Permanent Residents Not Wanting to Stay Permanently: Transnational Practices and Intent-to-Stay of Filipino Residents in Nagoya City

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ABSTRACT

There is a dearth of research and empirical evidence on the relationship between transnational practices and migrant integration. It is thus not certain whether the two phenomena can help facilitate a more connected world, or whether transnational practices can impede successful integration with the host country because of two reasons: either the migrant remains rooted in his or her home country and intends to return, or the migrant seeks to migrate to another country. In this paper, I look at the relationship between the transnational practices of Filipino residents in Japan and their intent-to-stay. Statistical analysis suggests that transnational practices such as sending remittances and having savings in the home country can have a negative association with intent-to-stay. That is, migrants who engage in such transnational practices are less likely to stay than those who do not. Other factors, such as length-of-stay in Japan and educational attainment, are also found to affect intent-to-stay. The paper ends with an exploration of how and why transnational practices impact intent-to-stay.

Keywords: transnational practices, integration, migrants, logistic regression, remittance

Introduction

As of 2017, there were 2.56 million long-term and permanent foreign residents in Japan (Ministry of Justice 2017). The number is expected to increase as Japan eyes more foreign workers, particularly from Southeast Asia, in preparation for the Tokyo 2020 Olympics. Filipinos have overtaken the Brazilians to become the third largest group of foreign residents in Japan, after Chinese and Koreans.

Data in this study come from a survey I conducted in Nagoya City among Filipinos who are long-term residents, spouse, and permanent visa holders in Japan as part of my dissertation research. Nagoya City has among the highest concentration of Filipino residents in the country. They express high levels of contentment regarding their lives in Japan. However, only a small number of them plan to stay permanently. An even smaller number have applied for Japanese citizenship.

Though naturalization rates in Japan have gone up in recent years, it remains low, as majority of permanent residents choose not to naturalize. Intuitively, one would think that the natural progression is to get permanent residency and, eventually, naturalize, as in many immigrant-receiving countries such as Canada and the United States. However, this is not happening in Japan. While naturalization and permanent residency are but dimensions of migrant incorporation, the scant literature nevertheless suggests that they can affect the success of integration policies. The importance of successful integration policies are underscored in the white paper released by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications in 2006 (Nagy 2008). It notes the importance of facilitating multicultural co-existence and integrating foreign residents to "revitalize municipalities and localities" in light of "depopulation, aging, and local public finance crises" (Sioson 2017, 501; see also Nagy 2008). While the national government remains ambivalent on the role of permanent residents, many local governments have been proactive, implementing policies and programs to improve the integration of foreign residents with the native population.

In this paper, I explore possible reasons why Filipino foreign residents choose not to permanently stay in Japan. I focus on specific transnational

practices among Filipino residents and assess how these affect their intent-to-stay permanently in their host country. There is a dearth of research and empirical evidence on the relationship between these two phenomena. It is thus not certain whether they can help facilitate a more connected world, or whether transnational practices can impede successful integration with the host country. After all, the migrant may remain rooted in his or her home country and plan to return. Return migration can be affected by strong ties to the home country (Barbiano di Belgiojoso 2016; Carling and Pettersen 2014; de Haas and Fokkema 2011). While having no intention to stay permanently in the host country does not preclude return migration, a proportion of return migrants can come from those without intention to stay.

Taking off from these arguments, I provide empirical data on intent-to-stay and transnationalism. I asked why foreign residents who are permanent and long-term resident visa holders are reluctant to stay permanently in Japan. I hypothesize that transnational practices—savings in the home country and the high frequency of remittance—play a role in this reluctance. Whether these practices will actually lead a migrant to return to his or her home country is not within the scope of this research.

This paper is organized as follows. The first deals with the theoretical underpinnings of the study. The next two discuss the methodology and the results of the logistic regressions. The final section explores the reasons behind the results of the quantitative analysis. By looking at how transnational practices affect intent-to-stay in the host country, this paper hopes to contribute to the debate on the compatibility of transnationalism and integration, and discuss policy recommendations for migrant incorporation.[1]

Migration and transnationalism

Studies on the effects of migration seem to be largely unidirectional. There are, for instance, studies on the impact of brain gain and brain drain on the migrant-sending country (Beine, Docquier and Rapoport 2001), but not on the receiving state. Others examine the effect of financial

flows (via remittances) on sending states (Amuedo-Dorantes and Poza 2006; Acosta et al. 2007; Yang 2008; Reyes et al. 2014), but not on host countries. Scholars also look at migration's impacts, through incorporation, on these receiving states (Parkes and Pryce 2007; Kymlicka 2012; Heath and Demireva 2014). The latter is a relatively newer discourse, as more migrants decide to stay longer and migrate for reasons beyond labor.

