the purity of the two religious forms and translated itself into vicious acts of violence and destruction.

Simultaneously with the announcement of the Separation Policy, Buddhist statues, ceremonial instruments, sutras, and the like, were either burnt, destroyed or removed, and Buddhist priests were expelled from Shinto-Buddhist syncretic shrines, such as the Hiyoshi Sanno Shrine in Daizen-ji in Tottori, Atsuta Shrine in Aichi, Nikko Shrine in Tochigi, Kan-ei-ji in Tokyo. These acts of violence paved the way for a nation-wide anti-Buddhist movement.

Meiji anti-Buddhist movement revealed two distinct patterns: that executed under the influence of the Hirata school of Shintoism and that of the Mito school of Confucianism, although cases involving the combination of the forces of the two schools were also observed. The former was vicious and thorough and demanded the people's unconditional conversion to Shintoism as were the cases in Satsuma in Kyushu, the Island of Oki in Shimane, Ise in Mie, Mino in Gifu, Tosa in Kochi and others. The latter was primarily designed to reorganize the economy of the territory by eliminating the non-productive elements of society, into which category Buddhism fell. As such, conversion was not demanded and Buddhist temples—although having been eliminated in considerable number—were nevertheless preserved within the range considered economically feasible, as were the cases in Toyama at large, Matsumoto in Nagano, the Island of Sado in Niigata, and others. The fact that a great number of the leaders of the Meiji Restoration were affected (directly or indirectly) by the Shinto-classicists, meant that they regarded Shintoism, nationalism and militarism as progressive forces; Buddhism, as a reactionary force.

Anti-Buddhist movement was observed between June, 1868 and July, 1871 when the daimyo jurisdictional territories were in the process of being transformed into prefectural governments. Anti-Buddhist movement, therefore, was carried out during a transitional period, under circumstances of political instability, social chaos, and emotional excitement, to an extent not anticipated nor intended by the central government. The anti-Buddhist movement of early Meiji period—like that of the Edo period—never had the support of the people who were accustomed to Buddhism or Shinto-Buddhist syncretism for centuries. The movement proved successful only in destroying the irreplaceable acts and treasures of antiquity and in leading people into confusion.

While anti-Buddhist movement was taking place on the prefectural level, the central government was absorbed in instituting a system of thought control aimed at propagating the cause of Imperial Rule. Shinto missionaries were dispatched to disseminate national policy and to spread the Great Doctrine (of the unity of state and Shintoism). In spite of the zeal with which they attempted to propagate the Doctrine, however, results proved contrary to expectation. Public apathy inevitably developed from thought control and, in the face of a vicious anti-Buddhist movement, the sympathy of the people was turning to the Buddhists.

The **Daikyo-in** (the College of the Great Doctrine), therefore, was established in 1873. It gave recognition to Buddhism and mobilized the Buddhist priests, as well, to propagate the doctrine of "patriotism and reverence to the Emperor and (Shinto) gods" and to enhance the cause of the Great Doctrine. Although the Buddhist priests were required to assume a subordinate role, their infiltration into the College disturbed the Shinto priests. The Buddhist priests, on the other hand, joined the College with varying degrees of apprehension. The Shin priests generally opposed the Great Doctrine as well as the intent of the College. Others, however, having gained state recognition and thus having been assured of their livelihood (matters which they had taken for granted under the Tokugawas), willingly submitted themselves to the dictates of the College. While the Shintoists spread the gospel of anti-Buddhism, the Buddhists, in haphazard manner, preached the **dharma**. The missionaries of the College thereby became the target of ridicule rather than the instrument of thought control. The great Doctrine created an awareness of its inherent danger among the conscientious Buddhist leaders and awoke them from the sheer idleness to which they were long accustomed.

Buddhist Attack on Christianity: The Seeds of Nationalism.

Shimaji Mokurai (1838-1911)—a Buddhist exposed to Western ideologies—vehemently opposed the Great Doctrine, zealously advocated the separation of state and Buddhism, pointed out the folly of the government in trying to force a faith of its own preference upon the people, and made clear that the freedom to choose one's own faith has no bearing on the slackening of patriotism. He received the strongest support from the Shin **samgha**. His views stirred public criticism against the government and, in May 1875, the College of the Great Doctrine was dissolved.

By contributing to the dissolution of the College, Buddhism actually paved the way to bringing about the freedom of religion, which the Meiji constitution was ultimately to provide in 1890, and set itself on the proper path toward modern reform. By voicing opposition to the Great Doctrine, it placed itself against the principle of the unity of state and Shintoism. By opposing state interference with religion, it identified itself as favoring freedom of religion. However, Buddhism had to purge itself of feudalistic elements within, reorganize its **samgha**, and provide positive means to cope with the demands of the new period. Nevertheless, as the Meiji leaders busily absorbed themselves in gaining the knowledge of the West and failed to develop democratic institutions, the Buddhist leaders likewise accepted the Western concept of freedom of religion and failed to create the ideal image of the modern man. Buddhism did not make a comeback by its own efforts but through two external factors.

While the Buddhists were demonstrating their dissatisfaction over the Great Doctrine, Saigo Takamori, Itagaki Taisuke, Eto Shinpei, Fukushima Taneomi, Goto Shojiro, and other nationalists were strongly advocating the occupation of Korea as a bulwark against China and Russia. Iwakura Tomomi, Kido Takayoshi, and Okubo Toshimichi, knowledgeable of Western power and of Japan's, opposed them. The dissatisfied elements of Saga (led by Eto Shinpei) and those of Kumamoto (led by Otaguro Tomoo, Kobayashi Kotaro and others) rebelled against the central government in 1874 and 1876, respectively. Saigo, supported by a group of dedicated followers, rebelled in Kagoshima in 1877.

Circumstances dictated that the government compromise with the Buddhists and bring about means to gain the support of the people who were, on the whole, Buddhists. A factor of far greater significance that actively contributed to Buddhist revivalism, however, presented itself, if one views faith becoming stagnant when inactive, becoming active when purpose is found, and purpose frequently taking the form of attacking its competitor. Buddhism found activity by allying itself with the state and attacking Christianity. Whether the path it chose to tread favored its development as a religion appropriate to the new period, however, remained uncertain.

In spite of the fact that Catholicism was officially outlawed under the Tokugawas, it nevertheless managed to survive underground in such areas as Uragami in Nagasaki. It continued to be suppressed after the new government of Meiji was established. Suppression of Christianity inevitably invited the protestation of the Western nations. Pressed from the West, the Meiji government finally lifted the ban in 1873. Protestantism entered Japan at about this time.

By allying itself with the state, which idealized the ancient society of Imperial Rule based on a Shinto mythology, and by attacking Christianity (the carrier of the idea of the separation of church and state), Buddhism severed itself from a direct involvement in a progresive program of religious reform. Buddhism—which lay idle under Tokugawa feudalism and absorbed itself in the development of sectarian dogmas, under the uninvigorating environment of cultural isolation—could not entertain hopes to contribute to bringing a new historical movement without incorporating new ideas. On the other hand, Christianity, although not necessarily forming the ideological nucleus of modern civilization, was nevertheless a contributing factor to its realization. Hence, the fact that Buddhism assumed the leading role in attacking Christianity, inevitably resulted in identifying itself as an element detrimental to the development of progressive thought and democratic institutions.

Signs of a democratic movement began to reveal themselves and critical views on government were freely expressed in the 1880's. The government took to indoctrinating its citizens with traditional Oriental ethics and morality to counter liberal ideas and to solidify the basis of Imperial Rule it had zealously formulated. On the other hand, leading citizens—although not necessarily to Christianity as a whole—did not hesitate to join hands with the Christians to challenge the government. Thus, by attacking the Christians and allying themselves with the state, the Buddhists inevitably identified themselves as anti-democratic, if not reactionary, elements.

The battle of words exchanged between the Buddhists and the Christians during this period, not only reflected a doctrinal difference but a political one as well. In the 1890's, an all out attack on Christianity took place merely on the ground that Christianity opposed the dogma of the divinity of the Emperior. Buddhists allied themselves with the state and in doing so affirmed, supported, and endorsed the Meiji constitution which smelled of Shinto mythology and Confucian-oriented codes of ethics.

Having suppressed the rebels of the provinces, the state then took to consolidating itself, politically and economically. By the late nineteenth century, it was prepared for military adventures in foreign lands. In order to bring Korea under its control, Japan engaged in wars with China in 1894-1895; with Tsarist Russia in 1904-1905. Buddhist leaders willingly supported the state in both instances. The two wars actively contributed in developing industry and, inevitably, labor movements which Buddhist leaders also supported the state in suppressing.

Acknowledging the fact that Japanese Buddhism had (with some notable exceptions) consistently espoused the cause of the state since the time of its introduction, it did so during periods when political ideologies were not clearly defined nor systematized. On the other hand, Meiji Buddhists lived in a society exposed to democratic, socialist, and pacifist ideas, but nevertheless revealed themselves as a body hostile to progressive movements. By placing itself in opposition to democratic movements and in support of the state, Buddhism was no longer able to cultivate independent thought appropriate to the new age. It had to faithfully follow the dictates of the state.

Inouye Enryo (1858-1919)—a Shin priest exposed to Western philosophy and science and the founder of Tetsugaku-kan (the present Toyo University in Tokyo)—most aptly demonstrated the attitudes of the Buddhist intellectuals of the time. He devoted much effort in writing books such as the **Haja Shinron, Bukkyo Katsu-ron** and others which were designed to defend the "rationalism" of Buddhism and to condemn the "irrationalism" of Christianity. On the other hand, in his **Nihon Rinri Gaku-an** and **Chuko Katsu-ron** (published in 1893), he glorified the Imperial Institution, demanded absolute loyalty of its citizens to the Emperor, advocated the unity of loyalty and filial piety, and attempted to justify the codes of ethics and a system of order of a pre-modern society. Inouye's works did not reveal any penetrating thought. In any case, that he was a Shin priest engaged actively in defense of Buddhism, that he entered the public arena in order to enhance the cause of Imperial Rule, meant that his views provided the **raison d'etre** of modern Japanese Buddhism and influenced, in no small measure, the path that modern Japanese Buddhism was to take.

Buddhist Attempts at Religious Reform: Assets and Liabilities.

Recognizing the fact that religions are the products of ancient societies, those which have overcome and survived the challenges of history and established themselves as "universal" religions, maintain the potential to contribute to the march of time. Revivalism then, at times, can become a progressive element; it becomes a reactionary force when it is incapable of grasping the basic forces promoting historical changes. Inouye Enryo, influenced by modern scientific reasoning, attempted to drive out non-rational elements that were inherent in Edo-nurtured Buddhism.

The fact remains, however, that Buddhism is not merely a system of philosophy but also a soteriological doctrine that demands the practices of **sila** and **samadhi** and the cultivation of **prajna** as instruments for realizing its ideals. In this respect, Fukuda Gyokai and Shaku Unsho command recognition, inasmuch as they attempted to revive the original spirit of Buddhism of strengthening the spirit of the individual man. Unsho (1836-1909)—a **Vinaya** master of Mt. Koya—indignant at the irresolute attitudes of his colleagues, descended the mountain monastery in May, 1868. Deploring the corruption of the Buddhist priesthood, he urged them to re-examine themselves with honesty and frankness. Gyokai (1806-1888) also criticized the Buddhist priesthood and called for the complete overhaul of the **samgha**. They became increasingly positive in proportion to the intensity with which the anti-Buddhist movement developed. At a time when the Buddhist priests—having been stripped of their dignity and secular power which they previously enjoyed under the Tokugawas—remained bewildered and occupied only with matters related to their own survival, Unsho and Gyokai spelled out the ultimate goal of Buddhism and the path that lay before them. Aside from the question of whether the views of this man constituted a positive step toward religious reform or not, the fact remains that their sharp criticism did succeed in rousing the Buddhist leaders from indolence and idle dreams. Their efforts, though commendable (because they worked within the confines of the established order), essentially suggest that their forms of revivalism inevitably led to merely restoring the old form of Buddhism, from which a spirit capable of meeting the new challenges of history, could not have emerged.

One who was able to merge the rationalism of Inouye and the spiritualizing qualities of Gyokai and Unsho was Kiyosawa Manshi (1863-1903), a Shin priest of the Higashi Hongan-ji Temple. Reviving the pure-faith doctrine of Shinran—based upon the premise of the possibility of "evil" men gaining direct access to enlightenment through faith and faith alone—Kiyosawa reorganized the Shin doctrine (whose spiritual vitality had worn itself out under the uninvigorating atmosphere of the Tokugawas) to meet the spiritual demands of the Meiji intellectuals. These intellectuals had been exposed to Western civilization and had awakened to realize the dignity of the individual man, only to be defeated in their bitter civil rights battles against the state. The merging of individualism and spiritualism characterized Manshi's thought.

Paralleling Manshi's spiritualizing movement, a Christian brand of very similar quality developed. A social critic and a poet by profession, a romanticist by nature, and a Christian by choice, Kitamura Tokoku (1869-1894) was a son of a humble **samurai**. He worked as a domestic servant at the foreign settlement in Yokohama, married a woman of his choice at the age of twenty, and comitted suicide at twenty-five. Disillusioned with the failure of the civil rights movements, he took to writing, reflecting strong influences of Goethe and Byron. But Christianity was the pillar of his idealism. He conceived of individuality as the inner core of life, which needed to be cultivated, and regarded the social expression of it as the significance of democracy. The fact that neither the time nor the society in which he lived were fully ripened enough to support his idealism, inevitably led Tokoku into flights of fantasy. The contradiction between idealism and realism inevitably led him to take his own life.

In the face of political defeat, Tokoku found compensation in a realm of higher ethical principle, attempted to seek therefrom the freedom of the spirit, but failed in its realization. Manshi trod a similar path, but in his attempt to seek the freedom of the spirit, he was actually entering the original domain of Buddhism, which deepened the awareness of his contingency and the meaning of human existence in direct proportion to the weight of the problems of reality he confronted. The modernization of Japanese Buddhism does not mean the uncritical acceptance of Western civilization nor the wholesale negation of it. Manshi conceived of practice and meditation—the indispensable elements of Buddhism that were conceived, formulated and experimented in the long procession of Japanese history—as the means through which the spiritualization of modern man was possible. The failure of Tokoku and the success of Manshi are not suggestive of the superiority of Buddhism over Christianity but suggest that Buddhism was far better domesticated than Christianity inasfar as the Japanese mentality of that time was concerned.

If Inouye Enryo represented a group that catered to the state, and Kiyosawa Manshi, to the spiritualization of the intellectuals, those who rallied to the support of the common men were Sakino Koyo, Watanabe Kaigyoku, Takashima Beiho and others who founded the **Bukkyo Seito Doso Kai**—the Pure Buddhist Society, organized in 1900. The Pure Buddhist Society attempted to free itself from the bonds of the established **samgha**, the dictates of institutionalized Buddhism, and the interference of state power. It dedicated itself to the establishment of its independence, to pursue the ideal goal of Buddhism, and to actively involve itself in promoting social reforms. Although it lacked the spiritual depth of Manshi's movement, it manifested a far greater advance in social action. Boldly criticizing Japan's involvement in a war against Russia while opposing socialism, it, however, showed sympathy to the causes of the proletarians and, in fact, cultivated friendly relations with Kotoku Shusui, Sakai Toshihiko, and other left wing radicals.

Be that as it may, neither the spiritualization movement of Manshi nor the social actions of the Pure Buddhists can be conceived as dominant Meiji ideologies. The fact remains that their movements soon faded into obscurity. The reason is obvious. That Buddhism lent itself to Tokugawa feudalism, meant that it established its roots in the rural communities; that modernization of Meiji Japan was primarily directed to the developing of industry, meant that the rural communities were, to a large extent, deprived of the benefits of modern civilization. Manshi and the Pure Buddhists catered to the urban intellectuals who remained outside the main stream of Buddhism. Furthermore, the fact that the urban intellectuals were exposed to a variety of Western ideas of a very positive nature, meant that Buddhism had had to offer something radically original, practical, and effective, were it to entertain hopes of assuming the ideological leadership in a period marked by the impact of Western civilization. Western democracy, rationalism, socialism, and the like, were far better systematized and more effective for coping with the social realities of the modern period than were those ever hoped to be conceived by the Meiji Buddhists.

The pendulum of time inevitably swayed the urban intellectuals away from Buddhism. Members of the civil rights movements were liberals, Christians, and socialists, although there were such men as Ueki Edamori (a Protestant-turned-Buddhist), Uchiyama Gudo, a socialist-Buddhist, and others. Despite the existence of a few liberal Buddhists, the main stream of Buddhism allied itself with the state which favored absolute monarchy, opposed liberal movements, and placed itself against progressive ideologies.

Religion and Patriotism: The Limits of Meiji Buddhism.

Inasmuch as the Meiji period represented a time when Japan was in the process of emerging as a modern state, and patriotism was the greatest unifying force by which the modern state could be realized, the relation between religion and patriotism of this period needs to be examined before any hasty conclusion may be formed against the Meiji Buddhists. Fukuzawa Yukichi (1834-1901)—a son of a humble **samurai**, knowledgeable of the West, and the founder of the Keio Gijiku—the origin of the present Keijo University in Tokyo—is typical of a Meiji intellectual. A liberal who was fully exposed to the lofty idealism of the West, he was a staunch supporter of the principle of "industrialization and militarization," based upon his contention that Western powers are capable of creating the lofty idealism of freedom and liberty as well as demonstrating themselves as ruthless colonial powers. Said he,

> Taking an interest in Christianity during a period when there is a Western fad, is as natural as one taking to summer clothes in summer. My sympathy lies with those who are obliged to consume so much of their time in such a trifling matter at this most demanding moment of history.

Fukuzawa is representative of those who had detached themselves completely from the bounds of conventional thought and were attracted to Western rationalism, utilitarianism, pragmatism, and nationalism.

On the other hand, some of those who conceived of Christianity as the source of Western civilization and either defended or encouraged it as a means of absorbing Western civilization, were Nishi Amane (1829-1897)—a law expert and an instructor at the Kaisei-jo, the origin of the present Tokyo University; Tsuda Masamichi (1829-1903)—also a law expert and one of the members involved in the drafting of the Meiji constitution, and Mori Arinori (1847-1891)—the Minister of Education who was assassinated on the day of the promulgation of the constitution by a Shinto fanatic. All these men represented Christian liberals.

Nitobe Inazo (1862-1933), on the other hand, was most representative of a Christian nationalist. Married to an American, he assumed the role of an interpreter between Western and Japanese ideas. A student of William Smith Clark (1862-1886)—the American educator-missionary to Japan—Nitobe held doctoral degrees in law and agriculture and assumed professorship at the Imperial University of Kyoto and Tokyo. However, he is best known in the West as the author of **Bushido** (the way of the **samurai**) which Theodore Roosevelt is alleged to have purchased in great quantity. He defended the Japanese practice of **seppuku**—better known in the West as **hara-kiri** (a vulgar expression that no **samurai** would have ever dreamed of uttering), as a refined art of suicide institutionalized by the **samurai** during the period of feudalism. When queried as to its justification from the standpoint of Christian ethics, he replied: "I am a Christian. However, I do not believe that Christianity is the standard of world ethics." He cited examples in Greek and Roman histories where suicide was not condemned, pointed out a case of **hara-kiri** in a Shakespearean play, and concluded that the tradition of condemning suicide probably originated during the Middle Ages in Europe.

The Japanese Christians loyally adhered to the **samurai** codes of ethics and succeeded in attracting the Meiji intellectuals of **samurai** breeding. Tolstoi's humanism—conceived as the merging of Christian idealism and **samurai** discipline—also attracted the intellectuals, humanitarians, and the romantic lovers of tragedy, which the Japanese are.

Uchimura Kanzo (1861-1930), a son of a **samurai** and also a student of Clark, was baptized in 1878 and studied in the United States from 1884 to 1888. Although he is primarily known for his stand against institutionalized Christianity and an advocate of **mu-kyokai-shugi** (non-Church Christianity), what actually characterized his brand of Christianity was his incorporation of the discipline of the **samurai** and the rationalism of the West, thereby capturing the interest of many Japanese intellectuals. Despite his having studied in the United States, he was not swayed into accepting all things Western. In fact, he did not care much for the life of the West. In his heart, he was a **samurai**. His motto was the "two J's," Japan and Jesus. His loyalty to Jesus was of the same quality as that of a **samurai** to his lord. Said he, "I for Japan; Japan for the world; the world for Christ; and Christ for God." Soon after his return to Japan from the United States, he was employed as an instructor at an American mission school in Niigata, but resigned his post as a result of a disagreement with American missionary teachers over a school policy.

Uchimura favored a system of religious education geared to the development of a Japanese Christian, not to the development of a Christian in the image of the Americans. Uchimura's **Representative Men of Japan**, published in 1894, deals with Nichiren (a militant Buddhist leader of the Kamakura period), Nakae Toju (a neo-Confucian humanist of the Edo period), Saigo Takamori (a militant nationalist of the early Meiji period), and others. But Uchimura was not a Shinto-like-nationalist, as can be attested by the fact that he boldly refused to give the proper sign of reverence—a bow, normally expected of a Japanese—to the Imperial Rescript on Education (which was recited by school principals of all educational institutions on days of national celebration) on the ground that such a display is a right reserved only for God. Uchimura was charged with **lese majeste** in 1891. But he made clear the difference between reverence to God and respect to the Emperor. Although he supported the state in war against China in 1894, ten years later, he opposed the war against Russia on humanitarian grounds. The **samurai** were ascetics who despised the overt display of intimate love and sexuality. Tolstoi despised music; Uchimura, plays and novels. However, Christianity did develop a higher dimension of loyalty than the **samurai**. Said Uchimura, "Love of one's country must be sacrificed before the love of God." Uchimura's love developed into international dimension and took the form of a universal love of humanity.

The Japanese Christians of this period were extremely conscious of their ethnic identity, and neither Nitobe nor Uchimura were exceptions. The aspiration for the development of a Japanese Christian personality was most dramatically demonstrated by a group of young co-eds in Miyagi Girls' Middle School—a Christian mission school in Sendai—where Saito Fuyu, Kohira Koyuki, Miyata Shin, and others protested by leading a strike in 1891 against the Americanization program of the school, instituted at the expense of neglecting the curriculum necessary for the understanding of their own cultural heritage. As far as patriotism was concerned, hardly a shade of difference existed between the ethnic-conscious Christians and the nationalists. Many Christians supported the Imperial Rescript on Education. The case of a Christian teacher—plunging herself into fire to save the Imperial Rescript and the pictures of the Emperor and the Empress from destruction—commanded the respect of the nation.

A **samurai** brand of loyalty that characterized Japanese patriotism, involves an absolute and selfless sacrifice for a cause or an ideal under which the preservation of honor takes priority over life. Loyalty to one's lord at the risk of life, most dramatically represented in the Kabuki drama of the forty-seven **ronins**, is the theme that always guarantees not only a packed house, but also an emotionally touched, tear-shedding audience. In the Meiji period, loyalty among the Japanese was simply shifted from lord to Emperor. The difference between the loyalty of the nationalists and the Christians was not one of substance but of the object to which it was directed. Buddhist patriotism failed to be strained through the meshes of modern civilization. It, therefore, failed to discover an objective beyond the narrow confines of nationalism. It was the liberal intellectuals, Christians, and socialists, who endeavored to create a parliamentary government and to promote civil rights movements in the early twentieth century. The Meiji Buddhists were inadequately equipped to involve themselves in progressive social actions.

A TRANSLATION OF "HOKAN" BY JUNICHIRO TANIZAKI

EDILBERTO N. ALEGRE

Introduction

THIS SHORT STORY BY JUNICHIRO TANIZAKI WAS FIRST PUBLISHED in **Subaru** (Pleiades), a literary apprentice magazine, in September, 1911 when the author was twenty-six. Of course, it has appeared since then in various collections of Tanizaki's works. Tanizaki joined the ranks of first-rate professional writers after publishing only five stories (this is one of them) in "undergraduate" magazines, on the strength of the critical evaluation of his works by Nagai Kafu—then an established writer. "Hokan," besides providing clues for detective work in the literary history of modern Japanese literature, attests to the ability of Tanizaki to tell a good story. In this story, first of all, Tanizaki is a skillful ranconteur. His story has humor, irony and a tragic note. In "Hokan," a professional jester provides the jokes and creates the merry mood necessary for the enjoyment of wine and song in **geisha** parties. (A **geisha** is a woman professionally trained to entertain at parties.) Sampei, the protagonist in this story, is not only a professional clown. He has the heart of a clown.

Seven years ago, Tanizaki's complete works were published in thirty volumes. Sei Ito, its editor and one of the foremost literary critics of Japan, noted that "Hokan" ranks as one of Tanizaki's masterpieces. This Japanese critic wrote that it has humor and the skillful finish of Tanizaki's later works. Moreover, its motif—the tragedy of a man who was too susceptible to the way of thinking of others—is repeated in Tanizaki's "The Mother of Captain Shigemoto."

The Translation *

HOKAN

(THE PROFESSIONAL JESTER)

The Russo-Japanese war, which agitated the world from the summer of 1904 to autumn, the following year, finally ended with the announcement of the Treaty of Portsmouth. Different enterprises suddenly rose to power, one after the other, as a result of the call for development of national power; parvenu and a new nobility arose. This story happened around the middle of April 1907, when the whole world was somehow as lively as a holiday.

The cherry flowers on the banks of Mukojima were just in full bloom. The day cleared up to a serene Sunday. Since morning, the steamships as well

* The **Asian Studies** is proud to include in this issue one of the first attempts, if not the first, of a Filipino to translate from the original, in Japanese, a noteworthy literary piece by a leading Japanese writer, Tanizaki Junichiro. (The Editor.)

as the Asakusa-bound trains were packed. Beyond Azuma Bridge which the people crossed like a slow stream of ants, from Yomatsu to the vicinity of Kototoi's boathouse, a warm haze settled. The opposite bank, from Prince Komatsu's Villa to the Hashiba, Imado and Hanakawado Districts, was enveloped in a bluish, misty light. Beyond that, the twenty steps of the park stood dimly beneath the wet, deep blue, stifling sky. The Sumida River which flowed from Senzumai passed below the bottom of the deep haze and formed fully a big river after meandering once at the tip of Komatsu Island. While the sunlight coruscated in the calm, tepid water which seemed to have been intoxicated by the spring on both banks as the river flowed straight on past Azuma Bridge. The rather thick and generous waves rolled lightly and languidly. A few boats—some of them, purposely for flower-viewing—were afloat on this river, the surface of which was as soft as quilt. A ferry boat sometimes left the mouth of Sanyo Moat and cut across the procession of downstream-and upstream-bound boats. It continuously transported its passengers who filled it up to the gunwale on the banks.

It was about ten that morning. A flower-viewing boat emerged from the mouth of Kanda River, passed by the walls of Kameseiro and was rowed midstream into Sumida River. Aboard this large junk's jolly boat which was attractively decorated with red and white striped curtains was a professional jester from Daichi. In the middle of the boat Sakakibara—a well-known stock broker, a **noveau riche** who made his pile in Kabutocho [1]—was accompanied by five or six subordinates. While slowly drinking from a large wine cup, he looked here and there at the men and women on board. His stout, ruddy face was already flushed with wine. As it was floating midstream along the walls of Count Fujido's Villa, a singing voice, accompanied by stringed instruments, floated from behind the curtains. The cheerful sound ruffled the waters of the Sumida River as the boat advanced along the banks of Hyapponkin and Daichi. Those on the streets along Asakusa bank and those on the Ryogoku Bridge craned their necks. Everyone was attracted to this resounding singing. Those who were on the shore watched for ways to discern the goings-on in the boat. Sometimes, the light breeze carried across the river the coquettish words of a woman.

I think that it was along Yokotsuna bank when someone disguised as a fantastic, long-necked monster appeared on the bow. Accompanied by a **samisen**,[2] he began to perform an extremely ludicrous dance. His head appeared to be completely covered with a very long, slender paper bag which was attached to a big balloon on which a woman's eyes and nose were drawn. His face was totally hidden inside the paper bag. He wore a gaudy, long-sleeved **yuzen** [3] kimono and white **tabi**.[4] A firm, manly wrist sometimes showed through the scarlet sleeve-band when his hands made the motion of holding something aloft. His brown, bony fingers were especially conspicuous. The lady on the balloon was blown lightly by the breeze. She espied the houses on the nearby river banks and grazed the heads of the boatmen she met, all the while

[1] Tokyo's Wall Street.
[2] A three-stringed instrument.
[3] Printed muslin.
[4] Japanese socks.

attracting the attention of the people on the shore who clapped their hands and resounded with laughter.

While they were shouting "Look! There!" the boat proceeded toward Umaya Bridge on which the people formed a dark swarm. Their yellow faces were lined along the railing as they looked down at the figure in the boat. As the boat approached, the long-necked monster's eyes and ears were distinctly drawn in mid-air and the onlookers were enticed to look at the indescribably buoyant expression which seemed to be crying, laughing, and sleeping. Meanwhile, as the bow of the boat moved into the shadow of the bridge, its head floated higher on the increased volume of water scraping slightly the railing and coming nearer to the spectator's gaze. They stooped for a look. Then it crawled languidly across the edge of the bridge girder and this time it floated gently toward the clear sky. When it reached Komagatado, the crowd on Azuma Bridge recognized it from afar and, even from inside the boat, it was apparent that the spectators were just like people waiting to welcome the return of triumphant troops.

As in Umaya Bridge, the humurous dance made the people laugh. Finally, the boat reached Mukojima. The sound of **samisen** became increasingly merrier. Just as a bull that pulls a festival float is urged on by meaningless shouts, the boat sailed as if pushed forward by the strength of the lively music. The river became narrow due to the number of boats that were rowed out for flower-viewing. The students in the boats, with fluttering red and blue banners, began to cheer. The crowd on the banks was simply astonished. They kept looking at the strange jester's boat as it moved along. The long-necked monster danced with increasing versatility. While the toy ballon was fluttering in the river breeze, the steamship suddenly belched white smoke and the jester immediately jumped so high he could see Matsuchi Hill below him. As if to curry favor with the onlookers, he continued his foolery, making himself the center of attraction in the river.

Near Kototoi, the boat left the shore but, even while it was going upstream again, those wandering around the riverbank—near Uehan Restaurant and the Finance Minister's Villa—looked far out at the river's course; while they watched the boat intently, they wondered what the face of the long-necked monster, which now looked like a ghost could really be. At last, the boat which caused much commotion on the banks with its audacious entertainment weighed anchor at the Kagetsugedan jetty. The passengers thronged pell-mell into the lawn. Surrounded by **geishas**, Sakakibara said, "Thank you. Much obliged." Amidst the cheers and applause, the man who impersonated the long-necked monster took off the head-fitting paper bag. From the opening in his blazing red neckband, his face that was beaming with smiles and his ebony black, bald head, began to show.

In place of entertainment on the shore, they continued their party here. Sakakibara mixed with the numerous men and women in the lawn. He made a commotion as he danced, ran about, played tag and hide-and-seek. The jester in a long-sleeved kimono slipped into his white **tabi** the red straps of a hemp-soled sandals and in faltering, tottering steps he chased and was chased by the **geishas**. After he wound a towel around his head to cover his eyes, he caused more commotion than ever. Sakakibara and the geishas clapped their hands in mirth and, swinging their bodies, they began to dance. Beneath the jester's ornamental petticoat, his hairy legs showed.

"Kii Chan! Kii Chan! I've got you!" he would shout. Somewhere there was the strain of a sharp, mature voice which seemed to be a geisha's. He flitted through the sleeves of women, hit his head against a tree, ran confusedly here and there. He went about in an incomparably fast pace. Since he played the fool, it was not easy to catch anyone.

Everyone was amused. They held their chuckles, approached his back on tip-toe, then, suddenly and coquettishly whispered, "Here I am," tapped his shoulder, and ran away. Sakakibara shook him, pulled his earlobe asking, "How's this? How's this?"

"Ouch! Ouch!" he cried in pain. Knitting his eyebrows and intentionally feigning a very pitiful facial expression, his body seemed to be in agony. He had such an impishly appealing expression that they hit his head or plucked his nose. There was no one who did not feel like teasing him.

Then a fourteen-to-fifteen-year-old tomboyish, half-fledged geisha followed him and tripped him with her hands. He fell and rolled skillfully on the lawn. Amidst the burst of laughter, he got up slowly. With his eyes closed, he opened his large mouth and bellowed, "Who? Who bullied this old man?" Like Yura San,[5] he extended his hands and groped his way out.

This professional jester was called Sampei. He was formerly a stockjobber in Kabutocho but, even at that time, he was dying to do his present job. Finally, four to five years ago, he worked as the apprentice of the professional clown, Yanagibashi. Since he had an extraordinary knack for clowning, his patronage was soon arranged. Now he is a worthy member of the group.

His old friends sometimes gossiped, "Sakurai (that was his real name) is so carefree! He prefers being a clown to being a stockjobber. I just don't understand why it could be any better. He probably earns a considerable sum so finally that would make him happy."

During the Russo-Japanese War, there was quite a number of brokerages with several employees around Kaiun Bridge. He was the associate of Sakakibara and several other brokers. Even then, he was known to make parties boisterous and interesting. Since he pleased his friends, there was always a place for him in their parties. He was versatile in both song and speech and, even when he became affluent, he never put on airs. He would forget that he was a fine broker. In fact, he was apt to forget his dignity as a respectable man. He was indescribably happy when he was heartily praised and doted on by his friends and geishas. Under the bright electric light, he would gaily move about his flushed, smiling face, changing his expression while saying, "Yes. Yes." Then he would talk volubly cracking witty jokes. He would go on endlessly as if his life depended on it. His winsome eyes glistened with uncontained joy during those moments. He would shake his flabby, slipshod shoulders as if he were not misbehaving. He had truly penetrated the essence of pleasure and was just like the very personification of merry-making itself.

[5] A character in the drama "Forty-seven Ronin" (Chusingura) who was often drunk.

The **geishas** could hardly distinguish him from the guests for he too welcomed and entertained them. At first, they thought, "What a weird person." They disliked him and felt something eerie about him in the pit of their stomachs. But they gradually realized what a sort of person he was—that he had no inexplicable intentions for he was simply the amiable kind who was happy to be regarded as charming. So they came to address him intimately as "Sakurai." But, though they found him useful, no one admired or flattered him even when he was already rich and influential. He was called "Sakurai" but never addressed as "Sir" or "Master." Naturally, he was considered as one rank lower than the guests but he did not find this rude.

In fact, he did not command love or respect. He was innately a person whom one held with a kind of warm contempt or regarded with pity—a likeable man whom one treated as a favorite pet. Perhaps, even a beggar would not have felt like bowing to him. Besides, even if they made a fool of him, he did not get angry; on the contrary, he enjoyed it. When he had money, he would surely invite his friends to a drinking spree. Whatever business held him back when there was a party or an invitation from his friends, he could not help himself. He would become a complete sluggard and go out cheerfully.

"Well, thanks for coming," his friends would begin to jest with him. He would bow again and surely revise his original greeting by saying, "Please, please. You don't have to be so salutary." The **geishas**, imitating the tone of the guests, would jokingly throw to him a crumpled ball of paper, "Here, here take this."

"Thank you so much," he would answer placing it on a fan and bowing a few times he would continue, "Thank you. Won't you throw a little more. This is only two farthings but it will do to help my family. Tokyoites usually side with the weak and crush the strong. . ." he would continue glibly in the tone of a magician in a fair.

Even such a carefree man seemed to fall in love. Sometimes, he dragged in an ex-**geisha** although he did not have any intention of sleeping with her. If he fell in love with her, he would be more slipshod and in order to win her favor, he would be zealously funny, losing all his dignity as host. When he wanted to curry others' favor, he was willing to be used at their will; at their beck and call, he would do as they bid him. "Do this. Do that," and, without any self-respect, he would do so. Somehow, he had been struck on the head and called "Damn fool!" by women drunkards. His lady friends and, even his tea house acquaintances, often refused his invitations so that every evening, with his friends and employees and his **samisen** as his wife, they drank, sang and created a great uproar in the second floor.

Once, his woman was won away by a friend. But even so, he regretted parting from them. He humored the woman, bought some clothes for the man, brought them to the theater and invited them once as guests. As before, he played the jester and was happy to be used completely as a tool. Lastly, he sometimes made **geishas** stay indoors with him, under the guise of hiring them as performers. With his male friends, he was not obstinate at all. Nor did he get angry at them due to jealousy. However, towards women, he was very fickle. When he liked someone very much, he persistently showed his attention and then suddenly his fervor would fade away. In this way, he has had numerous lovers. But, since no woman had ever fallen in love with him, he would press his suit as far as possible while there was hope for it. On opportuned occasions, he would go farther.

Thus, he had no prestige at all among his employees. Sometimes, he caused a heavy deficit. He neglected his business until, finally, he became bankrupt. After that, he worked as a salesman in spot bargains and then as a touter. When he met acquaintances, he bragged, "Just watch. I'll show you how well I can bounce back." He was quite affable and so, with his good foresight, he occasionally had a profitable job. But he was always taken in by women so that he would be badly off the whole year. Finally, he was heavily in debt. That was how he came to ask his old friend Sakakibara, "Please try using me for a while."

Although he was reduced to a mere employee, he could not fully forget the pleasures with the **geishas** which had permeated his whole body. Sometimes, while he appeared busy before his table, he would remember the voice of a coquette and the lively tune of the **samisen.** Lost in his own thoughts, he would sing a love ditty the whole day. When it became unbearable, somehow with persuasive talk and the money he bilked little by little, he would stealthily take leave of Sakakibara and go out to enjoy himself.

Some considering him pitiful would innocently give him some money. But he would go back to them repeatedly so that they became angry and they resolved to give him a good drubbing. "He's obnoxious! Such a hopelessly sloven person! I was not aware at all that he was so ill-natured," they would complain. However, there was something pitiful in him so that when they met him they would not speak harshly to him. When he said, "Next time I'll really fulfill my promise. Please let it pass this time," they would send him away but he would annoyingly follow them about imploring, "Please don't turn me away. Please. I'll pay you immediately. Please, for God's sake. For God's sake, please. . ." Most of them lost their patience with him.

Hearing about it, Sakakibara told him, "I'll take you out now and then so please don't trouble others so much." After accompanying Sakakibara to one of his intimate **geisha** parties, he was like a different man. He worked zealously and went about cheerfully. More than anything, **sake** [6] and his innocent face were balm to Sakakibara's moods of depression caused by financial worries, so that he frequently took him out with him. In the end, this became Sakurai's main job. The whole day, he was idle in the office. He would jokingly but proudly announce, "I am the paid entertainer of Sakakibara Ltd."

Sakakibara's wife came from a respectable family. They had three children. Everyone in his household, from Kami—his fifteen year old eldest daughter—to the maids, was fond of Sakurai. They would invite him inside to listen to his witty talks by saying, "We have some dainty dishes so please come to the kitchen and have some."

[6] Japanese rice wine.

"One as carefree as you would always be happy. You would go through life merrily never suffering even in poverty," Kami told him once.

"That's true. I have never been angry. Surely, that is because I know how to enjoy myself," he answered.

Then, for about an hour, he would keep on chattering. Occasionally, he sang to them in his low, husky voice. He had a general knowledge of all kinds of songs—ditties, Tokiwazu and Kiyomoto ballads,[7] etc. Elated with the beauty of his own voice, he would happily hum **samisen** tunes. Everyone listened attentively. Before anything else, he memorized popular songs. Then, he would immediately go inside and announce to Kami, "Shall I teach you an interesting one?"

He saw kyogen [8] at the **Kabuki** Theatre and the stageplays from the gallery a few times and all as often as they changed. Soon, he could mimic the voices of the famous actors like Shikuwan and Yaozo. Sometimes, in his zeal to imitate, he would be so absorbed in his practice that he would stare his eyes out or move his head about while in the toilet or in the streets. During idle moments, he mimicked or hummed ballads from beginning to end. Somehow or other, he felt unsatisfied when alone. Since childhood, he had been very much interested in songs and comic stories. Since birth and during his elementary days in the foothills of Mt. Atago,[9] he was considered a child prodigy. He had a good memory and he excelled in his studies. However, inspite of the fact that he was at the head of his class, his tendency to be a clown was already apparent. He was happy when his classmates treated him as their vassal.

He pressed his father to take him nightly to the variety-hall. He regarded the storytellers with a kind of sympathy; indeed, he longed to be one himself. Fashionably dressed, the storyteller would go up the stage and then suddenly stop to greet the audience and then begin, "I always hear that man has two weaknesses—wine and woman. This is so—most specially the powerful wife. Since olden times, it had been said that 'Our country cannot do without women'[10] . . ." He spoke with relish and affection that he himself must have certainly enjoyed his work. He spoke lovingly of women with each word. Sometimes, with a look full of charm, he glanced at the spectators. He was so affable that he left Sakurai with a very deep impression of human warmth. Ejaculating "Ah! korya! korya!"[11] the performer joined the lively **samisen** and, when he sang Japanese limericks, tuned the **samisen** to a noisier tone, and plucked its strings in the fashionable manner, he aroused even in the child, Sampei, his dormant prodigal tendencies. Sampei felt that it was indicative of the joy and happiness of life. On his way to and from school, he often loitered below the window of a Kiyomoto ballad teacher and listened with rapt interest. If he heard the Shinnai tune [12] while studying at night, he could not

[7] Types of ballad singing that originated in the mid-Edo Period (1603-1868).
[8] Comic interludes.
[9] In Kyoto.
[10] Refers to the mythical story that when their Sun Goddess (Amaterasu-no mikami) was angered by her brother, she hid inside a cave and the world was plunged into darkness.
[11] Meaningless emotive words.
[12] A sad and moving style of singing ballads.

continue. His head would be giddy with the melody and finally he would throw his books away. He received his first invitation to a **geisha** party when he was twenty. The beautiful entertainers were seated in a row before them. While holding a wine-cup, the theater-**samisen** which he had longed for all his life was brought out. He was so moved that his eyes were filled with tears. No wonder, he is so skillful in entertaining others.

