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BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS SIAM, CAMBODIA, AND VIETNAM, 1842-1858 *

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BRITISH POLICY AND THE REACTION TO BRITISH POLICY were significant factors in creating the political structure of nineteenth-century South-east Asia. Largely, they determined the position in that structure of Siam, of Vietnam, and of the intervening vassal remnant of Cambodia. Siam was more important in British policy than Vietnam, more important to British interests. But more fundamental in deciding the future of the two countries (on which the future of Cambodia also depended), was their reaction to British policy. Both sought to insure their political independence in the changing world of Southeast Asia. Their ruling groups chose differing means and thus enjoyed differing success.

At the time of the Crawfurd mission to Siam and Vietnam in 1822, the attitudes of the two governments did not seem very different. Both were jealous of the conquering English Company, and both sought to deflect its approaches—by treating in the tributary style of East Asian diplomacy and by implying that they could really deal only with the King of Great Britain—rather than meet the British more on British terms. Crawfurd's conclusions were somewhat similar in both cases: commerce with both countries should be carried on indirectly through Chinese junks. But he did recognize certain differences. The commercial importance of Vietnam, he thought, had been exaggerated; its political importance to the Indian Government was less. Siam, on the other hand, was (whether the Company ruled in India or not) "within the pale of our Indian diplomacy," [1] in view of British interests in the tributary states of northern Malaya and the British occupation of the Tenasserim provinces in the first Burma war. Not that this meant that there should be an envoy at Bangkok: such might only be a source of irritation. "The sea on one quarter, and impracticable mountains and forests on another, are barriers which, together with the fears and discretion of the Siamese Government, will in all likelihood preserve us long at peace with this people..."[2]

On the other hand, Crawfurd thought that the Royal Navy might be a vehicle for communication with Vietnam on the part of the British Government. A direct intercourse with the Crown would flatter the court at Hue and perhaps improve commercial relations.[3]

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* This paper was read to Section E of the Hobart meeting of the Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science in August 1965.

[1] John Crawfurd, *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China*, Second ed., (London, 1830), i, 472.

[2] *Ibid.*, i, 472.

[3] *Ibid.*, i, 474-5.

Whether a diplomatic approach on the part of the royal government would (at the time of Crawfurd's mission) have produced a different reaction in either country is, perhaps, doubtful. In fact, for two decades, it was not attempted in either country, even the way Crawfurd suggested as a means of cutting into the Company's diplomatic monopoly. By the time it was attempted, Vietnam's reaction had, perhaps, been affected by unfortunate dealings with other western powers. On the other hand, Siam pursued (despite one major crisis) a different policy, setting out from a treaty made with the Company's envoy—Captain Henry Burney—in 1826. Siam had indeed been brought into closer touch with the British by common boundaries and by a busier trade, and had been impressed by the defeat of the neighboring Burmese.[4] But the most important factor in the differing reaction of Siam and Vietnam was their different history, and the different roles earlier Europeans had assumed in it. Siam had played off the predominant European power in past centuries by calling in countervailing powers. Vietnam had seen different European powers involved in her Civil War. Indeed, Minh-Mang's growing repression of Catholic missionary activities in the 1820's and 1830's was of political origin. The missionary Pigneau had aided Cia-Long, who had re-established an independent Vietnam: might not his dynasty and Vietnam's independence be challenged in a similar way? This consideration seems to qualify Crawfurd's optimism about royal missions—though it is inconclusive, since for years none were sent—and to be perhaps the major factor in the treatment of them when they were sent.

The Supreme Government in Calcutta had been doubtful about dispatching the Burney mission to Siam. It observed that

> All extension of our territorial possessions and political relations on the side of the Indo-Chinese nations is, with reference to the peculiar character of those states, to their decided jealousy of our power and ambition, and to their proximity to China, earnestly to be deprecated and declined as far as the course of events and the force of circumstances will permit... . Even the negotiation of treaties and positive engagements with the Siamese Government... may be regarded as open to serious objection lest any future violation of their conditions should impose upon us the necessity of resenting such breaches of contract... .[5]

Nevertheless, the mission had been sent, since in practice Siam was already involved in "political relations" with the British. Moreover, a treaty was signed, providing that British merchants might "buy and sell without the intervention of other persons," that rice exports and opium imports should be prohibited, and that a measurement duty of 1700 ticals per Siamese fathom should be levied. The treaty also partially conceded Siamese claims over the northern Malay states, especially Kedah.

The attempts of the Penang Government to rectify what it regarded as an unsatisfactory conclusion, led the Governor-General to reiterate that the proper policy towards the Siamese was "to endeavour to allay their jealousy of our ultimate views...and to derive from our connection with them every

[4] W. F. Vella, *Siam Under Rama III 1824-1851* (Locust Valley, 1957), 118, 121.

[5] G.-G.-in-Co. to Gov.-in-Co., 19th November 1824. *Straits Settlements Factory Records 99* (4th January 1825), India Office Library.

attainable degree of commercial advantage, by practising in our intercourse with them the utmost forbearance, temper, and moderation both in language and action...and...by faithfully and scrupulously observing the conditions of the treaty which fixes our future relations..... ."[6] The Company was anxious to retain its existing relations with China and its position in the Canton market and unwilling, therefore, to press upon Peking's Indo-Chinese "feudatories."

East Asian diplomacy was, along with direct British commerce with East Asia, still in the hands of the Company. If this fact obstructed diplomatic relations between Britain and the Indo-Chinese countries (and this is, it has been suggested, doubtful), that fact also meant that British policy in the area was restrained and cautious. Vietnam was left alone, left to become involved with the missionaries and their supporters, to become more isolationist than ever. Siam was handled in a restrained way that, no doubt, facilitated the adjustment in Thai policy marked by the treaty of 1826.

In 1834, the Company's monopoly of the China trade was brought to an end, and the British Government appointed a Superintendent of Trade there. Further changes followed, with the deterioration in Anglo-Chinese relations, the first Opium War, the annexation of Hong Kong, and the opening of Chinese ports under the treaty of Nanking. In the minds of some, this seemed to clear the way for a new policy towards the Indo-Chinese vassals. The inhibition of the Company's Chinese policy was removed; the vassals might follow their suzerain's example and admit commerce more freely; and the British Government would benefit by conducting direct relations with them. Among those who argued in this way, were Charles Gutzlaff, Chinese Secretary at Hong Kong, and Montgomery Martin, one-time Colonial Treasurer.

In Siam, some commercial development had ensued upon the treaty of 1826. Junks from Siam came to provide one of Singapore's more valuable trades and in addition, trade was built up at Bangkok by Europeans, especially by the Scot Robert Hunter, who had four vessels annually making voyages by the mid-1830's.[7] The duties were so heavy on square-rigged vessels, however, that most of the produce went to Singapore on Chinese and Siamese junks.[8] Furthermore, in the late 1830's and 1840's, the Siamese government extended the monopolistic system of tax-farming—for instance, in 1839 in the case of sugar—[9] while leading Siamese began trading in their own square-rigged vessels.[10]

More particularly, Hunter became involved in a quarrel with the Siamese government which, at the time of the British expedition to China, had ordered a steamer from him. When, after the expedition had safely returned to India, the government refused to buy it, Hunter sold it to Siam's enemy,

[6] G.-G.-to ov.-in-Co., 23rd July 1827. *S.S.F.R. 142* (6th September 1827).
[7] R. Adey Moore, "An Early British Merchant in Bangkok," *The Journal of the Siam Society*, XI, Pt. 2 (1914-5), 25.
[8] G.W. Earl, *The Eastern Seas* (London, 1837), 177.
[9] Neon Snidvongs, *The Development of Siamese Relations with Britain and France in the Reign of Maha Mongkut, 1851-1868* (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of London, 1961), 136.
[10] Vella, *op. cit.*, 128.

the Vietnamese.[11] As a result of the quarrel, Hunter promoted protests to the Indian Government about alleged infractions of the Burney treaty—for instance, a memorial of May 1843 protesting at the sugar monopoly—at a prohibition on teak exports, and at the excessive punishments inflicted for importing opium.[12]

The Indian Government declared that the monopoly did not violate the treaty: no interference was at present required.[13] A further memorial from Hunter urged action to secure some redress over the sugar monopoly and over the breach of the agreement to purchase his steamer, and to conclude a new arrangement with the Siamese replacing the heavy measurement duties: "the successes of Great Britain in China are fresh in their memory . . . ."[14] Governor Butterworth in the Straits Settlements thought that most of Hunter's complaints lacked substance, but that the Burney treaty should be revised.[15] The Court of Directors thought the British right of remonstrance against the sugar monopoly not clear enough to justify action.[16]

The Company was still cautious, still concerned about the risks of collision and war. If Siam was not now to be considered in relation to China, it could still be considered in relation to Burma and to India in general: it was still within the pale of Indian diplomacy. General political considerations operated against any disposition to rush to the defense of the commercial interests of the Bangkok merchants or the Straits Settlements. There was a treaty with Siam: it was best to avoid risking the bases of relations it settled even if the Siamese were said to be infringing particular clauses.

The Vietnamese Government had made liberal commercial promises to Crawfurd, but trade with Vietnam was in fact (as he had prophesied) to center largely on Singapore, involving junks and topes and also royal Vietnamese vessels. The Vietnamese Government indeed sought a monopoly by denying Cochin-Chinese sailors the right to carry arms, and so discouraging their enterprise by committing them to the Malay and Chinese pirates.[17] The attempted monopoly was much more a function than a cause of the Vietnamese policy of limited communication, and this Gutzlaff failed to realize.

In his memorandum of July 1845,[18] he pointed out that—despite their promises to Crawfurd—the Hue Government had, in fact, frustrated a direct intercourse with Vietnam. But he explained this by referring to "the cupidity of the Government to monopolize as much as possible all valuable articles and export them in its own bottoms..... ." He thought the Emperor might be persuaded to turn to free intercourse and to impose moderate duties

[11] Snidvongs, *op cit.*, 141. Moore, J.S.S., XI, Pt. 2, 33.
[12] *The Burney Papers* (Bangkok, 1910-14), IV, Pt. 2, 81-3.
[13] *Ibid.*, 106.
[14] *Ibid.*, 129-35.
[15] *Ibid.*, 160-6.
[16] Court to G.-G., 2nd January 1846. *F.O.17/150,* Public Record Office.
[17] Earl, *op. cit.*, 198.
[18] "Remarks upon the establishment of a Commercial Treaty with Siam, Annam (or Cochin China), Korea and Japan," 12th July 1845. *F.O.17/100.* Gutzlaff had been a missionary in W.F. Vella, *Origins of 'Survival Diplomacy' in Siam: Relations between Siam and the West, 1822-56* (Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of California, 1950), 40.

as a means of raising revenue. He was optimistic over the effect of appointing "an accredited Envoy from Her Majesty."

Such an envoy to Siam, Gutzlaff thought, might secure a revision of the commercial parts of the Burney treaty and put an end to monopolies. The political topics and territorial disputes he would consider "as foreign to his mission, and entirely unconnected with the affairs of the Home Government..... ." A consular agent might be appointed, and on his accession he could advise the heir presumptive, "a devoted friend to foreigners..... ."

Sir John Davis, the Superintendent in China, supported Gutzlaff's plan. The Foreign Office, despite Gutzlaff's attempt to divide off "the affairs of the Home Government" from those of India, referred it to the India Board.[19] The President thought the Burney treaty "sufficient for the objects of Trade and Friendship; and, at any rate, I should be inclined to doubt the policy of risking the advantages possessed under the present treaty, in the attempt to obtain greater advantages under a new engagement." With Vietnam, however, there was no treaty, there was no such risk, and a negotiation might be attempted; if successful there, the scheme might be extended to Siam. A provision should be included against internal monopolies.[20]

The Indian authorities were prepared for experiment beyond the pale of their diplomacy, in Vietnam. Here, British interests were sufficiently unimportant to allow a new approach. In the case of Siam, British interests were more important, and a new approach—originating in a dubious breach of the treaty—might only risk the existing relationship. Again, therefore, it was not a lack of British endeavor, deriving from a lack of interest, that promoted Vietnam's isolation. Indeed, in this case, the very lack of interest promoted a new endeavor, while the weight of British interest in Siam contributed to the caution among the Indian authorities whose advice the Foreign Office followed. A full power — though no royal letter from the Queen — was sent to Davis for negotiation with Vietnam.[21]

The India Board also opposed the Board of Trade's proposition to appoint a consular agent in Bangkok for the purpose of certifying that Siamese sugar was not slave-grown and could thus qualify for importation into Britain at new lower rates of duty. A City merchant (Parker Hammond) approached the Foreign Office and proposed the appointment of a Bangkok merchant (Daniel Brown) as consul, and the negotiation of a new treaty with Siam. The proposal was repeated later in 1846 and in 1847, but Hammond was told that the Government "had no occasion to avail themselves of his suggestion."[22]

Possibly, the interested merchants brought the matter before Sir James Brooke during his visit to England in October 1847-February 1848.[23] Brooke was at a peak in his career: the Foreign Office had appointed him

[19] Davis to Aberdeen, 1st August 1845. *F.O.17/107.* F.O. to India Board, 24th. November 845. *F.O.17/107.*

[20] Ripon to Aberdeen, 11th March, 1846. F.O. 17/117.

[21] Aberdeen to Davis, 18th March 1846. F.O. 17/108.

[22] Memo., 19th August 1848. *F.O.17/150.*

[23] The dates are from Sir S. Runciman, *The White Rajahs* (Cambridge, 1960), 88, 91.

Commissioner and Consul-General to the Sultan and Independent Chiefs in Borneo; he had concluded a treaty with Brunei and became Governor of the new colony of Labuan.

In August 1848, Hammond and Co. again alluded to the sugar monopoly in Bangkok and other alleged infractions of the Burney treaty, and suggested that, in view of the China war, a British remonstrance would be heeded by the Siamese court. The Governor of Labuan, it was said, would willingly endeavor to remedy the decline of trade and a new treaty might be made.[24] The India Board, duly consulted, still adhered to its views of 1846.[25] Attempts to by-pass the Indian authorities in seeking action at Bangkok were thus still unsuccessful.

Meanwhile, in Singapore, the Chamber of Commerce had taken the matter up. It tried the Governor-General first, complaining of monopolies as infringing the Burney treaty and of the measurement duties specified in the treaty as hindering competition with native craft, and protesting at arbitrary acts against British subjects. A new treaty should be made, establishing equitable duties, securing unrestricted trading, ending the prohibition on rice exports, and appointing a consul.[26]

Despairing of the Indian authorities, the merchants turned to the Royal Navy. In May, they called the Senior Naval Officer's attention to arbitrary proceedings against the firm of Silver, Brown and Co., whose exports to Singapore had allegedly been prohibited. They suggested his proceeding to Bangkok "to give protection to British Trade and persons, in any emergency which the unsettled state of affairs there may render necessary, and further to require that such arbitrary proceedings as above alluded to be put a stop to and guarded against hereafter." Perhaps, he might be able to put relations with Siam on a better footing, or take security for the faithful execution of the existing treaty. Commander Plumbridge took no action, so the Chamber turned to the Commander-in-Chief. Sir Francis Collier replied, in turn, that he must refer to the Admiralty. The Admiralty referred to the Foreign Office, the Foreign Office to the India Board, with predictable results.[27]

Meanwhile, in October, the Singapore Chamber followed up with a direct approach to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston. Its memorial urged the conclusion of a new treaty with Siam. It also wanted the conclusion of a treaty with Vietnam, to be negotiated by an envoy or commissioner in conjunction with the Commander-in-Chief.[28]

Davis' mission to Vietnam had, in fact, proved a failure. He had been unduly optimistic; his judgments had been mistaken. The most difficult part, he had argued, would be the abolition of the trade monopoly. One problem—"the absence of the Sovereign character in the Governor General"—had, however, been overcome. Furthermore, the French clash with

[24] Statement by Hammond and Co., 11th August 1848. *F.O.17/150.*
[25] India Board to F.O., 23rd August 1848, and enclosures. *F.O.17/150.*
[26] Chamber of Commerce to G.-G., 28th January 1848. *F.O.17/151.*
[27] Ker to Plumbridge, 17th April 1848; Ker to Collier, 21st August 1848 reply, s.d.; F.O. to India Board, 6th November 1848; reply, 13th November, 1848 *F.O.17/151.*
[28] Memorial, October 1848. *F.O.17/162.*

the Vietnamese at Tourane, early in 1847, might lead them by contrast to receive well the pacific British.[29] But, in fact, the clash — deriving, like an American clash two years previously, from the missionary issue — had redoubled the exclusionist policy towards all Europeans. The new Emperor Tu-Duc brought an end to the royal trade to the southward.[30] Certainly this did not increase the likelihood of a friendly reception, even to an envoy of the British Crown. Davis, in the event, got no further than Tourane and was not allowed to proceed to the capital. Nor were the presents exchanged.[31] What the India Board had seen as an experiment guiding the future course in Siam, proved a failure. Vietnam was thus included in Singapore's direct representations to the home government.

Acting in his retirement as agent for the Singapore merchants, Crawfurd brought their memorial before the Foreign Office. He felt, however, that "a formal, and consequently expensive Embassy to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China is not desirable, and that the most eligible course will consist in sending a couple of Steamers of light draught, under the case of an experienced, and discreet naval officer, being the bearer of a letter from her Majesty to the Sovereigns of the two countries, with one from the Secretary of State to their Ministers, but without any powers to negotiate."[32] This recommendation was perhaps, somewhat on the lines of his Vietnam recommendation of the 1820's, except that he had then considered Siam to be exclusively an Indian matter. Furthermore, Crawfurd favored a rather different approach to Siam in another recommendation of March 1849. The mission to Bangkok should be conducted by a naval officer, with two small war steamers. Their appearance would have a "wholesome" effect, especially as the Siamese knew of "our exemplary chastisement of the Chinese..... ." In Vietnam, on the other hand, the envoy should simply deliver a friendly letter "requesting a continuance and extension of the commercial intercourse between the two nations... ." One steamer would be best; "and here, not forgetting the untoward circumstances which attended the recent visit of a French Admiral, the less military display the better . . . ."[33]

Again, Palmerston referred to the India Board. The President admitted that a more liberal system in Siam and Vietnam would benefit British commerce. The attempt to secure it, however, would (he apprehended) "produce only embarrassment and loss. If, however, the mercantile community, and Her Majesty's Government, at their own cost, and after due deliberation are inclined to run the risk, I should not deem it my duty to press further upon Your Lordship the doubts to which I have referred." Not that Crawfurd's paper removed those doubts. In the case of Vietnam, even according to his analysis, a mission was either needless, or it would be "fruitless." As for Siam, Crawfurd's plan was not to negotiate a treaty, but simply "to show that the capital of Siam, with its palaces and temples, might be laid in ashes in a few hours, and to satisfy the Court that an illiberal commercial

[29] Davis to Palmerston, 4th October 1847. *F.O.17/130.*
[30] Note enclosed in Parkes to Hammond, 3rd August 1855. *F.O.17/236.*
[31] Davis to Palmerston, 26th, 30th October 1847. *F.O.17/130.*
[32] Crawfurd to Eddisbury, 26th December 1848. *F.O.17/151.*
[33] Notes in Crawfurd to Eddisbury, 1st March 1849. *F.O.17/161.*

policy cannot be preserved in with impunity. . . ."[34] The India Board thus grudgingly assented to a mission. But the Davis "experiment" had been a failure, and really the Board's objections now extended to Vietnam also.

The Foreign Office turned to the Board of Trade. The outcome was influenced by the activities of Montgomery Martin. In 1845, he had put in proposals similar to Gutzlaff's and, early in 1849, he had suggested a mission to Japan, Siam, Korea and Vietnam, emanating from the Queen's government, unconnected with Hong Kong, which (he argued) was "still viewed in the Countries adjacent to China as connected with the East India Company and their Indian Territories," since all the Governors, so far, had been Company servants. Subsequently, he promoted his plans in the manufacturing districts.

In August 1849, the Singapore Chamber sent a memorial to Palmerston, suggesting the appointment as negotiator in Siam and Vietnam of Brooke, who had lately concluded a treaty with Sulu.[35] This was, in turn, communicated to the India Board and the Board of Trade. The India Board referred to its earlier views. The Board of Trade declared that "the manufacturing districts in the North of England" were in favor of "an attempt to extend our commercial relations with Siam and Cochin China. . . ." Palmerston resolved to send Brooke on the mission.[36]

Diplomatic dealings with the "Indo-Chinese nations" had, during the 1840's, been considered in relation to China with which a revolution in relations had occurred. Official proposals had emanated from Hong Kong and instructions had been sent to the Superintendent. At the same time, however, the merchants in the Straits Settlements—still under Company rule—had been urging a more active policy in the Archipelago. They sought direct contacts with the home government and the appointment (under the Foreign Office) of a Superintendent of Trade similar to the one in China.

The home government had not gone as far as this. It, however, displayed an interest in Borneo, Sulu and the adjacent islands, and was disposed to use Brooke as some kind of Superintendent or Commissioner of Trade without actually giving him the title and thus, perhaps, worsening relations with the Dutch.[37] Merchants in Bangkok and Singapore and their connections in London had seen the possibility of employing the apparently successful Brooke in the Indo-Chinese countries. There, nothing had yet been effected, and, though probably not because of Martin's argument, the Foreign Office favored the arrangement.

The new Southeast Asian orientation of Indo-Chinese diplomacy did not, however, mean that Southeast Asian matters were fully considered in Brooke's instructions. They were concerned with negotiating commercial stipulations

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[34] Memo in Labouchers to Palmerston, 10th January 1849. *F.O.17/161.*

[35] Memorial, 20th August 1849. *F.O.17/162.*

[36] Hobhouse to Palmerston, 10th November 1849; Board of Trade to F.O., 22nd November 1849. *F.O.17/163.*

[37] See the present author's paper, "The Superintendence of British Interests in South-east Asia in the Nineteenth Century," read at the Conference of Asian Historians, Hong Kong, 1964, and to be published in the *Journal Southeast Asian History* in 1966.

that might be compared to those with other "imperfectly civilized States," such as China and Turkey.[38] Nothing was said about the territorial relations with Burma and with the Malay states that had once made Crawfurd consider Siam purely an Indian concern. The India Board, grudgingly assenting to a mission, had grudged observations about its conduct.

The Foreign Office did not send out royal letters for Brooke to deliver. However, so far as Siam went, he thought this might aid him "in maintaining the high and firm position which is necessary to take with Indo-Chinese Nations. . . ."[39] In fact, he did not intend to attempt the negotiation of a detailed treaty, merely to pave "the way for a more frequent and friendly communication. . . ."[40] The old king must shortly die and a new order would ensue with the accession of the heir presumptive, Mongkut.[41] The *Sphinx*—the larger of the two steamers accompanying the mission—stuck on the bar of the Menam on its arrival from Singapore in August. Brooke's secretary, Spenser St. John, was to attribute to this the failure of the mission.[42] But Rama III was set against any invasion of Siamese customs and traditions: he tried to turn to account not only Brooke's lack of a royal letter, but also the fact that he came on the part of the royal government, while there was already a treaty with the Company.[43] Brooke agreed to put his proposals into writing. These were then summarily rejected.[44]

Brooke declared that the mission had been slighted and recommended that "amicable communications with the Siamese Government should cease till their feeling of hostility shall have been corrected. . . ."[45] The Burney treaty had been infringed and British subjects had been outraged. Decisive measures were called for: reparations and a new treaty should be demanded; and, if refused, "a force should be present immediately to enforce them by a rapid destruction of the defenses of the river, which would place us in possession of the Capital and by restoring us to our proper position of command, retrieve the past and ensure peace for the future, with all its advantages of a growing and most important commerce. . . ."[46] Mongkut would be placed on the throne. "At the same time the Malayan States (particularly Kedah) may be placed on a footing to save them from the oppressions they are now subjected to. . . ."[47]

As for Vietnam, Brooke had, on receiving the instructions, written to suggest that a royal letter and presents should be sent out for him to deliver

[38] Palmerston to Brooke, 18th December 1849. *F.O.69/1.*

[39] Brooke to Palmerston, 5th March 1850. *F.O.69/1.*

[40] Brooke to Palmerston, 2nd July 1850. *F.O.69/1.*

[41] Brooke to Stuart, 17th June 1850. John S. Templer, ed., *The Private Letters of Sir James Brooke* (London, 1853), ii, 304.

[42] S. St. John, *The Life of Sir James Brooke* (Edinburgh and London, 1879), 222.

[43] Vella, *Siam under Rama III*, 135-6.

[44] N. Tarling, "Siam and Sir James Brooke," *The Journal of the Siam Society*, XLVIII, Pt. 2 (November 1960), 52, 54-5.

[45] Brooke's Journal. *F.O.*69/1.

[46] Brooke to Palmerston, 5th October 1850. *F.O.*69/1.

[47] Brooke to Palmerston, 5th October 1850, confidential. *F.O.69/1.*

No presents were sent out by the Foreign Office, but a letter was forwarded.[48] In fact, Brooke did not attempt the mission. Instead, he declared that Cambodia was

> the Keystone of our policy in these countries,—the King of that ancient Kingdom is ready to throw himself under the protection of any European nation, who will save him from his implacable enemies, the Siamese and Cochin Chinese. A Treaty with this monarch at the same time that we act against Siam might be made. His independence guaranteed. The remnants of his fine Kingdom preserved; and a profitable trade opened. The Cochin Chinese might then be properly approached by questioning their right to interrupt the ingress and egress of British trade into Cambodia. The example of Siam—our friendship with Cambodia. The determined attitude (not Treaty seeking) would soon open Cambodia to our commerce and induce the Cochin Chinese to waive their objections to intercourse...

The Vietnamese were interfering with the trade at Kampot, and this would be the basis of an approach to them.[49]

The Singapore Chamber of Commerce had declared in June that trade with Siam, except by Siamese vessels, was "all but extinct," and suggested "that no course of proceedings short of actual hostilities can now or hereafter place our relations with that country in a worse position than that in which they now are." Brooke should be accompanied by an imposing force.[50] After Brooke's failure, the Chamber was divided as to future policy.

One group of memorialists thought that "a more advantageous treaty than the one at present in force cannot be concluded with the existing Government, unless by means which they would be unwilling to see employed." Singapore supplied Bangkok with British manufactures. This trade went on in the hands of Bangkok Chinese, "and while the present pernicious revenue system pursued by the Siamese Government continues, your Memorialists entertain strong doubts whether any attempt to force this trade into other hands and into other channels, would in any degree tend to improve or extend British commercial relations with Siam... ." The commercial difficulties were "not to be attributed to any petty attempt to interrupt British Commerce or evade the existing Treaty, but seem entirely connected with the internal administration of the Government, which no treaty, however, skillfully framed, could possibly remedy, nor anything else, short of a complete change in the policy of the Government regarding the mode of levying and collecting the revenues... ." The question should rest "until a change of Government and policy take place, when peaceful negotiations may be resumed with better hopes of success... ." A warlike demonstration might "convulse the whole Kingdom, put a stop for years to all trade, and perhaps ultimately render the establishment of British power in the Country indispensable... ."[51] The *Singapore Free Press* thought the aim here was

[48] Brooke to Palmerston, 6th March 1850; F.O. to Brooke, 22nd June, 2nd July 1850. *F.O.69/1.*

[49] As footnote 47.

[50] Logan to Brooke, 14th June 1850. *F.O.69/1.*

[51] Memorial by Boustead and Co., and others to Palmerston, 1850. *Singapore Free Press,* 17th January 1851.

> to suggest the expediency of confining the trade with Siam to Singapore, and the discontinuance of the attempt to prosecute a direct trade with that country, recommending in effect that the provisions of the existing treaty should be suffered to fall into disuse, and all preceding violations of it, and injuries to British subjects, quietly winked at. This course, although it might tend to the temporary advantage of the Memorialists, does not appear to us to be that best suited for upholding the respect due to the British nation, or for assuring the ultimate advantage of British trade with Siam... .[52]

Other memorialists indeed rejected the view as inconsistent with the previous views of the Chamber. If direct intercourse ceased, Singapore might derive some partial and uncertain benefit. But, even if Singapore's interests were alone to be considered, "we entertain no doubt whatever that, if our intercourse" with Siam "is fairly and freely opened up, the geographical position and other advantages enjoyed by Singapore must, under any circumstances, secure for it a very considerable portion of the Siam Trade, and we have no apprehension that, from such a Trade, left to find its natural channel, Singapore must ever be largely benefited... ."[53] Crawfurd noted these differing views and later saw the Foreign Secretary.[54]

Palmerston did not, in fact, follow Brooke's recommendations.[55] No doubt, this was not because he was sympathetic to the notion that Siamese trade might be confined to Singapore (as Crawfurd had thought back in the 1820's). Such narrow Straits Settlements views were unlikely to be endorsed at home. Indeed, the views of the second group of memorialists were, on this point, ultimately to prove more realistic. Generally, there were these tensions in the Singapore position: to some extent, its prosperity depended on the undeveloped character of Southeast Asian trade; development, the opening of new ports and routes, might threaten its dominance; but it could still hope for a substantial share of an expanded trade.[56]

More relevant, perhaps, to the nature of the decision in London — on which there seem to be no official memoranda to offer guidance — was the proposal of the first group of memorialists to await a change of government and policy, rather than to resort to warlike demonstration. This sort of view not only suited certain commercial interests involved in the indirect trade: it was consonant with the trend of British policy towards Siam as so far conducted by the Indian authorities and the India Board. It was important, Brooke had been told, "that if your efforts should not succeed, they should at least leave things as they are, and should not expose us to the alternative of submitting to fresh affront, or of undertaking an expensive operation to punish insult... ."[57]

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[52] *Singapore Free Press*, 24th January 1851.

[53] Hamilton, Gray and Co. and others to Palmerston, received 19th. December 1850. *F.O.69/2*.

[54] Crawfurd to Stanley, 21st December 1850. *F.O.69/2*. Crawfurd to Derby, 25th March 1852. *F.O.97/368*.

[55] Palmerston to Brooke, 6th February 1851. *F.O.69/3*.

[56] On the development of Singapore's trade, see Wong Lin Ken, "The Trade of Singapore, 1819-69," *Journal of the Malayan Branch Royal Asiatic Society*, XXXIII, Pt. 4 (December 1960), and Chiang Hai Ding, *A History of Straits Settlements Foreign Trade*, 1870-1915 (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, 1963).

[57] As footnote 38.

The India Board had opposed any negotiation that might risk relations with a marcher territory for a doubtful advantage. The Foreign Office had finally secured its grudging assent to the mission, but had inherited some of its unwillingness to engage in political adventure. Furthermore, it was widely held—as by Gutzlaff, so, as first, by Brooke—that the accession of a new king in Siam would bring a more liberal policy. Anglo-Thai relations would broaden down from the Burney precedent: their narrowing was only temporary, and was not a cause for violent interruption. In the case of Vietnam, there was nothing to resent, though Brooke had suggested an approach based on the interruption of trade at Kampot. There was also nothing to interrupt.

It is not clear what, if anything, he intended by so doing, but Palmerston did seek further information about Kampot. Crawfurd had pointed to its trade with Singapore in Chinese junks and small square-rigged vessels: it could become an entrepot for distributing British manufactures, and "at the same time check the exclusive commercial policy of the Siamese."[58] Some information was later received from Governor Butterworth, who drew upon Catholic missionaries.

> The King of Cambodia is now hemmed in between two rival and powerful Potentates, who would readily resent any supposed offense, with a view of seizing upon some coveted portion of his territory, which would in all probability have long since been divided between them, but for the advantage of having a neutral and powerless State, so well situated for settling their disputes, and making war upon each other without injury to their own immediate subjects. Doubtless the King of Cambodia would gladly and gratefully place himself under the protection of any European Power that would guarantee him protection against the Siamese and Cochin Chinese; but to make a treaty with him independent of the guarantee would tend only to increase his difficulties, without offering the smallest benefit to the contracting party... .

The trade at Kampot—one of the few remaining ports—could "never be considerable, in consequence of the main entrance to the country, the Mekong..., with all its feeders flowing into the Sea through the territory of Cochin China..." The country, too, had been devastated by recent Siam-Vietnam wars. Thus, "without the aid of Great Britain, Kampot or any other port in Cambodia, can never become a commercial Emporium."[59] The Governor quoted an article in the *Singapore Free Press*. The Cambodians, it suggested, sought to use intervals of peace in the Siam-Vietnam wars to develop intercourse with outside nations. The trade at Kampot which they sought to foster was imperilled by pirates (hence the use of vessels of European construction). "Here is a point where the wedge might be inserted, that would open the interior of the Indo-Chinese Peninsula to British Commerce, as the great River of the Cambodians traverses its entire length and even affords communication into the heart of Siam... ."

Another number of the *Press* (also published in August 1850) had pointed out the presence in Singapore of an employee of the King of Cam-

[58] Crawfurd to Stanley, 21st December 1850. *F.O.69/2.*
[59] Butterworth to Secretary, 20th May 1851. *F.O.17/185.* Cf his analysis to Vella's, *Siam under Rama III,* 107-8.

bodia during the preceding months. His real purpose, it was thought, was "to solicit the assistance of the authorities in suppressing piracy . . . and thus to render the intercourse with the Port more free and open. . . ." Surely, Britain would not so neglect her interests, the paper continued, "as to refuse the proffered friendship, especially as it will afford her a favorable opportunity of renewing that system which led to the establishment of the British name in the East, that of protecting the weak from the oppression of the powerful. . . ."[60]

Before this information had reached the Foreign Office, Palmerston had heard of a rumored Cambodian proposal for a political connection.[61] Butterworth, in turn, reported on this. He declared that "no overtures have been made to me, either directly or indirectly, to test the feelings of the British Authorities, relative to a Treaty of friendship." Constantine Monteiro, a confidential agent of the King, had shown him (Butterworth) his instructions the previous year, but they were not of a political nature, "and finding that he had fallen into the hands of the Editors of the Local Journals, I did not even seek an interview with him. . . ." The King's request for protection against the Chinese pirates notwithstanding, he had communicated to the Commander-in-Chief, and the *Semiramis* had been sent up in November.[62] In addition, it may be added, an unofficial gesture was made. The commercial firm of D' Almeida sent the *Pantaloon* to Kampot, with the Danish adventurer, L. V. Helms, as supercargo.[63]

According to a Cambodian chronicle for 1849, three Europeans came to trade—"Evang, Williams, and Hillomes." Subsequently the King sent two envoys to Singapore with a letter to "Joachim" instructed to ask the French for an alliance to facilitate commerce.[64] This, it has been argued, is really a reference to the Monteiro mission of the following year, concerned with the English.[65] Indeed, if "Hillomes" is Helms, not only the date but the order of events is mistaken, though "Joachim" may be identifiable with one of the D'Almeidas.[66]

On the other hand, it is not impossible that the Cambodians—supposedly seeking intercourse with European powers—sought contacts with the French, and this may be all that the alleged proposal of an alliance meant. Equally, nothing may have been said of alliance in communications with the English authorities. But the proposal to cooperate against the pirates had been accepted, and, while they certainly did exist in the Gulf of Siam, the presence

[60] *S.F.P.*, 23rd, 30th August 1850.

[61] It was mentioned in an interview with Hammond. Hammond to Palmerston, 19th May 1851. *F.O.97/185.*

[62] Butterworth to Secretary, 21st August 1851, and enclosures. *F.O.17/185.*

[63] L. V. Helms, *Pioneering in the Far East* (London, 1882), 95-108.

[64] A. B. de Villemereuil, ed., *Explorations et Missions de Doudart de Lagrée* (Paris, 1883), 355.

[65] C. Meyniard, *Le Second Empire en Indo-Chine (Siam-Cambodge-Annam): L'ouverture de Siam au commerce et la convention du Cambodge* (Paris, 1891), 360-1.

[66] Joaquin was the eldest son of the founder of the firm, José d'Almeida, who died in 1850. C. A. Gibson-Hill, "George Samuel Windsor Earl", *Journal of the Malayan Branch Royal Asiatic Society,* XXXII, Pt. 1 (May 1959), 109n.

of the *Semiramis* off Kampot could undoubtedly also be of political significance. The newspaper had indeed associated the two: protecting the weak traders from the powerful pirates, and protecting the weak Cambodians from their powerful neighbors, were connected operations.

Whatever the local officials may have hoped or tried to do, with their limited authority and indirect means,[67] it is clear that Monteiro's presence in Singapore before Brooke left on his mission must have influenced the recommendations he ultimately made in the hope that the home Government might break away from the traditions of Indian diplomacy in the area.[68] The recommendations were not followed, and nothing came of the Kampot inquiries. But Palmerston was prepared to send Brooke on a new mission to Siam when news arrived in mid-1851 of Rama III's death and Mongkut's accession. Mongkut, however, wanted the mission postponed till after the funeral.[69]

In March 1852, Lord Malmesbury, the new Foreign Secretary, asked if Brooke were ready to leave for Bangkok.[70] Brooke said he wished to stay longer in England for the sake of his health; he also declared that reforms were in progress in Siam, and recommended that the mission should await their completion.[71] The *Singapore Free Press* attributed some of the reforms—which included the establishment of an opium farm and a modification of the prohibition on exporting rice—to the contracts made by Brooke on his visit.[72] A reduction of the measurement duties it attributed to the representations of Helms, who had visited Bangkok.[73]

Crawfurd urged that these reforms were arguments against the negotiation of a new treaty. He had always opposed a treaty, he said. "I am quite satisfied that it will be a wiser policy to encourage the spontaneous development which is now in progress, than to shackle a barbarous power by express stipulations. . . ." Better than a mission would be a friendly correspondence between the Siamese ministers and the Governors of Singapore and Labuan. "Too busy an interference" might in fact risk the power of a liberal sovereign, for there was a powerful party opposed to reform. Crawfurd did not, perhaps, strengthen his case by declaring that this was the view of the Chinese merchants, who had "nearly the whole foreign trade and navigation . . . in their hands. . . ." [74] But the India Board, again consulted by the Foreign Office, agreed with Crawfurd.[75]

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[67] In 1853 H. M. S. Bitteth was sent from Singapore to convoy the junks to Kampot. The Siamese government complained that its visit caused some alarm in villages round the Gulf. N. Tarling, *Piracy and Politics in the Malay World* (Sydney, Melbourne, Canberra; Singapore, 1963), 215, 219.

[68] The statement, made in Tarling, *J. S. S.*, XLVIII, Pt. 2, p. 61, that Monteiro was sent to Singapore when the King heard of the failure of the Brooke mission is clearly mistaken.

[69] Brooke to Palmerston, 24th August 1851; *F.O.* to Brooke, 29th August 1851; Memo by Brooke, 18th September 1851. *F.O.69/3.*

[70] Addington to Brooke, 23rd March 1852. *F.O.97/368.*

[71] Brooke to Addington, 24th March 1852, two letters, *F.O.97/368.*

[72] *S. F. P.*, 4th July 1851. Cf. Snidvongs, *op. cit.*, 184.

[73] *S. F. P.*, 29th August 1851.

[74] Crawfurd to Derby, 25th March 1852, *F.O.97/368.*

[75] Herries to Malmesbury, 28th May, 16th June 1852. *F.O.97/368.*

One reason for Brooke's staying in England had been that he wished to meet the attacks on his policy in Borneo and the Archipelago. The controversy made it difficult for the Foreign Office to do anything more over the mission to Siam.[76] Some plan was being prepared, whereby Brooke was to leave his Labuan post, but to have greater scope as Commissioner, and to go again to Siam. In November, he dropped the Governorship,[77] but before the rest of the operation had been completed, the Government again changed.

Early in February 1853, the question of the Siam mission was brought up. Lord John Russell, the new Foreign Secretary, thought Crawfurd's arguments against it probably conclusive.[78] Shortly after, he interviewed Brooke. Brooke urged that the "jealousy" of the Siamese government was "not excited by intercourse and... not allayed by non-intercourse... ."It was "of a permanent character, arising out of the constant territorial aggrandisement of the East India Company... ." In the first Burma war, a mission had been sent: why not during the second?[79] But the India Board remained opposed to a mission, and Brooke was left with his consular appointment. Shortly after, indeed, the Coalition Government assented to an inquiry into Brooke's proceedings in Borneo.[80]

Brooke's position as "Commissioner" in the Archipelago at large had been informal. But the change of policy his removal implied, did not produce an outcry, since the pressures of the 1840's for a forward policy there had lessened. So far as the mainland was concerned, on the other hand, the commercial interests had not lost sight of the opportunities Gutzlaff and Martin had pointed out and, with the appointment of a new Superintendent of Trade at Hong Kong in 1854, the Foreign Office—reverting to its Davis policy—took the opportunity to give Sir John Bowring powers and instructions to negotiate when feasible with Siam, Vietnam and Japan.[81] The instructions, like Brooke's, did not cover any of the territorial matters that might be expected to emerge in negotiations with Siam.

Unable to go to Japan with a respectable armament, Bowring attempted the easier assignment in Siam first.[82] Aided by the diplomacy of his son (John) and of the Consul at Amoy (Harry Parkes), by the presence of the quaintly-christened sloop *Rattler,* by Siamese knowledge of Burma's fate,[83] and by the statesmanship of the new chief minister or Kralahom, Bowring rapidly secured the treaty of 18th April 1855.[84]

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[76] Memo by Addington, 4th February 1853. *F.O.97/368.*
[77] Tarling, *J. S. S.,* XLVIII, Pt. 2, 66.
[78] Minute, 5th February 1853. *F.O.97/368.*
[79] Brooke to Russell, 8th February 1853. *F.O.12/13.*
[80] Tarling, *J. S. S.,* XLVIII, Pt. 2, 70.
[81] Clarendon to Bowring, 13th February 1854. *F.O.17/210.*
[82] Bowring to Clarendon, 8th September 1854. *F.O.17/216.* W. B. Beasley, *Great Britain and the Opening of Japan 1834-1858* (London, *1951*), 98-102.
[83] G. F. Bartle, "Sir John Bowring and the Chinese and Siamese Commercial Treaties," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library,* XLIV, No. 2 (March 1962), 305.
[84] For an account of the mission, see N. Tarling, "The mission of Sir John Bowring to Siam," *The Journal of the Siam Society,* L, Pt. 2 (December 1962), 91-118.

The treaty, as Bowring told his son (Edgar), brought Siam "into the bright fields of hope and peaceful commerce. . . ."[85] It displaced the measurement duties and monopolies by a system of export and import duties, opened the rice trade, and provided for the appointment of a consul and for extra-territorial jurisdiction.[86] But for Siam, the "bright fields of hope" were political as well as commercial. The Siamese had again come to terms with the predominant power in Asia and so, had given themselves a guarantee for the future. Of this, they were aware.

