GREAT POWER INFLUENCE AMONG SOUTHEAST ASIAN STATES: A QUANTITATIVE MEASUREMENT

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INFLUENCE OF THE "GREAT POWERS" IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IS CERTAINLY not a new subject. The impact of bi-polar, tri-polar, and now perhaps quadri-polar worlds on the ancient yet now "developing" states of Southeast Asia is a topic of perpetual discussion and comment. Most of these works see the Great Power-Southeast Asian nation relationship as one of actor and acted-upon, the influence and the influenced.[1] A few have attempted to see the Southeast Asian nation-state as an independent entity with manipulative ability of its own,[2] but such cases are rare.

The purpose of this paper is to examine this relationship between the states of Southeast Asia and two of the Great Powers, Japan and the United States. Instead of assuming an influencer-influenced relationship, it will attempt to utilize a perspective in which it is at least given that Southeast Asian nations can and do make foreign policy choices with respect to larger powers, even if that choice is one of granting one Great Power or another an opportunity to increase its economic presence in Southeast Asia. It also will employ a quantitative method of analysis in an effort to render the study subject to replication and base its conclusions in readily available data.

HYPOTHESIS

The specific objective of this study is to examine the contentions by Vandenbosch and Butwell[3] that two trends are evident in the patterns of associations of Southeast Asian states with states outside the area: the first of these is a "movement away from political intimacy with one or more

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[1] See for example: Robert E. Osgood, George R. Packard III, and John H. Badgley, *Japan and the United States in Asia,* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968; Eugene R. Black, *Alternative in Southeast Asia,* New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Pub., 1969; Oliver E. Clubb, Jr., *The United States and the Sino-Soviet Bloc in Southeast Asia,* Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1962; William Henderson, ed., *Southeast Asia: Problems of United States Policy,* Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1963; Lyman M. Tondel, Jr., ed., *The Southeast Asia Crisis,* Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Pub., Inc., 1966; and Bernard K. Gordon, *The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia,* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966, and *Toward Disengagement in Asia,* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969.

[2] One good, if overly historical, example is Roger Smith's *Cambodia's Foreign Policy,* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965.

[3] Amry Vandenbosch and Richard Butwell, *The Changing Face of Southeast Asia,* Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1966, pp. 320-321.

Western nations;" the other trend is a "steady movement in the direction of greater interaction (not necessarily closer cooperation) among the several Southeast Asian countries and between each of them and the major Asian and Pacific states of China, India, Japan, and Australia."

These authors have argued that among the Southeast Asian states, although the Philippines and Malaysia remain close to their former American and British rulers, only Thailand—which was never colonized—seems to have a more intimate relationship with a Western power (the U.S.) than it possessed in the European era.[4] They add that even though South Vietnam's military dependence on the U.S. has increased since 1960, American influence has never equaled that once commanded by the French, and there are indications that the Vietnamese remain opposed to such influence despite the scope and importance of American aid.

Vandenbosch and Butwell thus contend that there has been a sharp decline in Western influence generally in Southeast Asia since the Second World War, particularly since 1960, and that increasingly foreign policies are being shaped "with major attention focused upon the interests and intentions of the countries in, and geographically closest to, Southeast Asia."[5]

In the last decades the four great powers which have conspicuously attempted to exert their influence in Southeast Asia have been the United States, Japan, China, and to a limited extent, the Soviet Union. Following from the contentions made above, it might be hypothesized that, among these, the influence of the United States has declined since World War II while that of Japan—which is geographically proximate—has risen. Considering the comparative position of these two states in 1946, substantiation of such a hypothesis would not be particularly surprising. It remains however to demonstrate this empirically and make some measure of the extent of change.

Two concepts are being employed in each of these propositions: level of influence and time. Time is easy enough to operationalize, utilizing annual data figures (or bi-annual as in this paper) to plot yearly or bi-yearly changes. Level of influence presents a somewhat more difficult problem. Selection of an indicator for an abstract concept such as influence must meet several criteria of judgment which aim at being value free and replicable. A useful indicator is (1) subject to quantitative measurement; (2) systematic, that is, "it must represent an appropriate sample of the universe of observable facts from which it was drawn (or, in some cases, it may comprise the universe itself);" (3) the indicator and the data gathering procedure must be explicit, orderly and repeatable—i.e., objective and therefore reliable; and (4) "if there are several possible indicators available

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 32.
[5] *Ibid.*

to him, the researcher should choose those that will give him the greatest amount of useful information most efficiently." [6]

There exists also the problem of validity of the indicator, or whether or not the indicator is actually reflective of the concept it is supposed to be measuring, and that of functional equivalence of the data for each of the countries under examination. Each of these criteria must be considered and balanced in indicator selection. In dealing with many of the developing states, indicators which satisfy all of these criteria are often hard to come by.

