

A WORLD INHUMAN IN ITS POVERTY

N. de Young

The mass of the people struggle against the same poverty, flounder about making the same gestures and with their shrunken bellies outline what has been called the geography of hunger. It is an under-developed world, a world inhuman in its poverty. But also it is a world without doctors, without engineers and without administrators. Confronting this world, European nations sprawl, ostentatiously opulent. This European opulence is literally scandalous, for it has been founded on slavery, it has been nourished with the blood of slaves and it comes directly from the soil and from the sub-soil of that under-developed world. The well being and the progress of Europe have been built up with the sweat and the dead bodies of Negroes, Arabs, Indians and the yellow races. We have decided not to overlook this any longer.

Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*

Any discussion of President Carter's foreign policy based on human rights, must be placed within the context outlined above in *The Wretched of the Earth*.¹ Without this perspective, we could lapse into a liberal dream-world, grateful that a president of a superpower speaks out against human torture, political imprisonment or censorship. Fanon, however, reminds us of the underlying causes of the violation of human rights: colonization and its heir, neo-colonialization. Underdevelopment, the child of neo-colonialism, breeds repressive governments, since revolution waits in the wing. If you cannot feed the people adequately, you must restrict their movements, lest there be mass uprisings. The industrialized nations have never accepted the responsibility for underdevelopment. The emotional invoke Malthusian arguments that poverty is self-inflicted; the academe attribute the cause of lack of development to the immaturity of their political institutions; or presidents hide behind demands for human rights. What is missing in Carter's cry for liberty is an even more basic demand—equality.

In the same year *The Wretched of the Earth* was written, Raul Prebisch warned the first conference of UNCTAD that in 1964, the Third World received \$3.6 billion dollars less in 1962 than in 1950 for the same volume of exports.² Even the World Bank's study on world income distribution conclude that:

The frightening implication of the present work is that hundreds of millions of desperately poor people have been hurt rather than helped by economic development. Unless their destinies become a major and explicit focus of development policy in the 1970's and 1980's, economic development may serve merely to promote social injustice.³

¹Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (London: Maggibon and Kee, 1965), p. 76.

²Tony Smith, "Changing Configurations of Power in North-South Relations Since 1945," *International Organization*, vol. 31, no. 1 (Winter, 1977), p. 21.

³*Ibid.*, p. 17.

Put more graphically, half of the world population of 3.9 billion people, earn less than \$200 per year and the Third World has decided "not to overlook this any longer".

The manifesto of the Third World, as *The Wretched of the Earth* has been called, bore fruit in a conference in Algiers in 1967, attended by 77 Third World countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Charter of Algiers adopted a common position on economic affairs. The major demands were for more favorable prices through organized commodity agreements, preferential access to the markets of the rich countries, greater aid through the IMF and greater control of multi-nationals. The Third World was looking for a more "just" international order. Their discussions and debates culminated in the Declaration of the New International Economic Order adopted by the 6th Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, in April, 1974. The Third World (the South) faces the North (the industrialized world).

The new cold war is neither essentially ideological nor fully system-oriented. It is, for the most part a simple bread-and-butter issue in the fundamental sense of the word.⁴

What the Third World wants is a share in the industrial world's economic growth and technological superiority. It is a demand for international justice and equality in global resource allocation and income distribution. Amuzegar commented that in the last four years, some primary commodities have risen four times or more in price, only to drop to one-third or less within a few months and

Only a Neanderthal free enterprise, or an economic Nihilist can honestly deny that such widely isolated gyrations, coupled with subsequent deterioration in terms of trade, make a shambles of national planning and domestic growth.⁵

The New Economic Order will be forged through a dialogue between the North (industrialized nations) and the South (the less developed nations). This dialogue wished to end the causes of the cold war by changing the world from an East-West cold war battle ground into a North-South dialogue. In January 1975, the U.N. supported President Echeveria of Mexico's Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. Article II of this Charter expresses clearly one such right:

Every state has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal over all its wealth, natural resources and economic activity.⁶

It is the less developed countries' right to demand this new order and the duty of the industrialized nation to jointly implement it. These are the rights that humans from the South ask for. A world "inhuman in its poverty" demands the rights and the means to be human.