It was Sakakibara who hit upon the idea of making him take up the profession of clowning. When he told him, "You cannot be idling always. I'll help you, so how about becoming a professional clown? You can drink for nothing and receive tips besides. There can be no better occupation. I'll take you to a dumping place for lazy-bones like you," Sakurai immediately acquiesced. Finally, through the good offices of Sakakibara, he was accepted as an apprentice of the professional clown, Yanagibashi, who named him Sampei. His friends in Kabutocho thought, "Sakurai a professional clown? Really, nobody is entirely useless!" They helped Sampei by spreading the humor. He was skilled in the arts of entertainment although he was still called a novice. At any rate, since he had the reputation of a harum-scarum before he became a professional jester, in less than no time, he was hired out.

One day, Sakakibara was in the second floor of an assignation house with several **geishas.** He was practicing hypnotism on them, one after the other. However, only a fledgling **geisha** was hypnotized a little; the others somehow did not feel sleepy. Sampei, who was present, suddenly shuddered with fear, "Please, sir, I hate hypnotism. Somehow, even just looking at a hypnotized person, I feel giddy." He was so terrified that he seemed to have been hypnotized himself.

"This is interesting. I'll do it to you, then," Sakakibara replied and glared at him. "There! I've got you! There, now you will slowly feel sleepy."

"That alone I wouldn't do for anything. Not for the world would I do it," retorted Sampei. His color changed and he made a move to escape but Sakakibara ran after him, passed his palm over his face a few times, and said, "There, now I've really got you. Its useless. You couldn't escape now." In the meantime, Sampei felt fagged out and fell.

He did everything they asked. Out of fun, Sakakibara suggested various things. When he said, "How sad," Sampei grimaced and wept bitterly. When he said, "It's vexing," Sampei became red with anger. He made him drink water as if it were wine, and made him hold a broom as if it were a **samisen.** All the while, the **geishas** laughed boisterously. All of a sudden, Sakakibara rolled up his clothes right in front of Sampei's nose. He produced a big sound and asked, "Sampei, this musk smells good?"

"Of course, this smells good. Very good. This is refreshing," Sampei answered as if he really felt good. The wings of his nose quivered as he sniffed the malodorous smell.

"Then, bear up well." With that, Sakakibara slapped him right at the base of his ears. Wide-eyed, he looked around restlessly.

"I was caught after all. I had never been so terrified. Did I do anything odd?" he asked. Slowly, he regained his composure.

Then Umekichi, a **geisha** fond of mischief, sidled up to Sampei and declared, "I, too, can hypnotize Sampei. There! I've got you. Now, you will gradually feel sleepy." She ran after Sampei who was walking away from the room. She leaped at his nape and said, "There! Its hopeless. I've got you completely." She rubbed his face. Sampei felt spent out again. He fell limp on her shoulders.

When she said, "Goddess of Mercy," he worshipped her. When she said, "A big earthquake," he appeared terrified. As always, his very expressive face made innumerable and incomparable changes. After that, with a stare from Sakakibara or Umekichi, he was hypnotized—he would be limp, then fall. One evening, Umekichi met him at the foot of Yanagi Bridge on her way home. She started at him and ejaculated, "Sampei!" There, in the middle of the street, he threw back his head. However, despite such a predisposition, he still craved for people's attention. They did not think he was shamming because he was very cheeky and he adjusted to the situations very skillfully.

Someone spread about the rumor that Sampei was in love with Umekichi. That otherwise, Umekichi could not hypnotize him so easily. The truth was Sampei liked tomboys like Umekichi who were so spirited that they did not give any consideration to sex differences. Since she first hypnotized him, he often met her in the evenings. He came to fall completely in love with her temperament. When there was an opportunity, he hinted at his feelings but, as she had marked him off as foolish, she never considered him as a possible love-partner. He waited for a good chance but, when he teased her with a few words, she would be like a child at the prime of naughtiness. She would stare at him and warn, "If you say those things, I'll hypnotize you." When she stared at length, he would put aside his important entreaties and fall down immediately. When he could bear it no farther, he candidly laid bare his heart to Sakakibara.

"It's not really befitting a merchant, and really, you cannot be proud of the circumstances but please speak forcefully to her with all your influence. One night will be alright."

"It was good of you to come. Don't worry. Leave everything to me," Sakakibara assured him. He took the responsibility immediately for, even then, he was plotting to toy with Sampei.

That evening, he went to his customary entertainment house and spoke to Umekichi about it.

"It's rather criminal but ask Sampei to come here tonight. As much as possible, speak to him in honeyed words, then, at the most important moment, inveigle him into being hypnotized. Make him undress completely and then ask him to do things as you please. I will watch by hiding myself," he proposed.

Inspite of herself, Umekichi hesitated, "But that's too much even for Sampei." However, when she learned that Sampei never got angry, she thought it was interesting and she agreed.

That night, a **jinricksha** man, with a letter from Umekichi, fetched him. She wrote, "Tonight I am alone. Please come by all means." Sampei trembled with joy. There can be no doubt about it—after his plea, Sakakibara arranged for them to meet. He dressed more than usual. Dressed fashionably, he went forth with the air of a lady's man to their place of assignation.

"Oh, do come closer. Really I'm alone tonight. Don't be so formal, Sampei. Make yourself at home," she cooed. She offered him a cushion and she never stopped serving wine. He felt uneasy and, very unlike himself, he was timid. Gradually, the wine began to affect him. He gained his pluck and began to fish out for compliments.

"A spirited woman, like you, really likes me?" He was completely unaware that Sakakibara, with a few **geishas**, had crosed the transom by passing through the **hakidashi.**[13] Umekichi firmly restrained herself from laughing. She enumerated his many skills off-hand.

"If you really love me so much, show me some proofs," she added.

"Proof. Well, really I feel like cutting my breast open that you may look inside."

"Then, how about being hypnotized so that you will confess the truth. Then I'll really believe you."

"No! I wouldn't do that for anything in the world!" Tonight also, Sampei resolved not to be deceived into it. If the occasion arose, he intended to tell her frankly that, because he loved her, he shammed a hyponotized person. But, at that moment, Umekichi stared at him intensely with her bright eyes and again, the desire to be used as a fool by a woman, came to the fore. At this critical moment, he once more let his head hang limp. He mumbled his answers and affirmed the questions as they were asked. He spoke glibly: "For your sake, I will throw away my life." "If you die, I'll die too," etc. Thinking that Sampei was already asleep, Sakakibara—who, up to now was peeping—together with the **geishas**, hemmed in around Sampei. They bit the sleeves of their **kimono** and hit their sides as they looked at Umekichi's mischief.[14]

Sampei was surprised but now it was too late to stop. The truth was that he was happy since Umekichi made him take up this terrible pretense. However shameful it may be, he decided to act as asked.

"We are alone so there's no need to be shy. Now, take off your coat," she asked him. He smoothly slipped off his unparalleled Japanese black crepe which was lined with evening cherry blossoms. Then, he untied his satin sash which had a simple dark blue peony design. After he removed his completely red clothes, only the long white crepe underwear on which the gods of lightning and thunder were dyed on the hem and back remained. One by one, he took off his smart clothes which he put on at great pains until, finally, he was completely naked. Even so, he was overwhelmingly happy over Umekichi's words. The result was that he did as she suggested. The things she said were simply appalling. After making much sport of him, she made him sleep soundly and then she left with everyone else.

The following morning, Umekichi woke him up. He suddenly opened his eyes and there, by his bedside, she was sitting in her night clothes. He

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[13] Window purposely for sweeping out dirt.
[14] Japanese clothes.

looked up at her very lovingly. In order to cheat him, she purposely scattered about the room a woman's pillow and clothes.

"I just got up and washed my face. You really sleep soundly. Surely, your future life will be good," she said with an innocent look.

"Since you like me this much, surely, I have a good life ahead of me. I'm so happy. I have realized my long-cherished desire," he replied. He bowed to her repeatedly and then, suddenly, he stood up and changed his clothes. It's rather early but please excuse me. People will talk. Then, Umekichi, forever. Ha! this sensual fellow!" he added hitting his head lightly and then left.

"How did things go?" Sakakibara asked him a few days later.

"Well, thank you. What I ran against wasn't so silly. Stout-hearted or spirited a woman is a woman. Absolutely a slipshod affair," he replied delighted in the very state of things.

"You're quite sensual," Sakakibara bantered.

"Hii! Hii!" tittered Sampei. He struck his forehead with his fan and laughed in a coarse, professional manner.

KOREA, FOCUS OF RUSSO-JAPANESE DIPLOMACY

(1898-1903)

I. H. NISH

THE ABORTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH PRECEDED THE RUSSO-JAPanese war, began in August 1903. In the previous five years, negotiations of a desultory kind had been going over Manchuria and Korea which have not received a systematic treatment from historians; it is the aim of this paper to examine them.[1]

When Russia took a lease of the Liaotung peninsula in March 1898, the world expected Japan, which had formerly occupied it, to protest vehemently. Instead, the Japanese accepted the **fait accompli** since the Russians had offered them a settlement of the Korean question by way of the Nishi-Rosen agreement which put the interests of the two countries on an equal footing within a nominally independent Korea. When, however, the Russians were attempting in 1899 and 1900 to get a lease at Masampo, which was one of the finest harbors in the Far East (within 160 miles of Japan's shores), the Japanese opposed them tooth and nail. They were ultimately unsuccessful but they showed that they were determined to protect their position in southern Korea.[2]

With the outbreak of the Boxer disturbances in May 1900, the Russians were forced to ease out of Korea to concentrate on north China and Manchuria, where they were having trouble safeguarding their railway lines. In these circumstances, Japan took a surprising initiative. The new Japanese Minister to Russia, Komura Jutaro, found Lamsdorf, who became Foreign Mi-

[1] The most illuminating works in Russian are still B.A. Romanov, Rossiya v. **Man'chzhurii, 1892-1906** (Leningrad, 1928) and **Ocherki diplomaticheskoy istorii Russko-Yaponskoy voiny, 1895-1907** (Moscow, 1947). In English, the standard treatments are in A. Malozemoff, **Russian Far Eastern policy, 1881-1904** (Berkeley, 1958) and (until 1901) W. L. Langer, **The diplomacy of imperialism** (New York, 1951). One difficulty is that the Russian published material is not sufficient to piece together a satisfactory account of the negotiations; but it is now possible, using Japanese materials, to describe the negotiations which took place and check them against Russian sources. For the last part of this period, this task has been well done in J. A. White, **The diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese war** (Princeton, 1964).

[2] In January 1900 Count Muraviev, the Russian foreign minister, circulated a memorandum containing a comprehensive review of foreign policy in which he advised against warlike actions in Korea. But Admiral Tyrtov, the navy minister, who had criticized the inadequacy of Port Arthur, wrote that it was necessary to acquire Masampo with Kargodo island as a "supporting station" in south Korea, in order to maintain Russia's naval position in the Pacific Ocean and prevent Japan's predominance there; as the time was not ripe for forcible measures, it should be acquired by diplomacy and purchase. "Tsarskaya diplomatiya o zadachakh Rossii na Vostoke v 1900," **Krasnyy arkhiv**, XVIII (1926), 15-16, 20-21. (Quoted hereafter as KA.)

This casts doubt on Malozemoff's view (**op. cit.**, 122) that "neither an act of aggressive policy nor a secret move to infiltrate into a strategic position" was intended. For further detail on the Masampo incident, I. H. Nish, **The Anglo-Japanese alliance** (London, 1966), chapter 3.

nister in June, to be ready to make a fresh approach. His analysis of the situation on 22 July was that "the situation in Manchuria and the difficulty of protecting the Manchurian railway having made Russia appreciate more fully the weakness of her position in the Far East, she appears to be really anxious to remove, if practicable, every possible cause of conflict with Japan." He reported that it was an opportune moment to come to an understanding with Russia on a safe and permanent basis: since the Russian occupation of Manchuria would become an accomplished fact and the possibility of conflict with Russia would retard Japan's industrial enterprise in Korea, the best course would be to prescribe spheres of influence, that is to say, Japan and Russia should have a free hand in Korea and Manchuria respectively and each should guarantee commercial freedom to the other in its sphere of influence.[3] On 26 July Viscount Aoki, the Japanese Foreign Minister, authorized Komura to go ahead and sent him the draft of a treaty on these lines. Komura seems to have had three interviews with Lamsdorf on the subject but on 4 August he proposed that Japan should defer presenting her draft.[4]

It is not known what it was in the Russian reaction that caused Komura to withhold his overture. Perhaps it was because Kuropatkin, the war minister, had been saying that Russia would not tolerate Japan's supremacy in Korea and would make war on her rather than accept it.[5] In any case, Lamsdorf had told the French on 1 August that he was deeply distrustful of the Japanese who were being tempted by the British to support them.[6] All in all, the auguries were not favorable for a Japanese initiative at that moment. Japan was in a weak bargaining position and, when the government changed in October, no attempt was made to follow it up.

There is no indication that the Russian leaders took the proposal seriously. Lamsdorf was even less inclined to do so when Izvolsky reported that Aoki had told him that Japan was content to observe the existing Nishi-Rosen agreement.[7] Whatever the truth of this report, it played into Russia's hands because the 1898 treaty suited her interests. When Lamsdorf approached Witte on this matter, the Finance Minister was not convinced that there was any need to give up Russia's stake in Korea. On 22 August, Witte wrote to a friend that he was not disposed to accept the bargain proposed by Japan and that Russia should take Manchuria while Japan took Korea. Elsewhere, he warned against Russia occupying Manchuria because it would give the Japanese an excuse to take Korea for themselves. The Russians did not see why, in establishing their position in Manchuria, they should make any concessions to Japan in Korea. So they let the Japanese initiative lapse without achieving any result.[8]

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[3] Japanese ministry of foreign affairs, Nihon gaiko bunsho [Japanese diplomatic documents], XXXIII (Tokyo, 1955), No. 522. (Quoted hereafter as NGB.)

[4] Ibid., No. 523. I. H. Nish, "Japan's indecision during the Boxer disturbances," Journal of Asian Studies, XX (1961), 449-458.

[5] KA, XVIII (1926), "Pis'ma Witte k Sipyaginu (1900-1)," 39-40; S. Yu. Witte, Vospominaniya (Moscow, 1960), i, 184-185.

[6] Ministere des affaires etrangeres, Documents diplomatiques francais, 1871-1914 (Paris, 1930-1959), Ire serie, XVI (1900), No. 2580 (Quoted hereafter as DDF.)

[7] NGB, XXXIII, Nos. 524-525.

[8] KA, XVIII, "Pis'ma," 40, 38; A. K. Gal'perin, Anglo-Yaponskiy soyuz 1902-1921 (Moscow, 1949), 61.

To secure the exclusion of Japanese power from Korea, the Russians thought it was in their interest to follow up proposals for Korea neutralization. At the outset of the Boxer troubles, Korea had asked to be placed under the guarantee of the powers. In September, the Korean ministers—at the instance of Russia—suggested making Korea a neutral country but were not taken seriously.[9] On several occasions in November, Izvolsky, the Russian Minister to Japan, spoke to Kato Takaaki, the new Foreign Minister, who agreed to examine any concrete proposal which Russia would put forward. On 7 January 1901 the Russian Minister left an appropriate proposal with Kato. The Russians were told in reply that, in view of their temporary occupation of Manchuria, Japan felt it best to defer the neutralization plan until the situation returned to normal. Izvolsky was gravely disappointed with this reaction since he had been lobbying influential statesmen who had indicated that they were favorably disposed to the proposal. Thus the second proposal for solving the Korean problem did not reach fruition.[10]

The Japanese leaders were suspicious of the various sinister activities in which the Russians were engaged throughout 1901 in Manchuria and at the Chinese court. Some, however, thought that they offered an opportunity for a Russo-Japanese deal over Manchuria and Korea. Inoue Kaoru, one of the Elder Statesmen, was impressed by the fact that **Novoye Vremya**, a newspaper of wide circulation, was at this time deploring Russia's undue involvement with the Far East and was advocating reconciliation with Japan.[11] He converted Marquis Ito, the leading Elder Statesman, and Katsura, the Prime Minister, to the view that it was worth taking seriously. It was, therefore, agreed that Ito should extend to Russia the trip which he was already planning to make to the United States and have unofficial discussions there.[12]

On 18 September, Ito set off from Yokohama, accompanied by Tsuzuki Keiroku, the son-in-law of Inoue. Before he left, he met Izvolsky who invited him to go to St. Petersburg—an invitation which Ito was of course delighted to accept.[13] The Ministry of Finance representative in Yokohama, K.A. Alekseyev, made a well-informed report on 14 September that the purpose of

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[9] **NGB**, XXXIV, Nos. 393, 396.

[10] **Ibid.**, Nos. 399-401; **KA**, LXIII, "Nakanune Russko-Yaponskoy voiny," 7-11.

[11] Tokutomi Iichiro, **Koshaku Katsura Taro den** [Biography of Prince Katsura] (Tokyo, 1917), i, 1061-1062, Inoue to Katsura, 26 August 1901, "Recently there was in the Tokyo **Nichi-nichi** newspaper an article translated from the Russian newspaper, **Novoye Vremya**, which stated that the outbreak of war between Russia and Japan would be a disaster for Japan and there is a good opportunity not to be lost for a prominent man to visit Russia and open talks."

[12] Tokutomi, **op. cit.**, i, 1066. I reject the idea expounded in Romanov, "Proiskhozhdeniye Anglo-Yaponskogo dogovora 1902," **Istori cheskie zapiski**, X (1941), 54, that Ito's journey had been suggested by Witte's remarks to Chinda at the beginning of July. Knowing the financial troubles which had afflicted Japan for the past year, Witte hinted that he was always ready to arrange for a loan to Japan in Paris and that Russia and Japan might reach, some sort of agreement over Korea and Manchuria. It is clear from Japanese sources that Japan did not think of raising a loan in Russia.

[13] **Hiratsuka Atsushi (ed.)**, **Ito Hirobumi hiroku** [private writings of Ito], (Tokyo, 1928-30), I, 1-58; "Nichi-Ei domei to Nichi-Ro Kyosho" [Anglo-Japanese alliance and Russo-Japanese underderstanding], No. 5. (Quoted hereafter as **IHH**.) Cf. KA, LXIII, Nakanune, 37; **DDF**, 2me serie, I (1901), No. 399.

the visit was to "find out how Russia would respond to an offer of alliance with Japan."[14]

It was 4 November before Ito reached Paris from the United States and in the meantime the situation in Japan had markedly changed. On 21 September Komura took over as Foreign Minister. After his first interview with Komura, Izvolsky concluded rather dubiously that he looked at the question of Russo-Japanese relations with more restraint than his predecessor and "evidently wishes quite sincerely to find ground for closer relations with us."[15] As against this, the Manchurian question erupted again in mid-October and only subsided with the death of Li Hung-chang. Lamsdorf had occasion to complain of the hostility of the Japanese Press and asked for the threatening movements of the Japanese fleet in Korea waters to be stopped.[16] In view of the undoubted anti-Russian feeling, it was not surprising that the Japanese cabinet should on 28 November deliberately decide to go ahead with the alliance with Britain. The Japanese had significantly changed their ground since Ito left; but this was because of new steps taken by Russia.

When Ito reached Paris on 4 November, the Franco-Russian allies did not immediately take council about the attitude to be adopted towards him. Presumably this was because they expected that he would be engaged in seeking a loan from the bankers. They were soon enough disabused of any illusion that Ito was travelling for the purpose of raising a loan. In Paris, Delcasse who gave Ito every opportunity to talk finance, had to admit that he "had not made a single allusion to financial assistance of any kind." In St. Petersburg also, Lamsdorf and Witte reported that Ito had not raised the subject of a loan. They were genuinely surprised at this because they had been led to expect that this would be his prime object.[17]

It was not until 10 November that Delcasse invited Lamsdorf's opinion on Russo-Japanese relations. After taking the Tsar's approval, Lamsdorf prepared a note to serve as an **aide-memoire** for the interview which Delcasse was due to have with Ito. The sole point of difference, Lamsdorf argued, was over Korea, where the Russian government was ready to enter into an exchange of views with Japan to clarify or extend the agreement of 1898. Russia, which disclaimed any intention of annexing Korea, recognized as natural the commercial and industrial expansion of Japan in Korea but could not allow Korea to become a strategic center for Japan to the detriment of Russian interests; she further proclaimed that she had no intention to annex Manchuria and was ready to have that province evacuated of her troops, provided guarantees were obtained.[18] This amounted to a brief for Russian Far Eastern policy down to 1903.

On 13 November, Ito visited the Foreign Ministry for discussions with Delcasse. Delcasse claimed that he could see no objection "if Russia and

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[14] Romanov, **Ocherki**, 145-146. Alekseyev's report is wrongly attributed to September 1902.

[15] KA, LXII, Nakamune, 37-41; Romanov, **Ocherki**, 148.

[16] Japanese ministry of foreign affairs, **Komura gaikoshi** [History of Komura's foreign policy] (Tokyo, 1953), I, 238. (Quoted hereafter as KG.) Romanov, **Rossiya**, 322; NGB; XXXIV, Nos. 326, 332.

[17] DDF I (1901), Nos. 545, 548.

[18] KA, LXIII, Nakanune, 42-43.

Japan were to join hands and France were to join in a coalition with them, since it would secure absolute supremacy, especially in the Pacific." Ito admitted that apart from Korea there were no places which were likely to give rise to trouble with Russia and seemed to invite French mediation; he thought the existing agreement was not the last word and Delcasse indicated that Russia was prepared to compromise. At their second meeting the following day, Ito said that he would be more than satisfied if Japan drew together with France in increasing friendship.[19]

Before Ito set off for Russia, he met Hayashi—the Japanese Minister to London—who had come to Paris especially to explain the progress which had been been made in drawing up the agreement with Britain. The Tokyo government was in a predicament: it had no authority over Ito's movements and could not be sure that he would comply if he was asked to cancel his trip to Russia. So it suggested that he should set off as soon as possible and confine himself to an informal exchange of views with the Russian leaders. On 26 November, Ito reached St. Petersburg. He had an audience with Nicholas II, two days later, at Tsarskoye-selo palace and received the Gold Cordon of St. Alexander Nevsky.

At a meeting with Lamsdorf on 2 December, Ito said that it was necessary to clear up the misunderstandings which were besetting Russo-Japanese relations. Lamsdorf reminded him that Russia had presented a plan for Korean neutralization in 1900 but Japan had replied that the present agreement was quite satisfactory. Ito observed that this may have been so in January 1901 while the emergency still existed; but the existing agreement should not be thought of as definitive. "If we do not arrive at a more permanent settlement, there is the danger that misunderstandings will constantly recur. Since the Japanese are constantly afraid that Korea will be overrun by Russia, Russia should acknowledge that the Japanese have the greatest interests in Korea." Lamsdorf, however, advocated a joint policy towards Korea whereby they could act together towards that government. He eventually admitted that Russia would probably not have any objection to 'delegating' Korea to Japan if water-tight guarantees were offered against its military use and against communications being interrupted. When he asked whether a small portion on the south coast of Korea could be given to Russia, Ito was not encouraging. Each claimed to be speaking personally; and the interview ended by Ito's agreeing to draft his proposals in the form of a memorandum.[20]

At his interview with Ito on 3 December, Witte claimed that he was not a specialist in foreign affairs but was in agreement with Lamsdorf and the Tsar on the question of the east. In his approach, he was more forthright than Lamsdorf: "Your country has always had considerable interests in Korea, mine has none; we must both agree not to occupy Korea and should not give up the equality between us which is stipulated in the present treaty."

[19] IHH, appendix, Nos. 2, 5. This account corresponds closely to the summary given in DDF, I, Doc. No. 545 (1901), and KA, LXIII, Nakanune, 43-44.

[20] IHH, appendix, No. 26; Russian foreign ministry, **Obzor snoshenii s Yaponiey Koreyskim delam s 1895 g.** (St. Petersburg, 1906), 68-70. (Quoted hereafter as **Obzor.**) According to **Obzor**, the first Ito-Lamsdorf meeting took place on 17 (30) November 1901, but this is disproved by other accounts.

Ito replied that this would not satisfy Japan which wanted to be supreme in the peninsula but would certainly guarantee that she would never injure Korean Independence or use its territory for military purposes against Russia or place installations on its coastline so as to close the Korean straits. Witte replied that, if Japan gave that threefold guarantee, Russia would not object to whatever else Japan did there and that, if required, Russia too could give guarantees. Although Ito was given every encouragement to air Japan's financial troubles, he did not admit that they were serious and made no mention of wanting a loan.[21]

It will be observed that Witte was inclined to play down Russia's stake in Korea in a way that Lamsdorf did not and may have been prepared to allow Japan a large say there provided she did not occupy the country and gave the threefold guarantee. He made no request for a station in south Korea, as Lamsdorf did. Neither of them made any mention of Manchuria except to say that Russia would certainly withdraw her troops. B.A. Romanov has criticized Witte for wrecking the discussions by taking the line that Russians wanted complete discretion in Manchuria but would only give Korea to Japan on certain conditions.[22] The impression left by the Japanese documents is quite the reverse, namely that Witte was more conciliatory than Lamsdorf who took an especially cautious line.

On 4 December, Ito again met Lamsdorf and presented him with the draft of a Russo-Japanese arrangement by which Russia would grant Japan absolute freedom of action in Korea in return for various guarantees. At first glance, Lamsdorf complained that the document set out only Japan's interests and Russia's concessions; there would be great criticism in Russia that she would, by signing it, sacrifice her equal rights in Korea under the present treaty; this draft could not form the basis for an arrangement. Ito asked what compensation Russia would demand and Lamsdorf replied that, in return for giving Korea exclusively to Japan, Russia would expect freedom of action in north China, should anything occur. Since this was so vague, Ito asked that a note setting out Russia's major demands should be sent to him in Berlin. Lamsdorf said that he could not guarantee to answer within a fortnight, since he only saw the Tsar once a week and that on Tuesdays! The statesmen parted under the impression that a basis might be found for a bilateral agreement. Lamsdorf remarked that, while Komura had been minister in Russia, they had unofficially discussed whether Korea might be allotted to Japan and Manchuria, to Russia. While Ito asked for an urgent Russian reply, Lamsdorf seemed to be thinking of continuing the negotiations in Tokyo after Ito's return there.[23]

Lamsdorf reported the conversations to the Tsar who commented that "Russia certainly cannot give up its previous right to keep as many troops

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21 IHH, appendix, No. 27.

22 Romanov, Rossiya, 336-337.

23 IHH, appendix, Nos. 30-31; KA, LXIII, Nakanune, 44-45. Malozemoff, op. cit., 171, has thrown doubt on the value of these conversations because of the linguistic difficulties involved; but a comparison of the records indicates that there were few substantial misunderstandings.

in Korea as the Japanese station there."[24] Lamsdorf redrafted the proposals in consultation with Witte and Kuropatkin. They set out Russia's demands in Manchuria and also contained some concessions to Japan in Korea. In a letter to Lamsdorf, Witte explained that a war against Japan over distant Korea could not be justified; Russia needed to be free to concentrate on Manchuria.[25] The Russian reply was sent to Berlin by messenger and reached Ito on 17 December almost a forthnight after he had left St. Petersburg.

Though Russia's belated reply contained concessions, it continued to be based on the principle that both powers had rights in Korea. On most of the terms, there was substantial agreements between the Ito and Lamsdorf drafts. But the Russians had added two clauses:

> 6. Japan acknowledges Russia's superior rights in that part of the territory of the Chinese Empire adjoining the Russian border and undertakes not to infringe Russia's freedom of action in that area.
>
> 7. [On occasions when military assistance proves necessary for suppressing revolts] Japan undertakes not to send forces to Korea beyond the number which the situation dictates and to recall the troops immediately [after] the mission has been achieved and agrees that, having fixed clearly in advance the area of a zone adjoining the Russian frontier, the Japanese army will never cross that boundary.[26]

Under article 6, Russia was claiming freedom of action in Manchuria, a matter which had not been raised in the conversations, though it is far from clear what Russia's true meaning was. In his accompanying letter, Lamsdorf played down this demand, saying that it only recapitulated the principles already accepted in the Nishi-Rosen memorandum of 1898 and in Komura's offer of 1900. Under article 7, Russia was again raising a new issue: that of a buffer state adjoining the Russian frontier, which was part of the thinking of the Bezobrazov group. The area involved was smaller than the Russian sphere of influence under the 1898 treaty; but it was nonetheless objectionable to the Japanese. The other provision of note was that Japanese troops could only be sent to Korea after Russia had given its approval.

Ito was neither enthusiastic about Lamsdorf's reply nor was he downhearted. He first contacted Tokyo, telling the Prime Minister that, while there were defects in the draft, "such details could all be amended to Japan's satisfaction"; such a favorable opportunity will not occur again in the near future. His was an attitude of restrained optimism. It is wrong for those like Romanov to argue that Ito left Europe with the conviction that it was impossible to talk to Russia.[27]

On 21 December, the Japanese premier replied thanking Ito effusively for his good offices and professed to be in general accord with his views. But he reminded Ito that Japan had during 1901 given certain guarantees over Manchuria which she could not now neglect, even to obtain recognition of her position in Korea. Russia had asked that her position in Manchuria might be

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24 KA, LXIII, Nakanune, 44, note of Lamsdorf to Tsar. 5 December 1901.

25 A. Yarmolinsky, The Memoirs of Count Witte (London, 1921), 117.

26 IHH, appendix, Nos. 51-52; Obzor, 71-73; KA LXIII, Nakanune, 50-51. Text in Langer, op. cit., 768-769.

27 IHH, appendix, No. 53; Gal-perin, op. cit., 768-776.

treated on a par with Japan's in Korea; but Japan could not countenance such a request. "You well know," Katsura concluded, "that I am not opposed to coming to an understanding with Russia but that in my view it must be reconciled with the obligations which Japan owes to others."[28] Irritated as Ito was to receive this admonition from Tokyo, he had no alternative but to reply to Lamsdorf rather icily. Writing from Brussels on 23 December, he admitted the conciliatory spirit of the Russian statesmen but saw little prospect of the two countries easily reaching an agreement of any permanence. He was doubtful whether the Russian draft could be used by the Japanese government as a basis for future negotiations, since it did not seem to bestow equal benefits on both parties.[29]

Should the Russians have been more generous in their concessions to Ito? Contemporaries spoke of the "reserve" which Russia had shown towards him;[30] and historians have generally written critically of her fatal miscalculation. On the other hand, the Russians did not know that Japan was conducting secret negotiations with Britain and could not realize the weakness of their position. Moreover, Ito, though an important person in his own right, was known to be out of line with his home government; it would have been incautious to have become entangled in private negotiations with him. There was thus much wisdom in Lamsdorf's suggestion that discussions should be continued in Tokyo. The Russian response had to be official and to commit the tsarist government in future, whereas Ito's approach was personal and in no sense carried his government's authority. Considering the slender authority which Ito possessed, the attitude of the Russian statesmen is fully understandable.

Ito now embarked on the most important part of his planned itinerary: his visit to London, where he found the alliance on the point of being concluded. After his discussions in Russia, Ito's view was that "even though we join in a defensive alliance with Britain, there will still be room for us simultaneously to come to terms with Russia over Korea."[31] When he met the Foreign Secretary, Ito drew from him the admission that he "saw no reason why His Majesty's Government should disapprove" of Japan obtaining Russia's recognition of her interests in Korea.[32] This remark meant that the Anglo-Japanese agreement which was signed on 30 January 1902, would not be a barrier to continued Russo-Japanese negotiations.

On his way to Naples to join his ship for Japan, Ito spent a while in Paris where he met Kurino Shinichiro, Japan's Minister to France (1897-1901), who had just been appointed as minister to Russia.[33] While he had been on leave in Japan in October, Kurino had taken the opinion of the Elder

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[28] IHH, appendix, No. 58.

[29] IHH, appendix, No. 60; Obzor, 74-75.

[30] DDF, II (1920). Doc. No. 84.

[31] IHH, appendix, No. 48.

[32] G. P. Gooch and H. W. V. Temperley, **British documents on origins of the war, 1898-1914** (London, 1926-38), II, No. 120.

[33] There is a considerable literature on Kurino and his attitude towards Russia: **Shishaku Kurino Shinichiro den** [Biography of Viscount Kurino] (Tokyo, 1942); Imai Shoji, "Nichi-Ei domei to Kurino Shinichiro" [Kurino and the Anglo-Japanese alliance], Rekishi kyoiku (February, 1962), 39-44.

Statesman, Inoue, on Japan's policy to Russia and prepared a memorandum on "settling Russo-Japanese problems in the east" which received the approval of the Premier and Foreign Minister. Kurino claimed that he made it a condition of taking up his new appointment and that he should do everything possible to further the cause of a Russo-Japanese agreement.[34] It was while he was in Paris in January **en route** for St. Petersburg that he heard from Ito that the British alliance was reaching its final stage and was naturally astonished that a policy so different from his own instructions had been adopted. He also attended the ceremony at the British Embassy in Paris at which Ito became a Knight Grand Cross of the Bath—an honor which was intended, Kurino believed, to soften the Marquis's feelings towards the alliance. Thinking that he would no longer be able to pursue the special policy in Russia for which he had been sent, Kurino proposed to cancel his journey to Russia and return to Tokyo. But Ito reminded him that he had the emperor's mandate and could not turn back.[35] Kurino did, however, inquire from Tokyo about his instructions and was told that "the premier and foreign minister desire to come to an arrangement with Russia over Korea; they do not propose to give final orders to conclude an agreement but merely to seek out the basis for such an agreement."[36] It would appear that in the Tokyo view the alliance with Britain would be merely the prelude to negotiations with Russia. Kurino proceeded to St. Petersburg, disgruntled but determined to work for a direct settlement with Russia.[37] Knowing that the British alliance was in the offing, Kurino made it one of his first acts to insure that the alliance was specially communicated to Lamsdorf with the fullest possible assurance. To this, Tokyo which was trying to avoid anything likely "to irritate the susceptibilities of the Russian government,"[38] readily agreed and an appropriate communication was made.

There can be no doubt that Lamsdorf and Izvolsky were disturbed by the news of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which reflected a failure in their conduct of Russia's Far Eastern policy. At the same time, Lamsdorf showed remarkable resilience. On 24 February he asked Kurino whether the Japanese government really wished to work for a friendly understanding with Russia to maintain peaceful relations in the Far East and safeguard their mutual interests. And later Lamsdorf inquired whether it was still possible to conclude a separate treaty between their two countries which would not be incompatible with clause IV of the Anglo-Japanese agreement. Kurino assured him that the agreement left all liberty to Japan to enter into a separate arrangement with Russia. Lamsdorf found this hard to believe.[39]

Meanwhile Ito had arrived back in Tokyo towards the end of February and attracted a great deal of speculation. When Izvolsky met Komura on 13 March, he asked him whether the government shared the views which Ito

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[34] Imai, **op. cit.**, 44.
[35] Kurino, "Nichi-Ro kyowa ni taisuru shian" [Proposals for a Russo-Japanese concord] in IHH, I, 349-354.[
[36] IHH, appendix, No. 71.
[37] DDF, II (1902), doc. No. 84.
[38] NGB, XXXV, No. 274.
[39] KG, I, 297; DDF III, doc. No. 194 (1903).

had expressed in his exchange of views with Lamsdorf. Komura replied that Japan had always wanted an understanding with Russia over Korea and no change had taken place in her attitude.[40] For his part, Ito discovered on his return that people in Tokyo were saying that he had made known to Britain what had transpired in St. Petersburg and had thus expedited the alliance. He, therefore, sent Tsuzuki to assure Izvolsky that this was untrue and that he had not disclosed his Russian conversations in London.[41] The Japanese, whose hand had been so much strengthened by their new association with Britain, were clearly trying to follow up the earlier Ito talks by formal negotiations. These hopes suffered a setback when the Franco-Russian declaration of 16 March was published as a riposte to the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

On 7 July, thinking that the Russian military faction which opposed Witte and Lamsdorf had lost ground and the civilian faction had regained its strength, the Japanese Foreign Minister asked Kurino to inquire on his own responsibility and absolutely secretly whether the time was ripe to begin talks for an understanding. On 23 July Kurino took up the matter privately with Lamsdorf who replied that, since Japan was not prevented by the British alliance from negotiating, Russia was still as willing as before and that they could treat Ito's views and his own reply as the basis for the negotiations.[42] On 4 August, therefore, Kurino—purely on his own initiative and without the sanction of his government—put forward a set of points as a sketch of the terms of a possible understanding. The so-called "private proposal on the Korean question" ran as follows:

1. Joint guarantee of the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean empires.
2. Joint guarantee not to use for military or strategic ends any portion of Korean territory.
3. Russia, recognizing the superior interests of Japan in Korea, undertakes not to interfere in the affairs of Korea or in Japan's actions over the peaceful interests of that country and acknowledges that Japan may exercise the following rights in Korea:
   A. freedom of action in advancing her commercial and industrial interests;
   B. to give advice and help to Korea in fulfilling the obligations of good government;
   C. when rebellion or internal disorder occurs and threatens Japan's peaceful relations with Korea, to send such troops as are necessary and to withdraw them immediately [after] their duties are completed;
   D. to maintain the guard as well as the police forces already stationed for the protection of telegraph and railway lines.
4. Japan will recognize the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen which was announced by Russia to the Japanese government in 1898 as well as Russia's freedom of action to protect her rights and interests in Manchuria.

These terms would replace all existing arrangements over Korea.[43] It will be observed that they correspond with Ito's proposals and that they go beyond

[40] KG, I, 297-298.
[41] Gal'perin, op. cit., 174, quoting foreign ministry archives for 21 March (6 April) 1902.
[42] KG, I, 298.
[43] Obzor, 78; KG, I, 299; R. Rosen, Forty years of diplomacy (London, 1922), i, 202.

them to meet Russian wishes. When Kurino saw Lamsdorf on 14 September, the Foreign Minister agreed to open talks if they were based on equal rights for Japan and Russia in Korea and Manchuria respectively. Lamsdorf also announced that Russia intended to appoint Roman Rosen again as Minister to Tokyo as a gesture of goodwill.[44] Everything was set fair for a fruitful period of negotiation. The situation was the more hopeful when the Russians withdrew in October the first batch of their Manchurian troops in accordance with their treaty with China.

The trouble was that Kurino's sketch had not been approved by his government. The French Ambassador to Russia suspected that Kurino was negotiating something but felt that he was liable to act and speak on his own authority.[45] In Tokyo, the cabinet had in October decided that government action and finance would be needed if Korea was to be developed as a Japanese sphere of influence. It was in these circumstances that Komura on 1 November communicated to Kurino five points to serve as the skeleton of an agreement with Russia although he did not take the approval of the cabinet beforehand. Since there is no sign that they were passed over to Russia, they need not be reproduced here.[46] They were, however, more demanding than those mentioned by Kurino and did not contain the "guarantees" which Ito had offered. They also included the additional demand that "Russia will not object to connecting a Korean railway with the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Newchwang Railway." On 20 November Komuro warned Kurino that his earlier "private proposals" had been presented too soon and indicated that they did not correspond on a number of points with Japan's desires.[47] Thus, no appreciable progress took place along this particular line.

This is not to suggest that the Russians were inactive. When Kurino's proposals were received in August, Lamsdorf admitted that he found them too demanding. They were referred to two diplomats with special experience of the Far East—Rosen and Pavlov. In his memorandum of 24 September, Rosen was critical of the effort which Russia had to make for the peaceful conquest of Manchuria at the expense of European Russia.[48] This was tantamount to a criticism of the policy of Witte who had just left to make an extended personal tour of Manchuria during the autumn. On his return, he wrote a long report for the Tsar in which he emphasized that it would be better to compromise with Japan over Korea. He then tackled Rosen's criticisms of his policy. On 10 January 1903 he prepared a reply to the memoranda of Rosen and Pavlov in which he again argued for an immediate agreement with Japan. It was largely at his instigation that a conference of diplomats to discuss Russia's Far Eastern policy was convened on 23 January.[49]

This was the start of a series of conferences in the early months of 1903 where Far Eastern policy was subjected to exhaustive examination by the

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44 KG, I, 298.

45 DDF, III (1903), doc. No. 194. For another example of Kurino's indiscretion, NGB 36/I, Nos. 397-398.

46 KG, I, 298-299; translated in White, **The diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese war**, 350-357.

47 KG, I, 300.

48 Rosen, **op. cit.**, i, 202-207; Romanov, **Rossiya**, 403, Note 1.

49 **Ibid.**, i, 208-209; Witte, **Vospominaniya**, i, 227; Romanov, **Rossiya**, 416-420.