In this study the method of analysis also plays a part in determining the selection of the indicator. Chosen here is the transaction flow model originally developed by I. Richard Savage and Karl Deutsch and further elaborated by Steven J. Brams.[7] Arguing that flows of messages provide the basis upon which decision-makers fashion images of other countries, Brams has examined three different kinds of transaction flows that involve the transfer of some information from one country to another. These are diplomatic exchanges, trade, and shared memberships in inter-governmental organizations.[8]

Of the three, Brams considers trade to be the best barometer or indicator of changing political relations between two countries, seemingly being more susceptible to private likes and dislikes. He states that "a country will rarely sever diplomatic relations with another, or pullout of an IGO, except under conditions of extreme provocation, but deteriorating political relations between two countries will usually dry up their trade in a hurry." [9] Alker and Puchala have also argued the validity of using an economic indicator leading to conclusions about political relationships between states. They note that "economics may or may not cause particular political relationships; but economic indicators may in either case help us describe the directions in which these relationships are moving." [10] They add that the expectations that patterns of international trade will usually serve as valid and reliable indices of stability and change in an international political climate are dependent on the validity of theories of international community formation which in turn point to the importance of communication and interaction in the integration process, citing Deutsch (1957) and Etzioni (1963).Since the concern of this paper is primarily with examination and comparison of relationships between states and not simply with indicators of those relationships, the assumption is made on the basis of the above

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[6] Richard L. Merrit, *Systematic Approaches to Comparative Politics,* Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1970, pp. 13-14.

[7] Stevens J. Brams, "Transaction Flows in the International System," *American Political Science Review,* Vol. LX, No. 4, December 1966, pp. 880-898.

[8] *Ibid.,* p. 881.

[9] *Ibid.,* p. 887.

[10] Hayward Alker, Jr. and Donald Puchala, "Trends in Economic Partnership: The North Atlantic Area, 1928-1963," in J. David Singer, ed. *Quantitative International Politics,* New York: The Free Press, 1968, p.288.

noted transaction-flow studies that trade will be a useful indicator, i.e., that it is a valid measure of changes in a political (foreign policy) relationship between two states.[11]

Validity criteria are the most difficult to meet among the criteria for indicators mentioned above. Otherwise trade (1) is subject to quantitative measurement, (2) is systematic in its representation of the universe (in this case), and (3) is subject to the objective and reliable data gathering procedures. With regard to the latter and to the other criteria listed earlier, trade—as well as being a reliable indicator of political relationships generally—is one of the better indicators that can be selected for Southeast Asia. Such possible indicators as investment patterns, verbal communications, and elite and mass attitudes and practices regarding the relationship in question are often subject to erratic collection methods (or no methods) in Southeast Asia or are subject to difficulties such as different collection methods for different countries. Trade data is even better than many other economic statistics from Southeast Asian states since trade is a well defined area for data collection and is subject to established customs regulations for nearly all countries in the area with fairly accurate records being kept for government tax purposes.[12] Moreover, in using trade data, figures for the two countries involved in bilateral trade can be compared and their accuracy assessed. A study of the accuracy of Southeast Asian trade data has led Naya and Morgan to the conclusion that although there are some errors in Southeast Asia trade data, this is not a hindrance for limited research purposes. Thus, I would contend that trade data meets criteria (4) regarding indicators, which provides that the researcher should choose those which give the greatest amount of useful information most efficiently. Trade data in general seems to be most useful and for Southeast Asia specifically is most efficient and reliable.

The question of functional equivalence of the data for all of the countries under examination is not one which can be resolved within the limits of this study. While such an analysis of the data certainly deserves further consideration, equivalence will have to be assumed for the purposes of this paper.

Thus, given the utilization of the transaction flow model and the obvious requirement of a transaction as an indicator, time and trade flows become

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[11] For a brief but useful summarization of the use of "economic instruments of policy" which elucidates the interaction of political and economic policy, see K. J. Holsti, *International Politics,* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967. pp. 279-309.

[12] Seiji Naya and Theodore Morgan, "The Accuracy of International Trade Data: The Case of the Southeast Asian Countries," *SEADAG Papers,* Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group, The Asia Society, New York: 1968. Accuracy may be considerably less when dealing strictly with trade between Southeast Asian nations in that considerable trade in the form of smuggling still seems to exist in some areas.

the indicators which assist in the operationalization of the hypothesis.[13] This does not mean, however, that other indicators could not or should not be used in measuring the direction and depth of political intimacy between Southeast Asian nations and outside powers. Multiple indicators are unquestionably advantageous when they are available.[14] Much empirical data dealing with the international relations of Southeast Asia remains ungathered, though, resulting in a limited scope for indicator selection. Of the few that are available, trade appears to be both the most valid for a study of political relations and the most complete. In order to pursue an empirical analysis of Southeast Asia's international relations, trade flows are consequently used with the hope that more and possibly better indicators will be employed in the future.

METHODOLOGY

The hypothesis has therefore been modified to read as follows: that *since World War II American influence in Southeast Asia has fallen while that of Japan has risen.* This hypothesis actually contains two parts, one concerning American influence, the other Japanese influence. Both will be tested and compared. Since data for North Vietnam is not available, North Vietnam is excluded from the analysis. Nine countries remain which constitute the region for the purposes of this study: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Burma, the Philippines, Thailand, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

The trade data is taken from the UN-IBRD *Direction of International Trade* for the period up to 1958 and from the International Monetary Fund's *Direction of Trade Annual* for the more recent years. Since both sets of data originate with the IMF, it is assumed that they are equivalent.