⁴Jahangir Amuzegar, "The North-South Dialogue: From Conflict to Compromise," *Foreign Affairs* (April, 1976), p. 557.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 559.

⁶Smith, "Changing Configurations." p. 5.

The Old Economic Order

It was necessary to introduce the idea of the New Economic Order in this study of human rights for two reasons: firstly, because it is an expression of the less developed countries' right to share in the world's wealth. (This is their perception of the meaning of human rights); secondly, the acknowledgement by the United Nations Assembly that there is a need for a new Economic Order, reflects the changing global patterns of international relations. This acknowledgement indicates that there has been a change. What then was the old economic order? Does it create the need for a new foreign policy based on human rights as Carter's perceptions dictate?

The basic characteristic of the old economic order was in America's willingness to lead and in the other nations' impulse to follow. The leadership involved the U.S. as the principal backer of such institutions as the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, and the World Bank. As the leading capitalist nation, the U.S. made sure that the exchange currency for international trade was measured in U.S. dollars. With the insurance of economic stability and backed by the approval of members of the UN, the U.S. assumed sole responsibility for defending the order against any communist advance. World War II left the allies in a devastated state and none could challenge the power of the U.S.

Two events in the 70's occurred, thus, undermining U.S. hegemony. The currency crisis of 1970-1, which forced Nixon to renege on the negotiability of the dollar, vitiated the latter's infallibility. Moreover, the U.S. debacle in Vietnam raised doubts as to whether the U.S. could or even should defend the 'free world' against Communism. The Nixon Doctrine, a do-it-yourself plan for Asia, signaled the beginning of the U.S. acceptance that it could no longer play the role of world policeman. There were other powers waiting in the wing to fill the vacuum. The economic recovery of both West Germany and Japan, as part of the U.S. strategy to instill life into the capitalist world after the war, now proved rival to the U.S. economic superiority.

In this scenario came the oil crisis in 1973. The Middle East cartel showed the way towards a new economic order. By raising the price of oil, the Third World members of OPEC created havoc in the old order. A new weapon had been unleashed. The effect has been aptly analyzed by Boumediene of Algeria:

The OPEC action is really the first illustration and at the same time the most concrete and most spectacular illustration of the importance of raw materials price for our countries, the vital need for the producing nations to operate the levers of price control, and lastly the great possibilities of a union of raw material-producing countries. This action should be viewed by the developing countries... as an example and a source of hope.⁷

It soon became obvious that the unity of the industrialized nations was ripped apart. Instead of cooperation, it became a question of every nation for itself. Britain and France opposed any common EEC alloca-

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 4.

tion scheme for oil and blocked the already existing scheme. Instead they both sent bilateral missions to the Middle East to swap arms and industrial products for oil. France made a bilateral agreement with Saudi Arabia. Italy, in 1974, reached an agreement with Libya. West Germany discussed increasing investments with Iran. In 1974, the overall EEC exports to the Middle East increased by 85%.⁸ In December 1974, the EEC supported the Resolution of November 6th, calling upon Israel to give up its occupied territories. Kissinger was furious at Europe's presentation to the U.S. of a *fait accompli* and at its decision to "elevate refusal to consult into a principle defending European identity."⁹ But Kissinger had forgotten that the U.S. had, in fact, made Europe dependent on oil from the Middle East. In the early 50's, 90% of the energy needs of Europe were met by their own coal industries. But the dumping of oil and the regulating of the price of coal by the U.S. changed the energy situation in Europe so that, by 1973, Europe was 60% dependent on oil from the Middle East.

