

“NEVER IMAGINE YOURSELF TO BE OTHERWISE...”: FILIPINO IMAGE OF JAPAN OVER THE CENTURIES*

Elpidio R. Sta. Romana and Ricardo T. Jose

Introduction

A casual talk among some Filipinos who formed long lines at the rear exit of the Japanese embassy in Makati, Metro Manila can reveal how much, or how little, or how far, a Filipino “understanding” of Japan can go. After receiving his visa to work for a short period of time in Japan, a Filipino commented that the reason why it is so difficult to get a visa is that the Japanese embassy is manned by Koreans! Only senior diplomats are Japanese. Anyone with a slight familiarity with Philippine-Japan relations in the 20th century will know what the Filipino meant. It is often said that the soldiers who committed the most hideous crimes against Filipinos during the Second World War were Korean mercenaries brought to the Philippines by the Japanese Forces. Not that the nationality of those who committed war crimes mattered. But the image of Japanese lower bureaucrats who in reality are performing a mere procedural task, is seen by Filipinos who are asking for a “favor”, as officials bent on bringing nothing but hardship upon others, much like the dreaded “Koryano” of the last months of the war.

How did this image come about? Is the memory of the war that deeply etched for a generation born after the war? All these in spite of decades of close official economic ties and social and human contacts between Japan and the Philippines? Or is it simply a continuation of what Japan’s image has been over the centuries?

This paper attempts to discuss the subject of Japan’s image (Nihon kan) in the Philippines over a long historical period based on primary and secondary historical and contemporary sources on the Philippine side. It is a very large topic and what follows is only a capsulized outline of how Japan’s image

*This paper is part of a worldwide project on Studies on the Diffusion and Change of Japanese Culture Overseas, under Prof. Tsuneo Ayabe of the University of Tsukuba, and supported by the Foreign Research Funds, Science Research Assistance [Kagaku Kenyu Hi Hojo Kin (Kaigai Gakugei Kenkyu)], Ministry of Education, Tokyo, Japan, 1988-1990. This is a revised English version of the original paper.

or persisted over many years. A methodological note is needed at the outset: until the end of World War II, much of what passes as "Filipino" primary historical sources are actually colonial records of Spain and the United States in and about the Philippines. There are very little surviving documents by Filipinos themselves until towards the middle of the 19th century. There are more indigenous sources on Japan in the Philippines after independence in 1946.

The significance of discussing Japan's image in the Philippines is for the sake of historical interest and record. Such a record can be the start for explaining dimensions of official, human, social and cultural interaction among Filipinos and Japanese. In general, such interaction has always been mixed. This is hardly surprising since from the earliest known record of Philippine contact with Japan until contemporary times, Japan's image in the Philippines, or the attitudes towards Japan of both colonizers and Filipinos has been a mixture of antagonism, fear, suspicion, respect, amity, inspiration, antagonism and unrealistic expectations. These images and feelings towards Japan and the Japanese changed little throughout the centuries. At certain times antagonism, fear, and suspicion prevailed; at other times, especially during the Revolution of 1896 and the American colonial period, a combination of respect, fear, inspiration, and unrealistic expectations, and during and after the Second World War antagonism, fear, and suspicion prevailed again, at least among certain groups in Philippine society.

From Wako to Goshuinsen

The earliest contact between Japan and the Philippines predated Spanish colonialism in the archipelago. (Spain colonized the Philippines in the late 16th century.) Japanese trader-pirates known as wako were trading with inhabitants of the northern part of Luzon in the Philippine archipelago. They settled in areas where they traded such as the Cagayan River, the vicinity of Agoo, and Bolinao in the present-day province of Pangasinan. They also went as far south as the Bicol region and Calapan in Mindoro Island.¹ There were already signs of antagonism between native traders and these Japanese simply because the latter behaved both as traders and pirates.

Spanish colonialism transformed Manila into a trade center and attracted the wako towards the city. Close contact with the colonizers led to more antagonism. In 1582, the Spaniards had already clashed with the wako in Cagayan, forcing the latter to flee.² Aware that the wako could cause problems with a major power (Spain) in the region, Hideyoshi Toyotomi sought to control traders by requiring them to carry special passports stamped with the vermilion seal of the shogunate. These seals earned the ships the name goshuinsen, or red seal ships. They began to visit the Philippines around 1584. Spanish ships also

made return calls to Nagasaki.³ By 1586 however, there were still reports that the wako continued to come every year to northern Luzon (Cagayan and Ilocos) "to rob and kill many natives, and seize the Chinese vessels that bring us food and goods". The Spaniards considered the Japanese as the third of five threats to the Philippines: the first threat being native revolts, the second the Chinese, the fourth and fifth Moluccas and Borneo, and the English, respectively.⁴

The goshuinsen brought to the Philippines folding screens, lacquer ware, woven silk goods, armor, cutlery band weapons, sandals, salted meat, cordage, copper and other metals for weapons and, more importantly for the Spaniards, wheat flour which could not be produced in the Philippines. The Spanish authorities exempted Japanese traders from import duties, especially in food, ammunition and raw materials. Japanese ships in turn left Manila with gold, deer skins, wax, honey, tree bark for dyeing, wine, Spanish curios and raw silk trans-shipped in Manila from China by Spanish traders. This trade in silk was quite important for the Spaniards because through it they were able to compete with the Portuguese in Macao, an important trading center for Chinese silk.⁵ Japanese demand for silk in Manila was so great that Governor Antonio Morga noted in 1598 that the Japanese traders were beginning to compete with Spanish traders. He recommended that the Japanese merchants be restricted from buying silk until the Spanish merchants completed their purchases. Japanese demand for deer skins also worried the Spaniards since it would deplete the animal population of deers. The improved ties with Japan because of the goshuinsen also served another Spanish goal: the spreading of Catholicism in Japan. It is said there were more Spanish missionaries than traders who went to Japan.

Trade, Religion and Suspicion

Historical records show that there were only about twenty Japanese residents in Manila at the start of Spanish colonialism in 1571. The number grew to 300 by 1593, and 1,500 by 1603.⁶ The Spaniards spoke both highly and suspiciously of the Japanese. Governor Morga considered them spirited, brave, "of good disposition" and a "race of noble bearing and behavior." A 1605 report stated that the Japanese were "all very brave men, who have little fear of death and are fond of going to the wars" which, the report noted, made them excellent mercenaries in Spanish expeditions. The same report continued that "their character is most cruel and ferocious, and they are bandits by nature."⁷

Certain events during the early Spanish colonial rule added more fuel to the antagonism. For example, when the Chinese corsair named Limahong attacked Manila in 1574 his second-in-command was a Japanese, most probably a wako.⁸ In 1587, an ill-fated Filipino anti-Spanish rebellion led by Don Agustin de Legaspi, Martin Panga and Magat Salamat took place in Manila and adjacent

areas. The Filipino rebels got in touch with a Christian Japanese adventurer named Juan Gayo and enlisted him in a plan to use other armed Japanese to be disguised as traders stationed offshore. On signal, Gayo and his men were to attack from the sea and help the Filipinos drive the Spaniards out of Manila. But when the time of the attack came, Gayo either simply lost interest or betrayed the rebels. The Filipino rebels waited in vain for his help; meanwhile, the Spaniards discovered the plan, rounded up the leaders and executed them publicly.⁹ The involvement of a Japanese naturally made the Spaniards more suspicious.

In 1591, a Japanese named Harada Magoshichiro was reported to have studied parts of the Philippines and recommended that Hideyoshi conquer the Philippines. Hideyoshi made concrete plans but sent an emissary the following year to Manila and demanded that the Spaniards become his vassals and pay tribute; otherwise he would invade the Philippines. He has just invaded Korea, and the poorly defended Spaniards could only reply that they sought friendship with Japan. Japanese ships entering Manila were checked thoroughly to make sure they carried no weapons. The Japanese community in Manila was disarmed and resettled outside Manila in a place called Dilao district. The next year, the Spaniards tried to guard their north flank by invading Taiwan but a typhoon thwarted that expedition. Later, Hideyoshi also sent a request to the Spanish authorities in the Philippines for shipbuilders but was refused by the Spaniards who realized that they will be used to build warships. The apprehensive Spaniards sought reinforcements from Mexico.¹⁰ The Japanese were also suspicious of Spanish attempts to proselyte in Japan. This mutual suspicion — Spain fearing a Japanese invasion, Japan suspicious of Spanish evangelization and fearful that Japan might be involved in power conflicts in Europe — was to continue into the early 17th century.

