

NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ARENAS OF STRUGGLE: THE CONTRADICTION OF THE PHILIPPINE STATE

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Introduction

In this paper I explore the structural and cultural bases of Philippine politics in order to explain why formal institutions such as political parties and national elections seldom express or represent the political will of their local constituents. This lack of articulation between national structures and their local sources of action is due to several factors. Foremost of these is the weakness of the Philippine state. It is organizationally unable to successfully penetrate and colonize the routines of everyday life at the village level. The imposition of law and order, in their normative and cognitive senses, is not achieved in many areas of everyday life (e.g. family, work, alliance networks) through the structures of the state.

The normative consensus on which the ideological reproduction of the Philippine state depends (i.e. a Filipino cultural identity) lies outside its control (e.g. unsuccessful attempts to impose a national language; the persistence of sub-altern discourses on nationalism and religion). Similarly, the material-economic conditions for the state's reproduction lie outside its jurisdiction (e.g. foreign aid and investment; repatriation of overseas wages) and hence it is unable to demand loyalty from its officials and citizens in exchange for a living-wage, thus subverting the source of the state's legitimacy.

This lack of complementation between the ideological structures (within its jurisdiction but outside its control) for its representation and material-economic resources (outside its jurisdiction but within its control) needed for its reproduction means that the Philippine state does not directly reflect class relations within a national polity. As a result the practical consciousness of most Filipinos is embedded in routines derived from notions of kinship, locality and association which generally lie outside the formal structures of the state even if substantively coterminal with it. It is those areas of the life-world which have retained a relative autonomy from

the state (e.g. family, ethnicity, religion) that provides the state with the normative consensus for its ideological representation. The consequence is a Filipino national identity independent of its political roots and its obligations to the state or, in other words, the clash between a Filipino cultural identity and a politics of praxis which seems to contradict or undermine this identity.

For the above reasons a conventional analysis of Philippine politics using western models of parliamentary democracy can at most provide superficial, shallow and obvious explanations, while an analysis that relies on class theory is often unable to account for the lack of a consciousness of class despite a strong awareness of inequality and the presence of class-action and struggle. The first approach mistakes the model for the reality while the second assumes that a conscious model of action precedes its practical expression—both approaches betray their western origins and intellectualist bias. Only under conditions of the modern and developed state can structures of consciousness and action be determined by one's social location. The growing importance of intellectuals to articulate as well as problematize such a consciousness and of party-bureaucrats to implement or suppress it characterizes the dilemma of the modern state. This progressive rationalization/domination of social life, which Weber (1978) investigated can only take place after the separation of the spheres of value resulting in distinct areas of life (e.g. politics, culture, science) each with its own type of rationality (e.g. normative/coercive; emancipatory/expressive; instrumental/cognitive) but all subsumed under the aegis of the state.

In the case of the Philippines, the routinization of everyday life conflates these spheres of values resulting in the structures of kinship, locality and association (e.g. kinship involves obligatory, expressive and instrumental aspects). Politics, culture and practical life are permeated by the undifferentiated sphere of values.

Under these conditions elections and the expression of a popular will are problematically related. Thus the common phenomenon in Philippine politics where candidates are expected to buy votes and return special favours to their supporters and patrons reflects this generalized value sphere. Politics is a strategic exercise less predictable than business but more lucrative and exciting. Those with economic, political or cultural capital can convert one form to the other since this transformation, like commodity-exchange assumes the continuity of a common currency of power. In such a

structure politics represents the political will of the powerful, a seeming tautology disguised by the fact that patrons require the continuing support of their clients lest they be deserted for more powerful ones.

Using Zamora, a municipality in which I have conducted field-work since 1975, I illustrate the lack of articulation between national and local structures. While Zamora is not necessarily typical of Philippine municipalities it nevertheless shows exemplary elements which allow me to explore the extent and nature of state penetration into local life. Zamorans are acutely aware of the world beyond its boundaries and readily respond to it using their experience and conception of local life. While Zamorans realize the limitations of local knowledge it generally provides them with an adequate basis for dealing with the demands of both national and international life.

The Mirage of Politics

After the 1987 elections in which Left-affiliated candidates did badly, Ed de la Torre, a Catholic activist commented that the N.D.F. had the support of the Filipino people but not their votes. I made a similar observation about the lack of complementation between political support and voting behaviour during the 1986 presidential elections in Zamora (Pertierra, 1987). Many Zamorans acknowledged their moral support for Aquino but voted for Marcos. The apparent contradiction between moral support and voting behaviour reflects distinct aspects of politics which are often not consciously elaborated by Filipinos but which nevertheless inform and constitute their political action and awareness. This paradox expresses a major conundrum of Philippine politics. It arises from the belief in western political theory that the political process involving both political consciousness and political action as expressed through elections generates appropriate structures and institutions.

Such a view assumes a purposive-rational model of political action embedded in structures which are both representational and participative. It also assumes a close and direct link between consciousness and action. However, at least in the Philippine case, one can claim, echoing Ed de la Torre, that while there may be a lack of class consciousness there is no lack of class action. In other words there is a continuous process of class struggle as expressed in organizations such as the N.P.A./N.D.F. even if this struggle is not

manifested in electoral support. The question then arises—why does this struggle not manifest itself ideologically and why is it not expressed electorally? What this example illustrates is that in analysing societies such as the Philippines we must abandon the models of political action drawn from western experience. This experience assumes that formal political institutions express a political will manifested in activities such as elections. This western model is inadequate for several reasons. It is too explicit in the definition of the political process (e.g. elections rather than millenarian movements), it assumes a strong coherence between belief and action (cognitive, motivational and purposive structures complement one another), it is based on the separation of spheres of value which in the West resulted in differentiated and distinct structures of action (Habermas, 1987; Parsons, 1949) and finally it stresses the representative rather than the hegemonic aspect of political structures.

At a recent conference on Philippine local politics (Kerkvliet & Mojares, 1990) regional specialists analysed the responses of several local communities to the replacement of Marcos by Mrs. Aquino. While this disruption was felt differently throughout the country, the contributors agreed that the political space created by Marcos' departure was quickly filled in by Mrs. Aquino. Despite a major turnover of national and local officials it appears that the structure of Philippine politics under Mrs. Aquino is not much different from what it was under Marcos (Krinks, 1987). The election results reflect this continuity particularly well. In an analysis of the 1987 election Robson (1987) writes, "What kind of national political administration has the Philippines ended up with after the congressional elections? The Philippines now has a reconstructed formal political system very similar to the one which existed prior to martial law" (Robson 1987:140). Commenting on how martial law was sions then existing in Philippine society, Robson concludes, "Expecta-itself a conservative and unsuccessful attempt to contain the tensions are still high, social distress is more intense, and the old structures of inequality are still there. Now that Aquino is no longer alone on centre stage, people will be looking more critically at the operation of the post-Marcos national political system. If their hopes for a better future continue to be frustrated there is more than one historical tradition to which they can turn in search of a better life" (Robson 1987:141).