Japan, on the other hand, was in a tighter spot. Almost all of the country's essential oil was imported—90% of it from the Middle East, with only a 45-day stock supply. The same oil history as in Europe had taken place. In the '50s, 60% of energy was supplied by coal. By 1970, oil accounted for 70%. The U.S. had forced upon the Japanese oil agreements, giving the U.S. oil companies permanent rights to supply crude.¹⁰ Taro Yamashita (the first president of Japan's Arabian Oil Co.) warned:

Think of the Pacific war. It's cause was the blockade or prevention of movements of only some two million tons of oil. It is oil that dominates the world.¹¹

The crisis of 1973 led to Japanese bilateral agreements with Saudi Arabia and to the cooperation with the USSR in developing the Tyumen oil fields in the Soviet Far East and the coal fields of the Yakutin region.¹²

The oil crisis led to the break up of the alliance of the industrialized countries. The old order based on U.S. hegemony as the unifying power, was no longer considered legitimate. Old relations would no longer work. Free trade, the bastion of capitalism, became expensive. Protection tariffs began to emerge, particularly in the U.S. who, even by 1971, had a trade deficit with Japan amounting to \$3.2 billion. The tidy economic system envisioned by the authors of the Bretton Woods Agreement had not foreseen that competition could in fact destroy it. The crisis is described by Gunder Frank as a crisis of accumulation since the process of accumulation (development or growth) "no longer

⁸Wilfred L. Kohl, "The U.S., Western Europe and Energy Problem," *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 30, no. 1 (Spring-Summer, 1976), p. 89.

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰Malcolm Caldwell, "Oil Imperialism in South East Asia" in M. Delden (ed.), *Remaking Asia* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), p. 26.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 26.

¹²Boris Slavinsky, "Soviet Far East and International Trade," *Asian Survey*, vol. XVII, no. 4 (April, 1977), p. 327.

functions as it has before and requires far reaching readjustments in order to make it function again in the future."¹³ The Third World believes the solution lies in establishing a new economic order. President Carter however, has a different solution.

Carter's Solution

These lessons were not lost on Carter when he became President. His closest adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski had already labelled the situation as an "isolated America in a hostile world."¹⁴ In his major foreign policy speech at Notre Dame (May 22, 1977), Carter spoke of a "new world that calls for a new American policy." A new perspective is needed:

It is a perspective which recognizes the fact that we alone do not have all the answers to the world's problems. Our mutual survival depends on our mutually solving problems.¹⁵

Instead of a world dependent on the U.S., now proven incapable of a solo world leadership, interdependence was now to save the world. Cooperation, not competition, was to be the solution. No longer would the U.S. engage in unilateral action. Consultation and dialogue with its allies would preface any major foreign policy decision. Carter believed this cooperation possible only if the doctrine of Trilateralism were accepted and put into practice by the industrialized nations of the world.

Trilateralism is a belief in the continual "trialogue" among the three most industrialized geographical areas of the world: Western Europe, Japan and the United States. The "ism" refers to the belief that no one section can do without the others and, therefore, it condemns any unilateral action. As one spokesman of trilateralism Richard Ullman wrote in *Foreign Affairs*: "Further American unilateralism would fuel a spiral of defensive reactions that would leave all the Western economies worse off."¹⁶ It, therefore, has two faces, says Ullman: an inward and an outward one. Inwardly, it seeks to preserve industrialized societies by pursuing common policies and preserving liberal political values. He justified this by pointing out that:

The demise of liberal democracy in society after society outside the trilateral geographical sphere has made this aspect of trilateralism's "inward face" seem especially urgent.¹⁷

The outward face looks to the "needs" of the poorer nations.

According to this view, the nations involved in trilateral discus-

¹³Andre Gunder Frank, "Economic Crisis: Third World and 1984," *World Development*, vol. 4, no. 10 and 11 (October, 1976), p. 854.

¹⁴Zbigniew Brzezinski, "America in a Hostile World," *Foreign Policy* (June, 1976), p. 65.

¹⁵Jimmy Carter, "Special Address to Foreign Audiences," *U.S.I.S. News Release* (Manila, January 22, 1977), p. 3.

