

PEASANT SOCIETY AND UNREST PRIOR TO THE HUK REVOLUTION IN THE PHILIPPINES

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*Part I: A case study of social and economic changes in the 20th Century for peasants in Central Luzon.**

AT THE TURN OF THIS CENTURY, THE PLAINS OF NUEVA ECIJA WERE grass lands and forests. Filipinos had used the heavy cover for hiding and surprise attacks in their guerrilla wars against the Spanish and the American armies. After the revolutionaries had surrendered, many of their illustrado leaders held Sunday outings to shoot wild boar and deer in those forests. At the same time, some of the poor farmers in the area, many of them settlers from other parts of Central Luzon and Ilocos region, hunted to add to their meager food stores, just as Negritoes had done before being driven away by the newcomers.

As one travels through Nueva Ecija, he marvels at the expansive rice fields. That the wildlife, grasslands, forests (except for some standing timber high in the Sierra Madres and on balding Mt. Arayat) are gone and in their place stretch rice fields represents a history of interest to more than topographers and botanists. These physical changes betray intricate ecological changes of special importance to the peasants there. If one could study those changes, he could better comprehend the reasons for the growth of agrarian unrest that prevailed in Nueva Ecija and other parts of the central plains, beginning at least as early as the 1930's and peaking about 1948-52. Furthermore, such a study would reveal in some detail the society and economy of Central Luzon peasants. In order to make a manageable study, I have focused on one barrio's history, drawing generalizations by putting the case study data together with more general information about the province and Central Luzon as a whole.

In Tables I and II below the most striking trends are the rapid increases in land use and population growth. Note too the large percentage of farmers who, in 1939, are tenants, with practically all of them being share tenants (*kasama*). The basis of the economy for Talavera, Nueva

* This case study is an abbreviated version of a more detailed one that I am presently writing and will be part of my dissertation. The data was collected, in the main, during four months (March through June, 1970) of interviewing residents over 40 years old living in Talavera, principally in the barrio of San Ricardo. I am deeply grateful to all the people, especially to the peasants in San Ricardo and my hosts in Talavera, who were thoroughly generous to this outsider and talked freely about themselves and their community.

Ecija, as indeed for all of Central Luzon during this time period, was agriculture. *Palay* (unhusked rice) was the most important single crop.

TABLE I: CENSUS DATA¹

| | | 1903 | 1918 | 1939 |
|----------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Number of Farms | N.E. Talavera | 13,381 n.a. | 33,764 1,106 | 78,313 4,515 |
| Total Area of Farms (Hectares) | N.E. Talavera | 90,367 n.a. | 205,410 7,086 | 289,202 17,196 |
| Total Cultivated Area (Hectares) | N.E. Talavera | 26,763 n.a. | 97,159 4,881 | 221,956 13,689 |
| Population | N.E. Talavera | 134,147 3,352 | 226,721 8,658 | 416,762 20,442 |

(Note: n.a. = not available in the Census data for that year.)

TABLE II: NUMBER OF FARMS BY TENURE AND YEAR²

| | # Farms | Owners (%) | Tenant (%) | Other (%) |
|----------|---------|-------------|-------------|-----------|
| 1939 | | | | |
| N.E. | 78,319 | 26,221 (34) | 52,029 (66) | 69 (0) |
| Talavera | 4,515 | 1,084 (24) | 3,430 (76) | 1 (0) |
| 1960 | | | | |
| N.E. | 58,566 | 13,168 (22) | 44,670 (77) | 728 (1) |
| Talavera | 2,726 | 199 (7) | 2,518 (93) | 9 (0) |

(Note: Owners include both full and part owners; tenants include all types. Percentage figures are rounded to nearest whole number.)

There were two main systems for clearing and planting the land in the early 1900's. The first, *buwis* or *buwisan*, was the less common and by the 1930's was practically extinct. The second, *kasama* or share-tenancy, was popular from the early 1900's and continues right up to the present. (According to the 1960 Census, 90% of all tenants in Talavera were kasama. For Nueva Ecija the respective figure is 94%.) Under *buwis*, a man would clear a small, 3-4 hectares, parcel owned by one with many uncleared hectares. For the first season or two he paid nothing to the landowner, and lived off whatever vegetables he could grow on the still rocky, weedy, and stump-filled land. Then he would probably plant *kaingin* style (slash and burn with no transplanting) for his first few crops of rice, and pay a set

¹ Figures taken from the three respective censuses. *Census of the Philippine Islands, 1903*. United States Bureau of Census. Washington: Government Printing Office. *Census of the Philippine Islands, 1918*. Census Office of the Philippine Islands. Manila: Bureau of Printing. *Census of the Philippine Islands, 1939*. Census Office of the Philippine Islands. Manila: Bureau of Printing.

² The 1939 tenancy figures are from the 1939 Census. For 1960, *Census of the Philippine Islands, 1960*. Bureau of Census. Manila: Government Printing Office. Other provinces with high tenancy rates in 1939 were Pampanga, 70%; Negros Occidental, 68%; Bulacan, 64%; Tarlac, 53%.

fee to the landowner. Or he might just continue planting vegetables and bananas, marketing to neighbors and nearby settlements what he could not consume. In the mid-1930's in San Ricardo, Talavera, the fee typically paid for 3-4 hectares was about ₱60 per year.

The reasons why the buwis system did not thrive lie mainly with indebtedness. The majority of those practising buwis could last only a few seasons without going into debt, usually to the landowner himself. Many in fact had to borrow the initial capital, small though it was, to buy tools and rent or buy a carabao. One season of crop failure due to drought, typhoons, or pests was usually enough to put in debt others who had avoided initial debts. In San Ricardo, as elsewhere, the practice was for the landowner and buwis tenant to agree that they shift to the kasama system. Then the tenant would plant palay and give about 50% of the harvest to the landlord.

Most tenants began as kasama right from the beginning. When General Manuel Tinio had hundreds of uncleared hectares in the San Ricardo area, men would approach him and ask for a plot of land. He would assign each man 2-4 hectares, depending on his and the tenant's desires. The tenants for the first year or two paid nothing to Tinio, nor was he paid anything by the hacendero. While the tenant prepared the land for palay cultivation, he raised vegetables to eat and borrowed from the landlord rice rations, which he would repay after he had started palay cultivation. Typically the tenants planted a season of kaingin before the first palay. Thus after about two or three seasons, the land was ready for palay.

Some of Tinio's tenants were families he brought from any one of several haciendas he held in the province. While he held some positions in the Philippine government, he even arranged for ex-prisoners to work his land if they wanted a new start in life. Most tenants, however, were migrants from Pampanga, Bulacan, and Ilocos provinces. Wherever their origin, they were all part of a labor-intensive agricultural system through which Tinio's hacienda of over 400 hectares in San Ricardo was cleared and farmed.

Manuel Tinio was not the only landowner in San Ricardo in the early 1900's, but his holdings were the biggest. His land encompassed the lion's share of the total in the area, and a large number of the people living there were his tenants. It is instructive to examine how he came to own his land.

Like his several brothers and sisters, Manuel Tinio inherited land (about 68 hectares) from his father's estate. The Tinio family had owned large tracts of land dating back to the 19th Century. Before Manuel Tinio could finish his college education in Manila, the Revolution came; he joined and acquired the rank of general. While eluding the Spanish armies, he often hid in the forests around San Ricardo. After making his peace with the Americans, he began purchasing large sections of his former hideout; by 1905 he held between 350 and 400 hectares of formerly public land, paying

50 to 100 pesos per hectare. In 1907 he was appointed governor of Nueva Ecija by the American regime. In 1908 he was elected to that position. Then he was appointed Director of Labor in 1909, the first Filipino to hold a directorship of any agency in the new American colony. He became Director of Lands in 1913, a post he held until 1916 when he apparently retired to hold no more public offices. All this time he continued to collect land holdings in many parts of Nueva Ecija, although some of his methods were reportedly unscrupulous.³ It is not known exactly how many hundreds of hectares he added during those years, but in the Talavera area alone they exceeded three hundred. Some of the land he parcelled out to relatives; some he later sold for profit. Most he developed into rice haciendas.

Each tenant on the Tinio hacienda in San Ricardo cultivated, roughly, 2-4 hectares, and each was allowed a lot for his house. Most of the houses were built in clusters forming *sitios* and *barrios*. Sometimes too Manuel Tinio loaned carabaos to those tenants who had none of their own. Tenants paid all expenses for plowing, harrowing, and harvesting; Tinio paid for seeds and transplanting. They generally shared expenses for threshing and maintaining the irrigation canals, which Tinio had built in about 1918. After harvest and after each party had been re-imburshed for his respective expenses, the remainder was divided 50/50. Any debts owed to the hacendero was subtracted from the tenant's share.

Practically every *kasama* had *utang* (debt) to Tinio. He was the sole source of rice for those who could not keep a surplus to last a full cycle from harvest to harvest. As mentioned above, the typical *kasama* was borrowing even before he had planted his first palay. The rice tenant family borrowed for eating of *bigas* (milled rice) each year. For this type of *utang* no interest was charged. For any money borrowed, the tenants repaid its equivalent in palay at the prices prevailing for palay at harvest time (about ₱2 per cavan of palay in the 1920's). Whatever was left after paying his debts, the tenant took home, although some choose to leave part of their palay in Tinio's bodega at no charge. Most tenants, however, had only a few cavans remaining; sometimes they had none. In any case, they soon would have to start once again the whole borrowing cycle.

The economic aspect was only one part of the relationship between the tenants and the hacendero during those years. Tinio also saw to his tenants' personal needs, such as medical attention, contributing to families during times of joy (like births and marriages) and times of sorrow (like illness and deaths). While he did not always live on the hacienda, he was frequently there and easily and readily interacted with his tenants, including visiting them at their homes. It is reported that Manuel Tinio looked upon his tenants as extended members of his family, perhaps as a grandfather

³ Several informants said that not only was Manuel Tinio the first Filipino to be a director, he was also the first to be removed from office because of corrupt practices.

looked upon his grandchildren. The tenants, in turn, felt considerable personal debt to Tinio that went far beyond monetary re-payment. Consequently they did all things for him at his asking—e.g., helping around his house and grounds, building and repairing irrigation and canals, clearing land for no re-imbursement, and mending his bull-carts.

The landlord-tenant relationship was reciprocal, with each partner feeling that he benefited. For the tenant there was economic security, knowing he would always have rice to eat, to plant, and enough left over for modest celebrations. The tenant could count on Tinio's ration and loans even in times of crop failures, which were more than occasional. There was also the important social security that the hacendero's paternal protection provided. As regards the landlord, there were financial profit, social prestige, and political benefits for him. His lands were cleared at practically no expense to him, he had a ready source of free labor for any work he might want done around the hacienda or elsewhere, and he could borrow money on the merit of his land and its productivity in order to further expand his holdings or to invest in business endeavors. There too was some capital gain from loaning money to tenants and being repaid its equivalent in palay at the low prices prevailing during harvest. He could hold on to the palay, then sell later in the year at higher prices in order to get more return per cavan. Despite this gain for the landlord, the peasant did not look upon the hacendero as their exploiter. Those old enough to remember describe Manuel Tinio, for example, as their benefactor and protector.

In 1924 Manuel Tinio died. His land was eventually divided among his many children (he had married twice), but from the time of his death until just before the Japanese occupation, one of his eldest sons administered several of Manuel's haciendas, including the one in San Ricardo. Under this new administration, the little world of the peasants there began to change. The causes do not follow simply from that change of hacenderos, yet from their perspective, the peasants attribute much of the cause to that fact. There were both small and large alterations in the system that at first irritated the peasants, but gradually became grave matters of survival.

When he took over his father's haciendas, Manolo Tinio had just graduated in engineering from Cornell University in the United States. He had been away for several years, and did not have the close, paternal-like ties his father had had with the tenants. He set up his house in Cabanatuan, the provincial capital, and rarely was in San Ricardo. He relied more than his father had on *katiwalas* (overseers) to run the hacienda because he had several farms to look after plus other interests in Cabanatuan and Manila. Consequently there was far less interaction with the peasants. This meant not only less of the personal touch but less concern for the tenants' well-being. The tenants knew this—they could feel it and see it.

The hacendero's contributions to a tenant family's baptism, etc., declined in number and amount. There was less assurance that the hacendero would look after a sick tenant or member of a tenant's family. At the same time, the new hacendero's management was *mas mahigpit* (more strict, stringent). Old tenants in Talavera recall that General Manuel Tinio had allowed them to take home free handfuls of palay to feed their chickens and ducks. Manolo Tinio had this stopped. The practice of *pulot* (picking up and keeping for free fallen grain after harvest) was allowed, but was more closely supervised by the katiwalas who had strict orders about exactly what grain could or could not be kept. As the years moved along, the strict enforcement of the new hacendero's policies were institutionalized by means of written contracts that all tenants signed and by armed guards to insure that the contracts and policies were not violated. Theoretically written contracts could have been to the tenant's interest as well as to the landlord's. In practice, not necessarily. The landlord was the one who drew up the terms, for there was no bargaining power on the tenant's part. The tenants were not yet organized enough to play the counterpart to management in a management-employee context. Furthermore, anyone not wanting to follow the rules of the hacienda could be replaced by others with increasing ease. (Recall the earlier population growth figures. Part II of this paper has more discussion on this point.)

The most drastic change for the tenants was the cessation of rations. For a few years Manolo Tinio continued the practice of giving rations but by the early 1930's (if not sooner) he "... put a stop to that."⁴ His reasons reflect his way of looking upon the hacienda system he had inherited and his decisions to change it. For one thing, the rations were repaid with no interest. This seemed an un-business-like manner to handle one's capital. Second, the hacendero grew tired of seeing "long, sad faces" after such harvest, since most tenants had little or no palay to take home after having paid their debts to the hacendero. Tinio decided that if the tenants needed loans, it was better for his psyche and business that they get loans elsewhere, or, as the tenants put it, "*sa labas*" (outside the hacienda). That way, too, he and his katiwalas would not have to be bothered keeping accounts of loans and collections.

Changes in the landlord-tenant relationship were occurring not only on this hacienda nor only in this part of Central Luzon during the 1920's and 1930's. Landlords throughout the region were becoming increasingly impatient with the kasama system and wanted as little to do with it as possible. Yet in the absence of anything to replace tenant labor, large landowners still had to rely on the kasama for economic returns. Landlords began seeing kasamas as unequal business partners, with the landlord providing the land and most of the capital, and the tenants their labor and some capital—

⁴ Manolo Tinio, Interview, 21 May 1970. San Ricardo, Talavera, Nueva Ecija.

principally, carabaos and farm implements. The previous ties binding the paternalistic relationship were gradually cut until only the economic strand was left. Yet even that grew weaker since increasingly the economic relationship was insufficient to meet the peasants' minimum needs. The most unfortunate result for the peasant was that he was left trying to cling to a dying socio-economic ecological system.

While the landlords were breaking their ties with tenants, other alternatives for the peasants were narrowing. In earlier years they could move from one area to the next in search of (1) more fertile soil or uncleared land owned by large landowners and (2) better conditions and arrangements with landlords. Such moving about indeed did continue into the mid 1940's, but the satisfaction it brought declined. First, population density was taking its toll of the land. Uncultivated land became scarce. The few unfarmed hectares in the San Ricardo area just before World War II were quickly converted to rice fields after the war. Where before there had been plenty of room to move around in, by the 1940's it was rather close quarters.⁵ Moreover, the soil was less fertile and crop yields suffered. Older tenants in San Ricardo remember pre-World War II days when they could get yields without fertilizers and irrigation that today they can equal only with fertilizers and irrigation (when they have those).

As for searching for better relations with landlords, tenants were finding that practices among landlords were becoming increasingly uniform. Several who left the Tinio hacienda in San Ricardo in the late 1920's and early 1930's found that things were much the same not only elsewhere in Talavera, but all over the province. Example: There was a time when tenants could hope to find landlords who would give loans interest free. But in the 1930's and 1940's, tenants were choosing among landlords who demanded a repayment of only three cavans of palay, rather than four, per cavan of bigas borrowed. At the same time, peasants found themselves in non-bargaining positions. Landlords could set the terms; if a tenant refused, there would be others who would accept.

