


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ASIA AND THE HUMANITIES*

CESAR ADIB MAJUL

I

Historically, the attitudes and responses of the Western world towards the various Asian humanistic traditions have been a function of various needs. In a very important sense, the shift in these needs represents a progressive transformation from particular to relatively expanding universal ones. Significantly, such an expansion has been accompanied by a proportionate increase in its spiritual dimensions.

In the eighteenth century as well as the beginning of the nineteenth century, knowledge of Asian humanities among Westerners was confined to those interested in the exotic or hitherto unknown sources of wisdom. Some European intellectuals have even used this knowledge as a critique of what they believed constituted intellectual or moral complacency among their contemporaries. Such knowledge widened in scope later on when missionaries were led to deepen their studies of Eastern moral values and religious beliefs as part of their efforts towards more successful proselytizing. Often, unsuccessful missionaries returned to their home base to end up as experts on different sorts of oriental religions while preparing others to take their places at home and abroad. The imperialist powers, too, had their experts not so much to know the weaknesses of their subjects, who had been conquered mainly by force, as to make their rule more efficient and tolerable. Thus it is no accident that some of the most monumental compendia of Islamic Law or their translations used in India were produced under the patronage of British rulers.

After World War II, the almost universal trauma resulting from widespread destruction and immense loss of lives, the fear of a nuclear war as well as a genuine desire for world peace, the rise of many independent countries from colonial status, new political realignments

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among nations, and a new concept of international relations not entirely devoid of the expectations for a one-world in the very distant future, made imperative the knowledge of the ideologies of other countries as well as the moral and religious values which might have entered into the formulation of such ideologies. Cultural centers, exchange programs, cultural missions, scholarships etc., became the order of the day. But such programs, although allowing an increased number of Westerners to know more about Asia, had probably enabled more Asians to know more about and even imbibe Western values to the extent that many of them have come to question if not abandon, some of their own traditional values. In any case, a basic premise behind all the above programs and missions was that knowledge of the culture of another country would hopefully moderate, if not eliminate, obstacles to friendlier relations along political lines or at least avoid misunderstandings in negotiations among different statesmen.

In the last few years, problems of overpopulation, pollution, malnutrition, illiteracy, etc., have become universal in their import and implication. However, programs sponsored by developed nations or world agencies to help other nations have often met a cultural wall, generating, probably unwittingly, misunderstanding if not outright hostility. The misunderstanding as well as the resulting resentment have often been brought about by experts from the developed countries of the West whose prescriptions could not fit into the value systems and social institutions of the countries they meant to help. Conversely, suspicions about or imputation of unnecessary motives to such experts may have been the result of ignorance of other cultural values than their own. All these obviously point to the necessity for a widening and an intensification of the knowledge of other cultural values on the part of experts as well as on that of the population where problems of world import are to be resolved. The burden of knowledge ought to be everyone's concern and not be placed merely on the shoulders of the experts.

It is important to note that alongside the shifting needs of Westerners to know Asian values, there have been sincere efforts by many universities, especially those in the United States, to include courses on Asian humanities in their liberal arts curriculum. But this program was meant to enrich the lives of the students and accelerate their creative impulses while enabling them at the same time to understand more deeply and appreciate their own culture through a comparative

knowledge of other cultures. The Conference on Oriental Classics held at Columbia University in 1958 bears out this observation well. Although members of the conference spoke of the "intrinsic value" of some of the Oriental Classics while giving secondary importance to their historical value, and emphasized that the problem of the Western humanities was understanding better "humanity in Asia" or "discovering the essential humanity in various civilizations", the aim of the existing or proposed academic programs was the intellectual growth of the students. In effect, the higher institutions of learning had produced an elite which had a fair understanding and even empathy for the cultural values of other peoples. However, when some members of this elite come to occupy high positions in the state, how much of their previous education in the past facilitate their task of improving the relations between their country and another Asian one?

Undoubtedly, the enrichment of a person's intellectual life, understanding among peoples of each others' cultures, the cultural competence of experts charged with the explanation and implementation of programs of world import, and the the facilitation of channels of communication so necessary to peaceful relations between nations are all desirable and ought to be encouraged. However, it is problematical whether all of these desiderata, if realized, can radically or ultimately solve problems urging immediate solutions like the danger of a nuclear holocaust and that of dwindling raw materials and their unavailability or high cost.

Undoubtedly, the great powers do not presently desire a nuclear war, especially one where all will be the losers. But it is not idle to speculate that should one of them be absolutely sure of emerging totally victorious from such a war with negligible losses on its side that it will not restrain itself from going into it. The point here is that the fear of a nuclear war among the great powers does not result from compassion for the people of the rival power and a love for human race, but because their own nationals stand in danger of extinction. In brief, the fear of a nuclear war is a function of national interests and does not stem from humanistic considerations based on universal principles. Based therefore on pragmatic and partisan principles, the desire for a state of no-war, euphemistically called "peace", cannot endure for long should other exigencies demand otherwise. It is instructive to note that many years ago there were nations who, not yet possessing a nuclear bomb, had demanded a ban on all nuclear armaments on

the basis of peace and humanity. However, the moment they were able to produce an atomic blast, they conveniently forgot all their past moralizing. The great powers, in turn, condemned such a blasting as if only they had a monopoly to kill on a large scale.

The problem of raw materials as dramatically shown in the last energy crisis all point to the necessity for the existence in the not too far away future of a common pool of world resources and even of services for the benefit of all mankind, from which countries can draw on the basis of urgent needs and priorities. At present, most help to developing countries from rich or developed countries have been done on the basis of historical or friendly relations or with the inevitable attached strings. This is not to deny that genuine needs of a particular country are being satisfied through the aid of another friendly country; but the point here is that there is the probability that there is another country in more urgent need for the particular aid granted. The fact is that countries having much needed resources which they can spare actually manipulate them in terms of national interests and power politics. Forgetting that the recent Arab use of the oil weapon had been based on techniques learned from the West, some quarters in the West have demanded that all Arab oil should be internationalized for the benefit of mankind in general. In principle this demand is, I believe, rational and good, provided that all other nations in the world internationalize their raw materials, their technical knowledge as well as their surplus agricultural and industrial products.

At present, it is quite difficult to convince a person who is sophisticated in the knowledge of international relations that international agencies like the World Bank are not influenced by the very rich nations who have contributed to its capital. It is much harder to convince him that as the rich nations become richer, the developing countries do not become relatively poorer. For example, in the last few years, export products from the West to Asia had, in some cases, jumped up to 300% in their prices while, for many years until the October War of 1973, the prices of raw materials from Asia and Africa had remained more or less stationary. This means that the highly industrialized countries and international cartels have become richer while the developing countries exporting raw materials have become relatively poorer. In response to the demand for higher prices for their raw materials on the part of the developing countries, the industrialized countries had planned an organization of consumers to present a united front. In the face of all these,

the United Nations Secretary General reflected that there was need for agreement on certain general principles which ensure a rising standard of living for the developing countries while guaranteeing continued economic security for the developed ones. But as long as nations will adhere to their claims to their own resources and make their specific demands regarding trade and tariff arrangements and accessibility to other markets, and as long as the developed nations will, as a reaction, band themselves into an economic block to maintain their primacy in the international economic sphere, conflict between blocks of nations will be chronic in increasing proportions and with dangerous implications. However, should some form of understanding be arrived at in accordance with the view of the Secretary-General, all what this means is that only some developing countries but most industrialized countries will profit from it. Indeed this does not necessarily imply that the whole of mankind will benefit from such an arrangement.

The idea of having a world agency where the surpluses of raw materials and agricultural and industrial products are registered or deposited and from which any nation can draw in accordance with its needs under a system of priorities, will never be possible unless all the peoples of the world begin to develop a sense of common direction as well as a set of universal values transcending those of particular nations and particular cultures. In brief, no concept of a world community can be both meaningful and operative unless it is based on a set of universally held values. I take it that this is one of the possible implications of what is meant by Dr. Michael Novak to constitute a planetary humanities.

II

One possible concept of a planetary humanities is that it includes within its connotation the following elements: that the survival of the human species is a value to be cherished, that individuals as such have an intrinsic value all their own, that in human experience and historical transformation different peoples have arrived at certain values and principles worthy of mutual adoption (or adaptation) by other peoples to enrich each other's lives and institutions, and that these principles can be viewed as representing ultimately a cumulative effort on the part of the human species for a more cohesive and happier universal order where particularistic cultural elements are simply peripheral. The basic postulate in all these is that in all man's efforts to bring about what they believe constitutes order and harmony, there are common

ingredients of humanity in all of them — elements transcending the limitations of race, speech, and geography. But, indeed, of overriding importance is the survival of the human species in this earth without the sacrificing of any race or segment to achieve this end. Admittedly, this is a value. As to the question why this ought to be a value of mankind, neither logic nor empirical philosophy can give a definite answer. Attempts at an answer are found in classical moral philosophy and certainly in all of the great religions.

However, a planetary humanities as outlined above cannot come into being unless a great part of the world population or at least its intellectual leaders, moral leaders, and academicians develop a consciousness of its fundamental connotations. They must be committed to a form, or order, or cohesion of a world community and possess a sentiment for what constitutes human expectations believed to be realizable in such an order. A basic assumption here is that human life ought to have some direction or purpose if it is to be worthwhile or significant.

Moreover, as previously hinted, the evolvment of a planetary humanities if it is to have some form of universal sanction must incorporate within it, albeit transformed to a higher and more universal level — values which have characterized the great humanistic traditions all over the world, have stood the test of time, and still continue to maintain their hold on a great part of the world's population. It is here where the various Asian humanistic traditions can play an important and vital role.

The problem of a planetary humanities accommodating Asian values invites some observations. First of all, values represent reactions or responses of people to certain human and social situations; as expressed in statements, they represent both prescriptions and preferences. They do not describe facts but rather exemplify human responses to factual situations and needs. Moral, political, and aesthetic judgments pertain to the realm of values. Values represent the human urge to create ordered life both in the individual and the social level. They aim to bring about what is conceived to constitute harmony and happiness as a response to biological and other human needs within the framework of some adjustment to the physical and social environment. A generally systematized group of values accepted by a people within a historical span of time is what may constitute a humanistic tradition. As such, Asia represents a constellation of different cultural patterns and value systems. Some of them might even use similar terms, but the

connotation or operative character of such terms might differ. What Asian tradition does not value justice, peace, harmony and freedom? Yet, no different from the Western world, such concepts may not mean exactly the same thing. Moreover, Asian value systems must not be viewed as something static or expressive of a philosophy of negativism or resignation. At present, many Asian countries are manifesting a form of social dynamism, and this might be due to the influence of Western values which may have been accepted within the sanction or framework of traditional values. Certainly, in various degrees, the ideas of modernism and the need for technological change are affecting Asian traditional values.

In trying to locate certain Asian values, it would be wise to be aware that in a given society considered as possessing a particular culture, different but parallel value system may exist side by side. It is well known that a protest against certain religious forms may originate from, or be expressed through, religious outlets. Sufism is an example of this in relation to the kind of Islamic orthodoxy propounded by the legalists. Buddhism is another in relation to Hindu tradition.

In the variety of Asian cultures and humanistic traditions, some are closer to those of the West rather than to some other Asian ones. For example, the Islamic humanistic tradition (which is really not monolithic but which exemplifies historical and geographical variations and is not confined to Asia since it predominates in North Africa) has more points of historical and substantive contacts with the Western tradition than say with Confucianism or Hinduism. The well-known reason for this is that Jesus Christ and many of the other Hebrew prophets have been incorporated into the pantheon of prophets revered by Islam. The belief here is that the Prophet Muhammad, although the last, belongs to this long series of prophets. Moreover, the lands that initially fell under the sway of Islam were already exposed to the Graeco-Roman tradition and had sizeable Christian communities. Yet one must not disregard one aspect of the Islamic humanistic tradition closely associated with Sufism (or Islamic mystical philosophy) which appears to cross religious borders. It has been recently demonstrated that many of the Sufistic ideas of Ibnul 'Arabi, the Spanish-Arab mystical philosopher, have a one-to-one correspondence and even doctrinal similarity with those of Lao Tzu, the Chinese Taoist philosopher. The fact that there is no known historical contacts between these two philosophers have led some other mystically-inclined scholars to assert

that they all drew their knowledge from a common source that existed during a primordial time — a knowledge which had persisted, with accretions, up to the present. However, more empirically minded scholars would probably comment that man's response to similar situations would probably elicit similar questions and answers.

Nevertheless, in spite of the differences between, and even existence of, competing humanistic traditions, it can be stated outrightly that there is an essential humanity and commonness to all of them. Cultural borrowing, the transfer of cultural values from their places of origin to far away places, similar responses of persons belonging to different cultures to similar human or social situations, the communicability of values by persons belonging to different races, creeds, and cultures, and genuine appreciation of artists for art forms produced in another age and clime all attest to the existence of an essential humanity common to all man's traditions. Moreover, in Asian traditions, most of the humanistic values have their origin or sanction in religion or are at least based on a metaphysical system (which in many Asian cultures is not entirely devoid of moral prescriptives). Asian religions, philosophical, and mystical systems have assumed the oneness of the human race as well as the sameness of the nature of man. A deeper study of religions will reveal that a one-to-one correspondence between their major concepts is possible. All of these generally suggest that many of these values are universal in their intent. This is not to deny that different religions have their *differentia*, but this might only imply their social function in satisfying particular or local needs.

There is probably no culture that is so poor that other cultures cannot learn something from it. However, the merit of a culture in its contribution to an albeit slowly emerging world culture is, by definition, the universality, actual or potential, of its key concepts. In the same manner that ideas of modernism, increased standards of living, and a healthy life should not, in spite of their origin, be considered a monopoly of the West, so must a great deal of the humanistic traditions of the different Asian civilizations be considered universal property. Actually, the diversity of culture should be the very instrument to enrich a future world culture. Allah says in the Qur'an: "O Mankind! Lo! We have created you male and female, and have made you nations and tribes that ye may know one another." (Sura XLIX, v. 13). That is, that they may learn from one another.

It is difficult for any one person to talk authoritatively of all Asian humanistic traditions. But I would like to mention how certain concepts of an originally Asian humanistic tradition — that of Islam — can serve as elements of a planetary humanities. One of the basic concepts of Islam is that of *amanah* or trust, that is, Man's life, his family, his property, his intelligence and talents and so on are really not his own but qualities or objects entrusted to him by the Divine. Also, that the earth and the skies around have been given to man for his use but only in the sense of his being a vice-regent on earth. Another concept of Islam is that of *community* to which a man must sublimate his personal or selfish interests. Undoubtedly, both of these concepts have their parallels in Western political thought. The Qur'an also tries to impress us with the idea that two of the greatest sources of evil in man come from his desire to live forever on earth and to hold absolute power. The original temptation of Adam is succinctly narrated as follows: "But the Devil whispered to him, saying: O Adam! Shall I show thee the tree of immortality and power that wasteth not away?" (Sura XX, v. 120). Here can be seen immediately Islamic values of universal import: that since man's life on earth is transient, he is accountable for his actions and must show compassion in his dealings, and that all power on earth is limited and relative and must be exercised as a trust (*amanah*). (See Annex, "Notes on the concept of *Amanah* in Islam").

Also, the Islamic concept that all religions and ethical systems different from its own are likewise the result of Divine revelation and that differences in races and nations were meant to enable different peoples or communities to solve problems and enrich their lives through specific creative impulses and then learn from each other, demonstrate the supreme virtue of tolerance. Certainly, this virtue is not equivalent to what passes now as religious apathy as an element of a new concept of freedom. Just a few of the values of Islam that have a universal message have been touched upon. Certainly, Judaism, Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism (in its various forms), Hinduism, etc., have corresponding or similar ideas as well as other ones.

No genuine reconstruction of the present world system regarding the solution of world problems, the sharing of world resources or raw materials, and even political adjustments along a one-world concept is really possible unless there is an *a priori* acceptance of certain universal values or at least the possibility of these; this is something beyond aca-

democratic curiosity or mutual appreciation or even mere understanding of each other cultures. The awareness of such values may accelerate the expectations of a one-world in proportion to its popularization among the world population. But here a vicious circle may arise: not all human beings will have the same expectations unless they have approximately similar standards of well being. Also, many persons will be inclined to keep their loyalty confined to a nation and not go beyond it if they think that their well being is best secured within it. One tends to be loyal to a system as long as one is a beneficiary of it. Consequently, adherence or commitment to a planetary humanities will be greatly determined by its ability to satisfy expectations of the world population. The function of world education here is also crucial.

It is not gainsaying to state that there are multitudinous forces today that will eventually lead the different countries and peoples of the world to get together to solve common problems if each is to survive. But again this effort might not necessarily be guided by a common will for the good of all mankind but might only reflect the will for each to survive. Furthermore, if what will make mankind get together involves coercive elements and expedient principles, then the nature of the world's integration would at most be negative in character. What might be necessary is the development among all individuals and peoples of that kind of will that represents the will for the good of all mankind and not just the good of a particular race, nation, or segment. It is in the development of this will for the good of all mankind as such that the intellectuals, academicians, religious and moral leaders can play an important role. Obviously a key factor in this development is world education.

What might be done initially is to increase translations of the humanistic literature of the peoples of this world and widen their accessibility not only to the higher centers of learning but to other quarters as well. Curricula in the colleges and universities must offer more liberal courses that expose the young to such humanistic traditions. Philosophers or humanists with a good background in philosophy will eventually have to come out with a system demonstrating the equivalences or correspondences between the basic ideas of these traditions with special concentration on those that have direct import on the value of humanity as such and its survival. The results of their labor can then be distributed to various educational agencies in the world such that their influence can be felt in all levels of education including the

primary ones. Hopefully, a new world generation will arise that will have imbibed of such ideas and, although adhering to their own particularistic cultures, will be committed to certain values which will in effect constitute a planetary humanities. Consequently, their approaches to world problems will be based on a categorical imperative where humanity will be considered an end in itself.

All of these point to the awesome responsibility for a new breed of intellectuals, academicians, and creative thinkers to accelerate their contacts with one another and unify their vision of a universal or planetary humanities. It is a vision that will leave alone the great religions and philosophical systems to their votaries and yet testify to their validity and essential unity. It is a vision that will have as its sanction humanity as a whole as well as the survival of humanity with a new well-thought-out concept of its well-being as a major value.

ANNEX

Notes on the Concept of Amanah in Islam

Amanah (trust) is one of the most fundamental concepts in Islam. The true believer (*mumin*) is trustworthy or faithful to the trust. Since Allah is the Living and the source of all life, a person does not own his life but holds it only in trust. Since Allah is the All-Knowing and the source of all knowledge, a person's intelligence as well as all of his intellectual accomplishments are to be held in trust. All property, whether legally registered as private or otherwise, belongs to Allah and is, therefore, to be held or utilized by men as a trust. Since Allah is the Owner of All Sovereignty, political power can only be exercised by man as a loan under trust. Indeed, the concept of *Amanah* has tremendous political, economic and social implications. Knowing some of the Beautiful Names of Allah, which are, in effect, the names of his qualities, the Muslim can readily know what things ultimately belong to Allah, but which are allowed for man's use as a trust.

Clearly, in social life, the idea of *Amanah* serves as a primary safeguard against human arbitrariness while constituting a basis for the rights of persons on other persons and institutions. Its practice connotes the exercise of individual as well as group responsibility. Allah said in the Qur'an: "Lo! We offered the trust unto the heavens and the earth and the halls, but they shrank from bearing it and were afraid of it.

And man assumed it. Lo! he hath proved a tyrant and a fool." (Sura XXXIII, v. 72). This verse strongly suggests that when a person marries, raises a family, studies for a degree, practices a profession, owns property, exercises power of different forms, etc., he has entered into certain commitments. But man, in the exercise of any such trust, has often acted irresponsibly. His tyranny results when he uses his intelligence of purely personal, family or dynastic interest; and his foolishness comes about when he believes that he knows everything or can do anything without the help of Allah. Such a tyrant or fool had broken or abused the trust. In effect, he had committed the sin of Pride and had forgotten Allah.

From the Islamic point of view, man is given access to the things of the earth and the skies to facilitate and make more effective his service to and worship of Allah. That this access must be governed by the principle of *Amanah* implies that man's actions must be done not for selfish interests or to harm others, but for the good of the greater whole. In the practical sphere, this greater whole can refer only to the *umma*, or Muslim community. What is meant here is that the life, strength, intelligence, skills, property, etc., of the Muslim must be geared to the wider and greater interests of the *umma*. A serious study of the Covenant (*mithaq*) between Allah and the *umma* as well as a function of the latter in this world, reveal that a purpose, among others, of the Islamic community is to serve as a witness to the other religious communities of how the *Amanah* is to be made manifest and operative in social life. However, all this is not to deny the very important duties and responsibilities of the Muslim to the whole of Mankind since, according to the Qur'an, there is also a Covenant between Allah and Mankind which was implicit when He said to the sons of Adam: "Am I not your Lord?" (Sura VII, v. 172).

Written for the Muslim Educational
and Cultural Association (Cornell
University)

A DIVISIBLE AND GRADUATED PEACE

E.D. SOLIDUM AND R. DUBSKY

Introduction

The task of the peace-maker is said to be to prevent major conflicts from arising among nations and to work for conditions of acceptable peace among nations. Whether inspired by concerns for survival of man or nations or by the Augustinian belief that man by nature strives for a state of peace, conceived as harmony or perfection, the peace-maker seeks to define various ways or means or to devise some schemes or models by which the task can best be accomplished.

History reveals a great many such schemes whose aim was to state conditions that are necessary for the attainment of international stability of peace. Some schemes have been utopian in character while others have been realistic enough, some even greatly affecting both political thought and political reality.

Among the earliest recorded schemes dealing with peace are those that originated in Asian countries roughly 2,300 years ago. Thus the Confucian conception of a universal commonwealth based on morality or goodness or the Legalist concept of a universal imperial state in China and Kautilya's despotic government aiming at universal conquest in India, however short of modern "internationalism", have at least that much in common. In its own peculiar way, each tried to overcome prevailing conflicts among the "warring states" then, ultimately tried to effect universal peace and greater prosperity. It is interesting to note that the three schemes mentioned were not mere utopian ideas but rather practical schemes (with their idea of imposing a universal hegemony on other states) and that they all vastly affected then current and subsequent political thought as well as political actuality both in India and in China.

In modern times, a fresh stimulus to seek rational solutions to problems of peace may be said to have originated in 17th century

Europe with the rise of rationalism.¹ Starting roughly with Grotius' attempt to redefine the universal principles of natural law by reference to human reasoning alone, a great many rational schemes have appeared. The overall effect has been to inject a new element of rationality into the relations among nations, to subject such relations to certain international principles of right.

Some such schemes sought solution to international conflicts in federalism (e.g., the Duke of Sully), yet others in downright universalism (e.g., Emeric Cruce). Among the better known schemes of this period were Rousseau's *Project for Perpetual Peace*, advocating a strong central system of government for Europe, and Kant's *Eternal Peace* reflecting the new liberalism and universalism of the Age of Enlightenment, in favor of free federation of nations. Similar solutions to international conflicts were also manifest in 20th century thought on peace. In one scheme, Bertrand Russell, advocated the total surrendering of sovereignty by nations to one strong world government. In another, John Strachey, another English thinker, advocated a kind of condominium of two super-powers, America and Russia, obviously under the spell of post-World War II political reality.

Every age may be viewed as being influenced in its perceptions of peace by the conditions of international life at that time. If so, our current perceptions of international peace may be said to be shaped by the peculiar experience of the 20th century man. Thus we have been affected in our perceptions of peace by such factors as the conflagration of the two world wars, the recent rivalry between two ideological camps known as the cold war, the enormous advance in modern technology, particularly military technology, and the development of nuclear capacity of certain nations. Suddenly, modern military nuclear technology has come to be seen as having potentially devastating effects on all men and nations, as threatening the very survival of the human race. It is due to these factors that new approaches to solving international conflict situations and ensuring peace had to be developed. Such concepts in the current vocabulary of international politics as "collective security" or "peaceful coexistence" owe their origin exactly to the new conditions of international political life.

¹ See F. S. Northhedge, "Peace, War, and Philosophy" in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (ed. Paul Edward) New York: Macmillan and The Free Press, 1967, Vol. 6.