A much more recent trend focuses on the transnational practices of migrants, particularly on how they retain their values and identities, and cultivate linkages to their home countries (Glick Schiller, Bascha and Blanc-Szanton 1992; Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999; Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt 1999; Vertovec 2004). "The assumption that people will live their lives in one place, according to one set of national and cultural norms, in countries with impermeable national borders, no longer holds" (Levitt 2004).

In light of these developments, two opposing beliefs on transnationalism have emerged. On the one hand, some scholars argue that there is nothing to be feared about transnationalism, which has long been practiced among migrants. An increasing number of empirical studies celebrate these transnational practices, which help facilitate a more connected world (Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt 1999; Sheringham 2009; Van Bochove, Rusinovic and Engbersen 2010). On the other hand, this celebratory stance is countered by warnings that migrant incorporation and transnationalism can be disastrous. Living in two different societies can create conflicts of interest between home and host countries (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004), especially when the host state, through naturalization and permanent residency, becomes home.

Research by Snel, Engbersen, and Leerkes (2006) on migrant groups in the Netherlands; Sheringham (2009) on Brazilian immigrants in Ireland; de Haas and Fokkema (2011) on African immigrants in Spain and Italy; and Carling and Pettersen (2014) on various immigrant groups in Norway—shed some understanding on how these two phenomena, transnationalism and migrant incorporation, interact. The present study hopes to add to this relatively little body of research. Furthermore, because migrant

integration tends to be context-driven (Penninx 2005), the paper provides an interesting case study of a country like Japan, whose attitudes to receiving migrants remain "ambivalent."[2] Before I provide and discuss the results, let me first define some important variables used in this study.

Transnational practices

Transnationalism emerged in the 1990s in light of increased interactions between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries (Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton 1992; Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt 1999; Guarnizo, Sanches and Roach 1999; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). Transnationalism studies argue that migration processes are changing and the assumption that people will stay and live in only one place no longer holds. They argue that migrants exist in many contexts and have contradictory affiliations. Therefore, the core of transnationalism lies in the continued interaction of migrants with their home country, while they settle and establish new relations in their destination countries. To be a transnational migrant then is to "live their lives across international borders" (Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999, 344).

The number of concepts and approaches to study transnationalism has grown. These include "transnational social fields" (Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton 1992), where transnationalism refers to the increased "interlinkage between people all around the world and the loosening of boundaries between nation-states" (Schunck 2014, 259). These studies pertain to the transmigrant's multiple involvements in various institutions: the family, the economy, and the political system, among others. They also focus on the new types of migrants who engage in regular "circular migration," moving back and forth between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries. Faist (2000) also refers to the "social spaces" that facilitate transnationalism and transnational movements. He argues that existing social capital in the receiving countries can facilitate more movement, looking at kinship networks, ethnic ties, and capital across borders.

Another approach, argued to provide the most empirical evidence, focuses on transnational practices. For Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt (1999), transnational practices refer to an individual migrant's border-crossing activities: economic, political or sociocultural. Economic transnational activities include remittance-sending or transnational entrepreneurship. Political transnational practices cover electoral and nonelectoral activities that can influence conditions in the sending country (Schunck 2014). Sociocultural transnational activities involve, among other things, "recreat[ing] a sense of community" and are often observed in "practices of sociability, mutual help, and public rituals" (Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo 2002, quoted in Schunck 2014, 49).

In this paper, I focus on transnational practices, in particular, remittance-sending, whose impacts on local development have been well-documented. Currently, "personal remittances" to the Philippines constitute as much as 10.5 percent of the country's GDP (World Bank 2017).

Intent-to-stay

There is skepticism over the use of "intent," either to stay or to return, because that intent (intent-to-return, in this instance) often never gets fulfilled (Carling and Pettersen 2014; de Haas and Fokkema 2011). However, intent is an important factor in considering the actual rate of returning or staying. Carling and Pettersen (2014, 14) argue that "intentions can be seen as a necessary but not sufficient criterion for action." In any case, a spate of research argues that staying permanently and eventually naturalizing in the host country have a huge impact on migrant integration (Penninx 2005). Luthra, Platt and Salamonska (2014) note that regardless of whether migrants actually stay, their intentions, especially in the early stages after migration, are associated with different patterns of integration. They add that "circular and temporary migrants tend to show weaker levels of subjective orientation towards the receiving society and perceptions of its hospitality and have lower levels of social and residential integration"

(5). Indeed, migrants' intentions are related to "attachments to host and home countries" (Barbiano di Belgiojoso 2016, 1). Geurts and Lubbers (2017) also find that migrants who decide to stay permanently invest better in the language of their host countries. At the same time, Bijwaard, Schluter, and Wahba (2011) remark that intentions-to-stay are shaped by experiences in the host country. In this respect, intent-to-stay can be seen as an index of migrants' experiences in, attitudes to, and perceptions of, the host country.