Homesteading or owning one's own land was one option that a few peasants could try for in the early years of the 20th Century. Then there were favorable homestead laws, which were sometimes administered fairly, and some public lands for that purpose were still available. But in the San Ricardo area, as elsewhere in Central Luzon, the landowner who farms his own small piece of land with his family now, as before World War II, is clearly the exception. This is a consequence not only of big-moneyed people

⁵ A good indication of this density and scarcity of farm land is the system of *puesto* now practiced in Nueva Ecija but did not exist prior to about the late 1940's. Under this system, a tenant farmer who wants to give up his parcel can get a payment (nowadays about ₱1,000 per hectare in the San Ricardo area) from a person who wants to take his place as the tenant on that parcel. Such a payment for the right to cultivate a piece of land was unheard of before because there was at that time land yet to be cleared and cultivated.

buying large tracts of land. Many who did in fact homestead failed to survive the hardships. A handful in San Ricardo, for example, lost their holdings in the 1930's because they were forced to borrow large amounts from money-lenders or larger landowners, then later give up their land in an attempt to pay back their debts.

As another alternative to adjust to the changing ecological system, a peasant could try to augment his income through other work. This became especially crucial as cash, rather than just rice, became important for the peasant family's budget. While there were no reported "cottage industries" in San Ricardo, men and women did look for miscellaneous work such as cutting wood to sell (in the earlier years of the 20th Century, wood was so plentiful that no one sold it), raising a few pigs or poultry to sell in the market, and growing some vegetables on the few hectares irrigated during the off-palay season. There too was short-term agricultural employment such as transplanting rice seedlings. San Ricardo residents report that work that before had often been done free by friends and relatives later, as the need for work and extra income increased, was done for payment. For example, previously, peasants would help each other harvest palay with no payment expected. By the 1930's and especially in the post-war 1940's, it was common to pay a team of harvesters about 6% of the harvest. Since this expense was usually subtracted from the gross harvest (before the net harvest was divided between landlord and tenant), such payment came out of the landlord's pocket, so to speak, as much as the individual tenant farmer's. In such a fashion the wealth of the barrio was shared not only to increase a tenant's income, but also to provide employment for a small but growing number of men who did not even have a plot of land to work on as a tenant.

Another option was *pagitiis lamang*—to simply endure the changes and hardship as best as possible. For most this meant, at the very least, borrowing rice and money at higher and higher interest rates, either from their landlords or from money-lenders.⁶ Some could get courage and spiritual support through religion. The family system, which included relatives on both the husband's and the wife's side, often helped. People too cut back on their already meager diets, having less meat and more vegetables to accompany their staple food, rice. As an indicator of the desperation and scarcity, elder residents of San Ricardo point to the custom of pulot. They remember when stalks of palay could lie on the ground for week and no one would bother to pick them up. But during the 1930's and even more so after the Japanese occupation, the practice of pulot became very common, with the numerous *namumulot* (those gleaning the fields) following right

⁶ Interest rates varied with the loan source and over time, but for rice the general trend in the Talavera area was 50%, then 100%, and by the late 1930's 150% (5 cavans of *palay* to be paid for every 1 cavan of *bigas* borrowed). (Note: 2 cavans of *palay* equals about 1 cavan of *bigas*.) For money, interest rates before World War II were about 20%.

along behind the harvesters. For many people it became an important way to add a little to their small incomes.

These various responses by peasants were not done one at a time. People did several simultaneously, trying to regain at least economic security in an eroding system. Some responded with more public and even hostile actions. People began placing blame for their worsening situation. As they did, they began pointing more frequently at the landlords, money-lenders, and, later, apathetic or unresponsive government officials. This process will be analyzed in the second part of this paper.

The conditions analyzed above for one part of Nueva Ecija are not isolated phenomena. What was happening in Talavera is but a microcosm of the general situation in the province and in practically all rural areas of Central Luzon and parts of Southern Luzon. As mentioned earlier, older residents of San Ricardo who farmed in other parts of the province, or even other parts of Central Luzon, said that they experienced worsening relations between landlords and tenants no matter where they went. From interviews with peasants in other municipalities of Nueva Ecija (especially Cabiao and Guimba), I found that conditions similar to Talavera had prevailed there too. Another researcher, doing an intensive socio-economic history of Pampanga, has found that from the late 19th century and continuing through the 20th, the economic and social ties previously linking tenants and their landlords were dwindling in number and strength until only a slim strand was left—and even that was increasingly strained.⁷ In *Land and Peasants in Central Luzon* by Takahashi Akira, one can see that in Bulacan as well population pressure on the cultivated land was increasing while ties between landlord and tenant diminished.⁸ Newspaper stories prior to World War II would also help confirm that the situation in San Ricardo, Talavera was a microcosm of Central Luzon. (Newspaper accounts for the 1930's will be analyzed below.) Finally, through interviews several former Huks have described such conditions as characteristics of Central Luzon.

Part II: Building towards revolution.

In this section of the paper, I will argue that preceding the Huk-PKP revolution of the 1940's and early 1950's there was a gradual intensification

⁷ The researcher referred to is Dr. John Larkin. He has just completed a manuscript on the history of Pampanga up to 1922. That manuscript is now in press, but Dr. Larkin kindly allowed me to read it. He continues the argument started in his unpublished dissertation—that the social and economic bonds holding Pampangan society together were becoming untied. Cf. John Larkin, *The Evolution of Pampangan Society: A Case Study of Social and Economic Change in the Rural Philippines*. Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, 1966.

⁸ Tokyo: The Institute of Developing Economics, 1969. While Takahashi's excellent work focuses on present day Central Luzon, there is a historical dimension to the study, albeit interspersed among several chapters. Cf. particularly Chaps. 3, 7, and 15. From Takahashi one sees too that time has not improved the peasants' lot, and my interviews about present day conditions with peasants in San Ricardo would support Takahashi's findings in all essential aspects. Significantly, Takahashi's peasant respondents in a barrio in Baliwag, Bulacan, attribute much to the Huk movement (of the 1940's to mid 1950's) for any improvements.

of events revealing spreading frustration and hostility among the peasants of Central and Southern Luzon against a socio-economic system that could no longer satisfy their basic economic and social needs. This intensification involved several staged processes through which peasants tried to regain the security they needed. These steps were not necessarily followed in the same sequence in all parts of the central plains of Luzon. But what the peasants learned individually and as a class of people was the necessity for united action in order to present their grievances and demands, whether to their landlords, their local political leaders, or the national government. This building of unity was first accomplished, generally speaking, only among small groups, such as tenants for a single hacienda or landlord; but gradually these small groups came together forming larger organizations and unions. Their methods were varied, from more or less individual acts, like assaulting a landlord or overseer, to more complex and long-term actions, such as seeking justice through the court system, waging strikes, or electing chief spokesmen to political office. There were also occasional small outbursts of violence that foretold the eventual outcome—revolution—if the far more numerous actions through the legitimate channels failed, as they eventually did, to bring satisfaction.

Unfortunately for Philippine history there is little published research about peasant groups and sporadic uprisings rooted in social and economic disequilibrium. The few that do exist tend to remove the occurrences from their wider context. Nevertheless, it is instructive here to consider briefly four sporadic uprisings in the 1920's and 1930's that have received some attention from historians. These four are the *Kapisanan Makabola Makasinag* (1924-25), Tayug uprising (1931), Tangulan incidents (principally 1931), and the Sakdalista (principally 1934-35).⁹ For more details on each, the reader should refer to the research cited in footnote nine, but for our purposes it is sufficient to extract similarities and differences among the four. Then we can see the relationship of these four to other peasant activity, which will be subsequently analyzed.

In terms of area, these groups had considerable differences; however, they all were confined, for the most part, to Central Luzon. The Kapisanan uprising (which its members hoped would become a revolution) was in the area of San Jose, Nueva Ecija. However this secret society had members in other parts of that province as well as in parts of Pangasinan and the Ilocos provinces.¹⁰ Its members, mostly Ilocanos, grew in number from 800 in 1924 to 12,000 one year later. The Tayug uprising was in Tayug, Pangasi-

⁹ For information on the first three groups, see Milagros C. Guerrero, "The Colorum Uprisings: 1924-31," *Asian Studies* 5 (April 1967), pp. 65-78; and Roy M. Stubbs, *Philippine Radicalism: The Central Luzon Uprisings, 1925-35*. Ph.D. Dissertation (unpublished), University of California, Berkeley, 1951. For the Sakdalista group, see David R. Sturtevant, *Philippine Social Structure and its Relation to Agrarian Unrest*. Ph.D. Dissertation (unpublished), Stanford University, 1958; also, see the Stubbs' dissertation.

¹⁰ All my information on the Kapisanan comes from Stubbs' dissertation.

nan, but the participants were part of a larger society generally known as *colorums*. During the American occupation colorum groups had been sprouting in many parts of the Philippines, including Nueva Ecija, Pangasinan, Tarlac, La Union, Batangas, and Surigao.¹¹ They were not necessarily connected to each other; in all likelihood they were fairly autonomous. But it is difficult to know exactly how autonomous each was from the other since the name *colorum* seems to have been assigned to any band of religious mystics in the country.¹²

The Tangulan was both rural and urban based, being the result of a federation in 1930 between the *Kapatiran Magsasaka* (Brotherhood of Peasants), based in Bulacan, and the *Kapatiran Anak ng Bayan* (Brotherhood of Patriots), confined to Manila. Its members reportedly grew from about one thousand to forty thousand. Its rural membership expanded to include, in addition to Bulacan, parts of Nueva Ecija, Rizal, Laguna, Pampanga, Quezon, Cavite, and Bataan.¹³ In terms of membership and area, the Sakdalista movement was by far the strongest of the four, as revealed in the 1934 elections. In Laguna two Sakdalistas were elected to the House of Representatives, two more to the Provincial Board, and four municipalities elected Sakdalista presidents, vice-presidents, or councilors. In Tayabas (now Quezon province), a Sakdalista was also elected to the House. A Sakdalista was elected governor of Marinduque and several more were elected to municipal offices in Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Rizal, and Cavite.¹⁴ A few months before the abortive uprisings in May 1935, its membership was estimated between 68,000 and 200,000. The Sakdal leaders claimed a following of 150,000.¹⁵

There are several similarities among these four groups that should be emphasized. First, while at first each tried to express their aspirations through a variety of means (including participation in elections by Tangulans and Sakdalistas), each one eventually tried to stage a revolt that would bring a quick end to the established government. In each case repression by the local and national governments (by denying to members basic rights—public meetings, free speech, free press—supposedly protected by law) preceded the outbreak of violence. Also in each case local police and the Philippine Constabulary (PC) quickly put down the revolts. Typically too, members of these groups who had turned informers and revealed plans for the uprisings aided the military considerably. Once crushed, each group disappeared, or, in the case of the Sakdalista, changed its outlook and lost its radicalism. Part of the reason for the death of these groups following their short-lived revolts was the strong tendency for “hero worship” of the prin-

¹¹ Guerrero, “The Colorum Uprisings: 1924-31,” *Asian Studies*, April 1967, p. 66.

¹² Stubbs, pp. 54, 58. *The Tribune* in the 1930’s does this as well.

¹³ Stubbs, pp. 95-7, 107. Joseph Hayden, *Philippines: A Study in National Development*. (New York: The Macmillan Company), p. 915.

¹⁴ Stubbs, p. 164.

¹⁵ Stubbs, p. 165.

cipal leader of each.¹⁶ Once that leader had been killed, imprisoned, or discredited, there was little left to hold the group together.

While the groups as such faded away as their leaders were removed, there is considerable evidence that their members did not completely abandon the issues and aspirations that the groups had expressed. The areas where the organizations were the strongest and most active are also the areas where peasant activities were the most vigorous in the 1930's, according to reports from *The Tribune*. (See Appendix, Table A.) I will support this contention in more detail below, but for purposes of illustration we can point to the Tayug area where, according to newspaper accounts, there was peasant unrest in 1931 (aside from the uprising itself), 1935 (2 incidents), 1936 (4 incidents), and 1937 (3 incidents). All these protests reported in the newspapers and the Tayug uprising itself were, for the most part, aimed at worsening economic conditions on one or two haciendas in the area, which together held virtually all the land there. This continuity of area would suggest that followers of one group frequently became involved in another once the first died or lost its appeal. That is indeed the case for many areas of Central and Southern Luzon, as we shall see below. But again as an illustration, many in the Tangulans later were among the ranks of the Sakdalista.¹⁷

The reason for such continuities of area and participation among the four groups and with other peasant activities of the 1930's lies in the issues and aspirations involved. From the point of view of most participants (mostly peasants), the basic purpose of these groups was economic improvement. More specifically, the peasants in these groups saw the landlords as the primary cause of their economic impoverishment and thus they were hoping for a new order in which their predicament could be improved. Some participants were even hoping that the new order would bring land re-distribution. Especially important was their realizing that unity among themselves was necessary in order to push for change. The various leaders were the ones who told their respective followers that only through independence from the colonial power and its established government could such improved economic conditions come. Because of this, unrest due to economic and social causes took the form of aborted uprisings for immediate independence.

In terms of planning and organization for revolution, the Sakdalista uprising was the most impressive of the four. David Sturtevant argues that the Sakdalista movement was a kind of midway point between blind (and often messianic-in-kind) peasant outbursts, on the one hand, and well organized, will directed peasant movements, on the other.¹⁸ To some extent that is true.

¹⁶ The phenomenon is easily seen in the findings of Stubbs and Sturtevant. The term "hero worship" was a description used by Pedro Abad Santos, leader of the Socialist movement in Pampanga, for the Sakdalista party. Sturtevant, p. 215.

¹⁷ Stubbs, pp. 102, 115-16, 193-94.

¹⁸ Sturtevant, p. 154.

In 1935 the Sakdalista movement was the largest and most widespread, single peasant organization; and through it peasants did understand more fully the value of unity among themselves. But other Central Luzon peasants, in addition to those in the Sakdalista movement, were also joining together for similar reasons. The Sakdal uprisings in 1935 (principally in Cabuyao and Sta. Rosa, Laguna, and San Ildefonso, Bulacan, involving four to seven thousand people in all) were the most obvious peasant activities at the time. They were by no means, however, the only ones, not even in the provinces where Sakdal strength was greatest (Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, and Laguna). Not even the violence was peculiar to them since there were numerous violent incidents by peasants during that year, even in the same areas. What was unique in 1935 about the Sakdals was their attempt, however premature, to overthrow the government. Most peasant incidents, violent and non-violent, earlier in the decade, as well as after 1935, were aimed not at achieving political power but at demanding solutions for social and economic problems confronting them.

Table A (Appendix) is a summarization of all newspaper (*The Tribune*) reports for the years 1930-40 (inclusive) of peasant and labor activities. Most of the data is summarized by province, but where incidents were few, several provinces were grouped by area, e.g., Northern Luzon and Mindanao. Activities include such things as a few tenants attacking a landlord's bodega; peasant demonstrations in barrios, poblacions, and provincial capitals; petitions of peasants and laborers seeking government help regarding some economic, social, or political problem; burning of cane or palay fields; strikes; notifications of planned strikes; requests from a group of peasants or laborers for improved conditions, etc.; and anything else that indicates an expression of protest or desire for change by laborers or peasants. For the most part there was no difficulty in making a decision about whether or not to code a newspaper item as an incident. Sometimes subjective judgment was unavoidable, but not enough to change the general pattern, which was the main purpose for coding newspaper data.

Each incident was counted as equal. That is, a strike that involved several hundred peasants was counted as one, but so was the burning of a few hectares of sugar cane by a few tenants or a small strike by factory workers in Manila. These qualitative differences among types of activities will come out in the more detailed analysis below.

One additional comment before going to that analysis. When counting incidents, I distinguished between peasant activity and labor activity, but in the summary tables presented in the Appendix those distinctions were eliminated. Labor activity in Central and Southern Luzon was extremely rare, but for the Visayas (except for Negros Occidental), Mindanao, Northern Luzon, and, of course, Manila, labor incidents account for virtually all activity. In Negros Occidental peasant and labor actions were about equal in frequency. Data for peasants actually include a few more incidents than

what would normally be considered strictly peasant activity; I have also included agricultural workers. This means that in addition to actions by peasants *per se*, I have included actions by sugar central workers who worked in the mills themselves or cut and hauled cane for the centrals. The reasons for this inclusion are (1) many who were central workers of this type also were peasants in the narrower sense of the word, (2) such central workers were often fellow union or organizations members with peasants, and (3) frequently newspaper reporting did not draw distinctions between peasants and other agricultural workers.

