

Asian Studies

Islam and Philippine Society The Writings of Cesar Adib Majul

Introduction

Julkipli Wadi

Islam in the Philippines

- Islam in the Philippines and its China Link (1999)
- An Analysis of the 'Genealogy of Sulu' (1979)
- An Historical Background on the Coming and Spread of Islam and Christianity in Southeast Asia (1976)
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- The Role of Islam in the History of the Filipino People (1966)

Filipino Nationalism

- *Principales, Ilustrados*, Intellectuals and the Original Concept of a Filipino National Community (1977)
- Asia and the Humanities (1973)
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- The Relevance of Mabini's Social Ideas to our Times (1973)
- Social Background of Revolution (1971)



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Asian Center, Magsaysay cor. Guerrero Sts.
University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City
Email: upasianstudies@gmail.com
Phone: 63.2.920.3535 or 63.2.981.8500 loc. 3586

Editorial Note

This current issue of *Asian Studies* on the works of the eminent scholar Cesar Adib Majul initiates a series of retrospective volumes on works by prominent intellectuals that have appeared on the pages of the journal over the past five decades. Some of the authors to be featured include James Scott, Nicholas Tarling, Benedict Kerkvliet, Willem Wolters, Robert Reed, David Sturtevant, Norman Owen, Emanuel Sarkisyanz, Jean Grossholtz, Ian Nish, and many others.

The series fulfils two objectives - one practical, the other academic. The practical aspect is that the journal is faced with a backlog of twelve (12) issues and coming out with retrospective volumes is one way of overcoming this rather large surfeit. From a scholarly standpoint, however, the retrospective issues enable readers to look back to the past in order to make sense of the present.

In his introductory article, Islamic Studies Dean Julkipli Wadi notes that that this Majul issue, which covers a “rich historical canvas” of works on Moro society, culture, and politics, serendipitously appears at a time when a “Framework Agreement” between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) had just been signed on October 15, 2012.

The editorial board begs the indulgence and patience of readers for the chronological discrepancies that will appear in these retrospective issues. Thus, dates and events in some articles may not necessarily synchronize with volume dates and numbers. This Majul issue, while being released in December 2012, actually comprises Volume 46, Numbers 1 and 2 of 2010. It is hoped that the backlogs will be fully covered by the first quarter of 2013 so that regular publication will resume by June of the same year.

We also take this opportunity to announce the reorganization of *Asian Studies* via the reconstitution of a new seven-person editorial board, the formation of a 24-person editorial advisory board, and the recruitment of a managing editor and editorial associate. Their names and designations appear in the editorial box in this volume.

Lastly, the editorial board of *Asian Studies* wishes to extend its condolences to the family of David Wurfel, who passed away on 12 November 2012. He was a brilliant scholar, a committed social activist, and a member of the journal’s editorial advisory board.

Eduardo C. Tadem, Ph.D.
Editor in chief
5 December 2012


Introduction

Islam and Philippine Society: The Writings of Cesar Adib Majul

Julkipli Wadi

~oOo~

Cesar Adib Majul is the author of ten reprinted articles that comprise the present volume of the *Asian Studies* journal. He is an erudite scholar, well-remembered by his colleagues, students, and friends in the University of the Philippines (UP), in academic circles in Southeast Asia, and in other parts of the world. It augurs well for the UP Asian Center that they are honoring him and his contribution to Philippine scholarship, especially his writings on Filipino nationalism and Muslims in the Philippines.



Those who knew and had read Dean Majul, as he was popularly known, must be familiar with how he extensively dissected the issue of Filipino nationalism. His voluminous body of work covers the Philippine Reform Movement, the Philippine Revolution, and the sociopolitical thought of Jose Rizal and Apolinario Mabini, among others. Equally important are his groundbreaking studies on Islam in the Philippines and Southeast Asia, which cover the nature and dynamics of Moro society; the genesis of Philippine Islam and its cross-cultural currents in the Malay world; and the background, causes, and dynamics of the Mindanao conflict.

It is timely to review his pertinent works, especially in light of recent events. With sheer serendipity, these reprints come auspiciously after the signing of the “Framework Agreement” between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) on October 15, 2012. The Agreement is envisioned to usher a new dawn of peace in the Muslim South. To say the least, these articles provide a rich historical canvas that can help determine the context and possible trajectories of the Framework’s vision of peace.

Undoubtedly, the University of the Philippines has been the nation’s edifice of knowledge, a home for chiseling ideas, and a clarion of liberal thought and philosophy since its establishment in 1908. Dean Majul was a pillar of UP’s Golden Age, which saw the rise of student activism that culminated in the First Quarter Storm. Dean Majul would probably loathe the praise — a

humility that was a hallmark of his personality. Indeed, he hardly spoke about himself in his writings, and, except in some extemporaneous lectures, seldom used first-person pronouns in his work. It is in fidelity to his self-effacing nature that part of this introduction is written. It puts Dean Majul not in the spotlight, but in the company of rare and exceptionally brilliant group of UP scholars.

Very few Filipino academics and social scientists, even if they could match Dean Majul's more than half a century of productive scholarship, could claim to belong to a distinct class of scholars. While many have the rigor to probe the different dimensions of the sciences and diverse fields of knowledge, only few could crisscross into and leave indelible marks on major disciplines; only few could produce such pioneering research in these fields of study.

Such scholars have a comprehensive appreciation of knowledge and its universality, and a solid conviction to develop the fields of sciences, arts, humanities, and culture. They take it upon themselves to provide accessible general education to every Filipino. Aware of the compartmentalization of knowledge in modern times, they are never fazed by the rigidities of specialization, which are lamentably evident in some disciplines. Such scholars contribute greatly to these fields, possibly even more so than traditional practitioners. By engaging in interdisciplinary work, this elite group of scholars grasp a discipline's fundamental assumptions, approaches, and major discourses; they easily recognize its strength and potential, as well as its gaps and weaknesses; they then extrapolate new postulates, and produce powerful, path-breaking research.

If the work of these scholars have withstood the test of time, it is not because of their stature and affiliation but because of their continuing relevance; their careful and just appreciation of facts; their clarity of ideas; the sharpness of their analyses; their dexterous command of the language of various disciplines; and their clear reading of events and careful foresight into the manifold vistas of the future.

Even after their prime, they continue to produce scholarship that has always been grounded; that is, while they have evolved and expanded their intellectual horizons, they never abandoned their early writings and paradigms. Instead, they broaden and refine them, while taking the opportunity to reflect on them.

Many scholars carefully and consciously juggle academic and administrative duties, social responsibilities, and, not least, the constant pressure from politics and government. However, very few can insulate themselves from the morass of power; the temptation of wealth and luxury; and the capacity to fend off promptings and handle people's platitudes; instead, these few choose to adopt a higher moral standard and live a simple life. They are ready to serve anyone and provide opportunities to those with merit

and potential. They are silent humanitarians, generous in their little yet magnanimous ways; and despite opportunities to enjoy the perks of fame, they opt for a spiritual nurturing that even their colleagues and friends hardly notice.

All of these choices and decisions may appear too imposing on a scholar's character and moral fiber. They may seem rigid and limiting to scholastic pursuits. They may even be mistaken as high-handedness or snobbery. However, such scholars approach life, not with frigidity and emotional detachment, but with a positive disposition and down-to-earth friendliness, especially toward their colleagues and students. They possess a magnetic personality, charisma, and a spontaneity to exact humor and crack jokes even on insignificant and, at times, silly situations. These traits win them friends from different generations, who remember them not only with reverence, respect, and admiration but also with fondness and laughter.

Despite the intrigues that come with research work, administrative duties, and political engagement, such scholars have no difficulty shouldering social responsibilities and articulating the ideals of nation-building. They see, among other things, the urgent need to promote harmonious relations between the majority on the one hand and the minority and the marginalized on the other. They believe that no nation is worthy of itself unless it fully respects its own value and that of each part that constitutes the whole.

The mark of these scholars is not only measured by the number of published works; it is also shown, most especially, in their kind words and in the cherished memories they left behind. Lastly, the hallmark of their scholarship arises not only from the veracity of their perspectives (many of them still waiting to be fully recognized) but also from their deep and ongoing relevance. These scholars articulated many social and political problems that have gone unaddressed. Their work are not only social commentaries on their time, but also a lighthouse that the nation and future generations can hardly afford to neglect and learn from; a guide they can look up to so that they can set and right their sail from time to time.

Cesar Adib Majul was born in Aparri, Cagayan on October 21, 1923. He was of Syrian and Filipino descent. He had his primary and secondary education at De La Salle High School. Like many of his generation, Majul was forced to postpone his studies because of World War II. In 1947, he obtained his Bachelor's Degree in Philosophy from the University of the Philippines, where he became a philosophy instructor less than a year later. In 1953, at the same university, he earned a Master's Degree in Philosophy. His thesis was entitled "Formalization of the Logic of Aristotle," written under the tutelage of Ricardo Pascual, the eminent Filipino philosopher who studied under Bertrand Russell. Four years later, in January 1957, he received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from Cornell University. That year also saw the publication of his major work on the Philippine Revolution. In 1967 and 1974, Dean Majul was Visiting Professor at Cornell University.

He became University Professor at the University of the Philippines in 1979 and obtained *Honoris Causa* from the same university on November 27, 1989.

In UP, Dean Majul occupied various academic and administrative positions:

- Assistant Head of the Department of Philosophy, 1959
- Chairman, Division of Social Sciences, College of Arts and Sciences, 1960–1961
- Dean, University College, December 1961–1966
- Dean of Admissions, 1966
- Dean, College of Arts and Sciences, February 1969–June 1971
- Dean, Institute of Islamic Studies, Philippine Center for Advanced Studies, UP System, 1974–9 July 1979
- Officer-in-charge, Institute of Islamic Studies and the Asian Center, UP, 10 July 1979–31 December 1979.

Dean Majul also had other appointments in the Philippine government:

- Member, Board of Regents, University of Mindanao, 1961–1962
- Chairman, Board of Directors, Philippine Amanah Bank, 1974 –March 1980
- Chairman, Presidential Commission that drafted the “Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Presidential Decree No. 1083), 1975.

Apart from books like *The Political and Constitutional Ideas of the Philippine Revolution*, *Mabini and the Philippine Revolution*, *Muslims in the Philippines*, *The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines*, and *Islam and Conflict Resolution: Theories and Perspectives* (as co-author), Dean Majul wrote around 150 articles that were published in national and international journals and other reputable publications. After his retirement from UP in 1980, Dean Majul continued to write in the United States. His last work is *Remembrance and Forgetfulness in the Holy Qur'an*; he finished it a few days before passing away in San Pablo, California on October 11, 2003.

In broad strokes, the writings of Dean Majul may be grouped into four, cumulatively evolving areas: (1) Philosophy and logic; (2) Philippine social and political thought, Philippine revolution, and Filipino nationalism; (3) Asian studies, Islamic thought, Muslim history, society, and culture; (4) and spirituality of Islam and Qur'anic exegesis.

The first and fourth areas, which cover the early and the last phase of Dean Majul's intellectual career, are not represented in this volume. However, the ten articles below epitomize the second and third areas. They form a

substantial body of work on crucial and ongoing issues in the Philippines, including the converging yet varying postulates of Philippine nationalism and the Moro struggle; contesting discourses on Asian values and humanities; and the advent of Islam in Southeast Asia, particularly in the southern Philippines.

The articles, which were published in previous issues of *Asian Studies*, have been divided into two sections. The first covers the history of Muslims in the Philippines; the second discusses Dean Majul's writings on the Philippine Reform Movement and Filipino nationalism. The years in parenthesis indicate the original year of publication in *Asian Studies*.

"Islam in the Philippines and its China Link (1999)" is based on one of Dean Majul's last lectures, which was delivered during the UP Centennial celebration. In this article, he returned to the main source of the Sulu relics, particularly the Tuan Maqbalu Tombstone in Bud Datu. Using what may be described as "archaeological historiography," he sheds (more) light on the advent of Islam in the Philippines, which he previously discussed in *Muslims in the Philippines*. His analysis in this article juxtaposes archaeological diggings in China; tombs like that in Bud Datu in Sulu; and tomb designs and calligraphy in Central Asia. Dean Majul integrates his findings with the historical data to reveal the networks of an Islamic Emporium, one that spanned Sulu, China, and Central Asia during the 13th and 14th century CE. In particular, he showed the Philippines' early Islamic link with China via Sulu, citing exquisite narratives that speak of early Muslims travelling from Arabia to China as early as the 7th century CE.

"An Analysis of the 'Genealogy of Sulu' (1979)" supplements and clarifies Dean Majul's discussion in his 1973 book, *Muslims in the Philippines*. In the latter, he explored the issue of *tarsila*, or genealogy, of royal families, particularly in Maguindanao and the Sulu Sultanates. The work provides a broader understanding of the chronology of Islam in the Philippines, especially its relation to the broader trend of Islamization in Southeast Asia. In "Analysis," he writes that "no history on the Muslims of the Philippines can be written without paying due regard to *tarsilas*." "Their existence can also be a source of pride," Dean Majul added, "not only for the Muslims but for all Filipinos; for they represent the efforts of the human mind to understand the past within an ordered pattern — that of descent and sequence of events in time and space." Finally, he declares that *tarsilas* "have given part of the Filipino people a historical sense, without which their present would be unintelligible and their future blurred."

Dean Majul locates the advent of Islam and Christianity within the broader history of Southeast Asia in **"An Historical Background on the Coming and Spread of Islam and Christianity in Southeast Asia (1976)."** Aware of both religions' postulates and origins, he recognized the clashing tendencies of and the long historical antagonism between Islam

and Christianity, as shown in the age-old “Moro wars” and the difficulties of Muslim-Christian dialogue and co-existence. But even before interfaith dialogue became a buzz word, Dean Majul had also already perceived Islam’s and Christianity’s nurturing and cooperative elements; he proposed the need to further strengthen Muslim-Christian policy of unity and co-existence in Southeast Asia.

Written during a critical period in 1976, **“Some Social and Cultural Problems of the Muslims in the Philippines”** draws the historical background of various social and cultural problems of Muslims in the southern Philippines. In this article, Dean Majul shows how the so-called Muslim problem had been defined and addressed from the colonial period to the Martial Law years. He underscores the fact that the emergence of a new economic order in the South necessitates the birth of a new Muslim leadership, one imbued with the teaching and fundamentals of Islam.

“The Role of Islam in the History of the Filipino People (1966)” idealizes the concept of a national community in the Philippines and the extent to which it accommodates a heretofore separate but parallel history of the Muslim South; Dean Majul rightly saw that the history of Mindanao, like that of Christian Philippines, is a response to Western colonialism and imperialism. More particularly, the article problematizes the location of Islam and the history of Muslims in the Philippines within two historical formations: that of the Filipino-dominated national community on the one hand, and that of Southeast Asia on the other. The latter includes the resistance of generally Islamized peoples against European colonialism in the Malay World.

“Principales, Ilustrados, Intellectuals and the Original Concept of a Filipino National Community (1977)” is a postscript to Majul’s early writings on the Philippine Reform Movement. The article examines (the then) new historical sources of Spanish colonialism in the Philippines, and traces the development of reformist groups like the *ilustrados* and intellectuals like Jose Rizal.

“Asia and the Humanities (1973)” analyzes Western attitudes on the Asian humanistic tradition; Dean Majul acknowledges the different and underlying cultural, historical and sociological forces that shaped Asian humanities in Asian countries and their diverse animation with the West. Dean Majul argues that the West’s interest on humanities in Asia is a product of ever-changing needs, from particular to relatively universal concerns, including an increasing focus on spirituality. The West’s interest was, at times, a part of a general search for exotic and unknown sources of wisdom, which were used to aid the proselytization efforts of Western Christian missionaries. Majul then points out that such interest belongs to a broader political scheme, whereby imperial powers sought not only to know the weaknesses of their colonial subjects but also to find indigenous

knowledge that could help them rule more effectively.

In **“National Identity and the Philippine University (1973)”** Dean Majul underscores the task of nation-building and the ongoing process of forging a national community. He identifies the elements of nation-building: a sense of belonging, commitment to a definite ideology, and a vision for individual and social good. After citing the fundamental requirements to help establish such elements, Dean Majul points out the important role of educational institutions in nation-building; universities like UP can nurture academic excellence, intellectual leadership, and critical thinking.

“The Relevance of Mabini’s Social Ideas to our Times (1973)” reflects on the social and political thought of Apolinario Mabini, the philosopher *par excellence* of the Philippine Revolution. Mabini had chiseled his vision of the Filipino national community in his *Decalogue* and other writings. In his article, Dean Majul examines the extent to which Mabini’s ideas mirror Philippine politics and society in the 1960s. He also explains the role of Mabini’s thought in shaping Filipinos’ notion of national community. Majul then weighs the balance sheet in terms of how such vision of community is underpinned by both positive and negative appropriations, a reason why Filipinos continuously struggle to increase their national consciousness.

“Social Background of Revolution (1971)” supplements *“Principales, Ilustrados....”* While the latter delineates the major groups and critical players in the rise of reform movements, the former provides a deeper background: it looks back to the beginning of Spanish colonialism in early Islamic Manila. “Social Background of Revolution” injects new historical nuances that complement Majul’s discussions in his major books, *Political and Constitutional Ideas of the Philippine Revolution* and *Mabini and the Philippine Revolution*.

Though written decades ago, these ten articles provide a rich background on Philippine history and its relation to other Southeast Asian countries and the rest of the world. In light of China’s preponderant role and a new US pivot in Asia, the articles offer a firm historical framework that can help one understand ongoing issues, tensions, and opportunities. Finally, the articles can play a substantial role in resolving the issues behind the Framework Agreement of 2012. Dean Majul’s writings offer well-articulated and historically grounded studies that can help reconcile and renegotiate the clash and convergence of two national communities and identity formations: the Filipino and the Moro.

Julkipli Wadi is Dean of the Institute of Islamic Studies, University of the Philippines Diliman. He is writing a biography of Cesar Adib Majul.

ISLAM IN THE PHILIPPINES AND ITS CHINA LINK*

*Cesar Adib Majul***

During ancient times, the Arabs of the southeastern part of the Arabian Peninsula were the first navigators of the Indian Ocean. They had discovered the secret of its monsoons. The Romans learned of the ocean routes from the Arabs and used them, to be followed by the Sassanian Persians. But by the 4th century, the Arabs came to monopolize the routes once more. From India, they sailed further east to the Malay Peninsula; and China was not far away. Chinese records inform us that as early as 300 A.D., long before the advent of Islam, the Arabs (possibly with Persians) had a counting house in Canton (which they later on called “Khanfu”) where they met for business transactions and which also served as a warehouse for their merchandise. Thus, it can be said in general that from the 4th century to the 7th century, the sea trade between Egypt, Persia and India on one hand, and that of India to Southeast and East Asia on the other hand, were progressively falling under Arab control.¹ It is certain that the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions knew a lot about China and a *hadith* or Prophetic tradition attests to this. In addition, it is highly probable, in spite of the contention of some Western Orientalists, that some of the Prophet’s Companions had gone to and died in Chinese sea ports.

Students of the *Sirat un-Nabi* or Biography of the Prophet will recall that when the Prophet Muhammad and his followers were being persecuted in Makkah, he arranged to have about 83 of them plus 18 of their women folk emigrate to Abyssinia to seek asylum there — a total of 101 persons, not including children. Arab and other Muslim scholars have meticulously studied the lives of these individuals and tried to indicate their parentage, tribe, and final days. What resulted from their careful studies was the information that about 33 of the men returned to Makkah on or before 622 or the first year of the Hijrah, 16 joined the Prophet

*This paper was presented on February 3, 1999, at the Asian Center Conference Hall, University of the Philippines-Diliman, Quezon City.

**Cesar Adib Majul, Ph.D., is a University Professor Emeritus of the University of the Philippines.

in the battle of Khaybar in 628-629, and 19 returned sometime later on to Madina to join the Muslims there. The Muslim annalists, while knowing the names and much of the early lives of the remaining ten, are silent on their ultimate fate.²

A few years ago, Dr. Sayyid Qudratullah Fatimi, the well-known Pakistani scholar, attempted a search on the fate of these ten Companions of the Prophet. By dint of hard work, he was able to gain further knowledge of at least five of them. He came across a tradition of South Indian Muslims that a companion of the Prophet named Tamim Ansari is supposed to be buried in Kovalam (Covelong) on the Coromandel Coast, a place known to the Arabs as Ma'bar, an important port haven for Muslim traders from Arab lands sailing further east. Professor Fatimi believes that Tamim Ansari is none other than Tamim bin al-Harith bin Qays. (Ar, "Ansari" or Helper is just a title here). Rereading and more carefully interpreting various Chinese records, while correcting past studies of Western scholars, Professor Fatimi arrived at the following: four Muslim wise men are reported to have come to China during the Wu-te period (618-626) during the Tang Dynasty. Their leader was Su-ha-pai Sai Kan-Ko-shihh (or Said Sa'd bin Abd Qays). He is supposed to have been buried in Canton (Guangzhou, Khanfu of the Arabs) after having preached there. The other three were: Kai-Ssu (or Qays bin Hudhafah), Wu-Ai-Ssu (or Wu-Wai-Ssu) or Urwah bin Abi Uththan), and Wan-Ko-Ssu (or Abu Qays bin al-Harith).³ Two of the last three are believed to have died and been buried in Ch'uan-chou (Quanzhou, Zaitun of the Arabs) in Fu-kien province. So, five of the ten Companions of the Prophet whose last days were for some time unknown have, according to the esteemed professor, been located, and four of them had died in China.⁴

By the end of the 8th century, the Muslims of Canton (Khanfu) must have been quite numerous, since in 758 some of them (possibly mercenary soldiers) were able "to sack the city and make off to sea with their loot."⁵ In the next century, trade between Western and Eastern Asia started to accelerate. It is generally agreed by scholars that by 801 Arab merchants and sailors had begun to dominate the Nanhai or Southeast Asia trade.⁶ At this time, Muslim lands had become centers of population, culture, art and wealth, and demands for foreign goods, including luxury ones, increased dramatically. It was during this century that an increase of Arab accounts of trade in Southern Asia started to appear. This was a time, too, which coincided with the heyday of the Srivijaya empire, which had its inception at the start of the 7th century. It was a commercial empire, with a Buddhist orientation, that once extended its power or influence over Sumatra, Java, the Malay Peninsula, and up to Champa in the present south coast of the Malay Peninsula, an important *pie'd a terre*. It was a Srivijayan port and of great importance to Arabs since tin, swords

and other metals were imported from it. It is believed that in 674, the Khalif Mu'awiya had coveted it but finally opted for friendly trade relations as a better alternative.⁷ (Kalah had been identified with Kedah by some scholars. However, the researches of Professor Fatimi conclusively identify it with Klang in Penang, Western Malaysia. Kalah was also known as Qalah to the Arabs).

In 878, during the last decades of the Tang Dynasty, an event with far-reaching consequences to the spread of Islam in Southeast Asia took place in Canton (Khanfu). It was a time when the Tang Dynasty was disintegrating. A rebel leader, Huang Ch'ao, with his army, sacked Canton and massacred, according to Muslim accounts, thousands of merchants composed of Muslims, Nestorian Christians and Jews.⁸ The deterioration of law and order coupled with increased piracy in the region forced thousands of Muslims to flee to Kalah, with some of them disembarking in Champa (Sanf). For the next half century, Arab and Chinese records about Muslim traders in the sea ports of China are silent. But Kalah increased its importance and, for some time, it became the farthest eastern stop for Muslim merchants, both Arabs and Persians. The merchants there came to learn about new products as well as better sources of other older ones, principally spices. In partnership with the local inhabitants, or having them serve as agents, the Muslim merchants steadily accelerated the growth of a local or regional Southeast Asian trade. "This local trade was the cause of a slow but steady penetration of Southeast Asia, reaching as far as eastern Java by the end of the eleventh century."⁹ It was their having been instrumental in the acceleration of a Southeast Asian local trade that led Muslim traders to come to know Borneo more intimately. And Sulu was not far away. Nevertheless, some Chinese ships did appear in Kalah — but they were owned by "smugglers." Thus Kalah could have served as an indirect venue to get at Chinese products.

When the Sung Dynasty came to power in 960, it adopted a policy to encourage the return of the Muslim traders. In 971, it opened Canton to foreign trade. In 977, a Chinese ship owned by a Muslim from Canton named P'u Lu-hsieh (Ar. Abu Rashid?) appeared in Borneo to initiate trade.¹⁰ In this same year, too, Pu Ni (Brunei or Borneo or a site in it) sent an embassy to China. It was headed by a Muslim named P'u Ali (Ar. Abu'Ali). It is probable that the initiative for a Borneo-Canton trade originated from Muslim merchants domiciled in Canton.¹¹ In 982, a ship owned by a Muslim carrying goods from Ma-I (Mindoro, the Mayyid of the Arabs) arrived in Canton. But the reopened door to China did not lead to a decline of the flourishing local trade. Actually, it even further accelerated it, since the enterprising traders now brought more Southeast Asian products to China as part of their profitable ventures. A new route had emerged: Borneo – Sulu –

Palawan – Mindoro – Luzon – Canton. In time, another route would also become frequent, that is, from China to Java passing by the coast of Champa.

It is not gainsaying that the local trade that emerged after the 878 event witnessed the opening of additional Southeast Asian ports to participate more intimately in it. And when trade flourished, with new-found wealth and connections with rich Muslim traders, these ports became, in effect, principalities with powerful chieftains. And when China once again opened its sea ports to foreign trade, many of these sea principalities came to trade directly with the Celestial Empire using their own home-built ships.

Before the 878 event, there were few Muslim settlements in Southeast Asia and these few were mainly in the north of Sumatra. But after the development of the local trade, more Muslim settlements became discernible. By the 13th century, what became noteworthy was the emergence of port principalities with Muslims at their head, such as that of Samudra-Pasai in Sumatra, Perlak in the Malay Peninsula, etc. By now, Pasai had supplanted Kalah as a better center for the trade activities of the Muslim traders. In the first decade of the 14th century, Trengganu in Eastern Malaysia had a Muslim ruler. In 1414, the ruler of Melaka became a Muslim. Thus was Islam able to have a religious and political base in the lands of the Malays in Southeast Asia.

The rise of Muslim sea principalities during the 14th and 15th centuries coincided with the progressive decline of the Srivijaya empire. Indeed, by 1300 this decline could be attributed to Siamese incursions into the Malay Peninsula, the rise of Hindu Majapahit, the rise of “independent” port principalities during its weakness, and Islam’s erosion of its Buddhist base. Some scholars maintain that Srivijaya had ceased to exist in 1372. Others suggest that it managed to survive a few years more till the final blow came in 1397 from Majapahit troops. For all practical purposes, the Muslim traders were taking over Srivijaya’s commercial empire piece by piece.

Most, if not all, Western scholars have argued that the Islamization process in Southeast Asia started from the Western route, that is, from the Arab, Persian and Indian lands, to Sumatra and other places nearby. However, Professor Fatimi believes that “the dawn of Malaysian Islam definitely broke on the eastern horizons of Malaysia” and that this “line runs all through the eastern coast facing the China Sea: Phan-rang, Patani, Trengganu, Pahang and Leran [in Java].”¹² Professor Fatimi gave many reasons for the existence of this line, like the early Muslim sea principalities there many years before the foundation of Melaka around 1400. To be

added were the close relations between the Muslim merchants of both Champa and China, the marriage of a Champa princess with a Majapahit prince and so on. Professor Fatimi did not deny a parallel western line of Islamization. What he emphasized was that the eastern line had to be taken into account if a more complete picture of the Islamization of Southeast Asia is to be gained. And what is important to anticipate at this point are the strong traditions in Sulu that attest to the coming of Muslims from China with missionary aims as early as the 4th century, if not earlier.

When the Sung Dynasty reopened its ports to foreign traders at the end of the 9th century, Canton was their major entry. But in 1087, during the North Sung Dynasty, an imperial order decreed the setting of the foreign trade office in the nearby port of Chu'an-chou (Quanzhou). This was the famous port known to Marco Polo and Ibn Battuta as Zaitun. It became "full of foreign vessels and merchandise."¹³ During the Yuan or Mongol Dynasty (1278-1638) the port became more prosperous than ever. "Quan(zhou) became the capital of Qimin (Fujian) as well as a collecting center of foreign goods, strange treasures and curiosities from various foreign lands. It was known as the most popular place where wealthy merchants took up their residence."¹⁴ Ibn Battuta visited this port city when he was in China in 1345-1346. He witnessed its commercial prosperity and large population. He described how it had a Shaikh-ul-Islam, a *qadi* or Muslim judge, and a Muslim quarter. He even claimed that the city had the biggest harbor in the world.¹⁵ However, just before the end of the Yuan Dynasty, there was a ten-year tumult in the city. From 1357 to 1366, a Persian garrison revolted there. With Chinese allies, it came to control the city and nearby areas. The revolt caused the city's destruction and gradual decline.¹⁶ In 1368, two years after the revolt, the Ming Dynasty came to power. Having the revolt in mind, it initially forbade foreign trade in the city and closely monitored events there. Consequently, the remnants of the Muslim community there, more specifically the merchant class and families, left the city for good. They left behind a large and well-built mosque, possibly seven or eight smaller mosques, and their ancient graveyards — of which many stones were used later on to strengthen the city walls and houses of farmers. When the Foreign Trade Office moved north to Fuzhou in 1472, during the Ming Dynasty, the use of the sea port further declined.¹⁷ In time, even the name and location of Zaitun was erased from the memory of the foreign Muslim traders. The importance of Zaitun to Philippine historians is that it was the main port where Muslims visiting Java and the Philippines embarked from the 11th to the 14th century.

On one of the slopes of Bud Dato, a few miles overlooking Jolo, stands a centuries-old venerated tomb of a Muslim. Tradition has it that it was around this

spot where some Sulu sultans were crowned — hence its name. The tombstone was intact till around the 1950s or 60s, when some vandals broke it into various fragments. However, since then, some civic-minded Jolo residents as well as some Muslim religious leaders had repaired the tombstone and did additional work to protect it from the elements. Good photos of the tombstone before its initial damage are still available.¹⁸ The gravestone reads:

Said the Prophet, peace be upon him:
 “Whoever dies far away dies a martyr.”
 Allah has taken away the late blessed martyr Tuhan
 Maqbalu on the date: The sacred, holy month of Rajab.
 May Allah increase its holiness. The year ten and seven
 hundred.

The date 710 Anno Hejira is equivalent to the year 1310 A.D. Since the day of the month Rajab is not specified, Rajab here could have been either November or December. Who was this Tuhan Maqbalu? That he was a Muslim who died far away from his home or land of origin, that is, a foreign Muslim, is attested by his description as a martyr (*shahid*) in accordance with a Prophet *hadith*. That he was entitled “Tuhan” implied that he had some political authority, since contemporary tombstones in Southeast Asia had used this title to designate ministers of state.¹⁹ The name “Maqbalu” is based on the Arabic tri-literal root Q-B-L. “Maqbul”, which means acceptable or reasonable in Arabic, is a known proper name. However, so far, I have not come to know any person with the name of “Maqbalu.” It may have been due to an error in spelling or transcription, or simply a local non-Arab variation of “Maqbul.” This is something to be left to the experts.

In the early days of the American occupation of Sulu, there was a plan to convert the tomb area in Bud Dato into a park. It was then that some Sulu datu claimed that the tomb was that of Rajah Baguinda, an ancestor, who hailed from Sumatra and established a principality in Buansa. This claim, while having political overtones, did not seem to have any firm historical basis. Rajah Baguinda, the Sumatran prince referred to, was most probably buried in Mt. Tumangtangis near Buansa, where he ruled and he, at any rate, must have died during the first half of the 15th century — nearly a hundred years after Tuhan Maqbalu. At any rate, Maqbalu’s tomb may well be the earliest important archaeological data for establishing a chronology of the history of Sulu, as well as that of the coming of Islam to the Philippines. The tombstone appears to be unique in form and structure in Sulu. The tombstone of Mohadum (Ar. Makhdum) Aminullah in Bud Agad in Sulu island has somewhat of a similar shape. But it appears to be of a much later

construction, probably using Maqbalu's tomb as a model, unless it was based on another similar one that has long disappeared.

In 1984, a very important work, *Islamic Inscriptions in Quanzhou (Zaitun)* appeared in China. It was sponsored by the Quanzhou (Ch'uan-chou) Foreign Maritime Museum of Fujian, China.²⁰ It contains more than 200 photos of tombstone tables and related objects, their descriptions, transcriptions in their full texts, translations into English, as well as learned annotations. The vast majority of the tombstones belong to the 13th and 14th centuries.

Clear photos of the Bud Dato tombstone before its destruction, as well as a careful study of its later restoration, reveal the following characteristics: it is carved of diabase and its top is of the so-called pointed bow shape. It has a protruding tenon designed to be set upon a recumbent slab. It quotes in relief the Prophetic tradition (*hadith*): "Whoever dies far away [from his home] dies a martyr." Its calligraphy is generally of the *naskhi* style. Moreover, the borders of the original yellow rectangular recumbent slab had lotus flower petal carvings of typical Chinese design. These carvings were still extant in the 60s. Comparing Maqbalu's tomb with many of the extant tombstones and recumbent slabs in the above work by Chen Dasheng, the similarities are so striking that one cannot but conclude that the Bud Dato tombstone was cut in Quanzhou (Ch'uan-chou), the Zaitun of the Arabs and Persians.²¹ At the very least, it must have been cut or carved in nearby Canton or Hang-chou (Ar. Khansa) where there was also a thriving Muslim community during the 12th-14th centuries, as attested by travelers. Friends or associates of Tuhan Maqbalu must have plied the route Sulu – Ma'l – Zaitunj. It was this route that brought Muslim traders from China. Whether they were Chinese Muslims or Muslims from other parts of Asia or their Chinese descendants is another question.

Sulu *tarsilas* (Ar. Silsila) or genealogical accounts narrate how a certain Karim ul-Makhdum came to preach Islam in Sulu. Oft-repeated traditions reveal that he was accompanied by Chinese traders or companions. These are often designated by informers as "Hoy Hoy" or "Sini Hoy." What is clearly meant here is "Hui Hui" ("Hui Hoy" or "Huei Hoy"), a Chinese designation from the Muslim people of China. Who was this Makhdum Karim? The *tarsilas* reveal that he was either a Muslim preacher or merchant, or both. His name "Karim" strongly suggests that he belonged to the guild of famous and wealthy merchants called "Karimi merchants," whose ships were also called "Karimi." As early as the 12th century, these traders had a loose organization in Egypt and they did quite well up to the end of the 14th century, when they had already expanded their trade activities up to China. At the beginning, they sort of monopolized the spice trade from Yemen

to Egypt, and then from India to Yemen. Then, they expanded their trade from India to China. It is reported how a Karimi merchant claimed that he had made at least five trips to China. One who was in Aden in 703 A.H. (1303) had just arrived from China.²² That the Makhdum Karim “walked on water” might only mean that he was a Sufi who belonged to the Qadiriya Tariqat or Sufi order, since its founder, Abdul Qadir al Jilani was reputed to have walked on water. And, as is well known, this saintly man is still the patron saint of sailors or mariners in some parts of Egypt. To say that a particular Sufi walked on water is a symbolic way of saying that he belonged to the Qadiriya Tariqat. The Sulu tradition stating that the Makhdum Karim was an *auliya*’ or saintly person corroborates this. Incidentally, Ibn Batutta attested to the existence of a large group of Sufis in Hang-chou (Khansa) which he considered to be the largest city in the world. It had a Shaikh ul-Islam, a *qadi*, mosques and *mu’azzins*.²³ That the Makhdum Karim came to Sulu on an “iron pot” may only mean that he came on a constructed ship with iron fastenings.”²⁴ Dr. Najeeb Saleeby calculated the coming of Karim ul-Makhdum to Sulu at around 1380. He had various reasons for this date. One of them was based on a calculation he made on the number of generations from the Makhdum to persons claiming descent from him.

On the top of Bud Agad, a few miles in the interior of Sulu island, stands the tomb of Mahadum (Makhdum) Aminullah. He is also reported to have been accompanied by Chinese companions or partners. In fact, near his tomb is another tombstone inscribed in Chinese characters. The caretakers claim that it belongs to one of his Chinese companions. (Unfortunately, neither I nor any of my companions could read Chinese and the rubbing made was quite poor. It is hoped that with peace and order in Sulu, someone qualified can go to Bud Agad and read it). The interesting thing about the tombstone of the Makhdum Aminullah is that its tenon is similar to that of Tuhan Maqbalu’s, although its bow shape is not as marked. It has no inscription and appears to be of a more recent construction. It is probable that traditions about the Makhdum Karim and the Makhdum Aminullah had been confused or intertwined through the ages. A reason may be that the title of “Makhdum” (Ar. He who is served) had been taken as a proper name. Their activities, too, may have had similarities. In any case, they are buried in different islands.

Now, Sulu *tarsilas* narrate that ten years after the arrival of the Makhdum Karim, a certain Rajah Baguinda, a prince from Menangkabaw, landed in Buansa with some courtiers and soldiers, and eventually established a principality there with himself as head. (“Baguinda” here is a Menangkabaw honorific, not a proper name). He then married a local lady. This would be around the 1390s. This calculated date is quite acceptable. Some historians put 1377 as the year that the Srivijaya empire

collapsed in Sumatra. However, some of the remnants of the empire managed to survive in Palembang, where they were dealt a final blow in 1397 by soldiers and sailors of Majapahit. According to Professor Oliver Wolters, an event took place in 1397 which coincided with the final dissolution of the Srivijaya empire. A prince of Palembang, Sumatra threw off his allegiance to Java and incurred, as a consequence, a brutal invasion. One source claims that this prince, with a small following, eventually founded a principality in Melaka. Another source describes how the princely evacuation from Palembang was of such a great magnitude that “the sea seemed to be nothing but ships. So vast was the fleet that there seemed no counting. The masts of the ships were like a forest of trees; their pennons and streamers were like driving clouds and the state umbrellas of the Rajas like cirrus.”²⁵ Referring to this incident, Professor Wolters further writes that “... the years immediately before 1400 were a disturbed time in the western archipelago, and this is another, and perhaps more likely, time when small groups of adventurers migrated to Borneo and elsewhere.”²⁶ It is likely, too, that one of these prince adventurers was no less than the Rajah Baguinda from Sumatra. As mentioned earlier, Srivijaya’s power had started to wane as early as 1300. The fact is that the Muslim Arabs, Persians and Indians were already at the time taking over more and more of the commercial hegemony of Srivijaya. As a writer puts it, the Arabs became “the real heirs of Sri Vijaya.”²⁷

The Sulu *tarsilas* state that one of the very first foreign Muslims to come to Sulu was a certain Tuan Masha’ika. He must have certainly been a Muslim since the word “*masha’yikh*” is one of the plural forms of the Arabic term “*shaikh*,” a term of respect. Some of the names of his children and grandchildren like Tuan Hakim, Aisha, Tuan Da’im, Shaikh Aba, Kamal ud-Din, Katib Mu’allam, Afif ud-Din, Fakr ud-Din, Abdul Wakil, Maryam, *et al*, also attest to this. The title “tuan” here is a latter variation of “tuhan.” “Tuhan” in very early times referred to the Deity; but after the advent of Islam, it was relegated to refer to persons to mean something as “lord.”

It would be a beautiful story if Tuan Masha’ika (or Tuhan Masha’yikh) were the same person as Tuhan Maqbalu. But the *tarsilas* state that when Rajah Baguinda landed in Buansa, a son of Tuan Masha’ika called Tuan Hakim, and three grandsons, namely, Tuan Buda, Tuan Da’im, and Tuan Bujang were chiefs in Sulu. That is, they were alive in the 1390s. This makes the identity a bit problematical, unless Tuan Hakim is excluded from the list of those still alive in the 1390s.

The Yuan or Mongol dynasty (1278-1368) had utilized the administrative services of foreign Muslims and encouraged the trade activities of its ports in the

China Sea. It was, in general, tolerant of Islam and permitted the building of mosques, and the practice of most Islamic rituals. But, for various reasons, during the latter part of the dynasty, the Mongols ceased to favor Muslims. Thus, when the Chinese people started to revolt against the Mongols in 1367, they were generally supported by the Muslim population. From a population of about 50,000 in the 9th century, the Muslims grew, up to about 4 million in the 14th century.²⁸ Ming Tai-Tsu, the first emperor of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) which supplanted the Mongol dynasty, introduced a strong policy to sinicize the Muslims of the empire, the majority of which were descendants of Central Asian Muslims who came as mercenary soldiers during the Mongol dynasty. The Ming dynasty was a government imbued with Confucian ideals, although some Chinese Muslim scholars tried to point out that its emperors had hidden sympathies for Islam.

It was the Ming Ch'eng Tsu (Yung Lo), the third emperor, who, after consolidating his rule, launched a total of seven naval expeditions from 1405 to 1433. The command of the fleet was given to the famous Muslim admiral Cheng Ho (Ma San-pao Kung). He was assisted by a well-known Muslim historian and interpreter, Ma Huan, as well as by other Muslim scribes. A great number of his sailors were Muslims, who were sinicized. The expeditions utilized hundreds of ships, big and small, and they involved thousands of sailors and soldiers. One of the expeditions, the sixth, reached East Africa. The last one went as far as Jeddah in the Arabian Peninsula. It was then that a small group of Chinese Muslims went to visit Makkah.²⁹

Numerous reasons have been propounded by scholars on the purpose of these expeditions. A common one was that they were simply launched to elevate the prestige of the new dynasty while exercising some form of political influence over neighboring countries. At any rate, among other things, the expeditions were able to result in the following: it led the kingdom of Siam and the growing state of Melaka to have peaceful relations, while at the same time consolidating the Melakan sultanate's independence and legitimization; reduced piracy in Sumatra and nearby islands with the capture and execution of Ch'en Tsu-I, a notorious brigand, and the killing of about 5,000 of his followers; fostered trade relations between many Southeast Asian port principalities and China; and acknowledged the rule of many Muslim princes of such principalities and had, in fact, by inviting them to pay tribute to the Celestial Court, further strengthened and legitimized their rule at home. Thus were the position of Muslim rulers in Sumatra, Java, Borneo and Sulu strengthened under a Pax Sinica. Eventually, Muslim rulers of port principalities of Java were able to join forces to do away with the Majapahit Hindu Empire. Demak and Mataram rose out of the ashes of Majapahit. Melaka would soon become a flourishing trade

center as well as a theological center. Under the rule of the pious Mansur Shah (1458-1477), Muslim teachers spread out to neighboring islands. Brunei would eventually grow to become a naval power. All these were far-reaching results of the visits of Cheng Ho's fleet.