To some extent, the French and Americans were acting with the British in China, and there was a reference in the discussions to their sending missions to Siam also. The Kralahom said he was glad Bowring had arrived first, for the Siamese "had trusted that he would be the pioneer of the new relations to be opened between them and the West, as they could then count upon such arrangements being concluded as would both be satisfactory to Siam, and sufficient to meet the demands that might hereafter be made by other of the Western Powers. . . ."[87]

Parkes took the treaty home, and returned in 1856, charged with the delivery of letters and presents from Queen Victoria, and with securing the further definition of some of the clauses, in particular, those relating to consular jurisdiction and to the modification of the Burney treaty.[88] Parkes was less enthusiastic about the Kralahom than Bowring had been and more inclined to work with Mongkut; in any case, there was—during 1856—a coolness between them, and the Kralahom was taking little part in public affairs. It was upon the First King, therefore, that Parkes relied in negotiating (despite some conservative opposition) the additional agreement of May 1856. This defined consular jurisdiction and met most of the other British requirements, including a demand to specify the taxation due from Siamese subjects and thus, under article 4 of the Bowring treaty, from the British residents also. The negotiations in fact set the legal and taxation systems of Siam much in the shape they retained till the end of the century, when the system of consular jurisdiction (more especially its application to Asian proteges of the European powers) became a spur to the Europeanization of the judicial administration and to codification,[89] and when the Siamese, seeking expanded revenue resources, sought to acquire tariff autonomy.[90]

In the course of the negotiations, Parkes made much use of the royal letter. He was the first envoy to bring from England.[91] It helped him to move

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[85] Bowring to E. Bowring, 13th April 1855. *English Mss. 1228/125,* John Rylands Library, Manchester.

[86] For the text, see J. Bowring, *The Kingdom and People of Siam* (London, 1857), ii, 214-26.

[87] Enclosure No. 15 in Bowring to Clarendon, 28th April 1855. *F.O.17/229.*

[88] On Parkes' mission, see an article by the present author, "Harry Parkes' Negotiations in Bangkok in 1856," to be published in *The Journal of the Siam Society* in 1965.

[89] See Detchard Vongkomolshet, *The Administrative, Judicial and Financial Reforms of King Chulatongkorn 1868-1910* (Unpublished M. A. thesis, Cornell University, 1958), 159ff.

[90] See J. C. Ingram, *Economic Change in Thailand since 1850* (Stanford, 1955), 177-8.

[91] Bowring did not have a letter, despite H. G. Quaritch Wales, *Siamese State Ceremonies. Their history and function* (London, 1931), 180.

his steamer, the *Auckland,* up to Bangkok, and to open and improve his communication with Mongkut. The letter, Parkes said, "touched his heart and flattered his ambition." [92] In fact, the King's ambition, and the object of the concessions he made, was to secure the recognition of Siam as an independent state on a parity with European nations. The letter marked the achievement of this, he believed. It was something both Bangkok and Hue had looked for in 1822. The object then had been to evade such concessions, to assume at least a parity without coming to terms. The policy of Siam had changed, and the major concessions of the 1850's built upon the change. In Vietnam, there had been no such change: on the contrary.

As might have been anticipated, some Indian points had come up in the discussions of 1855, and Bowring had referred them to the Governor-General. These included the definition of the Kra boundary with British Burma, and also the status of Kedah, a Malay state whose position was defined in some detail in article 13 of the Burney treaty, but which the Siamese thought could now be simply declared a tributary. Governor Blundell, Butterworth's successor in the Straits Settlements, thought articles 12 and 14 more important, as they provided in a measure for the independence of other Malay states, Perak, Selangor, Trengganu and Kelantan.[93] The matter was referred to England, where India House officials noted "the inconvenience if not hazard of officers of Her Majesty's Government entering into treaties with states and countries connected [with] tho' not absolutely subject to India, independently of the Government of India. . . ."[94] The issue did not come up in the Parkes discussions—as a result all the relevant Burney articles remained in force—and the Governor-General, to whom the Court referred it back, did nothing. But, in practice, the position was changed by the Bowring treaty.

Diplomacy could no longer be purely "Indian." The Governors in the Straits Settlements, like Blundell regarding them as more or less independent, had often dealt directly with the tributary states, even Kedah. With the appointment of a consul at Bangkok, this became more difficult, and after the reaction against Governor Cavenagh's bombardment of Trengganu in 1862, there was a disposition to recognize Thai claims there and in Kelantan, as well as in Kedah.[95] British intervention occurred in Perak and Selangor in 1874, and so, in territorial, as in commercial matters, a new stage was reached in the relationship of Siam and the West that endured till the turn of the century. But their claims in Cambodia—also mentioned by the Siamese in their 1855 Kedah proposal—were affected by the relations of Vietnam and the West.

Bowring had found the Siamese anxious that he should also go to Hue. It was a matter of maintaining Siam's prestige among its neighbors. Among these, Burma—truncated by the second war with Britain—was no longer

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[92] Parkes to Clarendon, 22nd May 1856. *F.O.69/5.*

[93] Tarling, *J. S. S.*, L, Pt. 2, 111-2.

[94] Note on Court to G.-G.-in-Co., India Political, 1st October 1856, No. 36. *Despatches to India and Bengal,* C, 329, India Office Library.

[95] N. Tarling, "British Policy in the Malay Peninsula and Archipelago, 1824-1871," *Journal of the Malayan Branch Royal Asiatic Society,* XXX, Pt. 3 (October 1957), 69-74, 80-3.

a great power. But Siam and Vietnam were rivals and joint suzerains of Laos and Cambodia.[96] Bowring did indeed plan to go to Vietnam. He decided, however, to announce his purpose first. The reception afforded the announcement would enable him to judge whether he should go alone, as to Bangkok, or await the French and U.S. envoys. They might prove an embarrassment, especially if the reception were favorable.[97]

In September Bowring sent the *Rattler* to Tourane with Thomas Wade —the Acting Chinese Secretary—to carry his communication to the court of Hue.[98] But at Tourane, Wade was told that the letter could go to the capital only if, after inspection, it proved to contain nothing objectionable, and that Wade could not go under any circumstances. In the event, the letter was not delivered at all.[99] "It is obvious," wrote Bowring, "that the policy of the Cochin Chinese will continue to be that of repudiating the advances of foreigners, so long as foreigners can be kept in positions too remote to cause any anxiety. . . ." He thought that a direct approach to Hue with some ships of war might secure a treaty.[100] These were not at once available, but he told Montigny, the French envoy, that he could inform Tu-Duc that he intended to come.[101] Bowring had indeed said that the outcome of the Wade mission would decide the question of cooperation with other European powers.

The Superintendent had revived French interest in Siam by communicating his treaty, and he had also suggested, after the Wade mission, that Montigny's credentials should extend to Vietnam.[102] Montigny secured a treaty on the English lines in Bangkok. Then, departing from his instructions, he attempted a *coup* in Cambodia, where he sought to establish French protection, but came up against Siamese opposition.[103] Meanwhile, the *Catinat* had been sent to Tourane to announce the arrival of the envoy. Again, a French ship became involved in conflict with the Vietnamese.[104] By the time Montigny arrived in January 1857, the *Catinate* had left, and his negotiations made no progress. The failure of the envoy worsened the treatment of the missionaries and precipitated the intervention which Napoleon III had come to favor.[105]

The new crisis in China had led to Bowring's replacement there by the appointment of Lord Elgin as High Commissioner in April 1857.[106] Bowring told his son (Edgar) that he looked to Siam *"proudly* in my hours of gloom. . .

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[96] Snidvongs, *op. cit.*, pp. 275-6.

[97] Bowring to Clarendon, 7th May 1855, two letters. *F.O.17/229.*

[98] Bowring to Clarendon, 6th September 1855. *F.O.17/233.*

[99] Wade to Bowring, 17th September 1855. *F.O.17/233.* A fuller account of the Wade mission, as also of the earlier mission of Sir John Davis, will appear in the present author's "British Relations with Vietnam, 1822-1858," to be published in the *Journal of the Malaysian Branch Royal Asiatic Society* in 1966.

[100] Bowring to Clarendon, 8th October 1855. *F.O.17/233.*

[101] H. Cordier, "La politique coloniale de la France au début du second empire (Indo-Chine, 1852-1858)," *T'oung Pao,* Series 2, X(1909), 311.

[102] J. F. Cady, *The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia* (Ithaca, 1954), 144-5. Clarendon to Cowley, 18th February 1856. *F.O.27/1109.*

[103] Cady, *op. cit.*, 149-52.

[104] H. Cordier, "La France et la Cochin Chine, 1852-1858: La Mission du *Catinat* á Tourane (1856)," *T'oung Pao,* Series 2, VII (1906), 497-505.

[105] Cady, *op. cit.*, 154-5, 178 ff.

[106] W. C. Costin, *Great Britain and China 1833-1860* (Oxford, 1937), 231.

Kampot is also becoming a very important place and I must try to get a Treaty with Cambodia—now that China is taken from me (I do not complain) I hope I shall do the rest of the work—Cambodia-Cochin China-Korea-Japan —we must open them all. . . ."[107] In fact, shortly after, Bowring heard that he was prohibited from leaving Hong Kong during Elgin's tour.[108] So he saw the French expedition to Vietnam of 1858—which he had in some sense set in motion—from a distance and inactively. He thought the French, by setting themselves up in Cochin China, might embarrass themselves and the British and threaten Siam and Cambodia. But, on the whole, he laid most emphasis on the embarrassment they would cause themselves.

The fact was that Vietnam had established no commercial and political relationship with the predominant power in Asia which thus felt no great concern over its future. In part this was because Vietnam offered fewer commercial attractions than Siam and no similar territorial points of contact. But this had not prevented—indeed in one case it had stimulated—the dispatch of diplomatic missions, none of which had been welcomed by the Vietnamese. Their attitude to the mild British approaches was no doubt affected by the more violent activities of other Western powers; but their reaction to European contacts had long been different from Siam's. The rejection of the Wade mission led Bowring to foster and associate himself with the French venture, and more or less eliminated the final chance of Vietnam's establishing a prior relationship with Britain.

Established in Cochin China, the French were in 1863 to enter direct negotiations with Cambodia. Admiral La Grandiere felt free to move at the expense of the Siamese, as Anglo-Thai relations had been strained by the Trengganu bombardment. A Cambodian emissary—significantly echoing the statements of 1850—said how important it was for the French flag to fly in Cambodian waters, to destroy piracy and restore commerce. A treaty then signed at Udong in August gave Cambodia French protection.[109] The India Office, consulted by the Foreign Office, felt that, so long as French proceedings did not interfere with the independence of Siam, they could be regarded without anxiety.[110] In 1867, Siam gave up her claims over Cambodia in return for the provinces of Battambang and Angkor. Another part of the pattern of relations between Siam and the West was set till the turn of the century.

[107] Bowring to E. Bowring, 6th June 1857. *English Mss. 1228/185.*

[108] G. F. Bartle, "Sir John Bowring and the *Arrow* War in China," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library,* XLIII, No. 2 (March 1961), 310.

[109] B. L. Evans, *The Attitudes and Policies of Great Britain and China towards French Expansion in Cochin China, Cambodia, Annam, and Tongking 1858-83* (Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of London, 1961), 68-69.

[110] *Ibid.,* 101.

TRENDS IN REGIONAL ASSOCIATION IN SOUTH EAST ASIA

MICHAEL LEIFER

SOUTH EAST ASIA, THE AREA SITUATED TO THE EAST OF THE Indian sub-continent and south of China, enjoys a debatable regional coherence. Although it is possible to postulate its geographical identity in terms of common features,[1] South East Asia is essentially an expression of convenience for a zone of extreme human diversity. The Chinese (with *Nan yang*) and the Japanese (with *Nan yo*) had a traditional holistic view of South East Asia, a term which came into Western usage only during the Second World War to specify a theater of military operations within part of the Japanese occupied area. Today, South East Asia includes Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, both Vietnams, Malaysia Indonesia and the Philippines.[2] The present governments of these countries pay scant regard to the convention of South East Asia as a unity, and their actions demonstrate little desire to translate sporadic utterances about regionalism into practical forms. At the same time, there has been no indication of any popular urge for regional association.

South East Asia presents a kaleidoscopic aspect and there is little reward in searching for features common to all countries of the area and which may, therefore, be said to contribute to their collective sense of regional consciousness. Indeed, one is bound to agree with the historian who acknowledged the imposibility of "subsuming South East Asia in terms of an integral civilization, like those of India, China, Korea, and Japan."[3] But even where affinity exists—as between some of the countries—political considerations weigh more heavily than say, cultural bonds. Relations between Thailand and Cambodia and between Indonesia and Malaysia are cases in point.

A common experience of colonialism is sometimes nominated as the unifying tie in South East Asia, Thailand excepted. But colonialism in South East Asia, although common to the region, was not of one variety

[1] Charles A. Fisher, *South-East Asia, A Social, Economic and Political Geography* (London, 1964), pp. 5-7.

[2] One should include also the British Protectorate of Brunei, an enclave within the Borneo territory of Malaysia, the Portuguese possession on the island of Timor and with the Indonesian assumption of power in West Irian, the island of New Guinea.

[3] H. Benda, "The Structure of South East Asian History," *Journal of South East Asian History* (March, 1962), p. 108.

and, therefore, not exactly a shared experience. The various colonial systems each established their own distinctive imprint and left their own peculiar legacy. Colonialism in South East Asia was never a uniform condition; nor was its impact uniform. Colonialism, however, did consolidate the fragmentary character of the region and set up political barriers which shaped the pattern of national succession. It also established ties with metropolitan territories which have proved, in most cases, peculiarly resilient. The end of colonialism did not see a removal of so-called artificial barriers impeding regional coalescence—either the division of the colonial inheritance into states which had historic claims to territoriality (as in Mainland South East Asia) or the territorial extent of the colonial dominion used as the rationale of national legitimacy (as with Indonesia). In no case did a new state incorporate territory which had come formerly under the jurisdiction of more than one colonial authority.[4]

The Japanese occupation interrupted colonial rule and brought a brief regional, though not administrative, unity. But in this period, no enthusiasm was demonstrated for independence on this basis, although Indonesian nationalists viewed their claims within a wider context than the territorial limits of the Netherlands East Indies.

There is a sense, however, in which colonialism did lead to a uniform condition. The aftermath of colonialism saw the emergence in South East Asia of independent states asserting sovereign rights. This marked an attempt to realize Western ideas about nationalism within the framework of a western model—the nation-state. This development, too often neglected particularly in the West where it is taken for granted, focused priorities in terms of territorial national interest. At the same time, the establishment of independent states meant that diplomatic vehicles were created which could be exploited to satisfy not only national demands but also the ambitions and special interests of elite-groups in control of the various national movements. For them, the desire to participate in managing and representing a state, especially in its inter-national relations has proved to be long lasting. And there has been little sign of any willingness to sacrifice these perquisites of power for the sake of some wider form of association. The existence of a quasi-international community, with its dramatic stage at the United Nations, has permitted national actors to aspire to world roles; for some, the Cold War has exaggerated their sense of international importance. In this context, they tend to become conscious of the benefits of continued separate political identity as well as the true extent of their differences with regional associates. In-

[4] One minor exception is the Turtle Islands which were transferred from British to Philippine jurisdiction in 1948.

deed, the opportunity to operate on the international stage has provided a means to demonstrate newly acquired independence, to discredit domestic opposition as anti-national, as well as to distract popular attention from closely defined domestic policy issues.

South East Asia is, by no means, a unique example of the contraverting of ideas about the passing of the nation-state. It is expecting too much among those who enjoy the benefits of separate territoriality in both new and old states, that they should voluntarily relinquish positions of eminence unless there is an assured opportunity for even greater distinction. This writer is not so cynical as to believe that exceptions to this suggested general pattern could not arise. However, the experience of South East Asia, since the Second World War, has been to discourage optimism on this score.

Until very recently, all practical schemes of association have not been exclusive to South East Asia. The two notable examples—the Colombo Plan and the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (E.C.A.F.E.)—are both useful ventures in limited economic cooperation, but they have made little contribution to regional integration. The former is an instrument by means of which specific forms of economic assistance are provided on a bilateral basis in accord with the generosity of donor countries and the expressed needs of recipient countries. It also provides for technical and other training in educational institutions of the donor countries. The actual Colombo Plan Bureau is no more than a coordinating office for the bilateral arrangements which are the plans in operation.[5] The latter, *i.e.*, E.C.A.F.E., which places much less emphasis on the provision of material economic assistance, has had most success in multilateral collaboration in the collection of economic data, the exchange of statistical information, the adoption of uniform standards, and in the planning stages of developmentlal infrastructures. E.C.A.F.E. however, because of its multilateral functioning, has experienced considerable difficulty (in spite of a zealous secretariat) in advancing the degree of economic cooperation much beyond the formalistic level.[6] A notable exception has been the Mekong River Scheme where, significantly, all the riparian states stand to gain equally.[7] However, for the most part, the problems of economic development facing the

[5] A useful account of this organization is to be found in L. P. Singh, *The Colombo Plan: Some Political Aspects* (Department of International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra, 1963).

[6] See David Wightman. "Efforts for Economic Co-operation in Asia and the Far East," *The World Today* (January, 1962). Also, L. P. Singh, "E.C.A.-F.E.'s 18th Session in Tokyo," *Australia's Neighbours* (April-May, 1962).

[7] See C. Hart Schaff and Russell H. Fifield, *The Lower Mekong* (Princeton, 1963).

countries of South East Asia remain to be solved on the basis of individual, rather than cooperative, effort.

The experience of political association has been even less fruitful. Here, the Cold War has been an intrusive dividing factor. The Baguio Conference of May 1950, for example, arose from an unequivocal initiative by President Quirino of the Philippines to foster an anti-Communist coalition in the aftermath of successful revolution in China. These plans misfired because of neutralist inhibitions and the occasion became instead one for pious platitudes which tended to disguise its original purpose.

The South East Asia Treaty Organization (S.E.A.T.O.) set up at Manila in September 1954 under American sponsorship was, perhaps, a more honest anti-Communist enterprise. However, its formation and its composition became factors of regional and wider discord. Neutralist countries tended, with some justification, to see S.E.A.T.O. as a colonial construct. With only Thailand and the Philippines as legitimate regional adherents, it was not difficult either to misunderstand or to misrepresent the purpose of the organization. Recurrent crises in Indo-China and parallel demonstrations of disunity within its ranks have also challenged S.E.A.T.O.'s adequacy as an alliance. The moment of truth for S.E.A.T.O. came in March 1962 with the American assurance to Thailand that her obligations to defend her S.E.A.T.O. partner did not depend upon the prior agreement of all the other parties to the treaty.[8] The necessity for such an assurance would seem to be conclusive evidence of a serious breakdown in S.E.A.T.O.'s consultative machinery. Thailand may have been given renewed confidence in the willingness of the United States to come to her assistance in an emergency. In so doing, however, the United States pointedly reserved her use of S.E.A.T.O as a vehicle for the defense of vital interests in South East Asia. The following May brought the fiasco at Nam Tha, in Northern Laos, when the Royal Army was routed; the United States, ostensibly to counter a threat from across the Mekong, sent troops into Thailand on the basis of its unilateral interpretation of obligations under the Manila Pact. This step was taken without allied consultation and token forces dispatched subsequently by Britain, Australia and New Zealand owned their presence to bilateral arrangements with the Thai government. S.E.A.T.O., for its part, has shown no potential for fostering regional, or any other kind of unity. Indeed, present consensus within the organization appears to exist only on the basis of opposition to a fellow member's uncrystallized proposal for neutralization in South East Asia.

[8] This assurance, by Secretary of State Rusk, is to be found in a joint statement with Thai Foreign Secretary Thanat Khoman made 6th March, 1962. See George Modelski (ed.), *S.E.A.T.O.: Six Studies* (Melbourne, 1962), pp. 293-294.

The Asian-African Conference at Bandung in April 1955 was an attempt, among other things, to make neutralism and peaceful coexistence respectable and to welcome China into the community of new nations. To an extent, it proved to be a successful venture, if only of passing significance. But just because the venue of the conference was in South East Asia, one can hardly draw conclusions about regional association. Bandung's relevance was extra-regional as it related to Indian optimism in dealings with China. The sight of India leading a somewhat penitent China into the Afro-Asian community is incongruous viewed from the perspective of autumn 1962. However, the Bandung Conference appeared to make sense in 1955. Bandung—perhaps more than any subsequent similar occasion, except the United Nations General Assembly of 1960—demonstrated the benefits accruing to those who have a visible stake in the perpetuation of the state system. The sequel to Bandung (certain to be more Afro-Asian than Asian-African) to be held in Africa sometime in 1965 is just as likely to reproduce these features.

The institutions and events considered up to now, represent milestones for some. This may be so, but they have relevance to the subject of this article only to demonstrate their irrelevance as stages in regional development.

Strictly speaking, the first and, so far, only example of moderate success in regional association within South East Asia took place in July 1961. Then, Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand—after a false start with S.E.A.F.E.T. (South East Asian Friendship and Economic Treaty)—set up the Association of South East Asian States (A.S.A.). S.E.A.F.E.T. was proposed first in January 1959 when the Malayan Prime Minister paid a visit to the Philippines. The following October, Tunku Abdul Rahman, in a letter to President Garcia, announced his intention of writing to the Presidents of Indonesia and South Vietnam and the Prime Ministers of Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand to inform them of what he had in view. However, the lukewarm response—with the exception of Thailand, which verged on hostility from some neutralist leaders[9]—led to revised and more limited plans emerging as A.S.A. This association was ostensibly launched as a non-political cooperative enterprise, independent in every way from any power bloc or military alliance. Its declared aims were limited to economic and cultural association. Yet, despite such disclaimers about its purpose, there was little doubt that the endeavor marked an attempt to achieve political solidarity between countries with a similar

[9] For example, the Cambodian response was "Our government believes that to create what might become a shadow S.E.A.T.O. would be quite disastrous." *Cambodian Commentary* (January, 1960), p. 4.

outlook on international issues. Thailand and the Philippines were members of S.E.A.T.O., while Malaya was linked militarily with three S.E.A.T.O. allies. In February 1961, when the S.E.A.F.E.T. idea was resurrected as A.S.A., at a meeting of foreign ministers in Kuala Lumpur, much concern was being expressed over the prospects of an imminent Communist takeover in Laos.

Even before the dispute over Malaysia had produced a serious cleavage within A.S.A., the Association had been working at a low level of activity. There had appeared to be little desire on the part of the governments involved to press ahead with ambitious schemes of cooperation. This served, perhaps intentionally, to keep it out of the international political limelight and to avoid the denigration from Moscow and Peking which its initial appearance evoked. Its modest scale of operations were less offensive also to governments within South East Asia who were regarded as potential members but who saw in A.S.A. an invidious extension of S.E.A.T.O. A.S.A., however, has not yet demonstrated any potential for growth and has passed most of its short existence as a divided house. Although discord between Malaysia and the Philippines has moderated to the extent that the Philippines has assumed the role of mediator in the dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia, the question of the disposition of North Borneo remains still to be settled. While one would not expect A.S.A. to vanish altogether from the South East Asian scene, its prospects, even within its original limited framework, are poor. And, in view of the shock to its functioning brought on by the Malaysia dispute, it cannot be expected, at least in the foreseeable future, to have more than a very modest existence.

Within Maritime South East Asia, the concept of a "Malaysia" has never been the basis for accord among prospective members beyond a vaguely accepted notion of association between peoples of ethnically related Malay origin. The idea, however, has enjoyed periodic currency, and in the latter stages of the Second World War, the prospect of Indonesian independence aroused expectations of its fulfillment, in the context of association with the Malay Peninsula and the British possessions in North Borneo.[10]

[10] Evidence of this can be found in Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics under the Japanese Occupation*, Interim Report Series, Modern Indonesia Project (Cornell, 1961). William Roff, "Kaum Muda—Kaum Tua: Innovation and Reaction Amongst the Malays 1900-41," and Yoichi Itagaki, "Some Aspects of the Japanese Policy for Malaya Under the Occupation, With Special Reference to Nationalism," both in K. G. Tregonning (ed.), *Papers in Malayan History* (Singapore, 1962). Radin Soenarno, "Malay Nationalism, 1896-1941," *Journal of South East Asian History* (March, 1960), and Garth N. Jones, "Soekarno's Early Views Upon the Territorial Boundaries of Indonesia," *Australian Outlook* (April, 1964).

Malaysia, conceived as a political union betwen ethnic Malays, is hardly a practical concept to apply in a South East Asia of nationally-conscious states. Indeed, for this purpose, it is somewhat anachronistic to deal with human groupings in terms of peoples. It is more realistic to consider identifiable territorial units, each with their own particular inrests derived, in part, from their geography. Association, if it should occur, would not be between peoples of so-called Malay origin, but between independent states asserting sovereign rights with all that this could imply by way of conflict of interest. Any practical scheme for political association (especially involving more than two countries) is likely, therefore, to be limited in design. And while, on the one hand, a Malaysia could be expected to be a limited form of association determined by specific circumstances, a more exclusive union—such as the one which came into being on September 16th, 1963—could not be expected to find favor among neighboring states with reason to regard themselves as competing candidates for political leadership.

The Malaysia of Tunku Abdul Rahman, it should be pointed out, is hardly an orthodox exercise in regional association. Indeed, this Malaysia was possible only because the British colonial power in Borneo was anxious to be dispossessed of the territories concerned. The British government was quite happy to pass on this legacy to her respectable former ward, the Prime Minister of Malaya, who saw North Borneo in a Malaysia as a means to remedy the dangerous and anomalous position of Singapore. It was less than a month after a resounding defeat of the governing Singapore People's Action Party in a by-election in April, 1961, that he reversed his hitherto uncompromising attitude towards union of Malay and Singapore, albeit in a wider context. Singapore enjoyed self-governing status but was not fully independent when the island-state joined Malaysia. Her leaders gave up the doubtful prospect of independence for the economic security which union within Malaysia promised. Besides, the P.A.P. government was faced with the imminent prospect of overthrow from the extreme left, and Malaysia—both as a popular issue and as a practical concept—saved its political skin.[11] In Sabah and Sarawak, initial opposition to the idea of Malaysia was overcome, partly because it was realized that the British were determined to leave. The Philippines' claim to an undefined part of North Borneo and then Indonesian confrontation were further compelling factors.

As an outcome of negotiations in the first half of 1963 to resolve the dispute over Malaysia, there emerged the notion of Maphilindo—a pro-

[11] See Michael Leifer, "Politics in Singapore," *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies* (May, 1964).

spective confederation of so-called Malay nations. The Malayan government was willing to put aside its misgivings and concede the principle of such a confederation as a way of facilitating the acceptance of Malaysia by Indonesia and the Philippines, its prospective confederal partners. The Philippines government, which initiated the proposal in July 1962 (in a limited form which then seemed to exclude Indonesia) had the previous month claimed an undefined part of North Borneo. President Macapagal's proposal for a Malay confederation came at a time when it was common knowledge that the British and Malayan governments were about to finalize arrangements for the establishment of the new Federation of Malaysia. One is forced to conclude, therefore, that President Macapagal's initiative was directly related to the Filipino claim to North Borneo and was seen as a way of either forestalling or superseding the proposed Federation of Malaysia. After the Brunei uprising, in December 1962, the objections of Indonesia to Malaysia came violently to the surface, and this situation offered scope to the Filipino government in its new found efforts to assume a more authentic Asian identity. President Macapagal's proposal for a Malay Confederation was then restated with Indonesian membership specifically included. Through 1963, the Philippines moved closer to a country which symbolized the main stream of Asian nationalism.

Indonesia, as did the Philippines, regarded the concept of Maphilindo as a way to isolate Malaya diplomatically, and thereby, to obtain concessions before Malaysia became a *fait accompli.* The Indonesian government, previously wary of multilateral entanglements, saw in Maphilindo the prospect of establishing its pre-eminence in Maritime South East Asia, as well as an opportunity to remove the British and American presence—considered obstacles to that aim.[12] Maphilindo as a tripartite exercise has, so far, come to naught because of the self-evident incompatibility of interests among all three countries involved. No measures have been taken to implement article nine of the joint statement of the summit conference in Manila (July 30th–August 5th, 1963) which recommended the establishment of national secretariats for Maphilindo affairs. The Indonesian government has not shown any inclination to call off its campaign of confrontation against Malaysia. On the contrary, the outcome of the meeting in June 1964 in Tokyo demonstrated President Soekarno's determination

[12] Article 11 of the Joint Statement issued by the President of Indonesia, the President of the Philippines and the Prime Minister of Malaya in Manila on August 5th, 1963, stated *inter alia:* "The three heads of government further agreed that foreign bases—temporary in nature—should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of any of the three countries. In accordance with the principle enunciated in the Bandung Declaration, the three countries will abstain from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers."

to maintain Indonesian irregulars in Sabah and Sarawak.[13] Meanwhile, Indonesian support for a unitary state of North Kalimantan conflicts with Filipino ambitions in Sabah.[14]

One common interest between all three countries, which is believed to have encouraged the acceptance of the principle of Maphilindo, is a general resentment of the role of the Overseas Chinese in South East Asia with an attendant fear of the intentions of Communist China. However, this motive could not be expressed openly in Malaya where Overseas Chinese make up approximately 37% of the population. Indeed, the government felt bound to issue vigorous denials that Maphilindo was ever conceived of as an anti-Chinese measure.[15]

South East Asia has been traditionally an area subject to dominating influences from outside. At the present time, apart from the unlikely potential of Indonesia, there is no center of countervailing power within the region which could oppose any serious intervention should it appear from its currently expected direction—the North. Maphilindo, it would seem, was in part an attempt to provide for such an exigency. However, its ill-fated history suggests that there would need to be a tangible and direct threat of large scale dimensions to revive the confederal body and to get it to function as an agency of active cooperation in defense. By then, it might prove to be too late, unless assistance were to come from outside the region.

In a recent study, one writer, after an analysis of the difficulties impeding cooperation in South East Asia, concluded that "the usually mentioned obstacles to regional cooperation do not look so large when subjected to close analysis as when they are lumped together."[16] In a sense, this statement is quite unexceptionable. However, it compares with that attributed apocryphally to a physician who, after examining a patient suffering from several serious complaints, propounded that the condition seemed less critical when each complaint was considered individually rather

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[13] *The Times*, London, 22nd June, 1964.

[14] In the Joint Communique issued following the meeting between President Soekarno and President Macapagal in Manila from January 7th to 11th, 1964, President Soekarno assured President Macapagal of Indonesian support for the Philippine claim to Sabah within the framework of the principle of self-determination. Given continued Indonesian declarations of support for the rights of the people of North Kalimantan, President Soekarno's assurances to President Macapagal cannot be taken at their face value.

[15] See *Straits Times*, Singapore, 17th June, 1963.

[16] Fernand K. Gordon, "Problems of Regional Co-operation in Southeast Asia," *World Politics* (January, 1964), p. 252.

than all together. The underlying implication of the above quotation is that the divisive factors in the existing relations between South East Asian States are capable of early resolution. The danger of such an assertion is that the reductionist nature of the argument—perhaps convincing in individual cases of conflict—tends to overlook the total picture of normal interstate relationships. These follow essentially from the separate territoriality of the state and the ungoverned nature of international society. Consequently, cooperative ventures must be related to the prospect of tangible advantage likely to accrue to the principals involved. They must also offer no challenge to national sovereignty which is jealously cherished in the new states of Asia. Where they do, overriding exigency is most likely to be the catalyst of political change. An essential element of the movement for unity, which grew up in Western Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War, was a deep belief—in certain quarters—that the traditional nation-state had ceased to fulfill any useful function and that it ought to be superseded by some large polity. No such ethics moves minds in South East Asia. And, at the level of cooperation (as opposed to integration) there has yet to be demonstrated any belief that real benefit is likely to accrue from more than a very limited functional association. The statement quoted overlooks, above all, the fact that the political differences which, when taken separately, may appear intrinsically slight are, in essence, a reflection of the resilient nature of the multi-state system of which the states of South East Asia form an essential part.

South East Asia, perhaps more than any other region in the world, demonstrates all the elements of quasi-anarchy and quasi-order which are intrinsic parts of an international society. One can expect no more than that international relations and, consequently, regional association will develop along lines of mutual interest wherever and whenever this is recognized. And here, so-called regional boundaries need have little relevance.

Recently, there have been several examples of attempts at interregional mediation in South East Asia. Most notable have been the efforts of Thailand in attempting to resolve the dispute over Malaysia. The Cambodian leader, Prince Sihanouk, has also played some part in this process of attempted conciliation, as well as in arranging the International Conference on Laos in 1961. At the same time, both the Malaysian Prime Minister and the Filipino President have offered their services to Cambodia in connection with disputes with her neighbors. Meanwhile, the Philippines has become less of a protagonist and more of a mediator in the conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia. These experiences could indicate the crude beginnings of an informal process of conflict resolution

within South East Asia.[17] It is this type of activity, together with limited functional economic arrangements, which one would most expect to see as a basis of any development in regional association.

However, it must be reiterated, that South East Asia is no insulated compartment; it is in no sense a natural entity. It has no real similarity to what sociologists would describe as a sub-culture and, for the time being, there is no individual or collective strength available to enforce from within a "Monroe Doctrine" for the area. For these reasons alone, it is advisable to be ultra-cautious in taking conventional boundaries for granted and to expect to see association taking place within these boundaries rather than across them.

In conclusion, it is perhaps significant that South East Asia, as a conventional term, has become increasingly the property of university area specialists. While this is fruitful in that it can bring together scholars from various disciplines, it has its pitfalls in that it can also obscure horizons through an over-obsession with a geographical convention.

[17] A range of institutional possibilities along these lines are suggested by Russell H. Fifield in *Southeast Asia in United States Policy* (New York, 1963), Chapter 12.

PEASANT MOVEMENTS IN COLONIAL SOUTHEAST ASIA*

HARRY J. BENDA

HISTORY—RECORDED HISTORY, THAT IS—HAS NOT BEEN KIND TO the peasantry, and for obvious reasons. Peasants may affect history, but as a rule they do not make it; if anything, it is made for—with or against—them. More important still for purposes of the historian's craft, not only do peasants hardly ever record their fate, their betters have rarely bothered to do it for them; if they have remembered to mention the peasantry at all, they have as often as not relegated it to the role of supporting cast for their own pageantry.

Southeast Asian history has been no exception to this rule: Europe-centric no less than indigenous historiography has almost exclusively dwelt on the heroes of the Great Tradition. If court chroniclers devoted their energies to the legitimation of dynasties and the recording of their sponsors' glorious deeds, colonial historians spent theirs on the exploits of empire builders, "pacifiers," and governors-general. It is true that historians of modern Southeast Asia have occasionally, not to say grudgingly, referred to the peasantry, but then usually in order to score a point in a widening debate. "Colonial" historians, confronted with the upsurge of modern nationalist movements, have tended to imply that the Southeast Asian peasantry was basically "loyal" to the alien regime, untouched—unspoiled perhaps—by the noisy agitation of urban politicos. Nationalist writers as well as pro-nationalist authors abroad, by contrast, claimed unity of "national" purpose between urban intelligentsias and peasantry. If the peasants were in commotion, the former could brush it off as the exception to the rule of rural placidity; the latter would annex it, so to speak, to the mainstream of rising anticolonialism and nationalism. But

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these interpretations are only variations on a dichotomous theme which transposes one historian's rebel into another's hero, without necessarily coming to grips with the specific nature and problems of the peasantry.

The agrarian history of modern Southeast Asia need not be, as Karl Marx posited with regard to European medieval history, the region's "secret," truer history; but it is at least a very important part thereof which fully deserves closest attention. Both the sources and the tools for its study admittedly leave a great deal to be desired. But we are not entirely without documentary evidence, thanks largely to the labors of colonial administrators charged with missions of inquiry into peasant conditions, especially at times of agrarian unrest. As for tools, though as yet underdeveloped, they do exist. To begin with, we have some recent and highly suggestive studies of peasant movements in medieval and modern Europe.[1] Though of course not "transferable," they can and do suggest significant modes of approach and techniques. Second, let us not overlook the fact that some outstanding sociologists and anthropologists have for decades been gathering ample materials and gained valuable insights into peasant life and peasant movements in many parts of the world.[2] With deliberate selectivity, the social historian can and should learn from them; he may regret that so much of their attention has been focused on small,

[1] See e.g. Norman Cohn, *In Pursuit of the Millenium: Revolutionary Messianism in Medieval and Reformation Europe and its Bearing on Modern Totalitarian Movements* (London, 1962); E. J. Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (Manchester, 1959); and Vittorio Lanternari, *The Religions of the Oppressed: A Study of Modern Messianic Cults*, tr. by Liza Sergio (New York, 1963); Cf. also Sylvia L. Thrupp (ed), *Millenial Dreams in Action: Essays in Comparative Study* (The Hague, 1962). For a recent contribution concerning Indonesia, see Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Tjatatan tentang segi-segi messianistis dalam sedjarah Indonesia* (*Jogjakarta*, 1959).

[2] Here the literature is truly overwhelming and only a few titles shall shall therefore be cited. One of the anthropological classics is, of course, Robert Redfield's "Peasant Society and Culture," reprinted in *The Little Community and Peasant Society and Culture* (Chicago, 1960). Of more specific interest for this essay are such works as Georges Balandier, "Messianismes et nationalismes en Afrique Noir," *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie* XIV (1953), 41-65; A. J. F. Kobben. "Profetische bewegingen als uiting van sociaal protest," *Sociologisch Jaarboek* XIII (1959, 5-72; E. Michael Mendelson, "A Messianic Buddhist Association in Upper Burma," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* XXIV (1961), 560-80; Justus M. van der Kroef, "Javanese Messianic Expectations: Their Origin and Cultural Context," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* I (1959), 299-323; "The Messiah in Indonesia and Melanesia," *Scientific Monthly* LXXV (1952), 161-65; and "Messianic Movements in the Celebes, Sumatra, and Borneo" in Thrupp, *op. cit.*, 80-121; Peter Worsley, *The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of 'Cargo' Cults in Melanesia* (London, 1957).

isolated, often indeed preliterate, societies rather than on major ethnic groups that are part of highly developed cultures; he may object that in their endeavors to comprehend the morphology and social mechanics of contemporary peasant life, anthropologists have paid scant attention to its historical development. But these and other reservations should come after, not before, the historian has tried to enrich his skill in dealing with the peasantry, the overwhelming, and hitherto virtually history-less, majority of Southeast Asians.

The study of peasant movements does not necessarily shed much light on the peasantry under "normal" conditions. Almost by definition, peasants who revolt have moved out of, or have attempted to move out of, "normal" conditions, and even the most careful *ex post facto* inquiry into the causes underlying peasant unrest may distort the preexisting order of things. In other words, we have no ways of reconstructing rural "normalcy," certainly not in premodern times. This state of affairs has its dangers which we must guard against: One is the assume *ex hypothesi* a rural Arcady in an *aetas aurea;* the other, to assume, on equally flimsy grounds, that peasant movements are primarily, if not exclusively, a modern phenomenon, a conditioned reflex to the impact of colonial rule.

As we well know from European history, peasant movements are part and parcel of premodern societies. To assign the peasantry a static role, though an (often implied) commonplace among writers on Southeast Asia, is on modest reflection a fallacy. Surely the courts and dynasties that fill the pages of the area's history lived off the peasants, fought their wars with peasant levies, and, as ruling classes everywhere, imposed hardships on those unable to escape the burdens of organized social and political life? Let us equally avoid the pitfalls of "Oriental Despotism" and of retrospective romanticism as starting points for historical analysis.[3] It is not at all unlikely that were reliable, written records of the past available, they would reveal peasants "moving against their overlords, or—and perhaps more frequently, given the abundance of space—literally moving away from their reach. Unfortunately,

[3] A mere listing of such writings would be as long as it would make somber reading. But to limit ourselves to one brilliant and pivotal writer whose labors have secured him our lasting gratitude, it must be said that John S. Furnivall was often guilty of this kind of retrospective romanticism concerning the peasantry in precolonial Southeast Asia. Cf. my article, "The Structure of Southeast Asian History: Some Preliminary Observations," *Journal of Southeast Asian History* III (1962), esp. 133-34.

such records only exist, and even then sporadically and often in none too reliable form, for the modern colonial period. We may thus have to be satisfied with the meager glimpses which the available materials may provide for a relatively very short span of the history of some of the countries of Southeast Asia. The record is far from complete, let alone always reliable; by the same token, much of it still awaits analysis. In any case, the fact that no such materials have (as yet) been found concerning peasant movements in Thailand does not necessarily mean that none occurred, but rather that no one saw fit to report them, or to make such reports as do exist available to the public. Indeed, it is not at all unlikely that with the demise of the colonial bureaucrats—our major sources of information of the recent past—an official conspiracy of silence may come to shield the peasantry from the historian's (and field worker's) curiosity. This would be a most regrettable by-product of national independence, at the very time when progressive politicization of the Southeast Asian peasantry is doubtless accelerating the pace (if nothing else) of rural life.

The second interpretive danger, that of seeing peasant unrest primarily or even exclusively as a response to Western colonial rule, is closely connected to the problem so far discussed; once again, current nationalist historiography may continue and deepen it.[4] The tendency to equate peasant movements with nationalist movements is as prevalent as it is easily explained: those writing national history will clutch at any sign of antigovernmental protest in colonial times to establish the case for the rising tide of Southeast Asian nationalism. But it may be suggested that the equation of the two categories of protest rests on very slender roots. That the peasantry revolted against colonial governments is, of course, true; but it must be repeated that peasant rebellions against authority are an age-old "normal" aspect of strained relations between the Great and the Little Traditions. This is not to deny that revolts against foreign overlords were frequently cast in anti-foreign ideological—especially religious-ideological—molds or that, equally important, Western economic penetration and political control had all too often brought with them more or less profound changes which, in turn, effected social dislocation among the

[4] This is certainly true of the only book that has up to now endeavored to analyze peasant movements in all of Southeast Asia, *viz.* Erich Jacoby's *Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia* (New York, 1949).

peasantry and hence became an important causal factor in "agrarian unrest" in colonial Southeast Asia.