While intent-to-return points to the home country, intent-to-stay, on the other hand, looks to the host or destination country. Intent-to-stay, however, does not preclude perfect or straightforward assimilation or integration. It can, however, point to smoother and easier integration because the intent-to-stay can encourage the development of affinities with the host country. This obviously has policy consequences. In a country like Japan, whose stance on immigration remains ambivalent at best, it is interesting to see if, how, and to what extent the transnational practices of migrants impact their intent-to-stay. Among other things, intent-to-stay serves as a vantage point to evaluate, if not modify, Japan's policies that discourage this intention, if not integration altogether. These include strict immigration controls and lack of liveability programs for migrants.

Intent-to-stay and transnational practices

In this paper, I focus on two economic transnational practices—remittance-sending and having savings in the home country—and their impact on intent-to-stay. When remittances fund the education of household members, they are often seen as a form of investment, which adds potential human capital to the household (Lopez, Acosta, and Fajnzylber 2007; Calero, Bedi, and Sparrow 2008). Using remittances for housing or enterprises is also seen as "asset accumulation in the home country" (Osili 2004, 823), which create incentives for migrants to return later.

The role of remittances, which make up a huge chunk of the Philippines' GDP, has been studied extensively (Alburo 1993; Asis 2006; Docot 2009; Reyes et al. 2014). Scholars ask if, how and to what extent remittances can be and have been channeled into local development, even as they dispute its role in spurring such development. Also, remittances serve a cultural role in reconnecting migrants with their home country. As gifts, remittances signal their "re-entry into Philippine society since gift-giving implies a relationship between the giver and the recipient" (Alburo 2005, 146). Suzuki (2005, 2011) connects this to "utang na loob" (loosely translated as 'debt of gratitude') and notes that "every interaction between Filipinos potentially renders a site in which they engage in the reciprocity and redistribution of power" (2011, 57). Therefore, "utang na loob" is not just an economic exchange but also a social bond (Ileto 1982).

Filipinos in Japan

Filipino migration has "come in waves" (Tolentino 1996, 57). The first wave began in 1903; the second, from 1945 to the 1960s. The more "massive" third wave began in the 1970s as a consequence of Marcos government's labor export policy. The third-wave arose due to a confluence of the supply and demand factors of migration. The Philippines' economic difficulties in the 1970s—and the institutionalization of the labor export policy in response to these difficulties—created a supply of a ready and mobile labor force.

During the same period, Japan opened to foreign workers many jobs in sectors considered as 3D (dirty, dangerous, and demeaning). Many Filipinos began work in construction, manufacturing, and entertainment industries in Japan. From the 1970s to 1990s, Filipino entertainers were one of the largest groups of Filipino workers in that country (Anderson 1999). Over 100,000 came in 1989, which became known as *Japayuki Year One*. Though *japayuki* literally means "Japan-bound," the term took on a negative connotation; critics of Japanese government's immigration policies argue that the entertainer visa is used as a sidedoor through which

unskilled labor can enter Japan (see Suzuku 2005, 2011; Parreñas 2010, 2011). Japayuki was also historically associated with *karayuki*, a term that originally referred to Japanese women, mostly from poor agricultural families, who travelled abroad to work as "seasonal laborers" during the nineteenth century. Its association with prostitution came later in the twentieth (Terami-Wada 1986, 303). Many Filipino entertainers, regardless of whether or not they engage in prostitution, acquired a negative image. After 2005, however, the number of entertainers entering Japan fell due to the publication of the *Trafficking in Persons Report* (TIP) by the United States, in which Japan was listed as a country engaging in human trafficking through its entertainer and trainee visa systems (Yamashita 2008). While the number of entertainers dwindled, the number of long-term resident, spouse and permanent resident visa holders increased from less than 200,000 in 2005, when the TIP Report was released, to almost 230,000 in 2016 (Ministry of Justice 2016).

Filipinos in Japan more than tripled from 1982 to 1990, and by 2016, there were 243,662 registered Filipinos in Japan (Ministry of Justice). They are the third biggest group of foreigners in the country, after the Chinese and Koreans. Despite their large number, their geographical distribution is uneven. Currently, most of them are in the regions of Kanto, Chubu, and Kansai. Their presence points likewise to the presence of corporate firms, manufacturing companies, and other industries.

In 2016, there were 33,346 Filipinos in Aichi Prefecture. Filipinos are the third largest foreign population in Aichi, making up about 15 percent (Aichi Prefectural Government 2017). About 60 percent of Filipinos in Aichi are considered permanent residents, while a fourth are considered long-term residents. Fifteen percent are spouses and dependents of Japanese nationals. There are more females than males in the working-age group.

Nagoya City in Aichi Prefecture is one of the biggest cities in Japan and has attracted many foreigners to the country. The Sakae Entertainment District in the center ward of Nagoya City still hosts many Philippine pubs where a number of Filipinos work as entertainers. As of 2016, there

are about 8,568 Filipino residents in Nagoya City, making them the third most numerous foreign resident group after Chinese and Koreans (Aichi Prefectural Government 2017).

