THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE ASIANISM

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Within two decades since its independence in 1946, the Philippine foreign policy and national attitude have slowly but surely acquired a stamp of Asianism. The Philippines became independent on 4 July, the date of the anniversary of American independence. It embarked on a foreign policy with well defined Cold War alignments and global concern (which spelled 'special relations' with the United States and fear of international Communism represented by the Soviet Union) and an attitude of 'splendid isolation' towards Asia. President Roxas initiated a Philippine foreign policy in a spirit of virtual repudiation of Asianism when he declared that 'the magnetic pole of our foreign policy will be the United States', and called upon Filipinos to 'preserve at all costs our intimate relationship with that great country'.

In 1963, President Macapagal changed the date of the Philippine independence anniversary from July 4 (the date on which the United States 'granted' independence) to June 12 (the date in 1898 when the first Philippine Republic was proclaimed). This symbolic act marked the take-off point when the Philippines slipped away from its American-centred orbit into an orbit of Asian diplomacy and comity. President Macapagal affirmed that one tenet of the 'Unfinished Revolution' of the Philippines was 'a deliberate reorientation of (our) foreign policy towards our Asian homeland'. A year later he went still further when he declared that 'it is not on the basis of the size and power... but on the basis of its ideals, which it effectively upholds that the Philippines has ventured to play a modest role in international affairs, particularly in the region of the Afro-Asian community.'

2 President Macapagal's address at the Conference of heads of governments of the Federation of Malaysia, Republic of Indonesia and Republic of the Philippines, July 30, 1963, Manila.
3 Speech delivered by President Macapagal before the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan in Tokyo on 22 June, 1964.
The term 'Asianism' has been used in this article to signify an awareness by the Philippine government and people of being a part of Asia as well as a sense of fraternity with it. The first aspect implies, by the logic of geography, a concern for security owing to Philippine proximity to any Asian source of threat; the second entails, by the logic of history, an empathy with newly emergent Asian countries on account of common colonial experience. These two aspects of Philippine Asianism have not developed uniformly. Security oriented geographical Asianism pre-dates independence; fraternal Asianism has matured only recently. The Philippines, moreover, has regarded different Asian countries as objects of security concern at different times. For the Philippines straddles two regions. It is peripheral to both Southeast Asia and the Far East as a northern and southern extremity respectively.

Since the Philippines became independent only in 1946, Philippine Asianism before 1946 should be discerned in the views and, to some extent, actions of Philippine leaders and political organizations. Thereafter it must be examined in the light of Philippine foreign policy and political thought.

**PHILIPPINE ASIANISM BEFORE 1946**

*The Katipunan*, which launched an armed revolt against Spain in 1896, looked up to Japan as a redeemer of independence just as 'France had lent aid to young America' in 1778. This hope arose from the proximity of Japan and its assumed ability to extend aid. Filipino nationalists were inspired by the French and American Revolutions, not by the Meiji Restoration in Japan. Mabini’s concept of Oceania, aimed to liberate Malay lands from Indonesia to the Marianas, did not refer to Japan.

During American rule, seeds of Asianism sprouted. Filipinos began to feel both a fraternal bond for fellow Asians and fear of the two giant neighbours—China and Japan.

Fraternal Asianism was reflected in a student debating society of the University of the Philippines in the 1930’s. But its slogan ‘Malaya Irredenta’, being more of a distant ideal than a plan for action, was soon sidetracked.

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4 Teodoro A. Agoneillo, *The Revolt of the Masses*, (University of the Philippines, Manila, 1956), pp. 124-25, 131; in any case there is little evidence to indicate that Japan intended to get embroiled in the Philippines whether against Spain or the United States.


6 Ibid., p. 4.
Security-oriented Asianism was of greater concern. In 1927, two leading intellectuals, Maximo Kalaw and Claro M. Recto, debated the problem of Asiatic Monroeism and the role of independent Philippines in the Far East, through three widely read journals, viz, the *Tribune*, *La Vanguardia* and *Taliba*.

Recto expressed a fear that: a defenseless Philippines could not ward off population pressure from China and Japan by dint of exclusion laws. While China would be preoccupied with domestic strife, Japan would certainly 'extend along the line of least resistance'. The slogan of 'Asia for the Asians' would lapse into 'Asia for the Japanese' unless Western influence was preserved in the Far East as a balancing factor against China and Japan. Recto also warned against a Pan-Asian movement emanating from the Soviet Union which would submerge the Philippines under an avalanche of Communist ideas.

Kalaw envisaged 'the rise of the still submerged nations like India, Java and an enlarged Siam of sufficient strength to offset any possible aggressive ambitions of China and Japan'. He projected an image of a 'Pan-Asiatic Confederation' to replace Western dominance.7

Like all polemics devoid of policies, this debate had sound and fury but no impact on contemporary Philippine political thought. Even Kalaw had tempered his idealistic Asianism with a statement, 'We... (are) an Oriental people standing at the portals of Asia in deep sympathy with their kindred neighbours yet with hands outstretched to the cultures of Spain and America...Our chief characteristic should be our Catholicity; our chief strength the harmonious amalgamation of the East and the West'.8

The Sakdals who, led by Benigno Ramos, staged an uprising on May 2-3, 1935, represented a militant form of fraternal Asianism. With the help of protagonists of the Pan-Asian movement in Japan where he had resided since 1934, Ramos had disseminated nationalist Pan-Asianic literature among rural Filipinos. A propaganda sheet, entitled *Free Filipino*, appealed to the Japanese people in the 'spirit of Asian solidarity'. Many *Sakdalistas* hoped