We may posit two major criteria that generically distinguish peasant movements from nationalist movements. First, they usually differ as to locale. Whereas Southeast Asian nationalist movements belong to the political culture of modern cities—more accurately perhaps of the administrative centers of colonial governments—peasant movements occur in the agrarian hinterland. Many cases of recorded unrest in modern times actually occurred in areas that had not experienced Western economic penetration, but in districts which seem to have been traditionally prone to peasant rebellions, their records in this respect usually antedating colonial rule. Although nationalist leaders were at times quick to claim *ex post facto* parentage over peasant movements, they had not organized them; indeed, as a rule urban leaders were ignorant of their imminence and as surprised as European administrators by their actual occurrence.[5]

This spatial distance reflects the far more important social, ideological and organizational distance separating the modernized, often westernized Great Tradition of the intellectual of the colonial capital city from the still predominantly traditional, in many cases religious, leader living amidst the Little Tradition of rural Southeast Asia. The dichotomy is, of course, not limited to Southeast Asia. Intellectuals in most cultures stand aloof from the peasantry, and colonial Westernization if anything strengthens that aloofness, since the native intelligentsia derives much of its intellectual and political frame of reference from an alien culture. The point to be stressed is not the oft-repeated and over-stressed "rootlessness" and "alienation" of the non-Western intellectual from his own culture,[6] but rather that in colonial times he had learned to express his political program in an essentially Western frame of reference and that the logic of the colonial superstructure forced him to cast his political organizations likewise in essentially modern, Western molds.[7] For sure, the dichotomy between intellectual and peasantry can be exaggerated. The individual intellectual could bridge the gap if he so desired, and occasionally (most notably in

[5] A good case in point is the Saya San rebellion in colonial Burma, further discussed in the text below.

[6] Cf. Edward Shils, "The Culture of the Indian Intellectual," *The Sewanee Review* 1959, 1-46 ,where this problem is most perceptively dealt with.

[7] See my article, "Decolonization in Indonesia: The Problem of Continuity and Change," *The American Historical Review* LLXX (1965), 1058-73.

the case of India's Gandhi) did; but it happened but rarely in colonial Southeast Asia, and in the few cases when it threatened to occur (as e.g. with Soekarno), colonial governments took precautions against the very closing of the gap.

In their most pronounced and typical forms, then, nationalist movements differed from those that arose among the peasantry in that the former were urban-centered, rationally organized, and equipped with what we may call a specific, "ameliorative" program of action, while the latter were rural-centered, more or less spontaneous and using non-specific or "holistic" programs of action. Southeast Asian nationalism was intrinsically forward-looking; anticolonialism was only one aspect of its ideology whose most important constructive tenet was the creation of a modern nation state carved in the image of the modern colonial state. That its spokesmen often used traditional ideological appeals and elements in their nationalism,[8] and that for that matter nationalism often draws on powerful traditional—cultural and ethnic—identifications, are for our present purposes less significant factors than that the goal of nationalism is specific and modern. By contrast, most peasant movements were reactions to social *malaise,* as often as not backward-looking, and whose goal usually was the recreation of an imaginary state of primordial past tranquillity, of social *stasis.*[9] That ofttimes peasant movements started with a quasi-ameliorative appeal, ie., with demands for the alleviation of specific grievances, is less important here than the fact that they usually bypassed such a stage to grow into all but anarchical, "nativistic" movements not infrequently appearing in millenial garb. Similarly we may regard the fact that they were directed against alien rulers, and were to that extent also anticolonial, as less significant than that their "holistic" platforms called for the destruction of the *status quo,* for the abolition of all burdens of civil life, and for the creation of paradise on earth.

Like all "ideal types," this dichotomy must not be carried too far: even the most rationally organized urban movement in colonial times may have contained a goodly admixture of "holistic"

[8] On the importance of traditional concepts in Indonesian nationalism, see Emanuel Sarkisyanz, *Russland und der Messtanismus des Orients: Sendungsbewusstsein und politischer Chiliasmus des Ostens,* (Tübingen, 1955). 297-307.

[9] On this point, see also Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Geerts (ed.), *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (New York and London, 1963), 105-57.

elements: the excessive expectations so often placed on the longed-for independence, or the adumbration of revolution for the sake of revolution[10] are examples of just such elements. Similarly, even the most obscure peasant movement would occasionally carry overtones of a reformist, "ameliorative" tinge. More important still, though the social historian of modern colonial Southeast Asia must be aware of the basic polarity between urban intelligentsia and rural peasantry, he cannot chart the two in terms of total isolation in the twentieth century. The two spheres did by and large remain separate, but here and there their tangents would meet. These meetings were as often as not accidental rather than organizationally planned, the odd urban charismatic leader casting his image—often, *malgré lui*, a traditional image—over the rural population.[11] What mattered even more than such accidents was the fact that every now and then in the twentieth century local leadership of peasant movements passed from traditional to more modern elements, with or without organizational ties to urban centers proper. It is within the framework of such a changing continuum, then, that a few selected peasant movements in modern colonial Southeast Asia shall now be examined.

Our first example is the so-called Samin Movement, centered in the Blora district of Central Java.[12] Its beginnings go back to the 1880's, but it continued to preoccupy the Dutch authorities well into the first two decades of the twentieth century. Saminism

[10] The "romanticism of the uncompleted revolution" has become one of contemporary Indonesia's major ideological themes. Cf. Herbert Feith, "Indonesia's Political Symbols and Their Wielders," *World Politics* XVI (1963), 79-97.

[11] One of the clearest early examples is R.U.S. Tjokroaminoto, co-founder of the *Sarekat Islam* in Indonesia. He is carefully discussed by Robert Van Niel, *The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite* (The Hague and Bandung, 1960), 92-93 and 105-07. For a brilliant discussion of Soekarno, see the doctoral dissertation by Bernhard Dahm, "Sukarnos Kampf um indonesische Unabhangigkeit" (Kiel, 1964), scheduled for early publication.

[12] I am completing a separate article on the Samin movement based i.e. on archival materials which I had the opportunity to consult in The Netherlands in 1961-62. The movement is more or less briefly mentioned in most standard histories of modern Indonesia, but no modern monograph specifically devoted to it has yet appeared. The most important printed sources are: *Verslag betreffende het onderzoek in zake de Saminbeweging, ingesteld ingevolge het Gouvernements Besluit van 1 Januari* 1917, *No.* 20 (Batavia, 1918); Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, *Het Saminisme. Rapport uitgebracht aan de Vereeniging "Insulinde"* (Semarang, 1918); J. Bijlevelt, "De Saminbeweging," *Koloniaal Tijdschrift* XII (1923), 10-24. The annual colonial reports (*Koloniale Verslagen*) published by the Netherlands Indies government often contain relevant information, especially those for the years 1907-1909. Cf. also van der Kroef, "Javanese Messianic Expectations...," 317-18.

constituted a classic case of what we might call a "pure" peasant movement, confined not only spatially but also ideologically to rural Central Java, and at no time embracing more than some 3,000 followers. Samin himself was an illiterate peasant preaching what appeared to be a most obscure doctrine of social *stasis;* he enjoined his followers to purify themselves by withdrawing from material longings and from the social order. That social order, curiously enough, included not only the colonial government as represented by the Indonesian bureaucratic hierarchy but also Islam, even its most heterodox and syncretic variety. Non-payment of taxes and refusal of services to the one, ignoring the Muslim prayer and marriage ceremonial of the other apparently constituted the two major "anti's" of Saminism. It had no organization proper, a few individual disciples spreading the word—occasionally even in adjacent regions. Although colonial investigators tried hard to read a specific millenial program into the movement, to all intents and purposes it had none. Samin and his immediate (equally illiterate) followers were exiled from Java in 1907 and 1908, never to return home; but, contrary to expectation based on experiences with more or less Islamically tinged, messianic *Ratu-Adil* movements, Saminism did not die out. It flared up, briefly, between 1914 and 1917, and, again, several ringleaders were banished outside the island; thereafter it sporadically reappeared in the early 1920's. In his reminiscences, a Dutch official sarcastically reflected that Saminism had in fact never constituted a real threat to society, and that bureaucratic panicking had led to severe precaution rather than to just retribution.[13]

Interestingly enough, Saminism continued to draw adherents even when *Sarekat Islam* activities penetrated its territory; but though one might expect cleavages between the vaguely anti-Islamic Samins and the often militantly Muslim local *S. I.* leaders, no such confrontation appears in the pages of official reports in spite of redoubled Dutch vigilance of that period.[14] One might similarly have expected Saminism to lose out when confronted by a regionally-organized, far more modern, movement. But it apparently managed to hold its own, and remained what it had been from the very outset: A low-temperature, almost gentle anarchism reaching back to a premodern—pre-Dutch, pre-Islamic—Java. Indeed, the Java to which it seemingly harked back was unconnected to the

[13] G. L. Gonggrijp, *Brieven van Opheffer aan de redactie van het Bataviaasch Handelsblad* (Maastricht, n.d.), Letter #89, esp. 334-36.
[14] On the *Sarekat Islam,* see Van Niel, *op. cit.,* 90-159 *passim.*

island's Hindu-Buddhist Great Tradition; rather, it revolved in a typical peasant *milieu*, in the realm of a peculiar variant of the *abangan* tradition of rural Java.[15] Its efforts were directed towards regenerative reintegration of the primordial village society, without ever looking beyond that society.

The Saya San Rebellion, our next example, occurred in the rural Tharawaddy district of Lower Burma, a region with a fairly sustained reputation for peasant unrest even in pre-British days, in December 1930.[16] It, too, was quite limited in size, its following perhaps not totalling more than 3,000; and, though adjacent areas were to some extent affected, the rebellion itself remained fairly localized. Unlike the slow smouldering discontent of Saminism, the Burmese rebellion exploded in a violent, brief climax, only to collapse after Saya San's capture by the British; he was subsequently tried and executed in 1931. There were other, more important, differences. For one thing, Saya San himself was by no means the obscure rural illiterate of his Javanese predecessor. He had indeed, been connected with the Rangoon-centered General Council of Buddhist Associations, for which he carried out propaganda activities in the mid-1920's. Yet he chose to withdraw from the city's religious-political organization, disappeared and clandestinely organized his rebellion, not along modern, but along traditional lines. Saya San did attack the foreign ruler, but it was not so to speak a frontal attack waged on alien soil; it was, rather, a turning away, a bypassing of that alien soil, a cosmological attempt to exorcise the foreigner by recreating the traditional Burmese monarchy in a jungle clearing, complete with the magico-religious paraphernalia of old Burma. Where Samin had abjured Islam, Saya San personified the "political monk" of Buddhist Burma; but it was popular, not scriptural, Buddhism that provided the ideology of the rebellion, a folk religion in which, in fact, the *nat* rather than the Buddha occupied the central place, and which preached a religious crusade against the unbeliever quite at odds with the Buddhist Great Tradition. Even then, Saya San's gospel could be the more easily disseminated precisely because it fell

[15] Cf. Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Glencoe, 1960), Part I.

[16] For a brief treatment of the Saya San Rebellion, see John F. Cady, *A History of Modern Burma* (Ithaca, 1958), 309-21 and literature cited there. An interesting nationalist rebuttal of the government's explanation of the causes of the revolt, written in the 1930's but only published after independence, is Ma Ma Lay's "The Real Origin and Causes of the Burma Rebellion," printed in English in the Burmese volume *Thu lou lu* (Rangoon, 1953), 371-91.

within traditional folk religion, but also because *pongyis* could and did serve as missionaries-lieutenants.[17] In contrast to the Samin's passive resistance, Saya San's royal jungle army killed the lone European in its rural midst. Both, however, hoped for salvation in social—in Saya San's case also political—*stasis*: a return to the past, a prevalent theme in the Little Traditions of Indianized Southeast Asia.

The Vietnamese uprisings which form our third example took place in the province of Nghe An in North Annam—it also extended to Ha Tinh, south of Nghe An—at about the same time as the Saya San revolt, but in locale, size, organization and leadership they differ quite markedly from the two movements we have so far discussed.[18] Nghe An, a rugged, densely populated rural region, had for centuries been a center of elite resistance to both Chinese and French rule. The main area of the revolt, the Song Ca river valley, lay adjacent to the provincial capital of Vinh and the town of Benthuy, both of which had some French-owned industries; their labor force (some 3,000 men) was largely recruited from among the near-by-peasantry. Thus the spatial and social distance between old and new was considerably narrower in this case. Organizational efforts from mid-1929 onward were first of all directed at the industrial workers, and it was a strike in a match factory in March, 1929 that inaugurated joint waves of unrest which culminated in massive peasant protests, demonstrations and riots embracing some 50,000 people (i.e., just under 10% of the population) between September and December.

It is the organizational apparatus that most clearly distinguishes the turbulent events in Vietnam from their previously dis-

[17] Sarkisyanz, *op. cit.*, 339-68 is indispensable for a good understanding of these aspects of the Rebellion and of the political significance of Burmese Buddhism in general.

[18] In collaboration with Mrs. Joan L. Shapiro, I am preparing an article on the "Soviets" of Nghe An. They are briefly referred to in several standard works on modern Vietnamese history, but have so far not received detailed attention by scholars other than the ranking Marxist Vietnamese historian, Tran Huy Lieu whose monograph has appeared in a French translation, *Les Soviets du Nghe-Tinh de* 1930-1931 *au Vietnam* (Hanoi, [1960]). Several important contemporary official speeches and reports were published. See esp. Governement-Général de l'Indochine. Direction des Affaires Politiques et de la Sureté, *Générale Contributions a l'histoire des mouvements politiques de l'Indochine francaise.* Documents, Vol. B, "La terreur rouge en Annam (1930-1931)." Among the many contemporary works some of them of a journalistic rather than scholarly nature, may be cited: Do Duc Ho, *Soviets d'Annam et désarroi des dieux blancs* (Paris, 1938), and Pierre Varet, *Au pays d'Annams: Les dieux qui meurent* (Paris. 1932). For a brief treatment in English, see I. Milton Sacks, "Marxism in Viet Nam," in Frank N. Trager (ed.), *Marxism in Southeast Asia* (Standford, 1959), esp. 124-27.

isolated, often indeed preliterate, societies rather than on major ethnic groups that are part of highly developed cultures; he may object that in their endeavors to comprehend the morphology and social mechanics of contemporary peasant life, anthropologists have paid scant attention to its historical development. But these and other reservations should come after, not before, the historian has tried to enrich his skill in dealing with the peasantry, the overwhelming, and hitherto virtually history-less, majority of Southeast Asians.

The study of peasant movements does not necessarily shed much light on the peasantry under "normal" conditions. Almost by definition, peasants who revolt have moved out of, or have attempted to move out of, "normal" conditions, and even the most careful *ex post facto* inquiry into the causes underlying peasant unrest may distort the preexisting order of things. In other words, we have no ways of reconstructing rural "normalcy," certainly not in premodern times. This state of affairs has its dangers which we must guard against: One is the assume *ex hypothesi* a rural Arcady in an *aetas aurea;* the other, to assume, on equally flimsy grounds, that peasant movements are primarily, if not exclusively, a modern phenomenon, a conditioned reflex to the impact of colonial rule.

As we well know from European history, peasant movements are part and parcel of premodern societies. To assign the peasantry a static role, though an (often implied) commonplace among writers on Southeast Asia, is on modest reflection a fallacy. Surely the courts and dynasties that fill the pages of the area's history lived off the peasants, fought their wars with peasant levies, and, as ruling classes everywhere, imposed hardships on those unable to escape the burdens of organized social and political life? Let us equally avoid the pitfalls of "Oriental Despotism" and of retrospective romanticism as starting points for historical analysis.[3] It is not at all unlikely that were reliable, written records of the past available, they would reveal peasants "moving against their overlords, or—and perhaps more frequently, given the abundance of space—literally moving away from their reach. Unfortunately,

[3] A mere listing of such writings would be as long as it would make somber reading. But to limit ourselves to one brilliant and pivotal writer whose labors have secured him our lasting gratitude, it must be said that John S. Furnivall was often guilty of this kind of retrospective romanticism concerning the peasantry in precolonial Southeast Asia. Cf. my article, "The Structure of Southeast Asian History: Some Preliminary Observations," *Journal of Southeast Asian History* III (1962), esp. 133-34.

such records only exist, and even then sporadically and often in none too reliable form, for the modern colonial period. We may thus have to be satisfied with the meager glimpses which the available materials may provide for a relatively very short span of the history of some of the countries of Southeast Asia. The record is far from complete, let alone always reliable; by the same token, much of it still awaits analysis. In any case, the fact that no such materials have (as yet) been found concerning peasant movements in Thailand does not necessarily mean that none occurred, but rather that no one saw fit to report them, or to make such reports as do exist available to the public. Indeed, it is not at all unlikely that with the demise of the colonial bureaucrats—our major sources of information of the recent past—an official conspiracy of silence may come to shield the peasantry from the historian's (and field worker's) curiosity. This would be a most regrettable by-product of national independence, at the very time when progressive politicization of the Southeast Asian peasantry is doubtless accelerating the pace (if nothing else) of rural life.

The second interpretive danger, that of seeing peasant unrest primarily or even exclusively as a response to Western colonial rule, is closely connected to the problem so far discussed; once again, current nationalist historiography may continue and deepen it.[4] The tendency to equate peasant movements with nationalist movements is as prevalent as it is easily explained: those writing national history will clutch at any sign of antigovernmental protest in colonial times to establish the case for the rising tide of Southeast Asian nationalism. But it may be suggested that the equation of the two categories of protest rests on very slender roots. That the peasantry revolted against colonial governments is, of course, true; but it must be repeated that peasant rebellions against authority are an age-old "normal" aspect of strained relations between the Great and the Little Traditions. This is not to deny that revolts against foreign overlords were frequently cast in anti-foreign ideological—especially religious-ideological—molds or that, equally important, Western economic penetration and political control had all too often brought with them more or less profound changes which, in turn, effected social dislocation among the

[4] This is certainly true of the only book that has up to now endeavored to analyze peasant movements in all of Southeast Asia, *viz.* Erich Jacoby's *Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia* (New York, 1949).

metropolis. But it went beyond its limits, and, in Southeast Asia's only colony with universal suffrage, started to address itself to the peasantry on Luzon. Sakdalism thus seemed to bridge the two realms to a remarkable degree: it took part in the debate concerning the islands' political future, by trying to sabotage the plebiscite in which Filipinos were to vote on the Commonwealth proffered by the United States; but at the same time it managed to translate its battle cry for immediate independence into terms that gave that independence a specific, social and economic, meaning at the village level. Thwarted in its efforts to play urban politics after the reunification of the *Nacionalista* leadership, Ramos—at that time actually in Japan—chose to incite open rebellion in the countryside. Thus, with a far less tightly-trained organization than Vietnamese Communism, some Filipino leaders had likewise succeeded in temporarily harnessing a peasant revolt. Whatever freedom may have meant to Ramos and to other urban politicians, to the *tao* who had taken up arms against the powers-that-were it meant an end to taxes, *cedula,* a sudden, holistic redress of a social order he had good reason to resent.

A few concluding remarks may be in order concerning the generic significance of these four examples of peasants on the move in colonial Southeast Asia. They have, it is true, been dealt with far too sketchily, out of their cultural contexts, social and economic conditions, and with quite inadequate attention to their respective colonial settings. They were chosen more or less arbitrarily to demonstrate different types of locale, ideological orientation, leadership and organization. Each one of them could be multiplied many times over, and indeed there are some extremely complex movements—such as e.g. the *Sarekat Islam*—that must await careful future analysis.

No attempt has, moreover, been made to describe and analyze the causes that underlay each of these movements; they were often complex and interconnected, but at times difficult to pinpoint in detail. No simple economic explanation was found to account for Saminism; furthermore, it started almost two decades before the Dutch Ethical Policy, with its many-faceted interference in village life, was introduced. Both the Burmese and the Vietnamese uprisings took place before the full impact of the world depression hit the Southeast Asian export economy. Overpopulation may have been a causative factor in Nghe An, perhaps to some extent in Luzon, but not in the other two examples. European plantation

enterprise must likewise be ruled out as a major social irritant: it only existed on a large scale in Nghe An, but in fact was there restricted to the upland regions, with a predominantly Thai labor force that remained totally unaffected by the rebellions in the valley.

The demands of modern governments, usually subsumable under the heading of increased taxes collected with increasing efficiency, the withholding of waste lands from village access, the imposition of government monopolies (such as the hated salt and alcohol monopolies in Vietnam)—these were some of the specific and burdensome innovations against which peasants apparently struck out. To these generic grievances we may sometimes add the overtones of class struggle, wherever there appeared local beneficiaries of the new colonial order, such as the *nouveaux riches* in Nghe An and perhaps also the more rapacious *caciques* in Luzon. Though the specific causes of unrest are by no means always clear, basically the peasantry seemed to rebel against changes introduced from the outside. What nowadays is so often glibly called the revolution of rising expectations may thus more accurately be termed a revolution of rising irritations—an age-old protest against outside interference, now recast in a new, colonial—and hence often foreign—setting.

But this, as was posited earlier in this paper, means that the direction of these rural movements and uprisings was essentially distinct from that of the great politics of the city. For one thing, because the peasants ultimately wanted to restore, or recreate, social balance, for another, because they did so in a local context. This is quite clear in the case of the Samin and Saya San, but it requires some brief comment in the Vietnamese and Philippine examples which are such interesting, and complex, incidents where outsiders had assumed leadership over the peasantry, and where the struggle was apparently fought under the aegis of modern, urban-derived ideologies. Unfortunately, our information on both the Vietnamese and the Philippine events is not adequate to show us how these ideologies were translated into terms meaningful to the rebelling peasants. The major question here is not necessarily how Communists e.g. manipulated their Marxism to make it compatible with indigenous beliefs stemming from both Great and Little Traditions.[22] We may in addition want to ask what specific

[22] On this intricate question Sarkisyanz, *Russland und der Messianismus* ...provides a great wealth of information and insight.

aspects of the new doctrines the Vietnamese peasantry may have usurped, so to speak, for its own purposes. It seems very likely that it still fought for its own, local interests, rather than for a brave, new Communist world. In the Philippine case, at least, we know from interrogations of surrendered peasants that "independence" to them meant the peasants' perennial paradise—the abolition of taxes, of the *cedula*, of indebtedness, in short, deliverance from the burdens of existence. A similar borrowing—if that be the right term for it—from Lutheranism seems to have occurred in the German Peasant War of the early 16th century, and other examples could be adduced from a wide variety of cultures at different periods.

It is, then possible to suggest that peasant movements deserve to be studied as a special category in Southeast Asian social history. Even with modern leadership and organization, they do not necessarily lose their identity, let alone being necessarily coterminous with anti-colonial, nationalist politics. The two streams could, and did, occasionally meet and coalesce, but they could as easily diverge again. For the attainment of independent nationhood could programmatically satisfy the urban nationalist without necessarily mitigating—indeed as often as not acerbating—the peasantry's revolution of rising irritations.

AN ESSAY ON THE POLITICAL FUNCTIONS OF CORRUPTION

JAMES C. SCOTT

Introduction

MOST DISCUSSIONS OF CORRUPTION IN DEVELOPING nations have generated vast quantities of heat and righteous indignation while shedding little light on the phenomenon itself. Observers from Western nations, often quite oblivious of their own recent history, have contributed more than their share to the resulting confusion and moralizing. Only recently have a handful of American and English economists and political scientists — profiting perhaps from their respective nations' long experience in this area — began to examine corruption in a more systematic, dispassionate, and comparative manner.[1]

In this new spirit an attempt is made here to examine in some detail the political functions of corruption. Before plunging in, however, we must have a working definition of corruption, a difficult task in view of the immense variety of entrepreneurial skill which has been devoted to its actual practice. Profiting from the definitional efforts of J.S. Nye, we may, with one caveat, subscribe to the statement that, "Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence." [2] The only problem with this definition is that with the meaning it attaches to the term, "private regarding," it seems to exclude illegal favors done without reward by public officials on behalf of, say, their ethnic or religious group. Perhaps the term "non-public" would be more appropriate here as it includes, within the definition, deviations which favor longer groupings. With this qualification, the term covers most of what is meant when people speak of corruption among public officials. It includes behavior ranging from a peasant's minute payment to the government hospital orderly so that he might be examined by the physician more quickly to a large firm's generous

[1] See for example, Nathaniel Leff, "Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption," *The American Behavioral Scientist* (November, 1964), pp. 8-14; J.S. Nye, "Corruption and Political Development, A Cost-Benefit Analysis," *The American Political Science Review* (June, 1967), pp. 417-427; Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simkins, *Corruption in Developing Countries* (London: Oxford U. Press, 1963); and Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949), pp. 71-81.

[2] J.S. Nye, *op. cit.*, p. 419.

contribution to a politician in return for his fiddling with the tax laws to its advantage. It includes not only favors done for cash, but illegal favors done for motives of loyalty or kinship.

About the actual causes of corruption we shall have very little to say except as they touch on its political function. But one point should be clear; while there may well be a greater incidence of *illegal* corrupt acts in the developing nations than in the West at a similar stage of economic development, there is no reason to suppose that the actual behavior we are referring to—forgetting for a moment its legal status—is any more widespread in the new nations than in the West at a comparable epoch. Judgments which imply otherwise are not simply cases of Westerners forgetting their own past and wagging their fingers at developing nations. The misunderstanding is usually more subtle and involves: a) a failure to compare legal systems at analogous periods and b) a failure to distinguish between the private and public sectors.[3]

1. The gap between the legal system and social practice: The development of the legal system in most Western nations was a more or less internal affair. At any given time, there were a host of governmental and non-governmental practices the legal standing of which had not yet been determined. In Great Britain, for example, before civil service reforms were instituted a tremendous number of sinecures—"officers without employment"—and pensions were distributed or sold by the crown. Although even contemporary observers called this corruption,[4] such patronage did not contravene any existing law until the Whigs found it to their political advantage to pass one.

The new nations, by contrast, have often adopted a system of laws and general orders which give expression to reforms which were the product of long political struggle in the West. Consequently, the Malaysian politician, for example, finds himself denied by much of the patronage which helped build strong political parties in England and the United States. Acts which were at one stage in Britain or the U.S. quite legal, or at least legally ambiguous, are now expressly forbidden by the laws and regulations of new nations. The behavior is the same in each case, but the legal status of the act has made corruption seem more widespread in developing areas.[5]

2. Private morality and public morality: It is quite obvious that, even today the standards of behavior for the public sector are more puri-

[3] See Wraith and Simkins, *op. cit.*, pp 12, 13.

[4] See John Wade, *The Black Book,* (1820) cited in J.F.C. Harrison, ed., *Society and Politics in England: 1780-1960* (New York: Harper, 1965), pp. 93-98.

[5] In fact, many new nations regulate public appointments in a more stringent manner than nations like the U.S. If a Nigerian were told about the political considerations involved in the appointments of postmasters in America he would undoubtedly call it corruption. The fact that it is now institutionalized, "legal" patronage and accepted practice would not change his view of it.

tanical than those of the private sector. The president of a business firm may appoint his inept son assistant vice president and, although he may regret the appointment from a financial point of view and be accused of bad taste, he is quite within the limits of the law. Similarly, if he lets an overpriced supply contract to a close friend, the market may punish him but not the law. Should a politician Smith or bureaucrat Smith feel inclined likewise, however, he is likely to find himself without office and perhaps the object of the State-vs-Smith criminal action.

Whether a given act takes place within the public or private sector thus makes all the difference in the world as to whether it is defined legally as corruption or not. Restraints in the one case are the responsibility of law enforcement agencies and, in the other, it is the discipline of the market which checks such behavior. The point here is simply that the larger the relative size and scope of the public sector, the greater is the proportion of certain acts which will be legally considered corrupt. And this is precisely the case in new nations where the role of the public sector is comparatively more important than it was in the West. Many of the acts which we are considering took place within the confines of the private sector in developed nations and therefore fell outside the formal definition of corruption. By contrast, the public sector's size in developing areas changes what were private concerns in the West into public concerns, making the incidence of corruption—legally defined—that much greater.

The restrictiveness of the legal system and the expansion of the public sector, then, turn what might otherwise be simply bad taste or stupidity into corruption. But we should keep in mind that the incidence of such behavior in the national community as a whole may well have been as high or higher in the West than in the new nations although its legal status is vastly different.[6]

II

Input Influence-vs-Output Influence

1. The Distortion of Formal Analysis

By now political scientists are well acquainted with a growing body of theoretical and empirical literature which examines the process by which

[6] One further distorting factor concerns the greater attention paid to corruption at the national level. In the West, although there are wide differences here, local and/or state governments were more powerful than they are in developing areas generally, and a great deal of the total "volume" of corruption took place at this level. By comparison then, the national governments in the West may have seem less corrupt than in the new nations since local units were an equally attractive source of plunder in the West.

interest groups influence legislation. The strategies of influence, the nature of the relationship between elected officials and pressure groups, and the independent effects of the legislative process itself are among the subjects in this area which have received considerable scrutiny. Using the common distinction between input and output functions, the studies referred to are concerned with a portion of the input functions of a political system.

In contrast to the well developed structures for interest articulation and aggregation found in industrialized Western nations, students who have attempted similar analyses in less developed nations have encountered slim pickings indeed. The picture which has emerged from such attempts most often emphasizes: 1) the lack of subjective civic competence which inhibits the expression of demands; 2) the weakness of interest structures which might organize and clarify previously inchoate interests; 3) and the relative absence of institutionalized forms through which political demands might be communicated to political decision-makers. In this context, the weakness of interest structures when coupled with the personalistic character of political loyalty allows national leaders to formulate policy free from many of the restraints imposed by party interest groups in the Western setting.[7]

Even given competitive elections, then, the very weakness of political interest structures means that demands originating outside elite circles will not have nearly the degree of influence on legislation which they do in more highly organized political systems As far as it goes, this seems to be an accurate analysis. It would be a grave mistake, however, to assume that because legislation is often drawn up in an atmosphere free from the organized pressure of interest groups, that therefore the public has little or no effect on the eventual "output" of government.

My point is simply that much of the interest articulation in the new states has been disregarded because Westerners, accustomed to their own polities, have been looking in the wrong place. A sizeable proportion of individual, and occasionally group, demands in less developed nations reach the political system, not before laws are passed, but rather at the enforcement stage. Influence before legislation is passed is generally called "pressure-group politics" and is the frequent object of examination by political scientists: influence at the enforcement stage is generally called "corruption" and has seldom been treated as the alternative means of interest articulation which it in fact constitutes.

2. Rational Impulses to Corruption

The peasants who avoid their land taxes by making a smaller and illegal payment which supplements the Assistant District Officers' disposable income, are as surely influencing policy outcomes as they would if they formed

[7] See Lucien W. Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 19, 26, 27.

a peasant union and agitated for the reduction of land taxes. In a similar fashion, businessmen who protect their black market sales by buying protection from civil servants are changing policy outcomes as effectively as they might by working as a pressure group through Chambers of Commerce for an end to government price controls. A strong case can be made as well that, within the context of certain political system, it may be more "rational" —and here we use the term "rational" in its economizing sense—to protect one's interests when laws are being implemented rather than when they are still being debated by politicians. Three examples of situations in which corruption may well conserve scarce resources are suggested below:

a. Where organizational skills are scarce and where, as a result, interest group associations are either weak or non-existent, the corruption of law enforcement may be a more economizing way to exert influence over policy outcomes. The divisive loyalties of peasants to their ethnic, village, religious or caste grouping creates enormous organizational barriers which all but preclude their induction into an association which would seek to advance their interests *qua* peasants. Given this situation, it is more rational for the individual peasant or for the peasants of one village, say, to influence the laws which disadvantage them by bribing local government officials.

b. Where legislative acts tend to be formalistic—where the administration of law is so loose and erratic that existing law has little relation to eventual governmental outputs, it may well be more rational to make demands known at the enforcement stage than at the legislative stage. Businessmen in a developing nation may realize that, although the government has passed what they consider to be an unfair tax law, their actual administration bears little or no resemblance to what is called for by the statutes. This may occur because enforcement personnel are unwilling or unable to follow its directives or because politicians do not allow them to. Under the circumstances, it may make more sense for each firm to "buy" precisely what it needs in terms of enforcement rather than financing a campaign to press for a new law that would be as formalistic as the present one.

c. Where a minority is discriminated against politically and regarded more as a "subject" than a "citizen" group by the general population, its members may well feel that pressure group action would destroy what little political credit they enjoy and thus turn to the corruption of enforcement officials to avoid damaging political attacks from more powerful groups. Throughout much of Southeast Asia and East Africa, a large proportion of commerce and industry is in the hands of groups which, even if they have managed to acquire local citizenship, are considered as aliens by large sections of the local population. It would be foolish, even suicidal in some cases, for these so-called "pariah" capitalists to seek influence openly as an organized pressure group. A healthy regard for their property and skin alike forces them as a

group to rely upon illegal payments to strategically placed bureaucrats if they are to safeguard their economic interests.

At least two of the conditions (a and c above) under which influence at the enforcement stage becomes "rational" are off-cited characteristics of the less developed nations.[8] We have already remarked on the relative absence of associational interest groups which might bring the demands of their constituency to bear on the legislative process. Quite by itself this deficiency in organization makes the resort to corruption a rational strategy for many. And in underdeveloped areas there are groups which are virtually denied access to the open political area whether for ethnic reasons (the Chinese in Southeast Asia) or for ideological reasons (the private business sector in nations where the political elite champions public sector enterprise) or both, who thus exert their influence via more informal routes or else forego the effort to shape policy altogether.

The reader will note, however, that the specified conditions under which it would be rational—other things equal—to seek influence at the enforcement stage have applied only to the seeker (buyer) of influence. The ultimate success of the transaction, of course, depends on the bureaucrat(s)or politician(s) in question. Provided that the civil servants' concern for the law or the nation at large does not impose restraints upon him,[9] we may say that the probability of him refusing, say a bribe, will be equal to the product of the probability of being punished times the severity of the penalty if punished.[10] Thus a severe penalty coupled with a very small probability of being caught and punished is roughly equivalent in its disincentive effects as a quite small penalty coupled to a high probability of being found out. Looking at things from the government side for a moment, then, there are three factors at work determining the probability of corruption (assuming the value of the reward to be constant):

1. The extent to which loyalty to the law, to the government, or to the nation has become a private value.
2. The probability of being caught.
3. The severity of the penalty if caught.

As regards the initial factor, the growth of concern for the national community, law, or to government policy *per se* is a slow process and, although such concern has begun to take root quite firmly in many new

[8] The remaining situation (b) where, because the laws are formalistic, influence at the enforcement stage would be more rational is fairly common among new nations, but not so general that one could call it "characteristic".

[9] The value of the "reward" for a corrupt act is the other factor here, but we are assuming, for the moment, a "constant" reward.

[10] Similar restraints are of course applicable to the case of the "buyer" of influence too, although we have thus far assumed the buyer to be a pure *homo economicus*.

nations, the leaders of these nations would be the first to concede that it has not yet rendered their civil establishments immune to corruption. The crucial importance of whether one's loyalties are engaged or not can be seen by the fact that corruption by the officials of clan associations among the Chinese in Southeast Asia or of tribal associations in Dakar or Kinshasa is rare in comparison with corruption among public servants in the same areas.[11] In the one case group loyalties are firmly engaged and in the other, group loyalties are less strongly at work. Given the predominance of familial and parochial loyalties in the less developed areas, restraints, for the short-run at least, are often more a function of the penalties involved and the likelihood of being apprehended. In most new nations the penalties are quite severe—involving at least the loss of a relatively secure, high-paying, high-status past and, at most, loss of life. The probability of being apprehended, however, although it varies considerably from nation to nation, is generally quite low. The disincentive effects of severe penalties are therefore largely vitiated by the small likelihood of prosecution.

Under the circumstances we have described—circumstances which apply to most developing nations—it is not only rational for individuals and groups to seek influence at the enforcement stage but it is also rational for governmental officials to admit such influence.

III

Corruption and the Process of Political Inclusion

In a piece that challenges many of the assumptions commonly held by students of *political development,* Samuel Huntington, proposes an alternative theory of *political decay.*[12] Briefly put, Huntington's argument is that the rapid social mobilization—urbanization, politicization, etc.—characteristic of new nations has placed an all but impossible burden on their new and frail political institutions and has led to the decline of political competition, political instability, national disintegration, corruption, and institutional decay. The new nations are, accordingly, "buying rapid social modernization at the price of political degeneration." [13]

I would like to suggest, however, that what we have called corruption represents an effort—albeit informal—of the political system to cope with

[11] See Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simkins, *Corruption in Developing Countries* (London: Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1963), p. 50.

[12] Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," in Claude E. Welch, Jr., ed., *Political Modernization: A Reader in Comparative Political Change,* pp. 207-241.

[13] *Ibid.*

a rate of social change which chokes the formal channels of political influence. Thus we can view corruption as an *index* of the disjunction between the social system and the formal political system; a subversive effort by the social system to bend the political system to its demands. In fact, the extent and variety of corruption in a new nation is a fairly accurate reflection of the failure of the formal political system to aggregate and meet the demands of important sectors of the society. Groups or individuals who seek influence through corruption have what they feel are essential interest which the open political system has failed to meet or perhaps even regards as illegitimate. In this way corruption supplements the capacity of a formal political system which is unable to process demands created by social mobilization.

The fact of corruption means that, while the formal political system may seem rigid and restrictive, the informal political system represented by corruption may add a substantial openness and flexibility to ultimate policy outputs. Political competitiveness may, if you will, enter unobtrusively through the back door. An empirical assessment of the interests represented by policy outputs would be quite inadequate if it stopped at the content of laws and failed to ask in what direction and to what extent corruption in fact altered the implementation of policy. The table below is an effort to distinguished between those groups which achieve access to political influence via the formal political system and those groups which, for a variety of reasons, must enter the competition at a more informal level.

Table I

Groups and Their Means of Access to the Political System in Less Developed Nations

Granted Access to Formal Political System	*Groups Resorting to Informal (Corrupt) Political System Because Denied Formal Access by virtue of:*		
	Ideological Reasons	*Parochial Reasons*	*Lack of Organization*
a. Political elites	a. Indigenous business groups	a. Minority ethnic or religious groups	a. Unorganized peasants
b. Party branches	b. Foreign business interests		b. Unorganized urban lower classes
c. Civil servant ass'ns	c. Political opposition		
d. Professional ass'ns			
e. Trade unions			

This categorization is rather sketchy and cannot do complete justice to any single developing nation but it is sufficiently descriptive of the situation in most to alert us to the variety of interests which make their surreptitious way through the political back door. Aside from those groups which are

blocked from formal participation by ideological reasons—and which are often well organized—the formal political system is *par excellance* the domain, the monopoly, of the modern social sector. The very nature of the formal political system places the unorganized and the minority communities at a tremendous disadvantage such that their interests are seldom represented in the content of legislation. This imbalance is, if not rectified, at least mitigated by the influence at the enforcement stage which constitutes virtually the only access to the political system afforded these groups. Thus corruption serves as an important corrective to the competitive advantage enjoyed by the modern sector in a formally modern political system.

Corruption as an Alternative to Violence

As we have indicated, the incidence of corruption in a developing nation is one indicator of a lack of integration in the formal political system. To the extent that corruption admits important interests which are blocked from formal participation, we may say that it seems as a deterrent to politically motivated violence.[14]

The political history of the West is rich in occasions where the timeliness of corruption allowed a new group to secure a measure of influence denied them by the formal political system and thereby diverted them from what might have become revolutionary pursuits into more mundane calculations of advantage. England may well owe the relatively peaceful inclusion of her bourgeoisie to the venality of her public officials while in France, on the other hand, the relative efficiency of the centralized bureaucracy under the monarchy left open only the revolutionary path to political power. Fattened by the West Indian trade, the British *nouveaux riches* were able to outbid rural landlords for seals in Parliament and to secure, by bribery, the conditions under which commerce might flourish. Urban and rural capitalists in France were less fortunate in this regard and resorted to a successful frontal assault on the system itself.[15]

In a similar vein, the corruption of the big city machines secured a measure of influence for the European immigrants who arrived in the United States in the late 9th and early 20th centuries. In return for their political support of the machine boss the newly arrived received patronage employment, favored treatment in court, and loans and welfare payments which were often quite outside the bounds of strict legality. Thus groups which might have otherwise become susceptible to more radical, not to say revo-

[14] Cf. Martin C. Needler, "The Political Development of Mexico," *American Political Science Review* (June, 1961), pp. 308-312.

[15] Nathaniel Leff, "Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption," *The American Behavioral Scientist* (November, 1964), pp. 8-14.

lutionary, doctrines were effectively domesticated and given a stake in the system.[16]

Much of what we have said about the West is true as well for underdeveloped areas: the villagers who have recently arrived in the cities of West Africa, the Chinese or Indian businessman in Southeast Asia, have all been attached, in greater or lesser degree, to the informal political system which attempts to meet their needs and demands. Corruption acts on these groups as essentially a conservative force which, by granting them influence over policy outputs, weds them more firmly to the political system and dilutes the impulse toward more radical solutions. In this limited sense, then, corruption is also a democratizing influence inasmuch as it allows for the participation of interest groups beyond what the formal political system alone can presently manage.

Referring again to Huntington's theory of political decay, it would perhaps be more accurate to look at corruption as a sort of half-way house between violence and constitutionality, a means by which some of the new demands produced by rapid social change are accommodated within a political system whose formal institutions are inadequate to the task. If the concept of political development includes the capacity of a political system to respond to new demands in such a way as to reduce the potential for violence, then corruption and political development are not at all incompatible. Viewing corruption from this angle, the following paradigm might represent an appropriate developmental sequence.

Table II

A Political System's Capacity for Integration Demands Over Time

Non-Integration	*Informal Integration*	*Formal Integration*
Violence — — — →	Corruption — — — — →	Constitutionality (*i.e.* institutionalization of demands)
e.g. Congo	Thailand	England/USSR

Any existing political system will, of course, exhibit all three tendencies and one must ask by what means the *preponderance* of political conflict is managed. Thus, within the United States, one can find violence where the demands of negroes are frustrated and corruption as the avenue by which

[16] For one group, and an important one, widespread corruption may well increase political alienation and the attractiveness of radical solution. The urban, Westernized, middle class have often incorporated current Western notions of governmental probity and are thus likely to view corruption as a symptom of the nation's moral turpitude. The same comment might apply to a lesser extent to the military officer corps.

illegal gambling and prostitution are represented,[17] but the preponderance of political demands are now processed at the formal, institutional level.

When violence becomes less common in a political system, corruption often becomes more common. The relationship is not simply fortuitious, but rather represents the substitution of bargaining for raw contests of strength. In this context, one might say that in England violence was beginning to give way to corruption around the period of the Glorious Revolution and that corruption became less prominent than institutional politics by the reform period of the 1830's. In the United States the apogee of violence represented by the Civil War—where fellow citizens slew one another on a scale not equalled before or since—gave way to corruption of similarly Texas style proportions through the 1880's and 90's well into the first portion of the 20th century.

It is important to understand that the conservative effects of corruption are a direct consequence of the fact that corruption places influence in the hands of individuals and groups which are most likely to be non-participants in the formal political system,[18] that is, corruption is conservative to the degree it is democratizing. In spite of the fact that corruption is often particularistic—dispensing favors to certain sections of the community more than others—and that when it is not particularistic it usually benefits wealth elites more than other groups, the question is historically not one of choosing between the formal political system and corruption. Either because of their lack of organization or their outright exclusion from formal influence by the dominant elites, the groups which acquire influence at the enforcement stage are exercizing the only means of influence open to them. Thus the choice is usually between no access or else limited, imperfect access which corruption at least provides.