¹⁶Richard H. Ullman, "Trilateralism: Partnership for What?," *Foreign Affairs* (October, 1976), p. 3.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 5.

sions feel they are the sole representatives of liberal democracy (note the absence of any reference to egalitarianism) and that, together, they must protect its establishment by unifying their policies. Democracy has failed in "society after society" outside their circle and the trilateral countries must stand fast. Communism is not the only threat then. The Third World, having failed to become liberal democracies, could become the enemy. Ullman even goes so far as to say that "the primary reason for Northern unity is to be able to negotiate more effectively with the South."¹⁸

By saying this, Ullman acknowledges the change in international relations outlined above. The capitalist industrialized nations have, for a long time, lived with the threat of Communism. They now face the threat of the South. It was fear of the Arab boycott, says Ullman, not the Soviet military which "led the Western Europeans severely to limit American ability to operate from their territories in support of Israel during the October 1973 War."¹⁹ The call to unity as the only means of maintaining their leverage against the South is unmistakable. Oil had been the source of the division in the trilateral countries. The OPEC action triggered off the divisive response of the industrialized nations and a counter-offensive became necessary. The North-South dialogue takes on aspects of a North-South confrontation, with the North realizing it had better consult and agree among each other before confronting the South's demands. Ullman sums up his definition of trilateralism by saying, "it is not an end in itself, rather an approach, an arena for problem solving." The process of dialogue is

To prevent any one of the poles to doing mischief to either of the others. In such a framework, the Nixon shock of 1971 would be impossible.²⁰

An association was started in 1973 in order that these discussions could take place. Under the auspices of David Rockefeller, the Trilateral Commission was set up, funded by the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. With offices in New York, the Commission has a membership of 200, from business, politics, academe and publishing communities of the trilateral world. One former director, Zbigniew Brzezinski, now Carter's National Security Advisor, views the result of trilateralism as a "community of developed nations." The path to the community runs through "intensive, regular and even more formal political consultations."²¹ There should be "common planning with regard to problems or arenas of mutual interest," in order to achieve a "shared political perspective among the governmental bodies of the three trilateral units."²² George Ball, a former U.S. Secretary of State and now one of Carter's advisers, in

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁹*Ibid.*

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 12.

²¹Zbigniew Brzezinski, "U.S. Foreign Policy: The Search for Forces," *Foreign Affairs* (July, 1973) p. 724.

²²*Ibid.*

an article entitled "Trilateralism and the Oil Crisis," endorses the aims and says the basic purpose of trilateralism should be: "instead of a mutually defeating contest for positions of special advantage, they should design a broad program of common action."²³

Trilateralism and Human Rights

A precise description of the Trilateral Commission comes from one of its more prominent members, Jimmy Carter, who when Governor of Georgia, was invited to join the Commission. In his biography, *Why Not the Best?*, Carter gives us his appreciation of the Commission:

In order to insure the continuing opportunity for penetrating analyses of complicated, important, and timely foreign policy questions, there is in operation an organization known as the Trilateral Commission. A group of leaders from the three developed areas of the world meets every six months to discuss ideas of current interest to Japan, North America and Europe. Subjects like the world monetary system, economic relations between rich and poor nations, developed countries, and other possibilities for international understanding and cooperation are first studied by scholars, then debated by members of the commission, and finally analyses are published and distributed to world leaders. Membership in this commission has provided me with a splendid learning opportunity, and many of the other members have helped me in my study of foreign affairs.²⁴

This "splendid learning opportunity" provided Carter with the framework for his foreign policy. The framework of trilateralism furnished the perspective Carter spoke of in a *Special Message to Foreign Audiences*. It was a perspective that "recognizes the fact that we alone do not have all the answers to the world's problems."²⁵ It should be pointed out that these words were part of an address given immediately after his inaugural address. In a most unusual occurrence in the annals of presidential precedence, Carter spoke to the friends of the U.S. immediately after he had spoken to the American public. The point here is that Carter sees trilateralism as the key to maintaining the unity of the industrialized world and wanted the world to know it. It might also be pertinent to mention here that several of Carter's advisers were also past members of the Trilateral Commission: Cyrus Vance, Mondale, Woodcock and of course, Brzezinski. As many as ten leading U.S. administrators are members of the Commission.