Cheng Ho's fleet was able to reestablish contacts with the descendants of Sino-Muslim troops who were sent as part of an invading force to Java in 1292, more than a hundred years earlier during the Mongol dynasty.³⁰ While the main fleet was in some other place, some of Cheng Ho's sailors would visit nearby ports. Sulu would be one of these. Although the Admiral himself never landed in Sulu, some of his subordinates or "envoys" did. This explains the coming of Pon Tao Kung, named Pei Pei Hsein, to Jolo, where he is said to have succumbed to malaria. Tradition says that there was a community of Chinese in Sulu who greeted and honored him as an envoy of Cheng Ho. A memorial erected by latter-day Chinese in his honor still exists in Tulay. Apart from Chinese records, Brunei sources also mention of another Chinese worthy who visited it on behalf of the Admiral. After these visits, many tribute-bearing rulers or envoys from different parts of Southeast Asia went to China, where they received gifts whose value exceeded that of the tribute. Sulu rulers were not far behind in sending such profitable tributes.

During Cheng Ho's visits, there were many Chinese settlements in Sumatra and Java. The Muslims there were reported as belonging to the Hanafi madhhab rite or school of law. It is said that in time, some of their mosques became shrines where Cheng Ho was being honored, a non-too-Islamic practice. Eventually, however, with an increasing loss of contact with the China mainland, as well as stronger religious influences from Arab and Indian lands, the Hanafi rite gradually gave way to the Shafi madhhab.³¹ The Shafi rite came to predominate in Malay lands. Javanese teachers or missionaries to the Moluccas and Brunei missionaries all belonged to this school of law. This is one explanation why the Muslims of Sulu and Mindanao belong to this school.

The time of Cheng Ho's expeditions also coincided with that of the work of some of the so-called Saints (*auliya*) of Java. One of them, Sunan Ngampel (Bong Swi Hong, Raden Rahmat) of Surabaya, was a leader of Chinese Muslims of Java and he led his followers to eventually become Shafis.³² He lived during the last decades of the Majapahit empire and died around 1478. In 1447, he is reported to have married Nyi Ageng Manila, the daughter of a Muslim Chinese domiciled in Manila called Gan Eng Cu. Gan Eng Cu is said to have been the head of the Chinese community in Manila until he was transferred, through the instructions of one of Cheng Ho's subordinates, to the port of Tuban in northeastern Java in

1423 to head the Chinese Muslim community there. He was also named “Ki gede Manila” and later given the title “Tumanggung.”³³ Incidentally, according to the *Babad Tanah Jawi* (Javanese Annals), Majapahit had once claimed some sort of political hegemony over Manila in the 1430s — a time coincident with Gan Eng Cu’s residence there.

It may be mentioned in passing that Cheng Ho could have had an Islamic agenda of his own. In some of his trips, he brought with him not only Ma Huan, a Muslim historian, but also Hassan (Fei Hsin), the Imam of the Sian-fu Mosque in Nanking, one of the oldest mosques in China. One wonders if their visit to the first ruler of Melaka had something to do with his encouragement to become Muslim. Be that as it may, Cheng Ho had various times petitioned the Emperor on behalf of his Muslim community. He was from Yunnan Province, where many Turkic Muslim soldiers had settled earlier. Cheng Ho was the descendant of a long list of Muslims. He was seventh in the line of descent of Sai tien-chi (Sayyid Ajall) of Bukharan origin and reputed to be a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. Sayyid Ajall Shams ud-Din was instrumental in putting Yunnan under Mongol control and he was made governor of it. He was a top military leader and administrator. His sons also came to administer Yunnan. It is believed that Sayyid Ajall, like his descendant Cheng Ho, had Sufi tendencies as evidenced by the nature of their tolerance of other religious beliefs.³⁴

After Admiral Cheng Ho’s death in 1435, official contacts between China and the Southeast Asian sea principalities gradually declined. Nevertheless, private trade increased. What happened was that by the end of the 15th century, Confucian scholars had gained more influence over the Celestial throne and recommended strongly that relations with “barbarians” should cease, since China was a country that was self-sufficient unto itself. The advent of the Ch’ing or Manchu Dynasty in 1644 increased this isolation. Of all the dynasties that came to rule in China, that of the Manchus was the most intolerant and repressive of Islam and Muslims. Needless to say, it provoked Muslim revolts which were repressed with great cruelty.

In the late 15th century and early 16th century, Muslim traders from Arab, Persian and Indian lands still came to Southeast Asia for its valued spices and other important products. They would also appear in Chinese ports, but in smaller numbers. But their centuries-old control of the spice trade was yet to meet its most severe challenge. With North Africa, Western Asia and part of the Balkans under Muslim rule and thus blocking them, the Portuguese were able to sail around Africa to get to India, where they aimed to control, or at least share, in the spice trade

there and of Southeast Asia. They defeated a Muslim fleet at Diu in 1509 and pirated Muslim trading vessels in a systematic manner. In 1511, they captured Melaka and thus made a bid to control the whole spice trade in the area. Muslim leaders were forced to patronize other ports, especially those in Sumatra. Brunei started to become more of an important trading and shipping center. But other events were also combining to lead to the inevitable, more of what Arab and other Muslims would call as something from “above the winds.” Internecine wars between Muslim states, plagues, reduction in population, and the general decline in their productive powers in agriculture and handicrafts resulted in a great reduction in their capacity to both import and export. Their loss of sea power in the Indian Ocean diverted the spice trade more directly to Europe. Neither the Arabs, Persians or Indians had the power to match the bigger and stronger Western ships or the greater European capital and credit.³⁵

The 16th and 17th centuries ushered the coming of European imperialism and colonization to Southeast Asia. Most of the Malay lands fell under Western rule. A few Muslim traders and teachers still managed to come. But they were viewed with deep resentment and suspicion by the European colonials. The protection and spread of Islam now fell on the shoulders of the Malay people themselves, who had come to cherish the religion of the old Muslim traders and teachers. Islam would stoke pre-nationalistic elements. In the later 16th century, Brunei preachers were evident in Luzon and Mindanao. Javanese teachers would sail to the Moluccas on missionary activities. But, at any rate, the northeast movement or expansion of Islam from the Indonesian islands to the Philippines, to complete a geographical process, was blocked by the Spaniards. But this is another story, another chapter in the history of Islam among the Malays of Southeast Asia.

Notes

¹ Chua Ju-Kua, *His Wok on the Chinese and Arab Trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries*, entitled Chu-fan'chi. Tr. Friedrich Hirth and W.W. Rockhill. St. Petersburg, 1912. p. 4 and p. 14; and Roland Braddell, “Notes on

Ancient Times in Malaya," *JMBRAS*, Vol. XX, Part II, December 1947. pp. 8-10.

²Sayyid Qudratullah Fatimi, "The Role of China in the Spread of Islam in South East Asia," First International Conference of South East Asian Historians. Singapore, January 1961. Mimeograph copy. Pp. 2-3. For additional information on these Companions of the Prophet, see *The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ishaq's Siral Rasul Allah*. Introduction and Notes by A. Guillaume. Oxford University Press. Pp. 146-148, pp. 167-169, and pp. 526-529.

³Sayyid Qudratullah Fatimi, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-4.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁵Chau Ju-Kua, *op. cit.*, p. 15. See also Lo Hsiang-Lin, "Islam in Canton in the Sung Period," *Symposium on Historical, Archaeological and Linguistic Studies on Southern China, South-East Asia and the Hongkong Region*. Eds. F.S. Drake and Wolfram Eberhard. Papers presented at a meeting held in September 1961 as part of the Golden Jubilee Congress of the University of Hongkong, Hongkong 1967, p. 177.

⁶Wang Gungwu, "The Nanhai Trade: A Study of the Early History of Chinese Trade in the South China Sea," *JMBRAS*, Vol. XXXI, Part II, No. 182, p. 107.

⁷Sayyid Qudratullah Fatimi, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁸For a biography of Huang Ch'ao, see *Biography of Huang Ch'ao*. Translated and Annotated by Howard S. Levy. University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1961. Arab accounts by Abu Zaid and Mas'udi are found in *ibid.*, pp. 109-121. Also cf. G.R. Tibbets, "Early Muslim Traders in South-East Asia," *JMBRAS*, Vol. XXX, Part I, No. 177. 1957. p. 19.

⁹G.R. Tibbets, *op. cit.*, pp. 21, 31 and 43.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹²Fatimi, Sayyid Qudratullah. *Islam Comes to Malaysia*. Singapore, 1963. pp. 66-67.

¹³ Dasheng, Chen. *Islamic Inscriptions in Quanzhou (Zaitun)*. Tr. Chen Enming. Yinchuan: Ningxia from the Arabic text edited by C. Defremery and B.R. Sanguinetti. Vol. 4. The Hakluyt Society, London. 1994. p. 894.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. xiv.

¹⁵ Gibb, H.A.R. *The Travels of Ibn Battuta (A.D. 1325-1354)*. Translated with revisions and notes from the Arabic text edited by C. Defremery and B.R. Sanguinetti. Vol. 4. The Hakluyt Society, London. 1994. p. 894.

¹⁶ For details of this rebellion, see Chang Hsing-lang, "The Rebellion of the Persian Garrison in Ch'uan-chou (A.D. 1357-1366)." *Monumenta Serica*, 3(1938), pp. 611-627; and Maejima Shinji, "The Muslims in Chu'uan-chou at the End of the Yuan Dynasty." *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, 32(1974), pp. 47-71.

¹⁷ Dasheng, Chen. *op. cit.*, p. xiv.

¹⁸ Good photos of the tombstone before its vandalization were kindly provided by William "Bill" Beyer.

¹⁹ The title "Tuhan" was in very early times used for the Deity. Later on it was used for high-ranking officials or officers of state. Some princes used it. A prominent Muslim lady buried in Java also carried this title. In the tombstone of Maqbalu, the term had often been wrongly read as "Timhar" since the letter "n" had been read as "r."

²⁰ Dasheng, Chen. *op. cit.*

²¹ Comparing Maqbalu's tombstone with many of the extant tombstones in Quanzhou (Ch'uan-chou), especially figures 32, 33, 37 and 48 in Chen Dasheng's text, striking similarities are clearly seen. To be mentioned further is that whereas the date of Maqbalu's tomb is 1310 C.E. (710 A.H.), figure 32 is 1290 C.E. (689 A.H.), figure 33 is 1299 C.E. (698 A.H.), figure 37 is 1302 C.E. (702 A.H.) and figure 48 is 1325 C.E. (725 A.H.). All five headstones are contemporaneous.

²² Cf. E. Ashtor, "The Karimi Merchants," *JRAS*, 1956. Parts I and 2. pp. 45-56.

²³ Gibb, H.A.R., *op. cit.*, p. 902.

²⁴ J.V. Mills, "Arab and Chinese Navigators in Malaysian Waters in about

A.D. 1500.” *JMBRAS*, Vol. XLVII, part 2, Dec. 1974, No. 226. p. 10.

²⁵Wolters, Oliver. *The Fall of Srivijaya in Malay History*. Asia Major Library, Lund Humphries, London. 1970. p. 76.

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 190.

²⁷Moorhead, Francis Joseph. *A History of Malaya and her Neighbors*. London 1957. Vol. I, p. 123.

²⁸Haji Yusuf Chang, “The Ming Empire: Patron of Islam in China and Southeast-West Asia,” *JMBRAS*, Vol. LXI, Part 2, Dec. 1988, p. 1.

²⁹There are numerous works on the Cheng Ho expeditions. An interesting one is by Haji Yusuf Chang, which strongly suggests that Cheng Ho was a pious Muslim with an Islamic agenda in his naval trips. See his *op. cit.*, pp. 25-39. It might be of interest to note that in 1417, Cheng Ho left a memorial in the Muslim cemetery at Ch’uan-chou (Quanzhou). For more information on Cheng Ho, see William Willets, “The Maritime Adventures of Grand Eunuch Ho,” *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, Vol. V, No. 2, Sept. 1964. p. 26; and Su Chung-Jen, “Places in South-East Asia, the Middle East and Africa visited by Cheng Ho and his Companions (A.D. 1405-1433),” *Symposium on Historical, Archaeological and Linguistic Studies on Southern China, South-East Asia and the Hongkong Region*. pp. 198-211.

³⁰Haji Yusuf Chang, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

³¹Graaf, H.J. de and Pigeaud, Th. G. Th., *Chinese Muslims in Java in the 15th and 16th centuries*. Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, No. 12, 1984. pp. 78-79 and p. 175.

³²*Ibid.*, pp. 79-80 and p. 175.

³³*Ibid.*, p. 15, p. 17, p. 19, pp. 59-60, p. 74 and p. 148.

³⁴On Ajall’s life, see Morris Rossabi, “The Muslims in the Early Yuan Dynasty,” *China Under Mongol Rule*. Ed. John D. Langlois, Jr. Princeton University Press, 1981, pp. 287-291. For Cheng Ho’s and Sayyid Ajall’s Sufi tendencies cf. Sayyid Qudratullah Fatimi, “The role of China in the Spread of Islam in South East Asia,” *op. cit.*, p. 31 and p. 33.

³⁵Charles Issawi, “The Decline of Middle Eastern Trade (1100-1850),” *Islam and the Trade of Asia*. Ed. D.S. Richards. Oxford 1970, p. 266.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE "GENEALOGY OF SULU"*

CESAR ADIB MAJUL

I

The term *tarsila* comes from the Arabic *silsilah*, which means a chain or link. It is used in the Muslim South as in other parts of the Indonesian and Malay world to refer to written genealogical accounts. One of the primary functions of the *tarsila* was to trace the ancestry of an individual or family to a famous personality in the past who was either an important political figure or religious teacher. This fact immediately suggests that *tarsilas* were not meant to remain purely historical documents or quaint remembrances of things past. On the contrary, they served to bolster the claim of individuals or families to hold political power or to enjoy certain traditional prerogatives, if not some prestige in their respective communities at least. Consequently, all sultans and leading datus had their respective *tarsilas*.

Obviously, if *tarsilas* were to serve their purposes, they had to be kept up to date. When written on perishable materials such as paper, their contents were preserved by copying them on new paper. Thus, the age of the material used is no index to the age or authenticity of the accounts. However, it is commonly accepted that the use of the Malay language, especially in the earlier parts of *tarsilas*, is an index to their ancient character—at least for those parts in Malay. The use of this criterion is quite reasonable. Sulu was actively involved in the trade which covered the Malay peninsula and the Indonesian archipelago as far back as the 13th century, if not earlier. And, as is well-known, the *lingua franca* of the traders was Malay. This language was also extensively used in the Sulu court, just as it was in the courts of Malacca, Brunei, and so on. It was only during the 17th century, with the coming of the Spaniards to the Philippine archipelago and other Europeans

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to other parts of Southeast Asia, that the Sulus gradually became isolated from other Malay lands. It was then that the use of Malay in the Sulu court began to decline.

The tradition of writing or having *tarsilas* among the Muslims in the Philippines probably derived from the Muslim principalities in the neighboring Indonesian islands which has an earlier history of Islamization. In turn, these principalities used as a model the earliest part of the *Sirat Rasul Allah* (*The Biography of the Messenger of Allah*) as their model. This work was written by Ibn Ishaq (c. 85 A.H. — A.H. — 151 A.H. or c. 704 A.D. — 768 A.D.). Its first paragraph, in the recension of Ibn Hisham, contains the genealogy of the Prophet Muhammad, tracing his descent from Adam—a total of 48 generations. The style here is not much different from the Jewish Bible's genealogies.

It would be a mistake to look at the *tarsilas* of the South as purely genealogical documents. Actually, they may contain descriptions of some of the personages mentioned, place names, and actual data regarding distorical events in the past. Some *tarsilas* even include mythological elements, some of which have now lost their original meaning for us. In brief, *tarsilas* were meant to accomplish a few aims beyond the genealogical function. These aims will be discussed in greater detail later on.

II

We are all greatly indebted to Dr. Najeeb Saleeby for the collection, translation, and publication of many *tarsilas* from Sulu and Mindanao in the first decade of this century. We owe Saleeby even more, considering that many of these documents had been burnt or lost during the last days of the Japanese Occupation in 1945. This especially holds true for the Sulu documents belonging to the Kiram family and Haji to put down in writing the dictation of Faqir Maulana Hamza, in the possession of some of the leading Muslim families in the upper valley of the Pulangi were burned in 1972 as a result of fighting between government troops and secessionists in the area. Nevertheless, there still exist *tarsilas* among some families there—at least this is what we have been assured.

In the past, *tarsilas* were jealously guarded from the prying eyes of the curious, especially those of strangers. It took years

of friendship with the families of the sultans and chief *datus* for Saleeby, who was an Arab from Lebanon, to succeed in seeing the *tarsilas* and having them published. Yet even Saleeby missed some important ones, possibly because of mistrust. For example, he did not have the chance to see the ones from the Buluan and Tawi-Tawi areas. In any case, the debt of Philippine Muslim scholars to Saleeby remains inestimable.

That the sultans jealously guarded their *tarsilas* does not mean that they did not divulge some of their contents to foreigners. For example, Alexander Dalrymple, who was in Sulu in 1761 and 1764 and who came to know the Sulu Sultan 'Azim ud-Din (Alimudin) in Manila, learned from the Sultan and other leading *datus* many details of Sulu *tarsilas* which correspond to those published by Saleeby in 1908. Likewise, Thomas Forrest, who was in Maguindanao in 1775, was able to put down in writing the dictation of Faquir Maulana Hamza, a Maguindanao sultan, who was consulting his *tarsilas* on data concerning the history of Maguindanao. Moreover, the Sultan appeared to have known the genealogies of the sultans of Sulu and Brunei, to the extent of claiming that they, together with the sultans of Maguindanao, had a common Arab ancestor somewhere in the dim past. Significantly, some Maguindanao *tarsilas* make it a point to mention dynastic or marriage relations between the royal families of Maguindanao and Sulu. The Brunei *Selesilah*, likewise, makes reference to a marriage between the Brunei and Sulu royal families. John Hunt, who was in Sulu in 1814, appeared to have had indirect information regarding various Brunei and Sulu *tarsilas*, probably from his *datu* friends. Written from memory, however, his account is a bit unreliable since he often confuses different sultans with each another and unnecessarily telescopes events. But anyone with a knowledge of Dalrymple's works and Spanish sources can easily recognize the misidentifications in the genealogy and historical events reported by Hunt. No less than seven varied sources must have been available to him. If, instead of lumping them together, he had reported them separately according to specified sources, he would have been of greater value to present-day scholars.

What follows is a description and analysis of the Sulu *tarsilas* published by Saleeby.

III

The so-called "Genealogy of Sulu" was published by Saleeby in 1907 in a chapter of his important work *The History of Sulu*.¹ It was supplemented, in the same chapter, by another *tarsila* which he entitled "Sulu Historical Notes." For convenience, Saleeby also entitled various parts of the "Genealogy of Sulu" in accordance with subject matter, successively as follows: "Sulu author's introduction," "Descendants of Asip," "Descendants of Tuan Masha'ika," and "Original and later settlers of Sulu."²

The first part deals with the writer of the *tarsilas* while the second part is a *tarsila* of the descendants of Asip, one of the ministers who came to Sulu with Raja Baguinda, a Sumatran prince. (Incidentally, the writer of the *tarsilas* claimed descent from Asip.) The other two *tarsilas*, namely, the "Descendants of Tuan Masha'ika" and the "Original and later settlers of Sulu," as well as the "Sulu Historical Notes" were written in Malay, attesting to their antiquity. It is believed that the "Sulu Historical Notes," which consists of four parts, were originally composed before the "Descendants of Tuan Masha'ika" and the "Original and later settlers of Sulu." All three *tarsilas* have many elements in common, but unlike the "Original and latter settlers of Sulu," the "Sulu Historical Notes" do not deal either with the first sultan or his descendants.

Disregarding some differences (if not actual inconsistencies) between the above three *tarsilas*, and setting aside certain details which are not quite relevant for purposes of this essay, what follows is their summary:

During the time of Raja Sipad the younger, a son or descendant of Raja Sipad the elder, a certain Tuan Masha'ika, arrives in Jolo island, in the area now known as Maimbung. At that time, the inhabitants are not Muslims but worshippers of stones and tombs. On account of his qualities, probably regarding knowledge and skills, he is very much esteemed and respected by the people. In time, he marries a daughter of Raja Sipad. She bears him three children of which two, one male and one female, have Arab names. The name of the female,

¹ Saleeby, Najeeb M., *The History of Sulu* (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, Inc., 1963).

² The "Genealogy of Sulu" and the "Sulu Historical Notes" are found in *ibid.*, pp. 30-36.

'Aisha, is a typical Muslim one. One of the sons, Tuan Hakim, in turn, has four sons (Tuan Da'im, Tuan Buda, Tuan Bujang, and Tuan Muku) and a daughter.

Not long after, people from Basilan (called *Tagimahas*) and another group called *Baklayas* settle in Sulu. They are followed by Bajaos supposed to have come from Johore. The Bajaos do not remain in one place but become scattered in various islands.

Some time after the arrival of the Bajaos, a certain Karim ul-makhdum, entitled Sharif Awliya, arrives in Sulu and eventually settles among the Tagimaha nobles in Buansa, who then build a mosque. At this time, the people of Sulu begin to adopt Islam. Ten years later (it is not clear whether after the arrival of Karim ul-makhdum or after the building of the mosque), Raja Baguinda from Menangkabaw, Sumatra, appears with his followers, in Buansa. There is a fight between the Raja and his followers on one hand, and the Tagimaha chiefs of Buansa and their followers on the other. Peace ensues henceforth, especially after it is found out that Raja Baguinda is a Muslim like the Buansa chiefs. Raja Baguinda appears to have become a chief in Buansa as evidenced by the report that five years after his arrival, he receives a gift of elephants from the Raja of Java. In any case, Raja Baguinda settles in Buansa and marries there. It is important to note that one of the *tarsilas* mentions that during the arrival of Raja Baguinda, some of the Sulu chiefs (not from Buansa) were Tuan Buda, Tuan Da'im, and Tuan Bujang. These chiefs, it will be recalled, were grandchildren of Tuan Masha'ika of Maimbung.

Now, according to the "Original and later settlers of Sulu," it is while Raja Baguinda is in Buansa that Sayyid Abu Bakr, after having stayed in or passed through Palembang (in Sumatra) and Brunei, arrives and preaches Islam. The people then become more attached to Islam. Abu Bakr then marries Paramisuli, the daughter of Raja Baguinda, and ends by establishing himself as the first sultan. He lives thirty years in Buansa and upon his death, one of his sons, Kamal ud-Din, succeeds him as sultan.

The enumeration of sultans in the "Genealogy of Sulu" is as follows:³

³ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 34. The names of the above seventeen (17) sultans are Saleeby's transcriptions from the Arabic Jawi script. Strictly speaking, not all follow the correct Arabic transcriptions of the names the way

1. Abu Bakr (Sultan Sharif)
2. Kamalud Din
3. Maharaja Upo
4. Pangiran Buddiman
5. Sultan Tanga
6. Sultan Bungsu
7. Sultan Nasirud Din
8. Sultan Kamarat
9. Sultan Shahabud Din
10. Sultan Mustafa Shapiud Din
11. Sultan Mohammad Nasarud Din
12. Sultan Alimud Din I
13. Sultan Mohammad Mu'izzid Din
14. Sultan Sra'il
15. Sultan Mohammad Alimud Din II
16. Sultan Mohammad Sarapud Din
17. Sultan Mohammad Alimud Din III

Judging from the last name in this list of sultans, this enumeration of sultans was completed around 1808 since 'Azim ud-Din III (Alimud Din III), seventeenth and last in the list, ruled and died in this same year. He was sultan for only 40 days. The earlier portions of the chapter must have been written much earlier. Some of its contents were even told to Dalrymple in 1761.

The brief summary above suggests various observations and conclusions:

1. The genealogy of Sulu asserts that the earliest inhabitants of Jolo island were centered in the area of Maimbung, in the southern part of the island. Their rulers were called "Raja Sipad," from the Sanskrit Raja Shripaduka, a title of Indian or Hindu origin. The second wave of settlers were the Tagimahas who came from Basilan and who settled in Buansa, in the northern part of the island west of the present Jolo town. The third wave were the Baklayas who settled in the northern part of the island east of Jolo town. They were followed by the Bajaos (and Samals) who settled all over the Sulu archipelago.

they are spelled classically. For example, the Tausug Sarapud Din is Sharaf-ud-Din in correct Arabic, which a learned man ('alim) in Sulu would normally use.

2. Tuan Masha'ika was one of the first foreign Muslims to come to the Maimbung area and, therefore, to Jolo island. That some of his children and grandchildren had Arabic names supports this view. Moreover, the "Sulu Historical Notes" state that "Masha'ika begot Mawmin." Now, the word "*mu'min*" (pl. *mu'minin*) is an Arabic term for "faithful" or "believer." The phrase, therefore, means that Masha'ika begot Muslims. Furthermore, the word "*masha'ikh*" is one of the Arabic plural forms for "*shaikh*," a title of respect. In South Arabia, the term "*masha'ikh*" is also used for pious men or religious leaders to distinguish them from the "*sayyids*" or "*sharifs*" who are descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. Of common knowledge, too, is the fact that the majority or Arabs who settled in the Indonesian archipelago came from Southern Arabia.
3. The account of the genealogy of Tuan Masha'ika to the effect that he was "born out of a bamboo and was esteemed and respected by all the people," not only reveals that this land of origin was unknown, but also serves to emphasize his greater knowledge *vis-a-vis* the people he came to live with. The other report in the "Sulu Historical Notes" that the parents of Tuan Masha'ika were sent to Sulu by Alexander the Great shows that the writer of the "Sulu Historical Notes" was acquainted, in one way or another, with the traditions of the Malacca sultans who claimed descent from Alexander the Great. Other Sulu traditions state that the rulers of Sulu were descended from Alexander the Great. This is simply a technique to bolster the claim for legitimacy to rule, for the rulers of Sulu were, in this case, claiming kinship with the Malacca sultans.
4. The coming of Karim ul-makhdum suggests the coming of a Muslim to actually preach Islam. This is unlike the coming of Tuan Masha'ika to whom neither the preaching of Islam nor the building of a mosque is attributed. The word "*makhdum*," in Arabic, means "master." In Arab lands, it is used as a converse of "server." However, in India and in the land of the Malays, the word came to be used as a title for Muslim religious teachers or scholars and pious men. That he was called "Sharif Awliya" suggests that people considered him a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad since this is what

- "Sharif" connotes. His title of "Awliya," the Arabic plural for *wali* or saint, implies that he was a pious man.
5. The coming of Raja Baguinda from Sumatra and his establishment of a principality in Buansa creates a dramatic link between Sulu and a center of an older empire, that of Srivijaya, which was based in Sumatra. In personal terms, this means that Raja Baguinda was claiming uninterrupted sovereignty. His marriage with a local girl also means that his descendants who became sultans had rights to land in Sulu by virtue of bilateral relations. In brief, the Sulu sultans who were descended from Raja Baguinda could not be criticized as representing a foreign dynasty; after all, their ancestress who married the Raja was of local origin. In effect, the links with Raja Baguinda who was asserted to be a Sumatran prince bolstered the claims of Sulu sultans to reign in Malay lands.
 6. Sayyid Abu Bakr, who was entitled Sultan Sharif, is also asserted to have been a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. The word "sayyid" like "sharif" connotes this. It has been held by some classical Muslim jurists that one of the qualifications for a *khalif* was to belong to the Quraish or family of the Prophet. Clearly, then, the claim of the Sulu sultans to rule over Muslims is based on their reputed descent from the Prophet, through Sayyid Abu Bakr. But again, in order to strengthen their claims on the land without appearing fully as a foreign dynasty, the Sulu sultans claimed descent from the wife of the first sultan who, in spite of her being a daughter of Raja Baguinda, was considered a local girl. Indeed, her mother was reported to have been a lady from Buansa.
 7. In brief, the Sulu *tarsilas*, particularly those owned by the Sulu royal family, are not mere genealogical accounts made for posterity's sake, but represent documentary evidence *par excellence* to support their claim of legitimacy to rule over Muslims as well as their claims to their right to the land. The *tarsilas* are also meant to show kinship and historical links between Sulu and older centers of empire.
 8. Of great importance is that the three above-mentioned *tarsilas* try to explain the advent and the spread of Islam in Sulu. As such, they represent an affirmation that

Sulu constituted an important part of the Islamic international community—that of *dar-ul-Islam*.

The problem can now be raised as to the authenticity or historicity of the personalities and accounts found in the *tarsilas* as well as to that of the chronology.

IV

First of all, the elaborate and well-preserved tomb of the Sultan of Sulu, Sultan Sharif, still exists on one of the slopes of Mt. Tumangtangis which faces Buansa. The tomb carries the elaborate titles of the Sultan; but, unfortunately, it carries no date. A stone slab nearby is pointed out as the marker of the grave of Kamal ud-Din, the second sultan.

According to Spanish records, Spanish soldiers in 1638 destroyed one of the most revered tombs near Buansa. This tomb was a center of pilgrimages and was supposed to be that of a Muslim ruler who had come from other lands. Whether or not this tomb was that of Raja Baguinda remains an unsolved problem.

The fourth sultan, Jangiran Buddiman, was known to the Spaniards in 1578. He was a brother-in-law of the Brunei Sultan Seif ur-Rijal and had a home in Brunei.) The fifth sultan, called Pangiran Tengah, was also known to the Spaniards and the Jesuit Francisco Combes narrated a few things about him. This same priest also had various times conversed with Sultan Bongsu. In effect, all the sultans numbered from 4 to 17 in the "Genealogy of Sulu," had dealings with the Spaniards and some of them had even communicated with the Dutch and the English. However, that sultans from 4 to 17 are to be considered as historical figures only because of the existence of cross-references in European sources, is no reason why the first three sultans cannot be regarded as historical figures in their own right. It is just unfortunate for scholars that the first three sultans had no dealings with or were unknown to the Spaniards, who were simply not to be found in the area. But, indeed, there are Spanish references to a Sulu ruler in 1521 who happened to be a father-in-law of the Brunei sultan. This ruler might have been one of the earlier sultans. On the basis of other *tarsilas* or Sulu traditions not reported by Saleeby, it accepted that it was the first sultan who placed the different peoples of Sulu, including those in the mountains in the interior, under

one rule. Thus did Sulu begin to have the semblance of a principality or small state.

Unfortunately, not a single Sulu *tarsila* bears any date. (The same holds true for the Maguindanao *tarsilas*.) The Brunie *Selesilah*, however, contains one single date. Scholars cannot, so far, be absolutely sure about, or conclusively prove, the existence of Tuan Masha'ika or Raja Baguinda. But this does not mean that they did not exist. On the contrary, to assume that they existed can explain a great deal of Sulu history. Actually, by cross references to other sources, historical or archaeological, the probability is that they actually existed. And more than this, they signify persons involved in the dramatic political and religious transformations in the history of Southeast Asia.

Professor Oliver Wolters, in his brilliant book *The Fall of Srivijaya in Malay History*, describes a momentous event in the history of Southeast Asia which took place in 1397, a time coincident with the final dissolution of the Srivijayan empire.⁴ His researches revealed that around this year a prince of Palembang, Sumatra, threw off his allegiance to Java, and consequently incurred a brutal invasion. A source says that this prince escaped with a small following to found, after some adventures, a kingdom in Singapore, after which he or his descendants founded Malacca. Another source, however, mentions that the princely evacuation was of such great magnitude that "the sea seemed to be nothing but ships." It says: "So vast was the fleet that there seemed to be no counting. The masts of the ships were like a forest of trees; their pennons and streamers were like driving clouds and the state umbrellas of the Rajas like cirrus."⁵ Referring back to this incident at the end of one of his appendices, Professor Wolters concludes that ". . . the years immediately before 1400 were a disturbed time in the western archipelago, and this is another, and perhaps more likely, time when small groups of adventurers migrated to Borneo and elsewhere."⁶ One is tempted to ask whether Raja Baguinda was not one of these Sumatran adventurers who came to the Philippines to found a principality. The "Sulu Historical Notes" and the "Original and later

⁴ Wolters, Oliver, *The Fall of Srivijaya in Malay History* (London: Asia Major Library, Lund Humphries, 1970).

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

Settlers of Sulu" mention that he went to Zamboanga first, whence he sailed to Basilan until he decided to transfer to Buansa where he and his followers first had to fight the Tagimaha chiefs before he could establish a principality. That the *tarsilas* say he came from Menangkabaw instead of Palembang is not of much consequence; for the central power in Sumatra in the few years before 1400 was located in Palembang. It does seem that some of the Palembang adventurers had founded not only the city of Malacca, which was to become the greatest emporium and Islamic center in Southeast Asia in the 15th century, but also a principality in Sulu which had become so important later on as to attract the Sharif Abu Bakr. The Malays who eventually left Palembang for Malacca saw this principality as the heir to, or the continuity of, the empire of Srivijaya—an assertion of Malay maritime supremacy in the area of the western archipelago. When the Sulus aimed to build Sulu as the greatest trading center in their own area in the eastern archipelago, was this not a parallel of the action of Malacca's founders?

There is an indirect evidence to further support the speculation that Raja Baguinda came to Sulu about 1397 A.D. or slightly later. This has to do with the *tarsila* report that, five years after his arrival, Raja Baguinda received a gift of elephants from Raja of Java. This date can be placed at anywhere between, say, 1397 A.D. and 1405. Now, in 1410 A.D., the new ruler of Brunei, in the north of Borneo, formally requested the Chinese Emperor that he should not pay tribute anymore to Java (Majapahit) but instead to the Celestial throne. This request was approved by the Emperor.⁷ All this means that before 1410 A.D., Brunei was tributary to Java. Most likely, the ruler who gave a gift of elephants to Raja Baguinda was not *the* ruler of Java (Majapahit) but one of the petty rulers of the numerous principalities that constituted the Javanese Empire. Widely-held traditions in Sulu state that the elephants came from the northeastern part of Borneo, an area where Brunei rulers exercised power. Thus, the gift came from the Brunei ruler, or his successor, who stopped being in 1410 A.D. one of the petty rulers tributary to the empire of Majapahit. Consequently, Raja Baguinda must have received his gift not later than 1410 A.D.

⁷ Brown, D. E., *Brunei: The Structure and History of a Bornean Malay Sultanate*. (Brunei: Star Press, 1970), p. 133.

In his work on Sulu, Saleeby calculated that Sayyid Abu Bakr arrived in Sulu around 1450 A.D. This calculation was based on his belief that the Sayyid was the same Abu Bakr who, according to the *Sejarah Melayu*, was in Malacca during the reign of the Malaccan Sultan Mansur Shah. Furthermore, Saleeby calculated that Mansur Shah had begun to reign in 1400 A.D. Making allowance for various protracted stops in Palembang and Brunei, he concluded that Abu Bakr must have arrived in Sulu between 1436 A.D. and 1450 A.D. This calculation of Saleeby is not found in his above-mentioned book but in an unpublished essay entitled "The Establishment of the Mohammedan Church in Sulu and Mindanao: The Earliest Mohammedan Missionaries in Mindanao and Sulu."⁸ However, after Saleeby had written his book and essay, a more definite and accurate chronology of the Malacca sultan emerged. Mansur Shah, the sixth Malacca sultan, is now known to have ruled from 1458 (or 1459) to 1477 A.D. Thus, the Abu Bakr who was in Malacca during this reign could not have been the Sayyid Abu Bakr who, in Saleeby's conjecture, had come to Sulu around 1450. However, in the above-mentioned unpublished essay, Saleeby calculated, on the basis of the number of generations of succeeding Sulu sultans, that Abu Bakr's reign had begun between 1407 A.D. and 1436 A.D. This calculation fits the well-thought out speculation that his father-in-law, Raja Baguinda, left Sumatra in 1397 A.D. and arrived in Sulu not much later. Incidentally, Alexander Dalrymple, using Isaac Newton's computation for the reign of princes, calculated that the Sulu sultanate under the first sultan was established about 1526 A.D.⁹ But if it is considered that Dalrymple's list of sultans misses at least three of the earlier sultans and if 25 years instead of 20 is used for each generation, the sultanate might as well have been established in the first half of the 15th century. Indeed, the date of 1526 A.D. is wrong since Spanish records state that in 1521 there was already a ruler in Sulu who had enough prestige to have become the father-in-law of the Brunei sultan at that time.

Since the coming of Karim ul-makhdum to Sulu is stated by all *tarsilas* to have antedated that of Raja Baguinda by at least ten years, the date given by Saleeby, that is, about 1380

⁸ A copy was in the Beyer Collection.

⁹ Alexander Dalrymple, "Essay towards an account of Sulu," *The Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia*, Volume III, Singapore, 1849, p. 565.

A.D., can be accepted for want of better reasons to support another date. Actually, the end of the 14th century and the early part of the 15th century had witnessed various *makhdumin* (pl. of *makhdum*) coming to Java, Malacca, and North Borneo by way of India. That two or three places in the Sulu archipelago presently claim the grave of a *makhdum* is not a contradiction. The difficulty is that all of these places claim that their respective graves are the resting place of Karim ul-makhdum. My researches have shown that at least one other *makhdum* came to Sulu in the first few years of the 15th century and that he was associated with Chinese traders or travellers. He is buried in Bud Agad in the interior of Jolo island, and his name is different from that of Karim ul-makhdum.

As for Tuan Masha'ika, which is actually not a name but a title, not much can be said about the exact time of his coming beyond what is reported by the *tarsilas*. To seek a definite date of his arrival is an exercise in futility. The most that can be said about him is that since his grandchildren were already chiefs in Maimbung when Raja Baguinda came to Buansa about 1397 A.D., he must have come to Sulu by the first half of the 14th century. But if this is so, then he might not have been the first Muslim to have come to Sulu; although it is still entirely possible that he was the first Muslim to have come to Maimbung. The evidence for this is the grave of a foreign Muslim in Bud Dato, close to Jolo town, which bears the date of 710 A.H. (1310 A.D.). The name on the grave is that of Tuhan (Tuan) Maqbalu. However, is it possible that Maqbalu is the proper name of Tuan Masha'ika and that they are one and the same person? If so, then Tuan Masha'ika's grandchildren would have indeed been very aged chiefs of not less than 60 or 70 years when Raja Baguinda arrived. However, a peculiarity of *tarsilas* is that they tend to encompass events or, as some historians put it, to telescope them. Indeed, the *tarsilas* do not say that the Maimbung chiefs who were descended from Tuan Masha'ika, either fought against or greeted Raja Baguinda. The "Original and later settlers of Sulu" state tersely that they were chiefs living at that time, and this could mean at *around* that time. Certainly, they were not in Buansa, and they could have lived much earlier. Indeed, to say that they were chiefs living during the arrival of the Raja is a simple case of telescoping events, and it would be rash

to dismiss the possibility that the Tuan Maqbalu who died in 1310 A.D. is identical to Tuan Masha'ika.

V

Although the *tarsilas* in the "Genealogy of Sulu" are of great importance, there are also other important Sulu *tarsilas*. These can often serve to supplement the former. It is significant to note that some Tawi-Tawi *tarsilas* contain, for the same period of time, the names of other sultans not found in the "Genealogy of Sulu." An example is the name of Badar-ud-Din I. This sultan was known to the Dutch and the Spaniards and had written letters to them. He reigned from about 1718 to 1732 and was the father of the well-known Sultan 'Azim ud-Din I (known to the Spaniards and most Sulus as Alimudin) who was proclaimed sultan of Sulu in 1735. His name should have, therefore, been inserted between Sultan Muhammad Nasarud Din (no. 11) and Sultan Alimud Din I (no. 12) in the "Genealogy of Sulu." Other *tarsilas* insist that Alawadin, a brother of Sultan Kamalud Din (no. 2), succeeded him as sultan—something denied by the "Genealogy of Sulu." As a matter of fact, the elimination of the names of some sultans in a *tarsila* signify dynastic problems or controversies. Some names have been eliminated probably to prevent their descendants from becoming pretenders to the throne. In effect, some *tarsilas* can be quite selective in the enumeration of names. Saleeby was himself quite aware of this fact: in his *History of Sulu* he had to depend on other sources, notably certain *khutbahs*, to have a more correct enumeration or succession of Sulu sultans. Now, a *khutbah* is normally a sermon delivered in Muslim Friday congregational prayers. Some of them, however, were composed specially to serve as prayers for the Prophet Muhammad and the first four so-called "rightly guided" *khalifs* as well as for all persons who had reigned, including the incumbent ruler, as sultans in Sulu. They had become public knowledge by virtue of their repeated recitation in the mosques. Thus, it was not easy to tamper with the names of the sultans enumerated in such formalized *khutbahs*. A peculiarity of such *khutbahs* is that they were written in literary Arabic by relatively learned teachers or religious leaders. Consequently, there was the conscious effort to mention the sultans by their Arabic names, whenever possible.

On the basis of the "Genealogy of Sulu," other Sulu *tarsilas*, a few *khutbahs*, seals of sultans found in their letters

and now found in various archives, coins struck by them, and European historical references, especially Spanish, Dutch, and English, the following succession of sultans is presented. Their Arabic names as stated in the *khutbahs* as well as their common names are specified.