Political Adjustment by Self-Interest

The question of loyalties sheds further light on the function of corruption. In most developing nations the loyalties of the great proportion of citizens are restricted largely to parochial groupings and to close kinsmen. In the absence of the wider loyalties which would facilitate both the growth of effective parties and a measure of consensus on national goals, a system of political influence which emphasizes narrow self-interest—and corruption

[17] As the growth of a nation's political institutions continues, much of the residual corruption represents the effort of business interests which are *per se* illegal such as gambling and prostitution in the U.S., to protect themselves from prosecution.

[18] One must, of course, assess the openness and effectiveness of the informal political system as well. Often some groups are excluded from both the formal *and* informal channels of influence, a problem we shall examine later.

does precisely this—may well succeed in producing a degree of cooperation that would otherwise not be possible.[19] The "man in the street" in Bangkok or Bogota cares a good deal less whether the actions of the politician or bureaucrat conform to standards of due process than whether the outcomes benefit him or not. What is suggested here is that the system of self-interest represented by corruption is perhaps the only viable basis of political adjustment during the early stages of political development when narrow loyalties predominate. Later, the growth of wider loyalties leads to an increase of participation in the formal political system and a consequent decline in the level of corruption.

Where the interests of one's family dwarfs wider loyalties[20] and where political and economic life are seen as a zero-sum game, then, the cement which binds a group together must come from the individual rewards each receives by virtue of his participation. Operating in such circumstances, political parties in new nations are generally not so suicidal as to assume a high degree of loyalty to the political system *per se* or to modern interest groups. If a competitive political party wishes either to maintain or enlarge its basis of support it will of necessity have to turn to those inducements which motivate a good portion of its cadre and those whose electoral support it hopes to attract. In this setting, the resort to particularistic rewards (including patronage, exemption from prosecution, contracts, and land grants) is quite understandable. Some of these rewards can be distributed quite legally (through the "pork barrel", for example, in the Philippines) but many must be obtained in a less formal manner. In the short run, competitive political parties are more likely to respond to the incentives which motivate their clientele than to alter the nature of those incentives. Thus, as long as the circumstances we have described persist, political competition will always be associated with a certain amount of corruption.

IV

Who Benefits Most?

A. Parochial-vs-Market Corruption

Determining which groups benefit from corruption is quite a complex task. One might begin by recognizing that most corruption involves the

[19] David Greenstone suggested this in his article, "Corruption and Self Interest in Kampala and Nairobi," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* (January, 1966), p. 208. "The crucial function of self interest in politics is to replace a mutual dedication to the goals of 'good government' with a mutual if more selfish loyalty to a system of specific material incentives. Some of the decline in political capacity is offset by a modified and politicized version of the invisible hand."

[20] . . . "Amoral Familism," to use Banfield's term. Cf., *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (Chicago: The Free Press, 1958).

trading of a resource like wealth of family connections for power; that is, it involves the "purchase" of an authoritative governmental decision by some individual or group not legally entitled to enter into such a transaction. Both the buyer and the seller benefit in this "black market government" [21] since the buyer pays something less than what he estimates the benefits of the decision to be for him, while the power-holder, as a monopolist, charges what the traffic will bear and at least enough to compensate himself for the risks he runs.

Aside from the power-holder, be he politician or bureaucrat, who always benefits as a necessary partner in the transaction, the nature of the beneficiary depends to a great extent on whether the power holder is motivated more strongly by parochial loyalties to kinsmen, friends, or ethnic group or whether he is more impersonal and market oriented. Both play a role—sometimes simultaneously when say a politician will only do favors for his ethnic group but nonetheless exacts from them what he can in terms of cash, goods, or services. To the extent that parochial considerations predominate, however, the beneficiaries will be those with "connections" such as kinship, friendship, ethnicity, etc. Where market considerations prevail, on the other hand, wealth elites will benefit more since they are in a position to make the most lucrative bids. The two by two table below illustrates the relationships we have just discussed.

Table III

Type of Corruption	*Major Benificiary*
1. "Parochial"	Individuals and groups with "connections"
2. "Market"	Individuals and groups with wealth

South Vietnam under Diem would tend to fall in the "parochial" category given the favoritism shown northern Catholics, the Philippines would approach the "market" variety of corruption, while Thailand would have to be termed a "mixed" system.

B. Political Competition and the Beneficiaries of Corruption

Two other important factors which determine who profits from corruption are the balance of political-vs-bureaucratic power within the polity and the degree to which politics is competitive in the electoral sense. The table directly below suggests how these variables affect the direction of benefits.

[21] A term borrowed from Robert O. Tilman's unpublished paper, "Administrative Corruption: An Interpretation".

Table IV

Level of Benefits from Corruption by Social Group and Type of Regime

	Recipients of Benefits of Corruption				
	e.g. Indiv. & Groups with Parochial Connections to Elite	*Wealth Elites*	*Bureaucrats*	*Party Leaders Cadre*	*Voters*
1. Bureaucracy Polity (non-traditional—Thailand)	x	X	X		
Type of Regime					
2. Party-dominated Polity non-competitive—Tunisia	x	x	x	X	
3. Party-dominated Polity competitive-Philippines	x	X	x	X	X
investment/consumption/ orientation	Uncertain	Investment	Uncertain	Uncertain	Consumption

* large X's indicate the probable major beneficiaries of corruption in each type of regime, while small x's indicate minor beneficiaries.

In the table we assume that realistically those persons and groups closely identified with members of the ruling elite will always profit to some extent from corruption. If corruption exists at all, it will be difficult to deny the persuasive claims of family and friends.

The probable patterning of rewards for each type of political system is explained at greater length below:

1. Where parties are either weak or non-existent and where the bureaucrats—perhaps in league with the military—dominate, it is clear that bureaucrats and wealth elites will be the chief recipients of corruption's fruits. This pattern is typical of Thailand where the reigning military/bureaucratic elite is relieved of electoral anxieties and where non-parochial corruption consequently centers largely around payments made by local and foreign business concerns to secure licenses, tax relief, government contracts, etc.

The bureaucracy-dominated polity and the sort of corruption which characterizes it are becoming, if anything, increasingly common as the decline of political parties coupled with restive officer corps and a strong central bureaucracy conspire to create them. New nations such as Pakistan, Indonesia, Ghana, Burma, Dahomey, and perhaps even Nigeria, to mention but a few, fall into this classification at present.

2. Non-competitive, party-dominated regimes often have a strong ideological cast and a program for national reconstruction which has led some analysts to refer to them as "movement" regimes. Although the durability of

such regimes is now rather questionable, Tunisia, Tanzania, Kenya and pre-coup Ghana, come to mind as examples of this system of government.

The need of such regimes to strengthen the party as the engine of economic and social change means that, to the extent corruption exists, a portion of its benefits will flow to party cadre and supporters.[22] Whereas for the bureaucratic regime only parochial considerations are likely to interfere with "market" corruption, for the "movement" regime, the need to build the party organization also becomes a factor in determining who gets what. Virtually, by definition, a larger portion of corruption in a non-competitive party-dominated system is processed by the party elite with the bureaucracy becoming, as it were, a junior partner.

In actual practice during the 20th century, "movement" regimes have generally been motivated by socialist preferences for the public sector. The greater their success in propagating this doctrine, the less likely it is that wealth elites in the private sector will profit from corruption.

3. Political systems dominated by competitive parties further widen the range of beneficiaries of corruption to include the voters themselves. When elections are hard fought, those who control votes possess a power resource as surely as those who control wealth and can thus bargain in the informal political system. The access of wealth elites to the fruits of corruption is as evident in this regime as in a bureaucratic one and perhaps even greater since parties and politicians must have bonds for campaign purposes. But unlike the bureaucratic regime where there is no particular reason for the power holder to disburse his proceeds, the politicians in a competitive political system have great incentives to distribute a portion of their gains in buying votes and/or doing illegal favors for those who control votes which may influence the outcome of elections. Thus the competitive party regime, although it may encourage a greater amount of corruption, includes voters and vote brokers within the range of beneficiaries simply because the electoral process places bargaining resources in their hands.[23]

The outstanding example of this system and the corruption which typifies it is the Philippines, while nations such as Ceylon, Malaysia, Uruguay, Chile, Columbia, and Venezuela are possible candidates for inclusion here too. In the Philippines, which boasts the world's highest *per capita* cost for electoral campaigns, businessmen have easy access to politicians, and, the powerful "sugar bloc" virtually provides salaries for a certain number of senators and congressmen who protect its interests. The very competitive-

[22] To the degree such regimes are successful in creating national loyalty they will most likely reduce the *overall* level of corruption, although the direction of benefits will remain as we have indicated.

[23] This is not to say that wealth elites or bureaucrats profit less *in an absolute sense* from corruption since the level of corruption could, hypothetically, be so much higher than in another system that both groups might have higher absolute gains.

ness of the system, however, means that politicians find it useful to buy votes or perform illegal favors for local influentials.

What occurs in the Philippines is quite comparable to what happened in England, particularly before legislation against rotten bouroughs, or in the immigrant choked cities of the U.S. Furthermore, one can already see in the Philippines the growth of institutionalized means to reward voters and the consequent decline of more particularistic, illegal rewards—a process already experienced in much of the West. Two mechanisms are notable in this respect: first, pork-barrel legislation which enables the politician to channel employment, goods, and services to his constituents and remain within the law; and second, a legal patronage system which allows the successful candidate in the ruling party to nominate a number of his supporters for positions in the executive branch.[24]

The transfer of rewards from the informal to the formal political system—from illegality to legality—in this fashion presupposes certain changes in the nature of the electorate. For one thing, many of the rewards of "pork-barrel" legislation include indivisible benefits such as schools and public works and thus require a measure of community identification since voters must see themselves sharing in the gains of the entire community.[25] A system of legal rewards, in addition, necessitates a higher level of trust between voters and new candidates because pork-barrel funds and legal patronage can only be distributed after the nominee has won election while under pre-election bribery, the voter is paid off before he casts his ballot. Inasmuch as the transformation from outright corruption to the institutionalized rewards we have described requires the growth of both wider loyalties and political trust, we would not be inaccurate to describe it as a step in political development.

V

Economic Growth and the Benificiaries of Corruption

The relative success or failure of a nation to achieve a high rate of economic growth depends on a host of factors beside corruption. The motivation of the ruling elite, the skills and resources at its disposal, and its capacity for carrying out agreed policies are more central to the question of capital formation than corruption. Nevertheless, corruption may have some independent influence on economic growth which merits examination.

[24] See Gregoria A. Francisco and Paul de Guzman, "The 50-50 Agreement: A Political Administrative Case," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration* (October, 1960), pp. 328-347. The institutionalized political appointment of local postmasters and the nomination of cadets to the armed forces academies are instances of the same process in the United States.

[25] The conditions of "amoral familism" in the Southern Italian town Banfield, (*op. cit.,*) describes would render the pork-barrel an ineffective means of winning voter support.

A. Non-Distortive Corruption

Here it is useful to distinguish between corruption which distorts formal government policy, as it generally does, and corruption which has no appreciable effect on policy. In the latter category we would include what might be called "payments for speed". Such "speed money" may either add economic growth or have no effect on it, but only rarely would such corruption have a negative influence on growth. The citizen who pays a small illegal fee to a government clerk to receive his radio license more quickly is probably having no influence on economic activity.[26] Government policy is not changed since the citizen would have received his license anyway after, say, a half hour wait. On the other hand, the business firm which bribes a civil servant to secure a license to begin operation without a lengthy wait has decided that the wait would cost it more than the "bakshish" or "dash" needed to avoid such a delay. Providing the firm's calculations are accurate in this respect, corruption here has a net beneficial effect on the rate of economic growth.

B. Distortive Corruption: The Private Sector

Most of what we call corruption, however, involves not merely a payment for speed but a real distortion of official government policy. The peasant who bribes to avoid his taxes and the businessman who receives an overpriced contract through a highly placed relative are both changing government policy: the peasant escapes his legal tax obligation and the entrepreneur secures a contract he would not otherwise be granted.

If we are interested in economic growth this "distortive" type of corruption impels us to ask whether the policy which results from such corruption is more likely to contribute to economic growth than the original governmental policy which is being distorted. Here again the distinction between "parochial" and "market" corruption is central. In the case of parochial corruption, only an examination of the marginal propensity to save of groups with "connections" will begin to reveal whether this distortion will promote economic growth more than formal government policy. There is some evidence, however, that "market" corruption, inasmuch as it benefits wealth elites, is likely to have a greater multiplier effect than the formal economic policy of most new nations.

The case for market corruption can be made persuasively for Southeast Asia. The nations which have made the most economic progress to date are the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia while Burma and Indonesia have

[26] The act, however, increases the clerk's income and decreases the citizen's by an equal amount and if there is a difference in their marginal propensity to save, this may have some effect on economic growth.

hardly reached pre-war standards of real *per capita* income.[27] Although it is risky to generalize from only five cases, we would suggest that the size of the private sector is significant here. Both pre-coup Indonesia and Burma have opted for a largely state-run economy while Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines have imposed fewer restraints on the private sector. What few restrictions there are on private sector activity in the three more successful nations have been partly vitiated by corruption—the Philippines and Thailand would rank fairly high on anyone's scale of corruption—while ever widespread corruption in Burma and Indonesia failed to protect the private sector from state control or operation. In spite of the best intentions and a declared policy of economic growth, the state-run economies have performed significantly less well than those where the private sector predominates. Indications are that Southeast Asia is not an exception in this respect.[28]

If this analysis is correct, it follows that, other things being equal corruption which secures greater freedom of operation for the private sector will generally promote economic growth. The impetus to such corruption would, of course, be less if government policy imposed fewer restrictions on the private sector. But since we are speaking of the real world where most new nations are inclined to severely circumscribe or eliminate the private sector, "market" corruption may well enhance the possibilities for economic growth.

C. Effects of Political Competition on Corruption and Growth

Leaving aside for the moment the question of how effectively government policy promotes economic growth, one can distinguish between the groups which profits from corruption in terms of their marginal propensity to save. To the extent that corruption places power or money at the disposal of groups with a high marginal propensity to save it will clearly contribute more to economic growth than if it benefits groups with low marginal propensities to save (MPS). Using the list of groups in Table IV we can make but a few provisional judgments on this nature.

[27] Dee Douglas S. Paauw, "Economic Progress in Southeast Asia," *Journal of Asian Studies* (November, 1963), pp. 69-91. We have omitted the Indo-Chinese states from consideration here for obvious reasons.

[28] One might compare the performance of Ghana or Guinea (state-run economies), to that of the Ivory Coast, for example. Albert O. Hirschman has argued too, that the concern for balanced growth and the creation of the economic infrastructure, both of which require greater government intervention, are perhaps less conducive to growth than orthodox theorists would suppose. Our generalization is meant to apply to non-communist state-run economies. How much better, however, is the subject of some dispute.

Table V

Recipient Groups

	Individual and Groups with Parochial Connections to Elite	*Wealth Elites*	*Bureaucratic Elites*	*Pol. Leaders & Pol. Cadre*	*Voters*
MPS Estimate	uncertain	high	uncertain	uncertain	low

For those with parochial ties to the elite, bureaucrats, and politicians we cannot estimate *a priori* their MPS. It will vary greatly from country to country. In Malaysia one might suspect that bureaucrats have a higher MPS than politicians, and politicians a higher MPS than groups with parochial connections to the elite. Even if this is accurate, the order could well be reversed in other national settings. For voters and wealth elites, however, one can say with some confidence that the MPS of voters is relatively low and that of wealth elites relatively high. Thus, if we were concerned exclusively with economic growth, corruption which benefited wealth elites more than voters would be of greater benefit than corruption which favored voters. The fact that competitive political systems are more likely to include voters among the beneficiaries of corruption implies that corruption here is less favorable to growth—other things equal—than corruption in a non-competitive political system where voters are not among the beneficiaries. Under conditions of political competition the gains of voters from corruption will probably spread the wealth more evenly—an egalitarian income effect—but may well have less salutary growth effects since voters are more likely to consume than to save their gains. Corruption in a non-competitive system, on the other hand, does not have this levelling effect but may well contribute more to economic growth by favoring groups with a higher MPS. This is not to say that corruption amidst political competition necessarily retards economic growth but rather that it is not as likely to assist economic growth as much as corruption in a non-competitive setting.[29]

D. Qualifications

The proposition that "market" corruption which benefits wealth elites will contribute to economic growth is, alas, subject to a few other qualification which bear enumeration.

1. Not all of those who argue for the possible benefits of certain kinds of corruption in certain circumstances realize that, if carried too far, corruption is apt to be counter productive. There are at least two reasons for this.[30]

[29] Corruption in a competitive political system may marginally assist growth by subverting the bias of the electorate for present consumption and welfare.

[30] Leff, *op. cit.*, is an example of an analysis which errs, unlike traditional discussions, in its virtually unqualified praise for "market" corruption as a path to economic growth.

First, most forms of corruption, in fact, constitute a tax on economic activity. The payments for a license to do business, a construction permit, etc., are part of the costs of doing business to the merchant or entrepreneur. When such costs are relatively modest they are more than outweighed by the bureaucratic obstacles which they overcome and the incentive which they may provide for efficient operation. At some level, however, corruption may become so costly that many businesses which could otherwise operate at a profit become marginal or clearly unprofitable. One might imagine that politicians and bureaucrats would realize the point at which they are killing the goose which lays their golden eggs—and while the Philippines seem to appreciate these limits, it appears that in Indonesia, quite apart from the policy of nationalization, the race for spoils becomes so wild that many potentially profitable enterprises were either not begun or were actually forced to close down. In such circumstances, many Indonesians preferred to deposit their holdings in foreign banks.

The level of corruption leads us to a second, and related, problem of uncertainty. Many of the bribes paid to bureaucrats and politicians by businessmen were in effect efforts to reduce somewhat the high risk factor which surrounds investment decisions in underdeveloped areas. In this context businessmen would prefer a predictable system of corruption which assures them of the service or decision for which they are paying and sets known limits on the costs they will have to bear. A strong, cohesive party often creates these conditions of certainty by acting as a central clearing house for corruption of this kind. But when uncertainty prevails, when the payment for a decision offers little assurance that it will actually be carried out or if the full cost of a needed decision cannot be known, the businessman may prefer to remain "liquid" rather than running risks of such magnitude. Thus, the greater the extent of corruption (the costliness of a decision) or the greater the uncertainties involved (the risk factor) the less likely that corruption by wealth elites will have a postive effect on economic growth.

2. Until now we have assumed that most of the corrupt transactions between businessmen and bureaucrats or politicians expand the freedom of the private sector to respond to market forces. Some transactions, however, may actually restrict or distort market forces and have negative effects on economic growth. For example, a firm may secure a contract to supply materials to the government by bribing selected officials who are then unable to complain when he delivers materials well below contract standards or fails to observe other terms of the agreement. Similarly, an import or export enterprise might pay politicians or bureaucrats to enact laws or regulations which will give it a monopoly in a certain area or place obstacles in the path of its competitors. In such cases, corruption has the effect of inhibiting normal competitive pressures which serve to encourage more effi-

cient operation. Economic growth is more likely to be retarded than accelerated when corruption follows this pattern.

E. Corruption and Growth

Throughout this discussion we have suggested a number of conditions under which corruption may actually promote the process of economic growth. For the sake of convenience, most of these propositions are stated more succinctly below.

Corruption is more likely to have a positive influence on economic growth when:

1. National rulers are either uninterested or hostile to economic growth.
2. The government lacks the skills, capacity, or resources to effectively promote economic growth.

and when:

3. Corruption is "market" corruption where all "buyers" of influence have equal access to bureaucrats and politicians. (The assumption here is that if parochial considerations are weak, only the ability to pay will count and efficient producers will gain an advantage).
4. Corruption benefits groups with a high marginal propensity to save (*e.g.* wealth elites) more than groups with a low marginal propensity to save (voters)[31]
   — this situation is, in turn, more likely in a non-competitive political system than in a competitive one where votes can be traded for influence.
5. The cost of a unit of influence is not so high as to discourage otherwise profitable undertakings.
   — this situation is more likely when there is price competition among politicians and bureaucrats who sell influence.
6. There is greater certainty as to the price of a unit of influence and a high probability of receiving the paid-for "decision".
   — this is more likely when:
      a. The political and bureaucratic elites are strong *and* cohesive
      b. Corruption has become "regularized"—even institutionalized after a fashion—by long practice.
7. Corruption serves to increase competition in the private sector rather than to secure a special advantage or monopolistic position for any one competitor.

[31] For this reason Nye (*op. cit.*, pp. 424-425) feels corruption among the upper levels of the elite is more likely to be beneficial for economic development than corruption at lower levels.

This listing is, of course, far from complete although it does represent many of the major considerations involved in determining whether corruption will have a net positive or negative effect on economic growth. The greater the number of these enumerated conditions which a system of corruption satisfies, the greater the likelihood that corruption will contribute to economic growth.

VI

Conclusion

The preconditions for corruption are the existence of a government monopoly over goods, services, or posts and a level of demand for these benefits which outstrips available supply.[32] When the value of the scarce benefit is driven up by demand pressure to a level that exceeds the price the government has set (in many cases the government price is zero), offers to purchase it illegally are likely to occur. One writer has approximately called corruption a form of "black market bureaucracy".[33]

Since much corruption thus represents the penetration of the free market into areas where it is legally forbidden it becomes important to ask how "perfect" the bureaucratic and political "black market" is. A "perfect" market, among other things, responds only to cash and not to voting strength or kinship ties, its prices are determined solely by the interaction of demand and supply, and information as to product and price are available to all.

To the extent that this black market approaches "perfection" in this sense, it will be more likely to contribute to economic growth. A good many of the conditions we enumerated in the previous section reflect the fact that the freer the corruption market is, the higher the probability that wealth elites with their high marginal propensity to save will dominate the market. As beneficial as this might be for economic growth, chances are that it will restrict the equally important process of political inclusion or integration.

What we are suggesting is that, when it comes to corruption, political integration and economic growth may work against each other. The kind of corruption which most accelerates economic growth favors wealth elites and largely excludes voters and those with parochial ties to the elite from the market. Pure market corruption, then, may wed the wealth elite to the regime while excluding voters and "parochials". On the other hand, corruption which distributes the fruits of corruption not only to wealth elites but also to voters and "parochials" is surely more beneficial for political

[32] This excludes, for the moment, corruption which involves avoiding the enforcement of laws (*e.g.* tax laws, criminal laws) by a lesser "payment" to enforcement officials.

[33] Robert O. Tilman, "Administrative Corruption: An Interpretation," Unpublished paper, p. 7.

inclusion but is, at the same time, likely to spread rewards among consumers who are less apt to use these rewards as productively as investors. Which variety of corruption is considered "better" therefore depends whether economic development or political integration is deemed to be the most crucial systemic problem. The Congo, one might say, would be better off with corruption which maximizes political integration while Tunisia or the Philippines might be better off with corruption that maximizes economic growth.

Regardless of the potential economic benefits of market corruption, there are important objections to such corruption which relate to the adequacy of the price system in allocating values. Market corruption suffers from all the recognized shortcomings of any free market pricing system. First, claims in the market must be backed with money and distribution is therefore highly unequal. Such goods and services as education, health care, etc., for example, are subject to government intervention because the distribution which would result from the price system is considered by almost all as unsatisfactory.[34] Secondly, the price system often involves third party damages or costs which are not a part of the market's calculations. Examples such as pollution or the depletion of natural resources come to mind where the community attempts collectively to restrict the price system so as to protect third party interests. Market allocation may finally result in the private control of functions which the community has decided to collectively allocate. Private control over courts or military units, for example, are results of market penetration into government services which could impose tremendous costs on the community at large. The importance of such considerations as these may be great enough to warrant centralized decisions rather than market decisions (in this case corruption) whether or not the political system is democratic and whether or not corruption might promote economic growth.

In concluding, it is well to remember that the fundamental objection to corruption is that it always assigns greater importance to wealth and/or "connections" than to votes. This is presumably the democratic response to corruption in public life. If as in many developing nations, however, the political system is closed or oligarchic, the democratic objection to corruption becomes less valid since corruption may, in such instances, serve as an informal democratizing force.

[34] This and succeeding points are taken from Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare* (New York: Harper, 1953), pp. 387-391.

ON THE CHANGING ANGLO-SAXON IMAGE OF BURMA

EMANUEL SARKISYANZ

THE RENAISSANCE DEPARTURE FROM THE ROME-CENTRIC outlook of the Middle Ages opened West European minds to appreciation of exotic cultures and societies. By sixteenth century standards of sea-faring nations, the Asia which they discovered did not seem backward but advanced—even when the main purpose of observation and description was commercial prospecting. The earliest English traveller's report about Burma—the narrative of Fitch [1]—repeats the appreciation (probably, even the overestimation) for coastal Burma's capital, Pegu, found in earlier Italian and Portuguese reports about that maritime center.

It was not before the coming of the Industrial Revolution and the emergence of unmistakable superiority of British power, that the observers' own standards permitted the consideration of countries like Burma as backward and benighted. What is probably the last positive evaluation of the Burmese Empire by a British observer—the original Embassy Report of Symes —was written in 1795. But even in the early 1820's, the independent British merchant, Gouger, found it worth noticing that Burma's literacy rate was higher than that of Britain at that time.[2] Having been discouraged from trading in India because of the British East India Company's monopoly, he was pleased by the reception that he and his merchandise found at the Burmese Court. The British declaration of war on Burma in 1824, surprised this lone Englishman; it reduced him to the status of an "Interned Alien" in a Burmese prison, under almost subhuman conditions—the tropical counterpart of British prison situations of the time of Dickens. It was less the horrible experience that disappointed Gouger than did the loss of his private Burma market, a loss resulting precisely from the British victories in the war of 1824-1826. The Burmans appear as arrogant opponents and savage but brave—sometimes desperate—warriors in such British narratives as that of Snodgrass.[3]

The first Anglo-Burmese War cost the British East India Company more casualties than most of the Indian wars. Perhaps, its best known victim was the Baptist missionary, Adoniram Judson, of Sunday School fame. In 1812, he had come to Burma to preach the gospel of evangelical revivalism. Judson found the Burmese and their Court rather a tolerant but indifferent audience. The British declaration of war against Burma, however, made a martyr of this American missionary. Not understanding too well the difference between

[1] Ralph Fitch, "The Voyage of Mr. Ralph Fitch Merchant of London, to Ormuz and So to Goa in the East Indies, 1583 to 1591," in *Pinkerton's Voyages*, IX (London, 1811).

[2] Michael Symes, *An Account of An Embassy to the Kingdom of Ava* (London, 1809); Henry Gouger, *Personal Narratives of Two Years' Imprisonment in Burmah* (London, 1860).

[3] *J. J. Snodgrass, Narrative of the Burmese War* (London, 1827).

British and American speakers of English and knowing only that Judson had read about the impending British invasion without warning his host (the Burmese king) as well as learning that he had received remittances through a British merchant, the Burmese government mistook him for a spy. Judson suffered the horrors of imprisonment equal to those of Gouger. However, he was spared the fate of those taken, or mistaken for, spies during war time in modern countries. Yet, Judson was known to consider war as the best (if not the only) means to bring the blessings of Christianity and Civilization to benighted Burma whose capital he called the throne of the Prince of Darkness.[4] Yet, Burma studies are still indebted to Judson, (who acquired an enviable mastery of literary Burmese) for his Burmese-English Dictionary. Many of his missionary successors did not reach his intellectual caliber but have outdone him instead in zeal, a zest that made no fetish out of empathy or even tolerance. Thus, still at the beginning of our century, the Baptist missionary, Cochrane, gathered as "fruitage of fifteen years of war among the Burmese" that "the natives are so sodden in vice; so dull of head and slow of heart to understand and believe."[5] To such particular ministers of the Gospel, Buddhist monks as well as sculptors of Buddha statues appeared to be "emissaries of Satan" or else as the "Blight of Asia," who were "seemingly equal in intelligence to their graven images." With such particular standards, the message of Buddhism came to be described as "eternal death" and the state of the Buddhists as "utter darkness."

Comparably more understanding and tolerance for the Burmese was shown by some learned Catholic missionaries. The most remarkable of them was the Italian Sangermano, who lived in the country shortly before Judson, and left the most valuable Western account of early 19th century Burma.[6] In this tradition, the Catholic bishop Bigandet published, in the 1860's, an account of Buddhism as practised in Burma.[7] Its evaluation of the Buddhist monkhood, though by no means uncritical, is of high objectivity. Without departing from his dogmatic position, the author remained fair in his value judgments. To the same generation of scholarly observers of the Burmese scene, belonged the German ethnologist Adolf Bastian. While travelling in upper Burma during the 1850's, he was called by king Mindon to his court and was given, by royal command, instruction in the Burmese language—being expected, in return, to instruct the Burmese court physicians in modern medicine. Bastian had digests made from the Burmese Chronicle. Though his history is outdated, his communications from Mon sources retain some value, so do his direct observations of Burmese life. As an observer, this pioneer of German ethnology was in a position to throw light on the remarkable personality of Burma's penultimate king Mindon, with whom he debated about the ethics of self-defense. Though Anglo-Saxon historians of Burma usually

[4] Adoniram Judson, Letter of November 7, 1816 in F. Wayland, *The Memoir of the Life and Labor of Rev. Adoniram Judson* (Boston, 1853), I, 183.

[5] H. E. Cochrane, *Among the Burmans: A Record of Fifteen Years of Work and Fruitage* (New York, 1904), 157.

[6] Father Vincentius Sangermano, *A Description of the Burmese Empire* (Rome, 1833).

[7] *P. A. Bigandet, The Life or Legend of Gaudama the Buddha of the Burmese* (2 vols; Rangoon, 1866; London, 1880).

ignore Bastian, his accounts remain one of the main contemporary testimonies about Mindon's Burma.[8]

King Mindon, one of Burma's exemplary Buddhist rulers, was visited and characterized in a scholarly way by the British Colonel Yule, who accompanied the Embassy of British India's Governor-General to the Burmese court in 1855, under Phayre. Yule's *Mission to the Court of Ava*,[9] has been called the finest single British contribution to Burmese studies. However, Yule's reading was confined to European sources. In contrast, Phayre—Chief Commissioner of British Burma from 1862 to 1867—was an outstanding Burmese scholar, with an outlook high above the self-satisfied ethnocentrism of his contemporaries. Phayre's *History of Burma* (1883)[10] is mainly a political and military narrative and a record of violence, based on the Burmese royal chronicle which king Mindon gave the historical writer. Phayre's reconstruction of Arakanese chronology is still accepted. His image of Burmese history as a struggle of princes and peoples, with scant consideration for cultural and social dimensions, dominates Anglo-Saxon writing to the present. However, his standards have hardly been reached by subsequent British soldier-administrators, officials and merchants, who wrote about Burma as participants or apologists of the colonial establishment—an establishment about which Phayre had preferred not to write.

In contrast, Commissioner Crosthwaite thus described his achievements in suppressing Burmese resistance to the British Conquest:

> Weight was to be given to the *fait accompli* and to considerations of expediency rather than to those of abstract right or justice... . Unless men belonging to the village who were now dacoiting [resisting] surrendered within a fixed time, all their relations and sympathizers would be... removed to some distant place... . Many surrendered in order to save their people from being removed... .[11]

The bloodshed involved in the final British Conquest is merely glossed over in such British memoirs as White's "Civil Servant in Burma."[12] It largely consists of anecdotal episodes of inter-British colonial life. In spite of occasional glimpses of Burmese individuals, the Burmese people remain discreetly in the background—a kind of stage screen for accounts about routine activities of colonials. This is typical of the way the vast majority of the British living in Burma describe their experience in that country.

An exception to this pattern and, outstanding among the few British accounts of Burma, are the works of Scott. Against the background of rich military and administrative experience, he compiled much factual information in the *Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States*. The most important of Scott's numerous writings is *The Burman, His Life and Notions*, which appeared under the pseudonym of Shway Yoe and has been republished in many

[8] Adolf Bastian, "Reisen in Birma in den Jahren 1861-1862," *Die Volker des ostlichen Asien*, II (Leipzig, 1866).
[9] Sir Henry Yule, *A Narrative of the Mission to the Court of Ava* (London, 1855).
[10] Sir Arthur P. Phayre, *History of Burma... and Arakan* (London, 1883).
[11] Charles Crosthwaite, *Pacification of Burma* (London, 1912).
[12] H. T. White, *A Civil Servant in Burma* (London, 1913).

editions.[13] Remaining a classic of descriptive cultural anthropology from a time before there was such a discipline, it conveys a rich pageant of Burmese customs and beliefs on the eve of acculturation, following the British conquest. Shway Yoe presented his *Burman, His Life and Notions* with charming but unmistakable traits of childishness, primitivity and immaturity. Therefore, his work is considered, in present-day nationalistic Burma, as one not free of colonial bias.

The following generation of British readers of a traveller's account, romantically entitled *Peacocks and Pagoda,* already accepted being told that

> the average Englishman or American is slow to realize that an outlook different from his own is even possible; to bring him to see life through oriental eyes, though ever so dimly, is an achievement which fully justifies a certain amount of exaggeration.[14]

Such exaggerations may have been conveyed by Fielding-Hall, one of the most widely read British authors on Burma. This *fin de siecle* era was, in European intellectual life, a time of disappointment in Modern Civilization, Progress and Historical Christianity, a time when Europe developed self-doubts about her civilization and mission. Marxism, rationalist agnosticism (if not atheism) and Nietzschean attitudes, were challenging middle-class respectability and the liberal and missionary values by which Victorian empire building had been justifying itself. Rationalistic critique of the historical Christianity of the Churches affected Fielding-Hall, a colonial official serving in British Burma after its aggressive Pacification, a Burma whose Buddhism enchanted him. With emphatic sensitivity of the romantic, Fielding-Hall described the personality of the Burmese people in his book, *The Soul of a People,* the influence of which—on the reawakening of Burmese national consciousness—was not unlike that of the German romantic Herder's (1744-1803) cultural and political activization of Slavic nations in the nineteenth century:

> What was Buddhism doing? What help did it give to its believers in their extremity? It gave none. Think of a peasant lying there in the ghostly dim-lit fields waiting to attack us at the dawn. Where was his help? He thought, perhaps, of his king deported, his village invaded, his friends killed, himself reduced to the subject of a far-off queen. He would fight—yes, even though his faith told him not. There was no help there. His was no faith to strengthen his arm, to strengthen his aim, to be his shield in the hour of danger.
>
> If he died, if in the strife of the morning's fight he were to be killed, if a bullet were to still his heart, or a lance to pierce his chest, there was no hope for him of the glory of heaven. No, but every fear of hell, for he was sinning against the laws of righteousness— 'Thou shalt take no life.' There is no exception to that at all, not even for a patriot fighting for his country.
>
> And so the Burmese peasant had to fight his own fight in 1885 alone. His king was gone, his government broken up, he had no leaders. He had no god to stand beside him when he fired at the foreign invaders and when he lay a-dying with a bullet in his throat he had no one to open to him the gates of heaven.[15]

[13] Yoe Shway, *The Burman, His Life and Notions* (London, 1910); J. G. Scott, *Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States* (5 vols.; Rangoon, 1900).
[14] Paul Edmonds, *Peacocks and Pagoda* (London, 1924), 3-4.
[15] H. Fielding-Hall, *The Soul of a People* (London, 1903).

A poet's sensitivity and romantic empathy, enriched by unique scholarly knowledge, inspired the life work of Gordon Luce. Having originally come to Burma as a lecturer in English literature, he became captivated by the atmosphere of the Burmese Middle Ages and soon commanded the scholarly tools for penetration into the country's past, the literary and old Burmese, the Mon, Pali, and Chinese plus numerous tribal languages, and particularly the epigraphy made accessible through the activities of British Burma's Archaeological Department. It is due to Gordon Luce that medieval Burma of the Papan dynasty (1044-1287), previously treated by some colonial amateur antiquarians, has been opened to historical scholarship. His is the greatest single contribution that any Westerner has ever made to the knowledge of Burma. We owe a great majority of the research monographs on the history, sociology, economics, religion, anthropology, architecture and literature of old Burma to Gordon Luce—frequently cooperating with his Burmese brother-in-law, the Pali scholar, Pe Maung Tin. An example of their cooperation is a translation from the Mon inscription of king Alungsitthu (1131 A.D.):

> But I would build a causeway sheer athwart
> the river of Samsara, and all folk would speed
> Across until they reach the Blessed City.
> I myself would cross
> And drag the drowning over...
> Ay, myself tamed, I would tame the wilful;
> Comforted, comfort the timid;
> Wakened, wake the asleep;
> Cool, cool the burning;
> Freed, set free the bound;
> Tranquil and led by the good doctrines
> I would hatred calm.
> ... As the best of men,
> Forsaking worldly fame and worthless wealth,
> Fled, for he saw their meaning...
> So would I
> All worldly wealth forsaking draw me near
> Religion, and the threefold course ensue.
> ... Beholding man's distress I would put forth
> My energies and save men, spirits, worlds, from
> Seas of endless change.

Gordon Luce has thus formulated the feeling conveyed by monuments of Pagan:

> Though Alaungsithu's Cave is decked
> with prayer more sweet than lotus-scroll
> Though Damayan's great glooms reflect
> The terror of Narathu's soul.[16]
>
> This face a thousand thousand spires
> Called up along the plain and still
> With leaf of flaming gold it fires
> The crest of every tangled hill.

[16] The parricide Narathu (reigning 1167-1170) built the Damayan Pagoda.

Close-huddled fold and kings who dared
In myriad temples, mile on mile,
To soar beyond Samsara, spared

No palace room, no civil pile;
Impersonal, unseen, the fire
of life, whose tinder all things are,
Mid smoking jungle lifts its spire,
Where mind and matter writhe and jar.[17]

If Gordon Luce has opened Medieval Burma to historical scholarship, the novelist Maurice Collis has popularized Burmese historical and legendary themes among readers of fiction. Continuing a tradition which saw in the East a land of mystery and romance, Collis has reached a considerable audience which otherwise would have had no notion about Burma's past. His Burmese experience started in the field of law: Collis served as a magistrate in British Burma. But British colonial opinion forced him to resign because he had given an English driver, guilty of causing the death of a native in a traffic accident, the same sentence as had been received by a native motorist who had unintentionally caused fatal injury to a British pedestrian.

Burmese inequity, cruelty and arrogance, constitute a recurring refrain in Harvey's *History of Burma* which tends to be a subtle and indirect apology for the British conquerors of such a barbarous country: Burmese medieval *practices* are measured by the standards of Victorian *ethical theory* rather than by the practices of Henry VIII and other Tudors. Such bias is exemplified by Harvey's acceptance of a fantastic Portuguese report about a seventeenth century king of Arakan, sacrificing 6,000 human hearts, because some native gentlemen, of this author's acquaintance, told him that "the sacrifice is true to type, although they do not cite other instances..."[18] However, Harvey, who had a rich experience in Burma's colonial administration, did use as sources, not only the standard chronicles of the Burmese kings, but also a number of unpublished local chronicles in Burmese and Mon languages. He did have a command of literary Burmese which subsequent British and American experts did not take the trouble to acquire.

Professor D. G. E. Hall—the principal mid-twentieth century British authority on Burmese history—used for his primary research contributions not sources in the Burmese language but English and Dutch archival materials. His main contributions to knowledge deal with activities of the mercantilistic Dutch and British East India companies in Burma as well as with internal colonial policy correspondence between the British administrators themselves. In his short history of Burma,[19] 80 pages are devoted to 120 years of British and Burmese relationships and British rule over Burma. And 1,200 years of pre-British Burmese history are dealt with in almost the same space: 96 pages. His image of Burmese history is clearly Anglo-centric. In his book, *Europe*

[17] Gordon Luce and Pe Maung Tin, "Shwegugyi Pagoda Inscription"; Luce, "Greater Temples of Pagan," In *Burma Research Society, Fiftieth Anniversary Publications*, No. 2 (Rangoon, 1960), 382, 383, 176-178.

[18] G. E. Harvey, *History of Burma* (London, 1925).

[19] D. G. E. Hall, *Burma* (New York: Hutchinson's University Library, British Empire History Series, 1950).

and Burma,[20] published in 1945—on the eve of the liquidation of the British Empire—the Burmese chroniclers are compared to the propagandists of Dr. Goebbels: the Burmese chronicle is alleged to have explained the cessions of territory to the English (in 1826), not through military defeats, but through the Burmese king's compassion and generosity. The fact that there is no such passage in Burmese chronicles has been discovered only after this alleged "quotation" had served generations of Anglo-Saxon historians of Burma[21] for the debunking of a people which had resisted the Empire—without their having noticed that *if* such a passage had existed, it would have been an expression of the Buddhist ethos of an ideal ruler.

The religious and aesthetic dimensions of Burmese culture, as well as primary research in Burmese history, have been cultivated mainly through the Burma Research Society (founded in 1910). In its Journal have appeared most scholarly contributions to Burmese studies, including the pioneering writings of Gordon Luce and some of the monographs of John Furnivall who is the most learned of the Burma experts in the field of agrarian economy.

Furnivall had served in Burma under the Indian Civil Service up to the rank of District Commissioner. His outstanding contributions rest on his authoritative knowledge of Burmese agrarian problems. He had decisive influence on the introduction of socialistic—particularly Fabian—literature into post-Depression Burma. Although Furnivall's writings comprise topics like Burmese literature, folklore and religion, his outlook was that of an economist and, particularly, of an administrator who experienced and described the socially destructive impact of colonial relationships on Burmese society.[22] Yet, Furnivall's frame of reference was determined and limited by English utilitarian values. This socialist has felt that "the majority would not know what it would be voting for" and wanted the franchise to be restricted. For Burma, Furnivall desired the kind of regime that would "not give to the people what they want... but what they need."[23] He had little interest or appreciation for the Buddhist values of Burmese culture. Folk Buddhism was for him associated with "some religious fanatic's absurd propaganda." [24]

Similar attitudes of American Burma experts, like John Cady, seem to have been determined by a Baptist missionary background. The tradition of Baptist missionary education, as represented by the Judson College of Rangoon, cannot easily grant the existence of a living Buddhist source of Burmese cultural traditions as alternative to Protestant utilitarian values. But it does concede to its community and, by extension, to Burma the right to political independence. In John Cady's *History of Modern Burma,*[25] the author departs from earlier patterns of contrasting the achievements of British colonial rules with the cruelties and backwardness of pre-British Burma. He puts the colonial period into historical perspective, as a far reaching but passing episode in

[20] D. G. E. Hall, *Europe and Burma* (Oxford, 1946).
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] John Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice* (New York, 1956).
[23] Great Britain, *Burma Reforms Committee, Record of Evidence* (London, 1922), I, 4ff.; III, 219ff., 228ff., quoted by Cady in *A History of Modern Burma, (Ithaca, 1960)*, 226ff. and in J. S. Furnivall, *The Governance of Modern Burma* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950), x.
[24] *Ibid.*
[25] Cady, *op. cit.*

Burma's history. His book contains a reliable account of Burma's independence struggle. This cannot be said about the American Leroy Christian, who fell in the war against Japan: the latter's handbook—*Modern Burma*—[26] a descriptive presentation of the state of pre-war British Burma, underemphasizes the social disintegration brought about by colonial rule. Leroy Christian did not take the Burmese nationalists seriously enough. Events superseded such evaluations. The handbook which continues his *Modern Burma* is Hugh Tinker's *Union of Burma* which recalls, with sympathy and understanding, the rule of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League and of Prime Minister U Nu. While expressing appreciation for U Nu's Buddhist ethos, Tinker's liberal image of Burma is limited by his purely political categories. As to sources, he has been frequently satisfied with a Rangoon newspaper in the English language. Cultural factors in ideologies and even ethnological factors of Burmese nationality problems are passed over in an elegantly cavalier way.