An examination of Table A immediately reveals a heavy concentration of all peasant incidents in three provinces—Bulacan, Pampanga, and Nueva Ecija. The next most active provinces, but decidedly second to the above three, are Tarlac, Pangasinan, Bataan, Laguna, and Rizal. (One should note, however, that 16 of the total incidents in Rizal are labor, and not related to agricultural work, due to the growing urban nature of Rizal in the 1930's.) Not only are Bulacan, Pampanga, and Nueva Ecija the most active over the whole decade, but practically for any given year within that decade they dominate over the other parts of the country.

Table A also shows that the frequency of incidents was increasing over time. This is a general trend for the whole country, but is even more pronounced in the three principal provinces of Central Luzon—Bulacan, Pampanga, and Nueva Ecija. Table B (Appendix) shows that an increasing number of municipalities recorded incidents of unrest during the decade. Luzon provinces have the greatest degree of unrest for any one year compared to other parts of the country. For a few years Negros Occidental had several incidents in several municipalities, but it does not come close to matching most of the Central Luzon provinces, especially, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Nueva Ecija. Only in 1931, when nine municipalities reported incidents, was that province more active by this measure. An examination of the particular occurrences shows that there was only one incident in each of the nine municipalities and all incidents were labor as opposed to peasant. In that year there was a wave of strikes among lumber and dock workers in Negros Occidental.

Notice that while the number of incidents in Table A is generally increasing in Bataan and Laguna, there is not a large spread in area or number of municipalities (Table B). In each of those provinces there were just one or two large landed estates that repeatedly had trouble throughout the decade—namely, San Pedro Tunasan in Laguna and Dinalupihan in Bataan.

Tables C, D, and E (Appendix) are the breakdowns by municipality for the three core provinces of peasant unrest during the 1930's. Each Table clearly demonstrates the mushrooming number of incidents and the increasing number of municipalities affected. Notice the numerous repeated occurrences within individual municipalities for some of those years, especially as the decade draws closer to 1940. Also note the frequent re-occurrence

of rest within a particular municipality over time. That is, peasant activity not only is continuous and accelerating over time for each of the provinces, but also for many of the municipalities within each province.

In order to better understand the qualitative intensification of these quantitative increases for the three core provinces as well as some of the other areas of Luzon, one must look in some detail at each province in turn.

Nueva Ecija

The first reports in *The Tribune* of strikes in Nueva Ecija were in 1932 when tenants on four different haciendas went on strike in attempts to get loans of rice or cash from landlords who previously refused such requests. The strikes occurred in the months of July and August, the time of year when tenants usually could get loans from landlords. After each strike was settled, a government official announced that trouble in the province was settled and rumors of more strikes or peasant actions pushing similar demands were unfounded. Nevertheless, in the years that followed more strikes occurred, some seeking loans, others increased shares of the crop, reduced agricultural expenses, etc. Simultaneously, peasants in the province, almost all being tenants on large haciendas, pursued through other means similar objectives. The most common method was the use of group petitions. At first it was enough to petition directly to the landlord or his overseer; but increasingly over the decade petitions to local mayors, then to the provincial governors, and eventually to national government officials, including President Quezon, were utilized. Some too sought legal recourse through the courts, starting usually with the local justice of the peace, but almost inevitably having to go to the Court of First Instance (CFI) to appeal the lower court's rulings.

As the peasants went further and further away from the hacienda itself in seeking solutions, they had to rely more on assistance from others to help vocalize strike demands, present their petitions, and argue their court cases. The most public spokesman for Nueva Ecija peasants was Juan Feleo, a former school teacher from Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija. He was a long time peasant leader, starting at least as early as 1922, when he organized tenants in barrio La Fuente, Santa Rosa into a group called *Union ng Magsasaka* (Union of Peasants).¹⁹ While it is certain Feleo served as a spokesman for Nueva Ecija tenants earlier than 1939, it is not until that year that one finds *Tribune* reports of his role.²⁰

In that same year (1939) there are the first reported signs that peasants from various haciendas had come together to present joint demands. While

¹⁹ *Kasaysayan ng Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas* (History of the Peasant Movement in the Philippines), undated, p. 10. Exhibit W-412, Criminal Case No. 15844 (Hernandez, et. al.), CFI, Manila.

²⁰ *The Tribune*, 29 April 1939, pp. 1 ff.

there were peasant organizations that were several years old and had members from many different haciendas in virtually all parts of the province,²¹ not until 1939 do *The Tribune's* accounts show that such an organization, in particular the KPMP (*Kalipunang Pambansa ng mga Magsasaka sa Pilipinas* (National Society of Peasants in the Philippines), channeled joint demands for thousands of tenants in the province. The KPMP even served as a kind of bargaining agent for its members when they were threatening a massive strike against over 50 hacenderos in the province. By January 1940, the issues of that planned strike were referred to the CIR. All other attempts at settlement had failed, in part because the hacenderos refused to negotiate with the KPMP.²²

In the meantime there were numerous incidents of violence. In 1935, *The Tribune* reported that while a tenant and his landlord argued over the possession of a bundle of newly harvested palay that still lay on the field, the tenant struck the landlord with his scythe, killing him.²³ In later years the more typical acts of violence were confrontation between groups of tenants and PC patrols, whom the landowners would call, or clashes between "old" tenants (those who had worked the land the preceding season but were evicted for the following season) and newly hired tenants.

Liberally interspersed among petitions, court cases, threatened and actual strikes, and violent actions were activities like raiding hacenderos' rice bodegas, carting away harvested palay before the landlords could take their shares, dividing the crop before landlords or overseers could come to supervise the division, "old" tenants destroying fields planted by "new" tenants, holding demonstrations in town poblaciones and in the provincial capital at Cabanatuan.

If one makes a list of the specific causes or grievances involved in all this activity, the assortment is certainly wide. But after closer examination practically all revolve around one or more of the following: (1) payment or taking out of loans, (2) whether interests charged on the loans were fair, within the law, or according to the contract between landlord and tenant, (3) procedure for dividing the harvest (including demands for increased shares), (4) who—tenant, landlord, or both—is responsible for payment of particular farming expenses, (5) miscellaneous benefits, and (6) a peasant's right to be a member of a peasant organization or union.²⁴

Often other disputes grew out of these six. For example, in February, March, and April 1939, there was widespread eviction of tenants from their

²¹ *Kasaysayan ng Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas*, pp. 11-13. Also, according to a key informant in Guimba, Nueva Ecija (26 June 1970), the *Kapatirang Magsasaka* (Brotherhood of Peasants) had several chapters in various parts of Guimba, and Nueva Ecija in general, by early 1930's.

²² *The Tribune*, 16 January 1940, pp. 1 ff.

²³ *The Tribune*, 26 December 1935, pp. 1 ff.

²⁴ As an example of common demands, below are the 12 demands of a several-month-long dispute between several thousand tenants in Nueva Ecija (most of whom were in the KPMP) and over 50 landlords: (1) reinstate all tenants disposed during

lands. Removing a tenant from the land was one powerful method a landlord (or overseer) used against tenants who were insisting on the enforcement of amendment to the New Rice Share Tenancy Law, which had been passed the year before. That amended law specified a small number of mandatory conditions for any contract between landlord and tenant. Those requirements were aimed at protecting the tenant's interest regarding some of the six issues listed above. However, the contracts were only good for one year. After the harvest in January for the 1938-39 crop, tenants who insisted on the enforcement of that law were denied renewed contracts, and in their stead other men were hired who would not insist on contracts as specified by that tenancy law. By April 1939 at least 4,000 tenants in Nueva Ecija were "purged" and several additional thousand faced the immediate prospect of such ejectment.²⁵ In other rice areas of Central Luzon, including Bulacan, Pampanga, Bataan, and Tarlac, similar "purges" were occurring, but on a lesser scale.²⁶ The peasants sought protection not only through petitioning government officials, including President Quezon, but by unifying themselves and refusing to leave after being ejected. At the same time they tried to persuade, peacefully and otherwise, outsiders from signing contracts to work on the haciendas under conditions sub-standard to those required by law.²⁷ The Philippine Constabulary was very busy that year and the next, forcibly ejecting tenants whom hacenderos had dismissed (a typical method was to wreck the stubborn tenants' homes), intervening in disputes between tenants and hacenderos over the division of the crop, and trying to prevent angry tenants from molesting "new" tenants.

Something very noticeable about the incidents reported in the newspapers was the consistent repetition of trouble. Issues never seemed to be really solved. Indeed attempts at solutions often served only to compound the difficulties. Names of haciendas experiencing incidents repeated occur over the years: for example, the de Leon Hacienda in Cabanatuan; the Santos Haciendas (there were five) in Guimba, Nampicuan, and Cuyapo; the Ja-

1938-39 because there is no just cause for dispossession; (2) give tenants a ration of five cavans of palay per cavan of seedlings planted with no interest the time the fields are prepared up to the time of planting; (3) free rations to each tenant during harvest and threshing; (4) allow tenants to borrow money with which to buy prime necessities, with no interest, during the period immediately after planting up until threshing; (5) expenses for planting, pulling, cutting, must be borne share and share alike by tenants and landlords; (6) planters must be paid ₱2.50 per cavan of seedlings pulled; (7) palay planters must be paid ₱10 for each cavan of seedlings to be planted under *pakiyaw* contract/payment by the job/, and in case of daily engagement, they should be paid ₱0.70 per day; (8) cutters of palay must be paid ₱15 or five cavans of palay for each cavan of seedlings cut; (9) previous agreements entered into between landlords and tenants on the above listed points must be revoked; (10) landlords must recognize the KPMP's rights to collective bargaining for its members; (11) landlords who refuse to recognize tenants' right to ask for immediate liquidation or reliquidation/of the crop/should be punished; and (12) landlords must bear all expenses for irrigation of his farmland. *The Tribune*, 16 January 1940, pp. 1. ff.

25 *The Tribune*, 21 April 1939, pp. 1 ff.

26 *Ibid.*

27 *The Tribune*, 30 March 1939, pp. 1 ff.

cinto Hacienda in Talavera; the Buencamino Hacienda in Cabiao; and the Sabani Estate in Laur, to name but a few.

The trouble at the Sabani Estate is especially noteworthy because that Estate was owned by the Philippine Government, under the direct administration of the National Development Company. The newspaper accounts unfortunately lack background history to the trouble, but apparently the government had owned for many years the 11,000 hectare estate (of which only a fraction was actually cultivated).²⁸ Various grievances lingered without the government paying much heed. Finally in 1937 the tenants joined together in demanding that the government divide the hacienda and sell parcels to the tenants. They also wanted the manager and foreman at the estate removed because of reported maltreatment. The situation grew serious, especially when Philippine Army soldiers were sent.²⁹ But the peasants were temporarily satisfied and no strikes or serious trouble occurred. The government promised a reduction of rent from 33% of the crop to 25%. A year later 2,000 tenants, virtually all, on the estate organized a strike to protest a contract they had been asked to sign that would permit them to stay on the farm for only one year.³⁰ They saw this contract as an attempt by the government to side-step the demand that the estate be sold to the tenants. President Quezon himself investigated and in June 1938 came out in favor of selling the Estate to the tenants on an installment plan.³¹ A full two years later the peasants were still demanding the promised sale.³² In those two intervening years, there had been another strike, several demonstrations, and on at least one occasion the estate manager called in armed guards. The tenants were still asking that the land be sold to them and that the manager be immediately removed. For his part, the manager had reportedly been intimidating peasants from holding meetings concerning their petition and even was removing from the estate some of the leaders, who were tenants there, and threatening the ejection of many others. He eventually ordered that no future meetings be held without a permit, which he alone could grant.³³ Apparently the situation was still in considerable flux up to the time of World War II.

The reader will recall that the first part of this paper was a case study of one area in Nueva Ecija. It is appropriate now to return briefly to the Talavera case; through a closer look at peasant activity there, we can see in more detail the growth of peasant organization for Nueva Ecija and for Central Luzon in general.

²⁸ *The Tribune*, 3 June 1938, pp. 1 ff; 21 January 1939, p. 15.

²⁹ *The Tribune*, 23 February 1937, p. 14; 27 February 1937, p. 3.

³⁰ *The Tribune*, 31 May 1938, pp. 1 ff.

³¹ *The Tribune*, 3 June 1938, pp. 1 ff.

³² *The Tribune*, 23 May 1940, p. 16.

³³ *The Tribune*, 21 January 1939, p. 16; 9 December 1939, pp. 1 ff; 13 December 1939, p. 14; 16 December 1939, p. 2.

The first *Tribune* report of a peasant incident in Talavera was in 1936. But according to interviews in San Ricardo, there was a strike in 1935; and a few years earlier, some tenants in San Ricardo physically attacked a katiwala who had angered them by once too often denying them a bit of palay for their chickens. Peasants acting together while making demands on hacenderos intensified after 1935 in the San Ricardo area. While there is no newspaper report, two key respondents said that there was a rather large strike in 1938 against a landlord in a barrio near San Ricardo. That strike failed to bring results sought. The PC was called in to stop it; also, because unity among the tenants on the hacienda was weak, only some peasants joined the strike. This served as an important lesson to the peasants in the area—the necessity of acting together if they were to be effective.³⁴

As in many other parts of Nueva Ecija and Central Luzon, Talavera had numerous incidents in 1939 and 1940. (See Table D, Appendix). Not all of them were strikes, although many were. One of the troubled areas was the Tinio hacienda in San Ricardo. The increased frequency of activity indicated worsening relations between the landlords (and/or their overseers) and the tenants along with growing solidarity among tenants within a hacienda and signs of unity cross-cutting hacienda and municipality boundaries.

Peasants in the area were learning the importance of united action not only through their own experiences, but also from the experiences of others. One former local peasant leader (himself from a peasant family) said that an important influence in the 1930's was the labor union activity in Manila. "They [the peasants in Nueva Ecija] saw... that workers in Manila had joined together and acted as one in order to get better wages, etc." Also important, and more directly related, was an organization that originated in Bulacan called the *Samahang Magbubukid*, which, this informant said, served as an example throughout Central Luzon.³⁵ In the late 1930's two other important "teachers" were the aggressive tenant organization on the Santos Haciendas (in Guimba, Nampicuan, and Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija) and Hacienda Bahay Pare in Candaba, Pampanga.³⁶

By 1938 or 1939, about 30% of the peasants in Talavera were members of the KPMP, the largest peasant organization in Nueva Ecija that also had members in Bulacan and other provinces.³⁷ This figure alone is not an accurate indication of peasant action because many peasants who would not necessarily join the KPMP would band together to push certain

³⁴ Ely del Rosario, Interview, 16 May 1970. Bagong Sikat, Talavera, Nueva Ecija.

³⁵ Felipe Bulanadi, Interview, 7 June 1970. Talavera, Nueva Ecija.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ This figure of 30% is an average of the answers I received from two key informants in Talavera, Nueva Ecija.

demands.³⁸ Nevertheless, it is true, as this figure indicates, that there was considerable room for improvement in the strength of peasant alliances.³⁹

There was usually some form of mutual help among members of the KPMP or other, smaller, peasant groups. When, for example, KPMP members went on strike at a hacienda, fellow members working on other haciendas would supply the strikers food, clothes, etc.⁴⁰ There were also an increasing number of sympathy strikes and protests.⁴¹ Each member of KPMP was supposed to pay yearly dues of 70 centavos, although many could only afford 20-30 centavos. About 15% of the total dues collected stayed in San Ricardo chapter of the KPMP, about 20% went to the Talavera chapter, and another 20% to the Nueva Ecija chapter. The rest went to the national headquarters.⁴²

Strike was not the only method used by Talavera peasants. This is verified in the newspaper reports as well as in interviews. Typically peasants with grievances would go first to the provincial government in Cabanatuan, either to the Governor or to the Public Defender. There they would file their protest or petition and ask that the government intercede for them to persuade the landlord to make the necessary changes. Typically what was at issue was the failure of landlords, in the peasants' estimation, to abide by either their contracts or the various land tenure laws. Sometimes the matter went to court. But all too often the peasants lost out (*natalo*), whether in court or in the Public Defender's office. In the peasant's opinion, the reason for their defeats was that government officials, including the Public Defender, were "*bata*" (pawns) of the landlords and politicians.⁴³

There was at least one instance, however, when peasants were victorious. In 1936 a relative of the deceased General Manuel Tinio, Maria Pilares, claimed as part of the hacienda over which she was in charge large tracts of land in the areas of present day barrios Casili and Bagong Sikat. These barrios are adjacent to San Ricardo; indeed, at that time the latter was still a sitio of San Ricardo. The lands claimed bordered a Tinio hacienda there. Maria Pilares took her claim to the courts, saying that she had been paying the taxes on the land. Meanwhile she tried to evict the peasant families living on and working the land. She argued that at most the peasants were her tenants and that now she wanted them to leave. They refused. Each peasant claimed to be an owner of small parcels of the disputed land. An investigation was made, during which the peasants were represented by an attorney they had collectively hired. At one phase of the

³⁸ del Rosario, Interview.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*; also, learned from an interview with a former KPMP member in San Ricardo, Talavera, 1 May 1970.