While I largely accept the main thrust of Robson's analysis several inconsistencies have to be noted. We are told that the current formal structure of Philippine politics is very similar to the one prevailing before the declaration of martial law by President Marcos in 1972. The martial law phase of Philippine politics was a temporary departure, a conservative and unsuccessful attempt to contain the then existing social tensions. But at the present time (1987) these tensions are even greater and yet the political structure has reverted to the pre-martial law system which even then was unable to contain such tensions. There seems no choice then but to turn to another historical tradition for a better life. This is presumably what many Filipinos have done in supporting the N.P.A./N.D.F. There is, however, an air of unreality in such an analysis of Philippine political life. Much of this is due to the importance given to practices such as elections and their results in formal political structures. I shall argue that most of these formal institutions and structures have little to do with the expression of a political will and even less with the real articulation of power structuring the different classes in Philippine society. (May, 1987: 30-52, makes a similar claim for municipal elections in the 19th century). In other words, formal political institutions are the ideological misrepresentation of more fundamental structures of power and domination.

The Effectiveness of the State

Much of what is shallow, superficial and obvious in the political analysis of Philippine society stems from the assumption that formal structures and institutions such as political parties, elections, legislatures, bureaucracies are what they seem and proclaim themselves to be. However, the Philippine state, on which such structures and institutions depend is unable to penetrate and control the routines of everyday life to the extent necessary for their functional operation. This means that the structures of politics at the national level and their reproductions at the local level are neither consistent nor predictable. Local interests are not represented at the national level and national interests are not reproduced at the local level. A dramatic illustration of this lack of synchronization is the case of overseas workers. Zamorans like many other Filipinos are increasingly seeking employment overseas to obtain the economic security denied them at home. They do so largely through private resources and despite the bureaucratic difficulties imposed by the

Philippine and other governments. On the whole Zamorans feel that the Philippine state does not represent their interests and on their part feel no obligation to meet its requirements. Once abroad, while retaining their village and ethnic affiliation, they also experience strongly a sense of Filipino identity. Zamorans acknowledge the irony of discovering their sense of nationhood abroad.

The dichotomy between a cultural awareness of being Filipino and the lack of a national political consciousness is often mistaken by foreigners (e.g. Fallows, 1987; Mulders, 1987) as a confusion of identity. This mistake, like the earlier one linking political structures with a corresponding political consciousness, assumes that political institutions and a cultural awareness develop from a common source in the social structure. In this paper I explore the discontinuity between the generation of local experience and the constitution of national political structures. It is this discontinuity which transforms the realities of struggle into the illusions of politics. This discontinuity explains why Ed de la Torre can claim that the N.D.F. has the support of the Filipino people but not their votes. It also explains why the electoral process distorts perceptions of class relations such that people appear to vote against their own interests.

The role of elections for the allocation of political power is unproblematically assumed by Philippine scholars (e.g. Lande, 1964; Lynch, 1959) whose hierarchical model of society equates assent with consent. In their view elections open up real political choices even if the structures governing such choices are not open to contestation. Starting from a local basis of normative consensus these scholars extend this basis to cover the formal structures of the state. While this extension of the normative basis of local society may, as in the West, be extended to cover the state and its institutions, it assumes that the Philippine state functionally penetrates local modes of consciousness and their corresponding structures of action. It is precisely the success of this penetration and colonization by the state of the routines of everyday life, including aspects of inner experience, which I query in this paper. The role of elections either as exercises in political legitimation in order to preserve pre-existing structures of power or as expressions of political will formation depend on the success of this penetration of local society by the structures of the state. If the Philippine state is unable to effectively penetrate and control local structures of practical con-

sciousness and action then the interpretation of elections either as exercises in representation or in legitimation must be questioned.

At the conference referred to earlier, Philippine regional specialists reported that on the whole the electoral process (1987-88 congressional and local elections) resulted in the replacement of one set of officials by their political clones. Elections resemble a game of musical chairs with the guarantee that all participants have a very good chance of winning once. Elections are the process by which one set of occupants is replaced by another similar set but leaving intact and uncontested the political mechanism responsible for determining membership in such a set. In this sense elections serve to depoliticize politics by removing ideological differences from the public/formal arena of contestation. This practice has been largely successful, and has forced people with Left-leaning sympathies to resort to non-parliamentary forms of political struggle. The extent to which Philippine society as presently constituted can resolve ideological differences is hotly disputed among supporters of the Right and the Left. The Philippine state's inability to allow ideological differences from entering the formal arena of contestation reflects the narrowness of the state's ideological consensus.

Elections and Representation

Elections may be seen as an expression of a political will, in which case they are both representative and participative. On the other hand elections may be seen as instances of a hegemonic domination which uses them simply as a means for structural reproduction and legitimation. While both views of the electoral process are recognized in the Philippines (as they are in most polities) their respective salience and relevance varies as one moves from a local/communal to a national/societal level. The view of elections as constituting political representation and participation is well known at the village level and accounts for examples of conscious political change. The second view of elections as an exercise in political reproduction and legitimation is also well known and explains why political structures have remained much the same in the face of growing social inequality and dissatisfaction. Both of these views may exist at all levels of the political process but in Zamora the former is more closely associated with village elections while the latter is seen as applying more generally to national/prov-

incial elections. This paper explores the conditions which generate each respective view of elections in order to unravel the structures of power and to expose the real nature of political consciousness. In other words, to identify actions and structures which imply a political will even if that will is not discursively elaborated. The emphasis in western scholarship on the processes of discursive will formation as the basis of political/social action reflects both the western experience and its intellectualist bias. Other societies may structure their political/social practices differently.

Class and the State

Many Philippine scholars, including myself (Pertierra, 1988) have expressed considerable ambivalence in using conventional Marxist class analysis to investigate Philippine political and social consciousness. Part of this difficulty lies in disentangling the essential from the contingent elements of class analysis or in separating the analytic notion of class from its socio-cultural encrustations acquired through its use in a largely western, industrial democratic context. In this paper I retain the notion of class as a structuration of experience leading to particular forms of consciousness (including the lack of a class consciousness) which are necessary for the maintenance and reproduction of particular social orders. However, in the case of an ineffective state such as is found in the Philippines we cannot assume that the state acts as an apparently impartial arbiter of political opportunities while ensuring the reproduction of class relations. The Philippine state delivers very few social goods and is often bitterly resented by its reluctant citizenry. Scholars often mistake this reluctance for the lack of a national will whereas it more properly reflects a morally constituted view of politics—one which claims that the state has not honoured a moral obligation implied in citizenship. Unlike the case in advanced capitalist societies where capital uses the state to provide the stable social conditions for its own reproduction, the Philippine state is a direct source of capital accumulation but its undeveloped and neo-colonial nature prevents it from controlling the economic conditions for its own reproduction. Moreover, the state's resources are distributed personalistically rather than impersonalistically thereby limiting its capacity to elicit a general loyalty from its citizenry. The Philippine state is used to extract political capital rather than to ensure the reproduction of class relations. Class relations are reproduced through an ideology of patron-client rather

than through the mechanisms of a market whose conditions for profit are protected by a powerful state. In such a case western notions of legitimation and representation are inadequate to fully understand the political intentions and consciousness of Filipinos.