Russian ministers. The most important was probably that on 7 February which was attended by the foreign, war, navy and finance ministers as well as Russia's diplomatic representatives at Peking, Seoul and Tokyo. The two major issues for discussion were Russia's relations with Japan and the withdrawal of her troops from Manchuria. In particular, she had to decide how to respond to Japan's overtures of last autumn. Witte described her proposals on Korea as "exceedingly exacting" and seems to have gone back on his earlier views by calling for the neutralization of the Korean straits. Lamsdorf too was not prepared to pull out of Korea in view of the significance which it must in future have for Russian national interests. The conference reached complete unanimity on the desirability of some agreement with Japan over Korea but it was decided that the initiative should be left to the Japanese.[50] Since it was also decided not to withdraw the Russian troops from Manchuria unless the Chinese agreed to several further demands, the results of the conference were entirely negative. It committed the Russian government to a policy of inaction behind which the various groups interested in Korea and Manchuria could carry on their expansionist activities.

The Russians evidently hoped that they could avoid a major collision with Japan by this policy of procrastination. They chose to treat Manchuria as exclusively a Russian matter and gave no sign of yielding to the demands over Korea which the Japanese had put forward in 1902. The puzzling thing is that there are many instances where the Tsar, Lamsdorf and Witte, wrote in 1902 and 1903 that they were not prepared to risk a war over Korea and they were content to let Korea fall under Japanese influence.[51] But, at the conferences, the presence of other ministers (who had the right to share in policy-making on the Far East) prevented milder counsels from prevailing. Lamsdorf took refuge in procrastination.

The Japanese also delayed in pursuing their demands. One reason for the delay was to wait for the coming of Rosen and Kuropatkin, both of whom were known to have taken part in the conference in St. Petersburg and were thought to be harbingers of a new approach. Rosen reached Tokyo as Minister in April but carried no special instructions. When it became known that Kuropatkin was proposing to visit the Far East on a tour of inspection, the Japanese on 23 March invited him to extend his trip to Japan.[52] The Tsar gave his consent; Kuropatkin was briefed before his departure on how to improve relations with Japan without offering any concessions. Kuropatkin reached Japan on 12 June and was lavishly accommodated in the detached palace at Shiba. Komura tried to persuade Ito who was recognized as the most Russophil of the Japanese leaders to have a discussion with him. But Ito declined. Instead, Katsura and Komura both had conversations with the visiting War Minister who stressed that he had no official mission and could only speak privately. The Japanese spokesmen made it clear that the Russian occupation of Manchuria could not be permitted as it would lead to constant

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[50] **KA**, LII, 1932, 34-124, "Pervye shagi russkogo imperializma na Dal'nem Vostoke, 1888-1903," especially 110-115.

[51] Romanov, **Rossiya**, 436-437.

[52] **KA**, II, 1923, "Dnevnik Kuropatkina," 28 March 1903; **NGB**, XXX/I, Nos. 784-786.

incursions into Korea and encourage the break-up of China. Kuropatkin replied that he personally wanted some understanding with Japan over Korea and was opposed to the division of China. He explained that it was necessary for Russia to insure the security of her railways, that their equipment and maintenance costs were heavy and that there were many problems about the withdrawal of her forces which were receiving government consideration.[53] In general, Kuropatkin made it clear that he was not entrusted with a mission to reconcile Russian differences with Japan but only came to give an account of Russia's actions. There was much talk in the world press of a Russo-Japanese secret agreement on Korea and Manchuria being concluded while he was in Tokyo.[54] It was, however, merely wild speculation. He left Tokyo on 16 June on his way to Port Arthur for continued conferences on Russian policy in the East. By judicious bribery of Russian officers there, the Japanese received accurate information about the decisions taken at Port Arthur.[55]

On 23 June, within a week of Kuropatkin's departure, there was a major conference, held in the presence of the Japanese emperor, which was attended by four ministers and five Elder Statesmen. The situation had deteriorated: Russia had failed to evacuate its troops from Manchuria in April and had imposed fresh conditions on China; the Russians had moreover been pushing ahead to occupy Yonnampo (on the Korean side of the Yalu) and undertake timber and cable works in that area. These events were covered in detail in the press; public opinion became electrically anti-Russian. Kuropatkin's visit led the chief of the General Staff, General Oyama, to present a memorandum to the cabinet on 22 June, saying that now was the time to settle the Korean question once and for all while Japan had the strategic advantage. Against this background, the imperial conference passed a lengthy policy resolution. It agreed that negotiations with Russia should be opened up with the object of insuring the security of Korea and the supremacy of Japan's interests there and of keeping Russian activities in Manchuria within the limits of her treaties with China and preventing them from injuring Korean security.[56] Underlying this was the implication that Japan would not permit Russian forces to stay in Manchuria. The focus of Japanese policy, while still concerned with "Korean security," was moving more towards Manchuria. Assuming that this policy was upheld, it did not allow much room for maneuver, once negotiations were begun.

This tougher policy would have been communicated to Russia sooner, had it not been for a cabinet crisis. It arose from the fact that Ito had, at the imperial conference, advocated a milder policy and the cabinet resented his interference. On 25 June, the Premier decided to resign. There followed three weeks of crisis which only ended on 15 July when Katsura resumed the premiership and Ito was placed more out of harm's way. But Japan's approach to Russia was held up and her demands were not conveyed to Lamsdorf until 12 August. It is not necessary to follow through the Russo-Japanese nego-

[53] KG, I, 312, 321.
[54] London **Standard**, 28 July 1903.
[55] **NGB**, XXXVI, No. 804.
[56] **Ibid.**, No. 1.

tiations. The diplomatic language of Japan's terms was largely unreal because it obscured the fact that Japan was already determined in the last resort to go to war.[57] This paper shows that for more than three years before the official Russo-Japanese negotiations began, the Japanese had been making overtures to Russia over Korea. This fact has not received much attention since the Japanese sources have only recently become available.[58] In essence, it was Japan's purpose to take advantage of Russia's preoccupation with Manchuria, to improve her position in Korea. The stronger Japan grew, the more rigorous her terms became. Initially, she would have been content for Russia to withdraw from Korea. By 1903, when her bargaining power was reinforced by the British alliance, she was resolute enough to call upon Russia to recall the Russian troops from Manchuria.

The policy which Russia adopted towards Japan seems to have been unyielding. Where possible, she avoided discussions of Manchuria and stressed the need for neutralization of Korea by international guarantee. This formula was merely designed to conceal the widely differing views within Russia. Witte cared so little for Korea that he was probably prepared to use it as a pawn in order to further his own objectives in Manchuria. The Tsar and Lamsdorf supported him from time to time. But Witte's views were opposed by Kuropatkin, Admiral Alekseyev and the group associated with the name of Bezobrazov. Neutralization was a compromise which was put forward to save Russia from making even minor concessions.

These various overtures broke down except at one point. This was during Ito's conversations in St. Petersburg. Ito's parleys have been described as a double-cross to Britain; this is not so because it was the journey of a private person putting forward private views which were not authorized by his government. It has been argued that it was a double-cross to Russia insofar as Ito's presence in London was followed by the signing of the Anglo-Japanese alliance; this, however, is also untrue because the alliance owed nothing to Ito's trip to Britain. It has generally been said that Ito's conversations were a failure and were not pursued. This paper has tried to show that, while they were insignificant in their immediate results, his talks were not allowed to lapse and were taken up spasmodically by his government in the hope of improving Japan's position in Korea.

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[57] Romanov, **Ocherki**, 236-237.

[58] This is partly accounted for by the fact that the basic Russian documentary source, "Nakanune Russko-Yaponskoi voiny" (KA, LXIII) ends in January, 1902.

JAPAN'S SOUTHERN ADVANCE: THE INDOCHINA PHASE

STEPHEN UHALLEY, JR.

A FULL QUARTER CENTURY HAS PASSED SINCE JAPAN ENCROACHED upon what was at that time the French colonial possession of Indochina. An affrighted world, already dazed by the impact of the German **blitzkrieg**, became acutely sensitized to the beginning of Japan's "southern advance." Events moved swiftly in a world made of shifting sands. Only months later, in a startling moment of history, Japan established mastery over the wide expanses of the southern regions. In one fell swoop she had supplanted the effectual Asian presence of the four major colonial powers. A confused world was angered at the audacity, amazed at the intrepidity and awed by the extraordinary planning and policy execution of the Japanese. A shaken world observed what it believed to be the latest stage in the implementation of a grand premeditated scheme of conquest of several years vintage. Indeed, this assumption appeared to be irrefutably accurate against a background of steady territorial expansion since the Manchurian Incident of 1931, given the undeniable militaristic bent of the Japanese Government, and through the boastful declarations of aspiration by many Japanese speakers and writers. It is one of the fundamental assumptions which provided the justification for the war crimes trials. To a greater or lesser extent, an implicit acceptance of this proposition has colored almost every Western interpretation of Japan's role in World War II.

This writer, however, wishes to raise a serious objection to the application to every phase of Japanese expansion of the premeditated planning theme. There is a strong tendency for the dramatic and spectacular character of the achievement, to blind us to the real nature of the steps that led to it. One logically presupposes that a grandiose, unerring scheme preceded so vast and impressive an accomplishment. And when there is already evidence of a general line of seemingly conscious development prior to what appears to be a final consummation, it is only too easy to assume that all phases of the development were organically linked, that the events represented the unfolding of a master plan. But such an assumption contains all the pitfalls of any over-simplification. It does not allow for the indeterminable factors which are inevitably present in the historical process. It ascribes an unbelievable superhuman foresight to a group of militarists who time and again demonstrated the lack of even average pre-vision, and whose ultimate fate irrefutably confirms such a deficiency.

This paper explores the interpretation that Japan probably harbored no substantial plans for territorial aggrandizement in Southeast Asia prior to World War II. The southern advance, rather than being the conscious implementing of a plan to conquer Southeast Asia, if not the world, was initially something quite different. The few declarations of aspiration relating to the area envisaged only improved economic relationships.

When war broke out in Europe, an economic and political vacuum was created in Southeast Asia. The Japanese, rather than swiftly implementing a long developing plan of conquest, moved cautiously into Indochina primarily for a very limited military purpose. Rather than move boldly on the firm ground of carefully considered plans, the Japanese were merely opportunistic, and made but short-term improvisations as they proceeded into a series of military moves which were no longer within their capability to control. On the heels of military advancement, there mushroomed into being a rationalized ideal of a new dispensation in which Japan's leadership qualities might have been utilized best for the general well-being of all Asians. Nowhere was the unpremeditated, undeliberative character of the Japanese program more clearly manifested than in the contradictions inherent between this improvised theoretical justification and Japanese practice. Nowhere was the contradiction more clearly exhibited than in the Japanese policy toward Indochina.

Pre-War Penetration

Those who argue that Japan's twentieth century territorial ambitions in Southeast Asia antedate the fall of Holland and France in 1940, find it difficult to support their contention with concrete evidence.[1] To be sure, the Japanese navy is seen as the protagonist of the expansion of Japanese interests in the South Seas. But to draw a parallel between naval national aspirations and those of the army operating on the continent, can too easily lead one to unsupportable conclusions.

It appears to be naval personnel who made the earliest relevant allusions to the South Seas. Captain Gumpei Sekine (one time head of the Navy Department's Press Bureau) wrote in the August 1935 issue of **Dai Asia Shugi**, that Japan must not neglect the necessity for maritime advancement because of continental expansion. The most aggressive point he made was that Japan occasionally dispatch warships "for the purpose of protecting our national's overseas enterprises." Such moves "will encourage our emigrants and make them feel significant among the foreign peoples, with the result that they will exert all their energies in their professions." [2] In 1936, Admiral Sankichi Takahashi—then Commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet—reportedly told a group of Osaka industrialists: "Japan's economic advance must be directed southward, with either Formosa or the South Sea Island Mandates as a foothold." [3] The point of this advice was that the advance be economic, not military. There was even a proposal in the Diet that Japan seek out the possibility of purchasing a lease to the unexploited island of New Guinea.[4] Thus with few exceptions,[5] the activities of expansionists with respect to Southeast Asia were limited to extension of commerce. These activities, in turn, seem to

[1] We must acknowledge, however, that several late nineteenth century Japanese nationalist-activists had had an eye to the south, particularly upon the Philippines. See J. M. Saniel, "Four Japanese: Their Plans for the Expansion of Japan to the Philippines," **Journal Southeast Asian History**, IV, No. 2 (September, 1963), 1-12.

[2] W. H. Chamberlin, **Japan Over Asia** (Boston, 1937), 168.

[3] **Ibid.**, 167.

[4] **Ibid.**, 8.

[5] One exception is Lieutenant Commander Tota Ishimaru's book **Japan Must Fight Britain** which even envisioned the acquisition of Australia and New Zealand by the Japanese Empire. **Ibid.**, 159-170.

have been limited to the declaration of aspiration, rather than even the drafting of serious programs. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere announced in 1938, was exceedingly vague and ill-defined toward Southeast Asia, though the ultimate objective—again of an undefined hegemony—was implied.[6]

There were compelling reasons for limited Japanese interest in Southeast Asia prior to the outbreak of the European war, which easily out-balanced the attractions which the area held. Territorial ambitions were checked by the possibilities of becoming involved in a war with Great Britain, Holland, France, the United States or any combination of these nations. After the involvement in the China war in July 1937, the Japanese were all the more anxious to avoid such a possibility. A second reason for lack of real immediate interest in the area was the large-scale economic programming to which Japan was committed in Manchoukuo.

If the intensifying commercial activity in which Japan engaged in Southeast Asia was supposed to forbode a more tangible form of Japanese expansion, the pattern of trading activity was a curious one. In 1939, there was an unfavorable trade imbalance with the Philippines, Malaya and French Indochina. Only in Thailand had Japanese economic penetration made substantial progress.[7] The South Seas area as a whole comprised but nine per cent of Japan's total trade, as compared to twenty-seven per cent for North America and thirty-seven per cent for the Continental Area (Manchoukuo, China, and the Soviet Far East).[8] Of course, these percentages do not necessarily indicate a relative lack of Japanese interest in the South Seas, for the colonial powers purposely maintained artificial commercial barriers to impede the importation of a greater amount of cheap Japanese commodities into their protected colonial markets. These circumstances call attention to the restricted avenue in which Japan was forced to operate in Southeast Asia prior to the outbreak of European hostilities.

Had Japan made serious plans for territorial acquisition in Southeast Asia, the most important country which she would have had to take into account was Indochina. That country occupies a strategic position as stepping-stone to the rest of the area. To by-pass Indochina in the occupation of the East Indies, for example, would be to leave Japan's flank seriously exposed. Clearly, any carefully considered plan for the subjugation of any part of Southeast Asia had to be predicated upon the prior submission of Indochina, either by persuasion or force. We have noted that there was little likelihood of such an eventuality in Japanese calculations before the fall of France. But a nation which was planning on such a move at any time in the future, would be expected to at least engage in some degree of undercover preparatory work. Thus, it will be profitable to review briefly the history of Japanese penetration in Indochina.

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[6] W. H. Elsbree, Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements, 1940 to 1945 (Cambridge, 1953), 15.

[7] Hiroshi Sato, "Japan's Economic Relations in the Pacific Area," The Nippon Hyoron (August, 1940), extracts in Contemporary Japan, IX (September, 1940), 1194.

[8] Ibid., 1196.

In the century before the Shimabara Rebellion, the Japanese had made their presence clearly felt in Indochina. Tokugawa Shogunate "red seal" vessels called regularly in large numbers at the ports of Indochina where the Japanese population was quite large. There was a Japanese town in Cambodia, a country where no single Japanese was to be found in early 1940. Japanese were found even in responsible local government posts.[9] Japanese activities in Indochina were, however, ended by the long years of enforced isolation policy of the shogunate.

During the Meiji period, many Japanese again expressed interest in Indochina. The formation of the Japanese Asian Revival Society—coinciding with the intensification of French activities in Indochina—caused one of its members to argue for Japan to extend aid to the Annamese who were fighting the French.[10] However, Japan was not ready to challenge the rising Western hegemony in such areas as Indochina. Her efforts were turned instead to the realization of a long--range domestic industrialization program. For a time, following her victory of 1905, Japan was the focal point of greatly stimulated Asian nationalistic activity. But Japan's really significant direct contribution to this activity in Indochina (which had been encouraged by the Black Dragon Society[11]) was relatively short-lived. By 1910, under French pressure, Japan undertook the extradition of Vietnamese who had gone there to study.[12]

Information regarding subsequent Japanese activities in Indochina until the eve of World War II, is extremely difficult to find. But there appear to be some grounds for believing that a degree of penetration was attempted through at least three groups: the miniscule Japanese business community; the Vietnam Restoration League (Viet Nam Phuc Quoc Dong Minh Hoi), and the Cao Dai religious sect.[13]

The degree of penetration seems to have been minimal in all of these groups, but it was least effectual by means of the first—the business community. Due to the artificial barriers imposed by the French—the most impenetrable of any with which Japan was confronted in Southeast Asia—commercial activity between Indochina and Japan was slight. In 1939, there was a 25 million yen unfavorable balance for Japan in the trade between the two countries.[14] Commercial relations had actually been diminishing since a trade agreement was consummated in 1932.[15] The Japanese population, allowed to live only in Hanoi, Haiphong and Saigon, numbered approximately three hun-

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9 Seiichi Iwao, "Early Japanese Activities in Indo-China," Contemporary Japan, X (May, 1941), 619-620.

10 A former Japanese naval officer, Sone Toshitora. The organization was founded by Watanabi Koki and Miyajima Seichiro. J. Kallgren, "Asian Influence on Indochinese Nationalism," unpublished Master's Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of California at Berkerley, 1955, 17, citing Kokuryukai Editorial Staff, To-a Genkaku Shishi Kiden (Biographies and Records of Pioneer East Asian Patriots) (Tokyo, 1935), 816-823.

11 Ibid., 17.

12 J. Buttinger, The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam (New York, 1958), 428.

13 Kallgren, op. cit., 104.

14 Hiroshi Sato, op. cit., 1194.

15 C. Robequain, The Economic Development of French Indochina, trans. by Isobel A. Ward (London, 1944), 329.

dred.[16] Thus the efficient French police had no problem keeping the well-known, relatively few Japanese nationals under surveillance. The French could hamper the operations of suspected Japanese businessmen by preventing their re-entry into Indochina through various pretexts.[17] Whether as a consequence of this or not, Japanese commercial agents did not engage in large scale penetration activities,[18] but were used, if at all, for intelligence purposes of an extremely narrow purview. If the Japanese were interested in making substantial inroads into Indochina, they would have had to utilize more covert means.

The Vietnam Restoration League afforded one of the best vehicles for clandestine Japanese operations. This nationalist organization had a tradition of limited ties with Japan.[19] But it cannot be determined (on the basis of available information) to what extent the group was oriented favorably toward Japan, nor what its relationship with Japan was in the period immediately prior to World War II. It is surmised that there was some connection because of the League's participation in the revolt in southern Indochina which simultaneously took place with the Japanese entry into the north. There are indications that the rebels expected Japanese aid; when this was not forthcoming, their venture was soon suppressed by the French. The disappointed rebels fled to China. Members of the League who had not participated in the revolt, later constituted an important element in the principal pro-Japanese party of the subsequent occupation period.[20]

The Cao Daist sect—the third means by which Japanese penetration may have been effected—had received its greatest impetus as an organization, from a wealthy Cochinchinese woman who reportedly had lived in Japan for some time. Grounds for believing that the sect had undercover relations with the Japanese are based on three factors. The first is the unexplained source of the sect's considerable funds. The implication is that Japan may have provided some of this financial support. The second factor is that the French were ostensibly aware of the Cao Dai pope's underground political activities and deported him to Madagascar when it became clear that the Japanese were going to enter Indochina. Finally, the Cao Daists are believed to have had definite connections with the unsuccessful Vietnamese revolt which had been geared to Japan's entry into Tongking.[21]

It is to be noted that none of these groups contributed notably to the Japanese venture into Indochina, nor for that matter, were they of appreciable use to the Japanese during the period of occupation. The main point of this review of Japanese activities in pre-World War II Indochina—particularly those which might be interpreted as evidence of penetration for ulterior pur-

16 Seiichi Iwao, **op. cit.**, 619.

17 One prominent writer refers to the case of Mitsuhiro Matsushita, "an honest and well-known" Saigon merchant member of the Japanese firm, **Dainan Kohshi**, who was prevented from returning without apparent cause—Kyujiro Hayashi, "Glimpse of the South Seas Region," **Contemporary Japan**, IX (October, 1940), 1296.

18 Kallgren, **op. cit.**, 105, citing **Some Methods of Japanese Penetration in French Indochina Previous to the War**, August 31, 1943, private source.

19 Pham Boi Chau, who founded the organization in 1912, spent several years in Japan. Kallgren, **op. cit.**, 17-21.

20 **Ibid.**, 105.

21 **Ibid.**, 105-106.

poses—has been to show that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to support the contention that Japan had a conscious plan of expansion, in any form, toward Indochina prior to World War II. In part, it is true, Japanese exclusion from Indochina was due to a determinedly restrictive French policy. On the other hand, there is little evidence which would indicate that Japan was even interested in subverting the French or had any substantive designs in Indochina before the cataclysmic political and economic upheavals engendered by the war in Europe. The relative absence of information regarding Japanese penetration, only tends to confirm this interpretation of a general lack of interest by Japan. It is of the utmost significance that even the French prosecutor at the Tokyo war crimes trial, did not attempt to discuss Japanese subversive penetration of Indochina prior to 1940.[22]

If there had been a grand design on the part of the militarists, who so greatly influenced Japanese Government decisions, then it is one that lacked appreciable historic roots. Such a design for all intents and purposes, must have originated with the changing world situation of 1939 and 1940. Next, we might briefly review and analyze the motivations, actions and circumstances that led to the entrance of Japanese military personnel into Indochina.

Entrance Into Indochina

There is little, if any, doubt that the war in Europe—with the attendant disruption of world trade patterns and the fall of Holland and France—gave Japan cause to make corresponding recalculations in her aspirations and foreign policy toward Southeast Asia. Japan's aspirations were immediately inflated with respect to the role she might play in that area. It may even safely be conceded that Japan anticipated some of the transformations in the political configuration of the globe and gave forewarnings of a new direction evolving in Japanese policy. This may be gleaned from the declarations of certain significant agencies and personalities in the months preceding the key changes in Europe. On November 9, 1939, the Japanese Institute of the Pacific published in its organ, **The Pacific**, the claim that Japan had a preferential position in the South Seas because of her preponderant military strength. Consequently, the Institute asserted, "Japanese traders should receive improved treatment in Burma, the Dutch Indies and China."[23] Following the German invasion of Norway, Foreign Minister Arita, on April 15, 1940, served notice (it seems to this writer) to Germany as well as to the rest of the world, that Japan was bound to the South Seas region by "an intimate relationship of mutuality in ministering to one another's needs," and that Japan would be "deeply concerned" at any change in the **status quo** of the Dutch Indies.[24] On May 11, 1940, the day after the German plunged into the Netherlands, Foreign Minister Arita informed the Powers of Japan's increased concern over the area of Southeast Asia.[25] On May 29, 1940, General Koizo, Minister of Over-

[22] That part of the prosecution's case entitled "preparatory period" begins with the Japanese invasion of Hainan Island, it encompasses but two pages of the lengthy indictment. Robert Oneto, International Military Tribunal Far East, **Proceedings**, 6,710-2.

[23] The Institute was, at that time, held to represent the views of the Japanese Government. **The New York Times**, November 10, 1939.

[24] "Documentary Material," **Contemporary Japan**, IX (May, 1940), 656-7.

[25] **Ibid.**, IX (June, 1940), 778.

seas Affairs, declared: "The South Seas regions are very important in conjunction with the further expansion of Japan's economic strength... In the light of the progress of the China affair and the increasingly tense international situation caused by the second European war, careful and appropriate measures are required for the execution of Japan's South Seas development policy." [26]

The assumption that Japan immediately capitalized on the European situation to acquire territory in the south, is highlighted by its failure to give due recognition to several crucial factors. The first and foremost of these was the prevailing situation in China. In order for Japan to have been able to move militarily into Southeast Asia, she would have had to be relatively free from major commitments in China. Yet in the year 1940, the year in which the first Japanese military personnel entered Indochina, the reverse was manifestly the case. Which ever way one wishes to measure the extent of Japan's military commitment in China in 1940, one can hardly avoid conceding that this period was certainly anything but conducive to serious planning for opening another front elsewhere. In terms of personnel alone, Japan employed at least thirty-five divisions in China in 1940—numbering from 1,120,000 [27] to 1,350,000 [28] men. Against this considerable portion of Japan's military resources, there was a Chinese force of 5,700,000, three million of which were front line effectives.[29] In 1940, the conflict in China was not static. It was one of the war's most turbulent years. Though it is difficult to obtain statistics broken down into convenient periods, we may detect the sharp upward trend in the intensity of the conflict, from the following sets of figures. In the period from November 1938 to February 1940, there were four important battles, 163 major engagements, 5,349 minor engagements, and 4,143 guerilla engagements. From March 1940 to November 1941, the figures rise appreciably. In this period, there were five important battles, 333 major engagements, 6,704 minor engagements, and 5,142 guerilla engagements. The critical character of the latter period is attested further by noting the military activity for the duration of the war, a much longer period of time. Subsequent to November 1941 there were seven important battles, 136 major engagements, 9,329 minor engagements and 4,692 guerilla engagements.[30] Particularly bitter were the clashes between the Chinese Communist forces and the Japanese during 1940. In the period from June 1939 to May 1940 there were, according to Communist sources, almost 7,000 engagements between the Eighth Route Army alone and the Japanese, more than triple that of the previous year.[31] This turbulence is reflected in the number of casualties sustained by

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[26] NYT, May 12, 1940.

[27] Figure of the Nationalist Government of Military Operations—**China Handbook 1937-1945** (New York, 1947), 300.

[28] Figure given in F. F. Liu, **A Military History of Modern China 1924-1949** (Princeton, 1956), 205, citing Hattori, **Daitoa Senso Zenshi** (Tokyo, 1953), 314.

[29] **Ibid.**, 135.

[30] **China Handbook**, 1937-1945, 301.

[31] Yeh Chien-ying, **Report on the General Military Situation of the Chinese Communist Party in the War of Resistance** (September, 1944), 21. Statistics for the New Fourth Army are undifferentiated for the first three years of the war, but the period from May 1938 to May 1941 saw, on the whole, heavier fighting than the subsequent three years, 22.

both sides as a whole. In 1940, there were 114,426 Japanese killed and 229,191 wounded. These figures are a bit lower than the toll for each of the two previous years, but higher than the following two years.[32] The number of casualties inflicted by the Eight Route Army was 64,355, the second greatest number of any year during the war.[33]

It should be apparent from the briefest consideration of relevant statistics that the Japanese had their hands full in China during 1940. There is corroboration for this view of the situation by a number of reputable Western scholars, one of whom, in alluding to one of the most crucial theaters of action in China, remarked: "...early in 1940 the Japanese Armies were already beginning to lose such control of the Hopei plain as they had achieved in 1939. By 1940 Chinese control was sweeping back to the railway." [34] Another noted scholar perceived that the Japanese military were beginning to become wary of a "tedious and burdensome war of attrition" which might well "arouse such popular ill-will in Japan as to jeopardize the prestige and political power which the Army had secured since 1931." [35] A third, writing in late 1940, declared that "the prolonged test of strength with China has deprived Japan of the economic margin necessary to cover a large-scale conflict with a third power." [36]

It is with this situation and attitude in mind that we turn our attention to French Indochina—the role it played in the war, and the reason Japan decided to enter that country. With the China "incident" growing worse rather than approaching a solution, with Chiang K'ai-shek's continuing "intransigence," the Japanese determined to utilize every measure to bring the war militarily to a close. To accomplish this end, the Japanese began moving to seal off the area held by the "unregenerate" Nationalist government. Thus, a series of moves were initiated in south China calculated to redouble the pressure on the Nationalists and to blockade supplies to them from the remaining Chinese ports. The achievement of this objective served to highlight the traffic which continued to benefit the enemy, through neutral French Indochina and Burma.

The Japanese had not been insensitive to the French Indochina-Nationalist China reciprocal trading activities before their seizure of all the Chinese ports of entry. I have yet to come across a really objective Western account of the history of Japanese efforts to induce the French to delimit the supplies sent to Chungking. Even the most objective coverages of the subject seem unconsciously to reveal a pro-French sympathy. This is most clearly manifested in the tendency of most writers to emphasize the occasional Japanese bombings of the Yunnan railway, yet to completely ignore the Japanese apologies and attempts at compensation in instances when they were obviously at fault. The Japanese were fully aware of the legal prerogative of the French to engage in the trade. The French had such a right due to the fact that since a war had

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[32] **China Handbook** 1937-1945, 300.

[33] Yeh, op. cit., 21.

[34] G. E. Taylor, **The Struggle for North China** (New York, 1940), 169.

[35] F. C. Jones, **Japan's New Order in East Asia 1937-1945** (London, 1954), 1940.

[36] T. A. Bisson, "Indo-China, Spearhead of Japan's Southward Drive," **Foreign Policy Reports** (October 1, 1940), 176.

not formally been declared in China, the French were not violating the rules a neutral nation must heed. Yet the proportions of the Indochina trade made it a matter of vital strategic concern to the Japanese,[37] compelling them to exert every possible effort to persuade or pressure the French to recognize the "grave situation" in China and cooperatively to desist from further aggravating it.[38] On the eve of Japan's taking direct action in the matter, it was estimated that the war supplies transported over the Yunnan railway, totaled 17,000 tons per month. This figure represented some seventy per cent of the total munitions transported over all other routes to Free China.[39]

The surrender of France to Germany provided the propitious moment for taking concrete steps toward sealing off this extremely crucial supply line. Indeed the French, in anticipation of the Japanese moves in this direction, voluntarily began suspending the shipment of certain war material, two days before the first Japanese request.[40] In order to avoid unnecessary prolixity, this paper will make no attempt to retrace the tortuously intricate and detailed procedure whereby the Japanese pressured the Vichy regime into compliance with their increasing demands. There is readily available, at least, one good account of the machinations employed by the Japanese to achieve their objective of penetration into Indochina.[41] In brief, the story goes much like this. In order to suspend further military shipments to Nationalist China through Indochina, the Japanese resorted to a variety of military and diplomatic strategems. Militarily, these included the brandishment of a crack division in Kwangtung poised on the Tongking border, occasional bombings of the Yunnan railway, and the occupation of strategically located islands which rendered Indochina acutely vulnerable. Diplomatically, the Japanese persistently sought to apply pressure on Vichy, through the German Foreign Ministry. The moment for utilizing this latter means was never more propitious than in the couple of months preceding the consummation of the Tripartite Pact. Conversely, the German Foreign Ministry shrewdly deferred serving as an instrument of Japanese policy in this matter, hoping to promote the unseating of the uncooperative Yonai cabinet in Tokyo by virtue of its hesitation.[42] The Germans were successful in this tactic. The Japanese Army took the cue and replaced Premier Yonai with Prince Konoye, and Foreign Minister Arita with Yosuke Matsuoka.[43] The resultant German cooperation in bringing pres-

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[37] K. Bloch, "China's Lifelife... Indochina Frontier," Far Eastern Survey (February 14, 1940), 47-48.

[38] The Japanese case in the issue is well-presented, and is especially credible due to its restrained and relatively objective consideration of French arguments, in the "Business Report of 1939 Published by the Board of South Seas," IMTFE, Exhibit No. 616A, 1-8; the fullest exposition of the issue as viewed by a pro-French observer is Andrew Roth, **Japan Strikes South** (New York, 1941).

[39] Cabinet Information Bureau, "French Indo-China and the Chungking Regime," **Tokyo Gazette**, IV (August, 1940), 67.

[40] The French suspended not only shipments of arms and ammunition, but also of trucks and gasoline on June 17, 1940—"Excerpts from 'Business Report of South Seas Section in 1940,'" IMTFE, Exhibit No. 618A, 3.

[41] Jones, **op. cit., Japan's New Order.** This work is recommended reading for viewing the full context of which Japan's activities in Indochina were but a part.

[42] IMTFE, **Proceedings**, 6164-5.

[43] H. Feis, **The Road to Pearl Harbor** (Princeton, 1950), 79.

sure upon Vichy, in response to Japanese requests, marked the clearest of Foreign Minister Matsuoka's few diplomatic achievements.

As one might expect, the successive concessions which Japan forced from Vichy in Indochina, have been made to appear as yet further progressions in the unfolding of Japan's alleged ambitious program of conquest. But just as this paper has attempted to present a different interpretation of the motivation for entry, so it must explore a different reading of the early developments of actual Japanese penetration into Indochina. The popular conception of the Japanese southern advance, usually dates from the surprise occupation on February 10, 1939, of Hainan Island, strategically located off the south coast of Kwangtung and due east of Tongking.[44] The French, claiming territorial rights over the island, protested loudly. Japan sharply rejoined that there were no such legal restraints to the direct action she had taken.[45] Six weeks later, Japan occupied the Spratley Islands, still further south.[46] French Indochina was now clearly out-flanked. It is to be noted, however, that during 1939 and early 1940, Japan's attentions were fixed upon the supply route as it entered Yunnan. Occasional errors were made by Japanese pilots, as seems inevitable in such situations, and the Indochina side was bombed. The Japanese readily admitted such errors and offered compensation.[47]

The diplomatic and military pressures brought by Japan in June 1940, are generally considered further developments of this acquisitive program. And the entry of a team of Japanese military observers on June 29, 1940[48] to inspect the traffic between Hanoi and Kunming, is taken as the first concrete manifestation of a Japanese invasion of Indochina proper, by intimidation and guile. To be sure, less than a month later, the Japanese were serving new demands upon the French. This time, for airfields in Indochina and transit rights for Japanese troops.[49] One reason for this additionally desired military deployment by the Japanese, was the knowledge made public by the Japanese that critical war supplies continued to be smuggled into Yunnan through the mountains, a piece of intelligence not to be found in French accounts of the situation.[50]

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[44] It is of interest to note that a generally well-regarded Chinese military historian has made a significant mistake in causal relationships with respect to the Hainan invasion. F. F. Liu incorrectly asserts: "War broke out in Europe in September 1939 and, the following February, Japan took advantage of the French crisis and seized Hainan Island." Liu then writes off the painstaking Japanese efforts to penetrate Indochina by saying that "subsequently the French forces in Indochina were defeated...." Resting upon these faulty observations in his conclusion that Japan was attempting to isolate China, "in preparation for her long-contemplated southward push...." F. F. Liu, **A Military History**, 207.

[45] Publicity Bureau, Navy Department, "The Hainan Campaign," **Tokyo Gazette** (March, 1939), 17.

[46] On March 31, 1939. IMTFE, **Proceedings**, 6,710.

[47] IMTFE, Exhibit No. 616A, 6-7.

[48] **Ibid.**, Exhibit No. 618A, 4.

[49] "The Circumstances Surrounding the Conclusion of Agreement Between Japan and France Concerning the Advancement of the Japanese Army into French Indo-China, July-September 1940," IMTFE, Exhibit No. 620, 1.

[50] **The Japan Times Weekly**, VI (July 18, 1940), 415. See also IMTFE, Exhibit No. 618A, 3, on Chinese smuggling activities.

Whatever their motivation may have been in making further demands, once the Japanese had already acquired a foothold in Indochina, they were extremely careful in keeping a pretense of legality in their negotiations with the French. The latter, in a desperate situation, to be sure, played the game of diplomacy to the hilt. Having few stakes with which to bargain, the French alternately procrastinated and made bold counter demands. On several important points, French Ambassador to Japan Arsene-Henry actually persuaded the Japanese to relent. The most crucial of these was that the Japanese were not to have a "blank check" in Indochina, the receipt of which Henry feared had been the intention of Matsuoka.[51] The Henry-Matsuoka agreement also guaranteed French sovereignty over Indochina and that colony's territorial integrity. The most general concession the French were required to make was the recognition of Japanese economic and political predominance in the Far East. Because of this, the French agreed to concede privileges to Japanese trading interests in Indochina, superior to third Powers. Of the military concessions, the Japanese gave assurances that they were to be limited and temporary only. It was understood that the sole purpose of such concessions was to facilitate the ending of the Sino-Japanese conflict. The agreement further stipulated that the French were not to be involved in any expenditures, and, in the eventuality of the war's spreading to Indochina as a result of the military concessions, the French were to be compensated.[52] The settlement of specific provisions was left to Generals Nishihara and Martin in Hanoi, who signed a general agreement on September 4, 1940 and began working on particulars.[53] In doing so the French resorted to a number of evasive tactics, hoping, at the time, for aid from the United States. It might be noted that the procrastinating behavior of the French at this time was probably based, in part, on an underestimation of Japanese military capabilities, judged on the basis of the current Japanese commitment and difficulties in China.[54]

In order to compel the French authorities to reach an accord on the details of the September 4 agreement, the Japanese found it necessary to resort to extreme measures. The impatient South China Army—reacting to the continued delaying tactics of the French erupted into Tongking—administering a blistering defeat to the French forces at Langson.[55] But it is wrong to hold that this particular military operation was part of Japanese policy to force French acquiescence. It is true that the Japanese delivered an ultimatum to the French to reach an agreement by September 23, 1940 or suffer the incursion of the Japanese Army.[56] The French reached the necesary agreement on September 22 aboard the Japanese warship **Kawachi**.[57] The invasion of Indochina by the South China Army occurred three days later (on the 25th) without, therefore, any foreign policy objective. The French had already as-

[51] IMTFE, Exhibit No. 620, 6-7.
[52] **Ibid.**, 10-14.
[53] **Ibid.**, 16.
[54] In January 1940, the French had even held maneuvers in Tongking reportedly in order to "pressure" the Japanese. Roth, **op. cit.**, 43.
[55] IMTFE, **Proceedings**, 6,717.
[56] **Ibid.**, Exhibit No. 620, 41.
[57] **Ibid.**

sented to the immediate Japanese demands. It can only be concluded that this purposeless assault was a spontaneous gesture on the part of the aggressive young officers in the South China Army. But whatever else, it was clearly an unjustified attack and the Japanese Government readily admitted as much. The Emperor issued a personal order for the invading force to desist at once. The Japanese Government apologized for the incident, released the French prisoners, and returned Langson to the French. The general in command of the army and his staff were removed and many of the subordinate officers were court-martialed.[58] Even General Nishihara, in Indochina, was replaced by General Sumita,[59] as the Japanese Government anxiously sought to erase any semblance of official responsibility for the affray. Although it is probably true that this incident was not a conscious part of Japanese policy, it may well have had a beneficial effect on later Japanese efforts in Indochina. At least, it corrected the French estimation of Japanese military capabilities.

The military agreement finally reached on September 22, 1940 permitted the Japanese to garrison a maximum of 6,000 men in Indochina and to establish three Japanese airfields in Tongking. Permission was also given for 25,000 Japanese troops to pass through Tongking to Yunnan.[60] The Japanese objectives in Indochina had been satisfied. The supply route to Free China was effectively blocked, and Japanese military presence in northern Indochina was established on a legal basis, so that the great potentialities of the area might thus be utilized to end the dragging conflict in China. The prospects of an early end to that war were at no time brighter. Simultaneously with the successes in Indochina, was the three-month halt of supplies to Chungking by means of the Burma Road—a concession extracted from the British, then engaged in the all-important Battle of Britain.[61] There was in the wind even the possibility that the war might be ended without further military moves, through some adroit horse-trading in which Tongking might be given to Chiang K'ai-shek as part of a peace settlement.[62]

Economic negotiations between Japan and the French in Indochina began in October [63] and continued until the following May.[64] Of course, by the time they were completed, the Japanese obtained pretty much what they wished, for the negotiations spanned the time period during which Japan's general southward policy became much bolder. But economic gains for Japan were to

58 IMTFE, **Proceedings**, 36203-4.

59 Jones, 231.

60 IMTFE, Exhibit No. 620, 10.

61 "The Burma Route Question: Documentary Material," **Contemporary Japan**, IX (August, 1940), 1078-1079.

62 This plan was included in an unsigned memorandum of September 28, 1940, found in the Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives; reproduced in IMTFE, **Proceedings**, 6977-8; also in **ibid.**, "Japanese Foreign Policy," Exhibit No. 628.

63 The first meeting between Hajime Matsumiya and Governor-General Jean Decoux was held on October 22, 1940. **Contemproray Japan**, IX (December, 1940), 1599.

64 Board of Information, "Concerning the Conclusion of the Japanese-French Indo-China Economic Negotiations May 6, 1941," **Tokyo Gazette**, IV (June, 1941), 539.

have been expected in any event.[65] The political vacuum in the area fell far short in terms of immediate effect as did the economic vacuum created by disrupted world trade patterns. It is not difficult to understand how the French reconciled themselves to Japan as an alternative trading partner. The disadvantages of the new pattern were certainly less painful than no trading, no profit-making at all.

