



ASIAN STUDIES

Journal of Critical Perspectives on Asia

Transnational Flows and Spaces of Interaction in Asia

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and the Non-Reform of its Migration Policy | Gabriele VOGT

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Introduction

Transnational Flows and Spaces of Interaction in Asia

IT IS TEMPTING TO CONSIDER the articles in this volume as part of migration studies, which is popular among academic scholars and independent researchers. “Migration,” however, apart from being an overused term that has been appropriated by agencies of the state for opportunistic purposes, does not quite capture the multifaceted nature of crossborder movements of peoples. Nor does it do justice to the diverse intentions and rich symbiotic and reciprocal experiences of those who venture into foreign lands, as well as the ambivalent receptions accorded them by recipient societies and their peoples. Additionally, “migration” does not judiciously account for the movement of ideas, languages, and practices across nation-state borders which need not necessarily involve physical travels by individuals, and which, on the whole, illustrate the fragility of such demarcations.

It is probably for the above reasons that two recent publications, which would be labeled “migration studies” under traditional categorization, purposely and consciously avoided the use of the term. Caroline S. Hau and Kasian Tejapira (2011, 1) instead refer to “cross-border circulations of people and ideas” and “transnational mobility” (*ibid.*) as a “logical outcome of a world of ‘flows’ ... that are

propelled by advances in transportation and communication, diffusion of technology and ideologies; large-scale movements of capital, labor, tourists, commodities and cultural artifacts; expansion of mass education; creation of transnational public spheres and institutions; and relocation of production facilities ‘abroad.’

In this context, Hau and Tejapira question the relevance of the nation-state as a unit of analysis given that the “the sheer volume and speed of flows ... have eroded the sovereignty and capabilities of the nation-state, rendering its borders far more permeable than is popularly

assumed and opening it to the world far beyond the reaches and control of the territorially rooted state” (ibid.). Their preferred characterization of the above process, as reflected in their jointly-edited book’s title is “transnational flows and movements.”

The book’s “central organizing concept” (5) is “travel” which is not confined to the “physical movement of people” (ibid.) and includes the “circulations of ideas and discourses enabled by inflows of goods and commodities ... and its transformative effect on individual lives” (ibid.). These are defined by the “contingent and uneven processes of translation, circulation, and exchange” (22).

Harper and Amrith use the terms “sites and spaces of Asian interaction” and, in the edition of *Modern Asian Studies* they co-edited, argue that “by focusing on spaces—real and virtual,” one can “begin to conceive of new ways of capturing geographical imaginations and fluidity of borders and boundaries across Asia” (2012, 249). They work with concepts such as “local cosmopolitanism,” “moving metropolises” and “mobile cities” as characterizations of contemporary Asia (250).

With respect to diaspora studies, Harper and Amrith inform us that while “many recent works on particular diasporas have tended to look inwards—at how distinctive diaspora cultures maintained a sense of ‘home’ while abroad,” their “focus has been on how different diasporas have come into contact with each other in particular places” (250). The point is to “go beyond the oceanic perspectives that have dominated recent discussions of inter-Asian connections” and “to uncover connections that cut across regions” (ibid.).

“Transnational flows” and “spaces of interaction” appear to be more apt analytical frameworks for studying the movements of people and ideas across national borders. In a larger sense, they encompass the rubric of “migration studies” but go far beyond the latter’s current reach and parameters of analysis. With due respect to the four authors mentioned above, we have therefore taken the liberty of borrowing their concepts for this volume’s theme and working title.

Without originally meaning to, the five articles in this current edition of *Asian Studies* fit in nicely with the concepts of flows and spaces. Using historical, economic, socio-cultural, and linguistic studies, Mojares, Vogt, Yang, Santamaria, and Ubalde discuss critical issues and concerns in cross-border interactions and flows in an Asian context. At the same time, they break new ground by uncovering new empirical information and novel ideas which they situate within the purview of critical scholarship.

Resil Mojares, in “**The Emergence of Asian Intellectuals**,” traces the historical roots of Asian intellectual traditions by contextualizing them within an Asian regional context. He terms this a “corrective to the tendency to locate in the West the beginnings of area studies.” Using primarily the experiences of Filipino intellectuals at the turn of the twentieth century, Mojares notes the contributing factors of the development of anti-colonial movements and the rise of Japan as an alternative development model. Japan had been the Mecca for Asian intellectuals eager to shake off the yoke of Western colonialism. That soon became a false hope, however, as Japan took on a militaristic and imperialist turn and consequently elicited disaffection among these emergent Asian intellectuals.

While recognizing the positive contributions of the notion of “Pan-Asianism” to the development of an Asian intellectual network, Mojares avers that this now should be regarded merely as a “historical artifact.” In its place are the networks of Asian intellectuals that connect “on the basis of shared issues, advocacies, ideologies, and professional concerns.” These, however, are “dynamic linkages that can appear and disappear over time and space; thin out or thicken” as time and circumstances allow and not fed simply “by the ‘social fantasy’ of shared and common origins, culture and destiny.”

Gabriele Vogt’s “**When the Leading Goose Gets Lost: Japan’s Demographic Change and the Non-Reform of its Migration Policy**” illustrates the dilemma of Japan’s policy on foreign workers, which remains basically isolationist and is therefore unable to cope with the country’s demographic changes. These changes have resulted in a shrinking

working population and a consequent decrease in the number of skilled workers and professionals, as well as a healthcare system straining to adequately service an aging population.

Caught in this dilemma are contradictory initiatives among government agencies and business establishments. The situation of weak political parties with no coherent migration program adds to the problem. Vogt suggests bringing in “subnational actors” other than government and business; in particular, citizens who can introduce new ideas and bring about a new and more relevant migration policy. Utilizing the “flying geese” paradigm of economic development but applying it in the case of Japan’s immigration policy, Vogt regards Japan as the “reluctant leading goose” that, while not yet lost, is taking “an awful long time to hover in mid-air.”

Kee Ho Yang’s **“A Critique of Government-Driven Multicultural Policy in Korea: Towards Local Government-Centered Policies”** points to the flaws of South Korea’s policy and programs towards immigrants due to “inefficiency ... lack of adequacy, balance and locality, ... absence of communication among policy makers, overlap of budgets and tasks, and lack of coherence with other programs for foreign residents.” The “heavy focus on immigrants by marriage” and inattention to foreign workers results in a “gap of service programs among.... regions and subjects.”

Yang roots the problem in the overconcentration of power and decision-making in the central government whose policies continually fluctuates between “acceptance and strict regulation” depending on the political weather at a given electoral season. To counteract these inconsistencies, Yang proposes granting an active role to local governments who, in any case, act as the direct hosts of foreign residents. In addition, NGOs, as well as local and foreign residents themselves, should be similarly involved in order to craft a more inclusive multicultural policy.

Marrienne Ubalde, in **“Diverging Narratives: Lives and Identities of Japanese-Filipino Children in the Philippines,”**

uncovers the fluidity of identities of children of mixed Japanese and Filipino parents who are living in the Philippines. These children, who later came to be called *nikkeijin* or *shin-nikkeijin*, were born in the 1980s and 1990s mainly (but not entirely) of Filipina entertainers who worked in Japan or of Japanese tourists in the Philippines. That these identities are “multi-faceted and changing over time” is due to “the different webs of relations that an individual interacts with.”

Transnational connections are explored depicting mixed relationships between the children and their Japanese parent who remained in Japan or a surrogate parent in the Philippines. Organizational ties are important demarcations, however, marking a class distinction between Japanese-Filipino children who are affiliated with support NGOs and those who are not. Those who were relatively better off and were recognized by their Japanese parent were therefore content with their existing situation saw no need to seek the assistance from support NGOs. Ubalde says that “as far as the Japanese-Filipino children are concerned, the seeming divide within this category somehow proves that “ethnic and even racial categories were in fact cross-cut by the class divide.”

MCM Santamaria’s “**From *Tortillier* to *Ingsud-Ingsud*: Creating New Understandings Concerning the Importance of Indigenous Dance Terminology in the Practice and Kinaesthetics of the Sama *Igal* Dance Tradition**” highlights indigenous dance terms in the Sama *igal* tradition of southern Philippines by utilizing research methods from linguistics and cultural studies. Santamaria’s work appropriately fills a gap in dance scholarship which “often leave(s) out the study of indigenous dance terminology.” In looking at four localities in Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Zamboanga, he discovers that “some degree of significance” in shared dance terms exist, even if universality is not established.

Of relevance to the theme of this *Asian Studies* edition, Santamaria interestingly also draws out “regional affinities” in language use and finds commonalities in Sama *Igal* dance terms with those in Bahasa Melayu,

Bahasa Indonesia, and Central Javanese (Surakarta) dance terminologies. In one sense, his study reinforces the view among some scholars that the Mindanao-Sulu peoples can source its primary identity by reaffirming its cultural affinities with its maritime Southeast Asian neighbors.

As the articles in this volume show, the fluidities and uncertainties of transnational flows, as well as their varying impacts on domestic policies of recipient states, point to a dynamic and exciting field in area studies in Asia. The new spaces of interaction created as a result also open up new research activities for Asian scholars. The field is vast and largely untapped and waits to be further explored and analyzed.

Eduardo C. Tadem, Ph.D.

Editor in Chief

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The Emergence of Asian Intellectuals¹

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Abstract

The paper takes a look at how a self-conscious community of Asian intellectuals came to be formed at the turn of the twentieth century, inspired by such factors as the rise of Japan as a world power and the advance of anti-colonial movements in various parts of Asia. It takes as an example the case of the Philippines where a sense of the ‘region’ was an integral part of the Filipino nationalist movement in the late nineteenth-century. In particular, the paper looks at the case of Mariano Ponce (1863–1918), who may well be called “the first Filipino Asianist.” In recounting his story, the paper underscores the importance of local histories of Asianism as a corrective to the tendency to locate in the West the beginnings of area studies.

Keywords: Asian intellectuals, Mariano Ponce, Pan-Asianism, Jose Alejandrino

RESPONDING TO THE QUESTION of what ‘Asia’ is in objective terms, the Indonesian writer Goenawan Mohamad has said: “Asia is like God. You cannot categorically deny or affirm its existence. No one knows where it begins, where it ends, or whether there is a way to define it” (quoted in Butalia 2006, 2). Mohamad’s witty remark is a reminder of the arbitrariness of categories. Such arbitrariness is particularly true of *Asia*: a word of uncertain etymology, variably used since the time of the ancient Greeks; a word effectively enforced by Europeans rather than by Asians themselves; a word of vast application, defining a geography fluid and imprecise.

All these, of course, do not quite explain how Asians themselves—and here I am speaking in particular of scholars and intellectuals—have come to take ‘Asian’ as a meaningful and important marker of their identity.

A recent book provides a highly informative account of how the idea of an Asian intellectual community came about. In *From the Ruins of Empire: The Intellectuals Who Remade Asia* (2012), the Indian author Pankaj Mishra takes Asian public intellectuals as a definable formation. And he cites as a watershed event in the genesis of this formation Japan’s victory over the Russian navy in 1905, in the strait of Tsushima between Korea and southern Japan, in the course of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905).² A major naval battle that marked the first time a modern Western power was defeated by an Asian nation, the victory was hailed by many Asian intellectuals in widely separated parts of the world—among them, Mohandas Gandhi (then an unknown Indian lawyer in South Africa), Mustafa Kemal (a young Ottoman soldier in Damascus, later known as Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey), Sun Yat-sen (at the time, a Chinese political activist sojourning in London), Rabindranath Tagore (then a teacher in rural Bengal), and many more. For Mishra, the Battle of Tsushima was a defining moment in the political and intellectual awakening of Asia.

This awakening, of course, did not happen overnight with a single battle. By stressing the impact of Japan’s military victory over Russia, Mishra glosses over two important facts. Asians already began to look towards Japan in the 1880s as Japan modernized during the Meiji Restoration by laying the foundation of an industrial economy, a modern educational system and state bureaucracy, and a constitutional government. Showing that an Asian country can modernize in its own terms, demonstrating its might in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), and terminating the extraterritorial rights enjoyed by Great Britain, the United States, and other Western powers in 1899, Japan inspired by its example Europe-dominated and colonized Asians from Turkey and Egypt to India and Indonesia.

What Mishra also obscures is that—though the rise of Japan was exceedingly important in Asia’s awakening—the move to imagine and

foster transnational or intraregional solidarities already began in many places in Asia even before the Russo-Japanese War.

The case of the Philippines is enlightening in showing how intellectuals in one Asian country positioned themselves in the world (I speak of the Philippines because it is what I am most familiar with, but I hope that “local” histories of the idea of “Asianness” can be done for other parts of the region as well).

A form of “Asianism” was already part of the Philippine nationalist movement from its beginnings in the 1880s. Broadly construed as a sense of a ‘home region,’ this Asianism had the agency-specific meaning of belonging (in the ‘civilizational’ discourse of the time) to the “Malay civilization,” and to that geographic region the late-nineteenth century schoolbooks called *Malasia* (today’s Southeast Asia)[Mojares 2008, 303–25; Mojares 2009].³ (We must recall that modern geography was a basic subject in nineteenth-century Philippine secondary schools and Manila’s University of Santo Tomas, the first European-style university to be founded in Southeast Asia.) *Malasia*, however, was a somewhat loosely-defined region, itself embedded in wider circles of cultural and political filiations.

Jose Rizal and other Filipino intellectuals embedded the Philippines in the “Malay” region, as part of the claim that—contrary to Spanish denigrations of Filipinos as “a people without a history”—Filipinos were inheritors of a “high” and “ancient” Malay civilization. In the early phase of the Filipino nationalist movement, however, “Malayness”—or what was called *malayismo*—was deployed not as a charter for separation and sovereignty but as an argument for recognition and the right to an autonomous status within the Spanish empire. It was an idea rather than a movement, since Filipinos had little contact, if at all, with peers elsewhere in the Malay region and there was nothing comparable to the Filipino Propaganda Movement elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

In the early 1890s, the focus of the nationalist movement was reform, “assimilation,” and a status for Philippines as an overseas province rather than a colony of Spain. A revolution for independence was not as yet

perceived to be a realistic option. Thus, even as they proclaimed their being Malay, the networks Filipino intellectuals built were not with fellow Asians but with liberal elements in Europe, and in particular with similarly situated Cubans and Puerto Ricans, to whom Filipino intellectuals felt bound by a shared grievance and purpose.

It is thus that I cannot find a reference to Jose Rizal and other Filipino intellectuals forging links with fellow Southeast Asians. It would seem that their contact with Southeast Asia at this time was limited to transiting in Singapore or Saigon on their way to Europe. There is the story of Jose Rizal forming a friendship with the Japanese writer Suehiro Tetcho when the two found themselves traveling together in 1888 from Japan and across the United States to Europe. But while the experience inspired a “fantasy” of Asian solidarity in Tetcho, it did not quite have the same effect on Rizal (Hau and Shiraishi 2009, 329–88). There is also the story of Jose Alejandrino, a Filipino studying engineering in Belgium in 1894, having a Japanese schoolmate, the son of a Japanese diplomat, who spoke to him in Belgium of the need for “Oriental solidarity” against Westerners, but the idea did not really impress Alejandrino until much later.

In the Filipino political imaginary at this time, Filipinos saw themselves within the frame of “Greater Spain” rather than that of Asia. Hence, Filipino leaders—who were a group of highly Europeanized intellectuals—took a distanced, skeptical view of Japan’s call for “Asia for Asians.” Instead, they used, as the Filipino leader Marcelo del Pilar did, Japan’s rising influence as an argument for the closer integration of the Philippines to Spain, warning that if Spain did not introduce reforms, Japan’s redemptorist “Asia for Asians” policy would attract Filipinos, and the Philippines would gravitate towards Japan in the same way that Cuba and Puerto Rico were being drawn into the orbit of the United States (del Pilar 1894, 475–81).⁴

By 1895, however, the Spain-based Propaganda Movement had given up hopes that reform would come from Spain. And then in 1896, the Philippine Revolution began. The revolution radically changed the equation for Filipinos. Now turned revolutionary, the base of the Filipino

nationalist movement shifted—physically and intellectually—from Europe to Asia. The Propaganda Movement and the Aguinaldo government-in-exile set up headquarters in Hong Kong, and turned to Japan for political and material assistance in a struggle that had quickly changed in 1899 from a revolution against Spain to a war against U.S. annexation.

As the first nationalist revolution in Asia, the Filipino revolution stirred wide interest because of its implications for Western domination in the region. Leaders of the revolution were themselves aware of its regional implications. As Apolinario Mabini, the leading theoretician of the revolution, grandly declared in 1899, the revolution's "ultimate purpose" was "to keep the torch of liberty and civilization burning and bright in the Oceania, so as by illuminating the dark night wherein the Malayan race now lies degraded and humiliated, it may show to them the path to their social emancipation." He wrote that if the Philippine revolution succeeded, England, Russia, France, Germany, Holland, Portugal, and "other rabid colonizers" would "tremble for their colonial possessions and those they expect to have in the coveted partition of China in this troubled sea of the Far East." "The Philippine revolution," Mabini warned, "is contagious, very contagious" (Mabini 1969, 47–78; 79).

While Mabini makes geographic references to "Oceania" and the "Far East" (*Extremo Oriente*), it is clear that the primary foundation of an imagined solidarity is not so much geographic as political. This is shown in the organ of the Filipino nationalist movement, *La Solidaridad* (1889–1895), which may well be called a journal of comparative colonialism because of the attention it gives to drawing comparisons between the Philippine situation and that of other colonized areas in the world (like German Africa, British India, French Indochina, and the Dutch Indies).

While the solidarities are wide-ranging, Filipino revolutionary leaders knew that, in practical terms, the foreign material and political support they needed could only come from Japan. Thus in 1898, the Filipino nationalist Mariano Ponce was posted in Yokohama as the Aguinaldo government's representative in Japan (Mojares 2011, 32–63). In his three-

year stay in Japan, Ponce actively networked with Japanese “pan-Asianists” in and outside government, publicized the cause of Philippine independence, and initiated two clandestine (and failed) attempts to smuggle arms and ammunition from Japan to the Philippines.

It is important to note that Ponce was in Japan at a time that saw, arguably for the first time, the emergence of a ‘community’ of ‘Asian public intellectuals.’ Drawn by Japan’s growing power and the example it had set for how Asians can find their own path to freedom and civilization, assorted students, political agents, exiles, and refugees from the Middle East and South, East, and Southeast Asia converged in Japan. It is quite remarkable that if one draws up a list of those who visited or sojourned in Japan at the turn of the twentieth century (say, 1890–1910), one has a roster of leading anti-colonial intellectuals in Asia. As Mishra writes,

[i]n the early years of the twentieth century, Tokyo became a Mecca for nationalists from all over Asia, the centre of an expanded Asian public sphere...

The advance of imperialism everywhere forced Asian elites into anxious sideways glances as well as urgent self-appraisals. Very quickly in the early twentieth century, a transnational intellectual network grew, bringing Asian intellectuals into dialogue with each other (2012, 166; 168).⁵

In Japan, societies were organized to stimulate intellectual exchanges and promote the spirit of pan-Asianism. Through various societies and gatherings in Japan, Filipinos, Chinese, Koreans, Indians, Thais, Vietnamese, and Japanese met to exchange views and celebrate their solidarity. Ponce himself met fellow political refugees, like Park Yong-hyo and Yu Kil-chun, leaders of the Korean reform movement, Kang Youwei, the famous Chinese reformer and scholar, and Sun Yat-sen (with whom Ponce had the closest ties).

Illustrating the value of these networks, Ponce caused to be published in Tokyo in 1901, in Japanese translation, his book on the

Philippine independence struggle, *Cuestión Filipina: Una Exposición Historico-Crítica de Hechos Relativos a la Guerra de la Independencia*, a work that was also translated into Chinese and published in Shanghai in 1902 and reissued in 1913. Now little known in the Philippines, this book was, according to Rebecca Karl, an American scholar on Chinese nationalism, “perhaps the single most influential text for post-1902 Chinese interpretations of the global and Chinese significance of the Philippine revolution” (Karl 2002, 84;103; 247). Even more important, it influenced Chinese intellectuals in recasting China’s anti-dynasty struggle as a modern nationalist movement.

This was an intellectual high point. But political conditions quickly changed, both in the home countries of these traveling Asian intellectuals, and in Japan. “Pan-Asianism” was never a unitary or homogeneous movement (Saaler & Koschmann 2007). There were deep divisions among the Japanese as to the policy their government should pursue with regards to the rest of Asia, and deep suspicions among other Asians over Japan’s expansionist ambitions.

In the Philippines, the dream of an Asian republic faded with U.S. annexation. In the same way that the effective ‘world’ for Filipinos shifted from Greater Spain to an Asia that had Japan as its axis, the orientation in the Philippines now shifted from Asia to the United States—to such great effect that Filipinos came to have the reputation as the most “Americanized” among Asians.

Asianism would persist as an intellectual current in the Philippines. Mariano Ponce, who returned to the Philippines in 1907 after a twenty-year exile, continued to cultivate a scholarly interest in Asia, publishing a monograph on Indochina and a biography of Sun Yat-sen, which is credited as the first book by a Filipino on China. In 1915, Ponce founded together with Jose Alejandrino and leading Filipino intellectuals, *Sociedad Orientalista de Filipinas*, which launched in 1918 a monthly journal of Asian affairs, *Boletín de la Sociedad Orientalista de Filipinas*. These are the first Asian Studies society and journal independently established by Southeast Asians.

The Asian society founded by Ponce and Alejandrino was short-lived. But Asianism would continue in various forms. There were ambitions early in the twentieth century to build the Philippines as an “intellectual and commercial center” for the Malay region—an ambition that did not materialize because the Philippines was unable to build the needed material and intellectual resources, and because it was an ambition undermined by the Philippines’ dubious position as an American surrogate in the region (Kalaw 2001, 175). “Asia for the Asians” became the dominant theme in Manila’s intellectual life during the Japanese occupation—but it was an ideal warped by the reality of Japan’s imperial domination.

In Japan, the years that followed the Russo-Japanese War saw Japan’s “altruistic” pan-Asianism turn towards a more aggressive, self-interested posture as Japanese officialdom entered into treaties and agreements that committed Japan to recognizing the claims of Western powers in the region; at the same time, this assured for Japan certain prerogatives as an accepted member of the imperialist club in Asia. These would culminate, as we know, in World War II with the establishment of the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” under Japan. While Japan’s influence galvanized anti-Western feelings and boosted decolonization movements in Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, and India, it also raised the specter of another domination and dispelled the old romantic notions of Asian solidarity (Mishra 2012, 248–51).

How did Filipino intellectuals locate themselves in the world in response to these changes? The response was quite complex, given the pressures of changing global and domestic conditions. But one early and exemplary response was given in a lecture on “pan-Orientalism” on 23 March 1917, by Jose Alejandrino, a Filipino Asianist who also sojourned in Japan, like Ponce, at the turn of the century (Alejandrino 1918, 17–41).⁶ In that lecture in 1917, Alejandrino lamented that Japan’s “sentimental, altruistic, and noble pan-Orientalism has been substituted at the present historical moment by the aggressive and imperialist.” In spite of this, Alejandrino kept his faith in the original, emancipative spirit of pan-Asianism.

This Asianism however—Alejandrino suggested—must be built on new foundations. Speaking of the Filipinos, Alejandrino said that their experience with colonialism for three centuries had cultivated in them a tendency towards dependence on others to determine their future. Nations, he said (and here his immediate reference may have been both to Japan and the United States), are not a “nation of angels, without passions, who come solely animated by the altruistic proposition of working for our happiness.” Hence, the tendency towards dependence should be surmounted. What is imperative, Alejandrino argued, is that Filipinos themselves strengthen their own society and government and build a nation independent, progressive, self-reliant, and one that would command the respect of other nations. While he continued to hark back to the old romantic notion of Oriental solidarity, it is clear that Alejandrino was looking as well to a future when such solidarity would more securely rest on relations of parity and mutuality among nations that are mature, progressive, and free.

Alejandrino’s dream will remain problematic for so long as nations are divided by stark inequalities of power, economic, political, and military. But an Asianism multicentric and dynamic is a worthy ideal to pursue.

Asia has grown exceedingly complex; it can no longer be imagined as a totality, and the imperatives for action lie on many fronts and can no longer be reduced to the stark, racist East-West binaries of the past. In a time suspicious of absolutes, “pan-Asianism” should remain a name for a historical artifact rather than a current agenda, since the word—like “pan-Arabism,” “pan-Islamic,” or “pan-European”—has a hegemonic sound to it. Today, it suffices that intellectuals in Asia are connected in many ways on the basis of shared issues, advocacies, ideologies, and professional concerns. Such connections, however, need to be built up, particularly across issues, disciplines, and sectoral concerns.

In a recent essay, Caroline Hau and Takashi Shiraishi have proposed that it is best to think of Asianism as a “network” of dynamic linkages that can appear and disappear over time and space; thin out or thicken as hubs

of “people at the right place at the right time,” of people of shared sympathies and sometimes different persuasions. “A network, in other words, allows us to see Asianism in synchronic and diachronic terms of multiple agents, ideas, institutions, and practices without rigidly fitting them into categorical boxes” (Hau & Shiraishi 2009, 329–88). Such view, they say, will be a corrective to viewing “Asianism” as if it were Japan- or China-centered, or one fed simply by the “social fantasy” of shared and common origins, culture, and destiny.

To think of “networks” (instead of “community,” a word that has mystifying effects) is indeed a more precise and pragmatic view of how people come together. Yet, words like “networks,” “contacts,” and “linkages” also seem self-interestedly instrumental and morally barren. It says very little about what advocacies and ideals bring people together. There is something to be said as well (as Hau and Shiraishi themselves acknowledge) for the virtues and necessities of “fantasy”—even as we are watchful of its dangers—and for the affective values of friendship, respect, mutuality, and community.

Let me illustrate these values with the story of the Filipino Mariano Ponce, the person I mentioned earlier, a person who can justly be called the “first Filipino Asianist.” Sojourning in Japan for three years, caught between feelings of optimism and despair about his mission of enlisting Japan’s help for the fledgling Philippine Republic, Ponce lamented how the world is driven by the currents of what he called “positivism.” “There is no nation today,” he said, “that moves unless driven by its own interest.”

Yet, Ponce remained open to the world and genuinely admiring of the Japanese as a people. While in Japan, he immersed himself in Japanese culture and history—dressing up and living like a Japanese in Yokohama, and even marrying a Japanese woman, Okiyo Udangawa, the daughter of a samurai. In 1906, purely out of personal interest and on his own account, he visited Indochina (Vietnam) and tried to learn all he could about the country, alert to what Filipinos themselves could learn from Vietnam’s experience. In Vietnam, he tracked down Filipinos who had settled there,

remnants of the Franco-Spanish expeditionary forces that occupied Vietnam in 1858–62 (Ponce 1916, 68).⁷ This is now a little-known episode. More than a thousand Filipinos participated in the French occupation of Vietnam, as recruits of the French navy and soldiers in the Spanish expeditionary force that fought with the French. Ponce recounts a moving encounter with one of these Filipino soldiers, who had settled in Vietnam and married a local woman, in which the Filipino confessed that it was only when the Philippine revolution began in 1896 that he realized how wrong he and the other Filipinos were in helping the French against the Vietnamese, who were after all only defending their own country. This realization, he said, had deepened his affection for the Vietnamese.

Back in the Philippines after 1907, Ponce promoted knowledge about Asia even as he was actively engaged in the political and cultural life of his own country. He was on a trip to visit his friend Sun Yat-sen in China and to revisit Japan when he died, while transiting in Hong Kong, in 1918. There is more to this story. Ponce's wife, Okiyo, raised their family in Ponce's hometown in Baliwag, Bulacan, took a Filipino name, and, during the Japanese occupation, protected her townmates in Baliwag from abuses by Japanese soldiers, even as she played the role of 'mother' to the young Japanese soldiers stationed in the town. An old family photograph shows her looking very much like a Filipino matriarch, dressed in traditional Filipino dress, surrounded by her children and grandchildren.

This is just one story, and perhaps a bit romanticized, but it is a story worth telling for showing what, at the most personal level, being an "Asian intellectual" can mean.

Notes

- ¹ Keynote paper presented at the Eleventh API Public Intellectuals Workshop, *Engage! Public Intellectuals Transforming Society*, on 25 to 29 November 2012 in Tagaytay City, the Philippines. http://www.api-fellowships.org/body/keynote_mojares_tagaytay.pdf. It was also presented at *Asia Across the Disciplines*, the 9th International Graduate Students Conference, Asian Center, University of the Philippines, Quezon City, 7 December 2013.
- ² Mishra takes *Asia* in its original Greek sense, as the continent divided from Europe by the Aegean Sea and from Africa by the Nile.

- ³ “Malayness” was both a racial and geographic construct, referring as it did to that region late nineteenth-century geographers called *Malasia*, roughly corresponding to Southeast Asia today. Fluid and indeterminate, the notion of the “Malay world” had (for Filipinos) the Malay archipelago as its core, and radiated outwards to other parts of Asia, to include countries like Siam and Cochinchina.
- ⁴ Other articles by del Pilar on the Sino-Japanese War are in the issues of 15 Apr. 1893, 15 Aug. 1894, 30 Sept. 1894, 15 Nov. 1894 – 15 Feb. 1895, 15 Jan. 1895, 30 Apr. 1895, and 15 May 1895.
- ⁵ Among those who visited or sojourned in Japan at the turn of the century: Chinese leaders Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, and Sun Yat-sen; Lu Xun (a student in 1905; later China’s foremost modern writer); Abdurreshid Ibrahim (most prominent pan-Islamic intellectual of his time; a political refugee in 1909); Egyptian Ahmad Fadzli Beg; and Vietnamese nationalist Phan Boi Chau (1905).
- ⁶ A Belgian-educated engineer active in the nationalist movement, Alejandrino was involved in the effort in 1896-98 to procure in Japan arms for the revolution. He recounts that he was first made aware of “pan-Orientalism” around 1894 when, as a student in Belgium, a Japanese schoolmate, the son of the Japanese envoy in Holland, spoke to him of the need for Orientals to unite to combat Occidental arrogance.
- ⁷ On Filipino participation in the French occupation of Vietnam, see Rodriguez 1929.

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When the Leading Goose Gets Lost: Japan's Demographic Change and the Non-Reform of its Migration Policy¹

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Abstract

Population aging and shrinking continues at an unprecedented speed in Japan. In particular, it is the working age population (15–64 years old) that has been showing rapid decline. However, unlike other industrialized nations, Japan has no coherent and sustainable immigration policy to counter this decrease. The number of foreigners in the country (2011) accounts for 1.63 percent of the overall population. Only recently did Japan grant migrant healthcare givers from the Philippines and Indonesia access to its domestic labor market, which opened up the sector most influenced by the demographic change brought about by the entry of an international workforce. However, the new migration scheme has so far turned out to be a failure; the conditions are unattractive and hardly interests applicants to work in Japan. This paper argues that the system is indeed designed to fail; Japan's migration policy serves as an example of the indecisive character of the state's politics and its isolationist tendencies. This time, unlike in earlier decades, Japan refuses to take up the role of the leading goose for its region and beyond.

Keywords: Japan, Philippines, Indonesia, migration policy, demographic change, healthcare sector, Economic Partnership Agreement, Flying Geese Paradigm

Introduction

SINCE THE 1960s, Japanese economists have been using the *Flying Geese Paradigm* to describe Japan's so-called economic miracle—its high growth period—and the impact on its Asian neighbors. Kaname Akamatsu,² an economist from Hitotsubashi University,³ explained the paradigm as follows:

The wild-geese-flying pattern of industrial development denotes the development after the less-advanced country's economy enters into an international economic relationship with the advanced countries. [...] Wild geese fly in orderly ranks forming an inverse V, just as airplanes fly in formation. This flying pattern of a wild geese is metaphorically applied to the [...] three time-series curves each denoting import, domestic production, and export of the manufactured goods in less-advanced countries (Akamatsu 1962, 11).

This paradigm, originally referring to economic development, states that less developed countries tend to follow the path of more developed countries, who become more burdened by an extraordinary responsibility to pave a sensible and successful path for the countries in the same region (Mahiwo 1991, 41). In the 1960s, Japan took the role of the leading goose in the pattern, while the newly industrializing economies (NIEs) of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong followed as tier-two countries; and the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia as tier-three countries. The least developed countries in the region at that time, China and Vietnam, formed the rear of the flying geese formation. Half a century later, this order has somewhat changed: China overtook Japan as the world's second largest economy in 2010, a fact that left politicians and economists watching in awe (Bloomberg 2010).⁴

The paradigm—read with the eyes of a historian—states that it is through continuous crossborder interactions that deep and sustainable

development is best fostered. Institutional structures might be put in place, while informal networks might create trust among international partners in negotiations. Best practices can be shared among contemporary social scientists, supporting the argument that interaction fosters development. Japan since the 1960s has somehow proudly taken over the role, not only of an economic superpower, but also that of a mediator enhancing interaction among the Asian nations. Its longstanding efforts to balance the Japan-US alliance, to advance Asian regionalism, and to serve as a *de facto* representative of Asia in the “Group of 8” (G8) are cases in point (Dobson 2004).⁵ In addition, Japan’s cultural diplomacy, which proved successful in creating a positive image of Japan within the Asian region (Ogoura 2007; Palongpalong 1991) subsequently allowed its influence to grow beyond just being an economic role model. This so-called soft power—the creation of attraction through subtle, almost unconscious persuasion (Nye 2004)—worked well for Japan (Leheny 2006).⁶

The Flying Geese Paradigm has eventually expanded beyond the narrow realm of economic development into other areas of intense international cooperation. Walter Hatch (2010) in *Asia’s Flying Geese* looks into Japan’s political economy and traces the processes of regionalization within Asia. Another political scientist, Richard Samuels (2007), in *Securitizing Japan*, examines the validity of the paradigm to Japan’s defense policy in the region. These are two of the recent scholarly monographs on the expansion of the paradigm to other areas. This paper aims to contribute yet another small piece to the puzzle by examining the applicability of the paradigm in various policy fields. Two aspects of the paradigm lie at the core of the discussion: (a) the notion that lively crossborder interactions trigger mutual benefit, and (b) the belief that the initiation and implementation of these interactions are not bound to the realm of political elites but encompass economic actors and citizens alike.

This paper looks at Japan’s international political economy vis-à-vis its rapid demographic change, national healthcare system, and migration policies. Next to South Korea and probably China, Japan is among the

global forerunners of an aging and shrinking population (UNSD 2012). However, Japan neither asked for this pioneering position, nor is it too keen on carrying the weight of this burden. Yet it finds itself, once again, leading in terms of having an increasing number of an aging population, as well as in sensing the urgency to reform its migration policy and thus address the negative impact of an aging population on its economy. This also poses a reflective question that asks whether Japan also leads in the sustainable management of its demographic challenges. Will it emerge as a role model for other rapidly aging nations around the globe? The Asian region, as well as distant aging countries like Germany, closely watches Japan's actions in handling its rapidly changing demographics. Of particular interest is the extent to which Japan will make use of international migration as one possible countermeasure to, if not a declining population, a declining workforce.⁷

In 2000, the United Nations Population Division (UNDP) stated that Japan would need significant immigration to keep its working population at the 1995 level. To reach that year's ratio of Japan's working (15–64 years old) to non-working population, it would need the highest share of immigrants; that is, ten million immigrants per year. By 2050, the Japanese population will reach 818 million, 87 percent of which are immigrants and their descendants (UNDP 2000). Needless to say, this number could never be translated into *realpolitik*.

In fact, Japan is an outlier case for students of international migration. Despite being an economically wealthy and politically stable regional leader, it has a strikingly miniscule foreign population, 1.63 percent of its overall population (MOJ 2012). Among the OECD nations, which generally receive international migrants, Japan's foreign population is undercut by the Slovak Republic by 1.3 percent (OECD 2013). Following standard migration theories—particularly the push-pull model of demand and supply⁸—Japan is expected to have a much higher proportion of foreign population. The low proportion might indicate a longstanding political opposition to accepting, let alone, recruiting international labor migrants

(Hollifield 2000). The question that needs to be addressed at present is whether Japan's demographic development might or might not serve as a push factor strong enough to alter the state's deliberations about the future outlook of its migration policy. To what extent does the ongoing decline of its domestic workforce lead to an acceptance of international workers? As reflected in public discourse, the concern lies in the degree of acceptance of a foreign workforce among the political elite, business leaders, and citizens. This leads us to the second aspect of the paradigm. The first aspect corresponds to the question of Japan serving as a role model in tackling its demographic challenges, which it might have already taken up by asking for best practices from other countries.

In light of these, this paper focuses on how regional integration and international migration impact and reinforce each other. Economists see interdependence between regional integration and international migration as predominantly positive since global economic growth is predicated on each of these factors, even more so when both occur at the same time.⁹

It is argued that, *yes*, Japan's migration policy had undergone some recent changes, which might be directly linked to the nation's demographic development, *but* these changes do not go so far as to be called an actual migration policy reform. The *yes, but* argument will be reflected in this paper through the two case studies of the recently established bilateral economic partnership agreements (EPAs) of Japan with Indonesia and the Philippines. These EPAs provide the regulations for the international migration of healthcare givers from these two countries.¹⁰ Initially, one might regard this new migration avenue as a means to cater to Japan's healthcare sector, which finds itself already strained by continuously growing labor demand and by a declining workforce. However, as this paper will reflect, this new migration avenue is, in fact, a system deliberately designed to fail. It serves as a window-dressing to a strong, clear, and prevailing *no* to opening Japan's borders to an international workforce. This paper will set aside the discussion of the normative implications—whether it is “good” or “bad”—of Japan's latest migration policy; but it will identify and name the policy for what it is; in this case, a dysfunctional one.

Research design

Migration policy generally spans a wide range of various policy fields. Understanding international migrants as an additional workforce and as taxpayers, for example, creates the need to study labor market policy and public policies. Meanwhile, focusing on issues of cultural diversity leads us to study, for example, integration measures as an element of domestic security policies, as well as local *machizukuri* (community-building) initiatives carried out by the migrants themselves or by members of the receiving country. To those interested in the role of international migration as a determining factor for border control, issues of national security, state sovereignty, and international relations will be central in the studies. One might think about an ongoing list of other examples, which clarify how closely migration policy intersects with other policy fields; however, more often than not, multiple fields will be touched in a single study.