The Historical Formation of the Philippine State

The creation of the Philippine state underwent three major formative phases. The period of Spanish colonization marked the first phase. It was characterized by the dominant influence of the foreign religious orders, the suppression of a native Catholic clergy and the rising demands of the mestizo-led urban bourgeoisie finally culminating in the nationalist and revolutionary movements of the late 19th century (Phelan, 1964; Roth, 1977). The period from 1521 to 1898 saw the successful conversion to Catholicism of the majority of Filipinos. The exceptions to this success were the fiercely independent highland communities of Northern Luzon and the warlike Moros (Muslims) of Mindanao (Majul, 1967; Scott, 1974).

The close links between religion and politics were used by the early Catholic missionaries and explain their success in mass conversions following the initial conversion of chiefs and people of influence (Anderson, 1976; Phelan, 1964). It was mainly through these missionaries' efforts, both martial and ideological, that an otherwise decaying and disintegrating Spanish colonial power managed to impose its rule on its most distant colony for nearly four centuries. The end of the Spanish regime coincided with the expulsion of its missionaries, brought about by the rapid rise of a nationalist Church (*Iglesia Filipina Independiente*) controlled by an indigenous clergy and supported by elite-urban interests (Guerero, 1977). This religious expression of nationalism was rapidly eroded following its political defeat and American support of a foreign dominated Church. The brief interlude (1898-1902) saw the transition from Spanish to American rule and introduced the second stage of ideological-political formation.

The close and direct links between religion and politics were considerably weakened at the onset of the American period. Instead, the Americans embarked on a massive and largely successful education and indoctrination program, expanded the state bureaucracy and formed a highly effective national constabulary (May, 1980). While Spanish political sovereignty ultimately rested on the moral legitimacy granted to it by Catholicism, American imperialism shift-

ed its basis of legitimation from the religious to the secular order, substituting the concepts of democracy and literacy for hierocracy and predicancy, having previously ensured monopoly of military force (Shoesmith, 1978). The weak, pre-modern colonial Spanish state maintained its authority largely through ideological-moral means, effective enough until an emergent Filipino entrepreneurial class eroded both the material base (i.e. the economy) and its ideological superstructure (i.e. the rise of a Filipino clergy and intelligentsia). The American colonial period saw the rapid expansion of national structures. Mass political parties were established under American guidance and a generation of national politicians competed for increasing control over the nation's political future (Paredes, 1989). The orderly and gradual assumption by native political leaders of the mantle of government planned by the American colonial authorities, was interrupted by the sudden and unexpected Japanese invasion of 1941-1944.

The third and current (1946-1989) phase began with the granting of independence in 1946. Soon after its formal independence the Philippine state experienced a brief period of instability when its legitimacy was challenged by a Marxist-inspired, peasant-based rebellion (Huizer, 1972; Kerkvliet, 1977) which required American assistance for its successful suppression.

The Philippines emerged after the war as a quasi-feudal society whose dominant cultural and economic orientation was towards the United States. Local lords ruled, with varying severity, over their native dominions. American economic interests largely coincided with those of the Filipino elite and their respective political differences were easily resolved, following the latter's acceptance of the symbolism of democracy. Moreover, in exchange for continued American support, the elite willingly gave up whatever autonomy they may have exercised over Philippine foreign policy. This symbiotic relationship between the local elite and their American patrons worked in a world increasingly polarized between capitalist and socialist forces at the international level, and between landlords and peasants at the village level. Philippine support for American foreign policy, including the provision of military bases, was as useful as American support against the local communist rebellion. The communist menace overseas and local Filipino insurgents were seen as part of a common conspiracy to destroy both capitalism and democracy. The thoroughness with which such a view pene-

trated large sections of Manila and provincial society, is a testimony of American hegemonic success. The interests of the elite and their American mentors were portrayed as the interests of the nation or, in other words, the interests of the dominant became the dominant interest. In the process, other interests, such as those of the large peasantry, the growing proletariat and the neglected minorities, were suppressed or denied. It was in such monochromatic politics that the growing dissent of the sixties manifested itself.

American ideological domination of the Philippines started to show signs of strain when the local economy began to diversify from monocrop agriculture to early industrialization in the late fifties. Corresponding changes in the basis of political support, including the formation of a rural and urban proletariat, created pressures which the largely symbolic democratic institutions were unable to satisfy. Moreover, during this period many Filipinos discovered that they belonged to the Third World with which they shared similar interests and experiences. China and Vietnam provided alternative models near at hand in place of the traditional view that the interests of the Philippines always coincided with those of the U.S.A.

It was in such a context that martial law was declared, a confused attempt to satisfy some of the new political demands, without altering the fundamental structures of dependency which had given rise to the growing instability of Philippine society. Nevertheless, the declaration of martial law brought significant intended and unintended changes at different levels. The dismantling of post-war political institutions by President Marcos exposed their cosmetic nature, but also created a problem for the basis of political legitimation. Since this basis cannot be generated from below before the new system successfully delivers the political and social goods, Marcos' New Society chose to base its authority on the increasing monopoly of force, while simultaneously appealing for the support of elements of the increasingly diversified dominant class. The former resulted in the growing influence of the military in both civil and political affairs, the latter in the creation of the sub-class of technocrats whose interests draw them further into structures of dependency.

While the old society was based on the rule of landed oligarchs, the new reflected a class with more diversified elements, including

new sectors, such as the military, the technocrats and political cronies. As a strategy, martial law was too clumsy and inflexible to articulate successfully the diversified interests of the new class, making the problem of legitimation crucial. Consequently, the replacement of martial rule by some form of populist representation became inevitable, if the whole structure was to be preserved. It is in the undoubted interests of the United States and international capitalism to preserve such a structure and, as in the past, one may expect native representatives of these interests to emerge.

The Politics of Community and Society

It is accepted that anthropologists study how national cultures manifest themselves at the village level (Geertz, 1973). To this I would add that anthropologists also study how village life contributes to the constitution of national society. Just as it is impossible to understand village life outside the context of the national structure (e.g. state, economy, religion) of which it is a part, it is also impossible to understand national society without considering the values and routines of village life which help constitute it.

The task of anthropology consists of understanding the ways in which external structures are experienced locally and the local responses to these external structures. Moreover, this understanding must involve cultural and other meaningfully constituted actions on the part of local actors. It therefore assumes that structures of actions while not being reduced to systems of meaning nevertheless contain hermeneutic elements which enter into their final constitution. The confusion between systems of meanings and structures of actions arises from the fact that social interaction involves an active cooperation between subjects based on mutual understanding as well as one subject treating the other simply as a means to an end. In this latter case ego's actions are adjusted to but are not understood (by ego and alter) as part of alter's action. In other words, ego and alter adjust their actions to one another without necessarily having achieved a common understanding of a given situation. In this paper I explore the nature and extent of this common understanding of a given situation or its absence for local actors confronting structures such as the state.