Among the obstacles to more depth of perspective is the reluctance of Burmese informants to discuss political Buddhism as "too hot a subject" (or to speak about non-modern and non-rational spheres of Burmese culture) in order not to let their country appear "backward." Allegedly, such attitudes induced the destruction of some volumes of the Burma Research Society Journal. They certainly inspired attempts of censoring authorities to prevent the export of Burmese books on folk-beliefs. Against the long background of anti-Burmese European writing, there are pre-occupations that—if research by foreign scholars be allowed in Burma—might right the wrong. From these results, a notion has developed that research about Burma should wait until the Burmese themselves can produce it—such as the Burmese scholars Maung Maung, Htin Aung and Than Tun [27] have already done (the latter, precisely, in the "Humanities"). On the other hand, modern Burmese studies in America—as part of the so-called Area Studies—have developed into a preserve of social scientists, particularly the type of political scientists who consider cultural factors to be irrelevant abstractions and who are fully satisfied with descriptive treatment of outward political processes, starting with the 20th century.

One of the main pre-occupations of such social scientists' Area Studies is a search for political models. Thus, we are informed by Leach, that since the cultural patterns of the valley Burmans are determined by Indian models, the social patterns of the hill minority peoples must be understood in terms of Chinese models.[28] Another social scientist—Lucien Pye—has revealed how much of the Burmese political character is determined by tensions between patterns of Burmese infantile experience and the disciplinary experience of Buddhist monastery school education. Furthermore, Pye thinks that to have discovered the Burmese Buddhist's concern for the ultimate is to discover

[26] John Leroy Christian, *Modern Burma: A Survey of Political and Economic Development* (Toronto, 1942).

[27] Maung Maung, *Burma in the Family of Nations* (Amsterdam, 1956). Htin Aung, *Burmese Law Tales: Legal... Burmese folk-lore* (London, 1962). Than Tun, "Social Life in Burma, 1044-1287," *Journal of the Burma Research Society*, pts. i-ii, 37-47.

[28] Edmund Leach, "The Frontiers of Burma," in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, III, No. 1 (October, 1960), 51.

the concern for inherently "innocent things." Buddhist moralistic injunctions of Burmese statesmen, like U Nu, have "to his mind" something provocative. To Lucian Pye, "the Burmese insensitivity to the fact that their moralizing might be annoying to others suggests that such activities are designed less as a means of possibly controlling others than as a means of suggesting the innocence of their own intentions." [29] As seventeenth and eighteenth century Enlightenment notions about "Human Nature" die hard, cultural deviations from our own patterns have been interpreted as a sign of lack of sophistication in Burmese socialism—with its acceptance of Buddhist values.[30]

Much, if not most American research on Burma, has been performed or stimulated by experts, whose relationship with Burma began by some professional residence in that country, not by theoretical interest in it. Among the American economic advisers to the Burmese government, Walinsky has produced, from his experience, a valuable monograph about the problems of Burma's planned economy,[31] while Frank Trager contributed important works about Burma's welfare state programs.[32] Trager has also edited several symposia which show considerable understanding and sympathy for the Burmese view point. Even more are the Anglo-centric conventional images of Burmese history discarded in Dorothy Woodman's *Making of Modern Burma.* Not only does she not dwell on Burmese cruelties (in the Harvey tradition), but she actually goes out of her way to expose Victorian British methods of pressuring the remaining part of the independent Burmese kingdom into isolation from the outside world. Her revelations about the terroristic methods used by the British conquerors to break native resistance after 1885,[33] are based on the (otherwise forgotten) British contemporary reports of Grattan Geary [34] which have been confirmed by the diaries of the Russian visiting Indologist, Minayev.

An attempt to see and present modernity's impact on Burma's political ideas, in the context of its Buddhist cultural frame of reference, is made in Sarkisyanz's *Buddhist Backgrounds of the Burmese Revolution* (published outside the United States, in the Netherlands).[35] Its self-imposed limitations consist largely in its treatment of Buddhist impact, without much sociological consideration for the non-Buddhist animistic attitudes in Burmese culture, which have been examined through the anthropological field-work of Michael Mendelson.[36]

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[29] L. Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building* (London, 1962).

[30] George Torten, "Buddhism and Socialism in Japan and Burma," *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* II, No. 3 (April, 1960), 297, 303.

[31] L. J. Walinsky, *Economic Development in Burma* (New York, 1962).

[32] Frank Trager (ed.), "Burma," *Human Relations Area Files* (New Haven, 1960); F. Trager, *Building a Welfare State in Burma, 1946-1956* (New York, 1958).

[33] Dorothy Woodman, *The Making of Modern Burma* (London, 1963).

[34] Grattan Geary, *Burma After the Conquest* (London, 1886).

[35] Emanuel Sarkisyanz, *Buddhist Backgrounds of the Burmese Revolution* (The Hague, 1965).

[36] Michael Mendelson, "A Messianic Association in Upper Burma," *Bulletin of the London School of Oriental and African Studies,* XXIV, pt. iii (1961).

Both approaches are still not typical, while "religious" materials continue being relegated to the "Humanities" and, as such, are given little consideration in Burmese (unlike the more advanced Indonesian) Area Studies. However, R. Smith's *Religion and Politics in Burma* represents a step away from such conventions. In it, even remote origins, like the development of Buddhist kingship in medieval Ceylon, are not ignored. But this book appeared only a few months ago.[37]

[37] R. Smith, *Religion and Politics in Burma* (Princeton, 1965).

REFLEXIONS ON THE MIGRATION THEORY VIS-A-VIS THE COMING OF INDIAN INFLUENCES IN THE PHILIPPINES

JUAN R. FRANCISCO

ONE OF THE IMPORTANT PROBLEMS RELEVANT TO THE APPLICATION of the theory of migration on the peopling of the Philippines is the coming of Indian influences into the Islands. This theory has been taken by many a writer [1] as a historical fact. But on examination of the view, there seems to appear questions that would render it doubtful in the light of the developments during the time that this suggested migration occurred.

The purposes of this essay are two-fold—one, to articulate in a single work my views on the theory as expressed in a number of essays published in many journals; and two, to re-examine the same in the light of the new insights that accumulated during extensive field researches conducted by fellow workers and by me with the past decade or so.

The late Professor H. Otley Beyer laid the foundation of this view when writing on Philippines-Indian contacts in ancient as well as in modern times in 1948. He wrote:

> The first ship-using folk to trade with the East-Indies and the Philippines, within historic times, were probably the coastal peoples of India—whose daring voyages for trade and adventure into the eastern islands are frequently mentioned in the Jataka tales and some of the other epic and narrative poetry of the early Buddhist period (at least several centuries B.C.).
>
> The first *Indian immigrants* into this region seem to have been chiefly of the old Vedic faith, mixed with primitive nature and sun worship; although Buddhistic ideas became dominant in the early centuries of the Christian era. Indian traders and colonizers of these types seems to have entered the Philippines chiefly through eastern and northern Borneo, and continued to drift in—in competition with the Arab, Indo-Malayan, and Indo-China traders and settlers—down at least until the Chinese traders and settlers began to dominate, from about the 12th or 13th century onward.
>
> A second wave of Indian influences, this time of a Brahmanic character, came into the Philippines from Java and Borneo during the period of Majapahit Contact, in the 14th century . . . .[2]

In more specific terms, Beyer re-constructs the framework of his view, in 1952, and writes that:

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[1] E.g., V. A. Makarenko, "Some Data on South Indian Cultural Influences in South East Asia," *Tamil Culture* (Journal of the Academy of Tamil Culture), vol. XI, no. 1 (January-March, 1964), pp. 58-91 and many others.

[2] H. Otley Beyer, "Early History of Philippine Relations with Foreign Countries, Especially China," Historical Introduction to E. Arsenio Manuel, *Chinese Elements in the Tagalog Language* (Manila: Filipiniana Publications, 1948), p. 8.

> Sixth and last of the pre-historic migrations, occuring between 300 and 200 B.C., brought from the south our most numerous and advanced pre-historic people—the Iron Age group usually known as Malays. They filtered in fleets of dug out boats, up from the west coast of Borneo into Luzon via Palawan and Mindoro, and in another ocean pathway through the Celebes Strait to Mindanao and the Visayas. In addition to advanced, irrigated agriculture, these migrants brought four new industries. (1) the smelting, forging and manufacture of tools, weapons, utensils and ornaments of iron and other metals; (2) the manufacture of a great variety of turned and decorated pottery; (3) the art of weaving cloth on a handloom, and (4) the manufacture of beads, bracelets and other ornaments of green and blue glass. These crafts seem to have spread from there to Indo-China and Southern Malaysia, finally reaching the Philippines by way of Borneo and Celebes.[3]

Earlier in 1928, however, while writing on his finds in Novaliches, Rizal, Beyer appeared to be more certain of the Indian in the Philippines as coming via the migration route,

> When we learnt that all his material was not Chinese we looked around for its nearest relatives elsewhere, and found them in the Indian Peninsula.... All the Iron Age material is very much like that found in South India, Eastern Java, Northern Borneo, and in some parts of the Malay peninsula....While the prehistoric glass beads and bracelets found in India are of different colours, only two colours of beads are found here—green and blue—this supports my view that the motherland of this culture is India.[4]

On the date of this migration of Indian to the Philippines, Beyer expresses a relative certainty of this movement.

> It is not thought that any of these early Indians voyages reached as far as the Philippines before or about the 2nd or 3rd century B.C., where the 1st Iron Age culture seems to have been introduced from some South Indian source. From that time on, however—and especially after the 2nd century A.D., Indian penetration seems to have slowly percolated into the Islands in a fairly continuous flow.[5]

In support of his view of a Tamil influence upon Philippine culture, particularly systems of writing, V.A. Makarenko uses the wave of migrations theory as seen in the Beyer postulations.[6] These Tamils according to the view of Makarenko were part of the sixth wave that came to the Philippines bringing with them this culture tool—the syllabic systems of writing. These Tamils, of course, were those that first settled in the Malay Peninsula, and who came with Malays who constituted this sixth wave of immigrants.[7]

In another work, much earlier than that by Makarenko, the argument to explain the introduction of ancient systems of writing in the Philippines

[3] H. Otley Beyer and Jaime C. de Veyra, *Philippine Saga* (Manila: Capitol Publishing House, 1952), p. 2.
[4] H. Otley Beyer, "A Prehistoric Iron Age in the Philippines," *Philippine Magazine,* October, 1928.
[5] H. Otley Beyer, *Early History of Philippine Relations with Foreign Countries, Especially China.* (Manila: National Printing Co., 1948), p. 9. (Xerox Copy).
[6] Makarenko, *op. cit.*
[7] *Ibid.,* pp. 86-87.

was presented by Fletcher Gardner.[7a] Gardner is even more direct in his reference relative to the people who introduced the ancient scripts of the Filipinos were those who came from the time of Asoka, the famous emperor who ruled the Northeastern part of India—in the areas covered by the present Bihar, Bengal and Orissa in the 3rd century, B.C. And these came in the manner similar to that which was described by Beyer (and amplified by Makarenko).

The theory, as expounded by Beyer in another of his works, accepted by local writers for want of alternatives,[8] elaborated in more specific terms vis-a-vis South Indian Tamil presence in the area by Makarenko and argued in very expansive terms relative to the introduction of ancient Philippine scripts from the Asoka times of Gardner, has spawned some questions which are significant in the full understanding of the theory. These questions were more or less raised in a critique (of the theory) by F. Landa Jocano. He writes that Beyer's "scheme[9] of the waves of migration appears very impressive [and] assume[s], a semblance of verified facts."[10] The implication of this is that somehow the view is very much overdrawn and the conclusions therefrom very tenuous. I shall have occasion to refer to this in further detail later in this essay.

In more precise terms, the questions raised by Jocano may be cited *in extenso,* which in the light of the subject of the present essay are as relevant as they are in the context by Beyer's schemata of the peopling of the Philippines.

> How big was one wave of migration so as to establish large identifiable community and population patterns in a frontier, rain-forested area like the Philippines during pre-historic time? Did they carry along with them the necessary equipment so as not to adjust any more to the ecological givens of the new land, thus meeting effectively the requirements of the technology necessary

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[7a] See Fletcher Gardner, *Philippine India Studies,* San Antonio, Texas: Witte Memorial Museum, 1943. Also Gardner and Ildefonso Maliwanag, *Indic Writings of the Mindoro-Palawan Axis.* San Antonio, Texas: Witte Memorial Museum, 1939-1941. 3 volumes. (Microfilm). For a full critique of Gardner's writing see my *Philippine Palaeography,* 1969 (Revised 1966 Mss.), pp. 20-28.

[8] Pedrito Reyes, cited in Makarenko, *ibid.*

[9] Beyer's scheme as summarized by Jocano "Beyer's Theory on Filipino Pre-History and Culture: An Alternative Approach to the Problems," in M.D. Zamora, Editor, *Studies in Philippine Anthropology* [Quezon City: Alemars-Phoenix, 1967], p. 131 is cited here for easy reference:

> "The early sea-migrants came from South China, arriving in Northern Luzon during the periodic time-sequence, ranging from 5000 to 500 B.C. The Second "wave" came via south-central Luzon between 1500 [and] 500 B.C., coming from Indo-China. There were the supposedly rice-terrace building people, the descendants from whom now allegedly represent 18 per cent of the contemporary population. Between 800 [and] 500 B.C. another group of people came from Indo-China, crossed the China Sea and reached the Philippines by way of Southern Luzon. This was followed, sometime between 200 [and] 300 B.C., by the so-called iron-culture bearing people. This group came from Java and Sumatra. Then between 300 [and] 700 A.D. another group, the jar-burial people, came from South China and arrived in the Philippines by way of the Batanese group."

[10] *Ibid.*

> for the reproduction of the home-culture here? If they did not, which was likely, then the reproduction of the home-culture in the Philippines must have yielded to the pressures of the new environment. What culture complex, in other words, which we encounter here in the Philippines, was then the highly modified local developments rather than the "carry-over" from the mainland as averred? [11]

Jocano further emphasizes the point by writing that Beyer's "correlation has been based on typological comparisons of insufficient archeological materials. . . it is being unrealistic to assert that the characteristics of such a migrating people would still be present and definable today after several thousands of years of racial and cultural developments." [12]

Implications that may be drawn from the question raised by Jocano are inevitable. Migration, or wave of migration, as the term implies involves a pre-knowledge of the locus a people moves into. Such a fore-knowledge would further imply that the immigrants would have to carry with them the most important tools of their culture to be able to survive in a "frontier, rain-forested area like the Philippines." At the same time such a group of people would be culturally and even racially homogenous. In such a case, the Indians (as Beyer thought of them to be, or Dravidians, particularly the Tamils, as Makarenko had shown or the Asoka immigrants as Gardner has argued who immigrated to the Philippines, must have brought with them all that they could carry—their culture, tools, e.g., language, writing, rituals, etc. If these Indian groups were culturally and racially homogenous, they would have preserved much of what is now found in India-South India for that matter, for it was certainly the Coromandel coast from which these immigrants embarked for new lands.

Indeed, since South India and the Philippines possess comparatively similar climactic conditions, the culture that the Indians could have brought with them in the long years of their movement into the Philippines would still be flourishing until today, if not merely surviving in the remote areas of the Islands, considering the fact that it (the Culture) was transplanted in an ecologically non-hostile region.

Moreover, on this basis of what Beyer argues that "Indians traders and *colonizers*. . . seem to have entered the Philippines. . . . until about the 12th or 13th century. . . ." (see fn. no. 2), similar questions may be raised. The most important, however, would be—since the Indians did not only come to the Philippines as traders but also as colonizers (and colonization may also presage immigration), why do we not find similar intensive influence of Indian culture in the Philippines? Some Indian scholars, like R.C. Majumdar,[12a] have called the Indian presence in Southeast Asia

[11] *Ibid.*
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 133.
[12a] R.C. Majumdar, *Ancient Indian Colonies in the Far East* (Calcutta: Modern Publishing Syndicate, 1927, 1938), 2 volumes: I. Champa; II.

as the result of extensive colonization. But why not the Philippines also, which is indeed a part and parcel of this region, racially and culturally?

Examining all the evidences of Indian cultural influences in the Philippines—language, literature, art, writing, religion, to mention a few [13]—it becomes superfluous to argue for the full saturation of Philippine culture with Indian elements. Evidences to support the migration wave theory in these cultural aspects are extremely isolated in the whole context of Philippine life. For if there were actually immigration—even as Makarenko argued that the immigrants were "primarily the Tamils from Malaya and adjacent territories and from Indonesia," to support his view of long standing Tamil movements vis-a-vis the introduction of writing in the Islands—from India to the Philippines via the intervening areas, one would expect the most important aspects of Indian culture to be wholly preserved, and to function in the spirit and substance of that culture these immigrants brought with them for their motherland.

In more precise terms, a cursory examination of each of these evidences may be made to give better perspective of the problem as discussed above. These will in one way or another bring to light the salient features of these influences in terms of the data so far used to support the immigration view.

The most extensive evidences of Indian influences in the Philippines are Sanskrit elements in the languages of the country. These have persisted since their introduction in the Philippines between the 10th and 15th centuries,[14] and have been fully assimilated into these speech systems. They are, however, still recognizable through their forms in the Indonesian and Malay languages, which have been very profoundly Sanskritized.

There are about 336 words in Philippine languages which are recognizably probable Sanskrit in origin. But on further studies there are about less than 50% of these which have definitive provenance in Sanskrit.[15]

Much of the Sanskrit (or Indian) substratum of Philippine folk literature heritage could be discerned in motifs and perhaps themes. But very

[13] The subject has been dealt with in various papers by me, some of which I cite here for easier reference: Juan R. Francisco, "Sanskrit in Philippine Languages," *Adyar Literary Bulletin* (Madras, India), vol. XXIV, nos. 3-4, December 1960, pp. 153-172; "A Note on Agusan Image," *Philippine Studies,* vol. XI, no. 3, June 1963, pp. 390-400; "A Buddhist Image from Karitunan Site, Batangas Province," *Science Review,* vol. IV, No. 7, July 1963, pp. 7-11; *Indian Influence and Literature,* Quezon City, University of the Philippines, 1964; "Notes on the Probable Tamil Words in Philippine Languages," *Proceedings,* vol. II, International Conference-Seminar on Tamil Research, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1968, etc.

[14] Juan R. Francisco, "On the Date of the Coming of Indian Influences in the Philippines," *Philippine Historical Review,* vol. I, no. 1 (1965), pp. 136-152.

[15] I am indebted to William Henry Scott for giving actual statistical count of Sanskrit words in Philippine Languages based on my work *Indian Influences in the Philippines* (1964). He wrote—"Some 150 separate Sanskrit words are identified as the origin of Philippine terms, 64% of which appear in Tagalog, 36% in Bisaya and 28% in both Ilocano [sic] and Sulu. Although a different [sic] 28%" See his *Pre-historic Source Materials for the Study of Philippine History* (Manila: UST Press, 1968), pp. 52-53. Also see my "Further Notes on Pardo de Tavera's EL SANSCRITO EN LA LENGUA TAGALOG," *Asian Studies,* vol. VI no. 2 (August 1968), pp. 223-234.

few are the actual adaptation of the Indians' whole tales or epic studies. I am still in the process of assessing these influences in the folk epics of the Muslim peoples of the Philippines who may have been the most deeply Indianized groups before Islam was accepted by them as a religion. In the August 1969 issue of this journal, I published a brief study on a Maranaw prose tale which tells in miniature the lives of Rama, Sita, and Ravana.[16]

In the field of art, there are only a few pieces which show definitive Indian styles. But these have their development in the intervening areas, particularly Siam and Java, where Indian art flourished to rival its development even in the mainland. Since there are few of these pieces, it would not be superfluous to enumerate them here. There is the now famous Agusan image, which was originally identified as Saiva in orientation by Beyer, but which I identified as a Buddhist Tara on the basis of a re-study of the image. A clay medallion or votive stamp on whose obverse face is an image of the Avalokitesvara Padmapani in bas relief. It stands in the classic Indian pose known as *tribhanga*, "three bends," and appear to hold a *padma*, "lotus" in his right hand. This object was discovered in Calatagan, Batangas, associated with 14th-15th century Chinese porcelain wares which were dug from an ancient graveyard of the same age.

From Mactan are the Lokesvara statue and a statue of the elephant-faced god, Ganesha. These two are known only through photographs published by H. Otley Beyer. The latest addition to these Indian-oriented statues is the golden *garuda* pendant, found in Brookes Point, Palawan. Like the clay medallion, it is now deposited in the National Museum of the Philippines.[17]

Apart from these statues, there are other art objects like glass beads of various colors which Beyer identified to be of Indian provenance.[18]

Related to the expected development of the statues mentioned above in their function in the society would be their connection to the religious practices of the people who own these objects. However, there seems to be no evidence of the statues' direct relevance to the belief systems of the early Filipinos. If Beyer's reference to the Agusan Image as a "sacred heirloom" [19] were to be interpreted as an object of veneration by the Manobos [sic], still it cannot be established that it has any active function, in the belief systems of the ethnic groups from whom they were collected. In fact, except the Garuda image, which was bought from a family in Brookes Point, all the other images were excavated from archeological sites.

[16] Juan R. Francisco, "Maharadia Lawana," *Asian Studies*, vol. VII, no. 2 (August 1969).

[17] Detailed description of these art objects may be found in my "Notes on the Indo-Philippine Images," in M.D. Zamora, Editor, *Studies in Philippine Anthropology* (Quezon City: Phoenix-Alemar's, 1967), pp. 117-127.

[18] See fn. no. 4 above.

[19] H. Otley Beyer, "Outline Review of Philippine Archeology by Islands and Provinces," *The Philippine Journal of Science*, vol. LXVII, nos. 3-4 (July-August 1947), p. 302.

The ancient syllabic writings of the Islands are believed to have their ancestry in the South Indian Pallava Grantha script. But their development into what they were (and still are as they are being used by the Tagbanuwa of Palawan and Mangyan of Southern Oriental Mindoro) can only be understood in terms of their intermediate forms in Sumatra.[20] But, the very "primitive" forms of these scripts do not necessarily speak of their having fully developed in the context of their having represented in sophisticated symbolic forms the phonology of the Philippine languages.

Looking at all these evidences of Indian influence in the Philippines, as they are brought to bear upon the conditions—demographic, climatological and ecological—in the Islands at the time, it is hardly possible to accept the view that these elements of culture were brought by Indian immigrants, according to Beyer. That these immigrants did not come to the Islands in one single movement, but in waves, as Bayer argued, furthermore there would have been evidences of a full development of Indian culture in the Philippines.

If this view that the Indian influences in the Philippines were brought here by waves of immigration can not be accepted in the light of the existing facts brought about by advances in research, then what could be the alternative or alternatives to explain the presence of these cultural elements recognizably Indian in orientation, if not in origins?

There are two possible alternatives to this view. The first alternative uses for its proofs those that Beyer himself had used to argue for his view. On re-examining all these evidences, particularly the Novaliches finds, R.B. Dixon concluded that all artifacts found in the (Novaliches) sites [as well as others], were brought over as a result of a "long standing trade between the Philippines and India, particularly the South, even prior to the historic South Indian Chera, Chola and Pandyan kingdoms, whose history goes to the beginnings of the Christian Era or before."[21] This argument seems to fit this alternative view, but apparently it has an inherent weakness. For, if the Novaliches finds were to bear upon this alternative as proofs on which Dixon based his view, i.e., "while the pre-historic glass beads and bracelets found in Indian era, of some fifteen colors only two colors of beads are found here—green and blue—this supports my view that the motherland of this culture is India," [22] the following question may be raised: Why are there only *two colors of beads* found here, if there were a *long standing trade between the Philippines and India?* Considering the span of time the Chera, the Pandyan and the Chola ruled South India, there is a range be-

[20] Juan R. Francisco, *Philippine Palaeography,* 1969 (Revised 1966 Mss.). In preparation for the press as Monograph No. 5 of the U.P. Asian Center.

[21] R.B. Dixon, "Recent Archeological Discoveries in the Philippines and their bearing on the Pre-history of Eastern Asia," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* (Philadelphia 1930), vol. LXIX, no. 4, pp. 225-229.

[22] See fn. no. 4, above.

tween the early 2nd and the late 12th centuries A.D.[23] Dixon even goes further back in time "to the beginnings of the Christian Era or before." Hence, there would not had been just two colors of beads that were traded during this great span of time.

Corollary to this "long standing trade" is the view that this was not one way in direction. Rather, there were also Indonesians and Malays who plied the Bengal Bay in ancient times, and necessarily they were also the inevitable agents of culture movements. It is also possible—and probable—that this two-way direction of the trade between the Southeast Asian insular and peninsular regions and India may have also precipitated the introduction into India of Indonesian or Malay cultural elements; and these elements may have undergone a process of Indianization; then re-exported back in Indian clothing. The Philippines appeared to have been a very passive participant in this two-way traffic of goods—both material and non-material—because it was not in the direct route of that traffic.[24] Hence, the Indian aspect of its culture has been the result of a long and unconscious percolation from India through Indonesia and Malaya, a process which is the next point to be discussed in the alternative to the theory of immigration.

The second alternative view utilizes the same materials in support of it. All the Indian elements—from linguistic to literary, artistic, archeological and palaeographic—are relatively not as extensive to allow drawing the conclusion that India indeed participated directly in the peopling and/or enriching the cultures of the Philippines via the immigration movement. Unlike the Javanese, the Balinese or even the Malay, the Philippines can not compare with these peoples in the extent of the Indian overlay in their cultural orientations.

Indian cultural elements as they are now discernible in the fabric of Philippine culture can only be explained in terms of the intermediary of the Javanese and/or Malay who first received these Indian elements. The Javanese and/or Malay sojourn of these Indian aspects of the culture underwent modifications to suit the character and nature of the host culture. These finally reached the Philippines by the process of culture drift or stimulus diffusion. Of course, the process did not take place within a few years—say one decade or one score—but more likely centuries of slow and perhaps even "painful" percolation. This rather slow drift and stimulus diffusion may have been aggravated by the fact of history that at the period of this movement, the height of Indian influence in Java and Malaya and Sumatra has already reached its peak and it was on a steady decline. Even this slow process of movement was further checked by the very successful inroads of Islam, which was to become the most important single factor that finally stopped the influence of Indian elements into the Philippines.

[23] See K.A. Nilakantha Sastri, *History of South India* (Madras: University, 1958) for the dates of these dynasties—Chera, C.A.D. 130-210 (pp. 112-119); Pandya, A.D. 520-920 (p. 165); and Chola, c. A.D. 846-1173; (p. 210).

[24] See my *Indian Influences in the Philippines* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1964), p. 267.

URBANIZATION AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION: THE PHILIPPINES AND JAPAN

NOBUTAKA IKE

ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT POLITICS IS THAT industrialization and urbanization often bring about profound changes in the nature of politics. The literature on village politics, especially in Asian countries, rather consistently shows that rural communities try to avoid overt partisan confrontations and strive instead to arrive at some kind of "consensus." It is understandable that this should be so. In rural villages where people are not mobile, where everyone knows everyone else, and where both individual and group survival places a premium on cooperation, open partisanship that pits individuals and families against each other and thereby reduces the potential for cooperative endeavors is bound to be avoided.

As a country begins to urbanize and industrialize, however, preference for politics through consensus becomes much less pronounced. Face-to-face relationships that characterized village life give way to some extent to anonymity. The growth of a working class and its eventual unionization sharpens economic conflict between labor and management. Moreover, specialization produced by city life greatly expands the range of human needs, which, in turn, raises the level of political demands. Finally the presence of the mass communications media especially affects the political outlook of urban dwellers. Richard Fagen has succinctly summarized these changes in a communications model of political change:

> (1) socio-economic changes with important communications concomitants in channels, content, style, opportunities, etc. lead to
> (2) new ways of perceiving the self and the world which in turn lead to
> (3) behavior, which, when aggregated, are of consequence to the functioning of the political system.[1]

Where modernization proceeds without fairly rigorous totalitarian controls, usually one of the consequences is polarization in politics. This happens when different groups of political activists band together to try to put their leaders into political office. As a result, overt conflict between and among organized political parties rather than the pursuit of consensus comes to characterize the political scene. Robert Dahl in his study of political

[1] Richard Fagen, *Politics and Communication*, (Boston: 1966), pp. 108-9.

oppositions in Western democracies has suggested the following typology of opposition. He speaks of

(1) non-structural opposition characterized by "office seeking parties;"
(2) limited structural opposition, where the object is political reforms; and
(3) major structural opposition aimed at comprehensive political-structural reform.[2]

With this typology in mind, we may now turn to a consideration of structural opposition and its relationship to urbanization in two countries in Asia, namely Japan and the Philippines.

As is well known, Japan is the most industrialized country in Asia today and appears to be on the way to achieving the status of a "super power." While it is true that Japan's industrialization got its start in the latter part of the 19th century, the foundations for the industrial edifice were laid long before the opening of the country to large scale Western influences in the Meiji period. Already in the Tokugawa period (1603-1868) the country was becoming sufficiently urbanized so that by the 1700's Edo (present-day Tokyo) was probably larger than London was at that time. There were other cities, notably Osaka, the great commercial city which even boasted such sophisticated institutions as commodity exchanges, and, of course, Kyoto, the traditional capital and cultural center. In the Tokugawa period, Japanese industrial organization had not yet reached the stage where production took place in factories, but in certain lines such as textiles, small scale entrepreneurs organized production on the basis of the "putting out" system. Thus the evidence suggests that Japan had gotten a head start over her Asian neighbors in moving down the path of urbanization and industrialization.

Similarly in the political field, modern organizations and institutions appeared relatively early when compared to developments in other sections of Asia. For example, political parties were first established in the early 1880's, and by 1901 a small group of socialistically inclined middle class intellectuals had become sufficiently critical of the existing political system to feel compelled to form the first Social Democratic Party. In their manifesto the organizers of this party called for such political reforms as the enactment of universal suffrage, and such economic measures as the nationalization of the means of production. The government in power, apparently frightened by this program, banned the Social Democratic Party the very same day that it was organized. A more lasting attempt to introduce socialism in the form of an organized political movement came in the period after World War I. In the early 1920's a Communist Party was organized, but it was unable to obtain legal stature. Socialist parties, however, were allowed to operate openly. The Left-wing parties generally bene-

[2] Robert Dahl, *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies,* (New Haven: 1966), p. 342.

fited from the enactment of the universal manhood suffrage law which became effective in the 1928 general elections, but were unable to win widespread popular support partly because of the rise of ultranationalism that came on the heels of Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931.

Japan's defeat and the Allied Occupation that followed in 1945 substantially changed the political environment. Although the conservatives still remained in control, the Left-wing parties, including the Communist Party, which were legalized, no longer suffered legal and other forms of repression, with the result that the Socialists became the leading opposition party holding more than one third of the seats in the National Diet.

When we look into the sources of support for the Japanese Left, it is clear that it enjoys much more electoral support in the urban areas than it does in the rural communities. A detailed study of six elections for the House of Representatives held between 1947 and 1958 showed that there was a statistically significant difference in the percentage of votes cast for Socialist and Communist candidates among four types of electoral districts, namely, metropolitan, urban, semi-rural, and rural. In other words, the Socialist and Communist vote was directly correlated with the degree of urbanization.[3]

However, one might note in passing that there are some indications that support for socialism has been declining. According to one study, the percentage of socialist voters in those districts where the number of registered voters has increased the most (i.e., the large cities) between the 1958 and the 1967 elections declined from 38.51 per cent to 27.19 per cent in 1967, while in the districts where the number of registered voters declined the most (i.e., the rural districts) the percentage of vote increased from 23.22 in 1958 to 25.17 in 1967.[4] This trend, if it continues, may confirm the hypothesis put forward by Daniel Bell that after modernization attains a high level, political polarization decreases and ideological differences become less and less important.[5] Perhaps Japan, too, is approaching the "end of ideology," and, if so, it would signify that structural opposition is waning.

The picture in the Philippines is somewhat different. Urbanization and industrialization began much later, and large scale industrialization still lies in the future. It is revealing, too, to compare the chronological sequences in political development. Whereas in Japan the first stirrings of an organized Left appeared as early as 1901, in the Philippines the Socialist Party was not formed until 1929, and the Communist Party followed in 1930. The latter, however, was declared illegal by the courts in 1931, with the result

[3] Junichi Kyogoku and Nobutaka Ike, *Urban-Rural Differences in Voting Behavior in Postwar Japan*. Proceedings of the Department of Social Sciences, College of Education, University of Tokyo, 1959.

[4] *So-Senkyo no Kenkyu*. Published by Heiwa Keizai Keikaku Kaigi, (Tokyo: 1967), p. 11.

[5] Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology*, (Glencoe, 1960).

that the Communists joined forces with some of the Socialists. Then in the 1930's, the Left became linked to radical peasant reform movements in Central Luzon. During the Japanese occupation the communists organized the *Hukbo ng Bayan Laban Sa Hapon* (People's Anti-Japanese Army), abbreviated Hukbalahap or "Huks." After the end of the war, some of the Communist leaders ran for office under the Democratic Alliance label and six candidates managed to win election to the House of Representatives, only to be denied their seats. Unlike the situation in Japan where Communist and Socialist members actually sit in the parliament, since the Democratic Alliance episode, no representatives of the Left parties have obtained seats in the Philippines Congress. In general the political atmosphere in the Philippines is one where conservative groups and forces are overwhelmingly in control and even the moderate Left is forced to operate under constraints. Under the circumstances, the spectacle of a Socialist Party forming the chief opposition, as is the case in Japan, is virtually inconceivable in the Philippines at present.

The political party competition, therefore, takes place between two dominant conservative organizations, the Nacionalista and Liberal Parties. It is virtually impossible to differentiate between these two parties either in terms of doctrine or social basis. "At first glance," writes Jean Grossholtz, "the Philippines appears to have a two-party system that is national in character. But the closer look reveals that the two are not parties but coalitions of factions put together largely for electoral purposes and characterized by constantly shifting loyalties to men, not issues." [6] Given the nature of Philippines parties, it is not surprising that politicians should often shift from one party to another. Sometimes even presidential candidates are "imported" from the opposition party.

The failure of the party system to provide the electorate with meaningful choices in terms of doctrine and issues, coupled with governmental inefficiency and corruption which have plagued almost every administration regardless of which party was in control, has naturally led to a certain amount of frustration, particularly on the part of more educated sectors of the voting public. This sense of frustration has found expression in so-called "third force" movements which have appeared from time to time. O. D. Corpuz has characterized these third force movements in these terms: "In strategy the third force movement aimed at an appeal directly to the people and independently of the two leading parties. It was therefore partly a disillusionment with idealistic sentiments and crusading personalities." [7]

The most recent of these third force movements was the attempt on the part of Senator Raul Manglapus to win the presidency in 1965 under the Party for Philippines Progress (PPP) banner. Senator Manglapus cam-

[6] Jean Grossholtz, *Politics in the Philippines,* (Boston, 1964), p. 136.
[7] Onofre D. Corpuz, *The Philippines,* (Englewood Cliffs: 1965), p. 112.

paigned on a kind of Christian Socialist platform, advocating, among other things, social justice, and agrarian and tax reforms. In terms of Dahl's typology, the movement represented by the Party for Philippines Progress might be characterized as a form of "limited structural opposition."

Senator Manglapus' campaign met the fate which has consistently befallen third force movements in the Philippines. He ran a poor third to Ferdinand Marcos, the winning candidate, and Diosdado Macapagal, the incumbent. A tabulation of the vote for Manglapus shows, however, that he won about 10 per cent of the total in the cities and about 4 per cent in the provinces. Quite clearly he ran much stronger in the cities, and among cities he obtained in general more support in those where the degree of urbanization was higher.

But before we proceed to analyze the Manglapus vote in various cities, some preliminary remarks are in order. First of all, Karl Deutsch has suggested that modernization expands human needs, which, in turn, lead to increased demands for governmental services to meet these needs. If the government is unable to meet these demands because of increasing burdens put upon it, more and more of the population will become alienated and frustrated.[8] Certain inferences may be drawn from this model. Modernization proceeds faster in the cities than in the countryside so the demands would be greater in the cities, leading to a higher frustration level. Moreover, because of better communications the sense of frustration is mutually enforced. For instance, an individual is frustrated by a badly run postal system and his sense of frustration and outrage is aggravated when he reads letters to the editor or irate newspaper columnists complaining about the post office. If the inferences drawn from this model are correct, then we could predict that the city vote would be more inclined to some sort of structural opposition. In the particular case at hand, it would mean a higher percentage of vote for Senator Manglapus, since in the Philippines political context, he virtually had no chance to achieve victory, and hence a vote cast for the Senator was essentially a protest vote. Our hypothesis then would be that the percentage of vote cast for Senator Manglapus in the cities would vary directly with the degree of urbanization.

To test our hypothesis, we first had to rank Philippines cities according to some criteria of urbanization. Fortunately this had already been attempted by Isao Fujimoto, who believes that Philippines cities are undergoing a process of differentiation which is cumulative and unidimensional. For him cities are systems which transmit information of all kinds, and, he says, "communities differ in the amount of information they possess and how they process it." [9] He argues that the presence of certain institutions,

[8] Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," reprinted in Eckstein, Harry and David Apter (eds.), *Comparative Politics,* (New York: 1963), pp. 582-603.

[9] Isao Fujimoto, "The Social Complexity of the Philippine Towns and Cities," *Solidarity,* Vol. III, No. 5 (May 1968), p. 78.

for example, high schools, drug stores, dry cleaning establishments, etc., indicates complexity and the ability to maintain certain kinds of social information. "Thus, vis-a-vis the community as an information processing device, items can be found that will tap different levels of differentiations (or information complexity). Guttman scales line up the cities of the Philippines along this general dimension of complexity." [10] One of the scales he has devised is the "public articulation" scale for 39 Philippines cities.[11] It is based on the existence (or lack thereof) of such items as high schools, streets with names, college or university, long distance telephones, fire hydrants, Philippines News Service coverage, local newspapers, directories, traffic lights, TV stations, foreign embassies, daily newspapers, and foreign news services. He states that the public articulation scale "includes items which reveal much more directly the communication handling capabilities of a city." [12]

The next step in testing our hypothesis involved the calculation of the percentage vote cast for Senator Manglapus in the 1965 presidential elections. Here there is a problem, but I know of no way to cope with it. Under the law, only the two major parties are allowed election inspectors. Senator Manglapus has publicly stated that when he campaigned people came up to him whether he had election inspectors, and, he relates, "we would, of course, answer 'No' knowing that we had just lost more votes from electors who did not care to cast ballots that would not be counted." He goes on to state that after the election a certain person told him, "We are fifteen in our household. We all voted for you in one precinct. The final count gave you only three votes. What happened?" [13] Since there is no way to estimate the number of votes that were cast but not counted, I have had to take the official returns at face value in making the calculations.

The procedure followed was to calculate the percentage of vote cast for Senator Manglapus out of the total cast for the top three candidates, namely, Marcos, Macapagal, and Manglapus. Each city was then ranked according to the Manglapus vote. The highest turned out to be Cagayan de Oro with 27.38 per cent, and the lowest was Tres Martires with 0 per cent. This then gave us two rankings for Philippines cities based on the degree of urbanization according to the Fujimoto scale and the percentage of vote for Manglapus. The two variables were then tabulated as in the following 2 x 2 table (Table 1).

If we summarize Table 1 for the purpose of making a chi-square test, we get the results summarized in Table 2.

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[10] *Ibid.*
[11] *Ibid,* p. 88.
[12] *Ibid,* p. 79.
[13] *A Christian Social Movement,* (Manila: 1968), p. 3.

TABLE 1

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MANGLAPUS VOTE AND PUBLIC ARTICULATION SCALE

Vote for Manglapus		*Public Articulation Scale* High: 9-14		*Public Articulation Scale* Low: 1-8	
High:	7.00—28.00%	Cagayan de Oro	27.38	Gingoog	21.96
		Quezon City	14.90	Ozamiz	16.56
		Bacolod	14.06	Cavite	13.06
		Lucena	13.26	Cotabato	9.69
		Naga	13.24	Basilan	7.86
		Manila	13.12	Lipa	7.20
		Zamboanga	11.98		
		Baguio	10.12		
		Cebu	9.75		
		Dumaguete	9.37		
		Caloocan	8.83		
		San Pablo	8.77		
		Iloilo	7.27		
Low:	0-6.99%	Iligan	6.76	Legaspi	6.29
		Davao	6.58	Silay	6.26
		Cabanatuan	4.08	Toledo	5.01
		Dagupan	3.19	Lapu Lapu	5.00
		Butuan	2.87	Dapitan	4.83
		Angeles	1.99	Ormoc	3.05
				Roxas	2.91
				Tacloban	2.13
				San Carlos	1.64
				Marawi	1.25
				Danao	0.78
				Tagaytay	0.70
				Calbayog	0.52
				Trece Martires	0.00

(Amount after city equals percentage vote for Manglapus). Source: Republic of the Philippines, *Report of the Commission on Elections to the President of the Philippines and the Congress.* (Manila: 1967).

TABLE 2

SUMMARY OF TABLE 1

Vote for Manglapus	*Public Articulation Scale* High	*Public Articulation Scale* Low	
High	13	6	19
Low	6	14	20
	19	20	n=39

p about .025

The chi-square test indicates that the probability of such an association occurring by chance is about two and one-half per cent, well under the conventional 5 per cent level. Thus we can say that there is a statistically significant correlation between the vote for Senator Manglapus, here interpreted as an indication of limited structural opposition, and urbanization as measured by Fujimoto's public articulation scale.