This paper presents a multilevel study on aging and migration in Japan. It aims to focus on multiple issues, primarily on the framework of migration policy vis-à-vis the so-called intimate and public spheres. With regard to the public realm and the macrolevel social analysis, issues of Japan's demographic change will be of high relevance; these include Japan's labor market, shrinking workforce, and the discussions surrounding replacement migration as a countermeasure to these developments. On the microlevel, the paper tackles the issues taking place within Japanese families, such as the changing attitude to healthcare giving, and covers the intimate sphere of caregiver immigration from a Japanese perspective.

Moreover, it aims to contribute cases studies to the two aspects of migration theory: (1) the gap theory, which approaches migration studies using a political science perspective, and (2) the push-pull model, which entails an economics perspective. Firstly, the gap theory, using Cornelius and Tsuda's (2004) argument, says that many states show a "divergence between *policy output* (official guidelines) and *policy outcome* (actual result) in migration policy," where Japan is no exception (Vogt 2012). On the contrary, Japan is a more extreme example of the existence of such a

gap.¹¹ This paper will elaborate on the significance of the recent healthcare-giver migration to Japan for its migration policy gap.

Secondly, the push-pull model of demand and supply states that world regions of relative economic prosperity and political stability will be attractive to global human resources, while other regions will lose their well-educated workforce (brain drain) because of a lack of attractive wage levels and living conditions. Economists suggest that this imbalance is the only precondition necessary to set off human migration chains. However, James Hollifield (2000) argues against this assumption, stating that, in fact, state action allows for or prevents crossborder migration flows from occurring. This latter course of action will be supported by the case study in this paper.

The succeeding discussion will introduce the intersecting policy fields, demographics and migration in Japan. Following the introduction, I will present a case study on Japan's bilateral EPAs in the realm of the intimate and public dimensions of migrant healthcare givers in Japan. These agreements have been signed with the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam and allow healthcare givers to immigrate to Japan. In pursuing these case studies, the paper uses the qualitative content analysis of data released by various governmental bodies of Japan, as well as by nongovernmental organizations, labor unions, and companies. A special focus will be given to the political aspects of the case study; in addition, the relevance of the gap theory and the push-pull model will also be discussed.

Intersecting policy fields

As Japan's population continues to age and shrink, one of the most pressing questions the nation's policy-makers face is: who is going to work for Japan in the near future? In 2005, Japan entered a period of negative population growth; that is, the size of the overall population shrank. In particular, those aged between 15 and 64 years—the working population—decreased particularly rapidly. Projections estimated a decline of this group from 66 percent of the overall population in 2005 to 51 percent over the

course of five decades. Over the same period, the younger generation (below 14 years old) will drop from 14 percent to a mere 8 percent. The only age group that will grow is that of the elderly (65 years old and above)—from 20 percent in 2005 to 41 percent over the next five decades. By 2055, the ratio of working to nonworking population in Japan will be about 1:1, while the proportion of the young nonworking population becomes miniscule. In addition, there is a significant numerical shift within the elderly generation; the proportion of those above 75 years old will increase sharply, from 9 percent in 2005 to 27 percent in 2055 (Nihon Kango Kyōkai 2011, 3).

The effects of this shift on Japan's population demographics are severe; in particular, the elderly dependency ratio swells and strains the nation's social security systems. Using a case study-centered approach, one sees that the question of who is going to work for Japan in the near future is nowhere nearly as pressing as in the sector of elderly healthcare. The domestic workforce currently cannot meet the rising demand in this sector; in fact, the ratio of job openings to healthcare givers is twice that of the average of all other industries in Japan (Vogt 2007, 18). Currently 1.4 million healthcare workers for the elderly are employed in the country. According to the *Asia News Network* (2012), by 2025, the country will need an additional 900,000 workers to meet the rising demand in this sector.

Unsurprisingly, this sector is the first to be opened to a sector-specific and nation-specific migration avenue, closely monitored through the EPAs, which Japan has signed with three countries. The following subsections will discuss the structure of Japan's healthcare sector and migration policy.

Japan's healthcare policy

Professional healthcare services for the elderly have seen a distinct rise in Japan over the past decades. The paper argues that this trend is linked to the numerical changes in population demographics, although, as outlined above, this is only part of the story. Other factors that brought

about the rise in demand of professional elderly healthcare include the shift in attitude among the generation who receive care, and in the generation that gives it. In the longitudinal analysis between 1995–2003 by the Cabinet Office of the Government of Japan, the number of elderly stating that children have a duty to serve as their healthcare givers decreased from 57.3 percent to 48.6 percent; while the number of those in the caregiving generation who said that it is a filial duty to take care of their parents declined from 36.1 percent to 28.7 percent (CAO 2004). Moreover, in April 2000, long-term care insurance was introduced in Japan; since then, financial assistance to afford professional healthcare has become readily available to the general public.

While this shift in attitude is not an extreme one, it shows a steady trend towards the socialization of care. It is not only family members who take over the responsibility of elderly care; professional help is also becoming more and more acceptable within Japanese society; this is especially true for elderly women. In a survey by Unicharm, a large manufacturer of intimate care products, two-thirds of Japanese men still prefer their spouses to perform intimate care for them; while only one-fifth of the women do. Of the elderly women, 25.1 percent prefer their daughters to perform assistance with intimate care, while 32.7 percent—the largest group—prefer a professional caregiver to do the task, which is a major part of healthcare giving to the elderly (Unicharm 2008).

In the study of the implications of healthcare-giver migration to the domestic business sector, institutional care should be clearly delineated from the home-helper sector where the demand for workers is increasing more rapidly. The EPAs that regulate the movement of natural persons is specific to institutional healthcare givers and do not include home caregivers or domestic helpers. Bearing this in mind, a brief look at the labor market situation of healthcare givers in institutional care is appropriate. Among the industrialized nations, only Japan has a shortage of registered nurses—instead of a shortage of beds—as its most pressing problem when it comes to providing healthcare for a growing elderly population. Japan's average of 6.4 registered nurses per 1,000 patients, compared to those of two

leading countries in medical care, Germany's 9.7 and Sweden's 10.6, is comparatively low (Nihon Kango Kyōkai 2008, 2011; Vogt 2011b).

In other words, the most pressing need in Japan's healthcare labor market is the shortage of qualified personnel, a fact acknowledged by Japanese politicians and bureaucrats of relevant ministries. The question that needs to be asked, however, is *who* are the actors deemed suitable to counter this labor shortage? The fact that government representatives usually start their listing of preferred policy measures with (1) increasing the labor market participation of youth and women, followed by (2) increasing the use of care robots and technology, and (3) recruiting labor immigrants reveals a lot (Interview with Kōno, 20 February 2006). It reflects the difficulties politicians and bureaucrats—and to some degree also citizens—have in coming to terms with accepting and welcoming international labor migrants in large numbers. Japan for many years has been a country of side-door and back-door labor immigration (Vogt 2007). Today, it faces the need to profoundly revise this approach and to implement coherent and sustainable front-door immigration avenues (Vogt 2011a).

Japan's migration policy

More than a decade ago, economist Yasushi Iguchi stated that Japan had entered the second wave of a nation-wide immigration discourse. While the first wave dates back to the 1980s and was pragmatically centered on the issue of labor shortage (*hitodebusoku*) during the bubble years, the second wave started around the early 2000s when Japan's demographic change became a prevalent issue in the political, public, and academic discourses. Iguchi argues that there is nothing pragmatic in the second wave; rather it is a continuation of a highly emotionalized debate that is driven by a sense of crisis (*kikikan*) about the future of an aging country with few children and many elderly (*shōshikōreika*) (Iguchi 2001, 44).

Until the global economic downturn following the Lehman Shock in winter of 2008–2009, Japan had come to see a steady increase in the number of international immigrants, most of whom arrive as workers.

The economic downturn left none of the immigrant groups untouched; the Brazilian community in particular was the one most severely affected. Factory workers in the automobile and electronics industries were hit hard as well; many were laid off, and the Japanese government even offered cash for them to purchase return tickets to their home countries (Roberts 2012).

By the end of 2011, the number of registered foreign residents in Japan stood at 2,078,480; this represents a mere 1.63 percent of the total population (MOJ 2011; MOJ 2012). Japan's immigration policy officially "rest[s] on two pillars: firstly, immigration should only be available to highly skilled individuals, and secondly, immigration should always be on a purely temporary basis" (Vogt 2012). Ironically, around two-thirds of Japan's immigrant population fails to meet these criteria. This failure to adhere to the principles of Japan's migration policy guidelines "is not only condoned by the institutions of the state but in most cases is a direct result of the political initiatives of these institutions. Japan is thus an extreme case of the divergence between policy output (official guidelines) and policy outcome (actual result) in migration policy" (Vogt 2012).¹²

This study argues that Japan's latest migration policy reform—the implementation of bilateral EPAs, including the so-called movement of natural persons—is a rare attempt to cautiously adjust *policy output* according to *policy outcome*. Guidelines are being implemented to justify the on-the-ground reality of population aging and the needs of the healthcare labor market without compromising the basic principles of Japan's migration policy. Thus, what we see is, firstly, a bizarre discourse about the skill level of healthcare-givers deemed as "skilled workers" (Oishi 2005, 41), a category used by Japan's Ministry of Justice, which oversees the Immigration Bureau, for medical doctors, professors, journalists, missionaries, etc. Nurses also fall under the same medical residence permission as doctors do. Visa categories exist for all these professions; however, until today, there is no specific visa category for healthcare workers, instead, they work in Japan under "designated activities" (*tokubetsu*

katsudō). Another outcome of the Ministry's attempts to ensure that the arriving migrants do not counter the two pillars of the migration policy is the establishment of an EPA system that has turned out to be rather rigid. In theory, the system allows for a long-term stay in Japan, but in practice, sets the hurdles too high so that almost no candidate can pass.¹³

Case study: Japan's EPAs and the "Movement of Natural Persons"

Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has been in support of Japan's knitting close ties in international business, trade, and 'movement of natural persons' with its neighboring countries. In the 2003 report on the *Utilization of Excellent Overseas Human Resources*, METI stated that the "stimulation of innovation," which "will be essential in sustaining economic growth in Japan in the future" shall be triggered not only by a domestic workforce but also by "outstanding human resources from all over the world in the areas of management, research and technology" (METI 2003).

A decade after issuing this report, METI and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) have continued to support Japan's expansion of its net of EPAs. Whereas other ministries (particularly the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW)—a target actor of much lobbying of profession-specific interest groups—and the Ministry of Justice (most directly concerned with immigration control) have put much effort into opposing EPAs in general and the chapter on movement of natural persons in particular. All of Japan's EPAs include engineers and specialists in humanities and international services, which are the groups targeted in the movement of natural persons. The EPAs with the Philippines, Indonesia, and recently, with Vietnam also include the professional groups of "nurses and care-workers," while the EPA with Thailand adds "instructors" as a target group. In other words, while the chapter on the movement of natural persons only comprises a few of the usually many hundred pages of an EPA, it remains a prevalent theme in all of them.

How the system is supposed to work...

The EPAs signed by Japan with Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam state that “entry and temporary stay [...] shall be granted [...] natural persons who engage in supplying services as nurses or certified care workers” (JPEPA Article 110, 1, f). Every year, a total of 1,000 healthcare givers for each country are granted entry and temporary work permission to Japan via the bilateral EPA; however, up to this day, this quota has not been met once.

The EPAs between Indonesia and the Philippines administer the migration avenues for healthcare givers in general and distinguish between nurses (*kangoshi*) and certified care workers (*kaigofukushi-shi*).¹⁴ The Japan International Corporation of Welfare Services (JICWELS, *Kokusai kōseijigyō-dan*), a semigovernmental organization under the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, is responsible for choosing candidates for both tracks through aptitude tests and interviews of candidates in their respective countries. The Japan Foundation (JF, *Kokusai kōryū-kikin*) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, coordinates the preliminary language training of the candidates before their departure for Japan. Upon their arrival in Japan, the Japan Foundation, the Overseas Human Resources and Industry Development Agency (HIDA, *Kaigai sangyō jinzai ikusei kyōkai*), as well as private language schools, offer additional programs in Japanese language and culture to the candidates. This program is largely financed by the Japanese government.¹⁵ At the end of the initial six months in Japan, the candidates begin their work in the assigned institutions. They will continue their study of the Japanese language and thus will be given some time off during their working hours. The emphasis on candidates’ language education helps ensure smooth communication with their patients and coworkers; it is also necessary in preparation for the national examinations (for both nurses and caregivers), which is taken after a maximum of three years (for nurses) and four years (for careworkers) of on-the-job training. Passing the exam is a necessary step for (a) being employed as certified care givers, and for (b) being granted long-term residency in Japan (Vogt 2011b).

... and why it isn't working.

Employees

Several factors make the EPA-administered avenue of labor migration unattractive to potential migrants and employers alike. To potential migrants, the system is unattractive for three main reasons: firstly, their previously acquired skills are not fully acknowledged. Regardless of their work status in their respective countries, they have to work as nursing assistants and assistant caregivers upon their arrival in Japan and until they pass the national examinations. For many nurses, this incompatibility is particularly harsh since it entails a severe downgrading of their status and gradual deskilling (Kingma 2006, 78–120). Nurses are no longer allowed to perform certain tasks that they used to perform in their home countries and are not paid according to their skill level but only at an artificially designed employment level (Vogt 2011a; Vogt 2011b).

Secondly, the program requires participants to acquire additional skills and knowledge, particularly proficiency in the Japanese language, before they are allowed to work as certified nurses and certified healthcare workers. To many candidates, especially to nurses from the Philippines who received their education in the English language, migration to an English-speaking country is by far an easier and quicker route to becoming a successful player in the so-called big business that healthcare-giver migration has become (Kingma 2006, 78–120).

Finally, there is a high uncertainty over planning a future life in the country of their destination. As long as they have not passed the caregiver exam, potential migrants stay in Japan on one-year renewable visas. They are not eligible to claim family reunification during this period; neither are there any efforts from Japan's political actors to institutionalize existing local-level and private initiatives in providing social, economic, and political integration of the migrants into the Japanese society (Vogt 2011a; Vogt 2011b; Vogt 2013).

Most initiatives currently conducted in this field are private, such as, for example, Keiō University's in-house training program that aims to

educate Japanese care-giving personnel on how to best welcome their colleagues from Indonesia and the Philippines (The Japan Times 2010). An Indonesian nurse in the Kansai region praises the efforts of a Japanese doctor, who took the time to sit down with her every evening from 5 p.m. to 7 p.m. and helped her study medical vocabulary. This nurse had failed the national exam in the first attempt but eventually succeeded in the second one, and gave all credit to this particular doctor, who made her study ten pages of medical writings in Japanese every evening for about a year. However, the same nurse also reported that she was bullied by Japanese nurses, who apparently considered her more of a burden than an equal co-worker. Even after passing the exam, her assessment of the healthcare sector in Japan with regard to, for example, work-life balance, nurse-patient interaction, and the position of foreign healthcare givers in general is rather gloomy. At this point, she is toying with the idea of migrating again, preferably to one of the European or North American countries.¹⁶

Again, traditional migration destination countries such as Canada, which provide more generous citizenship and family sponsorship policies, prove to be a lot more attractive to potential migrants who want to build a future in their country of destination (Oishi 2011). Japan, on the other hand, generally offers little more than a transit country or a stopover on migrants' paths of circular migration back to their home countries (Vogt and Achenbach 2012).

Employers

Several factors render the EPA-administered migration scheme unattractive not only to the potential migrants but also to their potential employers in Japan. The uncertainty of their career development makes them risky candidates for employers to invest in. In a 2008 large-scale survey conducted by Kyūshū University's Asia Center, almost two-thirds (61.7 percent) of the hospital chiefs who had been polled felt negatively about accepting foreign nurses into their hospitals. Among those who refused to employ foreign nurses said that one pragmatic reason for this decision was

given by more than half of the respondents (55.4 percent): “because of the manpower and time required to train them.” Indeed, hospitals and nursing homes accepting healthcare givers, for example, need to ensure that there is always a Japanese staff on call for problems that might arise during the migrant caregiver’s shift, which turns out to be a significant extra burden (Vogt 2011b).

Other answers often given to this question all hint toward insecurity and fear when it comes to the migrants’ language proficiency and professional abilities. These answers include: “because of concerns about their communication skills with patients” (60.8 percent), “because I am not familiar with their nursing skill levels” (47.0 percent), “because of concerns about their communication skills with the Japanese staff” (45.2 percent) and “because of concerns about their Japanese language reading and writing skills” (42.5 percent). Language is obviously *the* crucial issue for all parties involved on the ground (*gamba*) of implementing Japan’s scheme of international labor migration (Vogt 2011b).

Lastly, gender also turned out to be an issue of concern. For example, during the matching process of the first batch of Indonesian caregiver migrants to Japan in 2008, 20 percent (86 individuals) of the potential care migrants could not be matched with Japanese employers. Interestingly, 66 of these 86 unmatchable candidates were men (Kobayashi and Sato 01 August 2008). This indicates that, next to ethnicity, many Japanese employers were indeed concerned about gender as yet another marginalizing factor in this predominantly female profession (Vogt and Holdgrün 2012).

Searching for the reasons of failure

The policy-making process: the initial stage (policy output)

The identified factors that make the EPA-guided migration system so unattractive to prospective migrants largely came about in lengthy negotiations among different Japanese ministries, showing in particular the imprint of the MHLW.

The Ministry of Justice (MOJ), the leading agency in migration issues and in charge of the Immigration Bureau, refused to participate in serious discussions on opening Japan's labor market to immigrants (Konō, 20 February 2006). MOJ representatives held steadfast onto Japan's migration policy output (as opposed to its outcome) of granting access to Japan's domestic labor market only to highly skilled migrants and only for a limited time, usually not longer than five years (Vogt 2012). Also, MOJ representatives made a clear distinction between, on the one hand, foreign nurses whom they deemed qualified workers and asked to apply for a work permission via the established visa category of medical services (*iryō*) rather than the EPA avenue; and, on the other hand, healthcare workers who were not to be given work permission in Japan because they were not highly qualified according to the criteria (Saita 2006).

METI, together with the Japan Business Federation (*Nippon Keidanren*), pushed for a comprehensive opening of Japan's labor market not only in the service sector but also in shipbuilding and farming. METI had been arguing for a prompt and pragmatic reaction to the labor shortage in the healthcare sector years before; in fiscal year 2004, the ratio of job openings to job applicants had risen to 2.03, while the same ratio stood around 1.00 (with seasonal variations) for all business sectors combined (Vogt 2007, 18). METI leaned toward accepting labor migrants of lower qualifications to work in the healthcare professions, whereas *Nippon Keidanren*, whilst agreeing with METI on the necessity of recruiting transnational human resources, held up its expectations for the competitive recruitment of some of the most sought-after human resources. To this end, *Nippon Keidanren* stressed the necessity of creating a generally welcoming atmosphere and some sustainable basic parameters (such as a network of international schools, etc.) for a potentially increasing population of foreign workers in Japan (Nippon Keidanren 2003).

The MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) also pointed out Japan's labor shortages in certain sectors and aimed to utilize these bilateral treaties as a means to liberalize the international movement of people without going through lengthy reforms of Japan's Immigration Control and Refugee

Recognition Act (*Shutsunyūkoku kanri oyobi nanmin nintei-hō*); a first draft of Japan's immigration law dates back to 1951, and the latest amendments date from 1990 (Behaghel and Vogt 2006, 122–125). As an actor in favor of the EPA-administered migration scheme, the MOFA further anticipated three positive side effects: (1) the stimulating economic impact of the bilateral EPAs on Japan and the Asia-Pacific region; (2) a possibly emerging image of Japan as a more open and modern nation,¹⁷ which might also foster economic growth despite a demographically-induced population aging and shrinking; and (3) hinting toward Japan's manifold responsibilities as an international actor, a prominent role when it comes to ensuring human rights in its region (Vogt 2007, 14–22).

The fact that the three ministries in favor of an EPA-administered migration scheme (i.e. METI, *Nippon Keidanren*, and MOFA) brought very different motives to the negotiating table might have turned things in favor of the ministries more reluctant toward the scheme. The MHLW, as the ministry most concerned with the labor conditions of the domestic workforce, in the end, emerged as the strongest voice in these negotiations. Initially siding with the MOJ, the MHLW was fiercely opposed to the EPA-administered migration system; later, it acquiesced only after having pushed for certain conditions, which the Japan Nursing Association (*Nihon Kango Kyōkai*) brought into the discourse. The main stumbling blocks for potential migrants—that is, their status as assistants irrespective of previous qualifications and their Japanese language proficiency, which is necessary in passing the national exams and in obtaining their visa status in the long run—are direct results of the Japan Nursing Association's influence on the negotiations via its lobbying channel, the MHLW. The association bluntly ensured that working conditions and wage levels in the profession would not deteriorate once it was opened to an international workforce, and actually aimed at improving these conditions first to ensure Japanese healthcare givers who had left their jobs would find it attractive to return. Because of the unattractive working conditions and relatively low wages, the nursing sector has one of the highest turnover rates of all jobs in Japan (Vogt 2007, 17–20).

*The policy-making process: evaluation & recent initiatives
(policy outcome)*

The unattractive opportunities provided by the sector has resulted in somewhat of a mismatch between the supply and demand sides, most prominently reflected in falling numbers of applicants and potential employers alike. “The number of Indonesians who came to Japan to be nurses or care workers has fallen from 362 in 2009 to 101” in 2012, as did those from the Philippines, “which dropped from 283 in 2009 to 101” in the same year (Asia News Network 2012). In 2009, when healthcare givers from the Philippines entered Japan under EPA regulations for the first year and those from Indonesia for the second year, their respective numbers had already reached their highest level so far. One hundred seventy-three (173) Indonesian nurses and 93 nurses from the Philippines entered Japan; so did 189 Indonesian healthcare workers and 190 healthcare workers from the Philippines (Ogawa 2012, 99). The numbers of those who could be placed successfully has since fallen sharply. In 2011, only 47 nurses from Indonesia and 70 nurses from the Philippines came to Japan under the EPA regulations; while only 58 Indonesian healthcare workers and 61 healthcare workers from the Philippines joined them (Ogawa 2012, 99). The original quota of 1,000 nurses and healthcare workers per country per year has not nearly been met even once.

Moreover, “the exam’s pass rate was abysmal at first. None of the 82 foreigners who took the exam passed in 2009 and only 3 out of 254 did in 2010” (Asia News Network 2012). In 2012, the pass rate for nurses stood at 11.3 percent or 47 persons out of 415 applicants. “Still they are a tiny group, making up just one thousandth of the 48,700 local applicants who passed” in 2012 (Asia News Network 2012).¹⁸ The rising number of passers is mainly a result of a friendlier national exam for healthcare givers, which includes easy-to-read characters to help in the reading of the more difficult Chinese *kanji* characters. Also, simpler Japanese terms have been used instead of the more complicated ones. While this might reflect a more welcoming attitude toward foreign workers in Japan, the EPA-administered avenue of international migration remains largely flawed and unattractive to either side involved.

Furthermore, tiny steps to improve the chances of migrant healthcare givers in passing the exam and getting hold of long-term residency and work permissions in Japan are almost dissolved when the Japanese government simultaneously implements a new national registration system for foreign residents. This new system centralizes the availability of personal data to the MOJ and guarantees the easy crackdown of the so-called unwanted foreign workers. The Japanese government continues to show a *one step forward, two steps back* approach in its migration, as well as in its hardly existing integration policies. This study argues that this indecisiveness in Japanese immigration policy is the result of government bodies hugely divided over the two central questions in this issue: (1) what kind of immigrants should be wooed to come to Japan—a division based on professions and nationalities hardly seems an ideal solution—and, (2) what should be offered to the new immigrants with regard to their period of stay and their participation in the economic, political, and public life in Japan.

To exemplify this prevailing indecisiveness among political actors, Nobuyuki Yumi, a bureaucrat in the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) told the press that the EPA-administered migration scheme is “not a measure for labour shortage in the nursing and caregiving field. [...] I consider the fields of nursing and health care to be important ones that generate jobs in Japan. Now the Japanese, especially the younger generation, are struggling to find jobs. [...] Former nurses who have quit can be encouraged to return to work instead” (Asia News Network 2012). While this statement clarifies that the discourse of denial of any labor shortage in the healthcare sector still prevails in the MHLW, even the Japan Nursing Association, the most influential protector of the healthcare labor market in Japan, has long come to talk about an actual shortage of staff. In 2006, the organization acknowledged that “however, demands for nursing workers have outpaced the suppl[y], due to the development of advanced medicine, [an] increase in the number of hospital beds and the aging of patients, Japan is now in the state of chronic nurse shortages in terms of both quality and quantity” (Nihon Kango Kyokai 2006).

Two months after Yumi's press statement, during an interview session I carried out in Tokyo on 9 December 2012, a high-ranking bureaucrat with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that MHLW was still "doing anything to prevent EPA from succeeding," while the MOFA was still laboring toward a more comprehensive approach within the EPA-system and toward its expansion to other business sectors and partner countries. This stance is also reflected in a statement made by Keizo Takekawa of the Japanese embassy in Manila. He is reported, during a symposium on aging and labor migration at the University of the Philippines in February 2013, as having called for "much more improvement [within the system]—in addition to addressing the language issue" (Calunsod 2013) by implementing a package of measures. These measures range widely from psychological support to migrants and an improved legal status to a shift in attitude toward migrant workers that would need to take root within Japanese society. This is also along the lines of what Futoshi Nasuno, Director of the Human Resources Policy Office within the METI, argued for during a conversation with the author at an international symposium at Tokyo's Sophia University in December 2013 (Nasuno 2013). On the same occasion, Hiroshi Kimizuka, Deputy Director for General Affairs in the MOJ-adjacent Tokyo Regional Immigration Bureau called for a need to comprehensively address the many prevailing gaps and shortcomings in Japan's immigration policy (Kimizuka 2013).

While in fact we witness some cautious steps toward reform initiatives, it nevertheless seems that the old argumentative boundaries of some ten years ago, when core ministries were debating the framework of the EPA-system, are still prevalent to this day. MHLW is predominantly concerned with the working conditions and job opportunities of the domestic workforce—all the more so in a still struggling global economy after the Lehman-shock—, while MOFA and METI are still working for an expansion and improvement of the EPA-system, and the MOJ suggests fundamental revisions of the immigration policy rather than pursuing nation- and sector-specific bilateral agreements.

The policy-making process: preliminary evaluation

At first glance, the present EPA arrangement seems like an open-door migration system in a particular field of employment. In practice, it has so many pitfalls that are sure to degrade it to, at best, a small-scale testing field for new migration policies. This is largely the result of somewhat pragmatic and somewhat ideological conflicts between ministries, which do not find any strong mediator in either the supranational or the subnational realm, let alone in what might be understood as traditional party politics. So far, there has indeed been remarkably little supra-state influence on Japan's migration policy. A convergence of international migration norms—for example, on the question of how to acquire citizenship—hardly occurs (Abe 2006; Surak 2008). We also see relatively little influence on the policy-making process coming from the subnational level. One exception is the diffusion of the concept of integration of foreign residents, which entered the national political discourse as a result of an initiative by numerous local governments in communities with an above-average proportion of foreign nationals, the so-called *Gaikokujin Shujū Toshi Kaigi*.¹⁹ We may conclude this section with the hypothesis that Japan's policy-making culture is still very much driven by the bureaucracy solely on a national level. Policy makers largely miss out on initiatives through the structures of multilevel governance that would enrich the political culture as well as the contents of many policy fields (Vogt 2011a). Instead, they find themselves caught in the deadlock of a competing and rival bureaucracy, which—until the summer of 2013—was not matched by an arena of strong actors from the realm of core political elites. With Prime Minister Shinzō Abe's Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP, *Jiyūminshū-tō*) winning the Upper House elections in July 2013, and thus repeating their Lower House election success of December 2012, they now hold a comfortable majority in both houses; the side of party politics within Japan's political system might emerge strengthened out of this line-up—in fact, we already see this trend occurring today, twelve months into the Abe administration.²⁰ However, this administration's policy proposals on immigration policy are still to be revealed.

Concluding remarks

At the center of interest to this study have been the following two aspects of the *Flying Geese Paradigm*: (a) the notion that lively border-crossing interactions trigger mutual benefit, and b) the belief that the initiative and implementation of these interactions are not bound to the realm of political elites but encompass economic actors and citizens alike.

For many of its neighboring countries, Japan's decades-long miraculous economic growth has been sort of a role model; because of its difficulties in coming to terms with its own history and in defining a new position within the Asia-Pacific region, it has never been an uncontested role model. Japan was the leading goose of economic growth, but never a leader of political, let alone military, strength of the region. Very often, however, Japan also proved to be a leader of innovation, with regard to technology, of cultural goods and of numerous global trends. Now more than ever, Japan is asked to step up and take a leading role in shaping new social, economic, and political models for the increasing number of nations with aging populations. Japan once again has become the leading goose—this time, it was pushed into that role. A continuing economic malaise, the dismal state of its politics, and a largely unhappy population (*The Japan Times* 05 June 2011) are more than obvious signs for the necessity of some profound changes (Vogt and Holdgrün 2013).

This study argues that the reluctant leading goose, Japan, is not yet getting lost, but it takes an awful long time to hover in mid-air, unable to choose any direction for further movement, i.e., in designing a sustainable policy that addresses the manifold economic problems of a declining workforce by, for example, reforming the nation's immigration policy. From a political science perspective, the study argues that the reason for this indecisiveness lies in conflicting interests between strong actors. Ministries and businesses, as well as labor lobbyists, neutralize each other's policy proposals. Moreover, largely because of the division in the Houses (i.e. different political majorities in Lower and Upper House), political parties in recent years have been particularly weak political actors, unable to set a

coherent agenda. Finally, elements of multilevel governance in Japan have not yet been powerful enough to enrich the policy-making process with innovative ideas.

It might be that what it takes at this point is indeed some lively border-crossing interactions with each actor, on the level of political elites and the citizens alike. The *Flying Geese Paradigm* tells us that there is no more efficient way to foster profound and sustainable economic development than through border-crossing interactions. The same holds true for fostering political and societal developments. Let this be a call for acknowledging, firstly, a pressing need for multilevel international cooperation among countries that face similar challenges. Population aging and the various challenges to domestic and global labor markets posed by this development are no longer an issue restricted to, for example OECD states, but span around the globe and are about to reach the so-called Global South, too. Secondly, international migrants themselves—as part of border-crossing flows—can be invaluable assets to each country's innovative potential, and should be acknowledged as such. By solely contemplating about the risks international migration poses to social stability and wage levels, we forfeit an opportunity to embrace their vibrant and diverse input to our societies, politics, and economies.

Notes

- ¹ Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the international symposium on Aging and Migration in 21st Century Asia at the University of the Philippines in February 2013, and at the Inaugural EAJS Conference in Japan at Kyoto University in September 2013. I would like to express my gratitude to the audiences at both events for their questions that were crucial in the process of rewriting this manuscript. My sincere thanks also go out to Michiyo Yoneno-Reyes, Emiko Ochiai, Wako Asato, Midori Okabe and Miwa Yamada as well as to two anonymous referees of the *Asian Studies* journal for prompting me to broaden my research perspective beyond the geographical and ideological boundaries of Japan.
- ² Kaname Akamatsu (1896–1974) is said to be the father of the Flying Geese Paradigm (*Ganko Keitairon*). He had originally developed the thought of one country's economic growth triggering economic growth in its regional neighbors as early as the 1930s, just after returning to Japan from a two-year research stay in Berlin and Heidelberg, where he had found his scholarly works influenced by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's philosophy and the thoughts of Friedrich List on national economics.

- ³ When Kaname Akamatsu was teaching at Hitotsubashi University, the school was still operating under its previous name: Tokyo School of Economics.
- ⁴ The author wishes to distance herself from any understanding of the Flying Geese Paradigm as an “up-to-date version of Japan’s original vision of a Greater Co-Prosperty Sphere for Asia, where the countries of the region are expected to gravitate towards Japan, which plays a dominant role as a leader” (Cortez 1995/96: 24). For an enlightening discussion of the Flying Geese Paradigm from a Southeast Asian perspective, please refer to Cortez (1995/96).
- ⁵ This group encompasses the world’s largest national economies. Member states include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.
- ⁶ Political scientist David Leheny (2006, 232) explained the attractiveness of the soft-power approach to Japan’s political leaders and business groups by stressing two aspects: “in one variant, it represents a peaceful Japan that can encourage other nations to become wealthy and wise through Japan’s own example and generosity. In another, it offers the opportunity to convince other people that Japan’s development as a normal country, with a normal military, is not to be feared, because it is a nation that has only best intentions. If people just get to know the Japanese—through their songs, their television hits, their anime—they will realize that they are kind and decent, creative and curious, and not to be feared.” The political strategy thus is to make use of cultural diplomacy when presenting a Japan that is vastly different from the wartime country, all the while generating a positive attitude toward Japan regardless of the fact that the nation’s political elites largely kept neglecting Japan’s wartime atrocities. Leaving all normative discussions aside, we can conclude very pragmatically that this strategy, to some degree, played out successfully. As social scientist Elena L. Samonte (1991) pointed out, the attitudes of Filipino elites toward Japan and the Japanese had been perceived to be improving. She quotes from a 1989 survey when pointing out that 55 percent of respondents saw an improvement in Filipino-Japanese relations (114); 84 percent of the respondents had a positive view of Japan; and 73 percent had a positive view of the Japanese (113). The Japanese were overwhelmingly viewed as “hardworking, honest, reliable, efficient and courteous” (113). Japanese products were particularly valued as “durable, advanced, using high technology” (114). The author concludes that Japan “though an Asian country” (122) has become a global economic player, and at the same time cautions Japan to stop “look[ing] down on her not so economically successful Asian neighbors” (122). As is well known, Japan’s rapid economic growth soon slowed down from the early 1990s onward. Yet, even today Japan is the fifth largest exporter and importer in the world. Among the top five importing countries of Japanese goods are, next to the US, four Asian countries, namely China, South Korea, Hong Kong and Thailand (Economy Watch 05 June 2013). Border-crossing activities of goods are in full swing. Following the assumption that export/import activities contribute to the making of an image of a nation through soft power, it is fair to conclude that Japan’s efforts in the realm of cultural diplomacy are continuing, and probably still showing effect.

- ⁷ Migration policy, family policy, and old-age policies, such as medical care, long-term care and the pension system account for the core demographic policies. For an analysis of Japan's demographic policies, please refer to Vogt (2008) and to Klingholz & Vogt (2013).
- ⁸ Please refer to later sections for a brief discussion of the push/pull model.
- ⁹ These are further laid out in the research literature on migration and development. For further insights, refer to Portes (2013).
- ¹⁰ Although the EPA between Japan and Vietnam has been in effect since 2009, the details of the migration scheme of healthcare givers have yet to be fully agreed upon at the time of writing this paper (MHLW 2013).
- ¹¹ Please refer to later sections for further explanation on Japan's migration policy gap in general, and for its application to the case study presented in this paper.
- ¹² While in previous years this fact has often been somewhat ignored by officials of Japan's Ministry of Justice (MOJ), they have now started to bluntly acknowledge the existence of this divergence, as well as a need to address it (Kimizuka 14 December 2013).
- ¹³ Next to the MOJ, the MHLW is another outspoken critique of the introduction of the EPA-administered migration avenue. Please refer to later subsections in this paper or Vogt (2007).
- ¹⁴ Please note that the same terminology is used in the paper at hand. Wherever the paper speaks of healthcare givers, this includes nurses and healthcare workers.
- ¹⁵ HIDA is also known under its previous name, Association for Overseas Technical Scholarship (AOTS, *Kaigai gijutsusha kenshu kyokai*). Kazuo Kaneko, President of HIDA, in a conversation with the author stressed the need for the organization to significantly improve their training programs for international human resources in Japan. He specifically pointed out HIDA's goal to substantially alleviate the number of international healthcare giver migrants to pass the various national exams in Japan by equipping them with a solid basis of Japanese language proficiency (Kaneko 17 December 2013).
- ¹⁶ Interview was conducted with a migrant nurse, who wished to remain anonymous, in the Kansai region on 30 September 2013.
- ¹⁷ As Vogt and Holdgrün (2013) argue, Japan's multiple phases of modernization have always gone hand-in-hand with the nation's opening up to its neighbors.
- ¹⁸ These numbers indicate the sum of applicants to the national nursing exam and the national healthcare worker exam (Ogawa 2012, 99).
- ¹⁹ The *Gaikokujin Shuju Toshi Kaigi* is a group of small-town mayors, which, interestingly enough, considers itself to be a nongovernmental organization and lobbies the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications for a more comprehensive approach toward integration policies directed to Japan's foreign residents.
- ²⁰ This thought was confirmed in a conversation with Japanese political scientist Jun Iio of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (Iio 28 November 2013).

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A Critique of Government-Driven Multicultural Policy in Korea: Towards Local Government-Centered Policies

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Abstract

In a short period of time, multicultural policy driven by the central government in Korea seems to have made impressive achievements, including the implementation of various regulations and laws, and the provision of financial policies and programs. At the same time, however, it has produced many ill effects that have drawn much criticism. Some point out that Korea's multicultural policy has been driven excessively by the central government and its bureaucracy and failed to take a root in the local community.

This paper argues that local governments are most important in facilitating social integration and in building the long-term stability of a multicultural society. When one considers the problems caused by the central-government driven multicultural policies of Korea, the local government should also be involved, using a local-governance approach that entails cooperation with the central government, NGOs, and foreign residents. Korea's local governments need to develop policies that encompass various programs and services for their multicultural populations.

Keywords: Korea's multicultural policy, central government and local government, local government-driven policies in Europe, Japan, and Korea, local governance.

Introduction

THE INCREASE OF FOREIGNERS in industrialized countries is a worldwide phenomenon. It is most common in the United States, Canada, and Australia, all of which were founded by immigrants; in European nations, which either received the subjects of their former colonies as post-war immigrants; and in East Asian countries that have experienced rapidly expanding wage gaps, labor shortage, and lower numbers of a younger population. Since the 1990s, the populations of foreign workers, immigrants by marriage, and foreign students from China and Southeast Asian nations have skyrocketed in Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. This phenomenon—global migration—has challenged the central and local governments of these countries to develop more effective policy initiatives, social integration programs initiated by civil society, and the expansion of cultural diversity.

The central governments of OECD (Organisation for the Economic Cooperation Development) countries have paid a great amount of attention to immigrant policies such as education programs and welfare support, but cannot deal with the vast diversity of immigrants, whose status vary as well. The lack of appropriate policies and programs causes problems and concerns in local communities (Thomson 1998, 74). Therefore, local governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), universities, and private companies have brought their efforts together to close this policy gap. In this paper, which uses South Korea as a case study, I will point out the problems of multicultural policy initiated by the central government, and sketch an alternative: that of a local government-driven multicultural society.