Strategic behaviour and coercive relations necessarily involve patterns of interaction which are not based on mutual understanding. In such cases ego uses alter for ego's ends irrespective of

alter's interest. Economic and political actions and their corresponding structures cannot therefore be assumed to rest on the mutual understanding and consent of social actors. This does not deny the fact that ego's actions are nevertheless meaningful from the viewpoint of ego's interest. But alter's response to ego's actions may not be meaningful in terms of ego's interests since alter and ego have not achieved a common understanding of interest positions prior to constituting the interaction. For this reason a social consciousness is not merely the sum of individual consciousness that nevertheless determine its constitution. Individual consciousness in the process of achieving a common understanding of interest positions generates a social consciousness which also determines patterns of adjustment and reciprocation of ego and alter even when their interaction is not based on mutual understanding. In other words ego's ends and his/her adjustment to alter are from the beginning socially constituted irrespective of having reached a common understanding of interest positions. I am simply claiming that ego is already a dialogical and social subject. There are no pre-social egos. The dispute between the moral economists (e.g. Scott, J. 1976) and those who stress the self-interests of peasants (e.g. Popkin, 1979) arises from a theory of consciousness which sees ego not as a product of a dialogical interaction but as monologically confronting other egos. A dialogical consciousness leads to a notion of community whereas the notion of society under capitalism often assumes a monological ego.

Notions of community and society involve distinct models of politics, with their corresponding concepts of personhood and consciousness. Society particularly as exemplified in the modern state with its conception of abstract justice, rational law and the duties of citizenship requires a psychological view of personhood with its emphasis on a reflective-monological consciousness and a strong sense of duty or responsibility (i.e. an interior and moral conscience). The disaggregative effects of a largely impersonal society with its extreme specialization of tasks and its relegation of power and authority to unknown representatives requires for its reproduction the idea of a highly developed personality, with a clear view of means-ends and a concept of nationhood involving the inalienable rights of its citizens. Community on the other hand is as much a system of signification as it is a structure of regular and stable interaction (Cohen, 1985). More accurately community is a structure of interaction of significant others (i.e. it is con-

sciously dialogical). The former is characterized by commodity exchange, the latter by gift exchange (Bourdieu, 1977; Mauss, 1969). In this paper I explore the basis of membership in the category of significant other in the case of Zamora, a municipality in which I conducted fieldwork (Pertierra, 1988).

I am saying that although many forces acting on Philippine society are generated externally and under conditions unknown to many Filipinos affected by them, nevertheless the Filipino responses to these forces can only be fully understood in the context of a Filipino cultural reality.

The extent and manner of penetration of state and other national structures into Philippine village life varies considerably. While not necessarily typical in all respects, I shall illustrate the manner and effect of this penetration and intercalation by discussing Zamora, a municipality in Northern Luzon with a population (1976) of about 8,000 people.

The Municipality of Zamora

Zamora is a rice and tobacco growing municipality in the province of Ilocos Sur some 350km north of Manila. Its inhabitants mainly speak Ilocano and live in 26 barrios or villages whose population range from 88 to 850 people. These villages are generally separated from one another by fertile fields that lie on either side of the river which effectively divides Zamora into its two major sections. Although the municipality sees itself as predominantly Ilocano, several villages retain close linguistic, cultural and kinship ties with non-Ilocano communities to the east of Zamora. Despite the long-time presence of Catholic missionaries in the area (circa 1760) Zamora retained much of its pre-Christian culture, including its political institutions until the first quarter of this century. Having rejected Catholicism, villages in Zamora accepted various forms of Protestantism soon after the imposition of American rule (1902-1946). However, when independence was achieved and mass-based political parties with national structures were introduced, Zamoran leaders and many of their followers switched their religious allegiance to Catholicism.

Apart from the presence of the Augustinian missionaries and the occasional visit of an official, state structures had not effectively penetrated Zamoran life for most of the period of Spanish colo-

nization (1521-1898). Even the imposition of Spanish surnames in the 1850's to facilitate record-keeping had little practical effect in Zamora until the 1920's when the Americans introduced village schools. The American period (1902-1946) saw an increased penetration of state structures into local society. Literacy was expanded, mass-based political parties begun to recruit members in Zamora and an increasing number oriented their activities towards the cash economy. However, until the decade of the 1950's when Virginia tobacco was introduced, Zamora retained its primarily subsistence economy despite significant changes in its ideological structure brought about by schooling and a strongly proselytizing Protestantism.

Like many other Philippine municipalities (Agpalo, 1972), Zamora is divided into two major sections characterized by geographic and cultural elements. The southern section centres around the village of Luna, while the northern section is headed by the leading families of Macaoayan, a prosperous and culturally distinct village. The competition between these two sections determines much of local political life and has repercussions for the linkages between Zamora and the Philippine state. Even before the time of its formation into a municipality in 1919 Zamora had been divided into two main sections. This division is expressed at two levels. The first involves a coalition of villages and the second the leading families who are responsible for determining the political and social affairs of the municipality and who generally live in its principal villages. While these leading families determine the configuration of personal alliances constituting each faction, the first level of this division (i.e. coalition of villages) exercises constraints in the range and stability of their choices. Apart from the geographic nature of this division (north vs. south) certain cultural differences also enter into its constitution. The northern section is dominated by non-Ilocano villages, while the southern section is predominantly Ilocano.

One of the major issues of sectional disputes has been the location of the municipal centre (*poblacion*) with its attendant services and personnel (e.g. government offices, health clinic). Access to and the use of government funds and services primarily benefit *poblacion* residents and hence its location is keenly contested by each section. These symbolic (i.e. status) and material rewards are the main reasons why Zamorans engage in politics, particularly since

political success has significant economic and religious consequences. At the present time and after several changes the *poblacion* is located in Bato, a village in the northern section. However, the main Catholic and Protestant churches are located in Luna, the centre of the southern section. Thus, the political and religious life of Zamora is divided between the two sections, each one trying to extend its domination over the other in both spheres (i.e. religion and politics). This internal competition between the two factions/sections of Zamora has deep historical roots whose origins are unknown to its present inhabitants. The manifestation of this rivalry, however, depends on the issues and resources available to Zamorans. The introduction of party politics has proved to be an ideal medium in which to express such a conflict. Thus, in a paradoxical way the intrusion of national politics has contributed to the continued development of local political and cultural differences.

Until 1964 each section was closely associated with a major party (the northern section with the Liberal party, the southern section with the Nacionalista party) but in this year Marcos switched from the Liberal to the Nacionalista party. This change caused a complex re-working of local political networks and since then party affiliation no longer clearly reflects factional groupings. This meant that during the 20 odd years of Marcos' rule sectional disputes did not manifest themselves primarily along party political lines. Marcos' supporters were found in both sections, all of whom attempted to maximize their links with their respective political patrons. The resources obtained, however, tended to flow along factional lines. In the last presidential elections Mrs. Aquino received her strongest support in the two villages (Macaoayan and Luna), each of which heads a section. In the constitutional elections only Macaoayan supported Mrs. Aquino. The point of all this is to show that political support which had earlier mainly been expressed along clear sectional lines is no longer reflected directly. In other words while national politics continues to have an impact in Zamora both during Marcos' days and now under Mrs. Aquino, this impact does not work primarily through the traditional sections as it had done until 1964. The result is a much less predictable and a less stable set of local political alliances since these now cross what are still significant structural divisions. It remains to be seen whether these cross-sectional political alliances diminish the traditional divisions or whether the old loyalties reimpose themselves on the new politics.