⁴¹ This is particularly apparent in *The Tribune* articles on all parts of Central Luzon.

⁴² Interview with former KPMP member, 1 May 1970. San Ricardo, Talavera.

⁴³ del Rosario, Interview.

investigation, the Bureau of Lands representative rejected some documents the peasants offered as proof of ownership, saying the documents were forged. Tension had been rising, and this rejection caused tempers to explode. Three hundred so-called "ejected tenants" stormed the hacienda of Maria Pilares and almost mobbed the agent from the Bureau of Lands. Despite this outburst, a judge ruled several months later that the homestead applications that the peasants had held since about 1925 were valid because the peasants had been paying the taxes on their plots of land. So the land was awarded to them, and the Tinio family's claim was denied. It was after this that Bagong Sikat got its name (literally translated it means the image of a sunrise; loosely translated, Brilliant Hope) because the people felt that through this victory they had indeed been given a chance for a full, prosperous life.⁴⁴ Such success in the courts was the exception rather than the rule, peasants in Talavera emphasized to me. That was true not only then, before World War II, but continues up to the present.

The principal objectives of Talavera peasants, whatever the particular tactics used, were to force landlords to pay the agricultural expenses they were supposed to pay, to prevent the landlords from unfairly ejecting tenants, to increase their shares of the crop (usually seeking 55%), and to have assurances that tenants could borrow rice or money with either no or only reasonable, as opposed to usurious, interest.⁴⁵

Debts and high interest rates were two of the biggest economic problems confronting peasants in the area in the 1930's, according to practically every informant I spoke with, even though their economic needs and aspirations were, relative to present day, still small. (For example, unlike today, peasants then were not even trying to make certain that their children could finish grade school or high school.) The peasants in Talavera, like their counterparts elsewhere in Central Luzon, requested that the government establish loan funds and local banks from which they could borrow at reasonable rates. No such facilities were made available. In the late 1930's, hungry peasants stormed several buildings, including the one in Talavera. They pleaded for rice to eat because either their shares of the harvest were simply too small or they had been removed from their land. As a consequence of these incidents and the general situation in Central Luzon, the national government created an emergency loan fund.⁴⁶ How-

⁴⁴ This narrative was pieced together from three sources: *The Tribune*, 10 December 1936, p. 2; Tomas I. Pagaduan, *Kasaysayan ng Talavera, Nueva Ecija*/History of, unpublished manuscript, 1967, pp. 78-79; and interviews with two peasants in San Ricardo who are sons of two of the claimants in that case. These two respondents, both of whom remember the incidents because they were grown ups at the time, still work the lands that their fathers had homesteaded. I wish to thank Mr. Pagaduan for allowing me to read his manuscript, which he hopes to publish at Manlapaz Publishing Company, Quezon City.

⁴⁵ Manuela Santa Ana, Interview, 16 April 1970, Talavera, Nueva Ecija; also, an interview with a former KPMP member, 1 May 1970, San Ricardo, Talavera.

⁴⁶ *The Tribune*, 3 October 1939, pp. 6, 14.

ever, the landlords were required to stand as guarantors for the tenants before they could qualify for such loans. For those peasants who had been ejected, this was an impossible stipulation. Even for those with parcels to farm that requirement was difficult because landlords were extremely reluctant to stand as guarantors.⁴⁷ After all, landlords themselves had been refusing more and more frequently to give loans. Besides, many disputes in 1938, 1939, and 1940 were over the so called "refusals" of tenants to pay back their debts.

In San Ricardo shortly before World War II, several tenants on the Tinio hacienda and other lands had tried to establish a small cooperative through which members could borrow money or rice. No one could tell me how many members there were; indeed, few could remember much at all about the cooperative since it existed so briefly. That cooperative did manage to purchase a small *telyadora* (threshing machine), which members could rent by paying only 4% of their harvest (as opposed to 6% elsewhere). With earnings from the *telyadora* the cooperative hoped to pay the balance owed on the machine and keep a healthy reserve from which members could borrow. After only two years the cooperative was dead. In 1939 it had to sell the *telyadora* in order to pay its debts.⁴⁸

In Talavera there were several peasant leaders from the peasant class. Each hacienda in the area seemed to have at least one tenant who would act as a chief spokesman and leader. Newspaper reports indicate this is true for most parts of the country where peasants were active. Two individuals in particular stand out in Talavera because they were extremely active and aggressive; furthermore, their involvement reveals some of the continuity in the history of peasant struggle in Central Luzon.

The first of the two is Patricio del Rosario. He was originally from San Miguel, Bulacan (born in 1881), but he left that province in search of new farm lands. He ended up in San Ricardo, Talavera, sometime before 1924 because he was once a tenant for General Manuel Tinio.⁴⁹ He had a fourth grade education, eight children, and his only occupation was tenant farming. In and about San Ricardo he had been a tenant for at least six different landlords (including Manuel Tinio, Manolo Tinio, Vivencio Tinio, and Augustino Tinio). He, like many others in the area, would move from landlord to landlord in search of better conditions. In practically every case he would first have to clear the still virgin land, 3-4 hectares, before he could plant. Not until sometime in the early 1930's did he have

⁴⁷ *The Tribune*, 22 October 1939, p. 7. This article also refers to 400 tenants in Jaen, Nueva Ecija, whose landlords refused to stand as guarantors.

⁴⁸ My principal informant on this cooperative is the former member, referred to in some of footnotes above. Interview, 24 June 1970. San Ricardo, Talavera.

⁴⁹ I am thankful to Ely del Rosario, a surviving son of Patricio, for most of this information about his father. Sometimes Mr. del Rosario could not remember precise dates, but at all portions of the interview he was extremely helpful. 16 May 1970. Bagong Sikat, Talavera.

his own carabao; before then he had borrowed from his landlord. The system for sharing the harvest was fairly standard—50/50 or 45/55 (in favor of the land owner)—but loan terms varied. Frequent droughts and typhoons, which badly damaged the crops, forced del Rosario to borrow; he was never out of debt all through the 1930's. By the mid 1930's, interest rates and borrowing arrangements were practically the same all over; consequently, del Rosario no longer moved in search of better arrangements with landlords. But two times in the second half of the decade he was ejected from the parcels he farmed because he had been active in efforts to get improved conditions—specifically, to increase the tenants' share from 50/50 to 60/40.

In 1932 del Rosario was a leading member of a Tangulan group in Talavera. The objective of this group was to improve the relations between landlords and tenants.⁵⁰ Not much else is known what this group did, or how closely it was linked with Tangulan groups elsewhere. It is possible that being a native of Bulacan, del Rosario's inclination toward peasant organization was influenced by any one of several peasant groups that did exist in that province in the 1920's, aside from any attachment he and other Tangulans of Talavera might have had with the Bulacan Tangulans. In 1938, del Rosario helped organize and lead a strike against a hacienda of an absentee landlord in a barrio near San Ricardo. Del Rosario's son recalls that his father was unhappy that the strike was not more successful because many tenants who were *bata* (pawns) of the hacendero's overseer and because several were afraid they would be evicted if they joined the strike. Del Rosario made a point of telling the tenants at a meeting in front of his house afterwards that all peasants must overcome their fears and stand up to the hacenderos and money-lenders.

By 1939 del Rosario and Amado Santa Ana were the foremost recognized peasant leaders of the Talavera area. By that time both were members of the KPMP. Sometimes they went to Cabanatuan and conferred with other KPMP leaders there, including Juan Feleo. On at least one occasion they led a contingent of KPMP members from Talavera to attend a large parade (over 15,000) celebrating May Day 1939 and hear President Quezon deliver a speech (which tried to persuade peasants not to resort to violence and to take their grievances to the proper government authorities).⁵¹

Amado Santa Ana was originally from Quezon, Nueva Ecija but moved to attend high school in Cabanatuan.⁵² He put himself through high school by working at various part time jobs, and had wanted to go to college but

⁵⁰ Pagaduan, p. 154.

⁵¹ The fact that Patricio del Rosario went with others from Talavera to that parade was stated in the interview with his son. But the figure of 15,000 was taken from *The Tribune*, 2 May 1939, pp. 2, 16.

⁵² Amado Santa Ana's oldest child, Manuela Santa Ana, kindly provided me with some facts about her father as best as she could remember it. She was born in 1924 so was still quite young before World War II. Interview, 16 April 1970. Talavera, Nueva Ecija.

could not afford it. Not much else is known about his younger life, except he married in 1921.

His wife's family had about six hectares of land on which he worked after he was married. This small piece of land was supporting him and his family (he had "many" children) plus several other families, all relatives of his wife. Eventually his in-laws had to sell the land to help pay some debts. Afterwards Amando Santa Ana had no permanent work; he just earned a little by helping other farmers at harvest time and doing odd job in and around Talavera. He and his family were living in San Ricardo.

Later, but exactly when is not known, he became "a-kind-of-president" of a peasant organization in the Talavera area. From this he received a little rice and money because members would sometimes give him contributions. However this was far from sufficient to support his family adequately. His oldest daughter remembers that she and her brothers and sisters would go out and *pulot* (glean) the fields to get additional rice. They also hired out as transplanters and harvester. Exactly what organization Santa Ana headed is not known, but it was previous to his KPMP activities. Perhaps it was the Tangulan group of which Patricio del Rosario was also a member. A newspaper report says that Amando Santa Ana was one of 10 men convicted for "sacking" the municipal building of Talavera on 3 May 1932. They were arrested; and their banners, insignias, and homemade weapons confiscated. They pleaded guilty of attempted rebellion.⁵²

Apparently jail sentence did not stifle Santa Ana's activism. In 1935 he was a Sakdalista and under surveillance by the Talavera police for his "radical" activities. As mentioned earlier, after his Sakdal days Santa Ana was an important KPMP leader in the municipality. According to his eldest daughter, the reason he continued his activities among peasants and served as a peasant leader was because he was trying to help peasants realize that the only way to get changes was to work together, to organize. And no matter what the particular organization, the central aim was to achieve better conditions for the peasants. This too was the purpose of two strikes which Santa Ana helped organize in 1935 and 1938. He hoped that through the KPMP enough pressure could be put on the government to get legislation passed and implemented that would force landlords to provide basic economic necessities, since landlords had become increasingly unwilling to initiate reforms.

Armando Santa Ana and Patricio del Rosario continued their peasant activities during the Japanese occupation. Both were the principal organizers of the Hukbalahap unit from the Talavera area, and both helped launch the war-time civilian peasant organization that eventually became, in 1945, the *Pambansang Kaisahan ng mga Magbubukid* (PKM; National Union of Peasants). Patricio del Rosario lived to see the end of the occupation and the

⁵² *The Tribune*, 18 May 1932, p. 10; 10 June 1932, p. 1.

beginning of the PKM. Santa Ana, however, did not. He was killed in a battle with the Japanese.⁵⁴ Del Rosario too was presumably killed, but not by Japanese. He mysteriously disappeared in February 1946. His family never did learn what exactly happened, but they are convinced his death was connected to his political activities. Many in Talavera think assassins hired by hacenderos killed him because at the time he was the president of the local chapters of the Democratic Alliance and the PKM, and was actively campaigning for legislation that would require a 60/40 sharing system (favoring the tenant).⁵⁵

PAMPANGA

In Pampanga, as in Nueva Ecija, peasant activity grew in intensity, and over the decade peasant unity strengthened. There are some indications that peasant organizations were maturing more quickly in Pampanga than in Nueva Ecija. For example, in 1933 and 1934 in three different areas—Sta. Ana, San Simon-San Luis, and Sta. Rita—tenants working for many different landlords in each of those areas presented as a group their respective demands to the landlords involved. In the Sta. Rita case the tenants formed an organization and had a spokesman who tried negotiating with the landlords.⁵⁶ In the Sta. Ana case, the newspapers made a reference to Jacinto Manahan acting as the peasants' representative.⁵⁷ Manahan at that time was the head of the KPMP.⁵⁸ Newspaper reports of similar organized activities among Nueva Ecija peasants working for different landlords came only in 1937 and 1938.⁵⁹ These peasant activities cutting across several landholdings in Pampanga and their apparent absence in Nueva Ecija for this early date may just be a function of the large haciendas that predominated in Nueva Ecija, while in Pampanga there were more comparatively smaller landholdings.

There are other indications of greater strength and unity among Pampanga peasants. While not until 1939 was there a province-wide demon-

⁵⁴ Republic of the Philippines, Bureau of Public Schools, Division of Nueva Ecija; *Historical Data Papers*, 1953. *Municipality of Talavera and its Barrios*. (This and many other Historical Data Papers on Nueva Ecija and many other provinces are located in the Filipiniana section of the Pambansang Aklatan (National Library), Manila.

⁵⁵ Del Rosario, Interview. For speculations that hacenderos killed Patricio del Rosario, my sources are numerous interviews in Talavera.

⁵⁶ *The Tribune*, 22 May 1934, p. 7; 10 June 1934, p. 11; 23 June 1934, p. 20; 23 August 1934, p. 16.

⁵⁷ *The Tribune*, 23 June 1933, p. 9; also, for other reports on the Santa Ana story see *The Tribune*, 2 July 1933, pp. 1 ff; and 8 July 1933, p. 14.

⁵⁸ I think that Manahan was still president of the KPMP in June 1933. He was the first president of that organization (founded in 1928), but was expelled from it sometime in 1933 because he was considered a traitor to the peasant cause. Just exactly when in 1933 is not clear. Cf. *Kasaysayan ng Kilusang Magbubukid*, pp. 11-12.

⁵⁹ According to interview data there were organizations in Nueva Ecija before 1937 that drew members from different parts of the province—e.g. *Kapatirang Magsasaka* and the KPMP. But in terms of public action involving such organizations, newspaper data is the earliest I have.

stration in Nueva Ecija, as early as May 1935, 3,000 "socialists" mostly from Pampanga, but some from Tarlac as well, marched in San Fernando, Pampanga, to celebrate Labor Day. The first newspaper reference to Pedro Abad Santos as a peasant leader is that article. He reportedly said that there was growing unrest of the masses due to unemployment and oppression, and "unless the abuses and wrongs are immediately stopped, I fear that a movement may break out any time."⁶⁰ Demonstrations of solidarity were practically yearly, sometimes twice yearly, occurrences in Pampanga from 1935 onward. Usually they took place in San Fernando, it being the capital town. On May Day 1939, 30,000 peasants and other workers marched, carrying placards denouncing "rapacious landlords" and condemning fascism. Among the speakers were Crisanto Evangelista and Pedro Abad Santos (national chairman and vice-chairman respectively of the Communist Party of the Philippines) and peasant leaders from Pampanga, including Agapito del Rosario and Luis Taruc.⁶¹ The preceding February an equal number had gathered in San Fernando from all over Pampanga to hear President Quezon. The growing size and number of such demonstrations indicate the spread of unrest and increased unity among the Pampangan peasants.

President Quezon had come to San Fernando that February (1939) to calm growing anger between peasants, on the one hand, and their landlords and central owners, on the other. The months of December (1938) through February had been filled with strikes, bloodshed, canefields set on fire, and unthreshed rice carted away. A general strike, which had been threatening since late December, finally started on January 21 when 500 central workers at the Mount Arayat Sugar Company walked out. They were quickly followed by central workers (about 1,300) at the Pampanga Sugar Development Company (Pasudeco) in San Fernando and mill workers (about 700) at the Pampanga Sugar Mills (Pasumil) in the Del Carmen area.⁶² These 2,000 sugar mill workers were joined by at least 20,000 peasants working in sugar and rice fields. This general strike effectively paralyzed the province for almost two weeks until representatives of all parties concerned reached some temporary agreements through the mediation of the Department of Labor. On February 5, Pedro Abad Santos ordered all strikers to return to work.⁶³ Negotiations for a final settlement dragged over several months, with intermittent strikes, burned cane fields, etc. (all of

⁶⁰ *The Tribune*, 5 May 1935, p. 4. We know from Luis Taruc that Pedro Abad Santos was working on the behalf of peasants years before 1935. *Born of the People*, (New York: International Publishers, 1953).