The near-universally recognized agency for maintaining peace in the contemporary world is the United Nations Organization. It was established after World War II principally in order to maintain peace and to develop conditions favorable to the development of peace. More specifically, as a machinery of peace, it was conceived to accommodate the need for "collective security" mentioned above, to prevent major conflicts among nations from breaking out, to mediate conflicts between disputing parties or nations as well as to encourage activities or development in particular nations that would presumably be conducive to greater general stability among nations — to universal peace. It may be added that the philosophy behind the idea of the U.N.O. as international guardian of peace is as much realistic as it is idealistic. It is idealistic in the sense that behind the U.N.O. there appears an underlying optimism and sentiment in favor of universal peace. It is at the same time realistic, in the sense that conflicts are not regarded as abnormal in relations among men and nations and that the instrument of war has not been abolished from international disputes altogether. Still, not all wars are considered as legitimate, but only wars that are undertaken in behalf of justice, to enforce the rights of man. Moreover certain rules of propriety are insisted on in accordance with which hostilities among nations should be permitted to occur only within certain mutually agreed limits and in good faith.

In the following pages, the authors while freely recognizing the great contribution to peace by the existing U.N. machinery for maintaining peace are looking into ways to improve on the present methods of maintaining peace. As we see it, on the existing peace-keeping arrangement, opportunities for peace can only inadequately be exploited and effective peace-keeping is too often made difficult, if not impossible, in practice. Hence we propose to explore a new direction that would conceivably improve the situation. A more effective approach to peace, however, does not imply merely a critical evaluation of the U.N. machinery or transformation of such a machinery. More than that it implies transformation or a new focusing of man's perceptions of peace. In our exposition we shall briefly consider these two themes. More fully, we shall first throw light on some of the weaknesses as these are reflected in our current perceptions of peace and in the existing U.N. machinery for peace-keeping. Subsequently, we shall suggest possible remedies for such weaknesses, which will lead us to state a new paradigm of peace. This paradigm, it will be shown, implies not

only re-orientation of our perceptions of peace but also certain structural changes in the international machinery for maintaining peace.

Perceptions of Peace

It is submitted that the problem of finding a workable scheme of international peace is difficult to achieve within the context of contemporary political practice. The difficulty partly emanates from a diversity of perceptions of peace. The first such diversity is said to be due to conflicting interests that characterize developing and developed countries.²

In developing countries, for example, the perception of peace is shaped by the need of the nation at issue to find stability for its new order at home and recognition as an independent power abroad. These countries are saddled with certain great and fundamental problems on which the very stability, even survival, of the nation depends, such as economic growth, maintenance of law and order within the nation's boundaries, national integration and general social well-being of the citizens, which frequently involve striving after greater social justice and eradication of poverty in the nation. The perception of peace in developing countries is, then, intimately connected with these objectives, that is, peace depends on the solving of the said problems. Hence their frequent worship of modernization and industrialization, their belief in the need of rapid changes in economic, social and political life. The issue of international peace, or of relation *vis-a-vis* other nations, must be perceived primarily in terms of the mentioned domestic concerns.

In developed countries, on the other hand, the perception of peace is colored by the relatively prosperous conditions of social life, the relative stability that prevails there. Under such conditions peace tends to be identified with the *status quo situation* which is judged beneficial to national interest. Thus the developed countries try to freeze the prevailing international conditions as much as possible, to advocate marginal changes, and to look with suspicion on rapid changes of developing nations, presumably hoping in that way to perpetuate conditions most favorable to themselves.

² Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, "Peace Research and Developing Countries," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 4, 1968, Oslo.

It is evident, then, that national perceptions of peace may radically differ depending on the direction in which national interest, so to speak, pulls. Such interests may be complete opposites, such as in case of conflicting economic policies or when the issue of modernization versus *status quo* is raised. Not surprisingly the leaders of certain developing countries (like in Burma and Indonesia) have become convinced that "a lasting and durable world peace remains elusive because of widening gap in income between developed and developing countries." Needless to say, when perceptions of peace differ so widely, they are hard, if not impossible, to reconcile, for they are related to particular experience or outlook of man and are ultimately derived from the more basic difference in social goals and values.

The second diversity in perceptions of peace is of ideological origin. Ideological theories tend to interpret all reality in terms of certain given categories of thought or belief, to suit their own pre-conceived goals. Likewise, the issue of peace must suitably be reinterpreted to fit in with the given ideological assumptions. The ideological dimension of the problem of peace comes out with particular clarity in Marxist theory.

Briefly stated, in Marxist theory the concept of peace is bound up with Marxist historical explanations and with the idea of class struggle as being an inevitable feature of all social life. The Marxist concept of peace contains a historical and a class element.³ Concretely, peace is a condition of social life that reflects a relative stability of a particular social system at a particular time. There is, e.g., a "bourgeois" kind of peace that characterizes bourgeois societies, a "feudal" peace under favorable conditions of feudalism, etc. Peace as conceived in Marxism is then a relativist concept; there is nothing like a permanent, universal peace possible for the class-ridden society (as Marxism sees it) of today. The term "universal peace" on Marxist theory is thus but an abstract, "formal" idea, strictly outside the scope of the concrete and historical Marxian vocabulary. Lasting peace will be with people only when classes and states, which are the conditions for the origins of war, will have withered away.

Another major obstacle to our finding a workable scheme of international peace is due to a certain vagueness that characterizes our

³ Karel Kala, "On the Marxist Theory of War and Peace," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 5, 1968, Oslo.

current perceptions of peace. Man simply does not appear to have a distinct enough idea of what peace means in a positive sense. We shall explain this point presently. To start with, we may divide people's responses to peace into negative or positive responses. Galtung, a prominent researcher of peace, speaks in this connection about "negative peace" and "positive peace".⁴ We shall take "negative peace" first for this appears the easier of the two to handle. Briefly, negative peace can be defined as the absence of war or of major international conflict situations, in Galtung's phrases, as "the absence of organized forms of violence." We may note that on this definition our perception of peace is essentially a negative perception, i.e., perceiving in terms of what peace is *not* rather than in terms of the conditions that characterize peace as such. Now such a negative perception of peace is open to immediate criticism. It is admittedly, in one sense, the sharpest and the most precise perception, and the most likely to be acceptable to all parties, but, in another sense it is also the most vague for it fails to tell us what peace actually is or what the positive actions or conditions are by which peace can be accomplished.

To put it differently, it establishes a relation between "non-peace" and the various "non-actions" that have led to "non-peace", but not between peace as such and the operations or actions that are positively conducive to peace. There is also another sound criticism of the negative perception of peace. With its sharp contrast between peace and conflict, it appears to have a discouraging effect on all conflicts, and so has a built-in conservative bias. It appears to favor non-disturbance of the *status quo* both at home and in international relations. It tends to advocate law and order solutions. Yet it may be argued that conflicts need not necessarily be bad whether within nations or internationally for the advancement of nations. They may provide a valuable stimulus for conflict-resolutions and so may ultimately advance the cause of peace in the world. In sum, negative perceptions of peace are vague, for they lack in positive content, apart from suffering from a conservative bias.

Positive peace implies not merely the absence of something, but rather the presence of something. This something is a particular state of being which we call peace or, when we perceive it in more

⁴ John Galtung, as quoted by Herman Schmid, "Politics and Peace Research," *ibid.*

dynamic ways, particular peace-inducing actions. Now it has been contended (by, e.g., Galtung) that our perception of positive peace has generally been weak and confused, that is both among people concerned with politics and among people at large. This is then taken to imply that such perceptual confusion about peace creates also confusion among people and nations in peace-oriented efforts or actions, and so makes any fruitful pursuit of peace in the world difficult, if not impossible, of achieving. We shall develop this point in more detail.

Perceptions of positive peace are, of course, an experience not unfamiliar to most men. After all, peace is a good presumably desired by all men and all men appear to have at least some idea about peace in their mind. There is, for instance, most likely to be universal consent on such positive assertions as the idea of peace perceived as the state of perfection or the best state of things. This can in turn be identified with such ideas of perceptions as harmony, order, reason, nature, and similar categories. On this perception, international peace would then be perceived as a state of international harmony. Or on a less elevated level, there is likely to be general consent when the perception of peace is expressed in terms of such ideas as social justice, the good life, common good, human happiness and so.

Yet on reflection it becomes immediately clear that perceptions of this general kind are not satisfactory if our aim is to arrive at sound and clear perceptions that could serve as reliable guides to peace-directed actions. Their main weakness is that they are too abstract, too vague, too static and ultimately lacking in operational reference. They tend to become ineffective when definite actions in behalf of peace are called for. They tend to dissolve our thinking about peace into vague generalities and even to lead to contradictions. To illustrate the last point: if peace means the best state of things, then there should be a great number of different "best states of things" given the heterogeneity of goals and values in the contemporary world, with some contradicting others. In that case our perceptions of peace are likely to lead not to harmony of interests but to the opposite, to disharmony! It is, then, our point that such general perceptions, although not unusual in speculative thought, are not concrete or exact enough whether for purposes of modern empirical political science or for decisions concerning peace in political practice.

Our contention that people's perceptions of peace are on the whole ill-formed and hazy appears to have been borne by recent empirical studies. One study aiming to discover reactions to peace was undertaken by Trond Alvik among school children in Norway.⁵ The findings of this study indicate that war is most familiar to children while peace elicits fewer responses among them. In other words, they find it easier to perceive war than to perceive peace. Presumably, here the fault is with us and with the ideas of peace that we project. These are usually general or vague, empty of empirical content, that children (and for that matter adults also) have no clear idea how to actually obtain peace.

The mentioned vagueness of perceptions of positive peace "in the abstract" appears to have yet other undesirable effects. Exactly because of its abstract meaning, positive peace invites subjective interpretations or subjective thinking about peace, and subjective thinking, in its turn, is likely to be influenced by political orientation, i.e., to be open to ideological distortions.⁶ Or alternatively, because they do not lend themselves to ready application, efforts at positive peace may be abandoned altogether in favor of negative peace. That is, our inability to define or perceive peace in clear and concrete positive terms may ultimately lead us to fall back on the thought of war — on negative peace, despite the difficulties which negative peace itself may have. Thus distortions and more confusions, more vagueness, may ultimately be the consequence of our positive perceptions of peace in the abstract. Instead of strengthening the cause of peace in the world, our perceptions of peace may, then, unwittingly have a mitigating effect on peace.

Our exposition of diverse perceptions of peace has revealed a lack of basic consensus on the meaning or experience of peace. But this does not imply that our diverse perceptions of peace are worthless or unusable in practice. After all, all the perceptions mentioned do elicit material response of some sort. Our point is merely to show that such responses are not congruent in character, that there is no universal consent on positive peace.

It has also been shown that the lack of consensus on peace may partly be attributed to our current practice to unduly generalize about

⁵ Trond Alvik, "The Development of Views on Conflict, War, and Peace Among School Children," *ibid.*

⁶ Helge Hveem, "Foreign Policy Thinking in the Elite and General Population," *ibid.*

peace. It seems that we have reduced our perceptions of peace to largely abstract and static ideas and so have made them difficult to relate to the dynamic reality of the rapidly changing world of today.

Having suggested the principal weaknesses of current perceptions of peace as we see them, we would like briefly to consider the remedies that appear available. The principal remedy, it seems would be to get away from the magic circle of abstraction and vagueness that, as we have suggested, appears to dominate today's perceptions of peace. Concretely, it is submitted that what is needed is the strengthening of our perceptions of positive peace or rather of the positive or empirical content in our perception by making these more concrete, more empirical, operationally more effective.

A certain reorientation in our thought and practice must, it seems, be effected if we are to succeed in our effort of developing a more "real-life" oriented sense of peace. First of all, it is clear that such a realistic approach to peace can never be effected by "feeding" people with mere general ideas about peace or by appeals to abstract rational arguments, as this frequently has been the practice today. Such general ideas are likely to create unreasonable expectations about peace that will remain unrealized in practice. Peace to be real or more lasting must grow out of real experiences of man, must be familiar to man's own personal experience. We should, then, approach peace from the bottom of the ladder of international relations rather than from the top. More specifically, we should concern ourselves first with peace-building, peace-making or peace-keeping on a local or regional level rather than on a "universal" level, as presumably the U.N. aims at, such as through cooperation on regional level in matters of common social, economic and cultural interests, by learning to solve the problems of peace at our doorsteps. In this way the perception of positive peace would in time acquire a new dimension or significance, and neither children of Norway nor adults in other countries would likely be at a loss when asked to say what positive peace means to them.

United Nations Peace-Keeping

The second great obstacle to our finding a workable scheme of international peace has to do with the present-day machinery of peace-keeping organizations. In the present section we shall try to identify this obstacle, suggesting what is "wrong" with today's institutional

peace arrangements or at least what makes such arrangements less effective than they conceivably could be. But first we shall give a brief account of the reasons why such institutional arrangements are needed, to dispell the idea that the world can somehow get along without them. What is ultimately proposed is not getting rid of an international machinery for peace keeping altogether, but rather to transform the structure and some of the assumptions and methods of the existing machinery.

Institutional peace arrangements may be said to originate in situations of inter-state conflicts. These arise when the interest or goal of one nation, such as national security or economic development, is inconsistent with, or in direct conflict with, the interests or goals of other nations. Every single country tries to stabilize its position and to extend its sphere of interest in the world. With that aim in mind, it mobilizes its power, and other resources or acts in such a way as to affect the conduct of other nations in a manner advantageous to itself. This is normally accomplished by such measures as formation of alliances, regional security arrangements, a deliberate policy of mutual cooperation with certain friendly nations, pursuit of a "balance of power" policy, etc. The idea behind all such measures is to narrow the area of potential conflicts or, to express it differently, to reduce potential conflicts to manageable proportions.

It is clear that the ideal inter-state relations is to eradicate as much as possible major conflict situations, which might lead to unmanageable frictions, even to war. Still, it may be argued that conflicts will always remain as an unavoidable feature of international life and that they may even do some good. It may be contended that no state exists without experiencing some amount of conflict. For there are certain problems that appear sufficiently universal and ever-recurring that make a perfect functioning of the world in the foreseeable future at least, near impossible of achieving. We may think of such problems as arise out of differences in ideological interests, out of economic problems (due, e.g., to raw materials, oil), new technological problems (such as, e.g., affect the current arms race), new social problems (such as have to do with malnutrition or education) or simply arising out of certain uncontrollable factors, such as drought, floods, famine. It is obvious that problems like these do not lend themselves to easy rational solutions and that they are likely to remain always with us to haunt the present-day social planner. Needless to say, they cannot but have

an upsetting effect on the relation among nations, being always a source of potential conflicts among nations, even of a serious kind. We may even argue that conflicts need not be necessarily bad or fatal to relationships among states. On the contrary, we may see them as having stimulating effects. Situations without conflict would presumably involve static, unchanging conditions. But change is generally wanted, hence some degree of conflict is likely to be beneficial and will provide the dynamism called for in effecting changes. What is important, of course, is that conflicts do not exceed certain limits, that they do not lead to irreconcilable differences of interest between two nations, or groups of nations. Extreme conflicts would make these a potential source of war-producing situations.

With ever-present conflicts in the world, some machinery for reducing inter-state conflicts, or at least the major conflicts, appears necessary if our intention is to have the world function in a reasonably rational and orderly manner. Here such peace-keeping organizations as the old League of Nations or the United Nations Organization of today have come into existence to fulfill exactly such a task. They have been established to deal particularly with conflicts that are of a more serious character, to effect specific settlements of international disputes, allegedly, so as to create a favorable climate for the existence of a lasting international peace.

It is not our purpose in this paper to describe the machinery or institutional structure of the U.N. having to do with peace keeping. Our purpose here is rather to critically evaluate the effectiveness of such machinery to see whether it is, particularly today, a "workable" or effective instrument for what it has been established — peace keeping.

The great contribution of the United Nations peace keeping machinery since its inception after World War II cannot be underrated. It has to its credit for instance such significant actions (however critically they have frequently been received by some parties) as resolving major threats to international peace in Korea, the Middle East and Congo. Moreover, the United Nations Organization has provided a valuable forum for discussing outstanding international conflicts, which by itself has descalated tensions, reduced the scope of such conflicts. Still, the machinery of peace keeping has been increasingly criticized as lacking in effectiveness and as not too well suited to the realities of present-day world. With increasing frequency, we hear voices

contending that it has demonstrated only limited usefulness in practice for peace keeping or peace making operations. Some voices even contend that it is unnecessary, that in practice there are other ways for solving international conflicts than current peace keeping methods. A reference is made here to certain states that prosper and live in peace even outside the framework of the existing international machinery for maintaining peace, such as South Africa or Taiwan, and to the fact that even these states that accept U.N. machinery by virtue of their membership in the United Nations Organization do not necessarily abide by it when they find it disadvantageous to themselves. An example is the recent unwillingness of Turkey to explore U.N. machinery for resolving the "Cyprus crisis," preferring instead "to take the law in her own hands." We shall presently consider in this section some of the principal specific points of criticism that are raised against the existing peace keeping machinery.

In the first place, the present weakness of the U.N. machinery for maintenance of peace is traced to the very structure of the organization which is said to have become outdated by the actuality of contemporary international life. As one prominent political scientist has put it bluntly: "The U.N. is unsuited in its present form."⁷ Established after the war, the organization was heavily influenced in its structural form by conditions, moods and climate of opinion then. It was assumed that the great powers were likely to cooperate in the maintenance of peace, that they would do the policing in behalf of less powerful nations. Moreover, a lasting universal peace was optimistically envisaged to be within man's possibility of achieving. Political reality, however, has undergone considerable transformation since then. There have been the great cold-war rivalry between the two powers, the United States and Russia; the rise to prominence of new powers such as Japan and Communist China; the increasing self-assertiveness of the new developing nations, as well as the rise in importance of certain nations due to their special strategic or economic importance such as the oil countries. In its present form then the U.N. machinery can hardly be said to reflect fairly the real alignment of forces in the contemporary world. This should then adversely affect not only its prestige but, more importantly, its effectiveness to act as the spokesman of "international interest."

⁷ William T. R. Fox and Annette Baker Fox, "International Politics," in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (ed. D. L. Sills) (U.S.A.: Macmillan and The Free Press, 1968), p. 59.

In the second place, the weakness of the United Nations is attributed to the absence of a definite machinery for enforcing U.N. decisions on peace and to its being slow in acting. To paraphrase Hobbes, a theorist of power politics, decisions without sword are but empty words. There is no standing army to enforce peace such as when flagrant violation of rights occurs or a situation of serious conflicts between two nations arises. If it acts at all, it tends to act *only after* aggression has taken place, when it may be too late to solve the conflict at issue. Its main concern then is merely to defuse the explosive situation. In that way the conflict at issue tends to be swept under the carpet, that is, peace is restored or kept by submerging the conflict itself. This inability to enforce peace, to act effectively to prevent hostilities as well as to satisfactorily solve certain outstanding problems concerning peace appears to vastly weaken the usefulness in practice of the U.N. peace keeping machinery. Not surprisingly certain nations prefer not to take advantage of this machinery in settling their disputes; they prefer acting on their own, hoping for the best in the future.

Thirdly, another major weakness of the U.N. machinery is due to certain built-in mechanisms or practices that mitigate against its effective functioning. We have in mind the veto power of the great powers, which effectively concentrates all real power in the hands of the great powers and so can bring the machinery to a halt. Or we think of the practice by the General Assembly (when the Security Council chooses to leave the issue at stake to be decided by that body) to pass on the responsibility for action to the Secretary-General, which in practice may have similarly paralyzing effects overburdening this one person who has no real power (such as an army) to lean on. Depending on his power of persuasion he can do only so much, most likely the minimum; namely, to defuse or isolate the conflict.

Fourthly, another great weakness of the U.N. machinery is said to be ideological. Decisions that are made in situations of conflict are made not on their own merit or following some objective impartial standard, but tend to be ideology-oriented. Each party tends to see the issue of conflict or peace in its own peculiar ideological way, to suit its own peculiar ideological ends. Hence there is not one peace they talk about, but many kinds of peace, each party having something else in mind. Needless to say, such ideological differences in outlook, have distorting effects and lead to confusion when peace-directed

actions are called for. They can thus seriously undermine the effectiveness of the U.N. peace keeping or peace making efforts, and in more extreme cases, render the machinery itself inoperative. It is significant that in this respect the U.N.O. has been charged with being a mere propaganda forum for certain nations, useful to some members for spreading their ideological message, but a poor instrument for arriving at genuine peace.

Fifthly, another major weakness of the U.N. machinery is the absence of well-defined and agreed-on international law procedures. There is no transactional law that would be acceptable to and binding on all governments. True, there is an International Court of Justice which adjudicates international disputes, but its authority is a strictly limited authority. It deals only with cases submitted to it on a voluntary basis and its decisions are not strictly obligatory on the parties of the dispute, for they cannot be enforced. This appears to reduce the mutual relationship in the U.N.O. to the good will of its members without any sound provisions as to how to handle those who disturb the peace. In practice, then, the U.N. may be strong as a moral force exerting restraining influence, but it is weak on the side of sanctions, incapable of preventing outbreaks of serious hostilities.

Sixthly, another weakness of the U.N. machinery is said to be due to its impersonality or vastness. There are obvious advantages in bringing so many nations together under one roof to cooperate, but the vastness of the organization is inevitably conducive to a dilution of mutual ties. An atmosphere of mutual trust can hardly be sustained with conviction when the vast majority of members can at best establish only superficial acquaintance. There is thus limited communication possible and with it limited genuine interest or cooperation. Even more, behind the facade of U.N. rhetoric advocating great principles of mankind, there is the old problem of how to express these general principles in the concrete terms of political reality. The nations that are not directly involved will try to talk the conflict out of existence rather than to provide a permanent solution to it. Not surprisingly collective security arrangements have been so far confined not to this body but to smaller region-oriented bodies. There is simply no trust in universal security arrangements because, again, the vastness of the organization precludes any definite idea about how these would work in practice. Such arrangements could only be vague in form and so unhelpful for definite anti-aggression actions. Conceivably they would

also pose the unpalatable prospect of having current U.N. difficulties magnified. As one writer has expressed this idea, such arrangements fail because "no government would be willing to commit itself beforehand to action against an unspecified aggressor," because "the potential aggressor might well have allies that would make action against it far from 'police action,' i.e., far from one-sided."⁸

Finally, there is another substantial weakness that cannot be written off lightly. This may be expressed by the charge frequently heard that the U.N.O. has failed on the side of idealism, that it stands for *status quo* political conditions, or at least that it is too static in its vastness and the diversity of interests involved in the organization, it would naturally tend to compromise solutions, to prevention of immediate conflicts rather than to take a more positive or active role in peace making or peace building. In this sense it is charged with being more negative than positive in its philosophy. Furthermore, it appears to regard its function terminated by ensuring for nations liberation from the slavery of colonialism. Yet, it is widely argued particularly by developing countries, that there are other forms of slavery than the former colonial forms and these are still to be overcome. The U.N. does not appear to be sufficiently alert in this respect. Ultimately, it seems, the idealism of U.N. is forgotten and in practice each nation plays its own peculiar game of pursuing its own self-interest. There appears a gap between the noble ideas of the organization and the actual performance. More specifically, developing nations are impatient to progress fast, to put the noble ideas such as concerning better material conditions of mankind in practice in their own lands. Yet they are frequently frustrated in their efforts by the interest of advanced nations which appears to be pulling in another direction. Hence political realism of the cruder kind, pure self-interest, becomes the norm of U.N. action and considerable disillusionment with the organization ensues. Needless to say, this reaction has an adverse effect on the image of the organization. It fails to provide a healthy and favorable climate for inter-state relations that are desirable for the solutions of their mutual problems, including problems of peace.

Our brief review of the major points of criticism frequently heard of the U.N. peace-keeping machinery reveals that not all is good and healthy with this machinery as it stands today. It is, of course, freely

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

admitted that no organization dealing with matters as complex as peace efforts can ever be perfect in its working, in the sense of being to the liking of all U.N. members. Still, it is clear that if the organization — and this perhaps applies to any organization — is to function as a truly workable and effective organization, its weaknesses must be identified and a remedy sought. In the next section, the authors set out a paradigm which, in their view, will remove some of the weaknesses that are present in the existing U.N. machinery.