Variables and data

Data in this paper comes from a survey, conducted from October to November 2016, of Filipinos living in Nagoya City. A snowball sampling method that approximates random sampling was utilized, meaning that the sampling method first proceeded as a normal snowball sampling. Given the specifications of the study, I had to conduct snowball sampling to identify the target population of the research: Filipino residents who have stayed for more than three months in Japan. In Japan, the difference between short-stay visas and long-stay visas is that short-stay visas (pertaining to tourist visa) can stay for a maximum of only three months (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018).

I recruited the first group of participants by taking part in events organized by Filipino migrant organizations. Key participants were selected from that group. That first group then recruited participants living in different wards in Nagoya. This approximated the random sampling method. Other participants were recruited through snowball sampling. A total of 459 respondents came from the 16 wards of Nagoya City. Majority of the respondents were females: aged 30 years old and above; married; either permanent or long-term resident visa holders; and living in Naka, Nakagawa, or Minato wards.

The questionnaire was devised after key informant interviews were conducted from 2015 to 2016. Interviews provided the baseline information necessary in constructing the survey instrument, which was pretested twice in September 2016. The final survey instrument deployed during data collection asked 71 questions divided into the following sections:

1. Demographic
2. Pre-migration and settling-experience
3. Employment and labor
4. Housing and health

5. Language proficiency
6. Civic participation
7. Transnational practices and ethnic ties
8. Intentions for the future

In this paper, I focused specifically on the relationship between intent-to-stay and transnational practices. Intent-to-stay was measured by the question, "Do you have plans to stay permanently in Japan?" Responses were coded as 'yes' and 'no' and given values of 1 (for 'yes') and 0 (for 'no'). To look at transnational practices, as previously mentioned, I focused specifically on sending remittances and having savings in the home country. The question, "How often do you send money to the Philippines?," determined frequency of sending remittances. Respondents were asked to choose among four possible answers:

a. Not sending remittances (0)
b. Irregular basis/only when needed (1)
c. Monthly (2)
d. Every 1–3 weeks (2)

The question measures the regularity of sending. Each answer was assigned a numerical value where 0 pertains to not sending (a), 1 pertains to irregular frequency (b), and 2 pertains to regular frequencies regardless of how often (c, d). Answers to questions (c) and (d) were categorized together as "sending remittances regularly" as both (c) and (d) pertain to regular frequencies of sending money even if (d) suggests more frequent sending.

The question, "Where do you have savings?," determined presence (or otherwise) of savings in the home country (Philippines). Respondents were asked to choose among three possible answers with corresponding values. The answers were ranked and coded, with higher values assigned to having savings in the home country.

a. Yes, only in Japan (0)
b. Yes, in both Japan and the Philippines (1)
c. Yes, only in the Philippines (2)

Other factors might affect intent-to-stay. Therefore, I also controlled for various demographic factors (migrant characteristics) including age, sex, educational attainment, civil status, as well as some economic and cultural integration factors such as employment status, perceived language proficiency, length-of-stay and the perception of having Japanese friends. I discuss the findings in the next section.

Intent-to-stay

The question on intent-to-stay was asked using a "yes or no" question, "Do you have plans to stay permanently in Japan?" Out of 459 respondents, majority expressed no intention of staying permanently in Japan (N=400, 87.15 percent); only about 13 percent expressed intent-to-stay.

Tables 1a, 1b, and 1c show the number of respondents based on their responses to the question on intent-to-stay. The distributions are disaggregated based on different groups of factors. The first group (Table 1a) is composed of migrant characteristics such as sex, age, educational attainment, and civil status. The second group (Table 1b) pertains to integration factors such as employment status within the last two weeks of the survey, length-of-stay in Japan, self-rated perception of language proficiency, and a yes-no question on whether the respondents had Japanese friends. The last group of factors (Table 1c) pertains to transnational practices, here operationalized as regularity of sending remittances and having savings in the home country.

Proportions were computed based on the total number of respondents falling into a category. For example, the percentage of "female" was based on the total number of females, which is 318 (in the column labeled N=). Thus, 43 out of 318 females or 13.5 percent of all females had an intent-to-stay.