Southward Ambitions

The bright prospects soon vanished, in reality, much sooner than in the visionary calculations of Japanese decision-makers. Had the potential of Indochina been utilized for the purpose for which it was brought under Japanese control, there is a strong possibility that events may have taken a far different turn. Instead, the ease with which Japanese authority had been asserted in northern Indochina produced a phenomenal transformation in Japanese psychology. Japan had approached Indochina with all the cautiousness of a seasoned militarist, fully aware of the limited resources at her command and of the many dangers involved. Once entry had been effected, however, caution soon dissipated as the Japanese found themselves comfortably ensconced in a position that strategically looked out upon an inviting world to conquer, in a rare moment of history in which it was feasible to make the attempt. The initial caution had been dictated mostly by the uncertainty of the degree of French resistance. But rather than meeting resistance, the Japanese found that they had gained territory without even an accompanying sacrifice of men to administrative or police positions. The compliant French obviated such necessity by continuing to assume the administration of northern Indochina, as well as the responsibility that went with it. For the first time, the Japanese militarist could conceive of the logistical possibilities of a southward expansion. A tactical adventure thus became transformed into the first step of an ambitious, but improvising opportunistic grand strategy.

The improvised character of the new turn in policy was clothed in a quickly rationalized ideology. The Japanese divine mission—heretofore applicable, in the main, to Northeast Asia—was now proclaimed to include most of non-Caucasian Asia. Japanese political theorists hammered out a new theme that conformed to the surging fortunes of war. Most typical and significant were the ideas advanced by Iwao F. Ayusawa, who—stimulated by the recent successes—became intrigued with a concept of dynamism which Japanese action seemed to typify. Life itself was something dynamic,[66] reasoned this theorist, thus making it illusory for nations to hope for an idyllic "static" peace. Instead, he advocated a principle of "dynamic" peace[67] in which the world would be carved into frankly ingeniously conceived mutually inter-

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[65] V. Thompson foretold Indochina's economic fate months before negotiations began: "...Regardless of the form control over her will take, Indo-China is already, and will be perforce increasingly, integrated into an almost exclusively Far Eastern economy."—"Indo-China in Suspended Animation," **Far Eastern Survey**, IX (August 14, 1940), 198. See also J. R. Andrus and K. R. C. Greene, "Recent Developments in Indo-China 1939-43," supplement in Robequain; and, Katsusaburo Sasaki, "The Economic Pact with French Indo-China," Contemporary Japan, X (June, 1941), 758-67.

[66] Iwao F. Ayusawa, "The New World: A Japanese View," **Contemporary Japan**, IX (July, 1940), 808.

[67] **Ibid.**, 807.

dependent regional systems.[68] Within each of these regions, however, "the controlling power" was to "rest with those who possess the qualifications to take responsibility in political, economic and cultural affairs only to the extent that the qualifications are tangibly demonstrated." [69] There is no difficulty in discerning which came first here: practice or theory. But such distinctions were quite irrelevant to a nation riding the crest of a success-fed ultranationalistic wave. Opportunity appeared to be knocking for Japan; the people as well as their leaders, in an intoxicated mood, prepared themselves to take advantage of it.[70]

The economic and political benefits which would accrue to the "enlightened" participants of the new order were now extended to the rest of East Asia. Japanese newspapers and magazines focused attention on the promising lands of Southeast Asia, musing quite suggestively on their incorporation into the suddenly mushrooming conception of empire.[71]

Just when Japanese policy definitely turned toward southward ambitions is difficult to ascertain precisely. We discern the changing Japanese psychology toward wider horizons as a consequence of the successes in Indochina and certainly, in part, due to the spectacular **blitzkrieg** triumphs in Europe. The Tripartite Pact may be considered as representing formally the shift in policy especially due to its reference to the South Seas and its implicit settlement of that area's disposition.[72] But even yet, one cannot point to definite developments in the Southeast Asian arena as Japanese machinations designed to make further inroads. The flash of Thai irridentism,[73] which sought to capitalize on French misfortunes and which has been often alluded to as an instance of calculated Japanese agitation, actually was only an embarrassment to the Japanese in September 1940.[74] At that time, the Japanese were anxious to reach a military settlement with the French and were not at all desirous of provoking unnecessary French resentment by aiding and abetting Thai ambitions.

In November 1940, however, there was a distinct change in Japanese policy. By now, Japanese ambitions had become encouraged enough to begin a conscious, but still cautious, probing into the newly opening southern re-

[68] **Ibid.**. 806.

[69] **Ibid.**, 808.

[70] See D. M. Brown's authoritative description and analysis of this ultranationalistic period—chapter 10, "Ultranationalism," **Nationalism in Japan: An Introductory Historical Analysis** (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1955), 200-237.

[71] An example is "Let's Look at Indo-China," **The Japan Times Weekly**, VI (July 18, 1940), 415. This newspaper article contains an interesting expression of intention, but one which, considering the time at which it was made, must not be thought of as representative of the current decision-makers' views, at least, not their public ones: "Although Japan's immediate interest in Indo-China arises out of its belief that it has been utilized by Chiang K'ai-shek as a supply base and route, there is, of course, a much deeper concern associated with general Far Eastern strategy, the redistribution of Far Eastern foreign possessions and the southern expansionism advocated by a considerable body of public opinion in Japan...," 415.

[72] "The Three-Power Pact Between Japan, Germany and Italy," **Contemporary Japan**, IX (November, 1940), 1493.

[73] See V. Thompson, "Thailand Irredenta—Internal and External," **Far Eastern Survey**, IX (October 23, 1940), 243-50.

[74] IMTFE, Proceedings, 6871.

gions. On November 28, 1940, Foreign Minister Matsuoka proposed peaceful arbitration of the Siam-Indochina border dispute.[75] The French, fully conscious of a Japanese accord with Siam, flatly refused. The cautious Japanese waited a full two months before renewing the proposal. On January 21, 1941, Japan again offered mediation. This time, the French acceded, under considerable pressure from both Japan and Germany.[76] This pressure was maintained throughout the subsequent negotiations. On March 11, 1941, an agreement was reached and signed.[77] As a price for her "good offices" Japan incorporated French Indochina into the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and extracted crucial commitments from Thailand as well.[78]

One sees in this pattern of development an initially hesitant and indecisive Japan, becoming bolder and more aggressive and acquisitive within the course of six months. A roughly similar pattern was unfolding with respect to the Netherlands East Indies.[79] There, the Japanese failed to gain substantial satisfaction prior to the war. But in the initial stages of probing in this direction, the Japanese revealed again the undecided and improvised character of their developing policy. On October 16, 1940, Japanese special envoy to the Netherlands East Indies (Ichiro Kobayashi) had even concurred, granted reluctantly, to a joint statement disclaiming Japanese hegemony over the East Indies.

External and Internal Compromises

We must now take into account factors other than the weight of the China commitment and the logistical feasibility of further expansion which influenced Japanese decision-making in these critical months. The considerations which had beset Japan on forcing the issue in Indochina, over and above the possibility of heavy French resistance, had been the possible reactions of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. As regards the first, in spite of the fierce and preoccupying Battle of Britain, the Japanese were aware that the remaining British forces—centered at Singapore—were a risk, given the other uncertainties in the situation. The United States had already served notice of its desire of a **status quo** in the East Indies.[80] And with the move into Indochina, Japan effected its first great compromise with destiny. The ease of entrance and the cooperation of the French administration, evoked such immediate dreams of expansion in Japan as to blind her to the

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75 **Ibid.**, 6874; Board of Information, "Concerning the Mediation of the Border Dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China," **Tokyo Gazette**, IV (March 1941), 383.

76 Once again the German Foreign Ministry put pressure on Vichy to comply with the Japanese demands. An account of these backstage negotiations is to be found in IMTFE, **Proceedings**, 6444-7.

77 "Letters between Matsuoka and Henry on Mediation, 11 March 1941," IMTFE, Exhibit No. 633.

78 Board of Information, "Thai-French Indo-China Border Dispute and Japanese Mediation: An Historical Review of the Affair," **Tokyo Gazette**, IV (May, 1941), 429-443.

79 H. J. van Mook, **The Netherlands Indies and Japan** (New York, 1944), 44-45.

80 Secretary of State Cordull Hull's April 17, 1940 response to Foreign Minister Arita's statement of April 15. J. C. Grew, **Ten Years in Japan** (New York, 1944), 318.

continuing necessity, not only of settling the China conflict but also of maintaining an understanding with the United States.[81]

The initial Japanese penetration into Indochina itself had brought about quick United States counter-action in the embargo on scrap iron and steel.[82] While it is true that the United States' action had a sobering effect on subsequent Japanese moves [83] and, as such, constituted a real compromising of Japanese action, yet there is still another dimension to the act. In addition to being a prohibitive warning as to the adverse consciousness of the United States, the very act of depriving Japan of a vital resource at will, dramatically symbolized to the Japanese their actual dependent status. Such an awareness, coming at the height of the current wave of ultranationalism permeating Japan, resulted not only in a positive sobering, but in a profound negative bitterness as well. This state of mind naturally led to the beginning of serious strategic consideration of the southern regions for their resource potential. Thus, paradoxically, the action of the United States served not only as a warning against, but as a stimulus to, further imperialistic ambition. The die was cast between Japan and the United States.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, while a source of apprehension for Japan in mid-1940, was to come to a mutually profitable understanding with Japan before another year had passed.[84] This anxiety-relieving understanding gave sufficient buoyancy to Japanese confidence in mid-1941 to lead to the precipitate moves, again in Indochina, that brought about the irrevocable conditions which found their fulfillment in the Pacific War. The Japanese decision to station troops in southern Indochina in July 1941—whether prompted by real or contrived fears of the so-called ABCD encirclement and the intrigues of Kuomintang spies in the area [85]—provoked the most extreme of measures short of open belligerency by the United States such as the freezing of Japanese assets in that country.[86] Indochina served as the first step to a greatly

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[81] Prince Saionji indicated Japanese initial apprehensions by revealing that Japan had hesitated to make proposals to the French Government because "America's attitude on this matter was not known and therefore Japan had been reserved." **Saionji-Harada Memoirs**, chapter 367, June 28, 1940, 2853.

[82] Feis, **op. cit.**, 106.

[83] Grew, **op. cit.**, 335-336.

[84] W. L. Langer (ed.), **An Encyclopedia of World History** (Boston, 1948), 1150. Mutual Non-Agression Pact signed April 13, 1942.

[85] Foreign Minister Toyada claimed that the chief reason for occupying southern Indochina was to facilitate carrying out the China war, a reason which was somewhat anachronistic by July 1942. More plausible was South Seas Bureau Chief Saito's statement that the move was in response to recent Anglo-American efforts to impede Japan's progress, and also to suppress De Gaullist activities in the south—"Proceedings of the Privy Council re Protocol between France and Japan and re Military Cooperation, July 28, 1941," IMTFE, Exhibit No. 649, 4; even more revealing but of uncertain value is the secret information imparted through military channels two weeks earlier: "The immediate objective of our occupation of French Indo-China will be [sic] achieve our purpose there. Secondly, its purpose is, when the international situation is suitable, to launch therefrom a rapid attack... this venture we will carry out in spite of any difficulties which might arise." "14 July 1941 Secret Information from Military Officials to Attaches," IMTFE, Exhibit No. 641, 1; see also Board of Information, "Joint Defense of French Indo-China," **Tokyo Gazette**, V (September, 1941), 122-8.

[86] Grew, **op. cit.**, 408.

expanded empire, but it was a compromised step, for it elicited a gravely unfavorable reaction from major interested world powers.

If Japanese activities in Indochina involved a grievous external compromise with destiny, it was matched by an internal compromise of no less significance and importance. This internal compromise was one of principle, brought about by the method whereby Japan was enabled to achieve a position in Indochina that permitted her to consider further southward expansion. In short, it was a compromise effected by pure military expediency. The broadened restatements of Japan's divine mission, which figured so prominently in the newly evolving ideology accompanying Japanese successes in Indochina, trumpeted the theme of terminating the white man's exploitation of Asians. In planning upon this theme, the Japanese seemingly proved themselves acutely sensitive to the dynamism of an emergent Asian aspiration. However, if the Japanese were aware of the latent Asian political consciousness, they certainly pitifully misgauged the dimensions of it. Consequently, when they heralded a theme which harmonized with the ripening Asian desire for independence, they were ill-prepared, not only to cultivate it properly or keep it within bounds but also to keep their own practices within the confines established by the improvised ideology.

When the Japanese retained the French as sole administrators of Indochina and openly declared their cooperation with, and support of, the most widely despised White imperialists, their ideological program lost something of its appeal elsewhere in Asia, as well. Of course, other Asian nationalists would seek to work with the Japanese irrespective of this basic contradiction between Japanese principle and practice. The nationalists were understandably opportunistic. But they were not unmindful of the experience of the Indochinese nationalists. This continuing experience provided food for doubt wherever the Japanese extended their domination during World War II. Nowhere was the hastily devised character of the new Japanese ideology more manifest than in this unresolved contradiction. Certainly the Japanese were aware of it, but they were unable or unwilling to employ the measures to correct it. Instead, they impotently tried to make the best of the situation through empty platitudinous declarations in a futile attempt to please everyone. This is illustrated in the course of single article by one prominent writer who, on one page, asserted that "as far as French Indochina is concerned Japan should settle matters amicably with the French Government." [87] Yet, on the very next page, he declared: "The great need is to win and consolidate the confidence of the 120 million natives of the South Seas region in such a way that they will welcome us Japanese." [88]

The reason for this contradiction can be traced back to the initially indecisive policy with which the Japanese approached Indochina. We have already noted that there was an insignificant amount of interest by Japan in Indochina, prior to the outbreak of the European war. What little interest there was, had probably been manifested through some support of certain nationalist movements. We have noted too, that there is some reason to believe

[87] Hayashi, 1302.
[88] Ibid., 1303.

that a nationalist uprising in southern Indochina was coordinated with the Japanese entrance into northern Indochina—the nationalists being hopeful of further support by the Japanese. For their part, the Japanese clearly discerned the logistical advantages of retaining the French administration, at least, for the time being.[89] As it was, "the time being" lasted for almost five years.

The **modus vivendi** between the French and the Japanese worked sufficiently well to preclude the necessity of preparing Indochinese nationalists to take over the reins of government. Thus, the nationalists received extremely little support or encouragement from the Japanese throughout the period of Japanese occupation. There is reason to suspect that some clandestine support was directed through a Japanese businessman known only as Matsushita, and through the **Kempeitai**.[90] The Japanese utilized the Cao Dai in anti-Western movements and protected them when the French attempted to suppress their demonstrations.[91] The single noticeable overt effort of the Japanese to aid a distinctly nationalist group ended in failure when it was crushed by the French, and Japanese arms and uniforms were confiscated. After this event (which was kept quiet), the Japanese no longer openly aided the nationalists. "The failure to pursue an anti-French policy led," one writer has noted, "to disillusionment on the part of the interested native element."[92]

It is perhaps ironic that the greatest contribution to the nationalist cause was the result of a by-product of the Japanese occupation. In order to counter the Japanese use of the Cao Dai sect and secretive support of nationalists, the French resorted to a number of strategems—the most relevant being the creation of a mass youth movement. In a couple of years, by 1944, the movement had grown so large that the Governor-General created a Consultative Federal Commission for Sports and Youth to coordinate its development throughout the country.[93] This movement proved successful in its immediate purpose of counteracting the Japanese "divide and rule" concept by substituting a viable ideology which strengthened the unity and federalist concepts of the French. On the other hand, the entire mechanism of the movement was all too conducive to nationalist activity and in due time became a vehicle for Vietnamese revolutionists.[94]

When the grant of independence finally came on March 9, 1945,[95] Indochinese nationalists had little reason to be grateful to Japan. Despite the pro-

[89] To be sure the Japanese had alternative plans. One such plan prepared in the War Ministry on October 4, 1940, counselled a maneuvering of an independence movement and then the compelling of France to renounce its sovereign rights over Indochina. This was to have been put into effect if England had been invaded by the Germans. IMTFE, Exhibit No. 628, 4-5. It must be pointed out, however, that such a plan does not necessarily reflect the intentions of the top decision-makers.

[90] Kallgren, **op. cit.**, 120, citing **The Degree of Japanese Control Over the French Administration of Indochina**, private source.

[91] **Ibid.**, 118.

[92] **Ibid.**, 121, citing Summary of Conditions in Indochina Late 1944, December 15, 1944, private source.

[93] **Ibid.**, 117-8.

[94] **Ibid.**, 119.

[95] "The Disposition of French Indo-China," IMTFE, Exhibit No. 663.

pagandistic reading of the affair given by official Japanese news sources,[96] the Japanese gesture was too obviously a desperate rearguard tactic. With the ending of World War II, some Japanese fled to the hills and joined nationalist units. Japanese also sold arms and ammunition to nationalists.[97] But there is no indication that either of these activities was the result of a conscious Japanese policy. When the Japanese left Indochina, the legacy they left behind was an empty one. The improvised ideology, lacking internal consistency, had gone up in smoke. The improvised strategy, based, at best, on gross miscalculations had logically precipitated its own destruction.

[96] According to Radio Tokyo, Wu Wen-an, an "influential leader" of the independence movement on March 11, 1945, declared: "We have long awaited this day, ever since the Japanese forces entered Indochina. We would like to return home as soon as possible and lend every cooperation to the Japanese forces, both spiritually and materially." On February 8, several young Indochinese, according to the same source, presented a letter in blood to Premier Koiso, requesting permission to join the Japanese forces. U.S. Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, **Programs of Japan in Indo-China with Index to Biographical Data** (Honolulu, August 10, 1945), 79.

[97] Kallgren, op. cit., 129.

THE JAPANESE MINORITY IN THE PHILIPPINES BEFORE PEARL HARBOR; SOCIAL ORGANIZATION IN DAVAO [1]

JOSEFA M. SANIEL

THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY'S APPROVAL OF WHAT WAS soon to become the Philippine Immigration Act signed by the United States President in 1940 (a year before Pearl Harbor) prompted a leading Japanese journalist, Mr. Yesotaro Mori,[2] to write: "The passage of the anti-Japanese immigration bill. . . by the Philippine National Assembly makes a definite step forward in the Island's effort to drive out Japanese influence." [3] On the other hand, the Japanese government's reaction to this legislative action was revealed in the immediate filing by the Japanese Acting-Consul in Manila, of a memorandum with the Department of Labor of the Philippine Commonwealth Government, requesting for "the continuation of the fair and just treatment of Japanese immigrants to the Philippines" who had "always entered unrestricted" into the Islands.[4]

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[1] This paper was submitted to the Specialist Panel on Philipipne Foreign Minorities, at the April 1965 San Francisco Conference of the Association for Asian Studies. It is a preliminary study based on data gathered from a preliminary search of documentary or written sources as well as from open-ended, depth interviews with people (generally between 35 and 69 years of age) who could give information about the Japanese in pre-war Philippines. The plan of expanding the study into one of monographic length, involves the broadening of the base of data of this brief study. It includes a plan of using a systematized interview schedule for interviewing residents of selected areas in the Philippines where the Japanese had resided. Unless indicated, the sources of information are interviews with Filipino pre-war residents of Manila, Rizal, Ilocos Sur, Nueva Ecija, Mountain Province, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Cebu, Leyte, Cotabato, and Davao. Few in number, many of the interviews were conducted in Davao and Manila. The data gathered from them filled gaps left in the records.

I would like to acknowledge here, the help and/or criticisms of my friends and colleagues at the University of the Philippines: Dr. C. Parel of the Statistical Center; Dr. M. Concepcion, Acting-Director of the Institute of Demography; Prof. O.R. Angangco, Head of the Department of Sociology, and Prof. P.S. Manalang, Director of the Undergraduate Department, Graduate School of Education. I would also like to thank my research assistants: Mrs. Dolores L. Ventosa, who undertook interviews in Davao and helped me in the preliminary stages of the research, as well as Miss Teresita Corcuera, who undertook some interviews of informants in Manila and vicinity and gathered materials on the topic, wherever they were found. Except for Figure 3, all graphs used in this study were prepared from raw data by Mr. Pio A. Muñoz of the Statistical Center, University of the Philippines.

[2] Formerly Managing Editor of the **Osaka Mainichi** and Executive Editor of the **Japan Times and Mail**, Mr. Yesotaro Mori was then associated with the Foreign Affair Association of Japan. See note 42, chapter XXVIII of J. T. Hayden, **The Philippines. A Study in National Development** (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1945), 947.

[3] Quoted from Yesotaro Mori, "Close Doors in the Philippines," **Contemprorary Japan**, IX (June, 1940), 689-697, in **ibid.**, 725.

[4] "Jones talks on action of Nippon Envoy," **Herald**, July 21, 1939, 1. See also "Kihara lauds uniform quota for Orientals," **Bulletin**, January 28, 1939, 1. Both clippings are in the Manuel L. Quezon Collection, National Library, Manila. (Hereafter cited as Quezon Col.)

Both responses to the passage of the immigration bill in the National Assembly suggest the existence of a significant and/or influential Japanese minority in the Philippines before the outbreak of the Pacific war, early in December 1941. Four years before, President Manuel L. Quezon described and doing business in the Philippines. . ."[5] From 1918 to 1941, this Jap- this minority as consisting of ". . .Thousands of Japanese subjects residing anese minority was the second largest group of foreigners in the archipelago, next only to the Chinese which was about six and over four times larger than the Japanese in 1918 and 1939, respectively.[6]

While the Japanese minority lagged behind the Chinese in number, the quantitative increase of the Japanese in the Philippines before Pearl Harbor, based on the Census data (this does not include the possibility of officially unrecorded increases), is impressive: more than twenty-two times and less than three times increase within the 1903-1918 and 1918-1939 intercensal periods respectively, or in 1939, more than twenty times over the 1903 Census figures.[7] This increase is even more remarkable when we consider that, unlike the Chinese, there was hardly any Japanese settler in the Philippines at the turn of the century. For after Japan emerged in mid-nineteenth century from her isolation of over 250 years, available records indicate—among others—that there was only a negligible number of Japanese sojourners, contract laborers, Consular officials and personnel, traders as well as military men who were in the Philippines between the 1870's and the close of the century.[8]

The number of Japanese in the Philippines, viewed in terms of the total population of the Island, appears insignificant: 7,806 compared to the total Philippine population of 10,314,310 in 1918, and 29,262 to 16,000,303 in 1939. But when we consider this number of Japanese **vis a vis** the influence of its members upon prewar Philippine society, its importance looms large.

Essential to an understanding of the degree of a foreign minority group's impact upon its host country, is its social organization. Because of the present lack of data regarding the Japanese minorities in the other areas of the Philippines, this study of the Japanese social organization in the Philippines is limited to the case of Davao. It will, however, be preceded by a discussion of the general developments concerning the pre-war Japanese minority in the Philippines.

I

Available Philippine Census data of Japanese immigrants and emigrants before Pearl Harbor, cover only twenty-nine years: 1910-1939.[9] (See Figure

[5] Quoted from M. L. Quezon's speech delivered at a banquet in his honor in Tokyo, Japan, February 1937. **Messages of the President**, III, pt. I (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1938), 41.

[6] The Census of 1918 records the total Chinese population in the Philippines as 43,802 and the Japanese, 7,806. By 1939, the Census figures were: Chinese, 117,461; Japanese, 29,262.

[7] The Census of 1903 records 921 Japanese residents in the Philippines.

[8] See J. M. Saniel, **Japan and the Philippines** (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1963) especially chapters V, VII and VIII. See also E. J. Corpuz, "Japan and the Philippine Revolution," **Philippine Social Science Review**, VI (October, 1934), 249-296.

[9] The statistical data used are found in Table 22 of the **Census of the Philippines for**

1.) Throughout this period, the number of Japanese immigrants far exceeded that of emigrants except in 1922, 1932-1935 and in 1939, during which years there were absolute decreases of the Japanese in the Philippines, as a result of increases in the number of Japanese emigrants and decreases in the Japanese immigrants of the Islands.[10]

The number of Japanese emigrants from the Philippines fluctuated within a range of 100-3,000 emigrants, averaging more than 780 per year from 1910 to 1939, and reaching only one notable peak of 2,945 Japanese departing from the Philippines in 1939—the very year which saw the largest number of absolute decrease of Japanese population in the Islands.[11] Because of the escalation of Japan's war in China and the possibility of her being involved in a Pacific war against the enemies of her European allies—Germany and Italy—it is likely that this trend of absolute decrease of Japanese residents in the Philippines, continued until Pearl Harbor.

Japanese immigration, on the other hand, fluctuated within a range of 500-4,500 Japanese entering the Philippines, averaging more than 1,500 per year from 1907-1939 (around twice as many as the annual average number of emigrants, thus leaving a balance of an average annual increase) and reaching two marked peaks: 3,559 in 1918; 4,170 in 1937. Within the period under consideration (1910-1939), the four largest absolute increases in the number of Japanese in the Philippines took place during the following years: 1917, 3,304; 1918, 2,871;[12] 1927, 2,394;[13] and 1937, 2,235.[14]

1939, II (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1940), 106. The statistical data is presented in a graph, Figure 1, of this paper.

Also used as source of statistical data is the graph of the number of Japanese residents in Davao found in H. Kamabara, **Davao Hojin Kaitakushi** (The History of the Japanese [Residents] in Davao) (Davao: Nippi-Shimbunsha, 1938). See Figure 3 of this paper.

[10] The annual absolute decreases for 1932 to 1935 were comparatively significant and could perhaps be viewed in terms of the decline in the prices of abaca—a result of the economic depression of the early 1930's and the increasing effectivity of the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods in the Philippines—a consequence of the Manchurian incident and the Japanese aggressive activities in north China during the first half of the decade, as well as the increasing tariffs on Japanese goods in most countries of the West and in their respective colonies in Asia, as in the Philippines. The absolute decrease in 1922 was negligible.

[11] This decline might be ascribed to the overseas Japanese residents—especially women and children—returning to their homeland, as a result of the expansion of the undeclared Sino-Japanese war, the outbreak of the European war which called for increasing war preparations in Japan; possibly also, the approval of the Philippine immigration bill by the National Assembly in 1939.

[12] The boom in Japanese trade and industries as well as in the prices of abaca during World War I, and the sale of American-owned plantations in Davao to Japanese entrepreneurs in 1917 which created a greater demand for both Japanese technical men and cultivators, might have caused the absolute rise in number of Japanese residents in the Philippines in 1917 and 1918. In connection with the sale of the American-owned plantations, it should be recalled here that the United States entered World War I in 1917, the year after the Philippines was given full autonomy under the Jones Law. It was a time when speculations were rife about Japan's ambitions in Asia and the inability of the Philippines to defend itself, in case Japan would choose to make certain demands upon the Philippines, while the United States was involved in the European war. For the economic development of Japan during the first World War, see W.W. Lockwood, **The Economic Development of Japan. Growth and Structural Change, 1868-1938** (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1954), 38-42.

[13] The 1927 banking crisis in Japan took place two years earlier than in the West. At the time, economic opportunities in the homeland hardly kept pace with the larger


JAPANESE IMMIGRANTS AND EMIGRANTS
1907–1939
NUMBER OF PEOPLE
PHILIPPINE CENSUS, 1939, Vol. II
TABLE 22, p.106
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
1907 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
YEAR
LEGEND: IMMIGRANTS EMIGRANTS

Figure 1

Comparing H. Kamabara's graph of the Japanese residents in Davao (see Figure 3) with the one depicting absolute increases and decreases of the Japanese population in the Philippines (see Figure 2), it can be noted that the trends of absolute increases or decreases observable in the latter are repeated in the former,[15] except during the first half of the 1930's. Within this period, there was an increase of Japanese residents in Davao, notwithstanding the general trend of an annual absolute decrease in the total Japanese population of the Philippines.[16]

Davao's total Japanese population in 1918 and in 1939 was over 34.5% and around 69% more than the total Japanese population of the other parts of the Philippines for the same years. Compared with Manila's, which ranked second in the size of its Japanese residents, Davao's was 177% more in 1918; in 1939, 277%. The range of the number of Japanese in each of the Philippine provinces, not including Davao and the city of Manila, varied in 1918 from O (in the provinces of Batanes, Antique, Capiz and Bohol) to 195 (in Laguna); in 1939, from 1 (in the provinces of Abra and Batanes) to 1,188 (in the Mountain Province).[17]

Outside of Davao and Manila, there were in 1918 only three provinces of Luzon and one in Mindanao with more than 100 Japanese: Laguna, Mountain Province, Zambales, and Zamboanga. Fourteen Philippine provinces—six in Luzon, five in the Visayas and three in Mindanao—had more than 100 Japanese by 1939: Mountain Province, Pampanga, Batangas, Laguna, Quezon (then Tayabas), Camarines Norte, Palawan, Masbate, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Cebu, Zamboanga, Cotabato and Misamis.[18]

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number of new job seekers pouring into the labor market each year as the population grew. This might account for the absolute increase of the number of Japanese immigrants in the Philippines in 1927. See Lockwood, **op. cit.**, 42-43.

[14] It is more different to attempt an explanation for the absolute increase of Japanese in the Islands in 1937, except perhaps, if there are proofs indicating that this increase resulted from the movement from China to the Philippines, of Japanese investors, agricultural cultivators, etc. Or, perhaps, the absolute increase of the number of Japanese in the Philippines in 1937, might have been encouraged by the sympathetic attitude of President Quezon towards the Japanese which is revealed in his statements to the press, after his return from his personal investigation of the so called "Davao problem," and his assurance of protection of Japanese rights of, and extension of courtesy to, the Japanese in the Philipines, during his Tokyo visit in February, 1937. See the record of the Press Conference held at Malacanang, May 8, 1936, Quezon Mss., Quezon Col. In this conference, President Quezon categorically denied the existence of the "Davao problem," adding "that it was ridiculous to believe that the Japanese control Davao." For President Quezon's speech in Tokyo, see the **Messages of the President, op. cit.**, 37-38.

[15] To cite some instances, when significant, absolute increases in the total Japanese population of the Philippines took place in 1917, and 1918, there was a parallel movement in the number of Japanese residents in Davao. The sudden decline of the number of absolute increase of the Japanese population in the Philippines between 1919 and 1923, had corresponding developments in Davao. And so was this parallel trend noticed in the marked expansion of the number of absolute increase of Japanese in the Philippines between 1923 and 1925.

[16] One can speculate that for reasons given in footnote 11, **supra**, the Japanese in the Philippines, who resided outside of Davao, decided either to return home or to move to Davao where, they might have thought, they had better chances to survive.

[17] The statistical data used are found in the **Philippine Census for 1939, op, cit.**, 428.

[18] **Ibid.**


INCREASE OR DECREASE OF JAPANESE IMMIGRANTS OVER JAPANESE EMIGRANTS IN THE PHILIPPINES: (1907 – 1939)
NUMBER OF PERSONS
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
-1,000
-2,000
1907 '08 '09 '10 '11 '12 '13 '14 '15 '16 '17 '18 '19 '20 '21 '22 '23 '24 '25 '26 '27 '28 '29 '30 '31 '32 '33 '34 '35 '36 '37 '38 '39
Y E A R
Source: Based on Table 22, Census of 1939 Vol. II, p. 106

Figure 2

DAVAO HOJIN KAITAKUSHI
(HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE [RESIDENTS] IN DAVAO)



LEGEND:

o- - - - -o DAVAO JAPANESE RESIDENTS.

•———• AVERAGE MARKET PRICE PER PICUL, PER YEAR OF GRADE-F ABACA.

NOTE:

1915 EXCEPT FOR DECEMBER.
1916 FROM SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER.
1918 EXCEPT MAY AND DECEMBER.
1919 EXCEPT MARCH.
1937 UP TO NOVEMBER, 1937.

SOURCE:

KAMABARA HIROJI, DAVAO HOJIN KAITAKUSHI (HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE [RESIDENTS] IN DAVAO) (DAVAO: NIPPI-SHIMBUNSHA, 1938).

NOTE: ON NUMBER OF JAPANESE IN DAVAO. (H. KAMABARA).

1. The statistical data for 1903–1909 are based on estimates, not on written records.
2. From 1919 to 1936, the statistical data are based on the report the Japanese Association made annually, on October 1.

Figure 3

If the Philippines is divided into ten regions, according to the classification of the Philippine Statistical Survey of Households (PSSH) of the Bureau of Census,[19] (see Figure 4) we can make—among others—the following generalizations about the Japanese population in these regions: (1) there were significant increases of Japanese residents between 1918 and 1939 in all ten regions except in Region II,[20] Region IV[21] and Region V;[22] (2) the regions of highest concentration of Japanese were Region I (Manila) and Region IX (includes Davao); (3) the region of least concentration of Japanese were Region II and Region X.[23]

In all ten regions, the number of Japanese males in 1918 was much greater than the number of Japanese females—the number of males being about fifteen times that of Japanese females in Region IX [24] (includes Davao); five times, in Region V; four times in Region VI,[25] Region VII,[26] Region VIII,[27] as well as Region X and only three times, in Region I (Manila).[28] But while the numerical superiority of Japanese males existed in all ten regions in 1918 (see Figure 5) thus making inter-marriage very possible, the Census figures of 1939 seem to support a Filipino anthropologist's assumption that the Japanese residents in the Philippines "did not inter-marry extensively with the native population."[29]Out of a total of 29,262 Japanese in the Philippines in 1939 (after over three decades of Japanese settlement in the Philippines, preceding Pearl Harbor) only 884 males married Filipino women, 874 of whom chose to retain their Filipino citizenship and only 10 took their husband's.[30] Was this because of the ease in arranging for Japanese females to marry Japanese overseas males who could choose their future brides from among pictures furnished them by middlemen based in Japan(the "picture bride")? Was it because Japanese males were averse to marrying Filipino females and Filipino females not generally disposed to marrying Japanese males? Or was it a combination of all these reasons and, perhaps, others? Definite answers to these questions are not easy to make because—unlike countries, such as Peru, where there lived a pre-war Japanese minority group which has remained in the country until today[31]—in the Philippines, hardly any prewar Japanese residents survived death or post-war repatriation to Japan. Identifying those who are still alive among the former residents of the Philippines, and interviewing them today would be most difficult.

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19 See Figure 4 of this paper.

20 Ilocos Sur, Ilocos Norte, Abra, Batanes and La Union.

21 Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Pangasinan, Tarlac, Bataan and Zambales.

22 Batangas, Cavite, Palawan, Quezon, Laguna, Marinduque, and Rizal.

23 Agusan, Bukidnon, Lanao, Misamis, and Surigao.

24 Sulu, Zamboanga, Cotabato, Davao.

25 Albay, Camarines Sur, Camarines Norte, Catanduanes, Masbate, Sorsogon.

26 Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Siquijor Is., Aklan, Antique, Capiz and Romblon.

27 Bohol, Cebu, Leyte, Samar.

28 See Figure 4 of this paper.

29 See M. Tangco, "The Christian Peoples of the Philippines," **Natural and Applied Science Bulletin,** XI, No. 1 (January—March, 1951), 99.

30 Census for 1939, **op. cit.,** 296-397.

31 See M. Titiev, "The Japanese Colony in Peru," **The Far Eastern Quarterly,** X, No. 3 (May, 1951), 227-247. See also "50,000 Japanese from 3 Generations Live in Peru," **Manila Bulletin,** December 16, 1965, III.


JAPANESE POPULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES
BY REGION: 1918-1939
POPULATION IN THOUSANDS
20
15
10
5
0
1918
1939
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
R E G I O N
MANILA
ILOCOS SUR ILOCOS NORTE ABRA BATANES LA UNION
CAGAYAN ISABELA MT. PROVINCE NUEVA VISCAYA
BULACAN NUEVA ECIJA PAMPANGA PANGASINAN TARLAC BATAAN ZAMBALES
BATANGAS CAVITE PALAWAN QUEZON LAGUNA MARINDUQUE MINDORO RIZAL
ALBAY CAMARINES SUR CAMARINES NORTE CATANDUANES MASBATE SORSOGON
ILOILO NEGROS OCC. NEGROS OR. SIQUIJOR IS. AKLAN ANTIQUE CAPIZ ROMBLON
BOHOL CEBU LEYTE SAMAR
SULU ZAMBOANGA COTABATO DAVAO
AGUSAN BUKIDNON LANAO MISAMIS SURIGAO
PHILIPPINE CENSUS, 1939 Vol. II p. 428
1918 Vol. II pp. 352-353

Figure 4


CITIZENSHIP AND SEX BY REGION
JAPANESE: 1918
POPULATION
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
REGION
LEGEND:
MALE
FEMALE
PHILIPPINE CENSUS, 1918: pp. 352-353

Figure 5

Whether the Japanese residing in the Philippines continued speaking their language, can be answered by comparing, on the one hand, the 1939 Census figures of the Japanese residents recorded in 1918 as well as in 1939 and, on the other, the data on the number of people who spoke Japanese in 1939 in each province of the Philippines as well as in Manila. With these two sets of statistical data in view, it can be said that the negligible balance between the two varied slightly.[32] This would suggest that both the first and second generation Japanese in the Philippines, during almost four decades of this century, appear to have persisted in speaking their language—without, of course, eliminating the possibility of their acquiring an ability to communicate in one or more of the Filipino languages. What seems interesting to point out is that in three of the four ranking areas in size of their Japanese population in 1918 and in 1939 (Manila, Davao and the Mountain Province), a negative balance was recorded, while in the province of Rizal, the positive balance was an exceptional high of 502 speakers in Japanese.[33]

What were the occupations of these Japanese residents in the Philippines who persisted in speaking their own language? It is well to note here the kinds of occupation in which they were involved and compare their number in each occupation to that of the Chinese, numerically the leading foreign minority in the Philippines[34] (see Figure 6).

The Japanese entered all the recorded occupations in the Islands: the non-gainful, and each of the eleven Philippine Census categories of gainful occupations.[35] Except in agriculture and fishing, the Chinese numerically exceeded the Japanese in every occupation, with the total number of Chinese involved in trade far outstripping the over-all number of Japanese engaged in all occupations of the Philippines. Over 6,700 Japanese compared to more than 1,200 Chinese were engaged in agriculture; in fishing, upward of 1,500 Japanese to less than 100 Chinese. A considerable number of offshore fishing establishments were operated by Japanese for Filipino owners. The former, operated only upward of 400 thousand pesos or 0.9% of a total of 46 million pesos assets of all fishing establishments in the Philippines in 1939; the latter, more than 43 million pesos or 94.8%.[36] In the late thirties, direct Japanese investments in the Philippines increased and became more diversified

[32] The balance varied from 1 (in Abra) to 57 (in Quezon, then Tayabas province) more people speaking Japanese in 1939 than the total recorded Japanese residents in a particular area (not including the exceptional high of 502 more people speaking Japanese in Rizal province); from 3 (in Bukidnon and Bataan) to 106 (in Davao) less people speaking Japanese than the Japanese living in a community (the high of 959 less people speaking Japanese in the Mountain Province is not included). For statistical data, see **Census for 1939, op. cit.,** 367-373, 428. See also **Census for 1918** (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1920), II, 352-353.

[33] It might be because, according to a respondent, a significant number of the members of the **Makapili**—a pro-Japanese organization established during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines—came from Rizal province and many of them had learned Japanese before the war.

[34] For statistical data, see **Census for 1939, op. cit.,** II, 505-521.

[35] They are: (1) Agriculture, (2) Domestic and Personal Services, (3) Professional Services, (4) Public Services, (5) Fishing, (6) Forestry and Hunting, (7) Mining and Quarrying, (8) Manufacturing and Mechanical Industries, (9) Transportation and Communication, (10) Trade, and (11) Clerical. See Figure 6 of this paper.

[36] See **Census for 1939, op. cit.,** IV, 351.

OCCUPATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES, BY CITIZENSHIP JAPAN AND CHINA; 1939



Figure 6

while it is likely that Japanese capital (which is difficult to ascertain) was indirectly invested in mining and manufacturing (especially in textiles) under the cover of Filipino names in order to circumvent the law covering foreign ownership in certain sectors of the Philippine economy.[37] The Japanese also worked for Filipino farm owners and/or lessors of public lands in Davao, where the Japanese in the Philippines mainly undertook their agricultural pursuits.

In the late thirties, while the number of Japanese involved in Philippine trade fell very far behind that of the Chinese, the former were fast developing a system of retailing (the Japanese response to the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods in the early part of the decade) which seemed to rival that of the Chinese in the Philippines. This was perhaps because Japanese retail shops were more modern and attractive than most of the Chinese shops, were financially backed by the great business houses of Japan and supported by branches of two Japanese banks in Manila.[38]

These banks must also have been involved in the trade between Japan and the Philippines. The general trend of trade between 1900 and 1938 indicate a fluctuation of imports within a range of more than 850 pesos in 1900 and over 32 million in 1920; exports, over 500 thousand pesos in 1910 and more than twenty million in 1937. Imports exceeded exports for all years—that is, the balance of trade was unfavorable to the Philippines from 1900 to 1938—except in 1901, 1903 and 1912 when exports left imports behind and in 1904, 1915 and 1916 when imports and exports were practically balanced. The gap between imports and exports increased tremendously in 1918 when imports exceeded exports by around 64.5% and widened in 1920 when it was 116%; another wide gap is noted in 1937 when imports was around 61% more than exports. It might be pertinent to recall here that the last gap occurred in the same year the number of Japanese immigrants into the Philippines reached a second peak which was higher than the first one of 1918[39] (see Figure 7).