Trilateralism becomes Carter's solution to salvaging the divisive world of capitalism. The fact that world leadership is now a multipolar structure makes management of the system more difficult. Fred Hirsch wisely points out that "the dominant partner reaps more of the benefit from a favorable group outcome than any one of a set of equal partners, and is thereby motivated to be more group-minded"²⁶ Group-

²³George Ball, "Trilateralism and the Oil Crisis," *Pacific Community*, vol. 5, no. 3 (April, 1974), p. 340.

²⁴Jimmy Carter, *Why not the Best?* (Hong Kong: World Today Press, 1977), p. 129.

²⁵See p. 8, note 3.

²⁶Fred Hirsch, "Is There a New International Economic Order?" *International Organization*, vol. 30, no. 3 (Spring, 1976) p. 523.

mindedness then consists in stressing similarities rather than differences. The divergence of interest must be refocused by stressing themes of unity. Underneath the interest of the nation-states of the capitalist world lie common values, traditions and philosophies. These must be emphasized and the conflicts de-emphasized. At the London Conference in May, 1977, Carter began to put this plan into action. He told the participants that any country that acquires a special competitive advantage at the expense of the other industrialized nations, would ultimately weaken the whole system. He pointed out that one country's surplus is another country's deficit. OPEC's \$45 billion dollar surplus is the rest of the world's deficit. The weakness must be turned into a strength. This is the strategy of Carter's solution. As Ball said in his essay:

What the oil crisis had shown is that though the industrialized nations differ in the details of their individual situations, their levels of natural resources, their geography and their political relationships, the common interests are far more important than the differences.²⁸

Thus, besides indicating the larger economic common interest, Carter must go deeper and emphasize the common interest in the ideological realm. Ball, the apologist for trilateralism reveals the key:

What must never be overlooked or disregarded is that the United States, Western Europe and Japan share a distinguishing common value: they are all committed to standards of personal liberty and the freedom of individual initiative quite unknown in Soviet Union or China.²⁹

The U.S. must then use "personal liberty" to distinguish itself from Communism—a system most Westerners believe necessitates the sacrifice of the individual. Carter then uses the theme of human rights to remind the industrialized nations of their common values.

The interlinking between the goals of trilateralism and the theme of human rights is well illustrated by Carter's major foreign policy speech at Notre Dame. In defining U.S. policy, Carter says that it should rest on five cardinal premises. The first two are:

First, our policy should reflect our people's basic commitment to promote the cause of human rights.

Next, our policy should be based on close cooperation among the industrial democracies of the world—because we share the same values and because, together we can help to shape a more decent life for all.³⁰

Premises 3 and 4 deal with the need for a more comprehensive and more reciprocal disarmament agreement and the need to reduce the

²⁷"A World Safe For Business," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (March, 25, 1977), p. 39.

²⁸Ball, "Trilateralism and The Oil Crisis", p. 341.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 345.

³⁰Jimmy Carter, "America's Goal: A Foreign Policy Based on Moral Values," *United States Policy Statement Series—1977* (U.S.I.S.), p. 6.

chasm between the world's rich and poor, respectively. Premise 5, then tells how the free world can achieve these goals:

Finally, our policy must encourage all countries to rise above narrow national interest and work together to solve formidable global problems, as the threat of nuclear war, racial hatred, the arms race, environmental damage, hunger and disease.³¹

The interconnection then is very closely spelled out—human rights becomes defined as a shared value. This shared value of human rights should help to solidify the industrialized world, “where freedom of expression is taken for granted.”³² Carter then tries to reinforce the notion that the value is not shared in the communist world:

The leaders of totalitarian countries understand this very well. The proof is that words are precisely the action for which dissidents in those countries are being persecuted.

What separates East from West, according to Carter, is the value of human rights, and what unites the West is its common value of human rights.