Regional Associations; Positive Peace

The paradigm which the authors submit as a workable or realistic scheme of international peace, as a model for peace-keeping, peace-making, peace-building activities, follows closely the recommendations advanced in the argument on perceptions of peace. In sum, its aim is to strengthen positive peace and to approach the issue of peace through regions rather than through the existing machinery of peace. The authors are convinced that a scheme of peace based on positive peace and regions will overcome some of the constraints or weaknesses from which the existing machinery of peace appears to suffer. Furthermore, it will promote more meaningful, more gratifying relations among the nations of the world, particularly in the long run.

First then the value of a negative approach to peace will not be denied. Assuming, as we do, that conflict is a characteristic feature of social life and not necessarily bad, we cannot imagine a world without conflict. Hence some thinking in terms of deterrents or danger of major conflicts or war can never be eradicated from man's perceptions of peace altogether nor can we have institutional peace arrangements without it. What is important is not that negative peace perceptions and negatively operating machinery for peace persist but rather that they assume less importance and positive peace is strengthened. The two should in fact be complementary, both strong in their own right, with positive peace increasingly assuming more significance in people's (or nations') life. That is, if negative peace is unavoidable, as we maintain, then for it to be meaningful or operative, it should be based on a solid foundation of stable positive peace. We can perhaps sum up this particular view on the value of negative peace under three points: (1) The assumption that a condition of conflict always exists due to heterogeneity of interests, resources and values. (2) The idea of peace based on absence of collective violence cannot exist unless

there is peace-building, i.e., negative peace appears to logically presuppose some form of positive peace. (3) Negative peace cannot be lasting without some lasting support from positive peace.

Our idea of the role of negative peace in peace-making may be given pictorial representation, as suggested recently by a prominent Japanese political scientist.⁹ The relationship of positive peace and negative peace may be likened to an iceberg. Its submerged part is our positive peace, its mountain-like part floating above the water is our negative peace. Now it is clear that the floating part can never endure for long unless the submerged part is a solid and enduring mass of ice. On this analogy, effective negative peace exists only in the presence of stable positive peace. We can extend our analogy even further. We can contend that the floating part of the iceberg is crucial to the safety of navigation. Without that part acting as a visible warning, a sort of a light-house, peaceful sailing in turbulent waters would be a much more perilous enterprise. On the second analogy, we of course assume that there will always be some turbulence, some conflicts present. If so, complete absence of negative peace appears undesirable, for perfect (positive) peace is really beyond the reach of man.

The core of our paradigm for international peace is the concept of a regional associations. By "regional association" we mean an arrangement under which several states group themselves together to form a regional organization with the view of mutual cooperation for some common good to attain. They see more benefit in working together, in sharing their interests with other similar nations than in competing with one another or trying to solve their problems singly. Such a regional association is conceived as flexible in its structure, to involve no loss of sovereignty for participating countries, to operate on a voluntary basis, to accommodate even heterogeneous value systems. It may be added that regional associations in our sense are not strictly conceived as geographic entities, although countries from the same geographic region are more likely to be drawn in them, presumably by virtue of similar interests. What holds them rather together is the political will motivated by attempts at cooperation and a certain degree of rationality among the participating members rather than feelings of competition. A particular country may, incidentally, be a member of more than one regional association.

⁹ Prof. Kinhide Mushakoji's idea at the International Peace Academy (IPA) Seminar in Tokyo, July 1974.

Under the proposed regional arrangement it would be the regions themselves that would look after peace and conflict-resolution at least within the boundary of the region. It is envisaged that such concrete regional arrangements are likely to make peace efforts more effective, more workable in practice than the present arrangement through the agency of the United Nations. On this arrangement the member-states would have near exclusive monopoly over negative peace solutions, the U.N. machinery no more intervening with particular states. It would be on the states themselves to thresh out their differences and to apply such negative measures as could be applied without breaking the regional cooperation. In this way, it seems, both negative peace and positive peace would vastly be strengthened or made more effective. It may, for example, be predicted that the area of negative peace is likely to be reduced to manageable proportions, for with constant need of practical cooperation within the group of nations involved in the regional arrangement, negative measures are likely to be more effective and at the same time more limited in scope. There is likely to be a gradual reduction of mutual incompatibilities, less conflicting goals, attitudes and behavior, less likelihood of violence. Likewise positive peace is likely to be strengthened, for we may anticipate gradual development of common goals, common attitudes and behaviour, of a "community of interests," mutual concerns for regional stability as well as mutual concern in such general matters as economic progress, modernization and people's general welfare. We may note that the importance of negative peace would be gradually receding in the background, positive peace becoming the principal agent of regional peace-directed efforts.

More specifically, the new regional arrangement is likely to enhance the prospect of peace in the following major respects:¹⁰ (1) Regional cooperation will replace national competition. (2) With mutual cooperation present, mutual confidence in time will grow as against mutual distrust. (3) With growing mutual cooperation and confidence, a homogeneity of values on a number of important issues is likely to develop. Perceptions will become compatible. (4) In case of conflicts within regions themselves, intervention from outside will be avoided, as peace-keeping is done by associated members themselves. In this way intrusion of alien interests, goals or values will be prevented

¹⁰ Estrella D. Solidum, "Maintenance of International Peace and Security," paper delivered at the IPA Seminar in Tokyo, July 1974.

or minimized, and the danger of states becoming mere pawns of great powers such as through direct U.N. intervention will be avoided. (5) As all associate members are directly involved in decision making process about peace, their decisions are likely to carry more weight or legitimacy with parties in dispute. Presumably, the problem at issue will be given sufficient airing, so that the solution to it likely to be more than superficial, hence to be more acceptable even to disputing parties. (6) Peace-makers are selected by member-states and should therefore be more acceptable than outside agents of peace. Also, since they are consensually recognized, they should more likely succeed where imposed solutions may fail. (7) Because of their personal interest in regional stability, regional members are more vitally interested than countries not involved directly in keeping conflicts to sub-threshold violence. (8) Regional members know best what measures are appropriate for their common security arrangements.

Our paradigm is not confined, however, to mere regional arrangements. It is rather a two-tiered arrangement, a two-layer structure. On the bottom level, as we have seen we have regional associations. There is in addition the role played in peace efforts by the U.N.O. on a "higher" level. In short U.N. peace activity is complementary to our regional activity. Concretely, current practice of negative peace-keeping on the part of U.N.O. will be abandoned in favor of regional negative peace-keeping arrangement. The negative function of U.N. machinery will not be, however, abandoned altogether. It will rather change in form. It will be directed to inter-regional conflicts rather than interstate conflicts as it has been until now. In this way, many of the disadvantages of the existing U.N. machinery will be overcome, such as the danger of particular states being used as mere pawns by the great powers. It is envisaged that, by confining itself to regions, the U.N.O. will extricate itself from the unrewarding — and perhaps impossible — task which it has at present, namely, to act as a watchdog — policeman for maintaining peace in behalf of all independent countries of the world, and that it will assume what appears to be the more manageable part of becoming a mere referee or watchdog of peace among conflicting regions or camps. In this new role, the U.N.O. would then act essentially as an agent for preventing collective forms of violence among regional groupings, doing its best to prevent or settle military confrontations or violent wide-spread international conflicts. To settle these it could then use such conventional methods as nego-

tiations, mediation, intervention, summitry, rapprochement, brokerage, arms control, both methods of persuasion and of compulsion.

It may be added that the current U.N. positive peace efforts would remain unaffected by the proposed changed role of the U.N. machinery in matters of negative peace. That is in such areas as social, economic and cultural relations or development, the existing U.N. machinery would function as usual. The U.N.O. still remains the central international authority in these areas. It may indeed be contended that our new arrangement is likely to affect beneficially also our positive peace operations. It seems that under the existing arrangement questions of international development (positive peace) are frequently closely bound with the consideration of international security (negative peace), and so the various U.N. programs of assistance become open to political pressures and even to blackmail by the more powerful nations or blocs of nations. The proposed separations of positive and negative peace, at least on the level of states, should lessen such pressures, should make it possible for U.N. development to approach their task in a more objective way.

We may finally highlight another realistic aspect of our paradigm, namely, its flexibility. This may be contrasted with the existing U.N. machinery with its largely negative approach to peace-keeping, which appears by far too static in character. More fully, the paradigm is intended not only to state the conditions for future peace operations but also to suggest the way to such operations. It is our conviction that negative peace is costly in maintaining and that we should therefore devote less of our time and effort on negative peace, more on positive peace. Now our development toward positive peace may be expressed in terms of certain correlations.¹¹ Briefly, the reduction in negative peace is a correlate of the increase in positive peace. On this formula the area of positive peace becomes extended over a certain period of time with increased positive peace efforts, there will be a corresponding decrease in time in our negative peace efforts, or the need for such negative efforts. Thus our paradigm may be viewed as dynamic in character, as accommodating changes, and having a definite time-dimension.

It should be evident by now that the proposed scheme will vastly effect international peace-keeping efforts. Its general impact may be

¹¹ This is Nguyen Chi's proposed improvement on Estrella D. Solidum's paradigm for peace, *ibid.*

summarized under the following points. First, peace-keeping efforts will aim at regional arrangements rather than at universal arrangements as they do under the existing U.N. machinery. Second, regions will acquire a new importance in international peace-keeping operations. They will become the focus for dealing with inter-state problems, the principal agent for establishing conditions of political stability and international cooperation. Third, universal multi-polarization of value system is likely to arise, which should favorably affect peace-keeping operations, for this should lead to reduction of national incompatibilities and to better management of conflicts among nations at least within the same general value system. Fourth, decentralization of international conflicts will be made possible, which again should enhance the prospect of success of peace-keeping operations, for high level conflicts will presumably be decentralized into conflicts affecting only a relatively small part of the world — regions — which are more manageable. Moreover, all "outside" intervention will be removed when peaceful solutions are sought. Fifth, regional responsibilities recognized in the Articles of the U.N. Charter will be strengthened and this by itself should give more chance of success to region-originating peace-keeping efforts.

Reorientation

It should be evident by now that our scheme of peace differs in many significant respects from the vast majority of contemporary schemes, whether in the area of perceptions of peace or in the area of the machinery for peace-keeping arrangements. It implies a major reorientation in our perceptions of international peace as well as certain structural changes in the existing peace-keeping organizations. It challenges some of the time-honored notions or beliefs about peace — what we mean by peace and how to go about securing peace. Even more, it is an implied call to loosen the grip over our imagination of some of the old notions of peace, to exorcise from our minds what Bacon has called the "idols of thought," that is those beliefs that have lost their vitality or are of limited practical usefulness today. This call is directed particularly to scholars and practitioners of politics concerned with peace. In this concluding section, we shall briefly suggest which of the old notions or ideas will have to be vastly modified, if not abandoned altogether, if our scheme is to apply, as well as what new notions or ideas we propose to put in their place.

The first notion that may have to be vastly modified, if not abandoned altogether, is the notion of peace itself as it is generally understood today. Our region-oriented scheme appears to directly challenge the near universally accepted belief that peace to be sought is "indivisible peace," *i.e.*, that there is something like one grand state of peace fitting for all mankind. Such a belief goes against the grain of our argument. Our scheme implies instead decentralization of peace-keeping and peace-making operations. It is contended that the most productive approach to conflict-resolutions or establishing peace is not by way of "universal" arrangements but rather by way of "regional" arrangements. We should not try to solve problems of peace on a world-wide basis but rather in pieces or parts, on a regional basis. Our approach, then, is not a universal scheme of peace but rather, what may be called, "peace by regions," "peace by pieces," "peace by parts." We believe in the wisdom of "dividing" peace, in "divisibility" of international peace. We advocate a "divisible peace" for mankind in place of the prevailing idea of "indivisible peace."

Our idea of a divisible peace may be illustrated by an analogy. We may think of our conflict or peace-solving operations on the analogy a jigsaw puzzle game.¹² In this game every piece represents a small conflict situation to be resolved. This in its turn may be regarded as an indicator — a warning signal — of other conflicts to come, of potentially bigger conflicts. Likewise, in our game of international life, we may regard every situation of conflict as part of a potentially much bigger conflict situation. It is, of course, in our interest to prevent such bigger conflicts from arising. Now to stop such potential conflicts we must *not* try to complete our jigsaw puzzle game (unlike in the real game), for if we allowed the jigsaw pieces to accumulate, we would in effect magnify our conflict situations, having conceivably a situation of a total conflict at hand, which might be impossible to handle. We should rather proceed with caution, solving one conflict after another, as they arise. We should, that is, "decentralize" our conflicts, treat them in relative isolation. Our real aim is to remove particular conflict-situations from the potential for bigger conflicts, from situations that might lead to a total conflict.

Another habit of thought that, on our scheme, may have to be corrected or expurgated is the current habit of undue idealizations and

¹²Somsakdi Xuto, "Emerging Conflicts in Southeast Asia," paper delivered at the IPA Seminar in Tokyo, July 1974.

generalizations about peace. This is a habit widely practiced by perhaps most modern men and is particularly dear to liberal traditions of thought, which implies an optimistic belief that a state of a perfectly rational — perfectly peaceful — world, where all conflicts among men and among nations will be terminated, is conceivable and possible of achieving. This belief is reflected in the terminology of most of our contemporary peace-talk, whether by the general public or by scholars or even practitioners of political life. It is reflected in such expressions as “universal peace”, “indivisible peace” mentioned above, Rousseau’s “perpetual peace”; Kant’s “eternal peace” or in the expression “durable” or “enduring” peace, favorite, it seems with American political leaders, such as Wilson, Roosevelt and more recently Ford. Now our scheme places the validity of such ideas of peace in question. It has been contended that such highly generalized notions lack empirical content or objective reference, that they are weak as useful operation principles or at best of limited usefulness for actual peace-directed actions. Moreover, we have also contended that they tend to distort our perceptions of peace, to give rise to confusion and so to false hopes about peace. In this sense our scheme is a plea for a more concrete, more operationally effective approach to peace, a plea in behalf of return to more empirically-oriented treatment of peace.

Our region-oriented scheme may lead us to abandon also another “idol” of modern thought concerning peace. This is the assumption which appears to lie under the existing machinery of the United Nations Organization, that peace-keeping or peace-making should be supervised¹ from above such as by the great powers sitting in the Security Council, presumably acting in behalf of potentially unruly nations. The emphasis here appears to be on peace-keeping activities being initiated or conducted from above, the great powers playing the role of international policeman or “impartial” game referees. The present scheme rejects this approach. It regards itself as a more democratic scheme, more in line with the current self-confidence of all nations. It implies an approach to peace from the bottom rather than from the top. It stresses real agreement among nations involved in the scheme, consensual action on at least certain minimal conditions such as mutual stability, cooperation and social progress. It emphasizes the presence of concrete results. By enlisting the participation of all parties concerned, the scheme may be said to practice a democratization of politics on an inter-national scale.

It may be added that our region-oriented scheme of peace is not intended to exclude, nor to render invalid, the idea of universal peace altogether. Its aim is rather to throw light on a workable path toward peace-making. Thus we may start with the "piece" of our regional peace, where peace becomes in time a property of the nations concerned deeply felt and then we extend our peace more universally. A possible analogy can be made between our notion of peace and the Confucian notion of human affection. This is a graduated affair starting with the family until it becomes extended to all mankind. In the end the universal state is likened to one large family in which all men are bound together by the bond of mutual affection. Likewise, our idea of peace is a graduated peace, from parts to the whole. It is to be a peace established on the solid ground of regional loyalties and interests, to lead ultimately to a world-wide network of common loyalties and interests of nations.

THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: CHINA COMMITMENTS AND LOCAL ASSIMILATION

LLEWELLYN D. HOWELL, JR.

Introduction

A topic which has occupied considerable attention since Southeast Asian states have begun striving for some form of internal national integration is the adaptation of Chinese sub-populations to the existing and usually dominant cultures of the region. The Chinese have generally been seen as outsiders and have been the subject of various forms of discrimination. Many Chinese have either chosen to respond to discrimination by simply remaining aloof from local culture or have overtly resisted integration on their own, perhaps generating some of the criticism which seems to characterize an anti-Chinese prejudice.

Given the importance of the topic, and if one wishes to concern oneself with the relations of Chinese sub-populations in Southeast Asia with the various indigenous groups,¹ one is concerned with measurement and evaluation of their integration or assimilation by some empirical criteria. Among the criteria used in the past have been the degrees of open conflict between Chinese populations and various groups claiming priorities of culture, religion, or language. Such conflict between Chinese sub-populations and previously dominant Malay groupings in Malaysia and Singapore, for example, has been quite conspicuous in recent years.² Much of the antagonism which became manifest in the events surrounding the 1965 coup attempt in Indonesia seemed to be a reflection of underlying Malay-Chinese disrespect and mutual fear rather than a consequence of the coup attempt itself or even China's involvement in it. Such conflict could be considered to be an indication of limited integration.

¹ The term "indigenous" is used to represent the major group present in the country when the primary Chinese immigration occurred. Most groups are known to have migrated into the region at one time or another, including those now referred to as indigenous.

² See Cynthia H. Enloe, "Issues and Integration in Malaysia," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XLI, No. 1 (Spring 1968), pp. 372-385.

At the other end of the conflict spectrum, little has been heard of Chinese conflict with the dominant groups of the Philippines or Thailand. In fact, the contrary seems to be the case. Observers note the relative passivity of the Chinese populations in those states (at least a lack of open conflict) and their high degree of participation in national society.³ Thus, a range of assimilation might be established according to the conflict criteria, with Malaysia at one end of the spectrum and Thailand and the Philippines at the other.

A violence indicator, however, would appear to be a rather gross characterization of divisions within the region and may well be a consequence of other types of relationships between the groups not specifically related to political or social integration. Other forms of commitment have been suggested as indicators of assimilation for the groups with which we are here concerned. One of these has been the question of loyalty to China,⁴ which has been of interest to scholars of overseas Chinese affairs for many years and in fact has become even more pertinent and useful in the years since 1949.

Given the revolutionary ethic of the Chinese government during most of the recent period and the growth of Southeast Asian Chinese populations, governments and peoples of the region have continued to look upon the local Chinese citizens and residents with considerable suspicion. Being a culture apart, the Chinese are often viewed, too, a "solid" group, impenetrable by non-Chinese, and, as William Willmott has pointed out, it is all too easily assumed that the solid block of Chinese tend to favor recent development in China or could all be brought to toe the line of that particular government.⁵

While some observers have either indicated a division among overseas Chinese according to class⁶ or have noted the possibility that

³ G. William Skinner, "The Thailand Chinese: Assimilation in a Changing Society," *Asia*, Vol. 2 (Autumn 1964), pp. 80-92.

⁴ See, for example, C.P. FitzGerald, *The Third China*, (Singapore: Donald Moore Press, Ltd., 1969), Chapter 3 and 4, and Robert O. Tilman, "Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines," in Wayne, Wilcox, Leo E. Rose, and Gavin Boyd, eds., *Asia and the International System*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, 1972), pp. 222-223.

⁵ William E. Willmott, "The Overseas Chinese Today and Tomorrow," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XLIII, No. 2 (Summer 1969), p. 210.

⁶ For a Marxist view of the Southeast Asian Chinese, see N. A. Simoniya, "Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia — A Russian Study," Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, Data Paper Number 45, December, 1961.

Overseas Chinese are fundamentally pro-Overseas Chinese,⁷ we remain without relevant data as to the direction or degree of commitment of Southeast Asian Chinese. Moreover, even the question of the utility of "China commitments" as an indicator of assimilation remains to be answered.

This paper presents a discussion of some recent data gathered through survey research in Southeast Asia which is directed at these questions and subsequently at the topic of Chinese integration into the various cultures of Southeast Asia. Two separate indicators of identity have been generated in this study. One is a direct measure of attitudinal commitment to China and the Chinese of China; the second is a degree of compatibility between attitudes of Southeast Asian Chinese and their respective indigenous groups. The first acts as an indicator of "China commitment" and the second an indicator of assimilation.

Method and Sample

Before proceeding to an analysis of the data, it is first necessary to provide some information on the methods by which the data were gathered and the nature of the respondent groups involved in the study. The data were gathered in 1970-71 through administration of two attitude tests: one of these refers to a social context and one to a political context. The tests were both of a "Bogardus" type,⁸ with five-point scales enabling respondents to evaluate and rate 27 nationalities in a social distance context and 27 corresponding countries in a political context.

⁷ See Lea E. Williams, *The Future of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 21.

⁸ See Emory S. Bogardus, *Social Distance*, Antioch Press, 1959. For a brief description in the context of other attitude tests, see Earl R. Babbie, *Survey Research Methods*, Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1973, Chapter 14; other social distance studies which relate to Southeast Asia include Chester L. Hunt, "Social Distance in the Philippines," *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (March-April 1956), pp. 253-260; Donald O. Cowgill, "Social Distance in Thailand," *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (July 1968), pp. 363-376; and Joe Khatena, "Relative Integration of Selected Ethnic Groups in Singapore," *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol. 54, No. 4 (July 1970), pp. 460-465. Forthcoming is Llewellyn D. Howell, Jr., "Attitudinal Distance in Southeast Asia: Social and Political Ingredients in Integration," *Southeast Asia*, Vol. II. 4.

While the structure of the two tests did not vary, the context was distinguished by providing reference statements for each of the points in the scale which were taken from the situational context. For example, in the social context statements such as (1) "I would be willing to marry a person from this group," (2) "I would be willing to have a person from this group as a close friend," etc. were used, with target groups being evaluated by the respondent as he gave them a "check-off score of 1 ("close") ranging to 5 ("distant"). In the evaluations of countries, which I have termed "Political," the context was altered by altering the statements used to represent each category. These now indicated degrees of suggested closeness between the respondent's nation-state and other states of the region. For example, (1) was "I would like to see this country and mine joined politically," and (5) "I would like to see no cooperation with this country whatsoever." Sequential statements in both tests thus represent increasingly more distant relationships either of social or international political nature.

The two tests and a questionnaire were administered in the language of the institution from which the respondents were drawn. Available versions included English, Thai, Bahasa Malaysia, Bahasa Indonesia, and Chinese. The respondents included more than 2500 university or college-level students from the five countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).⁹ Of these returned questionnaires, 2131 were usable and these provide the primary source of data on attitudes discussed in this paper.¹⁰

The total number of respondents was broken down into a listing of nineteen groups for which evaluation scores have been determined in the two contexts. These groups were distinguished by four basic criteria: nationality (citizenship), ethnicity, religion, and language of education. Table 1 provides a listing of the nineteen groups, their

⁹ ASEAN members are the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia.

¹⁰ Where possible, respondents were drawn from different sections of the country or from varying types of universities in an attempt to obtain something of a representative sample. For a more complete description of the data derivation process and the sample, see Llewellyn D. Howell, Jr. "Regional Accomodation in Southeast Asia: A Study of Attitudinal Compatibility and Distance" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Syracuse University International Relations Program, 1973).

characteristics, and abbreviations for each group which will be used in subsequent tables and discussion.¹¹

TABLE 1

NINETEEN GROUPS INVOLVED IN ATTITUDE PATTERN ORIGATION			
Type	Group Description	N	Code
	Indonesian Malays, Muslims*	213	INMA
	Indonesian Javanese, Muslims	103	INJA
	Singapore Malays in Malay Schools, Muslims	109	SPMA
<i>Muslims</i>	Malaysia Malays in Malay Schools, Muslims	98	MMMM
	Malaysia Malays in English Schools, Muslims	123	MMME
	Malaysia Chinese in English Schools, Christians	39	MCHE
	Malaysia Chinese in English Schools, Chinese Religions	200	MCRE
	Singapore Chinese in English Schools, Christians	89	SCHE
<i>Chinese</i>	Singapore Chinese in English Schools, Chinese Religions	56	SCRE
	Singapore Chinese In Chinese Schools, Chinese Religions	86	SCRC
	Singapore Chinese in Chinese Schools, Christians	12	SCHC
	Indonesian Chinese, Chinese Religions	36	INCH
	Thailand Chinese, Chinese Religions	42	THCH
	Philippines Chinese, Chinese Religions and Christians	40	FICH
	Thailand Thais, Buddhists	162	THAI
	Philippines Filipinos	371	FILS
<i>Others</i>	Philippines Mixed	77	FIMX
	Malaysia Indians	37	MINE
	Singapore Indians	10	SINE
		1903**	

¹¹ A complete listing of all social and political distance mean scores are available from the author.

