

JAPAN AND THE PHILIPPINES: FROM TRADITIONAL TO MODERN SOCIETIES*

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Most economically developing countries are undergoing transformation from traditionally-structured agricultural societies to post-traditional ones as they move into the technology oriented world. Practically all Asian countries, except Japan, have been experiencing this difficult process since the end of World War II. Japan pursued the first stage of its modernization in the nineteenth century.

This paper attempts to compare the early phase of the modernization of Japan (1868-1898) and that of the Philippines (1945-1972). It focuses on the innovations introduced by the Japanese and Filipino political leaders into their political systems. To appreciate the changes made within each country's political system during what is considered here as the first stage of modernization, spanning roughly a generation, a brief discussion of certain historical facts in the preceding period will be presented first. Meaningful social changes, it is here suggested, were subsequently made within the framework of existing institutions both in Japan and in the Philippines. In other words, tradition was used as a tool of modernization or development.

This paper will also deal with Japanese and Filipino family systems—i.e., their respective social organizations and value systems—and their impact on the functions of their political systems during the first stage of modernization or development.

The functions that these institutions perform require fundamental adaptation to the growth of knowledge of a society's diverse social institutions "that were in existence when man's greatly enhanced capacities gradually began to make themselves felt in recent centuries."¹ The question that can be posed here is: would structural transformation be an imperative in the modernization or development of a society so that it can make such fundamental adjustment? Can not change take place within social structures by using tradition as an instrument of modernization or development? It is submitted in this paper that by mobilizing traditional institutions and values, a society or polity can adjust itself to various changing conditions—internal and/or external—and maintain its boundaries with the help of adaptive political elites.²

Tradition is viewed here as a reservoir of the most central social and cultural experience prevailing in society. It is the most enduring

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¹C.E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 46.

²S.N. Eisenstadt, "Some Observations on the Dynamics of Tradition", *Comparative Studies on Society and History*, Vol. VII, no. 4 (October 1969), 46A.

element in the collective social and cultural construction of reality—a framework without which cultural creativity is not possible.³ Briefly, tradition is the source of motivation or the mainspring of action in society. Adaptive political elites are the power-holders in the political system of a society, those who can easily recognize and respond to threats to their society posed by changing conditions within and without it. In the Philippines and Japan during the periods considered in this paper, the adaptive political elites were mainly congruent with the socio-economic elites or were the latter's allies.

Historically speaking, the dominant adaptive elites and the government have been responsible for the modernization of society in its beginning stage. The people constituting the base of society join the effort owing to the influence of these elites, and only subsequently do the majority of the people become an additional determining group.⁴

Within this context, modernization or development will be viewed as the transformation of a traditional agricultural society into a modern industrial one. This transformation is achieved by selectively applying accumulated knowledge in the form of technology (conceived broadly as man's capacity to control, influence and manipulate his environment) to the different activities of men within the pre-existing political, economic and socio-cultural sectors of a society for the purpose of attaining what that society conceives as the "good life" (initially the conception of the adaptive elite.). In other words, ideally, social welfare or the welfare of everyone (not only of a privileged group) should be the goal of modernization or development. This involves the betterment of material life as well as the improvement of the intangible, the psychological dimension of living or the sense of personal and social well-being.

I

Some Historical Facts

It is possible to compare certain historical facts gathered from a study of social developments in Japan and the Philippines before the periods between 1868 and 1895, in the case of Japan, and within the period, 1946-1972, in the case of the Philippines. Starting in 1868, with the restoration of the emperor to full sovereign, the period for Japan ends in 1895, the year of its victory in its war with China. For the Philippines, the period begins with 1946, when the nation was declared independent by the United States, and ends with 1972, when martial law was declared by President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Because the periods being considered are not contemporaneous, there cannot be a one-to-one correspondence of their chronological settings. Nor can there be an equation of the content of the historical facts within each country, owing to the differences in their historical and socio-cultural expe-

³S.N. Eisenstadt, "Intellectuals and Tradition," *Daedalus* (Spring, 1972), 3.

⁴See S.H. Alatas, "Erring Modernization: The Dilemma of Developing Societies," paper read at the Symposium on the Developmental Aims and Socio-Cultural Values in Asian Society sponsored by the Asian Institute for Economic Development and Planning, Bangkok, 3-7 November, 1975 (mimeographed).

riences. Nevertheless, an attempt will be made to compare the historical facts before the periods covering the early stage of modernization delineated for Japan and the Philippines, when Japanese and Filipinos constituted the political leadership in their own countries.

The political system in which these leaders played their roles before 1868 in Japan and before 1946 in the Philippines can be described as "centralized feudalism." Japan had the *baku-han* system⁵ in which the shogun's overwhelming military as well as economic might (including those of his allies, the *fudai daimyo*) and other clever devices of checks and balances, like the *sankin kotai* (the hostage system),⁶ enabled the shogun to hold the balance of power among the heads of the *han* (domain)— the *daimyo*. But the position of the shogun had to be legitimized by the imperial institution. In this system, the *daimyo*'s leadership and house laws, not the shogun's, were the most possible content of the political experience of the people at the base of Japanese society. The people must have conceived the shogun as someone distant and the emperor even more remote. The shogun's income from his domain, which was in the selected quarter of Japan's territory, together with the *daimyo*'s tribute in *koku* (roughly five bushels of rice), was used to fund the shogunate.

The Philippines before 1946, had a Commonwealth government that had administered the country since 1935. Interrupted by the Japanese occupation in 1941-1945, the Commonwealth government was essentially the Spanish political system modified by the Americans, mainly at the central and provincial levels of administration. The major innovations included the creation of a Filipino legislature which in 1935 became the Philippine National Assembly;⁷ a judicial system theoretically constituting one of the three branches of government; and the introduction of guarantees of civil liberty. Under the Commonwealth government, a Filipino assumed for the first time the Presidency. Though practically independent from American supervision, the Commonwealth government continued to receive a High Commissioner, who represented the government of the United States. As the final authority on questions dealing with foreign affairs and currency, the American government also retained the final judgment on cases falling within a number of specified categories. To a certain extent, the first President of the Commonwealth, Manuel L. Quezon, like the shogun, was the first among political leaders and their allies. Quezon's social prestige and political power, along with those of his political and/or wealthy allies, enabled him to hold the balance of power among the significant, usually wealthy, power groups of Philippine society. He developed the Presidency into a very powerful office that appears to

⁵See J.W. Hall, *Japan, From Prehistory to Modern Times* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1968), 160-177.

⁶The outstanding control measure of the Tokugawa shogun which obliged all *daimyo* to reside part of the year in the shogun's capital of Edo and leave his wife and children behind when he travelled back to his domain.

⁷For a discussion of the Philippine political system, see R.E. Appalo, "The Philippine Political System in the Perspective of History," *Silliman Journal* (First Quarter, 1972), 1-27.

have rendered it difficult to operate the principle of separation of powers which the Americans introduced. It was not beyond Quezon to make the elites around him pay for whatever he needed to keep him in power.⁸ National laws reached the municipal level of government. Below it, what was meaningful to the people who composed the base of Philippine society, was the law of the powerful landlords and/or local political bosses who could dispense largesse bargained for ultimately from the Commonwealth President.⁹ Within this system, it is conceivable for the larger sector of the population to think of the Commonwealth President as someone distantly located and the American High Commissioner as even more removed from them, if the people were at all aware of his existence. To the end of the American colonial administration in 1946, the Philippine economy manifested "economic backwardness" which had been its lot since the beginning of the American period. For example, overdependence on a few exports which contributed the larger part of the revenues required to support government operation and other public services.¹⁰

To man the bureaucracy developed by the *Tokugawas*, the shogun depended on the Neo-Confucian-trained *samurai* as did the *daimyo* in their *han*. Similarly, the Commonwealth President relied on the *ilustrado*, or the intellectual elite educated in the American ideas and ideals of democracy, to administer the bureaucracy, a product of the successive Spanish and American colonial administrations.

Tokugawa Japan's society had a rigid class structure (which relaxed at the end of the Tokugawa period), composed of the nobles, the *samurai*, the farmers, the artisans, the merchants, and the class formed by those who did not fall under any of the above categories, such as the *ata* (outcast minority group). With the blurring of class lines as the Tokugawa period wore on, Japanese society became divided into two classes: the class of elites who held power as an accedence of status (e.g., the nobles, the *samurai*) or by virtue of wealth (the merchants and

⁸For instance, Quezon asked his affluent allies to arrange the purchase from Don Vicente Madrigal, owner of the D-M-H-M (*El Debate-Mabuhay-Herald-Monday Mail*) of the chain of newspaper publications, which he intended to use as a means of counteracting any criticism made of his administration published by Don Alejandro Roces' T-V-T (*Tribune-Vanguardia-Taliba*) chain, which supported Osmeña, Quezon's opponent in connection with the passage of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act. For more on Quezon as a political leader and how he operated with, or among, his allies, see T. Friend, *Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines, 1929-1946* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), 115; *passim*.

⁹Demands from the people or the local land-owner (if he was not the local political "boss") was first made on the political "boss" at the lowest level of government administration, i.e., the municipal level. The political "boss" on this level, bargained with the provincial political leader(s) or directly with political leaders on the national level—the legislators or government bureaucrats. Because the Commonwealth President, Quezon, exercised enormous power over the items of the budget and its disbursement, both legislators and bureaucrats ultimately had to bargain with him for largesse benefiting the people at the base of society.

¹⁰For more details on the "economic backwardness" of the Philippine economy during the American period, see N.G. Owen, "Philippine Economic Development and American Policy: A Reappraisal," *Solidarity* (September, 1972), 49-61. See also F.H. Golay, *The Philippines Public Policy and National Economic Development* (3rd printing; Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1968).

the artisans); the rest of the population, which made up the lower and larger base of Japanese society at the close of the Tokugawa period. By that time, political power had devolved into the hands of the lower-rank *samurai*—bureaucrats in the *bakufu* and in the *han*, particularly those from the *tozama* (outside) *han*—Satsuman, Chosu, Hizen and Tosa. Together with some nobles in the imperial court, they planned and executed both the Restoration and the changes aimed at transforming the existing society into something similar to those of the intrusive Western powers which were then pressuring Japan to open relations with them.

By 1946, Philippine society was practically a two-class society: the upper class, to which were co-opted those from the lower class who had acquired education or wealth; the lower class, which was made up of the larger sector of the population. Political power was controlled by the land-owning elite either directly or indirectly by supporting a political leader. For instance, President Quezon depended largely on the support of his affluent political allies from the landed elite, e.g., those belonging to the sugar bloc who were, at times, also engaged in business.¹¹ The political elite who inherited the leadership from Quezon, who died as President of the Commonwealth government in exile in the United States, were among those that can be considered second-in-command surrounding him before the Pacific War broke out. They planned and executed the development scheme intended to modernize and industrialize the country in the immediate postwar period.

Even before the first year of modernization in Japan and the Philippines, the leaders of each country had sought foreign advisers to help them plan the modernization or development of their societies, particularly the establishment of profitable industries and a strong military organization. The Japanese and Filipino leaders were assisted by foreign advisers in modifying their political systems to make them work as effectively as modern political systems are perceived to function in the West. Unlike the Philippines which depended largely on American advisers and assistance, Japan had a diversified list of foreign experts.¹² Because of their jealous concern over their own identity, the Japanese placed these advisers in administrative offices under Japanese supervisors, thereby relegating them to subordinate positions within the administrative hierarchy.¹³ Understandably the Filipinos could not place their American advisers on a similar level.

Supporting the political system of a society is its economic system. The Japanese economy before 1868 was basically agricultural. But during the early Meiji period, there were already long-term economic developments favorable to the rationalization of the economic system and the application of Western technology. These developments included the rise of rural capitalists with experience in invest-

¹¹See Friend, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

¹²They were the German, American, British, French and Italian experts, among others. See Hall, *op. cit.*, 287.

¹³*Loc. cit.*

ing accumulated capital in such productive enterprises as small-scale industries; the emergence of institutions that functioned like banks which made possible flexible financing; the existence of the cash nexus; and the standardization of certain products, a precondition for the introduction of the one-price system, a universalistic norm of modern society.¹⁴

Also predominantly agricultural, the Philippine economy before 1946 had undergone considerable changes, which were consequences of the following historical developments: the Manila-Acapulco trade, which contributed to the rise of Manila as a primate city; the agricultural and commercial "revolution" in the country during the late eighteenth through the nineteenth centuries;¹⁵ and the free-trade arrangement between the Philippines and the United States focusing on production of cash crops like sugar, abaca (Manila hemp) and coconut products, in the first half of the twentieth century.

In both Japanese and Philippine societies, landlordism and tenant agriculture had become prevalent. Some landowners became money lenders and merchants; a number of them, especially the Japanese merchants, invested in small-scale industries.¹⁶ Unlike Japan, which lacks large areas of tillable land, the Philippines before 1946 had plantation agriculture, as in the sugar plantations in Pampanga and Negros Occidental. The Filipinos were traditionally interested in investing surplus wealth not only in land but also in houses, jewelry and other conspicuous-consumption goods, while the frugal Japanese invested their savings in productive enterprises, including land. Indigenous capital was therefore readily available in Japan for investment during the first stage of modernization; the same was not true of the Philippines, which depended heavily on American economic assistance funds.

Traditional handicrafts and cottage industries, though declining, continued to operate in the Philippines alongside the extractive, though not the manufacturing industries.¹⁷ Manufacturing for the local market could not compete with the goods produced by the large-scale and

¹⁴For details related to these developments, see J.M. Saniel, "The Mobilization of Traditional Values in the Modernization of Japan," in *Religion and Progress in Modern Asia*, ed. by R.N. Bellah (New York: The Free Press, 1965), 134-135.