Certain implications may be drawn from our analysis. First of all, the proper functioning of democracy, at least in the Anglo-American model from which the Philippines political system is derived, appears to necessitate the existence of two major political parties that will compete for the control of the government. Moreover, as the late V. O. Key has suggested in his study of southern politics in the United States, it is assumed that a political party will be based on sectional, class, or group interests, and that differences in these interests will produce differentiation in the policies that political parties will seek to put into practice through their control of the government.[14] As we have suggested, the two major parties in the Philippines do not represent different sectional, class, or group interests, with the result that the interests of certain groups, for example, labor, tenant farmers, cultural minorities are hardly represented by either one of the two major parties.

There no doubt exists dissatisfaction with the present party set up. Moreover, as our data suggests, the dissatisfaction is not randomly distributed throughout the Philippines but tends to be distributed roughly according to the degree of urbanization. If we can assume that what has occurred in Japan and many other parts of the world will also take place in the Philippines, then the 1965 vote for Senator Manglapus would appear to be a harbinger of things to come. As industrialization and urbanization gain momentum in the Philippines, the present political party system based on identical parties is likely to give way to one where opposition means more than mere office seeking. A realignment of parties, when it occurs, will get its impetus from the cities, and will most probably result in the emergence of structural opposition.

[14] V. O. Key, *Southern Politics,* (New York, 1949), (Vintage Books Edition), p. 15.

THE JAPANESE MINORITY IN THE PHILIPPINES BEFORE PEARL HARBOR; SOCIAL ORGANIZATION IN DAVAO [1]

JOSEFA M. SANIEL

THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY'S APPROVAL OF WHAT WAS soon to become the Philippine Immigration Act signed by the United States President in 1940 (a year before Pearl Harbor) prompted a leading Japanese journalist, Mr. Yesotaro Mori,[2] to write: "The passage of the anti-Japanese immigration bill... by the Philippine National Assembly makes a definite step forward in the Island's effort to drive out Japanese influence." [3] On the other hand, the Japanese government's reaction to this legislative action was revealed in the immediate filing by the Japanese Acting-Consul in Manila, of a memorandum with the Department of Labor of the Philippine Commonwealth Government, requesting for "the continuation of the fair and just treatment of Japanese immigrants to the Philippines" who had "always entered unrestricted" into the Islands.[4]

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[1] This paper was submitted to the Specialist Panel on Philipipne Foreign Minorities, at the April 1965 San Francisco Conference of the Association for Asian Studies. It is a preliminary study based on data gathered from a preliminary search of documentary or written sources as well as from open-ended, depth interviews with people (generally between 35 and 69 years of age) who could give information about the Japanese in pre-war Philippines. The plan of expanding the study into one of monographic length, involves the broadening of the base of data of this brief study. It includes a plan of using a systematized interview schedule for interviewing residents of selected areas in the Philippines where the Japanese had resided. Unless indicated, the sources of information are interviews with Filipino pre-war residents of Manila, Rizal, Ilocos Sur, Nueva Ecija, Mountain Province, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Cebu, Leyte, Cotabato, and Davao. Few in number, many of the interviews were conducted in Davao and Manila. The data gathered from them filled gaps left in the records.

I would like to acknowledge here, the help and/or criticisms of my friends and colleagues at the University of the Philippines: Dr. C. Parel of the Statistical Center; Dr. M. Concepcion, Acting-Director of the Institute of Demography; Prof. O.R. Angangco, Head of the Department of Sociology, and Prof. P.S. Manalang, Director of the Undergraduate Department, Graduate School of Education. I would also like to thank my research assistants: Mrs. Dolores L. Ventosa, who undertook interviews in Davao and helped me in the preliminary stages of the research, as well as Miss Teresita Corcuera, who undertook some interviews of informants in Manila and vicinity and gathered materials on the topic, wherever they were found. Except for Figure 3, all graphs used in this study were prepared from raw data by Mr. Pio A. Muñoz of the Statistical Center, University of the Philippines.

[2] Formerly Managing Editor of the **Osaka Mainichi** and Executive Editor of the **Japan Times and Mail**, Mr. Yesotaro Mori was then associated with the Foreign Affair Association of Japan. See note 42, chapter XXVIII of J. T. Hayden, **The Philippines. A Study in National Development** (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1945), 947.

[3] Quoted from Yesotaro Mori, "Close Doors in the Philippines," **Contemprorary Japan**, IX (June, 1940), 689-697, in **ibid.**, 725.

[4] "Jones talks on action of Nippon Envoy," **Herald**, July 21, 1939, 1. See also "Kihara lauds uniform quota for Orientals," **Bulletin**, January 28, 1939, 1. Both clippings are in the Manuel L. Quezon Collection, National Library, Manila. (Hereafter cited as Quezon Col.)

Both responses to the passage of the immigration bill in the National Assembly suggest the existence of a significant and/or influential Japanese minority in the Philippines before the outbreak of the Pacific war, early in December 1941. Four years before, President Manuel L. Quezon described and doing business in the Philippines..."[5] From 1918 to 1941, this Jap- this minority as consisting of "...Thousands of Japanese subjects residing anese minority was the second largest group of foreigners in the archipelago, next only to the Chinese which was about six and over four times larger than the Japanese in 1918 and 1939, respectively.[6]

While the Japanese minority lagged behind the Chinese in number, the quantitative increase of the Japanese in the Philippines before Pearl Harbor, based on the Census data (this does not include the possibility of officially unrecorded increases), is impressive: more than twenty-two times and less than three times increase within the 1903-1918 and 1918-1939 intercensal periods respectively, or in 1939, more than twenty times over the 1903 Census figures.[7] This increase is even more remarkable when we consider that, unlike the Chinese, there was hardly any Japanese settler in the Philippines at the turn of the century. For after Japan emerged in mid-nineteenth century from her isolation of over 250 years, available records indicate—among others—that there was only a negligible number of Japanese sojourners, contract laborers, Consular officials and personnel, traders as well as military men who were in the Philippines between the 1870's and the close of the century.[8]

The number of Japanese in the Philippines, viewed in terms of the total population of the Island, appears insignificant: 7,806 compared to the total Philippine population of 10,314,310 in 1918, and 29,262 to 16,000,303 in 1939. But when we consider this number of Japanese **vis a vis** the influence of its members upon prewar Philippine society, its importance looms large.

Essential to an understanding of the degree of a foreign minority group's impact upon its host country, is its social organization. Because of the present lack of data regarding the Japanese minorities in the other areas of the Philippines, this study of the Japanese social organization in the Philippines is limited to the case of Davao. It will, however, be preceded by a discussion of the general developments concerning the pre-war Japanese minority in the Philippines.

I

Available Philippine Census data of Japanese immigrants and emigrants before Pearl Harbor, cover only twenty-nine years: 1910-1939.[9] (See Figure

[5] Quoted from M. L. Quezon's speech delivered at a banquet in his honor in Tokyo, Japan, February 1937. **Messages of the President**, III, pt. I (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1938), 41.

[6] The Census of 1918 records the total Chinese population in the Philippines as 43,802 and the Japanese, 7,806. By 1939, the Census figures were: Chinese, 117,461; Japanese, 29,262.

[7] The Census of 1903 records 921 Japanese residents in the Philippines.

[8] See J. M. Saniel, **Japan and the Philippines** (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1963) especially chapters V, VII and VIII. See also E. J. Corpuz, "Japan and the Philippine Revolution," **Philippine Social Science Review**, VI (October, 1934), 249-296.

[9] The statistical data used are found in Table 22 of the Census of the Philippines for

1.) Throughout this period, the number of Japanese immigrants far exceeded that of emigrants except in 1922, 1932-1935 and in 1939, during which years there were absolute decreases of the Japanese in the Philippines, as a result of increases in the number of Japanese emigrants and decreases in the Japanese immigrants of the Islands.[10]

The number of Japanese emigrants from the Philippines fluctuated within a range of 100-3,000 emigrants, averaging more than 780 per year from 1910 to 1939, and reaching only one notable peak of 2,945 Japanese departing from the Philippines in 1939—the very year which saw the largest number of absolute decrease of Japanese population in the Islands.[11] Because of the escalation of Japan's war in China and the possibility of her being involved in a Pacific war against the enemies of her European allies—Germany and Italy—it is likely that this trend of absolute decrease of Japanese residents in the Philippines, continued until Pearl Harbor.

Japanese immigration, on the other hand, fluctuated within a range of 500-4,500 Japanese entering the Philippines, averaging more than 1,500 per year from 1907-1939 (around twice as many as the annual average number of emigrants, thus leaving a balance of an average annual increase) and reaching two marked peaks: 3,559 in 1918; 4,170 in 1937. Within the period under consideration (1910-1939), the four largest absolute increases in the number of Japanese in the Philippines took place during the following years: 1917, 3,304; 1918, 2,871;[12] 1927, 2,394;[13] and 1937, 2,235.[14]

1939, II (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1940), 106. The statistical data is presented in a graph, Figure 1, of this paper.

Also used as source of statistical data is the graph of the number of Japanese residents in Davao found in H. Kamabara, **Davao Hojin Kaitakushi** (The History of the Japanese [Residents] in Davao) (Davao: Nippi-Shimbunsha, 1938). See Figure 3 of this paper.

[10] The annual absolute decreases for 1932 to 1935 were comparatively significant and could perhaps be viewed in terms of the decline in the prices of abaca—a result of the economic depression of the early 1930's and the increasing effectivity of the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods in the Philippines—a consequence of the Manchurian incident and the Japanese aggressive activities in north China during the first half of the decade, as well as the increasing tariffs on Japanese goods in most countries of the West and in their respective colonies in Asia, as in the Philippines. The absolute decrease in 1922 was negligible.

[11] This decline might be ascribed to the overseas Japanese residents—especially women and children—returning to their homeland, as a result of the expansion of the undeclared Sino-Japanese war, the outbreak of the European war which called for increasing war preparations in Japan; possibly also, the approval of the Philippine immigration bill by the National Assembly in 1939.

[12] The boom in Japanese trade and industries as well as in the prices of abaca during World War I, and the sale of American-owned plantations in Davao to Japanese entrepreneurs in 1917 which created a greater demand for both Japanese technical men and cultivators, might have caused the absolute rise in number of Japanese residents in the Philippines in 1917 and 1918. In connection with the sale of the American-owned plantations, it should be recalled here that the United States entered World War I in 1917, the year after the Philippines was given full autonomy under the Jones Law. It was a time when speculations were rife about Japan's ambitions in Asia and the inability of the Philippines to defend itself, in case Japan would choose to make certain demands upon the Philippines, while the United States was involved in the European war. For the economic development of Japan during the first World War, see W.W. Lockwood, **The Economic Development of Japan. Growth and Structural Change, 1868-1938** (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1954), 38-42.

[13] The 1927 banking crisis in Japan took place two years earlier than in the West. At the time, economic opportunities in the homeland hardly kept pace with the larger


JAPANESE IMMIGRANTS AND EMIGRANTS
1907—1939
PHILIPPINE CENSUS, 1939, Vol. II
TABLE 22, p. 106
NUMBER OF PEOPLE
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
1907 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
YEAR
LEGEND: —•— IMMIGRANTS —o— EMIGRANTS

Figure 1

Comparing H. Kamabara's graph of the Japanese residents in Davao (see Figure 3) with the one depicting absolute increases and decreases of the Japanese population in the Philippines (see Figure 2), it can be noted that the trends of absolute increases or decreases observable in the latter are repeated in the former,[15] except during the first half of the 1930's. Within this period, there was an increase of Japanese residents in Davao, notwithstanding the general trend of an annual absolute decrease in the total Japanese population of the Philippines.[16]

Davao's total Japanese population in 1918 and in 1939 was over 34.5% and around 69% more than the total Japanese population of the other parts of the Philippines for the same years. Compared with Manila's, which ranked second in the size of its Japanese residents, Davao's was 177% more in 1918; in 1939, 277%. The range of the number of Japanese in each of the Philippine provinces, not including Davao and the city of Manila, varied in 1918 from O (in the provinces of Batanes, Antique, Capiz and Bohol) to 195 (in Laguna); in 1939, from 1 (in the provinces of Abra and Batanes) to 1,188 (in the Mountain Province).[17]

Outside of Davao and Manila, there were in 1918 only three provinces of Luzon and one in Mindanao with more than 100 Japanese: Laguna, Mountain Province, Zambales, and Zamboanga. Fourteen Philippine provinces—six in Luzon, five in the Visayas and three in Mindanao—had more than 100 Japanese by 1939: Mountain Province, Pampanga, Batangas, Laguna, Quezon (then Tayabas), Camarines Norte, Palawan, Masbate, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Cebu, Zamboanga, Cotabato and Misamis.[18]

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number of new job seekers pouring into the labor market each year as the population grew. This might account for the absolute increase of the number of Japanese immigrants in the Philippines in 1927. See Lockwood, **op. cit.**, 42-43.

[14] It is more different to attempt an explanation for the absolute increase of Japanese in the Islands in 1937, except perhaps, if there are proofs indicating that this increase resulted from the movement from China to the Philippines, of Japanese investors, agricultural cultivators, etc. Or, perhaps, the absolute increase of the number of Japanese in the Philippines in 1937, might have been encouraged by the sympathetic attitude of President Quezon towards the Japanese which is revealed in his statements to the press, after his return from his personal investigation of the so called "Davao problem," and his assurance of protection of Japanese rights of, and extension of courtesy to, the Japanese in the Philippines, during his Tokyo visit in February, 1937. See the record of the Press Conference held at Malacanang, May 8, 1936, Quezon Mss., Quezon Col. In this conference, President Quezon categorically denied the existence of the "Davao problem," adding "that it was ridiculous to believe that the Japanese control Davao." For President Quezon's speech in Tokyo, see the **Messages of the President, op. cit.**, 37-38.

[15] To cite some instances, when significant, absolute increases in the total Japanese population of the Philippines took place in 1917, and 1918, there was a parallel movement in the number of Japanese residents in Davao. The sudden decline of the number of absolute increase of the Japanese population in the Philippines between 1919 and 1923, had corresponding developments in Davao. And so was this parallel trend noticed in the marked expansion of the number of absolute increase of Japanese in the Philippines between 1923 and 1925.

[16] One can speculate that for reasons given in footnote 11, **supra**, the Japanese in the Philippines, who resided outside of Davao, decided either to return home or to move to Davao where, they might have thought, they had better chances to survive.

[17] The statistical data used are found in the **Philippine Census for 1939, op, cit.**, 428.

[18] **Ibid.**


INCREASE OR DECREASE OF JAPANESE IMMIGRANTS OVER JAPANESE EMIGRANTS IN THE PHILIPPINES: (1907—1939)
NUMBER OF PERSONS
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
-1,000
-2,000
1907 '08 '09 '10 '11 '12 '13 '14 '15 '16 '17 '18 '19 '20 '21 '22 '23 '24 '25 '26 '27 '28 '29 '30 '31 '32 '33 '34 '35 '36 '37 '38 '39
Y E A R
Source. Based on Table 22, Census of 1939 Vol. II, p.106

Figure 2


DAVAO HOJIN KAITAKUSHI
(HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE [RESIDENTS] IN DAVAO)
AVE. MARKET PRICE IN PESOS PER PICUL PER YEAR OF GRADE E ABACA
NUMBER OF PERSONS
55
(13,500) 50
(12,000) 45
(10,500) 40
(9,000) 35
(7,500) 30
(6,000) 25
(4,500) 20
(3,000) 15
(1,500) 10
(0) 5
1903 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10 '11 '12 '13 '14 '15 '16 '17 '18 '19 '20 '21 '22 '23 '24 '25 '26 '27 '28 '29 '30 '31 '32 '33 '34 '35 '36 '37
AT THE BEGINNING
THE PERIOD OF DEVELOPMENT
FIRST BOOM PERIOD
FIRST BAD PERIOD
SECOND BOOM PERIOD
SECOND BAD PERIOD
LEGEND:
DAVAO JAPANESE RESIDENTS.
AVERAGE MARKET PRICE PER PICUL, PER YEAR OF GRADE-F ABACA.
NOTE:
1915 EXCEPT FOR DECEMBER.
1916 FROM SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER.
1918 EXCEPT MAY AND DECEMBER.
1919 EXCEPT MARCH.
1937 UP TO NOVEMBER, 1937.
SOURCE:
KAMABARA HIROJI, DAVAO HOJIN KAITAKUSHI (HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE [RESIDENTS] IN DAVAO) (DAVAO: NIPPI-SHIMBUNSHA, 1938).
NOTE: ON NUMBER OF JAPANESE IN DAVAO. (H. KAMABARA).
1. The statistical data for 1903–1909 are based on estimates, not on written records.
2. From 1919 to 1936, the statistical data are based on the report the Japanese Association made annually, on October 1.

Figure 3

If the Philippines is divided into ten regions, according to the classification of the Philippine Statistical Survey of Households (PSSH) of the Bureau of Census,[19] (see Figure 4) we can make—among others—the following generalizations about the Japanese population in these regions: (1) there were significant increases of Japanese residents between 1918 and 1939 in all ten regions except in Region II,[20] Region IV[21] and Region V;[22] (2) the regions of highest concentration of Japanese were Region I (Manila) and Region IX (includes Davao); (3) the region of least concentration of Japanese were Region II and Region X.[23]

In all ten regions, the number of Japanese males in 1918 was much greater than the number of Japanese females—the number of males being about fifteen times that of Japanese females in Region IX[24] (includes Davao); five times, in Region V; four times in Region VI,[25] Region VII,[26] Region VIII,[27] as well as Region X and only three times, in Region I (Manila).[28] But while the numerical superiority of Japanese males existed in all ten regions in 1918 (see Figure 5) thus making inter-marriage very possible, the Census figures of 1939 seem to support a Filipino anthropologist's assumption that the Japanese residents in the Philippines "did not inter-marry extensively with the native population."[29]Out of a total of 29,262 Japanese in the Philippines in 1939 (after over three decades of Japanese settlement in the Philippines, preceding Pearl Harbor) only 884 males married Filipino women, 874 of whom chose to retain their Filipino citizenship and only 10 took their husband's.[30] Was this because of the ease in arranging for Japanese females to marry Japanese overseas males who could choose their future brides from among pictures furnished them by middlemen based in Japan(the "picture bride")? Was it because Japanese males were averse to marrying Filipino females and Filipino females not generally disposed to marrying Japanese males? Or was it a combination of all these reasons and, perhaps, others? Definite answers to these questions are not easy to make because—unlike countries, such as Peru, where there lived a pre-war Japanese minority group which has remained in the country until today[31]—in the Philippines, hardly any prewar Japanese residents survived death or post-war repatriation to Japan. Identifying those who are still alive among the former residents of the Philippines, and interviewing them today would be most difficult.

[19] See Figure 4 of this paper.
[20] Ilocos Sur, Ilocos Norte, Abra, Batanes and La Union.
[21] Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Pangasinan, Tarlac, Bataan and Zambales.
[22] Batangas, Cavite, Palawan, Quezon, Laguna, Marinduque, and Rizal.
[23] Agusan, Bukidnon, Lanao, Misamis, and Surigao.
[24] Sulu, Zamboanga, Cotabato, Davao.
[25] Albay, Camarines Sur, Camarines Norte, Catanduanes, Masbate, Sorsogon.
[26] Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Siquijor Is., Aklan, Antique, Capiz and Romblon.
[27] Bohol, Cebu, Leyte, Samar.
[28] See Figure 4 of this paper.
[29] See M. Tangco, "The Christian Peoples of the Philippines," **Natural and Applied Science Bulletin**, XI, No. 1 (January—March, 1951), 99.
[30] Census for 1939, op. cit., 296-397.
[31] See M. Titiev, "The Japanese Colony in Peru," **The Far Eastern Quarterly**, X, No. 3 (May, 1951), 227-247. See also "50,000 Japanese from 3 Generations Live in Peru," **Manila Bulletin**, December 16, 1965, III.


JAPANESE POPULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES
BY REGION: 1918—1939
POPULATION IN THOUSANDS
20
15
10
5
0
1918
1939
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
REGION
MANILA
ILOCOS SUR
ILOCOS NORTE
ABRA
LA UNION
CAGAYAN
ISABELA
MT. PROVINCE
NUEVA VIZCAYA
BULACAN
NUEVA ECIJA
PAMPANGA
TARLAC
ZAMBALES
BATANGAS
CAVITE
PALAWAN
RIZAL
ALBAY
CAMARINES SUR
CAMARINES NORTE
SORSOGON
MASBATE
ILOILO
NEGROS OCC.
CAPIZ
ROMBLON
CEBU
LEYTE
SAMAR
SULU
ZAMBOANGA
COTABATO
DAVAO
AGUSAN
BUKIDNON
LANAO
MISAMIS
SURIGAO
PHILIPPINE CENSUS, 1939 Vol.II p.428
1918 Vol.II pp.332-333

Figure 4


CITIZENSHIP AND SEX BY REGION
JAPANESE: 1918
POPULATION
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
REGION
LEGEND: MALE FEMALE
PHILIPPINE CENSUS, 1918 - pp. 352-355

Figure 5

Whether the Japanese residing in the Philippines continued speaking their language, can be answered by comparing, on the one hand, the 1939 Census figures of the Japanese residents recorded in 1918 as well as in 1939 and, on the other, the data on the number of people who spoke Japanese in 1939 in each province of the Philippines as well as in Manila. With these two sets of statistical data in view, it can be said that the negligible balance between the two varied slightly.[32] This would suggest that both the first and second generation Japanese in the Philippines, during almost four decades of this century, appear to have persisted in speaking their language—without, of course, eliminating the possibility of their acquiring an ability to communicate in one or more of the Filipino languages. What seems interesting to point out is that in three of the four ranking areas in size of their Japanese population in 1918 and in 1939 (Manila, Davao and the Mountain Province), a negative balance was recorded, while in the province of Rizal, the positive balance was an exceptional high of 502 speakers in Japanese.[33]

What were the occupations of these Japanese residents in the Philippines who persisted in speaking their own language? It is well to note here the kinds of occupation in which they were involved and compare their number in each occupation to that of the Chinese, numerically the leading foreign minority in the Philippines[34] (see Figure 6).

The Japanese entered all the recorded occupations in the Islands: the non-gainful, and each of the eleven Philippine Census categories of gainful occupations.[35] Except in agriculture and fishing, the Chinese numerically exceeded the Japanese in every occupation, with the total number of Chinese involved in trade far outstripping the over-all number of Japanese engaged in all occupations of the Philippines. Over 6,700 Japanese compared to more than 1,200 Chinese were engaged in agriculture; in fishing, upward of 1,500 Japanese to less than 100 Chinese. A considerable number of offshore fishing establishments were operated by Japanese for Filipino owners. The former, operated only upward of 400 thousand pesos or 0.9% of a total of 46 million pesos assets of all fishing establishments in the Philippines in 1939; the latter, more than 43 million pesos or 94.8%.[36] In the late thirties, direct Japanese investments in the Philippines increased and became more diversified

[32] The balance varied from 1 (in Abra) to 57 (in Quezon, then Tayabas province) more people speaking Japanese in 1939 than the total recorded Japanese residents in a particular area (not including the exceptional high of 502 more people speaking Japanese in Rizal province); from 3 (in Bukidnon and Bataan) to 106 (in Davao) less people speaking Japanese than the Japanese living in a community (the high of 959 less people speaking Japanese in the Mountain Province is not included). For statistical data, see **Census for 1939, op. cit.**, 367-373, 428. See also **Census for 1918** (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1920), II, 352-353.

[33] It might be because, according to a respondent, a significant number of the members of the **Makapili**—a pro-Japanese organization established during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines—came from Rizal province and many of them had learned Japanese before the war.

[34] For statistical data, see **Census for 1939, op. cit.**, II, 505-521.

[35] They are: (1) Agriculture, (2) Domestic and Personal Services, (3) Professional Services, (4) Public Services, (5) Fishing, (6) Forestry and Hunting, (7) Mining and Quarrying, (8) Manufacturing and Mechanical Industries, (9) Transportation and Communication, (10) Trade, and (11) Clerical. See Figure 6 of this paper.

[36] See **Census for 1939, op. cit.**, IV, 351.


OCCUPATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES, BY CITIZENSHIP
JAPAN AND CHINA; 1939
PHILIPPINE CENSUS 1939, Vol. II, pp. 205-221
PERSONS IN THOUSANDS
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
JAPAN: MALE
FEMALE
CHINA: MALE
FEMALE
A B C D E F G H I J K
GAINFUL OCCUPATION
NON GAINFUL OCCUPATIONS
STUDENTS
DEPENDENTS
RETIRED AND
OCCUPATION UNKNOWN
A - AGRICULTURE
B - DOMESTIC AND PERSONAL SERVICES
C - PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
D - PUBLIC SERVICES
E - FISHING
F - FORESTRY & HUNTING
G - MINING & QUARRYING
H - MANUFACTURING & MECH'L. INDUSTRIES
I - TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
K - TRADE
J - CLERICAL

Figure 6

while it is likely that Japanese capital (which is difficult to ascertain) was indirectly invested in mining and manufacturing (especially in textiles) under the cover of Filipino names in order to circumvent the law covering foreign ownership in certain sectors of the Philippine economy.[37] The Japanese also worked for Filipino farm owners and/or lessors of public lands in Davao, where the Japanese in the Philippines mainly undertook their agricultural pursuits.

In the late thirties, while the number of Japanese involved in Philippine trade fell very far behind that of the Chinese, the former were fast developing a system of retailing (the Japanese response to the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods in the early part of the decade) which seemed to rival that of the Chinese in the Philippines. This was perhaps because Japanese retail shops were more modern and attractive than most of the Chinese shops, were financially backed by the great business houses of Japan and supported by branches of two Japanese banks in Manila.[38]

These banks must also have been involved in the trade between Japan and the Philippines. The general trend of trade between 1900 and 1938 indicate a fluctuation of imports within a range of more than 850 pesos in 1900 and over 32 million in 1920; exports, over 500 thousand pesos in 1910 and more than twenty million in 1937. Imports exceeded exports for all years—that is, the balance of trade was unfavorable to the Philippines from 1900 to 1938—except in 1901, 1903 and 1912 when exports left imports behind and in 1904, 1915 and 1916 when imports and exports were practically balanced. The gap between imports and exports increased tremendously in 1918 when imports exceeded exports by around 64.5% and widened in 1920 when it was 116%; another wide gap is noted in 1937 when imports was around 61% more than exports. It might be pertinent to recall here that the last gap occurred in the same year the number of Japanese immigrants into the Philippines reached a second peak which was higher than the first one of 1918[39] (see Figure 7).

Early in the 1920's, Japan became the second leading market for Philippine exports, a position she alternately occupied with Great Britain in the twenties on to the beginning of the thirties, and then continuously held from 1933 to, perhaps, 1940 when the United States Embargo on trading in strategic goods with Japan, applied to the Philippines. Mainly consisting of Philippine cash crops, sugar and abaca took the lead in the Philippine exports list of the 1920's with lumber and scrap iron—among others—added to it in the thirties.[40] Japan also held a leading position as a source of Philippine imports early in the twenties, and continued in this place through the next decade, except during the period of comparatively effective Chinese boycott of Japanese goods in the early thirties.[41] By 1937, despite her entry into the

[37] Hayden, op. cit., 713.
[38] Ibid., 713-714.
[39] See Census for 1939, op. cit., 240. See also Figure 1 of this paper.
[40] See the annual reports of the Insular Collector of the Bureau of Customs covering the 1920's and the 1930's.
[41] Ibid.


PHILIPPINES — JAPAN TRADE RELATIONS:
1900 — 1938
BULLETIN OF PHILIPPINE STATISTICS, 1939, p. 240
PESOS IN MILLIONS
30,000,000
25,000,000
20,000,000
15,000,000
10,000,000
5,000,000
0
1900 02 04 06 08 10 11 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38
YEAR
IMPORTS FROM JAPAN
EXPORTS TO JAPAN

Figure 7

Sino-Japanese war, Japan placed second to the United States in her total trade with the Philippines which was more than 52 million pesos.[42]

The Philippine-Japan trade would add up to a more favorable balance for Japan, if we consider Japanese services to the Philippines, such as transporting part of the country's imports and exports. As early as 1918, Japan became the third ranking (following the United States and Great Britain) in the number of vessels engaged in the foreign carrying trade of the Philippines.[43] She kept this position in 1925, even placing second to Great Britain during the last six months of 1933;[44] it is likely that she kept close to the first three positions in the carrying trade of the Philippines until Pearl Harbor.[45]

II

The outbreak of the last Pacific war and the subsequent Japanese occupation of the Philippines, confirmed the pre-war Filipino fear of Japan's intentions towards their country. An attempt will be made here to view the social organization of the Japanese minority in the Philippines—with Davao as a case study—as part of the larger social system, that is, the Japanese empire.

The empire of Japan which was dismembered at the end of the war, theoretically centered at the top in the emperor, who was considered co-extensive with the national polity (**kokutai**), and also the father of the nation—a family writ large. At the base of this social system's vertical hierarchy, was the Japanese family which was also vertically and hierarchically organized and controlled from the top by the father of the nuclear family, upwards by the house head, village head and ultimately by the emperor whose decisions were, in fact, those of Japan's national leaders working behind their divine emperor. The family system was the model for all other pre-war social groups in Japan, including economic groups which were also vertically and hierarchically organized from the small-scale family industries at the base, upwards in the family-owned-and-managed **zaibatsu** cartels—vast interlocking national and international business and commercial enterprises which could be manipulated from the top of the larger system. The decision-makers at the top held the power (behind the emperor) to allocate government subsidy to business and commercial concerns. Consequently, it was not the demands of the market but the national goals, set down by these decision-makers, which directed these economic groups' investment, production and other economic activities.[46]

Within the family system encompassed by the larger social system, conformity and hierarchy are the inevitable results; the individual is always

[42] "P. I. Foreign Trade Remained Healthy in 1957," **The Tribune**, April 1, 1938, 10.
[43] **Census of 1918**, op. cit., IV, pt. 2, 669.
[44] U.S. Governor General of the Philippine Islands, **Annual Report, 1933**, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1933, House Doc., no. 32 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1935), 19.
[45] This speculation is made on the basis of Japan's increasing total trade with the Philippines during the period, in the absence of available data at the time this paper was written.
[46] This theoretical framework is discussed more closely in J.M. Saniel, "The Mobilization of Traditional Values in the Modernization of Japan," in **Religion and Progress in**

aware of the group's judgment of his deeds. He is conditioned to recognize his "proper station" within the hierarchy, to accept directions from above, and to submerge his interests within those of his group. Group condemnation is the primary sanction for non-conforming behavior, a control mechanism which causes "shame" and "loss of face" to the individual.

It can generally be assumed that the first group of Japanese settlers, who came to the Philippines in the first decade of this century, were socialized within the aforementioned family system. They could have been educated under the educational system which was reformed in 1890 to facilitate control from the top and indoctrinate the students in the traditional values of filial piety and loyalty to parents and to the divine emperor. Moreover, these early Japanese migrants were participants in the larger social system, described earlier, which had been pushed by Japan's decision-makers into a successful war with China in 1894-1895, and, ten years later, with Russia.

It can also be supposed that these first generation Japanese residents of the Philippines and the other first generation Japanese who arrived in the Islands in later years, tended to behave as they were conditioned within the Japanese family system, thus making it possible for the values of the social system — filial piety and loyalty — to be transmitted to the next generation. The strength of these values varied according to the presence or absence within the community where the Japanese settled, of reinforcing institutions (such as Japanese schools) and/or social groups or associations. It should also be stated here that the members of the pre-war Japanese minority in the Philippines could have consisted mainly of first and second generation Japanese, if we take thirty years as the span of a generation. Furthermore, they were close enough to the Japanese home islands and closer to the southernmost part of the Japanese empire—Taiwan—to feel secure and maintain contact with other members of their extended families back home as well as keep abreast with the developments in the larger social system.

With the preceding frame of reference and assumptions in view, an attempt will be made to look at the social organization of the Japanese minority in Davao. This does not imply that the conception of social organization of this minority applies to other Japanese minorities located elsewhere in the Philippines. It is quite possible that the social organization of these other groups varied. If such variations did exist, the data to support this notion have yet to be obtained.

Available data suggest that in spite of geographical separation from the home islands, the degree of integration of this Japanese minority in Davao with the larger social system was greater than its integration with the alien social groups surrounding it. With the latter, one can presuppose a minimum amount of interaction and accommodation sufficient for its survival in an alien setting. This also implies the non-occurrence of assimilation with Philippine society and culture—except, perhaps, of some Okinawans who married Bagobo (indigenous minority) wives—[47] and the retention of its identity as a Jap-

Modern Asia, ed. by R.N. Bellah (New York: The Free Press, 1965), 124—149.

[47] See discussion on the two kinds of Japanese in Davao—the Non-Okinawan and the Okinawan (who dressed and spoke differently) and discrimination existing between

anese social organization. Unremarkable as this hypothesis may seem, it is necessary to validate it with supporting positive evidence. Besides, compared, for instance, with the second generation descendants of diverse ethnic immigrant groups to countries like America—whose aspirations center largely on cultural identification with the majority—this continuing cohesiveness and voluntary segregation of the Japanese minority in Davao, seem to indicate the strength and the power of the Japanese social organization and its underlying major value orientations. Of course, had the state of affairs in Davao extended beyond a second generation, there is no way of determining what could have happened. The continued geographic separation and increasing interaction with Philippine society might have reduced this high degree of integration. Historically, however, this has become academic. The Japanese residents of Davao who survived the last war, were repatriated to Japan and their lands and other properties—confiscated during the war—were disposed to Filipinos after the war.

Records have it that a year after their arrival in Davao in 1903 to work in the Awad plantation, many of this first group of Japanese cultivators, led by Suda Ryosaku, departed. They were followed in 1904 by another group which was composed of part of the Japanese contract labor team constructing the Kennon road leading to Baguio. This group—together with those who joined Oda Ryosaburo (otherwise known in the Philippines as K.S. Ohta) to Davao in 1905, formed the nucleus of what was to develop into the Japanese minority in Davao.[48] Having visited places in the Pacific and Asia as a result of his country's promotion of overseas development, and with his entrepreneurial experience,[49] it was no surprise to find Oda the leader of the Japanese in Davao. Always a "sympathetic listener" but also "a stern adviser," Oda assumed the responsibility of looking after his countrymen's welfare.[50] Socialized within the Japanese family system, the loyalty of these Japanese was automatically due Oda, the accepted head of the group.

The group expended as Oda's investments increased through the Ohta Development Company founded in 1907. A greater demand for Japanese labor was created and those who migrated to Davao either brought their families with them or waited after they were settled, before getting married. It is easy to imagine the expansion of the group who owed loyalty to Oda. Similar social relations were established between other Japanese entrepreneurs who invested in Davao, like Furukawa Yoshizo—founder of the Furukawa Plantation Company, and Akamine Saburo who managed the South Mindanao Company.[51]

These economic groups appear to represent the only group larger than the family and the group of three to five households within which the Jap-

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them, in C. E. Cody, "The Japanese Way of Life in Davao," **Philippine Studies**, VIII, No. 2 (April, 1959), 174.

[48] See Chronicle of Events in Kamabara, **op. cit.** Compare the facts in this chronicle with pertinent facts found in C. E. Cody, "The Consolidation of the Japanese in Davao," **Comment** (Third Quarter, 1958), 23—26.

[49] He was the manager of a partnership with his brother—the Japanese General Import Company of Manila—which Oda liquidated before he departed for Davao.

[50] Cody, "The Consolidation...," **op. cit.**, 25-27.

[51] For details about Furukawa and Akamine and their respective companies, see Cody, **Ibid.**, 29-31, 33.

anese in Davao could be integrated and directed, before the establishment of the Davao Japanese Association in 1916. But the loyalty of the members of such economic groups was inevitably drawn upwards to the center of the larger social system—the divine emperor—who had power to channel disciplined social action towards national ends which took precedence over other goals. This was obvious to a knowledgeable Filipino lawyer who wrote in 1935: "As a people, the Japanese are very nationalistic, and as such can never became Filipinos. Their traditions, religion, history and training make them so homogenous and compact. They are, and will remain, loyal to their Emperor..."[52]

How homogenous and cohesive were the Japanese minority in Davao? Occupying the choicest lands along the Gulf of Davao—extending from Malita in the southwest coast of the Gulf, northwards through Padada, Santa Cruz, Davao city, Guianga, Panabo, Tagum and along the eastern coast of the Gulf, southwards to Pantukan, Lupon and Sigaboy—these Japanese seem to have avoided settling in the interior, except in Compostela to the north. The center of control of the Japanese residents in Davao, which was also the major area of Japanese concentration, appears to have been the Davao City–Guianga area, the first area where Oda's company acquired its first portion of the public lands.[53] It was also in this area where the largest concentration of lands cultivated by Japanese as well as a number of Japanese corporations were located.[54] On this strip of land bounding Davao Gulf, the Japanese increased in number[55] as their economic role in Davao grew.

Conditioned in the family to accept the values and norms of the group for the interest and success of the group, these industrious, frugal and skillful Japanese succeeded in the economic penetration and development of Davao. At that time, the other inhabitants of the area were people with different value orientations who were neither as well organized nor as solidly financed[56] as the Japanese. The latter exploited Davao's rich natural resources in various ways and were invariably aware of the necessity of, at least, appearing as law-abiding and civic-minded alien residents,[57] if they were to attain the goals of their group. Thus, the Davao Japanese were often seen making frequent visits to lawyers and notaries, perhaps, to assure themselves that they were doing what was legally right.[58]

Though "intensely...Japanese" and self-sufficient, the Japanese in Davao were "...smooth, conciliatory and decent" in their relations with the local

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[52] Quoted from page 7 of the June 24, 1935 report of Atty. Teodasio Trinidad, Bureau of Lands Inspector, in Cody, "Japanese Way...," **op. cit.**, 180.

[53] See Cody, "The Consolidation...," **op. cit.**, 27.

[54] See E. Rodriguez report on Japanese corporations in Davao in the Manila **Sunday Tribune**, February 17, 1935, 1.

[55] See chart of Kamabara on the Japanese residents in Davao, figure 3 of this paper.

[56] See "Nippon Davao farmers are well financed," the **Manila Bulletin**, May 8, 1939, 17. See also "A Lesson from Davao," the **Manila Times**, October 31, 1917, quoted in Cody, "The Japanese Way...," **op. cit.**, 173.

[57] **Ibid., et passim.**

[58] See **Ibid.**, 175. For the Japanese who are conditioned to behave according to a set of norms within his own social organization, it was necessary for him to be guided—at least, by law—in his activities within an alien society.

population, even with the Bagobos who killed some of the Japanese pioneers.[59] According to a Public Land Inspector, sometime in 1919-1920, despite the deaths of some Japanese, "some other Japanese takes up the dead man's work like a soldier filling in a gap in the rank... For this [i.e., the acquisition of more lands] they were willing to sacrifice a few lives as an unvoidable part of the price they must pay."[60]

To insure their success in Davao, the Japanese turned to their traditional social group of three to five households to protect themselves within Bagobo territory, and maintain "proper" relations with the non-Japanese inhabitants—especially with ranking local and national government officials whom they entertained and to whom they offered their services and facilities. (It is said that Mr. C. Murakami—the largest Japanese individual private land owner in Davao—often entertained national government officials visiting Davao.) Joining associations such as the local Rotary Club or the Chamber of Commerce, Davao resident Japanese freely contributed to civic and charitable drives of the non-Japanese community. Yet, the Filipinos in Davao generally felt that the Japanese, as a whole, kept to themselves.

By 1920, the Japanese community in Davao consisted of Japanese entrepreneurs, businessmen and consular officials, on the top with the Japanese laborers as well as agricultural cultivators at the base. Most of them were married to Japanese. The men either returned to Japan to get married or sent for their brides ("picture brides").[61] The women's marriages were traditionally arranged by their parents who—when they could afford it—sent their daughters back to Japan for an education and marriage.[62] These Japanese families manifested a strong paternal authority.

Each family was usually self-sufficient, especially those living in farms who visited the town or city only to buy supplies from Japanese cooperative stores and to visit the Japanese Association's headquarters in Davao city. When the man of the house was a ranking businessman or consular official or non-agricultural worker, his wife generally stayed at home and did not enjoy the freedom to socialize with other members of the local community as did the Filipino women; if a farmer, his wife was often seen working with him in the fields.[63] In Davao city, the affluent Japanese lived in well-appointed suburban houses while the employees and laborers, in cottages and tenements, respectively, or in apartments or rooms rented from local owners which were built and furnished in non-Japanese style. The Japanese houses in rural areas,

[59] O. L. Walkup, "The Bagobo-Japanese Land Troubles in Davao Province," Part I (Confidential reports written to the Director of Lands in 1919-1920), in O. Beyer, **Philippine Ethnographic Series VI, Pagan Mindanao** (typescript), 11.

[60] Ibid., 8-9.

[61] See "Japanese Bachelor Residents of Davao want 6,000 Picture Brides," the **Manila Sunday Tribune**, May 17, 1931, 1. This report was denied in the same news release by the Japanese Consul perhaps because of the apprehensions in the Philippines about the Japanese plans in Asia. However, until today, the practice of "picture brides" married to overseas Japanese continues. See "19 Brides," the **Manila Daily Mirror**, March 11, 1965, 2, covering the proxy marriages of nineteen Japanese brides to Japanese farm workers in Brazil.

[62] Cody, "Japanese Way...," op. cit., 183.

[63] Loc. cit.

especially in Calinan and Daliao of the Guianga district, were low and unpainted, reminding the onlooker of similar structures in Japan. And as in Japan, guests at these houses removed their shoes before entering.

Both rural and urban Japanese, in any case, preferred Japanese food and drink and ate with chopsticks. The men usually wore Western-style clothes. However, the rural Japanese women wore their native attire while their urban sisters were seen more often in Western-style dresses. Within their homes, the Japanese spoke their language, although communication between the educated Japanese and inhabitants of Davao belonging to the same level, was in English; among the Japanese and non-Japanese residents of Davao, at the base, conversation was carried out in a mixture of Spanish and two of the Filipino languages—Visayan and Tagalog—referred to as "Abaca Spanish."