⁶¹ *The Tribune*, 2 May 1939, pp. 1 ff. At the end of 1938, the Communist Party of the Philippines, then headed by Evangelista, and the Socialist party, led by Pedro Abad Santos, joined in a coalition. Consequently each man became the two principal leaders of the new organization, which was usually called the Communist Party of the Philippines.

⁶² *The Tribune*, 21 January 1939, pp. 1 ff; 22 January 1939, pp. 1 ff; 25 January 1939, pp. 1 ff.

⁶³ *The Tribune*, 5 January 1939, p. 3.

which indicated that the Socialists under Pedro Abad Santos lacked complete discipline or control over the peasants).

Actually a final settlement never was reached; issues from that 1939 strike carried over to a large strike in 1940. In fact more complexities and cause for unrest sprouted from the 1939 trouble. For example, the hiring of strike breakers, a long time practice of landlords and centrals, created the problem of what to do with the strike breakers once the strikers returned to work. Prolonged hesitation on this question, especially by central managers, contributed to another large strike involving thousands of peasants in late 1939 and early 1940.⁶⁴ The Department of Labor declared that strike illegal, which meant that strike breakers now had even stronger claims to the jobs in the eyes of both the government and the central owners.

As in other parts of Luzon, strikes were far from the only activities among peasants in Pampanga. According to the newspapers, the first strike was in 1934 (120 sugar central workers in Mabalacat),⁶⁵ but Table E (Appendix) shows that there were several activities elsewhere in earlier years. Like the strikes, however, other activities increased in frequency and intensity from 1930 through 1940. For example, in 1935-36, angry tenants of two different landlords burned some cane fields; but ten fields were set on fire in 1938, six in 1939, and nine in 1940.⁶⁶ In addition, many similar acts of vandalism, such as destroying palay seed beds and raiding fish ponds, occurred in 1938-40 whereas only three such incidents were cited in earlier years. Another typical act that increasingly occurred was raiding landlords' bodegas to take rice that the tenants claimed rightfully belonged to them. Clashes between strikers and strike-breakers became more frequent as the number of strikes rose. In 1940, when strikes became so numerous that one loses count, there were at least eight clashes between strikers and strike breakers. Few fights involved guns since few peasants had any prior to World War II. But nevertheless, injuries and sometimes deaths did result since the men typically used bolos and clubs. Most showdowns of this sort were in connection with strikes against landlords, but some were the results of strikes at sugar centrals. Occasionally in 1939 and 1940 there were small battles between the PC, local police, or hired guards of the landlords or central, on the one hand, and peasants, on the other. These brief fights commonly resulted after armed men had been called upon either to protect strike breakers or to stand guard over palay that was being harvested.

By no means were violence and vandalism the peasants' normal activities. In fact, to the extent they occurred, they usually followed after other

⁶⁴ *The Tribune*, 19 January 1940, pp. 1 ff; 20 January 1940, pp. 1 ff.

⁶⁵ *The Tribune*, 13 January 1934, p. 14.

⁶⁶ Usually the newspapers do not report any motive for such arsons, but apparently the tenants who had been ejected from the land or who were on strike sometimes burned cane fields as a protest against not only the landlord and his practices but also against his hiring of others to replace them.

procedures had been tried, including petitions (to landlords and central owners and to outside parties, like government officials), court litigation, demonstrations, and strikes. For example, as in Nueva Ecija, various field representatives of the Justice and Labor Departments were kept busy trying to mediate between contending groups in Pampanga. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) played an increasingly important role in this regard all over the Philippines, especially in Nueva Ecija and Pampanga.

One activity that was distinctive to Pampanga was elections. At least the peasants' election activity was more obvious in that province than in any other in 1937 and 1940. In other provinces there may have been some attempts to elect particular candidates who were considered sympathetic to the peasants' cause, but such attempts are not documented in *The Tribune* and certainly must have been less successful than in Pampanga. The Socialist organization ran candidates (under the label of Popular Front) for provincial and municipal offices in those election years, with markedly improved success in the second as compared to the first. In 1937 Socialists won the mayorships in Mexico and San Fernando. In Mexico, Socialists also won for vice-mayor and all six seats on the municipal council. Socialists won six of the eight seats on the council in San Fernando. Their candidate for governor, Pedro Abad Santos, received 16,000 votes, but lost the election to Sotero Baluyut. Pedro Abad Santos' vote was 10,000 more than he had received in 1933 when he tried for the same office. To give an indication of the peasant support in 1937, one of the six councilors elected in San Fernando was a woman peasant, daughter of a tenant farmer. Two others were small farmers. (Of the remaining three, one was a law student and two were tailors). The news article reported that in both municipalities the Socialists won heavily in the barrios in order to make up for the much smaller Socialist votes in the poblaciones.⁶⁷

In December 1940, the next provincial elections, Socialist candidates, again under the Popular Front label, won the mayorships in nine municipalities—San Fernando, Vivencio Cuyugan (re-elected); Angeles, Agapito del Rosario; Mexico, Fernancio Sampang; Mabalacat, Virgilio Ocampo; Arayat, Casto Aleandrino; Porac, Marciano Dizon; Floridablanca, Benjamin Layug; Candaba, Eliseo Galang; and San Simon, Patricio Yabot. In San Fernando, Angeles, and Mexico, three of the biggest municipalities in the province, Socialists won all councilors seats. Pedro Abad Santos again ran for governor, but once more lost to Baluyut. Abad Santos did however, continue to increase his vote over previous attempts, receiving 20,538 to

⁶⁷ *The Tribune*, 18 December 1937, pp. 1 ff. Unfortunately there is no information about the councilors elected in Mexico, nor any detail such as how many votes were cast, the distribution of votes by municipality for Abad Santos, etc. Nor is there any account in *The Tribune* for the 1933 election. Moreover, officials at the Commission on Elections have told me that they have no voting data for pre-war elections.

Baluyut's 25,354.⁶⁸ Despite his personal defeat, Pedro Abad Santos was elated with the results:

The result of the election is gratifying even beyond my expectation. We have elected Socialist mayors with Socialist councils in eight out of 21 municipalities of the province. I am especially pleased with our victory in three strategic towns, namely, San Fernando, Angeles, and Arayat. The results shows (sic) that the movement is growing rapidly and steadily. . . . The fact that we won in the municipal governments rather than in the provincial board shows also that the movement is stronger at the foundation of the political structure, which means that the change is coming from below, rather than from above and therefore it is more dangerous to the old order.⁶⁹

It is important to point out that in all nine municipalities except one (San Simon), the peasants had been active during 1940 and in previous years. (cf. Table E). It seems certain that the elections were a continuation of peasants' attempts to improve their situation since these Socialist candidates, and the Socialist organization in general, centered their campaigns around the issues and problems that had been the focus of other peasant activity.⁷⁰ Further evidence of this contention is that at least six of the nine men elected mayors (Cuyugan, del Rosario, Sampang, Alejandrino, Dizon, and Layug) were frequently cited in the newspapers as leaders of and spokesmen for peasants and workers in their respective municipalities. Possibly the other three were also leaders but *The Tribune* neglected to mention their names. These six men also had important roles in province wide activities for they often spoke for Pampanga peasants and attended conferences of leaders and participated in negotiations with landlords and government officials when there were attempts to either avert or settle strikes.

This analysis of Pampanga can now turn to the issues involved in all this ferment. As with Nueva Ecija, there were many complaints, but the list can be reduced to a few central issues: (1) payment or taking out of loans; (2) usurious interest; (3) procedure for dividing sugar and palay harvests (including demands for increased shares); (4) payment of agricultural expenses; (5) miscellaneous benefits; (6) increased wages; and (7) individual rights to join organizations or unions. Comparing these basic demands to the list mentioned earlier for Nueva Ecija, the only difference

⁶⁸ *The Tribune*, 12 December 1940, pp. 1 ff. A Socialist also won the mayorship in La Paz, Tarlac (Leon Parungao), but there are no accounts of Socialists winning elsewhere. However, I was told in Nueva Ecija that a few Socialists were elected municipal councilors in that province in 1940. Unfortunately, I cannot find records of such elections.

⁶⁹ *The Tribune*, 14 December 1940, p. 9. The quote says eight, rather than nine, municipalities, because some Socialists did not regard Marciano Dizon, of Porac, as a true comrade, even though he was registered as a Socialist. (Casto Alejandrino, Interview, 12 November 1970. Camp Crame, Quezon City.)

⁷⁰ Perhaps if one had more local history data for San Simon, one could more easily explain Yabot's victory there. As it is, the newspaper reports only one incident in that municipality—in 1933. However, as late as 1939 there was a rumor that "agitators" were active there, but I did not code such rumors. Cf. *The Tribune*, 9 February 1939, pp. 1 ff.

is the demands for better wages. This demand, stated in various ways, was especially common among central workers, whether they be men in the mill itself or those cutting and hauling cane. Also, wage issues were important for peasants who farmed for a wage. For example, in the general strike of 1939, one of the 13 specific demands was that workers who were hired to plow a field should be paid a minimum of ₱1.50 a day. Regarding crop shares, a common proposal was 55/45 and 60/40, in favor of the tenant. Occasionally groups of tenants pushed for 75/25. Under this latter proposal tenants would have paid all farming expenses, whereas with 55/45 and 60/40 landlords and tenants were to share expenses.

Regarding loans and interests, peasants were trying to get guaranteed loans from landlords while simultaneously seeking to eliminate the ever increasing and burdensome interests. An incident in a barrio of San Fernando in 1935 is typical. A group of 50 tenants on the land of Simeon Aguas had requested the following reforms: each tenant be given three cavans of palay each month (as a ration); each be paid ₱2 per month whether they worked or not; a guarantee that each tenant could borrow up to ₱25 per month; and the landlord should provide free medical facilities. The landlord turned down all of these suggestions. Later when he discovered that some of his cane had been prematurely cut, he called a PC detachment to investigate. During the investigation the PC shot one of the tenants; peasants who were witnesses said that there had been absolutely no provocation. Afterwards one tenant said: "They [the landlords] tightened the screws on us. We cannot live under the present conditions, and when we asked the landlords to be liberal, they told us to accept the old order of things or get out. . . . As for the constabulary, they only serve the rich. They do whatever the landlords tell them to do."⁷¹

The tenant quoted had touched on another factor that sometimes provided additional issues that grew out of attempts to solve the basic ones—the use of the PC or hired guards to break strikes, etc. Other such related grievances were the refusals to re-hire strikers, the use of strike breakers, unfair practices of government authorities who were supposed to be working on behalf of justice, and no implementation of existing land tenure laws.

BULACAN

The situation in Bulacan during the 1930's was similar to both Nueva Ecija and Pampanga, although of the three provinces it was the least active. Table C (Appendix) shows that while there was considerable spread of activity by 1940, it was not as intense in Bulacan compared to Nueva Ecija and Pampanga. That is, most of the long term, recurring incidents fall within a few municipalities (mainly San Miguel, San Ildefonso, and San Rafael). Nevertheless, compared to the whole country or even to other provinces in Central and Southern Luzon, Bulacan peasants were extremely

⁷¹ *The Tribune*, 26 May 1935, pp. 1 ff.

active. The province had incidents in 19 municipalities; nine of these 19 experienced incidents in two or more years.

In order to analyze the qualitative and quantitative growth of peasant activities and organization in Bulacan, one has to divide the province into two areas. It is clear that the most active areas in Bulacan were San Rafael and San Ildefonso. Together these two municipalities made up the bulk of a huge (27,400 hectares) Buenavista estate owned by the San Juan de Dios Hospital, which is to say, by the Catholic Church. Peasants on that estate faced *some* problems that were different from those faced by peasants elsewhere in the province. The second area consists of the non-Buenavista areas.

In the 1930's the estate was in the hands of a management that was responsible to the Church. The land itself was cultivated (practically all palay) by two different arrangements: (1) by small tenant farmers who paid *canon* (rent) to the estate for small (2-3 hectares) plots, which they themselves worked; and (2) by tenants who also worked small parcels but paid rental not to the estate but to another lessee, who in turn paid a canon to the estate. That is, some tenants had a lease directly from the estate, while other tenants rented from individuals (called *inquilinos*) who had leased a large number of hectares. Newspaper reports are frustratingly confusing as to how many tenants and lessees there were in Buenavista, but the most consistent figures cited during the 1930's are between six and eight thousand.⁷² Of this number most by 1940 are tenant-lessees — that is, tenant farmers who leased directly from the estate the small parcels they farmed.⁷³ However there are indications in other news reports that in earlier years there were more *inquilinos* than this last reference would suggest. At any rate, by 1939 an estimated 30,000 people lived on the estate lands in San Rafael and San Ildefonso.⁷⁴

The complex history of the Buenavista estate cannot be analyzed briefly and certainly cannot be adequately studied through a heavy reliance on newspaper reports for just one decade. That history, in fact, could be the subject of an entirely separate piece of research. Yet it is important for our purposes to make one point—the continuously intensifying turmoil for the people, mainly tenant farmers, of this area from 1930 right up to World War II. That turmoil resumed and continued to escalate after the Japanese occupation. To this day it is not clear that the affair is settled.⁷⁵

On May 2 and 3, 1935, there was a Sakdal revolt in San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Elsewhere in the province there were also Sakdalista organizations, including one in the San Rafael area. While to most of the nation the Sakdal

⁷² *The Tribune*, 12 February 1939, pp. 1 ff; 4 April 1940, pp. 1 ff.

⁷³ *The Tribune*, 4 April 1940, pp. 1 ff.

⁷⁴ *The Tribune*, 12 February 1939, pp. 1 ff.

⁷⁵ Primitivo D. Mijares, "The Buenavista Scandal," *The Manila Chronicle*, 29 August 1970, p. 2.

uprisings looked like efforts to gain independence, to the participants and members in San Ildefonso the main objective was to have ownership of the land they and their forefathers had been working but still in the hands of the Church. Through the Sakdalista movement they expressed their impatience with their governments' (provincial and national) numerous broken promises to purchase the land and redistribute it to the people who farmed it.⁷⁶ Both before and after 1935 this demand for land ownership was the principal issue. In 1938, 12,000 residents of the estate demonstrated to ask the government to buy the Buenavista lands for immediate re-sale to those working the land.⁷⁷ In 1939 President Quezon dramatically issued the necessary orders, principally to Manuel Roxas (head of both the Rural Progress Administration and the Department of Finance) to purchase or lease the estate.

Between the Sakdal uprising in Buenavista in 1935 and Quezon's order in 1939, considerable organization, protest, and violence had transpired. Every year an increasing number of tenants and inquilinos had refused to pay their canon, which they claimed was exorbitant. And each year the estate managers would auction off the lands held by the delinquent tenants and inquilinos. Then fighting and sporadic violence would follow, either between "old" and "new" occupants or between the "old" occupants and the PC or estate guards dispatched to evict them. Between 1935 and 1939, at least three organizations had been formed, all in one way or another aimed at protecting their members' claims to the land. The first was the *Kabesang Tales*, which in 1936 had about 1,000 members.⁷⁸ Its members were both tenants and inquilinos. Later the two most powerful groups were the *Dumating Na* (in San Rafael) and the *Handa Na* (in San Ildefonso). In the newspapers there are no decent estimates of membership strength, but between 1937 and 1940 the two organizations grew substantially. Members would refuse to pay the canon and refuse to leave the land. Twice such protests so paralyzed the vicinity and threatened widespread violence that the national government stepped in and prevailed upon the estate management to extend the date for payment of fees. In the meantime the peasants took in their harvests despite management orders to the contrary.⁷⁹ In addition, the two organizations, through their principal leader and lawyer, Juan Rustia, had pushed all the way to the United States Supreme Court their claim that the estate did not in fact belong to the Church but to the Philippine government.⁸⁰ All previous court decisions (including the Philippine Supreme Court's) had denied such a claim. Rustia was insistent, however,

⁷⁶ *The Tribune*, 21 May 1935, pp. 1 ff.