The central government has had several inherent problems in implementing multicultural policies. Immigration policy can be easily turned into a political agenda during major national elections. Concerned with public opinions against immigration, the central government often limits itself to a passive response. Its immigration policy might fluctuate between acceptance and strict regulation. In contrast, local governments

have achieved better results by implementing flexible immigration policies that can be adopted in other contexts. This is because immigrants tend to concentrate in certain local areas and form local communities instead of spreading out nationally (Castles and Miller 2009, 229).

Since the early 1990s, European scholars have emphasized the role of the local government in a multicultural society (Caponio and Borkert, 2010), theorizing the local turn in immigrant policies.² And because local governments are important actors in the social integration of immigrants, OECD countries have recently emphasized their role in their policies for cultural diversity (OECD 2006, 1–7).³

Multicultural policy driven by the central government in Korea seems to have made an impressive achievement in a short period of time. It has quickly implemented various regulations and laws, and provided financial policies and programs. At the same time, however, it has produced many ill effects that have increasingly drawn criticism. Some point out that Korea's multicultural policy has been driven excessively by the central government and its bureaucracy, and that it has failed to take root in the local community. Others point out that the ill effects arise from the lack of unity of the fundamental philosophy of multicultural policy.

Nam-Kook Kim criticizes that there is not enough discussion on whether multiculturalism has been accepted in Korean society. Many Koreans don't agree on the kind of multicultural society where everybody, regardless of race and ethnicity, can live without discrimination and enjoy individual rights. Kim is uncertain if multiculturalism, like that adapted in Canada and Australia, can be chosen as a driving ideology in Korea (Nam-Kook Kim 2008, 348–350).

Hye-Soon Kim also provides several criticisms of the current multicultural policy of Korea: inefficiency because of the overlap of programs and budgets from various departments in the central government, an excessive concentration of regulations and budget on immigrants by marriage and multicultural families, and the lack of governance among the central and local governments and civil groups (Hye-Soon Kim, 2009, 618–620). Hee-

Jung Kim simply sees Korea's multiculturalism as driven by the central government and the bureaucracy. She adds that it does not offer a space for the voices of foreign residents themselves (Hee-Jung Kim 2007, 76–77).

The core of Korea's government-led multiculturalism is a social integration policy focusing on immigrants by marriage and their children to maintain ethnic homogeneity. It intentionally excludes foreign workers and unregistered foreigners (Kyung-Seok Oh, 2007, 33–35). Even this partial policy has many shortcomings: the uncertainty or overlapping of functions of organizations in charge of multicultural policies, the lack of a unified organization to monitor and evaluate various programs implemented by different government offices, and the absence of a coordinating system among the central, local governments, and civil organizations (Ho-Kyeong Lee 2010, 202–205).

In-Jin Yoon distinguishes between multiculturalism driven by the government and one by civil society. He identifies problems of the former: anti-foreigner sentiment,⁴ the exclusion of foreigners from the local community, and inefficiency of programs often overlapped by different institutions. According to Yoon, the policy should be transformed from government-driven to civil society-driven and to bottom-up or grass-root multiculturalism (In-Jin Yoon 2007, 282–288).

Another problem of the Korean government's multicultural policy is that each department seeks to attain budget and manpower for its own multicultural programs without communicating and coordinating with the others. The central government-driven multicultural policy also excludes local perspectives. According to Schalk-Soekar, the more active an exchange between local and foreign residents is, the more effective the policy can be (Schalk-Soekar. et.al, 2005, 533–550). It means that the entire local community should be included, instead of focusing on particular foreigner groups (Hong 2009, 172–185).

Central and local governments, civil organization, and the local residents are all essential to solving the various challenges of a multicultural society. The efficiency of multicultural policies can be improved through

legal and regulatory support from the central government, the building of a central-local-civil organization policy network, and mutual support among diverse actors coordinated by the local government (Sun-Mi Kim 2009, 220–221). Indeed, local governments can coordinate central and local actors to produce local-friendly policies for a multicultural population in different locations (Seung-Mi Han et.al, 2010). Needless to say, local government can help integrate fragmented multicultural policies at the local level, and energize interactions between foreign and local residents.

Because foreign residents actually live and work in local communities, the policies by the central government have to be implemented at this level. The monolithic multicultural policy imposed by the central government is limited because each locality has different types and origins of foreign residents, possesses different personal and material resources, and pursues unique development strategies (Ki-Sun Jung 2012, 7–11). Although many studies have criticized the central government-driven multicultural policy, few papers have advocated that such policies be transferred to local government. And not many have explored reasons, along with case studies and alternatives, for such a transfer.⁵


Multicultural phenomenon and local society in Korea

As of August 2013, there are 1.57 million foreigners in Korea, accounting for 3.1 percent of the total population. The influx of foreign labor since the early 1990s and the increase of foreign brides married to Korean men since 2000s have accelerated the multicultural demographic make-up of the country. The difficulty in finding brides in rural areas and the increase of marriage brokers have brought a surge in international marriages. Indeed, the number of marriage migrations has increased from a mere 25,182 in 2001 to 150,865 in 2013, accounting for 10.2 percent of the total foreign population in Korea. The influx of *Chosun-Jok* (Korean descendants from China) and foreign workers through the employment permit system have increased the number of foreign population up to 7 times between 1999 and 2012 (Figure 1).

The 2012 Statistics of Foreign Population in Korea by Ministry of Justice illustrates the number of foreigners in Korea according to nationality. They are Chinese and Korean Chinese (48.3 percent), Americans (9 percent), Vietnamese (8.3 percent), and Japanese (4 percent). After that, there are Thais (3.2 percent), Filipinos (2.9 percent), Indonesians (2.6 percent), Uzbekistanis (2.4 percent), Mongolians (1.8 percent), and others (17.4 percent).

FIGURE 1
Increase of Foreign Population by Year (1999-2012)
[Ministry of Justice 2012]

[To address printing requirements, the graph below was re-laid out – ed.]



More than two-thirds of foreigners in Korea are concentrated in the Seoul Metropolitan Areas, Gyeonggi Province, and Incheon Metropolitan Areas.⁶ Immigrants tend to live together or settle in more foreigner-friendly living environments like metro cities. As illustrated in Figure 3, derived from the Statistics of Foreign Population in Korea 2012, Seoul has the highest foreign resident ratio of 4 percent. It is followed by Gyeonggi Province (3.6 percent) and South Chungcheong Province (3.2 percent). Gangwon Province shows a relatively low ratio of 1.5 percent.

FIGURE 2
Ratio of foreign population in Korea by nationality in 2012
(Ministry of Justice 2012)




Table 1 below (derived source from the Statistics of Foreign Population in Korea, 1999–2012) shows there are forty-two local governments with more than 10,000 foreign residents. Ansan City has 60,583; Yeongdungpo City, 57,180; Guro City; 43,239; and Suwon City 40,537.

TABLE 1: Number of Local Governments Based on the Size of Foreign Residents (Ministry of Justice 2012)

Total	Over 20,000	20,000~ 10,000	10,000~ 5,000	5,000~ 1,000	1,000~ 500	500~ 100
230	13	29	41	97	42	8

FIGURE 3
Foreign Population Ratio in Province Areas (%)
 (Ministry of Justice 2012, Statistics of Foreign Population in Korea)
 [To address printing requirements, the graph below was re-laid out – ed.]




Figure 4 (next page) shows the classification of foreigners in Korea according to status. For example, working visa holders number 238,000 and overseas Korean residents total 189,000. Mostly Korean-Chinese, they work in restaurants or in construction. The Employment Permit System annually brings in about 230,000 foreign workers who can stay up to three years in Korea. They work in small or mid-sized business or manufacturing companies. Skilled foreign workers can stay up to four years and ten months. The permanent residents, the majority of whom are Korean-Chinese, overseas Chinese in Korea, and immigrants by marriage, are about 97,000.

Immigrants by marriage, including those naturalized, are about 230,000, and children of multicultural families are more than 191,000, with an annual increase of over 10 percent. According to 2013 statistics from the Ministry of Education, there are 56,000 students from immigrant families in elementary, middle, and high schools. The current foreign

population ratio of 3.1 percent in 2013 is expected to increase to 5 percent in 2020, and will reach to 9 percent in 2050, which is the current level in developed countries (Ministry of Justice 2012, 276).

The rapid increase of immigrants by marriage has been attributed to aging, low birthrate, and lack of labor in rural areas since 1990s. Initially, Korean-Chinese women have come to the metropolitan areas of Seoul and other rural areas, and later, more women from Southeast Asian countries have increasingly entered Korea after marrying a Korean man (Ministry of Justice 2006, 70).

The number of international marriages—more than 70 percent between a Korean male and a foreign female—reached its peak of 30,000 in 2005 and decreased to about 28,000 in 2012. It still accounts for 8.9 percent of total marriages in Korea. These couples live in rural villages or metropolitan areas across the nation.

FIGURE 4
Composition of Foreigners by Visa Status (2012)
[Ministry of Justice 2012]





Figure 5 illustrates the nationalities of immigrants by marriage. In the early years, the majority of females were Korean-Chinese and Japanese, but later, more women arrived from Vietnam and the Philippines.⁷ In 2011, Vietnamese comprised the largest group with 34.3 percent, compared to Korean-Chinese, with 33.9 percent. Along with women from the Philippines 9.3 percent and Cambodia 4.3 percent, more than 47.9 percent of immigrants by marriage come from Southeast Asian countries whose language and culture differ from those of Korea. Hence, more culturally sensitive policies are required for immigrants by marriage (Yi-Sun Kim 2012, 77–93).⁸

As the number of foreign residents has increased in Korea, both the central and local governments have paid more attention to

FIGURE 5
Immigrants by marriage by nationality (Kim, Yi-Sun 2012, 81)
[To address printing requirements, the graph below was re-laid out – ed.]



multicultural policies. Starting with addressing human rights violations against foreign workers, Korean multicultural policy got on the right track in 2005 under Rho Moo-Hyun's regime. With initiative from the central government, multicultural policies showed substantial improvements in financial support and policies in law, budget, facilities, and programs. These include the introduction of Employment Permit System in August 2004, the permanent residents' right to vote in local elections in August 2005, the creation of the Committee of Foreigner Policy in May 2006, the implementation of the local government ordinance by Ministry of Security and Public Administration since 2007, the legislation of Multicultural Family Support Act in March 2008, and the enactment of the refugee law in July 2013.

The budget for multicultural programs from the central government increased to 96.9 million USD in 2009, and to 197.45 million USD in 2012. National support networks have also been well established. There are 217 Multicultural Family Support Centers, and more than 350 programs and consulting services by religious and civil institutions, all of whom cater to foreign workers, multicultural families, and international students. However, these supply-driven, results-oriented, and performance-oriented policies from the central government have many limitations.

The problems of central government-driven Policies

In April 2006, the Roh Moo-Hyun government mentioned that the transformation of Korea into multicultural and multiethnic society is unavoidable. Since then, government offices have competitively pursued for social integration and multicultural policies. However, there have been few in-depth discussions among the central government, civil society, and experts with regards to the setting of such policies.

The Korean government did not declare any form of multiculturalism, like those adopted in Canada or Australia, as an active and positive policy (Willett 1999).⁹ There was not much discussion on

whether multi-culture, multiculturalism, or multicultural society was the goal. The real objectives of the government were to increase the population with immigrants by marriage, conduct an assimilation-like social integration of immigrants and children of multicultural families, and guarantee the labor supply through the Employment Permit System. The state has blended these as its multicultural policy (Hye-Soon Kim 2009, 615–616).

Without any consistent and systematic vision for multiculturalism and multicultural policy, individual departments in the central government often already consider public service to foreigners as part of multicultural policy. The Ministry of Gender Equality and Family and Ministry of Labor and others directly control their own budgets and programs at their respective local branch offices. They do not consider different types of foreign residents and the various living conditions of local communities. The central government also dominates multicultural policy through various channels of its own offices, often without coordinating with local authorities. It is not unusual to find the cases of overlapping policies, wasted resources, less efficiency, and conflicts between and among different government departments (Byeong-Doo Choi 2012, 30–31).

Since July 2012, the Ministry of Justice has implemented a social integration service that provides foreigners with the necessary education required for permanent residency and citizenship. To assist foreigners to adapt and settle in Korea, the service provides a range of general knowledge of Korean society, including Korean language, constitutional values, basic laws, and politics, and economy. There are 248 establishments for such purposes, including 45 designated service centers and 203 general offices.

Since 2008, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family has also provided various and specific programs for immigrants by marriage and their children based on the Multicultural Family Support Law. With a vision to build dynamic multicultural families and a harmonious society, the second phase of the basic plan for Multicultural Family Support Act (2013–2017) pursues a multicultural society that respects diversity and strengthens the foundation of the multicultural family. It focuses on supporting the employment of marriage immigrants and the education of

children from such marriages, as the residency period of immigrants by marriage in Korea has become longer.

As of January 2014, two hundred and seventeen multicultural family support centers nationwide provide Korean culture and language education, including lessons on tradition, custom, and cuisine. They also provide various counseling and information services for daily life and occupational training for multicultural families. Children of multicultural families can also receive after-school tutoring and Korean language classes.

The Ministry of Security and Public Administration enacted the “Standard Ordinance to Support Resident Aliens” in 2007, which more than 200 local governments have implemented. They offer Korean language education programs, services in different languages, establishment of a department dedicated for foreign residents, programs to improve the living environment of foreigner-concentrated areas, building support network for foreign residents, surveys and research, and hiring foreigners as government employees or advisors.

TABLE 2: Subjects for Designing Multicultural Policies
(Hong Choi 2011, 7)

Ministries in Charge	
Philosophy (Strategies)	Committee on Foreigner Policy Committee on Multicultural Family Policy Committee on Foreign Labor Policy
Accommodation Capacity (Infrastructure)	Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Security and Public Administration, Ministry of Health and Defense, Ministry of Employment and Labor, Ministry of Education
System (Action Plan)	Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, Local Governments

As was cited above, some critics also point out that the multicultural policy has been led excessively by the central government and its bureaucracy, and that it has failed to take root in the local community. Others criticize the lack of unity in the basic philosophy of multicultural policy, policy infrastructure, and laws and regulations for action plans (Table 2).

Let's take a look at the case of Korean language program for immigrants by marriage. The Ministry of Gender Equality and Family operates a Korean language program through multicultural family supporting centers. The Ministry of Education provides educational broadcasting programs to promote the learning of Korean language and culture through EBS (Educational Broadcasting System). The Ministry of Justice includes Korean language classes in its social integration program. The Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism offers home-visit Korean classes, Korean language textbook development, and infant education classes in rural areas. The Ministry of Security and Public Administration has its own Korean program and leadership program for immigrants by marriage in local community centers.

The Ministry of Employment and Labor also includes Korean language classes in its employment support program. The Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs dispatches social workers and Korean language teachers to the homes of multicultural families. The Ministry of Health and Welfare also operates a Korean society adaptation program, including Korean language classes. All in all, more than eight departments in the central government provide Korean language education, and actually compete to attract more attendees. These Korean language classes cause more confusion than certainty because they use different textbooks and require different criteria for teachers. For example, only 0.15 percent (2009), 0.48 percent (2010), and 0.66 percent (2011) of all immigrants by marriage have participated in the Korean language program by Ministry of Justice (Myeong-Hyun Kim 2013, 187).

Given this situation, criticisms focus on the evaluation of these different programs and the need to prevent any overlaps and inefficiency. If the local

government could control these initiatives, it will provide more consistent and systematic help for foreign residents in their city. One reason for this lies in the fact that foreigners tend to live in a concentrated area, where they form their own ethnic community. Faist explains this concentration through the theory of social capital. Immigrants live and work together in a place where they can find the necessary social capital: mutual assistance, ethnic alliances, ethnic understanding, and information networks. Immigrants away from their homeland form a new culture and identity based on the flow of capital, people, culture, and knowledge found in a transnational space (Faist 2000).

In Korea, many foreigners live and work in special areas. Most foreign residents in Youngdungpo City and Guro City are from China. Ansan City boasts of a diversity of foreign workers from different countries. Incheon Metropolitan Area also has many Overseas Chinese. More than twenty-two local governments have over 5 percent of foreign residents in their total population. There are forty-two local government areas, 18.5 percent of the total, with more than 10,000 foreigners.

The monolithic multicultural policy of the central government has not met the various demands of the local governments with different types of immigrants. There have been serious budget wastes and rampant inefficiencies in similar multicultural policies operated by several ministries of the state government. On the contrary, the local government can respond to different needs of the local communities that have different constituents: foreign workers and brides or Chinese immigrants. For instance, Ansan City has a large number of foreign workers and provides an overseas wiring service at banks during the weekend, the first and only such service in the nation. Guro City in Seoul has a large senior (50s and 60s) Chinese immigrant population and has the first center for such foreigners. The Gangneung city has a sizable number of immigrants by marriage and provides a mentoring program for children of multicultural families by college volunteers. Hence, the local government's multicultural policy can tailor diverse multicultural programs adapted for different demands of foreign residents in the local community.

While the Korean multicultural policy has been driven by the central government and is focused on short-term achievements, it is necessary for local governments and their residents to think of how to accept foreign residents gradually, and pursue a local-governance approach for multicultural policies (Pierre 2000).¹⁰

From central to local government: Europe, Japan, and Korea

It is a worldwide trend that the center of multicultural policy has shifted from central to local governments. In Europe, Japan, and other developed countries, local governments and NGOs often drive multicultural programs, and the central government implements laws and institutions to help them. In Europe, where debates on multiculturalism are common in national politics, local governments actively promote multicultural initiatives. For example, the United Kingdom promotes the social integration of immigrants through local governments. In Sweden, such governments raise funds to accommodate foreign refugees.

Essen in Germany has operated a multicultural network that involves the city government, civil organizations, university, and immigrant associations for over thirty years. The network provides language and multicultural programs for youths from immigrant families. The programs have become more efficient through a direct responsibility of the chief of Essen's social department for youth and a close collaboration with the local community.

Since 1990, Canada's Manitoba Provincial government has put one department in charge of all processes of immigrant services from selection to settlement. At that time, the central government of Canada preferred professional engineers while the provincial government wanted more general workers. Through an agreement in 1998, the provincial government now has an authority to recommend 200 immigrants annually. As of 2010, 77% of foreign residents in Manitoba arrive through the recommendation of the provincial government (Ki-Sun Jung et. Al., 2012, 13–52).

European states share a consensus that the future of Europe depends on its response to cultural diversity. Annually, they publish the European White Paper on Cultural Diversity, and started the Inter-Cultural City Project under the authority of the Council of Europe with financial support from the Comedia Foundation. Heads of European cities held annual meetings to share new visions of the city in which cultural diversity is the source of dynamics, innovation, creativity, and growth (Council of Europe 2013).

The European Union adopted the declaration of Faro, Portugal in 2005 to promote cultural and religious diversity and to facilitate dialogue among different groups. According to the declaration, a true Inter-Cultural City cannot be built on fragmented leadership or minor policy changes. It can be possible only by sharing visions and through the mutual efforts of institutionalized city governments and civil society. The Inter-Cultural City Project seeks to build alliances among cities and foster solidarity between central governments and international organizations. Twenty-three cities participate, including London, Lisbon, Amsterdam, Dublin, Copenhagen, and Oslo (Council of Europe, 2013).¹¹

Let's take a look at multicultural policies in Japan's local governments. As of June 2013, the number of registered foreign residents in Japan is about 2,049,123, accounting for 1.6 percent of the total population (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2013, no.13-06-01-1). Unlike Korean policies, which are driven by the central government, the local governments in Japan started their multicultural policies independently. It was in 1984 when the Kawasaki City initiated the program, "Inward Internationalization," to improve the situation of Korean-Japanese. The project was based on the rueful reflection on the pre-war colonial treatment of Koreans. From that experience, Japan started to build an organization dedicated to serving foreigners in Japan through programs such as the survey of foreign residents, abolishment of finger-printing, anti-discrimination, social welfare and pensions, elimination of nationality requirement for local government officials, enfranchisement, improving the environment for education, and housing and workforce development.

The Kawasaki City, which boasts of a large number of Korean-Japanese, established a committee of foreign citizen representatives through an ordinance in 1996. The city also added, to an amendment of the basic policy for foreigners, a subtitle of “Toward Intercultural Co-existence Society” in 1998. It enacted the basic principles for intercultural co-existence society such as the respect for human rights, encouragement of social participation, and support for independence. Hamamatsu City is one of the most populated cities in Japan, boasting of many Brazilian-Japanese. In 2001, the city established “Council of Municipalities with a Large Foreign Population” to build networks among local governments, and announced the Hamamatsu Declaration, which urges the central government to upgrade the acceptance system for foreigners. It also established “the committee for coexistence with foreign citizens” and started a campaign for the full enrollment of foreign children in local schools.

Multicultural policies of local governments in Korea follow the state’s lead. As the central government has focused on supporting of foreign residents, as has the local government (Kee-Ho Yang, 2006, 70–71). Partially because of population decline in rural and local areas, multicultural policy has become an important issue.¹² Local governments with either more than 50,000 foreign residents or over 2.5 percent of the foreign population created a department that serves foreign residents in the area (Committee on Foreigner Policy 2012). As of June 2011, twenty-six local governments had three department level offices and twenty-three team level multicultural offices. As illustrated in Table 3, the budget for local government-led multicultural programs has grown every year. It increased 1.7 times within four years from 93.28 million USD in 2008 to 166.85 million USD in 2012. This also entails an increase in independent action plans and programs. In 2012, the local governments had a 166.85 million USD budget for the programs, accounting for about 85 percent of the central government budget of 197.45 million USD (Table 3 next page).

TABLE 3: Annual Budget of Multicultural Programs for Central
and Local Governments 2008-2012 (unit: Million USD)
[Committee on Foreigner Policy 2012]

Central	Government	Local Governments	Total
2008	76.3	93.28	169.58
2009	96.9	224.47	321.37
2010	119.56	114.86	234.42
2011	181.40	146.58	327.98
2012	197.45	166.85	364.30

Table 4 below illustrates the different phases of programs of local governments with active multicultural policies in the metropolitan areas around Seoul. The first phase involves the most basic programs for Korean language, cultural experience, medical health services, and the publication of a community newsletter. The second phase includes job training, multicultural understanding classes, education for multicultural children, labor counseling, multicultural festivals, support for the early settlement, and the provision of temporary shelters. As the highest level at work in Ansan, Suwon, and Cheonan City, the third phase offers support for foreign communities and allows the operation of councils of foreign resident representatives and committees for foreign policies (Se-Hun Park et. al., 2010, 59)

Ansan City has about 60,000 foreign residents. It designated “Foreigner Street” as a “Multicultural Special Zone” in 2009. Ansan also built a three-story foreign resident center where city employees provide various services and programs. The center is open 365 days a year. A bank near the center is popular among foreign residents, who wire money to their home countries. It is the only bank open on weekends. The city’s “Little Multicultural Library” has about 10,000 books and magazines in 17 different languages and is popular among immigrants by marriage and children of multicultural families.

TABLE 4: Multicultural Policies in Major Local Governments
(Park Se-Hun et al. 2010, 59).

		Suwon	Seongnam	Bucheon	Ansan	Hwasung	Cheonan	Gimhae
First phase	Korean Language Education	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
	Cultural Experience	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
	Medical Services	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
	Newsletter	O			O	O		O
Second phase	Job Training	O	O	O	O		O	
	Education for Multicultural Understanding	O	O	O	O		O	O
	Education for Multicultural Children				O	O	O	O
	Labor Counseling	O			O		O	
	Multicultural Festivals	O				O	O	O
	Support for Early Settlement		O		O	O		
	Temporary Shelter						O	
Third phase	Support for Foreigner Community	O			O		O	
	Council for Foreign Resident Representatives	O						
	Operating Committee for Foreign Residents	O			O			

Suwon City has about 40,000 foreigners, 3.5 percent of its total population, and has the fifth highest concentration of foreigners among local governments in Korea. Foreign workers number 17,000, accounting for half of the total in the city. Immigrants by marriage have soared up to 34,000. The city helps foreign residents settle in the local community through Korean language education and consultation for Korean law. It provides English lessons, car maintenance training, and computer education. Other programs are teaching Korean language and how to cook Korean food. They also provide free medical services, and free haircut and make-up services courtesy of volunteers.

Gimhae City offers a program in which a Korean with more than five years of marriage experiences mentors other immigrants by marriage, helps them understand different national cultures, and assists them in resolving conflicts in multicultural families. Using conversational coaching method, a Korean mentor assists foreign spouses who have been married to a Korean for less than two years. They identify any issues in multicultural families through group interviews. For example, they share personal experiences with each other: a conflict caused by a lengthy phone usage and expensive phone bills during the early stage of immigration; issues of adapting to Korean cuisine, different sleeping and bathing customs; issues with Korean mothers-in-law or with a spouse, employment and money wiring, etc.

Pyeongtaek City is a typical hybrid city with urban and rural features. Its multicultural library provides information services to help immigrants by marriage and foreign workers adapt to an increasingly multi-ethnic community and to build a harmonious multicultural society. The library provides services and materials in fourteen different languages such as English, Chinese, Japanese, and Vietnamese. It also operates Korean language classes with the help of local universities.

Anyang City added Vietnamese as one of the languages of their city's website, in addition to English, Japanese, and Chinese. The number of content categories has expanded from thirty-three to ninety including

city news, multicultural support center, public library, tips for daily life, and announcement. A contracted translation service company updates this information in different languages.

Building local governance and future projects

As illustrated in the previous parts, it is necessary for local governments to drive and build multicultural governance, which is underpinned by three factors.

1) Local governance and its meaning

As for Korean multicultural policies in the future, I suggest three tasks: reviewing the capacity of local governments for multiculturalism; strengthening the communication among NGOs, foreign organizations, and local residents; and promoting the participation of local institutions and businesses. The self-empowerment of local governments, securing annual budget for programs and services, and building mutual exchange and networks are most important in building governance among actors of multicultural policies. In addition, the central government should provide continuing and enough resources to help local regions develop effective multicultural policies.

Local multicultural governance can facilitate social integration because it entails volunteerism from both foreign and local residents. Therefore, a local-governance model of multicultural policies should replace the current government-driven one in the long term. A multicultural model of interdependence between local residents and foreigners should also be pursued as an alternative.

A local-governance model includes general measures that aim to build a lasting multicultural society: the central government provides institutional, legal, and financial support for foreigners. At the same time, the local government, organizations, NGOs, and communities should cooperate in implementing policies and programs.

2) A model of multicultural policy led by local government

The central government is needed to pass some of its tasks in promoting social integration to local governments, and must rather focus on strengthening and financing the overall system. Local governments acknowledge, as their major problems, the lack of professional staff and their own, independent multicultural policy. This is in part due to an explosive expansion of departments dedicated to serve foreign residents within a short period of time. Considering an increasingly significant role of local governments in the future, the central government should not delay any necessary assistance. It should also help strengthen their capacities by presenting them with an appropriate policy model, supporting the professional training for local employees performing foreigner-related services, and introducing exemplary models from other countries to the local counterparts.

The local governments should also re-evaluate their own ability to implement multicultural policies, and reinforce their corporation with local and foreign residents. With the transfer of the central government's function to local government, the latter will be naturally the center of multicultural policies. Currently, the local governments play a central role in the social integration of foreign residents in worldwide. They embrace foreign residents with more flexible and adaptive policies while the central government focuses on a stricter immigration control.

In the future, local governments need to enlarge their capacity for and assertiveness in implementing multicultural policies. Most have been passive enforcers of policy guidelines and programs from the central government. Therefore, they are incapable of effectively responding to local challenges and of mobilizing internal resources such as residents' organizations and local businesses. The local governments should play a more active role; they can, for instance, survey foreign residents in the area and evaluate the support programs of NGOs for foreigners. They should also support professional enhancement efforts by employees.¹³

In order to be the control tower for the multicultural policy, local governments need to build a Governance Network with both government and civilian counterparts, as in the case of Cheonan, Suwon and Ansan Cities. In the Governance Network, public institutions and resident organizations, local and foreign residents, and representatives of foreign residents all participate equally, and evaluate and suggest policies accordingly.

3) Domestic and international networks among local governments

It is very important for local governments to build networks, where they can share their field experiences, information, and visions of a multicultural city. Such networks include the “Inter-Cultural City Project” by the Council of Europe, Japan’s “Council of Municipalities with a Large Foreign Population,” and Korea’s “National Council for Multicultural Cities,” which was initiated by Ansan City in November 2012. According to the founding prospectus, the Council will facilitate the exchange of information and help build close cooperation among local governments in actively handling increasing amounts of administrative demands of their constituents.

As mentioned before, local governments and foreign residents cannot capitalize on the sufficient benefits of multicultural policies for two reasons: waste of the budget and the inefficiency caused by separate policies by different ministries of the central government. Korean society has experienced a transitional state of conflicts and social issues around foreign residents. Therefore, close cooperation and coordinated countermeasures among local governments are seriously needed to solidify the direction of policies. The National Council for Multicultural Cities aims to discuss solutions for current issues faced by different local governments, and to build an organic relationship with the central government in implementing policies tailored for different regions, cases, and subjects.

The National Council for Multicultural Cities consists of cities with more than 5,000 foreign residents. Based on Article 152 of the Local Autonomy Law, it is an intercity council that promotes and improves on

research on programs on multicultural policies. A total twenty-four local governments are participating in the council, including five in Seoul, one in Incheon, fourteen in Gyeonggi-Province, two in South Chungcheong Province, one in Gwangju Metropolitan City, and one in South Gyeongsang Province. The Council aims to help improve multicultural policies, share experiences of local governments, and propose new policies to the central government. The Council is expected to lead multicultural policies of the local governments in the future.¹⁴

Conclusion

Korea's multicultural policy has been driven by various laws, regulations, and financial support from the central and local governments. Yes, it has been criticized because of its inefficiency arising from too many programs and regulations, and the lack of adequacy, balance, and focus on local conditions. Also, because of a heavy focus on immigrants by marriage and children of multicultural families, and the dearth of policies for foreign workers, there is an increasing gap of service programs among different regions, cases, and subjects.

In this situation, multicultural governance among the central and local governments is not working properly. The central and local governments have proposed various laws and regulations in a rather competitive and short-term-oriented fashion. This results in the absence of communication among policy makers, the overlap of budgets and tasks, and the lack of coherence with other programs for foreign residents. Therefore, the Korean government should change its current centralized multicultural policy, and its perspective of seeing foreign residents as only beneficiaries and objects of the policy. It should aim to build a multicultural society led by local governments and communities.

Korea's multicultural policy needs a system that reflects the experiences and situations of different regions and areas. It requires a balanced division of labor among the central and local governments, local offices and NGOs, local residents and foreign residents, and, public offices

and volunteer organizations. It also demands various policies and programs tailored to different needs for foreign workers, immigrants by marriage, and children of multicultural family in different regions. These policy makers and actors should build networks and continuously improve the system.

Multicultural governance of Korea's local governments is recommended to proceed with the following developmental stages. At the first stage, it should expand the scope of subjects from multicultural families to foreign workers, international students, and Korean Chinese. At the second stage, considering the tight budget situation of the local government, it should utilize local volunteers and provide programs and networks where multicultural families and local residents can share their experiences with each other. At the third stage, it takes a positive perspective on cultural diversity as the source of city creativity and dynamics, and aims to build a coexistence society where local and foreign residents live and work together.

Notes

- ¹ Thomson writes, "Multicultural policy is only needed where problems exist... If the Federal Governments had proper policies and programs in place there would not be any multicultural problems for local governments to worry about."
- ² Refer to the title of a seminar held in Barcelona, Spain in 20 October 2013. "Theorizing the local turn in immigrant policies: a multi-level approach." Accessed 30 January 2014. http://www.upf.edu/gritim/_pdf/GRITIM-EUR-IMISCOE_seminar_on_the_local_turn_-_Final_Program.pdf
- ³ OECD. 2006. "The integration of immigrants has a strong local dimension. While immigration applications are likely to be dealt with at the national level, migrants ultimately settle in local communities, and require support from local stockholders when integration proves difficult."
- ⁴ The problems of Korea's central government-driven policy have been unfolded in many areas. There are increasing numbers of internet cafes against the central government's top-down multicultural policy. They claim that the multicultural policy of the central government is capitalist's plot to force the poor for lower wages and define it as antipatriotic and antinational. It is concerned that the anti-multicultural claims seem to develop from a simple stereotype to a discourse.
- ⁵ See those articles. Keecho Yang. 2006.06; Seung-Mi Han et al. 2010; Ki-Sun Jung et al. 2012.

- ⁶ Korea's local governments elect top positions of the administrative branch and members of the local council every four-year. As of January 2014, there are 16 large-scale local governments and 227 basic scale governments. The average population of the basic local government is about 224,000, the largest in the world.
- ⁷ Min-Jung Kim (2012) gives a detailed explanation on the process of being gendered for Filipino woman migrants in Korean who are divided into three groups of migrant worker, female music band singer, and migrant by marriage.
- ⁸ Refer to Yi-Sun Kim. "Women Migrants by Marriage and Gender Structure of South East Asia and East Asia: Experience of Korea and Japan", *The Asia Research Fund*, 2012:77–93 [in Korean]. Figure 5 is also cited from the same article.
- ⁹ Canada's multiculturalism is based on three principles: society with diverse race, ethnicity, and culture, acceptance and respect for cultural diversity, and equal opportunities for public policies and programs.
- ¹⁰ For Pierre (2000), governance means participating of various actors—the local government, local businesses, NGOs, and local residents—to solve public projects in the local community through official or nonofficial influences during the process of policy decision and implementation.
- ¹¹ The genuine intercultural city cannot emerge from disconnected initiatives or small-scale policy changes. It can only be the result of a shared vision and the concerted efforts of a range of institutional and civil society stakeholders. Therefore the Intercultural City Strategy includes a wide range of actors in the city: local authorities, professionals, social services, civil society organisations, and the media. Focusing on the sustainability and effectiveness of the results, the Intercultural City Strategy includes the establishment of partnerships and alliances within each city but also on national and international levels(Council of Europe, 2013).
- ¹² Compared to European countries, Korea has a small number of children out of wedlock. Hence, low marriage rate has a direct correlation with low birthrate in Korea and becomes a clear threat to the development of the local government. For example, Sweden has 55 percent, France 48 percent, Denmark 46 percent, England 43 percent, and the United States 37 percent of children out of wedlock. But, Japan has 2.0 percent (2005) and Korean has 1.6 percent (2007).
- ¹³ In order to enhance the capability of local governments, it might be a good idea to make a network of local governments such as Japan's 'Council of Municipalities with a Large Foreign Population.' There are few opportunities for local government officials working on foreigner related programs to exchange experiences and information with others. Founded in November 2011, National Council for Multicultural Cities is expected to provide such opportunities.
- ¹⁴ In April 2013, National Council for Multicultural Cities suggested forming a working committee for a better cooperation between the central and local government officials. The committee includes government officials and foreign residents. The central government accepted the proposal and decided to establish the central-local government working committee. Ministry of Security and Public Administration, Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, Ministry of Justice will participate in the committee with five local governments including Ansan City and Guro City.

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Diverging Narratives: Lives and Identities of Japanese-Filipino Children in the Philippines

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Abstract

This study focuses on the lives of Japanese-Filipino children who are based in the Philippines, particularly on their identity/ies and social location in the society. One-on-one interviews were conducted by the author with nine respondents. In-depth life history interviews were then carried out with three selected respondents. Using Practice Theory as a framework of analysis, the study reveals that there are different ways that the Japanese-Filipino children craft themselves, mainly because of the different webs of relations that an individual interacts with. This conforms to the concept of identity as being fluid, multi-faceted and changing over time. Most importantly, this study reveals a kind of divide that seems to exist between those Japanese-Filipino children who belong to NGOs and those who (refuse) do not belong to any organization. Class appears to play a major role in this divide; a factor that is often overlooked in the existing studies about the Japanese-Filipino children.

Keywords: Japanese-Filipino children; identity; class; power and agency; life history

Introduction

THE PHILIPPINES HAS A LONG HISTORY of migration. Over the years, a significant number of Filipinos have gone to live and work in different parts of the world, particularly in the United States and the Middle East. Japan's high economic growth in the 1970s also attracted foreign workers, especially from Asia, to the country. A large number of migrant workers came as manual laborers to the unskilled jobs sector even though the Japanese government officially accepted only skilled workers (Sellek 1997, 178). At that time, the Philippines was facing the twin crises of unemployment and balance of payment deficit. As a temporary stopgap measure to address the crises, the administration of former President Ferdinand Marcos adopted a policy of exporting labor to foreign countries (Takeda and Erpelo 2008, 2). It was also during this period when "a number of male foreigners, including the Japanese, came to the Philippines for 'sex tourism'" (Suzuki 2010, 34), an unfavorable consequence of the development in the tourism industry. By the end of the 1970s, the Japanese tourists accounted for nearly one-third of all the tourists in the Philippines. In the 1980s about eighty percent of the Japanese tourists were men (*ibid.*).

The 1980s also saw an increasing number of Filipino women leaving the Philippines to work abroad as domestic helpers, entertainers, and health workers. In Japan, however, most of the Filipino women worked as entertainers, especially after the Japanese government, with the cooperation of the Philippine government, eased its requirement for "entertainer" visas in 1981 (Dinan 2000). In the present decade, migration still continues, wherein Filipino women are deployed to different parts of the world, with high concentrations in the Middle East (Saudi and United Arab Emirates), as well as in Hong Kong and Singapore (POEA Annual Report 2010). As of 2008 (since after 2008, the Overseas Performing Artist [OPA] category is no longer used in POEA reports), Japan was still the top recipient of Filipino OPAs, despite stricter regulatory measures by the Japanese and Philippine governments in 2004, as indicated in Table 1 below.


TABLE 1: Deployment of Overseas Performing Artists by Selected Destinations - New Hires (POEA 2008)

Destinations	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Japan	59,568	70,244	73,246	57,605	70,628	38,533	6,672	4,592	2,380
Korea	3	94	256	237	615	687	487	1,350	1,020
China	35	13	3	15	47	93	62	21	30
Hongkong	18	13	4	5	22	75	42	113	114
Bahrain	36	43	9	0	12	9	24	43	74

Many of these female entertainers have children with Japanese nationals, regardless of whether they are married or not especially in cases where the other already has a family. The increasing number of Japanese-Filipino children can be attributed to both the continuous entry of Filipina women to Japan, and the arrival of Japanese tourists who came to the Philippines particularly during the 1970s and 1980s. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2009) estimates that there are about 200,000 Japanese-Filipino children in the Philippines as of 2009. While a number of “Japanese Filipino Children” (JFC) grew up with a secured nationality,¹ some of them had problems with their “citizenship,” since they were not recognized earlier by their Japanese fathers (Suzuki 2010).

