

THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION

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Never before in China's history had the Chinese people practised direct action on such a great scale as they did in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) of the mid-sixties. Its influence has penetrated into every sphere of Chinese life: farm, factories, schools, universities, all the arts and culture, the army, the government, and the Party. Chinese communist commentators underscored this historical episode as "the greatest even" in the sixth decade of the twentieth century¹ yet unprecedented in the history of China.

I

The Cultural Revolution had its conceptual roots in the Marxist analysis of society, refined and developed by Mao on the basis of his long experience in the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China.

Marxist analysis distinguishes between the base and the superstructure of a social system.² The base is a system's mode of economic

¹ Editorial, *People's Daily* and *Red Flag*, January 1, 1967, reprinted in *Peking Review* (PR), No. 1, January 1, 1967, p. 8.

² Karl Marx, Preface to "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy," 1859 in T. B. Bottomore and M. Rubel, eds., *Karl Marx on Sociology and Social Philosophy* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1961), pp. 67-68. ' "

production. Ideas and institutions, laws and politics, and even religious concepts as well as artistic expressions are all parts of the social superstructure. Accepting this dichotomy, Mao expounded on the relationship between the productive forces and the production relations and between the base and the superstructure. In Marxist terms, productive forces refer to the essentials possessed by mankind to carry out material production namely, labor force, object of labor and productive tools. Production relations refer to the relations of men to each other or the places people occupy in the production process.

In his work "On Contradiction" Mao pointed out that in the contradictions between the productive forces and the relations of production, and between the base and the superstructure, the productive forces and the economic base "generally play the principal and decisive role." But "in certain conditions," the relations of production and the superstructure "in turn manifest themselves in the principal and decisive role." "When it is impossible for the productive forces to develop without a change in the relations of production, then the change in the relations of production plays the principal, decisive role." Likewise, "when the superstructure (politics, culture, etc.) obstructs the development of the economic base, political and cultural changes become principal and decisive." Briefly, "... while we recognize that in the general development of history the material determines social consciousness, we also — and indeed must — recognize the reaction of mental on material things, of consciousness on social being and of the superstructure on the economic base."³

Using the theoretical framework of the dialectical relations between productive forces and production relations, and between base and superstructure, Mao analyzed Chinese society. He noted that economically China was technologically backward. It had a predominantly small-scale, low-productive agriculture; its industry was mainly light such as textiles and food production.⁴ The situation was so because the production relations were not in harmony with the productive forces. Feudal landlords monopolized most of the lands while the majority of peasants were either landless or small land-holders or poor tenants who were forced to pay exorbitant rents and taxes.⁵ The bourgeoisie owned and

³ Mao Tse-tung, "On Contradiction," August, 1937 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press [FLP], 1964), pp. 38-39.

⁴ Po I-po, "The Socialist Industrialization of China," *PR*, No. 41, October 11, 1963, p. 6.

⁵ The Agrarian Reform Law of the People's Republic of China (Promulgated by the Central People's Government of June 30, 1950).

controlled factories and mines and other means of production while the workers toiled for the former's benefit; wage-workers were paid only half or even less than half of the full value they produced; the rest went to the capitalists.⁶ From this feudal and capitalist economy emerged a feudal and capitalist culture that served to perpetuate the status quo.⁷

II

Based on this analysis, Mao laid down his blueprint for the Chinese revolution. The establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 marked the beginning of a period of "New Democracy." It was "a united front composed of the working class, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, based on the alliance of workers and peasants, led by the working class."⁸ This was a transitional stage to the period of "Socialist Revolution and Socialist Construction." Until the latter period is achieved, China must undergo a program of economic transformation. At the same time, the new society was to have not only "a new politics and a new economy," but also "a new culture" that reflects and serves "the new politics and the new economy." Consequently, land reform and the step by step process of co-operativization were undertaken to liberate the productive forces in the countryside. China's capitalist economy was transformed through various forms of state capitalism.