* Despite the fact that narrower ethnic choices were offered to all Indonesian students (Minangkabau, Batak, for example) most of the students in Palembang, Sumatra chose the broader term 'Malay' to describe themselves. Only 8 students encountered in Java described themselves as Malay. Most instead chose 'Javanese.'

** Missing from this portion of the sample (causing the disparity between this figure and the total of usable questionnaires derived) are those who classified themselves in some way other than in these groups or who did not give the necessary information for classification.

Results and Discussion

Let me deal with the elements of analysis in the following order: first, I will discuss the results as related to the concept of "commitment" of the Chinese groups in this sample to the Chinese of China and Taiwan and to the nation-states of China and Taiwan; secondly, I will deal with the relative degrees of "assimilation" as operationalized and defined by common — or more appropriately, similar — attitudes between Chinese sub-populations and other sub-populations as provided in the social and political distance scores. Thirdly, I will deal with the relationship between the two concepts: commitments to China and/or Taiwan (people or state) as they vary with attitudinal assimilation.

In order to structure the analysis and give meaning to the discussion of results, let me pose the following propositions to be tested as a result of this study (i.e., part three above):

1. As the extent of commitment to Chinese from China increases among Chinese sub-populations in Southeast Asia, their degree of social attitudinal assimilation within their countries of residence declines.
2. As the extent of commitment to Chinese from Taiwan increases among Chinese sub-population in Southeast Asia, their degree of social attitudinal assimilation within their countries of residence declines.
3. As the extent of commitment to China increases among Chinese sub-populations in Southeast Asia, their degree of political attitudinal assimilation within their countries of residence declines.
4. As the extent of commitment to Taiwan increases among Chinese sub-populations in Southeast Asia, their degree of political attitudinal assimilation within their countries of residence declines.

a) *Strength of Commitment.*

The relative commitment of the Chinese groups in this study toward the Chinese of China and Taiwan and the states of China and Taiwan are provided in rank order in Table 2. These are mean scores for whole groups with scores closer to one (1) indicating a greater expression of commitment and scores closer to five (5) representing increasingly less commitment. The mean scores are of interest and will be discussed, but the ranks act as the indicators of relative commitment for purposes of hypothesis testing.

TABLE 2

RELATIVE GROUP COMMITMENT TO THE CHINESE AND CHINA

SOCIAL DISTANCE				
<i>China-Chinese</i>			<i>Taiwan-Chinese</i>	
Group	Score		Group	Score
SCRC	1.65	High	MCRE	1.74
MCRE	1.90		SCHC	1.75
SCHC	2.00		MCHE	1.78
SCRE	2.17		FICH	1.79
MCHE	2.25		SCRC	1.84
SCHE	2.59		SCRE	1.89
INCH	2.61		THCH	1.91
FICH	3.00		SCHE	2.15
THCH	3.00	Low	INCH	2.75
POLITICAL DISTANCE				
<i>China</i>			<i>Taiwan</i>	
Group	Score		Group	Score
SCRC	1.87	High	THCH	1.95
MCRE	2.38		FICH	2.14
SCRE	2.78		INCH	2.44
MCHE	2.82		SCRC	2.51
FICH	2.92		MCRE	2.54
SCHC	2.92		MCHE	2.56
INCH	3.28		SCRE	2.77
SCHE	3.38		SCHE	2.85
THCH	3.40	Low	SCHC	3.08

It is important to note both variation within compared rankings (e.g. the ranking for commitment of the groups toward China-Chinese as compared to Taiwan-Chinese) as well as variation between the two contexts. Let us examine briefly the social context commitment indicators. Little surprise should be generated by the order of responding groups in social distance expression. The Singapore Chinese who practice religions traditionally associated with the Chinese¹² and who are being educated in Mandarin, and who are therefore presumably more strongly imbued with Chinese culture, indicate the greatest affinity for

¹² Various responses were included here: Buddhist, Taoist, "traditional" religion, etc. Christians were not included in this category nor were the very few Chinese who identified themselves as Muslims.

the Chinese of China. Close behind are the non-Christian Chinese of Malaysia and the Christian Chinese of Singapore who are being educated in Chinese language schools. For both groups, one element of Chinese socialization — either religion or education — remains as a part of their environment.

Following are three more groups of Malaysian and Singapore Chinese who are products of the Western-oriented English language school system. Noteworthy is the fact that Malaysian and Singapore Chinese comprise the first section of this list, then to be followed by Indonesian, Philippines, and Thailand Chinese, in that order, as the least committed.

The following observations would be in order regarding the general description of this indicator. It would appear that the question of reinforcement is of importance to the establishment of relative degrees of commitment. If one is both oriented toward the traditional Chinese religious practices and educated outside of the Western context of the English language schools, the likelihood of some retention of commitment to the Chinese is established. If one of the elements, either religion or type of education, remains "Chinese," a greater degree of commitment is also maintained that would be the case if both were absent.¹³

However, as one moves away from both the religious and educational bases of Chinese culture, the degree of commitment seems to slowly lessen. This is true particularly for the Malaysian and Singapore Chinese. As nationality moves away from Malaysia and Singapore, commitments likewise appear to lessen. In the cases of the Indonesian, Philippine, and Thailand Chinese the degree of apparent commitment declines in seeming conjunction with the decline in opposition between religious groups. That is, more conflict is known to have been generated between Muslims and Chinese (both Malaysia and Indonesia) than between Christians and Chinese (Philippines), with none between Buddhist and Chinese (Thailand).¹⁴ This may lead to eventual conclusions regarding the impact of specific variables — religion es-

¹³ The question of causality, however, has not been dealt with effectively and cannot be answered with this data alone. Strong commitment may bring about an interest in maintaining a separate cultural identity. We can only establish that the strong commitments to the Chinese and Chinese religious and educational characteristics covary.

¹⁴ See Skinner, *op cit.*, Richard J. Coughlin *Double Identity: The Chinese and Modern Thailand* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), Chapter 5, esp. p. 92.

pecially — on assimilation but for the moment remains simply a characteristic of this particular list.

Turning to the degree of commitment to the Taiwan Chinese, several characteristics of the ranking are of note. First, it is important to consider that in most cases the scores generated by the target group of Taiwan Chinese are considerably lower than those generated by Chinese from China. Only two groups demonstrate a greater commitment to Chinese from China than to Taiwan Chinese: (1) the Singapore, Chinese-religion, Chinese-educated, and (2) the Indonesian Chinese. Both the Philippine Chinese and the Thailand Chinese show great and almost “classic” distinctions between their expressed commitments, with sympathies clearly being on the side of the Taiwan Chinese. Important, too, is the notable variation in ranking of the groups, with characteristics of Chinese religion and education being less of defining factors in determination of the strength of commitments. Further variation can be gleaned by the reader along with further specific analysis. Suffice it to note at this point that expressed commitments to Taiwan Chinese are less extreme than those for China Chinese and the order of the groups has changed perceptibly.

Placed in an international political context, the “China” scores generated by the groups do not develop into a particularly different pattern than did those for the Chinese of China. Singapore’s Chinese-educated, non-Christian remain as the group indicating the closest relationship to China, as they did in the social context. Philippine, Indonesian, and Thailand Chinese again fall in the more distant part of the list. A significant alteration in position is noted for the English-educated. Christian Chinese from Singapore who are found to have a relatively limited degree of commitment to China particularly when compared to their fellow citizens from the Chinese language stream. One might compare the magnitude of these political distance scores to those of social distance. The mean scores in political distance are considerably higher, indicating less commitment in the political realm than is demonstrable in the social realm.¹⁵

In political distance scores for Taiwan, one finds an almost complete reversal of order. Now the Thailand, Philippine, and Indone-

¹⁵ This, however, is a characteristic of almost all groups surveyed in the data collection effort. Expression of social union was easier to make than an expression of political union.

sian Chinese indicate the greater relative commitment to Taiwan, whereas the Chinese of Malaysia and Singapore indicate considerably lower levels of commitment. A contrast in direction of identity between the two Chinas has at last become evident.

Broadly generalizing, it appears from the political distance rankings that the Chinese sub-populations of Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia are considerably more sympathetic to Taiwan, whereas the Chinese groups of Malaysia and Singapore demonstrate a slightly greater commitment to China itself. Moreover, the existence of religious characteristics which are associated with Chinese culture or a Chinese education among the Singapore-Malaysia groups seems to facilitate expression of greater commitment to China.

In sum, then, these tables indicate that there are quite widely varying degrees of commitment to the Chinese of either China or Taiwan, and to the two countries of China and Taiwan. The wide variation in scores establishes for us that generalizations regarding "all" Southeast Asian Chinese would be very inappropriate. The table also establishes that there may be some impact of Chinese education and the retention of traditional Chinese religious beliefs in deriving and maintaining some commitment to either China or Taiwan or both. Also established is the relative lack of commitment by Chinese of the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia to China in particular, and a lack of relationship between social commitment to the Chinese and political commitment to the nation-state systems under which the target Chinese groups live.

b) *Assimilation.*

Let us now turn to our second type of indicator. Tables 3 and 4 provide Pearson correlation matrices for social and political distance respectively. Each score represents the degree of covariance (i.e. similarity) between the entire pattern of mean scores for any one group as it relates to any other group.¹⁶ From these matrices I have extracted the particular correlations of the various Chinese sub-populations and

¹⁶ A correlation coefficient is a numerical representation of the strength of prediction between two variables (in this case patterns of attitude expression). On a scale of -1.00 to 1.00, the negative figures represent an inverse relationship, the positive a direct relationship, with coefficients approaching one indicating more perfect relationships. Coefficients approaching .00 are considered to indicate no correlation or relationship.

the major indigenous sub-populations¹⁷ for the two contexts. Tables 5 and 6 provide a ranking of the assimilation or compatibility indicators.¹⁸ That is, those dyads of indigenous and Chinese populations which are listed close to the top of the list, which have correlations closer to 1,000 are considered to be more similar and thus more integrated. Where attitude patterns expressed either in the social context or in the political context are approaching identity, we might assume that a source of possible conflict is removed and assimilation has occurred.¹⁹

Quickly summarizing Table 5, which relates to social attitude compatibility, the important characteristics of the ranking are as follows: first, the now familiar grouping of three appears at the top of the compatibility list — Thailand, Philippine and Indonesian Chinese. Philippine and Thailand Chinese in particular have high compatibility scores (.89 and .85 respectively). The scores of the next seven groups decline in a rather regular fashion, then drop off significantly to the final score in the ranking, a low .21 for the SCRC-Singapore Malays. The latter would indicate little, if any, similarity between the attitude patterns of these two groups.

In Table 6, the international political attitude scores and ranking indicate little change from those provided in the social context. While the order is changed somewhat, the basic pattern within the grouping remains the same. Thailand and Philippine Chinese are again in the top ranks with scores significantly above those of the remaining paired groups. In a middle category, we find the same basic grouping as was

¹⁷ The choice was made according to what the author perceived to be the group projecting the primary national image. The choice of English-educated Malays rather than Malay-educated Malays, in particular, is one that can be questioned. The choices are indicated in Tables 5 and 6.

¹⁸ Assimilation, of course, entails considerably more than having similar attitude patterns. While "compatibility" is the better term, such attitude similarities would likely represent considerable interaction between the groups and exposure to similar experiences. True assimilation is therefore likely to accompany the compatibility expressed here.

¹⁹ As Jacob and Teune have indicated, "Similarity in peoples's expressions of social distance toward one another and toward persons and groups outside their community is taken as evidence of a feeling of social homogeneity . . . The closer the readiness to associate, the stronger the presumption of political cohesion within the community." Philip Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community," in Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds., *The Integration of Political Communities* (New York, Lippincott, 1964), p. 19.

TABLE 5
RANKED CORRELATIONS OF CHINESE AND
INDIGENOUS GROUP SOCIAL ATTITUDES

Chinese Group	Indigenous Group	Score	Rank
FICH	FILS	.89	1
THCH	THAI	.85	2
INCH	INJA	.55	3
SCHE	SPMA	.45	4
SCRE	SPMA	.42	5
SCHC	SPMA	.32	6
MCHE	MMME	.30	7
MCRE	MMME	.24	8
SCRC	SPMA	.21	9

TABLE 6
RANKED CORRELATIONS OF CHINESE AND INDIGENOUS
GROUP INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ATTITUDES

Chinese Group	Indigenous Group	Score	Rank
THCH	THAI	.93	1
FICH	FILS	.92	2
INCH	INJA	.76	3
SCRE	SPMA	.72	4
SCHE	SPMA	.71	5
MCHE	MMME	.65	6
SCHE	SPMA	.58	7
MCRE	MMME	.52	8
SCRC	SPMA	.25	9

found with the social distance scores. Last in the list, again, are the Singapore, Chinese-religion, Chinese-educated respondents.²⁰

In contrast to the degree of commitment to China, we find that in Tables 5 and 6 the general level of compatibility, as compared to commitment, is somewhat reduced — although in a uniform fashion —

²⁰ If we had included dyads for Malaysia involving the Malay-educated Malays as the indigenous group, their compatibility with Malaysian Chinese groups would be even lower, reminding us of the two sided nature of these scores. Particularly for Malaysia, the question of Western and Asian (in this case Malay) educational emphasis is important in the determination of the national culture into which the Chinese are being presumably assimilated.

in the case of political attitudes. For all groups, greater political compatibility is indicated than for social attitude compatibility.

Table 7 provides a summary means of comparing the social distance and political distance commitments to the level of attitudinal compatibility and provides a test of the propositions given above. These scores were derived by correlating the rank order of groups as they appear in Table 2 with the rank order of the same groups as they appear in Tables 5 and 6.²¹

TABLE 7
RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS FOR CHINA
COMMITMENTS AND ATTITUDINAL COMPATIBILITY (N=9)

Proposition	Target	Context	Correlation	Significant at .05
1	China Chinese	Political	-.94	Yes
2	Taiwan Chinese	Political	-.57	No
3	China	Social	-.79	Yes
4	Taiwan	Social	.45	No

c) *Propositional Tests*

The scores in Table 7 represent the relationship between commitment to China and what we have referred to as the assimilation indicators — i.e. attitudinal similarity as expressed in the data employed in this study. Of the two correlations which are significant, we find that both are highly negative. That is, as the degree of commitment to China or the Chinese of China increases, the similarity in attitude pattern with the indigenous group decreases (a confirmation of propositions 1 and 3). While the negative relationship is high for both social and political distance, it is of worth to note that the correlation is somewhat more extreme, and near perfect, for political distance.

Although the propositions relating to Taiwan and Taiwan Chinese are not confirmed, it is of theoretical value to consider the relatively high correlations (for social science) and particularly the positive score for proposition 2, which provides a convincing disconfirmation of that proposition and suggests that the opposite may be true.

²¹ Using Spearman's rho.

Conclusion

In summary, then, we have reached the following conclusions: first, from table interpretation we find that *Thailand and Philippine Chinese have and demonstrate the least commitment to the Chinese of China itself and have the greatest similarity to attitude patterns of their own respective indigenous groups.* For Thailand Chinese, this is a confirmation of a commonly held hypothesis on Chinese-Thai integration²² and support for the assimilation policies pursued by the Thailand government. Despite a reported "anti-Chinese" sentiment in the Philippines, there has been considerable Chinese-Filipino social, educational and marital intermixture and we can confirm a high level of attitudinal integration, at least, of Philippines Chinese and Filipinos.²³

Indonesian Chinese are close behind in this limitation of commitment to China and degree of similarity to attitude patterns of Japanese. As with the case of the Philippines Chinese, this may be partly reflective of the sample. The Chinese respondents were studying in an integrated social and language situation. This linkage between educational context and attitudinal similarity is important, however.

Secondly, *the Chinese of Malaysia and Singapore indicate a considerably greater commitment to China than do the three above mentioned groups and, with some variation, lower compatibility with the attitude patterns of their respective indigenous groups.* In both countries the size of the Chinese cultural community is large and this may have assisted in the maintenance of a "China identity." Singapore still maintains a complete Chinese educational system, including the respected Nanyang University. Chinese education in Malaysia is now being limited but may still have had its impact in the recent past on the attitudinal development of today's college-level students.²⁴

²² See Ken Turner, "The Overseas Chinese of South East Asia: National Integration and Alien Minorities," in Roger Scott, ed. *The Politics of New States*, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970, pp. 97-102; and David W. Chang, "Current Status of Chinese Minorities in Southeast Asia," *Asian Survey* Vol. XIII No. 6 (June 1973), pp. 591-2, 598.

²³ The reader should be reminded that the Philippines Chinese in this sample were in the English language educational system. However, this is certainly partly a result of Philippine governmental policy regarding limitation of Chinese education. See Chang, *op. cit.*, pp. 594-5.

²⁴ Nevertheless, the young are likely to be more forward thinking and concerned with local integration than their elders. See Chang, *op. cit.*, p. 596.

Thirdly, *among the Singapore and Malaysian Chinese, as the influence of Chinese religions or Chinese education, the expressed commitment to China increases and the compatibility with the indigenous groups appears to diminish.* This conclusion is supportive of attempts by local governments to affect the manipulable variable of these two, Chinese education. Chinese students studying in English in Malaysia and Singapore, where students studying in English in Malaysia and Singapore, where they also intermix with students from other ethnic groups, demonstrate a distinctly higher level of attitudinal integration than those studying in the Chinese language.²⁵

These results provide empirical support for the proposition that *there is a relationship between the retention of ties with China and the ability to assimilate with or be absorbed by national cultures in Southeast Asia.* Some Southeast Asian Chinese groups do retain a strong identity with China but, clearly some do not. And those that do not appear to be much further along the way toward integration with the broader population of the Southeast Asian states in which these Chinese sub-populations reside.

While these results are interesting and useful, the reader should be cautioned that although the sample is representative in many respects, in one it is not. All respondents were university or college level students, and while the Chinese often have a greater percentage of educational enrollments than is merited by their percentage in the population alone, these respondents may not accurately represent the attitudes of the Chinese population at large.²⁶ The results do, however, give a good picture of attitude patterns and the assimilating capabilities of tomorrow's elites and these are likely to be in directions which the larger Chinese populations will follow.

²⁵ As a unique approach to maintaining language priorities but also bringing about social intermixture of students, Singapore's National Junior College offers a curriculum in both English and Mandarin.

²⁶ Similarly, attitudes of more distinct elites may be not fully representative. A completely random sample of the entire Southeast Asian Chinese population is virtually impossible to obtain.

**CHINA'S DIPLOMACY THROUGH ART:
A DISCUSSION ON SOME OF THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL
AND ART FINDS IN THE PEOPLES'
REPUBLIC OF CHINA***

AURORA ROXAS - LIM

For over two decades the Peoples' Republic of China was isolated from most of the world. It was an isolation that was even more intensified by the raging hostility between her and her former ally the USSR. The situation began to change in the late sixties and seventies when attitudes and relations throughout the world have eroded most of the barriers that kept China apart. Hence when she finally took her seat in the UN in 1971, it was already a long anticipated fact. From China's point-of-view, her entry into the UN was the culmination of a long, period of introspection, of laborious internal preparations for her final re-emergence in international diplomacy. Indeed it can be said that China put to good account her forced isolation from most of the world by carrying out fundamental reforms called "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." In conjunction with these reforms, total re-examination of China's national heritage was carried out that entailed systematic investigations into all aspects of her past including that of archaeology and the history of art. These investigations carried out even during the most turbulent period of the Cultural Revolution bear witness to the great pains the Chinese took to make the past meaningful to the present.

It is therefore understandable that among the avenues taken by China to conduct international relations, she preferred not only that of sports (in which the Philippines participated in the exchange of bas-

* I am indebted to Dr. R. Santos Cuyugan, Chancellor of the PCAS and Mr. and Mrs. Luis Teodoro, Jr., recent visitors to China for providing pictures for this article and for the display at the PCAS library. I am also grateful to the PCAS Librarian, Mrs. Violeta Encarnacion and her staff for helping me gather materials needed for the preparation of this study.

Likewise, I wish to thank Mr. Tang T'ien-ts'in who translated all the Japanese and Chinese texts used in this study.

ketball teams) but the exhibition of archaeological and art objects. Although contrasting techniques, sports and art have much in common in the profound sense that China has put them to use. Sports and art are forms of human endeavour that can stand up to close scrutiny in spite of cultural and political differences; where an error or a slip and mediocrity cannot be disguised. By the same token the stamp of excellence whenever present is unmistakably observable. Still these two types of diplomacy served different purposes. Sports can be seen as a kind of cautious probing of Chinese capacity in *pakikipagkapuwatao*, in the give-and-take of person-to-person contacts. It is an avenue explored as much to receive and make the best impression on foreigners. The second strategy, the exhibition of art objects marks the more confident phase of Chinese diplomacy. Fittingly close to traditional practice of Imperial China since the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. to 220 A.D.), it is a one-way traffic in generosity. China sending gifts to friendly lands: silk, lacquer, bronzes, ceramics, art forms where China enjoys unquestioned pre-eminence.

But we must not overlook another noteworthy aspect of this strategy of diplomacy through art. The exhibits were sent to Paris and London, two European cities where there is a most discerning cosmopolitan audience for art and whose museums such as the Musée Guimet, the Cernuschi and the British Museum to name just a few, draw their greatest pride on their collections of Chinese art. Moreover, these two cities harbor the largest congregation of art scholars, dealers, orientalists, artists and other cognoscenti whose fortunes and careers rest on the continuous flow of things Oriental. The message clearly spelled out is that the Peoples' Republic of China has temporarily put a stop to the smuggling of her ancient art treasures. And so as China rejoins the community of nations in the UN and comes out to play on equal footing as a contender in sports, she also emerges to reap the admiration of the world by exhibiting her art.

The exhibits displayed at the Petit Palais in Paris and at the Burlington House in London from the fall of 1973 to January, 1974 comprise a small selection (385 items) of thousands of art and archaeological objects excavated from 1949 to about 1970. The total number of items displayed were small but since they were obtained under scientifically controlled conditions, they provide valuable corroborative evidence to large collections of Chinese art in many parts of the world. From what we can gather about the recent findings, there

is no doubt that these have significant impact on present knowledge of Chinese art and history. Certain notions have to be revised although in many cases they serve to substantiate with stratigraphic evidence previous theories. Finally, as it is the case in major archaeological and historical research undertakings, the data gathered raise as many questions and problems that can be satisfactorily answered at the present time. In fact there are enough questions raised to keep several generations of scholars busy. Nevertheless, the most exciting outcome of China's nation-wide archaeological excavations lies in the innovations the Chinese introduced in the methods, programs and attitudes of research. For unlike conventional Western type of scholarly practice, the Chinese are bent on achieving something quite novel in the history of archaeological and historical studies.

The general practice among western-trained scholars in the field of art history and archaeology is to conduct research wherein only trained specialists are directly involved. Other less trained people are employed as subordinates in a more or less heirarchic arrangement; as researchers, assistants, secretaries, cargadores, etc. The research team is composed only of specialist who supervise workers who often have only the vaguest inkling of what is going on. With respect to the archaeological site if it is still inhabited, it is fenced-off from the native dwellers and is usually guarded from any possible encroachments. Ideally such a method assures the least possible mishandling, efficient excavation, collection and final transport of excavated items to the museums and laboratories where thorough and highly refined studies can be conducted. Publications of initial findings and reports are made available to other scholars who can then carry on further analysis.

From what can be gathered from available sources, the Chinese are concerned mainly in inculcating historical and cultural consciousness among the inhabitants where excavated sites are located. Many types of archaeological activities are undertaken from very systematic excavations to hasty salvage archaeology (by their own admission) resulting from large public works. In all cases the prevailing practice is to make such undertakings a community effort. The inhabitants of the site, the workers, the army, and those willing and able are given instruction and training so that they can work together with the trained specialists from the Institute of Archaeology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Sites are preserved as much as possible as an educational resource of the community where the inhabitants take charge in its

preservation and in instructing visitors to the site. The laymen are encouraged to write about their experience and knowledge gained in archaeological undertakings for national publications. Needless to say, the device works to instill in the people a certain pride in their community and encourages them to sympathize with the workers of the past. Such an experience is made to draw a lesson in contrast: the workers whose creativity and ingenuity were tested under the most adverse conditions on one hand as opposed to the notorious luxury of the ruling class on the other. The juxtaposition of these two contrasting classes, the workers as against the ruling class runs through the research effort and in the famous exhibition sent to Europe.