Early in the 1920's, Japan became the second leading market for Philippine exports, a position she alternately occupied with Great Britain in the twenties on to the beginning of the thirties, and then continuously held from 1933 to, perhaps, 1940 when the United States Embargo on trading in strategic goods with Japan, applied to the Philippines. Mainly consisting of Philippine cash crops, sugar and abaca took the lead in the Philippine exports list of the 1920's with lumber and scrap iron—among others—added to it in the thirties.[40] Japan also held a leading position as a source of Philippine imports early in the twenties, and continued in this place through the next decade, except during the period of comparatively effective Chinese boycott of Japanese goods in the early thirties.[41] By 1937, despite her entry into the

[37] Hayden, **op. cit.**, 713.
[38] **Ibid.**, 713-714.
[39] See **Census for 1939, op. cit.**, 240. See also Figure 1 of this paper.
[40] See the annual reports of the Insular Collector of the Bureau of Customs covering the 1920's and the 1930's.
[41] **Ibid.**

PHILIPPINES — JAPAN TRADE RELATIONS: 1900 — 1938



Figure 7

Sino-Japanese war, Japan placed second to the United States in her total trade with the Philippines which was more than 52 million pesos.[42]

The Philippine-Japan trade would add up to a more favorable balance for Japan, if we consider Japanese services to the Philippines, such as transporting part of the country's imports and exports. As early as 1918, Japan became the third ranking (following the United States and Great Britain) in the number of vessels engaged in the foreign carrying trade of the Philippines.[43] She kept this position in 1925, even placing second to Great Britain during the last six months of 1933;[44] it is likely that she kept close to the first three positions in the carrying trade of the Philippines until Pearl Harbor.[45]

II

The outbreak of the last Pacific war and the subsequent Japanese occupation of the Philippines, confirmed the pre-war Filipino fear of Japan's intentions towards their country. An attempt will be made here to view the social organization of the Japanese minority in the Philippines—with Davao as a case study—as part of the larger social system, that is, the Japanese empire.

The empire of Japan which was dismembered at the end of the war, theoretically centered at the top in the emperor, who was considered co-extensive with the national polity (**kokutai**), and also the father of the nation—a family writ large. At the base of this social system's vertical hierarchy, was the Japanese family which was also vertically and hierarchically organized and controlled from the top by the father of the nuclear family, upwards by the house head, village head and ultimately by the emperor whose decisions were, in fact, those of Japan's national leaders working behind their divine emperor. The family system was the model for all other pre-war social groups in Japan, including economic groups which were also vertically and hierarchically organized from the small-scale family industries at the base, upwards in the family-owned-and-managed **zaibatsu** cartels—vast interlocking national and international business and commercial enterprises which could be manipulated from the top of the larger system. The decision-makers at the top held the power (behind the emperor) to allocate government subsidy to business and commercial concerns. Consequently, it was not the demands of the market but the national goals, set down by these decision-makers, which directed these economic groups' investment, production and other economic activities.[46]

Within the family system encompassed by the larger social system, conformity and hierarchy are the inevitable results; the individual is always

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42 "P. I. Foreign Trade Remained Healthy in 1957," **The Tribune**, April 1, 1938, 10.
43 **Census of 1918, op. cit.**, IV, pt. 2, 669.
44 U.S. Governor General of the Philippine Islands, **Annual Report**, 1933, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1933, House Doc., no. 32 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1935), 19.
45 This speculation is made on the basis of Japan's increasing total trade with the Philippines during the period, in the absence of available data at the time this paper was written.
46 This theoretical framework is discussed more closely in J.M. Saniel, "The Mobilization of Traditional Values in the Modernization of Japan," in **Religion and Progress in**

aware of the group's judgment of his deeds. He is conditioned to recognize his "proper station" within the hierarchy, to accept directions from above, and to submerge his interests within those of his group. Group condemnation is the primary sanction for non-conforming behavior, a control mechanism which causes "shame" and "loss of face" to the individual.

It can generally be assumed that the first group of Japanese settlers, who came to the Philippines in the first decade of this century, were socialized within the aforementioned family system. They could have been educated under the educational system which was reformed in 1890 to facilitate control from the top and indoctrinate the students in the traditional values of filial piety and loyalty to parents and to the divine emperor. Moreover, these early Japanese migrants were participants in the larger social system, described earlier, which had been pushed by Japan's decision-makers into a successful war with China in 1894-1895, and, ten years later, with Russia.

It can also be supposed that these first generation Japanese residents of the Philippines and the other first generation Japanese who arrived in the Islands in later years, tended to behave as they were conditioned within the Japanese family system, thus making it possible for the values of the social system — filial piety and loyalty — to be transmitted to the next generation. The strength of these values varied according to the presence or absence within the community where the Japanese settled, of reinforcing institutions (such as Japanese schools) and/or social groups or associations. It should also be stated here that the members of the pre-war Japanese minority in the Philippines could have consisted mainly of first and second generation Japanese, if we take thirty years as the span of a generation. Furthermore, they were close enough to the Japanese home islands and closer to the southernmost part of the Japanese empire—Taiwan—to feel secure and maintain contact with other members of their extended families back home as well as keep abreast with the developments in the larger social system.

With the preceding frame of reference and assumptions in view, an attempt will be made to look at the social organization of the Japanese minority in Davao. This does not imply that the conception of social organization of this minority applies to other Japanese minorities located elsewhere in the Philippines. It is quite possible that the social organization of these other groups varied. If such variations did exist, the data to support this notion have yet to be obtained.

Available data suggest that in spite of geographical separation from the home islands, the degree of integration of this Japanese minority in Davao with the larger social system was greater than its integration with the alien social groups surrounding it. With the latter, one can presuppose a minimum amount of interaction and accommodation sufficient for its survival in an alien setting. This also implies the non-occurrence of assimilation with Philippine society and culture—except, perhaps, of some Okinawans who married Bagobo (indigenous minority) wives—[47] and the retention of its identity as a Jap-

Modern Asia, ed. by R.N. Bellah (New York: The Free Press, 1965), 124—149.

[47] See discussion on the two kinds of Japanese in Davao—the Non-Okinawan and the Okinawan (who dressed and spoke differently) and discrimination existing between

anese social organization. Unremarkable as this hypothesis may seem, it is necessary to validate it with supporting positive evidence. Besides, compared, for instance, with the second generation descendants of diverse ethnic immigrant groups to countries like America—whose aspirations center largely on cultural identification with the majority—this continuing cohesiveness and voluntary segregation of the Japanese minority in Davao, seem to indicate the strength and the power of the Japanese social organization and its underlying major value orientations. Of course, had the state of affairs in Davao extended beyond a second generation, there is no way of determining what could have happened. The continued geographic separation and increasing interaction with Philippine society might have reduced this high degree of integration. Historically, however, this has become academic. The Japanese residents of Davao who survived the last war, were repatriated to Japan and their lands and other properties—confiscated during the war—were disposed to Filipinos after the war.

Records have it that a year after their arrival in Davao in 1903 to work in the Awad plantation, many of this first group of Japanese cultivators, led by Suda Ryosaku, departed. They were followed in 1904 by another group which was composed of part of the Japanese contract labor team constructing the Kennon road leading to Baguio. This group—together with those who joined Oda Ryosaburo (otherwise known in the Philippines as K.S. Ohta) to Davao in 1905, formed the nucleus of what was to develop into the Japanese minority in Davao.[48] Having visited places in the Pacific and Asia as a result of his country's promotion of overseas development, and with his entrepreneurial experience,[49] it was no surprise to find Oda the leader of the Japanese in Davao. Always a "sympathetic listener" but also "a stern adviser," Oda assumed the responsibility of looking after his countrymen's welfare.[50] Socialized within the Japanese family system, the loyalty of these Japanese was automatically due Oda, the accepted head of the group.

The group expended as Oda's investments increased through the Ohta Development Company founded in 1907. A greater demand for Japanese labor was created and those who migrated to Davao either brought their families with them or waited after they were settled, before getting married. It is easy to imagine the expansion of the group who owed loyalty to Oda. Similar social relations were established between other Japanese entrepreneurs who invested in Davao, like Furukawa Yoshizo—founder of the Furukawa Plantation Company, and Akamine Saburo who managed the South Mindanao Company.[51]

These economic groups appear to represent the only group larger than the family and the group of three to five households within which the Jap-

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them, in C. E. Cody, "The Japanese Way of Life in Davao," **Philippine Studies**, VIII, No. 2 (April, 1959), 174.

[48] See Chronicle of Events in Kamabara, **op. cit.** Compare the facts in this chronicle with pertinent facts found in C. E. Cody, "The Consolidation of the Japanese in Davao," **Comment** (Third Quarter, 1958), 23—26.

[49] He was the manager of a partnership with his brother—the Japanese General Import Company of Manila—which Oda liquidated before he departed for Davao.

[50] Cody, "The Consolidation. . .," **op. cit.**, 25-27.

[51] For details about Furukawa and Akamine and their respective companies, see Cody, **Ibid.**, 29-31, 33.

anese in Davao could be integrated and directed, before the establishment of the Davao Japanese Association in 1916. But the loyalty of the members of such economic groups was inevitably drawn upwards to the center of the larger social system—the divine emperor—who had power to channel disciplined social action towards national ends which took precedence over other goals. This was obvious to a knowledgeable Filipino lawyer who wrote in 1935: "As a people, the Japanese are very nationalistic, and as such can never became Filipinos. Their traditions, religion, history and training make them so homogenous and compact. They are, and will remain, loyal to their Emperor..."[52]

How homogenous and cohesive were the Japanese minority in Davao? Occupying the choicest lands along the Gulf of Davao—extending from Malita in the southwest coast of the Gulf, northwards through Padada, Santa Cruz, Davao city, Guianga, Panabo, Tagum and along the eastern coast of the Gulf, southwards to Pantukan, Lupon and Sigaboy—these Japanese seem to have avoided settling in the interior, except in Compostela to the north. The center of control of the Japanese residents in Davao, which was also the major area of Japanese concentration, appears to have been the Davao City–Guianga area, the first area where Oda's company acquired its first portion of the public lands.[53] It was also in this area where the largest concentration of lands cultivated by Japanese as well as a number of Japanese corporations were located.[54] On this strip of land bounding Davao Gulf, the Japanese increased in number[55] as their economic role in Davao grew.

Conditioned in the family to accept the values and norms of the group for the interest and success of the group, these industrious, frugal and skillful Japanese succeeded in the economic penetration and development of Davao. At that time, the other inhabitants of the area were people with different value orientations who were neither as well organized nor as solidly financed[56] as the Japanese. The latter exploited Davao's rich natural resources in various ways and were invariably aware of the necessity of, at least, appearing as law-abiding and civic-minded alien residents,[57] if they were to attain the goals of their group. Thus, the Davao Japanese were often seen making frequent visits to lawyers and notaries, perhaps, to assure themselves that they were doing what was legally right.[58]

Though "intensely...Japanese" and self-sufficient, the Japanese in Davao were "...smooth, conciliatory and decent" in their relations with the local

[52] Quoted from page 7 of the June 24, 1935 report of Atty. Teodasio Trinidad, Bureau of Lands Inspector, in Cody, "Japanese Way...," **op. cit.**, 180.

[53] See Cody, "The Consolidation...," **op. cit.**, 27.

[54] See E. Rodriguez report on Japanese corporations in Davao in the Manila **Sunday Tribune**, February 17, 1935, 1.

[55] See chart of Kamabara on the Japanese residents in Davao, figure 3 of this paper.

[56] See "Nippon Davao farmers are well financed," the **Manila Bulletin**, May 8, 1939, 17. See also "A Lesson from Davao," the **Manila Times**, October 31, 1917, quoted in Cody, "The Japanese Way...," **op. cit.**, 173.

[57] **Ibid., et passim.**

[58] See **Ibid.**, 175. For the Japanese who are conditioned to behave according to a set of norms within his own social organization, it was necessary for him to be guided—at least, by law—in his activities within an alien society.

population, even with the **Bagobos** who killed some of the Japanese pioneers.[59] According to a Public Land Inspector, sometime in 1919-1920, despite the deaths of some Japanese, "some other Japanese takes up the dead man's work like a soldier filling in a gap in the rank... For this [i.e., the acquisition of more lands] they were willing to sacrifice a few lives as an unvoidable part of the price they must pay."[60]

To insure their success in Davao, the Japanese turned to their traditional social group of three to five households to protect themselves within **Bagobo** territory, and maintain "proper" relations with the non-Japanese inhabitants—especially with ranking local and national government officials whom they entertained and to whom they offered their services and facilities. (It is said that Mr. C. Murakami—the largest Japanese individual private land owner in Davao—often entertained national government officials visiting Davao.) Joining associations such as the local Rotary Club or the Chamber of Commerce, Davao resident Japanese freely contributed to civic and charitable drives of the non-Japanese community. Yet, the Filipinos in Davao generally felt that the Japanese, as a whole, kept to themselves.

By 1920, the Japanese community in Davao consisted of Japanese entrepreneurs, businessmen and consular officials, on the top with the Japanese laborers as well as agricultural cultivators at the base. Most of them were married to Japanese. The men either returned to Japan to get married or sent for their brides ("picture brides").[61] The women's marriages were traditionally arranged by their parents who—when they could afford it—sent their daughters back to Japan for an education and marriage.[62] These Japanese families manifested a strong paternal authority.

Each family was usually self-sufficient, especially those living in farms who visited the town or city only to buy supplies from Japanese cooperative stores and to visit the Japanese Association's headquarters in Davao city. When the man of the house was a ranking businessman or consular official or non-agricultural worker, his wife generally stayed at home and did not enjoy the freedom to socialize with other members of the local community as did the Filipino women; if a farmer, his wife was often seen working with him in the fields.[63] In Davao city, the affluent Japanese lived in well-appointed suburban houses while the employees and laborers, in cottages and tenements, respectively, or in apartments or rooms rented from local owners which were built and furnished in non-Japanese style. The Japanese houses in rural areas,

[59] O. L. Walkup, "The Bagobo-Japanese Land Troubles in Davao Province," Part I (Confidential reports written to the Director of Lands in 1919-1920), in O. Beyer, **Philippine Ethnographic Series VI, Pagan Mindanao** (typescript), 11.

[60] **Ibid.**, 8-9.

[61] See "Japanese Bachelor Residents of Davao want 6,000 Picture Brides," the Manila **Sunday Tribune**, May 17, 1931, 1. This report was denied in the same news release by the Japanese Consul perhaps because of the apprehensions in the Philippines about the Japanese plans in Asia. However, until today, the practice of "picture brides" married to overseas Japanese continues. See "19 Brides," the **Manila Daily Mirror**, March 11, 1965, 2, covering the proxy marriages of nineteen Japanese brides to Japanese farm workers in Brazil.

[62] Cody, "Japanese Way....," **op. cit.**, 183.

[63] **Loc. cit.**

especially in Calinan and Daliao of the Guianga district, were low and unpainted, reminding the onlooker of similar structures in Japan. And as in Japan, guests at these houses removed their shoes before entering.

Both rural and urban Japanese, in any case, preferred Japanese food and drink and ate with chopsticks. The men usually wore Western-style clothes. However, the rural Japanese women wore their native attire while their urban sisters were seen more often in Western-style dresses. Within their homes, the Japanese spoke their language, although communication between the educated Japanese and inhabitants of Davao belonging to the same level, was in English; among the Japanese and non-Japanese residents of Davao, at the base, conversation was carried out in a mixture of Spanish and two of the Filipino languages—Visayan and Tagalog—referred to as "Abaca Spanish."

Japanese children could go to two Japanese primary schools from 1924. And even when a high school department was added to one of them, the pattern was for these children—especially the boys—to be educated in Japan after their elementary training. So far, it has been hard to check who underwrote the expenses of those whose parents lacked funds. The establishment of nine more Japanese schools in various places in Davao between 1933 and 1937,[64] could have resulted from the increasing Japanese population in the province and/or related to the need of reinforcing the transmission to the next generation—through indoctrination in school—of the values of filial piety and loyalty to the emperor, the center of the larger social system. These values, we recall, were first internalized within the Japanese family system and were crucially important in channeling cohesive social action as a response to directives—whether overt or covert—from the top. During the decade of the thirties, the larger social entity was faced with the repercussions of Japan's aggressive moves in Asia. Therefore, except English teachers, all administrators and instructors in Davao's Japanese schools totalling twelve in 1939, were recruited from Japan and were comparatively well paid. Guided by the teaching methods used in Japan, the Japanese children—initially disciplined within the family in unquestioningly obeying its head—were further conditioned to behave in this manner within a larger social institution: the school. The sight of disciplined Japanese students in the classroom made an observer compare it to what one sees in a military academy.[65] It is reasonable to conjecture that the Davao Japanese school's curriculum was similar to the homeland's, if any of the students eventually continued, as they did, their education in Japan, and if these schools were supervised by agents of Japan's Ministry of Education.[66]

The retention by a number of Davao Japanese residents of their Shinto and/or Buddhist beliefs and practices, manifested by the establishment of Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples in Davao—especially in the Davao City-

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64 See Chronicle of Events in Kamabara, **op. cit.** See also Cody, "Japanese Way...," **op. cit.**, 181.

65 Cited from the 1938 **Visitor's Guide, City of Davao, Queen City of Mindanao** in Cody, "Japanese Way...," **Ibid.**, 181. See also the **Manila Tribune**, April 29, 1939, 2.

66 R. H. Soriano, "Japanese Occupation of the Philippines with Special Reference to Japanese Propaganda: 1941-1946" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1948), microfilm copy in the library of the Graduate School of Public Administration, 88.

Guianga area [67]—intensified the integration and the cohesiveness of this minority as it simultaneously reinforced the barrier that served to segregate this minority from the non-Japanese residents. Segregation of the Japanese minority was further strengthened by the Japanese practice of policing themselves and settling outside of court civil and even criminal cases when anyone of them was the aggrieved party;[68] by their maintaining two hospitals employing Filipino doctors and Japanese nurses; publishing their own daily newspaper and other periodicals; building statues honoring prominent Davao Japanese leaders like Oda and Mikami, not to mention the establishment of their own radio station, market, moviehouse and other amusement places.[69]

These obvious manifestations of Japanese society and culture in Davao, must have caused Manila reporters and writers of articles covering the Davao Japanese in the thirties, to describe the Japanese villages in Davao as "Japanized villages." [70] The non-Japanese inhabitants of Davao were heard referring to Davao City as "Little Tokyo" and to the nearby town of Mintal in Guianga with its Japanese-owned industries, as "Little Nagasaki." [71] W. J. Anderson, in his book entitled **The Philippine Problem**,[72] pictured Davao as part of Philippine territory which the Japanese "are running practically as an independent state. . . ."

What these reporters and writers seem to have missed perceiving was the operation of the strongly integrated social organization of the Davao Japanese, which could have been manipulated by Japan's national leaders—operating behind the emperor—at the top of the larger social system encompassing it. Manipulation could have been done in two ways: through the Japanese business or commercial corporations in Davao and through the Davao Japanese Association, in conjunction with the Japanese Consulate of the province.

It is needless to point out here that the Japanese business and commercial enterprises in Davao depended largely upon the **zaibatsu** cartels and financial institutions in the homeland for aid and direction in conducting their economic activities. But these **zaibatsu**—interlocking business and commercial houses as well as financial institutions—in turn, depended upon government subsidy. In turn, the allocation of government subsidy was decided by Japan's policy-making group functioning behind the emperor. Therefore, it is conceivable as well as possible (probable?) that these decision-makers (at the center of the larger social system) manipulated the economic group within it towards the attainment of national goals. In the thirties, these goals were obviously oriented towards Japan's leadership in Asia.

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67 See the map of the pre-war center of Japanese Settlement in Davao (the Davao City — Guianga Area) indicating the buildings within the area, which is attached to the text of Kamabara, **op. cit.**

68 See Cody, "The Japanese Way. . .," **op. cit., et passium.** See also O. L. Walkup, **op. cit., et passim.** One respondent cited a case of theft of a bicycle committed by a Japanese against another Japanese which was settled out of court; the thief was ostracized by the Japanese residents of Calinan where the theft was committed.

69 Kamabara, **op. cit.**, 164.

70 See, for instance, the **Manila Sunday Tribune**, October 23, 1932. See also T.V. Nano, "To Save or not to Save Davao," **Commonwealth Advocate**, I, No. 10 (October-November, 1935), 43.

71 Cody, "Japanese Way. . .," **op. cit.**, 182.

72 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), 277-280.

When, for instance, Japan's decision-makers decided to undertake the expansion of the Japanese navy during the third decade of the century, the project could have necessitated a larger supply of rope made of abaca fiber or hemp which, at the time, was practically supplied by Davao. The delivery of the required quota to the navy could have been directed from the top to the head of the house of one or more of the **zaibatsu** family cartels which dealt with hemp production and trade in Davao. Take, for instance, the Itoh cartel of the wealthy Itoh family of Osaka. The Itoh house could have been made to deliver to the navy a certain quota of hemp at particular periods of time. The head of the Itoh house could have then communicated the required quota to Furukawa Yoshizo—the founder of the Furukawa Plantation Company in Davao—who was married to one of the Itoh daughters. On the basis of scattered pieces of information from respondents and insights derived from other sources, an attempt can be made to reconstruct what could have taken place in Davao regarding the delivery of the quota of hemp required by the head of the larger social entity. Furukawa—either directly or indirectly, through his representative—could have done one or all of three things: (1) contact non-Japanese plantation owners and arrange for the purchase of their produce; (2) farm shares of the quota to managers of Furukawa-controlled plantation who, in turn, could have divided their respective quotas among foremen of the plantation in charge of making the laborers work to deliver their quota; (3) contact Furukawa-aided sub-agents running stores or trading stations, to purchase part of the quota from individual Japanese families producing abaca on land which they owned, or leased or subleased from Filipino owners or lessors (in this last instance, the family head looked after the delivery of the amount needed).

Barring unforseen natural disasters, it is safe to hazard a guess that the deliveries required by the decision-makers at the top of the larger social system could have been made, if we view the aforementioned social process as being undertaken within the vertical, hierarchical social organization of the Japanese family and the economic group concerned, as well as the value orientation of the social organization which gave priority to the attainment of the larger social system's goals. Within this context, it can perhaps be said that this system of manipulation for national ends (from the top of the larger social system) of a business corporation concerned with the production of, and trade in, Davao abaca, could have been repeated **vis a vis** the other corporations dealing in other agricultural production and trade like coconut and coconut products as well as in other economic activities such as lumbering, manufacturing, retailing and fishing in which the Davao Japanese corporations were heavily invested.

Another means of channeling cohesive social action to the top of the larger social system, could have been through the Davao Japanese Association. By the eve of Pearl Harbor, the Davao Japanese Association had expanded from a small organization established in 1916 (four years before the establishment of a Japanese Consulate in Davao) for the promotion of mutual friendship and profit among its members, into a large one claiming all the Japanese residents of Davao as members. Quartered close to the Japanese Consulate in

Davao city, and exercising functions which could have been those of the Consulate, it can be surmised that the Association worked closely with the Consulate.

The Davao Japanese Association took charge of the census of Japanese arrivals and departures in the province as well as a record of births, marriages and deaths—always ready to aid Japanese who lacked funds to start their economic endeavors in Davao or to tide them through an emergency. The Association retained lawyers who appeared in court with their Japanese clients who were also furnished with interpreters by the Japanese Association. Through a committee composed of ranking members of the Association, it usually took charge of investigating cases which did not involve non-Japanese or if they did, when a Japanese was the aggrieved party. Generally, such cases were settled out of court.

The Association also exercised police functions to protect the rights and reputation of the Japanese in Davao and to keep them from any legal tangles with any non-Japanese. With contributions from its members, the Association—by 1939—had established twelve Japanese primary schools which it administered and supervised, in addition to a training school to orient new Japanese arrivals in the "proper" way of living life and carrying on "proper" relations with the non-Japanese residents in Davao. The rudiments and procedures of conducting business profitably in Davao were also taught in this training school which published in a booklet the basic rules and regulations each Japanese was to observe.

Besides extending long-term loans to farmers who were starting life in Davao, the Association took charge of depositing its members' savings in Tokyo banks. It also furnished the capital for, and managed the Japanese cooperatives in Davao which were aided by the **Kumiai** or neighborhood associations, in the sale of goods directly to Japanese families. The Japanese in Davao were made to buy their supplies only from these cooperatives which specialized in selling Japanese goods. Finally, whenever the Japanese in Davao protested some act of the Philippine government—as they protested the application of the 1919 land law to certain categories of land they had cultivated—the Japanese Association brought such matters before the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, though after the Consulate was established in Davao in 1920, it was the Consul with which the Association dealt to take action with Tokyo.

Led by ranking members of Davao's Japanese community who were, in some instances, also heads of business or commercial concerns in Davao, and exercising socio-political-economic functions dealing with its members' problems, the Davao Japanese Association was indeed an effective and powerful organization capable of channeling the cohesive action of the Davao Japanese minority upwards to the head of the larger social entity in the attainment of national goals. Being powerful in maintaining the cohesiveness of the Davao Japanese minority, and assuming that the Japanese in Davao always looked upwards for decision and direction, it is likely that the Association had a hand in the reported gatherings of thousands of Japanese residents in certain vicinities of Davao City in 1938 about which neither the Philippine army nor constabulary intelligence could report because of language handicap.[73] Secret meetings, according to a knowledgeable respondent, were at first held at the Japanese Association's office until they were discovered by the government agents; soon after, these meetings were held at the Ohta Development Company compound in Talomo, Davao City.

Surely, no news release could have come closer to the truth on the cohesive social organization of the Japanese minority in Davao than that made in 1938 which partly reads:

> ...There are 16,000 Japanese residents in Davao province. The bulk of this foreign population is concentrated in the plantation districts surrounding the city of Davao.
>
> It is a common belief in well-informed circles in his province that the Japanese plantations are so linked with each other as to facilitate not only close common communication but quick concentration of Japanese subjects upon a moment's notice. It is said that the plantations are so arranged as to give each and every one of these their most strategic value in the event of an emergency.[74]

This integrated social organization of the Davao Japanese minority could easily have been pushed towards a war footing (an emergency such as war, could have resulted in more intensive integration) by the policy-makers of Japan, working at the top of the larger social system, behind the person of the emperor.

To sum up, this paper has attempted to show, among other things, that bare statistics concerning immigration as well as emigration and commercial as well as other economic activities must be interpreted more subtly if they are to be meaningful. It is not enough to know that the Japanese numerically constituted an insignificant minority compared to the total Filipino population. The more significant question to raise, as in the case of Davao, is: under the circumstances, what effect, if any, did this relatively small group have on themselves and on the environing milieu—social as well as physical? The question can even be legitimately extended to include the effect on the large social system centered in the homeland. For purposes of this study, however, this survey and tentative interpretation of the social institutions—such as familial, economic, religious, educational institutions—and social groups or associations, which the Davao Japanese established for their operation and survival as a group, seem to support the hypothesis of greater integration with their indigenous culture and society. Every human activity connected with these institutions and the value system undergirding them showed a greater affinity, if not identity, with the Japanese social system. That this integration was incomplete is readily conceded—it is only for theoretical purposes that complete integration is ever postulated. A more significant and interesting issue is: was the social organization of the other Japanese groups in the Philippines similar to that of the Davao group?

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[73] "Meeting held by Japanese in Davao Intrigue," **Manila Daily Bulletin,** May 17, 1938, Quezon Col. See also "Japanese have P.I. Army on the Spot in Davao," **Ibid.,** May 19, 1938, Quezon Col.

[74] "Meetings held by Japanese...," **op. cit.**

COUNT MORIC BENYOVSZKY: A HUNGARIAN CRUSOE IN ASIA

FR. MANUEL TEIXEIRA

A Grave at Macau

J. F. MARQUES PEREIRA WRITING IN THE REVIEW "TA-SAI-YANG-KUO" (Vol. III, series 2) recalls an interesting vignette about old Macau. It purportedly owes its existence to an illustrated Swedish work dealing with Macau and dating back to the early nineteenth century. This work was translated into Portuguese by Consigliere Pedroso. An excerpt, which is of special interest, runs thus:

> Illustration 195 is a review of Macau. It shows the convent of Guia with the fortress and the bishop's palace all situated on rising ground. The town of Macau spreads itself below in a semi-circle following the configuration of the bay. In this town one comes across many churches and convents. Among the former one cannot view without emotion in the church of St. Paul the tomb of the young Russian girl who dauntlessly chose to throw in her lot with the adventurer Count Benyowsky when he escaped from the prisons of Petropawloski. She died of a broken heart after she learned that the Count for whose love she had sacrificed family and homeland had already been espoused to another.[1]

And the Swedish author adds ruefully, "These unfortunate incidents of unrequited love are too well known to require much explanation."

The Soldier

Maurice Augustus Benyowsky (in Hungarian, Moric Benyovszky) was born in 1741 in Verborva (Verbo) in the count of Nyitra and died in Madagascar, 7 May 1786. He was the son of a cavalry general Count Samuel Benyovszky and Rosa Revay. When he was scarcely fifteen years old, the young Maurice—following the paternal footsteps—joined the army (1758) and saw service in the first battles of the Seven Years War.

We next find the young soldier in Poland where he had gone to claim an inheritance. It was at this juncture that misfortune struck him in the form of his father's death and the subsequent appropriation of the family estates by greedy relatives. Young Benyowsky returned to the family seat at Krusso in Hungary and armed the retainers in an attempt to recover his paternal estates. He was denounced to the Empress Maria Theresa of Austria, then suzerain of Hungary. A decree from the chancellery at Vienna promptly and officially relieved the unfortunate young man of his inheritance. Embittered by the injustice of it all, Benyowsky left his native Hungary and went to live in Poland. From then on, the wanderlust and search of adventure dogged the steps of our hero. We next hear of him in Holland and England where he learned the arts of shipbuilding and navigation.

In 1766 Benyowsky was ready to make his way to India, somehow, when the Poles formed the Confederation of Bar to rid Poland of the Russian yoke.

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[1] Museum Utigifoet of Mellinoch Thomson.

The Poles were supported by France and Turkey, while Catherine II of Russia had Austria-Hungary and Prussia on her side. Benyowsky threw himself with characteristic energy into the fray and fought valiantly for the Polish cause, but his capture by the Russians in 1769 checked his aggressive instincts, at least, for the time being.

The Prisoner

He was sent to Kasan in the Russian interior and was allowed a certain amount of liberty under watchful guards. As a result of an abortive plot against the Russian governor of the garrison, he was exiled to Siberia. After twelve months of travel under the most difficult conditions Benyowsky, with other prisoners, reached the icy wastes of Kamchatka at the extreme Asiatic end of Siberia. The date was 2 December 1770. The prisoners were confined in the capital town of the region variously called Bolforetzkoy and Bolchetsk. During the long and nightmarish journey to Kamchatka, Benyowsky tried unsuccessfully to escape. Though unsuccessful, he did not despair.

In Kamchatka, the prisoners were allowed access to some arms for their defense against wild beasts and for hunting game for food. Next we hear of Benyowsky in the unlikely role of a schoolmaster. He was even then plotting to escape but bided his time. So successful was the school that the Russian governor sent his son and three daughters to attend it. Benyowsky's academic venture proved a financial success. He soon won the confidence of the governor Niloff as well as the affection of his eldest daughter, Afanasia. Notwithstanding the knowledge that he had left behind (in Szepes, Poland) his lawful wife, Afanasia—the Russian girl—was infatuated enough to get engaged to Benyowsky.

When the time was ripe, Benyowsky and his companions rose in armed conflict against the governor and the garrison. In the ensuing fight, the governor was killed and Benyowsky wounded. The rebels, however, triumphed. They commandeered a naval vessel and made good their escape. But not before Afanasia had secretly gone aboard disguised as a man named Achilles.

The Adventurer

The fugitives left Kamchatka in May 1771 aboard the **St. Peter and St. Paul** which carried a complement of seventy-five persons including the crew, twelve passengers and nine women. The next time we hear of the ship and its complement is 22 September 1771 when they turned up at Macau. What happened during the intervening six months?

It seems that Benyowsky's original plan was to make for Canton and thence to follow the sea route to Europe. Storms and high seas which prevailed in the southern seas at that time of the year, however, made them decide otherwise. The vessel could sail only as far south as Japan where the ship was allowed to refuel and Benyowsky was even permitted to carry on some barter trade with the Japanese, who at the time, were forbidden (by imperial decrees) from dealing with foreigners.

From Japan, it would seem, the vessel sailed across the comparatively calm waters of the Northern Pacific. Fr. Benjamin Videira, writing under the caption, "Mauricio de Benyowsky," said of the Hungarian adventurer:

> About five years before Captain James Cook, Benyowsky discovered the Behring passage connecting the N. Pacific with the N. Atlantic. It was a fortuitous passage necessitated by the tragic need of survival and the preservation of his faith. The English explorer and navigator traversed the Behring Strait on his third cruise of the N. Pacific in 1776 reaching latitude 70°44' north.[2]

It must, however, be noted here that Fr. Videira was mistaken in his conclusions. Benyowsky's voyage was in no way undertaken to safeguard his religion—in fact, his religion did not deter him from taking a lover and putting to death this lover's father. His predominant motive was to save himself. As for being Cook's predecessor in the exploration of the Behring passage, we can dismiss the claim. Benyowsky sailed across the northern Pacific and reached the coasts of California, probably by way of the Aleutians. He then retraced his steps, touched at various islands between Japan and Formosa and finally reached Macau. Cook's achievement was that he explored the Northern Pacific systematically in three separate voyages, discovered the Sandwich (Hawaiian) islands, coasted along the shores of Alaska and penetrated into the Behring passage. He went as far north as 70°44' latitude.

H. T. Sutton in an article which appeared in **The Straits Times**, makes mention of the diary which Benyowsky kept of his travels:

> And so matters would have rested with the memory of the false Baron fading into the waste-paper basket of forgotten rogueries. But for the unexpected scholarship, seventeen years later, of one William Nicholson, a mathematician, chemist, etc. He translated the journal of Benyowsky into English and it was published in London in December 1789... The journal replete with records of latitude and longitude shows that their voyage started on a course to the south, for it was the Baron's intention to sail to Canton where he hoped to find a passage back to Europe for his party of exiles. It is clear that they met gales, which in the month of May when they embarked from Kamchatka are to be expected in the North Pacific. And the journal shows quite clearly that, having blown far to the east for several weeks, they decided to sail east to find land to avoid starvation at sea which their unexpectedly prolonged voyage threatened.[3]

A propos this voyage across the Pacific, history has placed on record the feat accomplished by Don Joao da Gama, Captain of Malacca (1581-1582), who in 1589 crossed the North Pacific and reached Mexico. This was recorded by C. R. Boxer, who informs us that a Portuguese carrack of 600 tons commanded by Don Joao da Gama who was formerly Captain-General of Malacca left Macau for Mexico. Because of typhoon damage, he was obliged to seek refuge at the island of Amakusa on the Japanese coast. After repairs, he continued on his voyage in October. He reached Mexico after having traversed the Pacific at a much higher latitude than the course ordinarily taken by the Spanish galleons travelling between Manila and Mexico. He touched at a place which has since been called Ezo (Yezo). His voyage was directly contrary to the Iberian Crown legislation prohibiting commercial transactions between the Spanish and Portuguese colonies. Ac-

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[2] **Religiao e Tatria, Ano XLIII,** No. 7 (Feb. 24, 1957), 155.
[3] "Mystery Baron Appeared in 1771 (in) Macao with Five 'Petticoats,' " **Straits Time,** December 6, 1961.

cordingly, he was arrested and his ship and cargo impounded when he arrived at Acapulco.[4]

On his journey across the Pacific, Benyowsky touched at various islands. He noted in his journal that on 14 August 1771, he anchored at the island of Usmai Ligon which he located at 29⁰N. and which lay between Japan and the Ryukyu islands. This island, according to Benyowsky, was independent of either Japan or China and its inhabitants were peaceful and well advanced in civilization. They seemed to have come under the missionary influence of a certain Portuguese, Jesuit Fr. Ignatio Salis,[5] who arrived there in 1719. From this island, he went on to Formosa reaching there on 27 August. As his landing was opposed, he had to use force to subdue the natives. Through the good offices of a Spaniard, he succeeded in obtaining a safe passage to land. He then aided a local chief, King Huapo, in a war the latter was waging against the neighbors.

At Macau

After sojourning for ten days, Benyowsky set sail for Macau and cast anchor at the old city port on Thursday, 22 September. Six months of hardships—battling against the elements, unknown dangers, hostile natives—finally brought him to the safe haven of Macau. And what did Macau hold in store for the fugitives? Fortunately, the archives of Macau City Council (**Leal Senado**) leave us in no doubt of the facts.

On the day of his arrival, Count Benyowsky sought out the governor, Diogo Fernandes Salema de Saldanha, and begged hospitality for himself and his companions... "having arrived at this city by necessity and in the final stages of human endurance." The next day, Friday, 23 September, the governor convened a meeting of the City Council and laid the circumstances of the fugitives' plight before the assembly. The Council, however, deliberated over the matter and delayed a reply for a month. Thus, on 23 October, the governor sent a letter to the Council upbraiding their "tardiness and indifference so little in keeping with the traditional Portuguese hospitality." A reply was sent to the governor the same day stating that it was "manifestly unjust to deny the necessities of life to these Hungarians who claim to be dying of hunger," and the Council recommended that the governor decide in what form aid could be extended. Of the original ninety-six persons who left Kamachatka, only sixty-five reached Macau and they were taken care of by the City Council until the end of the year or the beginning of 1772.

The consequent expenses incurred were deemed prohibitive when the report was sent to the Viceroy of India Don Joao de Melo who in a letter of 28 April 1772 censured the City Council for its excessive liberality. Though the Hungarians had arrived at Macau in the last extremity, "and the Council had done well to come to their aid, the City resources are not derived from heaven, so more moderation should be exercised for the future in similar cases." We believe the Viceroy was justified in his stricture. We, Portuguese, tend to be too generous in our hospitality towards strangers. Nowhere were

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[4] C.R. Boxer, **The Great Ship from Amocon** (Lisbon, 1959), 52-53.

[5] His name is Inacio Pires, not "Salis," missionary in Kian-Nam from 1753 to 1777.

the Hungarians so well treated as in Macau. Moreover, the help given them was wholly disinterested. As for the recipient of this hospitality, they were well in a position to shift for themselves as subsequent events would show.

In his letter of 23 October 1771, Governor Saldanha wrote that the European factories at Canton had offered the Hungarian money and passage back to Europe, but at a price. Benyowsky had information and charts pertaining to his voyage which were sought after by the European powers. Thus he wrote in his journal:

> A certain Mr. Gohr, Captain in the service of the English Company came to see me and made me offer of services on the part of the Directors and a free passage to Europe provided that I would bind myself to entrust my manuscripts to the Company, and engage to enter into their service and made no communication of the discoveries I had made. This proposition so evidently disgusted me; but I was contented to answer that I was very sensible [sic] of the obliging offer made but that as I had accepted those of the French Directors it was not in my power to change my determination.

Disappointed, Mr. Gohr "took his leave in an affected manner." Next, it was the turn of Mr. l'Heureux, Director of the Dutch Company. He, too, was profuse in promises and presents but did not succeed in winning over the wily Hungarian who held out for the highest bidder. He, however, availed himself of the liquor offered by the Dutchman having returned the rest of the presents.

The fact was that Benyowsky had to side with the French who, at that time, were the allies of Austria-Hungary against Russia, England and Holland. There was also some business deals with the governor through an intermediary, a certain Spanish Dominican named Fr. Diego Zurita.[6] In this way, Benyowsky disposed of four hundred and eighty beaver skins, five hundred sables, and one hundred and eighty dozen ermines. In addition, the ship was also sold. When Benyowsky was ready to leave Macau, he was richer by 28,440 piastres which he received for the pelts and 1,070 taels of silver for the ship.

The "Annual Register" published in London for the year 1772 contained a letter from a Far East correspondent which caused quite a stir in city circles. It was entitled "Account of an Extraordinary Adventure in a letter from Canton." It described the arrival at Macau of Benyowsky's ship after a seemingly impossible journey from Kamchatka across the N. Pacific to the coasts of California then back again and finally ending at Macau. "Since I wrote the above" continued the correspondent, "the following strange account has reached me from Macao. One of the persons dressed like a woman, died a few days since. The lady was sent ashore with the following very extraordinary request to the governor: that the corpse should be interred where none had lain before and in an honorable spot; that the baron might have liberty to attend the funeral to pay particular honors to the deceased. This remarkable request producing that never-failing curiosity peculiar to the Romish priest-

[6] Fr. Zurita was born at Jaen, Spain, **circa** 1777; he did missionary work in the Philippines from 1763 to 1768. In 1769, he sailed for Spain **via** Macau, where he met Benyowsky.

hood, two worthies of the Franciscan Order, taking advantage of the night, peeped into the coffin and discovered the body of a man." Thus the letter from Canton.