Along with the economic transformation were a number of campaigns and drives to make the necessary social readjustments: the Campaign against Counter-revolutionaries, the Three-Anti Campaign (against waste, corruption and bureaucracy), the Five-Anti Campaign (against bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property and of state economic secrets, and cheating on government contracts), the Rectification Movement and the Anti-Rightist Campaign. But it was later revealed that readjustments in the superstructure were not keeping pace with the economic base.⁹ It was in this context that Mao introduced the theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

⁶ Po, *op. cit.*

⁷ Mao Tse-tung, "On New Democracy," January, 1940 (Peking: FLP, 1966), p. 2.

⁸ Proclamation of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China (Read by Mao Tse-tung at a rally on October 1, 1949).

⁹ Lin Piao, "Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China" (Delivered on April 1 and adopted on April 14, 1969).

In his speech entitled "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," he pointed out:

The class struggle is by no means over. The class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the class struggle between the different political forces and the class struggle in the ideological field between the proletariat and bourgeoisie will continue to be long and tortuous and at times will even become very acute. The proletariat seeks to transform the world according to its world outlook, and so does the bourgeoisie . . . It will take a fairly long period of time to decide the issue in the ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism in our country.¹⁰

Mao put forward more comprehensively this basic line for the period of socialism at the working conference of the Central Committee at Peitaho in August, 1962 and at the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the CCP in September of the same year. He stressed:

Socialist society covers a fairly long historical period. In the historical period of socialism, there are classes, class contradictions, and class struggle, there is the struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road, there is the danger of capitalist restoration. We must recognize the protracted and complex nature of this struggle. We must heighten our vigilance. We must correctly understand and handle class contradictions and class struggle, distinguish the contradictions between ourselves and the enemy and those among the people and handle them correctly. Otherwise, a socialist society like ours will turn into its opposite and degenerate and a capitalist restoration will take place.¹¹

III

For Mao, it is necessary to wage continuous class struggle while building socialism. Otherwise, the socialist revolution may change direction and slide back to capitalism. However, Liu Shao-ch'i, then Chairman of the People's Republic, was said to have challenged Mao with his theory of the "dying out of class struggle." In his speech at a meeting of Party cadres in Shanghai in April, 1957, Liu was reported to have said:

Today enemies inside the country have been basically destroyed. The landlord class has been wiped out long ago, and the bourgeoisie has also been destroyed in the main. That is why we say that class struggle among the principal classes inside the country has basically come to an end. That is to say, the contra-

¹⁰ Mao Tse-tung, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," February 27, 1957 (Peking: FLP, 1966), pp. 37-38.

¹¹ Lin Piao, *op. cit.*

dictions between the enemy and ourselves have been basically settled.¹²

From Liu's point of view, the question of who wins over whom — socialism or capitalism — has been settled in China. Since the revolution has been won, economic development must be given priority.

In the context of Mao's theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was a struggle under socialism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes. It was to settle which line China would follow, the Mao line which stresses continuous class struggle or the Liu line which emphasizes economic development.

As presented by Mao in his essay on "Contradiction," contradictory forces continue to exist in a socialist society. Official pronouncements as contained in the *People's Daily*, or the *Red Flag* editorials claimed that there existed in the years preceding the Cultural Revolution an organized opposition inside the Party apparatus diametrically opposed to Mao. In Mao's own idiom, it was a case of "non-antagonistic contradictions becoming antagonistic."¹³ "China's Krushchev," Liu Shao-ch'i, was the patron of this "black gang." Other "party capitalist roaders" included such prominent figures as Teng Hsiao-p'ing, secretary-general of the CCP (was rehabilitated and is today a vice-chairman of the CCP Central Committee, a deputy premier of the State Council, and the chief of staff, People's Liberation Army); Lu Ting-yi, director of the Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee; Chou Yang and Lin Mo-han, deputy directors in the Propaganda Department; T'ao Chu who replaced Lu Ting-yi; Peng Chen, mayor of Peking; Peng Teh-huai, ex-minister of defense; Lo Jui-ch'ing, chief of the general staff of the PLA; Chen Yun, a vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee; Yang Shang-k'un, director of Party affairs; Sun Yeh-fan, director of the Research Institute of Economics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences; Po I-po, director of the State Economic Commission. Also included in Liu's faction were the unreformed capitalists, landlords, unenlightened members of the petty bourgeoisie and intellectuals from the old society, and Kuomintang spies and saboteurs.