Western-trained scholars reading the Chinese reports are prone to complain that at present the Chinese apparently are reluctant to engage in the formulation of theoretical assumptions or to advance analysis of methodology along disciplinary lines or to engage in comparative analysis and evaluation. Most western-trained scholars given such amount of data would certainly proceed towards building up broad theories on social organization, cultural development, human creativity, innovation, etc. The Chinese writings on archaeology and art history however are on the whole descriptive, with little attempt to make comparative analysis much less historical and theoretical synthesis. It seems that western-trained scholars in search for the broad theoretical synthesis are looking in the wrong places if they rely only on Chinese archaeological and historical writings.

For the broad theoretical framework for research is founded on the same fundamental premises that guide Chinese society today. In spite of their internal wranglings, the prevailing principles based on the ideas of Marx, Lenin and Mao are what lie behind all socio-economic-political researches and these are no less binding in the field of archaeology and art. Thus the span of time covered by the materials exhibited comprising 600,000 years represent "the long struggle of the Chinese people" to achieve the society they know today. Current Chinese system of periodization commences with the Pleistocene onto the legendary Hsia (Although this is not yet supported by archaeology but alleged by the Chou to have preceded the Shang, the Chinese deem it right to reserve a place for it until such time as they can discover Hsia sites.) to the bronze age together with the slave-owning states beginning with the Shang Dynasty (16th century to 11th century B.C.) up to the last quarter of the fifth century B.C. From

thereon, Chinese society up to the middle of the 18th century was "feudal" and up to 1949 it was "semi-feudal" and "semi-colonial." In Chinese writings there is then marked absence of theories and general conceptions of universal import. Whatever findings they provide they are careful to point out that these were the results of conditions obtaining in China and could not be advanced for direct application elsewhere.


Nonetheless, regardless of the modest claims of Chinese archaeological research, just the enormity of the findings and the extent of excavations cannot but advance the cause of Chinese scholarship, history and many aspects of the history of technology and as an unintended bonus the specific ways by which certain changes in socio-economic relationships affect corresponding changes in art styles.

It is significant that the exhibits begin with Lantian man, *Homo erectus lantianensis* and Peking Man, *Homo erectus pekinensis*. (The latter is a reconstruction from the fossils lost while in American custody just before the outbreak of world war II.) Lantian Man and Peking Man were supposed to have lived in the middle Paleolithic of the Pleistocene. Lantian man was older than Peking Man but both shared similar cultures although the latter enjoyed a more advanced cultural stage. They used simple tools, engaged in hunting and fishing, gathered wild fruits and vegetables and lived in small isolated groups. According to Prof. Hsia Nai, Director of the Institute of Archaeology, "these discoveries prove that China is one of the cradles of mankind."¹ The development of *homo erectus* right within the heartland of Chinese civilization (the sites are Shensi and Choukoutien near Peking) prove without a shadow of a doubt that the peopling of China was an indigenous development and not the result of immigration.

The exhibition concentrates on the earlier periods tapering off towards the Yuan (1280-1368 A. D.), presents the constituent beginnings of Chinese civilization. We need not dwell here on a detailed account of the exhibits except to mention certain highlights as can be gathered from the available sources in our library.

¹ Hsia Nai, "Ancient Men in China," *China Reconstructs*, June, 1973, p. 20.

At the outset we can say that the long-standing dispute surrounding Neolithic pottery can now be put to rest. The beginnings, the sequence and further development of these wares can now be traced on more solid grounds. There are two distinct types of pottery complexes namely, Yangshao named after its classic site at Yangshao ts'un, Mienchih country in Western Honan and Lungshan named after its type site Ch'eng tz'u-yai, Lungshanchen, Licheng country in Shantung. Yangshao (also called Painted Pottery) dated between 2500 — 1700 B.C. is characterized by its reddish buff color, shaped by hand in a coiling process usually into large, bulbous jars and pots. The painted decorations are composed of geometric patterns on the body arranged along a focal point vertically or horizontally, maintaining a harmonious balance of surface ornament and the integrity of the vessel shape. Yangshao vessels are generally fired at the low temperature of 1,000 degrees fahrenheit.



Painted vase (Yangshao) ornamented with four circles filled with geometric pattern. Height 49 cm. Yungtsing, Kansu.

Yangshao wares resemble those made in West Asia and Southeast Europe, a resemblance which has led some scholars to conclude that the wares were importations or the products of immigrants into China from the West. However these scholars have yet to explain the means and paths of transmission if Yangshao is indeed an importation into China. But what they generally ignore is the remarkable similarity of Yangshao with Eastern wares and the fact that recent archaeology shows its wide distribution.² Moreover these wares apparently had long sequence of manufacture with its last phase moving into the sequence of Lungshan on to the early bronze age. All of these facts should be sufficient proof of the indigenous development of Yangshao culture in China.³

Lungshan pottery known also as Black Pottery culture is characterized by undecorated black ware, burnished to a high finish, wheel-turned whose technical perfection is such that the thinness of walls can be as much as .5 mm.⁴ Ornaments consist only of horizontal ridges which emphasize the sharpness of profiles. Forms such as *ting* (tripod on solid feet), *li* (tripod whose main body continues gracefully into three hollow legs), *tou* (a globular stem cup whose upper half forms a lid that can also be used as vessel) were first shaped into clay before they appeared in bronze.⁵ But the relationship of these two pottery cultures do not only rely on the continuity of vessel shapes. Their respective time sequences in excavated sites demonstrate that Lungshan evolved from Yangshao. The emergence of Lungshan culture prove to be gradual, its beginning phase overlapping with the last phase of Yangshao. The type site to show this stratigraphic sequence is Houkang, Anyang where the lowest level has red painted pottery (dated 2200

² Painted pottery wares have been excavated from sites in Szechuan, Northern Anhwei, Northern Kiangsu, Hopei and as far north as Southern Manchuria and as far south as Formosa and Lamma Island.

³ Seiichi Mizuro, "Prehistoric China: Yangshao and Pu-chao-chai," *Proceedings of the Fourth Far Eastern Prehistory and the Anthropology Division of the Eighth Pacific Science Congresses Combined*, Part I (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1953), pp. 89-101.

⁴ Hsia Nai, *ap. cit.*, p. 21.

⁵ All three pottery shapes were realistically reproduced in ancient Chinese scripts. The persistence of the basic tripod as a form in Chinese material culture has led to the use of the *li* as the distinguishing emblem of Chinese civilization.

1700 B.C.), the middle layer has black pottery (1700 — 1000 B.C.) and the upper level has white pottery which are found to be contemporaneous with bronzes (1500 — 1027 B.C.).⁶

The conclusion we can draw is that there existed two independent pottery traditions in China during Neolithic times with the later phase of one, Yangshao evolving into the other, Lungshan whose sequel in turn was to give rise to white, almost porcellaneous wares and then bronzes. This shows too that well within the heartland of Chinese civilization there were two contrasting norms and styles and by inference no one unifying center of power even at the height of the Shang-Yin Dynasty (1500 — 1027 B.C.). The Shang culture represented a high level mark of achievement within the capital at Anyang and was surrounded by varying degrees of cultural developments, some persisted in time along conservative, anachronistic lines, while others were explosive innovations that occurred sporadically in the center.⁷

With respect to the development of bronze, the excavations carried out at Erlikang, Cheng-chou in Honan province provide substantial evidence that bronze tradition emerged from China itself. The earlier belief was that bronze technique was introduced by the West. This view arose because many bronze vessels in Japanese and Western collections manifest a full grown, highly developed style. It was therefore assumed that these products could only be the result of external influence. Moreover, it was the contention that Chinese bronzes were made by *cire perdue* technique similar to western procedure. As archaeological findings reveal, the Chinese used instead the more difficult process of piece mold. In the excavations in Cheng-chou, bronze vessels, molds, slags were found together with tools and other foundry paraphernalia, pottery kilns and a rich variety of artifacts in bronze,

⁶ Takeshi Sekino, "On the Black and the Grey Pottery of Ancient China," *Proceedings of the Fourth Far Eastern...*, pp. 103-114.

See also note 7.

⁷ Chang, Kwang-chih, *The Archaeology of Ancient China*, (New Haven Conn.: Yale University Press, 1963). This is an excellent source book on the pre-historic archaeological sites in China. Its usefulness is even enhanced by the author's summaries of original Chinese reports with analysis of the data. Its value also lies in the author's synthesis of archaeological findings with historical accounts up to the Han dynasty. pp. 142-145, 163-164 & 175.

bone, jade and ivory. Sectional molds reaching to almost a hundred pieces to build one single bronze vessel were not uncommon. Afterwards, sections were joined together which explains the presence of ridge joints on the completed vessel.⁸ It was indeed more complex and cumbersome compared to the *cire perdue* technique. Although such findings argue decisively for the Chinese origination of bronze technology, still we should not discount the likelihood that the Chinese, noted for their resourcefulness could have also learned to take advantage of the relatively simpler *cire perdue* method once it was introduced from the west.

More details in the early experimentation and development of bronzes are provided by the recent finds together with their precedents in pottery, stone, and wood. Bronze tools, weapons, ritual vessels and the more homely objects from chariot fittings, belt hooks, mirrors, sculptures in three dimension, mainly animals, reveal the increasing technical competence, artistry and inventiveness that shaped them. The extent of Shang cultural influence can be mapped according to the site distribution of bronzes that appears to be wider than what has been assigned to this dynasty based on historical documents. It seems that Shang influence covered a wide area from Anyang in North Honan to Southern Hunan. Thus bronze sites are one of the primary indices in the shifts and fluctuations of the centers of power.⁹ Doubtless among all technological innovations of the time, bronze was the insignia *par excellence* of the military aristocracy, the wielders of power from the Shang dynasty to Chou up to the Han (16th century B.C. to the third century A.D.).

Since they constitute the material evidence of the formative stages of Chinese civilization, it is therefore clear why bronzes together with neolithic wares form the major sections of the exhibition recently sent to the West. Along with bronze weapons, tools and other paraphernalia, a number of remarkable ritual bronzes were exhibited. Again we find a great deal of diversity in aesthetic norms even within the same

⁸ *Op cit.*, pp. 137, 151, 171, 172, 195, 139-142. Chang agrees with the conclusions of Noel Barnhard in his book, *Bronze Casting and Bronze Alloys in Ancient China*. (Australian National University, 1961), p. 108.

⁹ Chang, *op. cit.*, pp. 205-206 & 210.

period and the same region which shows that the archaeological evidence cannot be fitted easily into the sequences and stylistic groupings drawn up by Perceval Yetts, Bernhard Kalgren and the eminent Chinese scholar, Kuo Mo-jo.¹⁰ At the risk of oversimplifying the subject, we can say for purposes of our discussion that bronze vessels generally fall into two major artistic tendencies representing the two extreme poles in the spectrum of taste. One tendency treats vessels in such a way that the decorative motifs create the effect of breaking the integrity of the vessel form. The primary decorative motifs are limited to the more mythical zoomorphs, the *t'ao-tieh* mask, *Kuei* dragon and motifs derived from these two basic elements in various combinations and animals in three dimension usually on flanges creeping up the vessel or right smack on the center of the lid. The vessels strike us as heavy, solemn, enigmatic even awesome and grotesque with stark contrasts in textures, surface topography and the shapes of component parts. By comparison the other tendency is one wherein decorative motifs maintain the continuity of the vessel form creating surface textures arranged around a main axis. In addition vessel types and decorations form a much wider repertoire. Decorative techniques include gilding, chasing, inlays, etching, engraving and appliques.

Vessels of the first type can be interpreted as generally part of the magical rites of ancestral worship that was indispensable to Shang rulers. By comparison, vessels of the second style manifest directly their utilitarian function and have none of the ponderous qualities of the first. The first style lingered well into the end of the B.C. era since the Chou who were cultural upstarts readily adapted Shang magical style for their ritual vessels upon their ascendancy in 1027 B.C.¹¹

On display are pictures of two wine vessels called *kuang* (a boat-like vessel with a spout and handle) where the animal takes over the shape of the vessel, completely overwhelming it so that it seems to be a three dimensional animal sculpture. It conveys something terrifying like an elemental power so that it seems inconceivable how one can

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 203-210 & 271.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, see also Noel Barnhard, "A Recently Excavated Inscribed Bronze of Western Chou Date," *Monumenta Serica: Journal of Oriental Studies*, (Nanzan: The Catholic University of Nagoya, XVII, 1958), pp. 12-46.



Bronze Kuang (wine vessel) with dragon design. Shang Dynasty. Length 41.5 cm. Shihlou, Shansi.

drink out of such a vessel. In contrast to the *kuang* the *lei* (a jar on a stand) from Chengchou, Honan maintains the continuity of the vessel form. The ornaments are shallow engravings composed of tight curls, S curves arranged horizontally along the roundness of the *lei*.

Bronzes of the succeeding periods exemplify the stylistic and technological changes we mentioned earlier although styles from the Shang and Chou periods continued. There was in addition a tendency to replace the *t'ao t'ieh* mask with mythical animals and other fantastic zoomorphs with more domesticated, naturalistic scenes particularly towards the Han period (206 B.C. — 220 A.D.). The mode of naturalism occurring primarily towards the last centuries B.C., becoming the hallmark of the Tang period (618 — 907 A.D.) was already apparent in late Shang period as can be seen in the Cheng-chou finds. This naturalistic trend is one of the prominent themes in the development of Chinese art. We shall pick up this theme later in our discussion.

Before proceeding any further in our discussion of bronzes, mention must be made of yet another major technological advancement within the period designated by the term "bronze age" (ca. 1500 B. C. up to the Han period). The development of iron metallurgy, iron implements and the extensive irrigation and water control system have all enormous consequences on the rise of states and for purposes of this discussion on art and craft specializations. (A picture of an iron mold is on display.) Iron appeared in China during the Warring States period (475 B.C. — 221 B.C.).¹² It also happened to be the era of rapid urbanization and the efflorescence of literary and philosophical activities. Some of the philosophers of this period are the giants of Chinese classical tradition: Confucius, Mencius, Lao Tze, Hsun Tzu and Han Fei-tzu. Each philosophy contended with one another in the same way that kingdoms were constantly at loggerheads. Shih Huang-ti put an end to the chaotic state of affairs of the Warring States Period by unifying China into the powerful administrative state, an accomplishment that entitled his lineage, the Chin, to give China her name.

¹² Joseph Needham, *The Development of Iron and Steel Technology in China*, (London: Newcomen Society, 1958).


Excavations from the Warring States and Han Periods are extensive. They include entire cities, cemeteries, tombs of royal personages and irrigation systems.¹³ The bronze *tou* (stem globular cup) dates to this period which gives us a picture of the life style of the rulers of the time. The *tou* represents the more elegant, light-hearted attitude characteristic of late Han style. The decorations are composed of sharp hooks in gold inlay with tiny circles placed in such a way to suggest the dragon *kuei* but in much attenuated form.

Another exquisite example of Western Han (206 B.C. — 24 A.D.) bronze is a *hu* on display showing the decorative innovations of the time. The decorations consist of lozenges and textural contrasts as an over-all pattern on the vessel surface. The composition of design motifs arranged in three successive levels conform with the continuity of the vessel shape. An ink slab of the Eastern Han Period (25 B.C. — 220 A.D.) appears by comparison to the *hu* previously discussed, to be an anachronism. The ink slab in the form of a crouching feline conceals the hollow container for the ink. Despite its size it recalls the grave zoomorphic sacral bronzes of Shang and Chou. And yet, the technical aspects of the ink slab betrays its actual age. The use of gilding and turquoise inlays show that this is indeed a Han artifact.

One of the most amazing finds in China is the Man Ch'eng tombs in Hopei province. These were the tombs of Prince Liu Sheng, a step brother of the Emperor Wu Ti who died in 113 B.C. and his wife Princess Tou Wen. Among 2,800 funerary items the most astonishing of them all is the jade suit of Princess Tou Wen, a morbid form of *haute couture*. The suit is made up of thousands of rectangular shaped jade pieces sewn together with gold wire and silk thread. It was believed that the body so encased would be preserved. Autopsy performed on the body subsequent to its excavation revealed that much of the remains were intact enough for the doctors to diagnose the physique, the ailments, cause of death including what the Princess ate just before death. It turned out that she had water melon seeds.¹⁴

¹³ Chang, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-188, 196-197 & 203.

¹⁴ Hsia Nai, "600,000 Years of Labor and Struggle: Exhibition of Archaeological Finds in New China," Part I, *China Reconstructs*, June, 1973. Part II, July, 1973.



Jade suit with gold and silk threads worn by Liu Sheng, Prince Ching of Chungshan and his wife. Mancheng, Hopei. About the end of the 2nd century B.C., middle of the Western Han Dynasty.

Thousands of bibelots accompanied the Princess to her death, two of them whose photos are on display deserve discussion, namely a bronze stem cup censer or *po-shan* and a lamp bearer in the form of a kneeling girl. The stem cup censer represents rugged mountain peaks covered with forests where wild animals lurk about the deep gullies. The decorations are cloud scroll motifs inlaid with gold and contrast with the dark patina of the bronze surface. The mountain represents the mythical mountain called *po* in Taoist literature which is believed to sustain heaven. The censer's upper half serves as a lid so that incense can be placed within the vessel. Whereupon the incense upon being lit causes smoke to rise simulating mountain mist. Thus as the image of the *po* mountain, the censer shows the preoccupation of the Han aristocracy with notions of immortality. And yet however much the *po-shan* censer demonstrates the evocation of immortality, still the underlying feeling remains very much close to the actual world. For compared to the other Shang bronzes we have already mentioned, the censer portrays in detail a closer interest in the natural world. Animals of different species are depicted in their characteristic movements as they lurk about the dense forests and hills. In spite of its miniature size, it is one of the most absorbing landscapes ever depicted in three dimension.

The second beautiful object found in Princess Tou Wen's tomb is a lamp whose picture is also on display. The lamp is held by a kneeling girl fitted with a movable shutter. The quiet expression of the girl and her graceful pose are remarkable since most tomb figures tend to be stolid and expressionless.

An entire tableau made up of pottery depict acrobats, musicians, singers and dancers that gives us a clue to the social amusements of the Han period. Technically less proficiently executed than the bronze examples from Princess Tou Wen's tomb, nonetheless the scene projects the gay, active atmosphere of the occasion.

Another brilliant portrayal in the naturalistic vein is on display, that of a bronze horse found at the Eastern Han tomb at Leitai, Wuwei country in Kansu. As in the Man Ch'eng tombs where the famous jade-suited lady was found, the Leitai tombs yielded various

human and animal figurines depicted in life-like manner.¹⁵ But the bronze horse is by far the most magnificent representation of that animal yet found. It depicts the horse in flight, its graceful swiftness is breathtaking. No doubt this type of horse came from those species imported into China following the exploits of General Chang Ch'ien in behalf of Emperor Wu. Chang Ch'ien is considered to be one of the world's greatest explorers. He left China in 136 B.C. and returned in 126 B.C. During the intervening years he travelled through some of the most difficult and dangerous territories of his time, he was captured and held prisoner twice by the Huns and each time he managed to escape. He travelled towards the T'ien Shan mountains via the Dzungarian gap and the Ili valley up to the Jaxartes river west of the Pamirs staying at Ferghana from whence he proceeded to Transoxania. Although Chang Ch'ien never reached as far as Syria and the mediterranean ports, he received enough information about these places which he wrote about upon his return. It was this general who brought back news of this "celestial horse" (*t'ien ma*) and who stirred up the imagination of Emperor Wu who then sent no less than three emissaries to obtain these horses. Only the third mission succeeded in bringing back a dozen or so horses in 102 B.C. after so much expenses in human life and resources.¹⁶

The picture of the bronze horse manifests the sense of wonder that must have inspired Chinese artists for so many centuries. These horses increased all the more the predilection of the nobility to use horses and horse-drawn chariots as status symbols. It went to the extent that it became the prevalent belief that the highest tribute to the deceased was measured in the number of horses and horse-drawn chariots deployed into the funeral cortege. In the later dynasties compared to the Shang, the funeral corteges became longer and more pompous. It is easy to imagine that the supply of actual horses and chariots was easily depleted. Hence substitutes in the form of paintings and other representations on silk, clay figurines, bas reliefs for example were the ones entombed.¹⁷

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Part II, July, 1973.

¹⁶ Joseph Needham and Wang Ling, *Science and Civilization in China*, Vol. III, Cambridge University Press, 1959, pp. 321, 511, 522-23, 535 & 549.

¹⁷ William Watson, *Archaeology in China*, Max Parrish & Co., Ltd., London, 1960, pp. 26-27, plates 79-84.

The wealth of material remains from the aristocracy are matched by quantities of objects from ordinary citizens. In the outlying provinces farther away from the capital of the Eastern Han at Loyang, excavated objects showed that there was more intense interest in common, ordinary life of the people but depicted with no loss in excellent workmanship. It is amazing how decorative motifs persist from Shang to Han, recognizable even when stylized and blended into a more localized style. In fact the objects unearthed from the outskirts of the centers of power convey a freshness of approach that eludes the more sophisticated artists of the urban center.

Among the examples of "provincial" art the ones found in the Kingdom of T'ien at Shihchaishan, Chinning, Yunnan should be of special interest for those specializing in Southeast Asia. Excavated between 1950 to 1960 a great deal of materials were retrieved.¹⁸ But it is regrettable that much of the reports in Chinese are not yet available to English-speaking scholars working on Southeast Asia. The items on exhibit manifest still a greater degree of realism than anything we have discussed so far. For example, the boar being attacked by two tigers in bronze portrays so dramatically the horror of the kill. Not a single item from the capital comes close to this sculpture in catching this portentous moment. (See illustration on p. 71)

Finds at Shihchaishan include bronze tools such as plowshares, axes, bronze ornaments in animal forms and most significantly for Southeast Asia, bronze drums that resemble the famous Dongson drums. These Dongson drums are important diagnostic tools in the analysis of indigenous Southeast Asian cultures.¹⁹ In the light of these excavations, theories regarding the origin and development of Southeast Asian bronze culture ought to be revised in order to include greater influence and inter-action between China and Southeast Asia. The shape of the Shihchaishan bronzes resembles those made by the Shans of Burma right up to our own century. But the Shihchaishan drums

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, pp. 31-32, plates 122-123.

Chang, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-126, 297-295, plates 15-17.

¹⁹ Victor Goloubew, "L'Age du Bronze au Tonkin," *Bulletin, Ecole Francaise d'Extreme Orient*, 29, 1928.

_____, "Sur l'Origine et la Diffusion des Tambours Metalique," *Praehistoria Asia Orientalis*, Hanoi, 1932.



Bronze plaque of two tigers attacking a boar Shihchaishan, Yunnan, Western Han.

are unquestionably unique from those drums that have so far been studied in Southeast Asia. The tops of the drums found at Shichaihsan are crowded with scenes depicted in three-dimension. The drum top is used very much in the nature of a stage. The scenes represented read like the ethnography of tribal groups in South China and with those cultural groups in Southeast Asia who have not participated directly in the Hindu-Buddhist and Islamic kingdoms of the the region.²⁰ One drums shows a scene of a chieftainness being enthroned, other religious rites are found on others.²¹ Shihchaishan drums together with the other archaeological evidence will certainly have profound changes on our knowledge of Southeast Asian prehistory.

²⁰ See note 18.

²¹ Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 27.



Bronze cowrie-container decorated with a spinning and weaving scene on the cover, Western Han Dynasty. Height 27.5 cm., diameter of bottom 30.9 cm. From a tomb at Shihchaishan, Chinning, Yunnan. Shows Chinese affinities with Southeast Asian bronzes.

Aside from the drums which date in the last hundred years of the B.C. era, China's affinities with Southeast Asian cultures are further substantiated by textile finds. (See sample on p. 74) Although the textiles, mostly silks dated to the Tang period (618 — 907 A.D.) were found in the Northwest, they show that tie-dying and batik techniques have been practiced in North China far away from Southeast Asia where such textile techniques were believed to have originated.²² Like the Dongson drums, these textile techniques were considered distinguishing features of Southeast Asian material culture particularly that of Indonesia before the process of "Hinduization" took place.²³ Again, the Chinese finds will have to be taken into account if these textile techniques are to be used to characterize the autochthonous elements in the cultures of Southeast Asia.