¹⁵See H. de la Costa, S.J., *Readings in Philippine History* (Manila: Bookmark, 1965), Chapters VIII and IX, 121-164. See also B. Legarda, Jr., "American Entrepreneurs in 19th Century Philippines," *Bulletin of the American Historical Committee of the American Association of the Philippines*, Vol. I, No. 1 (June 1972), 25-51.

¹⁶See T.G. Smith, *The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959), Part II, 67-213. See also O.D. Sheldon, *The Rise of the Merchant Class in Tokugawa, Japan, 1600-1868* (New York: Published for the Association for Asian Studies by J.J. Augustin, Inc., Pub., 1958).

¹⁷The extractive industries processed the products of mine, field, forest and sea. For examples: sugar milling, abaca (Manila Hemp) stripping, production of coconut oil and desiccated coconut, manufacturing of cigars, processing of gold and other minerals, production of lumber, furniture and plywood. See J.J. Carroll, S.J., *The Filipino Manufacturing Entrepreneur: Agent and Product of Change* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1965); 30.

efficient American manufacturers and imported tax free into the Philippines. The Filipino taste for American consumer goods was thus developed to the detriment of local small-scale producers like the weaving industry. The Pacific War in 1941 prevented implementation of an industrial program geared to the local market, in which government corporation were expected to play an important role.¹⁸

In Japan in the early Meiji period, small-scale industries supplied the consumption goods required by the people whose taste for them were reinforced by more than two centuries of isolation under the Tokugawas. Small-scale industries, especially silk, also contributed to economic development; their products composed Japan's main exports during the early Meiji period. Therefore, Japan could use scarce foreign exchange for importing the capital goods and technology¹⁹ to meet her development needs.

Both Japan and the Philippines had over two centuries of prior socio-politico-economic development. Together with the two countries' traditional institutions and values, this prior experience predisposed their political leaderships to select the particular aspects of modern society to which their societies were initially to respond.

Though at the beginning of the first phase of their modernization, the Japanese and Philippine societies and cultures had reached more or less comparable levels of development, yet the ability and rate of change taking place during one generation within each of the two countries' pre-existing traditional society differed. Among other things, this can be accounted for by the difference in their family systems, the core of social organization in both Japan and the Philippines.

II

The Japanese Family System

The basic unit of the traditional social organization in Japan is the *ie* (house or household). Sometimes referred to as the family system, the *ie* and not the individual is of primary importance. Generally comprising the house head's family members, it at times includes other members. The *ie* is a corporate residential group; it is also a managing body in agriculture or other similar pre-modern enterprises.²⁰ Hierarchical in its internal relationships, human interaction within the household is the primary and basic attachment and is taken as more

¹⁸For more details on the development of the Philippine economy, see A.V.H. Hartendorp, *History of Industry and Trade of the Philippines: From Pre-Spanish to the End of the Quirino Administration* (Manila: American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, 1958). See pp. 49-63 for the "synoptic list of government-oriented and controlled corporations and business agencies." See also L.E. Gleeck, Jr., *American Business and Philippine Economic Development* (Manila: Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc., 1975).

¹⁹W.W. Lockwood, *The Economic Development of Japan, Growth and Structural Change, 1868-1938* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), 34.

²⁰Chie Nakane, *Japanese Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 14. See also T. Koyama, "Changing Family Structure in Japan," in *Japanese Culture, Its Development and Characteristics*, ed. by R.J. Smith and R.K. Beardsley (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1962), 47-49.

important than all other relationships.²¹ The *ie* is paternalistic and strongly male-oriented. And it is goal-and-achievement-oriented. The crucially significant bonds within it are those between father and son, usually the oldest one, who, until the post-World-War II Civil Code was enforced, inherited from his father (by the principle of primogeniture) both the headship of the house and its property. In this way, loyalty to the head of the *ie* appears to have been a status rather than a personal loyalty. Such a social organization has generated what may be described as the collectivist norms and group consciousness of Japanese society. Outside the *ie*, kinship is comparatively weak. For instance, a married sibling who lives in another household is considered as some kind of an outsider. It is said that in rural Japan "one's neighbour is of more importance than one's relatives."²² On the other hand, the adoption of a son-in-law, especially the adoption of a talented person, again suggests tendencies away from personal to status loyalty which can perhaps be viewed as "generalized particularism."²³

The foundation of the individual's total emotional participation in the collectivity is the *ie*'s cohesive sense of group resulting in the building of a closed world characterized by strong group independence or isolation and developing in the consciousness of "us" among *ie* members as contrasted to "them." In this way, "Japanese group affiliations and human relations are exclusively one-to-one: a single loyalty stands uppermost and firm."²⁴ The head of the *ie* represents it in its contacts with those outside the group; when a member of the collectivity interacts with those outside the social group, he always conceives himself as part of his *ie*. In cases of membership in more than one group, only one is clearly preferred, e.g., the *ie*, and the others are considered secondary. Because the Japanese emotional participation within the *ie* involves the individual "body and soul," there is no room for serving two masters.²⁵ This total emotional involvement promotes a sense of unity which further strengthens group solidarity.

To keep the cohesiveness of the *ie*, the pre-World-War-II family code provided that in the following instances of adoption—i.e., a family's adoption of a male (in the absence of a male heir) or a female (on her marriage), or a male child (in the case of adoption of a young boy)—the one concerned had to remove formally his/her records from the family register of his/her original family and enter them in the register of his/her adoptive family. Adoption is thus a family mechanism which reinforces group loyalty because it promotes a single channeling of loyalties upwards to house head.

²¹Nakane, *op. cit.*, 5.

²²*Ibid.*, 5-7.

²³Saniel, *op. cit.*, 126.

²⁴Nakane, *op. cit.*, 21.

²⁵*Loc. cit.* The socio-psychological dimension of Japanese group cohesiveness is explained in C.T. Hally, "The Impact of Japan's Social Value System Upon Asia," *Publications Sud-Est Asiatique et Extreme Orient*. Centre d'Etude Orient, November 24, 1970, 14-15 (mimeographed).

The continuity of the family system is the main function of a woman in the *ie*. When a woman is married into the *ie*, she occupies the lowest status within it. She is considered a full member of her family of procreation after she bears a child, whom she views as her only possession,²⁶ perhaps, as a psychological compensation for her inferior position in the *ie*. Therefore, she tends to develop in the child a feeling of dependence upon her. This phenomenon, which is an aspect of Japanese group orientation and strengthens it, is referred to as *amae* (noun of *amaeru*). It is defined by T. Doi as "to depend and presume upon another's benevolence."²⁷ What is important is the cultural idealization of the mother, who is regarded as a given, expecting no reward,²⁸ a selfless benefactor. In a male-dominated society, the mother, who is not only a sacrificing individual but also a member of the inferior sex, helps dissociate the *on*—bestowal from superiority in status.²⁹ This view of a Japanese mother's role within the *ie* seems to have contributed to the feeling of belonging to one group and one group alone in the Japanese psyche. The mother's role appears not to have caused any deviation of the house member's loyalty and filial piety away from the house head in so far as decision-making of the *ie* is concerned.

Another factor reinforcing Japanese group cohesiveness is the *on*. The concept (translated as "love" and "devotion" generally to a hierarchical superior) is a set of obligations passively incurred, since it is said that every Japanese conceives himself as "debtor to the ages and the world." Through one's contacts in his life, *on* can be received from one's superior—the emperor, an individual's parents, his lord, his teacher, sometimes one's equal, and so on.³⁰ "From this debt his daily decisions and actions must spring."³¹ Each person is obligated to return an *on* in that *on*-receiving suggests either *gimu* or *giri*. *Gimu* corresponds to a limitless *on*; *giri*, to a limited, repayable *on*.³² This underscores the dominant value held by the Japanese which emphasizes togetherness and solidarity. While the *on*-receiver is expected to be dependent on the *on*-giver, the latter is presumed to be dependable. "It is not only that demonstration of dependability is normatively required but that to be depended upon is also emotionally

²⁶Y. Nojiri, "Japanese Woman in Family and Society—Autonomy and Dependence," Lecture sponsored by the Philippines-Japan Ladies Association, June 22, 1976, Makati, Rizal, Philippines.

²⁷T. Doi, "Amae: A Key Structure for Understanding Japanese Personality Structure," in Smith and Beardsley (eds.) *op. cit.*, 132. For a full discussion of the concept of *amae*, see Doi's book translated by J. Bester. *The Anatomy of Dependence* (2nd ed; Tokyo: Kodansha International Ltd., 1974).

²⁸T. Sugiyama Lebra, "Reciprocity and the Asymmetric Principles: An Analytical Reappraisal of the Japanese Concept of *on*," [reprinted from *Psychologia*, Vol. XII (1969), 129-138] in T.S. Lebra and W.P. Lebra, *Japanese Cultures and Behavior, Selected Readings* (An East-West Center Book; Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1974), 199-200.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 200.

³⁰R. Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946), 98.

³¹*Loc. cit.*

³²*Ibid.*, 114-132.

desirable.³³ Reciprocals of *on*, which are two forms of unconditional repayment of *on* (*gimu*), are: *chu*, repayment of one's *on* to the emperor or loyalty to the emperor; *ku*, repayment of one's *on* to one's parents or filial piety to one's parents, values stressed in the early stage of Japan's modernization process.³⁴

Within the family system as its core, the social organization of Japanese society and its values provided a basis for the development of an effective, centralized state administrative system capable of extending down to the household level. This will be discussed in more detail after considering the family system in the Philippines, which also constitutes the core of the country's social organization.

The Filipino Family System

The basic unit of the Philippine social organization is the nuclear family. Among the Filipinos of the villages who make up the larger sector of the Philippine population,³⁵ and to a certain extent those of the urban areas, the Filipino family can be graphically described as making up the core or the inner circle of three concentric circles. The second one around it is composed of a wide range of symmetrically recognized extended bilateral family kin—relatives of father and mother. The third is formed by ritual kin—e.g., kin acquired through such mechanism as the *compadrazgo*³⁶ or the use of kinship signals (in the superordinate-subordinate relations of members of the domains family with the ritual kins of the third circle), in the process of expanding the family links to include friends, partners, employers and so on, with whom a member (or members) of the family is (are) interacting or intend to relate more intensely to enhance the nuclear family's interest(s). Because of this third circle of kins, the Filipino family system may be viewed as multilateral.

A system of alliances is provided for by the expanded kinship structure. "But being a relative (other than a member of the nuclear family) does not necessarily mean being an ally, although the relationship provides one avenue for becoming allies. Once the alliance has

³³Sugiyama, *op cit.*, 199.

³⁴For details regarding *on* see Benedict, *op. cit.*, 198-232. See also Sugiyama Lebra, *op. cit.*, 192-204. For an expanded discussion on the mobilization of the traditional values of loyalty to emperor and filial piety to parents in Japan's modernization process, see Sanieel, *op. cit.* 124-147. See also Sanieel's article on "Communication and National Development in Japan," in "*Communication and National Development in Southeast Asian Countries*," 3 vols. (Quezon City: Institute of Mass Communication, University of the Philippines, [1967(?)]), Vol. 45-102 (mimeographed).

³⁵Castillo comments: "Until today, the Philippines is essentially a nation of villages and the typical Filipino is 'taga baryo' (from the village)." See G.T. Castillo, *The Filipino Woman as Manpower: The Image and Reality*, (College, Laguna: University of the Philippines in Los Baños, March 1976), 25 (mimeographed).

³⁶The establishment of relationship between parents and their children's godparents are basically by means of the Roman Catholic rituals of baptism, confirmation and marriage or some other means.

been formalized, roles and relationships are more or less defined."³⁷ It is however hard to trace the line of authority nor the status of the ties within the expanded circle of kin because the center of authority varies with different circumstances and situations at various spans of time. The extension of kin relationship beyond the nuclear family results in overlapping kinship status and roles among relatives; this complex network of kinship relations could involve an individual in entangling alliances and conflicts of interests and loyalties, especially in the absence of a dominant leader.

Within this extended kinship structure, an individual classifies and differentiates his kinsmen according to their position in the three circles of relatives: consanguineal (blood relationship), affinal (relationship through marriage), and ritual (relationship based on rites) kins. Superimposed on each structure linking the individual to relatives from each category of kin, is the generational pattern, which is defined in terms of the vertical positioning of individuals according to their order of descent. Recognition of relatives based on this arrangement generally covers three generations in the ascending level, while it reaches down to the fourth generation in the descending order. This long line of relatives is generally increased by the wide extent of recognized collateral relations extending to as far as third degree cousins of both father and mother as well as ritual kin. In this context, the Filipino social structure is both vertically and horizontally formed.

Faced with so many kins, a child eventually learns how to maneuver himself among them—in fact, how to manipulate them for his own benefit. Through this process, an individual learns how to play politics within the family system, especially with kins in the second and third circles of kins where the time-span of alliance groups are temporary and at times unpredictable. Thus there seems to be more room for creative individuals to develop within the Filipino family system than in the Japanese.