The continuation of the traditional sectional divisions no longer directly reflected in party political terms since 1964 are presently made manifest in the split religious congregations among both the Catholics and the Protestants of Zamora and in the attempts of each section to celebrate its *fiesta* (each section has a religious patron) as the major event in Zamora cultural-religious life. While Luna exercises a considerable religious advantage since this village is the centre of much local religious activity, Bato and Macaoayan have significant material resources which they can use to challenge Luna's claim to religious primacy. A considerable amount of local effort and resources are used to validate each section's claim to social, cultural and religious superiority and to ensure its continuity through links with national structures. Hence a tension is established between the desire to reaffirm local divisions and the need to adjust to external structures which do not necessarily conform to local differences.

The Basis of Community

The native term for propinquity (*ili*) can be expanded to cover widening areas all of whose inhabitants recognize membership in a common territory. Its smallest extent refers to a local neighborhood whose members are usually kin with easy and informal access to each other's houses and who frequently exchange labour and other services. It is then extended to other similar neighbourhoods in the village, eventually encompassing the village and beyond. As the area referred to increases the general obligations of common membership decrease correspondingly.

Other notions such as parentation (*kabagian, kaputot*) or association (*agkasukob, kagayyem*) are also used to refer to non-territorially constituted communities all of whose members recognize moral obligations to one another. Zamorans also recognize membership in nationally constituted bodies such as religious congregations and other associations whose members are often unknown to one another but who nevertheless acknowledge a common commitment to a set of abstract ideals. Finally, like other Filipinos Zamorans are increasingly conscious of belonging to a national polity even if its communal obligations are still difficult to specify (Anderson, 1983).

These notions of propinquity, parentation and association can take on varied and significant aspects which allow Zamorans to

adjust their actions to the appropriate situation. In the context of everyday life, the village is the focus of these notions of locality, parentation and association. However, Zamorans also interact frequently outside the village context and in such cases either extend or accentuate different aspects of these notions. The tobacco economy obliges Zamorans to develop ties with outside buyers on a regular basis; travel to Manila and other centres for educational and other purposes require Zamorans to establish stable networks outside the village; membership in a range of associations obliges them to extend their interests correspondingly. All of these extra-village orientations themselves arise in the context of ordinary village life and for this reason Zamorans at times willingly and at others reluctantly, leave the village in order to pursue them. In many cases such departures result in their permanent separation from their village community but just as often and despite the considerable effort and expense many Zamorans return regularly to renew village ties. Apart from the intensity with which village life focuses propinquity, parentation and association, these separate dimensions for basing social relations and for generating distinct models of community and society equip Zamorans adequately for their increasingly more regular dealings with national and international life. It is not unusual for people with overseas experience to encourage their juniors to go abroad with the advice that although adjustment to a foreign culture is initially harder than going to Manila the ultimate benefits outweigh the meagre advantage offered by Manila and other Philippine cities. They point out that if one must work as a domestic or a labourer one might as well do so for the highest wage and in circumstances which are least demeaning to one's sense of personhood. The benefits of both distance and pay in overseas work satisfy these criteria better than domestic service in Manila. Zamorans consciously compare domestic work abroad to selling tobacco to Chinese rather than to Ilocano buyers. The former sometimes pay more but more importantly the relationship with Chinese buyers is more narrowly (i.e. economically) defined and hence less demanding of other aspects of personhood. In other words, whenever Zamorans deal with outsiders, whose normative framework clearly lie beyond the structures of village life, they tend to develop the relationship along specific unidimensional lines. Converts to the *Iglesia-ni-Kristo*, an exclusive and nationalist religion frequently point out the difficulties of maintaining orthodoxy in the context of village life, with its generalized

demands of kinship and locality, and contrast this with the relative ease of meeting the heavy expectations of *Iglesia* membership in Manila and other urban centres. Many *Iglesia* members often converted to this religion during their stay in Manila because membership was seen as providing a sense of community in an otherwise anomic environment. However, their attempts to maintain this membership in Zamora often clashed with the loyalties due to kin and neighbours many of whom are non-*Iglesia*. This conflict is particularly acute in households whose members belong to different denominations. Such multi-affiliation households are rare, although increasing and the majority are marked by their belonging to the class of poor tenants. The *Iglesia* is particularly strong in Taliao, a village whose inhabitants mostly work as tenants of wealthy Macaoayan families to whom they are *not* related. In contrast *Iglesia* members from Luna who are tenants of their wealthy Catholic village kin often complain of the opposing demands set by their religious and economic positions.

In a village such as Macaoayan where uxorilocality is the preferred mode of post-marital residence (60% of households are uxorilocal), the notions of locality and association are particularly developed to the extent that the individual members of the council of Elders (*Panglakayen*) who effectively run village affairs often concur with council decisions against their own kin. In other villages such as Bangbangar this behaviour is unacceptable and parentation is the primary mode of social relations. Thus, even in Zamora itself the importance given to the notions of propinquity, parentation and association often vary from village to village and certainly from one context to another.

Legitimate authority and the adjudication of disputes

The notion of power differentials is, within certain limits, included in local notions of community. The recognition of legitimate authority is highly developed in Zamoran society although the process of its implementation varies from one context to another reflecting the overlapping nature of the models of community referred to earlier. I shall illustrate these different notions of legitimate authority by discussing the procedures for the resolution or adjudication of disputes in Zamora.

- (a) Tante was savagely attacked by his rival while courting a girl from a neighbouring village. His attacker who resided in the

- girl's village and who belonged to a wealthy family fled to the hills once the incident became known to Tante's kin. They threatened legal and retaliatory action unless compensation was immediately offered for Tante's serious injuries. These proceedings were conducted by the senior kin of both parties, mediated by the respective village officials and other interested third parties. Only after an adequate compensation was paid for did it become safe for Tante's assailant to return.
- (b) Two brothers became involved in an argument during a drinking session. The older one attacked his sibling nearly severing his ear with a machete. Since the dispute occurred between members of a kin-group, no outsiders, including village officials intervened. The brother paid for his younger sibling's hospital expenses and a major feast was celebrated to commemorate the moral unity of the kin-group.
 - (c) Some young men in Macaoayan were accused of theft and were brought before the village Elders, who had them publicly flogged. In addition, the accused youths were also flogged at home by their parents.
 - (d) A Macaoayan couple were having difficulty disciplining their son who repeatedly stole their money. They complained to the village Elders who promptly had him flogged and placed in stocks. The parents regretted their action and pleaded for his release. The Elders agreed on condition that the parents pay a fine for their son's misbehaviour. They provided a pig and native drinks for a feast.

These cases illustrate some of the notions of legitimate authority in Zamora. In the first case, the disputing parties belonged to different kin-groups, each of which represented the disputants. Only when the representatives of both kin-groups had reached agreement was the dispute settled. In the second case since the dispute was internal to a kin-group, mediation was a purely internal matter within the group. The third and fourth cases involved the village-community represented by the group of Elders and particular individuals whose kin-groups only secondarily entered the adjudication process. In the last case the dispute concretely only involved a delict within a kin-group but was nevertheless interpreted as a violation of the abstract rules against theft and a lack of respect towards members of a senior generation. All these cases indicate a willing delegation of authority and its legitimate use. In the first two cases the kin-group is seen as the primary unit responsible

for wielding authority over individual interests. The last two cases indicate that in Macaoayan the notion of legitimate authority is extended from the kin-group to the village Elders who represent the interests of the entire community. I should add that in the case of the quarrelling siblings, the abstract norm regarding the amity of a kin-group is obviously known and accepted. However no structures corresponding to the set of Elders in Macaoayan exists that allows for the breach of this norm to be enforced from outside the kin-group itself.