Table 1a: Migrant Characteristics vis-a-vis Intent-to-Stay

	N=	With intent to stay		Without intent to stay	
		N=59		N=400	
		Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Migrant characteristics					
Sex	459	59	12.9	400	87.1
Female	318	43	13.5	275	86.5
Male	141	16	11.3	125	88.7
Educational attainment	459	59	12.9	400	87.1
High School	145	20	13.8	125	86.2
Technical Vocational	68	8	11.8	60	88.2
College	246	31	12.6	215	87.4
Age group	459	59	12.9	400	87.1
15-24 years old	91	14	15.4	77	84.6
25-34 years old	178	14	7.9	164	92.1
35-44 years old	120	19	15.8	101	84.2
45-54 years old	57	8	14.0	49	86.0
55 years old and above	13	4	30.8	9	69.2
Civil status	459	59	12.9	400	87.1
Single/Never married	227	25	11.0	202	89.0
Married	191	26	13.6	165	86.4
Divorced	14	4	28.6	10	71.4
Widowed	13	3	23.1	10	76.9
Cohabitation/Live-in	14	1	7.1	13	92.9

Table 1b: Economic and Cultural Integration vis-a-vis Intent-to-Stay

	N=	With intent to stay		Without intent to	
		N=59		N=400	
		Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Economic and cultural integration					
Employment status	459	59	12.9	400	87.1
Has job	421	44	10.5	377	89.5
Has no job	38	15	39.5	23	60.5
Length of stay	459	59	12.9	400	87.1
Less than a year	106	3	2.8	103	97.2
1 year to less than 3 years	83	7	8.4	76	91.6
3 years to less than 5 years	39	5	12.8	34	87.2
5 years to less than 10 years	84	12	14.3	72	85.7
10 years to less than 20 years	97	23	23.7	74	76.3
20 years and above	50	9	18.0	41	82.0
Perceived language proficiency	459	59	12.9	400	87.1
0	33	1	3.0	32	97.0
1	184	10	5.4	174	94.6
2	176	28	15.9	148	84.1
3	59	15	25.4	44	74.6
4	7	5	71.4	2	28.6
Perceives having many Japanese friends	380	54	14.2	326	85.8
Perceives having no Japanese friends	79	5	6.3	74	93.7

Table 1c: Transnational Practices and Intent-to-Stay

	N=	With intent to stay		Without intent to	
		N=59		N=400	
		Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Selected transnational practices					
Regularity of sending remittance	459	59	12.9	400	87.1
Does not send remittances	79	28	35.4	51	64.6
Send remittances irregularly	166	13	7.8	153	92.2
Send remittances regularly	214	18	8.4	196	91.6
Savings	459	59	12.9	400	87.1
Has savings only in Japan	50	29	58.0	21	42.0
Has savings in both Japan and the Philippines	211	22	10.4	189	89.6
Has savings only in the Philippines	147	8	5.4	139	94.6

Gender and Educational Attainment

Relative to males at 11.3 percent, a bigger proportion of females had an intent-to-stay. More males (88.7 percent) expressed no intention to stay. Furthermore, more college degree holders (12.6 percent) and high school degree holders (13.8 percent) than those in other levels expressed an intent-to-stay.

More respondents aged 35 years old and above expressed intent-to-stay than those in younger age groups. Furthermore, as the proportion of those who have intent-to-stay increased, the length-of-stay also increased. The proportion of those without intent-to-stay decreases as the length-of-stay rises. In terms of employment status and perception of having Japanese friends, more respondents without jobs and with higher perceived language proficiency expressed a desire to stay than those without.

A little over 17 percent claimed they did not send any remittances to the Philippines, while about 36 percent did so on an irregular basis. The remaining 47 percent sent remittances either monthly or every one to

three weeks. The percentage of respondents with intent-to-stay declines in categories in which respondents regularly send remittances. Conversely, the percentage of those without intent-to-stay increases as sending remittances and having savings in the home country becomes more frequent. Almost 53 percent had savings in both Japan and the Philippines, while almost 37 percent had savings only in Philippines. A little over 10 percent had savings only in Japan.

Logistic regression results for transnational practices and intent-to-stay

I used logistic regression to investigate the impact of transnational practices on intent-to-stay in the host country, and their relationship to demographics such as age, sex, civil status, educational attainment, and their experiences vis-à-vis some integration factors that were previously noted (including perceived level of language, having Japanese friends, length-of-stay and employment status).

"Logistic regression models allow us to measure the isolated effect each independent variable has on the likelihood (odds ratio) of intending to return to the country of origin, simultaneously controlling for all other variables in the model" (Carling and Pettersen 2014, 21). Simply put, logistic regression allows us to the see the odds of one variable affecting the dependent variable as we control for other variables.

I proceeded into looking at four regression models, the results of which are outlined in Table 2. Model 1 regresses only intent-to-stay with the transnational practices variables; Model 2 regresses these variables combined with migrant characteristics such as age and educational attainment; Model 3 regresses transnational practices with integration variables such as having an income-generating activity, length-of-stay in years in Japan (how long the respondent has lived in Japan), self-rated language proficiency, and having Japanese friends; and Model 4 regresses these three sets of variables.

The Akaike information criterion (AIC), a test to measure the relative fit of goodness of statistical models (Carling and Pettersen 2014), shows that the explanatory power of the model increased when integration variables were introduced, but not when migrant characteristic variables were added.