As in the case of the Alker-Puchala analysis of the North Atlantic area, a number of assumptions are made in the use of a transaction flow model. These include: (1) the principal actors are autonomous enough to be able to initiate or to refuse transactions. This is particularly important in the case of the Southeast Asian countries and may be subject to refutation by those advocates of economic imperialism hypothesis. While there may be some substance to such contentions, the fact that Malaysia and Singapore conduct large amounts of trade with China as well as the United States, and that Indonesia has conducted such trade with China in the past, leads one to believe that the international trade of Southeast Asian countries is at least not controlled completely by the United States. There may be

[13] John E. Mueller provides a short analysis on the uses of aggregate data in research of this sort in Mueller, ed. *Approaches to Measurement in International Relations: A Non-Evangelical Survey,* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969, pp. 171-179. See also his "Introduction, or What's in a Number?", pp. 1-3 and "Systematic History," pp. 5-14 in the same volume.

[14] See Joseph S. Nye, "Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement," *International Organization,* Vol. XXII, No. 4, 1968, pp. 859, 860-874.

greater or lesser degrees of control over Southeast Asian trade by the major powers in different countries. But since this cannot be accurately calculated and some or most trade seems to be independently initiated, the autonomy assumption is made. (2) It is secondly assumed that by using a thirty-year span of time (as in the case here) anomalies such as explosive expansion of communications or transactions immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities will be eliminated from consideration in the relationship trends. (3) Lastly, it is assumed that the trends derived from this analysis can be substantiated through the use of accurate and valid indicators in a replication of this study. Replication using the same indicators is, of course, an expected part of the validation procedure of any empirically based study. No exception should be made in this case.

Since it would be expected that nations which have greater capability for trade (i.e. with larger GNP's or export-import capacities or demands) would actually have more trade, we must control for the total values of trade in the countries involved in our analysis. This is accomplished by translating data into percentages of world trade rather than using absolute figures. The implications of such a process will be noted in a moment. For the time being, the reasoning behind such a choice can be demonstrated in an example. Although forty million US dollars worth of trade amounted to almost the entirety of Laos' trade in 1966, forty million accounts for less than two percent of Singapore's trade for the same year. If we look only at absolute amounts, forty million dollars in trade would be equally important for both countries. If we look at percentage, however, it can be noted that this amount is much more important to Laos than to Singapore. Percentages, then, provide a means of assessing importance to the total economy.

The transaction flow model postulates that the level of trade between two countries is an indicator of the "salience" of the two countries toward each other. The extent of the salience is measured by formulating a "null hypothesis" regarding the level of trade between the two states and then measuring the extent of nonrandom trading relationships between the states under consideration. The null hypothesis posts a level of trade between the two countries which would reflect a completely random distribution of trade according to the trading capacity of each state, with such capacity being measured by the total value of world trade for each country. That is, if Country A commands ten percent of the world's exports as its imports, we could expect in a random distribution of trade that Country A would likewise receive ten percent of the exports of any Country B as its imports. Trade is obviously not random. Choices are made, for various reasons, regarding the direction and intensity of trade by each country. Given the arguments above, we are assuming that such choices—the "non-randomness"—are an indication of a positive or negative political relationship. If Country C conducted all of its trade with Japan, for example, this would be taken

as an indication of a highly positive political relationship. The random figure serves as a "baseline" against which to compare actual exchanges "in order to determine those cases where there is a greater-than-expected exchange" of trade and "presumably, a heightened awareness of a country's decision-makers for the affairs of another country." [15]

The deviation from the null hypothesis is formulated by calculating the relative acceptance (RA) of Country j for the trade of Country i as the difference between the actual (A) and expected (E) exchanges, divided by the expected exchange:[16]

$$RA_{ij} = \frac{A_{ij} - E_{ij}}{E_{ij}} \qquad \text{where} -1 > RA_{ij} > \infty$$

Actual and expected levels of trade are operationalized for the Southeast Asian states in the following manner: 1) *Expected level:* since both imports and exports to a foreign state can come under the restrictions of promotions of a national government, the expected level of trade must include both expected imports and exports. The proportion of each over which either country exercises initiating or inhibiting influences is not determinable. The gross figures must therefore be used. In that we are concerned with both imports and exports, a total trade figure is used to represent the flow of transactions between each pair of states (the U.S. and each Southeast Asian country, and Japan and each country).[17]

As stated above, I am assuming that the Southeast Asian state is in each case not only autonomous in initiating and refusing transactions but also has exercised that autonomy and therefore consents to the particular level of trade between itself and the U.S. or Japan. The expected level of trade in a null model would therefore be equal to that *percentage* of world trade in which the trading partner participates. That is, if the U.S. participated in 20% of total world trade, one would expect that it would also be the recipient of 20% of Indonesia's trade unless the government of Indonesia chose otherwise. Since the governments of the Southeast Asian states *do* choose otherwise, this expected figure is not usually matched by the actual percentage of the country's trade dealt to the major power.

The expected percentage, then, is calculated by simply dividing the major power's (MP) total trade (exports plus imports) by the total world trade for each calendar year. The expected percentage is thus equal to those world trade percentages given in Appendix IV.

2) The *Actual level* of trade between the states is calculated by dividing the total trade with the major power of each Southeast Asian state

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[15] Brams, *op. cit.*, p. 883.

[16] *Ibid.* See pp. 883-887 for some of the more sensitive implications involved in the utilization of this model and formulation.

[17] For a variation on the calculation of expected levels, see Alker and Puchala, *op. cit.*, pp. 291-293, as derived from the Savage-Deutch scheme.