The examples discussed indicate that Zamorans have a rich range of normative models of community that allow them to deal flexibly with the interactions of daily life. Apart from recognizing the normatively defined nature of social life, Zamorans are also aware that the structures of interaction are not exclusively nor perhaps even primarily based on these normative models. Conflicts of interests occur which not only bring into question particular normative understandings but their resolution is not always necessarily based on a fixed consensus of the normative basis of conflict. Villagers readily admit that they are internally divided into *baknang* (rich), *kakalaungan* (middle) and *napanglaw* (poor) status categories. These categories are, however, usually used referentially rather than addressively. It is impolite to refer to people as *baknang* or *napanglaw* in their presence. In the case of the former because it might be interpreted as a claim on their resources and in the latter because it could be seen as an imputation on their abilities. *Baknang* are not only rich but should be generous, *napanglaw* refers as much to a deficiency of character as it does to one's poverty. Some *baknang*, however, reject the obligations of generosity and most *napanglaw* can point out objective conditions to explain their poverty, thus maintaining their self-respect. In such a situation a notion of community incorporating wealth and status differentials cannot both assert its normative claims while acknowledging the disparities mentioned. The result is that while everyone in a village is acutely aware of status positions no one is willing publicly to align the notion of community with the existing status differentials. It should be noted that in a village such as Macaoayan, where generational status is not only recognized but enforced, the communal recognition of the privileges of Elders (male and female) is independent of their personal wealth, though not of other qualities such as a sense of equity, persuasiveness, or forcefulness.

Communitas, the Self and the Other

I began this paper by distinguishing between the moral support for a particular candidate (e.g. Mrs. Aquino) and the instrumental-strategic voting for another (e.g. Marcos). This apparent inconsistency arises from operating with a model of politics which advocates participation and representation while acknowledging the realities of reproduction and legitimation. Many people I spoke to in Manila in February 1986 expected Marcos to cheat but win the election, which is precisely what he did, thus partly justifying the stand of the radical Left. They had boycotted the election on the grounds that real political choice was not possible while Marcos controlled the media, the army and the Commission on Elections. The Left judged Marcos correctly and operating with what anthropologists call a structural functionalist model of society they had also assumed that his control of society's major institutions would insure the political compliance of the people. Like other models of society, structural functionalism conflates the regular with the casual, the role with the person and behaviour with purposive action. But society is not a machine, it is not an organism, nor is it only a chess game. It has the characteristics of all three only to the extent that these conceptions of society enter into its constitution through the action orientations of social agents. Except for the first metaphor which is more appropriate in an industrial context, we have seen how in Zamora people operate with a range of societal models some of which are similar to the view of society as a tightly knitted organic whole or alternatively as an open ended game or contest. Marcos was the head or *pangulo* of Philippine society and he determined its movement. Marcos was also the master operator, the nation's best politician who could wheel and deal successfully with the powerful and crafty Americans. These are the native equivalents of anthropology's structural functionalism and no doubt partly explain why many Filipinos naturally assumed that he would cheat and win the elections. What so outraged them, including Mrs. Aquino, when President Reagan initially accepted Marcos' manipulations, was the implication that Filipinos were either too stupid or weak-kneed to do anything about it. It was bad enough for many Filipinos to be manipulated by a corrupt and ambitious politician like Marcos but it was insupportable to be told by a foreigner that this was not happening or that there was nothing that could be done about it. The events at EDSA proved everyone wrong. The Left for assuming that the choice was

between boycott or revolution, Marcos for thinking that as *pangulo* he could do as he pleased, the Americans for presuming to teach Filipinos the traditions of democracy, the media for expecting a bloodbath, and students of Philippine society such as myself for failing to notice the early signs of *communitas* (Turner, V., 1974) seen at the huge, peaceful and spontaneous rallies held for Mrs. Aquino since her husband's assassination. What confused and distracted scholars such as myself was the lack of the normal ideological and cultural signposts for all this activity. Mrs. Aquino was an unassuming politically inexperienced, self-declared housewife. She came through birth and marriage from an immensely rich, powerful and ambitious family. Her class background, conventional education and personal religiosity seemed ideally suited for her role as supportive wife to an obsessively driven politician. Her role as the widow to complete the dead husband's task while unusual is not unknown to Filipinos who know of La Loba Negra or who remember Gabriela Silang (Routledge, 1979) and who more recently recall Aurora Quezon and Carmeling Crisologo. What was puzzling about Mrs. Aquino was her ability to depoliticize her husband's goal and in the process expand her popular support. In the previous cases of widows inheriting their husband's political tasks, these tasks were left largely unchanged and hence continued to attract the support only of the already committed. In Mrs. Aquino's case she attracted, at least initially, the support of many who would have been implacably opposed to her husband on both ideological and personal grounds. It was precisely her lack of political experience that made her so popular and successful as a politician. The old political structure had been so discredited both before and during Marcos' time that only people with non-political backgrounds such as Mrs. Aquino, members of the church, academics, businessmen or alternatively politicians who disclaimed political ambitions such as Diokno or Tañada were trusted. Mrs. Aquino's political innocence and the absence of a history of compromise this implies allowed her to approach hitherto untapped sources of support in the broad Left and in particular the progressive elements of the Church. But her support was not primarily along ideologico-political or pragmatic grounds as would have been Ninoy's had he lived and instead she attracted people across the entire spectrum of Philippine society, including and in particular the normally politically uncommitted. This realization came to me when I visited an old school-teacher who had never taken a great interest in politics, be-

ing too busy earning enough money to support her two sons. During the counting she visited her local polling booths and sternly lectured her former students who were now Comelec officials about the necessity of fairness and honesty. She had taught them these values as students, they were teaching these themselves as teachers and therefore had to practice these civic virtues to maintain their self-respect. The officials listened to her respectfully, some were moved to tears by her accusations and finally admitted that they were merely carrying out the instructions of their superiors. The crowd around the polling booth was growing bigger by the minute, the old schoolteacher continued screaming accusations at the officials many of whom had abandoned their duties, until finally a young kinsman gently led her home. Despite the enormous tension surrounding this incident, doubtlessly repeated many times in other parts of Manila, there was little evidence of violence in the crowd. In other words, the tension was not directed against anyone in particular but was a realization of the profound moral crises confronting the nation.