Japanese children could go to two Japanese primary schools from 1924. And even when a high school department was added to one of them, the pattern was for these children—especially the boys—to be educated in Japan after their elementary training. So far, it has been hard to check who underwrote the expenses of those whose parents lacked funds. The establishment of nine more Japanese schools in various places in Davao between 1933 and 1937,[64] could have resulted from the increasing Japanese population in the province and/or related to the need of reinforcing the transmission to the next generation—through indoctrination in school—of the values of filial piety and loyalty to the emperor, the center of the larger social system. These values, we recall, were first internalized within the Japanese family system and were crucially important in channeling cohesive social action as a response to directives—whether overt or covert—from the top. During the decade of the thirties, the larger social entity was faced with the repercussions of Japan's aggressive moves in Asia. Therefore, except English teachers, all administrators and instructors in Davao's Japanese schools totalling twelve in 1939, were recruited from Japan and were comparatively well paid. Guided by the teaching methods used in Japan, the Japanese children—initially disciplined within the family in unquestioningly obeying its head—were further conditioned to behave in this manner within a larger social institution: the school. The sight of disciplined Japanese students in the classroom made an observer compare it to what one sees in a military academy.[65] It is reasonable to conjecture that the Davao Japanese school's curriculum was similar to the homeland's, if any of the students eventually continued, as they did, their education in Japan, and if these schools were supervised by agents of Japan's Ministry of Education.[66]

The retention by a number of Davao Japanese residents of their Shinto and/or Buddhist beliefs and practices, manifested by the establishment of Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples in Davao—especially in the Davao City-

[64] See Chronicle of Events in Kamabara, op. cit. See also Cody, "Japanese Way...," op. cit., 181.

[65] Cited from the 1938 **Visitor's Guide, City of Davao, Queen City of Mindanao** in Cody, "Japanese Way...," **Ibid.**, 181. See also the **Manila Tribune**, April 29, 1939, 2.

[66] R. H. Soriano, "Japanese Occupation of the Philippines with Special Reference to Japanese Propaganda: 1941-1946" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1948), microfilm copy in the library of the Graduate School of Public Administration, 88.

Guianga area [67]—intensified the integration and the cohesiveness of this minority as it simultaneously reinforced the barrier that served to segregate this minority from the non-Japanese residents. Segregation of the Japanese minority was further strengthened by the Japanese practice of policing themselves and settling outside of court civil and even criminal cases when anyone of them was the aggrieved party;[68] by their maintaining two hospitals employing Filipino doctors and Japanese nurses; publishing their own daily newspaper and other periodicals; building statues honoring prominent Davao Japanese leaders like Oda and Mikami, not to mention the establishment of their own radio station, market, moviehouse and other amusement places.[69]

These obvious manifestations of Japanese society and culture in Davao, must have caused Manila reporters and writers of articles covering the Davao Japanese in the thirties, to describe the Japanese villages in Davao as "Japanized villages." [70] The non-Japanese inhabitants of Davao were heard referring to Davao City as "Little Tokyo" and to the nearby town of Mintal in Guianga with its Japanese-owned industries, as "Little Nagasaki." [71] W. J. Anderson, in his book entitled **The Philippine Problem,**[72] pictured Davao as part of Philippine territory which the Japanese "are running practically as an independent state. . . ."

What these reporters and writers seem to have missed perceiving was the operation of the strongly integrated social organization of the Davao Japanese, which could have been manipulated by Japan's national leaders—operating behind the emperor—at the top of the larger social system encompassing it. Manipulation could have been done in two ways: through the Japanese business or commercial corporations in Davao and through the Davao Japanese Association, in conjunction with the Japanese Consulate of the province.

It is needless to point out here that the Japanese business and commercial enterprises in Davao depended largely upon the **zaibatsu** cartels and financial institutions in the homeland for aid and direction in conducting their economic activities. But these **zaibatsu**—interlocking business and commercial houses as well as financial institutions—in turn, depended upon government subsidy. In turn, the allocation of government subsidy was decided by Japan's policy-making group functioning behind the emperor. Therefore, it is conceivable as well as possible (probable?) that these decision-makers (at the center of the larger social system) manipulated the economic group within it towards the attainment of national goals. In the thirties, these goals were obviously oriented towards Japan's leadership in Asia.

[67] See the map of the pre-war center of Japanese Settlement in Davao (the Davao City — Guianga Area) indicating the buildings within the area, which is attached to the text of Kamabara, **op. cit.**

[68] See Cody, "The Japanese Way. . . ," **op. cit., et passium.** See also O. L. Walkup, **op. cit., et passim.** One respondent cited a case of theft of a bicycle committed by a Japanese against another Japanese which was settled out of court; the thief was ostracized by the Japanese residents of Calinan where the theft was committed.

[69] Kamabara, **op. cit.,** 164.

[70] See, for instance, the **Manila Sunday Tribune,** October 23, 1932. See also T.V. Nano, "To Save or not to Save Davao," **Commonwealth Advocate,** I, No. 10 (October-November, 1935), 43.

[71] Cody, "Japanese Way. . . ," **op. cit.,** 182.

[72] (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), 277-280.

When, for instance, Japan's decision-makers decided to undertake the expansion of the Japanese navy during the third decade of the century, the project could have necessitated a larger supply of rope made of abaca fiber or hemp which, at the time, was practically supplied by Davao. The delivery of the required quota to the navy could have been directed from the top to the head of the house of one or more of the **zaibatsu** family cartels which dealt with hemp production and trade in Davao. Take, for instance, the Itoh cartel of the wealthy Itoh family of Osaka. The Itoh house could have been made to deliver to the navy a certain quota of hemp at particular periods of time. The head of the Itoh house could have then communicated the required quota to Furukawa Yoshizo—the founder of the Furukawa Plantation Company in Davao—who was married to one of the Itoh daughters. On the basis of scattered pieces of information from respondents and insights derived from other sources, an attempt can be made to reconstruct what could have taken place in Davao regarding the delivery of the quota of hemp required by the head of the larger social entity. Furukawa—either directly or indirectly, through his representative—could have done one or all of three things: (1) contact non-Japanese plantation owners and arrange for the purchase of their produce; (2) farm shares of the quota to managers of Furukawa-controlled plantation who, in turn, could have divided their respective quotas among foremen of the plantation in charge of making the laborers work to deliver their quota; (3) contact Furukawa-aided sub-agents running stores or trading stations, to purchase part of the quota from individual Japanese families producing abaca on land which they owned, or leased or subleased from Filipino owners or lessors (in this last instance, the family head looked after the delivery of the amount needed).

Barring unforseen natural disasters, it is safe to hazard a guess that the deliveries required by the decision-makers at the top of the larger social system could have been made, if we view the aforementioned social process as being undertaken within the vertical, hierarchical social organization of the Japanese family and the economic group concerned, as well as the value orientation of the social organization which gave priority to the attainment of the larger social system's goals. Within this context, it can perhaps be said that this system of manipulation for national ends (from the top of the larger social system) of a business corporation concerned with the production of, and trade in, Davao abaca, could have been repeated **vis a vis** the other corporations dealing in other agricultural production and trade like coconut and coconut products as well as in other economic activities such as lumbering, manufacturing, retailing and fishing in which the Davao Japanese corporations were heavily invested.

Another means of channeling cohesive social action to the top of the larger social system, could have been through the Davao Japanese Association. By the eve of Pearl Harbor, the Davao Japanese Association had expanded from a small organization established in 1916 (four years before the establishment of a Japanese Consulate in Davao) for the promotion of mutual friendship and profit among its members, into a large one claiming all the Japanese residents of Davao as members. Quartered close to the Japanese Consulate in

Davao city, and exercising functions which could have been those of the Consulate, it can be surmised that the Association worked closely with the Consulate.

The Davao Japanese Association took charge of the census of Japanese arrivals and departures in the province as well as a record of births, marriages and deaths—always ready to aid Japanese who lacked funds to start their economic endeavors in Davao or to tide them through an emergency. The Association retained lawyers who appeared in court with their Japanese clients who were also furnished with interpreters by the Japanese Association. Through a committee composed of ranking members of the Association, it usually took charge of investigating cases which did not involve non-Japanese or if they did, when a Japanese was the aggrieved party. Generally, such cases were settled out of court.

The Association also exercised police functions to protect the rights and reputation of the Japanese in Davao and to keep them from any legal tangles with any non-Japanese. With contributions from its members, the Association—by 1939—had established twelve Japanese primary schools which it administered and supervised, in addition to a training school to orient new Japanese arrivals in the "proper" way of living life and carrying on "proper" relations with the non-Japanese residents in Davao. The rudiments and procedures of conducting business profitably in Davao were also taught in this training school which published in a booklet the basic rules and regulations each Japanese was to observe.

Besides extending long-term loans to farmers who were starting life in Davao, the Association took charge of depositing its members' savings in Tokyo banks. It also furnished the capital for, and managed the Japanese cooperatives in Davao which were aided by the **Kumiai** or neighborhood associations, in the sale of goods directly to Japanese families. The Japanese in Davao were made to buy their supplies only from these cooperatives which specialized in selling Japanese goods. Finally, whenever the Japanese in Davao protested some act of the Philippine government—as they protested the application of the 1919 land law to certain categories of land they had cultivated—the Japanese Association brought such matters before the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, though after the Consulate was established in Davao in 1920, it was the Consul with which the Association dealt to take action with Tokyo.

Led by ranking members of Davao's Japanese community who were, in some instances, also heads of business or commercial concerns in Davao, and exercising socio-political-economic functions dealing with its members' problems, the Davao Japanese Association was indeed an effective and powerful organization capable of channeling the cohesive action of the Davao Japanese minority upwards to the head of the larger social entity in the attainment of national goals. Being powerful in maintaining the cohesiveness of the Davao Japanese minority, and assuming that the Japanese in Davao always looked upwards for decision and direction, it is likely that the Association had a hand in the reported gatherings of thousands of Japanese residents in certain vicinities of Davao City in 1938 about which neither the Philippine

army nor constabulary intelligence could report because of language handicap.[73] Secret meetings, according to a knowledgeable respondent, were at first held at the Japanese Association's office until they were discovered by the government agents; soon after, these meetings were held at the Ohta Development Company compound in Talomo, Davao City.

Surely, no news release could have come closer to the truth on the cohesive social organization of the Japanese minority in Davao than that made in 1938 which partly reads:

> ...There are 16,000 Japanese residents in Davao province. The bulk of this foreign population is concentrated in the plantation districts surrounding the city of Davao.
>
> It is a common belief in well-informed circles in his province that the Japanese plantations are so linked with each other as to facilitate not only close common communication but quick concentration of Japanese subjects upon a moment's notice. It is said that the plantations are so arranged as to give each and every one of these their most strategic value in the event of an emergency.[74]

This integrated social organization of the Davao Japanese minority could easily have been pushed towards a war footing (an emergency such as war, could have resulted in more intensive integration) by the policy-makers of Japan, working at the top of the larger social system, behind the person of the emperor.

To sum up, this paper has attempted to show, among other things, that bare statistics concerning immigration as well as emigration and commercial as well as other economic activities must be interpreted more subtly if they are to be meaningful. It is not enough to know that the Japanese numerically constituted an insignificant minority compared to the total Filipino population. The more significant question to raise, as in the case of Davao, is: under the circumstances, what effect, if any, did this relatively small group have on themselves and on the environing milieu—social as well as physical? The question can even be legitimately extended to include the effect on the large social system centered in the homeland. For purposes of this study, however, this survey and tentative interpretation of the social institutions—such as familial, economic, religious, educational institutions—and social groups or associations, which the Davao Japanese established for their operation and survival as a group, seem to support the hypothesis of greater integration with their indigenous culture and society. Every human activity connected with these institutions and the value system undergirding them showed a greater affinity, if not identity, with the Japanese social system. That this integration was incomplete is readily conceded—it is only for theoretical purposes that complete integration is ever postulated. A more significant and interesting issue is: was the social organization of the other Japanese groups in the Philippines similar to that of the Davao group?

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[73] "Meeting held by Japanese in Davao Intrigue," **Manila Daily Bulletin**, May 17, 1938, Quezon Col. See also "Japanese have P.I. Army on the Spot in Davao," **Ibid.**, May 19, 1938, Quezon Col.

[74] "Meetings held by Japanese...," **op. cit.**

THE PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION (1896-1901) WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ASIAN HISTORY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ANTI-COLONIAL MOVEMENTS IN ASIA, 1857-1918

Oscar L. Evangelista *

This paper situates the Philippine Revolution against Spain and the United States, 1898-1901 within the context of anti-colonial movements in Asia, 1857-1918. The year 1857 was chosen as starting point of the study as it commemorates the Indian (Sepoy) Mutiny of 1857-58, an important landmark in Asian History. It marked the intensification of Western imperialism in Asia, and served as symbol of resistance against imperialism. In turn, 1918 was the end of World War I, another landmark which brought significant changes in the tempo of Asian nationalist movements and paved the way for later revolutions. The paper asserts that by examining the Philippine Revolution against the events of this period, we see that it was well ahead of time. Other nationalist revolutions, with the exception of China, took place in the 1940's and 1950's.[1] To understand the place of Philippine Revolution in Asian history, it must be compared with other colonial movements in Asia that occured during the period under study.

Anti-colonial movements took different forms. Before the advent of Asian nationalism in the mid-19th century, resistance against western imperialism was expressed through revolts, millenarian/messianic movements, social banditry, etc. The Philippines, stemming from various motivations.[2] Indonesia and Java in particular, had many peasant revolts in the 19th century.[3] These were signs of anti-colonial discontent. It may well be argued that no colonial revolution took place in Asia before 1900, except that of the Philippines.[4]

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A Western author considered 1900 as the beginning of the era of the "Awakening of Asia".[5] There is reason for this since nationalist movements had taken roots in India, China, and parts of the Arab world; and were beginning to manifest in Burma, Vietnam and Indonesia. But the only other political revolution during the period under study was the Chinese Revolution of 1911.

It is therefore against the backdrop of mid-19th century pre-nationalist anti-colonial movements, and the nationalist stirrings between 1900 and 1918 that the place of the Philippine Revolution in Asian history will be situated. A survey of the tightening of colonial rule from the mid-19th century, and the corresponding responses of the colonized Asian countries follow, to further highlight the place of the Philippine Revolution.

The 1850's was a turning point in the expansion of Western colonialism in Asia. The Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution made the European powers stronger politically, and wealthier economically. Add to these factors the rise of European nationalism, with its emphasis on the glorification of the nation-state, and you have the motivations for more colonial ventures. Petty economic concessions and indirect influences over Asian territories no longer sufficed, as bigger stakes beckoned.

The first county to 'fall' was China. Between 1840 and 1860, China was subjected to political and military pressures through the Opium Wars, inevitably being opened up through equal treaties imposed on her, first by Great Britain, and later by other European countries which invoked "Most Favored Nation" clause to obtain similar privileges given to the British. This was to be the beginning of China's woes which will culminate in what is referred to as the "slicing of China like a melon" in the first decade of the 20th century. The Manchu leaders were, however, slow in responding to these pressures, although there were peasant uprisings which were more anti-Manchu than anti-western powers.

The first positive response to Western imperialism in China was K'ang Yu Wei's "100 Days of Reform"(1898) but since this was basically still in Confucian terms, the reform movement did not succeed. It was the entry of Sun Yat Sen and his Kuo Min Tang party that set the stage for the Chinese Revolution of October 10, 1911, and the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912. Of relevance to this paper is Sun's *San Min Chu I* (Three Principles of the People) where he defined his concept of

nationalism as one of love for China. The Republic unfortunately met one reversal after the other under Yuan Shish Kai. By 1916, China was a divided country with the northern area under warlords, and the south under Sun. While it is beyond the concern of this paper, the entry of Communism in China and its utilization as a nationalist ideology by Mao Tse Tung made civil war a necessity in the 1940's.

Japan was the next target in East Asia. In 1853, Commodore Perry became the instrument to likewise impose on Japan unequal treaties which forced Japan to terminate its seclusion policy started in 1640. Unlike the Chinese, the Japanese leaders responded more positively, and in the ensuing internal struggle for power, the Shogunate was abolished, the western Daimyos spearheaded what would be called the Meiji Restoration.

The modernization of Japan and its victories in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1995, and in the Russo Japanese War of 1904-1905 gave Japanese nationalism a different flavor. By becoming an industrialized country and assuming the status of the Westerrn powers, Japanese nationalism became ultra nationalism, paving the way for the expansionist moves of the Japanese leaders.

In Southeast Asia, Britain acquired Burma in a three-pronged annexation move: 1823; 1853; and 1886, to safeguard the integrity of the British Indian Empire against possible French encroachments. The latter was slowly building its own empire in Mainland Southeast Asia by the conquests of Cochin-China in 1862; Annam in 1867; and Tonkin in 1883; Cambodia in 1863; and Laos in 1893. France's occupation of "Indo-China" was motivated by the need to have access to China.

There was resistance from the local powers. Burma's *Konbaung* dynasty tried diplomacy and negotiation to ward off British presence in Burma, and in 1886, there was a rebellion in Lower Burma led by the *Thugyis,* which lasted for five years.[6] The Nguyen dynasty of Vietnam offered military resistance to French, to no avail. These types of resistance, although anti-colonial, were defensive in nature, involved only the ruling class, and were not nationalistic in nature.

Burmese nationalism manifested itself in the first decade of the 20th century, and drew inspiration from Buddhism. One of the early arms of Buddhist nationalism was the Young men's Buddhist Association,

obviously pattered after the YMCA of the West. Until the end of World War I, no radical movement developed in Burma.

The tradition of nationalism in Vietnam had a long history dating back from their long struggle against China. Vietnam was not lacking in reformers like Bui Quang Chieu and his Constitutionalist Party, and Pham Quynh's Tonkinese Party. As in Burma, no extremist group existed prior to1925.[7] Ho Chih Minh used communism as a nationalist ideology in fighting French colonialism.

Siam remained independent largely because of its "remarkable kings and officials" for leaders, [8] and for its policy of "dancing with the wind". Sensing that the British were in an expanding mood, the *Chakkri* dynasty decided to give economic and extra-territorial benefits to the British. Under Mongkut and Chulalongkorn, Siam underwent a modernization process that opened up the country to western influences.

With a national identity securely in place, Thai nationalism was directed against Chinese interests in the early 1930's.

In Island Southeast Asia, the Netherlands East Indies had become a national unit, directly ruled by the Dutch Government by the mid-90's. Dutch colonialism in what would become modern Indonesia share similarities with Spanish colonialism in the Philippines. The Dutch East India Company (V.O.C) started its commercial ventures in Java in the early 17th century, eventually moving into the outer islands, completing a process of colonization by the 1820's. While the Dutch ruled Java indirectly through the local rulers until the 1820's, the Dutch presence in Indonesia is as long as the Spanish presence in the Philippines. This is important to consider since the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaya were creations of Western imperialism. The process of becoming a nation was a long one considering the diversity of cultures and peoples that had to be welded together.

By the first decade of the 20th century, a form of cultural nationalism appeared in Java, with the formation of *Budi Utomo* in 1908 by Dutch educated Javanese. With the establishment of *Sakerat Islam* in 1912, a mass movement was gradually formed, and during the fourteen years of existence, " groups of every persuasion enrolled under its banner.[9] Starting off with anti-Chinese feelings, the issues expanded as the movement for change gained grounds, and the organization became

militant. Local rebellious incidents in 1919 were met with force by the Dutch government.[10]

British Malaya came into being with the incorportion of the ports of Malacca, Penang and Singapore into one unit, and the addition of the Federal Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang) in the 1870's. Due to the nature of the plural society that emerged, with the Chinese and the Indians forming the community with the Malays in the lead, no visible nationalist movement emerged until the 1940's.

The case of the Philippines is an exception to the rule as far as colonialism is concerned. The Spaniards, who established a colonial government in 1565, managed to control most of the Luzon and Visayan regions by 1665, making *Filipinas* the first true colony of Asia. The establishment of a centralized government, putting the different regions of the country under one system of law and administration, was a first step in gradually welding together the different ethnic groups. This was followed by the Christianization of the ethnic groups, again giving the Philippines a somewhat dubious distinction as the only Christian country in Southeast Asia. The 333 years of Spanish colonial rule were punctuated by revolts. By the middle of the 19th century, Spain succumbed to the lure of international trade, and had completely opened the country to foreign trade. This was a key factor that would bring dramatic changes to the economic and material life of some mestizos and natives who began as marginal recipients of the economic progress, and later became the intelligentsia called *ilustrados*.

In British India, the Indian (Sepoy) Mutiny of 1857-1858 is significant for the Indians as it is regarded by nationalist Indian historians as its war of independence.[11] The British East India Company had ruled India since 1762, and the completion of the empire in the succeeding decades brought in several grievances of political, economic, cultural and military nature resulting in a collective grievance against the British rule. Although it was led by the Indian elites, and confined to Delhi, the United Provinces and parts of central portion of India, the fact that the mutiny lasted for eighteen months was a testimonial to the support that it obtained from the different groups of Indians. For the British, the mutiny was the signal to terminate the rule of the British East India Company, and to put India under the direct rule of the British Parliament. Gradually, a core of educated Indians led in the development of Indian nationalism under the aegis of the Indian National Congress. Other Hindu-oriented groups

emerged to give the early phase of Indian nationalism, a Hindu type of nationalism.

After 1900, B.G. Tilak espoused a radical nationalism, but it was Mahatma Gandhi's non-violent movement that attracted the masses of Indians in India's fight to obtain *Swaraj* from the British. The base of the mass movement was in place by the end of World War I.

Over in West Asia, by the mid 1850's, the Ottoman Sultan had become a figurehead, with the Western Powers propping him up for their individual ends. Britain and France had shown interest in Egypt since the advent of the 19th century because of the strategic passageway that it offered through what would become the Suez Canal. France managed to build the canal, but the British maintained their presence, and when opportunity permitted with the bankruptcy of Khedive Ismail, a dual control of Britain and France was set-up and in 1885, Britain occupied Egypt. British presence in Egypt lasted until the 1950's.

Russian interest in the area lay in its desire to have a passageway to the Black Sea, while Germany wanted to have public works concessions linking their interests in the region.

In response to Western encroachments, West Asia resorted initially to Arab nationalism, a movement idealizing the greatness of the past, the common language, territory, culture, and aspirations for independence. The word "Arab" assumed a political, national character and became a basis for identity regardless of ethnic or racial background. H.A.R. Gibb thus defined Arab as "all those ... for whom the central fact of history is the mission of Mohammed and the memory of the Arab Empire and who in addition cherish the Arabic tongue and its cultural heritage as their common possession."[12] Syrian Christians influenced by the Syrian Protestant College, later to become the American University of Beirut, first broached the idea of Arab nationalism directed against the Ottoman Empire. Eventually, the direction turned to British and French imperialisms as the Ottoman Empire disintegrated after World War I to become secular to Turkey, but the weakness of the movement lay in the national character of the supposed participants. Egypt had always been a reality as a badge of nationality from early times even when Britain and France had to curve up the Arab World into Palestine, Lebanon and Transjordan. Iraq was likewise a creation of the British which was an aftermath of the settlement

with the Hashemite family for supporting the British through the Arab revolt in 1916.

Thus far, the survey of the period 1857 to 1918 has the following implications:

1. The mid-19th century was a significant dividing line in Asian History since from that point there was an obvious tightening of Western imperialist control over Asian countries in response to the demands of international trade and the ensuing rivalry that it espoused. Aside from direct rule, as in India and the Netherland East Indies, other forms of control were imposed. China, Japan and Thailand., among others, had to subscribe to other treaties; spheres of influence were set up in China, the Mandate system was used in West Asia.

2. Anti-colonialism during the period under study, took different forms: pre- and proto-nationalist revolts, millenarian/messianic movements, social banditry, brigandage, defensive wars' and the nationalist revolutions of the Philippines and China.

3. Nationalist movements before 1900 were confined to India, some parts of the Arab World, and the Philippines. After 1900, there was a general awakening of Asia as Burmese, Vietnamese and Indonesian nationalism began to stir; Indian nationalism was expressed through Sun Yat Sen's movement; and Japanese nationalism turned to expansion.

Clearly, the Philippine Revolution stands out as the first nationalist anti-colonial revolution in Asia. Why is the Philippine revolution a special case in Asian history?

First of all, compared to other colonized areas, Spanish colonization lasted for three centuries, longer than other colonized areas. The 333 years of Spanish exploitation and oppression brought both beneficial and negative results. On the beneficial side, the different ethnic communities were welded together into one community under a common system of law and governance. The Catholic Church and the missionary groups did their share in molding a basically Filipino-Christian community. On the negative side, the three centuries of oppression and exploitation took their toll in providing common grievances against Spain, and help explain why the time was ripe for a revolution, given other factors that shaped the nationalist movement in the Philippines.

The Philippines benefitted from the turbulent 19th century Spanish history where the struggle between the forces of liberalism, influenced by the ideals of the French Revolution, and the forces of conservatism represented by the Crown, the Church and the Military, affected Spanish plans and policies in the Philippines. For one thing, conservative and liberal regimes alternated with each other, bringing repressive regimes, and liberal ones. It was under a liberal administration that the Philippines was opened to World Trade, a momentous event because some Indios and mestizo Sangleys benefitted from the economic progress that followed the opening of the Philippine ports to foreign trade. From these families came the *ilustrados* who led the campaign for reforms and conceptualized the idea of a Filipino nation. These elites articulated the issues and fought for change. With economic progress, a leadership, an oppressed people, and the formation of a radical mass-based organization, the way was paved for a revolution.

The first phase of the Revolution against Spain ended in a truce and by December 1897, the Filipino revolutionary leaders went on voluntary exile to Hong Kong. The revolution resumed in May 1898 as an alliance was forged with America, then engaged in her own war against Spain. A "dictatorship" was initially formed, and as the revolutionary government replaced the dictatorship and strenghened its hold against the enemy, Spain withdrew and America decided to keep the Philippines. The Filipino-American war was a one-sided affair, but the Filipinos drew a heavy toll against the Americans through guerilla warfare.

The revolution was a failure in liberating the Philippines from colonial bondage, but in the context of Asian history, it had notable achievements. Aside from being the first anti-colonial revolution in Asia, the Philippines was also the first country to declare its independence. A republican system of government was established, guided by a constitution that recognized the separation of Church and State, gave more powers to the President because of the war-time conditions, had a cabinet, a supreme court, etc. It had an educational system from the primary to the tertiary levels, topped by the creation of the *Unibersidad Literaria de Filipinas*, the forerunner of the State University.

The Philippines is celebrating the centennial of the Revolution of 1896, but outside of Southeast Asia, the Revolution has not been given its due honors.[13] Asian history textbooks, especially those written by Western scholars, rarely mention the Philippine revolution. Even

Southeast Asian and Philippine history textbooks have confined themselves to stock knowledge about the Philippine Revolution, ignoring the changes in perspectives, and recent studies that give new directions to Philippine nationalism and the revolution.[14]

Presently, even Philippine history textbooks continue to perpetuate and accept as historical facts popular notions about the nationalist movement and the Revolution, such as the following: (1) Nationalism was first imbibed by the *ilustrados,* and later filtered down to the masses; (2) the leading propagandists were reformers; (3) the *La Liga Filipina* founded by Dr. Jose Rizal in 1892 was a reformist organization; (4) Andres Bonifacio and the leaders of the Katipunan, the secret organization whose aim was separation from Spain, were of plebeian origin; (5) the Katipunan membership was confined to Luzon, etc.

In the last fifteen years, mainstream research with new perspectives like the *Nouvelle Histoire* inspired by the French *Annales*, and recent studies in the U.P. Department of History under the perspective called *Pantayong Pananaw*[15] have enriched the literature on the Revolution, and provided revisionist interpretations of the perpetuated popular notions, and many more controversial issues.

On nationalism as an ideology, Romeo V. Cruz' pamphlet, "Ang Pagkabuo ng Nasyonalismong Filipino" argues that the idea of nationalism first took root among the Peninsulares, Spanish residents in the Philippines born in Spain, who were then called "Filipinos". The Peninsulares were influenced by developments in Europe and in Spain as the ideals of the French revolution spread throughout the continent. Cruz identified different types of nationalism starting out with the imperial type. The *ilustrado* Propagandists exemplified the liberal-imperial type of nationalism. Radical nationalism emerged with the establishment of the Katipunan, and the outbreak of the Philippine Revolution in 1896. Cruz' contribution to our history was to show that nationalism did not begin with the *ilustrados*, but that the Peninsulares had a role to play in the development of Philippine nationalism.

Reynaldo Ileto's controversial, if not monumental study, *Pasyon and Revolution* may eventually revolutionize the history of the development of nationalism as it debunks the earlier notion that the development of nationalism was an elite phenomenon. Ileto' study, using the "history from below" perspective, argued that the idea of *kalayaan* was

indigenously imbibed by the masses through the *Pasyon,* the popular reading fare especially during the Holy Week. Christ was not only the martyred son of God, but was himself a revolutionary figure. Using the *Pasyon Pilapil* version, Ileto focused on the Lost Eden/ Fall/ Redemption sequence of the passion of Christ as argument for the revolutionary effects on the masses. To Ileto, the idea of *kalayaan* among the masses was quantitatively different from the *ilustrados'* concept of *independencia.*

Onofre D. Corpuz' two-volume work *Roots of the Filipino Nation* published in 1989 puts in a new perspective certain aspects of the Propaganda Movement and the revolutionary situation. Where the Propaganda Movement tended to be called a failure in that it was directed at *Madre* Espana, Corpuz cites "unintended" effects like radicalizing some *ilustrados,* and politicizing young non-*ilustrados* in the Philippines like Andres Bonifacio and Emilio Aguinaldo. The twin development "promoted the revolution of nationalism, from reformism, through radicalism to revolution".[16]

Some of the radicalized *ilustrados* who later joined secret societies and eventually the Revolution were Graciano Lopez Jaena, Antonio Luna, Jose Alejandrino and Edilberto Evangelista. Jose Rizal himself abandoned reformism when he left Spain to go to Hong Kong where he planned the formation of *La Liga Filipina,* on his return to the Philippines. The structure of the *Liga* was proof that he was no longer associating with Spain. That the Liga Filipina was a secret organization patterned after the Masonic structure was proof of the revolutionary character of the organization, and the change of heart of Rizal about reformism.

Where Teodoro A. Agoncillo speaks of the "Revolt of the Masses" and the plebeian nature of its leaders, there are now studies, among them Fast and Richardson's *Roots of Dependency, Political and Economic Revolutions in 19th Century Philippines,* showing that Andres Bonifacio was of lower middle class status based on his work as a *bodegero* and the salary that he was receiving. That Bonifacio and other leaders of the first phase of the Revolution were of elite status changes the nature of that phase of the Revolution as a mass-based movement in terms of leadership.

The foregoing samples of revisionist studies have been the product of mainstream research using the Positivist School of history, with the exception of Ileto's study which is social history, and therefore has made use of literature and related fields to reflect the history from below

perspective. Another group based in the U.P. Department of History has come up with the *Pantayong Pananaw* perspective which is anchored on culture as the root of history, and is written in the Filipino language. It goes beyond the study of the document, and makes use of ethnography, ethno-linguistics, hermeneutics and other multi-disciplinary tools. A new periodization is presented in which continuity is the rule and colonialism as a landmark is not given the importance that most textbook writers have given it. The interpretations of this group on the Philippine Revolution add a new dimension to the continuing study on the Revolution.

The bulk of these "new studies" are compiled in the book KATIPUNAN: *Isang Pambansang Kilusan*, published jointly in 1994 by the U.P. Department of History and the Historical group called ADHIKA. As the title connotes, the *Katipunan* as operative in the Revolution of 1896, is seen as a national movement. Following the *pantayong pananaw* framework, the Revolution is no longer studied as a political phenomenon alone, but is seen in its totality, and in the lasting effect that it has had on the nation. The important point is that a regime fell and it was replaced by a structure shaped by the revolutionist in the name of the people. The Revolution may have been waged by members of a small group, but in their movement, they formed a strong force that joined the fight against the Spanish Government.[17]

To show that the Katipunan was a not just Tagalog based, the book mentions initial studies of the presence of the organization in Batanes; in Piddig, Ilocos Norte; Bicol; Palawan through the more than 200 deportees in 1896 who had connections to the Katipunan and the Revolution; and in Cebu. There were uprisings in Misamis, in Cotabato, and in Zamboanga, all in the southern island of Mindanao, but these were not necessarily Katipunan-inspired.

Ferdinand Llanes, the editor of the book, provides the various dimensions in the study of the Revolution. The "totality" covers such topics as local issues, cultural, intellectual, organizational, demographical, and sectoral (women, military, professional) concerns.

Between the mainstream and new studies on the Revolution briefly discussed here, one can see the changing face of the Philippine Revolution, and the interest that Filipino scholars and Filipinologists are giving to further stress the importance of that Revolution not only to the Philippines, but to Asian history as well.

In conclusion, this paper has examined the anti-colonial movements in Asia between 1857 and 1918, and has shown that the Philippine Revolution was ahead of its time with the Philippines being the first Asian country to wage a nationalist political revolution against Western Imperialism. Only China waged a similar revolution, but this took place in the next decade. Other anti-colonial agitations before 1900 were either pre- or proto-nationalist, while the period 1900 to1918 witnessed either the beginnings of nationalist movements led by the elites, or the growth of mass-based nationalism as in the case of India.

As the Philippines celebrates the centennial of its Revolution, various dimensions and interpretations of the Revolution have come out to further put in place its role both in the country, and in Asia. Our Southeast Asian neighbors like Malaysia and Indonesia have recognized the place of the Revolution. It is our hope that as more Asian history textbooks are written by Asians, a better treatment of the Philippine Revolution will be made.

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Endnotes

[1]For example, the Indonesian Revolution against the Dutch began in 1946, while the Vietnamese Revolution against France started shortly after World War II and ended in 1954.

[2]The revolts were caused by different motivations: (a) grievances caused by Spanish oppressive practices; (b) religious issues stemming from a desire to restore the old pre-Spanish religion; (c) agrarian problems, and (d) generally a desire to regain lost freedom.

[3]See Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Protest Movements in Rural Java*, Oxford University Press, 1973.

[4]The Meiji Restoration of 1875 was in itself a revolution from the top, but since it was "self-induced" to make Japan at par with the Western Powers, it is an exception to the prevailing pattern of anti-colonial revolutions.

[5]Jan M. Romein, *The Asian Century: A History of Modern Nationalism in Asia*, 1962.

[6]D.G.E. Hall, *A History of Southeast Asia*, p. 693.

[7]*Ibid.*, p.718.

[8]Milton Osborne, *Southeast Asia, An Illustrated Introductory History,* Allen and Unwin, 1988, p.73.

[9]Joel Steinberg, et. al., *In Search of Southeast Asia,* Praeger Publisher, 1971, p. 294.

[10]*Ibid.*, p. 295.

[11]Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, Oxford University Press, 1985 edition, p.323

[12]Bernard Lewis, *The Arabs in History*.

[13]For example, Michael Edwards' *Asia in the European Age, 1498-1955*, Thames and Hudson, 1961, dismisses the Philippine Revolution with this one line: Revolutionary activities amongst the Filipinos resulted in some relaxation of clerical rule. G. Robina Quale's *Eastern Civilizations,* Meredith Publishing Co., 1966, had also one line in reference to the Revolution of 1896: " In 1896 armed revolts began."

[14]See my paper "New Studies on the Philippine Revolution: An Analysis", read at the International Conference on Philippine Studies held in Honolulu, Hawaii, April14-17, 1996.

[15]The *Pantayong Pananaw* was pioneered by Zeus Salazar and other faculty members of the U.P. Department of History in the early 1980's. The word "pantayo" is translated as "among us", connoting an inclusive relationship. Thus writing in the Filipino without pretensions to addressing the outside world, nor being apologetic or defensive for what the Filipino and his culture is.

[16]Corpuz, vol.II, p.193.

[17]Llanes, p.iv.

A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TAXATION SYSTEMS IN THE PHILIPPINES UNDER SPANISH RULE AND INDONESIA UNDER DUTCH RULE DURING THE 19TH CENTURY

W. WOLTERS*

1. *The sociology of taxation systems*

> 'A total assessment of Spanish impact on the Philippines would thus include comparisons both with other colonies (e.g., Netherlands East Indies, French Indochina, British Burma) and with non-Western countries which retained or regained their political independence (e.g., China, Siam, Mexico)' (N. Owen, 1976, p. 84).

The student of colonial history who attempts to draw a comparison between Java (or rather, in view of the huge regional disparities: parts of Java) and parts of the Philippines (for instance Luzon) is struck by the sharp contrasts in development. While Javanese society during the 19th century, and well into the 20th century has remained a society of small peasants, in Luzon the process of colonial development has led to the increased concentration of land in the hands of a rural elite.

The process of social homogenization in Java had become clear already from 19th century Dutch investigations on the issue of land tenure. Researchers and writers in the 1870s and 1880s found that the heavy burden of labor services and land tax upon the village population had caused the villagers to work out some sort of equal distribution of land among themselves, in order to acquire as large a number of labor conscripts as possible.

The view of social homogenization comes back in Geertz' well-known thesis of 'agricultural involution', based on anthropological fieldwork during the 1950s and on the study of historical sources. Geertz gives the following concise statement of his theory:

> "Under the pressure of increasing numbers and limited resources Javanese village society did not bifurcate, as did that of so many other 'underdeveloped' nations, into a group of large landlords and a group of oppressed near serfs. Rather it maintained a comparatively high degree of social and economic homogeneity by dividing the economic pie into a steadily increasing number of minute pieces a process to which I have referred to elsewhere as 'shared poverty.' Rather than haves and have-nots, there were, in the delicately

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> muted vernacular of peasant life, only tjukupans and kekurangans—'just enoughs' and 'not quite enoughs" (Geertz, 1963, p. 97).

Geertz' theory has come under heavy criticism recently, from the side of writers who point out that he has overestimated the social homogeneity and the 'sharing' not only for 20th century but also for 19th century Javanese village society. Recent research has shown that already during the 19th century villages in many parts of Java had a marked social differentiation, with on the one hand a class of relatively well-to-do peasants, and on the other a class of agricultural laborers.

This revision of Geertz' theory is an important step towards a more realistic picture of colonial Java. The observed social differentiation of Javanese rural society, however, proves to be a differentiation within rather narrow margins. Even in those areas where the existence of a group of large peasants employing landless laborers is beyond doubt, there was still no class of big land-owners resembling the Philippines' landed elite. The large peasants in Central Java owned land in the order of 5 to 8 hectares and engaged in foodcrop production; Central Luzon landlords by the 1860s owned at least tens of hectares and in the first decade of the 20th century hundreds of hectares, cultivating cashcrops like sugar and rice, to be sold in wide market networks.

Dutch scholars at the end of the 19th century (Bergmer, Van Vollenhoven) sought the causes of Java's extreme land fragmentation in the heavy burden of taxation. In the same way one might attribute the emergence of a landlord class in Luzon to the benevolence of the Spanish tax system, benevolent at least for the rural elite.

Charting the impact of a certain tax regime upon the social structure is not the only way of studying taxation systems, and certainly not the most fruitful one. Taxation systems are as much adaptations to existing economic conditions as causes of changes in these conditions. The French taxation historian and sociologist Gabriel Ardant advocates a more comprehensive approach in which the interconnections of taxation, economic infrastructure and state institutions are studied. He points out that 'tight links' exist between the institutions of a certain state set-up, and he considers the study of the tax system the key to the analysis of this interconnectedness. Ardant writes:

> 'An understanding of the mechanics of taxation, of its economic implications, and of its influence on the spirit of revolt allows us to chart accurately the correlations that exist between the institutions of different European countries throughout the different periods of their existence.' (Ardant, 1975, p. 169).

The study of taxation systems in colonial states sheds light on the relationships between the colonial administrative apparatus and the indigenous political and social structure. The remarkable characteristic of colonial regimes, like the Spanish regime in the Philippines and the Dutch regime in Indonesia, in the first part of the 19th century, is the small number of European bureaucrats. By themselves this thin layer of administrators, assisted by relatively small armies, would not have been able to impose their policies on the native populations. The extent to which they were able to pursue their policies, depended on the willingness of indigenous elites to cooperate with the colonial regimes, and to carry out (and modify) these policies.

Both Java and Luzon belonged, for the greater part of the 19th century, to what Ardant calls rudimentary economies, and for which he stressed the limited fiscal possibilities. In rudimentary economies subsistence agriculture predominates, rural areas are relatively closed, crafts and industries hardly exist, and trade and markets are virtually absent. The main obstacles to taxation are insufficient production which makes tax returns very low, insufficient markets which makes the collection difficult, and limited information on the side of the fisc which makes assessment of taxes a permanent problem. The fiscal systems in the European rudimentary economies of the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries found a number of solutions for problems of taxation. Several types of taxation can be distinguished:

1. Levies on the circulation in the form of tolls and internal customs. These levies exert a heavy pressure on trade, and curb economic activity.

2. Direct levies, independent of the circulation:
   a) the tithe, payment in kind of part of the harvest. The evaluation of this tax and the collection are very difficult.
   b) the poll tax (capitation, headtax). Ardant writes about this tax:

> 'Gone were the delicate problems of evaluating wealth, one merely had to count the human beings in a nation and place the same tax on each head or on each group of men in large, ranked categories according to their titles, their status, or their occupations if there was a graduated head tax.' (Ardant, 1975, p. 185).

This tax required a minimum of registration of people, and consequently a minimum of organisation (Ardant, 1975; 1965, p. 415). The problem with this tax is that because of its 'forfaitair' character it is too light for certain groups, and too heavy for other groups (Ardant, 1965, p. 415).

c) Levies on the means of production, e.g. land or real estate. This type of taxation is popular among rulers who want to stimulate circulation (trade and markets) (Ardant, 1965, p. 422).

The land is an example of this type of taxation. The problem is the same as with the tithe: evaluation and assessment are difficult. In order to be able to levy a land tax on individual landowners the land fisc needs to have a cadaster. In European states cadasters were developed during the 19th century, under changing economic conditions.

A number of new taxes were developed in Europe during the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, in what Ardant calls intermediary systems, when the circulation became stronger, and transport and industry gradually developed. During the 17th and 18th centuries the excise tax (a form of indirect tax) became an important source of income for the state. This tax was thought superior to the direct and often arbitrary levies of the previous period.

In some European countries the main obstacle to the land tax, the problem of evaluation in the absence of a cadaster, was overcome by introducing the principle of repartition, developed in France towards the end of the 18th century. According to this principle the government leaves it upon a given community to apportion a fixed amount of taxation among its members. This is supposed to result in the effective and just distribution of the tax burden among the members of the community, because of the clash of interests (Ardant, 1975, 210-211). In countries like Russia and Spain the land tax with the principle of repartition was maintained up to the end of the 19th century. In other European countries during that period cadasters were built up on which the land tax could be based.

The income tax, a system characteristic of a more developed industrial economy, came into use towards the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century.

This brief outline of different taxation systems serves as a background to a more detailed analysis of the tax regimes and government institutions in the Dutch and Spanish colonies in Southeast Asia.

2. *The taxation system in Java during the 19th century*

For reasons of brevity only the main outline of the Dutch bureaucratic and taxation systems in Java will be presented in this section.