The fact of the matter was that Afanasia, Benyowsky's lover who escaped from Kamchatka disguised as a man, had fallen ill and died. In his journal, the Count had mentioned the death of twenty-three of his companions since the voyage out from Kamchatka, among them, two women. Of the death of Afanasia, he writes thus: "On 25th Miss Afanasia paid the tribute of Nature. Her premature death has affected me profoundly." It would seem from this piece of information that the Count did not marry the girl since he called her by her maiden name, Miss Afanasia. The author of the Swedish book cited earlier in the article takes this view; Marques Pereira, after mentioning the death of the Count, adds:

> Thus ended the adventurous life of the lover of that poor reckless girl who died 15 years earlier at Macau and whose grave in the Church of St. Paul when discovered by the Swedish writer 60 years after, so moved him with compassion. We have transcribed his account of what he saw and wrote. That was certainly before the fire which destroyed St. Paul's on 26 January 1835.

The count wrote in his journal that when he was in Macau, the bishop—Monsignor Le Bon—interceded (on behalf of the Hungarians) with the King, Don Jose, and with the all-powerful Marquis de Pombal. Fr. Videira judged that the bishop in question could not have been Le Bon but he was mistaken. Fr. Videira writes thus:

> A document says that the bishop of Macau, Don Bartolomeu Manuel Mendes dos Reis who had been at the court of Lisbon in 1766 and the Administrator of the See, Fr. Francisco Vaz, interceded for the Hungarians with the Marquis de Pombal and the King Don Jose I. The Count in his journal calls the bishop 'Msgr. Le Bon.' Could it have been prevarication on the part of Benyowsky?

This seeming contradiction may be resolved if we note the following facts: that there was a certain French bishop at Macau at the time; it is not beyond credence that Benyowsky, whose sympathies were with the French, had approached the French bishop to use his good offices on his behalf. The French bishop could then have referred the matter to the Diocesan of Macau while, at the same time, writing personally on behalf of his client. The Monsignor followed both procedures.

The French bishop was Olivier Simon Le Bon who was born at St. Malo, France, on 17 March 1710. He left for Siam on 18 May 1745. In 1754, he was named Procurator of the **Missions Etrangeres De Paris** at Macau and on 22 August 1764 he was named titular bishop of Metellopolis and co-adjutor of Siam and was consecrated in Rome on 28 December 1766. In 1771, he was at the French procuration at Macau waiting for a suitable opportunity to go to Siam. He was expelled from Siam in 1779 and died at Goa on 27 October 1780. From the Macau parochial archives, we learn that Simon Le Bon, Vicar Apostolic of Siam, baptized Olivario who was a Chinese adult, during his stay in Macau. Again, the diocesan records state that Fr. Joaquin Jose Carneiro received minor orders on 30 December 1764 from the hands of the bishop of Macau, Don Manuel Mendes dos Reis, and subdiaconate in

December 1771 at the hands of the bishop of Metellopolis and Vicar Apostolic of Siam. Monsignor Le Bon wrote on behalf of Benyowsky but in those days, it took twelve months to get a letter to Europe. By that time, Benyowsky was already on his way to France on board a French ship. In fact, the Count had accepted the French offer to transport the fugitives to France. So, on 6 December 1771, accompanied by Fr. Zuritta, Benyowsky left Macau and headed for the Ile de France (Mauritius) which he reached on 16 March 1772. Then, after touching at Madagascar, the ship carrying the fugitives reached France in June 1772. It was a little more than a year since they had fled the icy wastes of Kamchatka.

King of Madagascar

Once in France, Benyowsky offered his services to the French government to found a colony in Madagascar. This was accepted and, in the following year, and with soldiers placed under his command, he set sail for Madagascar. On the way, he tried to enlist the support of the native chiefs in Mauritius, but the French officials—sensing in him a rival—turned them away from him so that Benyowsky had to carry on single-handed. He arrived in Madagascar on February 1774. There, he established himself in the vicinity of the bay of Antongill near the mouth of the river Fingballe. He demanded from the French governor a sum of 50,000 pounds as payment for expenses. The former, alarmed at the request, started a commission of inquiry and sent a report to France. This caused the French to doubt his integrity.

How this upstart adventurer succeeded in making himself King of Madagascar makes interesting reading. One of the tribes which formed an independent entity on the island was the Sambarivas. Rimini, their king, had a daughter who was captured and sold into captivity to a neighboring tribe. Making use of this knowledge, the shrewd Count caused the rumor to be spread that he was the son of this lost princess, and to confirm this he had the testimony of a negro woman whom he had brought with him from Mauritius. This latter declared that she had accompanied the princess into captivity and that the Count Benyowsky was indeed what he claimed to be—the princess's son. Accordingly, he was proclaimed King and his wife, Queen. He got together some tribes and subjugated the rest of the island.

In November 1776, he returned to France with the purpose of obtaining funds for the development of the island. The **Pallas Great Lexicon** (Budapest, 1893, vol. III) thus describes his stay in France:

> In the meantime, he was so much slandered to the new French government that they gave no credit to his reports... Seeing the aversion of the French, Benyowsky returned to his native land after he had asked for and obtained pardon from the Empress Maria Theresa. During his stay at home, war again broke out with Prussia and the Count characteristically found himself embroiled in it. He and his soldiers distinguished themselves at the successful battle of Halschwert. When peace was restored, he hoped that Joseph II would be ready to further his 'Madagascarian' plan. But the Emperor was not interested. The Count seemed meanwhile to have turned his attention to promoting trade with Fiume. When he saw that there was nothing doing in his own country he tried England, but here again he was turned down. His proposals dated 25 December 1783, were

as follows: Defensive and offensive alliance with Britain provided he be recognized King of Madagascar. Although the British government did not take him seriously he was apparently trusted by some private individuals from whom he collected L4000. Benyowsky then went to the United States. There, a Maryland firm was persuaded to place a ship at his disposal. Leaving his family in Baltimore, Benyowsky returned to Madagascar alone. He landed at the bay of Antangara about 10 leagues or sixty miles southwest of Cape St. Sebastian on 7th July 1785. The ship was beached on the island of Joana in Oiboon, the African mainland and sold. He had now to contend with hostile natives. Benyowsky and his small group of Europeans and loyal natives occupied the French outpost of Angoutzi where he built a township in the native style. He next sent a group of 100 men to occupy a French factory at Foul Point but the latter were turned back by the presence of a French frigate sent out from Vila Diogo. Hearing of these doings, the French governor of Mauritius, M. de Soullac, sent a ship with 70 soldiers on board and on 23 May 1786, attacked the Count's positions. The Count had only two cannons, two Europeans and twenty-three natives. The natives fled at the approach of the soldiers and the Count was wounded in the chest and fell on the scence of fighting.

Thus ended the checkered and colorful life of the remarkable adventurer Count Benyowsky.

ASIAN UNITY AND DISUNITY: IMPRESSIONS AND REFLECTIONS (1964-1965)

SHEN-YU DAI

WHEN DR. CARLOS P. ROMULO VISITED PAKISTAN IN THE EARLY spring of 1965, this writer—as a Fulbright Lecturer stationed there—had the opportunity and pleasure of meeting him and listening to his talk at the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi. A presidential adviser on foreign affairs and head of the most influential university in the Philippines with a long, distinguished experience in world diplomacy and intellectual enterprise behind him, Dr. Romulo's remarks naturally carried a great deal of weight. No one, indeed, could fail to be directly impressed by his personal charm and eloquence, in the first place.

Among the things that struck me as most significant (although not unexpected under the circumstances) was his emphasis and apparent faith in the unity between Asian states. We are all familiar with the long tacitly understood, if not fully accepted, allegation that "there is no Asia" as a unit. Hence it was quite natural, especially in the South Asian context at the time (as Dr. Romulo traveled through the general area), that many challenging questions were asked by the audience and some of them were not very easy to answer. Yet, even on the ticklish point of a common policy on China (in view of the very apparent difference then obtaining between the Philippines and Pakistan), Dr. Romulo did not shrink in his stand. Nor did the skepticism seem to dampen his spirit or weaken his argument.

Is there, therefore, a real chance for, or trend toward, such an eventuality?

This question, as a matter of fact, had been ringing in my mind even before I heard Dr. Romulo, and I had also resolved from the very beginning of my Fulbright year (1964-65) to learn as much as possible in this regard while I had first-hand opportunities to do so—both inside the various major regions of the continent itself and from neighboring areas. On the whole, the immediate emotional and mental milieu of Asia (re-experienced in my case) was most conducive to such an undertaking, as expected. But this very immediacy also appeared to be giving the local observer a necessary "wrapped-up" feeling or outlook, if not otherwise compensated. My trip around the world in the same process, especially through the supposedly related or similar areas, such as North Africa and South America, proved to be just the needed compensation.

And yet, the net result of my observations and studies has tended to leave me in skepticism, or at least a puzzlement of which the end is not at all in sight.[1]

[1] The information outlined in this article has come mainly from the press and other materials gathered in Pakistan. But this writer had also benefited from both official

Southeast Asia

Take the Philippines and Southeast Asia for example.

Dr. Romulo was certainly not alone in expressing himself in favor of Afro-Asian as well as Asian unity. President Macapagal, whom he advised and undoubtedly President Marcos again, did and would inevitably do the same, in behalf (as a matter of fact) of the Philippines as a whole. Nor have been such expressions limited to the verbal stage.

In the economic field, for instance, an attempt to establish an "Asian Common Market" was made at no other place than Manila, by way of "the first plenary session of the first Asian Conference of Chambers of Commerce meeting" actually convened there (February, 1965). Sixteen nations were to participate, presumably in a spirit of unity.[2] Yet, Indonesia found herself unable to sit at the same conference table with Malaysia; Pakistan had to withdraw in the face of "political propaganda and publicity" allegedly made by "some businessmen from Formosa."

In the cultural field, the Tenth Asian Editors' seminar also took place in Manila (March, 1965) under the joint sponsorship of the International Press Institute and the Philippine Press Institute, with thirty-five senior journalists from nine countries present.[3] The theme of the seminar discussions was supposed to be "Press Freedom and Responsibility." But it was not only concerned with the existence of such freedom or awareness of such responsibility in some of the participating countries but also with such developments as Ceylon's Press Law controversy (which turned out to be a significant factor contributing to the nation's Cabinet change during the year) which further served to point at a regional disarray in this regard. Manila even concluded a Cultural Pact with far-away Pakistan (ratified in September, 1964), not without a touch, at least, from the Pakistani point of view, on religious (i.e., Muslim) affinity. And, for this matter, Pakistan and Indonesia, too, struck up additional friendship throughout the year. Yet, it is precisely on this same issue that Pakistan's relationship with Malaysia (another Muslim country) turned out to be considerably different from that with Indonesia. It was rumored that opposition leaders from Kuala Lumpur had even attempted to set up an Indonesia-sponsored rival government-in-exile in Karachi (February, 1965), resulting in an even more antagonistic relationship between Muslim Indonesia and Malaysia. Besides, the Philippines—despite her small Muslim minority—started to appear perhaps even utterly un-Asian when she celebrated her fourth centenary of conversion to Christianity and accepted a special commendation from Pope Paul VI (May, 1965).

and journalistic resources while traveling through, and visiting, relevant concerns in other parts of South Asia, as well as East, Southeast, and Southwest Asia, plus North Africa, West Europe, and South America during the year. These travels and visits which constitute part of his study, besides the Fulbright award, have been assisted by a Colorado State University Faculty Research Grant, for which he wishes, hereby, to express his sincere gratitude.

[2] Australia, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Republic of China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Republic of Vietnam.

[3] Hong Kong, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Republic of Vietnam.

Militarily, the Philippines has been not only a loyal member of SEATO, and staunch supporter of its policies in the general area, but also an advocate for a "NATO-type" jurisdiction for herself in relation to the United States military bases and personnel in her territory (as reported in February, 1965). But, while NATO remains remote to Asia as a whole (except for Turkey), even the Philippines' enthusiasm in SEATO itself has not been shared by her immediate neighbors like Indonesia—and recently by Pakistan, a fellow member in the same "collective defense" organization! Her close bilateral association with (or perhaps subjection to) the United States, in addition to the SEATO relationship, has never been looked upon with great favor by many Asian leaders inside or outside of the region, including some Filipino leaders. The Philippines, following the United States to South Vietnam militarily, appears even less popular in Asia as a whole.

Diplomatically, among the Maphilindo powers, the Philippines has shown more willingness to accommodate, especially in contemplating a further "summit conference" of local unity and amity (October, 1964); she has also shown more readiness to effect compromise elsewhere, such as mediating between India and Pakistan over Kashmir (March, 1965). But, the Indo-Pakistani dispute has proven to be beyond Manila's capacity; the Sabah claim on the part of the Philippines vis-a-vis Malaysia, has remained unsolved, and so does the issue of Indonesian "illegal entrants" into the Philippines. In the larger arena of Asia and Africa, President Macapagal called for "solidarity" (January, 1965); in this connection, he broke relations with South Africa (February, 1965). But the President, himself, emphatically pointed out that his country would not do likewise with the United States, even if some other Afro-Asian states might have so wished and urged.

Moving to Malaysia and Indonesia, the situation between them continues to be one of "confrontation." Rumors and gestures pertaining to a negotiated amelioration (through mediation) loomed large at times, involving many well-wishers and helpers.[4] Malaysia, on her part, also aired her preference for an "Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission" or a "fair hearing" before the "Non-Aligned Nations' Conference" at Cairo (October, 1964). But nothing materialized. Furthermore, in aspiring to association with the Afro-Asian and non-aligned countries, Malaysia was effectively blocked by Indonesia, despite the former's diligent diplomatic activities (pursued often personally by high-ranking Malaysian officials), among the relevant circles. Even the common Muslim bonds between the two contenders and many other Afro-Asian countries, failed to give effect to Kuala Lumpur's plea that "Muslims should not fight Muslims' (as especially stressed in April, 1965). A "Qirat Contest" conducted by, and in Kuala Lumpur, likewise, failed to qualify Malaysia's representation at the Afro-Asian Muslim Conference which was convened (unfortunately) at Jakarta in March, 1965! (At this Conference, even the Soviet Union was admitted.) The "confrontation" placed the whole range of in-between territories—Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei, as well as Kalimantan—in

[4] Attempts or indications of an attempt to mediate were reportedly made during the year, at least, by the following: Algeria, India, Japan, Nepal, Pakistan, Thailand, UAR, Zambia, as well as other Afro-Asian and non-aligned concerns.

continuous jeopardy and instability, with Singapore eventually seceding from the Malaysian Federation.

Not discouraged, Malaysia sought to strengthen her own defense by looking primarily to the west (e.g., the United States as well as Britain and other Commonwealth nations, especially Australia, New Zealand and Canada), but also selectively to the East (e.g., India on air force training). While in doing so Malaysia became increasingly drawn into Western international politics (such as Vietnam, in particular, and "East of Suez," in general), she nevertheless continued to attempt her own version of Asian unity. The measures she employed in this regard, however, were hardly effective. These ranged from the invitation of neighbors to a "Freedom Soccer Tournament" in Kuala Lumpur (March, 1965),[5] to the suggestion of a counterpart of the Organization of African Unity for Asia (made in May, 1965). "It seems to me, we should set about the task of bringing Asia together in the interest of Asia," said Malaysia's Prime Minister while visiting Tokyo, calling upon Japan to "give the lead." What kind of "lead" Japan can hope to give in the interest of Asian unity (in view of her very weakened position in Asia), must necessarily be opened to serious question, at least, for the time being.

Indonesia, on the other hand, left the United Nations because of Malaysia's presence on the Security Council. She then called for the establishment of a rival world organization based on Afro-Asian solidarity and with the explicit support of the People's Republic of China. According to President Sukarno, while his confrontation policy did not entail war with Malaysia (even after the withdrawal), this did not necessarily mean that the "real wishes" of the people, say, of Sabah, should not be determined anew by a U.N. mission in the absence of "colonialist interference" (as suggested in January, 1965). This, as accentuated by the secession of Singapore, made the fate of the Malaysian Federation necessarily precarious. President Sukarno, as a matter of fact, accused Malaysia of having actually tried to "subjugate" the Chinese majority there by incorporating it in the Federation. In this confrontation, the Indonesian President regarded his country's being supported by "2,000 million people from all over the world," including "the peoples of the Socialist bloc and Afro-Asian countries" (as he declared in January, 1965).

Thus, in strengthening herself, Indonesia chose to move exactly opposite that taken by Malaysia: Indonesia looked primarily to the East (basically Peking and Moscow, plus receptive Afro-Asian and non-aligned countries). At the same time, she spurned a part of the East itself, e.g., India on account of her aid to Malaysia, and most of the West, especially the United States and Britain. This general orientation seems to make Indonesia's attempt at Asian unity more natural; it came, as a matter of fact, merely as a part of her attempt at Afro-Asian, Nationalist-Communist, or NEFO (New Emerging Forces) unity vis-a-vis "Necolism" (Neo-colonialism and imperialism).

In trying to acquire sufficient economic development and military expansion to become the most powerful state responsible for maintaining "peace,

[5] Invited were Australia, Burma, Republic of China, Hong Kong, India, Republic of Korea, Thailand, and Republic of Vietnam.

security and stability in the entire Southeast Asia," for instance, Jakarta is known to have struck up a special partnership with Peking (at least at a time), especially with regard to large scale aid and the nuclear development program. And along with Peking, Rawalpindi also came as a new friend on the basis of Muslim affinity as well as RCD (Regional Cooperation for Development) scheme. This latter scheme, developed in July 1964 by the Asian members of CENTO (i.e., Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, all being Muslim countries), could have far-reaching significance if the Pakistani-Indonesian link turns out to be a successful and firm one.

Muslim affinity, in turn, has been subject to a tremendous Indonesian effort for expansion toward Africa as well as other parts of Asia and, as a matter of fact, the entire world. An Afro-Asian Muslim Conference, therefore, was convened at Bandung—the very site of the first (general, non-Muslim) Afro-Asian Conference (of 1955)—to coincide with celebrations of the latter's 10th anniversary (March, 1965). Here, delegates from some 35 countries—including the largest number from mainland China and a few from the Soviet Union, plus observers from some European states—were exhorted by President Sukarno to rely on "Islamic solidarity" for the elimination of imperialism and colonialism and achievement of national liberation and human progress.

Named by the Conference as the "Champion of Islam," the Indonesian leader's suggestions led to the establishment of a permanent secretariat for the Afro-Asian Muslim Organization in Indonesia itself, as well as other auxiliary political outfits like an Institute for the Study of Muslim Economics and an Afro-Asian Muslim Workers' and Peasants' Organization. Undaunted by the necessity of having to quell a last contingent of Darul Islam rebels inside its own territory, Indonesia expressed concern for the Muslims in India and mourned the murder of Malcolm X in the United States. As a result of the last Bandung Conference, a new avenue was also seemingly found and suggested to have the Malaysian-Indonesian dispute mediated at the then forthcoming World Muslim Conference in Mecca (April, 1965), although eventually to no avail. But this did not prevent Jakarta from airing its support for Muslim Arabs vis-a-vis Israel in Southwest Asia (April, 1965).

Hence, Indonesia's effort appeared during the period to be concentrated on making something positive out of her negative withdrawal from the U.N. (January, 1965), she called, for instance, upon the world organization to "go beyond the 1960 declaration on decolonization" and "support the further development of the decolonized countries; upon the "imperialists," to stop dominating the U.N. for intervention and other aggressive purposes in the Afro-Asian area; and upon the Afro-Asian countries, themselves, to "confront" the U.N. on the basis of "self-reliance" (a phrase which had sounded clear and loud from Peking). True to his own new status as "Champion of Islam," President Sukarno alleged that Indonesia's decision to withdraw from the U.N. was inspired by no other than the Prophet, Himself, who "once decided to move from Mecca to Medina because He could no longer live with the people of Mecca" (January, 1965).

But, not necessarily thus looking backward, the Indonesian leader saw "a New Asia and a New World now," banking on the formation—under Indonesian initiative, if not single-handed leadership—of a rival organization (in 1966?) such as CONEFO (Conference of New Emerging Forces), which would include the "anti-imperialist," "anti-colonialist," "national-liberation" forces of all Asia, Africa and Latin America. The existing framework of the Afro-Asian Conference conveniently furnished facilities to propagate this idea: for instance, the Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association, Jakarta; occasions, such as the Bandung celebrations mentioned above. With as many as thirty-seven Afro-Asian countries represented in the Indonesian metropolitan areas at this juncture (Spring, 1965), help (in small ways) also came from such suggestions as the Afro-Asian mediation for the Malaysian-Indonesian dispute, the Afro-Asian support for Kashmir's self-determination, the Afro-Asian condemnation of U.S. action in Vietnam and support for the Indo-Chinese People's Conference at Phnom Penh to provide an "Asian solution for Asian problems," solidarity of Southwest Asian oil producers **vis-a-vis** their Western counterparts **vis** the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), and a "pan-Arab oil body," and even GANEFO (Games of the New Emerging Forces).

When it was a question of colonialism and anti-colonialism, in the Indonesian view, there was little room for "peaceful coexistence." On this, Jakarta agreed wholeheartedly with Peking. And together, the two also conceived of a Jakarta-Peking-Phnom Penh-Pyongyang "axis" behind Hanoi, which would have wound up all the "leftist" countries in Asia for a cause. Not to be outdone by Peking along this line, Jakarta (on its own) further prompted such relatively self-confined countries, like Burma and Nepal, to participate more actively and extensively in Asian international politics. Holding "a very honorable position among Afro-Asian, Latin American and Socialist countries," in President Sukarno's terms (April, 1965), Indonesia should become "a lighthouse of world revolution against imperialism." Present indications seem to be that, even after the recent **coup** and supposed "rightist" ascendency in the country at the expense of Communist influence, Indonesia remains on the left.

The Malaysian-Indonesian differences appear to be basic. But, away from the Maphilindo area, the mainland of Southeast Asia has come no closer to even local unity due largely to the continuing conflict in Vietnam, although attempts to do so were not lacking. The Indo-Chinese People's Conference at Phnom Penh (February, 1965) was a good example. The international agreement on the three-way coalition government in Laos was another. And between the three parts of Indo-China, recurring border incidents made even a projected international conference on Cambodia's own "neutrality" impossible, although this version of neutrality (even if agreed upon) could hardly have fared much better. Consequently, Cambodia not only broke ties with the United States but also threatened to leave the United Nations or go Communist.

In Indo-Chinese border difficulties, as has been well known, also affected Thailand, which likewise had its own plans for Asian unity. Aside from its pivotal role in SEATO, Bangkok hosted a series of conferences along this line, such as the Asian Economic Planners' Conference (October-November, 1964) convened under the auspices of ECAFE and the Asian Jurists' Conference (February, 1965). "Asian Games"—a regional version of the Olympics—would also open in the Thai capital if not otherwise affected (1966). More significantly, Bangkok was actively involved (March, 1965) in a projected Nine Asian Foreign Ministers' Conference with the possibility of leading to what had become already dubbed as NEATO (Northeast Asian Treaty Organization).[6] Like SEATO, this could prove equally divisive among the neighbors in East and Southeast Asia.

South and Southeast Asia

Perhaps, Southeast Asia is not a good place to review the positive indications for Asian unity, in view of its continued instability since the end of World War II. If we move to Ceylon, Colombo would appear to be a better symbol for regional and inter-regional cooperation without so much as a single publicized negative denominator. The Colombo Plan, it is true, involved (among others) South and Southeast Asian countries which had been functioning quietly, with results, since 1950. Moreover, the so-called "Colombo Powers," were successful in arranging the first Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in 1954-55. The sixteen-nation Asian Weather Conference which was held in the same place (May, 1965), further added to the impression of smooth harmony. Yet, Ceylon itself was not without turmoil. She witnessed the political consequence of the issue of press freedom (as mentioned above) and the Buddhist-Marxist struggle that developed in the country during the period. In the wider Asian context, both cases could only be symbolic of more extensive disunity and antagonism, whether real or potential.

The controversy centered on the International Buddhist Conference that took place (after the near-abortive threats) in India, presented itself as undoubtedly relevant in this connection (September, 1963): like Islam, Buddhism did not wholly unite the Buddhist countries in South and Southeast Asia. Besides, India's border confrontation with both mainland China and Pakistan was too disturbing to "unity" to be overlooked. In the eyes of Rawalpindi and Peking, as a result of events which took place since 1962, India had been deserted, or had been isolated from the rank and file of Afro-Asian neighbors or—on account of her reliance upon Great Britain and United States for military aid—from even the "non-aligned" world. New Delhi's coolness toward the tenth anniversary Bandung celebrations in Indonesia, served to accentuate this state of affairs. In this light, India was said to have changed from "non-alignment to neo-alignment"; from "multilateralism to bilateralism," relied on the type of military alliance that she had professed to abhor. The rumored Anglo-American approach to a new strategic deployment "east of Suez" (April, 1965), with the center of gravity somewhat located in the Indian Ocean (upon India's explicit acquiescence) further contributed to controversy and distrust than to harmony among the Asian neighbors. And even India's proposed "Anti-Nuclear Union" (November, 1964), in the face of Peking's new nuclear status and India's own seeming acceptance of a U.S.

[6] These nine states in question were: Australia, Republic of China, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Republic of Vietnam.

offer of an "umbrella" of protection, did not seem to fire the imagination of any Afro-Asian neighbors for that type of "unity" based on peace.

Pakistan's newly-found friendship with the People's Republic of China (supposedly a measure for unity), only widened the gap between herself and India. While the creation of the RCD and its potential expansion from South and Southwest to Southeast Asia and even North Africa, under Rawalpindi's quiet but determined drive, appeared to be a singular stroke of genius (minus the sting of internal Muslim strife, although covering basically Muslim areas) to the credit of Asian unity, increasing vexation with the United States concerning aid to India, intervention in Vietnam, hostility toward Peking, and others, nevertheless brought to light (almost unexpectedly) a new centrifugal tendency on the part of this common member of CENTO and SEATO, to develop away from its alliances.

Even the RCD, however, represented a clear limitation, when viewed in the Southwest Asian context: its members—Turkey, Iran and Pakistan—being all Muslim but at the same time non-Arab. This brings in the possible question of Arab unity (as represented by the Arab League, with seven of its thirteen members in Southwest Asia) versus non-Arab unity, which, in turn, points again to the lack of real Muslim unity in the larger Afro-Asian arena.

Arab unity, to be sure, has had more meaning than can be thus tarnished in this manner. The UAR, even though a thing of the past in its literal sense, still hovers as a potentially influential symbol for certain basic unity in Southwest Asian-North African area. A new unified political command, for instance, was formed (December, 1964) between the UAR and Iraq. And even deviationist Tunisia chose to continue calling upon the UAR to take the initiative for Arab unity and for a solution of the "Palestine problem." The last problem was said to be "a problem for the Arabs to solve," in contrast to Zionism which was considered "a problem of the imperialists" (February, 1965). However, when the problem did come to a head as a result of a West German-Israeli rapproachment in March, 1965 (presumably under the pressure of "the imperialists"), Tunisia's President Bourguiba suggested compromise rather than a united Arab retaliation against Tel Aviv and Bonn, thus provoking the wrath of the Arab League to which his country belongs. But not entirely without any beneficial effect on Arab unity. For, as a result of the Cairo-Bonn confrontation and maneuver, common Arab sensitivity, vigilance and effort for bringing about an end to external colonial influence and authority in such Arab-populated areas as Aden, South Arabia and Oman, were intensified. This was indicated by the increasing terroist activities, under the leadership of the National Front for Liberation from within, and additional pledge of support—for instance, by Iraq and Kuwait—and a call for British withdrawal (e.g., by UAR) from without (Spring, 1965). Efforts for an operative Arab Common Market were also reinforced through such measures as the holding of a new (5th) Arab Petroleum Congress meeting in Cairo, coupled with an advocacy of "nationalization of Arab oil" (March, 1965): visa abolition among members of the Arab League, as a result of a recommendation put forward by the Arab Economic Union Council (March, 1965); the meeting of Arab Economic Ministers at Tripoli (April, 1965). The existing Arab Council for Atomic Research also called for joint search for radioactive raw materials (March, 1965). A new Arab Parliamentary Conference was likewise convened (May, 1965). The Arab states further launched a literacy campaign during this period (April, 1965), and even a project to develop the Arabic language throughout the Afro-Asian Muslim world was conceived (at Bandung, in March, 1965).

Moreover, the Arab unity movement was directly linked with the Muslim unity movement and, under a similar impetus with the Afro-Asian unity movement, in general. The Mogadishu (Somali Republic) World Muslim Conference (6th) involved most of the Afro-Asian Muslim and Arab countries (December, 1964-January, 1965). The Algiers Afro-Asian Economic Seminar (February, 1965), reportedly with as many as 60 delegations attending, also brought forth the issues of Afro-Asian and even Latin American economic cooperation and "self-reliance for developing countries." The Afro-Asian Muslim Conference (mentioned earlier) was to follow in the same vein (March, 1965), with an additional "Muslim summit at Mecca" looming as a sure project. The fourth Afro-Asian Solidarity meeting (which sponsored the Algiers Seminar) took place at Winneba (Ghana) with the usual expression of militancy (May, 1965). It resolved to extend such solidarity to Latin America by calling for the convening of its next meeting in Havana (January, 1966).

All this, however, led to the glaring failure for the Second Afro-Asian (Bandung) Conference, scheduled and re-scheduled to open in Algiers (June, November, 1965), to materialize, due to factors both foreseen (e.g., the Sino-Soviet controversy) and unforesen (e.g., the Boumedienne **coup** in Alegria) And in the Southwest Asian area itself, both Arab and Afro-Asian unity movements seemed to have failed to involve the non-Arab Muslims (e.g., Turkey, Iran and the RCD in general) very seriously. Turkey, in particular, not only started (as a result of the Cyprus dispute and subsequent diplomatic zigzagging) to placate the Soviet Union, like Iran had been doing, but continued to have a pro-Western orientation, with its membership in both NATO and CENTO, which could be viewed as "un-Asian." Yet, Iran ironically was able to strike out, seemingly in conjunction with the Winneba development, in a new direction of the unity approach, to establish, **via** its visiting Shah, unprecedented cultural relations with far away Latin America during the period (e.g., Argentina and Brazil, May 1965).

North and East Asia

The improving relations between Turkey, Iran and the Soviet Union, whose control over the entire northern regions of Asia serves to simplify the question of unity there, may be viewed, within the Asian context, as having a bearing on Asian unity as a whole. For, indeed, Turkey's membership in NATO and CENTO as well as Pakistan's membership in CENTO and SEATO, had made it almost impossible for the Soviet Union to feel comfortable along its southern flank. Adding to the Soviet Union's apprehensions, is the fact that Iran—also a member of CENTO—had not been changed from an awkward buffer into an accommodating neighbor at the close of World War II. Now, not only the formation of RCD (embodying these same southern

Asian members of CENTO and especially the two crucial links to SEATO and NATO) seemed to have mitigated their militarily antagonistic nature, but all three organizations have become friendlier with their northern neighbor or, in another sense, more neutral—that is, away from the West, during the year.

However, certain minority groups of common racial stock in North and Southwest Asian regions (like the Kurds), did and must be regarded as liable to create some political or border scuffle on both sides from time to time.

Between North and East Asia, where the most crucial factor for Asian unity (or disunity), in general, seems to lie, developments have not been as promising. While Mongolia has continued to lean heavily toward the North and, at the same time, has served as a tolerably effective buffer with respect to China in the south, and while Soviet leaders still occasionally denounce as futile "bourgeois propaganda" to divide the "Socialist camp," the ideological split (and even border difficulties) between Moscow and Peking, had simply become one of the supreme realities in international life, in general, today. As a matter of fact, some even considered the Soviet move in the U.N. concerning the principle of peaceful solution of territorial disputes, as having stemmed primarily from a fear of the potentially explosive nature of the Sino-Soviet border situation (Fall, 1964). On the other hand, the Sino-Soviet alliance **vis-a-vis** a United States-dominated Japan still persisted, albeit necessarily inactive for the time being. But within East Asia itself, all the major powers in the region had their respective ideas of "unity"—more extrovertly than introvertly, it seems.

The fact that mainland China has been traditionally the most dominant nation in East Asia, helps explain that, save in certain particular periods, a measure of unity in the region—perhaps, in terms of a **Pax Sinica**—always existed. Even without communism as a factor, it was not hard to understand the easy rapprochement between Peking on the one hand, and Pyongyang and Ulan Bator and Hanoi on the other. Nor was it difficult to comprehend (with China's newly gained power) why Japan—the modern encroacher upon China's territorial and political integrity—became more and more compromised in the Chinese neighborhood even with U.S. backing. True, Japan continued to side more with the United States than with Peking in the Sino-American confrontation during the year (and hence more with Taipei). But Japan already had to accommodate a new, permanent trade mission from the People's Republican Government (August, 1964), and promised not to oppose Peking's entry into the U.N. (December, 1964). At the same time, Tokyo also sent a Diet mission and special envoy to mainland China before Premier Sato went to the United States (December, 1964), where he could only agree with President Johnson on close consultation over "the vital importance of the question of China." Sato did not resist U.S. pressure to reduce trade and contact with Peking; instead, he simultaneously reciprocated a permanent trade mission and expanded tourist connection and activities toward that giant neighbor. The Japanese leader even expressed the wish for his country to become a "link" between the East and West (January, 1965).

Similarly, while attempting, on the one hand, to mediate the Indo-Pakistani dispute, Japan also tried to show understanding (or even support) for Indonesia's "confrontation" policy vis-a-vis Malaysia and the withdrawal from the U.N., on the basis of Japan's adjustment (in the words of her Diet mission to Jakarta) to "current developments in Asia," which, significantly, even included at one time a reluctance to support Soviet entry into the Afro-Asian Conference, seemingly in deference to Peking. Along the same line, Japan—urged by the United States—likewise improved her relations with South Korea (April, 1965); although to the dislike of Pyongyang and Peking, as well as some elements within South Korea itself.

But all these unfortunately, served only to accentuate the irreconciliability or disunity between Pyongyang and Seoul, and between Taipei and Peking. This was further aggravated by the two parties' different policies toward Vietnam during the period. Under the circumstances, the respective search for unity was also undertaken by Korea, Japan and China quite differently: the two Koreas and two Chinas vehemently spurned permanent division and failed to work for any compromise or reconciliation; they actively sought to ally themselves with opposing forces and organizations in the international arena. While Taipei and Peking became well entrenched in two different camps, South Korea (not to be outdone by the Afro-Asian oriented North) interestingly also started out to win friends in Africa as well as in Asia (March, 1965). And Japan, due both to its pre-war status and post-war development, as well as its close association with the United States and the West, in general, seemed to have embarked upon extensive and grand program for unity of its own.

Japan's gesture toward the conflict in Vietnam which is critical of U.S. bombing, fearful of the use of nuclear weapons, and reluctant to allow the use of U.S. bases in Japanese territory, but at the same time appreciative of SEATO's "sober judgment" of Communist threat in Asia and willing to provide economic and technical aid to South Vietnam—could only be a limited indication in this regard. Likewise, her gradual settlement of war reparations to her Southeast Asian neighbors, had been simply a requirement, although the opportunities were utilized to extend her technical aid and to establish new markets and investment outlets in these areas (as evidenced, for instance, by the Japan Productivity Center's mission and the Japan Industry Floating Fair Association's show-piece to South and Southeast Asia in late 1964). More positively, Japan has been extending financial aid and technical assistance—as part of the Western program—to many Asian areas not connected with the war (such as Pakistan), as well as African countries (such as Rhodesia), in fields ranging from rice cultivation and highway projects to steel and car industries. She even proposed to the Soviet Union a "joint development of Siberia" (February, 1965).

The Olympic Games that took place in Tokyo (October, 1964), of course, most typically symbolized Japan's peaceful re-emergence and ambitions as a new center of international influence in Asia and in the world. This is further spotlighted by the tremendous flow of tourists to and from the Land of the Rising Sun during the regular seasons. But, during the year, Tokyo was also the site of a Southeast Asian Aviation Conference (October, 1964), an Asian Parliamentary Conference (February, 1965), and an Asian Maritime Conference (April, 1965). Japanese authorities also proposed inter-governmental cooperation to combat diseases in Asia (April, 1965), the elimination of political discrimination in Asian games, and general support for the Asian Development Bank (May, 1965). Japan's Ambassador to the U.N. was also elected to the chairmanship of the world organization's Economic and Social Council for 1965. The WFO requested Japan to supply food to developing countries especially those in South and Southwest Asia and Africa (March, 1965). Moreover, Japan was most enthusiastically disposed to participate in the cancelled Second Afro-Asian Conference at Algiers and prepared even to propose Tokyo as site for the Third Conference.

The Overall View

But the key to Asian (or Afro-Asian, or even world-wide) unity or disunity undoubtedly continues to remain more in the hands of China than in those of any other Asian country.

For one thing, mainland China's unity (or disunity) projects were on a much more grandiose scale, unmatched by any other Asian and most non-Asian powers. China's rapprochement with Japan—whether economic or political—could mean Japan's long-range status as a basically Asian or Western-oriented power, i.e., fundamental unity or disunity for East Asia, and hence, the whole of Asia. The five border treaties Peking has concluded (up to March, 1965, with Afghanistan, after Burma, Nepal, Mongolia and Pakistan) likewise made an essential difference as to whether or not there was to be unity between the East Asian colossus and its Southeast, South, and Southwest Asian neighbors. And through its new friend, Pakistan, as the common link between CENTO, SEATO and the Muslim world, Peking's acceptability was enhanced to become also appealing in other parts of Asia (and Africa). Turkey and Lebanon, for example, were rumored at one time to have considered entering into diplomatic relations with mainland China (Spring, 1965). Also, ironically, while Peking's dispute with Moscow might have seemed basically negative insofar as North Asian unity was concerned, this dispute could at the same time be interpreted as purposely designed to win greater unity with, or leadership over, the traditionally Eastern, less developed, and today basically anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist and anti-Western areas of Asia and Africa, and even Latin America. The cancellation of the Second Afro-Asian Conference at Algiers during the year—due to multiple irreconciliabilities and a final threat of sabotage from Peking—bespoke Peking's powerful position (for better or for worse) as well as its frustration in the attempt to forge an Afro-Asian unity primarily under its own terms. India's failure to form an "Anti-Nuclear Union" among the non-aligned countries (basically Afro-Asian) as mentioned above, pointedly suggests the substance and political implications of this position.

China, after all, did become the first and, so far, the only Asian and non-Western nuclear power. This commanding posture could hardly be taken to mean only negatively as to its vulnerability or inviting weakness in relation to a possible U.S. attack, or as to apprehension and antagonism aroused in the Afro-Asian neighbors. The fact was that this new status actually aroused more admiration (secretly or openly) than hostility, and also led to additional diplomatic contacts with some of the more remote areas, such as Jordan, Kuwait and Cyprus in Southwest Asia.[7]

Conversely, the eclipse of Japan and power political absorption of Turkey by the West since World War II, plus India's recent humiliation, could only reinforce mainland China's dominant position in all the major regions of Asia (and the non-West), increasing Western—especially U.S.—presence and antagonism around China, all the more accentuating that position; the singular making of a rival taking on both of the super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, plus India.

The presence of observers from the Philippines (if we were to return to our point of departure in this discussion) in Peking, with an apparent probing mission during the latter's recent anniversary celebrations (October, 1964, shortly after which the first Chinese nuclear device was detonated), has stood as a testimony to the very devlish attraction as well as threat of Peking's position in relation to its neighbors.

Yet, would this state of affairs necessarily mean that Asian unity is closer to reality because of the rise of mainland China?

Hardly.

Precisely because mainland China seems to have come a long way in pursuing a measure of inter-regional unity in Asia and inter-continental unity in the non-West, would perhaps indicate that the forces working toward such inter-regional and inter-continental disunity have also increased to overwhelming proportions; witness the Peking-Taipei division, the Pyongyang-Seoul stalemate, the Hanoi-Saigon conflict, the Jakarta-Kuala Lumpur confrontation, the Peking-New Delhi brewing, the New Delhi-Rawalpindi animosity, the Israel-Arab antagonism, the Arab and non-Arab Muslim schism, and the Cyprus dispute, plus the whole range of Washington-Seoul, Washington-Tokyo, Washington-Taipei, Washington-Bangkok, Washington and London-New Delhi, Washington-Rawalpindi, Washington and London-Teheran, Washington and London-Ankara, and the overall NATO, CENTO, SEATO, and contemplated NEATO and "East of Suez" alliances. All these, had come about precisely because of Asia's internal contradictions and the outside world's repulsions and attractions that invariably contributed to Asian DISUNITY!

Under such circumstances, it would be a miracle if Asian leaders (incumbent or forthcoming) could work together to straighten out their differences, or even just get together for some eventual purpose of that kind, in any foreseeable future.

This, I submit, is not to underestimate these leaders' intentions, goodwill, or possible efforts. Rather, the odds are too great, and too human, against any easy or superhuman solution. It seem obvious that, in order to have Asian

[7] See this writer's study of "Peking and the 'Third World,'" Current History (Sept ember, 1965).

unity; many, many other things must be taken care of first or simultaneously, such as the Sino-Soviet unity, Soviet-American unity, American-Chinese unity.

But, how about American-French unity? French-British unity? East and West German unity? East and West European unity? West European and North American unity? North American and Latin-American unity? Latin-American and Afro-Asian unity? Northern and Southern African unity? Asian and Oceanic unity?