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that Japan would come to their aid. But both the revolt and the Sakdalista movement were stamped out.9

Manuel L. Quezon, as President of the Philippine Commonwealth, was concerned over Far Eastern stability in view of the rise of Japan. He sought neutralization of the Philippines to obviate future aggression by Japan—a contingency envisaged by the United States Congress itself.10 In 1937, he elicited from the Japanese Foreign Minister an assurance that Japan was willing to sign such a treaty. In November 1939, and again in December 1942, Quezon renewed his plea but the proposal came to a nought since President Roosevelt firmly opposed it.11

Under the Japanese occupation a blue print for Filipino 'orientalism' was drawn up within the framework of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Filipino leaders like José Laurel and the Japanese authorities diligently inculcated Pan-Asianism among the people through school curricula, news media and communications network. Filipinos did not welcome Japanese hegemony but only the spirit of Asian 'co-existence and co-operation'.12

After the end of the war, as after the Sakdal revolt, Pan-Asianism seemed submerged in Philippine political thought. Japanese aggression and occupation had given this concept a painful connotation.

PHILIPPINE ASIANISM AFTER 1946

Manuel A. Roxas, the first President of independent Philippines, took over a badly ravaged country, which perhaps oriented his foreign policy in the direction of seeking funds and protection from the United States. He noted that China was in the 'agonizing throes of national rebirth, and expressed pride in the Philippines being the first democratic republic in the Orient.13 His government

10 Section 11 of the Philippine Independence Act of 1934 authorized the President of the United States to enter into negotiations with interested powers to sign a treaty for perpetual neutralization of the Philippines.
12 José P. Laurel, War Memoirs: Written in Yokohama and Sugamo Prisons; (José P. Laurel Memorial Foundation, Manila, 1962), p. 60.
13 Inaugural address, July 4, 1946, Papers, op. cit.
supported Indonesia's struggle against the Dutch and strongly recommended its admission to the United Nations. But the Philippines took little initiative to come closer to Thailand and newly independent Asian countries like India, Ceylon, Burma and Pakistan.

The Roxas government (July 1946-1948) signed over twenty agreements with the United States. Among various powers with whom treaties of amity were signed, China was the only Asian power.

President Roxas' concept of the Orient appeared to be somewhat blurred. He noted, 'although we are today a part of the Western World, other than by geography, I believe we must develop strong commercial ties and cultural understanding with the great oriental nations which surround us'. Among these he listed China, Russia and Australia as natural trading partners of the Philippines.

Thus neither aspect of Asianism figured in President Roxas' assessment of the international situation. Japan lay prostrate in defeat; China and the Soviet Union were not feared. American bases on the Philippine territory were viewed as a cordon of security. Only the United States was to be an object of special fraternal bond.

President Quirino (May 1948-December 1953) faced a turbulent situation in the Pacific. China was in a state of flux with Communist victory in immediate prospect. Freedom movements in Southeast Asia were reaching fruition. He consequently emphasized the need for the Philippines to 'further strengthen its position' and assert leadership for the 'promotion and protection of the interests it shares in common with these (Southeast Asian) countries as well as its own.'

To that end, he desired a closer union among the peoples of Southeast Asia dedicated to the maintenance of peace and freedom in the region through appropriate methods of political, economic and cultural co-operation with one another. In March

15 Speech on February 1, 1947, Papers, op. cit.
17 President Quirino's letter of Instructions on the Proposed Pacific Union to Ambassador Romulo; Elpidio Quirino, The Philippine Ideology (Manila; 1949), p. 303.
1949, he proposed a Pacific Pact along the lines of NATO 'as a measure of self defense based on mutual co-operation', and visited Chiang Kai Shek in mainland China to solicit his support. President Quirino urged the United States not to 'tarry too long in the redefinition of fundamental attitude towards (security of free countries in) Asia'.

To concretize his proposals, President Quirino convened a conference in Baguio during May 26-30, 1950, which was attended by India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand, Ceylon and Australia. The 'exploratory' conference merely recommended mutual consultations through diplomatic channels among member states to 'further the interests of the people of the region'. President Quirino's concept of 'security and stability' ran counter to the spirit of 'change' and 'revolution' in contemporary resurgent Asia which encompassed even Communist China as a member of Asian comity. His efforts to ensure Far Eastern security found only a partial fulfillment in 1951 in the Mutual Defense Pact and Military Assistance Agreement with the United States, a non-Asian power.

In the field of Asian fraternalism the Quirino administration was more successful. The Philippines signed a Friendship Treaty with Thailand in 1951 and with India in 1952. President Quirino hailed the inauguration of the Indian Republic as a 'historic moment of far greater significance to all Asia and the world whenever self-determination and democracy are consecrated'. To forge closer ties with Indonesia, he exchanged visits with President Sukarno for the first time. He hailed Sukarno's visit to Manila in January 1951 as 'a historic moment in the life of the people of Southeast Asia'. Recalling racial and geographical ties between the two peoples, he reaffirmed 'traditional Philippine sympathy for Indonesia in her freedom struggle' against the Dutch.

President Quirino thus laid the foundations of geographical and fraternal Asianism in Philippine diplomacy.