⁷⁷ *The Tribune*, 23 January 1938, p. 3.

⁷⁸ *The Tribune*, 24 April 1936, p. 14.

⁷⁹ Jose G. Sanvictores, "A Study of the Conflicts at the Buenavista Estate in Bulacan," 21 January 1939, 17 pp. Roxas Papers, Bundle 10. Pambansang Aklatan, Manila.

⁸⁰ *The Tribune*, 11 February 1940, p. 32.

and so convincing to the members of the *Dumating Na* and *Handa Na* that he led them to boycott a plebiscite election ordered by Quezon in February 1939.⁸¹

When Quezon had finally started the government machinery moving to take the Buenavista estate, he decided to let the residents themselves decide whether the government should buy the estate and in turn lease it to the residents or whether the government should lease the estate from San Juan de Dios Hospital and sublease it to those farming the parcels. In leading the boycott of the plebiscite, Rustia argued that the land rightfully belonged to the government, thus it should not have to pay anything to the Church for the land. Secondly, since the government owns the land, it should redistribute it to the present farmers either free or at nominal cost.⁸² Thirdly, he and the members of the two organizations opposed certain specific aspects of the government's overall plan for administering the estate. They believed that the proposed "cooperative" would become like NARIC (National Rice Corporation), which they felt was an unwieldy body controlled by a few rice magnates, and hence would just perpetuate the status of the tenants as mere laborers.⁸³ Quezon's angry reaction to the boycott was to denounce Rustia, order the cancellation of the plebiscite, and announce that the government would proceed to lease the estate, with a 25 year option to buy, and in turn sublease it to the present tenants and inquilinos.⁸⁴ Quezon's action aroused the ire of even those residents who did not necessarily agree with Rustia; at the very least the vast majority wanted the government to immediately expropriate the land for resale to those farming it.⁸⁵ The *Dumating Na* and *Handa Na* continued their stand with Rustia still their spokesman, even though by now he and others in the organization were being harassed.⁸⁶

Meanwhile, inquilinos were also protesting the government's plan because under it the peasants would have to pay only 40% of the crop to the

⁸¹ *The Tribune*, 21 February 1939, p. 8.

⁸² *The Tribune*, 11 January 1939, p. 3. Also see, "Memo for . . . The President [Quezon]; Subject: More incitements in the Buenavista Estate," 24 March 1939, 2 pp. Signed: Patricio A. Dionisio, Confidential Agent, NBI. "Memorandum for The Chief, Information Division, P. C.; Subject: Non Signing of Government Lease Contract by Tenants of Buenavista Estate, San Ildefonso and San Rafael, Bulacan," 24 April 1939. Both documents are in the Roxas Papers, Bundle 10. *Pambansang Aklatan*, Manila.

⁸³ *The Tribune*, 21 February 1939, p. 8.

⁸⁴ *The Tribune*, 25 February 1939, pp. 1 ff.

⁸⁵ *The Tribune*, 1 February 1939 pp. 1 ff.

⁸⁶ A document in the Roxas Papers describes Rustia and the organizations *Handa Na* and *Dumating Na* as "subversive" and recommends that the principal leaders, including Rustia, of the two organizations should be prevented ". . . from holding any meetings either private or public, within the Buenavista Estate." Cf. "Memo for . . . The President [Quezon]; Subject: More incitements in the Buenavista Estate," 24 March 1939; Signed: Patricio A. Dionisio. Another document in the Roxas Papers is an account by a PC officer following around Rustia and trying to intimidate him. Cf. "Subject: Juan Rustia: To: Provincial Inspector, Bulacan," 7 June 1939, 2 pp. Signed: A. G. Fajardo, 1st Lt., PC. Both documents are in Bundle 10 of the Roxas Papers. *Pambansang Aklatan*, Manila.

inquilinos instead of 50%, which had been the previous prevailing arrangement.⁸⁷

President Quezon pushed through with the plan, but the trouble did not stop. Many tenants and inquilinos refused to sign the agreement with the new management of the estate—the Rural Progress Administration. The deadline for signing was extended. Eventually most signed, but when the time came to pay the rental the following year, a large number refused to pay. Agitation continued for the sale of the estate. The government administration began ejecting delinquent lessees (about 40% of the total) in an even more drastic fashion than had the previous management.⁸⁸ Despite the change in management, therefore, the old problems persisted. Not only did the questions of land ownership and distribution remain, but so did other issues, such as loan shortages, high interest rates, and unequitable distribution of agricultural expenses.

While these last mentioned problems were secondary themes for those on the Buenavista estate, they were primary for the peasants in other parts of Bulacan, just as they were for peasants in Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, and elsewhere in the central plains of Luzon. Strikes, raiding of landlords' bodegas, petitioning, and demonstrations were the typical incidents in the rest of Bulacan, especially San Miguel, Baliwag, Malolos, and Bigaa. And like the two provinces analyzed above and the Buenavista area of Bulacan, the size and intensity of such actions heightened through the decade. While the protests grew larger, the problems remained essentially the same, not only from area to area, but over time in any given area. In the newspapers names of landlords who had conflicts with tenants frequently reappeared, particularly in San Miguel, Baliwag, and Malolos. As an example for the points being made here about Bulacan in the 1930's, one can compare a series of strikes in 1933 with another series in 1940. In June 1933 at least 1,000 tenants of several landlords in the San Miguel area were striking or otherwise agitating for reform. Most were members of the KMP. They wanted the landlords to share half the agricultural expenses, increase the tenants' share of the harvest to 50%, reinstate tenants who had been ejected because they had gone on strike or otherwise had protested, and guarantee loans to tenants.⁸⁹ In January 1940 over 4,000 tenants affiliated with the KMP in five different municipalities, including San Miguel, called a strike with the principal demands being (1) a larger share of the harvest for tenants (so as to be in accordance with the Rice Share Tenancy Law), (2) landlords should pay half of the agricultural expenses, and (3) landlords should make low interest loans available to tenants.⁹⁰ Not only are the demands similar

⁸⁷ *The Tribune*, 14 February 1939, p. 16; 25 February 1939, pp. 1 ff.

⁸⁸ *The Tribune*, 5 April 1940, pp. 1 ff; 7 April 1940, p. 14.

⁸⁹ *The Tribune*, 2 June 1933, p. 9; 11 June 1933, p. 14; 13 June 1933, p. 11; 18 June 1933, pp. 5, 40; 23 June 1933, p. 9; 28 June 1933, pp. 1 ff.

⁹⁰ *The Tribune*, 12 January 1940, pp. 1 ff; 16 January 1940, p. 16.

between the two years, but at least two of the San Miguel landlords whose tenants had struck in 1933 also experienced the strikes and agitations of 1940.

GENERAL

I have elaborated on Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, and Bulacan to show the quality of the incidents and general unrest quantitatively summarized in Table A-E. The situation in the other Central and Southern Luzon provinces found in these tables could be similarly analyzed; the general picture would be the same, only on a smaller scale. The grievances involved, the gradual building of peasant unity, and the variety of activities found in the three core provinces are also found in other provinces in Central and Southern Luzon. Even the history of Buenavista, with its central issue of land ownership, has parallels in other large estates, particularly the religious estates of San Pedro Tunasan, Laguna, and Dinalupihan, Bataan.

In late 1938 the two biggest peasant organizations in Philippine history up to that time, AMT (Aguman Ding Malding Talapagobra) and KPMP, formally joined together.⁹¹ To commemorate the event they held a large parade on 11 February 1939 in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija.⁹² The event is representative of the principal process that was taking place during the 1930's—peasants were learning the importance of unity among themselves. This process did not begin or end during the decade, but it did make greater advances than perhaps in any other previous decades in Philippine history. Both the AMT and KPMP could trace their origins to several earlier and much smaller peasant groups, most of which historians have yet to rediscover but would include the *Kapatirang Magsasaka*, *Union ng Magsasaka*, *Lege de Campesinos*, *Tangulan*, *Kapisanan Makabola Makasinag*, and *Sakdalista*. The precise history of the building of larger peasant groups with social, economic and, later, political objectives has yet to be written for the Philippines, but this paper has indicated some of the continuities of areas, issues, and individuals involved. By 1939 the AMT, which was the mass organ of the Socialist party, claimed a following of 70,000,⁹³ drawn from all parts of Pampanga, and portions of southeastern Tarlac, southern Nueva Ecija, and western Bulacan.⁹⁴ The KPMP had about 60,000 members,⁹⁵ heavily concentrated in Nueva Ecija and Bulacan but also in Laguna, Rizal and Pangasinan.⁹⁶

⁹¹ Guillermo Capadocia, *History of the Peasant and Labor Movement in the Philippines*, [no date], 28 pp. Huk-PKP captured documents. Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

⁹² *The Tribune*, 12 February 1939, p. 4.

⁹³ Taruc, p. 46.

⁹⁴ Luis Taruc, Interview, 27 January 1970. Quezon City.

⁹⁵ Kenneth Kurihara, *Labor in Philippine Economics*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1945), p. 72.

⁹⁶ Areas of KPMP membership are based on news stories in *The Tribune* for 1938-40.

Together, then, the new AMT-KPMP alliance brought together about 130,000 peasants from Central and Southern Luzon.

The quality of peasant organization is not indicated by size alone. In 1938, 1939, and 1940 several general strikes threatened and sometimes took place. Two of these in Pampanga were cited previously. In early 1940 a general strike of 20-30 thousand peasants in 14 municipalities of Nueva Ecija was only partly avoided through the intercession of government officials.⁹⁷ Significant too are the increasing number of peasants going out on sympathy strike or otherwise showing their solidarity for fellow peasants who were striking or facing a crisis of some sort. Strikes in Calumpit, Bulacan, and Balanga, Bataan, in January 1939 were in part sympathy strikes for the general strike in Pampanga during that month.⁹⁸ The general strike in Pampanga in January 1940 also affected parts of Bataan, Bulacan, Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija.⁹⁹ Another recorded event indicating the growing solidarity among peasants in different provinces occurred in 1939. In March, April, and May of that year, landlords all over Central Luzon had been ejecting hundreds of tenants from their parcels of land. In May several thousand tenants in Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, and Bulacan simultaneously threatened a sit-down strike should landowners continue to eject tenants who were insisting on the implementation of existing tenancy laws. Eight thousand peasants from Arayat, Candaba, and Magalang, Pampanga, and San Antonio and Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, met at the municipal building in Cabiao to warn about the strike and protest such ejections.¹⁰⁰

Of course there were still many weaknesses in the peasant movement and unity was far from total. For one thing, there were still many peasants, even within Central and Southern Luzon, who were not members of the KPMP, AMT, or any organizations like them. After all, the strike breakers were peasants too, although frequently "imported", so to speak, from other regions.

Secondly, sometimes there were disputes between leaders of different, yet still aggressive, peasant organizations. There were for example, ideological differences among respective leaders of the KPMP and the Sakdalistas.¹⁰¹ Personal rivalries and differences over policy and tactics between some leaders of the AMT-KPMP organization and Juan Rustia may explain why the KPMP-AMT organization did not have an alliance with the *Dumating Na*

⁹⁷ *The Tribune*, 19 October 1939, p. 16; 10 January 1940, p. 12.

⁹⁸ *The Tribune*, 27 January 1939, pp. 1 ff; 31 January 1939, p. 14.

⁹⁹ *The Tribune*, 19 January 1940, pp. 1 ff.

¹⁰⁰ *The Tribune*, 18 May 1939, pp. 1 ff.

¹⁰¹ For some detail, but far from complete, see Jose Lava, *Milestones on the History of the Philippine Communist Party*, [undated; probably written about September 1950], p. 21. This manuscript, prepared from Lava's own knowledge of the CPP and from notes other Party members gave to Lava, was never, to my knowledge, published. Yet there are a few copies available; one is in the Filipiniana section of the Ateneo Library, Quezon City.

and *Handa Na*.¹⁰² Since Philippines organizations have historically tended to be personal followings of the leaders, it is possible that, to the extent these peasant organizations were only personal followings, the building of stronger and wider solidarity among peasants was jeopardized because of disputes among group leaders. Jose Lava says that a serious problem with the peasant and urban organizations prior to World War II was this personal following nature.¹⁰³ Undoubtedly this is true. But relative to earlier periods in Philippine history, there were stronger horizontal ties (or perhaps call it "class consciousness") among Central Luzon peasants in 1940 than previously. The sheer size of the AMT-KPMP organization suggests this. Also suggestive is the large number of principal leaders in those two groups, both before and after they joined together. Third, judging from the Talavera study, peasants generally joined together not so much because of special charisma or other attractiveness of its local leaders (del Rosario and Santa Ana) or of provincial leaders (e.g., Juan Feleo). What stood out as the important factors to their joint efforts were (1) the issues and problems involved were crucial to all of them, and (2) the realization that unity was important. The question of personal followings versus cause-oriented organizations deserves considerably more attention than can be allowed now in this paper. In a later analysis, I will take it up in more detail.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSES

The first law passed to regulate landlord-tenant relations was the Rice Share Tenancy Act of 1933. The law was never in effect anywhere in the Philippines until 1936. Up to that time its implementation was at the discretion of municipal governments, none of which ever took the necessary steps to do so.¹⁰⁴ In 1936 the law was amended to allow the President of the Commonwealth to put the Act into effect in municipalities he so designated. The essential provision of the law required that all contracts between landowners and tenants be in writing. In 1937 President Quezon declared that the law should be enforced in all Central Luzon provinces; later he added others. In reality the law merely stamped legal approval on the arrangements between landlords and tenants prevailing at that time.

The law did not reduce the number of tenant-landlord disputes; on the contrary, they increased because, in part, peasants were seeking implementation of the law.¹⁰⁵ "If enforced the Act would have improved the tenant's lot somewhat. But for those estates where the tenants were both acquainted with the law and bold enough to demand its applications, the almost univer-

¹⁰² *The Tribune*, 4 March 1939, pp. 1 ff.

¹⁰³ *Lava*, p. 20.

¹⁰⁴ Stubbs, p. 146; *The Tribune*, 1 May 1936, p. 2.

¹⁰⁵ *The Tribune*, 13 March 1939, pp. 1 ff.

sal reaction of landlords was to threaten ejection at the end of the agricultural year.”¹⁰⁶

The biggest problem with the law was that contracts were only for one year. Peasant organizations tried to get new laws that would make renewal of the contract automatic so long as the tenant had fulfilled his obligations. No such law was passed. The government did pass some amendments aimed at improving the tenants’ economic and social welfare. But if any landlord disliked certain specifications of the law, he could simply refuse a contract renewal at the end of the season to any tenants who insisted on contracts with those specifications. Such “purges”, referred to in the Nueva Ecija section above, threatened thousands of Central Luzon peasants by 1939. The Department of Labor admitted it was practically helpless to do anything to prevent those evictions.

More laws followed, all as part of Quezon’s “social justice” program. But they suffered from the limitations of earlier ones, such as having no automatic renewal of contract. Furthermore, like previous laws, the new ones would, if effectively implemented, bring only moderate change. Let us consider first the additional problem of enforcement, and then the moderate nature of such laws.

Aside from the inadequate administrative machinery and lack of personnel,¹⁰⁸ laws were never impartially enforced because of the political system in the country. In the provinces the landlords and others of the upper class had practically a monopoly on the economic and political power. This monopoly allowed them not only to influence pending legislation in Manila to fit their own interests, but to bend and even ignore the laws once passed. In Talavera the peasants’ unanimous and most bitter criticism against the political system prior to World War II (and afterwards, for that matter) was that the system was inequitable since those with wealth and influence could choose to either use the laws or ignore them, depending on their needs, and there was very little that the rest (those without wealth and influence) could do to counteract. Consequently, as noted earlier, peasants and peasant leaders charged that government officials (both local and national) played favorites with landlords and central owners. The Philippine Constabulary, forever being called upon by landlords and central owners, sometimes acted like personal armies of these influentials. In the eyes of the peasants the PC was

¹⁰⁶ David O. D. Wurfel, *The Bell Report and After: A Study of the Political Problems of Social Reform Stimulated by Foreign Aid*, Ph.D. Dissertation (unpublished), Cornell University, 1960, p. 409.