1. Sultan Sharif ul-Hasihim
(Sayyid Abu Bakr) — c.1450 — c.1480.
2. Sultan Kamal ud-Din.
3. Sultan 'Ala ud-Din.
4. Sultan Amir ul-'Umara
(Maharaja di Raja): ruled during the early 1500's.
5. Sultan Mu'izz ul-Mutawadi'in
(Maharaja Upo).
6. Sultan Nasir ud-Din I
(Digunung, Habud).
7. Sultan Muhammad ul-Halim
(Pangiran Buddiman): was ruling in 1578.
8. Sultan Batara Shah
(Pangiran Tengah — c.1590 — c.1610.
9. Sultan Muwallil Wasit
(Raja Bongsu) — c.1610 — 1650.
10. Sultan Nasir ud-Din II
(Pangiran Sarikula) — c.1645 — c.1648.
11. Sultan Salah ud-Din Bakhtiar
(Pangiran Bactial) — 1650 — c.1680.
12. Sultan 'Ali Shah.
13. Sultan Nur ul-'Azam — c.1685.
14. Sultan Al Haqunu Ibn Waliyul-Ahad — died c.1690.
15. Sultan Shahab ud-Din — c.1690 — c.1710.
16. Sultan Mustafa Shafi ud-Din — c.1710 — c.1718.
17. Sultan Badar ud-Din I — c.1718 — 1732.
18. Sultan Nasr ud-Din
(Datu Sabdula) — 1732 — 1735.
19. Sultan 'Azim ud-Din I
(Alimudin I) — 1735 — 1748; 1764 — 1774.
20. Sultan Mu'izz ud-Din
(Datu Bantilan) — 1748 — 1763.
21. Sultan Muhammad Isra'il — 1774 — 1778.
22. Sultan 'Azim ud-Din II
(Alimudin II) — 1778 — 1791.
23. Sultan Sharaf ud-Din
(Datu Salapudin) — 1791 — 1808.

24. Sultan 'Azim ud-Din III
(Alimuddin III) — 1808.
25. Sultan 'Ali ud-Din — 1808 — 1821.
26. Sultan Shakirullah
(Datu Sakilan) — 1821 — 1823.
27. Sultan Jamal ul-Kiram I — 1823 — 1842.
28. Sultan Muhammad Fadl
(Pulalun) — 1842 — 1862.
29. Sultan Jamal ul-'Azam — 1862 — 1881.
30. Sultan Badar ud-Din II — 1881 — 1884.
31. Sultan Harun ar-Rashid — 1886 — 1894.
32. Sultan Jamal ul-Kiram II — 1884 — 1936.

The exact dates for the reigns of at least fifteen of the above 32 sultans are known with certitude. The rest have to be calculated. The most comprehensive attempt at a chronology for the Sulu sultans is found in the work *Muslims in the Philippines*.¹⁰

VI

As mentioned earlier, some *tarsilas* contain mythological elements as well as incidents considered miraculous or normally impossible. It may be recalled that "Descendants of Tuan Masha'ika" say that he was born out of a bamboo. It also adds that he was not a descendant of Adam. The bamboo motif is quite common in many of the myths and traditions of the Malay peoples. The original meaning of such a myth is probably lost. However, it has certain functions, among which is portray the beginnings of mankind or certain important historical figures whose ancestry are not traceable. Thus, to say that Tuan Masha'ika was born out of a bamboo is to state that his origins were unknown. Here, also, the bamboo motif may be understood as a literary device to indicate the starting point of a story. The allegation that Tuan Masha'ika was not descended from Adam only serves to emphasize that he was an extraordinary man *vis-a-vis* the people he had come to live with, and that he represented a different and superior culture.

The report that Karim ul-makhdum came on an iron pot or vessel might mean that he came on a boat different from those used by the Sulu inhabitants at that time and that it

¹⁰ See Cesar Adib Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines* (U.P. Press, Quezon City, second edition 1973), pp. 14-24 for dates of the reigns of sultans and the bases for their statement.

was probably a boat utilizing metals in its construction. There are other *tarsilas* that narrate how the Makhdum came walking over the water. This is very interesting, for it suggests that the Mukhdum was a member of a mystical (*Sufi*) brotherhood (*tariqat*) of the Qadiriya order. The reputed founder of this *tariqat* was the famous Muslim mystic and saintly man called 'Abdul Qadir Al-Jilani (470 A.H.-561 A.H. or 1077 A.D.-1166 A.D.) to whom, it is believed, God gave the power to walk on the waters of rivers and seas. Even at present he remains the patron saint of fishermen and sailors in some parts of the Islamic world. Thus to say that Karim ul-makhdum walked on water is simply an allegorical or symbolic manner of stating that he belonged to the Qadiriya *tariqat*. Actually, a study of many of the *makhdumin* who went to Malaya and Indonesia had been Sufis and to them had been attributed extraordinary or magical powers. This is probably one reason why Karim ul-makhdum had been called "Sharif Awliya," for such men had been considered saintly and full of Allah's blessings to the extent that they were supposed to have *barakah*, that is, the power to confer blessings on other people.

To conclude, no history on the Muslims of the Philippines can be written without paying due regard to *tarsilas*. Their existence can also be a source of pride not only for the Muslims but for all Filipinos; for they represent the efforts of the human mind to understand the past within an ordered pattern—that of descent and sequence of events in time and space. Moreover, they have given part of the Filipino people a historical sense, without which their present would be unintelligible and their future blurred.

**AN HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE COMING
AND SPREAD OF ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

by

Cesar Adib Majul

An all too common feature of history has been the spread of such externally-introduced cultural institutions as religion. In Southeast Asia, for instance, the spread of Islam and Christianity had served to induce the peoples in the region to conceive of themselves as part of wider human communities, thus transcending the limitations of race, language, region and geography. Yet, paradoxically, Islam and, to a lesser extent, Christianity had provided those very elements of identity which played a large part in the struggle of the Malay peoples against foreign domination.

Some Theoretical Considerations on the Spread of Islam

The initial contacts between the Muslims from "above the winds" and the native peoples of Southeast Asia were made possible by the participation of the latter in the international trade that extended from the Arab lands to China. This participation increased and became more marked at the end of the ninth century.

In 878, on account of the massacre of large numbers of Muslims in Khan-fu (Canton) by a Chinese rebel leader as well as the deterioration of the political situation and increased piracy in the area, thousands of Muslim merchants, mostly Arabs and Persians, fled to Kalah (Kedah or Klang) in the western coast of the Malay Peninsula. This port settlement then became a major entrepôt of the Arab trade and, for some time, its farthest eastern stop. From Kalah, some Muslim traders settled in nearby places like Palembang. Arab trade in Southeast Asia soon became more organized and noticeable. Actually, a local trade began to flourish. It was probably due to this that Borneo and, subsequently, Sulu came to be known to Muslim traders. Even after they were again allowed to visit Chinese ports during the second half of the tenth century, Kalah retained its importance to the Muslims. By then Muslims had settled in such places as Champa and Leran in Eastern Java. At that time, the dominant religions in the area were Hinduism and Buddhism mixed with the local animistic beliefs and spirit worship practiced by a great majority of the inhabitants.

At the end of the thirteenth century, a Muslim principality was born in Samudra-Pasai, in the north of Sumatra, aptly known to Malays later as the "gate-way to the Holy Land (Mecca)". At the same time, if not slightly later, Treng-ganu and Patane began to evince Muslim characteristics by having Muslim chiefs.

Of far reaching consequences to the spread of Islam in the Islands of Southeast Asia was the establishment of the Malacca settlement around 1400. Its founding chief, who was of Palembang origin, consequently embraced Islam. Tradition contends that this conversion was due to a marriage alliance with a Pasai princess as well as to the proddings of Muslim traders who had it within their power to enrich the infant principality.

Not long after, Malacca, due to its favorable maritime position, grew into a most favored entrepot as well as a center for Islamic studies and teaching. Contacts with Malacca led Brunei's ruler to become a Muslim around the second quarter of the fifteenth century. From Malacca, teachers of Arab descent and with possible Sufi inclinations sailed to Java to spread the Faith. Missionary

activities became more prominent during the reign of Sultan Mansur Shah (1458-1477), who was a patron of Muslim scholars and studies. It was during his rule that Ternate chiefs became Muslims.

Around the first quarter of the sixteenth century, Madjapahit in central Java, a center of Hindu culture, yielded to a coalition of Muslim chiefs from some Javanese coastal principalities.

During the last quarter of the thirteenth century, simultaneous with the birth of the Muslim principality in the north of Sumatra, Sulu had its share of Muslim settlers. In less than a century, Sulu as well as parts of North Borneo became the center of activity of Muslim missionaries who were, in all probability, Sufi-oriented. They were, in any case, aided in their labors by the descendants of those Muslims who had come earlier.

Around 1390, due to political disturbances in Palembang and coincident with the elimination of the last vestiges of the Shri-Vijayan empire, there ensued an exodus of Sumatran nobles to other parts of the Malay world. A Sulu tradition narrates how a Sumatran prince with a group of ministers or learned men arrived at Buansa, Sulu, married a local girl and established a principality. This prince, called Rajah Baguinda, and his followers might have been part of this exodus. Furthermore, tradition says that a certain Sayyid Abu Bakr arrived in Buansa where he later on married a daughter of the Sumatran prince. This Sayyid is a historical figure and his tomb still exists in Sulu. He is credited with the establishment of the Sulu sultanate, an event calculated to have taken place around 1450. Tradition loves to recount how he taught Islam, built schools, converted the inhabitants of the interior of Jolo island and extended the frontiers of the sultanate by his charismatic personality, learning and gentle manners. All the sultans and royal datus of Sulu claimed to be his descendants. Again, if traditions are to be believed, and they do contain a great deal of truth, it was during Sayyid Abu Bakr's rule that Mindanao was visited by a few saintly Muslims. On this detail, traditions vary. One maintains that they came from Malacca; while others say that one of them was a brother of Sayyid Abu Bakr. They are reported to have left descendants.

In a sense, it can be contended that, the introduction of Islam and its subsequent spread in Sulu represent, in capsule form, a process which was repeated in other parts of the Indonesian islands. First was the peaceful arrival of Muslim traders. Mixing with the local population, they raised families and formed communities within a larger native society. Then came Muslim teachers to strengthen the Faith among the local Muslims as well as to spread Islam further. Soon local chiefs began to embrace the Faith, to be followed by their people. However, once the chiefs and their followers had declared for Islam, they themselves began to spread it to other areas, not in all cases without the possibility of some coercion.

Many alternative but complementary explanations have been propounded to explain the expansion of Islam in Southeast Asia. Some sociologists have emphasized that many Indonesians, especially those belonging to the humbler strata, readily accepted Islam in order to emancipate themselves from an oppressive caste system since Islam postulates the equality of all believers before Allah. Others have pointed out that the chiefs had become Muslims because of their need for political and economic alliances which could easily be provided by the Muslim traders. And once these chiefs embraced Islam, many of their followers, out of traditional habits of obedience, followed likewise. Religiously-inclined thinkers would like to speculate that the simple doctrines of Islam were, *per se*, attractive to the kind of religious mentality found among the masses of the Indonesians. Some of them would point out that Islam, as propounded by the teachers, who were mystically-inclined in many instances, fitted well into the religious patterns already existent among these people.

All of the above, however, do not deny that numerous Muslim marriages, on the part of the traders, generated communities of the faithful, which, on account of some of the above factors, could have served as bases for the spreading of Islam. From a more general and theoretical point of view, it is also possible that the nature of the international trade at that time could have effected certain changes in the Indonesian islands as well as in Sulu such that they created a spiritual vacuum which Islam readily filled. Actually, the advent and expansion of Islam in a great part of Southeast Asia is such a complex phenomena that one single theory may not suffice as an explanation. Probably, a combination of all the above theories, expressed in a more systematic and general form, would be closer to the truth.

The Rise of Brunei and the Advent of Islam in the Philippines

In 1511, an event of far-reaching consequences to the slow but steady expansion of Islam in the islands of Southeast Asia, took place. Blocked in their attempt to reach sources of spices in the Moluccas by the Muslim-ruled land mass from Morocco to the Balkans, the Portuguese sailed around the southern coast of Africa and arrived in Arabian waters. After establishing a few strong points in Asia and defeating a Muslim fleet at Dui in 1509, they reached Malacca in 1511 and succeeded in capturing it, thus jeopardizing the centuries-old Muslim primacy in the Southeast trade. Nevertheless, Portuguese expectations to fully control the spice trade did not materialize. They did not have enough men and, furthermore, they often alienated the native populations. Moreover, on account of the Portuguese monopoly in Malacca, Muslim traders commenced to patronize other ports like Pasai which soon began to rival Malacca. Many Javanese ports grew at the expense of Malacca. Also, Brunei began to develop itself as a center, taking over Malacca's former influence on the Moluccas and the Philippines.

"First pepper, then souls" was the principle which guided the adventurous Portuguese. This meant that the Portuguese had first come to monopolize the spice trade, and then extirpate Islam in the region. But this double aim of the Portuguese had to contend with three factors: that Islam had already been associated with the aristocracy of many principalities, that Islam had already begun to serve as a source of identity to a vast majority of the inhabitants and that the Portuguese were viewed as intruders and a danger to the existing profitable trade relations. Added to these factors was the displaced Malaccan aristocracy and their allies who were still able to harass the Portuguese. As a modern scholar had viewed it, the Portuguese opposition to Islam and the trade controlled by Muslims provoked the latter to accelerate their own missionary work and local trade activities. The further Islamization of some parts of Java, Makassar, the Philippines and the Moluccas, can be explained by this view.

As suggested above, the rise of Brunei as a trading center may be a consequence of Malacca's fall to the Portuguese. Due to its flourishing trade, Brunei began to be a naval power and commenced to establish trading posts in places as far as the present site of Manila. The founding of the Bornean settlement in Manila probably took place around the 1520's. Brunei's predominance in Philippine trade remained unchallenged until the arrival of the Spaniards in Philippine waters in 1565. Brunei's trade had so flourished that a time came when the Portuguese were constrained to come peacefully to Brunei to gather products from Makassar and the Moluccas.

At the wake of Malacca's fall to the Portuguese, a scion of the Johoro aristocracy, who was related to Malacca's sultans, arrived in the eastern part of Mindanao to found a principality. On the basis of genealogical calculations as well as the fact that the Kingdom of Johoro was not established till after 1511, it can be calculated that this event took place around 1520. Coming with a group of sea-faring people from the Straits, this redoubtable prince created a principality and, by means of a few marriage alliances, he was able to introduce Islam in Mindanao. Here again can be seen an event with causal connections to the fall of Malacca to the Portuguese.

The Onset of Christianity in the Philippines

When the Spaniards arrived in the Philippines in 1565, at least three sultanates were already established in the South. Manila, too, was a thriving Muslim commercial settlement ruled by Muslim chiefs of Bornean descent. Actually, the royal houses of Brunei, Manila and Sulu were related by marriage alliances. The Spaniards came at a time when Brunei was progressively gaining predominance in the islands with Islam securing a foothold here and there. In the early 1600's, Spanish officials perceptibly observed that had the Spaniards not come when they did, all the settlements (*barangays*) in the islands would have become Muslim or at

least have Muslim chiefs. At the time of the coming of the Spaniards, nearly all the peoples in the Visayas and Luzon were still in the level of spirit worship and animistic beliefs, although a general belief in a Supreme Being was generally held.

Spain came to the Philippines with a clear dual purpose: to Christianize the inhabitants and increase the territorial domains of the Spanish Monarch. While colonizing the natives, the Spaniards saw to it that Brunei's power in the islands was eliminated. Their interference in the internal dynastic squabbles in the Brunei royal family in 1578 and 1581 was intended to contain Bornean activities, both religious and commercial, in the islands. However, Spanish initial victories in Borneo were not followed by colonization.

By the beginning of the 1600's, except for the Muslims in the South and the pagans in the interior mountains of the large islands, most of the inhabitants of the Philippines had been Christianized. A great number of them, with their traditional chiefs, were clustered in towns. Within hearing distance of church bells, they lived under the watchful eyes of the Spanish friars and soldiers. With the passage of time, the colony was divided into provinces and bishoprics, and the Christianized natives, called *Indios*, were provided with two forms of identity – that of a Catholic and that of a subject of the Spanish King. They were studiously isolated from the Muslims and other peoples of Southeast Asia, except when they were needed to serve as soldiers to extend the frontiers of the Spanish Empire.

The Moro Wars and the Muslim-Christian Struggle for SEA Supremacy

Both as a matter of state principle and necessity to secure their colonial frontiers, the Spaniards never spared efforts to convert the Muslims into Catholicism and to transform them into docile subjects. The series of wars, covering more than three centuries, which these aims generated, ended only in 1898 when Spain relinquished its sovereignty in the Philippines to the United States.

In the early few years of the seventeenth century, the Muslims were strong enough to entertain the intention of competing with the Spaniards for the control of the Visayas. But most of the time afterwards, they were mostly in the defensive, battling a series of Spanish expeditions whose recruits were composed mainly of native Christians. It was in this century that the *moro-moro* plays were instituted. A sort of morality play, the *moro-moro* depicted the wars between the Muslims and Christians, with victory falling to the latter. The play usually ends with either a Muslim sultan or prince becoming a Christian or a Muslim princess falling in love with a Christian warrior and hero. Intended to instill a crusading spirit among the Christian natives, these plays created an image of the Muslims as ugly, fierce, bloodthirsty, piratical, faithless and thoroughly unreliable individuals. These plays were frequently staged up to the eve of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in 1942.

Quite a number of Spanish expeditions in Mindanao and Sulu during the seventeenth century were instructed to enslave Muslims, destroy their sea craft, burn their plantations and depopulate their settlements. In the next century, when peaceful and diplomatic means failed to induce the Muslims to become part of the Empire, total war was declared on some of them to the extent of branding Muslim prisoners and sending them to the oars. The nineteenth century had its share of destruction. Many islands were depopulated, although, at this time, the official policy was no longer to Christianize the Muslims, but rather to transform them into Spanish subjects.

Actually, not a few priests had recommended that Spanish officials help their missionary endeavors on the ground that as Christians the Muslims would be more inclined to be docile and loyal to Spain. However, at the end of the last century, the need to conquer the Muslims was dictated more by the fear that the Muslims would conspire with other European powers who were casting covetous eyes over the Spanish colony than by the need to Christianize them.

But all the destruction was not one-sided. The depredations caused by the Muslims on Christian settlements were violent and fearful. Some of them disrupted all economic life. Tens of thousands of Christians were captured for the slave market in Sulu or Makassar to end up in Dutch and other plantations. Such extensive destruction was aggravated by the fact that the Christian natives were prevented by the Spaniards from bearing arms for fear that they might be used against them; thus the Christian natives were normally left defenseless and helpless. Whereas, during the seventeenth century, the Muslims in the Philippines were, at intervals, aided by Borneans and Makassar warriors; by the nineteenth century, these allies had fallen under the control of other Europeans. This situation forced the Muslims in the Philippines to depend solely on their resources and to do their best to maximize them.

However, the above conflicts as well as their relative isolation from the rest of the Islamic world led the Muslims in the Philippine South to develop their native, as well as reinforce their Islamic, institutions. True enough, their isolation from the orthodox centers of Islam prevented the further enrichment if not the development of their religion along more orthodox lines. But noteworthy was that their Islamic consciousness was intense enough to serve as an element of identity and as a basis for the growth of nationalist sentiments. Islam, as it were, sanctified their patriotism and struggle.

Unlike those of the Spaniards, the results of Portuguese missionary activities in the Malay Peninsula and elsewhere in Southeast Asia were limited. Initially, missionaries under Portuguese patronage were successful in establishing a mission in Malacca and in the Moluccas. In the latter, however, the greed and rapacity of Portuguese officials nullified the work of the missionaries and caused enraged

Muslims to capture the Portuguese Ternate fort in 1574. Missionary activities in Brunei also failed.

In Malacca, the fall of the city to the Dutch in 1641 spelled the beginning of the persecution of Catholics in the area. Public worship among Catholics was first prohibited and then the religion itself, thus constraining Portuguese families to sail away to Java or India. Yet even if the Dutch had brought their Protestant religion and antipathy to Catholicism from Europe to the Indies, they, themselves, had no interest in propagating their version of Christianity in Malacca. They simply wanted to hold the famed city to prevent it from becoming a rival of their principal port town of Batavia.

In 1795, the British occupied Malacca, which, after a brief occupation by the Dutch, was then returned to them in 1824. The British primacy in the Peninsula during the nineteenth century, however, did not witness any vigorous Christian missionary activity. Nevertheless, earlier, in the last two decades of the preceding century, there were a few private schools run by missionary societies of the Church of England. They were then followed by Catholic missionary schools. Not a few Chinese who studied in such missionary schools became Christians. This is one explanation why it is calculated that about eighteen out of every thousand Chinese in Malaya are Christians. But, in general, the Islamic manifestation and its steady development in Malaya were left untouched by the British.

Dutch Supremacy and the Isolation of Muslim Indonesia

The arrival of the Dutch in the Indonesian islands and the establishment of their headquarters and chief trading post in Batavia in 1619 signalled the beginning of the economic interdependence between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Although the Dutch presence initially spurred some acceleration of Islamic activities among some Indonesians, they, the Indonesians, slowly found themselves cut off from relations with other Muslims. Moreover, the Dutch, in places where they wielded coercive powers, prevented the growth of Islamic institutions, especially on the political level, which would have more or less developed had the Indonesians been left alone. This two-pronged approach by the Dutch toward checking the spread of Islam proved effective in obstructing the instillment of the Islamic values among the Indonesians.

Initially, the Dutch, to some extent, supported Christian missionary activities. Indeed, there was a genuine antipathy to Muslim rites and practices as revealed by a Church order in 1643 which demanded that Islamic rites and schools as well as the practices of the Chinese and pagans be prohibited. However, Christian missionary activities were not allowed to operate freely. It was only as late as 1890 that Christian missionary schools got some government support. Dutch

colonial administrators were not as interested in religion as they were in commerce. Actually, they were often irritated by clerical demands at home as to what they ought to do. The East Indian Church was the only officially recognized church for many years until 1927. One reason why Protestant missionary activities were viewed with some neutrality by Dutch administrators was that they feared that missionary activities would inevitably attract a resurgence of Muslim fears and a possible counter-fanaticism. Possibly, this fear explains why missionaries were not allowed to proselytize in traditionally strong and conservative centers such as Acheh and Bantem. In other areas, the missionaries needed official permission. Moreover, the Dutch government saw to it that Protestant and Catholic missionaries labored in different areas to prevent sectarian conflicts between them; then Dutch missionary activities were normally successful among pagan tribes like the Bataks of Sumatra and, later on, the Torajas in Celebes.

The Rise of Liberalism and the Philippine Nationalist Struggle

The Philippine Revolution in 1896 and 1898, which was initiated in the Tagalog region of the Philippines and which then spread to other regions was, to a large extent, motivated by liberal ideas first enunciated in Europe. These were secular in character and direction.

As it were, the Christian natives wanted to form themselves into a national community that was neither religious in spirit nor colonial in character. It is a belief of many historians that one of the causes of the Revolution was the abuses of the friar religious corporations or the ecclesiastical predominance over affairs of the colony. However, the revolutionary leaders, many of whom were strongly anti-clerical and members of Masonic lodges, had to contend with a population that was loyal, not to the Spanish character of the Church, but to their own Christian religious principles and rituals. Thus it was expedient for these leaders to encourage the formation of a national Church that was to remain Catholic but divorced from the control of a Spanish hierarchy. The constitution approved by the Revolutionary government in 1899 originally provided for the principle of the separation of Church and State. But so bitter was the opposition of the native clergy as well as that of many of their parishioners that this provision was temporarily suspended, and one which provided for the maintenance of parish priests by municipalities requiring their services was added. In effect, regardless of the secular bias of many of the intellectual leaders of the Revolution, it was not easy to entirely disregard the religious sentiments of a great part of the ordinary supporters of the Revolution.

The leaders of the Revolution, too, failed to get the support or even the verbal sympathy of the Muslims in the South. From their perspective, the Muslims inferred that the elimination of the Spaniards would only signify the ascendance

of a Filipino Christian government. More than ever, they were determined to keep their traditional way of life, political and social system and Islamic beliefs. Since their historical contacts with the Christians of the North had been invariably one of conflict and antagonism, the Muslims preferred not to involve themselves.

The Americans, after a series of bloody wars, were finally able to pacify the different Muslim groups in the Philippines, but not without guarantees of religious freedom and a program of reconstruction, education and sanitation. But like the Spaniards, they did not encourage the Muslims to maintain intimate contacts with other Muslim groups either in Southeast Asia or the Arab world. In spite of some pressure from clerical groups at home, American official policy was not to get involved with any Christian missionary activity among the Muslims.

However, it was under the American regime that many settlers from Christian provinces were encouraged to migrate to Mindanao. This policy was pursued with greater energy by the succeeding commonwealth government established in 1935. This policy which to Muslims constituted an intrusion into what they claimed to be their traditional lands became an ingredient, among others, that continue to contribute to the mounting tension in Muslim areas up to the present. Although, at the beginning, Christian and Muslim communities had lived together in amity, succeeding political and economic rivalries were to cause tensions, if not actual conflicts, between them. It is this situation that the present government of the Philippines is trying to solve by bold programs.

The Islamic Revival and the Indonesian Nationalist Movement

In the last few decades of the nineteenth century, Dutch colonial policy was to encourage the application of *adat* or customary law among the various Indonesian groups, while limiting the further implementation or sway of Islamic religious law. Yet, certain religious activities like the establishment of Qur'anic schools and the *haj* were allowed to increase that kind of orthodoxy which does not constitute a threat to colonial rule. Clearly, these policies were meant to limit Islam's institutional hold over the rural areas and to regulate the contacts of the local Muslims with the outside Muslim world. However, it was not possible to completely prevent modern Islamic ideas from filtering into the colony. The *haj* itself became the vehicle for the entry of such ideas. Moreover, methods of communication with different Islamic countries became more accessible. From all these, a reaction to Dutch official policies emerged. Many religiously inspired Indonesian societies were formed.

One of the earliest of these was Sarekat Islam which was founded in 1912. This organization aimed to purify Muslim doctrines from indigenous religious accretions, upgrade the teachings of Islam and adapt them to the needs of a modern world. On account of its program and the dedication of its organizers, it was able

to greatly stimulate religious thinking and activity. In time, it began to represent Islam as a force against Dutch rule, the economic power of the Chinese, the increasing activities of Christian missionaries and other local practices that were alien to Islam. Whereas Christianity was opposed as the religion of the foreign colonizers, Islam was offered as an instrument of solidarity for Muslims and for welding diverse peoples of different regions and languages, even those with diverse historical developments into one cohesive group. Although in 1925, Sarekat Islam lost large segments of its membership on account of Dutch reaction, poor administrators, internal bickerings and sympathy of many of its members with the rising Left, its mark on other organizations and the nationalist movement was indelible.

Another organization, the Muhammadiyah, which was non-political in its conception, was founded in 1912. It aimed to intensify Islam among the Indonesian Muslims while bringing its message to others. Learning effectively from Christian missionary techniques, it established orphanages, schools, clinics, etc., while propagating simultaneously ideas of a pure and progressive Islam. It took a firm stand against Communists and Christian missionaries, a position that could not help but generate political implications. More specifically, in asserting its principle that Islam was superior to Christianity, toward which it had a pronounced antipathy, its members could not help but resent Dutch colonial rule which was administered by Christians.

The Nahdatul Ulama, founded in 1926, although an Islamic movement, was established precisely to moderate what it considered the too dangerous modernistic tendencies of the other Islamic organizations. Propounding an Islamic way of life, in accordance with its own lights, it was led to go against government policies which appeared to it as sheer interference in Muslim family life and law. In some way, its existence prevented the formation of a united Islamic front.

Persatuan Islam established in 1923, noted for some of its fundamentalist teachings and polemics against Christianity, also had its influence on Indonesian Muslims. Like other Muslim organizations, it stood for the preservation of Islam, considering the Christians as a grave threat to Islam.

It is difficult to deny that the above organizations and their like helped not only to generate a more sophisticated Islamic consciousness, at least among its members, but also to influence the nationalist movement in Indonesia. It is enough to recall that the Muhammadiyah, and Persatuan Islam, to some extent, provided recruits to the Masjumi party, and that the Nahdatul Ulama today still claims a large membership. The fact is that there are still many Muslims today who believe that Islam had provided for some of the elements that contributed to the nationalistic struggle and had initially served as a rallying point for independence. Others even insist that Sarekat Islam was the first genuine nationalist organization. All of this is not to deny the fact that not a few Christians helped in the

formation of the Republic. But it is equally true that the Christian population of the Moluccas had supplied many of the recruits for the Dutch Army that resisted the Indonesian movement for unity and independence.

The Quest for Islamic Relevance and Identity in Modern SEA

Much had been written by some Western scholars regarding the superficial understanding of Islam by a great majority of Muslims in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. But this view is itself superficial. As long as individuals consider themselves Muslims, feel that they belong to the Muslim *umma* or community, believe that Islam still has a function in solving social problems, contend that Islam still has a function in solving social problems, contend that Islam had enriched their lives and consider that they are different from non-Muslims, who can say that they are not Muslims?

However, all of these is not to deny that a function of the *'ulama* or learned men as well as Islamic organizations is and has been to refine the knowledge of Islam, internalize it further among the faithful and bring it up to a higher level of consciousness. On the social level, what is presumably desired by the Malaysian, Indonesian and Filipino Muslims is to preserve the integrity of their community as a Muslim community. This has nothing to do with whether they all have to know Arabic fluently, know the whole Qur'an by memory or know all the subtleties of the Holy Law — although these are all desirable qualities. The Malaysians fear that the strengthening and increase of non-Muslims with enormous economic resources among them will put their community at a disadvantage in their own land. The Muslims in the Philippines fear that the loss of their traditional lands by the influx of Christian settlers will lead to their dispersion as a community and result in a corresponding loss of their Islamic identity. Muslim Indonesians fear that their numerical superiority will erode and they feel that the rest of their brethren need further sophistication in the knowledge and practice of the Faith.

All these fears explain their deep resentment of Christian missionaries in their midst. It is a resentment that is similar to that which they have toward Communists or persons with secular ideas among them. Moreover, Muslims who know what they are and what their Faith signifies, believe strongly that their moral values and ethical standards are in no manner inferior to those of other religions. They maintain, too, that Islam has within it enough principles that can accommodate further ideas leading to a fuller and more creative life in a modern world.

Toward a Peaceful Muslim-Christian Policy of Coexistence in SEA

The above brief and unavoidably superficial historical narration and interpretations reveal the undesirable fact that throughout a large part of the history

of the Malay peoples in Southeast Asia, there had been tensions if not outright confrontation between two competitive cultures with their votaries fearful of each other. It is a fear accompanied by resentment and, thus, an obstacle to nation-building. The solution does not lie in that kind of secularism that advocates that the world view of Christians and Muslims must give way to a social system where the religious sentiment must be eliminated. This type of secularism, which is a materialistic one, is unrealistic because as long as man is possessed of an intellect he will have spiritual aspirations. It is also self-defeating for it makes man poorer in his view of nature, life and destiny. But secularism in the sense that political integration leave intact the integrity of religious communities within their own spiritual climates, while encouraging cultural diversity, a sense of tolerance and mutual appreciation, might still reduce tensions in a society.

At present, one of the major causes of tension is the presence of Christian missionaries in predominantly Muslim areas. It is a presence that affronts the pious and the learned among the Muslims since it suggests that their religion is inferior and their moral principles reprehensible.

Muhammad Rasjidi's paper entitled "The Ethical and Social Demands of Islam for a Modern Society," with special consideration for the Muslims in Indonesia, read by him in an international seminar held in Tokyo, Japan, in October 1968, points out clearly and dramatically the nature and dangers of such a situation. Even if, hypothetically speaking, some allowance is made for some possible exaggeration in Rasjidi's paper, the fact that it is believed widely by many Muslim intellectuals and is still being reprinted or quoted extensively in Islamic journals or reports, presents a warning fraught with serious implications. A main point of Rasjidi is that converting people in this modern world by means of economic and social inducements, in a manner taking advantage of their weakness, is an unreligious if not an anti-religious activity. This point, of course, does not cover those cases of conversions where an individual, by means of his studies or intellectual inquiries, comes to see that Light which Allah in His Mercy had seen it proper for him to see.

The Islamic attitude here is clear. The People of the Scriptures, that is, those with sacred texts, are not subjects for Islamic conversion in a manner involving any form of coercion. The Qur'an asserts explicitly that salvation is not the sole monopoly of Jews, Christians or Muslims. Thus, regarding the Christian and Muslim communities, what might be necessary is that they should not put obstacles on each others way for an intensification of their own religious beliefs and practices. Indeed, a truly religious spirit manifests itself when different religious communities provide opportunities to make each other delve deeper into their own religious resources.

All religions are like the different spokes of a wheel with a common hub

from which they all radiate. This hub, symbolically speaking, represents the belief in Allah or a primordial covenant where Man accepts Allah as his Lord and Master. The historical accretions to this belief or covenant, theological elaborations, differing or elaborate rituals and, above all, the power structures or organizations that accompany or justify all these, is what leads the spokes to become more distant from each other. As it were, in developing a direction further away from the hub, they alienate themselves from their Source as well as from each other. What is imperative is to return to the hub, for this is what is shared by all religions. Whereas the unsympathetic eye can only see the differences among them, the eye of love perceives the common core of them all.

SOME SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PROBLEMS OF THE MUSLIMS IN THE PHILIPPINES*

by

Cesar Adib Majul

As might be expected, Muslims all over the world, both individually and communally, would have common problems. These problems are oftentimes related to the Islamic way of life with all of its prescriptions, injunctions and expectations. At the same time, different Muslim communities expectedly have problems peculiar to themselves as a function of their geographical locations, their relations with their neighbors (both Muslims and non-Muslims), their historical development and other political and social forces within and without. Consequently, to understand the problems of the Filipino Muslims, it is necessary to assume certain facts: (1) that the Muslims in the Philippines are divided into at least twelve ethno-linguistic groups with some of them separated by different islands and most of them belonging to separate politically administrative units;¹ (2) that, although they form the second largest religious community in the country, they constitute a minority amidst a population that is overwhelmingly Christian, mainly Catholic;² (3) that they manifest some differences in their customary laws (*'adat*) as well as in their adherence to elements of Islamic personal or family law as exemplified in the *Shari'a*; (4) that their contacts with the other Muslims in Southeast Asia, have historically speaking, varied in intensity, with the Tausug and Samals, basically maritime peoples, relatively more exposed to outside influences than others. This reason, among others, partially explains why they have had "independent" historical experiences from each other. (5) that their economic bases show marked diversities, i.e. some are maritime peoples while

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others basically agricultural. Even among the rice producing ones, some practice wet-rice planting while others indulge in upland rice farming: (6) that for more than three hundred years of Spanish presence in the Philippine archipelago, the varied Muslim groups were never part of the Spanish colony called "Filipinas" and, therefore were subject to separate historical transformations from the other Christian groups with whom they are now co-citizens in a modern state; and (7) that the state to which the Muslims now belong is, from the constitutional point of view, a secular state where religious freedom and tolerance are ideally adhered to but where the religious motive still plays a large role in the life of many of the citizens.

It is nevertheless important to note, regardless of all the above, that the Muslims in the Philippines identify themselves as such. They all recognize each other as Muslims. Muslims, pray in each others' mosques, and affirm that they all belong to a wider religious community that transcends differences in *'adat*, language, race, region and nation. They are all acutely aware of their cultural differences from the Christians as well as other non-Muslim groups who live side by side with them. Historically, members of their ruling families have intermarried — mostly for purposes of political advantage or mutual economic benefits. All these, however, have not prevented them from fighting each other on account of dynastic rivalries or conflicts in the collection of tributes and other economic reasons.

The Advent of Islam

The arrival of Muslims in the Philippine South was a consequence of the international maritime trade which extended from North Africa to China and which gradually fell into Muslim hands around the eighth century. Although there was a decline in the Muslim trade with China near the end of the ninth century due to unstable political conditions in China, this trade started to pick up about a hundred years later. During this interim, Kalah in the Malay Peninsula became an essential entrepot of the Muslim merchants who were mainly Arabs and Persians, and who possibly included Indians. It is around this time that historians have noted the rapid rise of a local trade in Southeast Asia involving mainly the Malay Peninsula and Indonesian islands. As early as the 10th century, Borneo became known to Muslim traders. Their knowledge of Sulu and then Mindanao soon followed. Archeological findings demonstrate that there were already Muslim visitors in Sulu by the end of the thirteenth century and, if local traditions are to be relied on, visitors were already in Mindanao by the 14th and 15th centuries.

Obviously, the arrival of Muslim traders does not spell the arrival of Islam, much less its spread. A few Western Orientalists have offered various theories to explain the phenomena of Islam's expansion in Southeast Asia and, although caution must be exercised in accepting them, much can be learned from their

varied perspectives. For example, the view that the ruling families of not a few maritime principalities adopted Islam for political and economic reasons as well as to seek for a principle of legitimacy, with the subjects later on accepting the faith of their rulers, can explain some instances of conversion but does not serve as an explanation for the phenomenon in the whole of Southeast Asia. The other view that economic changes generated by the international maritime trade caused, in turn, an ideological vacuum that was readily filled up by Islam, is an attractive one but requires more evidence. Another idea that the arrival of Europeans with motives of conversion to Christianity stimulated Muslims to counteract and vigorously spread their Faith, while serving as an explanation for additional conversions to Islam in the sixteenth century, cannot, in any manner, explain the fact that Islam had already been established in some principalities in Sumatra and Sulu at least two hundred years earlier. One explanation, however, transcends all the above views.

One explanation, that transcends all the above views and appears to be the most solid and which has not yet been falsified is that Islam was introduced and spread by the teachings of Muslims who came from "above the winds". This is the explanation supported by most if not all local traditions in the region of the Malays from Sumatra to the Philippines. Whether these Muslims came with the original intention to teach or not is another matter; what the traditions emphasize is that they taught and preached. But when it is noticed that some of these traditions ingenuously reveal that these teachers were actually Sufis, then the intention to teach might have been there all the time. Admittedly, this is something that must be looked deeper into by Malaysian scholars. A Sulu tradition illustrates the advent of Islam as follows. According to legend, the first Muslim teacher in Sulu, called Makhdum Karim, besides having the power to talk by means of paper, also had the ability to walk on water. As is well known, Abdul Qadir Al-Jilani was supposed to have had this ability and he is the "patron saint" of sailors. Might not the tradition then actually say, in a folk manner, that the makhdum belonged to the Qadiriyyah *tariqat*? Is not this tradition complementary to those narrating the coming of different *auliya* to Indonesia and Borneo? Obviously, the teachings of these *auliya* would not have succeeded the way they did were it not for the fact that Islam satisfied deep aspirations and spiritual needs of not so much the upper classes of the island societies but of the masses as well. It is this spread of Islam among the common people that guaranteed its entrenchment.

The assertion that Islam was originally brought mainly by Arab teachers should not allow us, however, to disregard the fact that the natives themselves, once Islamized, played a great role in further spreading the Faith. It is enough to recall the role of the native courts in patronizing missionaries and the existence of pious and inspired converts to Islam who would like to share the message with others. All this mean that a time had come when the local Muslims had come to look up at Islam not as something foreign but as something that belonged to them as a cherished value. With the internalization of this value, it would not be long when influence of the *Shari'a* would gradually increase in the conduct of social relations. Furthermore, political institutions historically associated with older Islamic nations would also be adopted.

Hence, at the beginning of the 16th century, the world of the Malays in Southeast Asia could be viewed as a constellation of Muslim principalities, maintaining political and trade relations with each other as well as with older Islamic countries. The sudden appearance of Western imperialism and its attempts at Christianization fragmented this world into different spheres of Western influence; but not without having rendered Islam as an element of identity or force to resist the above intrusive element.

The Effects of Islamization

In varying degrees, among the different Muslim groups in the Philippines, it can be maintained that Islam brought the following effects or processes which are still existing. First of all, Islam introduced a new theological and ethical view of life and the universe. In proportion to the seriousness, dedication and the number of people adhering to it, Islam drove out the old gods, spirits and idols. A concept of revelation was introduced. Principles governing the relations between the creature and the Creator as well as those among individuals themselves and their families came to progressively fall within a totality in accordance with the belief in the Oneness of Allah. The compartmentalization of the diverse activities of man gradually diminished. Intentions and deeds came to be viewed as correlated in terms of Divine prescriptions and injunctions. Second, elements of the *'adat* diametrically opposed to the Qur'an began to weaken while other elements were allowed to exist. The progressive introduction of more *Shari'a* elements was effected by the development of a relatively sophisticated *'ulama*. Third, the Arabic script was introduced and the different languages of the different ethnic groups came to be enriched by Arabic terms, especially theological, moral, legal and technical ones. To be observed at this point is the gradual spread of Malay among the Muslims in the Philippines which also served as one of the agencies for the spread of such terms. Fourth, new art forms and novel literary devices (with corresponding terms) borrowed from older Islamic countries came to further enrich an indigenous art. Certain headgears and costumes associated with Islamic tradition were also adopted. Fifth, political institutions, not necessarily Islamic, but associated with some older Muslim countries, began to be implanted or grafted on older institutions. Sixth, the Muslims began to be gradually more aware that in spite of the facts of linguistic, racial and geographical differences, they formed part of a wider community — Muhammad's people. Seventh, the Muslims began to look at Islam as an instance of Allah's Mercy and that their community, as such, as well as their history, reflected a manifestation of Allah's workings in the created order.

It must not be imagined that all the above took place all at once and at one given place. The Muslim groups adopted Islam at separate times and manifested its institutions in different degrees. Indeed, even in a particular community, Islamic consciousness among individuals also varies in accordance with their intellectual capacities, their educational opportunities, their contacts with other Muslims, the quality of their teachers, the nature of their *'adat* and other multiple factors.

As mentioned earlier, some of the effects of Islam's coming represent a process which is still going on in the Philippines.