On the other hand, because of the value of authority, respect and reciprocity, as well as the insecurity of the alliance system, the individual is always concerned with the feelings of others (*makiramdam*). In other words, he has to develop a very sensitive "cultural antenna" which can monitor the feelings of people around him so that he can be guided in his relations with each of them within a particular situation and a particular moment of time. This concern perhaps accounts for the traditional Filipino hospitality, which generally impresses foreign visitors. *Makiramdam*, a mechanism which can be traced to the Filipino individual's need to be loved by others (synonymous to the fear of rejection), becomes the basis of the person's self-esteem (*amor propio*) when fulfilled. Since the principal rule is not to offend, its first requirement, therefore, is to be sensitive to the reaction of others. Highly valued are the traditional tools in the culture such as *pakikisama* (to get along with), *hiya* (shame), *utang na loob*

³⁷J.J. Carroll, *Changing Patterns of Social Structure in the Philippines, 1896-1962: An Outline Survey* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1968), 35.

(to be grateful or to bear a "debt of gratitude"), *delicadeza* (to be cautious), *mapagbigay* (to be generous), *makiramay* (to share), *pagtitiis* (to endure) and *pagtitimpi* (to suppress).³⁸ These cultural mechanisms appear to have prevented the Filipino from becoming a "rugged individualist" and Philippine society is characterized by accommodation rather than confrontation in the interaction between or among individuals.

The significant interaction patterns in the bilateral kinship system, based on the nuclear family, stem from the values of authority, respect and reciprocity. While authority is an important aspect of family system in other societies, it is a value stressed in the Filipino family system. It is based on age rather than sex. The comparative egalitarianism of Philippine society is rooted in pre-Spanish times, when women could inherit property and succeed to the headship of the *barangay*.³⁹ Respect is a function of the generational pattern in an individual's interaction with kinsmen. And reciprocity, or the mutual give-and-take relationship, is mainly a kin-group affair, since related families are expected to help one another in times of crisis and to mutually share blessings in prosperity.

The value of *utang na loob* and its sanction, *hiya*, is rooted in this kinship value of reciprocity. The concept, *hiya*, in Tagalog appears to be evident among people in practically all of the Philippines. In the broadest sense, it is best defined as "self esteem" (*amor propio*). *Hiya* seems to be one of the most important concepts in the Filipino social psyche because it reflects most of the aspects of Filipino value and motivation.⁴⁰

Paternalism, familism and personalism characterize the relationship within the nuclear family, the frame within which a Filipino's orientation in his society and culture is initially guided and continuously influenced. The hierarchically vertical structure of relationship and what many observers describe as the authoritarianism of the head of the family have generated a certain amount of conformity, which has limited some kind of bargaining or "politicking" by individual members of a family for support and reward within the family. This has perhaps been so because the pattern of generational respect in Filipino society has given decision-making power to the head of the family or older individuals, in the absence of a father or mother. Sometimes the head of the family may be an older sibling—whether brother or sister, or a relative of either parents who can take care of the children left parentless. In a fatherless family, it is generally the mother who acts as

³⁸L.V. Lapuz, M.D., *A Study of Psychopathology* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1973), 244.

³⁹A *barangay* was a pre-Spanish socio-politico-economic collectivity based on kinship, consisting of 30 to 100 families. According to A. de Morga, if there were no sons, the daughters succeeded to the position of chief of *barangay* with the oldest daughter given the priority to succession. See A. de Morga, "Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas," in *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898*, ed. by E. Blair and J. Robertson, Vol. XIV (Cleveland, Ohio: A. H. Clark and Co., 1903-1909), 126.

⁴⁰R.B. Fox, "Generalized Lowland Philippine Social Organization," 10 (mimeographed).

the head. For, unlike the Japanese, the Filipino female wife shares authority with the head of the family.⁴¹ The Filipino's loyalty and obedience to the head of the family also differs from the Japanese family in that it is person—rather than status-oriented.

The "line of authority in the Filipino family is difficult to define and delineate with precision. . . Available materials on the *Filipino family* suggest that functionally, it is *more supportive. . . than authoritarian* [italics mine]."⁴² The family extends support and protection to its members when required "even if such need arose out of deviant behavior and contrary to the expectation of the majority of the family members."⁴³ This is because the family—the nuclear and, to a certain extent, the bilateral family—and its members are concerned with avoiding "loss of face" which would cause *hiya*. The reputation or the "good name" of the family has to be maintained by all means and at all costs. Basically, the nuclear family and, to some degree, the extended bilateral kinship structure provide a Filipino with a high sense of security and "belonging." A Filipino Psychiatrist, L.V. Lapuz writes:

A person grows up in the Filipino culture with one paramount assumption: that he belongs to someone. When he presents his self to others, it is with his family that he is identified. He belongs to the family as a whole as well as to its members. Whatever honor, glory, infamy or disgrace he gains is shared by them. In good fortune and bad, his family is the first to know and participate.

Within the family, such belongingness becomes more finely delineated. One belongs to one's parents, or to whoever assumes or sustains meaningful authority and responsibility in their absence. . . The feeling of belongingness assumes an additional meaning aside from shared participation, as in the context of the family, in that inter-personal belongingness stresses allegiance, loyalty and a sense of obligation. The importance of parents particularly the mother, appears to be that of keeping the family intact, so that the feeling of belonging may continue. The absence of the parents (authority figures) makes the solidarity of the family difficult to maintain.

.....

Between the parents, there is a further choice as to whom one belongs. Almost always, it is to the mother. The loyalty, allegiance

⁴¹For more details on Filipino women's role in Philippine society see G.T. Castillo and S.H. Guerrero, "The Filipino Women: A Study in Multiple Roles," *Lipunan*, Vol. III (1968-1969), 16-37. See also Castillo, *op. cit.*; I.R. Cortes, "Women's Rights under the 1973 Constitution," (Professorial Chair Lectures; Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1975); Y.Q. Javellana, *Women and the Law: Round Table Conference: Achieving for Women Full Equality Before the Law*. Printed from *Philippine Law Journal*, Vol. XL, no. 1 (February 1975).

⁴²P.P. Mendez and F. Landa Jocano, *The Filipino Family in Its Rural and Urban Orientation: Two Case Studies* (Manila: Centro Escolar University Research and Development Center, 1974), vi.

⁴³*Loc. cit.*

and sense of obligation are stronger with her than with the father. One must never cause her hurt or displeasure. The greater attachment to the mother is, of course, inevitable not only because of biological circumstances, but also because of the prolonged intense emotional nurturing received from her. Here is where to belong gains the meaning of to be loved, cared for and protected. . . . Father is no less important, but love and loyalty accorded him arise mostly from what he does for the family as a whole; he provides its material needs and spearheads family activity in society. His relationship with the children is also influenced greatly by how mother presents his image to the children. Sadly sometimes, father does not have much of a role aside from being the bread-winner; he may then seek attachments which are more emotionally satisfying to him outside the family [which perhaps explains the prevalence of the *querida* (mistress) in Philippine society].

The Filipino woman portrays quite often the quientessence of this attachment to the mother. . . . Even after the daughter's marriage, the mother can still be a fount of strength, especially in times of stress. . . . her family of orientation comes first as far as a sense of belonging is concerned, rather than her family of procreation.⁴⁴ [underscoring supplied.]

The mother is the "broker" between her children and father; she negotiates with him for whatever a child needs. The father sometimes assumes the role of negotiator between his children and their mother. But because the mother generally holds the purse strings and ideally represents love and is the dispenser of *awa* (pity or compassion,⁴⁵ which implies concessions), she is powerful. (From the viewpoint of Western norms, however, the concept of *awa* can be interpreted as encouraging tolerance of corruption and condoning deviant behavior even when illegal.)

A person's feeling of belonging to someone can be taken as the extension of one's self, for "to belong" is to be "part of" someone.⁴⁶ It is in this context that mother's feeling of belonging to her husband perhaps motivates her to project, for instance, his image in the public mind as a successful businessman, a civic leader, an economic thinker and so on—on the strength of her talent.⁴⁷ Because she belongs to her

⁴⁴Lapuz, *op. cit.*, 236-237.

⁴⁵The use of *awa* is culturally sanctioned to relieve an individual from any burdensome guilt feelings. Forgiveness is forthcoming when an individual throws himself at the mercy of the aggrieved, and then undergoes a period of contrition and repentance. In this way, guilt does not stay very long. Guilt is dissipated through "blaming" and blame-shifting which simultaneously releases hostile impulses. Guilt in the context of Philippine culture is synonymous with "blame" and is another form of social control to discourage those who may become too aggressive or ambitious. Lapuz, *op. cit.*, 248-252.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 237.

⁴⁷For example, besides the Filipino women's active participation in business activities, there are others who manage their husband's property while "he dreams or dances his life away," or is the mind and the dedicated worker

children as they do to her, she also projects herself in their achievements.

From the foregoing discussion, it is easy to observe that "to belong to" or "to be part of" someone is the basic need of a Filipino. "It transcends the need to be dependent or to be interdependent or to be socially liked, accepted or approved of. When he knows whom he belongs to, then he knows that here is where his emotional and material security lies. He knows also that there is where he owes loyalty and allegiance, and this knowledge guides his behavior accordingly. This is his assurance against an unpredictable fate."⁴⁸ And in the Filipino family, it is the mother who claims priority to the loyalty of its members, although the father is theoretically the ultimate decision-maker and authority. The realities and dynamics of the Filipino family system therefore preclude the direct channeling of loyalties from the members of the nuclear family to the head of the family as compared to the automatic siphoning of loyalties to the head of the *ie* as in the Japanese family.

How are relations between kin and non-kin pursued within the Philippine social organization? Social distance marks the relations between members of the nuclear and expanded kinship collectivities, on the one hand, and non-kin on the other. This relationship is sometimes described in contemporary studies of anthropologists and sociologists of Philippine social organization as the *sila* (they)-and-*kami* (we) complex since primary social intercourse of Filipino society is basically centered on obligations to the nuclear family and then to the expanded kin group, if at all.

This kinship orientation of the Filipinos has brought about such values as *tayo-tayo* (lit. "we" or "among us"), related to the concept of *kami*, to include members of the kin group *vis-a-vis* non-kin, and *pakikisama*, values used to avoid conflicts within the family or the kinship group. In Filipino social relations, confrontation is avoided in favor of accommodation. Relationships with non-kinsmen are "delicate and insecure." Social patterns have however evolved "to bridge this social distance between kin and non-kin . . . hospitality, politeness of speech, indirection of interpersonal behavior."⁴⁹

Because of the individual's allegiance to his family and its welfare, he operates within a cultural setting of personal connections and transactions that could threaten but not always violate the merit principle. One instance is the appointment of qualified relatives to positions of responsibility within the bureaucracy. From the point of view of

behind a prominent businessman, a successful politician and the like which, according to Legarda, "are sometimes difficult to document but remain in the realm of 'what every woman knows.'" See B. Legarda y Fernandez, "Our Growing Entrepreneurial Class," quoted in H. de la Costa, *op. cit.*, 1965), 289.

⁴⁸Lapuz, *op. cit.*, 137.

⁴⁹R.B. Fox, "The Study of Filipino Society and Its Significance to Programs of Economic Development," *Philippine Sociological Review*, Vol. VII, nos. 1-2 (January-April 1959).

the Western merit system, this could be considered nepotism. To a Filipino, however, he is guided not only by the traditional norm of family obligation but also the pragmatic need of having someone in the administrative system on whom he can rely more fully than non-kin. This is not to say that appointments of undeserving relatives to government positions were not made by government officials. In this instance, however, Filipino society has its instruments of social control.

Filipino society's instruments of social control seem to be reinforced by the use of the direct method of criticism or gossip to level down a person and check his aggression and hostility. The ambition or achievement of an individual is sometimes debased; "blaming" is used as a force to maintain "equality" among members of social groups (like the nuclear family or the extended kinship group) and to serve as a threat to those who openly seek positions of power and advantage; the expansion of his social responsibilities toward the rest of his social group has a leveling effect on a successful individual. Such social controls exert pressure on an individual to conform with the norms, for instance, of a small, relatively cohesive nuclear family and to be loyal to it rather than to the larger social groups or the still larger social system—Philippine society. Intense loyalty by an individual toward his family, especially when headed by a strongly dominant person, can partly explain political killings that had taken place. It has also resulted in the segmentation of Philippine society.

Outside the nuclear family, kinship structures and loyalties are brittle. This can perhaps partly explain the ease with which Filipinos have accommodated selected foreign cultural traits. Since there was no possibility of a strong opposition against the external group bearing a foreign culture, these traits from abroad were accepted but modified to meet local needs. Nor was there initially any significant destruction or disruption of the Filipino nuclear families by the colonizing agents or agencies as did take place, for instance, in Central and South America. In other words, Western practices have been refashioned by Filipinos in the comparatively well-knit nuclear family to fit their own values and cultural demands.

We shall now turn to a consideration of the impact of the family system of Japan and the Philippines on each society's political system during the early stage of modernization.

III

In the period immediately before 1868 in Japan, and 1946 in the Philippines, the authority of the state or the formal government did not reach down to the people, who made up the base of each of these societies, i.e., the political systems that can be described as "centralized feudalism."

During the period considered in this paper as the first stage of modernization for each country, the initial goal of the political leaders of both countries who adopted certain cultural traits from the West was to mobilize and rationalize their society's resources to achieve a political system characterized by greater control over the society and

greater efficiency in attaining the goals they recognized as those of the "good society" that they wished to establish. Each of the two countries' political systems was geared toward attaining a single center of authority. However, the achievement of a modern political system initiated and led by the traditional but adaptive political elite, would result, as it did, in the conservation or protection of the role that these elites assumed in their society (therefore, their power).

In Japan the adaptive political leaders of the traditional government itself recognized that the country might succumb to the foreign challenges it then faced unless it introduced reforms that could at least attain the facade of a modern state. This perceived danger compelled them to immediately institute reforms which were designed not to transform the traditional social system but to strengthen it against foreign pressures. Thus Japan's modernization has sometimes been described as "defensive."