A Question of Legitimacy

The theme of human rights has two other important uses. The first is directed towards the American people in an attempt to use it to work a therapeutic miracle in a disillusioned public as a legitimatizer of a continued American involvement abroad. Carter knew well this disillusionment and saw it as a crisis involving the belief that the U.S. was unable to lead. The government had suffered damaging blows from the excesses of the Vietnam War which had engendered a powerful opposition to the war. The anti-war movement begun in the middle 60's served to radicalize the youth. Their opposition widened to include basic criticism of capitalism and the U.S. role as an imperialist power. This counter-culture began to question the fibers of the social system, then aggravated by the Watergate incident. The government's “honest image” was shattered. Even the people outside the counter-culture found it difficult to rationalize the President's motives. Economic recession loomed endlessly and the unemployment figures rose yearly. Clearly a domestic crisis in the realm of morale was obvious. The young nation, believing so much in the worth of its idealism, now had to face the truth.

Carter saw this and began to echo the need for truth. His whole campaign revolved around the restoration of fundamental values and truths. His campaign image was one of a home-spun, deep-rooted, back-to-the-farm philosophy. In his book, *Why Not the Best?*, we find him answering the question: Can our government be honest, decent? Quoting the Bible, he said, “If the trumpet gives an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself for the battle?”, and reasoned then that the uncertainty must be exchanged for goals of a clear vision of what is to

³¹*ibid.*

³²*ibid.*, p. 7.

be accomplished.³³ Clearly, he was trying to reestablish faith in the American system. Without the faith which presidents have used to marshal the spread of the American way all over the world, the American people would easily revert to isolationism.

In his Notre Dame speech, we find Carter's attempt to revitalize the American idealism:

We have reaffirmed America's commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy. In ancestry, religion, color, place of origin, and cultural background, we Americans are as diverse a nation as the world has ever known. No common mystique of blood or soil unites us. What draws us together, perhaps more than anything else, is a belief in human freedom. We want the world to know that our nation stands for more than financial prosperity.³⁴

The implication is, of course, that the American people should support a government, based on the pursuit of human rights, that has an obligation to "persuade and to lead" the rest of the world.³⁵

Needless to say, Carter had hit the enduring American attachment to idealism. Support for this program was overwhelming. In an interview with *Newsweek*, Patt Derian, the new Human Rights Coordinator at the State Department, was asked why the President so deeply believes in the Cause, whereupon, she replied: "Because it's the right thing to do."³⁶ *Newsweek* then comments "*that*, may be the clearest and simplest explanation of how Carter really feels, and why a great many people around the world agree with him."³⁷ Indeed, Carter received tremendous support from the American people.

Secondly, the theme of human rights has its own implications for the Third World. The Third World, encouraged by such events as the OPEC oil confrontation and the defeat of the U.S. in Vietnam, saw the old order crumbling and presented their vision of the new economic order as an alternative. The vision, as Ali Mazuri points out in *Beyond Dependency: The Developing World Speaks out*, is one of an emerging "new egalitarian morality". This morality is not immediately interested in personal liberty but rather, in the more basic human survival rights. In a world where half of the total population of 3.9 billion make less than \$200 a year, freedom of speech and other civil liberties are not the most important issues. It might be worthwhile to point out that when Carter first spoke about human rights, he was referring only to civil rights. The outcry against this, however, promoted a widening of the definition. *Newsweek* verifies this by saying:

One change is that Washington has adopted a broader definition of human rights. Food, shelter, health care and education—the rights the Soviets like to boast they are best at providing—have now been added to Washington's lists, along with such traditional U.S. con-

³³Carter, *Why not the Best?* p. 154.

³⁴Carter, "America's Goal: A Foreign Policy Based on Moral Values," p. 7.

³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 5.

³⁶"The Push for Human Rights," *Newsweek*, (June 20, 1977) p. 14.

³⁷*Ibid.*

cerns as free speech, the right to travel and freedom from torture and arbitrary arrests.³⁹

Once this was added to the definition, human rights could be used to remind the Third World of the attractiveness of the capitalist's protection of the individual vis-a-vis the socialist's abuse of it. Carter means to show this world that the U.S. "stands for more than financial prosperity." And,

from free and open competition comes creative change in politics, commerce, science and the arts. From control comes conformity and despair.