¹² "Thoroughly Criticize and Repudiate the Reactionary Fallacy of 'Dying Out of Class Struggle,'" *People's Daily*, August 20, 1967, trans. in *Survey of China Mainland Press* (SCMP), No. 4038, October 10, 1967, p. 6.

¹³ Edgar Snow, *The Long Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), p. 20.

The rise and upsurge of the high-level opposition came about as a consequence of the shift in leadership. In the government reorganization which took place with the inauguration of the new Constitution in 1954, Liu Shao-ch'i became the chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, top organ of state authority to which all other organs of government with the exception of the Chairman of the People's Republic, are responsible. The Eighth National Congress held in September, 1956 made Liu senior vice-chairman among the CCP Central Committee's four vice-chairmen. Although Mao retained his position as chairman of the Central Committee and remained concurrently as chairman of the Central Committee's Politburo, he was no longer the chairman of the Central Secretariat. Instead, the congress elected a Secretary-General, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, to handle the daily work of the Central Secretariat. Following the acceptance of Mao's relinquishment of his government responsibilities at the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee in 1958 to devote more time to party theoretical work, Liu was officially elected as chairman of the People's Republic in April, 1959. Thus, a new line of leadership revolving around Liu and Tang dominated the day-to-day affairs of China.¹⁴

IV

Meanwhile, Mao settled back to play a less active and immediate role. His political pre-eminence gradually diminished. "Mao Tse-tung Thought" which had been adopted by the 1945 Party Constitution as the guideline of CCP work was omitted in the new 1956 Party Constitution (to be restored in 1969). From 1961 onwards, some important decisions taken at Politburo meetings and Party work conferences were implemented without consulting Mao. Mao was said to have complained that "independent kingdoms" had existed, that he had not been consulted on many things and that since 1959 Teng Hsiao-p'ing had not discussed nor reported anything to him.¹⁵

¹⁴ Stuart Schram, "Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i 1939-1969," *Asian Survey* (AS), XII (April, 1972), pp. 252-293. Also refer to Howard Boorman, "Liu-Shao-ch'i: A Political Profile," *China Quarterly* (CQ), No. 10 (April-June, 1962), pp. 1-22; Peter Cheng, "Liu Shao-ch'i and the Cultural Revolution," AS, XI (October, 1971), pp. 948-957.

¹⁵ "Selected Edition on Liu Shao-ch'i's Counter-revolutionary Revisionist Crimes," published by the Liaison Station "Pledging to Fight a Bloody Battle with Liu-Teng-T'ao to the End" attached to August 18 Rebel Regiment of Nankai University, April, 1967, trans. in *Selections from China Mainland Magazine* (SCMM), No. 651, April 22, 1969, p. 1.

Furthermore, Mao's domestic policies came under open criticism from Party members. At the 1959 Lushan conference, Peng Teh-huai, then Minister of Defense attacked the "General Line for the Socialist Period" which was known to have been formulated by the Party under the guidance of Mao. These critics attacked the general line as "left-deviation adventurism," the Great Leap as "feverish," and the communes as "premature" and "making a mess of things."¹⁶ Although these "rightist opportunists" were removed from office, the intellectuals came to their defense and continued the attack.

Starting in 1959, Wu Hang, vice mayor of Peking, wrote a series of plays and articles on "Hai Jui" to satirize the dismissal of Peng Teh-huai. His offensive was followed and backed up in 1961 by another series of essays entitled "Evening Chats at Yenshan" by Teng T'o, secretary of the Secretariat of the Peking Municipal Party, and "Notes from the Three Family Village" by Wu Han, Teng T'o, and Liao Mo-sha, director of the United Front Work Department of the Peking Municipal Committee. These men were said to have the support of the Peking Municipal Committee headed by P'eng Chen, mayor of Peking. P'eng Chen was charged with having avoided the real issues at stake and having treated the ideological class controversy as a "pure academic discussion" and as a discussion of "different opinions"¹⁷ as reflected in his "Outline Report on the Current Academic Discussion Held by the Group of Five in Charge of the Cultural Revolution." P'eng was said to have the backing of Liu Shao-ch'i; otherwise, the "Outline" would not have been ratified by the Central Committee.¹⁸ Liu was himself charged with trying to "reverse the verdicts" on the "rightist opportunists." He considered the 1959 anti-rightist struggle as "aggravation," "struggle that has gone too far," "repeating the mistakes of brutal struggle and merciless blows in the history of the Party."¹⁹ And in the 1962 revised edition of his "How To Be a Good Communist," Liu pronounced that "the attitude adopted by the left

¹⁶ "Outline of the Struggle Between the Two Lines from the Eve of the Founding of the People's Republic of China Through the Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth CCP Central Committee," undated pamphlet from the Shanghai *Chieh-fang Jih-pao*, trans. in *Current Background* (CB), No. 884, July 18, 1966, p. 16.