But trade continued between the colony and Japan. At around 1600, Edo and Manila agreed to limit trading ships to six a year. This is significant as a matter of historical fact since the more famous and well-documented Galleon Trade between the Philippines and Mexico sailed only twice a year. The Japanese also encouraged the Spaniards to send more ships to Japan, even as far as the Kanto area. In 1605, it was reported that about five to ten ships were actually arriving in Manila from Japan. Between 1604 and 1616, no fewer than 30 goshuinsen vessels reached Manila. While both countries needed this trade, an additional goal of the Spaniards was to please the shogunate and help the cause of the ecclesiastical orders in Japan.¹¹

In spite of these progress, the Spaniards in Manila remained ambivalent towards Japanese residents. They regarded them as good counterbalance to the Chinese traders in the Philippines but at the same time remained suspicious of them. In 1603, the Spaniards enlisted the help of the resident Japanese to help suppress an uprising by Chinese residents. "They are a warlike race, and easily

come to blows with the Spaniards, for they will not suffer ill-treatment" wrote one Spaniard in 1619. There were also riots and uprisings in the Japanese community at Dilao in 1606, 1607, 1608 and 1609.¹² Probably as a result of these, the Laws of the Indies contained a suggestion that the number of Japanese in Manila should be limited. By 1620 there were 2,000 Japanese residents in Manila. Attempts were made to expel many of them in reprisal for the persecution of Christians in Japan as well as for security reasons. The expulsion order however, was not carried out due to government incompetence and corruption.¹³ Still, the Japanese continued to serve the Spaniards as mercenaries in a number of battles. In 1615 and 1616, Japanese serving on ships helped defeat the Dutch who tried to invade Manila. In 1639 Japanese residents again helped quell another Chinese uprising in Manila. In 1647 they again helped the Spaniards defend Manila from the Dutch.¹⁴ In this instance however, some Japanese went to the Dutch side to give information.¹⁵

In the early 17th century Pedro de Acuna, the Spanish governor general in the Philippines felt that the only reason the Japanese had not yet invaded was that they had insufficient knowledge of gunnery and naval construction, skills they can learn from the Dutch. These fears were further intensified in 1609 when Ieyasu requested the Manila authorities for miners, naval engineers and for direct trade with Acapulco.¹⁶ The Manila government relayed these requests to Mexico and requested for reinforcements. There were also reports from Spanish spies that the Japanese were planning to use Taiwan as an advance base for an invasion of the Philippines.¹⁷

The emergence of British and Dutch power in Asia by the second decade of the 17th century and the alternative trade and security arrangements they offered made the Spaniards more ambivalent in their attitudes towards Japan. In 1617, the Japanese opened trade relations with the British to the detriment of Spanish trade. Ieyasu also refused to sign a commercial treaty with Spain. Catholic attempts to evangelize in Japan were met with harsher bakufu suppression of Christianity and the deportation of Spaniards from Japan.¹⁸ The Spanish administration in Manila, and later the king of Spain himself, was forced to stop the religious orders from going to Japan. The continuing mutual suspicion led to several incidents. In 1628 the Spaniards burned a Japanese junk which entered Philippine territory without proper documents.¹⁹ In 1632, in a move to embarrass the Spanish religious, the bakufu, expecting that the Spaniards will turn away the helpless sick, banished 130 Japanese lepers from Japan to Manila. The Catholic church however took them and established a special hospital for them.²⁰ (The hospital for the destitute established by Spain survives to this day, the San Lazaro Hospital in Manila.)

There are reasons to believe that the bakufu did plan an invasion of the Philippines during this period. In 1630, the governor of Nagasaki suggested

sending a ship to Manila, ostensibly to reopen trade but actually to scout for likely invasion areas. Later, Lord Matsura Shigemasa also made a similar suggestion. The bakufu neither sanctioned nor obstructed the plan. Once in the Philippines, the ship surveyed the defenses of Manila and drew plans of Spanish fortifications.²¹ In 1637, Shogun Iemitsu acted on the suggestion and sent a pseudo-envoy to Luzon to inspect conditions in preparation for concrete plans. Before further plans could develop however, the Shimabara rebellion broke out, and Japan turned to its renown sakoku, or the closed door policy. This was probably the only reason that saved the Philippines from Japanese invasion in the 17th century. There were indeed good reasons to be suspicious of Japan.

From Sakoku to the Meiji Restoration

From that time on until the Meiji Restoration in 1868, contacts between the Philippines and Japan were minimal and were limited to Japanese castaways and survivors of shipwrecks. The Japanese in the Philippines continued to operate their shops in Dilao, San Miguel and San Roque, near Cavite, but they were few in number and the Spaniards watched them closely. Some Japanese settled in Cebu and in the town of Bay in Laguna.²² They did fight for the Spaniards again in 1660-1661 to crush the Malong rebellion in Pampanga and Pangasinan.²³

Completely uprooted now from Japan, many Japanese intermarried with Filipinas. The Japanese dealt with the Spaniards only on trade and matters related to the "Christian problem" but continued to live as a foreign community, separate from the Filipinos.²⁴ Japanese cultural influence during this period was limited to certain skills and crafts like making of some tools and weapons, the tanning of deer skins and some jewel craft. The Japanese also introduced the artificial breeding of ducks and fishes.²⁵

In 1868, Spain, not to be left out of concessions in the newly reopened Japan, became a signatory to the unequal treaties imposed by the Western powers on Japan and received the right to call on Japanese ports without giving the same right to the Japanese. Trade picked up slowly and a consulate was established in Manila in 1888. The Philippines presented some potentials as a source of raw materials and food for Japan. Between 1892 and 1896, the Philippines exported sugar, hemp, tobacco, coffee, coconut oil and indigo to Japan. It imported coal, silk, cotton goods, lacquer ware, porcelain, earthen wares and Japanese curios.²⁶ Japanese concern for security however remained unabated. Through the trade missions and other travelers, the Japanese were up to date with the weakness of the Spanish forces in the Philippines, Spanish maladministration and rising Filipino nationalism. Spanish maladministration also deterred Japanese emigration. While cordial relations prevailed on the surface,

Spain feared the rising strength of Japan. The slow growth of trade was probably due to Manila's sordid reputation: corruption at the customs and all levels of government, inconsistent application of laws, high tariffs, inefficiency, and a shortage of bottoms to transport goods. Spanish laws also discouraged foreign investment.²⁷ Other than trade, the Japanese were also interested in the prospect of migrating to the Philippines. The Spanish embassy in Japan suggested that the Japanese colonize certain areas in the Philippines similar to what the Japanese did in Hawaii. No formal agreement was reached however because of the resistance of the Spanish religious orders.²⁸

Japanese victory in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895 and the colonization of Taiwan intensified Spanish apprehensions about Japan. As a reaction to this and growing Filipino nationalism, the Spanish military and naval forces were reorganized and strengthened. A treaty defining Japanese and Spanish boundaries was signed in August 1895. The Spanish press in Manila, however still played up the Japanese phobia and warned of the dangers of Japanese invasion. Stories of Japanese spies proliferated.²⁹

It was only actually at this point that Filipino image of Japan appeared as distinct from the Spanish colonial administration's perceptions. Educated Filipinos began to exert influence on the colonial society from the middle of the 19th century. They were well aware of the economic growth and military power of Japan and of the Sino-Japanese War. As early as 1883, Jose Rizal, a foremost Filipino patriot noted that in Paris Japanese students were studying practical subjects such as engineering, artillery and medicine, while most Filipinos were studying the humanities or law. The La Solidaridad, the official newspaper of Filipino reformists' Propaganda Movement in Spain printed articles on Japanese policies, Spanish-Japanese trade and biographies of Japanese generals. There were attempts to solicit Japanese help for the Propaganda Movement before the outbreak of the Revolution in 1896. In 1895 for example, Jose Ramos, a son of a well-to-do family in Manila, sought aid from Japan for the Propaganda Movement. About to be arrested in Manila for his reformist activities, he fled to Yokohama where he continued working for Japanese support. He married a Japanese, became a Japanese citizen and helped in negotiating purchase of arms for the 1896 Revolution. He even entertained hopes of leading a group of Japanese immigrants to Manila.³⁰

In short, Filipinos saw in Japan a potential ally, a fellow Asian who could help in their independence movement. In January 1896, the maiden issue of Kalayaan, the newspaper of the Filipino revolutionary organization called the Katipunan, claimed Yokohama as its place of publication. This claim was credible since there were Filipino nationalists in Yokohama seeking aid for the revolution. In May of the same year, the Japanese cruiser Kongo arrived in Manila on a training cruise. The leaders of the Katipunan, through the

introduction of a Japanese resident in Manila named Tagawa Moritaro, met with the Japanese captain and other officers of the ship. They gave the captain a letter for the Emperor, stating that Japan could be to the Philippines what France was to the United States during the American revolution. The surprised and embarrassed Japanese responded by simply expressing hopes that the Filipinos could visit Japan and that he sympathized with the Filipinos in their desire for independence. The meeting produced no firm promises, but the Katipunan used it for propaganda purposes and inadvertently raised hopes for Japanese aid to the Revolution while none was actually forthcoming.³¹ The Spaniards suspected such a meeting, and protested. The Japanese, not wanting to get involved, sent their consul from Hong Kong to investigate and clear up the suspicions.³²

Before long, however, the Katipunan was discovered by the Spaniards and the Philippine Revolution broke out in August 1896.