The gradual acceptance of Islam, presumably like all forms of acculturation process, brought about some tensions or at least some mechanisms of adaptation. Conflicts between some elements of the *'adat* and the *Shari'a* were bound to ensue with the traditional chiefs defending the former as against the sultans and the *'ulama* supporting the latter. Undoubtedly, the element of power was involved in all these conflicts since more Islamization could spell the centralization of the powers of the sultans at the expense of the powers and privileges of the traditional chiefs who claimed a power link with the pre-Islamic past. To be noted, too, is that Islamic institutions were often manipulated to strengthen the vested interests of certain groups. Depending on the level of ignorance of Islam, many non-Islamic practices and institutions began to be considered Islamic or at least were **sanctioned** by what was conceived to constitute Islam. Moreover, Muslim attitudes toward neighboring tribes that did not adopt Islam but remained loyal to the older religion began to change. What is meant in particular is that relations between them began to be viewed as falling under Islamic principles in a manner that the slavery of non-Muslims was rationalized as justified by Islam. Of greater consequence to the lives of the Muslims is that after the Spaniards came in the last half of the sixteenth century, most of the inhabitants of the islands in the North, namely, Luzon and the Visayas, became Christians. A result of this was that the natural tendency of Islam to spread upward in a northern direction was now blocked. More than this, the Christianized natives were utilized by the Spaniards to fight and conquer the Muslims in the South in behalf of religion as well as the extension of the material domains of the Spanish Monarch. It had been often said that if the Spaniards did not arrive at the time they did, Islam would have secured a better and more secure foothold in the other islands. In Manila, at least, there was already a principality ruled by Muslims with many of their followers evincing Islamic practices, at least in their rituals and dietary laws. In any case, when the Spaniards arrived, many of the Muslim groups in Mindanao were still in the process of becoming progressively more Islamized in different intensities. Islam was spreading slowly and, generally, in a peaceful manner. But history was to take an unexpected turn with the presence of the Christian West on Philippine shores.

The Spaniards vs. the Muslims

When the Spaniards came to the Philippines in 1565, they brought with them the dual aim of Christianizing the inhabitants while extending the imperial domains of the Spanish Monarch. By means of different techniques — force, persuasion, threats or gifts — they were able to accomplish these aims in Luzon, the Visayas and parts of Mindanao. But they met bitter resistance in the Western part of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago where at least three sultanates were already well established — those of Sulu, Maguindanao and Buayan. Whereas the other

inhabitants of the country were mainly at the *barangay* level, that is, living in independent settlements consisting of a dozen to a hundred families, the sultanates represented political entities consisting of dozens of settlements, some of these found in different islands. Thus the fall of one Muslim settlement to the Spaniards did not spell the destruction of a sultanate.

The long series of wars between the Spaniards and the Muslims, extending for a period of more than three hundred years, had been called the "Moro Wars" by historians. The effects of these wars had left deep scars on the Muslims up to the present and constitute part of their problems. A major effect of the wars was that the slow but progressive movement of Islam to the north of the Archipelago was definitely checked and thus Islam became confined to parts of the South. On the economic sphere, many Muslim islands were depopulated with scores of settlements totally destroyed as part of a deliberate Spanish policy. The time-honored commercial activities of the Muslims were disrupted with hundreds of their sea-crafts destroyed as part of the same policy. All these were to cause the economic backwardness of the Muslims *vis a vis* the other inhabitants of the islands who came to benefit from the introduction of Western techniques to better agriculture and increase production.

Adding to the economic problems of the Muslims was the fact that their trade with the Indonesian islands was later on restricted by the commercial policy of the Dutch. The imperialistic policies of the Spaniards, the Dutch and, later on, the British, helped bring about a gradual isolation of the Muslims. An ensuing provincialism started to creep in among them due to the weakening of contacts with other Muslim peoples — slightly moderated by the return of a few hadjis and occasional itinerant Muslim traders from the Asian mainland. Some pre-Islamic institutions begun to surface with additional force — principally the *datu* system. Under stress of continuous wars and large scale destruction, it was to be expected that artistic expression and other cultural activities would suffer some decline or remain at a stand still. The declared policy of the Spaniards to extirpate Islam, as well as the Muslim refusal to abandon their Islamic heritage and traditional values and customs, led to Islam becoming their mark of identity. So much so, that even some pre-Islamic values were defended on the principle of Islam. Many customs and institutions became identified with Islam, at least in the minds of many Muslims. The defense of the family and land as well as loyalty to the chiefs became part of their Islamic duties. As it were, Islam began to provide the elements of an elementary form of nationalism.

The Spaniards looked at their wars against the Muslims as an extension of their wars against the Moors. Significant was that they called the Moors and the Muslims in the Philippines "Moros". They taught the Christian inhabitants to hate and fight the Muslims as enemies of their Faith. Year after year, they featured certain morality plays as part of the festivals in all the major towns where the Muslims were portrayed as ugly, vicious, treacherous, etc. (These plays were played in many town festivals even up to the eve of the Japanese Occupation in 1941

— more than four decades after the end of the Spanish regime in the Philippines). In return, the Muslims looked at their Christian neighbors as mere tools of foreigners to enslave them and as a people doomed to infidelity and perdition.

The effect of these plays which had, in effect, become to some extent a part of the folk lore of the Christian population cannot be overestimated. It had generated in the past a mentality that had even penetrated into the educational programs of the past administrations in the country while placing psychological obstacles on the recruitment of Muslims into political offices, the civil service and the armed forces.

The Moro Wars have left a terrible heritage of mistrust, suspicion and even fear between two religious communities otherwise related by racial and linguistic ties and a common cultural matrix that is pre-Islamic and pre-Christian. It is a heritage which for many years had served to obstruct the integration of the Muslims into a new body politic in spite of the fact that the principle of religious freedom had become part of the fundamental laws of the land. Fortunately, this heritage does not appear to be found anymore among the young. But it had already done a great harm.

To be observed is that the major sultanates were really never successfully incorporated into the Spanish colony in the Philippines that ended in 1898. Thus the Muslims had, for all practical purposes, independent historical experiences from others in the Archipelago. Contacts between them were mainly that of war or temporary truces. It is true that in the last quarter of Spanish rule in the Philippines, the policy toward converting the Muslims was abandoned. All that the Spanish government desired was to transform them into loyal subjects of the Spanish Crown. Yet, not a few Spanish priests argued that it would be easier for the Muslims to become a Spanish subject if he was first baptized a Catholic. Nevertheless, the newly declared Spanish policy of religious toleration, inspired by republican ideas then flourishing in Western Europe, induced some Muslim chiefs to accept Spanish sovereignty when resistance had appeared hopeless or suicidal. There is no doubt that the defense of Islam had provided a major reason for resistance to Spanish domination. But it cannot be denied, too, that the independence of the Muslims also signified the perpetuation of the powers and prerogatives of the traditional chiefs and their families whose preservation of Islam while appearing to them as having an intrinsic value also served as a guarantee for the preservation of their dynasties.

The Muslims During the American Occupation

The American occupation of Muslim lands which commenced at the turn of the century was met by a fierce resistance on the part of the Muslims who were led, in most cases, by traditional chiefs who were afraid that they would lose their former positions of power as well as their time-honored rights to collect tribute.

Undoubtedly, part of the resistance was caused by fear of the loss of independence and a traditional way of life greatly influenced by Islam on the part of other leaders and followers. American superior fire power and their guarantees that Islam was to be left untouched as well as a policy of attraction eventually enabled them to occupy all Muslim traditional lands — but not without a great loss of Muslim lives and properties. The American occupation did not do much to erase the old prejudices that the Christians had of the Muslims although it brought the benefits of better sanitation, more educational opportunities and job openings for Muslims in the constabulary and police force. Originally, American Indian fighters were actually sent to pacify the Muslims. In time, American attitudes changed when they came to see a people with a different culture, a more sophisticated political system and who had been influenced by one of the greatest cultures the world had ever produced. In any case, the Americans did not do much to dislodge the traditional leaders; neither was there an attempt to create another leadership based on a criteria.

Although the Americans generally followed their principle of religious freedom and toleration, they did not object to the coming of Christian missionaries to traditional Muslim areas while they made it hard for foreign Muslims, especially Arabs, to come and visit or live among the Muslims. The Americans, too, declared most of the Muslim ancestral lands as public land, since the Muslims did not have titles to their lands, and started to introduce Christian settlers from other provinces. A premise of the Americans was that with more Christian settlers among the Muslims, the latter would, in time, acquire some of the habits and attitudes toward government of the settlers, thereby facilitating the process of integration of the Muslims into the colonial body politic. They hoped, too, that the Muslims would eventually acquire some of the skills of the settlers, who, strictly speaking, were only slightly more advanced technologically than the Muslims.

The Muslims Under the Philippine Commonwealth

The Philippine Commonwealth, established in 1935, following the American colonial policy of bringing more settlers to traditional Muslim lands, completely showed a disregard of Muslim aspirations and expectations on the matter. It ignored the traditional leaders without making any effort to create a new leadership. It could not do otherwise since the political leaders of the Commonwealth themselves belonged to the traditional elite in the Christian areas. The Muslims, too, were confused on the issue of independence. Some of their leaders desired it while others preferred to remain under an American protectorate, a desire encouraged by some American military officers but vehemently objected to by Filipino national leaders. In any case, Muslim problems on the political, economic and cultural levels were left the way they were. The fact was that the fear of war with Japan, the agrarian problem in the central provinces which were quite close to the capital, the anticipation of independence and the jockeying for political positions on the part of the national leaders as well as their unawareness or misunderstanding of the problems of the Muslims, led the national leaders to disregard the Muslims. Thus, when

independence was declared in 1946, the Muslim people, with social institutions and a culture different from the majority of the Filipinos, found themselves bound with the latter in a new political entity with a direction which they had practically no hand in formulating.

The colonial heritage was too obvious. There was a general fear among Muslims about the loss of their traditional values and customs and they tended to look at the government as a mere successor of the colonial governments. Alongside the coming of additional settlers, there was an unevenness between the economic development of the Muslims as a whole and that of the Christians. Nevertheless, the traditional leaders utilized the democratic processes to have themselves elected in office. In this, they had to compete with non-Muslim candidates. Muslim leaders joined the different national parties and ended competing with one another in their own regions. This was a pure contest for political power although the candidates did not hesitate to use the issue of Islam to gain more votes. But the election of Muslim officials did not necessarily imply the enhancement of Islam or additional benefits to the bulk of the Muslim population. It only signified the further strengthening of the power, prestige and economic status of those Muslim officials and their families, especially if they were associated with the political party in power, as against those of their followers.

In the meantime, more opportunities for education, more communication and the opening of the professions to Muslims, however limited these might have been, gave rise to a group of young professionals who were generally coopted to the powers that be. Eventually there came about another emerging group of young Muslims who aspired to greater opportunities for education, more access to the professions and increased participation in political processes that signified some participation in decisions that would determine the destiny of the Muslims. They desired more involvement in the process of modernization, and in eliminating any obstacle that would prevent Islam from becoming more operative in their religious and social life.

The Muslims and Martial Law

The degeneration of the system of political parties, the abuses of politicians, widespread graft and corruption, the existence of private armies, student activism, ideological conflicts, threats of secession from the South, fear of subversion from other quarters and a slow but gradual breakdown in law and order coupled with the emergence of an atmosphere of general disregard for the duly constituted authority led the President of the Republic to declare Martial Law in September 1972. The government order for the disbandment of all private armies and the giving up of all arms by unauthorized citizens was bitterly resisted by those Muslims who had private armies as well as by those who did not want to give up their arms. In general, Muslims feared that if they were left unarmed, they might fall prey to non-Muslims who coveted their lands. Due to their historical experience, they feared

that the government might not do enough to protect them from their antagonists. This fear, added to past grievances, led to a coalition of Muslim forces to raise their arms against the new government.

In its aim to create a New Society, the government finally came to realize that it was time to study more deeply the problems of the Muslims and to muster whatever resources it had to allay Muslim fears as well as to give way to many of their social aspirations. The President refused to accept the principle that the Muslim problem could be solved only by force. He boldly and unequivocally admitted the errors of past administrations and revealed that the country had "never really bridged the cultural gap between the Filipinos and our Muslim brothers, and it is for us now really to bridge it . . ." On another occasion he emphasized that the nation could not be a strong one if one of its segments remained neglected and weak. What was needed was to strengthen all the segments to produce a cumulative result that would help and benefit the whole. As he put it:

We can begin to work our way toward this ideal national community only after we breach the barrier — a tragic legacy of our colonial period — that has tended to divide the Filipino nation between Christian and Muslim. In the revolutionary reconstructing of Filipino society that we are embarked on, we recognize the tremendous source of social energy that lies in the Muslim Filipino Community, which has by its courage and cohesiveness already made an invaluable contribution to our struggle for political independence.

The President then assured the people that the government was to serve the Muslims with the same vigor and zeal as other Filipinos while giving them all opportunities to serve the nation in a manner which would make "their cultural heritage and their religion, which is Islam, . . . forever be part of the Filipino contribution to world culture and civilization."

There is no doubt that for the first time in the history of the Filipino people, there is now a determined effort to rectify old ills while reconstructing Filipino society in such a manner that the Muslims will feel, and like to be, part of it. But this will involve a process that will take many years. Actually what is called the Muslim Problem depends on who defines the problem. And even from the point of view of Muslims, such a problem is not one but actually a conglomeration of various problems.

An Attempt to Define the Muslim Problem

In the last few years, much has been written on what these problems are, what the government expects of the Muslims and what the Muslims want for themselves. In the past, what the government defined as the problem did not necessarily coincide with what the Muslims considered the problems to be. Furthermore, even among the Muslims themselves, their definition of the problem or problems was often colored by their educational background, their social status, their profession,

their level of religiosity, their immediate needs, their Islamic sophistication, etc. A real problem is that there is no single person or institution among them all that can truly claim to speak authoritatively for them all. As is well known, the Muslims do not have a hierarchy or a monolithic institution that can speak for all of them. Nevertheless, it is possible to discover the varied aspirations of Muslims and recognize certain common factors among them.

Articulate Muslims have pointed out that a main problem of Muslims in the Philippines is how to preserve Islam in a country where they are a minority but where, nevertheless, the fundamental law of the land provides for a secular form of government. Clearly, this is a problem of most religious minorities. It can also be a problem for a majority religion if the state is purely secular. A few conservative Muslims insist that if Islam is to be preserved in any country, not only must the majority be Muslims but that political power must be in their control. This view is open to question. In the first place, there are countries where the majority of the population is Muslim but where Islamic law does not hold sway. On the other hand, there are countries where a Muslim minority is allowed to be governed by the personal and family laws of the *Shari'a*.

Even among Muslims, one must make a distinction between "a Muslim leader" and "a leader of Muslims". The first represents one who exerts efforts for Islam while the latter has, statistically speaking, Muslims for followers on issues representing power or politics which may have nothing to do with Islam. Hence, at most, political leaders can speak only for their regions.

The main problem of Filipino Muslims is initially not so much the preservation of Islam but a need to know more about Islam and then practice it. For what is the meaning of preserving something that one does not fully understand? Often the term "Muslim" has been used to identify oneself not so much in the positive sense but as a technique to differentiate one from others. While it can be truly asserted that in the Philippines there are numerous Muslims who are really knowledgeable in the Faith and other less sophisticated ones but truly pious, there is also a large number among the young who do not even practice the basic ritual requirements of the Faith or who do not know much about Islam except the name. It is also true that, historically speaking, many Muslims have fought for a Faith they understood; but it is equally true that others have died fighting for the protection of their ethnic group or in defense of their leaders and what all these signify without realizing that they were not really fighting for Islam but for a system which they had come to believe represented Islam. Needless to say, however, this situation had never been a monopoly of a society of Muslims.

Another phenomena observed in the big urban areas in the Philippines is the existence of some Muslim youth who in their chronic fear of being different from a non-Muslim population begin to abandon Islamic rituals in their process of adjustment. In their fear of being different from the others, they forget the Qur'anic statement that Allah had created different communities and that, therefore, Muslims, in so far as they are Muslims, cannot but be different from non-Muslims.

Other young Muslims become so blinded by Western institutions and are so impressed by the technology associated with the West that they begin to agree with the detractors of Islam that Islam signifies backwardness and fosters an anti-scientific spirit. They then begin to blame Islam for all the economic ills they left behind in their poor communities. Again they forget that Islam requires as a religious prescription the extension of the frontiers of knowledge while extolling the virtues of work. Others wish to keep their Islamic identity but easily fall prey to many of the temptations that form part and parcel of life in a big city and end up confused with terrible pangs of conscience. They forget that Islam fosters discipline, decency and propriety.

Toward the Preservation of Islam

It is the deeper understanding of Islam and its ensuing practice that will determine its preservation. But the creation of such an understanding can only come about by many factors which are all interrelated. First of all, the teaching of Islam must begin with childhood. Parental discipline and proper example are imperatives. Muslim teachers, too, must help set the example. As the saintly Shaikh Muhammad ibn al Habib said in one of his Ramadan discourses:

A man should ask his son, "Have you done the prayer or not?" When he comes in, say to him, "Have you come from school, did you say the prayer there?" If he replies, "No, I haven't" tell him, "You know that on the Day of Rising you will be asked about the prayer." If he finds his father insisting day after day about the prayer, it's inevitable that he will do it. But if he comes in and no one asks him he will never say the prayer. Now in our time there's great laxity. We need teachers who command and fathers who are firm with their children. If the man who teaches commands, and the father says to his son who comes home, "Have you prayed or not," he will undoubtedly be aware of his Din and he will undoubtedly say the prayer. However, if, for instance, the teacher prays but doesn't tell his pupils to and similarly a father doesn't ask his son, he will grow up without a scrap of the Din and will never say the prayer.³

And when the child grows up into an adult, he must make efforts to refine his knowledge of Islam, its institutions and history, while going into a deeper study of the life of the Prophet. He should by this time be disciplined enough to often read the Qur'an even in translation if there is no other alternative.

Needed, too, is the upgrading of the qualifications of the teachers in the madrasahs and the improvement of the curricula as an unending process. The *'ulama* must always try to improve themselves while exemplifying the virtues of humility and love of learning. They must always foster a deepened consciousness of the community or *ummah* as against personal or family interests.

Attempts at a Solution

But, as is well known, Islam is not confined to the performance of individual

duties to Allah; it involves the regulation of social relations. In brief, it demands the existence of a community. Yet, needless to say, such a community cannot truly exist unless certain basic elements of the *Shari'a* govern it. This is an aspect in the lives of the Muslims in the Philippines where the element of government, on the principle of religious freedom and tolerance, enters. On August 1, 1973, the President of the Republic issued Memorandum 370 creating a research staff to help codify Philippine Muslim laws. After this work was terminated, the President issued Executive Order 442 on December 23, 1974 creating a Presidential Commission to review the work and come up with a better product. The Commission terminated its work after consulting Muslim lawyers and members of the *'ulama* and the code it prepared is presently awaiting the President's signature.

This Code is confined to Muslim personal laws and does not involve criminal law. It also provides for a system of Muslim courts as part of the national system of courts. Actually, a great deal of Muslim personal law, especially on matters of marriage, divorce and inheritance, is now operative among Filipino Muslims. But the work of the Commission and the President's signature will signify the formal recognition of Islamic Family Law as part of the national laws of the land although applicable only to Muslims. The formal recognition of such laws coupled with the gradual evolution of a system of Islamic jurisprudence in the Philippines will go a long way in the Islamic education of the Muslim masses. Hopefully, also, the application of more *Shari'a* elements will reduce the influence of some old customs which tend to strengthen kinship relations in such a manner that makes nepotism possible. It might also create more consciousness of the community such that one will emancipate himself from purely personal or family interests and be able to conceive of a greater good — that of the *ummah*.

In accordance with its declaration that the Islamic heritage is to be considered as part of the patrimony of the Filipino people, a Presidential Decree in October 1973 as well as a Proclamation on October 26, 1973 recognized Muslim holidays while allowing the adjustment of the working schedules of Muslims to enable them to fast on the month of Ramadan. Thus it can be said that for the first time in the history of the Filipino people, many obstacles to the practice of Islam have been dramatically eliminated while positive measures to enhance it had been provided. Of great importance is the Letter of Instruction dated April 28, 1973, authorizing the use of Arabic as a medium of instruction in schools and areas that so need or desire it.

In the last so many decades, the Muslims, as a group, have lagged behind most of the other Filipinos in their educational and economic progress. Their provinces have the lowest rates in literacy. Of the Muslims who enter primary schools, not more than 2% finish their secondary education to enter college. To rectify this situation, the Mindanao State University has opened feeder schools to increase this percentage. It also enables Muslims to study in the University on a big number of scholarships. The government has also dramatically increased the number of scholarships to enable Muslims to get into other universities and work for the professions.

But the problem of madrasahs must, in the long run, be in the hands of Muslims. They inevitably require the public support of Muslims since the government is bound by certain laws preventing it from supporting religious institutions. If the madrasahs are well run and keep up with the required standards, there is no reason why their graduates cannot easily transfer to public secondary schools and easily compete with other students. Presently, there is the King Faisal Institute of Arabic and Islamic Studies at the Mindanao State University which counts among its faculty a few dozen Filipino graduates from Al Azhar and other Muslim universities. It has a few hundred **enrolees**. At the Philippine Center for Advanced Studies in the University of the Philippines, there is the new Institute of Islamic Studies which offers courses in Arabic and Islamics for Muslim students in Manila who desire to acquire more sophistication in their knowledge of Islam as well as non-Muslims interested in Islamic culture and institutions. A few scholarships for needy but qualified Muslim students are offered. These two above-mentioned universities are state universities.

A comparison between Muslim areas and Christian areas adjoining them generally shows that the latter have better roads, better schools, better irrigation systems and better marketing facilities. Reasons for these are numerous among which are the relatively higher level of education and technology among the Christian settlers, easier communication between them and national leaders, poor leadership among the Muslims coupled with a lack of bold imagination and past Muslim indifference to if not mistrust of the government. There are very few industries in Muslim areas and even these have non-Muslims as a majority of the employees. But this situation is now slowly changing. Many Muslims have seen the differences in economic levels between Christians and themselves and have the desire and will to lessen these differences. Many are trying to develop those skills necessary to compete with others. But not much can be accomplished unless the government first takes the initiative. The President, very much aware of the economic roots of the trouble in the last few years, has said: "We must build with haste in the Muslim areas the conditions that will accelerate the development of these areas, for as in other parts of the country, the peace in our Muslim South will endure only on the basis of social justice." The idea of the government, too, is that a strong Muslim South can eventually serve as a pillar of strength for the entire national community.

As much as possible, the Muslims have held fast to their traditional lands. This is not only on account of historical emotion but more so because land represents to them the last economic asset for survival. To assure them that they will not be displaced, Presidential Decree 410 dated March 11, 1974, declared that all ancestral lands occupied and cultivated by the national cultural minorities were to be inalienable and not disposable. However, details about the extent of these lands still have to be spelled out. Other proclamations have to do with the resettlement of Muslim refugees, relief and welfare projects and liberal trade policies for Muslims. The Philippine Amanah Bank, created on August 2, 1973, aims to create a class of Muslim entrepreneurs and help in the rehabilitation and **development** of Muslim areas while serving as an institution to train Muslims in banking or to acquire

economic skills. With more opportunities in the professions and more employment in industries, the present emphasis on land, among Muslims, might be reduced.

In a very important sense, the problems of the Muslims are part of the national problems. What is meant in particular is that there are also many non-Muslims in the country who are way behind others in educational and economic development. There are some Christian provinces that have poor roads and means of communication, that need more and better schools and have low literacy rates. The problem of the Muslims along such lines will thus have to be solved within the context of the whole country. That some priority had been given to Muslim areas had been due, it must be admitted, to the blood that had been shed there in the last few years, to the government's will to rectify past discrimination and injustices and to the concern shown by other countries.

The Need for a New Muslim Leadership

The economic uplift of the Muslim masses will have to be intimately connected with the rise of a new leadership among them. At present, the prestige of many Muslim traditional leaders especially the politicians among them have suffered. Rightly or wrongly, many of the young Muslims blame them for many of the social ills. They are often charged with having concentrated on their dynastic interests or the increase of their political power rather than the general welfare of the people, as having been unable to stop previous massacres in the old society, as having wasted their energies on too much "politics" and as having used Islam often for personal political purposes. Added to these is the charge that their chronic political rivalries and squabbles had served to divide their followers rather than to enable them to pool all their efforts for communal betterment. In brief, they have been charged as having acted more as leaders with Muslim followers rather than Muslim leaders.

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the traditional leaders in the past had served a valuable function in the resistance against foreign invaders, principally the Spaniards. Even at present, in remote areas, where the influence of national political and administrative processes are not yet universalized, they still are needed to give some modicum of order among the people. However, with more links with the national government, the gradual granting of autonomy to various Muslim areas with younger leaders chosen from the professional or technical group, and a progressive modernization accompanied by the destruction of the old political parties will lead to the further decline of the power of the old traditional families and politicians. Some scions of the old families will no doubt maintain some form of leadership in the future; but this will come because of their skills or expertise and function in a new order and not by virtue of origin. If the political and social tendencies in the Muslims areas follow its present course and the govern-

ment pursues its long-range plans, the future leadership among the Muslims will be with a new group of professionals, managers and technocrats, who, while loyal to a larger entity which is that of the nation, will also be nourished by their Islamic roots. It is hoped, too, that then the national situation will be one where all segments participate equally in its benefits and where there is mutual accommodation of all religious differences in an atmosphere of understanding and tolerance. It is then that peace will fully reign in a land that has witnessed so much poverty, discrimination, pain and blood.

For many reasons, some possibly traceable to the dim pre-Islamic past, power or authority had been a value among Muslims in the Philippines. What results these values were intended to achieve is another matter. But they explain, to a large measure, why Muslims had always agitated for more offices at the national level and in the civil service and armed forces while aspiring to become ambassadors and heads of offices. True enough, if Muslims were to hold positions in the upper levels in the government, they would be in a better position to bring to the attention of the government and explain existing or emerging problems involving their respective communities. But holding positions as such is no guarantee that they would work for their communities rather than their personal or family interests — unless they were first of all imbued with the Islamic spirit and had developed a high degree of social consciousness.

In this sense, the need for a new Muslim leadership reiterates the necessity for Muslims, in all levels, to know more about Islam and its fundamental principles and implications, and practice it. If all Muslims practiced the Islamic virtues of honesty, patience, steadfastness, love of knowledge, industry, bravery, decency and community consciousness, while frequently invoking the *dhikr* of Allah, then all these would constitute, in effect, the preservation of Islam in the Philippines. For all of these is equivalent to the internalization of Islam among Muslim individuals — and what is imprinted in the temple of the heart is not easily eradicated. According to a *Hadith*, Allah said: “Neither My Heavens nor My earth can contain Me, but the heart of My faithful servant contains Me.” This internalization is the real Islam and not the mere wearing of a headgear associated with Islam and shouting to the whole world that one is a Muslim, while on the side making money out of religious activities like the Mecca pilgrimage and taking advantage of the religiosity of other Muslims.

Whereas it is obviously desirable that the non-Muslim majority in the Philippines erases a great deal of its ignorance about or prejudices against Islam and Muslims, it is just as imperative if not more imperative for Muslims themselves to serve as a model community exemplifying the above-mentioned virtues. Then and only then will the rest of the Filipinos realize that the Muslim community in their midst is an asset from which they can learn a great deal. The Muslim community will then serve as a witness to the Message of Islam and make operative the Qur’anic verse:

Ye are the best community that hath been raised up for mankind. Ye enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency; and ye believe in Allah. (Sura III, v. 110)

FOOTNOTES

¹The Maguindanaos (550,000) and the Maranaos (450,000) in Mindanao Island, and the Tausug (325,000) and Samals (160,000) in the Sulu Archipelago constitute the four major groups. *Philippine Yearbook 1975*, p. 132.

²According to the Philippine Bureau of Census and Statistics, the Muslims, in 1970, numbered 1,584,938 or 4.32% of the total population. It is estimated, at present, that Muslims number at least 3 million out of a total population of about 42 million Filipinos.

³"The Ramadan Discourses of Shaykh Muhammad ibn al Habib" *Islam: A Quarterly Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1396 A.H. (England), p. 30.

THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN THE HISTORY OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE*

CESAR ADIB MAJUL

I

WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE, THE Filipinos find themselves in the difficult but exciting process of progressively welding themselves into a national community. Clearly, the granting of citizenship and other rights to a group of people living within a definite territory does not immediately create a national community, but such political characteristics do help to hasten its eventual formation. No national community is possible without consciousness of itself. This consciousness cannot be considered as something developed overnight, as it is usually the result of a long historical process as well as a constellation of expectations and aspirations of a people. A national community is, as it were, always in a process of becoming: that is, its members are trying to become more and more of a national community. Consequently, a people in the process of integrating themselves into a national community will search for further elements of common identity. On such element is the possession of a national tradition. Another is the existence of a common set of aspirations and expectations related to one another by a common ideology; or, in the absence of this, at least an agreement on how such an ideology is to be created or determined.

Now, no national tradition is by definition possible without the possession of a common history. It is a history cherished and treasured as an account of the development of a people or peoples in the process of becoming a national community. By common consent among most Filipinos, some of the regional revolts against Spain, the Philippine Revolution, and the precepts and ideas of persons elevated as national heroes constitute significant events that have entered into the composition of the Filipino national tradition. The fact that some of our scholars today are still discussing whether or not certain events are to be emphasized in the history of the birth of the Filipino people is merely a symptom that Filipinos are still in the search for further elements of national identity.

At present there are more than two million Moslems in the Philippine South with all the attributes of Philippine citizenship. Since it appears that everyone would like these Moslems to consider themselves Filipinos, it is understandable why there is a demand that they adopt, as their own history as Filipinos, the above mentioned significant events. It is to be noted that such events are closely related to or identified with the struggle against Spanish colonial domination. Since this is the case, the problem can be raised as to whether the struggles of the Moslems of the South against Spanish attempts to conquer them can also be taken as part of the general struggle of the native inhabitants of the Philippine Archipelago against not only Spanish do-

* A paper prepared for the Silver Jubilee of the Philippine National Historical Society. August 7, 1966.

mination but Western imperialism as well. If the Philippine Revolution is to be regarded not only as a movement of some Christian natives against Spanish rule, but of the Filipino people in their attempts at freedom, then there is no reason why the more than three hundred years of struggle of the Moslems of the South against Spain and resistance against pressure from other Western powers, cannot, in the same light, also be considered as part of the Filipino struggle for freedom. To put it in another way, both parallel struggles can be considered as a movement of racially and ethnically related peoples in the Archipelago that have helped to bring about the present situation where they find themselves trying to integrate into a single nation of Filipinos.

The implications of this is that the struggle of the Moslems in the South against any form of Western dominance is to be interpreted as an expression of their patriotism and love for the soil of their birth. Consequently, their outstanding leaders and heroes are to be honored as persons who helped bring about the formation of the national community.

At this point, we should recourse to a distinction between what might be called "The history of events in the Philippines" and "The history of the development of the Filipino national community." In the latter, not every event recorded in the former is necessarily significant to it. It is well known that many events in the Philippines have dealt with the internecine quarrels and squabbles between Spanish colonial officers and ecclesiastical officials or with institution affecting them solely. As long as these events did not appreciably affect the development of a national consciousness, they need not be emphasized in the second type of history. But, indeed, all events that helped bring about a greater consciousness of race, the universalization of expectations, a greater desire for independence, and a concerted opposition to foreign domination, will belong to the second. Certainly, almost up to the end of the nineteenth century, there was no such thing as a Filipino people in the sense we now understand it. It is well known that the Christian natives of the Archipelago generally came to be called "Indios," and the Moslems of the South "Moros." But there are many historical factors which have contributed to the progressive transformation of the "Indio" and "Moro" into Filipinos belonging to a national community. This process, not unaccompanied by conflict, has been gradual but inevitable.

II

In the writing of the history of the development of the Filipino national community, either in the form of a textbook or as an attempt to recapture the past with the view of understanding the present as well as to plot a direction for the future, the student of Philippine History is faced with the problem of how to deal with the growth and decline of the sultanates of the Moslem South. He is faced at least with two alternatives or opposing techniques, namely, either to deal with them as insignificant but nevertheless interesting chapters in the development of the national community or to deal with them as integral parts in the history of the development of the national community. The second approach interprets the struggle between the Spaniards and the Moslem sultanates as part of the history of Filipino struggle for freedom and, therefore, as an essential factor that helped bring about increasing possibilities for eventual independence of the people of

the Archipelago. Such an alternative assumes that the struggle of the Moslems was essentially one against Western colonialism and imperialism. However, from the historical point of view, this approach is complex since such a struggle was essentially part of a wider Malaysian struggle against European commercial infiltration and eventual colonial domination. In brief, the struggle of the Moslems of the Philippine South against Spain and resistance against other Western powers is simply an aspect of the wider Malaysian struggle against Western Imperialism in the whole of Malaysia.¹

That most of the present textbooks on Philippine History lean closer to the first alternative is understandable and certainly unavoidable to a great extent. First of all, most of the data our writers possess about the history of the Moslem South originated from Spanish sources. These sources are generally classifiable into two groups: those originating from Spanish colonial officials and those from the pen of Spanish ecclesiastics or missionaries. Spanish colonial officials were able to gather a great deal of statistics regarding the economic and military resources of the Moslems, their dealing with British and Dutch traders, etc.; but all these data were collected and viewed with the final objective of transforming the Moslems in the South from members of independent principalities into loyal subjects of the Spanish King. Crude attempts in the nineteenth century to understand their institutions were initiated to discover means of facilitating the problem of conquest. In the case of Spanish missionaries, data about population, beliefs, customs, etc., were gathered and disseminated among ecclesiastical circles with the aim of discovering the effective means to evangelize the Moslems and convert them into Catholicism.

The consequence is that the modern scholar exposed to all these cannot help but, albeit unwittingly, utilize the point of view of the authors of his only available sources to the extent of using their very language — a language not purely descriptive but colored by prejudice or value premises. This situation is understandable, for even if a scholar is inspired by intellectual curiosity or academic interest, he is apt to take over the perspective of the author of his sources in the absence of an original or alternative perspective. As mentioned earlier, some nineteenth century Spanish historians did look at the Moslem principalities of the South as an area to be conquered — an irritant to the colonial administration of the Philippine Archipelago. Other Spanish historians saw these principalities as populated by a people steeped in error and perversely refusing to see the light of what was conceived as the truth faith. Sometimes, even if the historian was not a priest, as long as he was deeply committed to the Catholic Faith or believed that the Christianization of the Moslems would make it easier for them to be integrated into the colonial body politic, he almost took the stand of the friar historian or writer. However, during the last few decades of Spanish rule in the Philippines, a couple of Spanish military writers had voiced a radically different approach.

Any modern Filipino historian, still following the principle voiced by some Spaniards of the last century that the Catholic religion is an essential

¹ The term Malaysia is used in a geographical sense. It includes Indonesia, the Federation of Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines.

element in the "national integrity" of the Philippines or that the Philippines is a Christian nation, will naturally look at the Moslems of the South as those "other Filipinos" who have not played an important role in the building of our growing national community. Such an attitude is clearly based on the premises that the Catholic religion is one of if not the basic element for identification in the Filipino national community; a concept presently unacceptable on legal and historical grounds. I hope that I am not exaggerating in having made the above digression; and if I had done so, it is simply on account of my desire to make a point.

In all fairness to some of the textbooks that have come about in the last couple of decades, allow me to note that space is sometimes allotted to the coming of Islam to the Philippines, the bravery of the Moslem warriors and their resistance, the birth of Moslem leadership as well as some admiration for them. These occupy a few paragraphs, and the coming of Islamic influences are dealt with in the same manner as the coming of Indian, Chinese and Japanese influences before Spain's arrival. This situation may be partially due to lack of available data or sheer ignorance, and stems to a great extent from the lack of a dialogue between the people of the North and the South.

This lack of communication is of two sorts. The development of a Christian culture among the peoples of Luzon and the Visayas, with the parallel intensification of Islamic institutions and consciousness of the Moslems, has helped to make them strangers to each other in spite of cultural affinities and geographical proximity. The other kind of lack of communication and understanding has come about because of the deliberate colonial Spanish policy to keep the two peoples divided. This was effected by making native Christian soldiers from Luzon and the Visayas fight the Moslems and thus extend the frontiers of the Spanish Empire. To increase the enthusiasm of the native soldiers, their Catholicism was emphasized as the factor that made all the difference. The Christian was, in effect, still fighting the Moor. In this manner, the Christian and Moslem natives of the Philippine Archipelago were made to continue the war of the Crusades which, having begun in the Mediterranean area, had shifted to the tropical regions of Malaysia. As long as the natives of both sides had no conception of a Filipino nationality, and as long as their identifying factors were their religion and diverse political loyalties, one group loyal to the Spanish King and his religious beliefs, the other to their own sultans and religious beliefs, their killing of one another was understandable and unavoidable. The ones who mainly profited from the struggle were the colonial masters. But history has its ironies: out of such conflicts emerged the existence of two peoples, joined by ancient cultural ties, with their fates thrust into each other to form a common destiny.

It is to be remembered that one of these peoples were natives who had been colonized and Christianized, while the other was not one of these. To refuse to take the history of the latter as an integral part of the history of the national community is in effect to assert that the proper history of the national community is that only of a conquered people, while the history of the unconquered people is to be dismissed. As it were, with the context of

Spanish colonial history, the freedom, valor, and independence of the Moslems were held against them; while in the history of our national community, these are ignored. The answer to this is that a history need not always be that of a conquered or unconquered people exclusively.

I have prepared a brief outline, along chronological lines, of the most salient points of the history of the Moslem sultanates of the Philippines South. Points of contact with Spanish colonial history of the Philippines are mentioned. But just as important are contacts with the neighboring peoples in Malaysia. It will be noted that the early history of the Moslem South is part of a wider field, that is, the history of Malaysia during its Islamization process as a concomitant of its participation in the international trade under Moslem control. This is the first stage in periodication. The second and third stages refer to the fragmentation of Malaysia with the coming of Western European commercial, religious and colonial penetration. The fourth and fifth stages represent the progressive isolation of the Moslem sultanates from the general stream of Malaysian history and exemplifies greater efforts of Spain to incorporate them into the affairs of the Philippine Archipelago. The fates of the Christian natives and Moslem natives of the Philippine Archipelago have been drawn closer together. The last stage refers to the decline of some sultanates and gradual disappearance of others as well as the eventual integration of all the inhabitants of the Philippines into a unitary state. The latter history of the Philippine Moslems then becomes significant only in relation to their Christian brothers and neighbors in the Philippine Archipelago. Their historical isolation from the rest of Malaysia is completed.

The following outline is presented to textbook writers for them to discover elements in the history of the Moslems which can be incorporated in the history of the Filipino people. It can also serve as an outline for a more specialized study of the history of the Moslem South and is thus offered to young Filipino Moslem scholars interested in such a study. It is not a comprehensive outline but its merits lie in a new interpretation exemplified by a system of periodication not yet fully experimented with but full of possibilities.

III

There are at least two approaches to the study of the early history of the sultanates of the Moslem South principally those of Sulu and Magindanao. A first approach is to lay emphasis on their political development along dynastic lines and the development of their indigenous institutions, while treating their relations with neighboring principalities as constituting their foreign relations. The second approach views the sultanates as part of a wider constellation of sultanates and principalities, a veritable Malaysian *dar-ul-Islam*. The first approach will no doubt bring about a great deal of important and interesting data, but such an approach tends to view the development of the sultanates as if they were relatively isolated phenomena. The second approach, on the other hand, incorporates the data of the first approach but views the development of the sultanates of the South as instances of the general spread of Islam in Malaysia. It, therefore, views the Philippine Archipelago merely as a geographical extension of the Malaysian

Archipelago and the next logical area for Islamic expansion together with or after the Islamization of Borneo, the Celebes and the Moluccas. Facts demonstrate that Islamic influences from Borneo and Sulu were beginning to shed root in Luzon during the first half of the sixteenth century. Not long after, Islam was being strengthened in Mindanao from Sulu as well as from the Moluccas.

The spread of Islam in the Malaysian Archipelago is indeed a legitimate field of inquiry;² but such a complex phenomena must not be looked at as a mere spread of a few theological principles or religious beliefs and rituals made possible by a handful of enthusiastic missionaries. The spread of Islam had represented an interplay of political, economic, psychological and social causes and factors together with their ideological concomitants. Furthermore, the attractive characteristics of Islam as such, as well as its ability to satisfy new needs brought about by rapid economic changes due to the nature of the international trade at that time, must also be considered.

The second approach is valuable and applicable to at least a couple of centuries before and after the coming of European powers to Malaysia. If this approach is acceptable, then a system of periodization can be formulated and presented in the following stages, which will be divided into various phases. Such divisions are not to be interpreted as rigid historial demarcations, but as a continuous process conventionally categorized into stages to make the history of the sultanates more intelligible and to emphasize historical incidents believed to be significant.

I. The first stage represents the conception of Malaysia as a constellation of sultanates and principalities exemplifying different stages in Islamization. It covers the period from the end of the 13th century to the end of the 15th century.

This stage portrays sultans, port-kings, minor chieftains, etc., participating in various degrees and intensities in the international trade from the Red Sea to the China Sea, a trade that was under the control of Moslem traders, principally Arabs, Indians and Persians. Many of the Malaysian ports served as sources of articles of trade and as clearing houses. A more direct participation of Sulu in this international trade can be traced to the arrival of Arab traders around the end of the ninth century or the beginning of the tenth century, not long after they were ousted from the China trade in 878 during the T'ang dynasty. After a prohibitive policy of the Chinese against Arab and other Moslem traders, Kalah in the Malay Archipelago became for some time the last port of call for them. However, due to the persistent demand for Chinese products in Arab lands either for domestic use or reexportation to other lands in the Mediterranean, the Arab traders made efforts to get at Chinese products. It was then that they learned or discovered a new route starting from Borneo then passing through Sulu, Palawan, Luzon, up to Formosa and the South of Japan where Chinese products were available. Even after the middle of the tenth century during the Sung

² For the validity of dealing with the Islamization of Malaysia from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century as an important periodization in Malaysian history, cf. Syed Hussein Al-Atas, "Reconstruction of Malaysian History," *Revue du Sud-est Asiatique*, No. 3, 1963.