Japan, despite its low population of resident foreigners, is notable for its rising rate of international marriages, particularly between a Japanese husband and a foreign wife. As a result, children of mixed ethnicities continue to be born in Japan or abroad. In 2012, out of 668, 895 marriages, 23, 657 (3.5%) were international marriages; moreover, the number of foreign brides (17,198) still exceeds that of foreign grooms (6,459) (Japan Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare Vital Statistics 2012). It is striking that the gendered pattern of Japanese-husband-and foreign-wife is most prominent in marriages between Japanese and Filipinos (Figure 1).

FIGURE 1
Nationality of Bride/Groom (by percentage) of a Japanese national
(Japan Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 2012)



In 2012, 96.2 percent of Japanese-Filipino marriages fit that pattern while those between Japanese husbands and Chinese wives, the highest incident of foreign brides, account for only 90% of the total marriages involving this nationality (MHLW 2012).

The modern history of the children of Japanese and Filipino unions dates to as far as the late nineteenth century when Japanese migrants came to the Philippines as part of the strategy of the Meiji government to alleviate problems of population explosion (Sellek 1997, 187). Though there were already a number of Japanese migrants to parts of the Philippine archipelago such as Panay (Mabunay 2006), it was not until the 1900s that an increasing number of male Japanese *dekasegi* (contractual) workers came to the Philippines and worked in building infrastructures in Baguio, such as Kennon Road in 1903 (Fresnoza-Flot 2008, 74). While some of these Japanese migrants brought Japanese wives with them, others married local women and lived peacefully in Baguio before World War II. When the war broke out, Japanese migrants, as well as their descendants who were old enough, were drafted by the Japanese military to work as interpreters and translators. The younger men were conscripted into the Japanese armed forces (Afable 2008, 36). After Japan's defeat in World War II, however, those who were not repatriated to Japan (many of whom were younger *Nisei* [second-generation]) had to conceal their Japanese ancestry to avoid discrimination from the local community, who often labelled them as [Japanese] "collaborators" (Fresnoza-Flot 2008, 78–79).

The case of the Philippine *nikkeijin* (as they came to be called) started to gain media attention in the 1980s when animosity towards Japan had died out and some of those families who were separated during the war started to look for their family members. This is heavily documented by Afable's (2008) study on the *nikkeijin* in Baguio. *Nikkeijin* generally refers to "a person of Japanese descent who is living outside Japan, including also those who have immigrated to Japan (Ohno 2007a, 243).

The revision of the Immigration Control Act of Japan in 1990 legitimated the long-term stay of nikkeijin up to the third generation [*sansei*] who hadn't been Japanese nationals. It is important to mention that some of the nikkeijin started to enter Japan in the late 1980s and participate in the labor force (Sellek 2007). However, most of the Philippine nikkeijin were not able to enjoy this privilege because they lacked the proper documentation with which they could prove their Japanese ancestry. The documents were either destroyed to conceal their Japanese ancestry or their births were not registered at all in the *koseki tohon* or family registry in Japan (Ohno 2008, 6). However, according to Flot's (2008) study, the eventual migration of those who were granted Japanese nationality indicated the importance of having "Japanese blood," which was a form of (socio-economic) empowerment since it allowed them to work in Japan and possibly improve their lives in the Philippines.

Aside from the nikkeijin, a new generation of children born to Japanese and Filipino parents particularly since 1980s came to be called *shin-nikkeijin* (*shin* meaning *new*). The new term served to distinguish them from the descendants of pre-war Japanese migrants. Shin-nikkeijin often carries a connotation of being children of "entertainers" (Suzuki 2010, 31). *Japanese Filipino Children* (JFC) is another label that has come to be applied to the children born of Japanese and Filipino unions. The term was popularized by NGOs assisting children of Filipino and Japanese parents (such as DAWN), particularly those who hardly knew their fathers. Thus, the term might carry a connotation of being "abandoned" by their Japanese fathers. This particular study focuses on the children of Filipino and Japanese parents, and those who do not belong to any NGOs. I will be using the term *Japanese-Filipino children* (note the hyphen and smaller *c* in *children*) in an effort to use a more neutral term than those mentioned above. The term is used to indicate their dual ethnicity² and to distinguish them from the nikkeijin, particularly the *Nisei*, who are either children of pre-war Japanese-Filipino unions or of both Japanese migrants to the Philippines. To avoid confusion, the study will use "Japanese-Filipino children" to refer exclusively to those born in the 1980s and 1990s.

In 2008, the revision in the Nationality Law of Japan gave the children of Japanese nationals born after 1985 outside of wedlock a chance to become Japanese nationals if they were recognized by their Japanese fathers even after their birth (Ministry of Justice, The Nationality Law). This revision can be interpreted as an effort to address the clamour to have a “Japanese nationality” of the growing number of Japanese-Filipino children who were born during the 80s and 90s, to mostly, if not all, Filipina entertainers and their Japanese partners. Moreover, the revision somehow placed the Japanese-Filipino children in a privileged position; unlike those who do not have “Japanese blood,” Japanese-Filipino children could now travel to Japan more easily. Nevertheless, media reports (Agnote 2008; Valmero 2009; Bullied in Japan, pre-teen half-Pinay commits suicide 2010; Matsubara 2012;) and a number of studies (Nuqui 2008; Seiger 2010; Suzuki 2010; Jabar 2011; Ito 2011; Asakawa 2013), including publications of some non-government organizations (NGOs) (Arboleda and Nuqui 2010), continued to emphasize the negative plight of Japanese-Filipino children born in the 1980s and 1990s. They are often stereotypically depicted as underprivileged, a group that seeks recognition from their respective Japanese fathers (so that they could go to Japan). At the same time, Japanese-Filipino children in Japan are perceived as migrants that endure hardships. Such depiction ignores those who were recognized from birth by their Japanese parent and/or those who do not belong to any NGO. More significantly, few (Seiger 2010) studies have given attention to Japanese-Filipino children who live in the Philippines and do not belong to any NGOs that assist Japanese-Filipino children. This study aims to fill these gaps. And it is in this context that I pose my research problem: How do Japanese-Filipino children who live in the Philippines and are not members of NGOs that provide assistance to Japanese-Filipino children construct their identity and social location in Philippine society?

The study involved two phases of one-on-one interviews with selected respondents based on the following criteria:

- a. Children of Japanese and Filipino parents who negotiate their identity that includes both Filipino and Japanese ancestry.
- b. Japanese-Filipino children between 18 and 30 years old; they were born during the so-called influx of Filipino women entertainers to Japan in the 1980s and 1990s.
- c. Japanese-Filipino children who are non-members of or not affiliated to organizations assisting Japanese-Filipino children. Non-membership in NGOs entails less influence of these organizations on one's identity formation.
- d. Japanese-Filipino children who are based in the Philippines.

This study employs purposeful sampling, crucially filtering for an individual's non-membership to any organization providing assistance to Japanese-Filipino children. It also utilizes the snowball sampling technique to address the difficulty in obtaining respondents based on the criteria above. Most of the respondents were recruited through referrals from other respondents, and from the author's friends and colleagues. Hence, it should be taken into consideration the possible influence of the author's background on the respondents recruited for this study. In addition, given the nature of the size and sampling of my respondents, the study should not be seen as a general representation of the Japanese-Filipino children in the Philippines. The study should be treated as an indicator of the possible role that belonging to an organization (that hints the factor of class) may play in studying the case of the Japanese-Filipino children in general. The study aims to create room for further research on this subject matter.

In-depth interviews lasting for one-and-a-half to two-and-a-half hours were conducted with nine (9) respondents in several locations (Quezon City, Las Piñas, and Bulacan). Interviews started in August 2012 and lasted until March 2013. All the interviews were recorded using a

digital voice recorder with the permission of the respondents. Ethical consideration was given importance. To protect their identity and privacy, the author assigned pseudonyms to each respondent and to other people whom they mentioned. The pseudonyms reflect whether the respondent has a Japanese or non-Japanese name.

Of the nine respondents, three were chosen for another set of interviews, the life history interviews, to obtain an in-depth understanding of how identity formation varies per individual. Selections of three respondents were based on some factors that the author deemed significant for the study: 1) self-identification; 2) relations with parents; 3) nature of relationship with friends; and finally 4) school experiences. The lengthy life history interviews were divided into two sessions so as not to exhaust the respondent (and the interviewer) and to ensure quality answers. Each session usually lasted for about two to two-and-a-half hours.

Given the small sampling size and the study's focus on identity, subjectivity, and agency, life history was chosen as a method because it provides a more in-depth understanding of an individual's life experiences, especially as a child of Japanese and Filipino parents in the Philippines. Life history may be referred to as "one rather peculiar and specific kind of narrative, a collaborative product [of] the dialogical relationship between teller and listener" (Waterson 2007, 3). As a method, it does not concern itself with the representativeness of the subject/respondent. According to Waterson,

it is the distinctive positioning of the subject that gives the narrative its authenticity, not the question of whether that individual is "average" or typical. However apparently unique, the individual's story will always be representative of the experience of living at that particular historical conjuncture, faced with those particular contradictions, opportunities or constraints (ibid 14).

Waterson also acknowledges the fact that while no ethnography can possibly say everything about a society, even life history or any other account is incomplete and composed of fragments. And so are identities.

Sherry Ortner’s Practice Theory, guided by Phenomenology, is primarily utilized as tool of analysis. One of the essential aspects of Practice Theory is its idea of “the production of social subjects through practice in the world, and of the production of the world itself through practice” (Ortner 2006, 16). The latter part proves to be crucial since it provides a dialectical synthesis of “structure” (defined as the social world as constituted) and “agency” (the interested practices of real people). Practice Theory emphasizes the actor in relation to a larger structure. Thus, in analyzing a particular case, Practice Theory does not treat it as an isolated phenomenon, but treats it in reference to a larger one. Finally, Ortner’s two forms of social embeddedness is an excellent point of analysis in treating individual cases; it helps in understanding the dynamics and influences of different kinds of relations that an individual has on other people and society in general.

FIGURE 2
Japanese-Filipino child’s web of (societal) relations
(Created by the author)




TABLE 2: Respondents' Profiles

Name/Sex	Birth Year	Birthplace	Passport/ Document of Recognition as Filipino Citizen	Occupation	Parent's Occupation (a): Mother/father	Schools Attended
Sakura/F	1991	Tokyo, Japan	Japan/Yes	UP Student	Clerk/ Businessman	Southville International School (K-12); University of the Philippines Diliman
Hiroshi/M	1993	Bulacan, Philippines	Japan/Yes	UP Student	Laundry house/ convenience store attendant	Integrated School of Montessori(K-12); University of the Philippines Diliman
Ayaka/F	1988	Kanagawa, Japan	Japan/Yes	UP Student	Entertainer/ Jazz player	Divine Light Academy (prep-g4); Elizabeth Seton School (g5); Junior and Senior High School at Kanagawa, Japan; Kanagawa Prefecture College of Foreign Studies (2-yr course)/ University of the Philippines Diliman (BA)
Yumiko/F	1993	Tokyo, Japan	Japan/Yes	UP Student	Entertainer/ salary man	Pre-school in Japan; St. Francis of Assisi College(pre-p-g1); Elizabeth Seton School (g2-hs); University of the Philippines Diliman
Mary Joy/F	1990	Makati, Philippines	Philippines	AMA Graduate/ Working	Entertainer/ clerk (TV network)	St. Francis of Assisi College (g1-g3); Vergonville Elementary and High School (g4-1 st hs); St. Therese School (2 nd hs-4 th hs); AMA College

Name/Sex	Birth Year	Birthplace	Passport/ Document of Recognition as Filipino Citizen	Occupation	Parent's Occupation (a): Mother/father	Schools Attended
Jiro/M	1991	Pasay, Philippines	Philippines	UPLB Graduate/ Working	Restaurant waitress-Supervisor/ Landscape gardening (own business)	University of Perpetual Help Sytem Dalta (pre-school-4 th year hs); University of the Philippines Los Baños
Sayuri/F	1992	Bulacan, Philippines	Japan/No	CEU-Bulacan Student	Recruitment agent/engineer	Integrated School of Montessori (prep-g2); Lord Angel's Montessori (g3-g4); grade 4-Senior High School at Kanagawa Japan; Centro Escolar University, Bulacan
John Michael Ray/M	1989	Quezon City, Philippines	CEU-Manila	Philippines	Entertainer/ Yakuza	Diliman Preparatory School (g1-hs); Mapua Institute of Technology, Manila; Centro Escolar University (stayed 2 yrs; Centro Escolar University, Manila (transferred)
Mayumi/F	1992	Osaka, Japan	Japan/Yes	MAPUA Student	Bar in the Philippines/ Construction worker	Prep-grade two at Elementary School in Osaka, Japan; Christian Values School (grade 2-hs); Mapua Institute of Technology, Manila

a. Refers to the occupation of the biological father of the respondent (at the time when parents met) since there are those whose parents divorced and the mother now has a different husband/partner.

Utilizing Ortner's Practice Theory, the conceptual framework assumes a distinct identity for Japanese-Filipino children as a group because of their dual ethnicity. But because of the stereotypical notions or connotations that some terms carry, different terms have emerged to specifically refer to their group. However, how an individual views or affiliates one's self to a particular group is affected or influenced by the different structures that one constantly deals with and by the acts or reflections of an individual on these influences. The double-headed arrow signifies the two-way relationship between the individual and social structures; the individual acts in the world but is also acted upon. At a macro level, it is assumed that both the Japanese and Philippine societies exert some form of influence (directly or indirectly) over the individual.

The circles enclosing "dual ethnicity" are perceived as fluid but also depend on one's social location. Since an individual is also endowed with "agency," (one's own desire and intention within a matrix of subjectivity) one does not completely succumb to the influences of either or both societies. Furthermore, since it is assumed that an individual is also embedded in different forms of relations that he/she has to constantly deal with, how he/she lives and identifies him/herself also varies. For this particular study, I focused on the respondents' relations or experiences with their 1) families, particularly their parents and upbringing; 2) friends, in terms of their ethnicity; and finally 3) educational institutions, focusing on the nature of the school (i.e. policies) and their social relations in it.

Lives and Statures In the Philippines

My study on the Japanese-Filipino children born in the 1980s and 1990s and based in the Philippines depicts a different picture of Japanese-Filipino children, who are seen in previous research as impoverished and seeking recognition from their Japanese fathers (Nuqui 2008; Suzuki 2010; Arboleda and Nuqui 2010; Ito 2011; Asakawa 2013). All my respondents, with the exception of Mary Joy, are leading a relatively better life in the

Philippines. This is more evident in the case of those who have lived in Japan and have noticed the difference in their economic status in the Philippines. Mayumi, who was born and raised in Japan until she was about eight years old, recounted that her family was poor³ in Japan; but when she transferred to the Philippines, her mother had provided for her needs in the form of balikbayan boxes or money remittances. Yumiko revealed that they had to do all the household work whenever they went to Japan for holidays, unlike in the Philippines, where they have a maid. For Ayaka, the Philippines gave her opportunities she could not have had in Japan where she has been living since she was 13. Ayaka's main motivation for returning to the Philippines was that she could afford to pursue a higher education there.

All of my respondents have attended either international schools or private schools and some have even attended (or are attending) premier universities in the Philippines. Those who have already graduated are also stably employed in decent companies in the country. Among my respondents, only Mary Joy attended a public school in the Philippines. But after her aunt, who works in Japan, helped finance her education, she was able to study again in a private school. These factors may indicate my respondents' relatively better socio-economic status in the Philippines. Mary Joy elaborated on this experience. When she first transferred to St. Therese, a private school, from a public school, she felt like an outcast because she was perceived as poor. Because of that she was forced to socialize more and resorted to treating her friends out. Among all my respondents, Sakura verbalized her better socio-economic status most clearly, saying that her school (Southvilles)⁴ mostly admitted children of "upper middle-class" families.

When it comes to their assessment about their overall life in the Philippines, most of them say that they have no problem integrating in Philippine society, particularly in their close circle of friends and acquaintances. In fact, most of them think that sometimes they are given special treatment just because they are "half-Japanese" and at times are mistaken for a "foreigner."⁵ However, they still acknowledge the fact that

sometimes they cannot escape being stereotyped as “poor in English” because of their “Japanese blood,” or being teased as a child of either a “Japayuki” or a Japanese soldier during World War II. But most of them pointed out that these were just forms of teasing and did not really lead to discrimination. Among my nine respondents, only Mary Joy expressed feelings of discrimination whenever her classmates raised the issue of her being half-Japanese. She felt quite ashamed that she did not know her father while at the same time concealing her mother’s entertainer background.

It is also worth emphasizing that majority of my respondents are recognized by their Japanese fathers since they were born, a fact that plays a vital role in their acquisition of Japanese nationality. When I recruited respondents for my study, I did not intentionally seek those who are recognized by their Japanese parent; my only filter was that they should not be affiliated to any NGOs assisting Japanese descendants in the Philippines. As it turned out, all but one of my respondents are recognized by their Japanese fathers (at least from the day they were conceived/born). This holds true even for those whose parents are not legally married, as in Jiro’s case, whose father still visits them every now and then in the Philippines. The recognition explains why most of them—Sakura, Ayaka, Yumiko, Sayuri, and Mayumi—have held Japanese passports since birth. Hiroshi, who used to hold dual citizenship has already chosen “Japanese nationality” and is now carrying a Japanese passport. But for Philippine-born children like Jiro, John, and Mary Joy, who did not previously have a Japanese passport, obtaining a Japanese nationality (as a child of a Japanese national) is now impossible since they are all over the age of 20. Article 3 of the 2008 revised Nationality Law (2008) states that individuals who are under 20 years old, and are recognized by his/her Japanese [national] father or mother, can acquire Japanese nationality by applying to the Minister of Justice (Ministry of Justice, The Nationality Law). John was just able to obtain a long-term visa as a child of a Japanese national. Meanwhile, the papers of Jiro and his siblings were being processed (at the time of the interview) to facilitate their travel to Japan. Mary Joy’s aunt, who is already a permanent resident in Japan, has promised to help

her get a visa (although she cannot elaborate what kind) to Japan so that she could be with her aunt there.

Most of my respondents maintain contact with their Japanese fathers, albeit in varying degrees. This holds true even for those whose parents have divorced or separated. Sakura and Ayaka grew up with their fathers around; Hiroshi, Yumiko, and Jiro have a “long-distance relationship” with their fathers who work in Japan. They talk frequently on the phone, and their fathers occasionally visit them in the Philippines or they themselves travel to Japan. Despite their parents’ divorce, Mayumi and Sayuri still keep in touch with their fathers and spend time with them whenever they can. John’s communication with his father was totally cut off after his parents separated when he was 10 years old. John’s father visited him when he was six or seven years old, and that was the last time John saw him; even so, John communicated with him through phone until his parents’ separation. He tried looking for his father when he, John, was in Japan but his mother told him that his father was too ashamed to meet him since he was not able to raise and support him.

It is clear that majority of my respondents have lived with their Japanese fathers at some point in their lives. This puts into question the prevailing image of Japanese-Filipino children born in the 1980s and 1990s as completely abandoned by their Japanese fathers or were born “fatherless.” It also challenges the notion that these children have strained relationships with their Japanese fathers and that their relationship is only “symbolic,” done solely to seek parental recognition and obtain Japanese nationality or long-term visas.

However, one respondent slightly conforms to this stereotype of Japanese-Filipino children. Among my respondents, Mary Joy is not recognized by and has not even met her Japanese father. Relevantly, she is the sole respondent whose mother at some point sought help from an NGO to locate her father, although this was not pursued. While Mary Joy initially wanted to know her father, she also resented the fact that he did not look for her. “Why bother and look for him?” she said. Nonetheless,

she does not really blame her father because she also recognizes her mother's fault in losing communication with him. This brings me to the different attitudes of my respondents to existing NGOs that assist to Japanese-Filipino children.

While most of my respondents recognize the help that these organizations extend to Japanese-Filipino children like them, they themselves have not seen the point of joining these organizations. Hiroshi, for instance, was invited by one of the organizations to join when he was in college. But upon learning from that NGO's website that their focus was primarily on those who were seeking recognition from their Japanese fathers, he felt awkward to be with them and did not join in the end. Yumiko, on the other hand, heard about these organizations in high school from another "half-Japanese" schoolmate who she thought was related to the organization. However, she thinks that, according to her mother, she herself does not need to join or get in touch with these organizations. Yumiko was told that these organizations are for those who were not acknowledged by their Japanese father and ended up not having [any] "citizenship."

Those who do not have any direct encounters with these organizations barely know about them or their activities. While they appreciate the possible help that these organizations can extend to other children, my respondents did not feel the need to take part in them. John and Jiro expressed similar sentiments. They claimed that they are already content with their lives and do not need support groups. Sakura said as much, saying that she grew up with both her parents around, as did Sayuri, who has known her Japanese father since she was young.

My respondents' Filipina parents took on different jobs when they were in Japan. Not all of them came to Japan as entertainers, as in the case of Sakura's mother who was a clerk; or Jiro's mother, who worked as a restaurant supervisor. In spite of that, it is undeniable that majority of my respondents' mothers were entertainers in Japan at some point in their lives. It is important to recall that in the 1970s, Japanese women⁶ were

replaced by foreigners, mostly women from Asia, in the entertainment industry. This could be an indicator that the source of stigma or discrimination of being a child of an entertainer is not only rooted in ethnicity (because they are only half-Japanese) but also in class,⁷ since an “entertainer” is not considered a prestigious job. Ortner elaborated on this tendency to ignore class in her study of the Class of '58 of Weequahic High School⁸ in New Jersey. She argues how “class” exists in America but is “hidden” or spoken through other languages of difference such as that of race, ethnicity, and gender (2006, 72). Nevertheless, it is important to consider the different circumstances that forced these women to work as entertainers. Mayumi’s mother first went to Japan not as an entertainer, but as a wife of a Japanese national after their marriage in the Philippines. However, her financial difficulties in Japan pushed her to seek a job first in a manufacturing company, which later closed down. She then transferred to a snack bar and after a couple of years, went into caregiving.

This finding fits Suzuki’s⁹ critique of the skewed representations of the union between Japanese husbands and Filipino wives. She argues that not all Filipino wives are so-called ethnicized brides or *Japayukis*. Mayumi’s description of her father as “very *probinsyano*” and her mother as “classy” clearly challenges the misconception about Filipino wives. This goes to show that Filipina migrants are somehow “empowered,” particularly in rural Japan. They are epitomized as modern and cosmopolitan, unlike their husbands from the Japanese countryside (Faier 2009). Following also Fuwa and Anderson’s study,¹⁰ some of these women maintained successful relationships with their Japanese husbands despite the different circumstances. The mothers of some of my respondents kept their families intact, regardless of the distance between Japan and the Philippines. The Filipino mothers were also able to send their children to good schools and provide them a relatively comfortable life, especially in the Philippines. Even those who became single mothers were able to support their (extended) families in the Philippines. With the exception of those like Yumiko, Mary Joy, and Jiro, all of my respondents’ mothers currently work in Japan, mostly in factories and dry cleaning shops. Some stayed on even after giving birth to their child/ren, while others returned

to Japan after spending some time in the Philippines. Frequent travel between Japan and the Philippines has become inevitable, as has for their children. Clearly, one has to see these Filipino women beyond their “entertainer” background.

Transnational connections with Japan also need to be considered to understand identity construction among Japanese-Filipino children, as they affect an individual’s “practices of constructing, maintaining, and negotiating identities” (Vertovec 2001, 575). Transnationalism refers to “exchanges, connections and practices across borders, transcending the national space as the primary reference point for activities and identities” (International Organization for Migration 2010, 1). Among my nine respondents, only Jiro and Mary Joy have not been to Japan. However, Jiro’s father sends packages from Japan almost every month, and spends time with his family whenever he is in the Philippines. Mary Joy said that she does not know much about Japan after her mother stopped going there when she was three years old. She, however, gets her idea about Japan from her mother; to some extent, from her aunt’s and cousin’s stories; and from what she sees on TV. Her knowledge about Japan, however, seems to be quite limited to “strict police,” modern restaurants, high rate of suicides, and ghosts. She also has this notion that people her age are fond of “cute things” and are “really nice,” judging from the friends of her cousins.

Alternatively, Ayaka, Sayuri, and to some extent Mayumi, have spent a good part of their lives in Japan. Most of my respondents go to Japan for holidays. While all of them have something positive to say about Japan, their different experiences account for their different attitudes about going there. John recalled being happy with his “first snow experience” in Japan, but admitted that living there for about two years pushed him out of his “comfort zone.” His time in Japan was spent learning and gaining some proficiency (N2) [in Japanese Language Proficiency Exam, N2 indicates that one is proficient enough to read, write and speak Japanese, with N1 as the most difficult and highest level a non-native speaker can obtain] in Nihongo. Despite his linguistic facility, he admitted that he still could not tap his full potential in Japan because of the language and cultural barriers. He also

tried engaging in different kinds of jobs (*arubaito*), from teaching English to construction work, which “pushed his limits” and somehow created in him a distaste for going to Japan. Some of my respondents also shared experiences of discrimination in Japan because they are “half-Japanese.” For instance, Ayaka and Mayumi were bullied at school. For the rest of my respondents, however, Japan is a big holiday site. Most associate Japan with positive experiences and pleasant memories of eating great food, going to amusement parks, and shopping. For Hiroshi, Ayaka, Sayuri, and Mayumi, whose parent/s have been staying in Japan for the longest time, Japan means being with their family and friends; thus, they always look forward to traveling there.

It is apparent that even if my respondents are mostly based in the Philippines, they maintain transnational connections with Japan, albeit in varying degrees. This even applies to the case of Mary Joy, who has never been there. Phone calls, as well as social media networks such as Facebook and Skype enable the simultaneous contact between my respondents and their loved ones in Japan. This just shows the complex influence of the “multi-local life-world” to the individual’s identities, positioning the “individuals in the course of their everyday lives within and across each of their places of attachment or perceived belonging” (Vertovec 2001, 578).

Ways of Belonging

After giving a general picture of my respondents’ lives in the Philippines, I will now focus on the nature of their identity and “belongingness” to a group and, in turn, to society. By using ways of belonging, I am referring to “practices that signal or enact an identity which demonstrates a conscious connection to a particular group.”¹¹ This discussion will be limited to the terms that they associate with being a child of Japanese and Filipino parents, and to their attitudes to organizations that assist Japanese-Filipino children.

Knowing “who you are” is an essential part of an individual’s existence. Our sense of identity reflects our life’s choices; the things we do; how we think; and how we behave or respond to different situations. As

“identity is relational, being constructed through relations of difference such as *us* and *them*” (Woodward 2002, xii), people have the tendency to assign names or labels to facilitate easier identification or differentiation. But in some cases, putting labels to things also creates division within a group or could lead to discrimination or stereotyping. This seems to be the case with the Japanese-Filipino children in the Philippines, as I will discuss below.

Group Identity

It can be recalled that several terms refer to the children of Japanese-Filipino unions. In the case of those born in the 1980s and 1990s, the focus of my study, this constant redefinition (inclusion and exclusion of membership to a group) can be analysed in terms of the social factors affecting group dynamics. According to Ortner’s concept of (social) “power” and “agency,” (2006) both Japanese and Philippine societies (considering the individual’s transnational connections) exert some influence on the members of the Japanese-Filipino children as a group, which in turn leads to their constant redefining of “who I am/who we are.” This translates to one’s “agency” in a group and as an individual. At a macro-level, changes in laws or policies (i.e. the Nationality Law) warrant different reactions and actions from those directly affected by these changes. For instance, granting a chance to acquire Japanese nationality to those born out of wedlock can be good news for such. But for those whose parents are legally married, this revision somehow strips them of their former privilege of having Japanese nationality because now they share such opportunity to those born outside marriage. Before the revision, a “Japanese nationality” served as a “status symbol” of “legal children” of Japanese nationals, differentiating them from those born out of wedlock. This could be a reason why several terms have emerged, probably to associate or dissociate one group from the other. I now go back to the labels or terms used to refer to Japanese-Filipino children.

Before I mentioned some of the terms during the interview, I first asked the respondents which ones referring to children with Japanese

Filipino parents they are familiar with. They all had something to say about their preferred labels based on their perceptions of the different terms and their experiences. For instance, Sakura does not want to associate herself with the term *Japino* (a word that combines Japanese and *Pinoy* [Filipino]) since she has this impression that it is mainly used for “bastard children of former Filipina entertainers.” For Hiroshi, there seems to be an “imbalance” in the term, *Japino*, since it seems that the “Filipino” element is more recognizable than that of the Japanese. On the contrary, John sees “balance” in the term, saying that it has both Filipino and Japanese elements. The term *JFC* or *Japanese Filipino Children* received mixed reactions from my respondents. Some found it more descriptive and easier for the general public to understand, while others thought it “weird.” *Nikkeijin*¹² appeared quite amenable to most of my Philippine-based respondents since the term is in Japanese, and it has a less discriminatory sense than other terms. Nevertheless, for some, it still has a negative connotation. Yumiko, for example, considered *nikkeijin* discriminatory, asserting that Japanese are very particular about having “pure blood.” Some of my respondents also expressed a kind of detachment with the term, thinking that *nikkeijin* implies having only some “Japanese blood,” and that it does not necessarily entail being “half-Japanese.” This is the case with Sayuri who has lived most of her life in Japan. These perceptions mostly come from what they see in mass media (TV and the Internet) and from what they hear from people at school. Sayuri seems to be distinguishing herself from the “Philippine *nikkeijin*” that also includes third- or fourth-generation Japanese.

My respondents also introduced other terms for Japanese-Filipino children that they have encountered, including *Japino*y, *Japoks*, and *Fil-Jap* or *Jap-Fil*. Most of them do not really like these terms, except for *Fil-Jap*. Additionally, those who stayed longer in Japan told me that *hafu*¹³ (technically the Japanese pronunciation of the English word *half* and written in *katakana*) was the usual label in Japan for Japanese-Filipino children like them. Ayaka prefers the term “double” or “mixed” instead

of “half,” since she feels that “half” seems discriminatory and connotes “incompleteness.” She also mentioned *kikoku shijo*,¹⁴ which according to her is the term used for “Japanese who have returned from other countries”. *Kikoku shijo*, however, according to Podolsky’s¹⁵ study (2008), refers mainly to [returnee] children of Japanese nationals who accompany their parents abroad because of the nature of their work i.e. military personnel, diplomat, missionary; the term does not apply to those with a half-Japanese ethnicity. *Kikoku shijo* presents a different context and problems than those of Japanese-Filipino children. Even though they are ethnically “pure Japanese,” *kikoku shijo* spend most of their lives abroad and have difficulty integrating to Japanese society once they return. Perhaps Ayaka shares the same sentiment and thus she could relate with the *kikoku shijo*. But still, some respondents expressed concern about [using] these labels, saying that these sometimes make them prone to stereotyping or discrimination. Some like Hiroshi and Jiro do not want any labels all; they prefer to be called either *Japanese* or *Filipino*.

All these suggest that an individual can relate to a group and at the same time avoid being identified with it. It is evident in my study that most of my respondents are wary about these labels because they fear being identified with other Japanese-Filipino children (abandoned or bastard children) or being classified as a son or daughter of a “Japayuki.” Culture¹⁶ plays a part in the qualms of my respondents about labels. A number of my respondents talked about this “Filipino culture” of creating word plays and making funny names, which could be a factor in their hesitations to be labelled. There are also terms such as *Bisapon* (short for *Bisayang Hapon*), *Japoks*, and even *Jafake* that are used by some of their friends to tease them. Although most of these take the form of jokes, some of my respondents admitted that they are sometimes offended. Most of them would rather have those terms or categories be used in formal settings or academic papers than in daily interactions. This visibly reveals the danger of putting labels or categorizations to certain groups because instead of uniting them, it further creates a divide within the group.

Individual Identity/ies

There appear to be three different ways how my respondents identified themselves. One group said that they are “more Filipino” (but for some a transition from being Japanese); another sees themselves as “more Japanese;” and the third group sees themselves as somewhere in the middle. “Filipinoness”, according to my respondents, is often associated with the following traits: tardiness, hospitality, having [extended] family bond and values, being adaptive, conservativeness, cheerfulness, [too] laxity, and even laziness. “Japaneseness,” on the other hand, is linked mostly to positive traits such as discipline, consciousness with time, industriousness, strictness, and [too] politeness, but it also includes monotony, stiffness, pride, and being [too] workaholic. I focused on three respondents, namely Sakura, Mary Joy, and Mayumi, the three whom I did a life history interview with, to have a deeper understanding of their identification process.

Practice Theory emphasizes the importance of “subjectivity as the basis of ‘agency’” in understanding the dialectical synthesis between the “structure” and the “agency.” *Agency* refers to some “specific desires and intentions within a matrix of subjectivity—of (culturally constituted) feelings, thoughts and meanings” (Ortner 2006, 110). How an individual affiliates his/herself to a country or a group depends on his/her position in society as an individual, which also affects his or her intentions and plans. It is important to look into the lives of each individual to understand where he or she is coming from, and why one identifies his/herself in a particular way. Ortner’s concept of the two forms of social embeddedness of agents is central to her “serious games” framework, and it serves as an excellent point of analysis. The first form of social embeddedness assumes that the “agent” (or the social actor) is always embedded in relations of solidarity. It is assumed that while social actors have “agency,” it is also impossible to imagine that the agent is “free” or is an unrestrained individual. An agent is “always embedded in relations of solidarity: family, friends, kin, spouses or partners, children, parents, teachers, allies, and so forth” (ibid. 130). I will focus on the lives of Mary Joy, Sakura, and Mayumi, specifically on their relationship with their parents, friends, and close colleagues.

As I have exemplified, my respondents express their sense of personal belongingness in different ways. Sakura positions herself in the middle of being Japanese and Filipino. It appears that the presence of her Japanese father and Filipina mother while she was growing up plays a crucial factor in her self-affiliation. She thinks that because she grew up having both of her parents around, she has learned two cultures (Filipino and Japanese). Sakura also attributes her learning English and Japanese at the same time to having both her parents around all her life. On the other hand, Mary Joy grew up without knowing her father. And her relationship with her mother is also strenuous. Although she had a “father figure,” her Papa Taishi (the Japanese boyfriend of her mother until Mary Joy was eight years old), he was often in Japan and Mary Joy got to be with him only during his annual visits to the Philippines. Mary Joy’s mother did not also teach her Japanese and this reinforced the superficiality of her interaction with her Papa Taishi, an interaction somehow confined to receiving gifts and money. Mary Joy grew up in an extended family where a number of her relatives have (had) relationships with Japanese men. Drawing mainly on stories of her relatives’ relationships with Japanese men, it appears that Mary Joy generally has a good impression of their Japanese partners. That is why she puts most of the blame¹⁷ on her relatives when it comes to their strained relationships with their Japanese partners. Growing up in the company of her aunt, uncles, and cousins, she [said that she] has known a number of negative Filipino traits, such as “being lazy to the point of depending on one’s siblings to survive;” not exerting any effort to find work; always asking for money from others; not being fair, and so forth. These impressions were made against the relatively congenial experiences she had with the Japanese people she met. This could be indicative of her desire to identify with the Japanese more than with Filipinos.

Meanwhile, Mayumi’s relatively substantial exposure to both Filipino and Japanese society puts her in a special situation. Born and raised in Japan, she spent as a child a considerable time with her Japanese father (and his family) and her own mother. Sharing her recent experience

of choosing a Japanese nationality and renouncing her Filipino citizenship (the Philippines allows dual citizenship while Japan does not), she expressed her sentiments about “losing” her Filipino nationality, realizing that she has become “more Filipino.” She added that it felt odd that she is holding a Japanese passport while she does not speak good Japanese, and her life is right here in the Philippines. Mayumi’s expression of her being Filipino can also be seen against the background of what happened between her mother and father prior to their divorce. Seeing her father as “violent” and her mother as having had to make a lot of sacrifices to raise Mayumi, she obviously sided with her mother. Describing her father as “*probinsyano*,” “mama’s boy,” and not providing for their family’s financial needs can indicate her negative impressions of Japan and its people.

The respondents have different stories on relationships with friends and romantic partners. Sakura has a number of friends with mixed ethnicities, most of whom she met at school. She did not really think that she was “special” since there were a lot of people like her in school, Southville. But after she got into college, her closest friends were mostly Filipino, although she still sees her high school friends. Mary Joy has not had a lot of exposure to people of her age with mixed ethnicities. Despite that, she also has a few “half-Japanese” friends in addition to her Filipino ones. But among these two groups, she thinks she is more comfortable with her Japanese-Filipino friend in particular, whom she has known since elementary school and to whom she could tell almost anything. However, being with her “half-Japanese” friends sometimes makes her feel insecure, mainly because her friends are recognized by their Japanese father while she does not even know hers. That is why sometimes she feels that she cannot fit in. Mayumi’s friends, on the other hand, are mostly composed of Filipinos, with the exception of her childhood “half-Japanese” friend with whom she still communicates. Unlike Mary Joy, Mayumi thinks that she has a “deeper connection” with her Filipino friends. Mayumi reflected that this is possible because she is technically “alone” in the Philippines, devoting most of her time at school and getting close to her friends, whom she regards more as family. Her relationship with her “half-Japanese”

childhood friend, on the other hand, is now limited to online exchanges; and Mayumi admitted that sometimes they have to hurdle a language barrier because her friend does not know Tagalog very much while Mayumi is not very good in Japanese.

When it comes to romantic relationships, both Mary Joy and Mayumi have gone out with Japanese-Filipino children like them. Both of them talked of the “commonality” they share with their boyfriends, pointing mainly to their “half-Japanese” ancestry. Mary Joy, for example, was able to share with a former “half-Japanese” boyfriend the feeling of not knowing one’s father. Both of them also had the same problem of not fitting in with their respective mother’s new family. All of her other former boyfriends were Filipinos. The privilege of having private conversations in Japanese in the midst of non-Japanese speakers in the Philippines makes Mayumi’s relationship with her current half-Japanese boyfriend more intimate. Sakura, on the other hand, had two relationships in the past with a Korean (for less than a year) and a Taiwanese (for five years). She and her Taiwanese boyfriend decided to end the relationship when he migrated to the United States. Presently, she is dating a Filipino. She admitted that she used to have a bias against dating Filipinos because she did not find them attractive. Today, her prejudices are based more on one’s educational attainment, such as whether one went to college or not. But Sakura, Mayumi, and Mary Joy do not think that they choose their future partners based on their nationality or ethnicity. According to them, their attraction to a man would still depend on the kind of person he is.