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20 President Quirino's message to Prime Minister Nehru, January 26, 1950.
21 President Quirino's speech to welcome President Sukarno on January 28, 1951, The Quirino Way, op. cit., p. 236.
President Magsaysay (January 1954-May 1957) reiterated that as 'good neighbour', the Philippines would 'participate in all regional activities that will promote closer economic and cultural relations among Southeast Asian countries, on the basis of mutual respect for each other's views and interests. On 27 September 1954, an 'Asian Good Neighbour Relations Commission' was up; its **raison d'etre**, as explained in the *Whereases*, was the Philippines' 'mission' towards fellow Asians and the 'duty to spread the blessings of freedom in our area and share with our neighbours and racial kin the bountiful legacy which has become ours as the first independent Republic in Asia'.

In 1955, the Philippine government signed an Immigration Agreement with Indonesia and became a fully pledged member of the Colombo Plan. In 1955, it recognized Burma, South Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Laos and sponsored the founding of a private Cultural Foundation of the Philippines to promote Asian contacts.

President Magsaysay, however, categorically stated that the security of the nation in the shadow of Communism—'a formidable new imperialism'—must take precedence in the Philippines foreign policy designed to 'commit us to active membership in the community of free nations'.

Three events in, and concerning Asia put to test President Magsaysay's Asian policy. They were the Indo-China crisis in 1954, the Afro-Asian Conference in 1955 and the Formosan question in 1955.

**SEATO**

To check Communist expansion through Indo-China the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had proposed a Southest Asian Alliance as joint warning to China. Dictates of security prompted President Magsaysay to commit the Philippines in the venture but fraternal Asianism withheld him from dispatch-

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ing Filipinos ‘to die in the defense of French colonial rule in Viet-
Nam’. His consent to an alliance was given as a quid pro quo for
self determination for Indo-China and an American guarantee of aid
to the Philippines in case of an attack.26 At his instance the Protocol
and the Pacific Charter, attached to the Manila Pact of September
8, 1954 (SEATO), proclaimed the ultimate aim to secure indepen-
dence for all countries ‘whose people desire it and are able to un-
dertake its responsibilities’. The original draft submitted by the
Philippines affirmed the principle of self-determination without any
qualifications but this being unacceptable to Western powers, the
Philippine government was forced to acquiesce in the final Western
draft. The Philippine Senate, however, passed a resolution on 14
April 1955, ‘expressing the sentiment . . . that the right of self-deter-
mination of subject peoples includes their right to decide exclu-
sively by themselves their ability to assume the responsibilities
inherent in an independent political status).’27 The Treaty also
provided for mutual consultation against subversion and economic
co-operation through technical assistance.28 The participation in
a pact which had only two regional members, tended to pull the
Philippines away from those Asian powers who viewed SEATO
as a weapon in the Cold War.29 Moreover, the Philippine mem-
bership of SEATO, an offshoot of its ‘special relations’ with the
United States,30 was merely an additional means to commit the
latter more firmly to the defense of the Philippines. SEATO was
criticised by Filipinos for not having ‘enough teeth and being too
vaguely worded;31 but the question of likely adverse effects on
Philippine relations with non-aligned Asian nations was not raised.
The guarantee of American protection remains pivotal to Philip-

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26 Statement by President Magsaysay, April 18, 1954, Official Gazette,
28 Signing of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the Protocol
and the Pacific Charter; Proceedings, Manila, 1954.
29 A sour note was struck in Philippine diplomacy when, on 25 April
1956, following his visit to Manila in January 1956, Prince Sihanouk of
Cambodia accused the Philippine Government of having exerted pressure
on him to join SEATO; the Philippine Government denied the charge but
could not dispel a general notion of its being a spokesman for Western
powers. Asian Recorder, February 4-10, 1956, Vol. 1, No. 58; p. 668; also
April 21-27, Vol. 1, No. 69, p. 801.
30 G. Modelski, ed., SEATO—Six Studies (F.W. Chesire Publishers, for
Australian National University, Canberra, 1962), p. 130.
31 Fifield, op. cit., p. 104. Carlos P. Romulo, The Meaning of Bandung,
pine association with SEATO\textsuperscript{32} although the Philippines has also increasingly used it as a forum to promote closer ties with other Asian member states.

**THE AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE**

In April 1955, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia, known as the Colombo Powers, convened a conference of newly independent Afro-Asian nations transcending Cold War alignments. The Magsaysay government was initially cool to the idea but later consented to participate after consultations with the United States.\textsuperscript{33}

The conference had a three-fold purpose: to promote cooperation among Afro-Asian nations; discuss problems of special interest to them; and consider what contribution these nations could make to peace.\textsuperscript{34} While not disagreeing with this objective, the leader of the Philippine delegation, Dr. Romulo, stressed that the fate of Asia was 'bound up with the fate of the whole world', and that 'the success of this conference will be measured not only by what we do for ourselves, but also by what we do for the entire human community.'\textsuperscript{35} Although President Magsaysay claimed that the Philippines 'forged closer ties with Asians and Africans, and effectively collaborated with them in achieving unity', he referred to the Conference primarily as a means to strengthen Philippine friendship with other 'free nations'.\textsuperscript{36}

In spite of its growing suction into Southeast Asian events, the Philippines remained watchful towards the Far East. In January 1955, President Eisenhower secured congressional authority to use American armed forces to protect Formosa, Pescadores, Quemoy and Matsu against aggression. In endorsing the American stand, President Magsaysay declared that the Philippines would not remain indifferent to developments in and around Formosa and that the


\textsuperscript{34} Communiqui issued by the Colombo Powers on December 29, 1954, Romulo, op. cit., p. 5.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., p. 73, 77.