Dynasty, when the Moslem traders were allowed once more to frequent the ports of South China and the old route through the coast of Indochina began to be utilized again, the new route was still used since the traders became acquainted either with new products or better sources of old products. However, it is clear that the use of this new or second route does not necessarily imply the Islamization of either Borneo or Sulu. It only suggests the presence of Moslem traders in Sulu and, therefore, its more direct participation in the international trade. Sulu had started to become a clearing house for products which its intrepid sailors brought from the more outlying islands.

The following are important phases of the first stage:

a. The coming to Sulu of Arab traders, who performed missionary activities during the end of the 13th century and the beginning of the 14th century. At this time there is evidence of a trading colony in Sulu consisting at least of transient Moslems traders. This is the phase of the coming of the *Makhdumîn* (Arabic Singular: *makdum*). The first seeds of Islam were sowed by them.

b. Increasing participation of Chinese traders in the Sulu trade. Traditional accounts claim that Chinese Moslem traders had accompanied or competed with Arab traders. Eventually, competition and other factors made the Chinese displace Arab traders in the second route.

c. The coming of Sumatran Islamic influences and political institutions during the end of the fourteenth century. This phase is represented in the Sulu tarsilas by the coming of Rajah Baguinda Ali with ministers and soldiers who arrived in Sulu and established a principality.

d. Sulu's official contacts with the Celestial throne 1417-1424. At least three "tributes" were sent.

e. The establishment of the sultanate in Sulu around the middle of the fifteenth century under the Sherif Abu Bakr, an Arab who had travelled extensively in Malaysia. The establishment of the sultanate assumes that a great number of the coastal inhabitants of Sulu had become Moslems and therefore responsive to such as Islamic institution. It also shows their acquaintance with some Islamic jurisprudential elements especially those which asserted the right of an Arab, more especially a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, to rule non-Arab Moslems. The Sheriff Abu Bakr initiated attempts to convert the inhabitants of the interior of Sulu (*Buranuns*) and is believed to have been successful. The coastal peoples and those of the interior of Sulu became slowly integrated into a political community under a central authority.

f. The coming of Islam to the Cotabato basin and its consequent spread to the Lanao area during the end of the fifteenth century. This is signified in the Mindanao tarsilas by the coming of the Sherif Muhammed Kabungsuwan, an Arab-Malay from Malaya, as well as a couple of Arab predecessors claimed to have been also sherifs and of which one returned to Sumatra.

g. The increase of Islamic influences in Sulu and Mindanao through greater maritime contacts with Malacca, Java and Borneo, and the occasional visits of Moslem traders and missionaries from Arab and Indian lands.

II. The second stage represents the coming of Western European Imperialism and Colonialization during the 16th and 17th centuries to Malaysia.

This stage represents the destruction of the Arab and/or Moslem monopoly of the international trade in Southeast Asia as a consequence of the coming of the Portuguese and the defeat of Arab fleets in Socotra (1507), Diu (1513), etc. The Portuguese and Spaniards came in the sixteenth century

not only to extend the possessions of their sovereigns but to spread Catholicism. In the same manner that they had the consciousness of coming from Christian lands and had a religious mission, the Moslems of Malaysia had a consciousness of their Islamic faith and of the integrity of *dar-ul-Islam*. It would be a fallacy to maintain that on account of the different stages of Islamization in the various parts of Malaysia there was no such conception. Actually, by this time Islam was well rooted in Aceh, Malacca, parts of Java, Brunei and Sulu. From a very important point of view, Islam constituted the only ideology that resisted and combatted Western Imperialism and Colonialism, and Christianity. Early Portuguese and Spanish authors had looked at their arrival in Malaysia as the continuance of the Crusader's war between Christians and Moslems. It will be recalled that the fall of Malacca in 1511 was less than two decades after the fall of the Moorish kingdom in Granada. The Turkish menace to Europe had also increased after their conquest of Constantinople, while the coming of the Portuguese to Malaysia had followed their wars in North Africa against the Moslems.

The important phases of the second stage can be summarized as follows:

a. The coming of the Portuguese and their disruption of the Moslem international trade control. The fall of Malacca to them in 1511, with the consequence that the center of power of Malaysian Moslems shifted from Malacca to Aceh in northern Sumatra. Dutch commercial interests in Java and other parts of the East Indies in the 1590's.

b. The coming of a Christian religious and economic threat brought about a deliberate attempts at Islamic missionary activities on the uncommitted parts of Malaysia who were either Hindu, pagan, etc. This time the missionary activities were initiated by Malaysians themselves, principally Javanese, accompanied occasionally by Arab zealots. Many port kings became Moslems; Ambon 1515, Banjarmasin 1520, Mataram 1525, Bantam 1527, Sambas, Bima, and Macassar in 1600, etc.³

c. The rise of Brunei as a commercial power, its dynastic alliances with Sulu, and its greater participation in the trade of the Philippine Archipelago. By the second half of the sixteenth century, Manila was already ruled by members of the Bornean aristocracy. This signified the beginnings of the Islamization of the area around Manila Bay. Beginnings of Bornean missionary activities in Batangas and other parts of the Philippines during the last quarter of the sixteenth century.

d. By the last quarter of the sixteenth century, there began a greater consolidation of the possessions of the Sulu sultan from the northeastern part of Borneo to parts of Zamboanga, including the islands of Taguima (Basilan) and Tawi-Tawi.

e. At the same time the consolidation of the "sultanates" of Magindanao and Buayan is begun. Dynastic relations between them as well as with the Moluccas, principally Ternate. Coming of Moslem missionaries and functionaries from Ternate to Mindanao.

f. Fall of Manila as a Moslem principality in 1571. Spanish attacks on Brunei in 1578 and 1581 and first attack on Sulu in 1578. Treaty between the Sulu Sultan and Spaniards on June 14, 1578.

g. Conflicts between Spaniards and Magindanaos in 1579, 1596, etc. Spanish attempts to colonize Mindanao.

³ At this point a study of Bertram Schrieke's theory that the spread of Islam in Malaysia was accelerated by the coming of Western powers is imperative.

h. Spanish expeditions to the Moluccas: 1582, 1585, 1593 and 1603. The expeditions can be interpreted not only as attempts to check Dutch ambitions in the area or to extend Spanish territories but also as attempts to isolate Moslems in the Philippine Archipelago and cut off sources of human and material aid to them from the Moluccas. Conversely, the temporary neutralization of the Magindanaos was sought to facilitate the conquest of the Moluccas.

III. The third stage represents the gradual fragmentation of the Malaysian *dar-ul-Islam* under the spheres of different colonial powers. It is a stage of great resistance and counterattacks against the West which were mainly unsuccessful. The rise of Aceh as a great Moslem power failed to dislodge the Portuguese in Malacca. Javanese resistance against the Dutch commercial ambitions had weakened. Brunei's eclipse as a commercial power had begun. Brunei's missionary activities in Batangas, etc. had ceased. The fall of Luzon and the Visayas to the Spaniards and the destruction of Moslem pockets of resistance in Mindoro and other islands signified that the northeast expansion of Islam to the furthest end of the Malaysian Archipelago had been checked. Islam's furthest limit would then be in its outposts in Sulu and in Mindanao. The following phases are important:

a. The contest for the control of Luzon and the Visayas between the Spaniards and the Moslems. This refers to at least two events: The first represents the 1589 attempts at alliance between the Brunei, Sulu and Magindanao sultanates with the disgruntled aristocracy of Manila and Tondo (now under Spanish rule) to dislodge Spaniards from the Philippine Archipelago. Desperate attempts to get Japanese help did not materialize. Significance of the Magat Salamat Conspiracy. The second event refers to the so-called piratical raids initiated by the Magindanaos with Sulu and Ternate help from 1599 to 1603. Blood compact between Magindanaos under Buisan and Leyte datus against Spain. Failure of the ultimate aim of such large scale raids.

b. The decline of the "sultanate" of Buayan around 1619 in favor of the Magindanao sultanate under the redoubtable Sultan Dipatuan Kuderat whose powers extended up to the Maranao regions. Cagayan de Oro becomes tributary to him in 1622 and Selangani in 1626. Kuderat's assumption of the title of Sultan. After his death in 1671 the decline of the Magindanao sultanate began and slowly broke up into various minor sultanates. Spanish presence in Mindanao frustrated the natural course of events for the gradual integration of various minor Moslem principalities under one centralized authority.

c. Spanish conquest of the Moluccas in 1606 cut off aid to the Moslems of the Philippines from the farther south. Further isolation of Moslems in the Philippines. Sulu and Magindanao sought for Dutch alliance in 1614. Increase of Moslem raids in 1616, 1625, etc.

d. The system of divide and rule of the Western colonial powers. Sultanates and principalities made to fight each other. In the Philippines, Christianized natives made to fight Moslems as well as to extend Spanish possessions. Spaniards persistently tried to foster dissensions between Buayan and Magindanao. Nevertheless, dynastic or commercial rivalries between Western powers at home and abroad brought to Malaysia. This explains Dutch aid to Sulu, Magindanao, and Ternate Moslems in their resistance against Spanish rule. The eventual frustration of Dutch ambitions in the Philippines also implied further dependence of Moslems in the Philippines on their own resources. Establishment of Spanish fort in Zamboanga in 1635. Continued raids on Spanish held territories by Moslem alliances.

e. The expeditions of Governor General Corcuera to Mindanao in 1637 and Sulu in 1638. Lanao expedition of 1639. The temporary character of Spanish victories. Fall of Jolo on January 4, 1638. Transfer of Sultan's capital to Tawi-Tawi in 1639. The long rule of Sultan Muwallil Wasit I (Rajah Bongsu) from around 1614 to 1648. His alliances with Macassar in 1638. Alliance with the Dutch in 1644. Treaty between Spain and Sulu on April 14, 1646. The evacuation of Zamboanga in 1662. The Sulu and Magindanao sultans as independent as before.

f. The inability of Sulu to expand or extract tribute from up North led it to look further westward in the Island of Borneo for its tributary expansion. On account of intervention in Brunei's dynastic wars, the Sulu Sultan's territories in Borneo extended further West to the Kimanis river in North Borneo around 1690. By the end of the seventeenth century during the reign of Sahab-ud-Din, the power of the Sulu sultan extended from parts of Zamboanga to the Kimanis river in the northern part of the islands of Borneo.

IV. The fourth stage refers to the attempts of the Sulus to regain part of their former glory during the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century. Around 1700 there were dynastic quarrels between Sulu and Magindanao and the Sulus tried to exercise some dominion over the Cotabato and Zamboanga regions. During this state there were strong attempts on the part of the Moslem sultanates to recapture their ancient commercial glory. The English tried to have a foothold in Sulu territory to exercise a greater hold on their China trade. A few salient events are listed below:

a. A modest resumption of Sulu trade with China initiated during the reign of the sultan Sahabud-Din around 1700. Badar-Din I's missions to China in 1726 and 1727.

b. Attempts of Badar-ud-Din I for peaceful commercial relations with Manila. Treaty of December 19, 1726.

c. The so-called piratical raids during this time and earlier can be interpreted as a source of income to make up for the loss of participation in the international trade and the former trade with China. The raids were also meant to weaken Spanish resources which were used to subject the Moslems. Of importance too was that they were also intended to intimidate Christian natives used by Spaniards to conquer the Moslems. Moslem attack on Palawan, the Calamianes, etc., under Datu Sabdula (Nasar-ud-Din) in the 1730's. The significance of these attacks is that they partially satisfied the expectations of the Sulus for strong leadership during a time when there was a dynastic rivalry for the sultanate.

d. The difference of character and rule of the two brothers A'zim-ud-Din I (1735-1748) and Muiz-ud-Din (1748-1763). The former believed that he could keep his throne and help Sulu with friendly relations with Spain and by the granting of concessions to Spaniards. Accepting the fact of the meager resources of the Sulus and their relative isolation from other Moslem principalities now under the domination of other Western powers, A'zim-ud-Din I believed that Sulu's progress could be the result of the strengthening of the institution of the sultanate and other Islamic institutions together with commercial and political relations with Spain and other lands. His attempts at commercial relations with China. His "tribute" to China in 1743. Muiz-ud-Din (Datu Bantilan), on the other hand, believed that such independence could be maintained by the closer relations with English who could be considered as sources of material aid against persistent Spanish aims at domination. He even toyed with the idea of contacting the

Ottoman sultan at Istanbul for possible aid to help maintain Sulu's independence. Bantilan's conception of dar-ul-Islam though relatively of place at that time reflects his Islamic consciousness. In 1754, he almost asked for Chinese protection. Muiz-ud-Din reign witnessed an increase of Moro depredations on the Bicol Regions, Mindoro, the Manila area, etc.

e. Relative peaceful relations between Sulu and Spain from the reign of Sultan Muhamad Israel (1774-1778) to Sultan Sharaf-ud-Din (1791-1808). Modest commercial prosperity for Sulu.

V. The decline of the sultanates. The decline already manifested earlier becomes more manifestly rapid by the middle of the nineteenth century onwards. Badar-ud-Din's earlier failure to capture Zamboanga in 1719 not long after its refortification by the Spaniards revealed Sulu's weakness. Badar-ud-Din's alliance with the Magindanaos and negotiations to patch divisive elements between Sulus and Magindanaos around 1720 to make another try at Zamboanga was not very effective. Greater pressure from Spaniards to assert their sovereignty in Sulu. Sulu was then being pushed into the vortex of conflicting and rival ambitions of Western powers which spelled doom to its independent existence as a small principality that had ceased to have place in a rapidly changing world condition. A few of the significant events are as follows:

a. The commercial ambitions of the English exemplified in the cession of Balambagan and the first cession of the North Borneo territories of the Sulu Sultan to them in the 1760's. Destruction of Balambangan in 1775 by the Sulus under the leadership of the royal datu Teteng. French commercial ambitions shown by their desire to purchase the island of Basilan from Sultan Pulalun (1842-1862) in 1844 and 1845.

b. Spanish use of steam war vessels in 1848 enabled them to gradually gain mastery of the Sulu Sea. The destruction of the power of the Balangingi Samals and forcible deportation of survivors in 1848 by the Spanish.

c. Spanish expedition to Davao in 1848. Oyanguren versus the Sulu Datu Bago.

d. The visit of James Brooke, the British consul general at Borneo and governor of Labuan, to Sulu in 1849. The inking of a political and commercial pact between Great Britain and Sulu (although never confirmed) revealed the attempts of Sulus to play one European power against another. Fear of rival Western powers in Sulu alarmed the Spaniards who now desire more than ever to subjugate Sulu.

e. Spanish fear of and reaction to the ambitions of the British and French as well as the persistence of piratical raids culminated in the Spanish expeditions against Sulu and the capture of Jolo in 1851 under the leadership of Governor General Urbiztondo. Treaty with the Sulus on April 30, 1851. Sulus interpreted the treaty as one of friendly relations while Spaniards considered it Sulu's acceptance of Spanish sovereignty.

f. The Spanish expeditions of 1876 and capture of Jolo. Establishment of a permanent outpost in Jolo. The January 1878 cession of Sulu's North Borneo possessions to a British Company by the Sulu Sultan. Treaty of July 26, 1878 with the Spaniards. Extension of Spanish power to other islands. Spanish intervention in Sulu affairs even in dynastic quarrels, etc. Rule of Jamal-ul-A'zam (1862-1881).

g. The rise of the *juramentados*. Significance of such an event is that organized resistance under the Sultan had failed. Responsibility for the integrity of dar-ul-Islam had become an individual one.

h. Change of official Spanish policy: the transformation of the Moslems in the Philippine Archipelago into loyal Spanish subjects rather than converting them into Catholicism.

i. The 1885 Protocol between Great Britain, Spain and Germany agreed that Sulu belonged to the Spanish sphere of sovereignty.

j. The 1891 Weyler Campaign in Cotabato. The 1895 Blanco's campaign in Lanao. The *juramentado* institution among the Magindanaos.

VI. The Philippine Revolution and the American Occupation.

a. The leaders of the Revolution considered the Moslems of the South as Filipinos bound with them by racial ties, ancient historical relations, and geographical propinquity. The Manifesto of the Hongkong Junta in 1898 declared that Filipinos were made to fight the Moros in Mindanao and Sulu who "in reality are our brothers, like us fighting for their independence." Aguinaldo's Message to Congress on January 1, 1899 proposed that the government be empowered to "negotiate with the Moros of Jolo and Mindanao for purposes of establishing national solidarity upon the basis of a real federation with absolute respect for their beliefs and traditions."

b. The Bates Treaty with the Sulu Sultan in 1899.

c. The defeat of sporadic uprisings against American Occupation and the futility of the battles of Bud Bajo (1906) and Bud Bagsak (1913).

d. Sultan Jamal-ul-Kiram's formal abdication of political power in 1915 (Carpenter's Agreement). Moslem representation in the Philippine Government.

e. The role of Moro resistance against the Japanese Occupation.

f. The independence of the Philippines on July 4, 1946. All Filipino Moslems with rights of citizenship. Their responsibility in building the national community and the responsibility of others towards them. The increased secularization of Philippine society.

Anyone with some acquaintance with the history of events in Sulu and Mindanao will easily notice the incomplete character of the above outline. Actually, there has been no intention at comprehensiveness. It is hoped that most of the important events were included. However, to one desiring to avoid a purely chronological narration, these events can only be significant in terms of the social and political institutions of the Moslem of the South as well as the economic structure of their society. It is indispensable to possess a good background of classical Islamic beliefs, practices, and institutions, over and above a knowledge of those indigenous or pre-Islamic elements shared by the Moslems of the Philippines with other Malaysian peoples. With such a background it is possible to appreciate the results of the impact of Islam on such indigenous elements. For example, the *juramentado* upsurge in the 1880's cannot be fully understood except with the knowledge of the Sultan's failure to prevent a non-Moslem power from controlling a land asserted to have been part of *dar-ul-Islam*. That the responsibility for the defense of such a territory had shifted from a duly constituted authority to that of an individual is only significant if elements of Islamic jurisprudence are considered. Likewise, the general lack of Sulu adherence to treaties entered between their Sultan and Spanish authorities can be better understood in terms of the relations between the Sultan and the datus or traditional chiefs. This in turn requires knowledge of Sulu traditions re-

garding the coming of the Sherif-ul-Hashim, reputed to have established himself as first sultan of Sulu, his commitments with the datus, the principles of dynastic succession, the division of territorial authority, etc. Moreover, the dynastic relations between the different sultans of Mindanao and their claims to rule and exact tribute are to some extent based on appeals to Islamic law and traditions.

For the first two stages in the outline there must be further recourse to additional local tarsilas other than those already published. One must also be continually alert to tarsilas that are slowly coming to light from Borneo and the Indonesian islands from the south of Mindanao. However, it is imperative to develop a technique to evaluate such tarsilas in order to render them of historical value. A comparative study of the local tarsilas is essential, and a great deal of some of them can be checked against Spanish, English and Dutch sources. The value of some tarsilas, especially those that present an enumeration of the sultans of Sulu, is that they do not only reveal the most salient characteristics of the personality of the sultans but also what the Sulus considered the most important historical event of their reign. Negatively speaking, the differences among tarsilas, relative to certain omissions, reveal dynastic rivalries and even certain Sulu models for dynastic successions. But further research into primary sources in the Spanish, British and Dutch Archives is indispensable. However, without the virtue of tolerance and the ability to emancipate oneself from unexamined premises, historical empathy for the struggles of the Moslems of the South, and an uncompromising desire to understand, nothing can be accomplished.

The history of the Moslems of the Philippine South and the lives of their sultans are not devoid of an epic character. That a great deal of cruelty, tears and suffering have followed the wake of their depredations and persistent struggle against aims to conquer them is not to be denied; but these are merely responses to similar inflictions upon them. In all life-and-death struggles, no contestant has a monopoly of virtue or vice. Yet the foe had observed the invariant bravery, stoicism in defeat, and, in general, magnanimity in the moment of Muslim victory. What had not been easily conceded to them is that such behavior could have stemmed from their basic Islamic belief, that there is a universal prescription for behavior and that man ought to try to approximate it. Indeed, in the further search for national identity one of our largest minorities in the Philippines can contribute a great deal.

PRINCIPALES, ILUSTRADOS, INTELLECTUALS AND THE ORIGINAL CONCEPT OF A FILIPINO NATIONAL COMMUNITY*

Cesar Adib Majul

Introduction:

The concept of a Filipino national community was initially verbalized in the 1880's by the *ilustrados*, the educated elite which emerged from the *principalia* class in native society after the educational reforms of 1863. This concept was a function of native response to colonial and ecclesiastical domination as well as the result of an interaction between the different social classes in the colonial society. The Philippine Revolution of 1896 and 1898 aimed, among other things, to concretize the concept. This was unlike the earlier twenty-five or more major uprisings in the colony which were mainly based on personal, regional or sectarian motives.

This paper aims to present a conceptual framework to understand better how the concept of a Filipino national community was the inevitable consequence of certain historical events. It attempts to elicit further the significance of such events by relating them to each other. It will also indicate certain continuities in Philippine history, a hitherto neglected aspect, while belying an oft-repeated statement that the history of the Philippines during Spanish rule was mainly a history of the colonials.

I. Spanish Conquest and Consolidation

When the Spaniards came to the Philippines in 1565, they had the following major aims: the conversion of the natives to Christianity and the extension of the political domains and material interests of the Spanish monarch. What they found in Luzon, the Visayas and parts of Mindanao was a constellation of widely scattered settlements called "*barangays*". These consisted of families which numbered from a dozen to more than a hundred. Each *barangay* was normally under the leadership of a chief or *datu*. In the Philippine South, however, a few dozen *barangays*, due to Islamic influences, had already welded themselves under the leadership of a central authority known as *raja* or *sultan*.

By means of superior technology and force and, in some cases, by friendly gestures and gifts to the chieftains, the majority of the *barangays* fell under Spanish sovereignty. But it was extremely difficult for a few hundred Spanish soldiers and friars to govern and indoctrinate about 750,000 natives who were living in dispersed communities. It consequently became imperative to resettle them into larger population centers called "*pueblos*" (towns). Thus were the

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beginnings of urbanization introduced in the Philippines to serve colonial interests. In effect, the *pueblos* became the effective centers for the religious indoctrination of the natives and to check on and ensure their loyalty.

The process of resettlement was not without great difficulties and suffering on the part of the natives. Many fled to the mountains or interior parts of the islands. Up to the eighteenth century, there were cases of Spanish friars trying to persuade such *remontados* to come down and settle in the *pueblos*. In any case, by the first quarter of the seventeenth century, *Filipinas*, the Spanish colony, had already scores of well-organized *pueblos* which at the same time constituted parish centers.

II. The *Principales*

The Spaniards did not do away with the old nobility. On the contrary, they strengthened the powers of the *datus* over their former followers. Whereas in pre-Hispanic times the *datus* held to their power mainly by consent and through constant consultation with the elders or heads of families, under the Spanish regime they became officials in the colonial bureaucracy. The *datus* of the *barangays* became the *cabezas de barangay* when the *barangay* was transformed into a subdivision unit of the *pueblo*. Up to 1785, the position of *cabeza* was hereditary. When some form of elections for a three-year term were later on instituted in certain municipalities, the position remained, in any case, among the families of the old nobles. By then, the eldest sons of the *cabezas* had acquired such vested claims that they often succeeded their fathers.

In the *pueblo*, the *cabezas* collectively formed the *principalia* or "principal men (of the town)". By the seventeenth century, they elected from among themselves the head of the *pueblo* who was called the *gobernadorcillo* or "little governor". Later on, another name was applied to him. This was *capitan municipal* or simply *capitan*. During the nineteenth century, the number of electors for the *gobernadorcillo* was limited to thirteen. Six of these had to be actual *cabezas*, six had to be ex-*gobernadorcillos* or ex-*cabezas*, and the last had to be the outgoing *gobernadorcillo*.¹ In brief, the position rotated among the members of a well-defined class. To be a *cabeza de barangay* or *gobernadorcillo* was the highest political position which a native or *indio* could aspire to.

In a restricted and administrative sense, the term *principalia* referred to all *cabezas* and *gobernadorcillos*, whether incumbent or not. In a more general and social sense, it denoted such officials as well as their families who also supplied the lower municipal offi-

¹One of the earliest treatments on how the old chiefs or *datus* became *principales* as well as on their functions and powers is found in Antonio de Morga, "Events in the Philippines Islands", Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898* (Cleveland, Ohio: 1903-1909), Volume XVI, pp. 155-157. For a convenient summary of the functions, powers and elections of *cabezas* during the middle part of the nineteenth century, see *ibid.*, Volume XVII, pp. 324-333.

cials. The *principalia* represented the upper crust of the native society.

As the *pueblos* grew, the number of *principales* and their retinue also increased. Sir John Bowring, who was in the Philippines in 1858-1859, wrote that the *principalia* who came to pay their respects to him in a town he visited numbered more than seventy persons.² At around this time there were at least 627 *pueblos* in the Philippines with a total population of about 3,345,790.³

It is difficult to guess whether it was originally intended by Spanish officialdom to let the *principalia* play a transitional role or not. In any case, for the most part of the Spanish rule it was not possible to do away with them. In fact, the *principalia* played an important role as the intermediary between Spanish officials and the bulk of the native inhabitants. It collaborated and cooperated with the Spanish government in implementing its ordinances while, at the same time, bringing to the ears of the government the difficulties of the people.⁴ It was the *principalia* which prevented an undesirable or radical social dislocation in the lives of the natives, while maintaining a continuity with the pre-Hispanic political leadership. Actually, the *datus* and later on their descendants were the very tools utilized to persuade their followers to resettle in larger communities. The traditional prestige of their leaders as well as habits of obedience, led many natives to follow them to the *pueblos* where the former were often tempted with residential lots near the *plaza* or center of the *pueblo*.

The official duties of the *cabezas* were numerous. They collected the tribute for the government and the *encomenderos*.⁵ They harnessed the manpower needed for the Spanish armed forces and for the forced labor (*polo*).⁶ They had judicial functions, albeit limited. They were charged to cooperate with the parish priests in all matters pertaining to public worship and religious instruction and festivities. The *gobernadorcillo* was also empowered to temporarily occupy the position of the *alcalde mayor* (governor of the province) when vacant, although this position was strictly reserved for Spaniards.

But the *cabezas* had many privileges also. They, their wives, and eldest sons were exempted from the tribute. They were also exempted from the *polo* and could even grant exemptions to others. They could

²John Bowring, *A Visit to the Philippine Islands* (Manila, Filipiniana Book Guild, Inc., 1963), p. 54.

³Census taken in 1833. Quoted from Paul P. de la Gironiere, *Twenty Years in the Philippines* (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1962), pp. 203-204.

⁴Onofre D. Corpuz, *The Philippines* (New Jersey; Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 28.

⁵Every male native from 20 to 60 years of age and every female from 25 to 60 years of age, or earlier if she married, had to pay tribute. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the tribute amounted to 8 *reales fuertes*. Chinese *mestizos* had to pay twice this amount. Spaniards, Spanish *mestizos*, and Europeans were exempted. In 1884, the tribute was replaced by a *cedula personal* which also served for identification purposes.

⁶In the first centuries of Spanish rule, every male native and Chinese *mestizo* from the age of 18 to 60 were liable to perform 40 days of work every year in communal projects like the building of churches, ships, bridges, roads, etc. In 1884, this was reduced to 15 days.

impose modest taxes to enable them to maintain the dignity of their office. Moreover, there were external symbols signifying their prestige. For example, they were entitled "Don". During Mass, they sat on the front rows. Their uniforms, top hats, tassels, canes, etc., enhanced their differences from the bulk of the native population.

The traditional prestige of the *principalia* which was due to their descent, official functions, and privileges provided them many opportunities for graft and corruption. For instance, they committed graft in the collection of tributes especially those in kind. In return for gifts or other personal favors, they often granted tax as well as *polo* exemptions. Some would even get part, if not all, of the wages of *polo* laborers. In the compulsory sale (*vandala*) of farm products to the colonial government, some *principales* would grant loans to farmers at interest—thus forcing the farmers to further depend on them.⁷

Some writers have commented that the *cabezas* and *gobernadorcillos* "did not count for much in the eyes of the Spanish colonial community" and that they often stood in fear of the Spanish friar serving as parish priest. Moreover, they were often taken advantage of by the Spanish *alcalde mayor* and other Spaniards. Nevertheless, these did not reduce the prestige of the *principalia* before their fellow natives.⁸ There is a great deal of truth in these observations especially in the first two centuries of Spanish rule. But as the official functions of the *principalia* and their economic base increased in the next century, some of them would begin to evince actions which many Spaniards considered presumptuous or arrogant. Often, *principales* would hold meetings in the absence of the parish priest or even refuse to stand up in the presence of Spaniards.⁹ They were out to maintain the dignity they believed was an integral part of their office. They did not hesitate to complain to the King or to the highest Spanish officials that they deserved more respect than what was actually accorded to them by Spanish parish priests and officials. In particular, the *principales* complained that they were not allowed to sit down in the presence of a Spanish friar and were often made to serve the friars at meals. Consequently, Spanish monarchs had to issue orders for *principales* to be accorded the respect due to them.¹⁰ At bottom, a great deal of the attitude of the *principales* demonstrated that they still considered themselves the nobility of the country with vested rights due their ancestry and office. It was an attitude not entirely unaccom-

⁷Comp. Robert R. Reed, *Hispanic Urbanization in the Philippines: A Study of the Impact of Church and State* (Manila: The University of Manila, 1967), p. 153. For a long list of the abuses and exactions of *cabezas*, see "Character and Influence of the Friars" from Volume II of Sinibaldo de Mas's *Informe sobre el estado de las Islas Filipinas en 1842* in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, Volume XXVIII, pp. 248-252.

⁸Cf. O.D. Corpuz, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁹Sinibaldo de Mas, *Report on the Condition of the Philippines in 1842*, Secret Report (Manila: Historical Conservation Society, 1963), Volume III, pp. 157-158.

¹⁰Feodor Jagor, *Travels in the Philippines* (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1965), pp. 92-93.

panied with resentment towards an alien rule judged by them as intrusive as well as onerous at times.

III. *Principales*, Friars and Native Priests

One of the earliest avenues opened to members of the *principalia* families to further increase their power and prestige was through the priesthood. Nearly all of the first Christian missionaries who came to the Philippines were members of the regular or friar orders. Due to the chronic lack of Spanish secular priests, most of the parishes had to be administered by friars. The claim of the Manila Archbishop, and later on those of bishops, to visit the parishes under their jurisdiction was bitterly opposed by the friar parish priests who claimed they were subject not to the Archbishop but to their own superiors. Whenever the Archbishop insisted on his episcopal rights on visitation, many of the friars would threaten to abandon their parishes—a situation that would have created havoc in the religious indoctrination of the natives. Since Spanish secular priests proved hard to get by, the obvious solution to the above problem was to ordain native secular priests. The friars were not initially against the principle of having native priests, but they fiercely opposed letting native secular priests serve as parish priests. What was then the “visitation controversy”? It gave rise to the “secularization controversy”.

The development of a native secular clergy faced many obstacles. Among these were: the division of the ecclesiastical territory of the Philippines among definite religious orders; and the opposition of colonial officials to enforce even the half-hearted attempts of the home government to secularize the parishes since they often suspected native priests as not having much love for the mother country.¹¹ Some Archbishops, in their eagerness to immediately fill empty parishes, hastily ordained native secular priests. The fact was that it was often difficult for the native clergy, many of whom were poorly trained, to immediately take over the majority of the parishes.

The secularization controversy degenerated to such a low level that both friars and native priests started to accuse each other of greed, incompetence, immorality, etc. Some sympathizers of the friars' cause went as far as to remark that such was the eagerness of the Archbishop to have secular native priests ordained that even Manila rig drivers and cargomen were recruited to study for priesthood. However, this remark, possibly made in malicious humor, is not really true. According to the testimony of the Jesuit priest, Juan Delgado, written around 1751, all the natives studying for priesthood in the four colleges in Manila were sons of *principales* and not of those non-nobles who descended from the pre-Hispanic freemen or serfs. The *principales*, he asserted, had kept their noble status—something which the Spanish King could not take away from them even if he wanted to. Moreover, he continued, the *principales* and

¹¹Horacio de la Costa. “The Development of the Native Clergy in the Philippines,” *Studies in Philippine Church History* Ed. Gerald H. Anderson (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1969), p. 104.

native priests were very much esteemed and respected by the native population.¹²

The candidates for the native clergy would normally originate from the families of the *principales*. This can be explained by the fact that the *principalia*, being the most aggressive and relatively most literate segment of the native population, would covet the position since it carried with it civil, economic, and religious power. Actually, the Spanish parish priest was a watchdog on the *principalia*. The latter was required to consult him on practically all official matters.

It was probably the powers vested on the parish priest that made it quite difficult for the friars to easily abandon their parishes to the extent that they had to vilify the character and competence of native priests to keep their posts. The powers and functions of parish priests were numerous and went beyond the purely religious ones. The testimony of Juan Villegas, a friar who had served as parish priest for about twenty years, before the Philippine Commission in 1900, revealed some of the actual powers and duties of the parish priest. According to Villegas, the parish priest had supervisory powers on education, taxation, and sanitation. He had responsibilities on the census and other statistics. He issued certificates of character and civil status. He had something to do in the drawing of lots for those who were to serve in the Army. He had to be present at the election for municipal offices and served as adviser to the municipal council. He was president of the prison board as well as member of the provincial board. He was a member of the board for the partitioning of Crown lands and often served as auditor at the provincial level, etc.¹³ Although some of the above powers were relevant only in the nineteenth century, many others were found as far back as the early days of the conquest. In any case, the bulk of historical evidence points to the friar parish priest as the real ruler of the *pueblo*.

The extensive powers of the parish priest would have reduced the political powers of the *principalia* to a cipher unless either those of the parish priest were reduced or the parish priest came from its ranks. In effect, if the parish priest came from the families of the *principalia*, the *principales* would have almost fully controlled the *pueblo*, and their power over the bulk of the native population better secured. This would explain, to some extent, why colonial officials in general were not very much in favor of the secularization of parishes regardless of their possible lack of sympathy for friars.

Native priests bitterly complained that in spite of their increasing numbers the ratio of parishes held by them was very much smaller than they deserved. The distribution of the parishes were as follows:

¹²Fr. Juan Delgado, S.J., *Historia General Sacroprofana, política y natural de las Islas del Poniente llamadas Filipinas* (Manila: 1892), pp. 293-294.

¹³U.S. Senate Document No. 190, 56th Congress, 2nd session; 1900-1901, (Washington Printing Office: 1901) pp. 64-66.

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Regular</u> | <u>Secular</u> |
|-------------|----------------|----------------|
| 1750 | 427 | 142 |
| 1842 | 287 (487 ?) | 198 |
| 1852 | 528 | 191 |
| 1870 | 611 | 181 |
| 1897-98 | 672 | 157 |

In 1870, out of 792 parishes (excluding 10 mission parishes of the Jesuits), 181 or 23% were under secular native priests. Whereas, the parishes under the friars averaged 6,000 each, those under the seculars averaged 4,500. In the 196 parishes controlled by the Augustinians, the average went as high as 10,000. In 1880, when the number of native priests rose up to 748, the number or proportion of parishes held by them did not increase but actually decreased. In 1898, there were 746 regular parishes, 105 mission parishes, and 116 missions, or 967 in all. Of this, 150 parishes, representing about one-seventh of the Christian population, were ministered by the secular clergy (nearly 100% natives).¹⁴ The fact that the number of parishes under the native clergy had been reduced in proportion to those held by the friars can be explained by the fierce opposition of the friars and their support from colonial officials against the secularization of the parishes. That there were about 600 native priests in 1898 as against 825 in 1890 may signify that there were other alternative avenues, like the professions, attracting the ambitious sons of the *principales*.

In 1870, Gregorio Meliton Martinez, the Archbishop of Manila and a well-known sympathizer of the aspirations of the native clergy, wrote a lengthy letter to the Spanish Regent where he exposed what he believed constituted injustices to the native clergy and a concomitant increase of resentment against the friars. He warned that continued official support of the friars would transform the resentment of the native priests into an "anti-Spanish sentiment"—a sentiment that would eventually be shared by their parents, relatives, and finally by the "whole Filipino people, with whom they are in closer contact than are the regulars, with the result that the danger would assume a grave character." The Archbishop then noted that the conflict was rapidly assuming a racial tone.¹⁵ True enough, in 1873, when three native priests were executed by the Spanish government for alleged complicity in a mutiny of native troops, their families and friends judged the execution as the result of a collusion of colonial officials and friars to do away with them because they were well known as champions of the native clergy and the secularization of the parishes. People began to call them "martyrs". Significant about the outcome of

¹⁴All the above figures on parishes and priests have been based on: James A. Le Roy, *The Americans in the Philippines: A History of the Conquest and First Years of Occupation, with an Introductory Account of the Spanish Rule*, (Boston and New York: 1914), Volume I, pp. 60-61; Jesus Ma. Cavanna y Manso, *Rizal and the Philippines of his Days* (Manila: 1957), pp. 127-130; and U.S. Senate Document No. 112, 56th Congress, 2nd session, p. 23.

¹⁵For the complete text of this letter, see Nicolas Zafra, *Readings in Philippine History* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1956), pp. 485-598.

the above mutiny was that many *principales* and priests were exiled from the Philippines on the charges that they were also involved. Being a native priest, regardless of the sincerity of his vocation, could make a person suspect of disloyalty to the government. The antagonism between the friars and the secular native clergy eventually transformed itself into a racial issue and then finally, a national one.¹⁶ It cannot be overemphasized that the blocking of the aspirations and expectations of the native secular clergy also served to frustrate those of the *principalia* families from which they originated.

IV. *Principales, Commerce, and Land*

During pre-Hispanic times, agricultural lands were held in common. The *datus* supervised the planting, harvesting, and distribution of the products of the land. Forest products were accessible to anyone. In the first century of the Spanish conquest, there was no systematic plan to exploit the natural resources of the colony. Spaniards were even prohibited from owning landed estates in the provinces. The so-called *encomenderos* did not own land but only had the right to collect the tribute from certain well-defined territories. Most of the Spanish civilians lived in Manila where they speculated in the Galleon trade. However, even from the earliest times, friar corporations had began to take possession of large tracts of land especially in the provinces.

About the middle of the eighteenth century, farsighted Spanish officials commenced to recommend the expansion of trade with Asia and Europe, the exploitation of Philippine resources, the reformation of the Galleon trade, the settlement of Spaniards in the provinces for agricultural and trade purposes, and government expropriation of the landed estates of the friar corporations.¹⁷

In 1781, the Governor-General created an Economic Society to promote the cultivation of export products and the establishment of industries. The next year, the tobacco monopoly was instituted. This brought about some financial independence to the government and soon it became independent of the annual Mexican subsidy.

The ensuing abolition of the Galleon trade in 1815 as well as the severance of trade with Mexico due to the latter's independence in 1820, forced Manila authorities to liberalize some of its previous

¹⁶Cf. Horacio de la Costa, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

¹⁷One of these officials was Francisco Leandro de Viana the royal fiscal at Manila. He wrote a lengthy memorial to the Spanish Court where he explained how the colony could support itself by the development of its natural resources, the creation of industries, the building of shipyards, the intensification of trade with other countries especially the neighboring ones, the increase of the tribute, etc. For the complete text see "Viana's Memorial of 1765", Blair and Robertson *op. cit.*, Volume XLVIII, pp. 197-338. Another official was Simon de Anda y Salazar who also wrote a memorial to the Spanish King in 1768. In it he accommodated some of the ideas of Viana Simon de Anda who also recommended a systematic operation of mines, revision of commercial rules, and reforms in the Galleon trade. However, most of the memorial is concerned with the abuses of the friars. For the complete text see "Anda's Memorial, 1768", *ibid.* Volume L, pp. 137-190.

restrictive commercial policies. Spanish ports were opened to Philippine products and factories were officially authorized to be created. This was also a time coincident with the spread of the *laissez faire* policy in Western Europe. All these led to the opening of Manila officially as a free port in 1834 to European traders. Soon a few provincial ports were also opened to world trade. Residents were also allowed to trade in any European port and this served to boost commerce. In spite of government restrictions, however, trade progressively fell into private hands.

The acceleration of exports can be seen in the following figures: In 1831, hemp exports amounted to only about 346 tons. In 1837, it rose to 2,585 tons and in 1858, it rose up to 27,500 tons—two-thirds going to the United States. Also, in 1782, about 30,000 piculs of sugar were exported. This increased to 146,661 in 1840. It became 566,371 in 1854 and, in 1857, the amount rose to 714,059.¹⁸ With an increase of exports (including tobacco, copra, coffee, and rice), many Spaniards and affluent natives began to invest in many of the foreign commercial firms.

Previously, as long as the agriculture of the colony generally remained on the subsistence level, serious agrarian troubles did not appear in the agricultural estates. However, it was during the beginnings of the export economy and much more later on during its acceleration that agrarian disputes began to become really serious. Among other reasons, like the increase of population and farm hands, this could imply that the ordinary tiller of the soil had come to feel that he also ought to be a beneficiary of the increased production of the land. This situation was mostly true in friar lands.

Although the Spaniards recognized the existence of communal land in the colony, they introduced alongside it the notion of private property as a source of wealth. As early as the seventeenth century, the *principales* and their relatives had already started to "assume the formal ownership of that portion of barangay land which their dependents ordinarily cultivated (as communal land)".¹⁹ This tendency increased as the years went on. Agrarian troubles, especially on friar lands, had assumed such alarming proportions that the Spanish government started to seriously encourage the application for land titles—something the friars opposed. In 1880, the government tried to further push land registration; but this well-intentioned law only served to enable the *principales* to strengthen their economic base for they were in the best position to know more about the requirements of the law and take advantage of it. This action of the *principales* to get titles

¹⁸Conrado Benitez, *Philippine Progress Prior to 1898* (Manila: Philippine Education Co., Inc., 1916), p. 70.