As to be expected in a country as large as China, her cultural affinities reach far and wide. Contemporaneous with the textiles so far discussed were those that show close resemblance to Iranian models. The design shows definitely an Iranian motif — a drinking couple flanking a large cup surrounded by a rondel of pearls used as a border.²⁴ China's middle eastern relations are amply demonstrated by art finds as we shall discuss in the latter part of this study.

The items exhibited which cover the earliest periods to the Han (206 — 220 A.D.) have been organized to illustrate the different cultural traditions that emanated from China's vast territory. Their respective material cultures, their developments and the different aspects and styles can be studied in their continuity, changes and deviations.

²² Hsia Nai, "Along the Silk Road: More Ancient Silks Found," *China Reconstructs*, April, 1972.

²³ This is the fundamental assumption used by George Coedes, the distinguished French scholar in explaining the historical developments in Southeast Asia. See his books: *The Making of Southeast Asia*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1966 and *The Indianized States of Southeast Asia*, East — West Center, Honolulu, 1968. See his discussion of Dongson culture in both books.

²⁴ Note that Sassanian rulers (266-642 A.D.), great patron of the arts in Persia, drew from the traditions of the Mediterranean civilizations. The first Sassanian embassy to China was documented to be 455 A.D. But contacts with West Asian countries must antedate official embassies for as early as 166 A.D. the presence of Syrian merchants was recorded at Loyang.



Batik-dyed silk. Tang Dynasty. Textile technology shows close relation to South-east Asian techniques.

In contrast to these earlier periods where a variety of art forms were displayed, the examples drawn from the succeeding dynasties, the Sui, Tang, Sung and Yuan concentrate mainly on ceramics. Enough examples however were exhibited to illustrate the range and development of various wares. One important point brought out in the exhibits is the fact that high-fired feldspathic glaze goes back to the 15th century B.C. The previous dating for this significant advance in ceramic technology was at the close of the Shang in the 11th century B.C. The excavations at Chengchou yielded a covered jar with a bright yellow glaze that showed that by the 15th century B.C. the Chinese succeeded in producing a glaze that coalesced completely with the body upon firing at very high temperatures. This technological discovery was not fully exploited until the Han period when it was systematically applied until celadons were achieved and on towards true porcelain. Representative items of this development were shown in the exhibition. The pictures on display show *Yüeh* and *Lungchuan* wares from Che-

kiang, *ting* ware from Hopei (a large *kundi* is on display), *ch'ing pai*-wares from Kiangsi and blue-and-white. A picture of a blue-and-white covered jar excavated near Peking show the Chinese ingenious adaptation of Iranian motifs. Wares of this type were exported in great quantities to the Islamic world.²⁵

Ceramics provide additional data of the cultural interchanges between China and the Middle East that not only supplement historical accounts but as we shall see from the new evidence brought out as a result of the excavations, require changes of earlier views. Western scholars have previously advanced the theory that the use of underglaze blue was an adaptation from the West. Originally developed in the Middle East around Mesopotamia and Persia this technique was later on introduced to China not later than the 11th century. This is proven accordingly by several factors. First the fact that cobalt blue, the raw material for the glaze was imported from the Middle East. Secondly Chinese ceramic experts notably in the *Kao-ku Yao-lun* (1367) speak of "Mohammedan blue". This same work contains a passage which describes the new repertory of forms, similar to Middle Eastern prototypes as having been the influence of the Mongols. Third, the influx of Muslims who set up their colonies in Canton and Ch'uan Chou in the 14th century as described by Ibn Battuta was considered proof of how Middle Eastern ceramic influences were transmitted.²⁶

Be that as it may, archaeological finds in Hangchou reveal the presence of blue-and-white wares which means according to a Japanese scholar, that they must have been manufactured earlier than the 14th

²⁵ F. Hirth and W. W. Rockhill, Chau Ju-Kua, *His Work on the Chinese and Arab Trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries*, St. Petersburg, 1911.

M. S. Collis, "Fresh Light on the Route Taken by Export Porcelains. . . .," *Transactions*, Oriental Ceramic Society, 1935-36, p. 28.

²⁶ William B. Honey, *The Ceramic Art of China*, Faber & Faber Ltd., London, 1954, pp. 94-97.

²⁶ Ibn Battuta was appointed by Sultan Muhamad Tughluq to conduct an embassy to China in 1346. His work, the REHLA (Travels) is a rich mine of information on the social, economic & political conditions of his travels in the Middle East, Africa, India, Sunatra, Java and China. His accounts are invaluable for their astute observations and veracity of many aspects of life of the people & lands he visited.

century as it was previously thought. From the associated finds, the blue-and-white ware discovered at Cheng-chou was dated no later than Southern Sung.²⁷ Another Japanese ceramic scholar Mikami Tsuguo in his study of Tang wares suggests that the influences between the Middle East and China was not simply a one-sided affair. It is equally valid to assume a complex relationship of mutual interactions, each side contributing and learning from each other. The Chinese importing the raw material, cobalt blue as well as some of the vessel types from Middle Eastern metal ware but no less significant is Chinese perfection of ceramic technology. One of them, the achievement of true porcelain and the brilliant blues characteristic of Ming wares was highly-prized by the Sultans and Caliphs of the Middle East. Moreover, according to Mikami Tsuguo Tang tri-colored wares were well-developed by the 7th century while Islamic counterparts of polychrome ware did not evolve until late 8th century. That the Chinese potters were way ahead in experimenting with different glazes can be further proven by an excavated site in the Middle East at Samarra. This is a site occupied for about 50 years in the ninth century where many Chinese Tang wares and celadons (both porcellaneous wares) were deposited along with local wares. Here is evidence of Middle Eastern reception of Chinese material culture long before the 14th century when Chinese potters were supposed to have adapted underglaze blue.²⁸

That the Chinese potters had a lively interest in the art of the Middle East and other cultures from the Mediterranean world can be demonstrated from several objects in the exhibition which could easily be mistaken as imports. On display is the picture of a yellow g'azed porcelain flask dated to the sixth century A.D. which shows in its form and decoration that the Chinese potters were always responsive to the tastes of the different peoples who imported their wares. The face of the flask depicts dancers and musicians in "Hellenistic" style and judging from the composition which uses as borders acanthus leaves to the rendering of the drapery and the musical instruments, show Chinese adaptations from the West.

²⁷ Yonaiyama Tsuneo, "Blue and Whites Unearthed in Hang-chou," *Nippon Bijutsu Kogei*, 1959, Nos. 249-250, pp. 8-15 & 38-45.

K'ao Ku Hsueh Pao, 1957, No. 1.

²⁸ Mikami Tsuguo, "Islamic Glazed Polychrome Pottery and Tang Tri-colored Porcelain," *Tosetsu*, 1958, No. 20, pp. 65, 27-32.

Gold and silver wares give more evidence of Chinese contacts and receptivity to Iranian and Hellenistic cultures.²⁹ At Ho-ch'ia, the site of ancient Ch'ang-an a silver box and a gold bowl were unearthed whose decorations follow very closely Sassanian design so much so that they could be mistaken for imports. However the discovery of sites with goldsmithing shops showed that they were in fact of Chinese provenance. How well Chinese artists have mastered Iranian models can also be seen in a silver wine pot in the shape of a saddle bag embossed with a prancing horse clenching a cup. Once again this shows Chinese craftsmen manufacturing goods to suit the specifications of their foreign buyers. In fact Chinese responsiveness to foreign tastes can be suggested as one of the important factors in the accelerated growth of Chinese international trade from the Tang period on to the Ming. Also on display is a gold cup with an eight-part design whose shape and décor combines Chinese floral motifs with Sassanian composition, a happy blending that results in a magnificent piece.

One of the most delightful sections of the exhibits are the tomb figures made mostly of ceramics which provide rich material evidence of the changing attitudes and styles of the times. We find greater interest in the detailed representation of the physiognomy and psychology of people and animals. From the tomb of General Chang Sheng in Anyang, dated 595 A.D., two tomb guardians show this vigorous interest in naturalism. Other examples of the same nature are those recovered from the tomb of Ch'ung-p'u near Ch'ang-an where we find the artist making an ironic comment. The servants appear ridiculous compared to the noble character of the camels and horses while the elegant court ladies are parodied who are depicted as empty-headed and quite vacuous. (The pictures of a groom and horse as well as the court ladies are on display.)

Our knowledge of Chinese human statuary are amplified by finds from the rock-carved temple at Feng-hsi-ssu near Loyang where the guardians of the Buddhist faith are represented as heroic figures. The finds at Loyang show the resurgence of Buddhist influences

²⁹ Basil Gray, "The Influence of Near Eastern Metalwork on Chinese Ceramics," *Transactions*, Oriental Ceramic Society, 1940-41, p. 47.

in the beginning of the eighth century. It is the Buddhist faith as much as trade that expanded the cultural horizons of Tang China. The variety of forms and designs in art reflect the complexity of Chinese society that enjoyed long contacts with the different cultures of the world. Tang Dynasty in fact is by common agreement considered one of the most sophisticated, urbane and cosmopolitan eras of Chinese history. Chinese eagerness to learn and adapt different cultural influences include not only adaptations from well-documented civilizations of the Hindu-Buddhist world, from Hellenistic and Islamic civilizations but from the people of the steppes. From these peoples such as the Hsiung-nu, the Chinese learned among other things animal breeding, weapons technology, cavalry tactics and the game of polo. A wall painting in the tomb of Crown Prince Chang Huai discovered at Chienhsien, Shensi shows a polo game under way. (A picture of a fragment of this wall painting is on display.) One east comment on the subject of amusements, is a group of pottery figurines dated to Yuan dynasty found at Chiaotsu, Honan illustrates how well the Chinese artists have mastered the technique of depicting animated and humorous poses of actors. Besides, these figurines give us an inkling of the high level of dramatic arts at the time.

In a discussion of a major exhibition such as this one which marks at the same time the re-emergence of China from years of isolation, the principle of selectivity exercised in the choice of items on display has much to say to the audience. Absent in the exhibition are paintings of scholar gentlemen from the Sung and Yuan periods. This type of art is usually done in brush and ink on silk or paper and have been assiduously collected for hundreds of years by Japanese and Westerners. The subject matter usually are landscapes from monumental panoramas characteristic of the Northern Sung (960-1127) to little vignettes of nature such as an insect hovering on a blade of grass. Included as an important category of scholar gentlemen's *ouevres* is calligraphy, the *sine qua non* of the artistic output of this social class. Paintings and calligraphy of such types reflected the life style of the Confucian literati, the elite intelligentsia class that dominated Chinese society as far as government and literary and artistic endeavours were concerned. By and large their artistic production depicted the refined

sensibilities, the aestheticism and romantic withdrawal from the mundane world by the artists. As for the works themselves, these were intended to be perused at leisure by a selected few.³⁰

It is significant that even a few examples from virtually thousands from these *ouuvres* were not shown. This seems to be consistent with the anti-Confucian attitude prevailing in China today. In their place, what have been exhibited are types of art that are relatively more utilitarian and the production of which require close collaboration between artists, designers, craftsmen, technicians and so on all along the line to the final user of the art object.

Aside from the absence of the paintings and calligraphy produced by the Confucian gentlemen literati which makes this exhibition a great departure from the conventional view of Chinese art and history, is the presence of art products produced from different regions of China. What is emphasized is the fact that these objects are the products of the multi-ethnic population living in China's present borders. The supposedly uninterrupted and continuous historical development of Han-nurtured and Confucian-oriented Chinese civilization has finally given way to another interpretation. Archaeological materials have contributed a wealth of evidence to show the checkerboard political and cultural geography of China. The general picture presented is that Chinese civilization is the outcome of the various advances made by many groups of people who contributed different ideas, technology and innovations. Confucian doctrines and institutions was merely one of the many streams that swelled the great ocean of this civilization. The contribution of peoples inhabiting the border lands, peoples who represent cultures of long and venerable standing are of no less importance than those made by the Han Chinese.³¹

Finally we cannot close this discussion of Chinese art and archaeology without bringing up the underlying motive in the nationwide

³⁰ Arthur Wright and Denis Twitchett, editors, *Confucian Personalities*, Stanford University Press California, 1962.

³¹ Hsueh Li, "Confucius and His Times," *Peking Review*, July 15, 1974, pp. 18-21.

Mass Criticism Group of Peking and Tsinghua University, "Confucius — the Man," *Peking Review*, July 15, 1974, pp. 15-18.

research into the past. The leaders of the Peoples' Republic of China are bent on forging a new type of human relationship and social organization the likes of which was never known in China's long history. Part of the fundamental tenets that shape the new China is the belief that the workers are the undisputed instruments of the country's progress. Thus this exhibition of art is made to dramatize this belief and crowns the workers triumphantly with the achievement of beauty.

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HUNTING AND FISHING AMONG THE SOUTHERN KALINGA*

ROBERT LAWLESS

Among the six major mountain peoples¹ of Northern Luzon, only two, the Kalinga and the Apayao, maintain hunting and fishing as an appreciable supplement to their regular food gathering and growing activities. But although the Kalinga are probably the third most thoroughly studied group, after the Bontoc and Ifugao, there is little in the literature on their hunting and fishing techniques, terms, ceremonies, omens, seasons. This lack of information is especially regrettable in view of the striking decline of hunting and fishing in the southern, and especially southwestern, portions of Kalinga-Apayao Province during the last decade.

This article then will give fairly detailed information on current hunting and fishing practices among the Southern Kalinga, explain where, when, and how these data were gathered, review the literature already written on such practices, give a brief reconstruction of the recent history of the decline of hunting and fishing, and finally indicate the impact of current political considerations and the future direction of hunting and fishing in Southern Kalinga.

Existing Literature About Hunting and Fishing in Kalinga

Seven full-length treatments of the Kalinga have been published. The oldest are Fay-Cooper Cole's two books in the early 1900's on the Western Kalinga,² who are often referred to as the Tinguian. Cole

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¹ Generally considered to be the Ibaloi, Kankanai, Bontoc, Ifugao, Kalinga, and Apayao.

² Fay-Cooper Cole, *The Tinguian: Social, Religious, and Economic Life of a Philippine Tribe* (Chicago: Field Museum of Natural History, 1922). and *Traditions of the Tinguian: A Study of Philippine Folklore* (Chicago: Field Museum of Natural History, 1915).

has about five printed pages on hunting and fishing³ and mentions that many deer and an occasional pig are caught by the dogs chasing them into long nets stretched across the runway of the game.⁴ This method is apparently not used in Southern Kalinga.

Roy Franklin Barton's book on Kalinga law⁵ — as understood in Lubuagan, Lubuagan — in discussing hunting covers only the rules governing the distribution of meat after the kill.⁶ His discussion of fishing is limited to about one page on rules governing the use of streams for fishing and the questionable statement that "fishing is not economically important."⁷

Edward P. Dozier's 287-page survey of Kalinga life in 1959-1960⁸ has less than two pages on hunting and two short paragraphs on fishing.⁹ Jules Deraedt's long article on a Northern Kalinga group¹⁰ focuses on kinship and has only two sentences on hunting and fishing.¹¹

Francisco Billiet and Francis Lambrecht's translation and analysis of four folk epics from Southern Kalinga¹² is an invaluable work, but it does concentrate principally on headhunting and tells us little if anything about wildlife hunting. Esteban T. Magannon's study of religion among the Southern Kalinga in Lubo, Tanudan Municipal District,¹³ has two short hunting rituals in the appendices.¹⁴

When, Where, and How These Data Were Gathered

This article represents some of the first part of a 12-month study of food gathering and growing activities among the Southern Kalinga. By Southern Kalinga I refer to the ethnic divisions proposed by Billiet

³ Cole, *The Tinguian*, pp. 378-386.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 379-380.

⁵ R. F. Barton, *The Kalingas: Their Institutions and Custom Law* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949).

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 85-87.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 87-88.

⁸ Edward P. Dozier, *Mountain Arbiters: The Changing Life of a Philippine Hill People* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1966).

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 132-135.

¹⁰ Jules Deraedt, "Some Notes on Buwaya Society," *Saint Louis Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 1969), pp. 7-110.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹² Francisco Billiet and Francis Lambrecht, *The Kalinga Ullalim* (Baguio City: Catholic School Press, 1970).

¹³ Esteban T. Magannon, *Religion in a Kalinga Village: Its Implications for Planned Change*. (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Community Development Research Council, 1972).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 73-75.

and Lambrecht,¹⁵ in which the Northern Kalinga occupy the Saltan River valley west to Salegseg, Balbalan, and south to Balbalan, Balbalan, the Mabaca River valley, and the upper Matalag River valley into Apayao Subprovince.¹⁶ In political units the Northern Kalinga occupy roughly Pinukpuk Municipal District, the eastern part of Balbaian Municipal District, and the southermost part of Apayao Subprovince. The Western Kalinga occupy most of Abra Province, where maybe a quarter of them are ilokanized beyond recognition, and the upper, Saltan River valley. In political units this is Abra and western Balbalan Municipal District. The Southern Kalinga occupy the middle Chico River valley from about eighteen kilometers south of Pinukpuk Municipal District to Bontoc Province and the Chico River tributaries of the Mananig, Tanudan, and Pasil Rivers, including part of northeast central Bontoc. The Southern Kalinga then live primarily in the political units of Lubuagan, Pasil, Tinglayan, and western Tanudan Municipal Districts in Kalinga-Apayao and in Natonin Municipal District, Bontoc. (Dozier postulates a division of Kalingas into Northern, Southern, and Eastern,¹⁷ but I don't consider his division valid; his two-month sojourn in two Kalinga villages was too brief to give him authority to speak on the tricky business of ethnic boundaries, and his thinking on boundaries seems to be dominated both by the rather arbitrary Philippine political divisions and by his prior commitment to a theoretical division between wet and dry rice farming.)

This article is based on data gathered in Pasil and Lubuagan Municipal Districts during the five months from July to November 1973. The hunting data are primarily from informants in the four barrios of Pasil that are widely regarded as the best hunting barrios, Balatoc, Colayo, Pugong, and Bagtayan (Bagtayan is actually a sitio of Galdang barrio); the fishing data are primarily from informants in one of the best known fishing barrios of Lubuagan Municipal District, Tanglag. My principal informants include Agaton, Tanglag; Tabas Angalao, Colayo; Dionisio Awing,

¹⁵ Billiet and Lambrecht, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-42.

¹⁶ Although I have never been able to get a clear ruling on this, it seems that since Kalinga-Apayao was created as one province in 1968, there is technically no longer any such thing as Kalinga or Apayao Subprovince. However, it is awkward to speak of Kalinga and Apayao as anything but political divisions since the boundaries have little geographic or ethnic validity.

¹⁷ Dozier, *op. cit.*, pp. 7, 9, 11.

Dalupa, Pasil; Ireño Bagyom, Galdang, Pasil; Alfredo Bakidan, Balatoc; Jose Balangi, Tanglag; Antonio Bulawit, Sumadel, Tinglayan Municipal District; Maximo Diwayan, Pugong; Max Duguiang, Lubuagan, Lubuagan; Lukas Gayodan, Dangtalan, Pasil; Miguel Herano, Bagtayan; Manuel Lamao, Bagtayan; Lognas, Dangtalan; Bulao Longodan, Colayo; Julio Meguingan, Balatoc; Gavino Mosing, Pasil Poblacion; Eduardo Nalog, Dangtalan; Juanito Palangyo, Pugong; and Jacinto Tullabang, Balatoc. Much of the data was translated by my two guides from Dangtalan, Andrew Dompao and Willy Kubao. Also, I went on several hunting trips in the forest surrounding the Bato rice field area of Pugong and in the forest area along the Tabia River between Bagtayan and Balbalasang, Balbalan; and I was able to observe some fishing activities in the Saltan River near Secsean, Balbalan.

*The Importance in Hunting of the Idaw*¹⁸

The *idaw* is a small bird about 12 cm. long with a black bill, a yellow breast, and dark red feathers; it is thought to be a variety of *maya*. It is believed that Kabunian, chief god of the Kalinga, speaks

¹⁸ A note on the rendition of Kalinga words in this article: Since my study is not at all linguistic, I have very little to say about the Kalinga language. It is evident that pronunciation, vocabulary, and occasionally grammar vary from region to region and even village to village; it is also evident that the pronunciation of Kalinga is very difficult for a non-Kalinga to learn (cf. Barton, *op. cit.*, p. 17). Almost all written Kalinga is biblical; Billiet has translated much of the Roman Catholic bible; and C. Richard Gieser of the Summer Institute of Linguistics, much of the Protestant bible. Neither of these translations contain detailed terms for hunting and fishing. My main concern here is simply the "spelling" of Kalinga terms. I have followed primarily the systems of Billiet and Gieser, which are close though Billiet's is based on Lubuagan speech and Gieser's on the speech of Guinaang, Pasil. I have used for voiceless stops the symbols *ch*, *k*, *p*, *t*, and *v*; for voiced stops *b*, *d*, and *g*, and for continuants *l*, *m*, *n*, *ng*, and *c*; for voiced vowels *a*, *e*, *i*, *o*, *u*, and *w*. The diphthongs are *ai*, *ao*, *ei*, *eo*, *ia*, *io*, *oa*, *oe*, *oi*, *wa*, *we*, *wi*, *wo*, and *wu*. In accordance with established systems I use *ay* for the *ai* sound and *ow* for the *oa* sound. Place names and individuals' names are spelled traditionally; some of these traditional spellings use symbols not in the above system, e.g. the barrio Colayo with the Spanish *c* rather than with *k*.

Almost all the vocabulary and spelling was checked with interpreters in Dangtalan, Pasil. In all Kalinga dialects the *l* and *r* are indistinguishable to my ear, therefore my interpreters, who seemed to know the difference, always had to point out this spelling. In Dangtalan *d* is sounded *ch*: this seems to be peculiar only to the Guinaang region and Lubuagan. My Dangtalan interpreters were not too helpful here, but wherever it seemed appropriate, I have rendered the *ch* sound into the

through the *idaw* and foretells good luck or misfortune. Almost all Kalinga, even those with Western education, pay close attention to the *idaw*. There are many beliefs connected with the *idaw*, and the reading of *idaw* signs varies from barrio to barrio and especially from region to region. The *idaw* is an extremely important traveling omen among the Kalinga,¹⁹ and so I will enter some comparative data here of beliefs from regions other than those barrios along the Pasil River. Although the *idaw* is the main traveling omen, any object, plant, animal, or natural event can convey a message from Kabunian. I will here discuss primarily only those pertaining to hunting.

In the hunting barrios of Pugong and Bagtayan and in general throughout the eastern portion of Pasil there is general agreement on the following *idaw* beliefs. (The barrios of Balatoc and Colayo in western Pasil, having been settled primarily from Tulgao, Tinglayan, have somewhat different beliefs, which I will summarize briefly later.) The *idaw* can give a sign in three places: 1. the place of beginning the trip to the hunting grounds, 2. the first resting place, and 3. the hunting place. However, a bad *idaw* at any time means that the hunters must return home. If there is only one good *idaw* in any of the three places, this is sufficient for a good hunt as long as there are no bad *idaw*. Ideally there should be three good *idaw* in the three places. (I am using the word *idaw* as the Kalinga do, i.e. to refer to both the bird and the sign.)

The following are bad *idaw*, and the hunters must return home whenever they have one: A sad *idaw* that does not sing loudly but

pan-Kalinga *d*. Other sounds difficult for a non-Kalinga to distinguish — and possible errors in my spellings — *g* and *k*; *b*, *p*, and *v*; *d* and *t*; and *k* and *g*. Some investigators (see e.g. Dozier, *op. cit.* p. xx) gave up entirely trying to distinguish *o* and *u*. Again, with the help of my interpreters I have made a spelling distinction that I believe reflects pronunciation.

One additional note about language; Some of the Kalinga terms are of recent Ilocano origin and some of Spanish origin. I make no effort to point out any of this since it is beyond the scope of my article.