Let us look at the results of each model. Values in the table are the odds ratio (OR) which represents the odds that an outcome will occur given a particular exposure, in this case, the odds that the respondent will have an intent-to-stay given different conditions. ORs show the association between the independent and the dependent/outcome variable, but it only shows likelihood and does not establish causality. It is one of the ways to quantify how the presence/absence of one variable (here, transnational practices, which is the main independent variable in question) is associated with the presence/absence of an outcome variable (intent-to-stay).

The significance of these ORs is then assessed by looking at p-values (not shown in table). The p-values determine the significance of the results of the regression, since they evaluate how well the sample data prove that the null hypothesis is true (in this case, that transnational practices do not have any impact on intent-to-stay). A low p-value suggests that there may be ample evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Pre-determined common levels, or cut-off points at 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001, test whether the results are not due to chance alone. P-values equal to or below 0.05 are denoted by an asterisk (*); values equal to or below 0.01 are denoted by a double asterisk (**) and those equal to or below 0.001 are denoted by a triple asterisk (***).

In logistics regressions, if the OR for a variable is higher than 1, it is considered a risk factor, i.e., having that variable increases the likelihood of an outcome, which is intent-to-stay (as opposed to not having intent-to-stay). On the other hand, ORs for variables lower than 1 are considered protective factors. Protective factors are believed to reduce the likelihood of having an intent-to-stay (as opposed to not having an intent-to-stay). I also accounted for other independent variables such as migrant

Table 2: Results of Logistics Regression

	Model 1 (OR)	Model 2 (OR)	Model 3 (OR)	Model 4 (OR)
Transnational practices				
Does not send remittances	1	1	1	1.00
Send remittances irregularly	0.23**	0.16***	0.22**	0.20**
Send remittances regularly	0.24**	0.25*	0.28*	0.29*
Has savings only in Japan	1	1	1	1
Has savings in both Japan and the Philippines	0.76	0.57	0.55	0.48
Has savings only in the Philippines	0.36*	0.31*	0.41	0.45
Migrant characteristics				
Female		1		1
Male		0.88		0.89
High School		1		1
Tech Voc		1.06		1.82
College		1.26		2.35*
Age in years		0.92		0.85
Age squared		1		1
Single		1		1
Married		1.66		0.76
Divorced		2.22		0.87
Widowed		1.54		0.92
Cohabitation/Live-in		0.76		0.34
Economic and cultural integration				
Has no job in the past 2 weeks			1	1
Has job in the past 2 weeks			0.40*	0.37*
Length of stay in Japan			1.11**	1.18**
Length of stay in Japan squared			1	1.00**
Language proficiency is poor			1	1
1			1.83	1.54
2			3.56	3.21
3			4.91	4.56
4			17.91	17.48
Perceives having not many Japanese friends			1	1
Perceives having not many Japanese friends			1.98	1.78
Constant	1.31	1.29	0.13	1.05
AIC	322.47	326.68	296.92	308.05

*) = $p \leq 0.05$; **) = $p \leq 0.01$; ***) $p \leq 0.001$

characteristics variables and some integration variables to account for other variables that may impact intent-to-stay.

Separately testing for the statistical relationship between transnational practices variables and intent-to-stay confirmed that sending remittance, regardless of regularity and having savings in the home country, is significant at $p \leq 0.000$. The association is protective, i.e., the more a Filipino resident sends remittance or saves in the home country, the less likely he will have an intent-to-stay. Model 1 shows that together, the transnational practices are highly significant, protective factors when predicting intent-to-stay. It also suggests that those sending remittances are about 80 percent less likely to have intentions of staying. Those with savings only in the Philippines are 65 percent less likely to intend to stay permanently in Japan.

Adding variables of migrant characteristics in Model 2 affirms the association of transnational practices variables with intent-to-stay. While the significance level declined, they remained significant at $p \leq 0.001$. Likelihood of not staying stood at about 80 percent for those sending remittances, and 70 percent for those saving in the home country.

Model 3 regresses integration variables and transnational practices with intent-to-stay. While significance level decreased, sending remittances and having savings in the home country are consistently negatively associated with intent-to-stay. This suggests that those sending remittances are 70 percent more likely to be without intentions to stay. Those with savings only in the home country are also 60 percent more likely have no intentions to stay. Length-of-stay in Japan interacts with these variables; a one-unit increase in length of stay increases likelihood of having intention to stay by 1.11 times. This means that an increase of one year in one's stay in Japan can increase the likelihood of having an intention to stay from 0 to 1 (as intention to stay only has values for 0 or no intention, to 1 or having an intention).

Having a job is another protective factor. Respondents with jobs are 60 percent more likely not to have intentions to stay. This may also be related to sending remittances, as majority of those doing so are considered

economically active. A variation of Model 3 (not shown) which removed all integration variables except for having a job and length-of-stay, as well as retaining educational attainment, was tested and showed high explanatory power. Interestingly, the explanatory power of Model 3 is the highest among the four models, complementing the earlier assertion that intent-to-stay can inform us about the impact of transnational practices on migrant incorporation. Further research, however, is required to understand this better.