Finally, Mayumi, Sakura, and Mary Joy have different experiences in schools in the Philippines. Of the three, only Mayumi went to school in both Japan and the Philippines. Her experiences in Japanese schools were generally pleasant, made up of interactions with teachers and schoolmates. Her being “half-Japanese” did not become an issue until she was in Grade Two, when her closest friends started to avoid her after learning that she is *hafu*. Upon moving to the Philippines, she did not meet a lot of Japanese or “half-Japanese” children at Christian Values School¹⁸ in Cavite. But that made her feel “special” because the people

around her took extra interest in her whenever they learned that she is “half-Japanese.” There were more international students when she went to college in Mapua,¹⁹ and here she met a number of “half-Japanese” students. Most importantly, school has become the center of her life in the Philippines, and she has become more active in school activities and organizations. One of the organizations she joined, a Christian group, introduced her to Christianity, a faith which she adheres to at present. Generally, Mayumi considers her life at school as fortunate because having a Japanese name somehow makes her stand out. People can remember her easily, and she gets special treatment when people assume that she does not speak Tagalog.

Mary Joy did not have a lot of foreign schoolmates in both the private and public schools she attended. Nonetheless, she often hid her Japanese ethnicity at school, fearing that people might ask about her father. Mary Joy went under the guise of being the daughter of a Chinese; it was a partial truth since her mother is “half-Chinese” and “half-Filipino.” Whenever people tried to point out her physical appearance, she would usually explain that her eyes and complexion are such because her mother is Chinese. Sometimes, just to cut the conversation short, she would plainly say that she is “pure” Filipino. She felt that she did not fit in at school most of the time, and this has led her to engage in delinquent behaviors just to be “cool” and also so that she could hang out with some of her schoolmates. Mary Joy did not talk a lot about her experiences in college. I could only assume that she did not really have a lot of friends then, especially since she had to quit school for a while because of family and financial problems and most of her batch mates may have already graduated ahead of her.

Sakura’s experience at school, she related, was rather “normal” since almost everyone in her school at Southville has mixed ethnicities. This is not a very usual situation in the Philippines. Sakura was popular in high school when the “F4 phenomenon”²⁰ swept the Philippines. At that time, the “Chinita look” was fashionable and Sakura had a Taiwanese boyfriend. Sakura recounted that she and her boyfriend were considered a “power couple” in high school since most of her schoolmates associated them

with the protagonists of the Taiwanese TV series. But Sakura also remembered arguing with her history teacher on the discussion about the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. In her life history, she elaborated on how she was torn between siding with the Japanese and sympathizing with the Filipinos for what they suffered. Consciously or unconsciously, Sakura tried to deal with the conflict by believing in one aspect of history: that those who did horrible things in the Philippines were not really Japanese but conscripted Korean soldiers. Historians have long interpreted this as propaganda of the Japanese government to offset the negative image of Japanese in history. Though it is true that there were non-Japanese conscripts, it is also wrong to suppose that there were not any Japanese soldiers from Japan during World War II.²¹ In some way, Sakura used this information to help her reconcile her internal turmoil about belonging to both ethnicities.

Ortner sees the social actor as “always enmeshed within relations of power, inequality, and competition” (2006, 131), the second form of social embeddedness. In this connection, I focus on my respondents’ nationality, i.e. the passport that they hold. Six out of nine of my respondents hold Japanese passports, along with the paper from the Philippine government that recognizes the holder as a Filipino “citizen.” Japan’s Nationality Law operates on the principle of *jus sanguinis*, relying specifically on patrilineal descent. Thus, recognition of the Japanese father is a crucial factor for a child to acquire a Japanese nationality. In the Philippines, holding “dual citizenship” is allowed, and it is somehow viewed as a prestige. Japan, on the other hand, does not allow dual citizenship; one has to renounce one’s nationality if one wishes to have a Japanese one. However, holding a Japanese nationality does not translate to easier integration in Japanese society, even with the individual’s half-Japanese ethnicity. Zulueta (2011), in her study of Japanese (Okinawan)-Filipino Nisei, points to their “mixed parentage” and limited knowledge of Japanese language as among the factors that led them to be perceived as “foreign” despite being a Japanese national. This applies to Japanese-Filipino children as well, since most of them grew up in the Philippines, coupled only with occasional visits to

Japan that most hardly know the Japanese culture. Even so, most of my respondents chose Japanese nationality.

Following Ortner's discussion of power and agency, it can be interpreted that my respondents may just be "acting within relations of social inequality, asymmetry, and force" (2006, 139). Having a Japanese passport gives an individual not only easier entry to Japan (where it is considered hard to secure a visa for a Filipino) but also an opportunity to live or work there. In addition, travelling to foreign countries is a lot easier with a Japanese passport than with a Filipino one because the former carries certain privileges such as visa exemption in some countries. Most of my respondents admitted that this was a reason for choosing a Japanese passport. Affiliating one's self with Japan, at least legally speaking, also seems prestigious because it is considered a "First World" country, unlike the Philippines, which is a "developing" nation.

Based on the interactions of my respondents with other people, the idea of power and inequality could also account for why someone like Mary Joy would try to hide her Japanese ancestry, and yet take advantage of her being half-Japanese and go to Japan.²² The hesitations among my respondents to pursue their lives or careers in Japan can also reflect the perceived inequality and competition that some of them experienced in Japan.

In addition, different circumstances and interactions with different peoples also affect how an individual presents himself or herself. In Sakura's case, whenever she is in Japan, she tries to look and behave more like the Japanese do. Mayumi, on the other hand, feels the need to somehow "tame" her being Japanese [when she is in the Philippines], especially in situations when she is prone to discrimination. Meanwhile, Mary Joy's "Japaneseness" is reinforced when she looks at her positive traits (that she attributes to her Japanese ancestry) but in most cases, she hides it to avoid bringing up her mother's background as an entertainer. This idea runs parallel to Woodward's idea of identity as historically specific; and can be seen as fluid, contingent, and changing over time (2002, xii). During my

interview, Sakura, Mary Joy, and Mayumi responded quite simply about their identity, their sense of belongingness. However, as they shared their life experiences, all seemed to have redefined their identity/ies as Japanese or Filipino or both. Their admission of belongingness to one ethnicity or their refusal at times to take sides depends on the situation and the people they are with. For example, some tend to shy away from their Japanese ethnicity when they are stereotyped as children of *Japayukis*, but when people compliment their excellence in math or drawing, their being Japanese comes to the fore.

After the interviews with the respondents, it became apparent that having some knowledge of and exposure to two cultures affects an individual's sense of belonging to society. My study shows that Japanese and Philippine societies have both influenced my subjects in varying degrees. It seems that the travel experiences of the respondents who shuttle between Japan and the Philippines affect their sense of belongingness. In Hayami's (2007) case study, she interprets the travel narratives of young Karen women from hills to cities as mobility between different fields of power. This mobility, she said, causes the individual to "objectify his/her own place of origin, and continue to question his/her own identity, both in terms of ethnicity and gender, in the process and webs of power" (ibid 254). Somerville's (2008) study of second-generation Indians living in Canada reveals that despite their Canadian citizenship and sense of inclusion within Canadian society, they maintain a connection to India through visits and constant communication with their friends and relatives. Somerville calls this "transnational belonging." Treating the individual as part of a "transnational social field" makes clear the possibility of being incorporated in a new state while at the same time maintaining transnational attachments to a homeland because of one's simultaneity of connection (Levitt and Schiller 2004). This is evident in the case of Ayaka, who, despite living in Japan for a long time with her family, still considers herself as Filipino "on the inside."

Adding the factor of transnationality, where individuals "experience multiple loci and layers of power" (Levitt and Schiller 2004, 1013) suggests

how one can be further influenced and embedded in the different social relations of more than one state without even being physically there. This somehow explains why some of my respondents position themselves in the middle of being Japanese and Filipino because they feel that they have a connection to both Japan and the Philippines. Thus, the circle enclosing one's network is not fixed, and the boundaries between what is "Japanese" or "Filipino" is particularly also hard to mark out since an individual constantly redefines his/her identity. Following Giddens's idea of a (partially) "knowing" subject, Ortner emphasizes that the "subject" is never passive—an individual also acts on the world but is also acted upon. As Japanese-Filipino children, my respondents somewhat straddle two invisible lines (Japanese and Filipino). Going back to the discussion of agency, it is important to reiterate that it is always up to the individual to choose who he/she is or is not, but the choices will always be influenced by his/her complex web of relations with other social agents. How Japanese or Filipino (or both) they are depends a lot on the social structures that they constantly deal or negotiate with.

Conclusion

This study explores the lives of the Philippine-based Japanese-Filipino children born in the 1980s and 1990s, and examines the different ways that they construct their identity and social location in Philippine society. My study revealed that my respondents enjoy a relatively better life in terms of socio-economic status and integration in Philippine society. Almost all of them attended private or international schools and premier universities, and most have been vocal of their relatively "easy life" here in the Philippines. The lives of my respondents also varied in terms of the different relationships they have with both their parents, on their upbringing, and their exposure to and attitude towards Japanese culture.

Using in-depth interviews and life history as a method, my study indicated that Japanese-Filipino children have various ways of constructing and viewing themselves, which vary according to different factors. As a

group, they expressed varying senses of identification to being a Japanese-Filipino child, mainly in response to the stereotypes and negative connotations of labels that refer to them. On an individual level, three distinct identifications came out from my interviews: those who consider themselves as “more Japanese;” those who see themselves more as “Filipino;” and those who refuse to choose between those two ethnicities and position themselves in the middle of being both Japanese and Filipino. Applying Practice Theory, particularly the concept of agency and an individual’s social embeddedness, my study has identified and analyzed the different factors that influence an individual’s identity construction. For this study, I focused on the dynamics of an individual with his/her family, friends, and romantic partners, as well as one’s school experiences. My study indicated that those who grew up with both their Japanese and Filipino parents for most of their life, as exemplified in Sakura’s life history, show a tendency to see themselves in the center of being Japanese and Filipino. For those who grew up without the presence of their mother and father (because of marital separation or long-distance relationships because the parents work in Japan), as in the case of Mayumi, who sees herself more as Filipino, the relationship with friends and her school experiences play bigger roles in identity construction. Mary Joy, who grew up not knowing her father and neglected by her mother, identifies herself more as Japanese mainly because her being “different” is always attributed by her family and friends to her being “half-Japanese.” I have also observed that it is quite common among my male respondents to identify themselves more as Filipino. This may indicate that gender also plays a significant role when it comes to identity construction.

The transnational connection of the individual was also considered, but one that needs to be explored further since it plays a crucial role to identity construction. As earlier studies (Vertovec 2001; Levitt and Schiller 2004) on transnationalism exemplify, transnational individuals form their identities out of multiple affiliations and belongingness to complex networks of peoples and places crosscutting national boundaries, influencing their gender, race, and class status.

Most importantly, the class factor appeared very prominent in my study. By filtering on the organization affiliation, I somehow also filtered the “class status” of Japanese-Filipino children. My study revealed that there seems to be a form of divide between those who are affiliated with organizations assisting Japanese-Filipino children and those who are not, and that class seems to be an important, if not the root cause of this division. My respondents’ view of those who are affiliated to such organizations somehow reflects their class belonging—that they do not need such organizations since they are “recognized” and are not in need of any (financial) assistance. Sakura exemplifies this when she said that her school mostly caters to “upper-middle class,” signalling her class affiliation. Class belonging, as demonstrated in this study, plays an important role in how an individual views oneself as well as others, influencing one’s sense of belongingness to a group and society. As far as the Japanese-Filipino children are concerned, the seeming divide within this category somehow proves that “ethnic and even racial categories were in fact crosscut by the class divide” (Ortner 2006, 69).

Finally, my study illustrated that how an individual crafts one’s self is influenced by different webs of relations with other people. Clearly, just because one is a Japanese-Filipino child does not instantly make one into a stereotype. In this regard, even if all of them are “half-Filipino” and “half-Japanese,” my respondents displayed different identity constructions and affiliations, and even different meanings of what it means to be Japanese and Filipino or something else. But considering that identity is fluid and changing over time, I also noticed the tendency of my respondents to constantly redefine their identity, despite affiliating one’s self to being Filipino or Japanese or even something else. It seemed that age also plays a role in identity construction since some of my respondents accounted that they used to consider themselves as more Japanese when they were young, but changed their views as they grew older. This hews to the phenomenological approach to life history, in which the way individual perceives or interprets things and events (of the past) might change as one gains more knowledge and experiences.

Notes

- ¹ Citizenship “delineates the characters of a member’s rights and duties within the national polity” while nationality legally delineates the category of belonging without granting full citizenship rights” (Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick-Schiller. 2004. “Conceptualizing simultaneity: a transnational social field perspective on society.” *International Migration Review* 38(3): 1002–1039, 1019).
- ² I use the term pertaining to the biological and cultural membership of an individual that is distinct from other groups of people.
- ³ She recounted just being fed kamote (sweet potato), having no electricity at home and moving out of their apartment for failing to pay the rent, because her father did not have a stable job.
- ⁴ Southville International School and Colleges is a private non-sectarian school with campuses located at Las Piñas, and Parañaque, Philippines. It claims to be the only international school in the Philippines that is recognized as an educational institution of international character, offering complete array of education from pre-school to College.
- ⁵ Jiro for instance said: “Pag alam din nila na may lahing foreigner ka they treat you well... ganun po yung tumatak sa kinang parang ginagamit ko rin minsan pag gusto ng good service” (If they [in the Philippines] know that you have foreign blood, they treat you well... that’s what stuck to me so sometimes I make use of it if I want a good service).
- ⁶ Karayuki-san refers to disparage Japanese women who were prostitutes in China from the end of 19th century to the early 20th century, from which Japayuki-san (Filipina entertainers in Japan) was derived from (Lieba Faier. 2009. *Intimate Encounters: Filipina migrants remake rural Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press).
- ⁷ Ortner uses the term in line with Bourdieu, pointing out to “certain economic-cum-cultural locations defined within an objectivist perspective...” while at the same time as “an identity term that is organized primarily around an economic axis” (2006, 72).
- ⁸ The group was 83 percent Jewish, 11 percent were non-Jewish whites and 6 percent were African Americans.
- ⁹ See: Nobue Suzuki. 2011. “Inside the home: Power and negotiation in Filipina-Japanese Marriages”. In *International Marriages in the time of Globalization*, edited by Elli K. Hekkila, and Brenda S.A. Yeoh, 53–67. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
- ¹⁰ The study rectifies the generalizations that pervade the literatures about the nature of an entertainer’s job in Japan, emphasizing that their job is more about “social and conversational intercourse, not social intercourse.” See: James N. Anderson and Nobuhiko Fuwa. 2006. “Filipina Encounters with Japan: Stories Beyond the Stereotype from a Pangasinan Barangay.” *Philippine Studies* 54 (1): 111–141.
- ¹¹ In relation to “ways of being”, which refers to the actual social relations and practices that the individual engages in rather than the identities associate with their actions, (Levitt and Schiller, Conceptualizing simultaneity, 1010). I focused on ways of belonging since in-depth interviews (as a methodology) did not enable me to actually observe actual practices of my respondents.

- ¹² For those who know *nikkeijin*, their general knowledge about the term is that it is used for all Japanese migrants and their descendants outside Japan and including also those who returned, not distinguishing whether they are from the pre-war or post-war period.
- ¹³ Mayumi however told me that *hafu* could also mean gay in Japan. Because of this nuance, people sometimes combine the word with the non-Japanese ethnicity of the person, i.e. “hafu-Firipinjin” in addressing half-Japanese individuals.
- ¹⁴ Literally means “children and women who returned to Japan.” Recently *kikoku shijo* is replaced by *kikoku sei* (students who returned to Japan) in most official documents pertaining to school documents and eligibility for entrance examinations.
- ¹⁵ For a thorough discussion of *Kikoku shijo*, see: Podolsky, Momo Kano. 2008. “Internationally mobile children: The Japanese *kikoku-shijo* experience reconsidered.” *Contemporary Society Bulletin*: 49-69. Kyoto Women’s University.
- ¹⁶ Culture is defined as “that complex whole which includes knowledge, beliefs, arts, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of a society” (Kottak 2002, 23)
- ¹⁷ Mary Joy related that her mother and some cousins were cheating on their respective Japanese partners even though they were kind and generous, so their Japanese partners left them.
- ¹⁸ A private-sectarian Christian school, under United Methodist School, located in Bacoor, Cavite. It caters to preschool up to secondary education.
- ¹⁹ Mapua is a private nonsectarian tertiary school in the Philippines with its campuses located in Manila and Makati.
- ²⁰ F4 refers to the four leading male characters in Meteor Garden, a Taiwanese telenovela based on a Japanese manga *Hanayori Dango* (Boys over Flowers) that became a hit in the Philippines in 2002. The F4 are depicted as sons of rich families and are extremely handsome. The female protagonist sported what was later known as the “Chinita look,” composed of “almond-shaped” eyes, long black hair, and fair skin.
- ²¹ See: James L. McClain. 2002. *Japan: A Modern History* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002).
- ²² For a focused discussion on Japanese ethnicity as genetic capital among JFC see: Seiger, Fiona-Katharina. “Genetic capital in claims for nationality: activist discourses on Japanese? Filipino Children in the Philippines.” Next Generation Global Workshop. Kyoto: Kyoto University, 2010. 20 December 2013. https://www.gcoe-intimacy.jp/images/library/File/3rd_next-generation_ws/Paper/.

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From *Tortillier* to *Ingsud-Ingsud*: Creating New Understandings Concerning the Importance of Indigenous Dance Terminology in the Practice and Kinaesthetics of the Sama *Igal* Dance Tradition

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Abstract

In researching Philippine dance traditions, many scholars often leave out the study of indigenous dance terminology. A notable exception is Francisca Reyes Aquino. Although mentioning quite a number of indigenous dance terms, her trail-blazing works tend to be rather general in approach to dance research and fail to interrogate the nuances and contextualized meanings of such dance terms. This paper seeks to study indigenous dance terms in the Sama *igal* dance tradition by using research approaches from linguistics and cultural studies. The study of indigenous dance terms is deemed to be important in creating understandings about the practice of the *igal* as well as the kinaesthetics embedded in it. The first part of the paper revisits the work of Francisca Reyes Aquino in terms of her compilation and use of indigenous dance terms as a major component of her development of instructional materials. It also briefly evaluates gaps in her work that help point the direction for future research. The second part relates this researcher's introduction to indigenous dance terms in the Sama *igal* tradition as a result of investigative forays in the field. It then presents a selection of dance terms that are deemed to be basic in the said tradition. The third part presents a linguistic and cultural analysis of these dance terms via movement meaning and

cognates, ecological metaphors, and relatedness to other movement terms in the maritime Southeast Asian region. The fourth part, by way of conclusion, presents a “socio-cultural linguistic model of dance terminology” as a way of redirecting approaches to dance research in the southern Philippines as well as the maritime Southeast Asian region.

Keywords: Sama-Bajau *igal* dance tradition, dance terminology, kinaesthetics, dance ethnography, maritime Southeast Asian culture

Introduction: Movement, dance terminology and the importance of understanding diversity within and pursuing comparisons across traditions

A CURSORY REVIEW OF LITERATURE on dance scholarship in the Philippines reveals limitations that hinder understanding the diversity within traditions and pursuing comparisons across traditions.¹ First of all, most of the literature in Philippine dance tends to adopt the format of encyclopaedic enumeration of what dances can be found within the borders of the nation-state (Aquino 1946; Alejandro 1972, 1978 and 1982; and Goqingco 1980). Hardly any of these pieces of literature interrogate the diversity found within traditions that comprise their often single-item lists of dances representing certain locales. Second, even with the emergence of scholarship that have a decidedly regional focus, they still tend to be enumerative in approach and hardly devote any discussion to the relationship among movement, dance terminology, and kinaesthetics (Ines 1973; Fernando-Amilbangsa 1983; and Fajardo and Fajardo 1992). It will be shown in later sections how the study of these three variables facilitates the formation of understandings regarding diversity within traditions and the pursuit of comparisons across traditions. At this point, it may be proper to state that in dance research, movement ought to be seen as one of the most basic units of analysis, for a study of movement or dance terms helps reveal qualities of movement that are deemed to be desirable and/or proper (as implied by the terms *kinaesthetics* and *kinethics*).²

In terms of methodology, it appears that Francisca Reyes Aquino set the most basic format for descriptive dance research in the Philippines. Her method is quite straight-forward. A brief discussion of the origin of the name of the dance is presented with notes as to where the dance was observed. This discussion is followed by a “how-to” section that details basic steps, patterns and phases of the dance performance. Sometimes, indigenous dance movement terms are mentioned in this “how to” section. Finally, a notation of the music that accompanies the dance is included in her compilation.

Francisca Reyes Aquino is the Philippines’ pioneer dance researcher.³ She is the first Filipino scholar to study Philippine dances systematically and the first to develop instructional materials relying mainly on detailed verbal description and diagrams (Aquino 1946; Tolentino and Ramos 1935). Her initial efforts in dance research have been noted by legendary dancer and choreographer, Ted Shawn (1929), in his book titled *Gods Who Dance*. In 1952, Aquino published *Fundamental Dance Steps and Music*. In this book, Aquino presented two categories of dance terminology. The first referred to “dance steps,” which detailed basic steps and footwork from all of the dances she observed in the country (See Table 1). The second category referred to “dance terms,” which, upon close examination, referred to the positions of dancers in the performance space, movement patterns across the dance floor, and the performer’s postures and gestures (Table 2).

In the “dance steps” category, Aquino described approximately 58 major types of steps. Of these 58 types of steps, 13 had indigenous labels (although 4 did not indicate specific provenance), 9 had Spanish-European loan-word labels, and 36 had English labels. The indigenous labels were: *bacui*, *bleking*, *chotis*, *espunti*, *haplik*, *itik-itik*, *korriti*, *kuradang*, *mudansa*, *palit-palit*, *papuri*, *piang-piang*, and *sangig*. The labels of Spanish or European origins were: *brancos con puntillas*, *brancos con vueltas*, *contragansa*, *engaño*, *habanera*, *mazurka*, *paso*, *polka*, *redoba*, *sagamantica*, *torillier*, and *waltz*. Although not indicated in her text, it appears that the English “dance steps” were either appropriated from some foreign tradition

TABLE 1: Francisca Reyes Aquino’s “Dance Steps” and Their Provenance

Provenance/Language	Dance Steps
English	<i>Change Steps, Chasing Step, Close Step, Cross Step, Cut Step, Rocking Step, Galop Step, Heel and Toe Change Step, Mincing Step, Shuffling Step, Skip Step, Slide Step, Step-Hop, Step Point, Step Swing, Step-Swing-Hop, Step-Brush-Swing-Hop, Sway Balance with a Point/Brush/Close/Hop/Waltz/Raise, Double Sway Balance, Three Steps and Point, Touch Step, Change-Step Turn, Four-Step Turn in Place, Cross-Step Turn, Cross Turn, Pivot Turn, Pivot Turn with a Point/Sarok and Point, Slide Turn, Brush-Step Turn, Three-Step Turn, Waltz Turn, Three-Step Turn in Place, Whirl Turn, Waltz (native), Waltz Balance, Cross Waltz (36)</i>
Spanish	<i>Brincos con Puntillas/Vueltas, Contra-Gansa (Grapevine), Engaño with a close/waltz, Habanera, Paso Español, Redoba (6)</i>
Visayan Region	<i>Bacui, Espunti, Haplik, Kuradang, Sañgig (5)</i>
Unknown (Not Indicated)	<i>Bleking, Chotis, Korriti Step, Korriti-Step Turn (4)</i>
Other European	<i>Mazurka, Polka (Plain, Heel and Toe, Hop, Slide) (2)</i>
Ilocos Region	<i>Mudansa Step, Sagamantica (2)</i>
Tagalog Region	<i>Papuri Step (1)</i>
Surigao	<i>Itik-Itik (1)</i>
“Non-Christian Dances”	<i>Tortillier (1)</i>

Note: This table is derived by the author from the content of Aquino (1952).

or invented by Aquino herself. The indigenous labels were apparently encountered during fieldwork, as were the labels of Spanish-European origins. Strangely enough in the case of *tortillier*, Aquino uses a French-derived label for a step of “non-Christian” origin. This step, as will be discussed in a following section of this piece, is known as “*ingsud-insud*” among several Sama groups in the Sulu and Tawi-Tawi Archipelagos.

TABLE 2: Francisca Reyes Aquino’s “Dance Steps” and Provenance

Provenance/Language	Dance Terms
English	<i>Arms in Lateral Position, Arms in Reverse “T”, Brush, Clockwise, Counter Clockwise, Crossed Arms, Cross-Over, Cut, Draw, Free Foot, Free Hand, Hands on waist, Hop, Inside Foot, Inside Hand, Jump, Leap, Outside Foot, Outside Hand, Place, Pivot, Point, Set, Slide, Stamp, Star with Right Hand, Step, Supporting Foot, Tap, Whirl</i> (30)
Spanish	<i>Abrasete, Cabeceras, Costados, Dos-A-Dos (Do-si-Do)</i> (4)
Tagalog Region	<i>Jaleo (Tagalog of Spanish Origin), Panadyak, Saludo</i> (3)
Ilocos Region	<i>Kumintang, Patay, Salok</i> (3)
Visayan Region	<i>Hayon-Hayon, Sarok(c)</i> (2)
Unknown (Not Indicated)	<i>Bilao, Hapay</i> (2)
Ibanag	<i>Masiwak</i> (1)

Note: This table is derived by the author from the content of Aquino (1952).

In the “dance terms” category, she described 45 terms with 11 indigenous labels or labels appropriated from European sources, 4 Spanish

labels, and 30 English labels. The indigenous labels were: *bilao*, *hapay*, *hayon-hayon*, *jaleo*, *kumintang*, *masiwak*, *panadyak*, *patay*, *salok*, *saludo* and *sarok*. The exact provenance of what appears to be two indigenous terms, *bilao* and *hapay*, were not indicated. The labels of Spanish or European origins were: *abrasete*, *cabeceras*, *costados*, *do-si-do* (*dos-a-dos*). Again, it seems that the English “dance terms” were either appropriated from some foreign tradition or invented by Aquino herself. The indigenous labels were likewise apparently encountered during fieldwork, as were the labels of Spanish-European origins. These observations imply that Aquino’s system of “fundamental dance steps and terms” that she used in her instructional materials is “inductively derived.” Her compilation is the first attempt in devising such “a system” for “Philippine national dances.”

Aquino’s collection of dance terminology presents contemporary scholars with several problems. First of all, the annotation of her collection indicates her position as a generalist rather than a specialist. She did not collect dance terminology either as a single dance piece or a single dance tradition (for instance, the dance terms of *pandanggo arakengkeng* of the *pandanggo* traditions of the Ilocos region or the dance terms of *igal linggisan* of the *igal* dance tradition of the Sama peoples of the Sulu and Tawi-Tawi Archipelagos). She cast her net across a wide set of ethnolinguistic groups. As such, an in-depth understanding of labels and movement aesthetics (kinaesthetics) cannot be gleaned from her work. Second, she did not interrogate the etymology of dance terms. Such an interrogation would have revealed root words and cognates that could have instructed scholars about “normative” qualities of specific movements and phrases. Third, given the nature of her data, she could not offer any cross-regional (intra-Philippine) or cross-national (international or maritime Southeast Asian or Asian) comparisons of dance terms. As such, her data appeared as isolated pockets of cultural knowledge, not connected to each other in terms of shared ideas, artifacts, and cosmologies.

Aquino’s census-like approach to the study of dance could perhaps be best understood in the context of her times. With little doubt, her

undertaking was part of a greater task of cultural accounting with the purpose of nation-building “under the watchful eye” of the colonial master, America in mind. Indeed, America skilfully undertook censuses, surveys, and other studies of their colonial “possession.” The census of dances of the people paralleled the census of the colony. Like many forms of colonial accounting, Aquino’s task did not require for a development of an “in-depth” or for that matter a “critical” view. What was required was a listing of what was present where... for the sum of the parts constitute the Filipino nation (read: colony) in a place called the Philippine Islands. In such a context, internal diversities are conveniently shoved into neat ethnic categories, and the links that cross the borders of the geo-colonial entity are likewise conveniently ignored, perhaps the better to prevent and contain the birth and spread of pan-regional identities, consciousness and movements. As such, a “narrow view” is understandable given the “narrow interests” of the commissioning discourse of the colonial mind, and in such a manner, “the Philippine Islands” were delineated and detached from “the other” parts of Southeast Asia.

Gaps notwithstanding, the seminal works of Aquino point to the existence of a rich lode of dance or movement terminology for scholars to examine and to revisit across space and time. It will be shown later that Aquino’s concern for dance terminology “ironically” holds the key for Philippine dance research to move away from an initially “narrow view” and to develop a “wider perspective” of dance that can account for diversity within traditions and at the same time validate links across traditions that go beyond the borders of the Philippine nation-state.

Probing dance terms in the Sama *igal* dance tradition

In 2005, this researcher received a generous grant from the Institute of Philippine Culture of the Ateneo de Manila University to conduct dance research in Tawi-Tawi, Philippines.⁴ This grant gave this researcher the opportunity to meet dance masters based in Sitangkai and Sibutu, Tawi-Tawi Province and to observe the Sama *igal* dance tradition as

practiced in the field.⁵ One of the dance masters that this researcher met in this initial foray in the field was Mr. Ligaya Baruk of Sitangkai. Mr. Baruk demonstrated the basic undulating movement of the arms of the igal tradition which he identified as *limbai*. The movement is supposed to mimic the swaying of palm fronds. Mr. Baruk also identified the sideward shuffling movement of the feet, which Aquino called the *tortillier*, as *ingsud-ingsud*. This encounter with Mr. Baruk started this researcher's interest in the study Sama igal dance terminology.⁶

Before proceeding any further, it may be most appropriate at this point to identify the position of this researcher in Philippine academe as well as his opinion on current issues confronting dance research in the Philippines. The researcher is Professor of Asian and Philippine studies at the Asian Center, University of the Philippines Diliman. He is primarily trained in political science, but has since branched out to multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches in researching cultural phenomena. He is of Tagalog and Bisayan (Davaoño) lineage. With reference to the so called "igal-pangalay debate," one of the current issues in Philippine dance research, he is of the opinion that the Sama igal dance tradition should be considered distinct from the Tausug *pangalay* dance tradition.

Basic Poses

In attempting to understand the mechanics of the dance vocabulary of the Sama igal tradition, one cannot divorce movement from basic dance poses or positions. Poses or positions are connected to each other by transitional movements or gestures.⁷ As the Sama do not appear to possess terms for basic positions, this researcher has devised the following vocabulary:⁸

- (1st) **First.** Palms folded in front of the chest as if in prayer.
- (2nd) **Second.** Both arms stretched to the sides at shoulder level like the wings of an eagle.
- (3rd) **Third.** One flexed palm placed in front of the chest and the other extended to the side at shoulder level.

(4th) **Fourth.** One flexed palm placed to the side of the ear and the other extended to the side at shoulder level.

High fourth. Raised or extended fourth position. Leading hand extended above the head at an approximately 45 degree angle to the neck and shoulders. The other arm is extended to the side at shoulder level.

Low fourth. One hand is extended to the side (slightly forward) at shoulder level, while the other is held at waist level with the palms in flexion.

(5th) **Fifth.** Both arms raised to the sides above the head, with bended elbows and flexed palms facing upwards with fingers pointing towards the head.

(6th) **Sixth.** One arm raised vertically in front of the shoulder bend at 90 degrees, while the other arm is placed lying down in front of the chest with the crook of the palm placed at the base or elbow of the vertically raised arm.

One usually ends a dance with a standard **first position** with hands folded at chest level, palms crossed at the wrist in flexion, one palm pointing upwards, the other downwards while joined at the wrists or with one palm placed over the other palm, in front of the body at chest level while bowing.

As mentioned earlier, movements are used as transitions from one position to another. They may also be used to “ornament” a certain position (posture) or movement phrase (pattern) within a particular dance sequence or “choreography.” The Sama traditional igal dance terms that are discussed in the following section were mainly collected from Bongao, Sitangkai, Sibutu, Simunul, and Tabawan. Recent research work via an Asian Center Research Grant using data gathered from informants from Sama diasporic communities in Batangas City, Municipality of Apalit,

Pampanga Province, and, Baranggay San Andres, Manila City confirm the use of these dance terms, albeit with some degree of variability.⁹

Hand, Arm and Upper Body Movements

Apart from basic positions or poses, dance terms may be observed in the use of the following labels pertaining to hand, arm, upper body movements:

Limbai is a movement that evokes the swaying of coconut fronds. Arms are raised and lowered alternately at the sides with the elbows leading with wrists following in articulation of wave-like motion either at the hip, shoulder, head, above the head levels. The limbai may also be done forward and backward.¹⁰

Ta'ut-Ta'ut is the act of over-extending the elbows, thus once again evoking the motion of waves.¹¹

Kello' is the act of rotating the palm at the wrist in an outward direction, fingers ending in a position pointing downwards.¹²

Kollek is the reverse of *kello'*. The palm is rotated at the wrist in an inward direction, fingers ending in a position pointing either upwards or to the sides.¹³

Kello'-kollek are observed as transitional gestures from one position to another. Five variations may be seen: *kollek* (one inward rotation), *kollek-kollek* (two inward rotations), *kello'-kollek* (one outward followed by an inward rotation), *kello'-kollek-kollek* (one outward rotation followed by two inward rotations) and, *kello'-kinolek* or *kello'-kollek pariata* (one outward rotation followed by an upward rotation to the side).

Ebed-Ebed is the shimmering or flicking of the fingers ornamenting the movement of the hands. Best executed with the use of ornamental nails called *sulakengkeng*, the movement brings to the mind orchid petals

quivering in the wind. The term can also be used to refer to the repeated tapping of the balls or toes of a foot with the sole held in contact with the floor.¹⁴

Kagong-Kagong is the mimesis of the movement of a crab's (kagong) claws. Palms are flexed towards the center of the body chest level.¹⁵

Kamun or **pagkamun** is the mimesis of the undulating movement of the sea mantis. Arms are flailed above the head in a forward and backward motion.¹⁶

Kidjut-Kidjut is the jerking movement of the shoulders which may be done alternately or in unison.¹⁷

Footwork

The following dance terms for footwork or movement of the feet or legs are likewise observed in the field:

Ingsud-Ingsud is the lateral movement of **the** feet executed through a shuffling movement through the ball and the sole of each foot. There are two kinds of **ingsud-ingsud**.¹⁸ The first is the parallel **ingsud-ingsud** where both feet move in the same direction at the same time. The second is the opposite **ingsud-ingsud** where either the ball or sole of each foot crosses or meets the other. The term is called **hengsod-hengsod** among the Sama Tabawan and **hiki-hiki** among the Sama Simunul. The movement is supposed to bring to mind the movement of the sea snail.

Kapo-Kapo is a movement that simulates wading into the waters. The ball of the foot is pushed forward before planting the whole foot on the ground. The other foot follows suit.¹⁹

Engke'-Engke' is like the kapo-kapo except that the feet are raised from the ground. The term literally means "raise-raise" or "up-up," obviously a cognate of **ang-at-ang-at** and **angkat-angkat**.²⁰

Kagis-Kagis comes from the movement of a chicken scratching the earth. The cognate in Tagalog is kahig-kahig. The base of the big toe of the leading foot “scratches” the floor backward to the side, upon which it is raised and planted towards the front. The other foot follows suit.²¹

Ketchek-Ketchek is a “mini” kagis-kagis. In the ketchek-ketchek, the foot is not lifted by simply allowed to slide towards the front tracing a quarter circle figure on the floor.²²

Henggel-Henggel is the alternate bending and extending of the knees on tip-toe as the dancer briskly walks or runs forward.²³

Hendek-Hendek is the upward and downward movement of the body in place or while turning around using an *ingsud-ingsud* movement. The body weight is supported by the back leg while the other leg is placed in front to execute the *ingsud-ingsud* movement.²⁴

Suhut-Suhut is the rapid backward movement of the feet.²⁵

Tendek is an emphatic stamp of the foot.²⁶

Tendek-Tendek are a series of stamps.²⁷

Laksu is to jump to another position remaining down in the final moment.²⁸

Oyoh-Oyoh is a trembling movement of the knee as the ball of the foot is tapped on the floor.

The supporting leg is bent, while the body is placed slightly forward.²⁹

Kiring-Kiring. Finally, in modern or contemporary *igal*, the swaying movement of the hips, observed usually but not exclusively among female dancers, is called **Kiring-Kiring**.³⁰ This label is a cognate of the Tagalog *giling-giling* and *kendeng-kendeng*. This movement has spawned a contemporary form of *igal* called *igal pakiring*.

It should be noted that the groupings under the headings of “hand, arm and upper body movements” and “footwork” are groupings devised by this researcher and do not reflect an indigenous categorization by the Sama peoples. As such, the categorizations mentioned above must be seen as categories of convenience. It should also be noted that the duplicated words indicated here in the context of dance are not diminutive forms but are instead “serialized forms” or actions done in a series.

Given the variability of the Sama language group as well as the great distances across Sama communities in maritime Southeast Asia, to assume a unified indigenous system of dance terminology would most probably be a faulty or overly ambitious idea at best. However, one may compile, compare, and eventually “inductively derive” a “system” of Sama dance terminology to serve as a basis for future comparisons; to facilitate the development of a system of dance instruction that possesses some degree of emic-orientation; and to guide research in pushing the known limits of continuities in dance term use. Table 3 shows a preliminary study of the distribution of terms as observed in Sitangkai, Tabawan, Zamboanga, and Simunul.³¹ This preliminary study indicates that even within the relatively narrow confines of the Sulu and Tawi-Tawi Archipelagos, dance terminology is not universally shared.³² In this table, “1” denotes the presence of the dance term, while “0” denotes the absence of its use. However, “0” or absence does not mean that the movement itself does not exist. It simply refers to the fact that the informant cannot volunteer or recall any term used for the particular movement.³³ Although universality is not established, some degree of significance in terms of sharing can be observed. Six terms out of twenty, or 30 per cent of the terms, can be observed in the four localities of Sitangkai, Tabawan, Zamboanga and Simunul. These terms are *limbai(y)*, *kidjut-kidjut*, *engke'-engke'*, *tendek*, *laksu*, and *kiring-kiring*. Five terms out of twenty, or 25 per cent of the terms, can be observed in three localities. Combining the two figures, one can at least conclude that “a significant number” of the terms are shared. Perhaps, future fieldwork can expand this aspect of shared-ness using this list as a basic template for comparison. Another

aspect that future research can examine is the idea of “intelligibility.” For instance, it is possible in cases where dance terms are not shared, for informants to understand the meaning of terms used by informants belonging to other Sama groups as well as to execute the corollary movements upon hearing specific dance terms even though they may not use such particular terms in their own practice of dance.