¹⁹ Traveling omens, especially from birds, are important to all mountain peoples in Northern Luzon, but these omens have not been systematically studied. I hope to have an article in the near future on traveling omens among the Kalinga. (Indeed, traveling omens and other signs of birds, objects, and events are both important and strikingly similar throughout the Philippines. If someone compiled the beliefs of the mountain "pagan" peoples and also those of the traditional, rural lowland "Christian" peoples, many would be surprised at just how similar they are.)

simply sits still and acts droopy; an *idaw* singing behind the hunter; an *idaw* singing on the left (termed *dumaog*) generally means that there will be a storm; an *idaw* flying across the hunter's path from left to right (termed *akom*) generally means the hunter will become too weak to carry things.

The following are good, and the hunters will have success: A *happy idaw* dancing and jumping around; an *idaw* singing on the right side (termed *malboy*); an *idaw* flying across the path from right to left (termed *bumasot*), which means generally that the hunter will bag a lot of game and will have the strength to carry it all home. If no *idaw* appears, the hunters must return home when they reach the hunting grounds. This omen is termed *dorpas*. To avoid such a completely wasted trip, many hunters purposely call the *idaw* to get a sign. It is called by an a-i-o-o-o-o-o sound uttered very loudly by the hunters.

The *idaw* can also tell a number of other things, e.g., both *malboy* and *akom* may also mean that an animal is trapped in the hunter's pit; an *idaw* singing near the pit means that the animal in it is dead or rotting; an *idaw* singing a peculiar tic-tic sound means that the hunter will make a catch but may meet an accident on the way home.

Other birds that carry the word of Kabunian to the hunters include the *pisot*, a large white bird. As a general traveling omen the call of the *pisot* means that when the traveler reaches a sick person, that person will die immediately. To the hunters it means that game will be killed. If it is heard at home in the evening, the hunters should go hunting the following morning. If they hear it in the fields, they may expect something to have happened in the village. If they find that nothing has happened, they should go hunting the following morning. If someone gives the hunters a piece of meat on their way back to the village, that invalidates the *pisot* sign. The cry of the *coling*, a hawk, is a strong sign; it is the ghost of the *idaw*. Upon seeing or hearing a *coling* anywhere the hunters must return home immediately.

The call of the *coop*, an owl, generally relates to marriage proposals; if one is in the house of his intended and hears the *coop*, he must leave immediately. Only the most traditional hunters will call off a hunt when hearing the *coop*, but since the *coop* usually calls only in the early morning hours, many hunters leave home later in the morning. The sound of the *sumigod* (a type of *idaw*) is a special

sign telling the hunter returning home with a new hunting dog that the dog will be a good one.

In Colayo and Balatoc there are generally two places for the hunters to listen to the *idaw*; both are resting places on the way to the hunting grounds. If in sighting or hearing two good *idaw* the first is on the left and the second on the right, this is termed *basil-ang* and is good. If the first is on the right and the second on the left (even though they are good *idaw*), this is a bad sequence termed *tokang* and the hunters must return home. (In some traveling situations, such as for trading, specifically a type termed *ba-at*, a *tokang* may be good.) A good *idaw* sound starts low with a slow tic—tic—tic and speeds up to a high-pitched tic-tic-tic-tic. A bad sound is a low, slow chuk—chuk—chuk—chuk. All sounds must be happy ones to work in the pattern; a sad sound is always a bad sign and the hunter must return home.

Billiet and Lambrecht, in speaking of *idaw* signs in Tanudan Municipal District, write:²⁰

The chirping (*palitpit*) or the talking (*bagbaga*, *makabagbaga*...) of the *idaw* birds may be either a good, neutral, or bad omen. The augury is good (which means "proceed"), if the chattering is accompanied by "prrrrrprrrrr" rolling sounds (*malboy kad*); it is neutral if the call is "pit pit pitpit pit pit pit"; it is definitely bad if the call is a continual whistling "wissss dsdsdsssiw" (*sumigud kad*), meaning "return home." ... Warriors [and hunters] stop six times to listen to the *idaw*'s call at six different stations along the path they are to follow; the sixth station is not far away from their village. Once they have passed the sixth station, they no longer pay any attention to the bird's call. The first (*mangona*) and second (*kagwa*) stations, both fixed by custom, and the fourth (*kapat*) station are the most important: the auguries at all these three stations must be *malboy* ("have a good sound"), unless the augur (*mangidaw*), a member of the group older than the rest, who is a recognized expert in interpreting auguries or omens, says that a neutral augury at the first or second station is good. In any case, however, the augury at the fourth station must be *malboy*. If at the third (*katlu*) station, the augury would be definitely bad, the warriors [and hunters] may nevertheless proceed, hoping that the fourth would be good. Bad auguries at the fifth (*kalma*) and sixth (*kanom*) stations no longer prevent the warriors [and hunters] from proceeding, since the augur will easily find a way of explaining away a *sumigud* bad omen through favorable omen.

Other bad omens that mean hunters must call off the hunt include a snake crossing the path, a recent earthquake or landslide anywhere in the hunters' home area, traveling path, or hunting area.

²⁰ Billiet and Lambrecht, *op. cit.*, pp. 277-278.

Also, if hunters hear a deer baying during the night, they should not go hunting the next day.

To foretell the fortunes of a hunt, hunters may read the bile of a pig butchered for some ceremony not connected with hunting. If the bile is small or empty, the hunters will not catch anything; if it is full or large, they will. A very common belief throughout the mountains concerns sneezing. If any person or animal sneezes during the moment that the hunters (or any travelers) are thinking about just setting out, then they must postpone the hunt or trip for an hour or so; generally some news is expected during that hour. If continually sneezing is heard, they should put off the hunt until the next day.

According to Dozier, "In Mabaca [in Balbalan Municipal District] if you dream of rice cake mixed with coconut oil or if you dream of drinking wine then you will catch a fat wild pig. Generally in the north, dreaming of a dead person is considered to be a sign of good luck in hunting A complete rainbow is a good sign, but not an incomplete one."²¹ Some informants told me that if only part of the hunter's cigarette burns after he lights it, he will surely catch something.

I have given here what seem to be the most widespread hunting omens in Southern Kalinga, plus some uncommon ones and a few from other areas of Kalinga. Such signs and beliefs are endless. Every barrio and indeed every hunter can always add to the list; anything done, felt, heard, or seen before a noticeably successful or unsuccessful hunt is a candidate for an omen. Some of them become more widespread than others; some never go beyond one hunter. All my informants without exception, however, strongly believe in the common *idaw* signs.

The Importance in Hunting of Dogs' Nipples

Hunting dogs are highly valued and now rather scarce in Southern Kalinga. A pair of good hunting dogs costs about one carabao, and a carabao currently sells for around ₱700 in Kalinga. The very best hunting dog will cost one carabao by itself. Hunting dogs in general are called *mingor*, which is the same term applied to a warrior who has killed at least one person. A similar term is *mangarat*.

²¹ Dozier, *op cit.*, p. 133.

Most informants said the two terms mean the same, but one hunter said that the *mangarat* can hunt alone but the *mingor* needs companions.

There is much information on how to recognize good hunting dogs but not much on how to train them; they generally learn by running with the pack. Some training occurs when owners throw stones at chickens for puppies to chase. However, hunters will never bother with a dog that does not have good hunting signs, and the most popular system for recognizing good hunting dogs is by their nipples. Again, the nipple rules vary from hunter to hunter, barrio to barrio, region to region even more than the *idaw* signs. The following information is limited to the barrios of Pugong and Bagtayan.

The best hunting dog is called a *bukod* (sometimes *bugtong*) and is recognized by examining the fourth nipple from the rear (in a row of five) on either side; this nipple should be balloon-like and the surrounding area clean and clear. Some hunters identify the *bukod* by the rear nipple, saying this double nipple must have the two parts widely separated.

Usually dogs hunt in packs, but the *bukod* can track down, catch, and hold a deer or wild pig all by itself until the hunters come. Some of the *bukod* before are reputed to have gone out occasionally by themselves without any hunters to track, kill, and eat a wild piglet. They are rare now; Bagtayan had seven just before World War II but has none now. In the old days the famous hunters used three to five *bukod* on one hunt. In all of Pasil there are now only three *bukod*; two in Malucsad, one in Pugong.

A dog called a *pa-as*, according to one hunter, can be used for hunting only by widowers and is identified by the nipple nearest the rear being single instead of double. Another hunter denied this, saying the term refers to a dog whose offspring all die. Still another hunter, while agreeing with the nipple rule, adhered to only part of the second hunter's explanation, saying that if the *pa-as* proves himself in a hunt, it means no harm will come to the owner's family; and if it doesn't, then an offspring of the owner will die.

The commonly used term *sabat* refers to a class of dog's nipples, not to an individual hunting dog. The nipples are not aligned crossways in the *sabat* breeds. Another hunter said that *sabat* has nothing

to do with nipples but refers to a point in the hunt when barking dogs have found signs of an animal and other dogs join them. It should be noted that all this disagreement comes from two barrios only about one hour and 15 minutes trail hike apart, both within the same Guinayang cultural region, and from experienced hunters.

Even more so than *idaw* signs, the nipple rules seem to be endless. Generally anything that is unusual in a dog's nipples is taken as a sign, and if that dog turns out to be a good hunter, then the sign becomes a rule. With the scarcity of hunting dogs, one cannot afford to ignore a dog, so the hunters look hard for peculiar nipples. Some more recent classes of nipples indicating good hunting dogs include these: unaligned nipples of any sort (*basiwal*); three nipples for the double rear one; an extra nipple (*sawal*) or missing ones; a nipple in the middle of the penis with a depression leading to the nipples on either side (*colis*); elongation of the nipples across the body rather than the length of the dog, as is common.

Still more nipple rules include the belief that a dog with balloon-like nipples should be owned only by rich men and a dog with thin nipples should be owned only by the poor. If one nipple is in front of the penis and often urinated on, then the dog will easily follow the animals' trail. If the nipples are twisted counter clockwise, the dog is a coward; if clockwise, a hero. All my informants believed strongly in all nipple signs though their interpretation of them sometimes differed.

There are other signs by which hunters may recognize a good hunting dog, but these appear to be more recent and are not quite so strongly held as the nipple beliefs. Dogs with ears that flop down are not considered good. Apparently it is believed that floppy ears will impair the dog's hearing on the hunt. But if one ear is pointed forward and the other flopped down, this is a good sign.

If the dog's hair is coarse, it will be a good hunting dog. Also, if the whorls on the underside of the dog are in the middle and not at the sides, as is common, the dog will be a good hunting dog. If the dog's tail leans to the left, it must be cut. Most of the short tails in Southern Kalinga are for this reason. Black spots on the lips and mouth are good, and if any of the dog's feet area are a different color, it will be certain to catch the animal whose track it steps into.

Hunting Techniques in Southern Kalinga

Often hunters go out in groups of ten or so and then break up into groups of two or three, each with several dogs, though sometimes hunters prefer to be alone so that they will not have to share their catch. Also it is believed that dogs with one hunter will not tire so easily. Resting of dogs depends on how much they run. Five hours in a day is about maximum, and they have to be rested the next day. Usually they run for two or three hours two days in a row and are rested for two.

Especially since the banning of firearms with martial law, dogs are easily the hunter's most valuable tool. The dogs generally chase down the game and surround it. There is much shouting during the hunt to cheer on the dogs and to locate where the hunters are. This shouting is with a wa-a-a-h-o-o-o-o sound. The hunters keep their eyes and ears open. If a hunter spots a deer or if one knows where deer are or if one is inquiring where deer are, he points with his hand closed: it is believed that if a person points with fingers outstretched, the deer will run in that direction far, far away. But the game is usually found by the sharper senses of the dogs.

When a dog has found an animal, it starts barking and the chase is on as the other dogs join in and the hunters try desperately, and not always successfully, to keep up with the dogs as they dash through the forests, up and down cliffs, around trees, through the underbush. Deer usually head for water and are trapped in the middle of a stream; wild pigs are usually cornered against boulders. Dogs may chase the squirrel-like *mutit* up a tree, and then the hunter knocks it out. When it falls to the ground, the hunter will have to fight off the dogs to get it.

If the deer is greatly tired when trapped in the stream, it will not fight hard, and sometimes in these cases the dogs tear it to pieces before the hunters can get to it. It is a very rare dog that simply grabs hold of the game and does not let go until its owner comes. If the dogs get so far ahead that the hunters cannot keep up with them and then cannot find them, it is expected that the dogs will return home the same hunting day. If they do not return, it is probably because they are having a feast in the forest. The next day the hunters send boys or relatives to search the river banks for the carcass of the deer to see whether any meat can be salvaged. This is termed *ubo*.

Dogs usually keep their distance from the cornered wild pig, simply barking at it and keeping it from escaping; lots of good hunting dogs have been killed by getting too close to a cornered wild pig. Usually the hunter cripples the pig with one spear thrust, then lets go of the spear — since the strong wild pig will be thrusting about — and finishes it off with his bolo, often striking at the spinal column. Generally after the spear thrust, the dogs rush in and hold the pig. Great care is taken in killing wild pigs because they are widely regarded as dangerous. The deer, which is usually in water when caught, is speared and then the hunter pulls it with the spear toward him on the head with a stone.

The common spear (*tubay*) is about two meters long and steel tipped with one wing or backup hook on each side; some may have two on each side. Also, spear tips can be made from the tough *bikar* bamboo (related to the *anos* bamboo). It is cut crossways at an acute angle making a sharp point. This tip is about 20-30 cm. long and is fitted over a piece of wood around two meters long for the complete spear. This traditional spear has no wing. Bolos may be made from any iron; they are often fashioned from automobile springs. Most of the steel spears and bolos in Pasil come from the blacksmiths in Uma, Lubuagan.

Distribution of Meat from the Kill

The meat from the kill is divided evenly among whomever is around, whether or not they participated in the hunt. It is said that farmers with fields near the forest may spend more time in their fields than really necessary in the hopes of getting some meat. Although anyone may spear a hunted animal, he cannot touch the carcass until the original hunters arrive on the scene. The share of the meat is called *ilang*, a term covering the share of meat from any type of butchering. Persons arriving on the scene after the butchering has started do not receive an *ilang*. The hunters by custom save back for themselves the head, neck, and thorax.

Usually the intestines and other inside parts (sweetbread) of the animal are cooked and divided and eaten on the spot of the kill (or nearby), while the meat shares are taken to the home uncooked. The lungs and bones are given to the dogs. The part of the sweetbread that the hunter may not finish and takes home is called *mer-utu*. The

division of anything that was cooked in the forest is called *bilay*. Special distribution includes the head going to the leading hunter or the oldest man in the group. Also, the head and the neck may be divided between the oldest man and the leading hunter. When one uses a borrowed dog or rifle, the owner of the rifle or dog gets a share of the meat, but the hunter gets the head. (The liver is divided evenly — unlike the butchering of domestic animals where it goes to the attending elite.) Generally owners of dogs get two *ilang* and those without dogs get one *ilang*. Shares are also given to persons the hunters meet on the way home.

The *ilang* is cooked at home, and friends and relatives are invited. One may save back part of the share for the immediate family, but if one saves back “too much,” he will be “talked about.” If the family doesn’t have rice, then they cook the *ilang* and take it to the house of some relative with rice, and that relative gets a large share of the meat. Small rattan strips tied and looped at the end may be stuck in the *sawali* wall of a person’s house in remembrance of *ilang*.

Business hunters have the meat to sell but usually eat the sweetbread. Generally the shoulder and the loin are sold, usually bringing around ₱40 from traveling middlemen for a full-grown pig, and the rest of the meat is taken home. The middlemen’s going to a business hunter’s house to buy meat is called *sifierr*. Salting and smoking of the shoulder and loin is sometimes done but is rather rare; it keeps for about a month. Meat is quite scarce in Southern Kalinga, and so nobody cares about storing it.

Trapping Techniques Used by Hunters

There are four main types of traps used in Pasil: 1. *Beto* — This generally refers to pit for trapping wild pigs and sometimes deer. They can be constructed in a variety of forms, but generally these are the steps: A. The pathway of the animal is located, usually leading to and away from watering spots, B. a hole is dug about one and one-half meters deep, sometimes square and sometimes round, with a diameter of a meter and one-half (a stone wall may be necessary if the soil is soft), C. the hole is covered in a criss-cross manner by easily breakable sticks. D. the sticks are covered with leaves and moss. Occasionally sharpened bamboo poles are placed in the bottom of the pit,

but this is considered dangerous to persons who may walk by; it was done more frequently in the past when there were fewer people around. Also, if the animal is killed in the pit, he is more likely to rot before the hunter gets back. One hunter may have 20 to 50 pits, and before World War II one barrio may have had as many as 1,000 pits in its hunting grounds.

Variations in the construction of the *beto* depend on the ingenuity of the hunter. Mamerto Dollipes of Dangtalan (who is primarily a farmer, not a hunter), for example, constructed a device to scare the wild pig into the pit; wild pigs are known to be very clever and will avoid pits. The pathway in this case is on the edge of a swidden and is hemmed in on one side by a fence and on the other by heavy bush. Above the pit are two stationary logs planted in the ground in an upright position. Between these two are three heavy logs leaning loose against one piece of wood. The single piece of wood, which is placed crossways between the two stationary logs, is held by one piece of wire looped around the stick and attached to a string. The string then is stretched across the wild pig's path. When the pig trips the string, the falling logs will frighten him into the pit. In addition the pit is baited with camote and taro, which are highly favored by wild pigs. A variation on this trap would be one constructed exactly the same except that no pit would be dug; instead the pig would be frightened over a shallow cliff to fall on bamboo spikes prepared below or frightened over a deep cliff to be killed in the fall.

2. *Kortib* — This trap is usually placed at the edge of a swidden along a fence. Heavy logs are set upright against the fence and held by a stick that will be released when the attached string or vine is triggered by passing wildlife. The logs fall directly on the animal, pinning it to the ground. This is the simplest trap to construct.

3. *Balais* — This is a spear trap for pigs or deer. It is dangerous to bypassers and is usually marked by crossed sticks placed around it or by horizontal marks cut in nearby trees. About two or three meters from the pathway of the animal a stick with a sharpened steel tip is set up at the level of the heart of the animal. A 60-cm. piece of bamboo is stretched and bent tight and then tied with string or vine. A string-trigger is set across the path, and when the ani-

mal touches the string, the spear is released. A rifle can be substituted for the spear.

4. *Lasag* -- Generally used for wild chickens, birds, and *mutit*, this trap is considered by some hunters for use only by children, but it is still a commonly used trap. A string or vine is tied to a stick that is then bent. The other end of the string is looped and placed on the ground with a trigger. When released by the animal stepping inside the loop, the trap jerks the animal up and secures him by the foot.²² This trap is generally placed on ground where there are many scratches.

Minor traps include the following: 1. *Apad* -- A trap for lizards similar to the *lasag* but usually smaller. 2. *Savid* -- Used for hunting bats at night when they feed on the fruits of the *kamussa* tree, this consists of several long leaves with sharp, curved thorns tied on long poles that are swung at the bats thus entrapping them. 3. Nightlight -- At night the hunter may place a kerosene light on an elevated rock and cover it with a screen. Birds will fly into it knocking themselves out, and the hunter simply picks them up. 4. *Pangati* -- Used for catching wild chickens. It is tied to a rope pegged to the ground and on three sides around it is spread a screen about three meters in length. Pegged to the ground, the screen has circles of twine about 10 cm. in diameter placed at about every 14th cm. along the screen. When a wild chicken comes to fight, it gets entangled in the screen.²³ Usually only one chicken at a time is caught.

Hunting Seasons and Habitats of Wildlife

Although hunting is done year-round, dry seasons (*dagun*) from February through April is the primary hunting time. Rainy season (*agilid*) brings out the much disliked small, black leeches. They suck deeply and a hunter can bleed considerably after removing them, usually by simply pulling them off. Occasionally these leeches get into the eyes and cause considerable trouble. Also, in the dry season the hunters are usually free from their primary work in the paddies and swiddens -- nobody in Southern Kalinga hunts full-time because everyone has at least one field to attend since planting in the swidden and harvesting in the paddy does not begin until June.

²² Cf. Cole, *op. cit.*, p. 381.

²³ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 380-381.

It would be thought that hunters would have detailed information on the habitats of various wildlife, but I could get little information on this; the hunters say simply that they depend on the *idau*. It is known that deer and wild pigs, the most commonly hunted animals, inhabit thickly forested areas, that lizards may be found near or in caves, that bats are found in the *kamussa* tree, and that the *mutit* and *vuwot* (squirrel-like animals) are generally hunted at night.

Ceremonies Associated with Hunting

There are few ceremonies currently practiced by hunters in Southern Kalinga, and the old-timers do not recall that many ceremonies were connected with hunting in the past. The one common ceremony is that when the hunters butcher a deer or a wild pig on the hunt, they spill the blood on the ground as an offering and ask the spirits for another animal the next day; it is believed that the spirits own the wild animals. The ears and nose may also be offered to the forest spirits. In Lubo, Tanudan, according to Magannon, the liver is roasted and then thrown piece by piece in the direction of the surrounding mountains and offered to the spirits in those mountains.²⁴

There is a ceremony termed *songa* that may be performed on at least three different occasions to improve the hunt. If a good hunting dog has been catching animals and then for no discernible reason it catches no more, the owner may butcher a chicken for the spirits to persuade them to let the dog continue good hunting. The head and feet of the butchered chicken are put on the end of a stick and placed up on the house. The owner (no medium is necessary) says something to the effect of "allow my dog to catch again" and smears the chicken blood on the dog, generally around its nose. The same ceremony may be done for a rifle that no longer hits its target or no longer kills or for a new rifle but not for a new dog. And, lastly, the *songa* may be done for those who get sick after a hunt. A medium is required then and it is similar to a curing ceremony.²⁵

²⁴ Magannon, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

²⁵ In Poswoy, Balbalan, according to Dozier, "A ceremony called *songnga* is performed in cases where the illness of the patient is so grave that death is considered imminent." (*Op. cit.*, p. 180). It is a worrisome fact of life for linguists and anthropologists that many terms while belonging to the same class of events will have meanings that vary considerably. A long list of such words could be compiled from just the seven studies mentioned in this article.

When traps are used, the hunter usually places a *purdos*, the knotted stem of the *runo* plant, by his door for one day indicating that visitors other than the immediate family are prohibited. At least one technique used by several hunters after unsuccessful hunts — and to which some hunters took strong exception — was to get a new *idaw*, a good *idaw*, in the forest before returning home and then to go out before sunrise the following morning to avoid any further *idaw*. In Northern Kalinga according to Dozier, hunting amulets include lemon fruits, rattan vines, crocodile teeth, a certain ginger.²⁶

Terms for Forest Wildlife

As with much of the Kalinga language, these terms may vary from place to place. I found that such detailed terms as these — which are all from Bagtayan — are not generally known in barrios that are removed from the forests and that have few hunters. The generic term for deer is *ugsa*. The female deer up to five months old is commonly called *igaw* (also *keis* and *taag*). The mature female deer is called *am'od*. There are many terms for the male deer due to his distinctive horns. These include the following: *poliwos*, suckling and beginning to have horns; *todo*, weaned and with horns about five cm. long; *padanga*, horns beginning to have branches; *sarakan*, full grown with hard horns; *mamotod*, horns are being knocked off (they say it's tired of having such horns); *mangobeobe*, horns starting to grow again; *mamobodo*, horns grow long and are soft with hair on them; *lasilas*, age when it is ready to die of old age.

The generic term for wild pig is *biaboy* or *laman*. The following terms apply for both male and female: *chagaw*, youngest suckling; *mamorporting*, small piglets, still suckling, whose color is yellow-brown or white and striped with the hair beginning to turn black; *sumsumhong*, weaning age; *gamayan*, full grown and completely black. A female pig able to bear offspring is called *pidchar*. The male is identified by the growth of his tusks: *ngisi*, canine teeth beginning to push out lips; *manabsavit*, canines protrude about one cm.; *vucar*, canines protrude about four cm.; *mavungot*, canines are about six cm. long and curve for the last 3 cm.

The generic and only term for wild chickens is *itaw*.

²⁶ Dozier, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

Fishing Techniques and Ceremonies in Southern Kalinga

Although fish are not planted in the paddies — it is said they would destroy the rice — a very small fish termed *palispis*²⁷ flourishes in the older fields. The people say that these fish tastes bad and that they didn't use to eat them but now they do. They are trapped with a conical woven bamboo trap about 12 cm. long and about nine cm. in diameter at the large end. The small end has a removable cap where the fish are taken out. It is called a *ḡobḡob-ong*. The fish enter a small hole at the large end and cannot get out because of small inward facing bamboo spikes. The placing of the traps is termed *mangto-ong* and is usually done sometime before harvest after the rice is ripened. They are usually placed near the stone walls so as not to destroy the rice.