Japan and the 1896 Philippine Revolution

It is known to Filipino historians that in spite of high expectations among Filipinos for Japanese support, Japan only went so far as to express sympathy for the nationalist revolutionaries but officially remained neutral of the revolutionary war. Japan simply wanted to avoid any conflict with Spain or other Western powers who might have designs for the Philippines. Upon the request of the Spaniards the Japanese promised not to give weapons and ammunition to Filipino revolutionaries. The Japanese also promised to keep watch on Filipinos and Spaniards in Japan who were sympathetic to the revolution. The Spaniards in return agreed to a revision of the unequal treaty with Japan in 1897.³³ But unconscious, or perhaps oblivious to all these, many Filipinos and the leadership of the Katipunan persevered in their hope for Japanese support. The Katipunan for example sent emissaries to Japan after the outbreak of the revolution to solicit Japanese material help.³⁴ There is something quite tragic about this period on Filipinos' image of Japan. Either through ignorance, obliviousness, or plain childlike naivete, many Filipinos continued to expect material help from Japan for the revolution. This kind of childlike "trust" or naivete was in stark contrast with the realism and rationality of Japanese foreign policy at that time.

There were a number of Japanese who gave moral support to the Revolution in spite of official non-involvement. Shigenobu Okuma and Hirobumi Ito stated publicly that they supported self-determination for the Philippines. Filipinos in Yokohama were reported to be in favor of the Philippines becoming a protectorate of Japan. Filipino revolutionaries continued to actively sought aid from Japan, largely because of a combination of encouragement by Japanese Pan-Asianists or plain delusion about Japan. The Katipunan sent emissaries to Japan who reported back that most Japanese were favorably inclined to the

Philippine cause and that Pan-Asianist sentiments were strong. One such emissary named Mariano Ponce reportedly told the Revolutionary leadership that Japan could offer 200,000 rifles for use by the Philippine Army. Ponce wrote home and recommended their purchase.³⁵ Examples of Japanese ultra-nationalists or shishi who supported the Philippine revolution were military men like Gen. Nogi who kept abreast of the developments in the Philippines. Some Japanese went to the Philippines to gather information and keep the Taiwan government informed. Some even contacted members of the Aguinaldo government in Hong Kong (during the period of the Hong Kong Junta) to negotiate possible Japanese assistance. Such men however were few in number.

With the outbreak of the Philippine-American War in 1898, liaison between the Japanese shishi and the Filipino continued. Mariano Ponce (with some help from Sun Yat Sen) was able to procure funds and purchased Japanese weapons and a ship to transport the weapons to the Philippines. The arms were ostensibly sold to a Japanese company and then consigned to a German merchant as the final recipient. The ship itself was bought through Sun Yat Sen.³⁶ The ship, the Nunobiki Maru, was an aged wooden vessel. It left Kobe for Nagasaki where it loaded 10,000 Murata rifles, six million rounds of ammunition, a few pieces of artillery and miscellaneous military equipment, and then proceeded to the Philippines. There were a number of ex-Japanese army officers on board who had resigned from the Japanese army so they could help Aguinaldo in a private capacity rather than follow Japanese official policy. However, almost like comical twist to the episode, the ship encountered a typhoon and sank off Shanghai.³⁷ Thus, ended the only major-scale Japanese involvement in the Revolution.

Other ultra-nationalists acted on their own initiative. A certain Capt. Hara Tei attempted to recruit former Japanese soldiers and some officers from the ill-fated Nunobiki Maru to fight with Filipino revolutionary forces. He managed to recruit some men, landed in Manila and joined the revolutionary forces in Bataan. Their operations, however seem to have had little effect on the war.³⁸ Aguinaldo's government negotiated for a second shipload of arms but American surveillance was so strict that the ship had to unload its cargo in Taiwan, its stated destination.³⁹ The Revolution and the Philippine-American War ended with Japan not having had any impact at all as some Filipinos, for better or for worse, had hoped.

Prostitutes and Laborers: The Early American Period

If Philippine-Japan relations under Spain was "Spain-Japan relations" until the late 19th century, Philippine-Japan relations under the Americans from 1900 was initially US-Japan relations. If security and trade vis-a-vis

Japan were the concerns of Spain and aid and alliance were the concern of Filipino revolutionaries, American and Filipino concern with Japan during the early US colonial rule in the Philippines was emigration. In 1903, it was reported that there were 921 legally registered Japanese immigrants in the Philippines, about 800 were laborers from Okinawa. The others were traders, small businessmen and prostitutes. There were also an undetermined number of illegal Japanese emigrants with fake passports.⁴⁰

As early as 1899, there were about 200 Japanese prostitutes (called karayuki) in Manila's Sampaloc district. They were patronized mainly by American servicemen and Japanese residents. They had no Filipino customers because they were too proud to accept Filipino customers. The majority of the Japanese residents in Manila at that time seem to have been connected with the prostitution business. In 1901, when the Japanese Association (Nihon Kyokai) was established about forty of the fifty members were prostitutes or owners of brothels. The board members themselves were brothel operators. The image among Filipinos of Japanese women was that of a submissive and tender wives.⁴¹ It was an image that lasted well into the 1950s. As of 1910, of the 209 Japanese women who were listed as employed in Manila, 122 were prostitutes and 35 were yayas (nannies), and the rest were employed in miscellaneous jobs.

The 800 Japanese laborers from Okinawa were used by the American authorities together with Chinese and Filipinos in constructing the famous Kennon Road that leads to Baguio City. These laborers later settled either in Baguio and Davao in Mindanao. The Japanese who stayed in the Baguio area became farmers; those who moved to Manila became artisans, and skilled laborers (carpenters, cabinet makers and the like). But the bulk of them — around 500 — went south and settled down as farmers.

As the Japanese community began to grow, the prostitution businesses declined and were replaced by trading firms and shops. Discriminatory immigration laws against Asian immigrants that were passed in the US mainland in 1907 and 1924 were not implemented in the Philippines. As a result, those Japanese who wanted to migrate to the US went to the Philippines instead.⁴² This, plus the generally friendly relations between the US and Japan in the 1910s and some Philippine autonomy in making immigration laws resulted in what Prof. Grant Goodman, a Japan studies specialist calls "permissive colonialism", which was a policy of openness to Japanese immigration. In 1918, 7,806 Japanese entered the Philippines — a full 50% of the foreign population increase for that year. In 1919, as a result of the hemp boom, around 10,000 Japanese entered the Philippines. The boom however did not last long and some 4,000 Japanese returned to their country.⁴³

Images of the Japanese in the Philippines during the early years of the

American administration varied. Japanese women in the Philippines were viewed as female, yayas (nannies), flirtatious wives, night club singers and waitresses. Men on the other hand were stereotyped as craftsmen, samurai, rough husbands, an apa (sweet ice cream cone) vendors. By the 1910s however, university educated Japanese began arriving in the Philippines. They became manufacturers, traders and professionals.