TABLE 3: Preliminary Study of Distribution of Terms

Dance Term	Sitangkai	Tabawan	Zamboanga	Simunul	Total
Limbai(y)	1	1	1	1	4
Ta’ut-Ta’ut	1	1	1	0	3
Kello’	0	1	0	0	1
Kollek	1	1	0	1	3
Ebed-Ebed	0	1	1	0*	2
Kagong-Kagong	1	1	1	0	3
Kamun	1	0	0	0	1
Kidjut-Kidjut	1	1	1	1	4
Ingsud-Ingsud	1	1	1	0**	3
Kapo’-Kapo’	1	1	1	0	3
Engke’-Engke’	1	1	1	1	4
Kagis-Kagis	1	1	1	0	3
Ketchek-Ketchek	1	0	0	0	1
Hengel-Hengel	1	1	0	0	2
Hendek-Hendek	1	0	0	1	2
Suhut-Suhut	1	1	0	0	2
Tendek	1	1	1	1	4
Laksu	1	1	1	1	4
Oyoh-Oyoh	1	1	0	0***	2
(Pa)kiring-kiring	1	1	1	1	4
Total	18	17	12	8	55

Note: “1” denotes the observation of the use of the term according to certain informants, while “0” denotes the non-use of the term. *jogjog anak tangan (literally: shaking of the fingers), **hiki-hiki, ***jogjog are the equivalent terms and/or cognates observed in Simunul. This table is derived from data gathered by the researcher from interviews of informants during various instances of fieldwork.

Meanings, aesthetic qualities and regional affinities

This section embarks upon a more detailed linguistic analysis of Sama igal dance terms in order to discover aesthetic qualities that may be gleaned from language use, particularly in metaphors, and in order to establish cognate terms found in Sama languages/dialects, Bahasa Melayu and Bahasa Indonesia, and in the highly specialized Central Javanese (Surakarta) dance terminology. This process of contextualizing Sama igal dance terms effectively relates the vocabulary to its cultural environment of maritime Southeast Asia, and to its physical environment of the tropics and the sea.

Limbai(y) is a name of a dance found among the Sama Kota Belud of northwest Sabah, Malaysia. Called *igal limbayan* among the Sama Sitangkai of Tawi-Tawi Province, Philippines, the dance is associated with female igal djin-spirit bearers (Hussin and Santamaria 2008, 39–64). Alain Martenot (1980) notes that the dance owes its name to the “slow and graceful swinging motion of the dancer’s arms.” A similar dance of the same name is found among the Sama Kubang of Semporna, Sabah Malaysia (Pugh-Kitingan, Hussin, and Baptist 2005). All of the lexicon sources available to this researcher refer to *limbai* as the motion of swinging.³⁴

- Generic Sama: “*hayunan tangan* (swinging of the arms)”(Hinayat 2003, 159)[“Generic” is my term for Sama entries in the Hinayat glossary that is not categorized under other Sama subgroups].
- Sama Sibutu: “*Jantih limbeyhan longngon-na* (His arms have a nice swing [as he walks])”[SSD, *limbey*].
- Central Sinama: “*Da’a palimbayhun basket* (Don’t let the basket swing)”[CSED, *limbay*]
- Sama Pangutaran: “*Da’a na ka’u ngalimbay kosog ma baldi iyu sabab p’nno* (Don’t swing that bucket hard because it’s full)”[EPSD 1992].”

In Tausug, *limbay* likewise means “to swing (the arms back and forth at one’s sides).” *Ayaw limbayan in lima mu, awn tau ha ulihan mu* (Don’t swing your arms, there are people behind you)”[Hassan, Ashely, and Ashley 1994, 290]. Mohamad Said Hinayat (2003, 159), however, cites *lenggang* as a Bahasa Melayu translation of *limbai*. *Lenggang* may be translated as “to wave” or “to roll” (Wojowasito and Wasito 1987, 167). It may also be translated as “to tip from side to side. *Bang banka’ dalam katigna, bo’ mbal biyaksa magbayan, maglenggang-lenggang* (When a canoe has no outriggers, and the person in it is not experienced, the boat keeps tipping from side to side)”[CSED, *lenggang-lenggang*]. *Igal* is traditionally performed on boats. **The aesthetic quality that comes to mind is, therefore, that of a dancer compensating for the tipping or pitching of a boat with the alternate raising and lowering (or swinging) of the arms.** In the Surakarta tradition of Javanese dance, *lembeyan-lembehan* refers to a specialized movement that involves “swinging the arm(s)” (Brakel-Papenhuyzen 1995, 104). Cognates include *limbey* (Sama Sibutu), *limbay* (Central Sinama), *limbay* (Tausug), and *lembey* (Javanese).

Ta’ut is translated in Bahasa Melayu as *hayun/ buai* (Hinayat 2003, 276), which means “to swing or to rock”(Wojowasito and Wasito 1987, 55). The meaning becomes clearer in a Central Sinama lexicon entry: “To bounce something up and down, as a hanging cradle. *Ana, bang anangis na onde’ inan, magta’ut na pa’in l’lla bang d’nda inan maghinang* (I tell you, when that child is crying the man has to keep on bouncing the cradle if the woman is working)[CSED, *ta’ut*].” Cradles or *ta’utan* in Sinama are not rocked from side to side. Rather, they are bounced up and down suspended from the ceiling. **The aesthetic quality in igal is therefore that of the hyper-extended elbow of the dancer bouncing or bobbing up and down as it is stretched away from the body.** A related word may be the Sama Sibutu *tugut* which means “to extend a fishing line; also, to let out string; to give more rope. *Bang eh ninduk ma pissi nu, bohoh takissa nu paragon na deyng, tugutin, supaya tatollon-na toongan* (If the bait on your hook is already bitten, then you are able to feel a fish is now running [away],

give more line, so that it will really be able to swallow [the hook][SSB, *tugut*].” In both *ta’ut* and *tugut*, the act of extending or stretching is apparent. In Tausug, *taut* likewise, means “to move a swing cradle up and down... (Hassan, Ashley and Ashley 1994, 467).” Cognate: *taut* (Tausug). Possible cognate: *tugut* (Sama Sibutu).

Kello’ in Bahasa Melayu is *bengkok* (Hinayat 2003, 123). *Bengkok* means “bent, curve or crooked”(Wojowasito and Wasito 1987, 55). *Kello’* appears to be a cognate of the Bahasa Indonesia word *eluk*, which means “curve” in English (Wojowasito and Wasito 1987, 80).

Kello’ in Central Sinama takes on the meaning of being “bent out of shape or alignment.” *Bang bay basi’ akello’ subay tinilu* (When a wire has been bent out of shape it should be straightened)[SIL Philippines 1992, 158].” *K’llok* is “curved” or “winding” in Sama Pangutaran, as in “*Gala nu iyu ayad kellok na; tom panganggala lahing* (Your harvesting knife is good; it is curved and is sharp for harvesting coconuts)”[SIL Philippines 1992, 158]. *Kalluk* is a Sama Sibutu cognate of the word which carries the same meaning, as in “*Pakalluk ni jalom ukil-na sanduk tutu* (This ladle’s carving curves inward)”[SSD, *kalluk*] The same word, which carries the meaning of being “crooked or out of alignment,” is found in Central Sinama, “*Mbal na makabontol an’ngge, asidda na ataha’t t’bbu. Pakkakuk na pareyo’* (The sugar cane cannot stand up straight, it is too long. It bends over downwards)”[CSED, *kalluk*]. Likewise in Tausug, *kalluk* means “curved, bent. *Kalluk in bingit* (A hook is bent)”[Hassan, Ashley and Ashley 1994, 219]. **Based on this image of a heavy stalk of sugar cane, the aesthetic quality appears to be that of rotating the palms of the hands at the wrists ending at flexion with the fingers pointing downwards.** Cognates: *eluk* (Bahasa Indonesia), *k’lluk* (Sama Pangutaran), *kalluk* (Sama Sibutu and Central Sinama), and *kalluk* (Tausug).

Kollek is obviously the reverse form of **Kello’** or **Kellok**. In Sama Sibutu, it means “to wiggle” as in “*Bang lai na pumpum ma kaluwaan, beteh ingga lowa-na? Ngollek-ngollek* (When the sea-worm is outside [of its hole] now, how is its appearance? ([It] wiggles and wiggles)”

[SSD, *kollek*] In the same dialect, it also means “to move the arms and hands in a fluid manner as in dancing the *igal*” [SSD, *kollek*]. In Central Sinama, *kollek-kollek* means “to make random marks, as the writing of beginners” as well as “movement of a caterpillar” [CSED, *kollek-kollek*]. “*Bang aku magsulat kollek-kollekku apa mbal aku ata’u anulat* (When I write, I scribble because I don’t know how to write)” [CSED, *kollek-kollek*]. In Tausug, *kulluk* means “bent, curved, warped. *Kulluk in sanga kahuy ini* (This twig is bent)” [Hassan, Ashley, and Ashley 1994, 248]. **The reference to the wiggling movement of sea-worm or a caterpillar emphasizes the aesthetic quality of the articulation of the rotating motion of the palms at the wrists.** As the reverse cognate of *kello’*, the parallel reverse motion of rotation would end in a position of the palms with the **fingers pointing upwards**. Cognates: *kello’* (Central Sinama), *eluk* (Bahasa Indonesia), *kulluk* (Tausug), *k’lluk* (Sama Pangutaran), and *kalluk* (Sama Sibutu and Central Sinama).

Ukel is a Central Javanese dance term which means “to turn, twist” and which “**always refers to the rotating motion of the wrist...**” (Brakel-Papenhuyzen 1995, 185). The movement, which has nine variants in the Surakarta tradition, may be appreciated as a cognate of *kello’* and *kollek* via the Bahasa Indonesia *eluk*, which in turn is related to the Sama Pangutaran *likku*, meaning curved (SIL Philippines 1992, 160). The Tagalog *liko* means “to turn either to the right or the left.” *Ukel* is most obviously related to *Ukkil* (Sama Sitangkai), *Ukkil* (Tausug) [Hassan, Ashley, and Ashley 1994, 506]. *Ukir* (Bahasa Indonesia), and *Okir* (Maranao-Iranun) referring to the curvilinear ornamentation in wood carving, jewelry and textile arts. Cognates: *ukkil* (Sama Sitangkai), *ukkil* (Tausug), *ukir* (Bahasa Indonesia), *okir* (Maranao-Iranun), *kollek* (Sama Sibutu) *kello’* (Central Sinama), *eluk* (Bahasa Indonesia), *k’lluk* (Sama Pangutaran), *kalluk* (Sama Sibutu and Central Sinama).

Ebed-Ebed refers to the “tissue-like material between the bones of the pectoral and dorsal fins. *Mat’ngnga’iting, ya katas-daing inan, ya he’ nionan ebed-ebed* (In the middle of the spines, the fish tissue, that is what is called ebed-ebed)” [CSED, *ebed-ebed*]. In Mohamad Said

Hinayat's glossary, it comes in the form of *eved-eved*, which means "to tremble" (*menggeletar kuat*) [Hinayat 2003, 106]. Interestingly, Central Sinama appears to provide another cognate in the form of *kebed-kebed* which means "to move restlessly. *Minsan bu'unta magkebed-kebed, taluwa baliyu* (Even our hair moves, hit by the wind)" [CSED, *kebed-kebed*]. The Tausug language provides an interesting cognate in the word *pidpid*, which is an adverb, meaning "tremblingly" (Hasaan, Ashley, and Ashley 1994, 358). Adding the above-mentioned data to that given by informants in the field, **the aesthetic quality in this movement appears to be the delicate trembling or quivering of either orchid petals or of fish membrane (!) animated by the wind**. Cognates: *eved-eved* (Generic Sama), *kebed-kebed* (Central Sinama), and *pidpid* (Tausug).

Kagong, meaning crab, is *kaghong* in the Mohamad Said Hinayat's glossary (Hinayat 2003, 106), *kagang* or *kagon* in Central Sinama (CSED), and *kagang* in Sama Sibutu (SSD) and Sama Pangutaran (SIL Philippines 1992, 157). The crab is likewise *kagang* in Tausug (Hassan, Ashley and Ashley 1994, 213). No aesthetic quality may be gleaned from the lexicon entries. However, it should be noted that Sama informants appear to limit the mimesis to the **shape and movement of the crab's claws**. Cognates: *kagang* (Central Sinama, Sama Sibutu, Sama Pangutaran), *kagang* (Tausug), and *kagon* (Central Sinama).

Kamun is the sea mantis. It is described in the Central Sinama lexicon as a "species of crustacean similar to a large shrimp, but notable for the series of retractable blade-like appendages along the underside of the tail section" (CSED, *kamun*). No aesthetic quality can be gleaned from this lone lexicon entry. It, however, appears that mimesis is largely limited to the **undulating movement of the body and the claws of the sea mantis**. No other known cognates.

Kidjut in the Mohamad Said Hinayat Sama glossary means "to raise the shoulders quickly (*menaikkan kedua bahu dgn cepat*)" [Hinayat 2003, 106]. In Sama Sibutu, it means "to move the shoulders up and own as in dancing; to shrug the shoulders. *Pag lling ongakah-ongakah, magtuwi*

rub a ya ngidjut”(SSD, *kidjut*). The movement appears to very important in dancing as the same source cites, “*Bang kow ngigal subey nipakidjut eh nu baha nu* (When you dance, you should move your shoulders).” In Central Sinama, this association with dance is repeated: “To raise the shoulders, especially as a movement in dancing”(CSED, *kidjut*). In Sama Pangutaran, the word is associated with the verb to jump, “*Kiyoblaan toad aku pakidjut manga aku, arak kahugan maglantay* (I was so startled that I jumped and I almost fell off the porch)”[SIL Philippines 1992, 158]. In Tausug, *kignut* is “an involuntary movement of muscles, a twitch”(Hassan, Ashley, and Ashley 1994, 235). Another possible Tausug cognate is *kig-kig* which means “to shudder in aversion or (extreme) disgust (235).” In Bahasa Indonesia, a cognate may be found in *enjot* and *enjut*, both of which invariably mean “to move up and down”(Wojowasito and Wasito 1987, 81). The term may also be related to the Javanese *kirig* (Brakel-Papenhuisen 1995, 101) and the Tagalog *kilig*. A possible cognate may be found in the Central Javanese (Surakarta) dance term of *genjot* which means “to move up and down.” **Given the above entries, it appears that the aesthetic quality is that of a sudden upward and downward movement or shrugging of the shoulders with the apparent element of surprise.** Cognates: *kig-kig* and *kignut* (Tausug), *enjot* and *enjut* (Bahasa Indonesia); *genjot* (Central Javanese), and possibly, *kirig* (Central Javanese) and *kilig* (Tagalog).

Ingsud is *insud* in Sama Sibutu which means “to edge toward, to move gradually or hesitantly; hence, to ‘inch along.’ *Bang aku nuley painsud, magtuwi niyah sidja maka dahowh min aku* (If I try to edge forward, immediately there is always [someone] able to [get there] first before I do)”[SSD, *insud*]. *Ingsut* in Bahasa Indonesia holds the same meaning (Wojowasito and Wasito 1987, 109). It is *insut* among the Sama Kota Belud, *ensod* among the Sama Kubang, and *ensot* among the Sama Beluran (Hinayat 2003, 66 and 95). In Central Sinama, it means “to move a short distance; shift position a little. *Paingsud ka min paningko’annu ilu...* (Move a bit from where you are sitting)”[CSED, *ingsud*]. In Sama Pangutaran, it means “slide v. *Ingsud* Slide the chair over here (*Paingsurun*

iya paitu)[SIL Philippines 1992, 156]. *Sagudsud*, a cognate found in the same dialect, means to “shuffle v. *sagudsud* Don’t shuffle your feet; you’ll stub them (*Daa na sagudsuran nu ani’ nu*)”[166]. *Ingsud* can also be found in Tausug which retains the meaning “to move (something) a little, budge (something)”[Hassan, Ashley, Ashley 1994, 197]. Another Tausug cognate may be found in *inut-inut* which means “to do something little by little, step by step, bit by bit...”[196]. The aspect of shifting or shuffling is also apparent in the Central Javanese (Surakarta) dance terms called *mingsed-ngingsed*, *gengser-kengser*, and *kesed* (Brakel-Papenhuyzen 89, 100, 119). Given the data gathered from informants and the entries above, it appears that the **aesthetic quality of ingsud-ingsud is that of a very slow and gradual movement articulated by the shuffling of the soles of the feet**; indeed, like that of the unhurried movement of a sea snail. Cognates: *engsod* or *insud* (Sama Sibutu), *ingsut* (Bahasa Indonesia), *insut* (Sama Kota Belud), *ensod* (Sama Kubang), *ensot* (Sama Beluran), *sagudsud* (Sama Pangutaran), *inut-inut* and *ingsud* (Tausug), *usog* and *isbog* (Tagalog and Bisaya) and *mingsed-ngingsed*, *gengser-kengser*, and *kesed* (Central Javanese).

Kapo’, according to the Mohamad Said Hinayat glossary, means “to wade into waters (*mengharung air*)”[Hinayat 2003, 116]. The same word is found in Central Sinama with the same meaning: “to wade through water. *Bay pakapo’ si Arung ni tahik, abasei lampinna* (Eldest daughter was wading in the sea, her diaper is wet)”[CSED, *kapo’*]. *Kapoh* in Sama Sibutu bears the same meaning: “*Kulindarahun dahowh sowwal nu, boho pakapoh ni tahik* (First, roll up your trousers, then wade into the sea)”[SSD, *kapoh*]. A possible cognate may be found in the Central Javanese (Surakarta) dance term, *kapang-kapang*, which means to “approach eagerly” and which is executed with the feet “placed down simultaneously, one exactly in front of the other”(Brakel-Papenhuyzen 1995, 99). This term may then be related to the Tagalog *gapang*, which means “to crawl.” Given the data gathered from informants and the preponderant reference of the entries above to “wading,” it appears that aesthetic quality of *kapo’-kapo’* is that of **slow and cautious forward steps led by the toes or**

the ball of the feet, as if probing the waters or the bottom of the sea for obstruction.” Cognate: *kapoh* (Sama Sibutu), possibly *kapang-kapang* (Central Javanese), and *gapang* (Tagalog).

Engke' means to move the feet up and down followed by a hop (*enjut*, *kengke*); its cognate, *engket*, means to lift (*angkat*); as such *engke'-engke'* is “to step forward on one foot followed by a hop” (Hinayat 2003, 66). *Hengke*, its cognate, holds the same meaning as *engke'-engke'* (86). In Sama Sibutu, *engkeh-engkeh* means “to tiptoe. *Engkeh-Engkeh ya bang luman ma kalimmian* (She tiptoes when she walks through the dirt)” [SSD, *engkeh-engkeh*]. Its second meaning is “to play a game involving jumping or hopping; hopscotch. *Mag-engkeh-engkeh kitabi* (Let’s play hopscotch)” [ibid.]. A third meaning is “to walk proudly...in an affected way. *Ngengkeh laasa kabisa abbu-na* (She is walking proudly due to extreme pride)” [ibid.]. In Central Sinama, *engke'* is likewise “to stand on tiptoe. *Subay paengke' bo' ta'nda'* (Must stand on tiptoes for it to be seen)” [CSEd, *engke'*]. *Engke'-engke'* is to “hop on one foot” [SIL, *engke'-engke'*]. In Sama Pangutaran, *engge'* is “to tiptoe. *Engge'eggeun bo' 'nsa' tumappat puul nu* (Stand on your tiptoes so that your heels do not touch)” [SIL Philippines 1992, 133]. This aspect of tiptoeing is also apparent in the Central Javanese (Surakarta) dance terminology of *engkyek-ingkyek* (Brakel-Papenhuisen 1995, 83). In Tausug, the cognate for *engke'* is likewise *angkat* which also means “to raise up or to lift” (Hassan, Ashley, and Ashley 1994, 61). Interestingly, another Tausug cognate can be found in *tingki* which means “... (to walk, dance, etc.) on tiptoe” (Hassan, Ashley, and Ashley 1994, 480). Given the data from informants and from the entries above, the aesthetic quality of *engke'-engke'* involves **stepping forward by hopping onto a tip toe position while simultaneously raising the opposite leg, thus giving a general “lift” to the body**. Cognates: *engket* and *angkat* (Sama dialects), *angkat* (Bahasa Indonesia and Bahasa Melayu), *angat* and *angkat* (Tagalog), *angkat* and *tingki* (Tausug), *engkeh-engkeh* (Sama Sibutu), *engge'* (Sama Pangutaran), and *engkyek-ingkyek* (Central Javanese).

Kag(h)is means “to scratch, claw or scrape (*kais*)”[Hinayat 2003, 106]. It is *kagis* in Sama Beluran which means “to scrape or to scratch out”(107). The word is a cognate of the Bahasa Indonesia *kikis* (Wojowasito and Wasito 1987, 146) and the Tagalog *kiskis*, both of which hold the same meaning “to scrape” or “to scrub.” In Central Sinama, the cognate is *kahig* which means “to scratch or rake the surface of the soil, as a chicken”(CSED, *kahig*). In Sama Pangutaran, *kagis* means to “sweep v. Kahig. You should sweep up around your house when there is trash (*Subay kahigan nu luma’ bi bang sompotan*)”[SIL Philippines 1992, 128]. In Tausug, *kagis* means “to scrape (something with a knife or similar object to clean it)”[Hassan, Ashley, and Ashley 1994, 214]. Another Tausug cognate, *kahig*, holds a similar meaning to the Sama Pangutaran cognate, that is, “to scratch lightly to find (something, as of a chicken looking for food)”[215]. The entries given above support **the aesthetic quality of footwork that mimics “a chicken scratching the earth.”** Cognates: *kagis* (Sama Beluran), *kais* (Bahasa Melayu), *kikis* (Bahasa Indonesia), *kiskis* (Tagalog), *kagis* and *kahig* (Tausug), and *kahig* (Tagalog, Central Sinama, and Sama Pangutaran).

Ketchek is supposed to be a “mini” version of *kagis*. Available lexicon sources do not reveal cognates that are exactly the same in form, but several possibilities may be explored. The first is *kekeh* which, like *kagis*, means “to scrape or to scratch”(Hinayat 2003, 146). A similar form of the word is found in the Sama Sibutu *keke*, which holds the same meaning: “to scrape. *Kekehin na sidja-na, daa na kupasin* (Just scrape its skin, do not peel [it])”[SSD, *keke*] The same word in Central Sinama possesses the same meaning: “to remove the surface of something by scraping. *Buwa gaha’, kineke* (Scraped off, just like rust)”[CSED, *keke*]. The second possibility can be found in the Sama Kubang word *kessek*, which means “to sprinkle or to splash”(Hinayat 2003, 125). This is obviously a cognate of the Bahasa Indonesia word *percik* (Wojowasito and Wasito 1987, 210), and the Tagalog words *pitik*, *wisik*, and *talsik*, which all hold the same or similar meaning. The Tausug cognates, *pigsik* and *tigsik*, both mean “to splatter, spatter, (something on something). *Ayaw*

kaw magpigsik sin tubig malummi' yan (Don't splatter that dirty water)"[Hassan, Ashley, and Ashley 1994, 359]. In Central Sinama, *kessek* means "to shake something off by a sudden vigorous movement. *Kesekin lalipan ma tanganu ilu* (Fling off that centipede on your hand)"[CSED, *kessek*]. The third possibility may be found in the Sama Beluran word *ketik* which means "to tick"[Hinayat 2003, 126]. The word appears to be a cognate of the Bahasa Indonesia *detik* (Wojowasito and Wasito 1987, 76). and the Tagalog *pitik*, both of which likewise hold the meaning of "to tick" or "to flick." Given the data gathered from informants and the lexicon entries above, it appears that the aesthetic quality of the movement is that of lightly **tapping the floor similar to ticking or flicking it as if to produce small splashes on a puddle of water**. Cognates: *keke* (Sama Sibutu), *kessek* (Sama Kubang and Central Sinama), *ketik* (Sama Beluran), *detik* (Bahasa Indonesia), and *pigsik* and *tigsik* (Tausug).

Hengel-Hengel means to simultaneously go up on tip toe on both feet (Hinayat 2003, 86). A cognate may be found in the Central Sinama verb *henggol* which means "to loosen something; to make something shaky by moving. *Da'a henggolun lam ilu ko da'a ahug pareyo'. Abila' saminna* (Don't shake that lamp lest it fall down)"[CSED, *henggol*]. In Tausug, the cognate is *hingu'* or *hingngu'* (Tausug Gimbahanun) which means "to loosen, shake or wobble (something)"[Hassan, Ashley, and Ashley 1994, 179]. Given the data gathered from informants and the lexicon entries above, it appears that the aesthetic quality of the movement is that **of making a series of vertically shaky steps by alternately going up and down on tip-toe**. Cognate: *henggol* (Central Sinama), *hingu'*, and *hingngu'* (Tausug).

Hendek is a Sama Sitangkai word that has several cognates in the region. One is *hendik* which means "to throb or pulsate, or to pound" (Hinayat 2003, 86). Another cognate is the Central Sinama word *hantuk* which means "to move a lure with a gentle up and down motion, as when fishing for squid"(CSED, *hantuk*). Yet another Central Sinama cognate is *handok* which means "to bounce vigorously up and down; to stamp the feet. *Bang angamu'-amu' si Indil ni ina'na bo' mbal kabuwanan,*

maghandok (When Indil asks anything from her mother and isn't given it, she stamps her feet). *Paghandok pelang buwatte', agtuy apong batangan* (When the canoe bounces like that, the outrigger boom will break right away)"[*ibid.*]. In Sama Pangutaran, *handok* is simply defined as a "bump"(SIL Philippines 1992, 154). In Sama Sibutu, *hendek-hendek* is defined as an "ungainly stride; clompy walk," and is further explained that "in this ungraceful way of walking, the whole foot is placed down at one time giving one a jerky, heavy walk. *Hendek-hendek eh na luman danda naan. ...That woman's walking is ungainly*"[CSED, *hendek-hendek*]. In Tausug, *handuk* means "to pound (something), thrust (something) onto or into (something else...)"[Hassan, Ashley, and Ashley 1994, 164]. Given the data gathered from informants and the lexicon entries above, it appears that **the aesthetic quality of the movement is that of making a series of bumpy up and down motion of the body while stamping or pounding one's foot on the floor.** Cognates: *hendik* (Sama Sitangkai), *hantuk* and *handok* (Central Sinama), and *handuk* (Tausug).

Suhut in Sama Sibutu means "to move back; to scoot back. *Suhutin gih, mbal gih dabattah* (Please move back [it] is not yet in place...). *Eh na masuhut siya-na ni bulian toongan...* (He scooted his chair to the very back)"[SSD, *suhut*]. In Central Sinama, *suhut* is likewise defined as "to draw back; to retreat. *Gibang bo' sinong, kowan bo' sinuhut* (left for putting forward, the right for pulling back)"[CSED, *suhut*]. In Sama Kubang, *suut* means "to go back, to back up or to give way" (Hinayat 2003, 276). In Sama Pangutaran, *sigput* means "jump back v. *sigput* A cuttle fish jumps back to the rear if it is speared from the front (*Kulabutan pasigput ni damuwihan bang tiyagbak min dahuban*)"[SIL Philippines 1992, 72]. In a similar manner, in Tausug *sigput* means "to jump back (to safety)"[Hassan, Ashley and Ashley 1994, 411]. Given the data gathered from informants and the lexicon entries above, it appears that **the aesthetic quality of the movement is that of moving rapidly backward in a jerky manner as if surprised.** Cognates: *suhut* (Central Sinama), *suut* (Sama Kubang), *sigput* (Sama Pangutaran), and *sigput* (Tausug).

Tendek is “to stamp the feet, as in dancing or as a childish gesture of frustration”(CSED, *tendek*). In Sama Sibutu, it is alternately as *tendek* or *tandak* which is a “gesture to stamp the feet. *Bang kow mbal hungun nisohoh daa kow subey magtendek* (If you dislike to be asked to do something, don’t stamp your feet)”[SSD, *tendek* or *tandak*]. Among the Sama Kota Belud and Sama Beluran, it is spelled as *tindak* which means “to stamp, to tread or to trample”(Hinayat 2003, 299). In Tausug, *tandak* means “to stamp one’s feet” (Hassan, Ashley, and Ashley 1994, 458). **The aesthetic quality of an emphatic stamping of the foot is supported** by both the data gathered from informants and lexicon entries. Cognates: *tandak* (Sama Sibutu), *tindak* (Sama Kota Belud and Sama Beluran), and *tandak* (Tausug).

Laksu means “to jump to a different location. *Palaksu ampan* (The grasshopper jumped)”[CSED, *laksu*]. It is also used as a label for the mudskipper in Central Sinama (ibid.). In Sama Sibutu, it possesses the same meaning: “to jump from one place to another. *Palaksu kow ni tahik* (You jump into the sea)”[SSD, *laksu*]. In Sama Pangutaran, it means to “jump down v. laksu Let’s jump down off the fence (*Palaksu kita min pagal*)”[SIL Philippines 1992, 72]. In Tausug, *laksu* means “to jump, jump over (something)”[Hassan, Ashley, and Ashley 1994, 265]. Given the data gathered from informants and the lexicon entries above, it appears that **the aesthetic quality of the movement is that of jumping downward to another place or position**. Cognates: *lukso* (Tagalog and Visayan languages) and *laksu* (Tausug).

Oyoh-Oyoh, *oyo’-oyo’* or *oyok-oyok* in Central Sinama means “to shake”(CSED, *oyo’-oyo’*). *Koyok*, its cognate in Sama Sibutu, is defined as “to shake; to rattle something. *Koyokan nu aku pakowan naan* (Shake that package for me)”[SSD, *koyok*]. In Sama Pangutaran, it comes in several forms: “shake v. *hodjog* Don’t shake the pier; I almost fell because it’s not secure (*Daa kau maghedjog ma jambatan iyu; hug aku agan sabab ‘nsa’ kahogot.*) *Jogjog* (When there is a typhoon the house shakes). *Bang niya’ badju jogjog na luma’*. *Tugtug* (Don’t shake there; she has a stomach ache). *Daa kau magtugtug maiyu; p’ddi b’ttong na*. *Jagjag* (Don’t shake it from its wrapping, it’ll be scattered). *Daa na jagjagun min putusan na*,

kanat meen...”(SIL Philippines 1992, 114). In Tausug, *jugjug* means “to shake something,”(Hassan, Ashley, and Ashley 1994, 208) while *uyug* means “(for something) to rock or shake (as if about to fall), be unsteady, totter”(520). In the Central Javanese (Surakarta) dance tradition, *hoyog-oyog* is a dance term with the same meaning as “to shake” (Brakel-Papenhuisen 1995, 90;145). The lexicon entries above support the observation of **the aesthetic quality of strongly shaking a certain body part**. Cognates: *oyo'-oyo'* and *oyok-oyok* (Central Sinama), *koyok* (Sama Sibutu), *hodjog*, *jogjog*, *tugtug*, and *jagjag* (Sama Pangutaran), *uyug* and *yugyug* (Tagalog), *jugjug* and *uyug* (Tausug), and *hoyog-oyog* (Central Javanese).

Pakiring as a term has very interesting origins. In Sama Sibutu, *pakiring* originally refers to a specific “body posture,” that is “to lie on the side. *Angey kow pakiring sidja ni kanan bang kow tuli? ...*(Why do you always lie on your right side when you sleep?)”[SSD, *pakiring*] It can also refer to a boat that lists: “*Hangkan na ley pakiring lansa basa mbal salih heka min dambilah maka min dambilah...* (The reason the boat listed because its cargos were not balanced)”[*ibid.*]. It can also mean “to tip to the side; to fall to the side; to place on its side. *Bang kow mattanah anu tutu, daa pakiringun* (When you put [this] away, do not put it on [its] side)”[*ibid.*]. It can also mean for something “to be tipped to the side. *Nikiring eh na boggoh* (The canoe is being tipped to the side by him)”[*ibid.*] In Tausug, *giling* means “to crank (something), keep (something) revolving or turning”(Hassan, Ashley, and Ashley 1994, 149). Another Tausug word, *linggang* (obviously a cognate of the previously discussed *lenggang*), means “to rock or sway (something), roll (something) back and forth.” The root of *pakiring* is *kid* which refers to “the side of the body; the side of the waist. *Piddih kid ku* (The side of my waist hurts)”[SSD, *kid*]. With almost all entries referring to “the side,” **pakiring’s aesthetic quality is without doubt that of a gentle side to side swaying of the hips**. *Pakiring* or *igal pakiring* is a contemporary form of *igal* that is characterized by the liberal swaying of the hips. Cognates: possibly *giling*, *gulong* and *kendeng* (Tagalog), *giling* and *linggang* (Tausug), and *guling* (Bahasa Indonesia).

It should be noted that most of the terms cited from lexical sources in this section do not appear to be dance terms. Most of them constitute part of the quotidian vocabulary of the cultures from which they are sourced. Quotidian nature notwithstanding, it can be seen in the discussion presented above that they provide clues as to how the Sama select and create terms for dance. They also contain valuable data on metaphors that give us ideas about the visual or aesthetic qualities of the movements. However, two terms (*kollek* and *kidjut*) are cited in lexical sources as terms that are specifically associated with dance. Other literature in the area of dance and music would include five other terms or their cognates (*limbai*, *ingsud-ingsud*, *kapo-kapo*, *engke'-engke'*, and *oyoh-oyoh*) as specific dance terms. As earlier noted, Martenot mentions *limbai* as a dance or movement term in passing (Martenot 1980). Brakel-Papenhuisen (1995) mentions cognates of *kollek* (*ukel*), *kidjut-kidjut* (*genjot*), *ingsud-ingsud* (*mingsed-ngingsed* and *genser-jenser*), *kapo-kapo* (*kapang-kapang*), *engke'-engke'* (*engkyek-ingkyek*), and *oyoh-oyoh* (*hoyog-oyog*) as dance terms in the Surakartan tradition of Central Javanese dance. This researcher will return to the significance of these apparent overlaps or continuities in the concluding section of this piece.

Conclusion: towards a sociocultural model of dance movement and terminology

The examination of Sama *igal* dance terms via a linguistic interrogation of their respective origins has revealed clues as to how actual movement ought to be executed. This “ought to” perspective is captured in the aesthetic qualities summarized in each of the entries that were discussed in the preceding section of this paper. Aesthetic quality essentially captures how “movement units” (specific kinema or kineme) “ought to” or “how they are desirably ought to” be executed (specific aesthetic). As such, dance terms reveal in this linguistic exercise reveal kinaesthetics (kineme + aesthetics) of the movement vocabulary of this particular dance tradition.

This linguistic understanding is further enriched by the accompanying visual imagery gleaned from the usage of each term either as a “dance term” or as a term describing more quotidian forms of movement. Table 4 shows that the Sama *igal* dance terms in this particular compilation or sampling hold much metaphorical association with flora, fauna, or other natural phenomena (15 counts). This category is followed by cultural artifacts and occupational or cultural activities (8 counts each). In this sociocultural context, movement acquires both meaning and nuanced expression. This can most probably be understood by citing an example from western classical ballet. In this tradition, there is a step called *pique*. The word means “to prick.” The dancer therefore is expected not only to execute a series of turns, but also to execute the series of turns “as if pricking the floor with her foot like a needle.” In this example, meaning is not only understood... movement is also given expressive nuance. This same process of giving meaning and nuance to movement may also be applied to the Sama *igal* dance tradition. *Kagis-Kagis*, should not just be a movement corresponding to alternately picking up the feet through the sides; it should be understood as alternately picking up the feet through the sides by first “scraping the floor with the balls” of the feet and must be executed with the accompanying expressive nuance “of a chicken scratching the earth.” This combination of meaning and nuance does not only make for better understanding(s) of the dance, but also performance(s) of the dance.

The linguistic interrogation of Sama *igal* dance terms has also served to recontextualize the dance tradition in at least three geographical, if not “imagined” cultural spaces. Table 5 illustrates this observation. First of all, the presence of multiple Sama cognates (48 for the entire sample) reaffirms the observation of inherent diversity in the Sama or Sinama sub-family of languages found within or in the vicinity of the Philippines. It should also be noted that the Tausug language shares a significant number of terms (18 out of 20 in the sampling of Sama terms) that are used as dance or movement terms in the Sama languages. This perhaps indicates to some degree the closeness of the Tausug *pangalay* and the Sama *igal* dance traditions which with very little doubt must have

TABLE 4: Dance Terms, Metaphors and Usages

<i>Igal</i> Dance Term	Flora, Fauna or Natural Phenomena	Cultural Artifact	Occupational/ Cultural Activity
Limbai	Palm Fronds, Leaves		Dance (arms)
Ta'ut		Cradle	To extend a fishing Line
Kello'	Sugar Cane	Knife (Blade), Carving	
Kollek	Sea worm, caterpillar		Dance (arms), Scribbling
Ebed-Ebed	Flowers, Fish Membrane, Hair		
Kagong	Crab		
Kamun	Sea Mantis		
Kidjut			Dance (shoulders)
Ingsud	Sea Snail		
Kapo'			To wade into the sea
Engke'			Game (hopscotch)
Kag(h)is	Chicken		
Ketchek	Splash of water		
Hengel			To make go up and down
Hendek		Fishing Lure, Boat	
Suhut	Cuttle Fish		
Laksu	Mudskipper		
Oyoh-Oyoh		Pier/walkway, house	
Pakiring		Boat	Dance style, Dance (hips)
Number	15	8	8

Note: This table is based on data gathered by the researcher from various lexicon entries, dance literature as well as interviews of informants during various instances of fieldwork.

developed together for a protracted period of time in the geosocial/political space of the Sulu Sultanate (ca. 1405–1915). This almost one-to-one correspondence in terms of cognates opens new avenues in dance research. That Tausug is most closely related to Butuanon, a northeastern Mindanao language, is already a well-established linguistic fact (Pallesen 1985, 15–16). If the cognates are not significantly present in Butuanon either as ordinary movement terms or as dance terms, then the direction of language convergence in dance can be hypothesized.³⁵ The direction of appropriation of dance can also be hypothesized.³⁶ Second, the diversity of the Sama languages can perhaps be appreciated even more with an expansion of the sampling for a study of dance terms that goes beyond the Sulu and Tawi-Tawi Archipelagos. The Sama or Sinama-speaking peoples are known to inhabit other spaces in maritime Southeast Asia. For instance, it would be interesting to study continuities or discontinuities in the use of dance terms in the extreme edges of the Sama world such as Roti Island to the south of Timor, Bajau Islands in the Riau-Lingga Archipelago near the Malayan Peninsula, and Kajoa in Moluccas Island in eastern Indonesia.³⁷ Third, places or “re-sites” both the dance and the language in between the Philippines and the greater or more expanded region of maritime Southeast Asia (20 cognates observed for each space). It should be well-noted that possibly seven (7) out of twenty (20) Sama dance term cognates in this study can be observed in Surakarta tradition of Central Javanese dance. This existence of shared dance terms can either imply a “shared movement concept,” that is most probably based on common environmental features of place or “cultural contact,” that is most probably indirect in nature but nevertheless constituting a “chain-link” of cultural practices that may have been engendered by trade, migration, or conquest.³⁸ Again, these pieces of insight open new avenues for future research to tread. This act of “re-siting” speaks eloquently of continuities that are apparent in (West) Austronesian cultures. The repeated interrogation of this phenomenon of rich diversity within a narrative of continuity can only benefit scholars of Sama cultures (or Sulu studies), Philippine studies and Southeast Asian studies... each autonomous field of knowledge production enrich each other.