(SEAS) by the total trade of the Southeast Asian state with all countries, for each calendar year. (See Appendices V and VI).

$$\text{Expected } (E_{ij}) = \frac{\text{Total trade of the major power}}{\text{Total world trade}}$$

$$\text{Actual } (A_{ij}) = \frac{\text{Total trade between SEAS and MP}}{\text{Total trade of SEAS}}$$

Using these basic formulations, the Relative Acceptance of major power trade is calculated for each Southeast Asian state over the period 1938-1968, with RA figures being derived for alternative years over that period. Several qualifications in use of the RA figure should be noted before proceeding to the analysis section of the paper. First, it should be recognized that there are other factors than political which hinder international trade, restricting the flow of transactions. In the case of trade, transportation costs and geographic distance play a large part. As Alker and Puchala argue, though, such factors as ethnic, cultural, or linguistic similarity, traditional affinities, and formal international political linkages and commitments similarly enter into the determination of trade flow direction and volume, in addition to purely economic determinants.[18] It may be possible to control for some of these variables but since most (perhaps all) of the factors listed above are also characteristics of political relationships between states, they remain in the model as a part of the economic indicator which represents that political salience we are intending to examine.

A second qualification is to note that since the measure of RA extends from -1 to infinity, symmetrical distance from a graphic zero line is not necessarily comparable. Trade levels may be only 100% below expectation, but they may also be 200% or 900% greater than expected. A level of 90% below expectation may thus be as significant as a level of 200% above expectation, depending on the circumstances for the particular country.

A final qualification deals with the varying size of the economy being considered. It is much easier to double the trade volume if its value is only $1 million than it is if that figure is $100 million, and likewise in having either figure. Fluctuations are likely to appear much larger in the countries with smaller trade volumes. Brams considers this to be a bias against the large nations, making it more difficult to analyze deviations in trade value. I consider it to be more of a bias against the smaller states, since minor changes in the absolute sense appear much larger than actual alterations in the political climate might call for. In either case, the reader should be aware of the difficulties in comparing the RA's of large and small economies.

[18] Alker and Puchala, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

	1938	1948	1950	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968
INDONESIA	+.96	+9.22	+2.03	+1.34	+4.19	+2.50	+1.36	+2.93	+3.29	+3.26	+4.06	+3.96
MALAYSIA	+.60	− .18	+ .08	+ .85	+ .79	+1.23	+3.22	+3.48	+3.04	+2.50	+2.39	+1.91
SINGAPORE							+ .49	+ .26	+ .45	+ .68	+ .67	+ .56
BURMA	−.40	− .13	+6.97	+4.65	+9.30	+5.54	+4.49	+3.94	+2.98	+2.46	+2.81	+2.48
PHILIPPINES	+.75	+ .78	+2.57	+3.27	+3.50	+5.15	+5.72	+7.31	+6.30	+5.17	+6.31	+5.40
THAILAND	+.92	+ .53	+9.62	+6.87	+8.73	+4.07	+4.60	+5.81	+5.07	+5.56	+4.16	+3.77
S. VIETNAM	−.03	0.00	− .23	+ .17	+1.63	+6.53	+4.30	+5.27	+4.50	+1.86	+5.67	+6.10
CAMBODIA						+4.34	+1.83	+3.16	+2.38	+1.28	+1.39	+1.21
LAOS						+1.35	+ .93	+4.70	+1.10	− .10	+ .61	+1.00
N. VIETNAM												

Salience: States of Southeast Asia → Japan

TABLE I

	1938	1948	1950	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968
INDONESIA	+ .04	-- .07	+ .11	+ .40	+ .09	+ .27	+ .24	+ .15	+ .08	− .02	+ .02	+ .65
MALAYSIA	+ .20	− .40	− .46	— .30	− .57	− .56	— .53	— .55	− .40	− .52	— .53	— .27
SINGAPORE							— .81	— .87	− .85	− .84	— .85	— .71
BURMA	− .93	− .93	— .97	— .88	− .90	− .90	— .85	— .89	− .90	− .81	— .59	— .67
PHILIPPINES	+3.94	+2.15	+2.85	+2.98	+3.27	+2.70	+2.81	+1.81	+1.92	+1.65	+1.24	+1.66
THAILAND	− .84	− .32	+ .15	+ .60	+ .13	+ .41	+ .11	− .24	− .38	− .51	— .41	— .04
S. VIETNAM	− .55	− .72	— .60	—. 42	+ .12	+ .60	+ .90	− .05	+ .90	+1.24	+2.61	+2.69
CAMBODIA							− .09	− .55	− .44	− .76	— .91	— .87
LAOS							− .38	− .50	− .21	− .61	+ .27	— .11
N. VIETNAM												

Salience: States of Southeast Asia → United States

TABLE II

ANALYSIS

Listed in Tables I and II are the Relative Acceptance scores for each of the Southeast Asian countries with Japan and then each with the United States. In order to facilitate the analysis and examine the data for support or non-support of the paper's hypothesis, the RA scores for each Southeast Asian country are placed on separate graphs with Relative Acceptance of Japan and the United States compared over the thirty-year period on each. Considering the limitation of fine distinction that accompanies parsimony,[19] the level of analysis in interpreting each graph will remain broad and more concerned with the general trends indicated than with specific and minor differences in RA scores.