The Philippines has had a long history of experiencing such crises, some of whose aspects are being increasingly explored by historians and no longer described as chiliastic or millenarian outbursts by uneducated and superstitious peasants. The notions of an egalitarian community encompassing all Tagalogs, Ilocanos or Visayans and eventually all Filipinos was a frequent theme in colonial history but interpreted by historians until Iletto (1985) as a form of religious mysticism or political misadventurism. These movements are now being more correctly seen as tentative attempts at extending the notion of a moral community beyond the boundaries of village, parentation and direct association initially in the only existing idiom, religion but later in its secular equivalents of nationalism and Marxism. These attempts are usually preceded by the rejection of the normal structures and followed by the experience of states of *communitas* or anti-structure before imposing what is seen as a new and better order. The *Guardias de Honor*, the *Cofrades de Hermano Pule*, and the *Sagrada Familia* all attempted to build the New Jerusalem in Arayat or Banahaw only to be crushed by the State or distracted by the exigencies of practical life. As cults came and went the only predictable thing was that others would take their place. Mrs. Aquino has not deliberately cultivated the image of the risen Rizal reincarnated as a woman to lead the Philippines out of the path of darkness. Nevertheless, many Filipinos see in her

the last hope to rescue the country out of its otherwise inevitable plunge into civil war, political dismemberment and economic ruin. Her unassuming nature, her conciliatory attitude and her sense of compassion exemplify the highly valued qualities not only of motherhood but more importantly of legitimate authority. She qualifies as the ideal *Inang Bayan* or mother of the nation and contrasted to the leadership qualities of Marcos as *pangulo* or head of the nation. She follows the people's will where Marcos would lead it, she listens where Marcos would order, she consoles with those who suffer, where Marcos would be detached and abstracted. These ideal and mythological qualities and contrasts between Mrs. Aquino and Marcos are similar to the comparisons between Mother Pilipinas and Father Spain familiar to Rizal's readers and still used, though with the U.S.A. playing the father's role, in much contemporary nationalist rhetoric. While these cultural models have not been notably successful in achieving their goals, including Mrs. Aquino's government, they continue to inspire generations of patriotic Filipinos who see them as counter-factual possibilities rather than as empirically disproven cognitive constructions. Like myths, these notions of *communitas* are not mistaken representations of reality since they do not seek as myths to cognitively represent reality. Instead they could be more profitably seen as the equivalence of a non-representational post-modernist discourse (Lyotard, 1983).

One of the most striking features of the event at EDSA on February 1986 was its festive nature despite the ever present possibility of serious violence. The accounts of many of the participants stress the element of curiosity, the need to find out what was happening as much as the explicit desire to show solidarity for the rebels. Parents took their children to share what they felt were crucial moments in a nation's experiencing of itself as a collectivity as much as to enjoy the pleasures of an outing. This recalls the simultaneously festive and serious social atmosphere during visits to shrines such as Antipolo in the 19th century and Banahaw in the 20th. Like EDSA these excursions/pilgrimages represented personal moral quests as much as experiences of collective effervescence and were characterized by the momentary loss of structure. Pilgrims going to Banahaw for the Holy Week celebrations are expected to shed their normal statuses and willingly co-mingle with their fellows. Signs of wealth and social distinctions are temporarily suspended during their sojourn in the mountain as each person seeks his/her own moral goal while simultaneously drawing social and

spiritual strength from their common participation. The occasion and symbolism of death for the celebration of spiritual and social life is a frequent theme in Philippine culture much commented upon by foreigners (Marryat, 1974) who were puzzled by the practice of holding dances and other celebrations after a funeral. The need for affirmation of group ties is strongest after the loss of one of its members.

Associated with the festive air at EDSA was the equally marked lack of agonistic behaviour or more accurately the repeated attempts at defusing tension before it could lead to conflict. Priests, nuns, old and young people were as keen to show their determination to hold their ground in preventing Marcos' troops from advancing on camps Crame and Aguinaldo as they were in extending their friendship to these same troops. No doubt it was this combination of defiance and appeasement that most confused the soldiers and their officers. In other words what truly characterizes states of *communitas* is the simultaneous de-structuring and re-structuring of social boundaries. Durkheim (1915) stressed the element of solidarity during these occasions with its implied boundaries between inside-outside—uninitiated/initiated—stranger/comrade. But it is precisely the conflation of these distinctions to stress a universal human condition such that insider/outsider-neophyte/initiate-self/other are seen to be mere cultural artifacts over a common nature that better reflects the states of *communitas*.

Corazon Aquino was not initially present at EDSA but it was obviously her supporters, urged on by Cardinal Sin, who gathered there to support Ramos and Enrile. These men had for many years been among Marcos' strongest allies and only when their own position became threatened within the Marcos camp did they decide to switch sides. Despite these purely self-interested motives, scores of Filipinos who would have held grudges against these men nevertheless openly welcomed them. Ideological differences were temporarily set aside in this celebration of *communitas*.

Communitas and local community

If by *communitas* we mean a social situation characterized by the suspension of the normal hierarchies between status categories and other structures marking social differences, this state is rarely if ever experienced in Zamora. There are occasions when normal social behaviour is partly suspended as in the case of ritual theft

practised between Good Friday and Easter Sunday when gangs of village youths are given considerable liberty in respect of private property. The celebration held during the major period of mourning is marked by the opposition between the ritual asociality of the deceased's kin and the extreme sociability of the attending guests. Visitors, during these occasions go to great lengths to entertain each other while close kin of the deceased maintain an uncommitted air at these proceedings. In Macaoayan, during the major traditional feasts held in the recent past, people would seal off the village and indulge in communal feasting for 3-4 days, during which time the household was disbanded and its members absorbed as individuals in the village collectivity. None of these occasions are complete expressions of *communitas* although they all involve a conscious suspension of normal structures, behaviour and norms. There are other occasions such as the ritual expressions of sexuality at weddings and during the performance of *comedias*, when a general air of sociability is expressed which resemble states of *communitas*. All these occasions occur within specific and predictable situations during which the multiplex nature of village ties and relationships are still operative. True *communitas* is difficult to achieve in local communities whose members are linked by dense and diverse sets of relationships. An exception to this occurs in villages like Macaoayan with its strong cultural identity, in Dirdirig with its distinctive religious orientation or among members of separatist sects such as the *Iglesia* and *Jehovah's Witness*. In all these cases the village community or local congregation is a main source of social identity and the temporary suspension of other ties is a way of renewing group solidarity. The stress on social equality during these occasions serves to mark members of the village or congregation from non-members. By temporarily suspending internal differences between members, the boundaries of group membership are emphasized and renewed. In another sense this is the opposite of true *communitas* where not only are individual differences suspended but even group boundaries are lifted, allowing the individual to experience collective life (*pakikipagkapua tao*) in the widest sense. This experience of universal humanity is most closely exemplified in the major religious pilgrimages when the individual consciously attempts to achieve communion with the universalized other. This loss of self as a prelude to a national or universal consciousness requires a highly sustained ideological commitment. The structures of experience predominant in village society such as Zamora generally mitigate against the

formation of such sustained ideological communities. However, the conditions for generating such ideological communities are clearly present in Zamora even if less highly developed than in pilgrimage sites such as Banahaw. In these latter cases the obligations of locality, parentation and friendship are subordinated to a more abstract and encompassing notion of community. For such a notion to prevail less localized structures of action such as those found in a developed nation-state would need to be dominant, with their corollaries of a class consciousness and an ideological politics. The present success of Mrs. Aquino and the apparent failure of political movements of the Left indicate that these latter ideological conditions do not presently prevail. On the other hand the momentary supercession of local differences exemplified in *communitas* have not led to their stable integration into the state. These cultural models of an egalitarian and free community have proved to be as unstable as the gains of elections.