¹⁰⁷ *The Tribune*, 13 March 1939, pp. 1 ff.

¹⁰⁸ The lack of machinery and the overlapping and conflicting areas of jurisdiction, creating only more confusion, is frequently reported in *The Tribune* for 1930-1940. For example, Manuel R. Joven, a national leader of KPMP, complained that 95% of the tenancy cases filed in the CIR the year before were still pending in November 1940; cf. *The Tribune*, 14 November 1940, p. 11. Regarding the confusing administration of laws, see *The Tribune*, 11 September 1940, p. 10; 18 September 1940, p. 11; and November 1940, p. 5.

in fact just that; peasants rarely would think to call on the PC to enforce an infringement of the law by a landlord.¹⁰⁹

The court system, especially at the local level, was no refuge for those without wealth or influence. The primary lower court in the provinces was the justice of the peace. These justices were appointive offices. Through the informal appointment process, including various intricacies of patron-client relations and family ties, the justices were usually responsible not to the law but to the wealthy and the influential. This was frequently true also of higher court officials.¹¹⁰ Pedro Abad Santos expressed the peasants' cynical view of the courts when he wrote to his brother Jose, who was then Secretary of Justice, "I might as well tell you at the outset that the workers [meaning tenant farmers, central workers, and other agricultural laborers] have lost faith in the courts . . . our ruling class has taken the place of the former [colonial] rulers and use the courts to further their interest and privileges."¹¹¹

Turning now to the extremely modest quality of any attempted reforms for the agricultural system, one can refer to other analyses of the "social justice" program, under which all the government's agricultural laws and plans fell.¹¹² The government (meaning in particular President Quezon) never intended sweeping reforms.¹¹³ While Quezon spoke frequently in favor of "social justice", he did little to implement it because, says Theodore Friend, the government was far more concerned with improving trade relations with the United States than with basic internal development.¹¹⁴ Others argue that the reason lies in the fact that "social justice" for the masses could only come at the expense of certain claims of property owners, which the Quezon government never questioned.¹¹⁵ Consequently, most of the laws had built-in protections for the property owners, be they landowners, central owners, rice dealers, etc.

When the laws and other parts of the political system failed to satisfy the peasants, Quezon relied on tokens and "father-like psychology."¹¹⁶ His

¹⁰⁹ Harlan R. Crippen also argues that the PC were but tools of the politicians and landlords. "Philippine Agrarian Unrest: Historical Backgrounds," *Science and Society*, 10 (Fall 1946), p. 351.

¹¹⁰ Peasants in Talavera told me how the judges were "on the landlords' side." Similar evidence comes from an interview with a former lawyer for peasants in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, during the 1920's and 1930's. Interview, 4 February 1970, Quezon City.

¹¹¹ *The Tribune*, 18 September 1940, p. 11.

¹¹² Theodore Friend, *Between Two Empires, Philippines* (1929-1946), (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965). Francisco Nemenzo, Jr., *The Land for the Landless Program in the Philippine Government*, MA Thesis, University of the Philippines, 1959. Loretta M. Sicat, *Quezon's Social Justice Program and the Agrarian Problem*, MA Thesis, University of the Philippines, 1959.

¹¹³ Sicat, p. 87.

¹¹⁴ Friend, pp. 156, 160.

¹¹⁵ Sicat, p. 90; Nemenzo, p. 78.

¹¹⁶ Sicat, p. 90; Friend, p. 160.

favorite method was to journey to the provinces and "perform" a speech that pleaded with the people to be patient and admonished them not to use violence.¹¹⁷ And when there was violence, or widespread strikes and other signs of unrest, Quezon was quick to send reinforcements to the PC units stationed in each province.¹¹⁸

By the end of 1940, the government had failed to meet the unrest with commensurate solutions. Ironically, the very laws that the unrest had helped bring about, having served as a kind of catalyst, created more problems and conflicts for the rural society than they solved. Indeed laws that peasants had hoped would protect them socially and economically were in fact used more and more to their disadvantage. The massive ejections in 1939 and 1940 are the most visible examples. To have contracts with landlords was originally thought to be a step in the right direction but they turned out to be disadvantageous to tenants. Given the nature of the social system, tipped so heavily in favor of the peasants' former patrons, such laws and contracts could not possibly include all the provisions and benefits that the peasants had so long before relied upon. (Cf. Part I of this paper). Of course, had the landed and wealthy been able they could have continued their role as the traditional patron; but by all evidence, that old order was gone for them. The masses, on the other hand, were still trying to hold on to that system.

In 1933 some tenants in San Miguel, Bulacan, opposed the idea of having contracts with landlords. They did not want to reduce ". . . the relations between tenants and landowners . . . [to] to a strictly contractual basis."¹¹⁹ Symbolic to the whole process taking place in Central Luzon (as seen in Parts I and II of this paper) the landlords increasingly insisted on such contracts while tenants realized, as the ones in Bulacan cited above had realized, that the contracts were contrary to their economic and social security. Such a business like arrangement was not what they wanted. Furthermore, they would always lose, if not by failing to get all the provisions they needed to protect their marginal income, then through the landlords' superior power and influence to escape from any conditions later found too restrictive. But in the 1930's peasants were learning the importance of organization and unity in order to stand up to the system in an attempt to regain the social and economic security they were losing. Under the guidance of their leaders, some of whom had visionary ideas very different

¹¹⁷ For example, see the news accounts of three of Quezon's famous speeches in Central Luzon: San Fernando, Pampanga (*The Tribune*, 15 February 1939, pp. 1 ff.); Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija (*The Tribune*, 2 May 1939, pp. 1 ff. 16); and Buenavista Estate, Bulacan (*The Tribune*, 1 February 1939, pp. 1 ff.).

¹¹⁸ E.g., in March 1939 Quezon prevailed upon the National Assembly to appropriate an emergency fund of ₱500,000 for additional PC being sent to Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, and Bulacan and for more employees in the Department of Justice. *The Tribune*, 4 March 1939, pp. 1 ff.

¹¹⁹ *The Tribune*, 6 May 1933, pp. 13, 14.

from the peasants' outlooks, they were trying more political channels, hoping to find the political system responsive where the economic and social system had failed to be.

REVOLUTION, 1946-54

From about 1946-1954, a peasant based movement, which I call the Huk-PKP revolution, unsuccessfully attempted to bring about change through organized violence.¹²⁰ In this section I want to briefly present evidence that that revolution was a continuation of the unrest analyzed above. That evidence centers around two propositions: (1) the areas of unrest prior to World War II correlate highly with the areas where the Huk-PKP revolution was the strongest, and (2) there are close similarities between peasant grievances and demands of 1930-1940 and of the attempted revolution. This comparison must be brief, with many questions left unanswered. In being so brief, the flavor of the whole period is almost lost—the turmoil, the revolutionary build-up, the government reaction, etc. Nevertheless, the purpose now is not to do justice to the revolution itself. That task is left for future writings.

Spaced between the peasant unrest and organizations of 1930-1940 and the Huk-PKP revolution was the Japanese occupation. Several guerrilla groups fought the Japanese forces during that time; the strongest one in Central Luzon was the Hukbalahap. To a degree the Hukbalahap was a continuation of the increasing solidarity and organization among peasantry since numerous Hukbalahap leaders had been peasant worker leaders; also the Hukbalahap was a united front that included, among other groups, the KPMP and the AMT.¹²¹ The principal areas of Hukbalahap strength and mass support were in Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Pampanga, Bulacan and Laguna,¹²² although there were also other guerrillas in these provinces. As an indication of Hukbalahap strength, it reportedly had 10,000 armed men in December 1943. During Liberation, the Hukbalahap was credited with taking from the Japanese three major towns in Central Luzon — Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija; Tarlac, Tarlac; and San Fernando, Pampanga.¹²³

The Huk-PKP revolution was strongest in the areas of the former Hukbalahap and the areas of greatest rural unrest prior to World War II. The

¹²⁰ PKP stands for *Partidong Kommunista ng Pilipinas*. Usually this Huk-PKP revolution is referred to simply as the Huk movement or Huk revolution. However, the Communist Party of the Philippines was also important in the revolution, yet not always coterminous with the Huks (or, more properly, the *Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan*/ People's Liberation Army/).

¹²¹ The best treatment to date on the Hukbalahap is Luis Taruc, *Born of the People*. There is also a document at Camp Aguinaldo that provides some valuable details: *History and Organization of the Hukbalahap and United Front Movement*, December 1945, 15 pp. plus appendices. It was prepared by the Military Police Command, AFWESPAC, Intelligence Division.

¹²² William J. Pomeroy, *The Forest*, (New York: International Publishers, 1963), p. 39.

¹²³ *History and Organization of the Hukbalahap and United Front Movement*.

first type of evidence to support this contention comes from Huk-PKP documents. Although a thorough analysis of all the relevant documents will require a separate study, one document in particular will serve the purpose of this paper. In 1950 the Huk-PKP leadership prepared a general organizational report, which was a summary of various regional reports from cadres and commanders.¹²⁴ Included in that report was a ranking of the various regions. (Table III).

Table III. RELATIVE RANKINGS OF HUK-PKP REGIONS, MAY 1950

| | <i>No. of cadre</i> | <i>No. of armed men</i> | <i>Degree of mass Organizations</i> |
|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Reco 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Reco 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Reco 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Reco 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Reco 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| Reco 6 and 7 | 5 | 5 | 5 |

According to the regional committee (Reco) divisions at that time, Reco 1 was Nueva Ecija, eastern Pangasinan, and northern Quezon; Reco 2, Pampanga, Tarlac, Bataan, and Zambales; Reco 3, Bulacan, Rizal, and Manila; Reco 4, Laguna, southern Quezon, Batangas, and Cavite; Reco 5, Bicol; Reco 6, Negros and Panay; and Reco 7, Mindanao.¹²⁵ In the document, Reco 6 and 7 were grouped together; had they been ranked separately Reco 7 would be last, judging from other related documents. Again based on a cursory examination of several documents regarding strength of the movement, the first four Recos are distinctly much superior to Recos 5, 6, and 7.

A second source of data for Huk-PKP areas are reports in the *Philippine Free Press*, beginning in 1948, that gave a brief summary of all Huk-PKP activity each week. Such activity included Huk appearance in barrios or towns, clashes between Huks and the government soldiers, etc. Table F (Appendix) is a numerical summary of those reports. For each incident a count of one was given. Since the *Free Press* names the municipality where each incident occurred, I coded incidents by municipality. The (b) columns on Table F are the number of municipalities in each particular province where one or more incidents occurred.

As with the summary of incidents from 1930-1940, a striking aspect of Table F is the heavy concentration in Central and Southern Luzon. Also, the three most active provinces are again Bulacan, Pampanga, and Nueva Ecija. The next most active province is Quezon. (I should note that the

¹²⁴ *Pangkalahatang Ulat Pang-Organisasyon* (General Organization Report), May 1950, 20 pp. Exhibit 0-1049, Criminal Case No. 14071 (Lava, et al.; Politburo Trial), CFI, Manila.

¹²⁵ Pomeroy, pp. 39-40.

increasing number of Huk-PKP incidents in Quezon, Zambales, and Bataan is probably due to Huk-PKP armed men retreating to those mountainous areas while being pursued by government forces.) Of course, the reports in the *Free Press* are not totally reliable, so figures in Table F can at best indicate only general trends and relative strength.

If one compares the overall picture of peasant incidents in 1930-1940 (Tables A and B, Appendix) with Table III and Table F (Appendix), the general conclusion is that the Huk-PKP movement was strongest in those same areas where peasant activities had been the most numerous and continuous. It is clear that there is considerable continuity between pre-World War II and post-World War II for Southern and Central Luzon. One can even say that the strongest continuity lies within the three core provinces of Central Luzon—Bulacan, Pampanga, and Nueva Ecija.

Interviews with former Huk-PKP leaders help to verify these continuities. Central Luzon provinces (principally Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, and Bulacan, and also southern Tarlac) were the easiest provinces for Huk-PKP cadres to organize in and move about. Even compared to Southern Luzon, the revolutionaries had an easier time in Central Luzon.¹²⁶ One long time peasant and Huk-PKP leader, Casto Alejandrino (the same Socialist who was elected Mayor of Arayat in 1940), compared the people's support in Southern Luzon to that in Central Luzon: "The initial response was the same—warm, hospitable, and attentive to what the Huks said and did. The difference was in their *stability*; the support of the people in Central Luzon is more stable, more dependable, when times become tough and pressure is great."¹²⁷ According to Cenon Bungay, due to politicalization more people in Central Luzon than elsewhere were either in the Huk-PKP movement or supported it. This politicalization had come over time and through struggle to improve their situation.¹²⁸ There were only "pockets" of politicized people in Southern Luzon; most of these were in Laguna and in the Quezon-Laguna boundary area. As in Central Luzon, these other "pockets" were in large measure politicized as a consequence of activity in the 1930's.¹²⁹

Peregrino Taruc said that lack of politicalization over time among the masses (peasants) was the principal reason why Huk-PKP support was never substantial in Iloilo and Negros Occidental, even though the socio-economic conditions in those provinces were somewhat similar to Central Luzon.¹³⁰ Other former Huk-PKP activists would agree. Looking again at Table A (Appendix), there were some incidents (mostly among laborers)

¹²⁶ Cenon Bungay, Interview, 15 July 1970. Camp Crame, Quezon City.

¹²⁷ Casto Alejandrino, Interview 14 July 1950. Camp Crame, Quezon City.

¹²⁸ Bungay, Interview, 15 July 1970.

¹²⁹ Alejandrino, Interview, 14 July 1950. The term "pockets" of politicalization is from Alejandrino.

¹³⁰ Peregrino Taruc, Interview, 9 July 1970. Camp Crame, Quezon City.

in Negros Occidental and Iloilo in 1930-1940. Table F (Appendix) and Table III indicate that the Huk-PKP movement was indeed weak in those two provinces, and captured documents I have seen would verify this. Yet the Huk-PKP movement spent considerable energy and sent several experienced peasant organizers and cadres to those areas, trying to get the peasants and laborers there to support and join the movement. The minimal success would not only bear out Taruc's analysis. It also suggests that revolution cannot be exported, so to speak, nor created in a short time. Revolution grows as the conditions allow and as the people come to that conclusion after a substantial degree of frustrated political activity.

Perhaps the reasons the workers in Manila did not support the Huk-PKP movement to any significant degree follow from the above generalization. In 1930-1940 there were numerous incidents (practically all strikes) in Manila. But unlike peasant unrest in the nearby provinces, the laborers' strikes seemed to have brought measurable results—e.g. increased wages and collective bargaining rights. Furthermore, in examining the newspaper reports, one does not see the repeated occurrences of strikes at the same factories, businesses, etc., which suggests again that the occasional strike among a group of workers brought some satisfying results. Consequently, as one Huk-PKP leader said, the workers in Manila did not develop a "political consciousness" because they directed their strikes, etc., at economic issues of immediate concern.¹³¹

It seems to me that the workers did not have to develop a "political consciousness" and move to the political realm in order to seek what they wanted. The peasants in Central and Southern Luzon, on the other hand, did have to, and later found that even at the political level there was little response to their needs. This discovery helped push them to revolution.

Turning now to the continuity of issues, the best statements of peasant demands and grievances are position papers, resolutions, and other documents of the PKM. (Between 1946 and 1948 the PKM was theoretically not part of the growing Huk-PKP revolution, but in actuality many of its members, numbering about half a million peasants,¹³² were already directly or indirectly involved.) Before reading such documents, one would expect to find a loud, shrill cry of "land for the landless", or land redistribution. Instead one finds that the documents assume that the tenancy system will continue and advocate reforms within that system. Prior to 1950 the most radical statement for land redistribution appears in a 1946 document that advocates a long range, many staged program through which more people will own their farm lands.¹³³ Other than that, the only call for land redistribu-

¹³¹ Jesus Lava, Interview, 19 August 1970. Camp Crame, Quezon City.

¹³² This figure appears in a "Letter to the Congress of the Philippines," 26 January 1948, from The Executive Committee, Pambansang Kaisahan ng mga Magbubukid. Exhibit W-435, Criminal Case 15841 (Hernandez, et al.), CFI, Manila.