Javanese society underwent a process of intense bureaucratization from about 1650 until well into the 19th century. During that time parts of Java were under direct control of the Dutch while the kingdom of Mataram in the interior of the island, (later divided into several principalities), maintained some form of limited autonomy. Sections of the principalities were brought under direct Dutch government in the first decades of the 19th century, while the remaining areas of the princes were gradually incorporated into the Dutch colonial system. During the 17th century the Dutch East Indies Company (V.O.C.) had acquired almost complete control over the surrounding seas and thereby cut off the island from external trade relationships. This eliminated an important source of income for the royal courts, forcing the ruling elite to intensify the exploitation of its own population. Under the princes the country was ruled and taxed according to the appanage system (appurtenances system) whereby the ruler allocated groups of peasant households to *priyayi* or royal officials. The *priyayi* and their lower-level officials had the right to exact tribute and labor-services from the peasants in the villages. Under the rule of Mataram the burden of taxation was not very heavy, but around 1800 the pressure increased due to the necessity of the rulers to provide a living for larger numbers of relatives and aristocrats.

After a period of vicissitude in its government policy towards the Indies, the Netherlands in the late 1820s returned to the policy of monopoly and exclusion which had characterized the East Indies Company. The Dutch king and the government, observing the increasing trade activities of American and English merchants on Java's shores, decided that they wanted to avoid a situation in which the costs of government would come for account of the Dutch, while the economic benefits would go to foreigners. In order to nationalize the trade in the Indies, the Dutch government established in 1825 the Dutch Trading Company (Nederlandse Handel Maatschappij), a private company intended to recapture the trade in Indian products and to promote the export of Dutch products to the East. This trading company was to be linked to a government controlled production system, called the Cultivation System (introduced in 1830). The main reasons behind this mercantilistic policy were the fiscal needs of the mother country.

Under the British interim government (1811-1816) a tax reform had been introduced, by which the old East Indies Company system of forced deliveries had been replaced by a land tax, to be collected by the village head. This system was retained after the Dutch restoration. The land tax proved to be a very deficient tax under the prevailing conditions. Not only was it unjust, it was also inefficient. The village heads levied higher sums than was allowed, and appro-

priated a large part of the revenue. The Dutch soon introduced an administrative change in the method of assessing and collecting the tax: they started to determine the amount of tax by 'admodiate, i.e. haggling with the village government, while the internal distribution of the tax among the villagers was to be done according to the repartition principle, not on the basis of individual assessment.

The Cultivation System introduced in 1830 operated in brief as follows: The natives were to devote a certain proportion of their land and labor-time to the cultivation of cash crops, to be sold to government agencies; with the payment for these products they would be able to pay the land tax. The government would thus receive, not a large amount of rice as payment for the land tax, but export crops, to be disposed of at the European markets (coffee, sugar, indigo). In practice the land cultivated with cash crops took the character of large state plantations, worked by the natives under the supervision of Dutch government officials and Javanese chiefs, acting as managers of the labor force. The Cultivation System remained in operation until the late 1860s. In 1870 a new law on agrarian holdings opened the possibility of private entrepreneurs to operate plantations in Java.

Throughout the 19th century the Javanese population had to carry out heavy labor services, which consumed a very great part of the total working time of each peasant. In addition to the Cultivation services, peasants had to do corvée labor for the building of roads, bridges, factories, irrigation systems and storehouses. Aside from these services for the central government they had to perform *desa* services for the welfare of their own communities, and *pancen*-services for several *priyayi* and for their own village head. All these labor services were imposed village wise, i.e. according to the principle of repartition. During the 1840s reports from Dutch officials made mention of neglect of sawah fields, harvest failures and actual starvation in some part of Java (Ergro, 1880, III).

In term of fiscal revenue the Cultivation System could be considered a success. Throughout the operations of the system a 'net surplus' ('Batig slot') could be transmitted to the Netherlands, alleviating the problems of the treasury. The mobilization of labor services on a large scale provided Java with a relatively efficient road system. The government, however, paid little or no attention to the welfare of the population (Day, 1966).

The heavy burden of corvée labor imposed on the villages brought about a levelling of landownership. Land was transferred from individual ownership to village or communal ownership, either as a result of pressure from the side of Dutch officials, or as a defense mechanism of the pressured villagers. As the land tax (levied on

landowners) had been commuted into corvée labor, and this corvée labor was imposed by repartition, each landowner came under the obligation to perform the services. In order to increase the number of workable men, land had to be parcelled out equally among the villagers, including the landless households. Although the social homogenization was in reality not as complete as some writers (a. o. Geertz) suggest, it remains true that in Javanese village society there was no class of big landowners.

There was, of course, a village elite, comprising of the village head and a number of other officials, who were exempted from performing the labor services. The village head had an important function as manager of the labor force, and thereby occupied a crucial power position in the organization of the Cultivation System. In this position the village head was able to earn from 'cultivation percentages', and to increase his landholdings.

This stratum of village heads and officials, however, was not transformed into a landlord class. One of the reasons why this group was not able to capitalize much more on its bureaucratic position was the Dutch policy of prohibiting and counteracting trade by native officials. Native chiefs were thus prevented from linking their landholding to productive and commercial enterprises. In addition to this, the Dutch monopoly on buying up and trading cash crops, and the absence of foreign merchants trading with an indigenous elite, curtailed the economic prospects of the Javanese rural elite.

3. *Mode and degree of integration into the world market: commercialization of the Philippine economy*

Spain maintained the mercantilist principle that colonial trade should be a monopoly of the mother country, until the first decades of the 19th century. Under these principles foreigners were excluded from the colonial trade, the production of certain local products was forbidden to stimulate the importation of Spanish goods, and finally for a long time (up to 1765) only one Spanish port (first Seville and thereafter Cadiz) was allowed to trade with the colonies. Throughout the first two centuries of Spanish rule in the Philippines, Manila was an important entrepot harbour and the Spanish merchants in the city acted as intermediaries. Chinese junks brought silk and other goods from China, and the annual State galleon, plying the route between Acapulco and Manila, exchanged these goods for Mexican silver, and brought in addition the *'Real Situado'*, a royal subsidy to the Philippine Treasury fixed in 1665 at the sum of 2,500.00 Mexican dollars called pesos. This currency was one of the main sources of money circulating in the Philippines. The subsidy was terminated in 1810 with the independence of Mexico.

During the 1780s the Spanish government drew up a plan to improve the economy of the Philippines and to increase the commerce between Spain and its colony, in order to let the mother country benefit from the productive resources of its colony. In 1785 a commercial company was created under the name 'Real Compania de Filipinas' (Royal Philippine Company), financed by private capital. This company was granted the exclusive privilege of trade between Spain and the Archipelago. For several decades the company conducted regular trade, not only with the Philippines but with its American colonies as well. In 1834, however, the company was terminated, as it operated permanently at a loss. Apparently Spain was not able to do what the Netherlands was doing at that time: to establish a profitable commercial trade link between the mother country and the colony. One can surmise that Spain as a semiperipheral state in the world system lacked the means of control to maintain a monopolistic position in its Asian colony.

Several causes can be mentioned for the failure of the company.

1. One important factor was that the company had not been able to realize a vertical integration of production and trade. It did not control production in the Philippines, it did not have direct relations with the rural cultivators (Schurz, 1939, p. 417). This vertical integration of production and trade was precisely what was done by the Dutch in Java.

2. The company was not in control of its organization of agents.

> 'Undoubtedly this laxness of responsibility among its subordinates—an evil from which all the great companies suffered—was partly due to the semi-public character of the organization and the consequent impersonal nature of its directive authority, as well as the impossibility of a minute supervision of its widely scattered operations.' (Schurz, 1939, p. 417).

   Favouritism to secure appointments was rampant. Capital advances distributed to tillers had not been repaid in agricultural produce. As Foreman puts it: 'Success could only have been achieved by forced labour, and this right was not included in the charter' (Foreman, 1906, p. 254).

3. The company was to have a monopoly of trade between Spain and the Philippines whereby Spanish goods would be exchanged for oriental goods in Manila. This monopoly could not be maintained in the early decades of the 19th century when the English and American ships started to come to Manila (Schurz, 1939, p. 417).

4. Finally, the chaotic conditions in Spain from 1808-1814 and the disruption of the American trade as a result of the wars of independence contributed to the failures (Cushner, 1971, p. 195).

During the last decade of the 18th century and the first decades of the 19th century the Philippines was opened to free trade with the whole world. During the 1790s American ships traded at the port of Manila, although the official restriction to foreign merchants was still in operation. During the 1820s American firms started to open permanent agencies in Manila. Several provincial ports were opened to foreigners during the 1830s up to the 1860s. The larger portion of exports was conveyed in foreign vessels.

The number of foreign merchant houses in Manila increased rapidly. During the 1820s seven English and American firms began to operate in Manila and during the 1850s, aside from the English and American houses French, Swiss and German commercial firms were active. Foreign trade (imports and exports) increased from the 1820s to the 1890s (Legarda, 1955, pp. 403-404). The main export crops were sugar, abaca (Manila hemp), coffee and tobacco. Imported goods included among others machinery for the sugar refineries. Several areas in the Philippines, notably Pampanga and Negros, experienced a great expansion of sugar production. Between 1831 and 1854 sugar production more than tripled (Cushner, 1971, p. 201).

The financial stimulus given by the foreign merchant houses accelerated the transformation of Philippine agriculture from a subsistence economy to an export economy. Foreman states:

> 'It was the capital brought originally to the Philippines through foreign channels which developed the modern commerce of the Colony, and much of the present wealth of the inhabitants engaged in trade and agriculture is indirectly due to foreign enterprise.' (Foreman, 1906, p. 258).

A monetized exchange economy gradually emerged during the middle and in the second half of the 19th century. Precise information concerning the degree of commercialization of the rural areas is scarce. Owen's study of Kabikolan in the 19th century provides us with a picture of the development of commerce and of market places in this province.

At the beginning of the century commerce was relatively limited in scale. Trade was predominantly in the hands of the *alcalde mayores* (provincial governors) and their agents (Owen, 1976, p. 299). A similar situation was described by Cruikshank for 18th and early 19th century Samar. In the first part of the 18th century it was the Jesuit priests in Samar who had monopolized trade (Cruikshank, 1975,

p. 32-35). In the period from around 1800 till 1840 it was the *alcalde* and the *gobernadorcillos* who formed a monopolistic trading network, which was increasingly facing competition from the side of Chinese mestizos. Apparently the economy of the early 19th century with its lack of currency and capital facilitated the monopolization of trade in the hands of political powerholders. At that time, however, the mestizo class, engaging in trade and buying up land, was on the rise.

Owen finds it striking that the sources on Kabikolan contain no references to town markets or to local merchants and peddlers before the 1830s. He takes this as an indication that commerce was too paltry an enterprise to warrant mention (or taxation) by the Spanish officials in the region' (Owen, 1976, p. 301). During the 1830s trade started to increase, and there was an influx of merchants from outside the region. This trend continued during the 1840s and 1850s, when both internal and external commerce expanded rapidly in the province. The number of market places increased. For the period after 1850 several travellers' descriptions of markets indicate that peasant marketing and local commerce had become a lively affair (Owen, 1976, p. 324). Revenues from the market tax monopoly from Camarines doubled between 1856 and 1873 (Owen, 1976, p. 325).

4. *The tax system in the Philippines during the 19th century*

The study of the Spanish taxation system encounters great difficulties. Official publications are usually not very reliable, not only because of the strong political controversies that characterized Spanish politics during the 19th century, but also because Spanish administrative law shows many contradictions, and a wide gap existed between law and reality. Moreover in contrast to the Dutch colonial system, relatively little attention was paid to investigations of a socio-economic nature. An important reason for the precarious Spanish colonial policy was the intensive political unrest and rivalries in the mother country. During the period from 1834 till 1898 Spain had no less than 36 parliaments and 79 cabinets alternately of liberal and conservative political color, and during that period 53 governor-generals were sent to the Philippines.

The taxation system in the Philippines was for the greater part meant for the maintenance of the state apparatus, of which the military expenses demanded a large share. The amount of money for development purpose was very small. To give an idea of the structure of the colonial administration the budget for the year 1885/1886 is given in table 1.

TABLE 1 BUDGET 1886/1887

Gastos/Expenditures	*Pesos*
1. Obligaciones generales (general liabilities) (expenses for the ministry of Colonies for the Philippines, Civil and military pensions, dismissed officials, passage money, amortization of treasury notes, etc.)	1,523,335.07
2. Estado (Department of State) (diplomatic and consular corps in E. Asia, etc.)	125,000.00
3. Gracia y Justicia (Department of Ecclesiastical Affairs and Justice) (Supreme Court of Manila, courts of first instance, cathedral clergy, parish clergy, missions, etc.)	1,085,769.62
4. Guerra (Department of War) (personnel, army corps, hospitals, artillery material (including governors of political-military cornandancias), pensions, etc.	3,494,923.31
5. Hacienda (Department of Finance) (personnel, equipment, expenses for the collection of taxes, mint, etc.)	1,356,031.30
6. Marina (Department of the Navy) (personnel, naval stations, arsenal, warship hospitals, etc.)	2,423,518.91
7. Gobernacion (Department of the Interior) (central and provincial government personnel, office of civil administration, post office, Guardia civil, telegraph office, prison, maritime mail, etc.)	1,267,007.43
8. Fomento (Advancement) (Department of Public Works, Agriculture, Commerce and Industry) (public works, roads, railways, rivers, forests, mines, etc.)	349,322.87
	11,624,908.51

(Montero y Vidal, 1886, pp. 169-186; Sancianco y Goson, [1975] pp. 13-21).

The following taxes can be distinguished:

a. *Direct taxes*

One of the earliest of all the levies of the Spanish kings upon their colonial subjects was the tribute (Priestly, 1916, p. 322), originally a vassalage payment. As Plehn pointed out: 'The tribute was a personal tax of the nature of a uniform poll tax and was the only tax universally enforced' (Plehn, 1901/1902, p. 685). The unit assessment was the household. Certain categories were exempted from the tributes: *alcaldes, gobernadores* and *cabezas de barangay* (in short the *principalia*), and their sons, soldiers, members of the civil guard, government officials, and paupers.

Tribute was collected both in specie and in kind. In 1593 the government proposed that tribute be paid in kind, which would lead to greater food production. This was still the case during the 17th century. The goods used for payment were: chickens, rice, coconut oil, wine (Cushner, 1971, p. 103). This reflects the predominance

of a subsistence economy and the absence of any monetary exchange. The Spanish crown, however, preferred payment in specie, in order to increase the gold flow to Spain. The collection of the tribute in kind caused various difficulties to the local officials, who somehow had to convert the goods into money. Apparently at the provincial level traders were operating who could exchange these goods for coins.

During the 18th century up to the 1840s the yield of the tributes was rather low. Several reasons can be mentioned for this phenomenon. The collection in kind entailed great losses due to spoilage; the lack of control from the higher administrative levels down to the lowest echelons, made a large part of the collected tribute disappear into the pockets of the local and provincial officials. It was only during the 1840s with the increasing centralization of the government structure that the control, and consequently the yield, increased impressively.

In 1884 the payment of tribute was repealed, and replaced by a graduated poll tax (or *capitacion,* head tax). This tax was collected by means of a certificate of identification, known as *cédula personal,* which every resident was required to obtain. As Elliott states: 'It was a sort of license to exist and to do business' (Elliott, 1916, I, p. 252). The *cédula* had to be shown in court and carried along while travelling.

While the tribute was imposed on households, the *cédula* was imposed on individuals. There were 16 different classes of *cédulas* according to income category, the highest category paying 37,50 pesos, while peasants were paying 1,50 pesos (Plehn, 1901/1902, pp. 691-693).

Although this tax was progressive, the burden was relatively heavy for those in the lowest category, and light for the richer people. Rajal y Larre in his study of the province of Nueva Ecija around 1887, gives an estimate of the budget of a *kasamá* (share-cropper) household, which harvests 80 cavans of palay (unhusked rice) a year (which indicates a field of more or less 3 hectares). This household has an income of 37,50 pesos, and pays as direct tax 4,69 pesos, and indirect tax 0,50 pesos: a total of 5,19 pesos, being almost 14% (Rajal y Larre, 1889).

During the last decades of the Spanish colonial government the *cédula* was the main source of government income, yielding 5-7 million pesos per year. During the years 1885-1886 the replacement of the tribute by the *cédula* increased the income of the direct taxes rapidly. Under the tribute system the number of people exempted from taxation had grown considerably, and these exemptions were discontinued under the *cédula* system (Corpuz, 1965, 16-17).

In 1878 two direct taxes were added, both imposed on urban incomes:

1) a tax on the annual rental value of urban real estate, known as the 'urbana', and

2) a tax on salaries, dividends and profits, commonly abbreviated as 'industria' (Plehn, 1901/1902, pp. 701-711).

The urbana tax was levied at the rate of 5% upon the net value of rental value of all houses. A number of exemptions were granted. The tax list or 'padron' was compiled by local assessment boards. The tax on industry and commerce was a continuation and extension of an earlier industrial and commercial license tax on Chinese. The assessment of both the old and the new tax were done by classifying commercial houses, factories and shops according to classes, and imposing the fixed levy. Hence the tax was an objective assessment, in the words of Plehn:

> 'In considering the form of the income tax, the most striking characteristic is the skillful way in which it avoids almost entirely the difficulties of a personal declaration, or estimate, of the annual income and the dangers of false statements and misrepresentations.' (Plehn, 1901/1902, p. 710).

The urbana and the industria tax were rather heavy levies on urban property and commercial enterprises. Plehn gives the following judgement on this tax on income:

> 'The tax is universal and affects every kind of economic activity except agriculture, which, as has already been stated it was the expressed policy of the Spanish government to foster and encourage.'

A remarkable feature of the Spanish taxation system was the absence of a land tax on rural property, such as had been developed under the British, the Dutch and the French colonial systems. Several foreigners travelling in the islands have expressed their amazement at the absence of any tax on landed property (Wiselius, 1876, pp. 64-65). The landowner class remained the least burdened by the tax system. A proposal for a more modern tax system, including a tax on land, was presented by Sancianco y Goson, a lawyer in Manila, who wrote a series of studies on the Philippine taxation system which were published as a book in 1881. He proposed the abolition of the capitation tax, and the *polo* (labor services). Sancianco y Goson argued that a tax on rural property would not only be a source of income for the state, but would also stimulate agriculture. He was aware of the existence of a class of wealthy Indios and mestizos in the countryside, whose income amounted to many thousands of pesos and who were undertaxed (Sancianco y Goson, 1881/1975, p. 8).

It was only in the Maura law of 1893 which aimed at reorganization of the municipal administration, that a small municipal tax on land was introduced. The law intended to provide for local self-government, whereby the *principalia* would be the local rulers, but their eligibility was to be based on the payment of land tax. This provision, however, was never executed, while the law itself was superseded by martial law in 1896 (Elliott, 1916, p.).

b. *Indirect taxes*

The customs duties were imposed on imports and exports. The tariff laws as they developed during the second half of the 19th century, was primarily meant for fiscal purposes, and hardly for protectionistic purposes. Spain did not have a well-developed industry which needed an outlet for its products, while the colonial government did not engage in productive enterprise on a large scale, except for the tobacco monopoly. The situation developed by the middle of the century that while Spanish ships brought nearly all the imports, most of the exports were transported by foreign vessels (Plehn, 1901/1902, p. 131). The customs duties consisted of ad valorem duties on goods, were set down in long lists of prices for all kinds of goods (usually in the order of 3-10%), increased by all kinds of surtaxes and special retributions. The custom laws were carried out with strong formalism and endless indolence, which made trading with the islands a difficult enterprise. Nevertheless the commerce of the islands showed an overall increase during the second part of the 19th century and so did the income for custom duties.

An excise tax (that means a tax imposed on the circulation of goods) was absent in the Philippines. The Spanish taxation system in the Americas had the *alcabala* (duty on sales), which was, next to the tobacco monopoly the largest revenue producer by the end of the 18th century (Priestly, 1916, p. 353). This was the revenue which bore heaviest upon the people, and it was consequently the most detested of all the long list of taxes, according to Priestly (Priestly, 1916, p. 353). The *alcabala* was never introduced in the Philippines. As Plehn stated:

> '(...) the early governors were so unanimous in their opinion that this tax was unsuited to the local conditions that it was never introduced, and there was in consequence no growth of indirect internal taxes for insular purposes.' (Plehn, 1901/1902, p. 148).

c. *Monopolies and lotteries*

The Spanish colonial government drew income from a number of monopolies: taxes on the sale of stamped paper, taxes on the

manufacture and sale of liquor, taxes on cockpits and on sale of opium.

The most important of the state monopolies was the tobacco monopoly, introduced in 1781 and abolished in 1882. Under this system certain districts were assigned for the compulsory cultivation of tobacco, while the planting of tobacco outside these areas (with the exception of the Visayas) was prohibited. The government was to purchase the entire crop in the tobacco planting districts at a price determined by the authorities. Contraband sales were to be prevented by a system of inspection and tolls along the roads and rivers. The tobacco bought by the government was processed in factories and made into cigars and cigarettes, to be sold via government agencies.

The monopoly yielded a large income, but also entailed heavy expenses. De Jesus gives the following judgement on the system:

> 'As a fiscal measure the monopoly achieved a genuine breakthrough. It enabled the government, not only to support itself without the Mexican subsidy, but even to contribute to the imperial treasure — which was the original motive for its introduction' (De Jesus, 1973, p. 270).

In the areas where the tobacco monopoly had been introduced it imposed an intolerable burden on the peasants, according to De Jesus. Outside these areas the numerous checkpoints along the roads and waterways, manned by a growing Spanish bureaucracy, hampered all trade, not only that of tobacco growers.

Most of the tobacco produced by the monopoly was sold among the inhabitants of the islands, only a small portion was exported after around 1837. The Spanish at first ignored the export potential of the tobacco, and aimed only at controlling the domestic market (De Jesus, 1973, p. 166). Because of this De Jesus considers the monopoly 'more of a sumptuary tax than a system of compulsory cultivation such as the Dutch introduced on Java' (De Jesus, 1973, p. 165).

d. *Labor services*

Compulsory labor was a feature of Spanish colonial policy in the Philippines. According to the Spanish laws the Indians, as new Christians, were 'free vassals' of the crown, and their property rights and personal liberty had to be respected, but labor services could be required from them. During the first half of the 17th century the Hispano-Dutch wars led to skirmishes and encounters in the Southeast Asian scene, and the Spanish government in Manila had to reinforce its defense, especially its naval defense. A large amount of labor was needed for woodcutting and shipbuilding. This labor was

recruited through the *polo* system, by which male Filipinos had the obligation to provide labor. The polo was organized by the alcalde mayor of the province. The burden of the polo and of other levies on the Philippine population seems to have been so heavy that an increase in the death rate and the flight to the mountains reduced the population during the 17th century.

During the first half of the 19th century the *polo* seems to have been much lighter. At that time the *polos* and *servicios* were organized at the municipal level. They were intended for public works, especially the building of roads and bridges, for service in the municipal office (*tanoria,* one week per year), and for night guard duties (*semaneros,* one week per year). Prior to 1884 the *polo* obligation was 40 days a year. In that year the number of days was reduced to 15. As the higher echelons of the bureaucracy (e.g. at the national and provincial levels) were not interested in making use of these services, the *polistas* were very often employed by municipal officials for private purposes, for instance working their fields or repairing their houses.

The *polo* could be redeemed by paying an annual fee (*fallas*) of 3 pesos per annum. This payment was to be collected by the municipal officials, and to be transmitted to the central government. As the central authorities did not exert close supervision on the labor services and the redemption fee, a great portion of this tax never reached the Treasury. These pilferings by provincial and municipal officials, were known as *caidas,* or droppings (Foreman, 1906, p. 224). The provincial and local authorities cashed the redemption fee from a large number of taxpayers, and then reported to the center a smaller number of redemption and a larger number of *polistas* coming out for actual service.

In the second half of the 19th century the *polo* services by that time called *prestacion personal* (personal services) required by the government were less exacting in terms of time. The intensified military program of the government, however, demanded more manpower for national defense purposes and this demand took labor away from local governments (Robles, 1969, p. 165). The burden, however, was apparently rather light. Cruikshank in his study of Samar during the 19th century, mentions figures of around a hundred men conscripted from a population of 150,000 and more in the latter decades of the century (Cruikshank, 1975, p. 171).

The corvée labor under the Spanish colonial government in the Philippines differed in a number of respects from the liege services under the Dutch in Java. In the Philippines it was only during periods of external military threats that labor was drafted for national works, and then mainly for defense purposes. For most

part of the time, and for most areas in the Philippines, the utilization of the labor services was left to the discretion of provincial and municipal officials. In Java the colonial government used native labor more intensively for purposes at the national level. During the cultivation system (1830-1870) in many areas of Java the population had to use its labor for the forced cultivation of cash crops for the government. In the second part of the 19th century corvée labor was employed under close supervision of Dutch government officials for the building and maintenance of national roads and bridges. Contemporary travellers judged the road system in Java far better than the one in the Philippines. While in the Philippines the local elite benefitted privately from the corvée labor, in Java the national government harnessed it to state building policies.

e. *Comments on the composition of the revenue* (see table II).

1. Budget 1757. In this budget the tributes accounted for a very small percentage of the total government income (1%). The main sources of government revenue were: the venality of offices, the sale of *encomiendas,* taxes farmed out.

   Excise duties (0.9%) and part and anchorage dues (5.8%) gave a low revenue, which indicates the low level of commercial activity and the virtual absence of an exchange economy.

2. Budget 1809. The total collection from tributes amounted to 21.7% of the stated total receipts. Income from custom duties has increased, which indicates growing commercial activity in the port of Manila. The tobacco monopoly is an important source of revenue.

3. Budget of 1848. During the 1840s income from tributes went up considerably, as a result of closer supervision and control by the central government, in other words of centralization (Robles, 1969, p. 125). Around 1850 the income from tribute probably accounted for some 30% of the total revenue. The income from tobacco monopoly has somewhat declined.

4. Budget of 1880-1881. In this year the income from tribute, though higher in absolute terms than 30 years before, accounted for only 21.4% of the total income. The main source for this year was still the tobacco monopoly (30%), which was to be abolished one year later.

   Note: The income from the tobacco monopoly has to be deducted from several data. Sancianco y Goson gives in his 1880-1881 budget the total income from the sale of tobacco i.e. ₱6,571,200. The bureaucratic apparatus managing the monopoly, had a large budget post for expenditure. Plehn (1901-1902, p. 143) gives an

indication of the costs, and provides us with the information that in 1880-1881 the monopoly was 'leaving a net revenue of 3,500,000 pesos'. The large post for expenses (being ₱3,071,200) has to be deducted from the total income.

5. Budget 1885-1886. This budget is interesting because it reflects the situation after the abolition of the tobacco monopoly (1882) and after the replacement of the tribute by the cédula (1885). Income from direct tax amounted to 54.3% of the total, while the absolute amount (6.2 million pesos) was much higher than in 1880-1881 (2.4 million pesos). Income from custom duties is rapidly increasing during the 1880s and 1890s.

6. Budget 1894-1895. Towards the end of the Spanish period two branches of the taxation system had become the most important. The *cédula* accounted for 37% of the total revenue, and custom duties for 33%.

5. *Interrelations between the Economy and Institutions in 19th century Philippines*

The taxation system described in the previous section reflects not only the economic structure but also the interrelations between the various institutions and the class alliance upon which they have been based.

As has often been observed, the Spanish colonial government in the Philippines could not have established and maintained its rule without the active support of a collaborating or mediating elite. The local chiefs, the *datus,* were incorporated into the Spanish bureaucracy as the local headmen, the *cabezas de barangay* of the newly structured parish communities (Phelan, 1959, p. 121). Robles writing about these local officials, states:

> 'Suffice it to say that no single stroke of psychology used by Spain was perhaps as ingenious as that of capitalizing on the native aristocracy and bestowing titles upon them to keep the machinery of local government going' (Robles, 1969, p. 67).

The colonial bureaucracy of which these local chiefs became the lowest level officials, had a peculiar structure. Whereas in the English, Dutch and French colonies a more or less monolithic civil service was placed on the top of the existing indigenous structure, the Spanish Philippines had no less than three bureaucratic hierarchies operating side by side. A civil military hierarchy consisted of royal officials, i.e. the governor-general and the higher magistrates at the center, with *alcalde-mayores* and military in the provinces. The ecclesiastical hierarchy consisted of the archbishop of Manila, a number of bishops and the secular priests (the latter working in a number

of parishes). The third hierarchy was formed by the monastic orders (Augustinians, Franciscans, Dominicans, Recollects, and Jesuits) with friars in the parishes. While the civil hierarchy reached down to the provincial level, the two ecclesiastical hierarchies had their priests at the local (pueblo) level. A small group of parishes was under diocesan or secular clergy, and could thus be supervised by the bishops. The majority of the parishes were under friars or regulars (members of the monastic orders, each with its own rule for internal discipline), who were not under supervision and control of the bishops, but under that of their own vicar-generals and provincials. The orders exerted influence not only at the parish level, but also at the level of the central government in Manila, while they maintained representatives in Madrid through whom they could establish direct contract with the king.

Although the Spanish colonial administration was meant to be paternalistic and highly centralized, in practice political control along vertical hierarchical lines was very weak. The locality, i.e. the municipal or pueblo level, was characterized by a relatively large degree of autonomy viz-a-viz the higher bureaucracy. Robles indicates a number of factors which contributed to this localism: the topographical diversity, linguistic and cultural heterogeneity, the necessity of maintaining traditional loyalties among the population. (Robles, 1969, pp. 24-26).

The local unit consisted of a *pueblo* (small town, surrounded by a number of villages (*barangays*). Society at the local level was a stratified society, with two classes: a landowning elite living in the pueblo, and a peasant class living in the villages. The peasants consisted probably of several sub-classes: small holding peasants and dependent sharecroppers (*kasamá*). The local elite, referred to as the *principalia,* are usually indicated as ex-officials, but aside from their political-administrative position, their economic position as landlords is important. The principal families in the pueblo were linked through kinship and intermarriage.

The local elite, the *principales,* formed a privileged group during the 19th century. They were exempted from tribute paying and *polo* services, and the levying of the capitation tax in the last quarter of the century could be considered a light burden for the big landowners. There was no obstacle to the acquisition of land, either by means of *pacto de retro* arrangements, or by opening up forest and shrub land. Labor could have formed a problem, and indeed it did in some areas and to some extent, as landless people could avoid working as laborers by clearing wasteland themselves. The problem of survival during the first lean years, however, made poor households prefer the relatively protected position of a sharecropper's existence on the land

of bigger landlords. It should be borne in mind that poor households relative to the principales, carried a much heavier burden with respect to tribute and *polo* services (or fallas).

The head of the pueblo, the *gobernadorcillo* had the right to carry the title of *Don* and *Capitan*. With this title went along several privileges, like the exemption of the tribute payment and of the *polo*. His duties consisted of the collection of tributes from the peasants. The heads of the *barangays* were called *cabezas*. They were responsible for the *repartimiento* of personal services and for the deliveries of goods (rice, oil, wine) to meet the tribute demands from the government (Cortes, 1974, 83-84).

The parish priest (usually a Spaniard) was a powerful person in the local community, where he not only exercised his clerical duties, but many administrative ones as well. He spoke the native language and had an extensive knowledge of the local community and its people. He acted as inspector of taxation, supervisor of the schools, president of the health board; he certified to the correctness of the official papers, kept the parish books, he was president of the census taking, he signed all kinds of certificates, he supervised the municipal elections, he was the censor of municipal budgets, the president of the prison board, counselor for the municipal administration, etc. (Testimony of the provincial of Franciscans, as quoted in Stanley, 1974, pp. 11-12).

Towards the end of the Spanish regime the friars became the target of increasing criticism, being considered the 'social cancer' of society. They were accused of abuse of power and moral corruption. The anti-friar arguments focused on the landholdings of the religious orders, and the friars who acted as curates were accused of being local despots. These accusations which came up in a period of changing power relationships (namely the growth of a national public opinion and the centralization of the colonial government) tend to overestimate the personal power of the parish priests. It would be more in accordance with anthropological insights in power-relationships in local communities, to emphasize the interdependence between the parish priest and the local *principalia*. He was as much dependent on their cooperation (for contribution, for assistance, for organizing processions and religious feasts) as they were on him (for advice, for acting as intermediary, for providing a religious legitimacy for their local power position). One might wonder whether the principal loyalty of the friar was not with his community.

The relative autonomy of the local level becomes clear when we look at the position of the *alcalde-mayor,* the provincial governor, a Spaniard. Before the government reforms of 1884 the *alcalde-mayor*

was in charge of a number of tasks: head of provincial government, head of police, military commander, tax supervisor, provincial judge. The concentration of functions made him a very powerful bureaucrat. He had the assistance of a small number of Spanish subaltern officials (according to Comyn not more than 27). Aside from these government duties, the alcalde acted as monopolistic trader in his province. In 1751 the alcaldes were permitted to conduct trade, after payment of a fine (*indulto,* privilege) to the central government. In 1844 a new law prohibited this trade.

The alcalde was able to establish a monopoly and to carry out his trade with the help of a network of agents in the towns, and these agents were usually the *gobernadorcillos* or other influential persons, and the *cabezas de barangay* (Robles, 1969, p. 113). The transactional relationship between the alcalde and the gobernadorcillos becomes clear from statements from the *Memoria* by Sinibaldo de Mas (1842). Mas stated that it was important for the gobernadorcillo to comply with the alcalde, because the latter could use his political power to harrass the local official. But

> '(...) it is important for the *alcalde,* to keep the *gobernadorcillo* satisfied' and 'the *alcalde* needs the *gobernadorcillo* so that he may use him in his business' (B & R, XXXVI, pp. 285-286).

One way to favor the gobernadorcillo was to allow him liberties in the collection of the tribute, the mobilization of the polo and in legal matters (landgrabbing). As the alcalde did not speak the regional language, he was unable to investigate matters himself, and therefore was completely dependent on trusted supporters, like the parish priest and the principalia (B & R, XXXVI, p. 286).

The networks formed by *alcaldes* and *gobernadorcillos* enabled these officials to enrich themselves (Robles, 1969, p. 80). This self-enrichment comprised of: pocketing the tribute and the redemption fees for the *polos y servicios,* making a profit on the tribute paid in kind, making a profit in buying up tobacco for the monopoly, acting as usurers. The trade monopoly enabled them to collect large amounts of money. This monopoly was possible in a predominantly agrarian economy. The abolition of the alcalde trade in 1844, according to Owen: 'was as much a result as a cause of rising private trade in the province' (Owen, 1976, p. 66).

This self-enrichment of the officials put a heavy burden upon the peasant population. The local priest usually knew the ins and outs of the abuses, but he was as a rule reluctant to interfere in these matters, because the simmering conflict between Church and State put him already in a precarious position viz-a-viz the alcalde. With re-

gards to the local officials, the priest probably accepted their abuses, because of the interdependencies between him and the local elite.

The relative autonomy of the local elite was probably increased by the emerging cash crop economy as a result of the integration of the colony in the world market, in the first half of the 19th century. The increasing importance of cashcrops prompted the appearance of a new group of landlords-entrepreneurs, drawn from the stratum of Chinese *mestizos*. The *mestizos* were able to take over part of the land of the traditional principalia, by acting as usurers and thus forcing the traditional landlords to turn over the title deeds to their land.

That the Spanish officials had to consider the power of the local elite, is well pictured in the following description by De Jesus, in his study of the tobacco monopoly:

> 'Such already was the power of the cabeza and the rest of the principales in the towns that Domingo Goyenechea, alcalde of Bataan, did not consider it safe to present the people with a choice between the monopolies and the double tribute. He believed that the fifteen to twenty principales in the town would surely opt for the double tribute and would bring the whole town to vote likewise' (De Jesus, 1973, p. 129).

The fact that around 1800 resistance to the tobacco monopoly had dwindled, can be attributed to alternative commercial possibilities for the local elite. De Jesus stated:

> 'In time, those displaced by the monopoly from the tobacco trade discovered that other crops, like pepper, cotton, sugar and indigo required less labor and returned higher profits than tobacco' (De Jesus, 1973, p. 126).

The growing link between the *new mestizo* landlord class in the countryside of Luzon, and foreign commercial interests, did not escape the attention of the Spanish government. The diplomat Sinibaldo de Mas in his report (1842) mentions the presence of a strong class 'of more than two hundred thousand rich, active, and intelligent mestizos' (B & R, LII, p. 39). And he expresses the fear that the Chinese mestizos might one day take over the government of the archipelago. He considers the rivalry between the natives and the mestizos an important factor militating against this rise to power, and he advises the government to foster this rivalry (B & R, LII, p. 65).

The colonial government in the Philippines underwent a process of centralization during the middle decades of the 19th century. Two factors accounted for this policy. The first was the increase in regional rebellions, which had to be met with military means, and this led to higher expenses for the army and navy, and to a centralization of the command structure. The second factor is the need for higher revenue

to finance the administration. The subsidy from Mexico (the *situado*) had ceased in 1810. The government took a number of fiscal measures, which did not involve a basic change in the tax system, but consisted of stricter control, higher levies, and the addition of surtax (Robles, 1969, pp. 54-55, p. 72).

The taxation system remained heavily biased in favor of the landed elite. The absence of any tax on landed property was a striking aspect of this policy. Plehn gives the following explanation:

> 'The reasons for thus favoring agriculture, which had all the more weight by virtue of the fact the [sic] 'friars' who were large landholders, had a decisive voice in government, are to found [sic]: first in the great natural advantages which the islands posses for the production of such crops as hemp, tobacco, copra, coconut, sugar, indigo and chocolate—crops which promise such magnificent returns for the general wealth and welfare of the country when they are developed; and second in the inertness of the natives and their reluctance to labor after their immediate necessities are supplied, which places a severe handicap on all agriculture [sic] endeavor' (Plehn, 1901-1902, p. 710).

When the friars are being mentioned as a pressure group, it is not only their estate interests which deserve attention, but also the close connection between the religious orders and the local landed elite, via the numerous curates serving in parishes. The friars were well aware of the political importance of the local elite for the maintenance of the state structure. They knew that the imposition of a land tax would alienate this group, and cause them to revolt. The hierarchical organization of the religious orders made it possible to convey this message from the local level upwards to the decision making level in Manila and Madrid.

6. *Conclusions*

A comparison of the two taxation systems leads to the following remarks:

A striking contrast between developments in Java and in the Philippines was the degree of control over commercial networks which both governments exercised. The Dutch administration in Java after 1830 re-established its mercantilistic monopoly on trade, thereby cutting off any emerging landed elite from commercial linkages. Javanese officials were completely dependent on benefits from their bureaucratic position. The Spanish government in the Philippines proved to be unable to maintain its old mercantilistic policy, and opened the ports to foreign traders. The Filipino rural elite engaged in cash crop production for export via these foreign commercial

links. The local elite thus acquired commercial interests and economic possibilities alongside its bureaucratic functions.

During the first part of the 19th century the rudimentary economies of the two colonies put severe limits to the fiscal possibilities of the colonial states. Direct taxation, collected via the indigenous hierarchical structure, turned out to be inherently weak. The land tax under the British and Dutch in Java produced a very low revenue. The tribute under the Spanish in the Philippines was equally inefficient. The higher level of the colonial administration had very little control over the native mediators.

The Spanish colonial regime never introduced a system of land tax. The notion of a land tax was not absent, as is shown from the reform proposals of Sancianco y Goson. Why such a tax was never accepted by the government can only be guessed at. The most plausible hypothesis is the influence of strong pressure groups upon government policy: the friars owning large estates and the native landowning class being the main pillar of the colonial regime. One might also point to the apparent weakness of the colonial administration: the extensive apparatus for the assessment of a land tax was clearly lacking, while the building up of a cadaster was beyond the capabilities of the administration.

Under the Cultivation System the Dutch commuted the land tax into corvée labor employed for the production of cash crops and the building of roads. From a purely fiscal point of view this incorporation of the village into a vertical production organization, was a remarkable achievement.

The Spanish had introduced the tobacco monopoly, a system under which certain areas were assigned for the cultivation of tobacco, which was to be bought by the government. This system was based on compulsory labor and forced deliveries. The profit which the government made, was on the monopolistic sale of tobacco in the island.

The Spanish did not make use of labor services on an extensive scale for national purposes during the 19th century. The *polos y servicios* were either used by local officials, or redeemed by a money payment which was partly pocketed by the local officials. One wonders why the central government did not employ compulsory labor on a larger scale. If not for cultivation purposes, corvée labor could have been used for public works and for the building of defense works.

In this respect a hypothesis can be put forward pertaining to the character of the local community.

Central Java villages consisted of small peasants, with a group of village officials owning larger fields, in the order of a few hectares. The village head was the only one with a rather large landholding, say 10 hectares. The demand for labor of this village elite was not very sizeable and could probably be satisfied from the *pancen*-services (for the village head) and by indoor servants. The labor of the mass of the small peasants could be put into the service of the government. There was no clash of interests between the labor demands of the elite and those of the government. On the contrary, by acting as manager of the labor force, the village head increased his own authority in the village.

Central Luzon municipalities consisted of a group of landowning principales, and a group of share-cropping peasants (*kasamá*). The labor demand of this local elite was sizeable, and a big labor input was required from the *kasamá,* i.e. from a large group of peasants with whom the landlords maintained personal and contractual labor relationships. Especially in areas where the landowning elite had turned to cash crop production, the availability of labor was a crucial factor. One can surmise that the landlords were not inclined to let the government mobilize this labor force. In other words there was a definite clash of interests between the central government and the local elite. What still has to be elucidated in this connection is to what extent and in what particular way the landed elite made its interests respected by the government.

Table II The Composition of Colonial Government Budgets: Income from Different Taxation Sources

Budget	Tributes, capitacion, sángleyes, later cédulas and income taxes	Custom Duties	Monopolies		Total	
1757	₱ 4,477 (1%)	25,938			697,455	
(Foreman, p. 251)		4,195			250,000	(situado)
		30,133 (6.7%)			447,455	(100%)
1809	364,474					
(Comyn)	30,000	257,179 (14%)	tobacco	506,754 (28%)	1,813,318	(100%)
	394,474 (21.7%)					
1848	1,629,117		tobacco	1,307,467 (23.3%)	5,592,540	(cijfer van 1851)
(Robles)	158,715					
	1,787,832 (32%)					
	1,991,578					
1880-1881	139,915	1,605,700 (13.8%)	tobacco	6,571,200	14,638,486	
(Sancianco y Goson)	23,615		sales	3,500,000 (30%)	3,071,200	
	76,000		profit			
	2,483,181 (21.4%)				11,567,286	(100%)
1885-1886	6,262.738 (54.3%)	2,176,500 (18.8%)		1,254,400 (10%)	11,528,178	
(Montéro y Vidal)						
1894-1895	6,659,450 (49%)	4,565,000 (33%)		1,112,850 (8.1%)	13,579,300	
(Elliott)						

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