The Americans saw the Japanese community basically as "an asset to the community." They were seen both by Filipinos and Americans as energetic, industrious, resourceful, thrifty, neat, clean, honest, law-abiding and with a sense of organization. But others saw them as intruders and a threat to Philippine labor because they worked harder and lived on less compared to Filipinos and Americans. The fact that most Japanese kept to themselves, formed their own groups, did not mix with the Filipinos nor became Christians or intermarried made them look suspicious to Filipinos. In any case, outside business transactions, there was very little direct personal contact between the Japanese and the Filipinos.⁴⁴

Trade between the Philippines and Japan during the early decades of the 20th century grew again with the balance favoring Japan most of the time until 1941. From 1926 onward Japan became the second largest trading partner of the Philippines. The number of Japanese enterprises in Manila grew and after the initial wave of prostitutes (who were eventually deported), the Japanese gradually began to enter manufacturing, the retail trade, shipping, lumber, mining, fishing and the import-export business. Retail trade however, remained a Chinese monopoly and the Japanese only succeeded in getting from five to eight percent of the trade. Big businesses and financial institutions like Mitsui Bussan Co., Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Bank of Taiwan also began to enter the Philippines. Sumitomo and Mitsui were interested in Philippine minerals, particularly iron ore, chromium, manganese, copper and gold and have taken over some mining interests sold by the Americans during the First World War.⁴⁵ The Japanese also became prominent in shipping, gravel and crushed rock business, the printing and binding industry, and the manufacture of bricks, tiles, boxes, bags, ice-cream cones, shoes, candies and other items. Many Filipinos lost out to the Japanese in the fishing industry.

Apart from the Japanese community in Davao, the Japanese in the Philippines were rather low keyed. There were Filipinos who were good friends of the Japanese and had joint ventures with them. Some of them allowed their names to be used in papers of incorporation, so as to give Philippine-Japanese companies a seeming 60% Filipino stock ownership as required by law in the purchase of land or the exploitation of Philippine natural resources. In Davao, the Japanese community had grown and developed. A consulate was established in

Davao and various Japanese support systems were set up like organizations, temples and hospitals. Direct trade between Davao and Japan also took place. While the Japanese generally lived by themselves, they were on good terms with the Filipinos, and apart from occasional friction with the Bagobos whose land was being encroached upon by the Japanese, the Filipinos and Japanese got along with each other, living their own lifestyles.

The 1930s and the Philippine Commonwealth

With the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1936 and setting of independence for 1946, the problem of relations with Japan naturally became linked with the prospect of independence. Some Filipinos began to worry about a "flood of immigration" after independence although Japanese immigrants to the Philippines were much less than those who went to the US and South America.⁴⁶ There was widespread suspicion that the Japanese who came in were spies, cartographers and photographers who were laying the groundwork for an invasion of the Philippines. The fact that many Japanese worked as household helps of American military personnel, photographers with shops located at strategic places, and that many of the immigrants were of military age, did nothing to dispel suspicions.⁴⁷ Some believed that these rumors were deliberately floated by the Americans to justify their holding on to the Philippines as a colony. Others believed that the Japanese did have a plan for economic and military conquest of the Philippines. Still, other Filipinos continued to look to Japan as a friend, a source of inspiration and a liberator from western colonialism.⁴⁸

The impact of the image of Japan on the issue of Philippine independence was that those who were against independence argued that if the Japanese threat was real, then independence was not desirable. Pro-independence Filipinos on the other hand had to prove that the threat was minimal. The Philippine independence missions to the United States from 1919 onward tried to play down the Japanese threat. They claimed, for example, that the Philippines and Japan were too different and Japanese rule in the Philippines will never succeed because the Filipinos could never be assimilated. They even claimed that the Japanese would never want to work in hot a place like the Philippines! An additional problem of pro-independence politicians was that to acknowledge that the Japanese threat was real was also to acknowledge the need for the continued presence of American forces in the Philippines even after independence.⁴⁹

Some Filipinos who saw Japan as a friend were those who were attracted to the idea of Pan-Asianism. They tried to look at the positive side of Japan, and how much there was to learn from Japan's experience. Japan's victory over Russia brought a sense of pride to them as Asians. Many who had been to Japan

were all praises for what they saw.⁵⁰ Still, other Filipinos saw Japanese as business opportunities or as a threat to the Philippine economy. The Japanese were interested in Philippines independence because it would eliminate US-imposed trade and investment barriers in the islands. By this time, the Japanese owned real estate in the Philippines, timber lands, mineral lands and agricultural lands. The immigration rate continued to be high. The fishing industry has become a virtual Japanese monopoly. The Japanese established more manufacturing companies in the 1930s producing, among other things, beer, rubber shoes, slippers, candies, canned fish, bicycles and others. The Commonwealth's National Economic Protectionism Agency (NEPA), which was supposed to protect Filipino enterprises from foreign competition, had as officers some men who were partial to Japanese businesses and actually got the NEPA to support Japanese enterprises.⁵¹ Even the retail trade yielded some of its traditional Chinese monopoly to the Japanese. The Japanese embassy in Manila and the consulate in Davao supported Filipino politicians who were partial to Japan, occasionally funding their campaigns to ward off possible anti-Japanese legislations.⁵² Japanese manufactured products, especially textile, were outselling US products. There were also frequent violations of the quota systems in textile imports from Japan. The problem of immigration was dealt with by the Commonwealth in the Immigration Act of 1940, which sought to limit immigrants from whatever country to 500 a year. Attempts to protect local industries proved to be of little use. To the concerned Filipino intellectuals, it was obvious that if nothing was done to check the situation, Japanese domination of the post-independence economy was inevitable.

There were a number of sincere and serious Japanophiles. There were journalists like Modesto Farolan and Francisco Icasiano, anti-White or anti-Westerners like Aurelio Alvero. There were also radicals who still looked to Japan for aid in the overthrow of the socio-economic order, like Benigno Ramos and the seditious Sakdal movement. These Japanophiles saw the good points in Japan discipline, patriotism, love of country and hard working—and admired Japanese culture. Others felt that the Philippines must ally itself with Japan and that this was the only way independence could be protected. Some Japanophiles worked openly, publishing articles in the media or editing magazines such as Oriental Art and Culture openly praising Japan. Academicians like Jorge Bocobo extolled the virtues of the Bushido and arranged for Japanese Filipino student dialogues.⁵³ There were also cultural exchange programs between Japan and the Philippines and cultural campaigns sponsored by the Japanese diplomatic mission.

However, the virtues of Japanese culture and the news of the war in China could not be reconciled. The American press which had strong influence in the Philippines was openly biased against Japan. Photographic exhibitions of atrocities in China clashed with the refined concepts of ikebana and bonsai being

propagated in magazines. The US High Commissioner Francis B. Sayre, reported that the cultural campaign was not very successful: "It does not appear that the Japanese made any strong effort at cultural penetration either with the mass of the people or with the elite groups." There were also organizations who tried to start a boycott movement of Japanese goods as a protest for the war in China.⁵⁴

The reaction of Commonwealth President Manuel L. Quezon to these conflicting views of Japan was to try to develop a policy of neutrality towards Japan as a post-independence policy of the Philippines. He visited Japan twice before the war and was impressed by Japan and even wanted to adopt for the Philippines some aspects of the Bushido. However, the status of the Philippines as a commonwealth of the United States and developments in China in the late 1930s mitigated against actively pursuing a neutralist policy.⁵⁵ Japanese assets in the Philippines were frozen on July 1941. Throughout all this time of gathering war clouds, the Filipino masses, again in a childlike way, did not take the problems too seriously. They did not seem to care or worry about Japan. To them, Japan was far away. They believed that the US would protect the Philippines. They still saw the average Japanese as the good loyal gardeners, shopkeepers, photographers, barbers, craftsmen, vendors. Japanese goods were still cheaper than the American ones though they broke easily. Even at a time when Japan was posed for war with a formidable military machine, the term "Laruang Hapon" (Japanese toy) still meant to Filipinos as products that broke easily. And since the Japanese kept to themselves, few people really knew what was on their minds.⁵⁶

The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

Much can be said about the Second World War in the Philippines but as far as Japan's image among Filipinos is concerned, Japan was simply not regarded as a "liberator" of the country from Western colonialism. This probably distinguishes Philippine response to the war with that of Indonesia or Indochina which saw the Japanese interlude in their history as a tactical opportunity to advance their struggle against western colonialism. Except for a few Japanophiles like Artemio Ricarte, almost everyone saw the Japanese as thwarting the timetable for Philippine independence which was to be declared in 1946. Most Filipinos therefore rallied to the American side and loyalty to the Philippines was equated with loyalty to the United States. Many historians interpreted this as simply the result of the Americanization of the Filipinos. However, in fairness, no other western colony in Asia at that time had a definite timetable for independence as the Philippines did. Thus, the almost totally anti-Japanese response during the war was understandable.