\textsuperscript{36} State of the Nation Message of President Magsaysay, January 23, 1956. The Philippine delegate, Dr. Romulo, sternly reminded Premier Chou En Lai at a private meeting during the Conference, that the Philippines was 'only geographically' a neighbour of China. Interview with Dr. Romulo, March 1963, Manila.
latter must remain in friendly hands. He indicated that the Philippine forces would be committed if necessary for that purpose.  

President Magsaysay thus struck a balance between a security oriented Asianism in partnership with the 'free nations' and a fraternal Asianism towards neighbouring states. In his view, there was no contradiction between 'special ties with the United States' and 'the Philippine desire to become a good neighbour in Asia in a united effort...to achieve the general prosperity of this region. In fact, he deposed, 'At every opportunity we endeavour to tell our neighbouring Asians the facts about our past and present relations with the United States...to strengthen and further unify the free peoples of Asia and the rest of the world'.

President Garcia (March 1957-December 1961) reaffirmed a good neighbour policy towards 'Asian friends', but admitted, 'our policy in Asia...cannot be adequately expressed in any single slogan'. In the Six Cardinal Goals, issued on 11 September 1957, the preservation of relations with the United States and strengthening of collective defense took precedence over the goal of developing 'closer ties with Asian neighbours on the basis of mutuality of interest and subject to the limitations of ideological differences'. The Ten Constants, enumerated in December 1960, indicated a significant shift in the Philippine attitude. Partnership with the United States was predicated upon 'sovereign equality and mutuality of interests'. Interest in Asia was styled 'Rebirth of our identity with Asia'.

The Garcia administration, however, sought closer ties primarily with the members of the 'Free World' including Asian neighbours. He pleaded for strengthening 'freedom' in Asia so that 'the Asians might enjoy the fruits of real independence and that the Philippines, being surrounded with communities of free Asians, would be all the more secure from subversion and attack'. He coupled this

38 President Magsaysay's foreign policy speech on Asia, Department of Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. II, March 1955, pp. 3-4.
39 Ramon Magsaysay, "Roots of Philippine Policy," Foreign Affairs, October 1956, p. 35.
41 Vellut, op. cit., p. 220.
42 State of the Nation Message, January 24, 1960.
plea for Asian freedom and security with the one for ‘intensifying technical and cultural exchanges’ with Asian neighbours.⁴³

President Garcia called upon the West to reckon with ‘resurgent Asia’ as an ‘actual reality’, wherein underdeveloped nations were ‘determined to pursue their destiny with Western help if possible but without it if necessary’. Even this fraternal Asianism had anti-Communist overtones for he exhorted Asians ‘to rival the speed with which the Communists are building up their countries industrially, but without destroying faith and family’.⁴⁴

With a view to forging closer mutual ties, the Garcia administration signed with Indonesia, a Cultural Agreement in April 1959 and an agreement in 1961 for a joint naval patrol of common waters. The Immigration Agreement, negotiated in 1956, was also ratified in 1961.⁴⁵ Numerous Indonesian and Filipino dignitaries exchanged visits during 1961. The following Filipinos visited Indonesia: Labour Secretary Castaño; Commerce Secretary Lim; Vice Chairman of the House Committee on Public Works Fuenteabella; an Air Force delegation led by Chief of the Air Force General Molina; and an army delegation led by Chief of Staff General Santos. General Nasution, Chief of the Indonesian Army and a delegation of Indonesian provincial officials visited the Philippines. Bilateral Cultural Associations were set up in both countries and visits by dance troupes were exchanged.⁴⁶

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

In August 1961, the Philippines, together with Malaya and Thailand, became a founding member of ASA [Association of Southeast Asia]—a non-political, non-military, regional co-operative alliance. Although Burma, Indonesia and Cambodia declined to join on political grounds, the Philippines viewed ASA as only a first step in the breaking down of economic barriers among Southeast Asian States and a stepping stone to an expanded regional alliance.

Apart from non-political relations with Indonesia and a trade agreement with U.A.R., Philippine diplomacy under President Garcia was confined within the 'pro-Western' world. During 1959-60, the Philippines signed trade agreements with Pakistan and South Korea, a Friendship Treaty with South Viet Nam and an agreement with Taiwan to 'liquidate' a long-standing problem of Chinese residents in the Philippines.\(^{47}\) In 1961, President Garcia paid state visits to Taiwan and Malaya.

PHILIPPINE ASIANISM IN THE NEW ERA

The Macapagal administration (January 1962) did not institute an abrupt break with past policies. The newly elected Vice President and Foreign Secretary, Emmanuel Pelaez, reaffirmed Filipino faith in comradeship with the United States', and praised SEATO, as an instrument for 'maintaining peace and stability' in Southeast Asia, for having 'served a useful purpose as a defensive shield against runaway communist expansionism.'\(^{48}\) While Presidents Magsaysay and Garcia maintained a balance between a link with the United States and exploration in the neighborhood, President Macapagal set out to establish an organic connection between the two. He explained, 'the Philippine role in Asia is to demonstrate that democracy works. It will be the most eloquent proof and justification of our following the United States. The success of Philippine democracy is a demonstration of the American ideal of freedom'.\(^{49}\)

Nonetheless, at the outset, Pelaez gave indications that Macapagal's 'New Era' administration would launch the Philippine foreign policy into new Asian orbit, transcending political alignments. Noting 'past obsession with political diplomacy in Asia', Pelaez commented, 'Too often, we have forgotten that strong long-standing social and economic ties underlie many an imposing political superstructure'.\(^{50}\) 'Being Asian', in his opinion, was the one binding force that kept Asians together 'against the onslaught of


\(^{48}\) Emmanuel Pelaez, 'The Philippine Foreign Policy: The Whole and Its Part'; *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, January, 1962; also speech by Pelaez on 'New Horizons for our Foreign Policy' on February 8, 1962; before the Scottish Rite Supreme Council, Manila, (Division of International Information, Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila).