The great democracies are not free because they are strong and prosperous. I believe they are strong and prosperous because they are free.⁴⁰

This argument is supposed to convince the Third World, which is locked into a dependence relationship with the industrialized nations, that continuing with this dependency will lead to prosperity. That it would be dangerous to upset the industrialized nations through exaggerated South demands. This view finds a staunch supporter in Daniel Moynihan, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, who said:

The world economy is not nearly bad enough to justify the measure proposed by the (Third World) and yet it is much worse than it would be otherwise in consequence of measures the (Third World) has already taken.⁴¹

In present day colloquialism, "don't tinker with the establishment for it is protecting you;" thus, perpetuating the "old protection racket." It is actually the same cold war under a new guise. For if the cold war issue (containment of communism) is dead, then the East-West dialogue turns into a North-South dialogue. The old order might have to be replaced by the New Economic Order. But the human rights issue continues the East-West confrontation, focusing on the need for 'free-world' including the Third World, to resist the communist advance. In other words, the old order, albeit modified to include the newly emerging industrialized nations, still stands. The U.S. has acknowledged its new obligation to consult the other trilateral members before it acts, and it may even have to listen to the demands of the Third World, but the old order is still "calling the shots."

"Calling the Shots"—Human Rights

Critics of American foreign policy have long focused on the hypocrisy of supporting Third World dictators. Roosevelt's answer to their accusation became the traditional response. Speaking of Raphael Trujillo, Roosevelt said, "he's an s.o.b., but, he's my s.o.b." Carter, however, now says;

Being confident of our own future, we are now free of that inordinate

³⁹*Newsweek* (June 20, 1977), p. 13.

⁴⁰Carter, "America's Goal: A Foreign Policy Based on Moral Values," p. 7.

⁴¹Daniel Moynihan, "The U.S. in Opposition," *Commentary* (March, 1975).

fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joins us in our fear. For too many years we have been willing to adopt the flawed principles and tactics of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our values for theirs.⁴²

Foreign aid was now to be drastically reduced in those countries where human rights were violated. The U.S. Congress revised the Foreign Assistance Act 1961, to contain Section 301 (a) which now made this a law. The Office of the Coordinator of Human Rights helped prepare a 141-page report on the human rights situation in 82 countries.⁴³ Each country was given a rating like "free," "partly free" or "not free." Seven countries were immediately deemed unworthy of aid—Mozambique, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia and Cuba.⁴⁴ The fact that they are all socialist countries should not go unnoticed.

In the 'free world,' the decision is not as arbitrary. In actual fact, there has been a 78% increase in military aid to South Korea, deemed "partly free." Indonesia ("partly free") was granted a 24% increase. Malik, in an interview with *Newsweek*, said that "great strides have been made in the area of human rights: Ten thousand political prisoners have just been released." Asked how many remained in jail, he said, "not more than 30,000."⁴⁶ Argentina, where there are currently 10,000 political prisoners, has received only "some cuts" in their military aid. The President of Argentina, Messendez, said that "he was prepared to kill 50,000 more people to stabilize the country." Iran, a country labelled "not free" has just been given \$1.2 billion dollars worth of Airborne Warning and Control Systems.⁴⁷

What is this 'selective morality' all about? None of the dictators of the non-socialist world have been refused aid. Is human rights merely rhetoric? Is it not to be taken seriously? It should be taken seriously, but should not be viewed as a complete departure from previous U.S. foreign policies. The dictators of the Third World have been told to "shape up", not to "get out".

And yet, the U.S. is aware, as Carter says, of the "reality of a politically awakening world." This world has the potential for revolution. A strongly repressive dictatorship would produce this violent reaction. Therefore, the dictators have been told to ease up, to prevent any uprising that would seek to overthrow a friend of capitalism. This is the use of human rights in the third world diplomacy.