Japanese behavior during the war did not help at all to change this attitude of Filipinos. All of a sudden the stories of atrocities in China became real. The Japanese was no longer the loyal and hardworking Japanese they had known before the war. They were now the arrogant conqueror. Physical punishment for minor infractions, slapping, looting, rape and massacre were common place. Women had to blacken their faces and feign pregnancy to avoid being fancied by soldiers. Upon seeing so many Japanese and their physical features, Filipinos began to derogatorily call them "sakang" (bow-legged).

The perception that the Japanese thwarted the popularly accepted timetable for Philippine independence meant that Japan could not possibly have won the war in the Philippines. It is said that Japan already lost the war in the Philippines on the second day of the war. However, some also say that had the Japanese soldier not been given to the habit of slapping people's faces, Japan could still have won the loyalty of Filipinos. The slapping of the face, while a normal act of reprimand for Japanese at that time, was simply demeaning to Catholic Filipinos who were inheritors of the Malay sensitivity and Spanish pride.

Winning the loyalty of the Filipinos was thus a great problem for the Japanese occupiers. Many pre-war politicians motivated by patriotism and self-interest cooperated with Japanese Military Administration. So did some Japanophiles. The Japanese however simply lost the Filipino masses.

It is worth pointing out however that anti-Japanese sentiments that arose because of the war was not entirely directed at Japanese alone. Any elderly educated Filipino who survived the war would attest that many of the worst atrocities committed by the Japanese Army during the last months of the war were actually perpetuated by Korean mercenaries brought to the Philippines by the Japanese. Many say that the Korean soldier was easily distinguishable from the Japanese soldier in appearance. It was the Koreans more than the Japanese who were more feared and hated by Filipinos. Many Filipinos in their middle ages today would recall that during the 1950s when they were children, to be called "Koreano" (Korean) meant that one was particularly rough and cruel, attributes which used to be reserved for Japanese. But this was only as far as educated Filipinos are concerned; the average Filipino in the streets did not bother to make the distinctions between Japanese and Koreans.

Post-World War II

Viewed from the perspective of a long historical time, Japan's image in the Philippines after World War II and independence in 1946 did not undergo any radical change. The suspicion, antagonism and threat perception remained, albeit more intense because of trauma of the war. After the period of high

economic growth of Japan, respect and a desire to imitate also permeated Philippine perception. In this sense, there is nothing unique about the Philippine perception of Japan compared to other Asian countries which experienced Japanese aggression.

After the war, the Philippines demanded reparations from Japan as a condition for signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty. But under intense American pressure, the Philippines was forced to reduce the original reparations demand of several billion dollars to only several hundred million dollars. The original amount was too unrealistic. In the context of the conduct of Philippine foreign policy after independence, the original amount of several billion dollars was in itself not only a sign of a strong anti-Japanese sentiment but also of a general naivete in the interpretation of Philippine importance to US postwar strategic policy compared to the importance of Japan.

Trade with Japan picked up gradually after the war and a Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation was signed with Japan in 1960. As proof of the intense suspicion and threat perception on the part of the Filipinos, the treaty was not ratified by the Philippines until 1973. The Philippine Congress consistently opposed the treaty for more than a decade. This treaty was probably the most scrutinized and vilified treaty in Philippine diplomatic history. It came under very heavy criticisms from politicians and businessmen alike so much so that the Philippine Congress was forced to freeze the treaty in 1969. It took the extraordinary powers of an authoritarian regime and the abolition of the Congress in 1972 to have the treaty ratified. The treaty was finally ratified in 1973.

This section on the contemporary image of Japan in the Philippines will focus on only two aspects: 1) a discussion of the nature of Filipino suspicion and security threat perception towards Japan, and 2) a discussion of a major cultural exchange program between Japan and the Philippines as they are indicative of Japan's image in the country in comparison with US cultural programs.

Other than as an economic threat, the experience of the Japanese occupation quite logically made the Philippines sensitive to the issue of Japanese defense policy. In a way, this is a logical continuation of the threat perception of the 1930s. The essence of Philippine perception of Japan's defence policy often revolves on the image of "militarism". While this is common knowledge, the intensity of these images in the Philippines is particularly acute. However, the factors that caused a more intense suspicion is not entirely indigenous to the Philippines but is directly related to a certain trend in Japanese politics that emerged from the late 1960s. This trend in Japanese politics was the decline of pacifist and leftist thoughts in Japan. Philippine perceptions of Japanese

defence policy has been greatly affected by the transfer of the pacifist-leftist arguments in Japan, or that group in Japan called the "unarmed neutralists", to some articulate sectors of Philippine society.⁵⁷ It mixed very well with the prolonged memories of the historical trauma of the Second World War. These same pacifist-leftist arguments are the legacies of the minshu undo (people's movement) of the 1960s in Japan concerned with then broad national issues. It is a movement which has long degenerated into jumin undo (residents' movement) concerned with highly localized issues of the late 1970s and 1980s. Pacifist-leftist arguments on Japanese security issues began to penetrate the Philippines at a time when the same persuasion was being displaced as a current in the mainstream politics in Japan in the late 1960s. It has contributed greatly to the lingering suspicion towards Japan.

The transfer to the Philippines of pacifist-leftist thoughts on Japanese security policy could be seen in the materials written in the Philippines on the topic of Japanese defense from the late 1960s to the early 1980. It will be noticeable that Japanese pacifist-leftist reasoning on Japanese defense policy began to be reflected in Philippine materials around 1970.⁵⁸ These materials were occasionally supplemented by dispatches from the New China News Agency during the height of Maoism. The group in Japan through which these views were transmitted to the Philippines can roughly be traced to those Japanese associated with the Beiheren in the late 1960s, and to the Pacific-Asia Resource Center (PARC) at present. The continuing impact in the Philippines of the pacifist-leftist arguments on Japanese "militarism" is completely out of proportion to the minuscule influence of pacifist-leftist groups in Japan today. (It seems that the Philippines shares this experience with Thailand.)

Philippine perception of Japanese defense based on the literature from 1970 to the early 1980s centers on the "problem" of Japanese "militarism" or rearmament and its threat to Asia. From 1970, the common argument found among Filipino analysts is that Japanese militarism is "on the rise" because of the growth of overseas interest of Japan, alliance with the US, perception of the Soviet threat, and the interest of the Japanese "military-industrial complex". Japanese military power is usually deduced from the size of defense budget and the fact that the Self-Defense Forces' (SDF) budget is the seventh largest in the world and third largest in Asia. It is also pointed out that growth rate of Japanese military expenditure is higher than some NATO members, and that Japan has regular defense build-up plans. Arguments on the symbolic 1% of the GNP limitation on defense expenditure is reiterated. In addition to this, it is also asserted that trends in the SDF arise from Japan's security relations with the US, which makes Japan a "junior partner" of the US in Asia. Japanese security interest in the Malacca and Lombok Straits, prominent in the 1970s, was seen as evidence of Japanese interest in expanded military role in Asia. The possibility of a nuclear Japan is also touched upon as if it is an immediate

alternative.

The transfer of these pacifist-leftist arguments on Japanese defense policy to the Philippines was the result of ideological affinity of groups in Japan with groups in the Philippine media, universities and non-government organizations (NGOs). Other than the phenomenon of the "historical trauma", the appeal of Japanese pacifist-leftist arguments in the Philippines can also be explained by the fact that quite a different set of symbols is attached by a Filipino audience to the arguments. This can be illustrated by using the well-known pacifist Yoshikazu Sakamoto's argument as an example. He once wrote that "The Japanese military has no independent strategy of its own. It can function only as part of the US armed forces in East Asia. The closer the collaboration the more dependent the Japanese military becomes on the United States."⁵⁹ If presented to a Filipino audience, an argument of this kind is interpreted as analogous to Philippines' own emotional issue of being a host to US military bases. Security relations with the US is then connected with the overall problem of Philippines economic underdevelopment. Not only is this quite different from the context of Japanese pacifist-leftists arguments, but in this way too the parochialism of Japanese nationalistic pacifist arguments is passed on to Filipinos as universalist ideology through the analogy. The situation is rather similar to the relations between Pan-Asianist thoughts in Japan and in the Philippines during the 1930s.