Looking at the graphs, it may first be noted that, in all cases the level of RA scores for Japan is higher than those for the United States for most if not all of the period since World War II. Only in the cases of the Philippines does the RA line for the U.S. appear above that of Japan for any part of the three decade period. This would lead us to the first possible conclusion, that American influence has not necessarily been higher than that of Japan in the post-World War II period, despite remembrances of the Japanese occupation during the war and the ill effects suffered by many members of the Southeast Asian populace during the period. This would tend to confirm the results of another study by this author employing the transaction flow model with a slightly different operationalization which dealt with the Relative Acceptance of Japan alone since World War II.[20] Even though considerable static follows the Japanese throughout Asia today, little of that criticism appears to sway governments or business leaders when it comes to the selection of trading partners. As can be noted from an examination of Appendices I and II, Japan, with a lower total world trade volume, also surpassed the United States (as of 1968) in absolute trade value with all Southeast Asian countries except South Vietnam, Laos, and the Philippines, all countries with relatively close military ties with the U.S. In the case of the Philippines, Japan has surpassed the absolute level of 1970 trade held by the U.S. according to preliminary figures. Laos has a low volume of trade, with the figures for the U.S. and Japan not being dissimilar. Even in the case of South Vietnam Japan seems to be rapidly approaching the absolute level of trade maintained by the U.S., South Vietnam's closest ally. Thus, Japan not only seems to have exceeded the U.S. in acceptance among Southeast Asian states as indicated by RA scores, but conducts a higher absolute level of trade with most Southeast Asian countries as well.

Our specific hypothesis deals with the direction of change in RA levels rather than with simple comparisons of the entire period. Dealing directly

[19] As in the case of the "Expected Level" calculations.

[20] Llewellyn D. Howell, Jr., "Some Implications of Trade Flow Patterns in Japan-Southeast Asian Relations Since World War II," (unpublished paper, Cornell University-Southeast Asia Program, May 1969).

with the contentions of that hypothesis, then, I will make a brief note of the trends indicated for each country in the region before concluding with a summary for the region as a whole.

Burma, while maintaining a far higher level of salience toward Japan than toward the United States, has dropped significantly in its Relative Acceptance of Japan since 1954 (from +9.30 to +2.48) while that of the U.S. has risen slightly (−.90 to −.67 in the same period). The considerable gap between the acceptance scores in 1968 for Japan and the U.S. indicates, though, that Japan remains the favored partner. Japan's decline may, in fact, be primarily a function of Burma's declining over-all trade rather than an alienation of Japan specifically. In general, we must note that the RA toward Japan has dropped while that toward the U.S. has risen slightly.

For Cambodia, the RA scores over the 30-year period run gradually parallel for the U.S. and Japan, with those of the U.S. being significantly lower on the scale than those of Japan. As was the case with Burma, the RA scores for Cambodia (excluding the "Indochina" portion of the graph) lie entirely below the zero line which indicates the expected trade level, while those for Japan, even in decline remain more than 100% above the expected level. In this instance neither power seems to be gaining on the other, although Japan remains far ahead of the U.S. in both RA and absolute levels. It will be important to note whether or not changes occur in Cambodian-American RA scores in future analyses, considering the 1970 overthrow of the government of Sihanouk and its replacement by a government which leans more toward U.S. policies in the area. A notable rise in Cambodia's RA toward the U.S. will help confirm the validity of the salience measure used here.

The Japanese RA has climbed considerably since 1958 for Indonesia while that of the U.S., barely above the zero level, declined between 1956 and 1966. The trends during this period would lend support to the general hypothesis of this paper. It is interesting to note, however, that since the departure of Sukarno in 1966, the RA for the U.S. has suddenly risen to its highest level since 1938. In that same period between 1966 and 1968 the RA for Japan declined slightly, although not significantly.

Laos, independent only since 1954, as with Cambodia and Vietnam, has shown considerable fluctuation in its RA scores. Since Laos is the smallest trader in Southeast Asia, (almost entirely imports), we might expect random fluctuations to show up in apparently more significant fashion, giving a somewhat distorted picture of the results. As can be noted from Appendix III, the very high saliency level toward Japan in 1960 is a combined result of a drop in Laos' total world trade and a slight rise in its trade with Japan. The absolute figures do not indicate the wide variation shown in the graph. The case of Laos seems to be an exceptional one and should

be regarded with some reservations. With or without the 1960 "peak" the general trends are, however, a decline in RA scores for Japan and a rise in those indicating saliency toward the U.S. This is contrary to the hypothesis but supportive of general knowledge on American-Laotian relations in recent years.

Data for Malaysia and Singapore should perhaps be reviewed together since the two countries have been combined for a substantial period and the data are, in fact, not separated prior to 1956.[21] First, it is readily noted that whether separated or united, the two countries have shown positive saliency toward Japan and negative saliency toward the U.S. for most of the thirty-year period. In both cases where divisions occur, Malaysia—within the just-mentioned bounds—shows a higher salience toward both Japan and the U.S. than does Singapore. For either country, RA scores for the U.S. show little variation over the period since World War II, remaining perpetually below expectations. Malaysia's RA scores for Japan, while remaining highly positive, have declined steadily since 1960. Those of Singapore have been fairly stable although much lower than those of Malaysia.