¹⁷ Jen Li-hsin, "'February Outline Report' Is a Sinister Program for Bourgeois Dictatorship," *People's Daily*, June 11, 1967, trans. *SCMP*, No. 3961, June 16, 1967, p. 5.

¹⁸ Wu Tung-hui, "Destroy the Back Stage Manager of 'Three Family Village'," *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, June 18, 1967, trans. in *SCMP*, No. 3977, July 11, 1967, pp. 10-16.

¹⁹ "Selected Edition," p. 28.

opportunists within the Party toward inner-Party struggle has shown their mistakes" and that "even when there is no divergence of principle within the Party, they insist on hunting for targets, taking certain comrades as 'opportunists,' as 'straw men' to be shot at during inner-Party struggle."²⁰

V

Liu's dissenting voice against Mao's policies was first aired at an enlarged Central Committee work conference held in January, 1952. He was reported to have said that the general line was "put forward blindly," that the Great Leap was "brought in a rush causing disproportions in the economy;" that the difficulties encountered following the Great Leap were thirty per cent the fault of nature and seventy per cent the fault of man;" that the communes were "set up too early," that if they were not established, things might be in a better shape and that the peasants were not so happy about the communes.²¹

After becoming the Chairman of the People's Republic, Liu instituted major changes in economic policies to overcome the economic dislocations of the "three hard years" (1959-1961) caused partly by such factors as natural calamities, the Soviet withdrawal of technicians and the "mistakes and shortcomings" in the Party's work in the preceding years. In the communes, Liu allowed the operation of a limited free market, the restitution of small plots to peasants, and the contracting of production quota with individual peasant households — the system of "san-tzu-i-pao."²² In industry, Liu supported a wage system encouraging incentive pay, advocated professionalization, profitability of industrial units and decentralization in economic planning giving broad decision-making autonomy to local production units.²³ He in-

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-28. See also Philip Brigham, "Factionalism in the Central Committee," in Jone Lewis, ed., *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China* (Cambridge: University Press, 1970), pp. 203-238; Schram, *op. cit.*

²² "The Struggle Between the Two Roads in China's Countryside," Joint Editorial, *People's Daily*, *Red Flag*, and *Liberation Army Daily*, November 23, 1967 (Peking: FLP, 1968).

²³ "Abolition of Socialist Planned Economy Means Capitalist Restoration," by the Red Guards for Mao Tse-tung's Thought of the "East Is Red" Commune of Shantung Finance and Economics College, *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, July 19, 1967 trans. in *CB*, No. 839, September 25, 1967, pp. 20-24. See also W. C. Adie, "China's Second Liberation," *International Affairs*, XLV (July, 1969), pp. 439-454; Charles Hoffman, "Work Incentive Policy in Communist China," *CQ*, No. 17 (January-March, 1964), pp. 92-110; Gene Hsiao, "The Background and Development of the Proletarian Cultural

sisted that only a few experts — directors, engineers, and technicians can be relied upon for economic construction.²⁴

In Mao's view, these new policies not only constituted a reversal of his whole approach to China's economic development but were also intended to disintegrate China's socialist economy thereby paving the way for capitalist restoration. What had happened in the years following the program of economic liberalization confirmed Mao's suspicion. Commune members were giving in to the capitalist tendencies inherent in the "san-tzu-i-pao." Basic-level cadres were displaying a bureaucratic style of work thus widening the gap between the leader and the led. In Mao's eyes, China was going backward — toward capitalism.