\(^{49}\) Quoted from *Time*, June 29, 1962, p. 21.

\(^{50}\) Speech on February 8, 1962, *op. cit.*
differences that try to set us apart.\textsuperscript{51} Pelaez upgraded the quality of Philippine diplomats assigned to Asian capitals to enhance the prestige value of Asia.\textsuperscript{53}

Three factors have accounted for this shift. One was the high pitch reached in the general soul searching and stocktaking of the Philippine role in Asia; the second was a combination of personalities catapulted into the position of makers and conductors of foreign policy; the third was the question of Malaysia which brought the first two factors into full play.

**PHILIPPINE FOREIGN POLICY IN A CRUCIBLE**

In the 1950's, a few politicians and intellectuals began to take a 'second look' at the Philippine posture in Asia. Senator Claro M. Recto favoured a 'realistic' policy in Asia; but his realism stemmed primarily from a concern for security against Communist China. Jose P. Laurel compared the Philippines to 'a man without friends in his own neighbourhood although ironically he had among his big neighbours blood relatives with whom he and his forbears had had cordial enough dealings for a long long time—centuries as a matter of fact'.\textsuperscript{53} These intellectuals commanded respect but not adequate political following. Their views, however, found echoes in the Philippine Foreign Affairs Department. In early 1954, Vice President Carlos Garcia, declared, '... by geographical propinquity, by ancestral ties, not yet wholly forgotten, by custom, manners and even in most respects, outlook, the Philippines belongs to this orbit (Southeast Asia)'.\textsuperscript{54} Reinforcing this Asian theme, Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Leon Maria Guerrero, called for 'Asia for the Asians' and admonished the Filipinos not to antagonize their neighbors whose destinies were 'inseparable' from theirs.\textsuperscript{55}

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\textsuperscript{51} Speech before First Asian Press Organization Conference, February 16, 1962. Division of International Information, Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila.
\textsuperscript{52} Time, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{53} Jose P. Laurel, Bread and Freedom, Manila, 1953, p. 68.
\textsuperscript{54} Speech on January 23, 1954, (Division of International Information, Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, Philippines, 1954). But as noted earlier, Garcia, as a President, could not translate this fraternal Asianism into Philippine foreign policy.
\textsuperscript{55} Address on February 5, 1954, (Division of International Information, Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, Philippines, 1954). Guerero's speech raised a controversy in which President Magsaysay did not participate; but Guerrero was soon removed as ambassador to London.
\end{footnotesize}
Since 1958, acute disaffection had arisen over Philippine diplomacy. Many felt that unlike India, Burma and Indonesia, the Philippines was lacking in an ‘effusive self-confidence and constructive candour’ which only comes from the ‘feeling of triumphant assertion of their national aspirations’.

Some felt that Philippine delegations to various international conferences were ‘looked upon as puppets — if not stooges — of the United States.’

Senator Pelaez declared, ‘Once we have accepted our place in Asia, that will be the time when the Filipino people will have found their soul. That will be the time when the Filipino people will have finally come home… Filipino superior mentality is a part of our blind adulation of all things Western. It is a symptom of our schizophrenic upbringing.’

A senior diplomat, Vicente Barranco, deplored the ‘symptoms of a split personality’ in the Philippine foreign policy. He pointed out that a Filipino, as a ‘Westernized Asian’ was an odd man out. Any Philippine support for the United States, he added, was attacked by Asians as slavish pro-Americanism, and however sincere its motives, the Philippines was always ‘suspected’ by the West as an Asian country.

Ramon Mitra, a commentator, noted that when the Afro-Asian Bloc emerged in the United Nations, the Philippines still preserved a ‘scandalous arrangement’ of special relations with the United States, that for many years only junior members of the Philippine delegation attended Bloc deliberations and that it was only Felixberto Serrano, who, on becoming a permanent delegate, established a close liaison with the Bloc. Mitra called for a ‘major effort from our leaders to create for the Philippines the image of an Asian country with Asian traditions and with Asian politics.’

Whatever the elements of reality and illusion in this disenchantment, the feeling of uneasiness was deep and real. The new standpoint challenged the traditional, sacrosanct national dogmas of the Filipinos, viz., that they belonged to Western civilization and the transfer of sovereignty in their land was a superior model to violent and chaotic processes elsewhere in Asia.

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58 Speech before the Manila Rotary Club in early 1959, quoted in Locsin, *op. cit.*


60 Mitra, *op. cit.*; p. 10.
Thus in 1962, the Philippine political thought favoured a radical Asia-oriented reappraisal of Philippine foreign policy.

**Combination of Personalities**

This seething spirit of Asianism became embodied into a Philippine foreign policy because of the constellation of personalities at the helm of the Philippine government. President Macapagal had been a keen student of regional affairs since 1946 when he was an official in the Foreign Affairs Department. As a Congressman in 1950, he had successfully authored a bill which called upon the government to formally claim North Borneo. Both he and Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Salvador Lopez, were active in the Malaya Irrendenta movement of the 1930's. Vice President and Foreign Secretary, Emmanuel Pelaez, as noted above, had long been an exponent of Asianism.