The Philippines, a former colony of the United States, and still considered a close ally of the U.S., shows the clearest trends in its saliency levels: in full support of the paper's hypothesis, the RA scores of the U.S. have steadily declined since World War II, whereas those of Japan have steadily risen. As of 1952, Japan had already achieved a higher ranking than the U.S. on the saliency scale, and generally has continued to expand its lead over the U.S. since 1954.

Thailand, noted earlier as a close military ally of the U.S. in recent years, surprisingly shows a fairly steady decline in its salience toward the U.S. since 1952. The RA scores for Japan are similarly in decline over that period but the absolute level of Japan's trade during the period increases regularly. Overt indications are of a saliency decline for both, however.

South Vietnam, an exceptional case for a number of reasons is the only Southeast Asian country which shows a rising, positive saliency toward the U.S. As a country greatly dependent on the U.S. military aid in the period since 1954 (the first positive year indicated on the graph), such a rise is not unexpected. What may be unexpected is that the saliency toward Japan has been and remains higher than that towards the U.S. throughout the period and has gained on that of the U.S. considerably since 1964, the years of most concentrated U.S. aid to South Vietnam.

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[21] Separate data for 1964, when Singapore was joined politically (and statistically) with Malaysia, are drawn from a study by Dr. Josefa M. Saniel. See her paper "Japan's Thrust in Southeast Asia in the Sixties," read at the Seminar on "Southeast Asia in the Modern World" sponsored by the Institut fur Asienkunde, Hamburg, Germany, April 13-17, 1970. This paper provides a thorough analysis of Japan's economic reach into Southeast Asia.

Summary and Conclusions

A classification scheme which provides for a summary analysis of trends for each state may be constructed as follows. Each country appears in the six cells below twice, once to indicate saliency toward Japan (the name not underlined), and once to indicate saliency toward the U.S. (with the name underlined and in capitals). The diagramatic analysis would most readily give support to the paper's hypothesis if the states underlined fell to the left part of the scheme while those not underlined were located toward the right.

Table III

Comparative Saliency

NATURE OF SALIENCY	DIRECTION OF CHANGE: DECLINING	NO BASIC CHANGE	RISING
POSITIVE	Cambodia Burma Thailand PHILIPPINES	South Vietnam Laos	Philippines Indonesia MALAYSIA SINGAPORE SOUTH VIETNAM INDONESIA LAOS
NEGATIVE	THAILAND CAMBODIA	Malaysia Singapore	BURMA

The hypothesis is not fully supported in this instance, although some substantiating evidence is provided. While only three states fall in the "declining" category with regard to the U.S., three also indicate declining salience levels toward Japan. But each of the three in Japan's "declining" group are also still positive in their saliency while two of those in the U.S. "declining" group are negative. In other words, *while both have apparently suffered some losses in Relative Acceptance among Southeast Asian states, Japan appears to remain ahead of the U.S. within the category in its acceptance by those states involved.*

In the "rising" salience category, each major power appears to be gaining acceptance from four Southeast Asian states, although not the same four. All but one of the countries in the category are in the rising and positive cell, Burma (with a still strongly negative saliency toward the U.S.) being the only exception. Referring to the graphs, it can be added again, however, that *for each country which has indicated a rising salience toward the U.S., the salience toward Japan remains at a higher—although possibly static or declining—level.* Even here, then, the United States is in a position of being forced to play "catch up" behind Japan rather than vice-versa.

Most noticeable in the scheme is the relative placement of Southeast Asian states in the positive and negative categories. *All countries in the region exhibit a positive salience toward Japan while only four (three of which are directly dependent on American military aid and support at present) exhibit a positive RA with respect to the U.S.* The fourth country, Indonesia, has recently (since 1966) increased greatly its trading volume and acceptance of investment from both the U.S. and Japan, with Japan still leading the U.S. in both relative and absolute levels of trade with that state.

The Relative Acceptance of the two major powers, leaving aside the aspect of change for the moment, is perhaps most striking in its import when displayed in two simple categories:

States with higher RAs toward the U.S. in 1968	*States with higher RAs toward Japan in 1968*
NONE	Burma Cambodia Indonesia Malaysia Singapore Philippines Thailand South Vietnam Laos

Notable among the list of high RAs toward Japan are U.S. allies Thailand, South Vietnam and the Philippines. While trade data does not include the considerable amounts of monetary and material support sent to these countries through the U.S. military, and therefore does not reflect "dependence" on such aid, the trading patterns still reflect some choice of trading partners for the products that are desired or are to be sent abroad as exports. Regarding the military aid dependency, then, it might be said that some U.S. allies in Southeast Asia demonstrate a higher Relative Acceptance of Japan than of the U.S. *despite* U.S. military aid.

Looking at the broad hypothesis around which this study is centered, it would have to be concluded that, in a qualified sense, the hypothesis is borne out in empirical analysis. Particularly considering the low RAs de-

monstrated toward Japan in the years immediately after World War II (when Japan's total trade volume was low), Japan has achieved very high levels of acceptance since the war, while the U.S. has done so only in isolated instances and under somewhat unusual circumstances. This conclusion is offered in a qualified sense only, because it would not appear that an assumption which underlines the hypothesis is that Southeast Asian salience toward the U.S. was at some time high while that toward Japan was low. The latter was the case in the immediate years after the Second World War, but—as can be seen from the graphs—the former was true only in the case of the one-time American colony, the Philippines. In most instances, therefore, salience toward the U.S. has never exceeded that toward Japan and consequently makes it difficult for salience toward the U.S. to fall still further while that toward Japan rises above its already high level.