In a word, if it is to Asia's comfort, no other continent is really enjoying any significant measure of unity; or conversely, until there is a value standard established in favor of continental unity rather than power political domination-individually or collectively, until all continents are thus striving for such unity, and until the whole world aspires to unity—THERE WILL NEVER BE ASIAN UNITY.

PHILIPPINE HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF MEXICO *

REEL 11

[Continuation of Vol. 20. This reel starts with p. 232 of Exposure 7. Exposures 8-10 missing.]

1801	Exp. 11—	The carpenter Ysidro Jose Abad is taken prisoner for several pieces of Chinese merchandise found in his possession. pp. 309-416

Vol. 21

1785-1788 [sic]

1785	Exp. 1—	Don Juan Antonio Jimenez Frenero reports to Sor Conde de Galvez having published the royal cedula about the Compania de Comercio de Filipinas, and letters of **alcaldes** and **tenientes** acknowledging receipt of copies of the said decree. pp. 1-71
1785	Exp. 3—	The Commissary of San Blas gives an account to His Excellency of the aid he asked for to enable him to discharge his duties. pp. 97-134
1785	Exp. 4—	The Commissary of San Blas tells His Excellency that he would await the payments of Don Francisco Antonio Mourelle and Jose Canizares, in accordance with previous arrangements. pp. 135-148
1785	Exp. 5—	Index of the correspondence which the aide-de-camp of the Infantry Division of San Blas sends to the Viceroy of New Spain. pp. 149-157
1785	Exp. 6—	A report on the inspection made of His Majesty's ship named **La Felicidad** alias **La Mexicana** which sets sail on orders from above. pp. 158-169
1785	Exp. 7—	Invoice of medicines being shipped in the schooner for the voyage it will make to the district of San Blas. pp. 170-172
1785	Exp. 8—	A list of tools and other instruments for calking which have been given by the arsenal of San Blas to Marcelino Becerra, carpenter. p. 173

* This list is the continuation of the list of documents in the first ten reels which was published in the December, 1965 issue of the **Asian Studies.** We are publishing in this issue the list of documents found in the last twenty reels (Reel 11—Reel 30). The processing of the documents was undertaken by the U.P. President's Committee for the Processing of the Lopez-Mateos Microfilms of the Philippine historical documents deposited in the National Archives of Mexico. The Committee's Chairman was Prof. G. Fores-Ganzon of the Department of History and Head of the American Studies Committee. Its members were: Dr. Lilia Laurel and Prof. Antolina Antonio of the Department of Spanish; Mrs. Justina S. Ocampo of the Department of History and Miss Lydia Escarilla (on leave) of the U.P. Library. (The Editor.)

1785 Exp. 9—The nature and amount of provisions being prepared by the accountant of the Royal Treasury in San Blas for the crew of the schooner La Felicidad.
pp. 174-206

1785 Exp. 10—Inventory of the packet-boat **San Carlos** which sails on orders from above, to a secret destination.
pp. 207-230

1785 Exp. 11—Inventory of tools and other instruments which have been given by the arsenal of San Blas to Francisco Rua, calker of the packet-boat San Carlos.
pp. 230-231

1785 Exp. 12—The Commissary of San Blas reports having received in that treasury $50,000 which the royal officials of Guadalajara had sent on orders of His Excellency.
pp. 237-240

1785 Exp. 13—Roster of the crew of the packet-boat **San Carlos el Filipino** which left for a secret destination.
pp. 241-244

1785 Exp. 14—Letters of various judges and **alcaldes** to Conde de Galvez, informing him that they had received copies of the decree regarding the establishment of the Royal Company of the Philippines.
pp. 245-304

1786 Exp. 15—Reply concerning the establishment of the Compania del Comercio de Filipinas.
pp. 305-313

Vol. 22

Philippines, 1785-1803 [sic]

1785-93 Exp. 1—An account of the stay at the Convent of Sto. Tomas de Villanueva, outside Mexico, of thirty Agustinian religious who left Spain for the Province of the Holy Name of Jesus in the Philippines.
pp. 1-50

1795 Exp. 2—An account of seven Recollect missionaries who arrived aboard the **Santiago de Espana.**
pp. 15-77

[Exposure 3 is missing]

1796 Exp. 4—Order concerning thirteen Recollect missionaries being sent to the Province of San Nicolas Tolentino in the Philippines.
pp. 77-102

1797-1805 Exp. 5—Joaquin de San Agustin writes that Father Jose Copacabana should not remain in the realm on the pretext of being sick; this is followed by several documents on the Copacabana case.
pp. 103-262

1802 Exp. 6—Query on whether or not in the collection of taxes on goods the 12% reduction on the value of goods should be applied to the cargo of two ships, as is done in cases when no fair is held.
pp. 268-301

Vol. 23

1785 Exp. 1—Don Antonio Bustamante Bustilo y Pablo, as **ad interim** governor of the New Kingdom of Leon, presents the names of guarantors demanded of him. [This document is partially illegible and apparently is continued in Reel 12.]

Reel 12[1]

Volume 23

1785 Exp. 1—Dr. Don Antonio Bustamante Bustillo y Pablo as Governor of the vacant bishopric which was of the diocese of Nuevo Reino de Leon presents the bondsmen sent to him.

pp. 1-30

1785 Dr. Don Antonio Bustamante canon of the Holy Church of Pueblo, as Governor of the diocese of Reino de Leon, presents papers asking for prorogation of term to such a time he deems desirable.[2]

pp. 31-61

1792 Exp. 3—Through Ignacio Cobarrubias, Dr. Don Antonio Bustamante says that in order to answer the principal judicial decree, he needs the paper regarding the appointment as trustee of and the accounts given by Don Felipe Calzado.[3]

pp. 62-98

1799[4] Exp. 4—Through Joaquin Jose Guerrero y Garcia, Dona Ma. Josefa Valdez y Bustamante says that the Villanuevas have returned Atty. Olmedo to his work without any answer, by virtue of the judicial decree given, and requests that he be reinstated under the terms of His Excellency.

pp. 99-130

1806 Exp. 2—Through Anselmo Rodriguez Balda, Don Jose Antonio Salazar y Bustamante and Dona Maria Josefa Quijano, mother and guardian of her young children, request an act of court from the Atty. of the Royal Treasury as ordered, and that later, it be registered in the Higher Tribunal. This paper is continued on page. 246.

pp. 131-176

1807 Exp. 3—Through Andres de Alcantara, the Cathedral of the Holy Church of Nuevo Reino de Leon requests that this document and its preceding papers be handed to the Attorney of the Royal Treasury as it is ordered.

pp. 177-218

1782 Exp. 4—Information regarding legitimacy and nobility given by Don Miguel Valdez Mayorasgo, of this name and of his wife Dona Maria Rafaela Bustamante y Pablo and his son Don Miguel Jose Marcos, all residents of this court.

pp. 219-245

1807 Exp. 5—Through Anselmo Rodriguez Balda, Don Jose Antonio Salazar Bustamante and Dona Maria Josefa Quijano, guardian of her

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[1] Reel 12 actually begins with p. 12 of Volume 23.

[2] Number of Exposure not indicated in the Index but this is related to Exp. 1 and corresponds to pages 31-61 in the microfilm.

[3] This is Calzado in the microfilm. In the Index this appears as Zalzado.

[4] This date is taken from microfilm. In the Index there is no date indicated.

young children, request that an account be made of documents which they accordingly present. This is a continuation of Exp. 2.
pp. 246-265

1897 Exp. 9—Through Anselmo Rodriguez Balda, Don Jose Antonio Salazar y Bustamante and Dona Maria Quijano, mother and legitimate guardian of her children, request that in compliance with what was resolved by the Higher Tribunal, the amount stipulated be given to each part and liquidation be confirmed.
pp. 266-280

1808 Exp. 6—Anselmo Rodriguez Balda, in the judicial decree of the finding of Dr. Antonio Bustamante, requests that an order be issued to the sub-delegate of Tlalpujahua in order to inform Mr. Manuel Lorenzo regarding the measures expressed in his claim against the properties of Dr. Bustamante.
pp. 281-289

1809 Exp. 7—The Branch on anniversaries of Puebla in the decree on the finding of Dr. Don Antonio Bustamante.
pp. 290-308

1811 Exp. 8—Papers regarding the remittance to Manila of ₱25,000 pesos kept in the Royal Treasury, and allotted by Dona Barbara Bersosa for the establishment of the Institution for the Poor.[5]
pp. 309-330

Volume 24

1786 Exp. 1—Consultation of the Most Illustrious Archbishop of this Holy Church regarding the shipment to Manila of the expressed amount which correponds to the pious work of Don Juan Gutierrez Villar, for the conversion of Chinese gentiles.
pp. 1-14

1788 Exp. 2—Papers regarding the remittance to Veracruz with destination to Cadiz of the amount of 48,134 pesos, proceeds from Ramo de Temporalidades of Manila (the Branch or office taking care of proceeds from ecclesiastical effects).
pp. 15-33

1788 Exp. 3—Sea freight from gross amount of cargo fee of the Frigate San Jose.
pp. 34-48

1791-1792 Exp. 4—Paper placed around 1790 to 1792, Second Book, corresponds to duplicate of the vesel of the year '92. A statement of accounts on p. 61.
pp. 48-124

1792 Exp. 5—Statement on the cargo conducted by the Frigate of His Majesty, **San Andres**, that left this port for that of Cavite.
pp. 125-145

1790 Exp. 5—Papers on the request that the landing of Don Ventura Reyes,

[5] This exposure is numbered 118 in the Index, but it should be Exp. 8, the only number missing in this volume.

a special Navy Ensign of the Frigate **San Andres,** be conceded and that this post be conferred to Cadet Antonio de Ortega..[5]
pp. 146-158

1790 Exp. 6—Don Francisco Bazo Ibanez, lawyer of the Governor and the Troops of the Marianas Islands, requests payment.
pp. 159-173

1791 Exp. 7—Papers regarding ecclesiastical stipends up to August 21, 1792.
pp. 174-180

1791 Exp. 8—Papers requesting that Don Juan Bautista David pay the Royal Treasury the difference of the duties that were not collected in the year '84 of what was shipped in San Blas for the Philippines.
pp. 181-241

1791 Exp. 9—That criminals sentenced to hard labor or banishment in a garrison should not be destined to the Philippine Islands; the destination of two prisoners who came from Peru.
pp. 242-280

1791 Exp. 10—That ₱58,300 be remitted to Acapulco for the clearing of the Vessel **San Andres.**
pp. 281-285

1791 Exp. 11—Papers regarding medicine, paper, pen, utensils which in accordance with a Royal Order have to come from Spain to Manila.[6]
pp. 286-291

1791 Exp. 12—Papers regarding medicines for the Hospital of Manila supplied by the Ministers of this Royal Treasury.
pp. 292-298

1791 Exp. 13—Request of Don Jose Bustamante that his brother Manuel should not be assigned to the service of His Majesty in Manila.
pp. 299-319

1792 Exp. 14—Appeal by Mariano Reyna that he be not assigned, for being idle, to work in those islands.
pp. 319-331

1792 Exp. 15—Supply in Havana to nine Franciscan barefoot monks and one lay missionary of the Philippines.
pp. 332-347

1791 Exp. 16—Arrival of the vessel **San Andres** at the Port of San Blas under the command of the Lieutenant of the Frigate Don Juan de Marquina; its arrival at Acapulco on November 30 and the measure regarding publication for the Fair and for the day of its departure.
pp. 348-391

Volume 25

1786 Exp. 1—Papers on the unloading of the Frigate **San Jose de Gracia** from the Port of Cavite, which arrived at Acapulco on November 21, 1779; on whether the original records would be sent to the Royal Tribunal of Accounts.
pp. 1-88

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[5] This exposure and the one preceding it are numbered 5 in the Index. This numbering is followed in this translation because both exposures deal about the Frigate **San Andres.**

[6] In the Index this is marked Exp. 12 like the one following it. Here it is Exp. 11 because in the microfilm this comes before Exp. 12 pp. 292-298.

1779 Exp. 2—Complete testimony of the original record of the unloading of the Frigate named San Jose de Gracia that arrived at the Port of Acapulco.[7]
pp. 89-212

Reel 13

Volume 25

1779 Exp. 2—Copy of the original manifest of the frigate San Jose Gracia which docked and unloaded in Acapulco.
pp. 89-212

1791 Exp. 3—Regarding two boxes of goods smuggled on board the frigate San Andres by the passenger D. Felix Ruiz.
pp. 213-235

1792 Exp. 4—Regarding the seizure of the passenger D. Felix Ruiz of the frigate San Andres, in which case the acting Guardia Mayor claims a right to sue.
pp. 236-247

1792 Exp. 5—D. Francisco Bustamante, in the name of D. Felix Ruiz, appeals to the Supreme Council of Real Hacienda on the question of two boxes of goods smuggled from China.
pp. 248-259

1792 Exp. 6—Regarding the seizure of the passenger D. Felix Ruiz because a box of cloth was mistaken for another of wax.
pp. 260-284

1791 Exp. 7—Papers against Antonio Fernandez, for not having submitted to the Royal Warehouses the goods entrusted to him by the Principal Ministers of the Treasury of Acapulco.
pp. 295-386

1791 Exp. 8—About some goods smuggled in the frigate San Andres by the sailor Antonio Diaz who died in that boat.
pp. 387-417

1797 Exp. 9—The Ministers of Acapulco, regarding the protest made by the Ministers of Manila on the value of the goods seized from D. Francisco Torres and D. Felix Ruiz.
pp. 418-432

1817 Exp. 10—Regarding the duties which should be charged in San Blas from the expeditions of the Comercio de Manila.
pp. 433-513

Volume 26

1787 Exp. 1—Royal Order stating excessiveness of the number of 2,343 pieces of goods shipped in the Galleon San Jose, and much more exorbitant, the number of 153 in the name of Commandant Don Diego Choquet.
pp. 1-5

1787 Exp. 2—Papers regarding the arrival in San Blas of the boat San Andres from China and repairs made here on this boat.
pp. 6-66

[7] Continuation of Exp. 2 in this volume is found in Reel 13 because Reel 12 ends on page 115 of Volume 12.

1799 Exp. 3—Account of the expenses made against this Department by the Royal Frigate **La Pilar**, during her stay in the port of Acapulco.
pp. 67-98

1799 Exp. 4—About the sending of the Budget of the year and other extraordinary aids.
pp. 99-156

1799 Exp. 5—Budget remitted by Sr. D. Ignacio Maria de Alava regarding the expenses to be incurred by the squadron in his charge.
pp. 157-215

1799 Exp. 6—Medicines from Spain for the drugstore of the Royal Hospital of Manila.
pp. 216-265

1700 Exp. 7—D. Cristobal Zorgo Diaz regarding permit to go to Manila.
pp. 266-273

Volume 27

1787-1788 and 1790 Exp. 1—The Casa Cosio asking permission to remit to Manila $50,000 on account of the Real Compania de Filipinas. Request made by the same in January, 1788 for the remittance of $20,000.
pp. 1-39

1792 Exp. 2—D. Francisco Yraeta, that he be permitted to ship in the **San Andres** $28,365 **reals** belonging to the Compania de Filipinas.
pp. 40-64

1790 Exp. 3—D. Ventura de los Reyes regarding extension of period for the payment of duties on the load of the boat **San Andres**. The same by D. Gabriel Teran in 1792.
pp. 65-80

1792 Exp. 4—D. Gabriel de Teran—Official of the Consulate of Manila, that the businessmen of Manila be granted extension for the payment of duties on goods shipped.
pp. 81-143

Reel 14

[Volume 27 is continued in this reel which starts with p. 139 of Exp. 4]

1792 Exp. 5—Don Gabriel Teran requests that the fair be put off two days until after the departure of the ship **San Andres** from Acapulco. Several documents to support the proposition explain the need for time to sell the goods from China brought in by the frigate **Magallanes**.
pp. 144-182

1793 Exp. 6—Testimony to support the charge brought by the Royal Company against Don Josef Teodoro Garcia de Arias, who had been entrusted with 7,847,536 pesos in his capacity as finance officer of the frigate **San Jose**, in 1788. Other documents support the claim that the said amount had been received by the finance officer.
pp. 183-223

1794 Exp. 7—Papers related to the **situado** in 1793, 1794 and 1795. A table of collections for 1791, 1792 and 1793 is included. There is a petition to transfer one-third of the amount collected, for use in the Philippines.
pp. 224-274

1794 Exp. 8—The governor-general of the Philippines requests 400 recruits for the **Tropa Veterana**. The documents include a roster of the men who applied, personal data, and the reasons for enlisting.
pp. 275-326

1794 Exp. 9—The amount distributed by the Treasury of Manila in the frigate San **Jose Bolandra, Horcasitas** and **Goleta Valdez**, totaling $38,890. Separate lists of the amounts in each ship are included.
pp. 327-347

Volume 28
1791-1792

1791 Exp. 1—A list of provisions for the frigate **San Andres** and the order that these be supplied from Mexico. The list includes wine, vinegar, pork, ham, sugar, and spices.
pp. 1-18

1792 Exp. 2—Documents clearing the ship **Galleta** that would leave for the Philippines and attesting to its being sea-worthy.
pp. 19-46

1791 Exp. 3—Papers assigning vagrants and other persons to the troops in the Philippines, including personal data of everyone and departure from Acapulco.
pp. 47-137

1792 Exp. 4—Order to provide medicines and other supplies to the frigate **San Andres** for its return trip to the Philippines. A list of the provisions given is attached.
pp. 138-151

1791 Exp. 5—The prosecution of Don Gerardo Ruiz for vagrancy. Included is a biographical sketch of the man.
pp. 152-205

1792 Exp. 6—Jose Nicolas Ramirez is being sent to Manila, after being condemned for vagrancy. Charges and defending testimonies are included.
pp. 206-221

1792 Exp. 7—D. Tomas Fernandez Manila seeks permission to send $2,000 to Manila as inheritance of his younger brother D. Jose Joaquin Montoya.

1792 Exp. 8—Complaint of the mess officer of the frigate **San Andres,** Don Joaquin de Ainciburu, against the commanding officer who left him stranded.
pp. 230-258

1792 Exp. 9—The Provincial of missionaries of the Province of San Gregorio, Philippines, requests that the passage of nine religious and a lay brother be arranged.
pp. 259-261

1792 Exp. 10—Father Joaquin de San Agustin requests permision to leave; includes a list of goods for the missionaries of the Marianas and the Philippines.
pp. 262-265

1792 Exp. 11—Don Juan Belluga is sentenced for vagrancy to serve eight years in the Manila regiment.
pp. 266-291

1792 Exp. 12—Don Cosme de Mier requests that he be allowed to ship 498 pesos and 7 **reals** to the officer in charge of properties of deceased persons in Manila.
pp. 292-305

1792 Exp. 13—Diego Echevarria petitions that he be excused from serving in the army in the Philippines where he had been assigned, explaining that he was entitled to this pardon for having been instrumental in denouncing the attempt to escape of criminals from the second chain-gang of which he was a member. He was sent anyway.
pp. 306-314

Vol. 29
1792-1793

1792 Exp. 1—Papers soliciting the re-assignment of eleven persons sentenced to serve in the army in Manila but who were found incapable. These contain individual appeals and supporting testimonies.
pp. 1-65

1792 Exp. 2—The lieutenant of Acapulco reports to those in charge of executing the order to convey Francisco Velasquez and Jose Cardona to Manila that the two are sick in Acapulco. He wants to know how far he should go to help them.
pp. 66-85

1792 Exp. 3—Permits of Pablo Archiundra and Jose Salazar, former soldiers of the Manila regiment who returned aboard the frigate **San Jose** in 1792.
pp. 86-92

1793 Exp. 4—Francisco Velasco sentenced for vagrancy to serve in the armed forces of the Philippines petitions that he be given freedom because of illness.
pp. 93-103

1784 Exp. 5—Documents pertaining to the arrival and cargo of the frigate **San Jose** which arrived at the port of Acapulco from the Philippines and the amount of the **situado** it brought in 1784. Included also is the **situado** brought by the ship **San Carlos.**
pp. 104-112

1784 Exp. 6—A royal order replying to the report made by the Governor of Manila to His Majesty concerning the increases in the treasury for 1779, 1780, 1781, including an itemized list.
pp. 113-124

1784 Exp. 7—A letter of the Governor-General of Manila suggesting that a certain amount itemized in a list be deducted from the **el situado.**
pp. 125-193

1785 Exp. 8—Letter and other documents sent by the royal officials of Manila regarding the **el stituado** of 1784.
pp. 194-198

1785 Exp. 9—Letter and other documents sent by the royal officials of Manila regarding the **el situado** of 1782, including an itemized list and a summary table of goods shipped, names of owners of bundles, etc. There is a suggestion of items which should be increased for the **situado** and items which should be decreased.
pp. 199-274

1788 Exp 10—Remonstrance presented by Don Juan Gonzalez and Don Antonio Palacios against the conduct of the Chief Officer and other royal officials of Acapulco who questioned the rights of the ship which arrived in 1787.
pp. 275-314

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Reel 15

Volume 29

1788 Exp. 10—Representation of D. Juan Gonzales and D. Antonio Palacios, regarding the explanation that the Castellano de Acapulco and Royal Officers ask for, regarding the duties of the Nao which arrived in the year 87.
pp. 275-314

Volume 30

1793 Exp. 1—That D. Jose Ignacio de Torres Elosua be drafted to the service in the army in Manila, for the reason that he is a vagrant.
pp. 1-30

1794 Exp. 2—D. Juan Antonio Cordero, destined to the Philippines asks that his case be remitted to the Royal Criminal Court.
pp. 31-36

1794 Exp. 3—Don Jose Ygnacio Arce's statement that he was apprehended without cause and sent to the Philippines.
pp. 37-70

1793 Exp. 4—Dona Joaquin de Tapia, that her son Francisco Ruiz Crespo be enlisted in the service of the army in the Philippines.
pp. 71-83

1794 Exp. 5—Ygnacio Rosales requests that he be relieved from army service in the Philippines.
pp. 84-95

1794 Exp. 6—Jose Mariano Reyna, vagrant, that he be relieved of his assignment to the Philippines.
pp. 96-125

1794 Exp. 7—Manuel Veguillos, vagrant, requests that he be relieved of service in the Philippines.
pp. 126-128

1794 Exp. 8—Mariano Malgarejo, that he be relieved from service in the Armada.
pp. 129-135

1794 Exp. 9—Manuel Herrera, in his behalf and that of other vagrants who had been sent to the Philippines, requests that they be exempted from service in the Armada, for reasons of the difficulties and diseases incurred in the trip to and from Acapulco and during the stay therein.
pp. 136-157

1794 Exp. 10—Jose Joaquin Pena, that he be relieved of the service in the squadron to which he was assigned for being a vagrant.
pp. 158-161

1794 Exp. 11—A request that D. Manuel Matute be sent for army service to the Philippines for being a vagrant.
pp. 162-211

1794 Exp. 12—Summary information, on the instruction of Superior order, inquiring about the veracity of some acts of D. Manuel Matute.
pp. 212-232

1794 Exp. 13—Jose Antonio de Luna Trejo requests that he be not sent to the Philippines as a vagrant.
pp. 233-239

1794 Exp. 14—D. Juan Jose Chavez, vagrant, requests that he be not punished by sending him to the Philippines.
pp. 240-262

1794 Exp. 15—Regarding the fate of 69 vagrants apprehended with no boat to conduct them to the Philippines.
pp. 263-294

1794 Exp. 16—Agustin Vicente Mendoza, vagrant, requests that he be set free.
pp. 295-299

Volume 31

1793 Exp. 1—That orders be passed to some municipalities for the sending of some vagrants to army services in the Philippines.
pp. 1-36

1793 Exp. 2—Payment of expenditures of the Chief Sergeant of the Plaza for the habilitation of the vagrants that are being sent to Manila.
pp. 37-54

1793 Exp. 3—Correspondence with the Guardia mayor of Acapulco, Don Jose de Rosas.
pp. 55-61

1793 Exp. 4—The subdelegate of Ycuzar, that the sending of some vagrants to the Philippines for army service be declared just.
pp. 62-123

1793 Exp. 5—52 prisoners remitted by the municipality of Puebla for army service in the Philippines.
pp. 124-137

1793 Exp. 6—That Joseph Gomez Medina be not sent to the Philippines for army service because he contracted marriage with Dona Manuela Carpintero.
pp. 138-159

1793 Exp. 7—Pedro Alvarado begs not to be sent as a vagrant to the Philippines for army service.
pp. 160-172

1793 Exp. 8—Jose Agustin de Aguayo, delivered by the Subdelegate of Tepeaca, for vagrancy.
pp. 173-181

1793 Exp. 9—Dona Gertrudis Pedrosa requests that her son Jose Alcocer be not sent to Manila.
pp. 182-186

1793 Exp. 10—That some of the vagrants of Puebla delivered for Manila be assigned to the King's Regiment.
pp. 187-194

1793 Exp. 11—Don Ildefonso Roa, requests not to be sent to the Philippines for service in the army.
pp. 195-202

1793 Exp. 12—Regarding the drafting of Francisco Castrillo, vagrant, for service in the army of the Philippines.
pp. 203-208

1793 Exp. 13—Pablo Martin Flores begs not to be sent to the service of the army in the Philippines.
pp. 209-220

1793 Exp. 14—Regarding the drafting of several individuals, vagrants from the jurisdiction of Maravatio, for army service in the Philippines.
pp. 221-264

1794 Exp. 15—Complaints against several gamblers, among them some of the drafted vagrants, of Juana de Soria, whom they disrobed on the 20th of June last.
pp. 265-281

1793 Exp. 16—Charge against Juan Jose Argeta for illicit relations with Maria Rafaela Espinoza.
pp. 282-352

Volume 32

1793 Exp. 1—Royal orders informing about the aid given to the mision of 88 religious (Agustinians) in the province of the Holy Name of Jesus in the Philippines upon representations of Fr. Pedro Carracedo.
pp. 1-81

1801 Exp. 2—Copy of the instructions given to a mission of Dominicans who came to the Philippines; copy coursed by Fray Antonio Marquez who came in the same mission.
pp. 82-123

1801 Exp. 3—Regarding which prelate should meet Fr. Antonio Marquez of the Order of Sto. Domingo, who arrived from Spain for the missions in the Philippines.
pp. 124-204

Reel 16

[Exp. 3 of Vol. 32 is continued in this reel, starting with p. 160.]

1792 Exp. 4—Concerning a group of Dominican missionaries who had arrived enroute to the Philippines.
pp. 205-221

1793 Exp. 5—Concerning a second batch of Dominican missionaries for the Province of Santo Rosario in the Philippines.
pp. 222-268

1795 Exp. 6—Fr. Antonio Marquez, Dominican, requests permission to return to Spain. Originally assigned to the Philippines, he was taken ill and failed to reach his destination. His request was granted.
pp. 269-310

1792 Exp. 7—A report concerning eight Religious of the Order of St. Dominic assigned as missionaries to the Province of Santisimo Rosario, Philippines. It contains biographical data, an account of their journey, and a list of expenses incurred.
pp. 311-384

1794 Exp. 8—Fray Joaquin Penalva, lay-brother of the Philippine missions of San Agustin de las Cuebas, requests that he be allowed to stay in the province of San Diego, Mexico.
pp. 385-418

1795 Exp. 9—Order that Fr. Gregorio Rodriguez, missionary of San Agustin de las Cuebas, be provided with a cassock.
pp. 419-423

1799 Exp. 10—Insistence of the Father Prior of San Jacinto that Fr. Juan de Olave be assigned and sent to the missions of those Islands.
pp. 424-448

1799 Exp. 11—Royal decree ordering the Governor of the Philippines to give to the admiral of the fleet, Don Felix Berenguer de Marquina, the treasury funds held in Manila, discounting the **situado** it is entitled to.
pp. 449-473

Volume 33
Philippines 1793-1799

1793 Exp. 1—Fr. Juan de la Consolacion, lay-religious of the Dominican mission of San Jacinto, Philippines, complains that he had been deprived of his post by the appointment of others who had just arrived from Spain.
pp. 1-44

1795 Exp. 2—A recommendation of the Captain-General of the Philippines that Don Jose Manuel Reyes be made to pay his indebtedness to the Casa Mortuoria of D. Vicente Memije.
pp. 45-116

1799 Exp. 3—Concerning allowances that should be given to Don Jose Tovar which he was entitled to as first pilot of the frigate **Aranzazu.**
pp. 117-127

1799 Exp. 4—Concerning the dispute which arose between the Governor and Captain-General of the Philippines and the Commandant of the fleet in those waters, over the bill of lading of the frigate, **Aranzazu,** belonging to the Department of San Blas.
pp. 128-190

1799 Exp. 5—Concerning the wastes perpetuated in the provisions sent from Puebla to Acapulco for the return of the **San Andres** in 1797.
pp. 199-238

1799 Exp. 6—The captain of the frigate, Don Jose Iturrigaray, presents claims for payment of his salaries and allowances. [Illegible in some parts.]
pp. 239-309

Volume 34
Philippines 1794-1795

1794 Exp. 1—Vagrants of Celaya being sent for service in the Royal navy.
pp. 1-22

1794 Exp. 2—That $59,000 and provisions for the frigate **San Fernando** from the Philippines be given. Includes itemized tables of provisions given.
pp. 23-50

1794 Exp. 3—Report of the arrival of the ship from the Philippines, **San Fernando Magallanes,** in Acapulco on November 27, 1794 and the announcement of the sale of its cargo and departure. Included are lists of passengers, crews, cargoes and their respective owners.
pp. 51-80

1794 Exp. 4—Vagrants from Valle de Santiago and Salamanca—personal data and other documents.
pp. 81-123

1794 Exp. 5—Charges brought about and prepared by the alcalde, acting as judge, against fourteen other vagrants.
pp. 124-175

1795 Exp. 6—Concerning advances made to meet expenses of the Dominican missionaries enroute to San Jacinto until they leave Acapulco.
pp. 176-188

1794 Exp. 7—That aid be given in salaries and allowances to D. Pedro Piedra Buena, Chaplain of the Navy, who went with the frigate Magallanes.
pp. 189-208

1795 Exp. 8—Juan Delgado and Rafael Medina, artillery men of the frigate Magallanes request permission to stay in San Blas.
pp. 209-214

[This Exposure ends on page 214]

Reel 17

[Continuation of Volume 34]

1795 Exp. 9—Papers regarding charges against Don Mariano Arroyo, for vice and incorrigibility.
pp. 215-242

1795 Exp. 10—Papers on charges against Ignacio Guardia and Jose Uribe, for vagrancy.
pp. 243-293

1795 Exp. 11—Papers related to the shipment to the Philippines of a box containing the work, **Hortus Malabaricus**, sent to the Botanist Juan de Cuellar of the Royal Order.
pp. 294-310

1795 Exp. 12—Papers regarding payment in advance of the amount of $140.00 annually to each missionary of those maintained in China by the Barefoot Franciscans of San Gregorio in Manila.
pp. 311-340

Exp. 13—Papers regarding the news that the chain-gang for Acapulco should leave with the vagrants assigned to serve His Majesty in the permanent regiment in Manila.*
pp. 341-383

Volume 35

1788-1808

1794 Exp. 1—Papers regarding the excess beyond what was allowed by the permit for goods delivered by the Philippine Frigate **Magallanes**, as fixed by Regulation.
pp. 1-62

1800 Exp. 2—On the retirement and salaries of the Ensign of the Frigate Don Manuel Clemente and previous application to remain in the Department of San Blas.
pp. 63-128

* No date is indicated for this exposure.

1801 Exp. 3—On the salaries of Navy Surgeon Don Miguel Maria Jimenez.
pp. 129-172

1798 Exp. 4—Royal letter of the 27 of January of this year regarding defects observed in the proceedings of the lawsuit on smuggling apprehended in the vessel **San Jose de Gracia** under the command of Don Francisco Jose Basco.
pp. 173-233

1802 Exp. 5—Application of Juan de Ariza, artilleryman of the Brigade, to proceed to Spain.
pp. 234-276

1802 Exp. 6—On the assignment of Jose Maria, orphan of Don Pedro Garcia de la Lama, to the permanent regiment in Manila, together with the report made by Regular Mayor Don Sebastian de las Heras on the excesses committed by the same and also a petition requesting that he be set free so that he could be cured.
pp. 277-280

1802 Exp. 7—Information given by Don Pedro Garcia de la Lama affirming the misconduct of his orphan Jose Maria.
pp. 281-300

1802 Exp. 8—Complaint presented by Don Nicolas Noriega, requesting that Don Jose Garcia de la Lama be reprimanded for the excesses indicated.
pp. 301-317

1808 Exp. 9—On the permission requested by Fr. Don Claudio Latendas, Chaplain of the Royal Chapel of Manila, to be cured outside this capital.
pp. 318-326

1802 Exp. 10—Papers of Don Diego Dominguez Pitolin of the vessel **Rey Carlos** on his stay in this Kingdom and the application made by his uncle for his return to the Philippines.
pp. 327-338

1802 Exp. 11—Royal Order on the prorrogation for 10 years of the grace period in which this Treasury will continue to pay the annual pension of 100 pesos to the priests that maintain the Province of Sto. Rosario of the Philippines in China and Tunking.
pp. 339-344

1803 Exp. 12—Deserters among soldiers and sailors who were embarked and aided in Acapulco to return to the Philippines, in the frigate **Casualidad.**
pp. 345-352

1803 Exp. 13—Papers related to the statement of Don Alejandro Parreno, Governor of the Marianas Islands regarding payment of due salaries and continuation of those that would fall due.
pp. 353-358

1803 Exp. 14—On the amount that should be paid in advance for the transportation of the Ensign Don Jose Ramirez Portocarrero.
pp. 359-362

1803 Exp. 15—Papers regarding the conveyance of Don Jose Ramirez Portocarrero, Ensign of the Infantry Regiment of Manila, by Don Domingo

Goyenechea, Captain and Mate of the Frigate **Casualidad**, from this port to that of Cavite.
pp. 363-377

1788 Exp. 16—Warrants issued by virtue of Superior Order of His Excellency Don Matias Galvez, Viceroy Governor and Captain General of New Spain, by the Magistrate of this city and Inspector General of the Kingdom, for the apprehension of the individuals indicated.
pp. 378-436

1803 Exp. 17—The Governor of the Marianas Islands concerning the $20,000.00 to be used in Manila and to provide the needs of the troops and other individuals who are to be sent.
pp. 437-440

1803 Exp. 18—Pardon for the disorder committed by Luis Montero Espinosa Ramos of the frigate **La Fama.**
pp. 441-466

1802 Exp. 19—Papers regarding the Ensign of the frigate, Don Manuel Clemente.
pp. 467-491

1801 Exp. 20—Testimony on papers with instructions as to which prelate ought to take Fr. Antonio Marquez of the Order of St. Dominic.
pp. 492-512

Volume 36
1800

1800 Exp. 1—On the restoration of the cost of the convoy which brought the cargo shipped to this capital to the Royal Treasury of Accounts, by the expedition of the frigate **San Rafael.**
pp. 1-15

1800 Exp. 2—Record and permit of entry in Acapulco of the frigate **San Rafael** coming from Cavite.
pp. 16-24

1800 Exp. 3—Papers of the Ministry of Acapulco on the departure of the frigate **San Rafael** and whether it should carry twice its record and the fruits it would wish to load, the Vessel **Magallanes** and two frigates having arrived.
pp. 25-29

1800 Exp. 4—Testimony of papers issued by virtue of Superior Order of His Excellency, the Viceroy of New Spain regarding the departure of the frigate **San Rafael** which sailed from Manila and came under the command of its chief Don Andres Amsiburu.
pp. 30-40

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1800 Exp. 5—Arrival of the frigate San Rafael alias **Comercio de Manila** with products and goods from Manila and Asia, and petitions that the Fair be held in Cuernavaca or San Agustin de las Cuevas, and other points.
pp. 41-166

1800 Exp. 6—Request that duties be paid in Acapulco for the shipment made on the frigate **San Rafael,** although said shipment was sold in this Capital.
pp. 167-180

1804 Exp. 7—Summary information aganist the C. Ab. Ydefonso Villegas of the Second Company, and the Distinguished Soldier D. Jose Barreiro of the third company, both accused as accomplices and in favor of the escape planned by Don Francisco Navarro from the galley of the Presidio del Organo.
pp. 181-206

1804 Exp. 8—Secret summary information against Don Francisco Navarro, in order to verify the insult and threats made to the Lieutenant Don Francisco Izquierdo, Commandant of this detachment on the night of the 15th of October of the said year.
pp. 207-234

1804 Exp. 9—Royal Order regarding the destination of prisoners to said Islands, and happenings relative to the escape of those who arrived on the frigate **Antitrite.** There are provisions for them to work on the road to Veracruz while waiting for transportation to their destination.
pp. 235-252

1804 Exp. 10—Regarding the escape of various prisoners who came from Europe.
pp. 253-289

1804 Exp. 11—Regarding the escape from prison and arrest of ten deserters.
pp. 290-331

Vol. 37

1801 Exp. 1—Permission given by the Governor and Captain General of the Philippines to three individuals of the frigate **Aranzazu** from the above mentioned Department.
pp. 1-13

1801 Exp. 2—From the Administration or Customs of this Capital requesting the calculation of prices of the goods shipped by the boat **Magallanes,** in order to arrange for the appraisal and dispatch of said goods in the Fair in Acapulco.
pp. 14-32

1798 Exp. 3—Expedient regarding prices of Chinese goods shipped on the boat **Magallanes.**
pp. 33-56

1801 Exp. 4—From the Father Prior of the province of Agustines of said Islands, regarding the presentation of salaries due to Religious employed in the Empire of China.
pp. 57-83

1801 Exp. 5—From Don Abraham de Poterat, Navy Lieutenant, regarding his coming to this Kingdom in order to cure his disease he asks permission to go to the Peninsula and seeks financial help chargeable against his services.
pp. 84-108

1801 Exp. 6—From Friars Jose Pelaez and Felipe Grarena, who just arrived from the Philippines, requesting permission to proceed to Spain.
pp. 109-113

1801 Exp. 7—From the Navy Lieutenant Don Abraham de Poterat, requesting permisison to embark in an official boat for Europe through Jamaica or in any other neutral boat.
pp. 114-117

1801 Exp. 8—From Don Luis Galabert, requesting aid from the company attorney (or officer) in order to return to Spain.
pp. 118-131

1801 Exp. 9—From Don Jose Ayala, elected judge of the Audiencia of Manila, regarding payment of salaries in accordance with the Royal Order which he has with him, the original of which was received directly.
pp. 132-149

1801 Exp. 10—Request that certain individuals from the Asian Squadron now in the service of the Department of San Blas be reinstated.
pp. 150-156

1802 Exp. 11—Friar Pedro de San Pascual, of the barefoot Franciscan order of the Province of San Gregorio, requesting permission to proceed to Spain.
pp. 157-165

1802 Exp. 12—Papers or charges against Jose Miguel Jurado for having deserted.
pp. 166-177

1802 Exp. 13—Regarding the destination of Jose Maria Esteban to this province on petition of his father.
pp. 178-193

1802 Exp. 14—Advance payment to Sr. D. Juan Jose de Elizalde and to the Navy Lieutenant D. Angel Crespo in order to make their trip to the Philippines.
pp. 194-198

1802 Exp. 15—Regarding the drawing of the pension of the Cannoner (Canonjia Supresa) of Manila done on the 11th of this April.
pp. 199-202

1802 Document pertaining to the Missions in China. (This document does not appear in the Index.)
pp. 203-219

1802 Antonio de Castro, second carpenter of the Armada, who came from the Asia Squadron requests to be transported to Spain. (This document does not appear in the Index.)
pp 220-223

1802 From Jose Ramirez Portocarreno Sub-lieutenant of the permanent Regiment of Manila; gives information of having left Cadiz on the 20th of March of 1800 in order to be transported to his destination. (This document does not appear in the Index.)
pp 224-253

1800 Exp. 1—From the Governor, requesting that 4 boxes of incendiary bullets, and "palanquetes" (bar-shots) be sent to Spain.
pp. 1-28

1800 Exp. 2—Sending of \$500,000 on the frigate **Pilar** as delayed payments from anterior boats.
pp. 29-67

1800 Exp. 3—From D. Santiago Ayala requesting shipment on the frigate **Pilar** of \$20,000 with premium of 17 2/3%.
pp. 68-84

1800 Exp. 4—License to ship $20,000 or more on the account of the Compania Filipinas on the frigate **Pilar.**
pp. 85-148

1799 Exp. 5—Appointment of Maestro de Plata for the goods shipped on the frigate **Pilar.** The Commandant Don Miguel de Zapian was so commissioned.
pp. 140-170

1799 Exp. 6—Vagabonds sent to Manila on the frigate **Pilar** during its last return trip made in March 1800.
pp. 171-253

1800 Exp. 7—Charges against Don Juan Francisco Vasquez for excesses.
pp. 254-298

1800 Exp. 8—Petition of Da. Lutgarda Rubin de Celis that her son, Don Esteban Sovaya, be assigned to Manila as a distinguished soldier.
pp. 299-310

Vol. 39

1800 Exp. 1—Permission to remain ashore requested by the acting Chaplain of the frigate **Pilar,** Friar Juan Bravo.
pp. 1-88

Reel 19

[Continuation of Vol. 39, Reel 18, Exp. 1. This reel starts with page 47 of Exp. 1.]