Table 5: Dance Terms and Cognates

<i>Igal</i> Dance Term	Sama Cognates	Tausug Cognates	Other Philippine Cognates	Southeast Asian Cognates
Limbai	Limbey, Limbay	Limbay		Lembey *
Ta'ut	Tugut	Taut		
Kello'	K'lluk, Kalluk, Kollek	Kalluk	Okir, Ukkil, Liku	Eluk, Ukel*
Kollek	Kello', K'lluk, Kalluk	Kulluk	Okir, Ukkil, Liku	Eluk, Ukel*
Ebed-Ebed	Eved-Eved, Kebed-Kebed	Pidpid		
Kagong	Kagon, Kagang	Kagang		
Kamun	Kamun			
Kidjut	Kidjut	Kig-Kig, Kignut		Enjot, Enjut, Kirig*, Genjot*
Ingsud	Engsod, Insut, Ensod, Ensot, Sagudsud	Inut-Inut, Ingsud	Isbug, Usog	Mingsed-Ngingsed*, Gengser-kenser*, Kesed
Kapo'	Kapoh			Kapang-Kapang*
Engke'	Engkeh, Engket, Engge', Angkat	Angkat, Tingki		Angkat, Angat Angkat, Engkyek-Ingkyek*
Kag(h)is	Kagis, Kahig	Kagis, Kahig, Kahig, Kiskis, Kais, Kikis		
Ketchek	Keke, Kessek, Ketik	Pigsik, Tigsik, Detik, Pitik, Wisik		
Hengel	Henggol	Hingu', Hingngu'		
Hendek	Hendik, Hantuk, Handok	Handuk		

<i>Igal</i> Dance Term	Sama Cognates	Tausug Cognates	Other Philippine Cognates	Southeast Asian Cognates
Suhut	Suut, Sigput	Sigput		
Tendek	Tandak, Tindak	Tandak	Padyak	Pjak
Laksu	Laksu	Laksu	Lukso	
Oyoh- Oyoh	Oyo'-Oyo', Oyok-Oyok, Koyok, Hodjog, Jogjog, Tugtug, Jagjag	Jugjug, Uyug	Uyog, Yugyug	Hoyog-Oyog*, Oyog
(Pa)kiring	(Pa)kiring	Giling, Linggang	Giling, Kendeng	Guling
Number	48	27	20	20

Note: This table is based on data gathered by the researcher from lexicon entries, dance literature as well as interviews of informants during various instances of fieldwork. Dance terms that are observed in the Surakartan tradition of Javanese Dance.

Finally, one must ask the question: what implications does this study have for Philippine dance scholarship?

First of all, the diversity apparent in Sama dance terms alludes to and supports the idea of the diversity found in Sama *igal* dance traditions. Sama *igal* dance is not one dance tradition but a compilation of many.³⁹ Philippine dance is likewise a compilation of diverse traditions defined to a large extent by scholarly decisions. Diversity most probably prompted Francisca Reyes Aquino to title her first book “Philippine National Dances” and not “Philippine Dance.” The plural form coheres beautifully with the complex reality of the Philippines. Second, as there is a need for generalists who study a vast number of diverse dances in a given geographical space, there is also a need for specialists who study singular traditions across national frontiers. Specialization in the study of one particular dance tradition of one particular ethnolinguistic group is still a relatively rare phenomenon in dance publication in the

Philippines. Third, as there is a need to study dance terminologies of particular traditions, there is also a need to compile comparative data across traditions. This comparative approach can only deepen our collective understanding of Philippine dance traditions in terms of embedded meanings and nuanced expressions. Perhaps, this step towards comparison can even help answer the very basic question of what in dance makes a Filipino...“Filipino.”

In terms of “nationalist labels and categories,” *igal* is problematic as it can be found in at least three Southeast Asian nation-states: Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. This “problem” perhaps offers opportunities in “re-siting” Philippine dance scholarship in the greater context of studies in maritime Southeast Asian cultures. The “problem” is undoubtedly conceptual and contextual. In this day and age of “regional integration,” colonial discourses of “othering” via rigid distinctions ought to give way to postcolonial discourses of “linking” via fluid (re)constructions of identities. As in Aquino’s time, the nation and the scholar must be (re) conceptualized and (re)contextualized. In so doing, a heuristic overlap is made apparent in the perspective of seeing “the Philippines in Asia, and Asia in the Philippines.” In such a manner, scholarly lineages are not disrupted, but are instead creatively transformed.

Notes

- ¹ An earlier version of this article was published in Hanafi Hussin and others, eds., *Southeast Asia Rising: Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Southeast Asia* (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Southeast Asian Studies, University of Malaya, 2013), pp. 358–376.
- ² “Kinethics” is a word coined by this researcher. See MCM Santamaria, “Expanding Knowledge, Extending Ties: Exploring Contexts and Forces that Shape the Sama Dilaut Igal Dance Tradition,” in Birgit Abels with Hanafi Hussin and Matthew Santamaria, eds., *Oceans of Sound: Sama Dilaut Performing Arts*, (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2012), p. 81.
- ³ The writing of this draft manuscript was made possible by the Asian Center Research and Special Projects Grant (2012-2013).
- ⁴ The Institute of Philippine Culture regularly bestows the Merit Research Award (MRA) to full-time and part-time faculty of the Loyola Schools, Ateneo de Manila University. This researcher submitted a proposal titled “Capturing Pangalay.” During the course of

the research, this researcher was enlightened by informants in the field about the difference between the Tausug pangalay tradition and the Sama igal tradition. From then on, this researcher has decided to refer to Sama traditional dances as belonging to the igal tradition.

- ⁵ The fieldwork in Bongao, Sitangkai and Sibutu, was done from 20 to 29 April 2005 together with Dr. Cynthia Neri Zayas, Dr. Amparo Adelina Umali III, and Ms. Marta Lovina Prieto. Interpretation and local assistance were given by Mr. Hamka Malabong, Hadji Yusuf Malabong and Hadji Musa Malabong of Sitangkai, Tawi-Tawi Province.
- ⁶ It may be argued that there are many igal traditions among the Sama as each island or even each community located in an island may consider their dance tradition distinct from each other. The Sama Sitangkai and the Sama Tabawan, for instance, view their respective traditions as distinct from each other. Differences may be observed in the music(s), costumes, properties and variations in the employment of movement vocabulary. Interestingly, dance terminology as in many other aspects of the Sama language(s) appear to be mutually intelligible among groups. The degree(s) of intelligibility will eventually have to be ascertained by future research.
- ⁷ Poses or postures and gestures have been well in several tomes on Southeast Asian dance traditions. Notable examples are found in Clara Brakel-Papenhuisen, *Classical Javanese Dance: The Surakarta Tradition and its Terminology*, (Leiden: KITL Press, 1995) and Toni Samantha Phim and Ashley Thompsom, *Dance in Cambodia*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
- ⁸ A keen observer will note that this researcher's devised vocabulary hews closely to that of western ballet terminology. The parallelism is intentional and proves to be quite useful as a mnemonic device.
- ⁹ Fieldwork schedules are as follows: (Badjawan), Baranggay Malitam and (Born Again Badjao Church), Baranggay Libjo Batangas City, 28 to 30 December 2012; (God' Love for Indigent Minorities compound), Municipality of Apalit, Pampanga Province, 2 to 4 January 2013; (Visit of informants from San Andres Manila), Asian Center, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, 6 February 2013; and (Interview of Artists from Bongao, Tawi-Tawi), GT-Toyota Asian Center Auditorium, 27 February 2013.
- ¹⁰ Interview with Mr. Ligaya Baruk, 22 April 2005, Sitangkai, Tawi-Tawi Province.
- ¹¹ Interview with Mr. Ligaya Baruk and Hadji Yusuf Malabong, 23 April 2005, Sitangkai, Tawi-Tawi Province.
- ¹² Interview with Calsum Telso and Al-Shadat A. Mohammad, 21 February 2013, Asian Center, UP Diliman, Quezon City.
- ¹³ *ibid.*
- ¹⁴ Interview with Abdul Said Hailaya, 7 December 2012, Hardin ng Rosas, UP Diliman, Quezon City.
- ¹⁵ Interview with Dalino and Nur Perong, 15 May 2012, Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon City.
- ¹⁶ Interview with Calsum Telso and Al-Shadat A. Mohammad, 21 February 2013, Asian Center, UP Diliman, Quezon City.

- ¹⁷ Interview with Hadji Musa Malabong, 21 February 2013, Asian Center, UP Diliman, Quezon City.
- ¹⁸ Interview with Mr. Ligaya Baruk, 22 April 2005, Sitangkai, Tawi-Tawi Province.
- ¹⁹ Interview with Calsum Telso, 21 February 2013, Asian Center, UP Diliman, Quezon City.
- ²⁰ Interview with Mr. Ligaya Baruk, 22 April 2005, Sitangkai, Tawi-Tawi Province.
- ²¹ Interview with Abdul Said Hailaya, 7 December 2012, Hardin ng Rosas, UP Diliman, Quezon City
- ²² Interview with Al-Shadat A. Mohammad, February 2013, Asian Center, UP Diliman, Quezon City
- ²³ Interview with Hadji Musa Malabong, 17 January 2012, Hotel Rachel, Bongao, Tawi-Tawi.
- ²⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁵ Interview with Calsum Telso, 21 February 2013, Asian Center, UP Diliman, Quezon City.
- ²⁶ Interview with Calsum Telso and Al-Shadat A. Mohammad, 21 February 2013, Asian Center, UP Diliman, Quezon City.
- ²⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁸ Observed among members of the Born Again Badjao Church, Baranggay Libjo, Batangas City, 30 December 2012.
- ²⁹ Interview with Calsum Telso and Al-Shadat A. Mohammad, 21 February 2013, Asian Center, UP Diliman, Quezon City.
- ³⁰ Interview with Hadji Musa Malabong, 21 February 2013, Asian Center, UP Diliman, Quezon City.
- ³¹ This researcher interviewed Hadja Washela Kalbit (aka Buwangkan Kalbit) of Simunul in her residence in Simunul in 19 October 2007 for the Sama Simunul dance terminology and Radzmina Tanjili, a Sama Dilaut of Zamboanga origin at the Asian Center, University of the Philippines in 13 March 2014 for the Sama Dilaut Samboangan dance terminology.
- ³² This researcher admits that the limited number of informants interviewed may very well have affected the results of this preliminary study. Casting the net over a bigger sampling may actually yield a very different result. Still, the results indicate some patterns which may help point the direction for future research.
- ³³ Variability of dance term use among informants as well as their ability to remember dance terms provide special challenges in dance research in the field. This only underscores the importance of expanding the number of informants to be interviewed as well as the importance of multiple visits to the field. In the experience of this research some dance terms are only “discovered” after the second or third visits. This indicates the non-universality or non-rigorous nature of use of dance terms.
- ³⁴ The lexicon sources are (Hinayat 2003) for Sama languages in the Southern Philippines and Sabah, Malaysia; (SSD) for Sama Sibu <http://www-01.sil.org/asia/Philippines/prog/ssb/dic/index.html> (accessed on 24 July 2013); (CSED) for Sama Central or Central Sinama; and (SIL Philippines) for Sama Pangutaran. (SSD and CSED were all

accessed on 24 July 2013. SSD stands for Sama Sibutu Dictionary [<http://www-01.sil.org/asia/Philippines/prog/sml/dict/lexicon/index.htm>] while CSED means Central Sinama English Dictionary [<http://www-01.sil.org/asia/Philippines/prog/sml/dict/lexicon/index.htm>]. (The links to each other are all the same, so to avoid repetitions and de-clutter the paper, the editors modified the Chicago format for citing online dictionaries. The modified citation gives the acronym of the dictionary, SSD or SSED, plus the dictionary entry to help in the location of a word—Editor.)

- ³⁵ That is, Tausug converging towards Sama or Sama-Sibuguey.
- ³⁶ That is, in this case... the Tausug *pangalay* appropriating from the Sama iganal.
- ³⁷ The same may be said of continuities and discontinuities in the music repertoires of the kulintang ensemble that usually accompanies the Sama iganal.
- ³⁸ I owe these particular pieces of insight to Dr. Ricardo Trimillos III who graciously shared with me his ideas regarding this draft. Errors in this piece are, of course, only mine.
- ³⁹ This may also be applied to Sama kulintang ensemble traditions. As one expands the sampling of study for Sama dances and music(s), one realizes that each island or even village community is unique from the rest in holding their respective repertoires of dance(s) with a close one-to-one correspondence with music(s). The “compilation” is synonymous to “aggrupation” wherein the scholar makes a choice of convenience.

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Commentaries

Southeast Asian Studies in Peking University

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THE DEVELOPMENT of Southeast Asian Studies in Peking University paralleled changes in China, and it has been characterized by an academic and teaching style unique to the university. Peking University is the top university in China, while its Southeast Asian Studies program ranks among the top four in the country.

China has had close relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors in the south. The Chinese, who come to and from Southeast Asia, left so many unique written materials on the geography and history of the region. After the 1911 revolution, contemporary scholars began to study Southeast Asia from the perspective of Sinology. Among them, Feng Chengjun, Zhang Xinglang, and Xiang Da are the most famous.

After graduating from the Université de Sorbonne with Law degree, Feng trained as a Sinologist under the strict guidance of Professor Paul Pelliot. During his involvement with Peking University in 1920, Feng published two books on Southeast Asia; one is *The History of Communication between China and South Sea*; the second is an edited book on textual research on the history and geography of the Western Region and the South Sea.¹ His research pushed the study of the South Sea to a new stage by using the historical material in the Chinese classics to supplement studies of Western scholars. Zhang Xinglang came back to China after the 1911 revolution. He planned to dedicate himself to his country by focusing on physiochemistry, which he studied in the United States and Germany for several years. However, political realities led him instead to turn to the study of the history of communication between China and the West. Affiliating himself in Peking, he compiled the historical

material collection on the communications between China and the West, and on the relations between China and Southeast Asia, which were based on his research of various versions of classics written in different languages.

Xiang Da understood European Sinology by copying the *Dunhuang* texts in some well-known libraries in Europe. His study on South Sea focused on the historical and geographical research of Zheng He's voyage down the Western Seas and reorganized and corrected classics on the South Sea written by the Chinese, such as *Textual Notes of the Customs of Cambodia*, *Notes on Zheng He's Nautical Chart*, etc.

Obviously, their research was marked by the features of their time. First, influenced by European Sinology and the spread of Western learning to the East, they sought to understand the customs of the South Sea by examining and correcting the historical and geographical facts in the classics. Second, their South Sea studies were viewed in the framework of the communication between China and the West. To some extent, this kind of study did not only supplement the Chinese historical studies, but also reflected the realities of China-Southeast Asia relations in ancient times. Third, contemporary arts and historical studies boosted national spirit to some extent. In line with the reappearance of the ancient glory of the Western Region or the South Sea,² their research played a unique role that science and industry could not do.

Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Southeast Asian Studies in Peking University has been divided into three stages. Two turning points include the Cultural Revolution in 1966 and the establishment of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies in Peking in 2002. From 1949 to 1966, the framework for academic organization and the choice of research area in the university was affected by those in the former Soviet Union, by the rise of national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and by the spirit of the Bandung Conference (the First Asian-African Conference was held on 18 to 24 April 1955). In the framework of international studies in China, Peking University was chosen to focus on Third World Studies to explain and

enrich Chairman Mao's strategic idea of differentiating Three Worlds. Because it focused on a region geographically close to China and was a rising developing area, Southeast Asian Studies received unprecedented emphasis in the university. The Oriental Language School, which was set up in 1946 in Nanjing, was also integrated into the university, and brought in specialists and training professionals in Indonesian, Vietnamese, Thai, and Burmese languages. Some, led by the leading Orientalist Ji Xianlin, set up the department of Oriental Language and Literature and trained teachers and researchers of Oriental languages and cultures. In 1954, the teaching and research section of Asian History, chaired by the famous historian Zhou Yiliang, was set up in the History department, where professional Southeast Asian historians were trained and some Asian history courses were taught. In 1964, the Institute of Asian-African studies, chaired by the famous political scientist Zhao Baoxu, was founded. It set out to do research on political developments in Southeast Asia. Some of the institute's professors had experiences in and of Southeast Asia; some of them were overseas Chinese who came to China from the region and were educated at Peking; others were native Chinese who studied at universities in Southeast Asia as graduate students or as visiting scholars. With their professors, these scholars trained during the 1950s and 1960s and became the main luminaries of Southeast Asian Studies at Peking University after 1949.

This period produced some academic writings on Southeast Asian studies, albeit centered at the university. The main themes of this research were as follows: first was the history of Southeast Asian states and their relationships with China. Historian Zhou Yiliang published two books, *The Peaceful and Friendly History between China and Asian States* (1955), and *Ancient History of Asian States* (1958). In both of these are chapters on the history of Vietnam from ancient times to the end of the 16th century, and on the history of relations between China and its neighboring Southeast Asian states. The second theme dealt with historical processes of anti-imperialism and anticolonialism in Southeast Asia. Chen Yan published his book entitled *Malaya in Fighting* (1951), while Chen Yulong wrote *History of Anti-Imperialism of Vietnamese* (1951).

Third were the languages and grammars of Southeast Asia. Yan Bao, Fan Honggui, Chen Yan, Wu Shihuang, etc. wrote academic papers, some of which were translations of classical works on the culture, history, and politics of Southeast Asian states. Wu Shihuang translated the book, *History of Indonesia (Sedjarah Indonesia)* by the Indonesian historian Sanusi Panei in 1959; Chen Yan translated *History of Burma*, a book written by a Burmese historian in 1965. These academic achievements definitely played an indispensable role in helping Chinese leaders and ordinary people understand the relationship of China with Southeast Asian states and the national liberation movements there. The writings also served as essential references for students.

During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Peking University was actually one of the main academic institutions where Southeast Asian studies essentially stagnated. After the reform and open door policy in 1978, Southeast Asian Studies professors worked hard to bring it back to the university. They studied the region comprehensively, but mainly focused on history, language and literature, political development, and overseas Chinese and their relationship with China.

First, in historical research, the group of Liang Zhiming, Liang Yingming, Li Mou, Zhao Jing, Yang Baoyun etc., wrote and published a series of books, such as *Modern History of Southeast Asia* and *Dictionary of the History of Southeast Asia*. These works showed a unique understanding of the history of Southeast Asia that departed from Eurocentric, Indocentric, and Sinocentric perspectives and laid an initial foundation for further development.

Second, besides excellent academic work in grammar and literature, professors in the Department of Oriental Language and Literature also ventured into cultural studies. Two other exciting developments were the introduction of Filipino Language courses and the publication of books, such as *Practical Grammar of Vietnamese*, *Elementary Course of Vietnamese*, *The Developmental History of Indonesian Language*, *The Literature History of Indonesia*, *Dictionary of Indonesian Language and*

Chinese, The Latest Grammar of Thai, Dictionary of Chinese and Thai, The Literature History of Burmese, The Concise Narrative of Burmese, Dictionary of Burmese and Chinese, The Civic Literature of the Philippines, The Four Main Cultures in the World, and Literature in Southeast Asia, among others. Because of its outstanding teaching and research achievements, the department was named a National Training Base by the Ministry of Education. It is also the main part of the Center for Oriental Literature, which is one of the key institutions for humanities and social sciences of the Ministry of Education.

Third, in the area of international relations and international politics in Southeast Asia, Zhang Xizhen published a book, *Contemporary Politics of Southeast Asia* and translated another, *Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia*. He also produced some advisory reports on the future of ASEAN-China relations, and on international relations in Southeast Asia, to the ministries and local governments of countries that bordered Southeast Asian states.

Fourth, research on the overseas Chinese was also conducted; a group of professors, who themselves were former overseas Chinese and were financially supported by the Angelo King Foundation in the Philippines, published the *Dictionary of Overseas Chinese All Over the World, Encyclopaedia of Overseas Chinese* (12 volumes), and a series of books compiled by the Center for Overseas Chinese Studies at Peking University. This made it the global center of the study of overseas Chinese in the region.

Fifth, in the subject of Chinese relations with Southeast Asian states, the two most important books with the same title, *The History of Cultural Communications between China and Foreign Countries*, were edited chiefly by Zhou Yiliang and He Fangchuan. He was Zhou's student in the Department of History in the 1950s. Zhou's book was published by the Henan People's Press in 1987, while He's was published by the International Cultural Publishing Corporation in 2008. The chapters on Southeast Asia were written by the experts in the History department.

Other books, products of long years of research, include *Concise Theoretical Studies on Han Culture* by Chen Yulong; *Marine Silk Road and Cultural Communication of China and Foreign Countries* by Chen Yan; *The Splendid Historical Chapter: The Relationship of Malacca Dynasty and Ming Dynasty in 15th Century* by Liang Liji; and *Zheng He and Indonesia* by Kong Yuanzhi.

In terms of the quality and quantity of academic achievements at Peking University, its Southeast Asian studies program had its share, all of which were a definite result of hard work and international academic exchanges. When China opened its doors, the overseas Chinese became the bridge between China and the world; moreover, they themselves became objects of study. Through their help, professors from Peking University began to exchange with their counterparts in universities and institutes in Southeast Asia. These professors went abroad to present their own findings and publish their papers and books in the languages of Southeast Asian states. Their academic work and time in the field has reflected China's enthusiasm since the reform and open door policy in 1978.

Compared with other Chinese universities that shifted their focus to applied programs, the professors of Peking insisted on working in traditional and theoretical fields. Not only did they pave new approaches in gathering material and methodology, they also did some original research that paralleled the times. Besides providing a wealth of data in their studies, they also trained a lot of graduate students, who eventually became a major force in Southeast Asian Studies in the university.

At the turn of the century, Peking University attained significant developments in Southeast Asian studies. Stimulated by the plan of a free trade zone between China and ASEAN, which was sponsored by the Chinese premier in 2001, the demand to comprehensively understand Southeast Asia increased rapidly. In order to respond to the intellectual challenge posed by the government and society, as well as sensing the need to integrate researches across disciplines, many professors began to

specialize in particular fields within Southeast Asian studies. On 13 September 2002, the university set up the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, which aims to: (1) integrate teaching and research in the Departments of History, Oriental Language and School of International Relations, and study Southeast Asia comprehensively from a multidisciplinary and multilevel perspective; (2) promote Southeast Asian studies as a discipline in Peking University; and (3) train more multidisciplinary experts of Southeast Asia.

Since the establishment of the Center, a number of developments have been accomplished. First was the setting up of the Ancient History of Southeast Asia program, which is composed of researchers from different departments in the University. The program has been completed and its final output was published recently by Peking University Press, with the support of the National Foundation of Humanity and Social Science. Second was the support given to the Yuanpei School in the launching of the training program of Language and History of Foreign Countries, which aims to train multidisciplinary scholars who will not only become experts of Southeast Asian languages but also understand its history.

Third was the active promotion of academic exchanges inside and outside the campus. In spring, it holds the Southeast Asian forum wherein some specialists in Beijing are invited to discuss important issues in the region. In winter, it hosts a national conference on different themes whose proceedings are revised and published. Almost every year, it invites well-known scholars in the field, including Anthony Reid, Hamashita Takeshi, and others, to give lectures. This year (2014), Dr. Filomeno Aguilar of the Ateneo de Manila University in the Philippines will be invited to give a talk on the latest discussions of historical studies of the Philippines. These also encouraged the members of the Center to attend academic meetings and share their own research, as well as to learn from their colleagues in and out of China. Fourth is the contribution to social and national policy through homegrown academic knowledge. Some scholars express their own views on particular issues that help the public understand the

international issues in Southeast Asia, while others contribute to policymaking by submitting advisory reports to governmental institutions.

At present, young scholars of Southeast Asian Studies in Peking University have obtained their Ph.D.s and have done fieldwork in the region. Their books indicate that they have assessed and evaluated the study of Southeast Asia by using an interdisciplinary methodology; moreover, they cover a wide variety of thematic studies, which differ from those of earlier scholars, who viewed the region through a historical perspective. Today's academics discuss the spread of literary texts, trade and cultural communication, military regimes and authoritarianism, overseas Chinese and nation-building, colonialism and separatism, the cooperation mechanism in ASEAN, ethnography and historical anthropology, and environmental history, among others. Following China's peaceful rise and its intricate relations with the Southeast Asian states, Southeast Asian studies in Peking University will definitely have a flourishing future.

Notes

- ¹ Western Regions is a historical concept that has different frontiers in different dynasties. In Han dynasty, it meant the area that was east to Yangguan Pass, west to Pamir mountains. In Qing dynasty, it meant the large area that was east to Dunhuang city, west to Balkhash lake, north to Russia and south to Lhasa. South Sea is also a historical concept. In Han dynasty, it meant the South China Sea, however its area was expanded to the large area that included the South China Sea and the Maritime scope in Southeast Asia and the east part of Indian Ocean in Ming and Qing dynasties.
- ² This means the historical review of some events, such as Han dynasty defeated the Xiong-Nu (the main nomadic nationality) and open the silk road that connected China and other Eurasian countries; and Zheng He Voyage in the Western part of Pacific ocean and Indian ocean in which the superiority and peace of Ming dynasty was showed to the countries along his sea route.

Towards the Autonomy of the People of the World: Need for a New Movement of Movements to Animate People's Alliance Processes¹

Ichiyo MUTO
Japanese Activist

The Second Wave

MY POINT OF DEPARTURE in imagining “another world” is that we are in the second historical wave of people’s movement against capitalism, the first wave being the 19th-20th century communist-socialist movement concentrating on the seizure of state as the decisive instrument of social change. Here I can hardly go into a historical assessment of that state-centred paradigm but it is obvious that the historic movement guided by that paradigm was tested and failed in a big way, leaving global capitalism triumphant, though in a miserable shape. The second wave is there to undermine and overthrow the capitalist regime in new ways, that is, in ways not dedicated to the seizure of the state and establishment of the party-state. I believe that this is the major lesson learned from the failure of the first wave. The second wave struggle certainly requires new practice guided by new visions and using new means to achieve “another world.” What then should be the visions and strategies of the second wave?

There seems to be a broad consensus among many of us who desire change in the way the world today is managed and ruled by a composite global power centre and keep from continuing an extremely destructive capitalism. Empire or not, this is a *de facto* global centre of rule, consisting of diverse agencies, national and transnational as well as public and private, an organic formation into which nation states have become inextricably

enmeshed. True, this global power is not monolithic but is divided by clashing interests among its components. Yet, they join forces when it comes to the point of defending their basic logic and rule, as well as their interests, against the actual and possible resistance from popular forces. There is in fact no legitimacy for this power, nor is there any democracy in the way global affairs are managed. The second wave of anti-capitalism movement therefore has to be a political struggle to resist, undermine, and overthrow this global power structure, a struggle for global democracy of a new type. It is clear that the global democracy we need is not a world government, or a resurrection of the sovereign nation state on a world scale. We are not struggling for a United States of the World, a universal state vested with the mission of abolishing capitalism from above.

What we envisage as “another world” must be a world self-governed by a people (global autonomy) that manage social and economic systems in non-capitalist ways. If this is to be our perspective, it follows that the key to bringing a change of this nature is the ability of the people of the world to organise themselves into a globally democratic autonomy, politically and morally forcing the capitalist power centre and capitalist markets to follow their rules, and finally terminating capitalism. Is such a perspective grounded?

The first step to answering this question is to recognise that there is yet no such entity as the “people of the world” as a potent agency of autonomy. It therefore follows that the possibility of bringing about “another world” depends on whether and how the people of the world can emerge as a body of global autonomy and, more specifically, whether and how social movements can be instrumental to the emergence of global people exercising autonomy.

People’s Alliance and Transborder Democracy

Let me take a look into this problematic using as a referent some of our pre-World Social Forum (WSF) experiences, namely, the People’s Plan 21 (PP21).² In hindsight, this programme was a forerunner of the movement

of movements for another world, projecting visions of global social change beyond the state-oriented perspective...

The key concepts we introduced then were *transborder participatory democracy* and a *global alliance of the people*, posited as the people constituting themselves to exercise autonomy. Emphasising that our hope for the future hinged on the formation of such a global people's alliance, we called it the "Alliance of Hope." We envisioned both transborder participatory democracy³ and a people's alliance, not as static institutions or bodies but as dynamic processes of constant formation and renewal. In other words, we adopted these concepts as movement concepts. I believe that these concepts are relevant in designing our global strategies of today.

The State of the Global People

Bound Together in Hostile Relations

In PP21, we chose the word "people" to designate the body to self-rule but, as pointed out earlier, we were keenly aware that there is no such "people" as an actually existing body to exercise democracy as self-rule...

Currently, capitalist globalisation entails two parallel phenomena. On the one hand, the accelerated development of communication technology and networking beyond borders has created a cosmopolitan arena, in which people, especially the young from far-flung cultural and political, as well as geographical locations and milieus are communicating and sharing information, sentiments, and cultures. Actions resisting the capitalist global rule spread fast benefitting from this development. On the other hand, we witness serious divisions ripping the people into antagonistic collectives and causing conflicts among them. People are badly divided, segmented, and set to fight each other, often to the point of violence, even murderous conflicts. The divides run between collectives of various kinds, as well as individuals. Inter-people conflicts of various social, historical, and economic origins have often been rekindled and aggravated under the spur of competition for survival most communities

are forced into. Religious and other “fundamentalisms,” jingoism, misogyny, racism, other hate campaigns, internal wars, and other forms of violence wielded by common people against one another are now part of the daily life on the surface of the globe. During the Bush war, Empire’s exercise of vertical violence bred, aggravated, and exploited horizontal violence among people’s collectives. How then can the people across the world autonomously rule themselves?

This perception leads us to the rejection of the notion of a global civil society that sees the world society more or less as an association of homogeneous individuals. The “civil society” discourse, prevalent in the 1990s, reflected the rise of NGO culture over social movements as complementary to the neoliberal offensive of capitalism. Similarly, we take exception to the idea advanced by some overoptimistic theorists who argue that the “multitude” under the hegemony of non-material labour already embodies the “common” and comes together preserving and benefitting from their singularities.⁴ I wish things were like that, but this postulate of predetermined harmony among people’s communities is not borne out by people’s realities unfurling in front of our eyes.

Building Alliances

The capitalist globalisation regime is dividing people into conflictual situations in the same process that links them up in the unequal global division of labour. The new inter-people relationships thus made, characterised by antagonistic closeness and not made by the choice of the people involved, breed inter-people violence and conflicts. On the other hand, this same process can, as it often does, generate the urge and initiative among some of the people dragged into antagonism to create new mutual relations beyond the externally erected barriers. The two diametrically opposed urges are stimulated by the same capitalist globalisation process.

Alliance building therefore relates to the effort to demolish from within the structural and subjective barriers separating and linking the people’s communities. In other words, if members of the groups linked

together by externally determined relationships begin to interact with one another, find that relationship not fatalistic, and discredit, weaken, and overcome it by creating new relationships of their own making, in which people from both sides find each other different than before, then the process to an alliance gets down to a start. In the PP21 programme, we called it “inter-people autonomy,” where communities self-manage not only their internal affairs but also their mutual relationships. People’s alliance—as a step toward people’s autonomy on a global scale—emerges as people’s collectives and communities create new relationships of their own making.

Here I am talking about very diverse groupings of global people with intersecting identities. Their diversity, instead of being developed as the richness of human civilisation, is exploited by the capitalist regime as the base of competition useful for capital accumulation. Alliance building is to give back life to diversity as the wealth of global society.

But what groups of people are we talking about? Global society is articulated into extremely complex, in fact infinite, sets of relationships, both macro and micro. These are constantly changing, so it would be useless to try to enumerate them. They come to the surface as new resistance occurs asserting certain identities. But some of the macro divisions are historically present, brought forward by major movements of the oppressed people involved. Among such division lines are those relating to North-South, gender, class, urban-rural, national, ethnic, cultural, and religious relationships.

These and numerous other burning issues are now closely intertwined, precluding the likelihood of separate solutions for each of them... To simplify, the present condenses in its midst at least the following problems and their legacies:

1. Thousands of years of domination of women by men;
2. Five hundred years of domination of the South by the North; the conquests of the people and their civilizations in the “new continent” legitimated the

notion of conquest in general — the conquest of people by the “civilized” and the conquest of nature by human beings;

3. Two hundred years of domination of agriculture by industry (industrial revolution);
4. Two hundred years of domination of society by the modern state and interstate system;
5. Two hundred years of the domination and exploitation of labor by capital;
6. One hundred years of imperialist domination of colonies;
7. Forty years of destruction of nature and diversity (homogenization) in the name of development.⁵

You can add any number of ‘current’ problems that have survived through history. The point is that none of them has survived in its original shape. These have been brought into a deformed synthesis in diverse combinations. Modern capitalism, for instance, integrates (2) to (5) on the basis of (1), while (7) integrates all the preceding problems. Item (2), mediated by (1), (3), (5), and (6), produces (7) in the form of the widening gap between the North and the South, and so on.

Our alternatives address precisely this problem complex. Given the organic intertwined-ness of the problems, the process to overcome it needs be a single process. “Single” does not mean “in one fell swoop.” Nor do we anticipate an apocalyptic settlement. It means disentanglement in the same historical time and in interrelatedness. It means that trying to fully resolve any one of the problems as separate from the others cannot, after all is said and done, succeed in resolving even that problem. This is a crucial point. For instance, the environmentalist movement will never succeed in preserving nature if it refuses to consider Southern poverty.

The clue to disentanglement is to begin with alliance builders taking sides with the dominated in the above list: women, indigenous people,

other oppressed minorities, the South, agriculture, labour, civil nature, and diversity. Already, vigorous voices have been raised and demands presented by or on behalf of them. We have fairly active social movements on all of those issues. The starting point in our search for global alternatives is to exert our full force to work changes on the dominating side in line with the demands of the dominated—on men, conquerors, North, capital, state, human arrogance, and homogeneity. Without the prerogative of the dominated, there is no emancipating alternative.

As hard as we might try, we shall find that an alternative world cannot be constituted by a mere mechanical summing up of such efforts. For there is no guarantee that alternatives evolved by different sectors and on diverse issues fall in predetermined harmony into a single picture of an alternative world. Alternatives pressed by urban citizens may collide with those developed by farmers. A feminist perspective may create misgivings among traditional communities. Conflicts are bound to occur.

But the differences and even conflicts can be constructive. They may be a driving force toward weaving comprehensive alternatives. If the conflicts end in antagonism, the current system will survive, capitalising on them. Mere compromise is postponement of antagonism. But if the differences are brought to a higher level of synthesis through dialectical interaction, then we have an Alliance of Hope with ever self-enriching alternative visions and programmes that fully cope with the entirety of the historical problem complex.

Characteristics of Inter-Movement Politics for Inter-People Alliance

Social movement today, in my view, faces this kind of historic challenge. For alliance building, movement plays a decisive role in helping this process get underway. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, discussing the World Social Forum and the global left, noted that one of the salient contributions of the WSF was “the passage from a movement politics to inter-movement politics”. By “inter-movement politics,”⁶ he signalled “a

politics run by the idea that no single issue social movement can succeed in carrying out its agenda without the cooperation of other movements.” I fully agree. Inter-movement politics, however, is not complete in itself. Nor is it merely a matter between issue-based movements. In the people’s alliance context, it carries a more general signification. A few important features involved include the following:

- **Inter-people politics:** Inter-movement politics, if relevant, must involve inter-people politics. Meaningful social movements are always an organic part of their respective constituencies. Inter-movement politics can have significance only when it is integral to inter-people politics and is not closed within itself. In other words, inter-movement politics is tested by the degree to which it engenders inter-people interactive politics conducive to people-to-people alliance making.
- **Movement and constituency:** This does not mean, however, that a specific movement “legitimately” and monopolistically represents one constituency considered more or less homogeneous. The constituency itself is a mobile entity comprising complex identities. The relevance of inter-movement politics should prove itself by the organic relationships it creates and recreates with the community. Inter-movement politics also works within the same constituent community that usually generates plural movement initiatives.
- **Interaction:** Interaction between people, as collectives and as individuals, in a positive context is one of the main modes of alliance building. Interaction in a hostile context would mean escalating hostility, distrust, and clashes, but we have abundant experience that people from usually unfriendly or even hostile groups, meeting in a favourable context, find each other just common human beings and friends.⁷

- **Mediation:** Let me call this kind of interaction “virtuous interaction,” while the other is a vicious interaction that aggravates conflicts. For virtuous interaction to take place, mediation is essential. Movement is expected to be an essential element of mediation. Assumptions under the old paradigm were that classes are represented by their parties and class alliances are deemed arranged when the parties representing them come together to sign a joint front agreement. But we know that movements, let alone political parties, do not represent people’s collectives. It is the people’s groups themselves that interact and enter into alliance processes. And it is in these processes that movements based in their constituencies can play indispensable mediating roles.
- **Bonds:** How can virtuous interaction take place among different communities, even those apparently antagonistic to one another? I cannot go too far here into this crucial question that would involve philosophical inquiries. But we all know that there are some certain bonds which enable human beings to live together in friendly relationships. Despite mounting evidence to the contrary, tempting us to be cynical, we cannot totally deny the working of this deeply seated social despite all evidence tempting us to be cynics. Christians may call it love, Hardt and Negri “love,” Confucians “jin” (perfect value, or benevolence), Buddhists “jhi” (mercy), and others by other names. I dare not give it a name though in 1969 we called it “peopleness.”⁸ At a more practical level, John Brown Childs, theorist and advocate of trans-communality, talks about “general ethics of respect.”⁹ All these terms seem to point to the ability of the people to make human linkages, displayed in multi-faceted actual practices.