VI

In 1962, Mao conducted the Socialist Education Movement intended to rectify the shortcomings of the basic-level cadres and to strengthen the mass line in rural work.²⁵ This was also known as the Four Clean-Up Campaign — checking on the handling of accounts, warehouses, properties, and work points in the countryside. The movement was later expanded to include cleaning up of politics, economy, organization and ideology. But operationally, the movement did not work out. It was said to have been sabotaged by Liu. Liu played up the mistakes of the cadres to divert attention from the far worse bureaucratic vices of those at the top. He was thus guilty of "hitting hard at many to protect a handful."²⁶ Furthermore, he distorted the nature of the movement by defining the Socialist Education Movement as "The contradiction between the four clean-ups and the four unclean-ups, the intersection of contradictions within and outside the Party, or that of the contradictions between the enemy and ourselves, and contradictions among the people."²⁷ Liu's approaches "do not tell in what society the

Revolution," *CQ*, No. 30 (April-June, 1967), pp. 33-48; Jan Prybyla, *The Political Economy of Communist China* (Pennsylvania: International Textbooks, 1970), chapter 9; Peter Tang and Joan Maloney, *Communist China: The Domestic Scene 1949-1967* (New Jersey: Seton Hall University Press, 1967), chapter 7; Edward Wheelwright, *The Chinese Road to Socialism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), chapters 3 and 4.

²⁴ "Two Diametrically Opposed Lines in Building the Economy," *PR*, No. 37, September 8, 1967, pp. 12-17.

²⁵ First Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Certain Problems in the Present Rural Work (Draft), May 20, 1963.

²⁶ "The Struggle Between the Two Roads." See also Richard Baum and Frederick Teiwes, "Liu Shao-ch'i and the Cadre Question," *AS*, VIII (April, 1968), pp. 323-345.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

contradictions exist between the four clean-ups and the four unclean-ups. Nor do they indicate in what Party the intersection of contradiction exist inside and outside. Nor do they say anything about the historical period and the class content of the contradictions between the enemy and ourselves and the contradictions among the people," and where therefore "not Marxist-Leninist way of looking at things."²⁸ The only correct approach was, as suggested by Mao's 23-Point Directive, to define the movement as "the contradiction between socialism and capitalism." Thus, Liu pursued a line which is "left in form but right in essence."

The Socialist Education Movement was later on much radicalized to become the basis of the "Sixteen-Point Decision" of the GPCR proclaimed in August, 1966.

VII

Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in four stages. The first stage was to mobilize the revolutionary elements — workers, peasants, soldiers, revolutionary intellectuals and students, and revolutionary cadres, and to create public opinion. Point fourteen of the "Sixteen-Point Decision" provided that "in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the only method is for the masses to liberate themselves . . . Trust the masses, rely on them and respect their initiative."²⁹ Yao Wen-yuan's attack against Wu Han started the ideological campaign. Subsequently, the *People's Daily*, the *Red Flag*, and the *Liberation Army Daily* carried a series of editorials and articles refuting the "revisionist" line in literature while propagating the official policies regarding the Cultural Revolution.³⁰

The second stage was the exposure and criticism of the revisionists. The May 16 Circular of the CCP Central Committee (issued on May 16, 1966 but was made public only a year later) called on the people to attack "those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have wormed into the Party, the Government, the Army and various spheres." Nation-wide publicity was accorded to the "first Marxist-Leninist" big character poster denouncing the "bourgeoisie royalists" inside the Peking University.³¹ At the same time, Mao extended his "warm support" to the Red Guards

²⁸ Some Current Problems Raised in the Socialist Education Movement in the Rural Areas, January 14, 1965.

²⁹ Decision of the CCP Central Committee Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, August 8, 1966.

³⁰ *The Great Cultural Revolution in China* (Hong Kong: Asia Research Center, 1968).

³¹ "Outline of the Struggle," p. 28.

who had begun to "bombard the headquarters" of the revisionists.³² Factory workers criticized the factory managers for practising "echoism,"³³ that is using wage increases and other material benefits to corrupt the "revolutionary will" of the masses.