1801 Exp. 2—The treasury officials report missing instructions among the papers sent to Acapulco for remittance to the Philippines.
pp. 89-179

1802 Exp. 3—Report on the wasted efforts involved by the absence of instructions regarding the dispatch of the war vessel **Montanez** and the ship **Rey Carlos.**
pp. 180-216

1803 Exp. 4—Papers concerning the pardon of the artillery man of the navy, Jose Manuel Orta.
pp. 217-224

1803 Exp. 5—Regarding the assistance to Don Antonio Chucon y Conde, lieutenant of the Regiment in Manila.
pp. 225-235

1804 Exp. 6—A report on the condition of the provisions sent through the frigate **Concepcion** and the surpluses included therein.
pp. 236-258

1804 Exp. 7—Regarding the advances made to the officials of the Philippines in accordance with the last royal order. [Some portions are illegible.]
pp. 259-264

1804 Exp. 8—Why two Religious Cayetano Gil Corono and Fray Antonio Pages should not be sent to the missions of the Islands.
pp. 265-281

1804 Exp. 9—Documents on the compliance of a Royal Decree providing that 61,000 pesos plus of secular revenues of Manila be sent to Spain.
pp. 282-292

1804 Exp. 10—Concerning the material help to be given to the members of the mission at San Agustin de las Cuevas who are assigned to San

Gregorio Province, Philippines and aid to the members who are sick.

pp. 293-297

1804 Exp. 11—The bills of lading of the **San Fernando** alias **Magallanes.**

pp. 298-329

1804 Exp. 12—The Acapulco Office reports having permitted the Commandant of Manila to remit $8000 to pay the salaries of the crew of the ships which carry his goods.

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1817 Exp. 13—Instructions to cover the balance of cash money for the return voyage of the frigate **Sta. Rita** which is in San Blas, with silver bars. [Some parts of the various documents are illegible.]

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1817 Exp. 19—Testimony regarding the official title of the order of His Excellency the Viceroy regarding the investigation of the exact amount brought by the **Sta. Rita** to Manila. Because of the suppression of the galleon trade, there was a move to recover the taxes paid by three ships, including the **Sta. Rita**, previous to the abolition.

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1817 Exp. 20—The authorized commercial official of Manila writes that in as much as the frigate **Sta. Rita** is due to arrive in San Blas soon, it be allowed to discharge its cargo, hold a fair and return quickly with the money realized in this and the previous trips.

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1817 Exp. 21—Attestation of the request made on behalf of Don Manuel Darvin y Columbeer, that he be granted a permit to hold a fair in order to sell the merchandize brought by the frigate **Sta. Rita.**
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1795 Exp. 4—Incident regarding the loading of stock in the frigate **Magallanes.**
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1795 Exp. 5—Appeal of Dn. Juan Antonio and Dn. Teodoro Parrodi that they be not sent to the army in the Philippines.
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1795 Exp. 6—Juan Antonio and Teodoro Parrodi explain that their assignment to the army in the Philippines had been based on false testimonies.
pp. 146-157

1795 Exp. 7—The Father President of the Hospicio de San Jacinto requests permission to ship $22,700 to the Philippines, obtained from stipends, alms, and other incomes of the missionaries.
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1795 Exp. 8—Don Pedro Martinez Cavezon requests a permit to enable him to travel via the **Magallanes** in its next trip to the Philippines.
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1795 Exp. 9—Concerning the criminal charge of homicide filed against the sailor Juan Sanchez of the frigate **Magallanes** committed on the constable, Juan Roldan.
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1796 Exp. 15—Documents concerning the investigation of the escape from the Castillo de San Juan de Ulna of Don Teodoro Parrodi, assigned to the regular army of Cuba.
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1809 Exp. 3—Concerning the arrival at the Port of Veracruz, aboard the **San Ramon** and **San Leandro** from Cadiz, of eleven confirmed criminals being sent to the Philippines and the request of four of them that they be not taken to Manila.
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1810 Exp. 4—Draft of payments made by the Philippines to individuals from the funds of the Royal Treasury of Mexico, chargeable to the Donations Fund.
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1810 Exp. 5—Account of the brig **San Carlos,** Branch of Shipyards.
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1811 Exp. 7—Itemized list of expenses incurred in Manila by the brig San **Carlos.**
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1813 Exp. 8—Concerning the sale of 550 quintals of steel rings which the Philippine vessel **Rey Fernando** brought as ballast.
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1814 Exp. 9—Royal decree of August 23, 1813 providing that the amount of $171,528 which had been sent to Mexico in a bill of exchange by the Governor of Manila in the form of aid, should be remitted to the Peninsula.
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1809 Exp. 3—Papers regarding the payment of stipends of Missionaries of the Province of the Most Holy Rosary of the Philippines.
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1809 Exp. 4—Lawsuit due to unchaste acts, against Joaquin Calderon who came from Spain and was bound for the Philippines.
pp. 71-183

1810 Exp. 5—The Rev. Fr. Agustin de la Virgen de la Pena, President of the Hospicio de San Nicolas, regarding the request that through this treasury, the stipends and the aid for priests who work in the Marianas Islands be fully paid.
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1810 Exp. 6—Royal Order in which Don Juan Utariz, Frigate Lieutenant, is assigned to command the Philippine vessel.
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1810 Exp. 8—Papers about Mr. Melchor de Guerra Leyva, Lieutenant of the Hunters of the Philippines, and his joining the Group of Invalids.
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1810 Exp. 9—Papers in which Mr. Melchor de Guerra Leyva, a retired lieutenant of the Veteran Battalion of the Prince in the Philippines, requests that he be granted two or three payments.
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1812 Exp. 10—Papers in which Mr. Emeterio Pastor requests that he be permitted to ship, through San Blas, $50,000 for Manila.
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1814 Exp. 1—Papers which give information that in Guadalajara, upon order of the Administrative Board of that Province, the duty of 3%

had been collected from the goods brought in from Manila by the vessel **Fidelidad.**
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1814 Exp. 2—Mr. Francisco Alonso de Teran on having demanded in Guadalajara the War Aid duty on the cargo of the Philippine vessel **Rey Fernando.**
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1815 Exp. 3—On the supply of medicines for the Military Hospital of Manila.
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1815 Exp. 4—Arrival at San Blas of the private vessel **Resolucion** coming from Manila with cargo and without any inspection.
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1816 Exp. 5—On the collection and remittance to Spain of the amount of three bank drafts from Manila belonging to the War Aid Branch.
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1816 Exp. 6—Papers on stipends and aid for the Agustinian-Recollect missionaries of the Marianas Islands.
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1816 Exp. 7—Papers regarding the 2nd sale in the fair of the goods from the Philippine vessel **Magallanes** and taxes paid.
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1816 Exp. 8—Testimony of judicial proceedings as consequence of the Superior Order of April 5 of last year, regarding the arrival at San Blas of the vessel **Resolucion** from Manila with cargo and without port inspection.
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1817 Exp. 9—Papers on the payment of a bank draft for $4,400 directed by Mr. Manuel Cacho y Herrera of the Manila Commerce against Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Alonso de Teran.
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1815 Exp. 10—Papers on the inquiry as to the whereabouts of the astronomical papers and instruments of his Majesty, which were left due to the death of Juan Bernace, captain of the frigate.
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1810 Exp. 11—Royal Order to get back the astronomical and hydrographical instruments and papers which were in the hands of Captain Juan Bernace.
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1818 Exp. 12—Papers regarding the personal description and allowance of Fr. Juan Cortes, a Franciscan priest assigned to the Missions of St. Gregory.
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1819 Exp. 14—The Reverend Father President of the Hospicio de San Agustin de las Cuevas, writes about the reimbursement of expenses incurred by three Religious who came from Vera Cruz to this Capital.
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1802 Exp. 3—Don Manuel Valero, pilot, who deserted the **Montanez.**
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1802 Exp. 4—Don Francisco Mariano Carrillo, Sergeant guard of the Philippine Government, claiming pay for four recruits.
pp. 157-181

1802 Exp. 5—The Ensign of the Navy Don Francisco Pinedo y Anuncivay who came from Asia to go to Spain became ill in San Blas.
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1803 Exp. 6—Don Francisco Patino, resident of Manila, requests permission to ship 20,976 pesos and 4 reals to those Islands.
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1804 Exp. 7—The Vicar of the Hospicio de San Jacinto, writes to the Treasurer about the reimbursement of one-third of the expenses incurred by the Religious who go to those Islands.
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1817 Exp. 2—Don Ygnacio Ampaneda seeks a permit to ship to Manila 12,876 pesos and 7 reals.
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1818 Exp. 4—Don Alonso Morgado, captain and owner of the frigate **Maria** from the Philippines requests a permit to ship $60,000, the returns of the cargo of the ship.
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1818 Exp. 5—Don Francisco Velez Escalante requests a permit to ship $2,160 realized from the sale of some tin-plates belonging to the Exchequer of Manila.
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1817 Exp. 7—Don Alfonso Morgfiado, captain of the frigate **Maria** which came from Manila reports the purchase in Acapulco of 20 quintals of copper bullets melted by the Insurgents.
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1818 Exp. 8—Final disposition of 20 quintals of bronze which upon orders of the Royal Exchequer and of the Central government were held in this place by its Governor, Lieutenant Colonel D. Agustin de la Vina.
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1818 Exp. 9—Arrival at the Port of San Blas of the brig **San Ruperto** alias **El Aventurero** which came from the Philippines with a cargo of merchandize.
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1818 Exp. 12—Concerning the embarcation, chargeable to the Treasury, of Fr. Francisco Angel Pumarada, missionary of the Province of San Gregorio, Philippines.
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1818 Exp. 13—The Reverend Father-President of the Hospicio de San Agustin de las Cuevas, requests that supplies of medicine for the Religious

of San Gregorio province, Philippines, be sent and that they be given what is due them.
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1818 Exp. 14—A report of the Religious missionaries of San Gregorio, Philippines, Fr. Anastacio Carrascal, Fr. Francisco Valuerde, and Fr. Francisco de la Soledad.
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1818 Exp. 15—Royal decree of September 25, 1818 reiterating previous orders regarding the suppression of the galleon trade of the Philippines.
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1819 Exp. 16—Inquiry as to whether the permit granted to Ventura de los Reyes to return with the value of the goods meant double the amount or only the value of the sale.
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1819 Exp. 17—Concerning 174 pesos in taxes which should be collected on the excess cargo brought by the frigates **Carmen** and **Rita** from the Philippines, that is, in excess of double the value of their cargo.
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1819 Exp. 18—Regarding the levy in Acapulco of 9% duties on cotton goods brought by the frigate **Paz.**
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1820 Exp. 20—The Reverend Father-President of the Hospicio de San Agustin de las Cuevas requests the reimbursement of expenses incurred by three Religious, amounting to $146.03 for laundry and clothes.
pp. 384-403

1820 Exp. 21—Concerning aid for the Religious Fr. Alonso Ramos, Fr. Victoriano de Torrejoncillo, Fr. Camilo de Tordellejo; and Fr. Vicente de la Puebla who arrived from Spain enroute to the Philippines.
pp. 404-406

1820 Exp. 22—Don Ramon de Zuniga requests a permit to ship $58,513, double the value of the goods brought from Manila by the brig **Felix** in April, 1819.
pp. 407-425

1820 Exp. 23—The Father-President of the Hospicio de San Agustin de la Cuevas asks for reimbursement of the travel expenses, from Vera Cruz to this city, of four Religious who arrived from Spain enroute to the Islands.
pp. 426-433

1820 Exp. 23a—[This exposure does not appear in the original index but is found in the reel.]—Transfer to Manila of the Religious belonging to the Province of San Gregorio, Philippines: Fr. Tomas Torres, Fr. Alonso Ramos, Fr. Victoriano de Torrejoncillo, Fr. Camilo Tordellejo, Fr. Vicente de la Puebla, and Fr. Manuel Sancho.
pp. 434-452

1820 Exp. 24—The delay in Tepacuaquilco of six Religious of the Province of San Gregorio, Philippines who are enroute to Acapulco.
pp. 453-457

1821 Exp. 25—Concerning the recovery of funds chargeable to Don Manuel Areytza, Don Gabriel Yturbe and Don Leonardo Alvarez, which the Manila office had sent to this city.
pp. 458-467

Reel 24
Vol. 50
1801-1821

1801 Exp. 1—The arbitrator of the frigate **San Rafael** reports the taxes on the rattan goods brought by the above-mentioned vessel. The document is officially labelled thus.
pp. 1-25

1803 Exp. 2—Don Jose Maria Migom asks that Don Bernardo de Sarasa be assigned as a distinguished soldier to the regular regiment of Manila.
pp. 26-45

1807 Exp. 3—Inquiry into how long an imprisonment Jose Martel, deserter from Manila who was apprehended in Veracruz, should have.
pp. 46-59

1808 Exp. 4—Notice regarding the arrest and remission to Manila of Manuel Lopez, deserter of the army there. Contains affiliation papers, description of the man, and a copy of the decision to have him arrested.
pp. 60-66

1808 Exp. 5—Juan Ignacio Batalon, sentenced criminal, requests that he be allowed to complete his term of imprisonment in one of the Infantry Regiments of this realm. [Several pages of the documents on this subject are illegible.]
pp. 67-84

1803 Exp. 6—A financial report of the Captain of the frigate, Don Ramon de Ortize y Otanez and the request to ship $5000 cash for soldiers and $3000 more for the expenses of the trip and port expenses.
pp. 85-130

1814 Exp. 7—A request to expedite the license so that the Reverend Father Francisco Munoz of the Hospicio de San Jacinto can proceed to Veracruz and depart for Spain.
pp. 131-142

1814 Exp. 8—Fr. Pelayo de Copacavana, lay brother of the Recollects of the Philippines seeks a license to be transferred to Spain; an account of his activities is also included. [Badly exposed films.]
pp. 143-193

1817 Exp. 9—Indorsement by the Father Provincial of San Francisco of a previous request for aid to the Religious of his Order, made by the central government to the Viceroy of New Spain. He explains why the assistance is necessary. [Illegible in some parts.]
pp. 194-233

1818 Exp. 10—Excerpts of the operations of the insurgent frigate named La Argentina in the Philippines and orders of the central government of the Islands to pursue it.

pp. 234-255

1818 Exp. 11—Attestation of the papers presented by the three defendant-priests Don Jose Maria Guiza and Don Nicolas Caballero, where they asked that the absolute pardon of February 25, 1817 be applied to them.

pp. 256-304

Vol. 51

1801-1802

1801 Exp. 1—Confidential inquiry of the Tribunal del Consulado of Manila concerning what authority the Governor of the Islands had in appointing the mate of the **Montanez.** The documents questioned the appointment of Jose Feria and recommended that of Manuel Lecaros.

pp. 1-17

1802 Exp. 2—Don Jose Fernandez writes about the position of mate of the **Rey Carlos** and the **Montanez.**

p. 18

1801 Exp. 3—Confidential papers about the positions of mate.

pp. 19-20

1801 Exp. 4—Official notice sent by the Real Tribunal del Consulado to the Governor concerning the appointment of Jose Fernandez as purser of the **Rey Carlos.**

pp. 21-53

1802 Exp. 5—Remittance of the parcel of letters from Spain destined for the Governor of Manila and the Commandant of the Asian fleet.

pp. 54-60

1801 Exp. 6—Correspondence with the Governor of the Philippines.

pp. 61-89

1801 Exp. 7—Duplicates of correspondence which have been sent to the Commandant of the Asian fleet for the **Montanez,** brought by the **Rey Carlos.**

pp. 90-98

1801 Exp. 8—Estimate of the funds needed for the maintenance of three vessels and four frigates composing the fleet destined for Asia, also for its commandant, Ignacio Maria de Alava, who is to head the fleet in 1802; includes his backpay and an itemized list of needs.

pp. 94-121

1802 Exp. 9—Correspondence with the Acapulco office.

pp. 122-134

1802 Exp. 10—Correspondence with the Commandant of the **Montanez.**

pp. 135-160

1801 Exp. 11—Papers on the replacement of 27 copper plates given to the **Montanez** by the Acapulco office.

pp. 161-174

1801 Exp. 12—Dna. Maria Tomasa Lasaigne requests a license to go to the Philippines where her husband is assigned, accompanied by a daughter and a maid.

pp. 175-180

1802 Exp. 13—The retirement of the Commandment of the **Montanez** and his relief.

pp. 181-184

1801 Exp. 14—Correspondence with the Commandant of the **Rey Carlos**.

pp. 185-192

1802 Exp. 15—Inventories of the **Montanez** and the **Rey Carlos**.

pp. 193-236

1802 Exp. 16—Vagrants sent to the Philippines aboard the war vessel **Montanez**.

pp. 237-353

1802 Exp. 17—Manuel Mendoza, sentenced to serve in the Manila regiment for vagrancy was found enlisted in the provincial battalion of Oaxaca.

pp. 354-365

1802 Exp. 18—Jose Francisco Fernandez, vagrant destined for Manila, reports that he can not comply because he is wounded.

pp. 366-377

1801 Exp. 19—Measures to recruit men in Acapulco needed by the frigate **Fama** and **Lucia**.

pp. 378-395

1802 Exp. 20—Measures to recruit persons needed by the war vesel **Montanez**.

pp. 396-421

Vol. 52

1804-1809

1804 Exp. 1—About the retirement from the service of Don Jose Bas, adjutant of the new battalions of Manila.

pp. 1-40

1805 Exp. 2—D. Jose Joaquin de Trigoyen, second pilot of the **Magallanes** writes about his sickness and need for help.

pp. 41-51

1805 Exp. 3—Fr. Jose Munoz of the Order of Preachers of the Philippines Islands asks the Royal officials to accept two-thirds of the payment of eight Religious who came in the **Magallanes** just as they did with the 32 others out of the 40 who came in the ship.

pp. 52-59

1805 Exp. 3a—[This document does not appear in the original index but is found in this reel.] Concerning the salaries of the Captain of the vessel, Don Joaquin Zarauz.

pp. 60-73

1805 Exp. 4—The Ensign of the frigate, Don Francisco Dufretay, requests payment of expenses incurred by him during his travel by land.

pp. 74-85

1805 Exp. 5—Fr. Jose de Loreto requests a permit to return to Spain.

pp. 86-94

1806 Exp. 6—Papers on the appointment of a surgeon for the frigate **Hardanger**; the surgeon had been D. Juan de Molina of the Acapulco Hospital who was being replaced by Don Antonio Sanchez de Linares.
pp. 95-127

[The reel ends on page 100 of Exp. 6.]

Reel 25

[Starts with p. 99 of Exp. 6, Vol. 52.]

1806 Exp. 7—Testimony of the step taken as to whether or not the Commandant of the **Nao** Don Angel Crespo should reimburse the Royal Treasury with the excess in allowances which apparently he collected in behalf of members of the Royal Expedition from New Spain in the said **Nao** to these Islands.
pp. 128-229

1806 Exp. 8—Charges against the deserter Juan Casimiro Quijano, groom of the frigate **San Rafael.**
pp. 230-257

1806 Exp. 9—Cristobal Jimenez Rumbo, son of Francisco from the Villa de Montalban, 40 years old, sentenced by the Royal Chancery of Granada for robbery, violent attacks and other excesses to 10 years imprisonment in the Philippines; he cannot leave the Philippines upon completion of the sentences without a permit from the above court.
pp. 258-266

1807 Exp. 10—Whether or not to collect $70 from the Lieutenant of Engineers Don Fernando Laserna which were given him for his transportation in the **Habana.**
pp. 267-274

1807 Exp. 11—Don Valentin de Borda y Shanchez, major of the provincial militia of Manila writes that the amount of $640 be paid to the general funds from the **situado** remissible to the Philippines, an amount owed to these funds.
pp. 275-280

1807 Exp. 12—Don Mariano Ortiz, adjutant of the battalions in the Philippines writes about payment of salaries.
pp. 281-286

1807 Exp. 13—Don Angel Crespo, captain of the frigate, wants his allowances and expenses of traveling by land paid to him.
pp. 287-306

1809 Exp. 14—Concerning the payment of salaries of the Governor and troops of the Marianas Islands.
pp. 307-326

1808 Exp. 15—Concerning the apprehension of deserters who abandoned the vessel **Magallanes** when it left for Caribe.
pp. 327-342

1808 Exp. 16—The Ensign of the Navy Don Gonzalo Ulloa commissioned to the Philippines asks a permit to bring upon his return the amount of his salaries and allowances.
pp. 343-347

1809 Exp. 17—That 75,000 pesos be paid by the agent of the Royal Company of the Philippines to the general fund.
pp. 348-358

1809 Exp. 18—The Governor of the Philippines asks that 14 important payments of $53,599 be disbursed from these funds and placed at the disposition of the President of Castilla.
pp. 359-366

Vol. 53
1802-1815

1802 Exp. 1—Arrival of the frigate **Nuestra Senora de Guia** alias **La Casualidad** with a cargo of fruits and other goods from China and the Philippines, by virtue of a special permit given by the Governor of the Islands on the strength of the Royal Order dated May 18, 1779. The claim of the mate about its leaving with the correspondence and manifest.
pp. 1-40

1802 Exp. 2—Despatch of the Acapulco office announcing it had allowed the frigate **Casualidad** to discharge its cargo; it had inspected and examined the manifests, and had indicated the results of the inspection.
pp. 45-120

1802 Exp. 3—Don Domingo Coyenechea, captain and master of the frigate **Casualidad** reports the certificate of entry.
pp. 121-129

1803 Exp. 4—Concerning the return to the Royal Treasury of $116 and 6 **reals** owed by Don Jose Blanchie, construction officer.
pp. 130-134

1805 Exp. 5—Agustin Blanco, sergeant who deserted the new battalions of the Philippines petitions a pardon.
pp. 135-193

1806 Exp. 6—Insanity of the second pilot of the frigate **Hardanger** and his relief by Don Jose de Yrigoyen, officer of the same class from the **Magallanes.**
pp. 194-205

1807 Exp. 7—Nicolas Becerra of the Agustinian Order, Province of San Nicolas Tolentino, Philippines, requests permission to stay in this realm until he has fully recuperated from illness.
pp. 206-239

1804 Exp. 8—A log book of seven Recollects assigned to the Philippines who came aboard the frigate **Nuestra Senora de los Dolores** alias **La Medea**; also concerning their stipends and clothing expenses.
pp. 240-250

1808 Exp. 9—Royal Order of February 1808 which arranges the sending to the Philippines of persons from the realm who can take over and exercise the duties of positions in the Royal Treasury which are vacant.
pp. 251-253

1809 Exp. 10—Royal order of April 16, 1809 about the creation of a new provisional command for the administration of the Compania de Filipi-

1803 Exp. 4—The Commandant of the battalions in the Philippines asks about instructions as to how much of what has been saved the officials can ship.

pp. 115-168

[This reel ends on p. 115.]

Reel 26

[Vol. 54, Exp. 4 is continued, starting with p. 116. The real title erroneously has "Vol. 55."]

1803 Exp. 5—An account of the arrangements made on the occasion of the death and funeral of Don Pedro Escudero, Lieutenant of the new battalions of Manila, who died enroute at the Villas de Xalapa.

pp. 169-262

1803 Exp. 6—Concerning the necessity of constructing beds and other articles to house persons in Acapulco assigned to the new battalions of the Philippines; twenty-five people of an estimated 200 have already left Spain.

pp. 263-276

Vol. 55

1803-1804

1803 Exp. 1—Despatch concerning the persons coming from Spain for the new battalions of the Philippines. This was mentioned in a letter, number 249 dated August 29, 1803.

pp. 1-112

1803 Exp. 2—Don Joaquin Iguacer, 2nd lieutenant of the Infantry Regiment of the King writes concerning his position.

pp. 113-116

1803 Exp. 3—The Intendant writes about discounting 416 pesos and 1/2 real from the Treasury given to the Lieutenant of Artillery Don Celestino Cordoncillo who is assigned to the Philippines.

pp. 117-133

1803 Exp. 4—Concerning the assistance given to the officers and men of the new battalions of the Philippines for their transport to their destination.

pp. 134-142

1803 Exp. 5—The Lieutenant of Artillery, Don Celestino Cordoncillo, assigned to Manila writes about his pay.

pp. 143-152

1803 Exp. 6—The Lieutenant Colonel of Engineers, Don Ildefonso de Aragon, requests the transport of his wife and servants. He cites precedents, ordinances, etc. entitling him to the privilege.

pp. 153-335

1803 Exp. 7—Regarding salaries of the Lieutenant Colonel of Engineers, Don Ildefonso de Aragon.

pp. 336-393

1804 Exp. 8—Exchanges between Captain Don Mateo Lamba and Don Jose Martinez regarding the charges of quackery filed against Lieutenant Jose Sebastian. [Illegible in many parts.]

pp. 394-402

1804 Exp. 9—Charges filed against Jose Sebastian, first lieutenant of the above-mentioned battalions, accused of having performed a surgical operation on Don Sebastian Diaz who died on September 21 as a result thereof.

pp. 403-443

Vol. 56

1804-1805

1804 Exp. 1—The Governor of Acapulco sends to the Viceroy the enlistment papers and personal data of deserters from the new battalions of the Philippines.

pp. 1-53

1804 Exp. 2—Concerning the return to the Treasury of monetary aid given to the Lieutenant of Artillery, Don Fernando de la Serna enroute to his assignment in the Philippines.

pp. 54-61

1804 Exp. 3—Concerning monetary advances to the Lieutenant of Engineers, Don Fernando de la Serna, to enable him to go to the Philippines.

pp. 62-83

1804 Exp. 4—Colonel Don Felipe de Crame requests payment of his salary and those of his two sons, Don Joaquin and Don Rafael.

pp. 84-99

1804 Exp. 5—Don Francisco Vinegra, Major of the new battalions of those Islands, asks for travel aid.

pp. 100-150

1804 Exp. 6—Papers for the arrest of Jose Peno or Toribio, who tried to burn the galleys which served as detention places for those sentenced to the galleys at Plan de Rio.

pp. 151-184

1804 Exp. 7—Don Francisco Martinez, resident of Zumpango del Rio files a complaint against the subdelegate of Textla, about the payment of $5000 he loaned to aid the troops of the Philippines.

pp. 185-199

1804 Exp. 8—Correspondence enjoining the Governor of Acapulco to allow leave for the officers and men of the new battalions and for him to help them.

pp. 200-213

1804 Exp. 9—Royal decrees providing that officers and men of the Philippine battalions be provided with the same privileges enjoyed by those of the Infantry Regiment while they remain in this realm, and that they be employed until such time they are sent to their destination.

pp. 214-237

[This reel ends on p. 220 of this exposure.]

Reel 27

[Vol. 56 is continued, starting with p. 220 of Exp. 9.]

1805 Exp. 10—Captain Manuel Romero de Leys writes about salaries.

pp. 238-255

1805 Exp. 11—Certification that Pedro Leija and Jose Carrillo, corporals, had been sick when the **Magallanes** left.
pp. 256-268

1805 Exp. 11a—Jose Carrillo complains about salaries due him and his infirmities.
pp. 269-280

1805 Exp. 12—Report on the corporals who deserted the army in the Philippines: Salvador Chacon, Sebastian Bardo, Miguel Guerrero, Ramon Bermudes, and Claudio Prera.
pp. 281-315

Vol. 57

1805-1817

1805 Exp. 1—Measures for the transfer of forty prisoners who were to board the ship from Spain to their destination in the Philippines.
pp. 1-58

1805 Exp. 2—Regarding the reimbursement to the subdelegate of Chilapa of expenses incurred by the criminals who were being sent to the Philippines, had escaped, and were caught in his jurisdiction.
pp. 59-67

1805 Exp. 3—Measures so that charges could be filed against the Officer of the Dragoons Don Manuel Cabeza for the escape of persons being sent in chains to Acapulco, under his charge.
pp. 68-123

1806 Exp. 4—The reimbursement of 625 pesos and 7-1/2 **reals** to the treasury of this city, spent in connection with the transport of the European criminals to this city and the maintenance of 13 who were left here.
pp. 124-141

1806 Exp. 5—Complaints of the criminal, Francisco de Paula Navarro, regarding the delay in the settlement of his case and of the other escapees from the chain-gang of Acapulco.
pp. 142-167

1807 Exp. 6—Measure instituted for the investigation of Europeans destined to Manila and of the prisoners of the three jails of the city.
pp. 168-176

1807 Exp. 7—Concerning the insanity of one of the criminals, Joaquin Landibar destined to Manila.
pp. 177-186

1807 Exp. 8—Report on the impossibility of the European criminal, Juan Fernandez, continuing his trip to Manila.
pp. 187-202

1807 Exp. 9—Juan Fernandez, one of the European prisoners destined to Manila and held in the city jail, asks that the shackles placed on him because he was insane be removed.
pp. 203-211

1807 Exp. 10—Doctor Diego Jose Cancino asks that he be paid for treating the European prisoner Leandro Vega.
pp. 212-227

1815 Exp. 11—Information requested on whether or not the purchasers of the

merchandise of the ship **Rey Fernando** should pay excise tax on the resale made on their own initiative.
pp. 228-278

1817 Exp. 12—On the lease of the house occupied by the Governor of Acapulco.
pp. 279-295

Vol. 58

1806-1807

1806 Exp. 1—Index of the official letters which the Governor and Captain-general of the Philippines is sending to His Excellency the Vice-roy of New Spain through the **Magallanes.**
pp. 1-2

1806 Exp. 2—Officers and troops of the Philippine Islands existing in this realm who are being ordered to leave on the frigate **Hardanger** for their destination.
pp. 3-101

1807 Exp. 3—The discovery that Don Vicente Dimas Benavente, accountant of the ships of the Philippines has been with the Royal Treasury.
pp. 102-118

1807 Exp. 4—Measure regarding where an amount remitted by the Dean of the Manila Audiencia should be sent.
pp. 119-133

1807 Exp. 5—Pensions and alms for the Dominicans in the Philippines.
pp. 134-160

1807 Exp. 6—The paper requested by the Commandant of the frigate **Francesa la Canonera** concerning the provisioning of the ship.
pp. 161-222

1807 Exp. 7—Disposition of the Commercial Office of those Islands that the value of the cargo of the **Magallanes** and the funds found in this realm belonging to the Islands be remitted in this and the ship escorting it, the **Francesa.**
pp. 223-226

1807 Exp. 8—The Consulado of those Islands orders the remission of the value of the goods brought in the **Magallanes** and of the funds accumulated in this realm via this ship and the escorting ship, **Francesa.**
pp. 227-242

1807 Exp. 9—The appointment of a chaplain for the **Magallanes** to replace Father Francisco Munoz who was appointed president of the Hospicio de San Ignacio.
pp. 243-258

1807 Exp. 10—The arrival in Acapulco of the **San Fernando Magallanes** and the proclamation of the fair for the sale of its cargo.
pp. 259-307

1807 Exp. 11—Permit for the remission of the accumulated funds in this realm realized from the cargo brought in by the **Magallanes** in 1804.
pp. 308-361

1807 Exp. 12—Stipends for the Agustinian missionaries of Manila and donations for altar lamps corresponding to 1805-1807.
pp. 362-375

1807 Exp. 13—Inquiry of the officials of the General Treasury whether or not they should deduct from the **el situado** of the Marianas and add to that of the Philippines the amount of 6781 pesos and 6 **reals** 7 **grams** which the officials of Manila claim they had credited to the Governor for his salary and that of the troops.
pp. 376-384

1807 Exp. 14—Measure requested by the commandant from the ministry to allow the transport of royal funds via the **Francesa la Canonera.**
pp. 385-464

Reel 28

[Continuation of Vol. 58, starting with p. 435 of Exp. 14.]

Vol. 59

1809-1810

1809 Exp. 1—About recruiting people for the Veteran Regiments of Manila.
pp. 1-29

1809 Exp. 2—Testimony of the Royal order of April 19, 1796 and subsequent measures to arrange the restoration to the funds of the **Montepio militar** $5000 which had been illegally paid to Dona Francisca Marquez, widow of the governor of Camarines.
pp. 30-57

1809 Exp. 3—Testimony of the Royal order or August 6, 1807 wherein His Majesty approves the expedition of the frigate **Ardanger** and the register granted to its recruiters, except that, in the future, the Administration should do everything possible so that the Consulado can take care of the expedition with preference for the representation of Don Jose Varela Cagigas and Don Felix Ruis, recruiters of the expedition.
pp. 58-127

1809 Exp. 5—Concerning the return of Don Cristobal Zaldua to this realm from the Philippines Islands.
pp. 137-161

1809 Exp. 6—Equipment and the sending of medicines for the **Magallanes.**
pp. 162-240

1810 Exp. 7—Don Pascual Ygnacio de Apechecha, seeks permission to ship $20,380 which Don Jose Antonio Apechecha, residing in Manila, has inherited.
pp. 241-251

1810 Exp. 8—The officials of the Acapulco Treasury reports the deductions from the **situado** of the Philippines which must be conveyed by the **Magallanes.**
pp. 252-256

1810 Exp. 9—Don Miguel Marin y Muros, pilot of the **Magallanes** reported on the shipment of $12,000 which he had collected in this realm.
pp. 257-278

1810 Exp. 10—Fr. Julian Bonhome asks that the money corresponding to the Religious of San Gregorio Provinces, Philippines, be sent in the **Magallanes.**
pp. 279-297

1809 Exp. 11—Fr. Francisco Munoz, vicar and President of the Hospicio de San Jacinto of the Philippines, requests His Majesty to grant a special permit so that Fr. Francisco Barrera, a lay brother, can go to the Islands aboard the **Magallanes.**
pp. 298-307

Vol. 60
1798-1809

1807 Exp. 1—The Acapulco Office reports having given the purser of the frigate **Francesa** permission to put on shipboard **galones falsos** because there was no time to obtain the proper license and implores approval of the act.
pp. 1-22

1807 Exp. 2—The provisions needed by the people of the **Magallanes** for the return voyages to Manila.
pp. 23-33

1807 Exp. 3—Medicines for the **Magallanes.**
pp. 34-38

1807 Exp. 4—Concerning the replacement of persons who transferred from the **Magallanes** to the frigate **Concepcion.**
pp. 39-58

1807 Exp. 5—The assignment of Don Jose Maria Valle for eight years service in the army of Manila.
pp. 59-61

1808 Exp. 6—Persons assigned to the Philippines Islands and sent through the **Magallanes.**
pp. 62-88

1808 Exp. 7—The Treasury officials of the General Funds of this city shall deliver to the Sergeant of the Dragoons of Michoacan, Jose Maria Coria, ten pairs of handcuffs for the security of persons he will take to the galleys that are being sent to Acapulco for the Philippines.
pp. 89-104

1808 Exp. 8—The provisioning in this city of the **Magallanes.**
pp. 105-112

1808 Exp. 9—Regarding the permit given to Don Vicente Perez de Tagle to ship $40,000 inheritance from his father, the Marquis of Salinas.
pp. 113-119

1802 Exp. 10—Permit granted to Don Vicente Perez de Tagle to ship $40,000 which his deceased father, the Marquis of Salinas, left in this realm.
pp. 120-145

1808 Exp. 10a—Regarding opium which was sent to Manila among the boxes of medicines in the last expedition of the **Magallanes.**
pp. 146-150

1808 Exp. 11—About the permit to ship in the **Magallanes** various articles and money which belong to the province of the Agustinian Recollects of the Philippines and to the treasurers of the Marianas mission.
pp. 151-170

1808 Exp. 12—Regarding the remission of the **situado** of the Marianas corresponding to 1808.
pp. 171-203

1808 Exp. 13—Concerning the stipends and alms earmarked by His Majesty for the missionaries of the Province of San Gregorio in the Philippine Islands.
pp. 204-229

1809 Exp. 14—Remittance to Manila of the funds found in this realm belonging to the heirs of Colonel Don Felipe Cerain.
pp. 230-264

1808 Exp. 15—Permit given to Don Santiago Ayala of Manila Commerce to register $75,0000 with the frigate **Francesa la Canonera.**
pp. 265-278

1809 Exp. 16—Testimony of the representation made by D. Francisco Diaz Durana, Dean of the Metropolitan Cathedral and executor of the Will of Colonel Felipe Cerain, asking the Viceroy of New Spain to intervene so that the funds of the deceased found in that realm could be shipped in the **Magallanes.**
pp. 279-296

1809 Exp. 17—Don Francisco Martinez Ibanez asks the Treasurer to pay him the remaining salaries of Don Diego Martinez Araque, former Regent of the Royal Audiencia of Manila.
pp. 297-331

1798 Exp. 18—Concerning the transfer to the Manila Treasury of $6,652, 2 **reals** and 10 **granos** belonging to the heirs of Don Diego de Aranque and $738, 2 **reals,** which belong to the heirs of Ramon Arango.
pp. 332-341

Vol. 61

1781-

1781 Exp. 1—Papers concerning the trip to Habana of the Chief Officer of Acapulco, Don Francisco Canaveral, the appointment of Don Rafael Basco and the payment of salaries to the former.
pp. 1-12

1785 Exp. 2—Claim advanced by Don Francisco Antonio Canaveral to have his back salaries sent to this Treasury addressed to its head, Don Juan Lucas Lazaga.
pp. 13-36

1785 Exp. 3.—Paper on the establishment of the Compania de Filipinas.
pp. 37-117

1786 Exp. 4—About the rental of a house in Acapulco to be used to deposit the **Belamen** of the frigate **San Jose.**
pp. 118-129

1783 Exp. 5—Investigation of the surpluses of the Casa de Vanderas for the Philippines and provisions for recruitment and remission thereof in compliance with repeated Royal orders.
pp. 130-260

[This reel ends on page 133 of this exposure.]

Reel 29

[Vol. 61, Exp.. 5 is continued; starts with page 153.]

1787 Exp. 6—A petition of Miguel Collado, Sergeant of the Philippines Regiment that he be allowed to return as officer in charge of recruits. The request was granted and provisions were made for passport and salaries to go to Acapulco, gather recruits and conduct them to Manila.
pp. 261-284

1787 Exp. 7—The request of Don Pedro Basco, Commandant of the Philippine frigate **San Andres** to remain in this realm and the same request of the Ensign of the Navy, Francisco Basco de la Rocha, commander of the **San Jose de Gracia.**
pp. 285-301

1790 Exp. 8—The commandant of the **San Andres** requests permission to stay in Mexico, pleading illness and desire to help his mother, and to entrust the command to the next officer.
pp.302-315

1787 Exp. 9—That the stipends of the clerics and three suffragans for the year ending in August, 1788 be sent. An itemized list is included.
pp. 316-322

1788 Exp. 10—Roster of recruits for the King's Regiment in Manila.
pp. 323-327

1787 Exp. 11—The royal officials of Manila ask those of Mexico and Acapulco for notice of payments made by their treasuries to Captain Don Francisco Jimenez, so that settlements may be made there of his accounts.
pp. 328-332

1788 Exp. 12—Petition of Don Francisco Javier de Mendreta and Don Marcos Ynguanzo Diaz, **oidores** of the Royal Audiencia of Manila that they be paid the salaries due them upon arrival at Acapulco.
pp. 333-344

1788 Exp. 13—Petition of Don Fabian de Fonseca, Intendant of Iloilo Province, Philippines, that his salary of $3,000 a year be paid to him monthly.
pp. 344-346

1788 Exp. 14—Dona Josefa Vega requests that Ramon Barrientos be not sent to Manila because he had a commitment to marry.
pp. 347-349

1788 Exp. 15—Official letter of the **alcalde ordinario** of this city, Don Tomas de Urizar, containing the charges brought against Juan de Dios Valle, Jose Rafael de Arce, and Marcelo Jose de Alvarez, who are all assigned to Manila.
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1788 Exp. 16—A petition of Don Francisco Solla, exchange broker of Veracruz City that his son Don Francisco Ygnacio be sent to the army of the Philippines because of bad conduct.
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Department of Public Works and Communications
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NAME	ADDRESS
Editor: Josefa M. Saniel	Institute of Asian Studies, U.P.
Owner: Institute of Asian Studies	U.P. Diliman, Rizal, Philippines
Publisher: University of the Philippines Press	Diliman, Rizal, Philippines
Printer: Philippine Graphic Arts, Inc.	Caloocan City, Philippines
Office of Publication: Institute of Asian Studies	Diliman, Rizal, Philippines

In case of publication other than daily, total number of copies printed and circulated of the last issue dated August 1965:

1. Sent to paid subscribers .... 134 copies
2. Sent to others than paid subscribers .... 866 copies

Total .... 1,000 copies

(Sgd.) JOSEFA M. SANIEL
Issue Editor

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 13th day of April, 1966 at Quezon City, the affiant exhibiting her Residence Certificate No. A-5363299, issued at Quezon City on January 17, 1966.

(Sgd.) QUIRINO D. CARPIO
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Doc. No. 310
Page No. 81
Book No. VII
Series of 1966

NOTE: THIS FORM IS EXEMPT FROM THE PAYMENT OF DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX. ACT 2580 REQUIRES THAT THIS SWORN STATEMENT BE FILED WITH THE BUREAU OF POSTS ON APRIL 1 AND OCTOBER 1 OF EACH YEAR

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