On the other hand, the Philippines, which was subject for over 300 years under Spain and the United States (including a brief period of Japanese control) was successively dependent on these colonial powers for its political cohesion. The challenge faced by the Philippine political elite (who inherited the authority of their colonial rulers) was the need to establish a cohesive political system that could assert Philippine socio-politico-economic independence in the face of internal threats (e.g., the Communist-led *Hukbalahaps*⁵⁰) and what has been referred to as the "cold war"—the post World War II power rivalry between the "free world," led by the Philippines' last colonial tutor, and "the Communist world." The political elite appear to have realized that the immediate introduction of reforms into Philippine society was necessary if it was to survive as a truly independent state.

During the period (for each society) covered by this paper, the political leaders of Japan and the Philippines worked for what seem to be the universal goals of both developing and developed nation-states: security and prosperity of their societies. Because the two countries aimed at achieving these general goals within their traditional social organizations (in which they were enculturated) as they moved towards becoming a modern state, the political system that evolved in each society, their specific goals, and the means used by the Japanese and Filipino political leaders differed.

The Modernization of Japan's Political System: The Politics of Authoritarianism

Unlike contemporary developing societies, Japan in 1868 had a strong national group consciousness or identity and solidarity. A country with a common language and culture which escaped Western

⁵⁰Abbreviation of "Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon" (literally, Army of the Country Fighting Against the Japanese). It was formed in 1943, in Central Luzon, and continued to exist during the period of the Philippine Republic as a rebel group aiming at dislodging the government.

colonization and which was practically closed to the world for more than two centuries before its modern period, Japan did not have to confront such difficulties as present-day modernizing post-traditional societies now do. The first stage of the modernization of Japan's polity was the creation of a centralized system, including the successful adjustments of centrifugal feudal loyalties to the center of the political system. The immediate goal of the nation-state was to recover full sovereign power, which was being infringed by "extraterritoriality" and the uniform five-percent (5%) *ad valorem* tariff enjoyed by the Western powers, under the so-called "unequal treaties" negotiated by them with Japan in the nineteenth century. In other words, Japan aimed at attaining equality with the Western powers.

The centralization and integration of the Japanese political system was accomplished through authoritarianism based on the concepts of the emperor and the family system with their undergirding Confucian values of loyalty and filial piety. Such values were powerful sources of motivation for conscious and purposeful action towards certain ends.

The restoration of the emperor to this theoretical place at the top of the political system in 1868 facilitated the transfer of allegiance from the feudal lords to the nation-state—a process usually requiring time—by substituting for abstract idea of nation-state the concrete notion of the emperor as the father of the nation. The father image of a divine emperor also provided the Japanese people with an unchanging, fixed source of authority, which aided the centralization of political control. The subject incurs duties toward his emperor as does a son to his parents and owes loyalty to the emperor who is responsible for his well-being. Within this context, the emperor system is the political expression of the Japanese family system, although the full notion of the family state only became explicit toward the end of the Meiji era. Besides projecting the emperor as the father of the nation, the imperial house being the main line and the other Japanese families its branches, the emperor system (on the basis of Shintoist and Confucian values) includes the concept of a divine emperor (the imperial sovereign) descended through an unbroken lineage from divine ancestors. He is also co-terminous with polity (*kokutai*).⁵¹

The emperor system was reinforced at the base of Japanese society by strengthening the family, which constituted the lower echelon of the vertically hierarchic society and its political and economic subsystems. In this way the family served as the keystone in a state which was also thought of as a large family headed by the emperor.⁵² Thus society and polity were conceived as one.

⁵¹The concept of *kokutai* is explained by Aizawa Seishisai, one of the scholars of the Mito school of Tokugawa Japan. See R. Tsunoda, *et. al.* (comps.), *Sources of Japanese Tradition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), 222-227; 288-289.

⁵²Saniel, *Mobilization . . .*, *op. cit.*, 125, 126.

To mobilize support from the base of the population, Japan's innovative political leaders translated the nation's goals into a traditional language of loyalty and obligation—the language of feudal and family ethics expressing ideas central to the experience of practically all Japanese.⁵³ By maintaining the socio-political, but not in certain instances the economic, e.g., the conditions of the peasant, the creative and pragmatic Meiji statesmen established a reliable and stable base of political support in the countryside. While the peasants' material welfare was not always taken care of, the Meiji political leaders at least gave them civil order and political security. They were not uprooted from their cherished way of life by enforced industrialization. Instead, the Meiji modernizers systematically preserved and integrated the pre-existing traditionally organized small and middle industrial sectors (whose structure, therefore dynamics, was patterned after that of the family system), into the state of economy in such a manner as to complement the production of the new large-scale industries, the organization of which was also patterned after the family system.⁵⁴ It was possible for the Meiji modernizing elites to make the government initially capitalize and manage the large-scale strategic industries⁵⁵ because they had at the government's disposal a "solidified" national income as a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1873. The law, which stabilized revenues from agriculture at a certain level, largely supported the government for 40 years.⁵⁶ In effect, Japan's industrialization during the first stage of its modernization was paid for by the agricultural sector. Gradualism, which characterized the modernization of the agricultural sector, preserved the continuity and stability of the Japanese village, while rapid and major social changes were taking place in other sectors.

Rapid industrialization first strengthened authoritarian rule by providing new instruments for concentrating power and wealth. Other instruments like banks and shipping companies were increasingly controlled by financial and shipping companies, which partly depended on government subsidies and contributed in no small measure to the national power of the new autocracy.⁵⁷ As industrialization continued, an increasing number of persons came to possess the economic and social prerequisites for participation in politics.

⁵³T.C. Smith, *The Agrarian Origins . . .*, *op. cit.*, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959), 205.

⁵⁴See T. Bisson, *Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), 9-10.

⁵⁵See T.C. Smith, *Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan: Government Enterprises 1868-1888* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1955), 97-98. See also E.H. Norman, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State, Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period* (I.P.R. Inquiry series; New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), 117-135.

⁵⁶See W.W. Lockwood, "Economic and Political Modernization in Japan", in R.E. Ward and D.A. Rostow (eds.), *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Studies in Political Development; Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), 118-120. See also B.K. Marshall, *Capitalism and Nationalism in Prewar Japan: The Ideology of the Business Elite, 1868-1941* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, ca. 1967).

⁵⁷Lockwood, "Economic and Political Modernization . . ." *op. cit.*, 120-145.

The high rate of population growth of modernizing Japan caused the persistence in the Japanese scene of small shops with less than five workers, which were rooted in the Tokugawa artisan tradition.⁵⁸ A number of them continued to produce traditional consumer goods to meet the essential needs of the Japanese people. The rest of these small concerns subsisted entirely on subcontract from large-scale industries, between which was a hierarchically structured relationship. Bimodality, or dual structure, of the Japanese economy characterized the industrial sector.

Affecting all aspects of Japan's transition into a modern state were the measures adopted to raise, equip, train and manage military forces. The centralizing of military power was connected with the political unification of the nation.⁵⁹ Raising a conscript army was one of the reforms changing the country's institutional structure. Among other things, universal military service helped reduce class lines, promoted social mobility and raised the level of general technological education. Imparting a sense of involvement in national affairs, universal military service heightened the feeling of identification with the national polity. While they trained, the conscripts acquired new skills, gained stronger orientation to the advantage of superior performance and achievement and were exposed to ideology tending to strengthen nationalism.

Along with Shinto beliefs, *bushido*, a status ethics systematized during the Tokugawa period and emphasizing loyalty, became the code of the national army. It made for the strength and cohesiveness of the modern Japanese army and was an effective means of directing all loyalties toward a deified emperor.

Within the military establishment, a conscious move was made to use the family as a model of social organization which aided in drawing easily the conscripts' loyalty and eased their adjustment to military life, where interpersonal relations of their villages were duplicated. The Tokugawa legacy of military leadership helped Japan to confront the international realities of the nineteenth century. Among the Meiji statesmen, it was the military or *samurai* who realized that it would be meaningless for Japan to confront the powers on an equal basis without military strength and power comparable to the West. In 1895 Japan won the first of the wars—the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895)—it fought within the next 50 years. War was closely associated with the entire process of political modernization because it enhanced the sense of patriotism and sense of mission of the country through government procurement of war needs and other expenditures. War eventually gained for Japan its goal of equality with the Western

⁵⁸I. B. Taeuber, *The Population of Japan* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958), 38-45. See also Lockwood, *The Economic Development . . . op. cit.*, 34.

⁵⁹This part of the paper covering the military organization of Meiji Japan is based mainly on R. F. Hackett, "The Military Japan" and N. Ike, "War and Modernization," both of which are published in R. E. Ward, *Political Development in Modern Japan* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), 328-351 and 189-211 respectively.

Powers in the twentieth century. Moreover, in the 1890's, the Sino-Japanese War kept at bay the politicians in the Diet whose opposition to the political leadership of the oligarchs became stronger especially as it concerned the expansion of the military budget. By 1895, the political parties in Japan were visible and "felt" mainly because of their "noise" function.

In Japan's modernization process, communication was a basic ingredient in nation-building, especially since it created a climate within which modernization or development could take place.⁶⁰ During the early years of modernization, the convergence of the socio-politico-economic hierarchies facilitated the communication from the top down to the lowest social unit (i.e., the family) of messages pertinent to the transformation of Japan.

Traditional norms of social processes were the major support of the modernizing policies of Japan's political leaders. Traditional Japanese expectations of socio-politico-economic behavior remained valid. Specialization and social interaction within the vertically hierarchical social, political and economic groups were still traditionally Japanese. The people continued to give loyalty and filial piety to their superiors who played traditional roles in new ways. Modern functions were grafted into their traditional roles. For instance, the functions of the first prefectural governors of Japan were grafted onto their roles of *daimyo*, or the role of the head of the Mitsui holding company grafted into his role as head of the Mitsui house. Traditional cognitive habits and roles as well as opinion-reaction relationships continued to be practised rather than unlearned. Within these social relations, therefore, acceptance of social changes necessary for modernization meant compliance with the prescription of the hierarchy.

Modernization, planned at the top of the political hierarchy, was transmitted through a communication system which coincided with the social hierarchical system downward through an all-encompassing bureaucracy to the informal communicator at face-to-face level in the smaller social groups, ultimately to the family, and accepted by the people as a matter of accedence to rank.

The new national system of education and mass media (at that time, including the newspapers and various types of literary works) greatly influenced the informal or face-to-face communicators who transmitted information on the modernization of the Japanese society.

As a response to the dysfunctional effects of Western influence on early Meiji Japan, the country's statesmen in 1885 turned to the educational system to counteract what was perceived as an imminent disruption of the social system and, ultimately, of the political and economic systems. They tapped the deep roots of native culture to vitalize the educational system of the state and make it more effective and hence meaningful to the people. By requiring that all important

⁶⁰This part of the paper covering communication and modernization in Japan is based mainly on the author's earlier work, "Communication . . .," *op. cit.*, 45-102.

aspects of the Education Ministry be approved by the Privy Council, which was controlled by the modernizing elite, it became easy for the oligarchs to manipulate the educational system so that it would assist the state when facing serious problems.

By 1890 the Imperial Rescript on education was promulgated to reinforce the concept of the emperor system and its underpinning values of loyalty and filial piety and the Confucian virtues of diligence, public spirit, respect for law and willingness to die for the emperor in battle. The Rescript was soon described as "the basic sacred text of the new religion of patriotism" which guided Japan's educators. By the turn of the century, the Imperial Rescript and the ethics or morals courses firmly set the pattern of Japanese ideological education which directed Japanese thought and action until the last war.

Like the educational system, the mass media were generally controlled by the political system. Nevertheless, the Japanese press, in its struggle for greater freedom of expression from the time it appeared during the period covered by this study, oftentimes assumed an anti-government posture. Because of the language barrier, the Japanese people experienced the initial modernization process under conditions of relative isolation from information coming from the outside world. What the Japanese learned about the world community was mainly what the Meiji modernizing elite wanted them to know.

Briefly, the changes introduced into Japan's political system, supported by the economic, military and communication subsystems into which were also introduced innovations during the first stage of the country's modernization, suggest the capacity of the leadership elite to use selective elements of the past. The elite employed to the maximum certain built-in resources of Japanese society for the purpose of modernization. All these account for the relatively rapid and smooth process of Japanese modernization. Within a generation, patriotism had been implanted on the consciousness of every citizen and only a few peripheral elements of society tended to question state values and institutions.⁶¹

While the politics of Japan's modernization may be described as the politics of authoritarianism, it was not without its weak points. One of them was the development of a political system that could easily be manipulated by the top political leaders to fight one war after another and to concentrate part of the attention of the political, economic and communication subsystems during the interwar periods, on the preparation for another war. But this is beyond the purview of this paper. Let me point out here, however, that the authoritarian political system of Japan faced the Satsuma rebellion in 1877, the only major threat to the modernizing political system, which was successfully quelled by Japan's new conscript army. And as Japan's economic system underwent change, the authoritarian government of the early Meiji period was confronted with a series of agrarian or peasant

⁶¹R.A. Scalapino, "Environmental and Foreign Contribution, Japan" in R.E. Ward and R.A. Rostow, *op. cit.*, 67-86.

uprisings between 1873 and 1881.⁶² At the end of the period under study, even if Japan was unable to remove “extraterritoriality” and uniform tariffs, its political leaders by 1895 were at least successful in negotiating treaties with some of the leading Western powers containing a promise of withdrawal of “extraterritoriality” in 1899. Japan also gained the respect of the powers after its victory in the Sino-Japanese War.