¹³³ *Patakaran Pangkabukiran ng PKM* (Agricultural Platform of the PKM), 20 March 1946, pp. 4, 5. Huk-PKP captured documents. Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

bution typically seen is that land owned by Japanese, the Church, and the government should be sub-divided and sold to the tenants. This paper showed earlier that expropriation of such lands was a central issue before the war on a government estate (Sabani in Laur, Nueva Ecija) and a Church estate (Buenavista in Bulacan).

Practically all other proposals regarding agriculture found in PKM and related documents captured from the Huk-PKP movement seek modification of the tenancy system. Most advocate increased shares for tenants (for example, usually 60/40, 70/30 (in favor of the tenants) or *buwisan*—fixed rent—for palay and tobacco; 40/30/30 for sugar, with 40% being for the tenant and 30 each for the landowner and the central); more equitable sharing of agricultural expenses, particularly irrigation fees; and better relations between landlords and tenants.¹³⁴ Like Central Luzon peasants before World War II many documents speaking for postwar peasants assail bad practices of landlords, with unjust evictions of tenants being the most common complaint. In addition to such modifications in the tenancy system, the PKM was also proposing more efficient and technologically advanced farming practices.

A 1952 document from the PKP spoke more forcefully about land redistribution and ending the tenancy system once and for all.¹³⁵ But such references are the exception; furthermore, I doubt whether they spoke aptly for the peasant base of the movement. When peasants in Nueva Ecija discussed the Huk-PKP movement's objectives, very rarely would they mention land redistribution (other than for Church and government owned estates) or anything bordering on ending the tenancy system. The main objective as regards agriculture, according to these peasants, was to increase the peasant's share of the harvest. Jesus Lava, formerly the General Secretary of the PKP, confirmed this in an interview. He said that peasants only wanted to increase their share; they really were not trying to get the land for themselves. "It was the Communist Party [in the Philippines] that popularized the slogan "Land for the Landless;" that didn't come from the peasants' themselves."¹³⁶

Two other peasant grievances of tremendous importance prior to World War II were (1) landlords frequently refused to give food rations and loans to their tenants and (2) the interest rates for loans either landlords or money lenders were usurious. These were also crucial issues for peasants

¹³⁴ *Patakaran Pangkabukiran ng PKM*; Bataan Provincial Committee, Instruction Number 5, to PKM, June 1947; *General Rules and Regulations of the National Peasants Union (PKM)*, September 1945. Huk-PKP captured documents. Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

¹³⁵ *Pahusayin ang ating Pagtuturo ukol sa atin Patakaran sa Pamamahagi ng Lupa sa Kabukiran* (Improve our instruction concerning our basis for the distribution of agricultural lands), June 1952. Huk-PKP captured documents. Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

¹³⁶ Jesus Lava, Interview, 12 August 1970, Camp Crame, Quezon City.

during the Huk-PKP movement. For example, they are the objects of attack in several articles of the PKM publication *Magbubukid* in 1946.¹³⁷ To the PKM the solution was to establish rural banks that would give low-interest loans and to establish cooperatives, which would also provide easy-term loans.¹³⁸ Peasants in Nueva Ecija also mentioned the establishment of loan sources as one objective of the Huk-PKP movement, but they said that was a more long-ranged plan. The more immediate solution was to reduce interest rates landlords and money lenders charged.

As regards the agricultural system, then, grievances and demands of peasants during the Huk-PKP revolution are strikingly similar to those during the unrest prior to the Japanese occupation. There are also similarities among non-agricultural issues. The most important of these is that during both time periods, peasants were highly critical of the political system. In both cases peasants believed the government was in the hands of the elite, particularly the landlords, while the poor people had no influence in government and without influence there was no way to get justice. This is how peasants in San Ricardo, Talavera, including former Huk-PKP participants, described the political system prior to and after the Japanese occupation. Similar descriptions appear in captured documents; e.g., "Only the big people and the wealthy have a decent life, while the rest of the people have no chance to escape their misery. At the same time, the government is in the hands of the reactionary capitalists and the poor people's enemy hacenderos."¹³⁹ Many peasants and captured documents aimed their criticisms at specific acts of repression, such as landlord armies molesting the peasants, government soldiers harassing PKM members even though that organization was legal (until 1948), and the unjust removal in 1946 of several Congressmen who were defenders of the peasants' interests.

Continuity in the areas of unrest and the issues involved in the unrest prior to and after the Japanese occupation supports the contention that the Huk-PKP revolution was the outcome of a process that started decades before, when the traditional socio-economic order began to disintegrate, leaving peasants in an increasingly precarious, insecure position. The evidence presented in this brief paper is admittedly incomplete, but more can be, and in the future will be, brought together to support the argument and analyze the Huk-PKP movement in some detail. From the evidence presented here one can conclude, at the very least, that the typical interpreta-

¹³⁷ *Magbubukid* (Peasant) issues held among the Huk-PKP captured documents at Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, are few. There is one issue for each of the following months: January, April, May, and July, 1946. Each issue is about 12 pages.

¹³⁸ "Ang Kahalagan ng Kooperatiba" (The importance of cooperatives), by Mateo del Castillo, *Magbubukid*, January 1946. Huk-PKP captured documents. Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

¹³⁹ "Material Ni Kas. Sigundo, ED ng Secom no. 8" (Material of Comrade Sigundo, Education Instructor of Section Committee no. 8), (not dated; probably written in 1953 or 1954), Huk-PKP captured documents. Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

tions of the Huk-PKP movement have to be abandoned. That revolution was not the work of communists or any other such ideologues. Of course leaders played important roles in the movement prior to and after 1940. They brought organizational, literary, legal, and other skills that helped to shape organizations and to encourage needed discipline and planning. Some of these leaders, especially at the national level, held Marxist-Leninist convictions and acted, in part, in accordance with those convictions. In this sense communism played a role in the whole drama of the movement. That role, however, was limited and directly dependent upon the existence of unrest, which grew out of profound social and economic problems and came from the rural people themselves. People who believe that "outside agitators," communist or otherwise, can somehow create peasant unrest and revolts do a grave injustice to peasants and commit serious errors in judgment. Secondly, the peasants' anger and frustrations were not sudden and new phenomena during the Huk-PKP period. The power holders—American and Filipino—in the Philippines had plenty of time to prevent the revolution. Instead they either could not or would not recognize the signs of unrest all along the way; or perhaps they were incapable of dealing with the basic problems.

APPENDIX *

TABLE A

| Number of Incidents | 1930 | 1931 | 1932 | 1933 | 1934 | 1935 | 1936 | 1937 | 1938 | 1939 | 1940 | Total |
|---------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| Bulacan | 3 | | 6 | 15 | 5 | 9 | 15 | 10 | 22 | 14 | 20 | 119 |
| Pampanga | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 14 | 1 | 19 | 36 | 44 | 64 | 193 |
| Nueva Ecija | 7 | 3 | 11 | 4 | 0 | 7 | 8 | 24 | 8 | 61 | 38 | 171 |
| Tarlac | 1 | 2 | 2 | | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 11 | 3 | 9 | 35 |
| Pangasinan | | 2 | 1 | | | 3 | 11 | 7 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 30 |
| Bataan | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | 1 | 7 | 15 | 26 |
| Northern Luzon | 2 | | 1 | | 2 | 2 | | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 19 |
| Ilocos | 1 | | | | | 1 | | 2 | 2 | | | 6 |
| Laguna | | 1 | 1 | | 2 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 7 | 31 |
| Rizal | 5 | 1 | 1 | | 5 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 44 |
| Cavite | 1 | | 1 | 4 | | | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 11 |
| Batangas | | 2 | | | 1 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 21 |
| Tayabas | 1 | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | | 8 |
| Bicol | | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 2 | 4 |
| Negros Occ. | 1 | 19 | 16 | 1 | | 3 | | 2 | 5 | 9 | 6 | 52 |
| Iloilo | 3 | 4 | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | | 2 | 2 | 4 | 20 |
| Capiz | | | | | | | | | 2 | 1 | | 3 |
| Visayan (other) | | 2 | | 2 | 4 | 3 | | | 2 | 5 | 3 | 19 |
| Mindanao | 1 | | 1 | 4 | | 5 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 22 |
| Manila | 12 | 6 | 4 | 7 | 22 | 9 | 11 | 11 | 29 | 25 | 23 | 159 |

* Tables A, B, C, D, and E are compilation of peasant and labor incidents as appeared in *The Tribune* (Manila) 1930-1940. It should be noted, however, no coding was done for the following movements: Kapisanan Makabola Makasinag, Tayug up-

TABLE B

| Number of Incidents | 1930 | 1931 | 1932 | 1933 | 1934 | 1935 | 1936 | 1937 | 1938 | 1939 | 1940 | Total |
|---------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| Bulacan | 2 | | 4 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 13 | |
| Pampanga | 1 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 9 | | 7 | 14 | 15 | 17 | |
| Nueva Ecija | 3 | 1 | 6 | 3 | | 5 | 5 | 11 | 5 | 19 | 17 | |
| Tarlac | 1 | 2 | 2 | | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 6 | 2 | 5 | |
| Pangasinan | | 2 | 1 | | | 2 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 2 | |
| Bataan | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | 1 | | 4 | 3 | |
| Laguna | | 1 | 1 | | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 4 | |
| Rizal | 5 | 1 | 1 | | 4 | 6 | 5 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 3 | |
| Cavite | 1 | | 1 | 4 | | | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | |
| Batangas | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | |
| Tayabas | 1 | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |
| Negros Occ. | 1 | 9 | 3 | 1 | | 2 | | 1 | 3 | 5 | 6 | |
| Iloilo | | 2 | 2 | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | | 3 | 2 | 3 |

TABLE C

| Number of Incidents | 1930 | 1931 | 1932 | 1933 | 1934 | 1935 | 1936 | 1937 | 1938 | 1939 | 1940 | Total |
|----------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| <i>Province of Bulacan</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | 2 |
| San Rafael | 2 | | 1 | 1 | | | 4 | 3 | 9 | 2 | 3 | |
| San Ildefonso | 1 | | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 9 | 2 | 3 | |
| San Miguel | | 2 | 10 | 2 | 1 | | | | 1 | 2 | 3 | |
| Baliwag | | 2 | | | | 1 | | | | | 1 | |
| Malolos | | | | | | 1 | | | 2 | 1 | 2 | |
| Bigaa | | | | | | 3 | | 1 | | | 1 | |
| Sta. Maria | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | |
| Bustos | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | | |
| Calatagan | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | |
| San Jose del Monte | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | |
| Polo | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 2 | |
| Calumpit | | | | | | | | | | | 2 | |
| Bulacan (town) | | | | | | | | | | 2 | | 1 |
| Hagonoy | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| Plaridel | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| Guiginto | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| Pulilan | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| Bocage | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| Meycauayan | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| (Unspecified) | | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | |

rising, Tangulan incidents, and Sakdalista. These four are discussed in the text of this paper. Nor were any counts assigned to two other occurrences: the activities of the Lope de la Rosa gang (principally in Bulacan and Nueva Ecija), and the activities of Asedillo and Encallado (principally in Laguna-Tayabas border area). These two cases must be studied more carefully first.

TABLE D

| Number of Incidents | 1930 | 1931 | 1932 | 1933 | 1934 | 1935 | 1936 | 1937 | 1938 | 1939 | 1940 | Total |
|------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| <i>Nueva Ecija</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nampicuan | 3 | | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | |
| Cuyapo | | | | 1 | | | 3 | 5 | | 2 | | |
| Gapan | 2 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | 2 | | 3 |
| Cabiao | | | 1 | 1 | | | | 2 | | 8 | | 4 |
| San Antonio | | | 3 | | | | | 2 | | 3 | | 1 |
| San Isidro | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | 4 |
| Cabanatuan | 2 | | | | 1 | 2 | 4 | 4 | | 13 | | 3 |
| Aliaga | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Jaen | | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | 3 | | 1 |
| Guimba | | | | | | 3 | | | | 3 | | 2 |
| Muñoz | | | | | | 1 | | | | 2 | | |
| Zaragoza | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| San Leonardo | | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | | 1 |
| Quezon | | | | | | | | 3 | | 1 | | 3 |
| Talavera | | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | 8 | | 5 |
| Bongabon | 1 | | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | 1 |
| Peñaranda | | | | 1 | | 1 | | 1 | 1 | | | |
| Sta. Rosa | 1 | | | | | | | 3 | 1 | 2 | | 2 |
| Laur | | | | | | | | | 1 | 5 | | 2 |
| Sto. Domingo | | | | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | 1 |
| San Jose | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | |
| Lupao | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | |
| Licab | | | | | | | | | | 2 | | 3 |
| San Carlos | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| (Unspecifiel) | 1 | 2 | 2 | | | | | | | 3 | | |

TABLE E

| Number of Incidents | 1930 | 1931 | 1932 | 1933 | 1934 | 1935 | 1936 | 1937 | 1938 | 1939 | 1940 | Total |
|------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| <i>Pampanga:</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Arayat | 1 | 1 | | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | 7 | 3 | 4 | |
| San Fernando | 1 | 1 | | | | 4 | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 11 | |
| Candaba | | 2 | 2 | | | 3 | | 1 | | 6 | 4 | |
| Angeles | | | | | 1 | | | | 3 | 2 | 2 | |
| Sta. Rita | | | | 2 | 2 | | 1 | 2 | | | 1 | |
| Mexico | | | | | 1 | | 3 | 2 | | 7 | 8 | |
| San Luis | | 1 | | | 1 | | | | | | 2 | |
| Guagua | | | | | 1 | | | | 1 | 1 | | |
| Porac | | | | | 1 | | | | | 2 | 2 | |
| Minalin | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | |
| Lubao | | | | | | | 4 | 4 | 6 | 5 | | |
| Floridablanca | | | | | | | 5 | 5 | 3 | 9 | | |
| Bacolor | | | | | | | | 2 | | | 1 | |
| Maguiapo | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | |
| Mabalacat | | | | 1 | | | | | 3 | 1 | 5 | |
| Masantol | | | | | | | | | 1 | 3 | 1 | |
| Sta. Ana | | | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 2 | 1 | |
| Magalang | | | | | | | | | 2.. | 1 | 5 | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|---|---|--|--|--|--|---|---|--|--|---|
| San Simon | | 1 | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| Del Carmen | | | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| Macabebe | | | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| Lantakita | | | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| (Unspecified) | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 3 | | | 1 |

TABLE F: *Huk-PKP Activity—Coded from Philippine Free Press Reports*

| Number of Incidents | 1930 | 1931 | 1932 | 1933 | 1934 | 1935 | 1936 | 1937 | 1938 | 1939 | 1940 | Total |
|---------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| Bulacan | 3 | 3 | 17 | 7 | 20 | 8 | 31 | 13 | 14 | 8 | 85 | |
| Pampanga | 6 | 5 | 14 | 6 | 29 | 11 | 42 | 14 | 64 | 15 | 155 | |
| Nueva Ecija | 6 | 4 | 41 | 21 | 32 | 16 | 55 | 19 | 42 | 15 | 176 | |
| Tarlac | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 15 | 9 | 12 | 8 | 37 | |
| Pangasinan | | 2 | 1 | 18 | 10 | 18 | 11 | 7 | 5 | 45 | | |
| Bataan | | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 12 | 9 | 17 | 7 | 37 | | |
| Zambales | | | | 5 | 3 | 8 | 4 | 10 | 8 | 23 | | |
| Northern Luzon | | 2 | | 4 | | 17 | | | 9 | | 32 | |
| Ilocos provinces | | | 6 | | 3 | | 8 | | | | 17 | |
| Laguna | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 20 | 13 | 25 | 15 | 23 | 12 | 76 | |
| Rizal | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 11 | 6 | 8 | 5 | 29 | |
| Cavite | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 3 | 9 | |
| Batangas | | | 1 | 1 | 10 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 13 | 8 | 30 | |
| Quezon (Tayabas) | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 8 | 7 | 29 | 18 | 31 | 13 | 76 | |
| Bicol provinces | | | | | | | 8 | | 7 | | 15 | |
| Negros Occ. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Iloilo | | | | | | 3 | 2 | 12 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 19 |
| Capiz & Antique | | | | | | | | 5 | | | | 5 |
| Visayan (other) | | | | | | | | 2 | | 3 | | 5 |
| Mindanao | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Greater Manila | | | 4 | | 5 | | 18 | | 10 | | 37 | |

NOTE: Column (a) is total incidents in the year by year; Column (b) is total municipalities that had one or more incidents that year.