It is not therefore surprising that the New Era administration of President Macapagal set out to explore fresh avenues of rapport with Asian countries, not because they were members of the 'Free World' but because they were Asian neighbours. A corollary to the new approach to foreign policy meant that the Philippines would participate in Asian affairs as a regional power with vital national interests, not just as an 'ally' of the leader of the 'Free World'—the United States.

**Malaysia Controversy**

The new assertive Asianism was immediately put to test when the Philippines, as a claimant to a part of Sabah, found itself involved in the Malaysia controversy. In early 1962, the Philippines Free Press published a series of articles in defense of the Philippine claim to North Borneo on legal, historical, ethnical and nationalist grounds, and urged the government to formally advance such a claim. It warned, 'Whatever the outcome, it should not be allowed to happen that the Philippines lost forever through failure to press its case what it might have gained as a matter

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61 The Philippines, unlike Indonesia, has not opposed this union or helped rebel elements but it contends that its claim to North Borneo should be negotiated. The Philippines does not claim North Borneo against the will of the residents but wants an impartial United Nations referendum. State of the Nation Message of President Macapagal, January 28, 1963.
of right'.\textsuperscript{62} On April 24, 1962, the Philippine House of Representatives passed a bi-partisan resolution urging the government to file a claim 'now or never'. Then onwards, President Macapagal, ex-legislator turned executive, set out to articulate the legislative and popular Filipino will into a Philippine foreign policy. On May 22, the Philippines formally laid claim to North Borneo and requested negotiations with Britain for amicable settlement.\textsuperscript{63}

In the Philippine diplomacy concerning Malaysia were intertwined three strands of Philippine Asianism: geographical as well as fraternal Asianism; an economic, Pan Malayan Asianism; and the Indonesian-Philippine rapprochement.

(a) Security and Fraternity — The argument for an urgency of regional security was advanced in support of the Philippine claim with an added emphasis on responsibility of the countries permanently situated in the region. For, as one Filipino politician put it, 'while Britain probably desires to play a lesser role in Southeast Asia' and make 'a graceful exit', the Philippines is 'here in Southeast Asia to stay'.\textsuperscript{64} The Philippines also rejected the delegation of British responsibility to the new state of Malaysia. President Macapagal declared, 'Our claim to North Borneo cannot be less than the claim of Malaya to the territory not only on the basis of superior juridical and historic rights but in the vital interests of our national security ... Malaya cannot likely insure for long the security of North Borneo for the free world'.\textsuperscript{65}

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\bibitem{63} The subsequent course of events and the relative merits of various claims are outside the scope of this study which only deals with the organic changes in the Philippine foreign policy, diplomacy and political thought reflected through the Malaysia controversy. It is noteworthy that while declining to retreat from its legal position, the Philippines, on its part, never allowed the Sabah claim to escalate into a crisis.
\bibitem{64} TV speech on March 30, 1963 by Representative Jovita R. Salonga, Chairman of the Legal Committee, Philippine panel at the London Talks on the Borneo Claim; full text printed in the \textit{Sunday Chronicle}, Manila, March 31, 1963, p. 15.
\bibitem{65} State of the Nation Message, January 28, 1963; also President Macapagal’s statement on 5 December 1963, \textit{The Malay Mail}, December 6, 1963.
\end{thebibliography}
The Philippine claim stemmed not only from considerations of legality and security but also from those of ethnic solidarity. A Filipino spokesman stated, 'what happens in North Borneo affects us with greater immediacy' and because of its proximity to us; the North Borneans come from the same racial stock; years of political isolation and hostile propaganda have created a gap between our two peoples'. Some politicians argued that the Philippines should be given a chance to demonstrate to North Borneans the sincerity of its purpose and the benefits of a union with the Philippines. Throughout the course of intensive diplomacy, preceding the formation of Malaysia, Pelaez stressed a vital need for a tripartite consultation between Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines, for 'seeking a just and amicable solution founded on their common concern for (their) security, freedom and wellbeing'. At the tripartite ministerial meetings in Manila in April 1963, Pelaez took pains to promote a confederation of the three states. But on the suggestion of the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr. Subandrio, he accepted a consultative machinery to be called Musjawarah Maphilindo after an Indonesian village custom of exchange of ideas. Pelaez welcomed the name as being a part of the common Malay culture of the past. Reiterating the 'peaceful claim to a part of North Borneo, President Macapagal declared, 'the overriding concern of the Philippines has been to help promote peace among Malaysia and Indonesia and in the region in which we live'.

This is a unique example — perhaps unparalleled in history, where a contestant state, itself has actively mediated in a controversy in order to promote regional security founded on fraternity.

(b) Pan Malayan Union or an Asian Common Market—Philippine opposition to Malaysia was balanced by its endeavours to promote an enlarged union of Malayan regions inclusive of Indonesia and the Philippines. Before the Philippine claim to North Borneo was put forward, President Macapagal had commissioned a Research Committee composed of eminent historians (Muslim and Christian) of the University of the Philippines to undertake a massive study

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66 Salonga, op. cit., p. 15.
67 Interview with various Filipino political leaders, Manila, April 1963.
68 Salonga, op. cit., p. 15.
69 Quijano de Manila, op. cit., p. 81. Maphilindo stands for Malaya, Philippines and Indonesia.
70 President Macapagal's speech delivered before the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan in Tokyo on 22 June, 1964, op cit.
of the feasibility of a Pan Malayan union in the light of the history, economics, and societies of the Malay countries.\textsuperscript{71} The Philippine claim was calculated 'to herald' a wider regional unit composed of the people of the Malayan stock since Malaysia as it stood was dubbed as a continuation of colonialism based only on an expedient of false security.\textsuperscript{72}