Prisoner's Dilemma

None of the gross violators of human rights, like Chile have been touched. The countdown after the 1973 coup is: 30,000 people killed,

⁴²Carter, "America's Goals: A Foreign Policy based on Moral Values," p. 3.

⁴³*Far Eastern Economic Review* (March 25, 1977) p. 37.

⁴⁴U.S. Department of State, *Human Rights Reports*, submitted to Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, U.S. Senate, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977).

⁴⁵*Daily Express* (Manila, July 6, 1977), p. 4.

⁴⁶*Newsweek* (June 20, 1977) p. 8.

⁴⁷Richard E. Ward "The Developing World, *The Guardian* (July 6, 1977), p. 10.

150,000 arrested, 1,200 disappeared and 6,000 currently imprisoned for political reasons. Gunder Frank deems it the "Chilean model" where wages have been reduced by 50% in order to keep foreign investment flowing into the country.⁴⁸ And aid continues to flow. The old order continues while the Third World finds itself in a trap. In game theory, it is called the prisoner's dilemma, when a solution can only be found through explicit cooperation.

On the one hand, the oil crisis stimulated a call for a new economic order but, on the other hand, the non-oil producing countries of the Third World suffered the most from the oil shortage and price increase. In 1973, non-oil producing countries registered a deficit of \$2.5 billion; in 1974, \$17.5 billion; and, by 1975, \$27 billion.⁴⁹ In order to balance this deficit, aid is necessary. As a result, they become prisoners of a system that only increases their dependency.

Their response, the call for a new economic order is, however, also a call from their jails. This new order is not to be brought about through a total revolution against the system. They have chosen to remain *in* the system and desire only to make functional changes. The IMF is not attacked. They instead demand a code of conduct for multinational corporations, debt rescheduling and increase in the capital base of the World Bank. They will be able to force some changes, but compliance with the system necessitates compromise. This is the prisoner's dilemma.

⁴⁸Frank, "Economic Crisis", p. 855.

⁴⁹Smith, "Changing Configurations of Power," p. 11.

Bibliography

- Amuzegar, Jahangir. "The North-South Dialogue: From Conflict to Compromise," *Foreign Affairs* (April, 1976).
- Ball, George. "Trilateralism and the Oil Crisis," *Pacific Community* Vol. 5, No. 3 (April, 1974).
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "America in a Hostile World," *Foreign Policy* (June, 1976).
- _____. "U.S. Foreign Policy: The Search for Forces," *Foreign Affairs* (July, 1973).
- Carter, Jimmy. "America's Goal: A Foreign Policy Based on Moral Values," Notre Dame University, May 22, 1977. *United States Policy Statement Series—1977*. U.S.I.S., 1977.
- _____. *Inaugural Address*. U.S.I.S. News Release (January 22, 1977).
- _____. *Why Not The Best?* Hong Kong: World Today Press, 1977.
- Fanon, Franz. *The Wretched of the Earth*. London: Maggibon & Kee, 1965.
- Frank, Andre Gunder. "Economic Crisis: Third World and 1984," *World Development*. Vol. 4, Nos. 10 & 11 (October, 1976).
- Hirsch, Fred. "Is There a New International Order?" *International Organization*. Vol. 30, No. 3 (Spring, 1976).
- Kohl, Wilfred L. "The U.S., Western Europe and the Energy Crisis," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Spring-Summer, 1976).
- Selden, Mark. *Remaking Asia*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1974.
- Slavinsky, Boris. "Soviet Far East and International Trade" *Asian Survey*, Vol. XVII, No. 4 (April, 1977).
- Sibler, Irwin. "Can Carter's 'New' Foreign Policy Save Imperialism?" *The Guardian* (June 1, 1977).
- Smith, Tony. "Changing Configurations of Power in North-South Relations Since 1945," *International Organizations*. Vol. 31, No. 1 (Winter, 1977).
- Ullman, Richard H. "Trilateralism: Partnership for What?" *Foreign Affairs* (October, 1976).
- U.S. Department of State. *Human Rights Reports*. Compiled for Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, U.S. Senate. Washington: U.S. Gov't. Printing Office, 1977.