¹⁹John Leddy Phelan, *The Hispanization of the Philippines* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1959), p. 117. For cases of *principales* selling or donating former communal lands to Augustinian friars during the seventeenth century, see Nicholas P. Cushner, S.J., "Meysapan: The Formation and Social Effects of a Landed Estate," *Philippine Historical Review*, (Volume VI), 1973, pp. 153-156. Later on, in 1745, the tenants of Meysapan rose against the Augustinian owners claiming that the estate was their ancestral land and that they wanted it back. *Ibid.*, p. 164.

to many former *barangay* lands extended up to the eve of the Revolution of 1896. All these explain what happened to the descendants of the old *maharlika* or freemen and "serfs" of pre-Hispanic times. The majority of them progressively became tenants or sub-tenants in the lands where their ancestors once worked on.

The relative absence of agrarian troubles in *principalia*-owned lands can be partly explained by the fact that, unlike the friars who lived far from their lands which were left to the charge of impersonal administrators, the *principales* lived on or near their lands and had familial or at least familiar relations with their tenants. Actually, some *principales* had also ended up as tenants in friar lands, but they often contested the claimed ownership of the friars by asserting that the land once belonged to their ancestors as far back as the ancient days. In any case, the fact that *principales* had strengthened their economic base by the acquisition of land explains why they came to be often called "caciques".

The commercial prosperity of the colony brought about by increased production and the export economy did not directly benefit the common tiller of the soil. What ensued was that the *principales* became one of the major beneficiaries. They were now building better and more permanent houses; the most affluent of them also having well-furnished homes in Manila. Manila had now begun to acquire progressively the characteristics of an urban and commercial center—improved roads and more bridges, better mail services, more commercial firms, increased government offices, additional courts, an expanding civil service, new printing presses, and so on. A rising middle class composed of Spaniards, *mestizos* (both Spanish and Chinese), and enterprising natives began to be noticeable. Many *principales* from the provinces started to visit Manila for business and other purposes. Their children went there, too, to get a better education. Soon, some of them would sail to Europe to further their studies.

V. *Principales and Ilustrados*

Coincident with the rising commercial prosperity came educational reforms. On December 20, 1863, a Royal decree provided for a system of compulsory primary education with free instruction for the poor and for the establishment of a normal school to graduate teachers for primary schools. Some of the reasons for the decree were: to propagate the Castilian language, to more effectively teach the Christian religion, and to raise the standard of civilization of the natives. Before 1863, the kind of primary education provided for the natives did not go beyond the parochial catechetical level.²⁰ Although there were colleges already opened to the natives who were studying for priesthood, there were, for all practical purposes, no chances for other natives to pursue higher education which was reserved

²⁰Cf. Domingo Abella, "State of Higher Education in the Philippines to 1863—A Historical Appraisal", *Philippine Historical Review* (Volume I, No. 1), 1965, pp. 23 and 26.

mainly for Spaniards, and Spanish *mestizos* to some extent. Up to the 1860's, the most educated segment of the native population were the native secular priests.

The Royal decree of 1863 stipulated that every town was to have at least one school for primary education (Article 3). Attendance was to be compulsory although instruction to the poor was to be free (Article 4). Primary education was to include reading, writing, Christian doctrine, Castilian language and grammar, arithmetic, history of Spain, geography, practical agriculture, rules of courtesy, and vocal music. Primary schools fell under the supervision of parish priests while the normal school was to be managed by the Jesuits.²¹

Significant to note in the decree was that graduates of the normal school were to have certain privileges while exercising their profession. For example, they were exempted from forced labor, and if they had rendered services for 15 years, they were to be completely freed from it. Those who had taught for at least five years were privileged to be called "*principal*" (Article 12).²² This means that they could vote for municipal officers or serve as such. Moreover, teachers with at least ten years experience were to be given opportunities to easily enter the civil service (Article 14).

The *gobernadorcillos* were charged to help in the implementation of the educational decree. For example, it became their duty to publicize the opening of classes, to issue certificates to those who could or could not pay, to see to students' attendance, and even to help in the giving of examinations. However, laws were also issued to prevent them from abusing their function in issuing certificates of poverty to students exempting them from paying the tuition fees.²³

Whereas some Spaniards did not fear the strengthening of the *principalia* families through education, since they assumed that this class was allied to them, other Spaniards were optimistic that the emergence of an educated segment in native society would eventually displace the *principalia*. Obviously, the families of the *principales* were in the best position to take advantage of the decree; and opportunities to enter the normal school would generally be confined to them. In 1864, the normal school in Manila started to function. Apparently there were natives with enough educational background to enter it. The fact was that there were many native families who made it a point to teach literacy and other forms of education in their homes.²⁴ In time, more normal schools in the colony would be opened. Manila alone graduated an average of 60 *maestros* up to the end of the Spanish regime. Being a teacher was in some way an alternative to that of being

²¹A copy of this educational decree is found in "Primary Education", Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, Volume XLVI, pp. 76-118.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 83.

²³This function is found in *ibid.*, p. 98. The parish priest could refuse to approve such certificates. See *ibid.*, p. 135.

²⁴Cf. Vicente Barrantes, *Apuntes interesantes sobre las Islas Filipinas por un español* (Madrid: 1869), pp. 46-47.

a priest regarding education as well as holding a position of dignity and prestige.

In 1864, primary schools also started operating in many towns, especially those around Manila. In 1870, there were around 1,779 primary schools in the colony with an attendance of about 385,907 students of both sexes although less than three percent of the students had an adequate mastery of the Castilian language.²⁵ In this same year, there were 2,300 secondary students all over the colony. In Manila, there were 1,883 such students of which 1,421 were natives and *mestizos* and 462 were Spaniards (both *insular* and *peninsular*). Santo Tomas, the pontifical university in Manila, had 40 secondary students (all Spaniards) and 580 students enrolled in higher education.²⁶ It is probable that these students were mostly Spaniards, Spanish *mestizos*, and native priests.

In 1875, another Royal decree established a faculty of Medicine and Pharmacy in Santo Tomas, although selected courses in both fields were offered a few years earlier. In the next year, courses in notary public were offered. Consequently, natives who had been able to consistently take opportunities of the decree of 1863 and then studied in the colleges were able to enter the university. Out of this first batch, were men like Jose Rizal and Marcelo H. del Pilar, who initiated the movement for reforms in the colony.²⁷ A succeeding group consisted of Apolinario Mabini and Emilio Jacinto who were to play leading roles in the ensuing revolution.

Enemies of the friars asserted that the opening of professions to natives at the university level was designed by the friars to prevent the sons of well-to-do families from going abroad where they might be infected by liberal or anti-clerical ideas. In any case, the growing population of Manila and the increasing urbanization of the city made imperative the offering of certain professional courses.

The educational reforms as well as the opening of the professions to natives caused the emergence of the *ilustrados*. The fact that the *principales* had the best chances to get an education led ordinary natives to equate the term *ilustrado* with *principal*. However, in its more restricted and correct sense, the term *ilustrado* referred to a person who had a profession, spoke and wrote Castilian well, and had been educated in any of the colleges. Colloquially, the term as a collective did not denote any Spaniard, however cultured or educated he might have been.

The *ilustrados*, as can be seen, were the educated elite that emerged from the *principalia* class. As such they began to enjoy a special prestige among the native population. Thus, among the natives,

²⁵"Public Instruction", Blair and Robertson, *ibid.*, Volume XLV, pp. 299-300.

²⁶Domingo Abella, *op. cit.*, Appendix A, p. 29.

²⁷For example, Jose Rizal enrolled in Santo Tomas in 1877 for a medical career while Marcelo H. del Pilar finished his law in the same university in 1880. Graciano Lopez Jaena, another reformer, tried to work for a medical career in the same university at the time Rizal was there but was not accepted due to his lack of a Bachelor's degree.

prestige along educational lines had ceased being confined generally to the priests. The *ilustrados*, considering that many Spaniards in the colony were illiterate or uneducated, were able to demonstrate what achievements natives were capable of. They would soon verbalize the aspirations of the *principalia* for a greater share in determining the destiny of the colony.

VI. *Ilustrados* and Intellectuals

Educational and municipal reforms, the opening of Manila to world commerce, political changes in the mother country, the coming of Spaniards with liberal ideas, and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 dramatically lessened the intellectual and religious isolation of the Philippines. Political changes in Spain could not but affect events in the colony. The September Revolution of 1868 which enabled Spanish republicans to echo ideals of the French Revolution made it possible for Carlos Maria de la Torre (1869-71) to serve as Governor-General of the Philippines. Deeply imbued with republican ideals, he generated aspirations and expectations among native priests, the rising middle class in Manila, and Spaniards of like mind. The Spanish Republic of 1873-74, although short-lived, nevertheless made inevitable the accommodation of further liberal ideas in Spain's political and social structure. Thus the return of the Bourbons the next year did not endanger republican gains. Actually, the Spanish constitution of 1876 accommodated many liberal principles. Furthermore, not a few ministers, noted for republican sympathies, served in various ministries.

All the above events affected the self-image and role of the *principales* and their families. They welcomed municipal and educational reforms and increased facility to enter the civil service, for they stood to gain from them. The majority, in particular, wanted to have the colony assimilated by Spain so they could be considered Spanish citizens with the same rights and privileges as any Spaniard. But they desired at the same time a status superior to that of the Chinese. There was nothing revolutionary or ideological in their aspirations. However, they were, in effect, out to control as much as feasible the colonial bureaucracy or state machinery by virtue of their noble descent, the claim that they were the true *naturales*, and their presumed loyal services to Spain. Needless to say, such claims were not permitted to go uncontested and actually provoked a strong reaction on the part of local Spanish colonials and friars.

Spanish colonial officials feared that the strengthening of the *principalia* would eventually lead the colony to follow the way of the Spanish colonies in the Americas towards independence. Spanish friars feared the loss of their ancient privileges and predominance as well as the eventual disappearance of the religious motive in native society which they had worked so hard to nurture. Spaniards born in the Philippines (Filipinos, *creoles*) realized that their chances to hold political or civil positions would be lessened; they had already resented

the arrival of other Spaniards from the mother country as presenting the same danger. The fact was that the highest and choicest offices of the bureaucracy was often given to *peninsulares*.²⁸

Opposition to an influx of *peninsulares* as well as rivalries between them and the *insulares* can be better appreciated in terms of the following figures. In 1864, there were 4,054 Spaniards. Of these, 500 were priests, 270 were businessmen and proprietors, and 3,280 were government officials, Army and Navy officials, etc.²⁹ In 1870, there were 3,823 *peninsulares* (1,000 priests, 1,000 members of the Armed forces, and 1,800 civil officials and others). The number of *creoles* and Spanish *mestizos* was 9,710.³⁰ In 1876, the number of Spaniards (*peninsulares* and *creoles*) doubled. Indeed, the *creoles* and their progeny would have liked to occupy most of the offices held by the *peninsulares* in the same manner that the families of the *principales* desired it for themselves. Obviously, too, the *peninsulares* and *insulares* would combine to prevent the natives from holding such coveted positions. The population of the Philippines in 1871, according to the *Guía Oficial*, had reached 5,682,012.

In the face of hostility to their aspirations, the *principalia*, especially those in the *pueblos* near Manila, often resorted to various tactics to asserting their rights while harassing the friars. For examples: a *gobernadorcillo* would be elected over the candidate of the friar parish priest; the *principalia* would refuse to allow its tax list of *cedulas personales* to be compared or checked with the parochial list; in religious festivities of the Chinese in Binondo, the *principales*, as civil officials, claimed precedence over the friars. In addition, the *principalia* demanded the right to supervise cemeteries. *Principales* would often issue *manifestos* favoring the retention of Spanish officials believed by them to be anti-clericals while boldly demanding the expulsion of friars. In a subtle gesture to contest friar parish priest

²⁸When the Spaniards came to the Philippines, they called the natives "*indios*". Later on this term was confined to the Christianized natives since the Muslims came to be called "*moros*" and the pagans "*infieles*". The term "*Filipino*" was reserved for Spaniards born in the Philippines who were also called "*creoles*". Spaniards who were born in Spain and came to the Philippines were simply called "*españoles*" or "*peninsulares*". Often to distinguish the Spaniard born in the Philippines from the *peninsular* the former was called "*insular*". However, around the middle of the nineteenth century, some Spanish writers had used the term "*Filipino*" to denote "*indios*". To avoid confusion, however, they made a distinction between "*españoles europeos*" and "*españoles filipinos*", the latter referring to the *creoles* or Spaniards born in the Philippines. In general, *indios* who went to study in Spain were called there "*Filipinos*" since it appeared that the term "*indio*" had acquired a derogatory connotation. However, during the Revolution in 1896, and even earlier, many educated *indios* had already started to call themselves "*Filipinos*", to the chagrin of some *españoles filipinos*.

The term "*mestizo*", without any qualification, referred to Chinese *mestizos* or Chinese half-breeds. When qualified as *mestizo de español*, it denoted Spanish half-breeds. When Jose Rizal was called "*mestizo*" in his trial in 1896, it referred to his Chinese ancestry and did not mean that he had a Spanish father. Rizal was also called an *indio*. By the beginning of this century, the term *mestizo* came to be technically confined to children who were half-white and half-Filipino. Colloquially, however, there were cases when the term was extended to refer also to any white person or one with strong European features.

²⁹Edward Gaylore Bourne, "Historical Introduction", Blair and Robertson *op. cit.*, Volume I, p. 60.

³⁰"Le Roy's Bibliographical Notes, *ibid.*, Volume LII, footnote, pp. 115-116.

supervision of schools, *principales* often volunteered their willingness to contribute to the establishment of schools—presumably to be under their direct control. In many ways, these demands and actions of the *principales* were based on certain interpretations of the laws. This led Spanish officials to suspect that they were being well-advised by recently graduated native lawyers.³¹ In any case, for once *principales* had begun to contest friar prerogatives in a more sophisticated and determined manner.

Friar retaliation and colonial repressive measures were severe. Any questioning of the *status quo* was often labelled as *filibusterismo* or subversion. Many scions of the best native families and Spanish *mestizos* left to study in Spain not only to escape harassment but also because they were not satisfied with the nature of instruction and the curricula in the colony. This steady stream became more noticeable in the early 1880's. Many of these students and others who joined them had a fair mixture of Chinese blood while a few had Spanish blood.³² In Spain, they joined the colony of some exiles, professionals, and students who had gone there earlier. There, they were able to breathe in the relatively freer political atmosphere while having more access to political literature.

Initially, these *ilustrados* worked in a desultory manner when they exposed what they believed were wrong in the colony and suggested how to attain greater progress in its social and economic institutions. However, it would not be long when they would start organizing and coordinating their activities to generate the so-called Propaganda Movement, which was, in effect, a movement for reforms in the colony.

What the reformers voiced first of all was the assimilation of the colony to Spain or making it a province of Spain. This would have given the natives the same political rights enjoyed in Spain or at least it would have made the Spaniards and natives in the colony equal before the law. Some reformers postulated that equality before the law implied that all offices in the colonial bureaucracy (excepting those of the Governor-General and heads of the various ministries) were opened to anyone. Nevertheless, they suggested that this be made through a system of competitive examinations. They also asked for the change of the military regime into a civil one. This would have made more operative the enjoyment of civil rights. Representation of the Philippines in the Spanish Cortes was also demanded. This would have made it easier to voice the aspirations of the natives while exposing in

³¹A narration of such harassments is found in John N. Schumacher, *The Propaganda Movement: 1880-1895* (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1973), pp. 96-114.

³²The *principales* since the earliest times were strengthened by the blood of the thrifty Chinese. This enabled them to acquire the skills for entrepreneurship and industry in the urban areas. Some Chinese *mestizos* were able to become *principales*, possibly by virtue of the status of their mothers. The *principalia* was also strengthened by the blood of the prestigious Spaniards who started coming in relatively bigger numbers around the middle of the nineteenth century. With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, more Spaniards came.

the mother country any violation of laws or rights. Another demand was for the secularization of the parishes and the expulsion of the friars, who, unlike the ever loyal natives, were charged as merely working for the interests of their religious corporations as against those of Spain. This charge was to do away with a clerical force which consistently opposed reforms in the colony while at the same time enabling natives to occupy the post of parish priest with all of its powers and privileges.

All these demands revealed that the *ilustrados* believed that they could hold their own against the Spaniards in intellectual matters and in holding important political as well as ecclesiastical positions. They were asserting that as *naturales* they had a right to have a more involved participation in the determination of the direction of their country. They were also claiming for a greater share in the economic and social benefits of the colony.

Spanish colonial officials and friars contended that the demand of the reformers did not truly represent the aspirations of the majority of the native population who were asserted as content with the *status quo*. The reformers were judged as ungrateful for it was the very education they had imbibed in the colonial regime that enabled them to demand a change in it. To belie the above contention, the reformers, through speeches, *manifestos*, articles and books tried to disseminate their ideas. A newspaper, *La Solidaridad*, was published in Spain. Many copies of the newspaper and other printed materials were smuggled to Manila where they were avidly read by discontented *principales*, native petty officials in the civil service, and members of a rising working class consisting of printers, petty clerks, artisans, etc. Many affluent *principales* as well as native priests supported the movement financially and even helped to distribute the printed materials. It should also be mentioned that the *ilustrados* in Spain were in close contact with, and even encouraged in their work by not a few Spanish officials and Masons. Many of the *ilustrados* joined Masonry as a means to get more sympathy from liberal thinkers who happened to be Masons. This organization could have led some *ilustrados* to become not only more anti-friar but anti-clerical as well. This, however, did not make them cease to voice the aspirations of the native secular clergy— for some time at least. Significant about some of the books and articles published by the *ilustrados* was their attempt to resurrect legends and other matters dealing with the Pre-Hispanic epoch. This, in an important manner, reflected pride on indigenous elements while consciously belying the assertion of friars that before the coming of the Spaniards, the natives were doomed to perdition and that there was nothing for them to be really proud of.

Crucial to note is that among the *ilustrados* there were a few who could be termed “intellectuals” in the exact sense of the word. Besides a profession, they had a well-grounded liberal education, and were good writers. They were the first to realize that in the historical stage the

Spaniards found themselves, they would not be able to consider the natives as persons that ought to or could be considered their equals. They concluded that since it was the essence of colonialism to have both exploiters and exploited, what they conceived as constituting the good life could never be realized in the colonial setup. The native intellectuals were the most sensitive to acts of humiliation and racial discrimination or prejudice. Comparing themselves with Spaniards with lesser intellectual accomplishments, they were frustrated when they were not given similar rights and courtesies as those towards the Spaniards in colonial society. They were thus led to conceive of an alternative community where what they believed to constitute the good life could be made operative. It was to be a community where man's potentiality for the development of his intellectual and moral virtues could be actualized, and where there was an absence of humiliation, exploitation, and special classes. The logic of such an alternative system was that it would eventually be independent.

The first intellectual to conceive and verbalize such an alternative system was Jose Rizal. In his two novels, the *Noli Me Tangere* and *El Filibusterismo*, he demonstrated, by means of well chosen characters, narration and analysis of certain social situations, that the Philippines under the structure of colonial and ecclesiastical dominance, could not really progress educationally, socially, economically, and morally. To him it was imperative to have the people slowly but surely develop a form of social consciousness with national overtones such that they would eventually form themselves into a national community where *national sentiment* (a concept akin to Rousseau's general will) would pervade. Although greatly influenced by many ideas of the French Revolution as well as the liberalism then found in Spain, he had to resurrect indigenous traditions, emphasize certain elements like a common racial ancestry and a history pre-dating the Spanish conquest. He believed that should the natives become more aware of their past history and racial ties, emancipate themselves further from individual and sectarian interests, cultivate a high degree of social consciousness, develop their native languages, and feel confident in their inner energies and appreciate more the products of their labor, while all the time distinguishing themselves from the Spaniards, they would eventually form themselves into a national community. It was a community which the Spaniards had to face eventually and grant political independence unless it was willing to face dire consequences. Before writing his novels, Rizal once wrote that what was wrong in the Philippines was that, there, "a man is only an individual; he is not member of a nation." What he implied here was that the individual became more significant and more capable of developing his potentialities in a social system that was national in character. The people, too, were not to be tools of other nations. They had to act in a corporate capacity and their gains were to be sought for along communal and not individual or partisan ends.

But Rizal did not stop with mere writing. He organized the *Liga Filipina* as a tool to hasten the emergence of a national community.³³ The national community was to be called "Filipinas" and to be owned by the natives who were now asserted to be the real Filipinos. Rizal's antagonists clearly saw that the success of his ideas would leave no place for Spaniards in Filipinas. They realized that the national community would finally erode the colonial system. Their attacks on him increased with the result that he and those who came to imbibe his ideas became further alienated from their colonial rulers.

Eventually, the intellectuals among the *ilustrados* had to fight the conservatism of the majority of the *principalia* while resenting those *principales* who were closely identified with the colonial regime. These intellectuals well perceived that there were *principales* merely interested in augmenting their privileges and powers if not eventually aspiring to inherit the colonial mantle. To such intellectuals, the substitution of an oppressive native dominance for a foreign one would not represent any improvement from both the human and moral point of view. In the same manner that they were against "economic and administrative caciquism", they would also be against native ecclesiastical dominance.³⁴ Thus the reform movement which initially begun as a movement in behalf of *principales* transformed itself into a movement in behalf of the whole people.

VII. Reformers, Revolutionaries, and *Principales*

The ideas of the reformers eventually seeped into the urban working class in Manila and Tondo. When the work of the reformers were then correctly seen to be doomed and the repressive measures of colonial officials and friars became increasingly unbearable, a new leadership from the above class emerged. Thus was the *Katipunan* association born with the aim of attaining a national community by revolution. Its founder, Andres Bonifacio (b. 1863) was a clerk in a foreign commercial firm. He was taught reading and writing at home and built himself up through self-study. Bonifacio and his advisers were deeply influenced by Rizal who was now seen by them as a man who had emancipated himself from a class bias and who had conceived of a national community along moral principles.

Because of its nativistic appeal and promise of a better future for the people, thousands in the provinces joined the *Katipunan*. Among these were members of messianic groups that were peasant-based, a common feature in Philippine history, who were just waiting for such an organization to appear.³⁵ The vague understanding of Spanish officials of the nature of such messianic groups, many members of which joined or at least sympathized with the *Katipunan*, led them to

³³A detailed analysis of Rizal's concept of a national community and how the *Liga* could serve as a tool to realize it, is found in the author's monograph, *Rizal's Concept of a Filipino Nation* (Quezon City; 1959).

³⁴Cf. James A. Le Roy, *Philippine Life in Town and Country* (New York and London G.P. Putnam's Sons 1905), pp. 180-181.

³⁵The works of David R. Sturtevant and Reynaldo C. Ileto offer deep insights into such messianic movements.

report varying estimates of *Katipunan* membership ranging from 100,000 to 400,000. *Principales* and native priests soon started joining it. Kinship or racial ties, patriotism, sheer desperation, hatred of Spaniards, wish for a better social system, or hope to profit from the revolutionary movement might all have entered into the total picture of membership.

When the actual uprising took place in 1896, many conservative *principales* as well as *ilustrados* recoiled in horror at the very thought of blood and violence. Nevertheless, some of them were arrested and even executed by Spaniards who never thought that a revolution could emanate from another yet humbler segment of the native population. Eventually, the leadership and organization of the revolution fell into the hands of the *principales*. An index to this was the Tejeros Assembly held on March 22, 1897, where revolutionary leaders met to form a new revolutionary government. Emilio Aguinaldo, who had studied in one of the colleges in Manila to become a teacher and who like his father had once served as *capitan municipal* in Cavite province, was selected President. Even the selection of Bonifacio as Director of the Interior was protested by a *principal* who haughtily asserted that "The position of Director of the Interior is very great and should not be occupied by one who is not a lawyer." He then suggested another person who has a law degree. The meeting was marred by factional squabbles and regional differences. The government it established officially replaced the *Katipunan*. Bonifacio, who had left the meeting angrily with his loyal followers, was eventually executed by orders of a military court controlled by the faction opposed to him.

It was through the intermediacy of other *principales* that Spanish government officials and leaders of the Revolution were able to ink the Pact of Biak-na-Bato in December 1897. In the resumption of the Revolution in 1898, the role of the *principales* became intimate and important. It was clearly seen by the revolutionary leaders that the struggle for independence had greater chances of success with the support of the *principales*. To gain legitimacy as well as support for the revolutionary government, it was essential for the municipal officials of different towns to ratify a previous declaration of independence. It is significant to note that the Revolutionary Congress, with an original number of nearly 90 members, which set out to frame a constitution for an independent Filipinas was composed of 40 lawyers, 16 physicians, 5 pharmacists, 2 engineers, one priest, with the rest consisting of businessmen and landowners. Many of the provisions of the constitution which was promulgated had reference to the sanctity of property.

When in 1898 the prospects for the success of the revolution was high, some affluent Manila *ilustrados* wanted to form a bank and take advantage of the revolutionary government. They were blocked by other *ilustrados* of relatively humbler origins like Apolinario Mabini who, like Rizal, was also an intellectual.

Many of the generals of the revolutionary army were either *ilustrados* or at least *principales*. However, as to be expected, the bulk of the revolutionary army was composed of the ordinary *tao*—most of them descendants of the once proud *maharlikas* or freemen who were now converted into tenants, sub-tenants or mere peasants. With the success of American arms against the revolution, many *principales*, lured by promises of offices in the new regime or to protect their properties and vested interests, accepted American sovereignty. Among them were former members of the Revolutionary Congress. All of these were happening while a guerrilla warfare supported by the peasantry and messianic groups increased in intensity. This warfare suggests that agrarian unrest has been a continuing part of a historical pattern in the Philippines even before the Revolution. It was the *principales* who cooperated with the Americans to reestablish law and order in the country. The majority of the members of the first National Assembly came from their ranks and they were the first to agitate for a peaceful movement for independence. All of these, nevertheless, reflected the assertion of native leadership on the part of a special segment of the native population.

The problem still facing the present national community that has come to be in the Philippines is whether it has within it the will, and the structure under a dedicated and emancipated leadership, to accommodate further many of the elements that characterized its original conception—elements referring to the intrinsic worth of an individual as such, the avoidance of all forms of exploitation, and the principle that the social and economic benefits of the nation ought to redound to the good of all and not solely to those of special classes.

ASIA AND THE HUMANITIES*

CESAR ADIB MAJUL

I

Historically, the attitudes and responses of the Western world towards the various Asian humanistic traditions have been a function of various needs. In a very important sense, the shift in these needs represents a progressive transformation from particular to relatively expanding universal ones. Significantly, such an expansion has been accompanied by a proportionate increase in its spiritual dimensions.

In the eighteenth century as well as the beginning of the nineteenth century, knowledge of Asian humanities among Westerners was confined to those interested in the exotic or hitherto unknown sources of wisdom. Some European intellectuals have even used this knowledge as a critique of what they believed constituted intellectual or moral complacency among their contemporaries. Such knowledge widened in scope later on when missionaries were led to deepen their studies of Eastern moral values and religious beliefs as part of their efforts towards more successful proselytizing. Often, unsuccessful missionaries returned to their home base to end up as experts on different sorts of oriental religions while preparing others to take their places at home and abroad. The imperialist powers, too, had their experts not so much to know the weaknesses of their subjects, who had been conquered mainly by force, as to make their rule more efficient and tolerable. Thus it is no accident that some of the most monumental compendia of Islamic Law or their translations used in India were produced under the patronage of British rulers.

After World War II, the almost universal trauma resulting from widespread destruction and immense loss of lives, the fear of a nuclear war as well as a genuine desire for world peace, the rise of many independent countries from colonial status, new political realignments

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among nations, and a new concept of international relations not entirely devoid of the expectations for a one-world in the very distant future, made imperative the knowledge of the ideologies of other countries as well as the moral and religious values which might have entered into the formulation of such ideologies. Cultural centers, exchange programs, cultural missions, scholarships etc., became the order of the day. But such programs, although allowing an increased number of Westerners to know more about Asia, had probably enabled more Asians to know more about and even imbibe Western values to the extent that many of them have come to question if not abandon, some of their own traditional values. In any case, a basic premise behind all the above programs and missions was that knowledge of the culture of another country would hopefully moderate, if not eliminate, obstacles to friendlier relations along political lines or at least avoid misunderstandings in negotiations among different statesmen.

In the last few years, problems of overpopulation, pollution, malnutrition, illiteracy, etc., have become universal in their import and implication. However, programs sponsored by developed nations or world agencies to help other nations have often met a cultural wall, generating, probably unwittingly, misunderstanding if not outright hostility. The misunderstanding as well as the resulting resentment have often been brought about by experts from the developed countries of the West whose prescriptions could not fit into the value systems and social institutions of the countries they meant to help. Conversely, suspicions about or imputation of unnecessary motives to such experts may have been the result of ignorance of other cultural values than their own. All these obviously point to the necessity for a widening and an intensification of the knowledge of other cultural values on the part of experts as well as on that of the population where problems of world import are to be resolved. The burden of knowledge ought to be everyone's concern and not be placed merely on the shoulders of the experts.

It is important to note that alongside the shifting needs of Westerners to know Asian values, there have been sincere efforts by many universities, especially those in the United States, to include courses on Asian humanities in their liberal arts curriculum. But this program was meant to enrich the lives of the students and accelerate their creative impulses while enabling them at the same time to understand more deeply and appreciate their own culture through a comparative

knowledge of other cultures. The Conference on Oriental Classics held at Columbia University in 1958 bears out this observation well. Although members of the conference spoke of the "intrinsic value" of some of the Oriental Classics while giving secondary importance to their historical value, and emphasized that the problem of the Western humanities was understanding better "humanity in Asia" or "discovering the essential humanity in various civilizations", the aim of the existing or proposed academic programs was the intellectual growth of the students. In effect, the higher institutions of learning had produced an elite which had a fair understanding and even empathy for the cultural values of other peoples. However, when some members of this elite come to occupy high positions in the state, how much of their previous education in the past facilitate their task of improving the relations between their country and another Asian one?

Undoubtedly, the enrichment of a person's intellectual life, understanding among peoples of each others' cultures, the cultural competence of experts charged with the explanation and implementation of programs of world import, and the the facilitation of channels of communication so necessary to peaceful relations between nations are all desirable and ought to be encouraged. However, it is problematical whether all of these desiderata, if realized, can radically or ultimately solve problems urging immediate solutions like the danger of a nuclear holocaust and that of dwindling raw materials and their unavailability or high cost.

Undoubtedly, the great powers do not presently desire a nuclear war, especially one where all will be the losers. But it is not idle to speculate that should one of them be absolutely sure of emerging totally victorious from such a war with negligible losses on its side that it will not restrain itself from going into it. The point here is that the fear of a nuclear war among the great powers does not result from compassion for the people of the rival power and a love for human race, but because their own nationals stand in danger of extinction. In brief, the fear of a nuclear war is a function of national interests and does not stem from humanistic considerations based on universal principles. Based therefore on pragmatic and partisan principles, the desire for a state of no-war, euphemistically called "peace", cannot endure for long should other exigencies demand otherwise. It is instructive to note that many years ago there were nations who, not yet possessing a nuclear bomb, had demanded a ban on all nuclear armaments on

the basis of peace and humanity. However, the moment they were able to produce an atomic blast, they conveniently forgot all their past moralizing. The great powers, in turn, condemned such a blasting as if only they had a monopoly to kill on a large scale.

The problem of raw materials as dramatically shown in the last energy crisis all point to the necessity for the existence in the not too far away future of a common pool of world resources and even of services for the benefit of all mankind, from which countries can draw on the basis of urgent needs and priorities. At present, most help to developing countries from rich or developed countries have been done on the basis of historical or friendly relations or with the inevitable attached strings. This is not to deny that genuine needs of a particular country are being satisfied through the aid of another friendly country; but the point here is that there is the probability that there is another country in more urgent need for the particular aid granted. The fact is that countries having much needed resources which they can spare actually manipulate them in terms of national interests and power politics. Forgetting that the recent Arab use of the oil weapon had been based on techniques learned from the West, some quarters in the West have demanded that all Arab oil should be internationalized for the benefit of mankind in general. In principle this demand is, I believe, rational and good, provided that all other nations in the world internationalize their raw materials, their technical knowledge as well as their surplus agricultural and industrial products.

At present, it is quite difficult to convince a person who is sophisticated in the knowledge of international relations that international agencies like the World Bank are not influenced by the very rich nations who have contributed to its capital. It is much harder to convince him that as the rich nations become richer, the developing countries do not become relatively poorer. For example, in the last few years, export products from the West to Asia had, in some cases, jumped up to 300% in their prices while, for many years until the October War of 1973, the prices of raw materials from Asia and Africa had remained more or less stationary. This means that the highly industrialized countries and international cartels have become richer while the developing countries exporting raw materials have become relatively poorer. In response to the demand for higher prices for their raw materials on the part of the developing countries, the industrialized countries had planned an organization of consumers to present a united front. In the face of all these,

the United Nations Secretary General reflected that there was need for agreement on certain general principles which ensure a rising standard of living for the developing countries while guaranteeing continued economic security for the developed ones. But as long as nations will adhere to their claims to their own resources and make their specific demands regarding trade and tariff arrangements and accessibility to other markets, and as long as the developed nations will, as a reaction, band themselves into an economic block to maintain their primacy in the international economic sphere, conflict between blocks of nations will be chronic in increasing proportions and with dangerous implications. However, should some form of understanding be arrived at in accordance with the view of the Secretary-General, all what this means is that only some developing countries but most industrialized countries will profit from it. Indeed this does not necessarily imply that the whole of mankind will benefit from such an arrangement.

The idea of having a world agency where the surpluses of raw materials and agricultural and industrial products are registered or deposited and from which any nation can draw in accordance with its needs under a system of priorities, will never be possible unless all the peoples of the world begin to develop a sense of common direction as well as a set of universal values transcending those of particular nations and particular cultures. In brief, no concept of a world community can be both meaningful and operative unless it is based on a set of universally held values. I take it that this is one of the possible implications of what is meant by Dr. Michael Novak to constitute a planetary humanities.

II

One possible concept of a planetary humanities is that it includes within its connotation the following elements: that the survival of the human species is a value to be cherished, that individuals as such have an intrinsic value all their own, that in human experience and historical transformation different peoples have arrived at certain values and principles worthy of mutual adoption (or adaptation) by other peoples to enrich each other's lives and institutions, and that these principles can be viewed as representing ultimately a cumulative effort on the part of the human species for a more cohesive and happier universal order where particularistic cultural elements are simply peripheral. The basic postulate in all these is that in all man's efforts to bring about what they believe constitutes order and harmony, there are common

ingredients of humanity in all of them — elements transcending the limitations of race, speech, and geography. But, indeed, of overriding importance is the survival of the human species in this earth without the sacrificing of any race or segment to achieve this end. Admittedly, this is a value. As to the question why this ought to be a value of mankind, neither logic nor empirical philosophy can give a definite answer. Attempts at an answer are found in classical moral philosophy and certainly in all of the great religions.

However, a planetary humanities as outlined above cannot come into being unless a great part of the world population or at least its intellectual leaders, moral leaders, and academicians develop a consciousness of its fundamental connotations. They must be committed to a form, or order, or cohesion of a world community and possess a sentiment for what constitutes human expectations believed to be realizable in such an order. A basic assumption here is that human life ought to have some direction or purpose if it is to be worthwhile or significant.

Moreover, as previously hinted, the evolvement of a planetary humanities if it is to have some form of universal sanction must incorporate within it, albeit transformed to a higher and more universal level — values which have characterized the great humanistic traditions all over the world, have stood the test of time, and still continue to maintain their hold on a great part of the world's population. It is here where the various Asian humanistic traditions can play an important and vital role.

The problem of a planetary humanities accommodating Asian values invites some observations. First of all, values represent reactions or responses of people to certain human and social situations; as expressed in statements, they represent both prescriptions and preferences. They do not describe facts but rather exemplify human responses to factual situations and needs. Moral, political, and aesthetic judgments pertain to the realm of values. Values represent the human urge to create ordered life both in the individual and the social level. They aim to bring about what is conceived to constitute harmony and happiness as a response to biological and other human needs within the framework of some adjustment to the physical and social environment. A generally systematized group of values accepted by a people within a historical span of time is what may constitute a humanistic tradition. As such, Asia represents a constellation of different cultural patterns and value systems. Some of them might even use similar terms, but the

connotation or operative character of such terms might differ. What Asian tradition does not value justice, peace, harmony and freedom? Yet, no different from the Western world, such concepts may not mean exactly the same thing. Moreover, Asian value systems must not be viewed as something static or expressive of a philosophy of negativism or resignation. At present, many Asian countries are manifesting a form of social dynamism, and this might be due to the influence of Western values which may have been accepted within the sanction or framework of traditional values. Certainly, in various degrees, the ideas of modernism and the need for technological change are affecting Asian traditional values.

In trying to locate certain Asian values, it would be wise to be aware that in a given society considered as possessing a particular culture, different but parallel value system may exist side by side. It is well known that a protest against certain religious forms may originate from, or be expressed through, religious outlets. Sufism is an example of this in relation to the kind of Islamic orthodoxy propounded by the legalists. Buddhism is another in relation to Hindu tradition.

In the variety of Asian cultures and humanistic traditions, some are closer to those of the West rather than to some other Asian ones. For example, the Islamic humanistic tradition (which is really not monolithic but which exemplifies historical and geographical variations and is not confined to Asia since it predominates in North Africa) has more points of historical and substantive contacts with the Western tradition than say with Confucianism or Hinduism. The well-known reason for this is that Jesus Christ and many of the other Hebrew prophets have been incorporated into the pantheon of prophets revered by Islam. The belief here is that the Prophet Muhammad, although the last, belongs to this long series of prophets. Moreover, the lands that initially fell under the sway of Islam were already exposed to the Graeco-Roman tradition and had sizeable Christian communities. Yet one must not disregard one aspect of the Islamic humanistic tradition closely associated with Sufism (or Islamic mystical philosophy) which appears to cross religious borders. It has been recently demonstrated that many of the Sufistic ideas of Ibnul 'Arabi, the Spanish-Arab mystical philosopher, have a one-to-one correspondence and even doctrinal similarity with those of Lao Tzu, the Chinese Taoist philosopher. The fact that there is no known historical contacts between these two philosophers have led some other mystically-inclined scholars to assert

that they all drew their knowledge from a common source that existed during a primordial time — a knowledge which had persisted, with accretions, up to the present. However, more empirically minded scholars would probably comment that man's response to similar situations would probably elicit similar questions and answers.

Nevertheless, in spite of the differences between, and even existence of, competing humanistic traditions, it can be stated outrightly that there is an essential humanity and commonness to all of them. Cultural borrowing, the transfer of cultural values from their places of origin to far away places, similar responses of persons belonging to different cultures to similar human or social situations, the communicability of values by persons belonging to different races, creeds, and cultures, and genuine appreciation of artists for art forms produced in another age and clime all attest to the existence of an essential humanity common to all man's traditions. Moreover, in Asian traditions, most of the humanistic values have their origin or sanction in religion or are at least based on a metaphysical system (which in many Asian cultures is not entirely devoid of moral prescriptives). Asian religions, philosophical, and mystical systems have assumed the oneness of the human race as well as the sameness of the nature of man. A deeper study of religions will reveal that a one-to-one correspondence between their major concepts is possible. All of these generally suggest that many of these values are universal in their intent. This is not to deny that different religions have their *differentia*, but this might only imply their social function in satisfying particular or local needs.

There is probably no culture that is so poor that other cultures cannot learn something from it. However, the merit of a culture in its contribution to an albeit slowly emerging world culture is, by definition, the universality, actual or potential, of its key concepts. In the same manner that ideas of modernism, increased standards of living, and a healthy life should not, in spite of their origin, be considered a monopoly of the West, so must a great deal of the humanistic traditions of the different Asian civilizations be considered universal property. Actually, the diversity of culture should be the very instrument to enrich a future world culture. Allah says in the Qur'an: "O Mankind! Lo! We have created you male and female, and have made you nations and tribes that ye may know one another." (Sura XLIX, v. 13). That is, that they may learn from one another.

It is difficult for any one person to talk authoritatively of all Asian humanistic traditions. But I would like to mention how certain concepts of an originally Asian humanistic tradition — that of Islam — can serve as elements of a planetary humanities. One of the basic concepts of Islam is that of *amanah* or trust, that is, Man's life, his family, his property, his intelligence and talents and so on are really not his own but qualities or objects entrusted to him by the Divine. Also, that the earth and the skies around have been given to man for his use but only in the sense of his being a vice-regent on earth. Another concept of Islam is that of *community* to which a man must sublimate his personal or selfish interests. Undoubtedly, both of these concepts have their parallels in Western political thought. The Qur'an also tries to impress us with the idea that two of the greatest sources of evil in man come from his desire to live forever on earth and to hold absolute power. The original temptation of Adam is succinctly narrated as follows: "But the Devil whispered to him, saying: O Adam! Shall I show thee the tree of immortality and power that wasteth not away?" (Sura XX, v. 120). Here can be seen immediately Islamic values of universal import: that since man's life on earth is transient, he is accountable for his actions and must show compassion in his dealings, and that all power on earth is limited and relative and must be exercised as a trust (*amanah*). (See Annex, "Notes on the concept of *Amanah* in Islam").

Also, the Islamic concept that all religions and ethical systems different from its own are likewise the result of Divine revelation and that differences in races and nations were meant to enable different peoples or communities to solve problems and enrich their lives through specific creative impulses and then learn from each other, demonstrate the supreme virtue of tolerance. Certainly, this virtue is not equivalent to what passes now as religious apathy as an element of a new concept of freedom. Just a few of the values of Islam that have a universal message have been touched upon. Certainly, Judaism, Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism (in its various forms), Hinduism, etc., have corresponding or similar ideas as well as other ones.

No genuine reconstruction of the present world system regarding the solution of world problems, the sharing of world resources or raw materials, and even political adjustments along a one-world concept is really possible unless there is an *a priori* acceptance of certain universal values or at least the possibility of these; this is something beyond aca-

demic curiosity or mutual appreciation or even mere understanding of each other cultures. The awareness of such values may accelerate the expectations of a one-world in proportion to its popularization among the world population. But here a vicious circle may arise: not all human beings will have the same expectations unless they have approximately similar standards of well being. Also, many persons will be inclined to keep their loyalty confined to a nation and not go beyond it if they think that their well being is best secured within it. One tends to be loyal to a system as long as one is a beneficiary of it. Consequently, adherence or commitment to a planetary humanities will be greatly determined by its ability to satisfy expectations of the world population. The function of world education here is also crucial.