President Macapagal's initiative for a Malayan union was not an innovation in Philippine thought or Philippine policy but was rooted in a movement for a Pan Malayan Economic Union supported by Filipino economists, industrialists, politicians and educationists. In 1960, Miguel Cuaderno, Governor of the Central Bank, spoke of an 'economic imperative' for such a union. In January 1960, the Araneta University held a symposium of Filipino leaders and Malayan and Indonesian diplomats to explore avenues for economic co-operation.\textsuperscript{73} Larry Henares, Jr., President of the Philippine Chamber of Industries, argued that despite stable political institutions, propped up by a 'new vocal and militant middle class', the Philippines had progressed less than Japan, India and Malaya. In his opinion this could be remedied 'not by demands for protection but more assertive and forward-looking initiative by Philippine industry in domestic and external, Southeast Asian markets'.\textsuperscript{74} Pelaez himself had been an exponent of an Asian Common Market on the grounds that Asian competition in the world market was hamstrung by the ECM.\textsuperscript{75}

As the Malaysia question escalated into a Southeast Asian crisis and hopes of persuading Indonesia to join ASA began to fade, the Philippines grew disillusioned with ASA as a possible nucleus of a future economic alliance.\textsuperscript{76} Pelaez pointed out the need to recognize the limitations of ASA and develop 'to the fullest extent possible' bilateral relations with '(those) Asian countries

\textsuperscript{71} Quijano de Manila, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 44.
\textsuperscript{72} State of the Nation Message of President Macapagal, \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{73} Salvador Araneta, 'An Economic Pan Malaya', \textit{Sunday Times Magazine; May 1, 1960}, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{76} In late 1962 both Philippines and Malaya accused each other of dealing a serious blow to ASA, see \textit{Far Eastern Economic Review}, October 4, 1962, p. 4; October 11, 1962, p. 48; October 18, 1962, p. 48; October 18, 1962, p. 138.
that for the present were unable to join ASA for political reasons.\(^{77}\) The country foremost in the Philippine thinking was Indonesia.

(c) *Philippine-Indonesian Entente*—The Malaysia controversy threw into disarray the traditional alignments in Southeast Asia. ASA came to a standstill, Malaysia and the Philippines, hitherto united in anti-Communism got enmeshed in a dispute; the Philippines and Britain, military allies in SEATO, became diplomatic antagonists. But the most significant realignment of forces, resulting from this development, was the Philippine-Indonesian entente. This new understanding between the two was in sharp contrast to the political attitude and policies of previous Philippine governments towards Indonesia. In signing the 1956 Immigration Agreement, the Philippine government was actuated by apprehension over infiltration of Islam, Communism and illegal trade through Indonesian immigrants. The Philippine vacillation over West Irian for a number of years was resented by Indonesia.\(^{78}\)

The growing strength of the Communist Party in Indonesia, coupled with the non-alignment policy of the Indonesian government and its friendly relations with the Soviet Union and China, had caused uneasiness in the Philippine government. Indonesia, on its part, was firmly opposed to SEATO. As for ASA, Dr. Subandrio, in a brief meeting with the Philippine Foreign Secretary, Felixberto Serrano, in Manila in September 1960, merely expressed ‘sympathy for the proposed project in line with the desire of his country to forge closer ties with peoples of the region’ but deferred the matter for future discussions\(^{79}\) which, however, did not take place. Consequently, until 1962-63, Philippine-Indonesian diplomatic contacts did not get off the point of aloof courtesy.

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\(^{77}\) Speech on February 16, 1962, *op. cit.*

\(^{78}\) In November 1954, in the First Committee of the General Assembly, the Philippines abstained on an Afro-Asian resolution which urged the Netherlands and Indonesia to pursue their endeavours to solve the controversy; in December, it voted in favour of the resolution at the plenary session; but in 1958, it again abstained on a similar resolution. In December 1961, the Philippines voted against the Indian resolution [accepted by Indonesia] and for the Brazzaville resolution [rejected by Indonesia]; which called for self determination for West Irian. Indonesia indicated its ‘keen disappointment’ over Philippine vote. *Indonesian Observer*, 25 November and 6 and 7 December, 1961. Perhaps, the Philippine action was not voluntary. A student of the Philippine foreign policy has observed that ‘the West Irian question offers at least one instance of the Philippines, “losing face” because of Western pressure’. Vellut. *op. cit.*, p. 195.

\(^{79}\) Locsin, *op. cit.*
President Macapagal and Pelaez took the first steps to veer Philippine-Asian policy into closer ties with Indonesia. The Philippines played an important backstage role in the preparation of the Bunker Plan for the solution of the West Irian dispute.

In addition to racial affinities, security was considered as a raison d'être of the reversal in Philippine policy towards Indonesia and subsequent alterations in calculations and assessment of the regional situation. Fear of Communism still underlied Philippine Asian policy but, as Pelaez put it, 'In the past the big question of security used to be Indonesia. Now the air of suspicion is gone. This is a big gain for if Indonesia is with us we can keep this region from being dominated by outsiders, including Communists.' Many Filipino politicians endorsed this view and argued further that the only way to stem communism in Indonesia was to foster democratic forces therein by friendship and diplomatic support. At one point, the Speaker of the House of Representatives advocated a defense pact with Indonesia. Both Indonesian and Philippine leaders expressed complete agreement on the goal of understanding and harmony between Malay people as the genuine foundation for peace and stability in the region.