All this argue for the conceptualization of the modernization of Japan’s political system in 1868-1895 as the result and the adoption of the politics of authoritarianism.

As for the personal and communal well-being of the Japanese people during the first stage of modernization within an authoritarian political system, let me quote W.W. Lockwood, a noted economic historian of Japan:

What actual improvements came about in the material well-being of the Japanese population during this early period is difficult to determine. Some advance in living standards is evidenced in the decline of mortality rates, in increased per capita consumption of food and clothing supplies, and in the growth of public service of various kinds—especially in the cities. Most of the rise in total national income, however, seems to have been absorbed in supporting the growing population. Capital formation and arms absorbed additional amounts of the increment . . . it points to the formidable obstacles, both social and technological, which stood in the way of real improvements in the lot of the peasant and worker, despite the notable growth in the scale and productivity of the Japanese economy.⁶³

The modernizing oligarchs of the early Meiji period, however, assured the people at the base of the Japanese society of civil order and political security. In terms of the psychological dimension of living, the peasants continued to live within their cherished way of life. Because the workers in the city operated within a social structure and interacted in social relations patterned after the family’s, they also continued to enjoy the warmth of reified kinship relations, at least, within the period covered by this paper.

Was the modernization of Japan’s political system and its consequences comparable to those in the Philippines in 1946-1972? A discussion of the process of political modernization in the Philippines is in order.

The Modernization of the Philippine Political System: The Politics of Patronage and Incorporation

Unlike the Japanese who emerged at the first period of modernization (1868-1895) with a strong national group consciousness reinforced

⁶²See N. Ike, *The Beginnings of Political Democracy in Japan* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1950), 72-86.

⁶³Lockwood, *The Economic Development . . .*, *op. cit.*, 34.

by a common language and culture, the Filipinos had to hurdle the additional challenge of a country divided into numerous islands and several major languages. Like Japan in 1868, the Philippines in 1946, was not effectively linked together by a network of transportation and communication system. (In fact, during World War II, the country lost a large part of its infrastructural services.)

However, the belief of practically all Philippine ethnolinguistic groups in the values rooted in the family system (the core of Philippine society's social organization) suggests a factor of cultural unity among Filipinos in general. Yet, during the period covered by this paper (1946-1972), the dynamics of the family system described earlier did not generate cohesive political unity among components of Philippine society; neither were the people at the base of Philippine society directly involved in politics except as electoral moral supporters of their patrons, usually wealthy and socially prestigious persons who were also either political leaders or supporters of a political leader.

Within this socio-cultural context it seems evident that political unity could be achieved only when a clever, dynamic and strong but benevolent leader occupied the top position of his alliance system, which makes it possible for him to become national leader at the center. Such an individual is referred to as *pangulo* (literally, one who plays the role of leader) in terms of pre-Spanish indigenous value which survived through the first period of Philippine modernization delineated in this paper. This value views the family, society and polity operating as a human body, with head, eyes, ears, arms, legs, fingers and toes.⁶⁴

... Its law is the logic of interdependence, symbiosis, and cooperation. In the body the head . . . is superior and paramount, it being the seat of intelligence and wisdom, all other parts of the body are subordinate to the head in varying degrees, depending upon their position and relation to the body. Thus the family, a society or polity must have a head, and the other members of these units must subordinate themselves to the head. The value of organic hierarchy is clinched by the folk saying: "*Ang sakit ng kalingkingan damdam ng buong katawan,*" (The pain suffered by the little finger is suffered by the whole body.) [This suggests that the head bears the responsibility of always looking after the well-being of the body, his welfare-function.]⁶⁵

Obviously, this model is not only organic but also hierarchical. Only a dominant head, or *pangulo*, with talent, political ability and resources could cope with the socio-political fragmentation of Philippine society

⁶⁴The organic-hierarchical model of Philippine society and polity was presented by R.E. Agpalo, Manuel A. Roxas Professor of Political Science, College of Arts and Sciences, University of the Philippines System, in his first Professorial Chair lecture entitled "The Organic-Hierarchical Paradigm and Politics in the Philippines" (Professorial Chair Lecture Series, Monograph No. 1; Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1973).

⁶⁵R.E. Agpalo, "The Political Elite in a Post-Traditional Society: The Case of the Philippines," paper read at the Seminar on "Elites and Development" sponsored by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bangkok Office, held in Bangkok, May 12-18, 1975, p. 20 (mimeographed).

as represented by the varying competing family alliances, each led by a leader from a dominant political family, usually also a socio-economically dominant family.

Fragmentation in Philippine society can perhaps be viewed as the consequence of the brittleness of kinship relations outside the nuclear family within a basically agricultural society. To become the leader of an alliance group within his community, an aspiring head of a nuclear family—usually a strong father figure—has to mobilize the support of other families or individuals to form a faction or alliance. Such faction reveals the convergence of political and the socioeconomic groups within a community. A faction has “a range of concern and activity for exceeding the sphere of politics proper [or] the contest of public offices and debate on how the powers of government are to be employed.”⁶⁶

The role of the nuclear family, which is the core of a faction or an alliance in Philippine society, as perceived by Filipinos, is revealed in the following articles of the Philippine Civil Code.⁶⁷

Article 216—[The] family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects.

Article 220—In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.

As mentioned earlier, the father in the Filipino family is the authority figure and exercises a vast amount of familial power, although he shares authority with the mother, as supported by Article 311 of the Civil Code. She exercises her authority subtly because she is a symbol of love and compassion. The father’s position of authority in the Filipino family is reinforced by the principle of *bono pater familia* (the “good father”) in Roman law, which was applied in the Philippines during the Spanish period and is now embodied in the Philippine Civil Code. Article III of the Civil Code states: “The husband is responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family. . . .”⁶⁸ This provision immediately places the mother legally at a lower level of the hierarchic structure of the family than her “provider” husband, although she enjoys actual “partnership” with him in the social interaction or dynamics within the family system. The superordinate position of the father as legally stipulated is further supported among others, by

⁶⁶C.N. Lande, *Leaders, Factions and Parties. The Structure of Philippine Politics* (Monograph Series No. 6; New Haven, Conn.: Southeast Asian Studies, Yale University, ca. 1965), p. 16. See also M.R. Hollnsteiner, *The Dynamics of Power in a Philippine Municipality* (Quezon City: Community Development Research Council, University of the Philippines, 1963).

⁶⁷See Philippine Republic Laws, Statutes, etc., *Civil Code of the Philippines* (Manila: Central Book Supply, 1949), 50.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, 31. See also I.R. Cortes, *Women’s Rights Under the 1973 Constitution* (Professorial Chair Lectures Monograph No. 10; Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1975), 14-15. L.R. San Diego, “Women in the Family,” in Y.Q. Javellana, *op. cit.*, 42-43.

Article 311 of the Civil Code: "The father and mother jointly exercise parental authority over their legitimate children who are not emancipated. *In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary*" (italics mine).⁶⁹ The father's role as a "provider"—the beneficent and generous authority figure—emphasizes his welfare function. This is also an inherent function of the mother who, in the perception of the children, also symbolizes love and compassion, since she shares authority with the father.

In this connection, an additional source of the mother's hidden power lies in the fact that she generally is the family's treasurer. Furthermore, the prior affective attachment of the children to the mother (in terms of the concept of "belonging") continues even after the children are married. This is especially true of daughters who persist in seeking their mother's advice, help and support, especially in times of crisis. Daughters perceive their family of orientation as claiming priority in allegiance before their families of procreation. Hence, it is conceived that the mother holds a key position in affinal alliances formed for political and other purposes within the Philippine social organization.

Fairly unstable and fluid, such socio-political alliances or factions on the municipal level in the Philippines are usually bifactional within each community.⁷⁰ These two factions can be viewed as the faction in power (or the "in group") and the faction out of power (or the "out group"). Each faction, which is amorphous rather than discrete,⁷¹ is led by a political leader, generally a wealthy individual occupying a high social status within his community. He is generally someone who has developed his bargaining or politicking skills, which he initially learned as he interacted with the members of his family system. His base of power is his nuclear family and the cluster of families he and members of his family are able to mobilize around him from among members of their extended kinship or family system and even those outside it, if any.

.... The membership of the typical faction, being bound not by categorical ties but by a network of individual dyadic relationships between patron and client, landowner and tenant, or leader and follower, will usually be a cross section of the community with representatives of every social class occupation, religious affiliation, and point of view. These circumstances all but preclude the formation of ideological distinguishable groups.⁷²

The dyadic, or patron-client relationship described above as linking the components—individuals or families—into one or the other of the

⁶⁹Philippine Republic, Laws . . . , *op. cit.*, 66.

⁷⁰Lande, *op. cit.*, 18. Bifactionalism, according to Lande, antedates the national two-party system which first appeared in the Philippine scene in 1907 and persisted when the Nacionalista Party dominated the political scene, except in the elections of 1938, when the leaders of the dominant party imposed a single slate of candidates.

⁷¹*Ibid.*, 16.

⁷²*Ibid.*, 18.

bifurcate socio-political alliances or factions was also apparent on the provincial and national levels of the political system. "It is important to recognize . . . that local factions [also provincial factions], though imbedded in, and taking much of their shape from social alignments peculiar to each [local or provincial] community, are also imbedded in, and in part shaped by the nationwide two-party system"⁷³ which re-emerged in 1946 as a consequence of the split of the immediate pre-World War II dominant party—the Nacionalista Party.

Patronage, requiring bargaining skills, is manifest in politicking for support or incorporation of individuals or families into one of the two factions or alliances on every level of the political system's hierarchy. It is a means by which a patron shares with his followers or clients the economic and other advantages of power on whatever level of the political system he plays his leadership role. In exchange for the support the clients give to the political leader in his drive for power and status, the clients receive patronage of various kinds, most of which are personalistic and particularistic in nature. Examples of these are aid for medical, legal and funeral expenses, recommendation for a job, a bank loan, a contract or franchise and so on.⁷⁴

Within this socio-cultural context there is need for every patron, who is the political leader of a faction, to have an open communication system so that he can constantly receive messages regarding his constituency and the situation among political leaders at the higher levels of the political system, especially at its center. He has to be especially aware of messages channeled through his community's built-in social control system. These messages would help him decide how patronage can be used at any given time with maximum benefits, i.e., the maintenance of the viability of his alliance group or faction and therefore his continuance in power.

The politics of patronage and incorporation becomes extremely complex at the center or on the national level. The President—the *pangulo*—has had to bargain continuously (by sharing largesse or using his power) not only with his own party or alliance system but also with the opposition in an attempt to incorporate its members to strengthen his base. Those who cannot be incorporated are purged, rejected, destroyed or neutralized because they are perceived as "destructive or cancerous."⁷⁵ Briefly, in order to maintain political leadership of an alliance system from the national to the local levels of government, the *pangulo*, possessing a strong and dynamic personality, besides being a clever or skillful politician with resources of his own, must also continue strengthening his faction by preventing defection and, when necessary, incorporating additional dominant socioeconomic or politically dominant families into his group. He must also destroy or neutralize those factions that are inimical to his interests and which cannot be incorporated in his alliance system.

⁷³*Ibid.*, 15.

⁷⁴Agpalo, *The Organic-Hierarchical . . .*, *op. cit.*, 3.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, 4.

The patron-client relationship is akin to that between benevolent father and children, a characteristic of the Filipino family. If this is so, then one can view the Philippine political system as composed of a hierarchy of "good fathers" serving as political leaders on the municipal, provincial and national levels of government. But one should readily add that the concept of a "good father" applies mainly to the perception by clients of their patron—the political leader. The concept holds true for as long as the leader continues to exercise his welfare function beneficial to his clients by means of patronage.⁷⁶

Unlike the Japanese pyramidal political system, which has the emperor at its apex (behind whom the Meiji oligarchs planned and decided the modernization of Japanese society), the Philippine political system may be conceived as consisting of tiers of a pair of pyramids representing the "in" and the "out" factions on every level of the political administrative divisions linked upward with counterparts through the political leader who occupies the top of each pyramid. Such conceptualization does not preclude a leader on the lower levels from approaching the *pangulo* directly, if he has access to him. Nor does it prevent the *pangulo* from directly interacting with allies at the lower levels of the political system. Individuals had in fact gone to the *pangulo* to convey personally their needs or complaints. Presidents Magsaysay and Macapagal, for instance, had a day set aside to listen personally to the people's needs or complaints. In addition, each President had some kind of "complaints committee" to which individuals could address their request for help, their complaints and the like through personal interviews, letters, telegrams, and so on. This process reinforces the image of the *pangulo* as a benevolent head behaving like a generous and understanding father toward his children, seeing to it that "the hurt suffered by the little finger" is immediately relieved.

The control of the locus of power within a national alliance system—whether of the "in" group or the "out" group—depends on the continuing control by the political leader (the *pangulo*, in the case of the "in" group) of his allies who play leadership roles of the smaller alliances on the lower levels of the political hierarchy. Such alliances reveal dyadic relationships in the transactions between the leader of the alliance with ranking members or families within the alliance who could also carry on dyadic relations with those members and families of lower social status and so on. Therefore, patronage—as a tool for the exercise of a political leader's welfare function toward his followers or clients—has to be dispensed, if he wants to remain in power, whether on the national, the provincial or the municipal levels of the political administrative units. Patronage on the levels below the national level depends both on the largesse dispensed by the *pangulo* and on the political leader's own resources.