In conclusion, it is suggested that a replication of this study might more profitably be centered on a slightly altered hypothesis, one concerned not with ascendancy or decline in Relative Acceptance, but rather with level alone. Since the same general trends should appear in a replication, changes in saliency will still appear, should that be the researcher's interest. Changes do not seem, though, to be of particularly great importance—certainly not as important as absolute level alone where Japan clearly predominates when using an economic indicator. Should that conclusion remain suspect, it is an obvious next step in an empirical analysis of interstate relations to move to use of diffferent or multiple indicators, should they be available.[22]

The purpose of this study has been to make an application of empirical analysis to the study of Southeast Asian international relations. The emphasis has been on method and analytical technique but descriptive statements regarding relations between states have resulted from use of the method and have been presented as well. It is likely that there will be disagreements with both method and conclusion, and some of these may be justified. It is my intent, however, that even in such possible disagreement a step be taken away from the impressionistic, normative, and prescriptive pronouncements that have dominated foreign policy studies on Southeast Asia in the past several decades. Hopefully, that intent as well as the furtherance of the understanding of Southeast Asian international relations have been served by this study.

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22 ". . . independent tests should be used to corroborate influences based largely on economic transactions. The use of multiple indicators of intense, enduring, and rewarding relationships helps prevent the deification of any imperfect indicator." Alker and Puchala, *op. cit.*, p. 289.


BURMA
Saliency toward the U.S. and Japan 1938-1968
+ 10
+ 9
+ 8
+ 7
+ 6
+ 5
+ 4
+ 3
+ 2
+ 1
0
− 1
1938 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70
Japan
U.S.



* Data until 1954 for Japan and until 1956 for the U.S. is that of Indochina trade.


INDONESIA
Saliency toward the U.S. and Japan 1938-1968
+ 10
+ 9
+ 8
+ 7
+ 6
+ 5
+ 4
+ 3
+ 2
+ 1
0
− 1
1938 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70
Japan
U.S.



* Data until 1954 for Japan and until 1956 for the U.S. is that of Indochina trade.



* Data until 1956 is for Malaya and Singapore combined.


PHILIPPINES
Saliency toward the U.S. and Japan 1938-1968
+ 10
+ 9
+ 8
+ 7
+ 6
+ 5
+ 4
+ 3
+ 2
+ 1
0
− 1
1938 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70
Japan
U.S.



* Data until 1956 is for Singapore and Malaya combined.



* Data until 1954 for Japan and until 1956 for the U.S. is that of Indochina trade.


THAILAND
Saliency toward the U.S. and Japan 1938-1968
+ 10
+ 9
+ 8
+ 7
+ 6
+ 5
+ 4
+ 3
+ 2
+ 1
0
− 1
1938 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70
Japan
U.S.

APPENDIX I

DIRECTION OF TRADE

imports c.i.f (nearest million U.S. $)
exports f.o.b

Imports from and Exports to the U.S.

	1938	1948	1950	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968
INDONESIA	28	92	78	132	71	140	61	86	120	74	60	169
	69	87	156	277	167	191	173	216	135	170	179	175
MALAYSIA							8	18	32	34*	46	54
	9	82	20	36	30	46	93	156	188	149	177	240
SINGAPORE	112	269	310	382	169	226	28	42	51	45	51	102
							33	19	15	12	15	29
BURMA	2	5	1	6	5	5	7	8	7	16	24	12
	0	2	1	3	1	2	1	1	1	1	3	1
PHILIPPINES	86	468	235	283	326	318	292	298	268	372	348	436
	94	228	236	236	263	257	274	307	327	388	398	436
THAILAND	3	16	25	58	43	51	52	65	71	84	128	186
	0	53	75	99	55	97	57	56	39	25	76	81
S. VIETNAM							62	53	105	134	311	271
				Indochina			5	5	3	2	2	2
CAMBODIA	3	14	9	38	51	74	7	7	10	3	2	2
	7	3	11	14	22	21	9	7	5	4	1	2
LAOS							2	1	4	7	9	8
							0	0	0	0	1	0

Sources: 1938-1956 *Direction of International Trade*
1958-1968 *Direction of Trade* (*Annual*)
* From Saniel. See ff. 21.

APPENDIX II

DIRECTION OF TRADE

imports c.i.f (nearest million U.S. $)
exports f.o.b

Imports from and Exports to Japan

	1938	1948	1950	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968
INDONESIA	30	57	46	60	120	76	49	110	115	121	119	147
	25	12	13	28	60	89	36	70	91	128	175	252
SINGAPORE							14	34	43	59*	95	105
	7	6	18	64	48	79	159	269	261	256	301	343
MALAYSIA	43	11	43	78	83	169	77	87	105	114	138	209
							13	14	23	27	49	62
BURMA	5	1	16	21	46	36	46	64	53	55	47	39
	2	1	18	30	63	42	12	13	16	17	15	12
PHILIPPINES	9	4	18	20	31	56	90	155	120	181	278	411
	10	10	23	51	67	117	100	159	184	225	325	398
THAILAND	11	5	43	36	65	61	84	118	139	213	301	366
	1	0	44	62	69	35	22	72	72	131	141	147
S. VIETNAM						53	40	62	60	34	138	199
				Indochina		0	1	5	4	7	6	3
CAMBODIA	1	0	2	9	13	10	8	14	16	11	12	20
	6	2	2	5	15	4	1	8	3	6	8	7
LAOS						2	1	2	2	1	3	7
						0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Sources: 1938-1956 *Direction of International Trade*
1958-1968 *Direction of Trade* (*Annual*)
* From Saniel. See ff. 21.