The simplistic and occasionally inaccurate views of Japanese pacifist-leftist groups have also penetrated the Philippine foreign policy bureaucracy's image of Japanese defense policy. In 1975 for example, the Philippine Center for Advanced Studies (PCAS) which was a short-lived foreign policy think tank for the government, wrote inaccurately the following in a briefing paper for former President Ferdinand Marcos entitled ASEAN II: Basic and Strategic White Paper, dated September 18, 1975:

For the moment, Southeast Asia itself does not stand in the way of Japan's reinvigorated military machine; the danger will come if and when successful national liberation movements interdict the free flow of raw materials to Japan or nationalize standing Japanese assets. Then extreme right elements are likely to step in and reimpose Japan's armed might over the region. Since the fall of Vietnam, the US defense secretary has stepped up criticisms of the 'slowness' of Japanese military buildup—and the Japanese right wing is chafing under Tokyo government ratification of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which to their mind unduly restricts Japanese military strength. Meanwhile, the Japanese arms industry is doing good business in Southeast Asia, whose armies supposedly prefer the smaller,

lighter Japanese-made weapons.”⁶⁰ (Emphasis added)

The inaccuracy lies in the implied power of the “extreme right” on Japan and the assertion of Southeast Asian use of Japanese-made weapons. Indeed, anyone would be at a loss in identifying who or what the “extreme right elements” are in Japan. The export of weapons is prohibited in Japan. Also, the Japanese arms industry is probably the most inefficient in the world, thus making Japanese light infantry weapons the most expensive in the world. The PCAS was later replaced by the Presidential Center for Special Studies (PCSS) in 1977. In an undated paper of the PCSS entitled The President’s Visit to Japan: Briefing Papers”, Japan was described as “quietly rearming” as borne out, again, by the growing defense budget and periodic defense build-up plans. The implied substantial Japanese military power was supported by evidence which were exact duplicate copies of pages from the Japanese Defense White Paper on Japanese armaments, military structure, organization, and statistics with no attempt to connect them to wider trends in the Japanese society and politics.⁶¹

Another briefing paper of the PCSS prepared for former President Marcos during former Prime Minister Nakasone’s visit to the Philippines restated Asian fear of Japanese military power, especially after US President Reagan began pressing Japan for an expanded role in the Pacific. While it is true that there is such a trend, what is noteworthy in the paper is the conclusion that “Japan and the US are committed to protect each other in times of emergency and that Japan has appeared to be the greatest ally of the US in the Pacific”.⁶² The existence of a Japan-US alliance is of course a fact but one would have expected that something else more than the obvious should have been said about the matter such as the complexities of Japan-US relations.

Japanese official pronouncement on its defense policy can also be interpreted differently in the Philippines in ways that parallels the appeal of the ideological arguments of the pacifist-leftist. For example, former Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe said in an official visit to Manila in early 1986 that Japan will never have a military role in Asia. While quite straightforward as a statement of Japanese policy towards ASEAN, a Filipino audience equates “military role” with military bases, military aid and arms supply similar or equal to the military role of the US. Japan will probably not have this kind of military role for a long time. The meaning a Filipino audience can attach to the Foreign Minister’s statement is quite different from what he probably had in mind since a military role similar or equal to the US as conceived by Filipinos may be different from a strategic role which Japan might have.

Thus, for many among the articulate in the Philippines, Japanese defence policy, no matter how it is stated, or what it is, remains a specter that haunts Asia and the Philippines.

It seems however, that the anxiety over the specter of Japanese "militarism" is not shared by the Filipino public. This fact can be substantiated by an opinion survey in the Philippines directly related to the public's perception of external threat. In response to an open-ended question on which country is friendliest to the Philippines, 36% of a nationwide sample of approximately 2,000 respondents in 1986 considered Japan the second friendliest country to the Philippines. (The United States was considered as the friendliest with a score of 73% nationwide. China was third with 11%.) In Metro-Manila, which traditionally is considered as the only place where foreign policy is debated, Japan also ranked as the second friendliest country with a much higher score of 60%. (The US remained the friendliest country to Filipinos in Metro-Manila with 83%; China was again third with 17%.)⁶³

In response to a follow-up question in the 1986 survey on which country Filipino respondents see as a threat, the Soviet Union ranked first for both nationwide and Metro-Manila samples with a score of 32% and 51% respectively. Ranked fifth most threatening country nationwide was Japan, but with only 5% of respondents considering it a threat. In Metro-Manila, Japan ranked only 10th out of 12 countries listed as the most threatening country with a score of only 2%.

In a more recent surveys in 1988 and 1989⁶⁴ which asked 1,200 nationwide respondents whether they think the Japanese government can be trusted (actual Filipino term used is *pagitiwala* and *kumpiyansa*, i.e., trust and confidence in), 17% in 1988 said they have great (*malaki*, lit. big) confidence in the Japanese government. This percentage improved to 24% in 1989. For Metro-Manila, 22% felt that the Japanese government was trustworthy in 1988; this improved to 32% in 1989. Respondents who were undecided on whether Japan could be trusted or not was 29% nationwide in 1988 and this rose to 36% in 1989. In Metro-Manila it was 25% in 1988, and 39% in 1989. As for respondents who had little trust and confidence on the Japanese government, the percentages were 52% nationwide in 1988; this declined to 39% in 1989. In Metro-Manila the corresponding percentages of those who have little confidence on the Japanese government were 52% in 1988 and 28% in 1989. The increase among those who were undecided in their attitude towards Japan probably came from the ranks of those who had little trust in Japan.

What the discussion and the figures above probably show is that there is dichotomy and contradiction in the Filipinos' image of Japan. The mass public does not really share the sentiments of the more intellectual class of Philippine society. The image of Japan among the intellectuals has never been part of Philippine popular culture. The situation is quite similar to the situation in the 1930s when the elite were already anticipating problems with the Philippines'

post-independence relations with Japan while the masses were generally oblivious to the problem. The difference is that this time the military threat from Japan is truly minimal.

Cultural and Educational Exchanges

Another way of determining Japan's image in the Philippines is through a discussion of Filipino response to what is probably the most important Japanese cultural program in the Philippines. This is the Monbusho scholarship program which will be discussed and contrasted below in comparison with Filipino response to US scholarship programs in the Philippines. Compared to a single major Japanese scholarship program, the United States has had four major scholarship programs in the Philippines from 1948 to the late 1980s. These are the Fulbright-Hays, Fulbright-Smith-Mundt, the East-West Center degree and non-degree programs. (Both Japan and the US have other minor scholarship programs such as the Japan Foundation in the case of the former and private foundation for the latter. These minor programs are not discussed in detail here.)

Table 1 shows the number of Filipinos who have taken advantage of scholarship programs offered by Japan and the United States.

The earliest US scholarship program in the Philippines was the Fulbright-Hays which started in 1948. The Monbusho scholarship program started in 1954. Later, US degree and non-degree scholarship programs at the East-West Center were started in 1961. (The year of the start of another US program, the Fulbright-Smith-Mundt could not be determined with the sources used in this paper.) From 1954 to the end of 1987, a total of 727 Filipinos studied in Japan under the Monbusho program. In comparison, a total of 2731 Filipinos studied in the US under the four major programs from 1948 to 1984, the latest year that detailed data is available. (If other minor scholarship programs are included, the total figures will be 778 for Japan and 3226 for the US.)

The number of Filipinos who began studying in Japan only started to rise significantly in 1980 and 1981 when it rose to 31 in 1980 and 33 in 1981, up from 21 in 1979. From 1954 to 1978 or a period of 24 years, the annual number of Filipino Monbusho grantee ranged anywhere from three to 17; the average for the period 1954 to 1987 was 20 Filipinos going to Japan under the Monbusho program. In contrast, US scholarship programs from 1948 to 1984 averaged 67 a year. Each of the US scholarship program had averages higher than the Monbusho program with the probable exception of the Fulbright-Smith-Mundt program.