Model 4 combines the three groups of variables—transnational practices, migrant characteristics, and integration. It suggests that with migrant demographics and integration variables, sending remittances remains a significant protective factor at $p \leq 0.05$. Irregular and regular remitters are 70 to 80 percent more unlikely to intend to stay. Interestingly, while remaining as a protective factor, having savings partly or only in the Philippines shows a decline in effect. Respondents who answered thus are 50 percent less likely to intend to stay in Japan. Results from Model 4 also suggest a significant positive association between intent-to-stay and educational attainment, with the odds of intending to stay increasing as educational attainment improves. This supports Carling and Pettersen's (2014) findings that those with higher education are more likely to stay than those with lower education (who have higher intentions to return). Other results of Model 4 show that length of stay is found to be significantly associated with intent-to-stay as a risk factor (OR=1.18).

Overall Results, Some Nuances

In general, certain transnational practices are significantly associated with intent-to-stay. Migrants who send remittances are about 70 to 80 percent more likely to have no intention to stay. However, the relationship between having savings in the Philippines and intent-to-stay produced mixed results, as other factors must be considered. This despite the notion that having savings is a protective factor, meaning that residents with some savings in the Philippines are more likely to be without an intent-to-stay in Japan.

Additionally, other variables seem to influence intent-to-stay. Length-of-stay, or the number of years living in Japan, and the educational attainment of the respondent show significant associations with intent-to-stay. Respondents with educational attainment higher than secondary education are more likely to have an intention to stay. A year's increase in length-of-stay in Japan increases likelihood by 1.18 times. This in a way confirms that intent-to-stay is somewhat a summary of the experiences of the migrant in the host country (Luthra, Platt and Salamonska 2014). This also corresponds to Cela, Fokkema and Ambrosetti's (2012) findings on the impact of duration of stay on transnational practices among Eastern European migrants in Italy. They argue that the level of transnational behavior declines as the migrants spend more years in the host country.

Interestingly, having a job is a protective factor, in that those with income-generating activities are about 65 percent more likely not to intend to stay. One possible explanation is the association of remittance with having a job: those who send remittances tend to be more active economically. Data from the survey show that among the most common reason for migration is to find a job to support their families back home (74 percent).

In summary, variables that suggest negative association with intent-to-stay include sending remittances, having savings in the home country, and having a job. These factors are likely to decrease intent-to-stay. The significant risk factors—inducing migrants to stay—in Japan include high educational attainment and length-of-stay.

Summary and Conclusion

This paper is a quantitative study on whether transnational practices can influence intention to stay in the host country. Logistic regression confirms that transnational practices have significant association with intent-to-stay among the respondents. Migrants who send remittances to the Philippines and who have savings partly or only in the Philippines are more likely not to stay in Japan, the host country. While other factors such

as educational attainment and length-of-stay may intervene to influence the intention to stay, transnational practices, particularly sending remittances regardless of regularity, can work against the intention to remain in Japan.

Length-of-stay can impact intention to remain in the country, perhaps through creation of ties within the host country. The longer a migrant stays, the stronger his social integration becomes, creating a stronger desire to stay permanently (Martinovic, van Tubergen, and Maas 2009). In my study, data also showed that those who are more likely to have an intention to stay tend to be in skilled occupations. This complements the finding that higher educational attainment can increase likelihood of intention to stay as they can engage in jobs that do not fall in the 3D categories, and thus enjoy a better position in Japanese society.

Those with lower educational attainment tend to be employed in lower-skilled jobs, often as factory workers and entertainers. The association of entertainment work with prostitution and human trafficking since the release of the TIP Report in 2005 created a negative image of Filipinos in these lines of work (Suzuki 2005; Parreñas 2010, 2011), which were categorized as 3D. Coming back to the Philippines, however, these Filipinos did not suffer from such labels, as they were able to cross borders and return successfully.

Majority of Filipino residents who do not intend to stay in Japan expressed intent-to-return. While the paper does not argue that having no intent-to-stay precludes intent-to-return to the home country, it is interesting to note how the history of migration from the Philippines creates an incentive-to-return, and militates against intent-to-stay. The Philippines' "culture of migration" (Asis 2006) and the large volumes of remittances channeled into the Philippine economy have resulted in the almost "glorification" of migrants and "balikbayans" (returnees). Studies refer to them as "modern day heroes," "economic saviors," "citizens of the world," "new aristocrats" and "ambassadors of goodwill" (Quoted in Docot 2009, 114–15). Returnees are often seen as successful and build better lives back home. New houses often built in styles common in places where they had

been migrant workers often symbolize this step-up in the economic ladder, as seen in the town of Mabini in Batangas province, south of Manila. Dubbed as "Little Italy" (Onishi 2010), majority of its residents have worked in Italy as housekeepers and domestic workers. Often, migrants who came back are welcomed as elevated members of their society. This exaltation of the migrant creates an incentive-to-return, considering the type of jobs that majority of the respondents engage in.