It is not gainsaying to state that there are multitudinous forces today that will eventually lead the different countries and peoples of the world to get together to solve common problems if each is to survive. But again this effort might not necessarily be guided by a common will for the good of all mankind but might only reflect the will for each to survive. Furthermore, if what will make mankind get together involves coercive elements and expedient principles, then the nature of the world's integration would at most be negative in character. What might be necessary is the development among all individuals and peoples of that kind of will that represents the will for the good of all mankind and not just the good of a particular race, nation, or segment. It is in the development of this will for the good of all mankind as such that the intellectuals, academicians, religious and moral leaders can play an important role. Obviously a key factor in this development is world education.

What might be done initially is to increase translations of the humanistic literature of the peoples of this world and widen their accessibility not only to the higher centers of learning but to other quarters as well. Curricula in the colleges and universities must offer more liberal courses that expose the young to such humanistic traditions. Philosophers or humanists with a good background in philosophy will eventually have to come out with a system demonstrating the equivalences or correspondences between the basic ideas of these traditions with special concentration on those that have direct import on the value of humanity as such and its survival. The results of their labor can then be distributed to various educational agencies in the world such that their influence can be felt in all levels of education including the

primary ones. Hopefully, a new world generation will arise that will have imbibed of such ideas and, although adhering to their own particularistic cultures, will be committed to certain values which will in effect constitute a planetary humanities. Consequently, their approaches to world problems will be based on a categorical imperative where humanity will be considered an end in itself.

All of these point to the awesome responsibility for a new breed of intellectuals, academicians, and creative thinkers to accelerate their contacts with one another and unify their vision of a universal or planetary humanities. It is a vision that will leave alone the great religions and philosophical systems to their votaries and yet testify to their validity and essential unity. It is a vision that will have as its sanction humanity as a whole as well as the survival of humanity with a new well-thought-out concept of its well-being as a major value.

ANNEX

Notes on the Concept of Amanah in Islam

Amanah (trust) is one of the most fundamental concepts in Islam. The true believer (*mumin*) is trustworthy or faithful to the trust. Since Allah is the Living and the source of all life, a person does not own his life but holds it only in trust. Since Allah is the All-Knowing and the source of all knowledge, a person's intelligence as well as all of his intellectual accomplishments are to be held in trust. All property, whether legally registered as private or otherwise, belongs to Allah and is, therefore, to be held or utilized by men as a trust. Since Allah is the Owner of All Sovereignty, political power can only be exercised by man as a loan under trust. Indeed, the concept of *Amanah* has tremendous political, economic and social implications. Knowing some of the Beautiful Names of Allah, which are, in effect, the names of his qualities, the Muslim can readily know what things ultimately belong to Allah, but which are allowed for man's use as a trust.

Clearly, in social life, the idea of *Amanah* serves as a primary safeguard against human arbitrariness while constituting a basis for the rights of persons on other persons and institutions. Its practice connotes the exercise of individual as well as group responsibility. Allah said in the Qur'an: "Lo! We offered the trust unto the heavens and the earth and the hills, but they shrank from bearing it and were afraid of it.

And man assumed it. Lo! he hath proved a tyrant and a fool.” (Sura XXXIII, v. 72). This verse strongly suggests that when a person marries, raises a family, studies for a degree, practices a profession, owns property, exercises power of different forms, etc., he has entered into certain commitments. But man, in the exercise of any such trust, has often acted irresponsibly. His tyranny results when he uses his intelligence of purely personal, family or dynastic interest; and his foolishness comes about when he believes that he knows everything or can do anything without the help of Allah. Such a tyrant or fool had broken or abused the trust. In effect, he had committed the sin of Pride and had forgotten Allah.

From the Islamic point of view, man is given access to the things of the earth and the skies to facilitate and make more effective his service to and worship of Allah. That this access must be governed by the principle of *Amanah* implies that man’s actions must be done not for selfish interests or to harm others, but for the good of the greater whole. In the practical sphere, this greater whole can refer only to the *umma*, or Muslim community. What is meant here is that the life, strength, intelligence, skills, property, etc., of the Muslim must be geared to the wider and greater interests of the *umma*. A serious study of the Covenant (*mithaq*) between Allah and the *umma* as well as a function of the latter in this world, reveal that a purpose, among others, of the Islamic community is to serve as a witness to the other religious communities of how the *Amanah* is to be made manifest and operative in social life. However, all this is not to deny the very important duties and responsibilities of the Muslim to the whole of Mankind since, according to the Qur’an, there is also a Covenant between Allah and Mankind which was implicit when He said to the sons of Adam: “Am I not your Lord?” (Sura VII, v. 172).

Written for the Muslim Educational
and Cultural Association (Cornell
University)

NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY*

CESAR ADIB MAJUL

THE TASK OF NATION FORMING AND THE SEARCH FOR THOSE elements to identify a nation or national community is a constructive, thrilling, and exhilarating experience to all participants. It is a task which is a challenge to people either as individuals or groups as they attempt to integrate themselves into a wider community. The problem of national identity is, in effect, the search for those elements which will serve to define their integration into a national community for human and social purposes. It is important to point out that although the Philippines is internationally recognized as an independent state, its citizens are actually still in a process of integrating themselves further into a national community. For if this was not the case, then why all of this talk for the search of national identity? What has just been said might appear as a contradiction; but it is not so in fact. However, it cannot be denied that belonging to a state under the authority of a particular government can provide for an element of national identity. But national identity is much more than this.

You all know that when the Spaniards arrived in the Philippines, what mainly existed in the Archipelago were a group of widely scattered *barangays*; and the facts show that not all of them were maintaining friendly relations with one another. It was only in the sultanates of Sulu, Maguindanao, and Buayan that scores of *barangays* (*banuas*) and even different islands were subjected to a central authority. The Spaniards, in an important sense, were able to integrate the inhabitants of the archipelago and give them an identification of sorts. But it must be emphasized that the natives were identified either as colonial subjects of the Spanish King or ecclesiastical wards of the Church. Admittedly, these two identifying factors in some way transcended that of loyalty to a particular chief, family, *barangay*, or even linguistic or regional group. But the Spanish integration was effected not so much for the well-being of the natives *per se*, but rather for the interests of Spanish colonial and ecclesiastical superiors; interests that were often diametrically opposed to those of the natives. For then, how would you explain

¹ A talk before English majors. Oct. 13, 1969.

the numerous revolts against the colonial oppressors? Against this background of colonial exploitation and intellectual, educational, and social stagnation among the natives, some members of the relatively more educated segment of the native population realized that within the colonial and ecclesiastical framework into which they had been thrust, it was difficult if not impossible to attain individual progress and freedom and what they conceived as constituting the social good. Actually they even charged the colonial authorities with having obstructed the attainment of such aspirations. Thus these native leaders were led to conceive of the necessity of forming an alternative community which in effect became the national community. In brief, if the natives of the Philippines were to attain the individual and social good at all, it would have to be done in terms of an identification radically different from those which the Spaniards had originally imposed upon them.

You will all recall that up to the end of the last century, the natives of the Filipinas colony were not called "Filipinos" but "Indios." The Filipinos at that time were the Spanish born in the Philippines. Therefore, it can be used, in an important sense, that Filipinas belonged to the Filipinos but not to the Indios who were born here. The Propaganda Movement and the Philippine Revolution were interrelated movements attempting to transform the Indios into Filipinos such that Filipinos would end up belonging to the native inhabitants of the Philippines. Filipinas was to belong to the natives who were asserted to be the real Filipinos because they were born in it and the land was the land of their ancestors before the coming of the Spaniards. So we can now see that as Filipinos we are a new nation or rather, to be consistent with my thesis, a people still trying to become Filipinos and to make the Philippines really belong to us. The question now is: What is it that makes a Filipino? Is it enough to be a native of the Philippines to be a Filipino or does it require certain specific commitments? What are these commitments? The answer to the above questions is at bottom the same as the answer to the question of what constitutes our national identity.

First of all, we must not assume that the search for national identity ceases the moment a people feel themselves to have constituted a national community. Actually, a dynamic national community keeps on evaluating its elements of identity — eliminating some while adding others in accordance with new needs and expectations in its process of development. A national community that does not evaluate some of its fundamental values has become static and unresponsive to inner needs as well as to external influences. Thus, we should not prescribe that the moment we have enough iden-

tifying elements to consider ourselves a nation that the matter ends there.

The problem at hand is to discover those elements already existing among us and serving to identify us further as Filipinos, as well as those values which we ought to and can adopt in order to make the nation more cohesive. Thus, with your kind indulgence we have to go into a digression that is partially theoretical. I take it that there are at least three principles needed for the analysis of the beginnings and the growth of a national community. The first principle is the consciousness of belonging to a wider group. This consciousness is a matter of degree. It can be vague or highly sophisticated. New or growing nations can be distinguished from older nations by using the above first principle as a criterion. A sense of history here is involved. We can now appreciate better why Rizal worked hard at the British Museum to learn about our past before the coming of the Spaniards in order to search for what he calls "our ancient nationality," which was subsequently lost. Admittedly, some mythology enters into the picture when people write about their ancient days; but then who can deny that a great deal of mythology and fiction is involved in our lives and relations with one another as long as they serve some pragmatic purposes?

The second principle is a commitment to a definite ideology or at least to a basic agreement as to the procedure or technique to arrive at such an ideology. What is happening now in the Philippines is that many groups with particular sectarian ideologies are competing with one another to have elements belonging to their particular ideology be accommodated in that of the national community. Which of these competing ideologies will succeed is left for the future to decide. In a generally democratic society, it is expected that such competition ought to be done by discussion and persuasion. Clearly, discussions, if they are not to reflect bitter economic dissensions but signify differences on how to arrive at the good of all, must be carried on among people among whom there are no gross economic inequalities. Incidentally, adherence to democratic procedure by all competing groups in a society, in an important manner, provides for an element of identity among a group of people.

Related to the second principle is the third one which is the general belief that the formation or existence of a national community brings about the enjoyment of what is conceived to constitute the individual and social good. This principle involves the nature of commitment either to the idea of having a national community or to the fact of a nation; for why should people work to bring about or work for something if they will not get anything out of it. Indeed, it is when people feel that some of their deeply felt aspirations will be satisfied in a community that they will effectively participate in

its formation and be willing to undergo sacrifices for it. This third principle is important for it was precisely because it was felt by the generality of the natives of the Philippines that they were not getting much out of the Spanish or enough of the American colonial system that they began to think of another system. However, as Rizal pointed out, if the new system would be just like the old one, then nothing much in terms of human development and the social good would be attainable.

My conclusion from all the above is that as a starting point in the development of our national community we already have some prescriptive elements, and the nature of these has to do with the thinking of our revolutionary fathers. Their messages are still cogent. We need a system where the freedom of the individual as well as his intrinsic value is asserted and where the social conditions for the development of his talents are provided for. Moreover, in this social condition, there is supposed to be a complete absence of exploitation, of any form of humiliation, of overwhelming self-esteem, and of tyranny. All work for the benefit of all, in the spirit of consideration, love, discipline, and sacrifice. The member of the community has learned to emancipate himself from his personal and even family interests for those of the whole society. Our revolutionary fathers believed that the existence of a national community they were fighting to bring about was to constitute essentially a system of moral relations.

At this point, another question can be raised: Why then did our revolutionary fathers not immediately conceive of a universal community based on the individual's sense of humanity instead of one that was national in character? Why did they have to speak initially of a nation? The answer is due to the historical stage in which our revolutionary fathers found themselves; nations were fighting one another or exploiting each other or competing with each other to have more colonies. Classes were fighting each other for social supremacy and dynasties tyrannized the bulk of the population. Our revolutionary fathers therefore deemed it necessary that the natives should belong to a nation different from other nations and that theirs should be strong enough to resist the exploitative tendencies of other nations. They must be Filipinos first before they could fight for their rights *qua* human beings. After all, the other nations *vis-a-vis* each other were not thinking of the human condition or moral considerations; they were strengthening themselves as nations in order to take advantage of others. In brief, if other nations were to think in terms of moral relations they would not have come as colonizers or exploiters. This does not mean that our revolutionary fathers did not anticipate that the march of mankind was eventually towards a greater sense of humanity and that nationalism would ultimately

become a thing of the past. The message here is clear: nationalism is, at best, a tool for human and social ends. It is not an end in itself.

Historically speaking, individuals and groups have played their part in delineating principles to guide the national community. Such individuals are those with great vision and statesmanship. They are usually called the fathers of a nation. Groups, reflecting the vague aspirations of the people but able to articulate them better, have also played their part in adding to the elements of national identity. But more than this; individuals, like groups, can be creative by pointing out new directions to a national community. The University of the Philippines not only as a state university but as a community of scholars can play a similar creative role. By means of academic excellence, intellectual leadership, the will to work for a common good, as well as with the parallel development of a more effective communication between its academicians (both faculty and students) with the masses of people, universities can play a dramatic and creative role. By virtue of its advantages in the development of skills as well as a grasp of the subject matter of the different divisions of human thought, an academic community can be more sensitive to the nature of increasing government needs and social demands and be in a better position to set forth certain directions that will make the national community more cohesive, more responsive to the demands of modernization and technical progress, and a culturally richer one. Scholars, too, are in the best position to study the different cultural elements among our diverse peoples to discover principles worth adopting by all—thus letting our sub-cultures play an important role in nation-building. By means of persuasion in an atmosphere of freedom, an academic community can not but generate expectations among the people, even along constructive ideological lines. In any case, any professor or student by developing himself along lines of academic excellence tends to increase the educational level of society. Therefore he helps society to determine what aims it ought to pursue as well as to discover the means for attaining them. That is why academic freedom and free speech must be cherished possessions in all academic communities. If this were not the case, then society would lose an opportunity to profit from its potentially more brilliant segment. We should not fear discussions, criticisms, and more ideas, whatever may be the manner in which they may appear; for it is out of conflicting opinions that the best ones might prevail for the benefit of all. However, all ideas, if they are not to bring about contrary or negative results, must be accepted on a voluntary basis. Allow me to say that I do not believe that there is an idea that is so eminently good that it ought to be imposed.

On account of our history, geographical situation, and international relations, it is suggested that the further search for elements

for our national identity might consider, among others, the following principles: a deeper study of the work of our revolutionary fathers and the agrarian basis of the popular support of the Philippine Revolution; the need for an accelerated integration of our different cultural groups, both the majority and minority groups, by an emphasis on a common cultural matrix as well as a selection of the best values from our sub-cultures to be adopted by all within the context of a pluralistic society; the elimination of all vestiges of colonialism and imperialism in our social life and the development of new attitudes among the people regarding other nations; the recapture of cultural ties with our Asian neighbors from which we had been separated from by means of a deliberate colonial policy; the search for a more equitable economic system that will avoid any form of exploitation between groups in our society; more scientific development and the adoption of the techniques for modernization as well as the strengthening of our economic base not only to raise the standard of living but also to prevent other nations from exploiting our country; the development of our national language to further our sense of unity and experiments in having new thought forms to bring about more knowledge; the development of literature and the arts to enable our emerging culture to become a truly creative one and make our lives more adventuresome in the world of ideas and feeling; and the search of moral principles to moderate conflicts among ourselves, enabling us to develop the virtues of discipline and work for the good of all. It is not naive to assume this early that in a future world culture, elements of a new and vigorous Filipino culture will be incorporated. This was a hope of some of our revolutionary fathers. This is a responsibility you are all expected to bear. THANK YOU.

THE RELEVANCE OF MABINI'S SOCIAL IDEAS TO OUR TIMES*

BY CESAR ADIB MAJUL

It is with a combined sense of humility and honor that I address the faculty and students of the Lyceum. There can be no alternative to this attitude since not only is my talk this evening one dealing with the ideas and the mind of a national hero to whom we are all specially beholden, but the main audience represents one of the most concerned student bodies in our country. It is a student force that is playing its expected role of leadership in making the Filipino people move more surely and inevitably towards greater national and social consciousness.

Clearly, no movement can be purposive or can acquire direction, unless it is motivated and guided by certain ideas and principles giving it, as it were, nourishment as well as support. The compelling character of any movement is in the final analysis, a function of the nature and strength of the ideas behind it. Paraphrasing Mabini, the movement of a people is like the energy of an overflowing river which can be destructive unless properly channeled—then and only then can such an energy be converted into something beneficial.¹ Indeed, what harnesses human energies are ideas.

As long as we are still in the process of increasing and intensifying our national consciousness and the further development of a national community, it is necessary and proper to draw those cogent ideas and principles from the common matrix of the thinking of our revolutionary fathers for it is from this matrix that we can discover those forces that initiated the process of our having become an historical people and which opened the gates of nationhood for the Filipinos. It was the Philippine Revolution that transformed the *indio*, previously identified and categorized as a subject of the Spanish monarch or as a ward of Spanish ecclesiastical authorities, into a Filipino, a member of an indigenous national community. During the Spanish regime, the term "Filipino" was reserved for Spaniards born in the Philippines, and what was called "*Filipinas*" was for their benefit as well as for some other Spaniards born in the Peninsula. But persons like Rizal, Bonifacio, and Mabini were among the first to conceive of the transformation of the *indio* into a Filipino. In brief, *Filipinas* was now to be for Filipinos, who were to be the natives of the Archipelago and whose ancestral roots were traceable to those inhabitants living before the Spanish conquest. It is in this important sense that our

* Based on a talk before the faculty and student of the Lyceum of the Philippines, sponsored by the Student Catholic Action, on July 22, 1968—occasion—104th birth anniversary of A. Mabini.

¹ See "A los revolucionarios Filipinos," *La Revolucion Filipina*, Vol. I, p. 102.

revolutionary fathers were the first to conceive of the notion of a Filipino national community. But more than this, each helped to bring it about in the manner provided by their particular genius. This evening, we shall deal with a few of the ideas of Mabini relevant to particular problems of the national community.

First of all I would like to emphasize that Mabini was the political philosopher *par excellence* during the Philippine Revolution and probably the most comprehensive, so far, that our people had produced. Recognizing that the basic problem in all political philosophy in its attempt to formulate the conditions for social order and progress is that of political obligation, he analyzed this problem and deduced from it all its ramifications until he was led to formulate a generally consistent theory. This enabled him to understand further the meaning of the Revolution and devise practical programs to render some of his theoretical principles operative. Starting with a conception of man and society and assuming natural law as a postulate, Mabini traced the social function of government and then justified the existence of this institution in terms of Man's nature and the character of social relations. It was on this basis that he presented a theory of, and justification for, revolution.

Mabini's social and political ideas can be presented into two categories: The first deals with the individual as Man. Here, regardless of regional, racial, national and religious qualifications, the individual is viewed as an organism with intellectual and moral capacities and equipped with the natural impulses to develop these capacities. And whatever obstructs the development of these capacities means to Mabini, the absence of freedom. Besides developing moral and intellectual capacities of the individual, society must provide a system of relations established primarily to satisfy mutual economic wants. The second category, less abstract than the first and closely related to empirical and historical data, deals with the aspirations and expectations of a particular people whose problems are such that, if unsolved would prevent them from attaining those ends which properly belong to them as men. It is in terms of this distinction that the concluding section of Mabini's *Decalogue* can be better understood:

... as long as there are national frontiers erected and maintained by the selfishness of races and dynasties, to him [that is, to one's countryman] you ought to unite in a perfect solidarity of purposes and interests, to have strength, not only to fight the common enemy but also to realize all the ends of human life.²

The implications of this prescription is that in the historical phase wherein Filipinos found themselves, it was only through nationalism, in the sense of the need of forming a national community, that they will be able to solve their social problems and do away with those obstacles to be able to enjoy what properly constitute human ends. In simpler terms,

² "El Verdadero Decalogo," *ibid.*, p. 107.

nationalism is not an end in itself but simply a means to bring about that social order that makes possible human ends, more specifically the development of the intellectual and moral energies of a people.

With your kind indulgence, I would like to digress further on this matter. First of all Mabini considered that the relation between the colonizer and colonized was marked essentially by oppression and exploitation. To keep this relation which is plainly to the advantage of the colonizer, the colonizer must limit the liberties of the colonized, control his education, and keep him dependent economically. In effect, the colonizer generates that social situation which is precisely the negation of that atmosphere of freedom vitally needed for a person to develop his intellectual and moral faculties. We must remember that Mabini was born as a colonial subject of a Mother country that was in its last throes as an empire and where the will to rectify colonial mismanagement was almost absent. On account of personal experiences as well as those of his friends, he concluded that a colonial situation was irreversibly incompatible with the freedom of the individual as Man—freedom to develop one's talents and inner energies, freedom to enjoy the right to life and security, a chance to have the best possible education, and opportunities to contribute not only to the progress of one's own people but to that of mankind as well. Consequently, Mabini, in the light of his colonial experience, was led to the belief that the independence of his people was a fundamental prerequisite to their individual freedom; this in turn was needed if Filipinos were to do their share in contributing to the progress of Humanity.

A facile answer to what could be done with the obstacles is: Do away with the exploiters! But this is not possible unless the exploited first of all become conscious of their conditions and then by means of a unity of purposes and interests transform themselves into a community strong enough to do away with, what Mabini called, the common enemy. The community formed, while exemplifying an organized force with a better chance for successful ventures, would also serve as a sanction for the use of coercive action.

According to Mabini, the aim of all government, if it is to be legitimate and thus would deserve the name, is to secure "*la mayor suma de libertades, conocimientos, bienes y seguridades para los ciudadanos*."³ What is here succinctly stated can be interpreted to mean that the government had to grant to the citizens the greatest number possible of political rights, the best form of education, and maximum satisfaction of economic needs and security. Since Mabini assumed that a colonial government was incompatible with such aims, he believed that only through the instrumentality of a national community would such aims of government be operative, provided that, naturally, the national community was working within the context of independence.

³ "La Trinidad Política", *ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 69.

Again, it can be clearly seen that independence was also a means and not an end in itself. Moreover, although it was a necessary condition, it was not sufficient to bring about good government. Here Mabini evidently followed the warning of Rizal about the possibility of the native slaves of today becoming the governing tyrants of the morrow. Mabini believed, nay, wished, that patriotism or love of country, moral consideration for each other, a life of reason and virtue, and loyalty to a greater whole, in this case the national community, will push to the background all exploitation and bring about the blurring of class differences. Herein lies one of the meanings of his *Decalogue*. This aimed to bring about a social consciousness among the people within the framework of a political structure such that when an individual willed a certain good, it would be for the good of the national community and not merely for individual, family or sectional interests.

Mabini probably wrote his *Decalogue* in the first few months of 1898. However, after many months of experience as an official dealing with many of his countrymen, especially those with high government offices or economic interests, he arrived at the sad discovery, as we shall see later, that the exercise of the will for the good of all was a difficult one especially when it ran counter to personal, family, class or institutional interests.

Mabini had no second thoughts about prescribing and justifying a revolution against any foreign rule. In the early part of 1898, justifying the revolution against Spain he wrote:

A revolution is always just, if it tries to destroy a government that is foreign and a usurper.⁴

Although he was relatively more prudent and moderate prescribing revolution against a national government, he justified it under certain conditions:

A revolution against a national government or one composed of elements of the country is also just, if such government abuses the power placed at its disposal by the people for the purpose of the administration of justice, and uses this power to drown out the public voice and to administer to its caprice and convenience.⁵

After the defeat of the Filipino revolutionary forces in the field of battle on account of superior American military forces, and while Mabini was in exile at Guam, he was able to reflect on the causes, strength, weaknesses, and decline of the Revolution. Possibly thinking of the divisive forces that plagued the Revolution and those men who tried to take advantage of the Revolution to perpetuate their own interests, he was able to analyse and describe some of those factors that do bring about revolutions. This time, he was not prescribing or rationalizing a revolution, but simply approaching the subject as a social scientist. This is what he wrote:

⁴ "Ordenanzas de la Revolucion," *ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 108.

⁵ *Ibid.*

The possibility must be taken into account that a powerful and unscrupulous class might exploit the ignorance or corruption of its compatriots to further its own particular interests. In such a case, the revolution will worsen rather than improve conditions.⁶

when a government produces the stagnation of a people to perpetuate its own interests or that of a particular class . . . a revolution is inevitable.⁷

It is to be noticed here that Mabini was using the term "government", not in its most abstract sense, but to refer to a group of officials charged with the administration of government. In this sense Mabini looks at government as possibly constituting itself as a special segment (or elite) in society with particular interests of its own not necessarily identical with those of the country. He also suggests that the government may be allied with a particular class in society precisely because it might belong to this very class. It clearly appears that Mabini by 1900 had lost the political innocence he evinced during the early days of the Revolution in 1898. This makes his message to us the more important.

It will be recalled that at the start of the Revolution in 1898, Mabini believed or hoped that with independence, the circumstances would be such that a good national government, in accordance with his criteria already discussed, would ensue or at least be possible within the foreseeable future. Such an optimistic attitude is explained by the revolutionary fervor and the hope for the reconstruction of social relations that filled the minds of the revolutionists. But after a year or so, it clearly appears that Mabini was not so sure anymore that independence necessarily implied what he considered to be a good government. The early optimism of Mabini can be further explained by at least three of his premises. The first is that man's natural impulse to progress will lead him to destroy any obstacle hindering this progress. The second is that in the face of a common danger, coupled with a love of country and mutual love, the people would thrust aside all class and regional differences. The third, closely related to the second, provides that the conception of a greater good, that of the community, will make men sublimate their personal interests to it.

If Mabini were asked now why independence might fail and could not rise to the kind of government he had in mind as well as the absence of exploitation by fellow nationals, he would answer unequivocally. Those people, who, in effect, comprise the government, have failed to conceive of the general good of the national community especially when this good ran counter to their personal or family interests. These are the persons, too, who have used their positions not for social service but as means to cater to selfish aims.

⁶ "La Revolucion Filipina," *ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 275.

⁷ *Ibid.*

A second question to be raised is whether the people can develop this conception. Although Mabini worked to generate this conception by means of his writings and personal example, most of his exhortations were directed to the leaders of the Revolution. Certainly his *Decalogue* was for all and his educational programs were to universalize this conception. But since time was of the essence, he had to concentrate on the leaders. He might have believed, too, that the example of working for the good of all had to come from the political leaders of the country. This makes sense, I believe. The reason is that it would be very difficult for the generality of the people to develop this conception by themselves unless they are concerned that they are the beneficiaries of the social system and have come to feel at the same time that there is no discrimination against them, that is, the system of social relations has not been used to serve the interests of special segments of society. To Mabini, when a government is truly serving the interest of the whole populace, its successes as well as its failures must be shared by all the members of the body politic. Reflecting on the failure of the Revolution, he expressed great disappointment on the actions of revolutionary soldiers who committed great abuses on the civilian population, particularly with their acts of violence on women. He blamed the soldiers for their lack of discipline and the officers for the absence of the decision or even inclination to punish cases of immorality. The more serious charge was against the top ranking leaders of the revolutionary movement, specially those who acquired their leadership "not by meritorious acts but by reprehensible means."⁸ Believing that every person, however humble, can do his bit for the national cause, Mabini pointed out as one of the causes of the revolution were the presence of those persons who presumed that "they could not serve their country except on an elevated position."⁹ This attitude, Mabini added, was dangerous to the common welfare. There were other causes enumerated by Mabini for which time does not allow us to discuss. At bottom, all what Mabini was telling us is that national failures are caused by immoralities, selfishness, and presumptions found in all segments of society, especially among the leaders.

Everything that we have discussed so far if properly analyzed presents a dilemma or, worse, a vicious circle. If the political leaders of a country do not conceive of, or act in, terms of the good of the national community, or if they act for their own benefit or that of a special segment in society, then clearly the social relations of the country will not redound to the benefit of the people. If the people come to discover that social relations are not for their benefit but for a special segment of society, that is, they judge their society as an unequal society, then how can they be expected to be loyal to a national community or even conceive of it

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 318.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 321.

or its good? And if there is no conception of a national community among the people, where is that higher good to which they are supposed to work for and to which they are expected to sublimate their personal or selfish interests? How can such people emplace in power leaders who possess the will for the good of all, when they themselves do not have this will, much less recognize it in others? The vicious circle can be broken. In our country things are not as bad as the theoretical situation presented in the above argument. The vicious circle had been disrupted by our great national heroes and at present its destruction may be slow, but sure.

To understand this vicious circle, it is necessary to know what a national community connotes, and to make a distinction between its conception and actual realization or operative character. A national community is not a concrete object that can be seen; nor is it a mere collection of individuals. As conceived by our revolutionary fathers, especially Rizal and Mabini, a national community is a collection of individuals related to one another by racial affinities as well as by a common history of suffering, aspirations, and expectations, and where all individuals, over and above their love of the country of their birth, have certain attitudes in common. Among these attitudes are the desire to develop the intellectual and moral faculties for the benefit of all, pride in the achievements of other members of the community, the absence of shame on the results of one's labors and inner energies, refusal to accept any form of injustice even if one could profit from it, not to take advantage of any other member of the community, and above all to be ready to give up one's life in the defense of those rights that are believed to belong to any member of the community. All these can be condensed into the following: In a national community each member when he wills, wills for the good of the whole community as against personal, family, or particular or segmental interests.

So far we have been dealing with a conception. In actual life, a national community is always in the process of becoming, as it were, in a flux. To put it in another form, a community can be in the process of becoming more and more of a national community; and the criteria for this is the accommodation of more and more of the elements of a national community as well as an intensification of those already existing. The conception of a national community is an ideal or at most a model.

The problem at hand is not whether we Filipinos now have formed ourselves into a national community. It is rather how much of the elements of a national community are present as well as how they are being intensified and whether other elements are slowly entering into the conception of a national community.

The problem as stated assumed that to some degree we are a national community; but, from another point of view, we are not yet a highly developed one at least from the model presented. Let us first deal with the positive

aspect of the problem. The fact that we have national heroes is a tacit admission that these men have helped bring about a national community — at least in its beginnings. Many of them had sacrificed personal interests for the benefit of others while some did die that the conception might be realized. Who will deny now that Mabini played his part in bringing about the national community? And when he wrote once about the Filipinos being on the threshold of a national life, he implied that there was now something achieved which was previously absent during the Spanish regime. The fact that we have had honest judges, especially in the highest tribunals, brave prosecutors, dedicated teachers and social workers, soldiers who had willingly given their lives in battle, honest and hardworking civil servants, vigilant student bodies, thinkers like Recto, etc., citizens willing to testify in court in spite of threats to their lives or those of their nearest kin, etc., and etc., all demonstrate that we do have many of the elements of a national community. We need not belabor this point.

Though the negative aspects of the balance sheet are depressing, it is not entirely hopeless. What can be said when members of the legislative branch vote for themselves higher salaries when money is needed for other neglected problems of the community? And when this action, plus the obstruction of bills that will harm special interests as well as the passing of laws that favor certain groups against others, begins to be resented by a great number of people, will not this situation lead the people to look down at some government officials as forming a special segment in society? And worse still, when political parties differ from each other, not in the attempts to help bring about the social good, but in their mad contest to grasp political power and use it for their benefit, is this not a sign that there are leaders in our country who have failed to conceive of the good of the community? The high existence of crime is also an index to the low social and community consciousness on the part of our population. Most of these criminals are generally victims of lack of a good education and lack of opportunities for economic betterment, some of them are victims of bad example when they see others appropriating for themselves what is illegal, or when they watch officials use governmental power for their personal benefits. Added to all these, is their calculation that when they get into trouble, there will be someone powerful enough to protect them. All these constitute the sheer lack of the will for the good of the national community. I take it that I need not dwell further on these details.

The increase of social and national consciousness must be through the agency of those persons who, by virtue of their education and sensitivity to inequalities, can emancipate themselves from petty interests to be able to conceive of the social good. Mabini always looked up to the educated segment to provide ideas, direction, and support of the revolutionary movement. Although he was later on disappointed with the actions of many of the

relatively educated leaders, his general principle is still valid, especially now when it is no longer true that education is a monopoly of the relatively more opulent groups in our society. It is up to the educated segment of our country, especially the youth belonging to this segment, that must develop the will for the good of the national community. They can do this in political participation. By electing into office only of those who have learned to exercise this will, the educated youth of our land do not only serve as the conscience to the community but help bring new elements into what would constitute a national community.

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CESAR ADIB MAJUL'S
MUSLIMS IN THE PHILIPPINES

SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF REVOLUTION

CESAR ADIB MAJUL

FILIPINO NATIONALISM BEGAN AS A PROCESS INITIATED BY AN ETHNIC group trying to transform itself into a national community in order to make operative an original concept of what was believed to constitute individual progress and social betterment. It slowly emerged and developed as a response to what was judged to be the oppressive and exploitative character of foreign domination.

In time, on account of rising expectations from within and pressures from without, it began to generate new values and techniques, although its general direction remained practically unchanged. The revolution against Spain as well as its transformation into a vigorous resistance against the imposition of American sovereignty were resorted to in order to remove formidable obstacles to the formation of a national community which by its very logic implied political independence. The conception of a national community initially germinated in the minds of some members of the relatively more educated and articulate segment of the native population in the Philippines during the last few decades of the nineteenth century. How and why this conception arose as well as what it intended to accomplish were primarily determined by the nature and results of the Spanish Conquest.

At the beginning of Spanish colonialism in the Philippine Archipelago in 1565, what existed in the islands was a constellation of settlements called *barangays*. Generally representing kinship groups under the leadership of *datus*, they included from a dozen to about a hundred families. While some were linked by trade ties; others were isolated from or hostile to one another. Manifesting varying levels of political development and complexity, some had begun to weld themselves into a wider and relatively more centralized political entity where different *datus* looked up to a *rajah* as their overlord. Such wider political entities were already found among Muslims in the southern part of the Archipelago like those under the rule of the *rajahs* of Sulu, Maguindanao, and Buayan.

The Spaniards came to the Philippines with two unambiguous aims: to Christianize the natives and to extend the material domains of the Spanish King. As a corollary to these, those who had served their King well were to earn their reward from the work of the native and the sustenance of the lands conquered. The Spaniards came when the sultanate of Brunei was extending its political and economic sway over the Archipelago. But the fall of Maynila to the Spaniards in 1571, the destruction of Brunei in 1578

and 1581, the abortive Tondo Conspiracy of 1588, and the gradual elimination of Bornean traders from the Islands, doomed to death Brunei's ambitions in the area. Meanwhile, the Spanish *conquistadores* and missionaries, working hand in hand, carried out the pacification of the Archipelago. Although they failed to conquer the major Muslim sultanates in the South, they at least succeeded in checking the political tendency of these sultanates to expand northwards to Mindoro and the Visayas. Also, the Spaniards were not very successful in fully extending their complete sway over the tribes in the mountain fastnesses of Luzon.

The occupation of the areas collectively denominated "Las Islas Filipinas" or "Filipinas" (after Felipe II) was not entirely unopposed by the natives. A few belated attempts by scions of old ruling families to do away with the Spanish presence and recover a claimed leadership never succeeded. The same fate befell organized attempts to revert to the older religion. Quite a significant number of natives fled to the hinterlands, refusing to the very end to accept the new rulers and their strange ways and beliefs. But that as it may, by the opening of the seventeenth century, Filipinas was securely under Spanish domination.

To more effectively consolidate their gains, collect tributes, govern the natives, and Christianize them or at least prevent them from losing the newly acquired faith, the Spanish authorities began to gradually replace the *barangay* system with new social groupings. A process of resettlement was slowly but progressively carried out which eventually established the new towns or *pueblos*. In effect, a town constituted a parish center. But the process of urbanization initiated by the Spaniards took a long time to accomplish.¹ In the eighteenth century, Spanish authorities were still trying hard to encourage natives living in the mountains to come down and settle in organized communities.

As a reward to those adventurous subjects who had dared to cross strange seas into unknown frontiers to extend his Empire, the Spanish King authorized the *encomienda* system. In certain delineated areas, deserving *conquistadores* or colonizers were granted *encomienda* privileges among which was the authority to collect for themselves part of the tribute. In return, the *encomenderos* were charged with the task of looking after the educational and religious needs of the natives. The *encomienda* served as a very effective arm of the government in its efforts to control the natives, preserve Christianity, and even to collect its revenues, but the invariant rapacity of the *encomenderos* and continuous ecclesiastical objections to the system eventually brought about its dissolution by the end of the eighteenth century.

¹ The most recent work on Spanish attempts at urbanization in the Philippines is Robert R. Reed, *Hispanic Urbanization in the Philippines: A Study of the Impact of Church and State* (Manila: The University of Manila, 1967).

Apart from paying the tribute, the pacified natives, with a few exceptions, rendered forced labor which lasted for a certain number of days a year. To protect the natives (called *indios*, since the term "Filipino" was reserved for Spaniards born in the Philippines) from the rapacity and abuses of adventurers as well as to moderate the conflicts that might ensue from the impact of an advanced civilization on a basically agricultural people, the Laws of the Indies were applied to them. But whereas earlier, these laws tended to protect the *indios* from the harshness of a colonial system that was too far away from the Mother Country to be checked, a time came when its continued application reflected a telling accusation against Spain to the effect that she had done nothing to prepare the *indios* for a time when they would no longer need their protective umbrage.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century what any keen observer of the Philippines scene would have recognized was the existence of two distinguishable but coincident communities. Making some allowances for unchristianized tribes in the interior of the large islands and few pockets of Muslim inhabitants in that part of Mindanao already considered as an integral part of Filipinas, the inhabitants of Filipinas can be conceived as having been integrated into a political community as well as into a religious one. As member of the first community, the *indio* was a colonial subject of the Spanish King; as a member of the second community, he was a Catholic ward of the friars and subject to the Roman Pontiff. Here therefore were two of the most important identity factors for the native as far as the Spanish authorities were primarily concerned. His family, region or linguistic group, were not important, for, as a member of such, he was merely an *indio*.

The above-noted community distinctions can be better appreciated by a short digression on Spanish colonial and ecclesiastical administration in the colony. At the head of the colonial system was the Spanish Governor and Captain General; the first title emphasized his civil functions while the latter referred to his military powers. The different provinces were under the administrative supervision of governors (*alcalde-mayores*) while the different towns were nominally under the administration of native *gobernadorcillos*, assisted by petty native officials. Parallel to this colonial system was the ecclesiastical body. At the top of the hierarchy was the Archbishop of Manila, followed by a few bishops who headed their respective dioceses. A parish priest, who was usually a friar curate, took charge of the smallest unit, the parish. There seemed to be two entirely separate and clearly delineated systems. In practice, however, there was much overlapping of functions between them. For instance, the Governor General exercised the vice-Royal prerogatives in ecclesiastical matters while Archbishops wielded some political powers and quite a number at various times served as *ad interim* Governors General. In brief, there was no separation of Church and

State, an arrangement which consistently produced disquieting results in the colony.

THE SPANISH COLONIAL AUTHORITIES did not actually eliminate the authority of the former *datus* and their families or descendants who, in effect, came to constitute the so-called *principalia*, the principal men of the towns. Since there were not enough Spaniards in the colony, it was essential to utilize the traditional leadership for their experiments in social organization and other colonial purposes. The former *datus* were initially instrumental in persuading their followers to resettle in the larger settlements determined by the Spaniards. They were the agents in collecting the tribute, in harnessing manpower either for the Army and Navy or for labor projects. Moreover, it was from the ranks of the *principalia* that the *gobernadorcillos* and the *cabezas de barangay* were chosen. These were the petty officials in the municipal level and the highest civil positions that an *indio* could aspire to almost up to the last decade of the Spanish regime. The bases of *principalia* power lay initially in their traditional authority, in the fact that their ranks supplied most, if not all, of the native officials, and in political privileges like exemption from the tribute, forced labor, etc. They were privileged, if not encouraged, to have their houses in the centers of the towns, near the churches and government offices — a way of inducing their followers also to move to the town. The *principalia* members stood as intermediaries, between Spanish officials, both civil and ecclesiastical, and the generality of the natives. At times they had to moderate the excessive or harsh demands of Spanish officialdom on the people while exhorting loyalty on the part of the latter to the government — all the while trying to maintain or strengthen their power base. In an important sense, the existence of the *principalia* served to prevent a radical social dislocation in the lives of the natives when the colonial authorities implemented their system of social reorganization.

In the early part of the nineteenth century, through an accelerated movement towards resettlement, a great part of the native population came to live within hearing of church bells. The *indios* stood as mute witnesses to the internal squabbles between and among Spanish colonial and ecclesiastical officials; and the history of Filipinas as written by friar historians remained primarily a history of the Spaniards in the colony. Meanwhile, the *indio* population grew. Probably at this time, the native Christian population had reached about 2 million.

All of these does not mean that the native population had completely adapted themselves to alien rule. From the inception of Spanish rule, at least twenty-five major uprisings took place.² The causes were various:

² A fair summary of uprisings against Spanish rule in the Philippines is found in Gregorio F. Zaide, *Philippine Political and Cultural History* (Manila: Philippine Education Company), Volume I, pp. 343-367.

attempts of members of the old nobility to regain privileges which had been withdrawn by Spanish officials; abuses and cruelties of Spanish *encomenderos* and government officials; imposition of heavy tributes as well as forced labor; and a desire to revert to the older religion. But the preponderant issue was agrarian in character with tenants or peasants questioning the ownership of land by friar landlords. Regional or local in character and devoid of the notion of nation or even race, most of them were easily crushed by the cunning use of loyal native troops from other regions. However, all this had one thing in common: a general resentment of what was considered the imposition of an alien rule and a general though vague desire to revert to a system of relative greater freedom of movement, thought, and choice. The British capture of Manila in 1762 and the evident inability of the Spanish government to contain the attacks of the Muslims from the South played their part in transforming a belief of Spanish invincibility to that of weakness. It was not with exaggeration that Francisco Leandro de Viana, a Spanish royal official in Manila, wrote in 1765:

It is certain that the Indians desire to throw off the mild yoke of the Spaniards; that they are Christians, and vassals of our king, simply through fear, and fail to be either Christians or vassals when they consider us weak; and that they neither respect nor obey any one, when they find an opportunity for resistance.³

But the general resentment to foreign rule however mild it might have been asserted was sharpened by certain changes which took place in the colony. These changes resulted from the economic expansion around the middle of the nineteenth century, educational reforms, and the coming of European liberal ideas — all contributing to the rise of an educated and professional class of *mestizos* (both Chinese and Spanish) and *indios*.