What the data seem to show is that for Filipinos, Japan is not a priority place

for study compared to the US. This contrast is significant specially if one considers the fact that the Monbusho grants are much more generous than US grants. The Monbusho program is an outright grant whereas Fulbright programs for example, during its first decade and a half of existence, required Philippine counterpart funds for the grantee. Japan, in other words, for a large part of the

TABLE 1
Yearly Admission to the Monbusho Program and
US Scholarship Programs

Year	Monbusho	Fulbright-Hays	East-West Center, Degree Program	East-West Center, Non-Degree Program	Total US Grantees	Year	Monbusho	Fulbright-Hays	East-West Center, Degree Program
1948		42			42	1971	12	41	15
1949		38			38	1972	9	40	10
1950		47			47	1973	13	36	36
1951		67			67	1974	16	30	30
1952		75			75	1975	15	27	27
1953		75			75	1976	17	16	16
1954	3	76			76	1977	16	18	18
1955	4	137			137	1978	15	21	21
1956	3	61			61	1979	21	22	22
1957	4	61			61	1980	31	25	25
1958	4	57			57	1981	33	23	23
1959	2	69			69	1982	44	24	24
1960	5	70			70	1983	45	18	18
1961	6	68	25	16	93	1984	62		
1962	3	60	22	12	82	1985	76		
1963	4	79	25	25	104	1986	72		
1964	4	102	20	14	122	1987	96		
1965	7	98	23	20	121				
1966	4	74	29	34	103	Yearly Ave.	20	53	21
1967	2	69	10	26	79				
1968	11	59	13	25	72	Sub-total	675	1907	490
1969	8	34	23	21	57				
1970	8	48	15	32	63	No Data	52		
						Sub-total for Monbusho	727		
						Fulbright-Hays-Mundt*			
						Sub-total for US			
						Other Programs	51		
						Total	778	1907	490

Note: Data on the yearly admissions of the Fulbright-Smith-Mundt are not available in the sources used here.

SOURCES: *Philippine-Japan Alumni Directory*, 1988; *Directory of Filipino and American Participants in the Fulbright, East-West Center, Hubert Humprey and International Visitors Programs, 1948-1984*, 1985

post-1945 era, has never really been attractive to Filipinos as a place of learning. This is so in spite of the undoubted economic success of Japan from the latter 1960s. The language barrier and Filipino unfamiliarity with the Japanese educational system may be part of the explanation for this tendency. But it is more probable that many Filipinos until the late 1970s never really believed there is much to study in Japan in spite of genuine admiration for Japanese economic success.

The trend only began to change from the mid-1980s. The number of Filipino grantees of US programs began to decrease significantly while Monbusho grantees rose sharply, especially after 1984. It is of course known that the US has serious budgetary constraints while the Japanese government has begun to increase its annual budget for foreign students. It is difficult to confirm how much a factor Japanese budgetary constraints was in the 1970s in deciding the number of foreign students to accept. It undoubtedly was a factor; perhaps a combination of a budgetary limits of the Japanese government and image of Japan among Filipinos as not being a place of learning were the basic causes of the trends discussed above. The significant increase in Monbusho grantees after 1984 was definitely an indicator of greater budgetary outlay by Monbusho. Thus, it is also possible that Filipinos only began to see Japan as a place of study when it was less possible (for fiscal reasons of the US government) to go to the US.

Another set of data that can be revealing of Japan's contemporary image in the Philippines is the field of specializations of Filipinos who studied in Japan compared with those who studied in the US. Table 2 below presents comparative data of fields of specialization of Monbusho and US scholarship grantees who studied in Japan and the US, respectively.

TABLE 2
Fields of Specialization of Former and Current Filipino
Grantees of the Monbusho
Scholarship Program and US Scholarship Programs

	MONBUSHO PROGRAM*		ALL US PROGRAMS	
	No. of Grantees	As % of Total	No. of Grantees	As % of Total
Social Sciences	89	0.150	491	0.279
Education/Counselling	89	0.150	296	0.168
Engineering	70	0.118	53	0.030
Medical Courses	64	0.107	100	0.056
Applied Sciences	61	0.102	56	0.031
Agricultural Sciences	28	0.047	92	0.052

The top five fields of specializations in descending order for Filipino grantees of the Monbusho scholarship program are social science, education, engineering, medical courses and applied science (chemistry, computer science, food science, geography, mathematics, physics, etc). Agricultural science is a distant sixth preferred field of specialization under the Monbusho scholarship. For US scholarship programs, the top five fields in descending order are social science, applied and fine arts (architecture, music, fine arts, theater, literature, communications and linguistic), education and counseling, business and management and biological science. Medical course follows biological course very closely as the sixth preferred field of specialization.

(A short explanation is needed: the high number of Filipinos who studied education/counseling in Japan is probably due to the fact that the Monbusho scholarship offers a special teachers' training program. Other than this, grantees under the Monbusho program are free to choose their courses.)

If the figures above says anything about Japan's image among Filipinos, it shows that Filipinos are basically interested in social science and scientific and technological fields that can be learned in Japan. The humanities and arts of Japan are of little interest to Filipinos. It is also surprising to know that in general, Filipinos do not consider Japan as a place to study business and management. For those who studied in the US on the other hand, the social sciences and scientific and technological fields are also preferred fields of study; therefore as far as these data are concerned the image of Japan and the US among Filipinos are probably the same. However, the striking difference between the data on Japan and the US is that there is a very large number of Filipinos who studied applied and fine arts and business and management in the US whereas very few did in Japan. In terms of numbers, at least 300 of all those who studied in the US studied applied and fine arts whereas at least only 20 did so in Japan. For business and management, the numbers are at least 114 for the US and 27 for Japan. Thus, Japan is not appreciated among Filipinos for its highly developed cultural forms and there is only little appreciation for Japanese business management practice. Japan, like the US, is only appreciated for its social sciences, scientific and technical fields. The difference is that the US is also appreciated for the humanities. This tendency among Filipinos is obviously the result of historical experience but so is everything in any society. These data simply negate a self-image among Japanese that their society can be appreciated either for its highly developed cultural and art forms or its business management practice. At least among Filipinos, Japan is appreciated largely for science and technology, which also confirms a self-image of Japanese about their own society as a high-tech society. Finally, social science is the top field of interest for Filipinos who studied in the US and Japan. More than the image of Japan or of the US among Filipinos, this fact probably shows a type of historical continuity among Filipinos studying abroad. Jose Rizal observed in the

1880s that Filipinos in Europe tended to study law and humanities while Japanese studied technical and scientific courses. Perhaps Filipino preference for social science and humanities courses in Japan and the US or anywhere for that matter is something intrinsic among Filipinos, and Japan's, or the US', cultural impact on the Philippines is quite irrelevant.

Summary and Conclusion

Virtually throughout four centuries of Philippine-contact with Japan, the image of Japan among Filipinos and their colonizers has been a mixture of fear, suspicion, respect, inspiration, antagonism and unrealistic expectations. At certain times fear and suspicion prevailed; at other times, especially during the Revolution of 1896 and the American colonial period, a combination of respect and inspiration, and during and after the Second World War, antagonism, fear and suspicion as well as a place of learning technical skills. Japan has never been appreciated by Filipinos in the way many Japanese had hope to be appreciated, that is, appreciation and understanding of their highly developed and sophisticated culture. This has particularly been true since 1945. Japan will probably remain as being only good for its technology and business and little else. Perhaps a good way of ending this chapter is with an advise from Alice in Wonderland: do not imagine yourself to be otherwise than what others imagine you to be.

NOTES

¹Miguel Lopez de Legazpi to Felipe II, 23 July 1567, in Emma Blair and James Robertson, (eds.) The Philippines Islands, (Cleveland: A.H. Clark Co., 1903-1909) [Hereinafter referred to as B&R] Vol. 238, p.99, Vol. 18, p.99; C.R. Boxer, The Christian Century in Japan, 1549-1650 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), p. 260.

² The battle is described in Juan Baptista Roman to the Viceroy, 25 June 1582, B&R 5: 192-196; Fr. Diego Avarte, History of the Dominican Provinces of the Holy Rosary, Manila, 1640, B&R 30: 273-275.

³Josefa Saniel, Japan and the Philippines, 1868-1869 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1963), p. 29; R.H.P. Mason and J.G. Caiger, A History of Japan (Tokyo: Tuttle, 1972), p. 167.

⁴Memorial to Council, by citizens of the Filipinas Islands (Santiago de Vera et al.), 26 May 1586, B&R 6: 178, 183.

⁵ Conde de Lemos to the King, 31 March 1607, B&R 14: 229; Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 242; Antonio Morga, Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas, B&R 16: 183; Enrique Corpuz, "Japan and the Philippine Revolution," Philippine Social Science Review, (1934), p. 252; Decrees regarding commerce, Felipe II, 31 May 1592, B&R 7: 138.