- **Internal impacts:** Virtuous interaction can cause changes not only in the mutual relationships between groups, but also in the internal power relationships and cultures within the groups involved, in emancipating directions. Contacts and interaction with others may first make a community repulsive and defensive, but if the ideas are emancipating and interaction is properly mediated, there emerge people in the group liking them and using them to change the dominant structure, if any, of the group they belong to. These are very complex processes that sometimes lead to imposition but if channels of mediation are properly constituted, it will create mutually learning and changing processes. As Childs observes, “These ethics of respect can lead to some transformation of interacting participants” and “this transformation is not a one-sided conversion to a single perspective, but rather involves an opening up to shared understandings.”¹⁰
- **Structural changes:** We have said that under the capitalist regime different communities and collectives of the people are bound together, even despite themselves, in antagonistic relationships, typically of hierarchical formation. Alliance building therefore would not continue, even if virtuous interaction is constituted, if the oppressing/oppressed, exploiting/exploited, dominating/dominated relationships that exist between collectives are allowed to continue. For alliance building to continue and develop, this process should entail processes mitigating the structural and subjective inequality in power relationships toward the goal of their abolition. Otherwise, alliance building will remain a mere lip service and be discredited.

- **Alliance and economic articulation:** This aspect of the matter takes us to the broader field of building another world, or another global society. In the classical Marxist-Leninist understanding, a worker-peasant alliance was not only the key to the formation of revolutionary power, but also the basis for new economic articulation in a new society between industry and agriculture, or urban and rural. The experience of the first wave – mostly negative – should be reassessed from this angle, namely, the economic aspects of class alliances and antagonisms. The people's alliances that we are envisaging here, which embody a far more complex inter-group dynamic than worker-peasant, are pregnant with future economic articulations of another world. This means that people's alliances are not just political partnerships that are likely to collapse the moment political goals they are aimed at are achieved, but rather the embryo of a society yet to come. Alliance building through interaction and relational transformation will involve processes of changing existing socio-economic patterns of articulation toward a better world.
- **Dialogue with nature:** Interaction should take place not only among people. The alliance building process of necessity entails reflection on the whole course of capitalism-driven modern civilisation, particularly its arrogance toward nature, including our bodies. Interaction—or dialogue—with nature will have to be initiated, learning particularly from the wisdom of indigenous peoples, and redefining development and progress, in order to find ways to undo the self-destruction we have willingly inflicted upon ourselves.

- **Social contracts as steps in an ever-evolving people's charter:** Alliance building through positive and virtuous interaction is a dynamic process and therefore fluid and changeable. But at each phase of the process, the parties involved must negotiate terms of agreement at a given time on a certain basis. In other words, the permanent process needs times of punctuation. This will represent the formal aspect of alliance building. This means that we are coming up with inter-people social contracts at diverse levels. Some of them may be written out and signed on and others may be accepted as new habits observed and practised. At a time when nation states still exist, the autonomous agreements may be institutionalised or even made into state laws or written into international covenants. Let me emphasise that these are processes already underway; but they are not necessarily perceived as steps towards alternative world building, as they are usually seen only in the respective issue-based contexts. Thus, in actuality, alliance-building processes are, explicitly or implicitly, social contract making processes. The agreements and contracts are also renewable and actually being renewed reflecting new inter-people relationships. Movements are there as agencies to remake them through inter-movement politics. If these numerous autonomous inter-people contracts and agreements proliferate and are accumulated, linking ever broader segments of global people's activities, and if they begin to guide the course of events, then we approach inter-people autonomy whose shared basis will be a people's charter composite of numerous agreements and in constant process of renewal.

Is such an effort a “movement”? I think this is exactly what people mean when they use the term, a ‘movement of movements’. This coinage vaguely implies cooperation among various movements but can be understood as only a temporary, utilitarian cooperation. I think it can mean far more.

The WSF has created excellent possibilities for a new type of movement to emerge. In fact numerous workshops and other events in the arena offer various issue-, sector-, class-, gender- and otherwise-based movements to meet, develop common platforms, and common action. But systematic efforts of WSF to encourage inter-movement politics, it appears to me, have been absent or minimal. As far as I know, meetings of social movements which used to be held as voluntary projects were not intended, nor were they appropriate, as occasions to facilitate serious, patient discussion and negotiation for transborder alliance building. Setting dates for worldwide action and agreeing on general goals, it seems, was the utmost that social movement gatherings could aim at. It is time for us to clearly recognise inter-movement politics, and for that matter inter-people politics, in their own right, as new dimensions of movement.

I think the time is ripe for change. The Bush administration ironically gave us a focus—the war—while the WTO gave us another focus—neoliberal globalisation. The WSF functioned as an effective arena where, by the momentum of huge convergences, people emerged as ‘another superpower’, making their presence felt. But that stimulus is gone with the downfall of Bush, leaving Empire and global capitalism bogged down, so that the hostile global foci that have so far facilitated people’s mobilisations have, equally, become less visible. Instead of constituting ourselves chiefly by reacting to the global power, we need to find ways to constitute ourselves among ourselves through the medium of a movement of movements.

Notes

- ¹ This is an edited and developed version of an essay prepared by the author in August 2009 for ZNet's 'Reimagining Society' project (*Asian Studies* is reprinting this essay originally published in People's Plan Japonesia—Critical Analysis for an Alternative World, November 2009, <http://www.ppjaponesia.org/modules/tinycontent/index.php?id=7> — editor).
- ² The contents of the 1989 PP21 programme are covered in AMPO Vol 21, Nos 1-2 ('Steps into People's Century'); of the 1992 Thai PP21 in AMPO Vol 24, No 3; and of the 1996 programme in AMPO Vol 27, No. 2; available from the Pacific-Asia Resource Center (PARC), Toyo Bldg, 3F, 1-7-1 Kanda Awaji-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-0063 Japan; Phone: +81 3 5209 3455; Fax: +81 3 5209 3453; Email : ampo@parc-jp.org. The Keynote address by Muto Ichiyo to the Minamata conference is reprinted in Jeremy Brecher et al, eds, *Global Visions*, South End Press, 1993; major documents and declarations from 1989 through 1996 were published in a book form in Hong Kong in 1997. Copy availability can be checked with PARC in Tokyo; also for major statements from PP21 convergences go to www.ppjaponesia.org/
- ³ Transborder participatory democracy is (a) worldwide democracy practiced by the people of the world and (b) the right of the people to participate in any decisions that affect them, regardless of where those decisions are made. This concept was proposed by Ichiyo Muto in the keynote to the 1989 PP21 Minamata gathering.
- ⁴ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, 2004 – *Multitude : War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*. New York : Penguin Press.
- ⁵ Muto, 'Alliance of Hope and Challenges of Global Democracy', *Ecumenical Review*, World Council of Churches, Jan 1994.
- ⁶ Boaventura de Souza Santos, 'The World Social Forum and the Global Left', <http://www.forumsocialmundial.org>.
- ⁷ Due to the nature of this paper, it is difficult to cite concrete examples of interaction among people's groups causing virtuous internal changes. Such occurs both at macro and micro levels. In large-scale interaction, think of encounters between the Zapatista movement and the Mexican civil society organised by EZLN. The systematic interactions caused the Mexican civil society as well as inter-continental encounters. Mediated encounters, interactions, and alliance building efforts are underway at millions of levels from macro to micro, involving interim solutions of all kinds; even 'conflict resolution' processes may contain lessons to be drawn; it is therefore important for us to study these instances from the perspective of people's potentials to create and recreate social/political relationships of their own as against the imposed mutual relationships.
- ⁸ Ichiyo Muto, PP21 Keynote Speech, "For an Alliance of Hope," *AMPO*, Vol.21, No.2-3, 1989.
- ⁹ John Brown Childs, *Transcommunality-From the Politics of Conversion to the Ethics of Respect*, Temple University Press, 2003, p. 22.
- ¹⁰ Childs, *ibid.*, p.22.

The Philippine Platform on Indigenous People's Rights¹

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ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED Indigenous Peoples (IPs) from Aklan, Boracay, Antique, Cebu, Guimaras, Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Capiz travelled by land and sea for the 1st Visayas-wide consultation on the Philippine Platform on Indigenous Peoples Rights (PPIPR) held in Baranggay Aglinab, Tapaz, Capiz.

Held from 18–19 January 2014, the event was jointly convened by two of the country's biggest IP networks: the Koalisyon ng mga Katutubong Samahan ng Pilipinas (KASAPI, National Coalition of Indigenous Peoples in the Philippines) and the Kalipunan ng mga Katutubong Mamamayan ng Pilipinas (KAMP, National Alliance of Indigenous Peoples Organizations in the Philippines).

IP Situation and the PPIPR

KAMP National Coordinator Joana Jaime provided a general situationer of indigenous peoples and shared how they are coping with natural and man-made disasters such as typhoon Yolanda and aggressive development projects. She said resistance to such projects, including large-scale mining, logging, plantation, mega dams and militarization, have resulted in the extra-judicial killing of IP leaders. To date, 40 IP leaders nationwide have been killed under the Aquino government.

The PPIPR is the first in a series of consultations under KASAPI-KAMP partnership, which seeks to bring together membership-based indigenous peoples' organizations (IPOs, not NGOs). It aims to help them get to know each other, and bridge the isolation that has kept them separate

for several centuries. In addition, even IPOs not affiliated with KAMP and KASAPI were allowed to join the platform's activities and participate in consensus-building processes, making agreements, and arriving at common positions. The platform is not organized as an umbrella organization, but as a venue that facilitates IPs' exchange and sharing, and respects the organizational integrity of each participant.

The 2013 Indigenous Peoples Agenda

Since 2010, national and regional IPOs have consolidated an IP Agenda and have had it updated yearly during the annual celebration of World Indigenous Peoples Day every August. Among others, the 2013 IP Agenda includes the following:

- 1. On ancestral lands, resources and development**
—to put a stop to the land grabbing of indigenous peoples' territories, and to halt large-scale mining and the building of mega dams.
- 2. On human rights and militarization**—to stop Oplan Bayanihan and de-militarize indigenous communities; dismantle para-military groups sowing fear amongst IP communities; to stop the use of schools, barangay halls, barangay health centers, meeting centers of tribal councils as army camps; and to investigate the killing of 35 IP leaders and bring those accountable to justice; and to stop the tagging of IP leaders resisting plunder of natural resources as “terrorists.”
- 3. On the NCIP, IPRA implementation and Conflicting Laws**—to respond to the institutional assessment of the NCIP (National Council of Indigenous Peoples) that was done by the University of the Philippines-Baguio; to totally revamp of the NCIP and, after due process, bring into accountability officials

who violate the law; to junk/repeal the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 and pass the people's mining bill; and to stop the implementation of the Joint DENR-DAR-NCIP-Register of Deeds Administrative Order. The Joint Administrative Order should not be allowed to undermine the rights of IPs to their lands, but should, instead, fast-track the processing of the IPs' legal recognition of their ancestral lands.

- 4. On Delivery of Basic Social Services**—to provide access to free health services and support indigenous health care systems, and to ensure the conduct of a participatory review that aligns the policies of various government agencies involving education and culture (e.g. DSWD, DepEd, CHED, TESDA, DOST, LCC, NCCA, NCIP)² so that it ensures that education policies and programs for IPs are anchored on indigenous education systems and the right to self-determination.

To date, the Aquino government has not responded to any of the above. Instead, assaults against IP leaders resisting the plunder of natural resources within their ancestral domains continue as killings of IP leaders rise to forty (40).

The 2013 IP Agenda coincides with key demands embodied in an international document approved by IP representatives and delegates around the world—the Alta Outcome Document. The document was approved by the Saami Parliament in Alta, Norway, a preparatory gathering for the high-level special plenary meeting of the United Nations General Assembly known as the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) to be held in September 2014.

A workshop followed and participants discussed latest issues and emerging concerns in their own communities. They also shared their views and responses regarding the KASAPI-KAMP partnership on the PPIPR.

Common issues and experiences on disaster and land grabbing of ancestral lands highlighted the discussions. One group spoke about government relief goods, reporting that rice distributed by the Department of Welfare and Social Development for disaster victims was unfit for human consumption. Thus, the rice was fed to chickens, but they died later on. Another group identified threats posed by the South Korean-funded Jalaur Megadam Project. Three indigenous communities in possession of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) issued by the Office of the President of the Philippines will be submerged because of the dam. Moreover, the dam site is 11 kilometers away from the active West Panay fault that had once triggered an 8.3-magnitude earthquake in 1948, destroying 55 churches, 17 of which are beyond repair.

According to the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), the project area itself is prone to rockslides because of the sedimentary nature of the land. The land is therefore unsafe. Also, given that an average of 17 to 19 typhoons hit the Philippines each year, the megadam can also overflow and flood one city and nine municipalities downstream. About 17,000 indigenous peoples and thousands of people downstream of the river can be affected. Moreover, because water in the Jalaur river is insufficient in irrigating the vast rice and sugarcane lands downstream, constructing the megadam will aggravate this problem during the dry season.

Notes

- ¹ This is a shorter, slightly-edited version of a press release issued by KASAPI and KAMP. The full-length version may be viewed at <http://iphndefenders.net/mediabox/docs/PR%20Visayas-wide%20PPIPR%20Consultation.pdf>.
- ² DSWD (Department of Social Welfare and Development); DepEd (Department of Education); CHED (Commission on Higher Education); TESDA (Technical Education and Skills Development Authority); DOST (Department of Science and Technology); LCC (Literacy Coordinating Council); NCCA (National Commission for Culture and the Arts); and NCIP (National Coalition of Indigenous Peoples in the Philippines).

Reviews

Book Reviews

America's Informal Empires: Philippines and Japan, edited by Kiichi Fujiwara and Yoshiko Nagano, Anvil Publishing, 2012, 354 pp., ISBN 978-971-27-2765-8.

IN *AMERICA'S INFORMAL EMPIRES: Philippines and Japan*, Kiichi Fujiwara and Yoshiko Nagano appropriated the term *informal empire* to refer to America's efforts in creating a strategic post-war, post-colonial archetype to control resources or people in the Asia-Pacific region. In numerous ways, the book presented alternative explanatory models to demonstrate how America's hegemonic influence on Japan and the Philippines established a new world order.¹

Fujiwara and Nagano did not disappoint. For one, there is a dearth of foreign-based scholars working on Philippine and Philippine-related studies today. Intersecting these with the works of Philippine-based scholars and in light of issues surrounding US-Japan relations is an added plus. Furthermore, the book worked on a variety of interdisciplinary themes and issues previously untouched in recent times. Most importantly, the authors discussed the state and the functional application of geographical variables in determining America's political behavior vis-à-vis Japan and the Philippines.

I was deeply impressed with the book's attempt to interrogate empire and nation-building, nations and nationalism, and the vicissitudes transecting the three parties involved. For instance, Reynaldo Ileto's "War with the US and Japan, and the Politics of History in the Philippines" rendered new perspectives on the nearly-forgotten Filipino-American War (1896-1902) and the Japanese occupation of the Philippines (1942-1945) by critiquing Theodore Friend's *Between Two Empires*, while drawing

parallelisms between the two wars in order to bring around residual perceptions about America's colonial presence as "a fall into darkness" and not as a "golden age" as it had been romanticized by many.

Temario Rivera's "American Impact on Elite Community in Post-War Japan and the Philippines" provides a counterpoint to Iletto's study. In contrast to America's clear mandate during the post-World War II period to eliminate Japan's ruling elite while sparing Emperor Hirohito, Rivera suggests that America restored the Philippine oligarchy while deflecting perceived threats brought about by the grouping of progressive forces in the democratic alliance.

Oscar Campomanes' "The Japanese Analogy as Liminal Crisis-Effect in Initial Filipino-American Encounters, 1898-1899" discussed how, according to Felipe Agoncillo's seminal account of Filipino republican formation at the end of the nineteenth century, Filipino mission in the United States was generally perceived like "Japanese" by many Americans. Agoncillo says, "You have heard little of us..." (99). Campomanes suggests that by knowing very little about the struggles and trials of Filipinos under Spain, America may have failed to fully grasp the contexts and nature of the nation they were supposed to have "liberated".

Floro Quibuyen's "Japan and America in the Filipino Nationalist Imagination: From Rizal to Ricarte" provides an interesting take on Artemio Ricarte as a "forgotten hero" who "passed away with not even a marker placed on his grave" (127). Quibuyen's study is a wonderful attempt to situate Philippine nationalist consciousness vis-à-vis Japan and America before, during, and after World War II. Like Iletto and Campomanes, Quibuyen fills in a gap in social and historical studies by using counter-narratives to explain how Philippine attitudes towards the two colonial masters were met with contrasting responses.

Yoshiko Nagano's "On the Same Terrain of Colonial Modernity: The Mystification of Jose Rizal and the Symbolization of the Japanese Emperor" suggests that Rizal was America's functional national hero, whose memory was brewed and bred to perpetuate the colonial master's grip on

the archipelago. In contrast, the Japanese Emperor signified ambiguity vis-à-vis Japan's attitudes toward issues surrounding the Pacific War—the creation of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Dai-tô-a Kyôeiken), the issue of comfort women, and so forth.

In discussing the paradoxical nature of Japanese emigration to the Philippines during the American Colonial Period, Patricia Afable, in “Baguio's Early 20th Century Japanese Community: Culture, Society and Work in an American ‘Hill Station’ in the Philippines,” articulated the unique partnership between Japanese migrant workers and the American managers and capital owners. Meanwhile, “fruitful social and economic accommodations between Japanese and highland peoples on the one hand, and Japanese and Americans on the other, set the geographical and technological stage for the second half of the century,” Afable suggests (202).

Articulating the emergence of *salidummay* as a folk song in the Cordilleras vis-à-vis Japan's *sambika/shoka/gunka*, Michiyo Yoneno-Reyes suggests that at one level, modern folk songs in many places across the Philippines and Japan are “a form of bodily-aesthetical ‘surrender’ of the ‘Igorrots’ and Japanese to Anglo-Saxon musical tastes... as epitomized by the system of tonality and meter...” (255).

In the world of theater, latecomers may have to wait to be seated until an appropriate break in the performance comes through. As a belated colonial master, America seized every opportunity to break through early on, by exploring asymmetrical opportunities vis-à-vis the British empire to sit, stare and shudder. Collectively, the aforementioned scholars along with Julian Go in “The Philippines and US Imperial Identity,” Satoshi Nakano in “Memory and Mourning: Six Decades After the Two Wars,” Augusto Espiritu in “Competing Shadows: Japan and the USA in the Filipino American Imagination,” Nobue Suzuki in “Love Triangles: Filipinos, Japanese and the Shifting Locations of American Power,” and Hiromu Shimizu in “Refiguring Identities in an Ifugao Village: Sketches of Joint Projects from a Filipino Filmmaker, a Native Intellectual, and a

Japanese Anthropologist under American Shadow(s)” challenged many interdisciplinary interrogations on or about informal imperialism. By working on the US, Japan, and the Philippines these authors brought a renewed appreciation of “informal empires” in a manner so remarkably different from its standard British variety.

Despite attempts to problematize and reconsider the roles of commerce and culture in shaping America’s informal empires in West Pacific, it remains a puzzle why, after World War II, America privileged Japan—“the enemy”—over the Philippines—“the friend” and erstwhile colony. Japan’s economy grew by leaps and bounds, enough to create a dent in global affairs during the latter half of the twentieth century. In sharp contrast, America chose to maintain the Philippine ruling elite, which contributed greatly to political instability, economic collapse and over-all sorry state throughout the archipelago from the late 1960s onwards. Still, Fujiwara and Nagano’s book creates an opening for future scholars to explore many possible paradigms of understanding on the subject. Many other hows and whys of informal empires deserve to be constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed in the context of America’s dangerous precedents.

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Note

- ¹ Barton and Bennet (2010, 67) define “informal empire” as a “willing and successful attempt by commercial and political elites to control a foreign region, resource, or people.”

Reference

- Barton, G.A. and B.M. Bennett. 2010. “Forestry as Foreign Policy: Anglo-Siamese Relations and the Origins of Britain’s Informal Empire in the Teak Forests of Northern Siam, 1883-1925.” *Itinerario* 34(2): 65–86.

The Japanese in the Philippines 1880s-1980s,
Motoe Terami-Wada, National Historical Commission of
the Philippines, 2010, 156 pp.

ALTHOUGH IT TOOK FOUR more years to complete after its intended publication in celebration of the 50th anniversary of Philippines-Japan relations, the book is a wonderful addition to the anthology on the Japanese in the Philippines from the 1880s to the 1980s. Terami-Wada had a diplomat husband, whose work had brought her to various places. Coming to Manila in 1973 during the Martial Law, she was “curious about what it had been like to live in Manila during the Philippine Revolution” and “yearned to know how the Japanese community developed under the American regime” (ii). Whilst juggling marital, parental and teaching duties, the author pursued her scholastic penchant and inquisitiveness, which led to the five terrific articles on her Japanese compatriots in the Philippines.

The book explores the physical and imaginary presence of Japan and the Japanese in the Philippines from the late nineteenth to the twentieth century. The first essay deals with the Japanese involvement in the Philippine revolution based on her prize-winning essay (1985) and an article on the Japanese residents in Manila during the revolutionary era. It reveals that six years before the outbreak of the Philippine revolution, Japanese intellectuals like Suganuma Teifu advocated for Japan’s southward advance to help achieve Philippine independence, so that Filipinos would subject themselves to the emperor and agree to Japanese immigration to the islands. Initially, Japan was the model to the Filipino propagandists and revolutionists. Filipinos in Japan began to associate themselves with Japanese sympathizers, who agreed to help send munitions in exchange for the protectorate status of the Philippines under Japan. However, this cordiality dissipated when Japan was persuaded to remain neutral in the conflict between Spain and the United States. However the seed had been sown, and according to Pio Valenzuela, Andres Bonifacio would agree to the idea of associating with the Japanese.

Terami-Wada sees this “as probably intended to give the Spanish authorities the impression that Imperial Japan was behind the revolution,

although it is not certain that this was Bonifacio's intention" (13). Bonifacio's *realpolitik* became clearer when Aguinaldo, who had him executed, asked for protection from the United States, as was clearly stated in the 1898 Declaration of Independence. The rest of the article deftly tackles the different motives of the Japanese residents who volunteered in Aguinaldo's army. It also includes two useful appendices, one on the identity of some Japanese residents (taken from the *Radicación de Extranjeros* from the National Archives), and the other on the excerpts from the correspondence of Sakamoto Shiro to Colonel Kususe Kiyohiko on the Philippine Revolution.

The next essay is about the *karayuki-san* or Japanese prostitutes in Manila. The author proves the veracity of the account of Muraoki Iheji, whose credibility was doubted by some Japanese scholars. The paucity of materials written about the karayukis did not hinder Terami-Wada from describing the dynamics of the Japanese brothel business, from a limited number in 1896 to its growth as a community in Sampaloc. She also discussed the images of the Japanese—usually as prostitutes—by the Filipinos recorded in popular Tagalog songs and with the closure of the red light district in 1920. She would look closely into these pre-war images in a separate chapter.

The third essay provides a discussion on the pre-WWII Japanese organizations and institutions in Manila, which were divided into: official and semiofficial groups, service groups, and goodwill groups. The first were groups affiliated with the national or local governments or received funding from the latter. The second aimed at promoting and maintaining cultural and economic solidarity among the Japanese, while the third served to cultivate friendly relations between the Japanese and Filipinos.

The last two essays of the book examine the shift in Filipino perceptions of the Japanese from the pre- to the post-war periods. Equipped with a good command of Tagalog, the author selected 63 short stories from *Liwayway* magazine, which was the pioneering and most popular Tagalog publication, and serialized novels with reference to Japan or the Japanese from the pre-war (1920s–1940s) and the post-war (1946–1988) eras. One pre-war serialized novel was "*Krisantemo*" by Jose Esperanza Cruz published in 16 installments in the mid-1940s. It deals with a romantic story between a Filipino and a Japanese mestiza. The author's content

analysis revealed that images of the Japanese by the Filipinos in the pre-war era were predominantly associated with Japanese women either as nanny or as *geisha* (hostess-waitress) in the metropolis; or as landowners in Davao; Japan was perceived as a travel destination, a place of study among elite Filipinos, and as a modern country. In contrast, in the post-War period, particularly from 1946–1988, she found that Filipinos depicted the Japanese as cruel soldiers, tourists, *Japayuki* recruiters, and towards the 1980s, as *yakuzas*. These images, however, might only indicate how the Tagalogs perceived the Japanese. It would be interesting to compare them with those in Pangasinan, Iloco, Hiligaynon and Cebuano stories.

Overall, despite a few grammatical and typographical errors the book remains valuable for its scholarship. A well-organized index is also a useful addition to the book. Nonetheless, I wish that the author could have included in this selection her works on the Japanese propaganda corps in the Philippines (1991), and on Lt. Shigenobu Mochizuki and the New Philippine Cultural Institute (1996). These are fine articles that could have provided other vistas during the wartime Philippine period so conspicuously absent in this book.¹

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Note

¹ This book will be reprinted soon. The new book will have corrected grammatical and typographical errors.

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- _____. 1996. "Lt. Shigenobu Mochizuki and the new Philippine Cultural Institute." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 27 (March): 104–123.

Collective Killings in Rural China during the Cultural Revolution, Yang Su, Cambridge University Press, 2011, 300 pp., ISBN 978-0-521-17381-0.

Deconstructing Evil

THE GREAT PROLETARIAT Cultural Revolution (GPCR) was bloody, violent, and disastrous—this is no secret. According to county records and the Chinese Communist Party’s post-mortem investigation in 1984, as many as 1.5 million Chinese perished because of collective killings in the countryside at the height of the GPCR (37).

To sweep the killings under the general mantle of Mao Zedong’s criminal regime, however, is to assume too simplistic a position. There is no doubt that Mao was to blame. This position, unfortunately, does not explain the circumstances surrounding the collective killings in the Chinese countryside.

Entire families of “class enemies” were murdered not by Red Guards or soldiers, but by neighbors and erstwhile friends. The methods of execution were far from systematic; victims were bludgeoned, stabbed, or thrown off cliffs.

Yang Su offers a new perspective, attempting to analyze the role of ordinary people in the violence of the GPCR. Su asks, “why did such an extreme form of killing appear in the time and place it did? How did state sponsorship induce ordinary citizens to become killers?” (7).

Yang Su argues that the current state policy model of genocide is insufficient to explain many of the mass murders throughout history. In fact, it hinders further study into the nature and rationale of genocide, since it simplifies the issue by assigning all blame on the state.

Su deliberately uses the term “collective killings” to demonstrate the reality of mass murder in smaller units, such as townships and counties. Current scholarship focuses on the national view, ignoring the distinct reality that collective killings do occur on a more local level.

Instead of the generally accepted state policy model, Su proposes the “community model of genocide” (11) as a more accurate means of studying mass murder. As he puts it: “collective killing can be seen as a special form of collective action” (19).

The Community Model

The state policy model of genocide relies on a “top-down” perspective, focusing on the state’s role in the violence. With Su’s community model, however, the focus shifts towards the role of local actors. It looks at local conditions, community friction, key actors, and their response to state policies.

Here, the state is present but its role is indirect. The willing participation of local actors in collective killings (at times even in direct disobedience of state policies) is the crux of the study. The community model acknowledges the contrast between state-sponsored violence and collective killings. Where mass murder sanctioned by the state is viewed as an extension of its bureaucracy, community-led collective killings are emergent, reactive, unpolished, and unsystematic (11–19).

Su outlines five key processes that contribute to community-based collective killings:

...(1) the historical underpinning of social grouping, (2) the designation of killing categories, (3) the preparation of potential perpetrators, (4) the demobilization of the law, and (5) the removal of moral constraints through framing war (220).

Framing War and the Breakdown of Law

The community model is emergent and reactive rather than systematic and bureaucratic. There is a sense of urgency compelling local actors, turning them against neighbors and leading them to commit mass murder.

They believed that certain segments of the population were dangerous. These enemies sought to overthrow the Communist government and destroy the country. Never mind that many of the landlord descendants—the usual “enemies”—were not organized, had no money or clout, and had shown no indications of rebellion. It was—to them—a pre-emptive strike. With a “war” state of mind in place, all “normal” procedures of handling enemies would no longer apply.

The Paradox of State Influence

At the heart of Su’s community model of genocide is a most interesting conflict. To create an atmosphere conducive to community-based collective killings, there must be both state mobilization and state breakdown.

In the cases in which policies of explicit extermination seem to be absent, state policies such as discrimination against minority groups and stigmatization of so-called state enemies may take on a genocidal dimension and result in massive numbers of killings, by way of mediating actors in between (258).

The state provides the means, but it is the local actor who makes the killings possible. Su’s research showed a high number of collective killings in Guangdong and Guangxi, but there were many more communities where little to no collective killings were recorded (taking into consideration that *all* records were underreported).

Limited Sources

The chief limitation of Su’s book, obviously, is China’s unwillingness to provide information. His research cites three major sources: county gazetteers (the *xianzhi*), post-GPCR investigative reports, and interviews with survivors.

During a brief window wherein China sought to review its GPCR mistakes, the government commissioned a number of investigations in order to study the collective killings in rural areas of the country. When the reports proved too shocking, however, the initiative was quickly shut down.

Nevertheless, these investigative reports form the meat of Su's research. Beyond the statistics provided by the *xianzhi*, these reports clearly show the extent of violence and significant role of local perpetrators with no discernible state connections. The executions lacked organization or planning, with most victims killed by the roadside with nothing more than farming tools.

Lessons

Despite its limitations, Su provides a unique means of analyzing collective killings. The public executions during the GPCR were borne of local and national circumstances.

At the same time, however, Su's community model offers a new way of understanding genocide beyond China's borders. The state policy model is insufficient. It is misleading and potentially distracts from underlying factors that allow such atrocities to happen time and again.

It is too easy to lay the blame on megalomaniacs, while the role of ordinary men in collective killings remains unnoticed. Hopefully, Su's community model will allow scholars to finally draw the right conclusions and find a way to end these atrocities once and for all.

Krysty CHOI

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Poetry

I Want to Be a Bullet!

Three Poems by Wiji THUKUL

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THE THREE POEMS translated here into Filipino and English are by the Indonesian writer Wiji Thukul and taken from the collection *Aku Ingin Jadi Peluru* (I Want to Be a Bullet! [Magelang: Indonesiatera, 2004]). Wiji Thukul was born in 1963 to a poor family in Solo, Indonesia. He was a worker-poet, cultural worker and activist. He was reported missing in the same year that the dictator Soeharto was forced to step down. Ramon Guillermo would like to thank Gelacio Guillermo for his comments on the translations.

Ano ang Saysay ng aking Pagtula?

Ano ang saysay ng aking pagtula
 Kung hindi pumasok sa eskwela ang aking kapatid
 Dahil hindi mabayaran ang matrikula
 Ano ang saysay ng aking pagtula
 Kung umuwi ang aking tatay na nawasak ang pedicab
 Kapag kailangan ng perang pambili ng bigas
 Kung kailangan naming kumain
 At kung wala nang makakain?
 Ano ang saysay ng aking pagtula
 Kung nag-aaway ang tatay at nanay
 Pinagbibintangan ni nanay si tatay na siya ang may kasalanan
 Kahit ginigipit na ng mga bus ang mga pedicab
 Sino ang may kasalanan kung mas mura nang
 sumakay sa bus kaysa magpedicab?
 Ano ang saysay ng aking pagtula
 Kung *sinasakal* sa utang si nanay?
 Kung *sinasakal* sa utang ang kapitbahay?
 Ano ang saysay ng aking pagtula
 Kung napilitan kaming magtayo ng bahay
 Sa tabi ng maruming kanal
 Samantalang lalong nagmamahal ang lupa
 At hindi kami makabili
 Sino ang may kasalanan na hindi kami makabili ng lupa?
 Ano ang saysay ng aking pagtula
 Kapag namatay ang isang maysakit sa kanyang bahay
 Dahil napakamahal magpa-ospital?
 Ano ang saysay ng aking pagtula
 Na kumakain ng aking oras sa loob ng ilang buwan
 Ano ang maiaambag nito sa paglutas sa kahirapang
Sumasakal sa amin?

Ano ang naibigay ko
 Kapag nagpalakpakan ang mga nakinig sa aking mga pagbasa
 Ano ang naibigay ko?
 Ano ang naibigay ko?

Semarang, 6 Marso 1986
 (Translation of *Apa yang Berharga dari Puisiku*)

What is the Worth of my Poetry?

What is the worth of my poetry
 If my younger sibling did not leave for school
 because the school fees could not be paid?
 What is the worth of my poetry
 If my father's pedicab suddenly breaks down
 If rice had to be bought with money
 If we have to eat
 And when there is nothing to eat?
 What is the worth of my poetry
 If father quarrels with mother
 Mother blames father
 Even as pedicabs are pushed off the streets by city buses
 Who is to blame that it is now cheaper
 To ride a bus than a pedicab?
 What is the worth of my poetry
 If mother is being *strangled* by debt
 If the neighbors are being *strangled* by debt?
 What is the worth of my poetry
 If we are forced to build our house
 Along a canal
 While the cost of land keeps going up
 We cannot afford to buy
 Whose fault is it that we cannot afford to buy land?
 What is the worth of my poetry
 If a sick person dies at home
 Because hospitals are expensive?
 What is the worth of my poetry
 Which takes up months of my time
 What can it contribute to alleviate the poverty
 That is *strangling* us?

What have I given
 When the audience at the poetry reading have applauded
 What have I given
 What have I given?

(Translation of *Apa yang Berharga dari Puisiku*)

Balada ng Bala

saan ang nguso ng baril na iyon?

gusto kong sabay na sumabog at maging bala
hanapin ang noo mo, tumuro sa kamatayan Mo
makita ang kaluluwa Mong lumilipad
at hahabulin ito ng sarili kong kaluluwa
upang malaman ang Iyong tinitirahan
handa akong magpatiwakal
tiyak ito, pagkaraan malaman ang inuuwian Mo

ngunit ang balang naghahanap sa Iyong noo
ay nakatagpo lamang sa Iyong matang mambabarang
sim salabim
magbalik ka sa tunay mong anyo!
at totoong hindi magkakaroon kailanman ng
magdadala ng
baril
para sa akin
lalo't higit sa noo
ang magandang panaiginip na ito
ang magandang panaginip na ito
bakit magpakailanman?

(Translation of *Balada Peluru*)

The Ballad of the Bullet

where is the muzzle of that gun?

I'd like to explode and at the same time turn into a bullet
seek your forehead, aim towards your death
see Your soul take flight
and I will chase it with my own soul
so I will know where Your house is
I am ready to kill myself
Certainly, after knowing where You live

but the bullet that is looking for Your forehead
only met Your eyes which cast a magic spell
abracadabra
return to your true form!
and it is true, no one will
carry
the weapon
for me
what more
target the forehead
this beautiful dream
this beautiful dream
why is it eternal?

(Translation of *Balada Peluru*)

Buo pa rin ako at ang mga Salita ay hindi pa Nadudurog

hindi ako artistang gumagawa ng balita
pero ako ay totoong laging masamang balita
para sa makapangyarihan

hindi tula ang aking mga tula
kundi mga madidilim na salita
na pawisan at nagtutulakan
naghahanap ng daan
hindi sila mamatay-matay
kahit dukutin ang mga bilog ng aking mata at palitan
hindi sila mamatay-matay
kahit inilayo ako sa aking tahanan
tinutusok-tusok nang nag-iisa
hindi sila mamamatay
ibinayad ko na ang kanilang hinihingi
panahon - lakas - sugat

lagi akong sinisingil ng mga salitang ito
laging sinasabi sa akin
buhay ka pa rin

totoong buo pa rin ako
at ang mga salita ay hindi pa nadudurog

(Translation of *Aku Masih utuh Dan Kata-Kata Belum Binasa*)

I am Still Whole and the Words have not yet been Destroyed

I am not an artist that makes news
but for certain I am always bad news for
those in power

my poetry is not poetry
but dark sweaty words
crowding each other
searching for a way out
they refuse to die
even though my eyeballs are gouged and replaced
they refuse to die
taken away from my home
repeatedly stabbed alone
I have already paid what they demand from me
time-strength-wounds

those words never stop demanding
always they tell me
you are still alive

certainly I am still whole
and the words have not yet been destroyed

(Translation of *Aku Masih utuh Dan Kata-Kata Belum Binasa*)

Chang'e

In the beginning,
 I was darkness and you were light
 and beyond us was the vast carpet of night,
 beneath us was the earth,

and destiny was pulled
 by the gravity of our motions:
 light shields darkness shields light—
 the immortal fragrance of our collision
 pervaded the calm of moonlight breeze, and
 beneath us was the earth,

round and rough, an abrupt growth
 in the sullen vacuum of the universe.
 In my sleep, I dream of earth,
 Wilderness of beauty in its chaos and its lushness,
 the rough soil, the scent of grass

From above,
 my fingers pluck a song
 at the strings of a zither
 and its music whispers its way
 into the ambiguous mass of smoke
 beneath us, the earth.

Celine SOCRATES
 University of the Philippines Diliman

Maple Song

In spring I slow down my bike
When the maples shed their
Seeds of down, nasty cottony
Wisps of them blown higgledy
And piggledy in the fledgling
Air they get into your eyes
And ears, brush your hair in
The salt and pepper of their
Thing so that you pedal perforce
Into a lento, or is it adagio now?
Andante perhaps - not to do
So is fool and hardy you risk
A neck or limb in the chiasma
Of cars or the miasma of buses.
Look now that bric, that brac
The kindergarten gate flies on
The wing of kidsong, look the
Peonies quivering by the teashop
The ancient players of mahjong
Dreaming of their first love,
Sipping their tiny cups of blue.
Look the cornucopia of Sinkiang
Grapes spill lilac and gold and
Emerald and red in the silvery
Light of this morning's gift,
The hum and drum of yesterday
Effaced by the maple song.

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
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