During the first centuries of Spanish colonial rule, there was no special effort to exploit the natural resources of the country. The native population continued to depend on a subsistence economy. Most Spaniards lived in Manila where a great number of them speculated in the galleon trade. This explains to a great extent why, except for the friar corporations, few landed estates were owned by Spanish settlers. Spanish mercantile policy was restrictive in nature: the galleons that traded with Mexico were government-owned, while the trade with neighboring Asian nations was strictly supervised and regulated. But by the end of the eighteenth century, a determined effort to depend less on Mexican subsidy made it imperative to develop the agricultural possibilities of the country as well as to relax the economic policy. The latter was in line with the shift in Europe from the mercantilistic to the *laissez faire* policy. Corollary to these efforts was the adoption of a new system of taxation calculated to make tax payments more equitable and collection more systematic and effective. Under the more

³ Viana's Memorial of 1765," Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands* 1493-1898 (Cleveland, Ohio: 1903-1909), Volume XLVIII, p. 202.

liberal commercial policy, free trade existed between Spain and the Philippines: Manila was opened to world commerce. Soon other ports were also opened.

It was in the middle of the nineteenth century that more and more commercial activities fell into private hands. At this time there were about fifteen foreign commercial firms in Manila which progressively acquired the characteristics of an urban port and commercial center. Hemp, sugar, and copra were exported and plantations were on the increase, especially in the Tagalog provinces and in Central Luzon. At around this time, too, the *principalia* began to strengthen its economic base by acquiring land, some of which had previously belonged to the *barangay* as communal land. According to John Phelan, although the Spaniards recognized communal ownership of land, they introduced the notion of individual ownership of land as a source of wealth. What then ensued was a tendency of the *datus* and their families to "assume the formal ownership of that portion of the *barangay* land which their dependents ordinarily cultivated (as communal land). During the seventeenth century the trend increased, more and more Filipino chieftains acquiring the actual title to the land that their dependents cultivated." ⁴ But the best cultivated lands, especially those around Manila, were in the hands of the friar corporations. There were so many agrarian problems and unrest in these lands that the Spanish government in 1880 decided to adopt a system of land titles. But this well-intentioned law enabled the *principalia* to strengthen its economic base, for it was the more intelligent and alert segment of the population that could understand and take advantage of the law. According to Apolinario Mabini, a prominent revolutionary leader, and who as a lawyer became intimately acquainted with the manner of how titles to land were acquired, the law benefited a few to the dispossession of many. Writing in 1900, he reflected:

When we were adolescents, the General Government of the Islands required that landlords present a sort of declaration of their properties specifying the situation, area, and boundaries of each parcel in order to acquire the titles called "Composicion con el Estado." Setting aside those who include in their declarations the land of others, it can be said that only a few were able to obtain titles and they were the ones who could afford the costs or who were precisely the ones who needed documents to give an appearance of legality to their spoils. Finally, the Mortgage Law (*Ley Hipotecaria*) came, and while it gave a surer title to some honestly acquired properties, it, instead, gave greater stability to the ownership or possession of many invalidly acquired properties; thus favoring the rascals. ⁵

⁴ John Leddy Phelan, *The Hispanization of the Philippines*, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1959), p. 117.

⁵ Apolinario Mabini, "Cuestiones en relacion con las corporaciones religiosas," *La Revolución Filipina* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1931), Volume II, pp. 146-147.

According to Mabini, the tillers of the soil then ended up as tenants to their new owners but were allowed to remain in the lands of their ancestors, as long as they kept saying the *canon*. Mabini claimed he was witness to all these in the Tagalog areas, that it became a problem to the Revolutionary government, and that a similar situation also existed in the northern part of Luzon.⁶

That before the Revolution in 1896 agrarian unrest or resentment was generally confined to friar estates can be explained partially by the fact that although landlords belonging to the *principalia* had homes in the town centers, they kept familial and familiar relations with their tenants and kept close contacts with their lands, unlike the friar corporations which kept their central offices in Manila and left the supervision of their lands mostly to administrators who were, in effect, business managers solely interested in increased production and profit.

Alongside economic expansion came educational reforms. On December 20, 1863, a royal decree provided for compulsory education with free instruction for the poor. It also stipulated the establishment of a normal school for teachers in primary education. Primary schools were supervised by parish priests while the normal school was placed under the Jesuits. Before this decree, what generally existed for *indios* were parochial catechism schools.⁷ Now, the three R's as well as geography, Spanish language and history, and even elements of agriculture were included in the curriculum.⁸ Significant about this decree was its provision that teachers who had performed some years of notable service could assume the title of "principal" and be entitled to the same privileges granted to the *principalia*. In this manner the *principalia* was later strengthened by a new factor — the integration into it of relatively more educated men.

By 1870 there were already 1779 primary schools attended by about 385,907 students of both sexes. However, it can be calculated that less than 3% of the students had an adequate mastery of Castilian.⁹ In this same year, out of 1,883 students enrolled in secondary schools, 1421 were either *mestizos* or *indios*.¹⁰ There is no evidence that in 1870 there were *indios* in Sto. Tomas University in Manila enrolled in courses of higher learning or studying for a profession. However, around 1875, some *indios* who had been earlier in the secondary schools began to be admitted to study for the professions like Law, Medicine, and Pharmacy. Many persons who were to play roles in the movement for reforms or the Revolution belonged more

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 147-148.

⁷ Cf. Domingo Abella, "State of Higher Education in the Philippines to 1863—A Historical Reappraisal," *Philippine Historical Review* (I, 1), 1965, p. 23.

⁸ A copy of this educational decree is found in "Primary Education," Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, Vol. XLVI, pp. 79-118.

⁹ Cf. "Public Instruction," *ibid.*, Vol. XLV, pp. 299-300.

¹⁰ Domingo Abella, *op. cit.*, Appendix A, p. 29.

or less to the first or second batch of *indios* who studied for a profession. Among them were Jose Rizal, Emilio Jacinto, and Apolinario Mabini.

Before 1870, the highest if not the only important profession generally opened to the *indio* was the priesthood. In 1870, out of nearly 800 parishes only 181 or about 23% were in the charge of native priests. Moreover, whereas parishes under friar control averaged about 6,000 each, those under the native secular priests averaged about 4,500 each.¹¹ Significant about these figures is that whereas in 1880 the number of native priests rose to 748, the proportion of the parishes held by them did not increase at all but decreased instead. At this time, there were about 911 friars.

The majority of the candidates for the priesthood originated from the *principalia*, for this was relatively the most aggressive and economically better off segment of the native population. *Mestizos*, too, trained for the secular clergy. Because of what they felt as discriminatory policies towards them, the native secular clergy became fierce antagonists of the friars whom they claimed could not validly hold parishes but should have been confined to their monasteries. At bottom, the conflict between the Spanish friars and native secular priests was for the control of the parishes with their attendant political powers and social prestige. When therefore, in 1872, three native priests, one of them a Spanish *mestizo*, were garroted by the Spanish government on alleged complicity in a mutiny of native soldiers, some natives judged the execution as the result of a conspiracy of Spanish officials and friars to do away with the three priests since they were known champions of the native secular clergy. Other members of the *principalia* looked at the issue as a racial one. The so-called secularization controversy thus became such a serious one that the Archbishop of Manila, writing earlier to the Spanish Regent in 1870, warned and foretold that the continued resentment of the native clergy might eventually be transformed into an anti-Spanish sentiment, more so because of the growing belief that the colonial government invariably took the side of the friars in the controversy. He also reflected that the issue was slowly assuming racial implications; sympathy and moral support for the cause of the native priests had reached beyond their families to the larger community.¹²

In the meanwhile political events in the Mother Country were to have repercussions in the colony. Consequent to the Spanish Revolution of 1868 which toppled the monarchy and introduced freedom of speech, press, and assembly, as well as religious toleration in Spain, a confirmed liberal, Carlos Maria de la Torre, was named Governor General of Filipinas.

¹¹ Cf. James Le Roy, *The Americans in the Philippines* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1914), Volume I, pp. 60-61.

¹² For an English translation of this letter, see Nicolas Zafra, *Readings in Philippine History* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, Revised Edition, 1956), pp. 485-498.

His appointment was hailed by different segments of the Manila community —by the Filipinos (as distinguished from the *peninsulares* or Spaniards born in Spain), Spanish *mestizos*, and educated *indios*. For the first time, during 1869-1871, Manila had a respite from the traditional colonial policies of Spain. De la Torre's numerous reforms implemented the ideals of the Revolution of 1868. Spaniards, *mestizos*, and educated *indios*, were all placed on the same footing. The governor's official residence was thrown open to all, even as the incumbent himself discarded the trappings of his high office. Freedom of speech, press and assembly generated a sense of urgency and hope for political and religious reforms. But in 1871 the monarchy returned to power in Spain, followed shortly by the designation of Rafael de Izquierdo as successor to De la Torre. A period of reaction set in, characterized by attempts to do away with the liberal changes De la Torre had introduced. It was during Izquierdo's term of office that the Cavite Mutiny of 1872 took place. Although from all indications the affair was a mutiny initiated by native soldiers in Cavite in collusion with others in Manila, to colonial authorities, it was actually a preview of separation from Spain led by those very men who agitated for reforms under the previous regime. Aside from the three native priests who were publicly executed, many Spanish *mestizos* and scions of prominent native families or the *principalia* were exiled. Rumor was rife in Manila that the actions of the government were mostly instigated by friars who were out to eliminate those men who had previously demanded for reforms, and to stop, one and for all, native aspirations for increased secularization of the parishes. This is probably the first time when some members of the *principalia* began to be seriously disillusioned with the colonial government and *status quo*. In an important sense, the secularization controversy, in so far as it represented an attempt of native priests to increase their share of parishes and in their attendant political and social benefits, was a function of the *principalia's* general struggle for a more active share in the control of the social life of the colony. The execution of the three priests in order to be understood in its true significance must be viewed with this background.

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE of the Philippines in 1880's is definable. The Spaniards in the colony were born in Spain (*peninsulares*) or born in the Philippines (*creoles*, Filipinos). The *peninsulares* tended to look down at the Filipinos who, in turn, bitterly resented the fact that the choice offices in the colonial bureaucracy were given to the former.¹³ The Spanish friars represented a special group. Their corporations owned vast stretches of the best cultivated land, and those who were curates enjoyed political and

¹³ Cf. Sinibaldo de Mas, *Report on the Condition of the Philippines in 1842*, III, Secret Report (Manila: Historical Conservation Society, 1963), pp. 17-20; and pp. 122-126.

civil power. On account of the original evangelical aims in the conquests, they enjoyed a special position and the prestige that went with it. The Spanish *mestizos* also formed another segment. The pure-blooded Spaniards also tended to look down on them. According to the figures of 1864, out of 4,050 Spaniards in the colony, there were 500 clerics, 270 merchants, land owners, and proprietors and 3,280 government officials, Army and Navy officers, etc.¹⁴ In 1870, there were 3,823 *peninsulares* (1,000 clerics, 1,000 Army men and soldiers, and 1,800 civil officials and others), and 9,710 *creoles* and *mestizos*.¹⁵ In 1898, the number of Spanish civil and military officials reached 5,800.¹⁶

The native population can be generally classified into the *principalia* and the masses of the people. The *Guia Oficial* reported that the population of the Philippines in 1871 was 5,682,012, which increased to 6,252,987 in the next twenty years. In 1880, there were about 748 native priests. What is significant about the *principalia* in the 1880's was that Spanish and Chinese blood were being assimilated by it. To strengthen their economic base and probably because many of them had come to look at the colony as their home, some Spaniards married into the best native families. The ever industrious Chinese *mestizos* also followed the same route.¹⁷ Thus some *principalia* members acquired some prestige by having Spanish blood while others profited by the infusion of the blood of an industrious people. Whatever Spanish or Chinese blood a native might have, he was still generally called an *indio*.

While in the 1870's, the term *ilustrado* could be applied to any educated individual in the colony, it began to be more definitely applied to that segment of the native population which in the 1880's was classified as educated. Probably possessed of a good mastery of the Castilian language, the *ilustrados* were made possible by the educational decree of 1863 providing for universal primary education and normal schools. These, in turn, made it possible for some *indios* to be included among the 1,421 Spanish *mestizos* and *indios* attending secondary schools in 1870. Some of these and certainly others following them would then work for a Bachelor's degree in the few colleges in Manila. By the middle of the 1870's, *indios* were allowed to enter the University and work for degrees in Law, Medicine, and Pharmacy. However, other colleges were also already offering degrees in Law as well as vocational courses.

¹⁴ Edward Gaylord Bourne, "Historical Introduction," Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, Volume I, p. 60.

¹⁵ "Le Roy's Bibliographical Notes," *ibid.*, Volume LII, footnote pp. 115-116.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

¹⁷ Although pioneering in nature, the best comprehensive treatment of the social structure of the Philippines just before the Revolution in 1896 is Reed, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-173.

The *ilustrados* as an educated elite always enjoyed a prestigious position in the native population especially when they practised a profession. Earlier the only profession open to an *indio* was that of the priesthood, now he could demonstrate other achievements to be at par with the conquerors. It is reasonable to surmise that in the same manner that the *principalia* would supply the bulk of the native clergy, it would also produce most of the *ilustrados*. Only people with means were generally able to send their sons to secondary schools or to the university. However, this is only part of the picture since facts demonstrate that superior students from the humbler strata of the native population were able to study for a profession and thus earn the right to be classified as *ilustrados*. But because the *principalia* had the edge in sending its sons to work for a higher education, there was a tendency in native colloquial speech to identify the term *ilustrados* with that of *principalia*.

Soon after the events of 1872, a few Spanish *mestizos* and *principalia* members left for other centers of Asia and Europe, principally to study for the professions. They were able to meet some escaped exiles and reflect further on the ills of the colony. The opening of professional schools in Manila to *indios* around 1875 did not stop the steady stream of young native students going to Europe where the political and educational atmosphere did not appear as stifling as that in the colony. Others went to Spain simply to develop greater professional competence or to study something not available in the colony. According to Mabini:

In order to prevent you Filipinos from going to Spain or abroad to acquire knowledge not offered in Manila and thereby acquire liberal and anti-religious ideas, the friars changed their program of studies and established colleges for medicine and pharmacy to better their control on the choice of textbooks and have a hand in the selection of professors. Among the necessary evils, it was preferable to choose the lesser one. However, such was the desire to learn and become educated that many scions of well-to-do families preferred to study in Spain and thus they travelled to Europe . . .¹⁸

Continued harrassment from colonial authorities and friars increased the number of natives going to study in Spain. They brought with them a litany of what was wrong with the conditions in the colony. Breathing in a relatively freer atmosphere, getting themselves exposed to liberal ideas, witnessing the political ferment in Spain, actively joining secret societies, and becoming increasingly conscious of the evils of the colonial regime to which some of their families fell victims, the young *ilustrados* in Spain generated a movement later called "the propaganda." By means of a newspaper, novels, articles, meetings, speeches, and even some pressure on Spanish ministers and politicians, these reformers tried to expose the ills of the colonial regime while proposing remedies for them. Among the most pro-

¹⁸ "La Revolución Filipina," *La Revolución Filipina*, Volume II, p. 285.

minent reformers were: Jose Rizal, Marcelo H. del Pilar, Graciano Lopez-Jaena, Mariano Ponce, Antonio Luna, Juan Luna, Pedro Paterno, and Jose M. Panganiban.

Worthy of note was that although some of these *ilustrados* had once called themselves "*indios bravos*," they had begun to call themselves "Filipinos" for they had assumed that Filipinas was their country. Some Spaniards, too, in Spain, called them "Filipinos"—something that was still not done in the colony.

What the reformers wanted initially and primarily was the extension of the political rights already enjoyed in Spain under the Constitution of 1876 to all the natives and Spaniards in Filipinas. The liberties asked were those of speech, press, communication, assembly, and the right to petition for the redress of grievances. The demand for equality before the law implied that the natives would naturally be given the same opportunities to hold civil, judicial, and even military positions in the colony if they were so qualified. For the Mother Country to know better the state of the colony, it was demanded that Filipinas be represented in the Spanish Cortes. The secularization of the parishes was also a constant demand. Later on, the reformers asked that Filipinas be transformed from a colony into a regular province of Spain.

The reformers had a great deal of native sympathizers, including priests, who supported their newspaper *La Solidaridad* and helped sustain the movement. The supporters had various motives: the *principalia* who wanted to strengthen its position by the exercise of political rights, the ambitious natives who desired in time to be able to hold civil and military positions monopolized by Spaniards, the ordinary native who aspired to be spared from the vexations of a brutal police and an oppressive political system, and the native priests who wished to have a chance to administer more parishes. The Reform Movement, in effect, represented the desire of a segment of the population to have a greater hand in determining the destiny of the country while ensuring the population of greater share in its social and economic benefits.

But the movement generated the expected reaction not only from colonial authorities in the Philippines but from the Spanish friars as well. If the movement were successful, the Spanish officials would slowly have to give up to the natives many of their offices—both civil and military. If the parishes were secularized, the friars would have to confine themselves to their monasteries and leave the parishes which were the source of their political and civil power.¹⁹ The fact was that the Spanish colonial and ecclesiastical bureaucracies in Filipinas were, except in the very lowest

¹⁹ For an enumeration of the duties of parish priests which demonstrates their religious, political, and social power, see *U.S. Senate Document No. 190*, 2nd Session, pp. 64-66.

levels, a monopoly of Spaniards. Thus Spanish officialdom in the colony represented a special class. So did the friars and the ecclesiastical authorities. There was practically no demand by the reformers that the friars did not oppose vehemently, as evidenced by their Memorial of 1898 which they framed when some quarters in Spain blamed them for the Revolution in 1896.²⁰ It was the contention of the friars that the demands of the reformers and their attitude towards friars was not a universal phenomena and that they, the friars, were loved and respected by the generality of the people, while the reformers represented a chronically unhappy and ungrateful lot. To belie this contention, the reformers saw to it that their ideas became more widely spread and popularly supported.

What should be noted is that many of the reformers were not simply against what they believed to be friar dominance in the political life of the nation and in the social life of the people but that they were also against those *principalia* members who, besides being under friar dominance or positively corrupt, were profiting from the colonial system and satisfying personal interests. The municipal reforms suggested by M. H. del Pilar in *La Solidaridad* were not only designed to enlarge the electorate but to reduce, in effect, the traditional power and privileges of the *principalia* in the towns. Rizal, in his novels, tried to portray the *principalia* in the towns as tools of the friars and cacique benefiting from the colonial system. As Le Roy put it, the campaign of the reformers "was not alone a protest against ecclesiastical domination, but also against economic and administrative caciquism . . ." ²¹ Although some of the *ilustrados* who had participated in the Reform Movement were of *principalia* origin, they, for a number of reasons, were able to emancipate themselves from their class interests, and they began to view the interests of a wider community transcending class interests. In brief, a movement initially seeking opportunities for the educated segment of the native population became inevitably transformed into a movement for the rights of a whole people.

Among the reformers, Rizal conceived the clearest and most cogent statement of a national community. He first thought that political reforms in the colony might bring about increased political rights; but realizing that these were not possible as long as Filipinas remained a colony, he began to agitate for her transformation into a province of Spain. Arriving at the sad but realistic conclusion that the Spaniards would never consider the *indios* Spaniards, he sought for another social situation where the *indio* was accepted as a human being with natural rights. By an uncanny and brilliant utilization of various characters in his novels which were in effect veritable social analyses and commentaries, he demonstrated how educational, economic, and social attempts of the natives were blocked. He left it to

²⁰ See "The Friar Memorial of 1898," Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, Volume LII, pp. 227-286.

his perceptive readers to conclude that the *indio* as a member of a colony was exploited since the essence of a colony implied this; moreover, as a subject of the Spanish King he was denied justice though he paid the tribute and performed other forms of services for his sovereign. As a member of a Church community, his religiosity was not only taken advantage of but did sometimes serve to prevent his progress. Furthermore, ecclesiastical authorities were not only denying the Christian *indio* a desirable form of education but constituted the very enemies of his political and educational betterment. The conclusion was inevitable; there was need to integrate the natives of Filipinas into another community wherein he was neither identified as a subject of the Spanish King or as a Church member. This had to be a national community.

Rizal believed that if there was a larger community to which the natives were loyal and committed, they would be able to discard their petty and even family or regional interests in favor of a greater good. Although he was aware that some *indios* were able to arrive at certain heights of educational attainments or economic well-being, these to him were not significant since they did not necessarily imply social progress. This is the meaning of his lament, "in Filipinas, a man is only an individual; he is not member of a nation."²² This was as well the meaning of his complaint to a native priest, "In Filipinas, there is INDIVIDUAL progress and perfection but not a NATIONAL or GENERAL one."²³

Partially blameable for the so-called proverbial indolence of the *indio* and a slowness in the progress of his economic well being was, according to Rizal, the absence of what he termed as "national sentiment."²⁴ This absence was exemplified by a depreciation of the results of one's labor, an undue admiration of what was foreign simply because it was not native, and the tolerance of injustice either because fighting it endangered personal interests or simply because one could in some manner benefit from it. On the other hand, the existence of national sentiment meant that a person had self esteem, was not ashamed of the products of his labor, and would fight any form of injustice even at the risk of his life. Reduced to its basic essentials, national sentiment was nothing else but unqualified integrity and a high form of social consciousness. What was thus exhorted was the development of a will to work for the benefit of all as against personal or petty interests. But Rizal himself bewailed the fact that there was unfortunately no nation to speak of. This he started to construct and explain through

²¹ James A. Le Roy, *Philippine Life in Town and Country* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1905), p. 181.

²² "Sobre la indolencia de los Filipinos," *Escritos Politicos e Historicos* (Manila: Comision Nacional del Centenario de Jose Rizal, 1961), p. 257.

²³ "De Rizal al P. Vicente Garcia," *Epistolario Rizalino* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1933), Volume III, p. 137.

²⁴ "Sobre la indolencia de los Filipinos," *op. cit.*, pp. 254-257.

historical studies. Rizal tried to demonstrate that once upon a time, before the arrival of the Spaniards, the natives of the Archipelago had a culture and an ethics of their own and were not the savages doomed to perdition as portrayed by later friar historians. Moreover, the natives were once an industrious people having commercial relations with other parts of Asia. Here, Rizal was not simply blaming the conquest for a great number of ills plaguing the natives; he was aiming at the development among the Filipinos, of a sense of racial affinity; of continuity with their past and pride in them. In this manner they would come to look upon themselves as an historical people and thus a sense of unity or brotherhood might perchance be effected.

Added to an awareness of a common racial origin and history, Rizal believed that with an educational system fostering intellectual and moral virtues, and with the development of a will for the good of all and the habits of industry, the natives would be progressively integrated into a national community which was essentially to be a moral one. Then and only then would the Spaniards realize that they were facing a matured people who were aware of their rights, had a sense of justice, and most important, were willing to die in its defense. Rizal was once optimistic enough to believe that Spain would slowly but increasingly grant political rights to the natives, such that, after a period of autonomy, independence would normally follow.²⁵

Carefully distinguishing the enjoyment of rights from independence,²⁶ Rizal asserted that independence did not necessarily imply the existence of political liberties since it was possible for a people to become independent while remaining ignorant and politically indifferent or even corrupt. Under such conditions, the existence of a native tyranny would be the more likely possibility. Hence Rizal insisted that before the attainment of independence, the people had to be educated—this was the major criterion to prevent the substitution of an alien oppression by a local one. Again, perceivable here was Rizal's fear that the *principalia* would simply succeed Spanish colonial officials and perpetuate the same abuses should the people not change their habits and attitudes.

When Rizal wrote his novels and major articles, it was significant that he had begun to call the natives of the colony "Filipinos"; but what was revolutionary here was that he asserted that the *indios* were the real Filipinos and that Filipinas was their native country and thus belonged to them. Not all Spaniards in Filipinas cherished such ideas.

But Rizal did not remain content to propose the problem of the necessity of a national community. He devised an organization to bring about an integration of the natives into such a community. The *Liga Filipina* aimed "to unite the whole archipelago into one compact, vigorous, and

²⁵ "Datos para mi defensa," *ibid.*, p. 333.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

homogeneous body," and have its members protect each other in "every want and necessity." It was to encourage education, agriculture and commerce, and more important, the organization was to represent a "defense against all violence and injustice." The *Liga* envisioned that ultimately all of the natives of the Archipelago would be members of it—constituting a veritable third community in Filipinas which, by its very logic, would not only give the natives, the true heirs of the land, a new identity, but would dispense with the other two communities as identifying factors for them. Noteworthy, again, about the *Liga* was that it was qualified as "Filipina."²⁷

Probably one of the reasons that compelled Rizal to return to Filipinas in 1892 was to establish the *Liga*. In less than a week after his arrival he addressed a group of professionals to explain the plans of the *Liga* and have officers handle the organization. But the organization disintegrated after a few days, for Rizal was exiled to Mindanao on some charges. In the hands of others, nevertheless, it was reorganized in 1893 but then it was dissolved the next year on account of internal dissensions among its officers: those still interested in supporting the Reform Movement that was becoming moribund in Spain and those who had given up hope in a peaceful agitation for the political and social improvement of the colony.

Rizal's exile to Dapitan, the ineffectivity of the *Liga*, the harassment of *ilustrados* who made a bid for reforms, and the general despair engendered by the increasing repressive character of the colonial government, brought about the formation of the secret society called the *Katipunan*. Its leader, Andres Bonifacio, and its founders generally came from the urban working class in Manila and Tondo. In time its membership extended to other urban areas, in the Tagalog provinces and beyond. In 1895 the organization was becoming complex enough; its Supreme Council had all the characteristics of a government cabinet. It was estimated, probably with some exaggeration, that on the eve of the revolution in 1896, the *Katipunan* had at least 100,000 members, including women. By this time, too, *ilustrados* and priests were, if not formally, enlisted in its ranks or at least supporting it. In Manila, a few scions of the *principalia* also joined it. The appeal of the *Katipunan* lay in its secret character, its impressive and mysterious initiation rites, its native and folk symbolisms, and its revolutionary character—all producing the culminative result that here at last was a truly native power organization. It also performed, by means of its modest publications, a form of outlet for the expression of indigenous literary talents without the normal downgrading by Spanish critics.

²⁷ For a more comprehensive and detailed analysis of Rizal's idea of a national community and what it could accomplish as well as how the *Liga Filipina* could help bring it about, see the author's monograph *Rizal's Concept of a Filipino Nation* (Quezon City, 1959).

The leaders of the *Katipunan* were deeply influenced by the works of the reformers and they maintained to the very end the deepest respect for Rizal, who personally never cared to join them. But they had arrived at the conclusion that the Reform Movement was doomed to failure and that what constituted the social good could not be attained except by armed revolution to bring about the independence and that atmosphere of freedom pre-requisite to the good life. Emphasizing that the Filipinos, before the coming of the Spaniards had a developed culture and that the friars had capitalized on the religiosity of the people for their own benefit, the *Katipunan* exhorted its members to develop patriotism and those virtues of industry, bravery, and perseverance, that would make possible a sort of utopia in the not too distant future.

The discovery of the *Katipunan* in 1896 forced the *katipuneros* to raise the standard of revolt at a time not determined or anticipated by their time table. Consequently, they had to suffer a few military reverses. The Spanish authorities and friars prejudging that the revolt was the work of liberals, Masons, anti-clericals, etc., started to arrest numerous *ilustrados* and *principalia* members, to the extent of executing scores of them. Among these was Jose Rizal. This belief enabled the real leaders of the *Katipunan* to escape the Spanish dragnet and flee to the provinces, while innocent men were liquidated by firing squads. Many *ilustrados* were genuinely shocked by a movement that essentially signified force and violence; while other *principalia* members, conservative by nature, feared that any violence might spell a disruption in their enjoyment of a privileged position and a threat to their economic interests. But the panic that governed the highest offices of the colonial government as well as the general cry for blood by the friars and other Spanish residents brought about a heightened repressive policy on the part of the government. Even conservative natives became resentful of the Spaniards while fearing for their lives. Thus was the atmosphere of general disobedience widened.

The *Katipuneros* under Bonifacio suffered a few reverses in the hands of well-disciplined Spanish troops; however, in Cavite, under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo, the *katipuneros* were not only able to hold their own but even win some battles. Aguinaldo joined the *Katipunan* while a young student in Manila. Upon his return to his home town, he was elected *capitan municipal*, a position his father had once held. By all indications, he belonged to the local *principalia* and would normally have attained a professional degree in Manila were it not for his father's death which led him to return home to take charge of family affairs. It was inevitable that the contest for the leadership of the Revolution would be between Bonifacio and Aguinaldo. Where Bonifacio believed that the original organization of the *Katipunan* was sufficient to pursue the movement, many of the Cavite *Katipuneros* under the leadership of members of the *principalia* insisted

that another system of government be instituted. It was Aguinaldo who emerged as the president of the new government. The divisions were so clear that even the election of Bonifacio as the Director of the Interior was questioned by the remark that he was not even a lawyer. It may be speculated that regional bias was involved in the election of most of the officials in the new governmental set-up; but what was obvious was that *principalia* members of Cavite played an important role in the election of Aguinaldo. The tragic death of Bonifacio not much later and the practical necessity to close ranks on account of the Spanish offensive, as well as genuine popular support of a hero, all pushed Aguinaldo to become the undisputed leader of the Revolution.

The Spanish offensive was of such an intensity that Aguinaldo and his troops had to leave Cavite for Biak-na-Bato where the decision for renewed effort for the Revolution was made. A provisional constitution along republican lines was then adopted. Realizing that the capture of Biak-na-Bato would not spell the end of the Revolution, the Spanish Governor General Primo de Rivera decided on a new approach which was that of a peaceful settlement in which the revolutionary leaders were to receive a large amount of money in return for their exile and the granting of a general amnesty to all who revolted. With part of the amount given to him and other revolutionary leaders, Aguinaldo and his closest companions left for exile in Hongkong. However, the so-called Pact of Biak-na-Bato did not accomplish what it was intended to do. This was the situation in 1897.

The outbreak of the Spanish American War in April 1898 and United States' ambitions in the Pacific brought a new factor in the resurgence of the revolution against Spain. The defeat of the Spanish Navy by an American squadron in May forced the Spaniards to court support of the Filipinos. Abroad, Aguinaldo was already in contact with American consular officials and his help was solicited. On May 19, Aguinaldo with his aides arrived in Cavite, and the first thing he did was to raise an army with the help of captured Spanish guns and ammunition made available by Admiral Dewey. Soon after, more guns and ammunition purchased from part of the money given to Aguinaldo through the Pact of Biak-na-Bato arrived. With initial successes against Spanish troops, his army grew and it was further swelled by Filipino troops who had deserted the Spanish Army. Appeals of the Governor General for Filipino loyalty and promises of future reforms as well as exhortations by the Manila Archbishop for Filipino support on the basis of a common faith fell on deaf ears. In the meantime, the Filipinos established a dictatorship under Aguinaldo and on June 12, 1898 the independence of the Philippines was solemnly declared. Many *ilustrados* left Manila to join Aguinaldo, offering him every kind of advice and help. With Apolinario Mabini as his major adviser, the Dictatorship was changed into the Revolutionary Government on June 23. To reassure

the new government of their loyalty and commitment, a few hundred municipal officials met in Bakoor on August 1 and ratified the previous declaration of independence.

The refusal of American officers to allow armed Filipino troops to enter Manila after its surrender on August 14, in spite of the fact that the Filipinos played a major part in the siege of the city, signified to Filipino leaders that the Americans were not only determined to deny them a share in the victory but that they intended to stay indefinitely in the country. In the mind of some of Aguinaldo's advisers, war with the Americans seemed inevitable, and therefore, every care was taken to prevent any American pretext for war.

In response to what was considered the American threat, the Revolutionary government made strenuous efforts to extend its sway on as large a territory as possible. By the end of the year, except for the city of Manila and a few pockets nearby occupied by the Americans and other spots occupied by harrassed Spanish garrisons, practically the whole of Luzon had fallen under the authority of the Revolutionary government. Not long after, other islands in the Visayas and some towns in Mindanao pledged their loyalty to it. The Revolutionary government also transferred the capital to Malolos which was not only easier to defend than the towns in Cavite but also made it possible for Filipino troops to have greater maneuverability or even convert themselves into guerrilla units should the need arise. Diplomats were sent abroad to get foreign recognition of the independence of the Philippines—but without success. To strengthen itself further in the face of the American challenge, a Congress was convoked at Malolos to frame a constitution along republican lines and thus while gaining more popular support among all segments of the Philippine population, it was to be demonstrated to all foreigners that the Filipinos were determined to govern themselves and had the capacity to do so. In accordance with the republican constitution promulgated by Congress, the Philippine Republic was proclaimed with Aguinaldo as President on January 23, 1899.

The Malolos Constitution was republican, mainly based on South American models and European ones to some extent. Noteworthy about it was that nearly thirty percent of the document referred to the rights of citizens exemplifying that the Filipinos were out to enjoy those rights never enjoyed before and for which elaborate safeguards had to be secured. It was designed to make the legislature the supreme branch in the government. As a formal document it reflected one of the most important steps in the political development of the Filipino people.

As expected, practically all of the members of the Congress at Malolos were *ilustrados* or members of the *principalia*. Although the membership fluctuated, at one time, out of nearly one hundred members, about eighty percent had professions. Whereas most of them were local graduates,

a few studied in European universities. The majority of the delegates were appointed not only because conditions did not warrant elections in all districts but also to have the town aristocracy become members and thus support the Republic. The electoral laws promulgated by the Revolutionary government in providing that the local officials were to be elected by the leading citizens of the towns guaranteed that the *principalia* would not only remain in control of the towns but would, when elections were possible, be elected into Congress. The *principalia* was now determined to rule in the place of the Spaniards.

More than once the *principalia* tried to exercise undue influence on Aguinaldo as when they almost induced him to approve their plan to have a national bank with the authority to float loans. It was Mabini who thwarted their plans. However, Aguinaldo's recognition that the Malolos Congress had the power to promulgate a constitution represented a victory on their side. Felipe Calderon, the father of the Malolos Constitution, himself confessed that his constitutional plan was to see to it that the *ilustrados* rather than "an oligarchy of the ignorant" would rule the country; probably referring to some Army leaders and soldiers whom he characterized as "ignorant almost in their entirety."

Although probably all *ilustrados* saw eye to eye with Calderon who insisted on the principle that the government ought to be in their hands, not all agreed that the *principalia* should play this role of leadership. The fact was that not all *ilustrados* had the same economic origins or prejudices. Mabini, who was of humble origin, was ever suspicious of "the rich in Manila" and he opposed the idea to allow the Malolos Congress to frame a constitution. To him it was merely a consultative body to the revolutionary government and was intended to reflect a visible sanction and loyalty to the Revolution on the part of a segment of the population. The irony of it all was that it was Mabini who framed the electoral laws that made possible the Revolutionary Congress, which, once convoked, refused to be satisfied with remaining a purely consultative body.

It was agreed by all that Aguinaldo had to remain as head of the state for an indefinite period. Having the general loyalty of the Army and admired for his achievements, he came to be identified with the humbler strata of Filipino society. He was not entirely opposed by the *principalia* as long as he offered them concessions. The *ilustrados* of humbler origin were determined to see to it that he was not made a prisoner of the *principalia*. Yet these *ilustrados*, in common with other *ilustrados*, wanted to guide the direction of the Revolution; depending all the time on Aguinaldo not to allow the "ignorant" to get out of hand.

Meanwhile, the ordinary soldier, of peasant origin, was there to serve and hope for a better future where he could own a piece of land unmolested. But after the friar estates were confiscated by the Revolutionary government,

the ensuing Republic, needing an additional source of income, passed a law enabling "men of means" and "local chiefs" to administer them provided they could present security either in cash or in bond.²⁸ In brief, the *principalia* was allowed, by law, to further strengthen its economic base by additional land ownership.

But regardless of different interests and basic conflicts a spirit of optimism had permeated all classes in the Philippines. Patriotism became the rule and a sense of nationality was dramatically beginning to extend itself. The Filipino government in extending its sway over a great part of the Archipelago meant that Filipinas was beginning to belong to Filipinos, now the real natives of the country. The persons in the highest offices of the government who had begun to exercise or manage the coercive powers of government began to have a stake in the preservation of their authority. They were all determined to keep it. The generality of the people, having been oppressed in the past, now hoped that the new social situation would eventually offer them many of the things they felt they were denied before. Thus, a new series of aspirations and expectations were generated, bringing, in turn, greater loyalty to a government believed to be the very tool that would concretize such aspirations. All of these factors led Mabini to assert categorically that the Filipinos during the Revolution were able to take the first few steps in the building of a national life.

But the outbreak of hostilities with the Americans dashed all hopes of the expected social amelioration. Faced with superior troops and heavy artillery, the Filipino troops were forced to lose ground steadily. Malolos fell on March 31, 1899 and the capital was transferred various times. American military officials thought the war would soon be finished and the only problem would be one of mopping up operations. But they were mistaken, for they had underrated the persistence of the Filipino soldier and the determination of many revolutionary leaders. But the Filipinos needing pace so badly made various overtures for it. The Americans refused to listen to them unless it was under the premise of unconditional surrender and the laying down of arms by all Filipino troops. On account of the military offensive of the American army, Aguinaldo, on November 12, formally disbanded the Army and converted it into guerrilla units. Thus the war became more difficult for the Americans to contain.

With the American advance scores of members of the Revolutionary government fell as prisoners. Fifty-seven of those well known for their inveterate resistance to the imposition of American sovereignty, including Mabini, were deported to Guam. Their deportation was decreed because, not

²⁸ For this law passed on February 19, 1899, see John M. Taylor, *Report on the Organization for the Administration of Civil Government instituted by Emilio Aguinaldo and his followers in the Philippine Archipelago* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903), pp. 70-71.

having accepted the fact of the American presence, they stood as a symbol of opposition that encouraged Filipino resistance in the fields and mountains. Many of these prisoners actually encouraged resistance not because they thought that the Filipinos were eventually to be the military victors but simply to demonstrate to the Americans that they were facing a determined foe that deserved better peace terms that would include the recognition of political rights in the new regime envisioned for them. The capture of Aguinaldo on March 23, 1901, and his taking an oath of allegiance to the United States the next month only signified that the end of the armed struggle against the United States was near at hand. True enough, by 1902, the majority of the resisting generals either surrendered or were captured.

Brutalities of American soldiers and cases of racial prejudice on their part were soon moderated by the introduction of an American system of education even while the war was going on. In pacified areas, the American offer to some of the old leaders of Filipino participation in government appeared sincere, and in a matter of a few years the scars of the war were erased. Many members of the former Revolutionary Congress and government began to assume positions in the new order, and they cooperated with the American authorities. But not all of them gave up their work for the eventual independence of their country. They were biding for their time when political liberties would be given to them such that they could peacefully agitate for it. What appeared as indelicate to Mabini was how some persons who once held high offices in the Revolution rushed unashamedly to cooperate with the new master. He believed that more prudence on their part would have merited the respect of the Americans. Actually to Mabini, the war against the Americans was merely a continuation of the previous struggle against Spain since the Filipinos were still struggling to regain and enjoy those rights that properly belonged to them and which the Americans appeared to be denying. However, Mabini was led to hope that the history of the Americans and their political ideology might eventually force them to progressively grant Filipinos more political rights. Essential to him was that the Filipinos had to merit such rights by working for them instead of waiting for a colonial power to grant them as a sort of grace.

The lack of a truly radical economic program on the part of the revolutionary leaders left unsolved the chronic agrarian problems of the country. It can be speculated that if the Revolution was allowed to run its normal course without American interference, the agrarian problem would have vexed it and affected its direction. This was revealed by Mabini when he wrote:

When we were connected with the Malolos government, some very frightened *ilustrados* told us that the cry for liberties had begun to germinate socialistic or communistic ideas in the minds of people who got a bad deal in some pro-

perties of questionable origin, without understanding that the discontented ones precisely belonged to the class of those unfortunates who were dispossessed by *hacenderos* and big landowners.²⁹

Neither did the Americans introduce any novel economic program to solve the chronic economic ills of the Philippines. Actually, their recruitment of principalia members to hold political or civil offices served, it not to postpone the solution, to make it more difficult. Moreover, friar lands purchased by the civil government were sold to corporations and to those with easily available means to purchase them. The change of ownership did not eliminate the problem.

THE ROAD OF THE NATIVES of the Philippines towards increasing freedom and their integration into a national community as Filipino has been a long and difficult one. From scattered settlements they were welded into a community of subjects to the Spanish King that formed simultaneously a Church one. Finding in time that both systems failed to provide them with what they later on considered essential to a fuller life, they were led to reflect on an alternative one. In the historical stage they found themselves, it was imperative that this community had to be national and independent. Because of colonial obstruction, a revolution was resorted to as a technique to attain independence. The struggle against the Americans was viewed as part of the process initiated against Spain. Independence, too, was looked up to as a means to secure that social situation where Filipinos could develop their native talents in an atmosphere of freedom and where values were not imposed from without but were the result of their free choice and deeply felt needs. Then and only then could the Filipinos effectively contribute to world culture. In brief, to be a universal man, it was essential first of all to be a Filipino.

In a national community, at least in the minds of those who originally conceived it, there was to be no racial prejudice, humiliation, and denigration of the results of one's efforts at self-improvement. In it each person counted as an individual with intrinsic worth but endowed with a preeminently social consciousness directing him to work for the good of all rather than for selfish motives. It was therefore essential that there was to be a complete absence of any form of exploitation in order that each citizen might be more committed to the national community. These then are the major invariants that entered into the original concept of the national community. As the Filipinos become progressively integrated into a national community, their problem is whether these elements are to be retained and achieved or discarded.

²⁹ "Cuestiones en relación con las corporaciones religiosas," *op. cit.*, p. 148.

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