The third stage was the seizure of power and the formation of revolutionary committees. An editorial of the *People's Daily* declared that "the basic question of revolution is political power . . . those who have power have everything; those who are without power have nothing . . . Seize power, all the Party power, political power and financial power still held by the counter-revolutionary revisionists."³⁴ Following the seizure of power, a "three-way-alliance" composed of representatives of the army, the revolutionary cadres and revolutionary masses was formed in every unit.³⁵

The last stage was the stage of struggle-criticism-transformation, that still goes on today. Struggle-criticism-transformation means "to struggle against and crush those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic 'authorities' and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and to transform education, literature and art and all parts of the superstructure that do not correspond to the socialist economic base." The main force in this movement was the "Mao Tse-tung Propaganda Teams" composed mainly of industrial workers with the participation of the Liberation Army. Beginning in July, 1968 these teams moved into universities, colleges, middle and primary schools and all aspects of the superstructure.³⁶ This was also the period of consolidating the Party, "getting rid of the stale and taking in the fresh."³⁷ At the same time, the Red Guards and all educated youth were ordered to go to the countryside "to be re-educated by the poor and lower-middle peasants."³⁸ Likewise, cadres who had committed mistakes were sent

³² NCNA-English, Tirana, June 27, 1967, quoted in *The Great Power Struggle in China* (Hong Kong: Asia Research Center, 1969), p. 3.

³³ "Message to All Shanghai People," January 4, 1967, published in *Wenhui Bao*, January 5, 1967, reprinted in *PR*, No. 3, January 13, 1967, pp. 5-7.

³⁴ *People's Daily*, January 22, 1967, reprinted in *PR*, No. 5, January 27, 1967, pp. 7-8.

³⁵ *Red Flag*, No. 5, 1967, reprinted in *PR*, No. 12, March 17, 1967, pp. 14-16.

³⁶ Yao Wen-yuan, "The Working Class Must Exercise Leadership in Everything," *PR*, No. 35, August 30, 1968, pp. 3-6.

³⁷ Joint Editorial, *People's Daily*, *Red Flag*, and *Liberation Army Daily*, January 1, 1968, reprinted in *PR*, No. 40.

³⁸ "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," *CQ*, No. 37 (January-March, 1969), p. 164.

to rural "cadre schools" to reform themselves through labor and close contact with the peasants.³⁹

VIII

The Ninth Party Congress of the CCP opened on April 1, 1969. (The preceding Party Congress had taken place in 1956). It was attended by 1,512 delegates. It was claimed that no previous Congress ever had so many industrial workers, peasants, and women among its members. Mao was elected chairman of the presidium with Lin Piao and Chou En-lai as vice-chairman and secretary-general respectively. At the opening session of the presidium, Lin Piao delivered a political report on behalf of the Central Committee. His report summed up the basic experience of the Cultural Revolution, analyzed the domestic and international situations and outlined the fighting tasks of the Party.⁴⁰ A second communique released on April 14 announced that Lin's report was adopted after "many good proposals for addition to and modifications of the report" had been made by the delegates who discussed it "sentence by sentence." At the same time, the Ninth Congress adopted the draft Constitution of the CCP which reaffirmed "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-Tung Thought" as the theoretical basis guiding the Party thinking and stipulated Lin Piao as the successor to Mao.⁴¹ Mao's theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat was incorporated into the Constitution. Since "the defeated class will still struggle," the task of struggle-criticism-transformation must be continued.⁴² The closing session on April 24 elected a new Central Committee with Mao as its leader and Vice-Chairman Lin Piao as its deputy leader.⁴³ Meanwhile, revolutionary committees have become the new power structure (and are today the people's government at the local level as provided in the new Constitution of the People's Republic of China adopted by the Fourth National People's Congress convened in January, 1975). Education has been reoriented becoming more concrete and pragmatic as it applies to production and work. Political awareness is considerably heightened among the population.⁴⁴

³⁹ *People's Daily*, October 5, 1958, cited in "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," CQ, No. 37 (January-March, 1969), p. 152.

⁴⁰ Press Communique of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Ninth National Congress of the CCP, April 1, 1969.

⁴¹ Press Communique of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Ninth National Congress of the CCP, April 14, 1969.

⁴² Lin Piao, *op. cit.*

⁴³ Press Communique of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Ninth National Congress of the CCP, April 24, 1969.

⁴⁴ Joint Editorial, *People's Daily, Red Flag and Liberation Army Daily*, October 1, 1968, reprinted in *PR*, No. 40, October 4, 1968, p. 18.