I have argued following Pinches (1987) that the events at EDSA in February 1986 can be described as an instance of *communitas* which involves the temporary suspension of social hierarchies and relationships. I then examined the ideas and conceptions of community in a municipality such as Zamora to see how they may be used as a basis for creating states of *communitas*. I noted the possibilities of extending the moral basis of local community to include wider interaction as well as pointing out the difficulty in dissolving dense village ties required to create *communitas*. It seems that while local notions of community may be expanded to include open boundaries of interaction required for *communitas*, the village itself is not a suitable site for this condition. Instead one must look to inter-village, inter-regional and national gatherings such as those found in religious sites like Banahaw to experience *communitas*. This and other sacred sites found throughout the country provide a link to a Philippine past which predates its colonial ideological formation. Despite the Christian idiom in which its sacrality is expressed, sites such as Mount Banahaw inspire in their believers states of solidarity and community outside the existing structures of society. Secular society with its fixed hierarchies, imported values and foreign orientation constituting the outer self (*labas*) is contrasted with the egalitarian structures and native values characterizing the inner self (*loob*) experienced during these sojourns to Mount Banahaw. Banahaw cults have indigenized Christianity by reinter-

preting it in matriarchal forms, egalitarian structures and autochthonous themes (Gonzales, 1985).

However, this tradition of revolt and resistance to external domination persists only in the margins and interstices of Philippine society although like the events at EDSA it can provide a crucial juncture affecting the direction of motion along the fixed rails set down by the dominant relations of secular society (Pertierra, 1983). This tradition of resistance to the hispanization of local community, while remaining largely outside the direct control of the colonial and later the post-colonial state, constitutes one of the most powerful sources for cultural/ideological production (Love, R., 1977). These sites of resistance provide many of the central values for a Filipino national consciousness (e.g. the discourse of the *Pasyon*, Ilet, 1975) with its roots in the colonial period. Moreover, the reproduction of cultural areas on which the state itself depends (e.g. nationalism, *kalayaan*) originate in these sites of resistance. While this tradition is not totally autonomous of the structures of the state and in fact often defines itself as a social movement in opposition to the state's secular values (e.g. *colorum*) its reproduction can only be achieved in areas of life relatively unpenetrated by the state. It is precisely those areas of the life-world which have retained a relative autonomy from the state which provides the state with the normative consensus for its own structural reproduction. It is this lack of complementation which has given rise to a sense of Filipino national identity independent of its obligations to the state or in other words creates the clash between a Filipino cultural identity and a growing political consciousness.

CONCLUSION

I have argued in this paper that both the formal and the substantive links between elections and the manifestation of a political will are highly problematic in the Philippine case. Part of this difficulty can be traced to the non-complementary and incommensurable source of political consciousness and cultural identity. Class relations are not dependent on the structures of the state for their reproduction. Instead they are embedded in cultural practices and power relationships expressed in the idiom of propinquity, parentation and association (with their dialogical emphasis) which in themselves prevent a clear articulation of a consciousness of class even if they cannot deny the experience of increasing inequality. In other

words, unlike the West, class relations are not experienced as arising out of market conditions whose stability and profitability are guaranteed and protected by the state. Instead, class relations are embedded in notions and practices involving kinship, locality and alliance. These conditions do not generate a reflective consciousness of close even if social inequalities are acutely experienced. This paper has been largely exploratory, using my experience of Zamora to investigate the nature of political consciousness, its expression in elections and its cultural origins. My rejection of existing models of Philippine politics and culture oblige me to suggest alternatives that can account for the stabilities and fluctuations of Philippine social life previously explained using models naively transposed from their western sources. This transposition has generated formal political activities such as elections which, like Balinese shadow plays, conceal the realities and mechanisms of struggle and power even as they retain the interests and involvement of their participating audience.

This paper has expressed dissatisfaction with the prevailing view of Philippine society which accepts the formal models of institutions such as the state and the process of allocation of political power such as elections for their substantive reality. This view of Philippine society is generally subsumed in hierarchical/consensual models of patron-client relationships based on normatively bound local communities. While normatively bound local communities exist in Zamora, the extension of a normative consensus and hence a morally based politics outside the boundaries of local community is highly problematic. In cases where a normative consensus not based on local community is achieved as in religious and other social movements their basis of generation remains relatively autonomous of the state (at least since their secular, post-hispanic phase): Apparent exceptions such as the N.D.F. and institutions such as the Philippine Army have yet to prove their capacity to generate and reproduce normative consensus beyond immediate strategic and instrumental needs. As events in Poland (Mitzal & Mitzal, 1986) have shown, even societies with strong centralized structures are unable to subsume civil relations totally into the state. At present neither the N.D.F. nor the Philippine Army (Selochan, 1988) possesses the material or cultural resources to use the state to dominate civil society.

For the reasons above, conventional class analysis is not adequate for understanding Philippine society. While class relations generate perceived inequalities they do not necessarily lead to a reflexive class consciousness. However, this lack of a developed consciousness of class does not prevent class conflict from being a practical and active element of everyday life (Pinches, 1984). A developed consciousness of class depends on the presence of a strong state which is able to colonize and penetrate the routines of daily life through the process of reproducing capital. At present non-economic factors enter significantly into the ideological construction of subjective consciousness expressed in formal political actions such as elections. The economic and political conditions for a theoretical and social consciousness of class may not exist but increasing inequality generates a practical/performative class consciousness which is threatening to overthrow the present interests of the state. Until the Philippine state is better able to articulate the interests of its constituents as well as more successfully penetrate the routines of practical life its stability will remain problematic. Marcos correctly sensed that the former oligarchic interests of the Philippine state are no longer viable even if expressed through the rhetoric of parliamentary elections. The Aquino government appears unable to extend the interests which it represents or even to effectively dominate them as indicated by the repeated challenge to its authority on the part of an even more narrowly based (but more structurally cohesive) interest-group (i.e. the military). However, the military's links with a nationalist ideology are tenuous at best. For many sections of Philippine society such as peasants, workers and students the military represents the most odious aspects of the state. It has played no historic or cultural role in creating or defining a Filipino sense of nationhood except by continuing, during the colonial and post-colonial periods, its primary role as the agent of colonial oppression or as its post-colonial client. Unlike Catholicism or even electoral politics, the Philippine army has few roots in society. Unlike the case in other Third World states (e.g. Indonesia), the Philippine army had no role in liberation struggles nor has it, since independence, distinguished itself as defender of the nation. However, its present role as a main challenge to civilian rule must be seen as an attempt by or otherwise unstable and ineffective state to strengthen and rationalize its domination over its citizenry before acquiring their practical consent. Since electoral politics has clearly failed to provide the stable conditions for the accumulation

of capital the Philippine state appears headed towards more authoritarian directions. Whether it can overcome the resistance of its semi-autonomous local communities such as Zamora as well as co-opt traditional sub-alter discourses remains questionable.

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