APPENDIX III

TOTAL TRADE FOR ALL STATES

imports c.i.f (nearest million U.S. $)
exports f.o.b

	1938	1948	1950	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968
INDONESIA	248	465	440	948	629	856	544	578	647	691	583	662*
	380	395	800	934	867	882	791	841	682	724	679	689
MALAYSIA							725	905	1008	1069	1144	1205
	315	1298	1607	1915	1573	2045	811	1189	1068	1117	1387	1390
SINGAPORE	334	1320	2009	1943	1569	2058	1222	1332	1318	1136	1328	1661
							1026	1136	1116	906	1102	1271
BURMA	78	180	111	192	204	198	204	260	219	272	157	139
	178	229	158	264	251	246	195	226	265	237	193	111
PHILIPPINES	132	666	384	484	545	597	559	604	587	868	957	1280
	116	327	337	352	396	437	493	560	563	767	838	848
THAILAND	57	144	209	304	312	365	393	453	541	680	1166	1150
	89	223	304	329	283	334	309	408	462	593	694	658
S. VIETNAM						218	232	240	264	298	444	466
						45	55	86	57	48	24	12
CAMBODIA	57	188	210	450	351	57	76	95	102	82	111	116
	96	92	79	116	97	37	53	70	54	96	67	89
LAOS						35	26	12	24	26	43	55
						1	1	1	1	1	1	4
JAPAN	1070	684	974	2028	2399	3230	3033	4491	5637	7938	9524	12989
	1109	258	820	1273	1629	2501	2877	4055	4916	6674	9777	12973
U.S.	3230	10990	8962	10850	10396	12803	13340	22520	24040	27760	27720	33066
	3960	15810	10281	15054	14986	18952	17738	26220	27650	34340	39980	34199
WORLD	25400	63400	58000**	86500	88000	108100	113100	135500	149800	181900	215300	224400
	23500	57300	55400**	80000	85500	103100	107300	128000	141400	172400	203600	212100

* estimated from partial data
** Soviet bloc excluded

APPENDIX IV

Percent of Total World Trade

U.S. and Japan

	1938	1948	1950	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968
UNITED STATES	14.70	22.27	16.96	15.55	14.62	15.03	14.10	18.49	17.75	17.52	18.54	15.41
JAPAN	4.45	0.78	1.58	1.98	2.32	2.71	2.68	3.24	3.62	4.12	4.60	5.94

APPENDIX V

ACTUAL PERCENT OF S. E. ASIA'S TRADE (WITH JAPAN)

	1938	1948	1950	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968
INDONESIA	8.71	7.97	4.79	4.63	12.03	9.48	6.34	12.72	15.53	17.59	23.59	29.48*
MALAYSIA	7.15	0.64	1.70	3.67	4.16	6.04	11.30	14.50	14.61	14.41	15.61	17.26
SINGAPORE							4.00	4.07	5.24	6.90	7.69	9.24
BURMA	2.69	0.68	12.60	11.18	23.89	17.72	14.71	16.00	14.40	14.24	17.54	20.68
PHILIPPINES	7.78	1.39	5.64	8.45	10.44	16.66	18.00	26.93	26.44	25.40	33.61	38.02
THAILAND	8.56	1.19	16.78	15.59	22.57	13.73	15.02	22.05	21.96	27.03	23.75	28.34
SOUTH VIETNAM						20.41	14.21	20.33	19.90	11.79	30.70	42.19
CAMBODIA	4.31	0.78	1.21	2.31	6.11	14.46	7.59	13.51	12.24	9.38	11.01	13.12
LAOS						6.38	5.18	18.46	7.60	3.70	7.40	11.86

* from derived data

APPENDIX VI

ACTUAL PERCENT OF S. E. ASIA'S TRADE (WITH THE U.S.)

	1938	1948	1950	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968
INDONESIA	15.36	20.77	18.83	21.73	15.90	19.04	17.55	21.28	19.20	17.18	18.93	25.44*
MALAYSIA	17.63	13.40	9.11	10.83	6.33	6.62	6.60	8.31	10.59	8.37	8.78	11.31
SINGAPORE							2.66	2.47	2.71	2.79	2.71	4.43
BURMA	0.97	1.51	0.59	1.90	1.47	1.50	2.10	2.01	1.81	3.37	7.54	5.16
PHILIPPINES	72.58	70.07	65.31	62.50	62.50	55.60	53.75	51.96	51.78	46.46	41.55	40.98
THAILAND	2.39	15.22	19.49	24.72	16.47	21.15	15.59	13.99	10.97	8.51	10.97	14.77
SOUTH VIETNAM							26.75	17.57	33.70	39.33	67.00	56.92
CAMBODIA	6.66	6.28	6.81	9.09	16.36	24.09	12.79	8.30	9.87	4.04	1.68	1.90
LAOS							8.80	9.23	14.00	28.14	23.63	13.66

* from derived data