Further Research

Key informant interviews (during the initial phase of the data collection in this study) suggest other factors that affect intent-to-stay, including many of the respondents' aspirations to move to a different country once their stay in Japan is over. The pretest included a question on the respondent's intention-to-stay permanently in Japan and whether he/she has plans to migrate to a different country. Some respondents had such plans, while others had inconclusive responses. At any rate, while Japan remains an attractive destination for many Filipinos, it is often considered a step to a bigger, more permanent destination. Paul (2011) notes that in multistage migration patterns, step migration is often used to accumulate savings, resources, and connections to migrate to another country. Japan, as well as Hong Kong, is often seen as among the immediate destinations for Filipino migrants. But according to a survey among Overseas Filipino Workers in Hong Kong (Paul 2011), migrants often have one destination in mind—America. This intention shapes the attitudes and experiences of migrants in their present host country (say, Hong Kong or Japan). If they do not intend to stay, they will invest less (emotionally or otherwise) therein, and this hurts integration. Thinking of the destination country as a stepping stone limits this possibility of accumulating experiences, or at least determining attitudes to their host country.

Migrant characteristics, as well as these goals and plans, can influence their ability and willingness to integrate. Understanding that migrants also have agential capacity to influence their integration can help inform the

direction of integration policies. Intent-to-stay can inform us what programs and policies are needed to help facilitate successful integration. Further research can be developed to assess migrants' migration trajectories and intents for the future.

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Notes

[1] Long-term, spouse and permanent resident visas are among the 27 different types of visas intended for foreigners who want to enter Japan. Those three types fall into the family-related visas, which have no restriction on activities. It also includes special long-term residents, refugees, children of Japanese nationals and of permanent residents. While long-term and spouse visa holders need to renew their visas, in some cases in six months, and in some in three years, permanent resident visa holders have residency rights to stay indefinitely, only needing to renew their residency cards every five years. Another visa category, working visas, cover engineers, researchers, highly skilled professionals, medical doctors among others. Entertainers, included in this group, are usually allowed to work and stay in Japan for three months and can renew their visas for another three. The last group is the non-working group, which includes short-term stayers such as tourists. It also includes trainees, students and dependents (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017).

[2] Integration is generally defined as a process of mutual adaptation between host countries and migrants. The current popularity of the term has come with the rejection of assimilation theory and multiculturalism. Assimilation theory refers to the "melting pot," a metaphor to describe a heterogeneous society becoming more homogenous in time (Gordon 1964; Alba and Nee 1997; Gans 1992, 1997). However, more diverse groups of migrants do not follow the straight-line assimilation theory, and minority cultures are not static (Glazer 1993). Both realities have elicited adjustments to the theory. On the other hand, multiculturalism, as a rejection of the "melting pot" metaphor, argues an ideal wherein members can maintain their distinct ethnic collective identities and practices. Criticisms exist, however. First, multiculturalism essentializes culture and risks its objectification (Walden 1995). Second, the toleration of different cultures that multiculturalism espouses will lead not to accommodation but to indifference (Kukathas 1995); and multiculturalism's politics of recognition ignores the actual problem of economic inequality and exploitation, whose remedy is economic restructuring (Miller

2006; van Parijs 2004). The biggest criticism, however, has come from governments who previously championed multiculturalism. This backlash is most salient in terms of the lack of social unity and increasing tensions among diverse groups, as in the case of Australia, Germany, Britain, and France. For (some) Western European governments, multiculturalism promotes division and separation, in contrast to what it was thought to stand for: integration and unity. Integration therefore is seen as a shift from these two extreme views of migrant incorporation. It looks at integration as concerned with rights and duties of migrants and host societies, which implies a sense of obligation and respect for a set of values that bind migrants and host countries in a shared purpose (International Organization for Migration n.d.). In this sense, integration is not just for long-term migrants; it also addresses issues shorter-term migrants may face.

[3] Japan has often been seen as "new" to immigration, more because of its ambivalence rather than its lack of experience in receiving migrants. In fact, people have moved in and out of Japan even before the economic boom in the 1980s. There is a common misconception about Japan being "homogenous." Studies show that Japan has, in its history, deployed measures to address foreign populations, implying that foreign populations have existed since. Kondo (2002) notes that the development of policies pertaining to immigration control and integration can be divided into three periods. The first period characterized by "*douwa*," which literally means assimilation, governed most of the period from the Second World War to the beginning of the industrialization and economic booms. The second period is characterized by "*kokusaika*" or internationalization, covered the period from the economic boom of the 1980s to the 1990s. The third period, which has often been the focus of many Western scholars studying immigration in Japan, saw the emergence of "*tabunka kyousei*" or multicultural co-existence.

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