It was within this political system that the Filipino political elite undertook the first steps toward modernizing Philippine society. The ultimate goal of the modernization or the introduction of changes

⁷⁶This is explained in more detail in *ibid.*, 3.

within Philippine society was the survival of the Philippines as a truly independent state that could channel cohesive social action toward the attainment of perceived social goals, which were the goals of the polity. Because society and polity were conceived as one, and because Philippine society was led by members of a minority socioeconomic political elite, these social goals were those articulated by the adaptive political elite. It was they who responded to domestic challenges as well as those coming from outside the society. Like the Meiji oligarchs', the Filipino adaptive elites' response, was intended to strengthen the *status quo* as they pursued the goals of their perception of a "good society" through the politics of patronage and incorporation.

Philippine politics remained elitist in 1946-1972, the period covered by this paper.⁷⁷ The prewar one-party system was transformed into a two-party system—the Nacionalista and the Liberal parties—which remained cadre parties, composed of notables, many of whom kept political power within their family for generations—the so-called family dynasties.⁷⁸ The larger sector of the country's population, including farmers and workers, continued to be unrepresented in the small group of political elite.

Patronage was apparent in the civil service system. A study of the administrative elite conducted in 1960 indicated that although the response of higher civil servants showed a preference for "merit methods" in the selection process, the pervading influence of patronage and the "charity" concept was revealed in the continued appointment of non-eligibles to "emergency positions." According to the study, high unemployment, generating pressures on politicians to provide livelihood to members of their constituency and the nature of the family relationships in Philippine society, appear to have been the barriers to the effective application of the merit system.⁷⁹ The same study however suggests that

. . . both merit and patronage systems have their share of virtues and faults. They are merely tools to be used in the attainment of stated goals. The issue at stake is how both systems may be used properly to enable government to accomplish its goals.⁸⁰

⁷⁷Unless otherwise indicated, the discussion on the post-independence politics in the Philippines is mainly based on an unpublished typescript of R.E. Agpalo entitled "Society and Politics in the Philippines."

⁷⁸The term "family dynasties" refers to the families within the elite or *principalia* class (the socio-economic dominants in Philippine society) who were more politically active than others of the class and have produced a succession of political leaders, sometimes not only during two or three decades but, in many cases, even for generations. Such political dominance has been enhanced by intermarriage. See D.C. Simbulan, "A Study of the Socio-Economic Elite in Philippine Politics and Government, 1946-1963," (Ph.D. Dissertation, The Department of Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, May 1965), 124, 203-204. See also L. Guevarra, "Political Dynasties" (Point of Order), *Manila Times*, January 20, 1963, 4; "The New Look' in Political Dynasties," September 14, 1963, 4; "Political Dynasties Must Go," *Weekly Nation* (Editorial) July 13, 1970, 1.

⁷⁹G.A. Francisco, Jr., *Higher Civil Servants in the Philippines* (Manila: College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, ca. early 1960's), 191-192 (mimeographed).

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, 187.

Between 1946 and 1972 the politics of patronage was also exercised by presidents, senators and representatives, who provided patronage to all their allies and to the people in general; the people as a reciprocal gesture, supported their patrons. As they did in the past, the political elites, continued to incorporate emerging social forces into their ranks. For example, the industrialists in the 1950's, the technocrats in the 1960's and the students in the late 1960's. So did the counter-elite attempt to absorb some of those constituting the new social forces, especially the students.

Alongside these continuities there were observable changes between 1946 and 1972 which contributed to the modernization of the political system as a result of societal changes.⁸¹ Among them were: the expansion of the electorate, which indicates that the common man at the base of Philippine society had become more mobilized politically in 1972; and the proliferation of interest groups, including technocrats, students, industrialists and religious groups, which increased popular participation in the political system and broadened their world view as well as articulated their interests with other groups or with the government. Moreover, the literacy rate expanded, a result of the pre-independence American educational policy promoting universal education. It also meant the common man's liberation from ignorance and parochial moorings. Within the same period, his occupation was qualitatively changed, as indicated by the decrease in the number of people engaged in occupations classified as farmers, fishermen, hunters, loggers and related workers. On the other hand, there was an increase in those engaged in professional, technical and similar services, as well as those engaged in transport and communication. The number of clerical workers also increased. Life expectancy lengthened with the improvement and expansion of public health and education. (The latter presented the political elite with the problem of a "population explosion.") The number of radios used in the Philippines rose, though there was only modest progress in the expansion of areas with electrical service.

These changes suggest that whatever were the weaknesses of the Philippine political system and its political leaders, between 1946 and 1972, the political elites performed their welfare function, which was usually done with the extension of patronage to their followers or clients. Their motives of course, can be questioned. Generally the competition between two strong factions within a community during an election year yielded benefits to the people like the building of health centers, churches, parks, basketball courts and the like. Sometimes these were accomplished through the use of the political leaders' own resources although, usually, they were charged against public funds, e.g., the "pork barrel" especially when the political leader is part of the "in group."

A student of Philippine political elites observes:

An examination of elite public pronouncements and writings would suggest a deep commitment to libertarian—even egalitarian—

⁸¹The statistical data supporting these generalization are found in R.E. Appalo, "Society and Politics . . . , *op. cit.*, 19-25.

principles. There is an apparent sense of social consciousness and responsibility, of solicitous regard for the toiling "downtrodden" masses. The pattern has been set by Quezon.⁸²

Roxas, Osmeña and other Filipino presidents and politicians, says D.C. Simbulan, have followed this style of rhetoric. Yet, "elite values reflected empirically in elite actions and attitudes and identified in the manner in which they 'experience, perceive and interpret the concrete situation which they confront in life,' may not necessarily correspond with their publicly proclaimed goals and ideas."⁸³ The latter are only political formula, ritual symbol and slogan which the political elite create to elicit support from the base of the population. President Magsaysay, for instance, started in 1953 the so-called grassroots technique of campaigning, a change from his predecessors' reliance mainly on their provincial and local leaders to deliver the votes.⁸⁴ This was an innovative attempt of the *pangulo* to link the center and the periphery of power, an approach which Magsaysay's successors followed. Thus the larger sector of the Philippine population was finally in face-to-face contact with candidates for elective positions, including those aspiring for the Presidency. Although their voting record continued to be influenced by their patron—the political leader they supported.

As a result of the foregoing developments, in the second half of the 1950's and in the early 1960's, the people at the base of Philippine society, with the help of emerging innovative and adaptive political elites, worked for the legal linkage and autonomy of the *barrio* (a social collectivity which was previously a subdivision of the municipality) to the political system through a series of laws.⁸⁵ These laws appear to have been the logical culmination of the various community-oriented development projects sponsored by both the public⁸⁶ and private⁸⁷ sectors of Philippine society which focused on the *barrio*. By 1963, the

⁸²Simbulan, *op. cit.*, 321.

⁸³*Ibid.*, 326-327.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, 328.

⁸⁵R.A. 2711 Art. 9, Section 2229 1/2 (Revised Administrative Code) in 1955; R.A. 2379, Barrio Chapter, which was signed in 1959 but implemented only the following year; R.A. 3590, amending R.A. 2370, in 1963. See Congress of the Philippines, Joint Local Government Reform Commission, *Municipal and Barrio Law of the Philippines: A Compilation of General Permanent Statutes Relating to Municipal and Barrio Governments* (Manila, 1970).

⁸⁶For instance, the community-centered projects, including youth programs of the Bureau of Public Schools, Bureau of Agricultural Extension and the Department of National Defense. The last one was inevitably involved in the various post-World War II resettlement projects of the government, especially during Magsaysay's Administration. The same President also mobilized the armed forces to assist in the improvement of rural conditions by fielding them in the rural areas to build roads, especially feeder roads to link isolated barrios to the main road, artesian wells, etc. It was during Magsaysay's Administration that the Presidential Assistance for Community Development was established to coordinate development projects in the rural areas.

⁸⁷For example, voluntary agencies and organizations formed to assist in rural reconstruction, like the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM), and the Philippine Rural Community Improvement Society (PRUCIS).

barrio acquired a corporate personality, became legally autonomous from the municipal government which previously supervised it, and had elective officials who were given some power to tax and certain privileges like government insurance coverage. Within an elite-operated political system, this development in the *barrio* suggests the possibility of the emergence of *barrio*-level administrative elites who initially would play politics in terms of the politics of patronage and incorporation in the manner they were enculturated.

Most of the community-development projects in the *barrio* underwritten by both the public and private agencies depended largely on foreign funds and consultants. A number of Filipinos involved in the projects were trained abroad with foreign funds. A major contributor to these projects during 1945-1972 was the United States government, which has long ago considered the Philippines important in the free world's defense against what was then viewed as the Communist threat to Asia.

Considerable funds from the American government were channelled into the political, economic, military and communications systems of Philippine society. They were in the form of rehabilitation or economic and/or technological and cultural assistance funds. From 1956, the year the Japanese Reparations Agreement was ratified, Japanese capital, technology as well as economic and cultural assistance were increasingly extended to the Philippines.⁸⁸ It can therefore be pointed out here that foreign aid, a factor in the Philippines' first stage of modernization, is absent in Japan's experience. Japan's is an example of modernization that relied mainly on the country's own resources; it even limited the amount of foreign loans it incurred during the first period of modernization.

The President—the *pangulo*—and his allies at the center of the political system (including the legislators) decided the allocation of both government and foreign assistance funds channelled through the government poured into the rural areas, especially during the Magsaysay administration. Generally, assistance to the private sector was directly given to them. Within the cultural context of Philippine social organization, such funds could have been perceived as largesse that was being shared by the *pangulo* with the lower political leaders and the people. Similarly, foreign aid could have been viewed in this manner by political leaders at the lower echelon of the hierarchy and by the people.

Government subsidies such as incentives given to industry were also used by the *pangulo* and by his "in group" allies so that they could best assist the former in maintaining themselves in power. Foreign assistance extended to the Philippines as aid in the industrialization of the country was also used by the political elites to bargain for the commercial elite's cooperation and loyalty to the "in group." To prevent the balance-of-payments from deteriorating further in 1949, the govern-

⁸⁸See Hartendorp, *op. cit.*, *passim*. See also his book entitled *History of Industry and Trade of the Philippines: The Magsaysay Administration* (Manila: Philippine Education Co., 1961), *passim*.

ment imposed import and exchange controls. This system of controls was used by the political elite on the national level "to favor Filipino over alien manufacturers, and one's friends, relatives and political supporters over others,"⁸⁹ as their support is necessary for the political survival of those at the top of the political system. Incorporation into the "in group" of the head of a commercial or industrial family would often mean the incorporation of the other members of the nuclear family of the commercial or industrial elites.

Preferential trade relations under the Philippine-American Trade Agreement of 1946, later revised by the Laurel-Langley Agreement, which was implemented from 1956 to 1976, favored families who were landed but who were at times also commercial or industrial elites. Among them were families engaged in the production of cash crops like sugar, abaca and coconut. Because the production of cash crops require bank loans—a form of government subsidy—and because their export to the American market called for allocation of the total amount of each agricultural product that could be so exported, a political decision, transactions on subsidy and allocation between the President and his allies at the apex of the political system, on the one hand, with the landed or commercial/industrial elites, on the other, partook of the politics of patronage and incorporation.

The family is usually the basic unit of urban corporations. Its structure therefore emphasizes support of the family and loyalty to it, not to the larger collectivity, such as the economic subsystem of Philippine society or Philippine society/polity, itself. It can be said that the motivations which bring Filipinos into commercial, financial and manufacturing entrepreneurship have their origins in features of Philippine social behavior and organization stemming from the family system and its social values. All these generate, among other possibilities, what is referred to as "economic personalism" within the Philippine economic collectivities.

. . . Filipino economic personalism provides the social cement which helps overcome lack of trust and weakness of institutional facilities. In the Philippines, entrepreneurship is to a significant degree an activity involving personal manipulation and social organization. Economic success depends importantly upon social alliance, technical competence is less crucial than social competence, and legal-rational "efficiency" is subordinate to personal loyalty and trust.⁹⁰

It is obvious that "personalism" within Filipino organizations contrasts with the impersonal and rational traits of Western economic organizations.

A sociologist J. J. Carroll, observes that "the family enterprise is still the rule in the Philippines: a major share of the original capital for the enterprise was provided in most cases by either the entrepreneur

⁸⁹Carroll, *op. cit.*, 34.

⁹⁰J.N. Anderson, "Buy-and-Sell and Economic Personalism: Foundations for Philippine Entrepreneurship," *Asian Survey*, Vol. IX, No. 9 (September 1969), 641-668.

himself or his family; the entrepreneur or his relatives held the office of chief executive at the beginning and performed key management functions in most cases; and in the relatively short histories of most enterprises studies, financial control and the office of chief executive have tended to remain in the family of the entrepreneur. On the other hand, the heavy capital requirements of a number of the recent enterprises . . . have apparently forced some entrepreneurs to obtain most of their capital outside the family."⁹¹

In the last instance, the family usually seeks government assistance by applying for reparations allocation. Other industries, like the textile, flour and canned milk using cotton, wheat and powdered milk, respectively—work for government allocation of these raw materials sent to the Philippines as part of the American economic relations. Under this arrangement, there is a considerable risk in tying Philippine industrialization to the availability of surplus commodities from the United States.⁹² And it is such capital-intensive industries that depend on government help and, therefore, on political connection, which are "monopolized by Filipinos."⁹³ Thus, they are referred to sometimes as the "political industries."⁹⁴

It is at this point where the family owning or managing a manufacturing enterprise uses its wide network of kinship relations—consanguineal or ritual—and friends who work with politicians so that the family corporation could secure the allocations, loans, guarantees and the like from the government agencies concerned. Who gets what amount is mostly a political decision which corresponds to the decision of the "in group" led by the *pangulo*. This situation was partly responsible for the overcrowding of industries, especially during the 1950's and the 1960's, when the government had apparently no consistent policy in regulating and giving assistance to the private sector. That most of the manufacturing corporations are owned by a single family or by a small number of closely related families explains why these corporations are not purely economic institutions which aim to maximize the rate of returns and their purpose has been to enhance the welfare of the family members and the family. Thus it is hard to estimate the rate of returns in terms of comparable measures used in developed countries in the West where management and ownership are separate. Not in terms of Japan's where loyalty to such a larger entity as the nation-state, takes precedence to loyalty to the smaller collectivity.