⁶Boxer, *op. cit.*, 302.

⁷Morga, Sucesos, B&R 16: 198-199; Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 267-268.

⁸Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

⁹Santiago de Vera to Felipe II, 13 July 1589, B&R 7: 99; Gaspar de Ayala to Felipe II, 15 July 1589, B&R 7: 124; Aurelio Calderon, The Turmoil of Change in Philippine-Japanese Relations, 1565-1945 (Manila: de la Salle University, 1976) p. 7; Corpuz, *loc. cit.*, has a different account.

¹⁰Morga, Sucesos, B&R 15: 129; detailed correspondence regarding the affair is in B&R 8: 243, 256-267 and B&R 9: 23 *et seq.*; also Corpuz, *loc. cit.*

¹¹Saniel, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30; Boxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 262, 301.

¹²Pedro de Acuna to Felipe III, 15 July 1604, B&R 13: 227; Hernando de los Rios Coronel, Memorial and Relations for His Majesty, 1621, B&R 19: 221; Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

¹³Milagros Guerrero, "Japanese Trade and Investments in the Philippines, 1900-1941", Philippine Social Science and Humanities Review, (March 1966), p. 8. On the 1621 expulsion policy, see B&R 20: 52, 97, 153 and 169 for the official and unofficial versions of its implementation.

¹⁴Juan Lopez, Events in the Filipinas Islands, 1639- 1640, B&R 29: 202; Fr. Joseph Fayol, Affairs in Filipinas, 1644-1647, B&R 35: 216; Calderon, *loc. cit.*

¹⁵Hernando de los Rios Coronel, Reforms Needed in Filipinas, B&R 18: 308-309; de los Rios, Memorial..., B&R 19: 221.

¹⁶Calderon, *op. cit.*, p. 31; Guerrero, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

¹⁷Bartolome Leandro de Arquisola, Conquest of the Moluccas Islands, 1609, B&R 16: 279-280.

¹⁸Saniel, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

- ¹⁹Tavora to Felipe IV, 1 August 1628, B&R 23: 54-55.
- ²⁰ See Josefa Saniel, "Origins of San Lazaro Hospital," Philippine Social Science and Humanities Review, XXIII:2-5 (1958) for details of the incident.
- ²¹Guerrero, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
- ²²Scattered references to other Japanese communities are in B&R 22: 222 and 23: 285.
- ²³Casimiro Diaz, Conquistas de las Islas Filipinas, (Valladolid, 1890), B&R 38: 167.
- ²⁴Ygnacio de Paz, Description of the Philippine Islands, c. 1658, B&R 36: 91-92.
- ²⁵Calderon, op. cit., p. 11.
- ²⁶Guerrero, op. cit., pp. 12-13.
- ²⁷Guerrero, op. cit., p. 12
- ²⁸Ibid.; Corpuz, op. cit., p. 256; Grant K. Goodman, "Japan and the Philippine Revolution: Image and Legend," Journal of Oriental Studies, (January 1970), p. 101.
- ²⁹Saniel, Japan and the Philippines, pp. 226-233; Goodman, op. cit., pp. 104-105.
- ³⁰Motoe Terami Wada, The Cultural Front in the Philippines (Thesis, University of the Philippines, 1984),p. 22; Saniel, op.cit., pp. 171-175.
- ³¹Goodman, op. cit., pp. 102-103; Saniel, op.cit., pp. 186-191; Wada, ibid., pp. 23-24.
- ³²Saniel, loc. cit.
- ³³Saniel, op. cit., pp. 199-201, p. 207.
- ³⁴Ibid., pp. 255-258.
- ³⁵Ibid., pp. 258-267, 308-315; Rafaelita Soriano, The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines, with Special Reference to Propaganda, 1941- 1945 (Doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, 1948) pp. 43-44, p. 46.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 45-46; Goodman, op. cit., pp. 105-106.

³⁷ Goodman, loc. cit.; Wada, op. cit., pp. 25-26; James Eyre, "Japanese Imperialism and the Aguinaldo Insurrection," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, (August 1949), p. 904.

³⁸Eyre, ibid., p. 107.

³⁹Goodman, op. cit., pp. 108-109. A romanticized account, typical of several others, is Ki Kimura, Aguinaldo's Independence Army, (Tokyo: Daitoa Shuppan, 1943).

⁴⁰Report of the Philippine Commission, 1900, as quoted in Grant Goodman, Four Aspects of Philippine-Japan Relations, 1930-1940 (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1967), p. 1.

⁴¹Wada, op. cit., pp. 32-37; Goodman, op. cit., pp. 2-3; Seitaro Kanegae, The Path to Friendship: A Tale of a Japanese Immigrant in the Philippines, (Manila: LAHI, 1987), p. 2, p. 15.

⁴²Grant K. Goodman, "A Flood of Immigration," Philippine Historical Review, (1965), pp. 33-35.

⁴³Serafin Quiazon, "The Japanese Community in Manila, 1898-1941," Philippine Historical Review, (III: 1, 1970), pp. 191-192; Goodman, Four Aspects..., p. 3.

⁴⁴Goodman, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

⁴⁵Quiazon, op.cit., p. 192; Guerrero, op. cit., p. 48.

⁴⁶Goodman, Four Aspects..., p. 4; Quiazon, op. cit., p. 193.

⁴⁷Goodman, "Flood...", p. 170.

⁴⁸Goodman, Four Aspects..., p. 4; Grant K. Goodman, "The Problem of Philippine Independence and Japan," Southeast Asia, (Summer, 1970), pp. 169-170.

⁴⁹William Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922, (Austin: University of Texas, 1971), pp. 59-56; Kanegae, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

⁵⁰Goodman, "The Problem of Philippine Independence...", pp. 174-176, 186-187.

⁵¹Quiazon, *op.cit.*, pp. 194-197.

⁵²Some of the intercepted communications from the Manila consulate reveal the extent of Japanese involvement in lobby groups and politicians. See, for example, Document 254 in U.S. Department of Defense The "Magic" Background to Pearl Harbor (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), Vol. 2, p. A-138 to A-139.

⁵³See Goodman's essays on Benigno Ramos in Four Aspects...; and on Pio Duran, The Historian, February 1970).

⁵⁴U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippines (Sayre), Sixth Annual Report of the High Commissioner to the Philippines, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 109; Francis B. Harrison, The Origins of the Philippine Republic, (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1974), p. 55.

⁵⁵Grant K. Goodman, "Nitobi's Bushido: The Samurai Ethic in a Philippine Setting," Festschrift in honor of Dr. Marcelino Foronda, Jr. (Manila: de la Salle University, 1988); "The Philippine Legislature Trade Mission to Japan, 1933," Monumenta Nipponica, (Vol. XXV, Nos. 3-4, 1970).

⁵⁶Interview with Armando J. Malay, Quezon City, 26 August 1988.

⁵⁷Mike Mochizuki, "Japan's Search for Strategy", International Security, Vol.8 (1983-84), pp.153-179.

⁵⁸Examples of these writings are Hernando Abaya, "Japan's New Role in Asia: An Imperialist Collusion?" Graphic, July 29, 1970; A.B. Colayco, "Return of the Rising Sun", Asia-Philippines Leader, January 28, 1972; Raul S. Manglapus, Japan in Southeast Asia: Collision Course, (USA: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 1976; Alejandro M. Fernandez, The Philippines and the United States: The Forging of New Relations, (Quezon City: NSDB-UP Integrated Research Program), 1977; Renato Constantino, The Second Invasion: Japan in the Philippines, (Manila), 1979; Merlin M. Magallona, Warning: Japanese Militarism on the Rise, (Quezon City), 1982; and Eduardo C. Tadem, The Japanese Presence in the Philippines: A Critical Re-assessment, Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines, January 1983.

⁵⁹Yoshikazu Sakamoto, "Major Power Relations in East Asia", The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, February 1984.

⁶⁰Philippine Center for Advanced Studies, University of the Philippines System, ASEAN II: Basic and Strategic White Papers, September 18, 1975, pp.23-24.

⁶¹Presidential Center for Special Studies, The President's Visit to Japan: Briefing Papers, undated.

⁶²_____, Briefing Papers: Prime Minister Nakasone's Visit to the Philippines, undated.

⁶³Ateneo-Social Weather Station, Ateneo-Social Weather Station Public Opinion Reports, October 1986.

⁶⁴Social Weather Station, Social Weather Report, February 1989.