In a major foreign policy speech, given on the eve of President Sukarno's visit to Manila, President Macapagal dwelt on the resurgence of Africa and reaffirmed his country's pledge to the Afro-Asian bloc as well as commitments to the Western powers led by the United States. But he singled out Indonesia to explain its importance in world affairs and referred to Philippine-Indonesian consultations as a 'relentless way to promote the maintenance and growth of Maphilindo as a constructive concept for peace, freedom

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80 Ever since his first visit to Indonesia to attend the Bandung Conference, Pelaez had advocated close ties with Indonesia. As a Senator he had described his second visit to Indonesia in 1959 as an 'education in humility' imparted by the 'proud nationalism of the Indonesians', Locsin, op. cit.

81 Interviews with high ranking diplomats and officials in the Philippine Foreign Affairs Department in Manila, dealing with Indonesia, May 1963; also Manila Chronicle, 19 August 1962.


83 The Indonesian Foreign Office Spokesman, Ganis Harsono, declared that his government opposed such a pact as being contrary to non-alignment. Philippines Herald, March 1, 1963.

and welfare of the people of our region and consequently the well-being of all mankind.\textsuperscript{35}

Much water has flowed over the bridge since these sentiments were expressed. Indonesia’s line of action \textit{vis-a-vis} Malaysia and lately, the United Nations, coupled with the new evidence of unpalatable Indonesian activities in Southern Philippines, has put a damper on the initial euphoria of Philippine-Indonesian entente. But what matters is not how long this entente endured, but that it did take place at all for it testified to the bold policy of the Philippines to seek new friends (Indonesia) and, if necessary, join issues with old ones (Malaya) whenever its own national interests were involved.

CONCLUSION

Southeast Asian politics are changing too fast to sketch the shape of events to come and stay. However, a broad pattern has emerged in the Philippine outlook. A formerly American-oriented nationalism has been transformed into Asianistic nationalism; and a formerly America-centred foreign policy has moved into a new Asian orbit. In the new orbit the Philippines has not collided with the United States. For the latter, under the late President Kennedy [and now President Johnson], had forged friendly ties with Indonesia and other Asian non-aligned powers,\textsuperscript{36} and had refrained from commenting on the Philippine claim to North Borneo. Thus once again there is a balance between Philippine Asianism and Philippine-American relations.

In the Far East, Philippine Asianism remains fundamentally security-oriented, but the object of fear is Communist China, not Japan. The Philippines voted in favour of a resolution in the General Assembly branding Communist China as an ‘aggressor’ in the Korean war, and sent a Philippine contingent to fight along with the United Nations forces. It signed the Japanese Peace Treaty in 1951 to consolidate its Far Eastern security against a ‘common danger’ of Communist China.\textsuperscript{37} Since then the normalization of trade and diplomatic relations with Japan in order to ‘open another

\textsuperscript{35} Speech to the Manila Rotary Club on 10 January 1964; text in the \textit{Manila Chronicle}, 11 and 12 January, 1964; also his speech in Tokyo on 22 June 1964, \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{36} The Kennedy administration styled non-aligned countries ‘friends’ as distinct from militarily aligned allies. McGeorge Bundy, ‘Friends and Allies’, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, October 1962.

\textsuperscript{37} State of the Nation Message of President Quirino, January 26, 1953.
avenue of prosperous intercourse'. has become a tenet of the Philippine foreign policy. In 1960, the Philippines signed a Treaty of Commerce, Amity and Navigation with Japan. After his election, President Macapagal declared his intention to broaden these relations on a 'clear and stable basis', not later than the end of 1963.

Although the treaty has not as yet been ratified by the Philippine Senate owing to persistence of fear of Japan, President Macapagal has reaffirmed his determination to carry out his resolve for stronger ties with Japan 'within the earliest time possible to make up for the lost time in the past'. He has, moreover, declared that Japan and the Philippines 'are now allies in the cause of freedom', and by accelerating the consolidation of their ties, 'they may then be in a better position to meet their respective responsibilities, as allies in the struggle to preserve the rights and fundamental freedoms of the free world and enhance the prosperity of all mankind.'

This constitutes a reversal of the prewar security-oriented Philippine Asianism which had viewed Japan with either fear and suspicion or respectful awe but never as an ally.

In Southeast Asia, Philippine-Asianism is both security-oriented and fraternal. In view of the growing shadow of Communist China in Indo-China, the Philippines desires continued 'presence' of Western powers in Southeast Asia, just as Recto had sought it in 1927 to offset the growing power of Japan. But apart from that, the Philippines has affirmed an Asian Monroeism in calling for 'Asian solutions for Asian problems' especially in the Malaysia dispute. It was in the spirit of fraternal Asianism that the Philippines entered into a new era of friendship with non-aligned Cambodia. At one stage in 1963, the Philippine-Cambodian relations grew so close that Cambodia accepted the Philippine offer to try to 'iron out (Cambodia's) differences' with the United States.

As President Macapagal declared, quoting Holmes, 'the great thing is not so much where we stand as in what direction we are going.' That direction of the Philippines is now clearly marked —Asianism in national ideology and international conduct.

88 State of the Nation Message of President Magsaysay, January 26, 1954.
89 State of the Nation Message of President Macapagal, January 26, 1963.
90 Speech in Tokyo on 22 June 1964, op. cit.