Within the Filipino corporation, the report of rate of return is usually low. One reason is the unnecessary costs for foreign travel once or

⁹¹Carroll, *op. cit.*, 158. Carroll's findings are based on his study of 92 manufacturing enterprises.

⁹²F.H. Golay, *op. cit.*, 303.

⁹³Yoshihara, "A Study of Philippine Manufacturing Corporations," paper read at the Conference of Agriculture and Economic Development held in Tokyo and Hakone, September 6-10, 1971, sponsored by the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University (The Japan Economic Research Center; Kyoto, 1971), 12. Yoshihara's sample consisted of the 254 largest manufacturing corporations in the Philippines.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, 18.

twice a year, large salaries for the owner-manager, his wife, (who is usually the corporation's treasurer), and other family members, expenses for family automobiles, food, restaurant and nightclub, prestige items like helicopter and airplanes. They are all charged to the corporation though they are not strictly needed for the business, and not considered part of corporate earnings. In this connection, the government loses both ways: on taxes collected from the corporation which reports a low income, and on taxes collected from the family or family members, who likewise report lower profits than they actually enjoyed. Though illegal, there has also been underdeclaration of earnings by both Filipino and foreign corporations.⁹⁵

While ownership and management have not been separated in the post-war Filipino manufacturing corporations—a factor sometimes cited to account for the comparative inefficiency of these corporations—there is a possibility that it has been this merger of ownership and management under a family, which has enabled these corporations to survive the first stage of industrialization. However, their comparative success as family enterprises can be viewed as having fragmented the country's efforts toward industrialization. This is because loyalty within a family enterprise is given first to the family rather than to the country. This conclusion, based on insights into the Filipino family system and values as well as on impressions from readings of newspaper reports and other sources of information, has to be validated through empirical investigation.

In a society, like the Philippines, which stresses the family to a pronounced degree, the preceding description of a family corporation argues the essential relationship between the management of a family corporation with the social system—its organization and values.

Philippine society has values that militate against boundaries and emphasize unity of society and polity. Therefore, increasing differentiation would upset this unity and lead to issues that divide the people. Before 1972 two projects of the Marcos Administration which helped him win an unprecedented second term as President were: the rice program and the infrastructural development program. Their success appear to support the hypothesis that for economic development projects to succeed in Philippine society, it is desirable to diminish the boundaries between society and polity.

In the case of the rice program, the Rice and Corn Productivity Coordinating Council, which was established in 1958, was an inert body until 1966. In that year, Marcos, through Executive Order No. 50, vested it with power and responsibility to implement the program thus centralizing a function that had been divided among a number of agencies. The then Executive Secretary was designated Rice Action Officer, a position that was never formalized. An innovative member of the adaptive elite, the Rice Action Officer was goal-oriented and had authority and influence. He pursued his task by a "process of short-circuiting the bureaucracy."⁹⁶ This he accomplished through the use of

⁹⁵*ibid.*, 19.

⁹⁶B.A. Aquino, "The Philippines: Development in the Context of Two

his authority and personality to mobilize the bureaucracy. He went to the field, visited those engaged in the program and worked through an underlying network of alliances. "In the actual workings of coordination, the informal, personalistic staff and advisory relationships exert as much, if not more, influence than the formal chain of command usually outlined in the organizational chart of an agency. . . ."⁹⁷

A similar strategy was used for the second program—the infrastructural development program for the construction of roads, bridges, ferries, schools, hospitals, power and irrigation facilities and other physical amenities. The President placed this function as a responsibility solely of the Infrastructure Operations Center under the leadership of the Army. It then monitored all infrastructural projects throughout the country and mobilized the Engineering Corps for road-building and repair. This approach reveals considerable ingenuity in mobilizing the Army's strong potential for modernization.⁹⁸ The two programs indicate that modernization and development can be achieved in the Philippines by using the firm basis of the basic pattern of cooperation that underlies the whole functioning of the administrative system: the social alliance or the network of alliances in Philippine society. This principle seems to have been intuitively, although perhaps not consciously, recognized by the Presidents who had instituted the following approaches of economic planning in the Philippines after the National Economic Council (NEC)—considered the main economic planning agency of the government—was handicapped in carrying out its economic-policy planning for lack of direct implementing powers to enforce even its own plans and policies.⁹⁹

An innovative way of planning the country's economic policies more effectively was tried by President Magsaysay, who empowered the Budget Commission to prepare and implement a "Five-Year Fiscal Plan" which actually short-circuited the NEC. It is conceivable that the implementation of the plan could be better undertaken because of the power of the President, the *pangulo*, in whose office the Budget Commission functioned. Likewise, in 1962 President Macapagal set up a Program Implementation Agency, which was composed of a technical economic staff directly under the Office of the President.¹⁰⁰ These competent, high-level technicians, or technocrats, seem to have served the President well, not only as economic planners but also as "trouble shooters" in the implementation of plans. Similarly constituted was the

'Colonial Hangovers' ", unpublished typescript, December 3, 1969, 21. The analysis of the two projects included here are mainly based on this paper.

⁹⁷V. Arcega, "How The RCPCC Beats the Bureaucracy" (Los Baños, University of the Philippines, 1968), mimeographed.

⁹⁸Aquino, *op. cit.*, 24-25.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, 17.

¹⁰⁰C.S. Alfonso, "Organization for Economic Planning: The National Economic Council; The Presidential Economic Staff, The Budget Commission and the Central Bank," in *Perspective in Government Reorganization*, ed. by J.V. Abueva (Manila: College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1969), 179.

Presidential Economic Staff, which was created by President Marcos in 1966 and reorganized into the Development Management Staff (DMS) in the early 1970's. These organizations employed not only civilian technocrats but also members of the armed forces. Such groups of economic planners, implementors, if not managers, of economic projects which were usually intergovernment agencies projects (thus hurdling bureaucratic differentiation) performed better than the powerless NEC.

Within an economic system where the family and the network of alliance (mainly familial) were involved in the policies of patronage and incorporation, Philippine society in 1946-1972 survived two crises in its balance of payments—one, in 1948, and the other, in 1969. Although Philippine economic trends in the early 1970's were thought of as bleak by some people, the economic system proved viable and, having survived, continued to sustain some amount of growth (though not too significant to meet the growing needs of an "exploding" population), a rate of increase of more than three per cent.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), through its members who were recruited in the planning and implementation of economic-development plans contributed to the Philippines' economic survival during the period covered by this paper. Comparatively monolithic in an alliance ridden society, the AFP, by training, is oriented to the service of and loyalty to the nation-state and the President of the Republic who, under the Constitution, is its Commander-in-Chief. Because special training and qualification are required of members of the AFP, it was relatively untouched by the politics of patronage and incorporation as say, the civil service system. Politically, therefore, it was comparatively neutral, so far as the "in" and "out" groups are concerned; the AFP is ready to serve any *pangulo*. The national military system thus became the most nation- and goal-oriented as well as rational of the various subsystems within Philippine society. The AFP reinforces and assists in the maintenance of a *pangulo's* power as head of government for as long as he occupies the position.

Composed of survivors of the Philippine Army and guerrilla units who fought the Japanese in the last war, the AFP was expanded, since 1946, with American military assistance. This came in the form of military equipment, technology and training coordinated by the Joint Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG).¹⁰² In exchange, the Philippine government granted the Americans the right to establish military bases in the country, which also involved the grant of extraterritorial rights. American guarantee to protect the Philippines became more binding¹⁰³ after the victory of the Communists in China in 1949 and the outbreak of

¹⁰¹See J.H. Power and G.P. Sicat, "Industrialization in the Philippines," Discussion Paper No. 70 (Quezon City: School of Economics, University of the Philippines, April 24, 1970), iv.

¹⁰²The Philippine Military Assistance Act of 1946, later extended to July 1953.

¹⁰³Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty (1951) between the Philippines and the United States of America, Department of Foreign Affairs, *Treaty Series*, Vol. 2, January 1953, 14.

the Korean war in 1951. JUSMAG took care of administering the millions of dollars of military assistance to support wide-range purposes, like the training of Filipino jet pilots in Clark Field, the delivery to the Philippines of mine sweepers and ammunition, as well as the improvement of airfields and the construction of warehouses and divisional training sites in the country,¹⁰⁴ all of which appear to point to the need of securing the Philippines from external threats. It was believed that the Philippines which was then referred to as the anchor in a chain of islands or offshore bases running from Japan in the north, through Okinawa and Taiwan, constituted the first line of defense in the American held Pacific islands, including Hawaii.

American military assistance also contributed funds, advice and equipment to the struggle against the HUKS conducted by the Philippine army and the constabulary. In addition Magsaysay—then Secretary of Defense—initiated the “land for the landless” program, in which he involved the AFP. Military men served as managers of the farm resettlement program of the Economic Development Corporation.¹⁰⁵

Magsaysay’s twin strategy of “all-out friendship and all-out force” brought the military face to face with the people at the base of Philippine society. The first strategy succeeded in reducing the Huk threat to the Philippine polity; the second through “civil action” by the soldier, contributed to the restoration of the people’s faith in their government and the armed forces.¹⁰⁶

President Garcia’s Socio-Economic Military Program (SEMP) authorized the AFP Chief of Staff “to employ without prejudice normal military operations, military personnel for public works construction, food production, land resettlement and rural development,” and appears to have distinguished the objective of the armed forces civil action activities from their military purposes.¹⁰⁷ The diversification of the socio-economic projects of the armed forces not only expanded but deepened the AFP’s interaction with the larger base of the people at the periphery,¹⁰⁸ thus linking the latter to the center of the political system of which the AFP was its protector. Among the later developments of the socioeconomic projects of the AFP was the latter’s involvement in the first Civic Action Center established by President Macapagal to assist in the implementation of his land-reform program.

¹⁰⁴G.E. Taylor, *The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), 149.

¹⁰⁵R.E. Rueda, Jr., and E.R. Ermita, “The National Program in Food and Agricultural Production,” paper presented during the National Seminar and Convention on “The Role of Broadcasters in Rural Development and Food Production” organized and hosted by the Agricultural and Rural Broadcasters Organization, Inc., Manila, December 13-15, 1971. The theme of the Seminar was “Look to the Farmer—A Strategy for Plenty.”

¹⁰⁶R.M. Iletto, “The Role of the Military in Modernization,” lecture delivered at the ASEAN Seminar on “The Role of the Mass Media in the Development of South East Asia,” Manila, June 18-25, 1971, 10-12.

¹⁰⁷It was a rider to the General Appropriation Act for FY 1958-1959 (R.A. 2080). Since then, the item became part of each succeeding appropriation act of the Philippines. See *ibid.*, 10-12.

¹⁰⁸Iletto, *op. cit.*, 11.

President Marcos integrated the civic action program into the four-year socio-economic development program of the Philippines. He also enlarged the AFP Corps of Engineers into nine Construction Battalions, one Pioneer Engineer Battalion, one Engineer Forestry Battalion and other special units such as the Engineer Company in charge of topography mapping, which is necessary for the cadastral survey of the large unsurveyed part of the country, if land reform was to be implemented as fast as possible.¹⁰⁹

Moreover, President Marcos increased the number of the Home Defense Centers/Community Relation Units of the AFP (formerly the Civic Action Centers). He also set up Community Offices in all provinces and created the Rural Service Volunteer Program as well as made the AFP participate in the First Lady's Green Revolution Project, the Central Luzon Development Program, and the Commission on National Integration's Agro-Industrial program. All these projects and their activities were coordinated at the top by the Department of National Defense,¹¹⁰ whose head is a member of the President's Cabinet.

At the turn of the seventies, the contacts of members of the AFP with the people at the base of Philippine society, especially in critical areas, were increased through their function as consultants to the Barrio Self-Defense Units. Created under the authority of the Barrio Councils, these temporary civilian organizations were composed of volunteers who had banded together for self-defense. Their primary function was to defend and secure the *barrios* and *sitios* against dissident attacks.¹¹¹

Unlike Japan's military system during the first year of modernization, the Philippines did not have a conscript army requiring more than one year's training. Instead, Philippine society had less than a year of training for 18 year old male citizens. There were also those who underwent a pre-Military Training (PMT) at the secondary school level and the Reserve Officer's Training Corps on the tertiary level. Different from Japan's, these training courses were focused only on military technology.

It can therefore be said that by September 1972, the military system, through its involvement in various activities at the base of Philippine society, contributed to the linkage of the peripheral larger sector of the population at the base of society to the center of the political system. In this way, the AFP contributed to the modernization of the political system. But the existence of American military bases enjoying extraterritoriality in 1972 circumscribed the efforts of the adaptive political leaders.

Less obvious was the effect of Western-oriented education on the elite in circumscribing their ability to perceive the needs and

¹⁰⁹Rueda and Ermita, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹¹"The BSDU's are Legal, Sol. Gen. Felix Q. Antonio" (A.R. Mutuc, My Neighbor and I), *Weekly Nation*, August 24, 1970, 4.

interests of the people constituting the larger base of Philippine society. The Filipino elite may therefore be viewed as a culturally alienated minority group in search of its identity during the postwar period. For, historically, the people at the base of Philippine society had kept the integrity of their culture through more than 300 years of colonial rule. This was partly because the colonizing powers, at the time they exercised control over the Philippines, generally avoided the destruction of the native collectivities or their social organization. They also did not have enough colonial administrators and priests (in the case of Spain) to be fielded among the larger sector of the population. Instead, these succeeding colonial powers, including the Japanese during the last war, co-opted some members of the native elite to act as "brokers" or "mediators" between them and the people. For instance, the *barangay* chiefs, in the case of Spain; the municipal head (the first election allowed by the Americans took place early in the 1900's on the municipal level). in the case of the American colonial rule and the Japanese military occupation.

Provided the Filipino ruling elite performed the functions they were assigned to do by the colonial administrators, including the delivery of taxes, recruitment of labor for public works and the maintenance of peace and order, no intrusion was made into their cherished way of life. For these new functions were grafted into the political leaders' traditional roles in their communities, so traditional cognitive habits and roles continued to be practised. To a certain extent, this situation continued through the period 1946-1972, despite the penetration into this society by the armed forces by means of their military and civic action functions. (In this connection, it should be pointed out here that the civic-action component of the military men's activities in the *barrio* during the same period was a graft of a new function onto military functions of protecting and securing society.)

Thus the people at the base were left to depend on their own resources and to function within their precolonial traditional social organization, basically guided by traditional values and norms derived from the family system. It was in fact because of the preservation of the indigenous culture among the people at the base of Philippine society that Western institutions—like Spanish catholicism and American democracy were accommodated into the Philippine culture, therefore "Filipinized."

It may thus be deduced that the cultural gap between the elite and the people at the base of Philippine society was widened by the Western-type education developed by the succeeding colonial powers, to which only the Filipino elite had access. Though the American educational policy aimed at universal education, only a comparative few of the people at the base of Philippine society could hurdle their handicaps. And those who did were co-opted by the elite. This was

¹¹²The Presidential Commission to Survey Philippine Education, Education for National Development (Manila: The Presidential Commission to Survey Education, December 1970), 68.

because the former lacked the means for education beyond the four-year primary level of education, which was free during the American administration. A high dropout rate was evident in the public school system; literacy achieved at Grade IV was only 50% in the vernacular and successively lower for Pilipino (the national language of the Philippines) and for English; at Grade VI, literacy was 75% in Pilipino.¹¹²

Because of the destruction of lives and property during the last war, the Philippine educational system lacked teachers and physical plants; problems aggravated as the period wore on owing to increasing population. Moreover, because of the disruption of the civil service system, the postwar period witnessed the employment of "emergency teachers," which, like the "emergency workers" or casuals" in the governing bureaucracy during the period following the last war, often called for family connection with the "in group." Again, links of the teacher's family with those of the "in group" were important in gaining employment.

The family continued to be the main source of financing an individual's education on the tertiary level.¹¹³ And *the maintenance of family solidarity* continued to be among the development goals of Philippine society.¹¹⁴

There is a tremendous pressure of social demand for a university or college education which has swollen enrolments through a system of open entry regulated to a large extent by the ability of parents to pay fees . . . resulting in unemployment and underemployment of educated manpower . . . a shortage of technicians and well-trained professionals.¹¹⁵

Since only a few families could send their children to college, tertiary education widened the socio-cultural gap between the elite and the people at the base of Philippine society. Tertiary education also produced trained individuals who did not meet the manpower needs of a modernizing Philippine society because elite values did not stress the value of vocational or technological competence.

Unlike in Japan, the first stage of modernization in the Philippines did not result in educational training nor in the dissemination of social values that met the needs of a modernizing society. Moreover, the mass media—the print and broadcast media¹¹⁶ which were also run by the

¹¹³In 1961, 77% of students in college were financed by their families. See *ibid.*, 50. There is reason to believe that the situation did not change by 1972 as there continued to exist more private rather than public colleges or universities serving the needs for tertiary education in the Philippines.

¹¹⁴Among the educational goals formulated by the Board of National Education found in its report to the President in 1957, is the following: "A.4. To maintain family solidarity, to improve community life, to perpetuate all that is desirable in our national heritage and to serve the cause of world peace." *Ibid.*, 58.

¹¹⁵*Ibid.*, 97. G. Sicat, however, comments that the "mismatch between job requirements and available graduates should not predicate a helpless situation since those with any formal training may have the required flexibility to make job adjustments." See G. Sicat *New Economic Directions in the Philippines*. (Manila: National Economic Development Authority, 1974), 36.

¹¹⁶For details on Philippine mass media, see G.D. Feliciano and C.J. Icban, Jr., *Philippine Mass Media* (Quezon City: Capitol Publishing House, Inc., 1967).

educated Filipino elite, appear to have generally failed to transmit messages which could enhance cohesion among the people rather than divide them. In fact, before 1972, the messages received by the people through the mass media were mostly divisive because they mainly served the interests of those who owned the newspapers, radio and television stations,¹¹⁷ and those of their political patrons. Having gained the reputation of being one of the "freest" in the world, the Philippine mass media, as manipulated by their owners, seemed to have abused their freedom, especially during the biennial elections when they channeled invectives against individuals, scandalous and slanderous gossips, and so on. This was because the mass media in the Philippines, except those owned by the government, were owned by the socioeconomic elite who supported politicians. The politicians in turn protected the former's business and their other interests.

Before September 1972 it appeared that owners of the mass media allied themselves with the *pangulo's* (the President's) "in group" or with the "out group" alliance. Those who joined the *pangulo's* alliance system were in turn protected by the *pangulo's* office by way of meeting their needs and interests. Those who joined the "out group" did so because they wanted to replace the incumbent *pangulo* with someone who would be more sympathetic with and protective of their interests.

In view of this, messages channeled through the mass media before September 1972 gave prior support to either the main faction of the alliance in Philippine society, depending on which side the owner of the mass media favored rather than on the basis of protecting the society's interests.

At the end of the period, messages supporting the "politics of revolutionary agitation" and then the "politics of violence" were increasingly channeled through the mass media. According to a Filipino political scientist, R. E. Agpalo, these two types of politics were the consequences of

... the modernization of Philippine society which caused the development of a circular process of the people revolutionizing the counter-elite and the political elite and the revolutionizing counter-elite and the political elite further revolutionizing the people. The overall result of this circular process was politics of revolutionary agitation that developed in the Philippines during the post-independence period.¹¹⁸

Then he continues,

... By the mid-1960's the politics of revolutionary agitation was becoming more organized, making use of black propaganda, so-called "goons" and enormous amount of money. And by the later 1960's, for the first time in Philippine history, organized groups attempted to sabotage the constitutional ritual of the President delivering the

¹¹⁷For a list of radio stations in 1971 and their operators, see Republic of the Philippines, Department of Public Works, Radio Control Office, "List of Standard Broadcast Radio Stations as of September 1970-71." See also the "List of TV Stations as of June 30, 1971, prepared by the same office.

¹¹⁸See Agpalo, "Society and Politics . . .," *op. cit.*, 37.

state-of-the-nation address at the Congress of the Philippines and even . . . assault[ed] . . . the First Lady of the Republic. After this critical date, the politics of revolutionary agitation . . . [was] transformed to a politics of violence . . .¹¹⁹

The response of the President—the *pangulo*—to this “politics of violence” was Proclamation No. 1081, signed on September 21, 1972. The proclamation of martial law was announced to the people only on September 23, 1972, the terminal date of the period that this paper covers.

At this point the socioeconomic-political developments in the Philippines had already transformed the society into a post-traditional one by the linkage (though not yet effectively) of the people at the base of society with the center of the political system. Even if modernization did not uproot the larger sector of Philippine society from its cherished way of life and had practically left unchanged its basic pattern of social behavior rooted in family values and norms, the various interest groups—including students and church groups of various ideological persuasions—transmitted messages to them in an attempt to gain the support of the base. At times such messages might have been competing and confusing to the people. As this kind of politicizing was something novel to them, it is possible to speculate, on the basis of their enculturation, that their responses were varied. But whatever they were, it is not difficult to imagine that the people at the base of society did turn to their reliable nuclear family to cope with the new social phenomenon confronting them. Their prior loyalties, it can also be surmised, generally belonged to their nuclear family. This is not to say that there were no exceptions to this type of behavior.

In any case, a scholar on Philippine society writing at the end of the sixties comments:

. . . one of the most basic realities of Philippine social structure today is precisely the economic dependence of the many on the few. For the rural Philippines as a whole, this is documented with the finding that in the course of a year almost half of farm households obtained loans, 45 per cent of cash loans and 72 per cent of loans in kind being for immediate family needs. [The Philippine Statistical Survey of Households Bulletin, Series No. 12, Borrowing Practices at Farm Households, May 1961,” 1963, pp. xi-xv.] Intensive studies of specific areas indicate that perhaps 75 per cent of rural families live in conditions of chronic economic insecurity which breeds dependence on others.¹²⁰

On the basis of the dynamics of the alliance system and the societal-control mechanism of Philippine society, such dependence is not a one-sided but a reciprocal relationship. There has been a draining of material resources from those “who have” by those “who have not”. Such process can be described as some kind of leveling of the haves by

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, 38.

¹²⁰J.J. Carroll, S.J., “The Traditional Philippine Social Studies,” *Silliman Journal*, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (First Quarter, 1972), 82.

the have nots, a process which cannot be quantified or statistically accounted for. On the other hand, the have-nots support and protect the interests of the haves. Otherwise, the relationship between the two individuals or their families (a patron-client relationship) would cease. If it did, the client's loyalty, together with that of the other members of his family, could be moved to another patron with whom the reciprocal relationship between patron and client would be established. Such changes alter also the structure of both the alliance groups: the one from which an individual(s) moved away; the other, into which he (they) has (have) moved into. The point of authority of an alliance group is fluid, depending on the changing situation of the dyadic relationships within the group.

Briefly, the people at the base of Philippine society by 1972 were self-reliant and lived their life within the intensely personalistic and familial relationship of a community. And it is possible that this kept the psychic well-being (though not necessarily the quantity of the people's material possessions) at the base of Philippine society. It also maintained the stability of Philippine society at a time when changes were taking place in its upper sector. When the incumbent President (the *pangulo*), the one responsible for siphoning loyalties upward (through his alliance system) to the center of the polity (also the center of Philippine society) decided to lead the "revolution from the center," the people at the base, in general, seem to have continued accepting his leadership.

IV

Summary:

In this paper, an attempt was made to present the pre-existing conditions in Japanese and Philippine societies before the periods delineated as their first phase of modernization—1868-1895 in Japan, 1946-1972 in the Philippines. Within the period in each country, the modernization of the political system was achieved in Japan by means of the politics of authoritarianism and, in the Philippines, through the politics of patronage and incorporation. The people at the base of each of the two societies were linked to the center of the Japanese and Philippine political systems, respectively, by means of the two types of politics. However, there was a difference in the rate of changes towards modernizing each of these societies.

In a single generation, Japan was not only able to centralize the political system but also earned the respect of the Western powers as a rising and modernizing power, after the Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese political system strongly controlled the economic, military and the communication systems which, in turn, reinforced and strengthened it. Thus, by 1895, Japan was successfully industrialized and controlled directly by the political system. The communication system was similarly controlled. The military system, also controlled by the political system, was in turn, reinforced by the communication system.

On the other hand, the Philippines was able to develop some kind of a participatory political system through the alliance system domina-

ted by the politics of patronage and incorporation. The modernization of the political system—the linkage of the periphery (the people at the base of Philippine society) to the center of the political system—took sometime. It was the result of changes in style of the political leader playing the politics of patronage and incorporation to control or to maintain control of an alliance system that would allow him to win the highest position of the land—the Presidency. For example, campaigning for the Presidency or other elective positions among the people at the base of Philippine society. The use of the interagency task force to implement a project, also directly linked the population at the base of Philippine society to a leader who represented the *pangulo* at the center. The increasing involvement of the armed forces in civic-action work, in addition to their military function, also contributed to mobilizing the people constituting the larger sector of the population to participate directly in the political system. The military system appeared to be the most monolithic of the subsystems within Philippine society and the most rational as well as goal- and nation-oriented. On the other hand, the economic and communication systems were usually family-oriented because they were generally controlled by elite families who, in some way or another, divided Philippine society instead of contributing to its cohesion. So the modernization of the Philippine economic system and the gearing of the messages channeled through the communication system toward the nation's goals appear slower than Japan's during its first phase of modernization.

This paper tried to analyze the development of the social organization of Japan and the Philippines, based on their family systems, and the rate of change in each society. It showed how authoritarianism in the Japanese family had diffused into the political system in such a way that it strengthened the system's capability to initiate and sustain the first phase of Japanese modernization. In the Philippines, during the same phase, the Filipino family partly brought about the politics of patronage and incorporation. Such politics was derived from the alliance system that the Filipinos had created within their extended kinship structure. This difference between the Japanese and Filipino family systems and the politics each system generated account for the discrepancy in the rate of social change taking place during the first phase of modernization within each society.

The transformation of the Japanese and Philippine societies during their first phase of modernization was undertaken by adaptive political leaders who intended to strengthen rather than change the family systems while they initiated innovations to modernize their societies. This strategy of change preserved the social organization—therefore the psychic well-being of the people at the base of each of these societies—rather than increased their material possessions. This suggests a crucial question that a people must answer should they decide to modernize their country within a generation: should modernization result in a people's "being" or "having"?