Fishing techniques in the streams and rivers include the following:

1. *Sarop* — This refers to a diversion of the water in a stream to make it flow through a smaller side stream. Since it requires the building of dykes and dams, it is the only fishing technique that is done by groups of fishers; all other fishing is normally done individually. First, a trap termed an *ugat* is placed at the end of the diversion where the water will flow back into the main stream. The *ugat* is built along the same principle as the *ḡobḡob-ong* but is much larger, its size depending on the size of the diversion. After the placement of the trap, dykes may be built to reinforce the diversion, and the main stream is dammed. Also, bamboo floors (termed *asar*) may be constructed to catch the fish.

2. *Sidok* — This is a conical net about one meter in diameter at the mouth and about two meters long to its tapered end. The net is generally stretched around a circle of strip rattan at its mouth, and the net is handled by two crossed bamboo sticks attached to two sides of the mouth. It is generally used after rain when the water is muddy and the river swollen. The fisher stands in the water to use it.

3. *Dalloḡ* — The same as the *sidok* but smaller, this net is used by the fisher as he stands along the river banks.

²⁷ *Palispis* is translated by Kalingas as "Japanese fish." Some said that may be they were called that because the Japanese brought them during the occupation (which seems unlikely), but nobody knows for sure. The fish were not eaten before World War II, and therefore I couldn't get a clear answer on whether they existed before World War II; they weren't important enough then for anyone to recall clearly.

4. Goggles-and-rod-with-hook — The rod, which is often fashioned from an umbrella rib, has a fish hook secured on the end, and the fisher simply spots the fish and hooks it — or he may run the hook several times through a school of fish. The fisher often swims underwater and looks under flat rocks. If he stays out of the water, the technique is termed *vongwit*; if he goes in, it is termed *kamit*. Sometimes at night the fisher will use a flashlight for bait. This is of course a clear water technique.

5. *Bantak* — Generally for bigger fish, this is the common hook and eye technique. It may be used in clear or muddy water.

6. *Udal* — This is a trap exclusively for eels, and it takes about one day to construct. The size depends on what kind of eels the fisher expects to catch, but generally it is a long tube somewhat over a meter in length made of woven bamboo with one end closed. A frog is often used as bait tied near the closed end. One end of a string is attached to the bait and the other end to a strip of bent bamboo, which when pulled, will snap closed the door of the trap. It operates on the same principle as the *lasag* trap and will catch eels in muddy or clear water but is traditionally used only in muddy water.

7. *Tabokol* — This is a throw net with weighted leads. Before commercial products the fishers used leaves of abaca and maguey plants to make the string for the nets.

8. *Om'i* — This technique uses a vine (also termed *omli*) that is pounded into powder and then broadcasted into a stagnant pool. After 30 minutes the fish float dead to the top and are picked up by hand.

9. *Laray* — Used for catching crabs, this technique refers to putting a worm on the end of a string and then pulling it slowly as the crabs stick onto it.

10. Spearing — Any large fish and especially eel may be speared. This is often a night activity with flashlight and clear water.

The ceremonies and omens associated with fishing are somewhat similar to hunting but generally much less complicated. For example, the sound of a *pisot* simply means that the fisher will have a good catch for many days. Also, the *idaw* signs are simplified. If the fisher is not having good luck, he may butcher a piglet or chicken near a stream in a regular *songa* (or *lipon*). There are no distribution rules for fish.

Fishing Seasons in Lubuagan Municipal District

April and May are the main fishing months. In these months the water is muddy and the rivers and streams small. The *laray*, *sarop*, and *udal* techniques are used extensively in these two months, and May especially is regarded as the best time to trap eels. Nets are used from August through November when the rivers are often swollen. Goggles-and-rod-with-hook and spearing are used whenever the water is clear but most often in July and August. The *taboḳol* technique is also used in July and August when the rivers are not swollen and the stones can be clearly seen and are not covered with moss. *Bantak* and *omli* may be used anytime.

Types of Fish Caught and Other Notes

By their Kalinga names the fish most often caught in Tanglag are *dalit*, eel; *iḳan*, a squat fish of 30-40 cm. length; *ḳolidaw*, probably the largest fish, which is usually somewhat shorter than a meter; *pari-long*, a sucker fish about 15 cm. long; *dagdaw*, small shrimp *ḳipḳip*, a term for any small fish; *ti'apia*, a flat, black fish 15 or so cm. long; *ba lanba*, a fish about 10 cm. long with a long snout; and the small *mochi* fish.

Only eels are sold for cash, usually in Tabuk, Tabuk, the provincial capital, which is about 40 kilometers east of Tanglag, and sometimes in Lubuagan, Lubuagan. The other fish are bartered for rice or consumed at home. The only preservation technique used is drying. In the villages along the major rivers of the Chico, the Saltan, Mabaca, the Tanudan almost every male fishes, but most fishers along the Chico River agree that the fish were more plentiful just after World War II than now. There is relatively no fishing on the Pasil River since it is very swift and polluted from the mining area in the western part of Pasil Municipal District.

The Historical Significance of Hunting Grounds

It seems evident from any theoretical or empirical viewpoint that hunting was more important in the 19th century and earlier in Southern Kalinga than it is now. Agricultural systems during those times were largely land-extensive, i.e., swiddens, with more leisure time for both headhunting and wildlife hunting than the present predominantly land-and-labor-intensive, two-crop paddy system allows. A point not

so evident concerns the ownership of hunting grounds and forest resources. Barton writes quite bluntly, "The hunting grounds of every region are open to every Kalinga,"²⁸ but this statement conflicts with much other evidence. In support of his position Barton points out that provisions for opening and closing hunting areas are not mentioned in peace pacts, but this serves only to indicate that peace pacts are fairly recent and cover only the law and order factors necessary for trading and eliminating the headhunting that had become bothersome by the early 1900s to both the Kalinga and the American administration. Again, it must be kept in mind that Barton's sources of information were limited to a few individuals from Lubuagan town, which as a population center had by the 1940s no more specific hunting grounds but instead encroached on the hunting grounds of the surrounding barrios, as I was repeatedly told in Pasil barrios.

That hunting grounds could be owned is shown by the fact that one of the continual large-scale difficulties in Pasil during the early 20th century concerned the protection of hunting grounds. Balatoc in western Pasil was settled largely by people from Tulgao, Tinglayan, sometime well before the 20th century. In the early part of the 1900s other settlers from Tulgao, which must have been a land-scarce area, tried to settle at Colayo, about a five-hour hike from Balatoc. However, under the leadership of Kaiabu, a famous headhunter and Balatoc figure during the Spanish period and throughout the early American period, Balatoc drove off the settlers several times, destroying their swiddens and beginnings of terraces, and Colayo was not settled permanently until the 1930s after Kaiabu's death. From all indications they were driven off because Balatoc, or at least the elite of Balatoc, claimed the Colayo area as its hunting grounds. This seems to be a classic illustration of elites keeping the forest intact for their own hunting while farmers go land hungry, as happened in Europe, especially in the 11th, 12th, and 13th centuries. The appropriation of hunting grounds begins from the historical moment when two hunting parties from different villages cross each other's path. The population density in Southern Kalinga is such that one can only imagine that this happened some time ago.

Forest resources in Southern Kalinga certainly can be held in private ownership, and this must have started whenever two indivi-

²⁸ Barton, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

duals looked at the same tree for the first time. That the rich in Tannudan owned forest resources in the very olden days is evident from the ancient folk epics.²⁹ Almost all the *yakal* trees (first class wood) and most of the *manguprol* trees (second class wood in the forest along the Tabia River in Pasil are marked as privately owned.

Much of the current difficulty about the boundaries of Pasil Municipal District — accented by the potential tax source from the gold and copper mines — is that the later peace pact boundaries were sloppy in specifying hunting and forest resource areas because of the over-emphasis on peace and trade. Government acts that create municipalities and provinces in the mountains generally simply name barrios in the absence of land surveys. The boundaries of the barrios are generally thought to be in the peace pacts, which the government is obliged to respect though they are not necessarily accepted as final. although the few early peace pacts — before the American occupation — were made primarily to settle trouble about hunting areas, the decline of hunting, along with the other factors mentioned above, meant that later peace pacts would be poor representations of traditional boundaries.

The Rise of Population and the Decline of Hunting

Census figures are notoriously unreliable. Any official population figures for the old Mountain Province unit from before 1935 may be regarded as inaccurate; Barton points out that these numbers were grossly inflated by the American lieutenant-governors so that their subprovince would look more important and money could be more easily gotten from the insular treasury.³⁰ The modern census have improved considerably, but they still must be approached with caution; Billiet and Lambrecht explain how the 1960 census in Abra is inaccurate in its counting of the various ethnic groups.

My own on-the-spot population and house count in the Poblacion and barrios of Pasil shows the recent official census to be in error by only about two percent, which is rather remarkable. This encouraging accuracy, plus the ethnic homogeneity of Southern Kalinga, gives us some reason for a bit of faith in the last three complete census in

²⁹ Billiet and Lambrecht, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

³⁰ Barton, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

Southern Kalinga. I am therefore entering the official figures here.³¹ (Since the boundaries of these Municipal Districts were different prior to the 1970 census, the barrio populations were used to compile the 1960 and 1948 figures for comparative purposes.)

These official figures indicate a steady population growth for more than the last 20 years in Southern Kalinga. The historical depth to my demographic and census data is not yet completed, but a preliminary survey indicates that with the exceptions of a small pox epidemic just before the turn of the century, a 1920 flue epidemic, a diarrhea epidemic in 1924, a severe rice shortage in 1927-1929, and perhaps the current (1973) measles epidemic we can say with some certainty that the population of Southern Kalinga has increased fairly steadily in the last 100 years, despite some out-migration to mining and educational centers. My data indicate an exceptionally rapid population growth from 1930 to 1941 — also a period for intensive building of irrigated and terraced rice paddies — and a moderately rapid one from 1950 to 1965 — when many barrio extensions and new sitios were established.

Population growth leads to a number of changes in the ecosystem (and in the people's culture);³² the most important of these for hunting is that the use of more and more land for agricultural systems decreases the forest land. This decrease of wildlife habitat, coupled with the intensification of the remaining hunting in smaller and smaller forest areas, means that the wildlife decreases at a progressively more rapid pace. (At least most of the wildlife decreases; it seems that rats, freed from the larger predators that kept them in check and able to survive in grasslands, increase quite rapidly, much to the dismay of the rice farmers.)

³¹ Kalinga-Apayao Census Branch Office, Bureau of Census and Statistics, Republic of the Philippines, "Population, Land Area and Density of the Province of Kalinga-Apayao by Municipality — Censal Years 1948, 1960 and 1970," *Kalinga-Apayao Census Banner*, Vol. I, No. 2 (April-June 1973), p. 8.

³² See Ester Boserup, *The Conditions of Agricultural Growth: The Economics of Agrarian Change Under Population Pressure* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1965); Don E. Dumond, "Population Growth and Cultural Change," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Winter 1965), pp. 302-324; Michael J. Harner, "Population Pressure and the Social Evolution of Agriculturalists," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Spring 1970), pp. 67-86; and Brian Spooner, ed., *Population Growth: Anthropological Implications*. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1972).

POPULATION GROWTH

Municipal District	Population			Area Sq. K's	Density			Percent Growth	
	1970	1960	1948		1970	1960	1948	'60-'70	'48-'60
Lubuagan	7,236	6,006	4,919	329.5	22.0	18.2	12.7	20.5	43.3
Pasi	5,557	4,801	4,035	188.0	30.0	25.5	21.5	15.7	19.0
Tanudan	5,696	4,607	3,849	349.1	16.3	13.2	11.0	23.6	19.7
Tinglayan	10,317	9,135	6,935	189.5	54.4	48.2	36.6	12.9	31.7

Although the last of the wild carabao in Southern Kalinga were seen in Lubuagan and Tanudan Municipal Districts sometime in the 1920s, the smaller wildlife of pigs and deer was maintained up until about the last decade, when there was a very sharp reduction in their numbers. Many persons in Pugong can vividly recall that just after World War II wild pigs mixed with domestic ones right in the barrio and were easily shot. They faded out by the mid-1950s and now keep to the forest, making their foraging forays only into the swiddens. Even the Lubuagan-Tabuk roadside barrio of Ableg — just 12 road kilometers from the Lubuagan population center — had hunting grounds and hunters just after World War II, but now there is no more hunting in Ableg. The Dollipas' trap mentioned earlier is in the Lonong rice field area about five trail kilometers from Lubuagan, less Lubuagan, and has not caught a wild pig in over a year, though a person hiking through the area in the early 1960s would see several wild pigs in a day. Just before World War II Galang had six full-time hunters who bagged at least three animals every day, and every one ate meat at least once a day. Now there is about one catch every three days, and some families have meat only once a month — and this is usually from butchered domestic animals. Just after World War II hunters in Balatoc, which is surrounded by forests, were catching three to five animals a day, and just before martial law in 1972 they were catching one to three animals a day.

In general throughout the hunting barrios of Pasil the hunters were getting three to five catches a day per barrio in the years before World War II, two to three a day just after World War, and about one a day during the dry season of 1972. Perhaps the most dramatic evidence of the growth of population and the decline of wildlife is in the area known as Amdalaw on the cliffs of the Pasil River just north across from Dangtalan barrio. In the late 1950s and early 1960s a young man in his mid-20s named Gavino Mosing killed many a wild pig in the then unpopulated Amdalaw area. This same man is now the mayor of Pasil and has his house in Amdalaw, supervised the building of a feeder road through the area in 1972, witnessed the laying of the foundations for the permanent municipal buildings there in October 1973, and has encouraged several families to move to Amdalaw, now known as Pasil Poblacion (or the Municipal Site).

The Effects of Martial Law on Hunting and Future Prospects

According to various newspaper accounts, based on government releases, in the first nine months since martial law was declared on September 21, 1972, a total of 532,616 firearms were confiscated, 145 private armies were disarmed and disbanded and their political overlords placed in detention, and over 12,000 criminals were apprehended. The outlawing of firearms has been the most immediately felt consequence of martial law among the Southern Kalinga. Before martial law almost every farmer went to his field armed with both a revolver and a rifle; a belt of ammunition completed the Kalinga workday costume. Most Kalingas welcome this change to a less trouble-charged atmosphere, though some Kalingas adhering to the more traditional concepts of revenge regret that their freedom in such matters is now curtailed.

In terms of hunting and fishing the results of martial law are still difficult to determine. There is less of an economic burden on hunters in terms of firearms; before martial law a shotgun costs ₱400 and a semi-automatic rifle costs ₱1,200. But now the expensive dogs are more necessary than ever. The hunting techniques using firearms are suspended. One hunter mentioned that a common way of hunting wild pigs before martial law was to whistle when one was spotted; the pig would usually stop still, and if the hunter fired immediately, he had a catch. Also, the hunter could wait at a guava tree for the pig to come to feed.

At least in Northern Kalinga and probably in Apayao "wild pigs, deer and other wild-game animals have multiplied and schools of fish are now teeming along creeks, streams and rivers" since martial law even to the extent that "some farmers have complained that the increase of wild pigs in forestlands have [sic] resulted in the destruction of kaingin crops by foraging wild animals."³³

There has been no noticeable increase of wildlife in Pasil and Lubuagan. The significant controlling factor is probably the extent of the habitat when the forests decrease to a certain point, and an increase in wildlife in Southern Kalinga probably should not be expected as might take place in the extensive forests to the north.

³³ Augustus U. Saboy, "Animals Are Happy," *Baguio Midland Courier*, Vol. XXVI, No. 7 (July 22, 1973), p. 3.

Even if hunting were completely abolished, it would be difficult for the wildlife to maintain its current population in view of the continual expansion of terraced paddies, especially in Pasil. It is doubtful whether the fish resources of Southern Kalinga, especially of the Pasil River, could ever regain their pre-World War II levels without extensive ecological program, including the stocking of fish in the mountain streams. Fishing in the other major rivers will probably remain a minor activity for some. It seems that hunting, however, is destined to become a thing of the past in Southern Kalinga in the rather near future; when the catch becomes less than one animal a week, hunters will find it more profitable to spend their time on extending their swiddens and building new terraces, which of course will further reduce the forests.

UNITY AND DISUNITY IN THE MUSLIM STRUGGLE

SAMUEL K. TAN

Some stereotyped ideas or theories about Muslim Filipinos have been propagated by both Muslims and Non-Muslims. They have caused some misconceptions and illusions of Muslim history and culture to such an extent that solutions to problems confronting Muslim areas are difficult to find. A re-evaluation is, therefore, necessary for two reasons: first, recent scholarship has shown more light and development in Muslim societies especially during the past decades; second, contemporary problems in Muslim areas, particularly in Sulu, require no less than a serious study. By this is meant not just a compilation of past opinions and statements, but a critical examination of sources of Muslim history and culture and their underlying assumptions. This examination of contemporary and past sources is essential to proper understanding of what has been called the "Muslim Problem."¹

For purposes of classification, theoretical approaches to Muslim studies, particularly in relation to such an important issue as armed struggle or violence, may be broadly divided into *unitary* and *pluralistic*. The *unitary* approach assumes that Muslims since pre-Spanish period have been a united people and that their oneness had been founded on Malay cultural unity and Islamic tradition, the beginning of which is

¹ The term appears in both official and unofficial sources. Many have questioned the appropriateness of the term including this writer. The term goes back to the Spanish period and, later, carried to the American regime during which the whole situation in Muslim societies was referred to as the "Moro Problem". Subsequently, the term assumed a more religious context in Muslim Problem" possibly related to the increasing dominance of Christian values in society and the polarization of society into Christians and non-Christians. In more recent times, the terms has acquired a regional dimension and problems in Muslim areas have been referred to as "Mindanao", "Sulu", "Cotabato", "Lanao", or "Mindanao and Sulu" problem. Trends seem to point to the adoption of a more ethnolinguistic terminology. In effect, it is inaccurate or unfair to consider the Muslims or Non-Christians as "the problem" since the Christians have also been partly responsible for the problems and tensions in Mindanao and Sulu.

traced to a time before the fourteenth century. The pluralistic view assumes that basically there has been no Muslim unity either on the basis of history or culture and that the unity referred to as "Muslim" or "Islamic" is more of a desired goal of contemporary Muslim movements rather than a present or historical reality. It is thus necessary to put in perspective the two approaches.

Introduction

In the pre-twentieth century period, Spanish and non-Spanish sources assumed that the "Moros"² were a fierce group of people, strongly influenced by "Mohammedanism," bound by a common Malay culture, and intensely antagonistic to Christianity. Typical of this unitarism were Francisco Combes, *Historia de Mindanao y Jolo* (1897, Retana) Jose Montero y Vidal's *Historia de la Pirateria Malayo-Mohametana en Mindanao y Jolo y Borneo* (1888, 2 Vols.); Pio A. del Pazos' *Jolo: Relato Historico-Militar desde su Descubrimiento por los Espanoles en 1578 a Nuestro Dias* (1879); Vicente Barrantes' *Guerras Piraticas . . .* (1878); and several accounts and commentaries by Spanish writers in Blair and Robertsons' *Philippine Islands* (1903-1908). The effect of such a unitary view on colonial policy and action was to treat all Muslims of Mindanao and Sulu as "Moros," assuming that they were uncivilized and, therefore, had to be either Christianized or put to the sword. This attitude was in keeping with both the impressions and the scholarship of medieval Europe which was dominated by ecclesiastical attacks on Islam and the Prophet.³ The Muslim reaction in the Philippines was to resist both Christianization and militarism which were the two inseparable instruments of Hispanization.⁴

At the close of the Spanish era and during the first two decades of American rule, Najeeb Saleeby wrote at least three studies on Muslim societies and history. He pursued a unitary pattern of analysis which,

² Peter Gowing traced the beginning of the term "Moro" or "Moor" to the Roman "Maurus" which, he concluded, was changed to "Moros". Then, it was introduced to the Philippines where it has been used to designate all the Muslim Filipinos. Gowing advocates the retention of the term on historical grounds and, in effect, suggests that the Muslims dignify the historic connotation of the term. It seems, however, better to replace it with indigenous terms such as *Tausug, Maranaos, Magindanaos* etc.

³ Francisco Gabrieli, *Muhammad and the Conquest of Islam*, translated from the Italian by Virginia Luling and Rosamund Lenell (N. Y: McGraw Hill, 1968).

⁴ John L. Phelan, *Hispanization of the Philippines* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), pp. 136-137.

however, differed in aim from its Spanish or Non-Muslim version. The latter, as was pointed out earlier, attempted to show the "Moros" as uncivilized. Saleeby saw them as one people with a common and proud history, enriched by patriotic resistance to colonialism and united by common belief in Islam and Malay culture. In *Studies in Moro History, Law and Religion* (1905), he showed that Muslim historical unity was strengthened by adherence to customary law and religious tradition. The *History of Sulu* written in 1908 and focused on Tausog society, emphasized diplomatic relations and the role of the Sultanate as a unifying factor. Assumption of unity was related to the continuity of political institutions as shown in the royal genealogies in the *tarsilas*; the important role of the Sultanate; and the numerous treaties between Sulu and foreign powers which considered the Sultanate as a sovereign state. Saleeby's contributions, therefore, to Muslim studies was to provide a theoretical alternative to biased Spanish interpretations of Muslim history and culture and to direct American Moro policy, in which he had part in formulating and implementing, to a positive view of Muslim societies. This was well articulated in the *The Moro Problem* which was published in 1913 when events in Muslimland were moving towards a critical Muslim-American confrontation in Sulu.⁵ But as it developed, American Moro Policy had both Spanish and Saleeby's unitarism which has remained in Philippine government policy.

Whether or not Saleeby's unitary approach was in consonance with either historical realities and undetached from its sociological context remains the main issue of contention. But it seems quite difficult to validate his thematic conclusion, either from historical evidences or from contemporary developments.

Providing support for unitarism is Majul's *Muslims in the Philippines* (1973) which seems to depend heavily on historical evidences including Southeast Asian sources. In fact Majul extends the same unitary approach to Muslim societies in Southeast Asia and the rest of dar-al-Islam.⁶ His contribution, therefore, to Muslim studies is in

⁵ Samuel K. Tan, *Sulu Under American Military Rule, 1899-1913* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines. Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review, March 1967); Paul D. Rogers, "Battle of Bag-sak", *Philippine Magazine*, vol. XXVI, No. 9 (Sept. 1939), pp. 370-71, 380-382.

⁶ Cesar A. Majul, *The Muslims in the Philippines* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1973).

providing support for a unitary approach to Muslim problems, in articulating a "Muslim perspective" for Philippine history and culture, and in establishing a theoretical link between Muslim history and that of the Muslim world. With a few exceptions, Majul's writings are limited to the pre-twentieth century period of Muslim history in the Philippines but the theoretical framework has been used by contemporary Muslim movements and by the government. It seems, however, that, although unitary in approach, Majul, in a pamphlet on integration,⁷ recognizes the lack of unity in Muslim leadership and movements. But whether or not such recognition is a repudiation of unitarism which has characterized most of his works and others before him remains a question.

What appears to have been left unanswered is the issue of fragmentation, diversity, and disunity in Muslim societies especially in the Muslim armed struggle. Perhaps, such problem can best be treated by inquiry into an analysis of social, political, economic, cultural, psychological, and ecological determinants of Muslim attitudes and behaviour. This is contingent on an integrated research program in which the contributions of the disciplines are recognized and utilized.⁸ But this integration of disciplinary methodologies is only possible in a situation where scholars are more aware of their inadequacies and limitations than their contributions. It is in the vacuum of intellectual inadequacy and humility that meaningful interdependence operates between scholars of various persuasions and specializations. Such interdependence in scholarship leads to better perception and, therefore, conceptualization of problems.

The unitary emphasis is also found in Alunan Glang's *Muslim Secession and Integration* and Jainal Rasul's *The Muslim Struggle for Identity*. But it is not clear how much unity is present in Muslim societies in view of more evidences of disunity or diversity. In Lanao, Cotabato, and Sulu, Muslim rebels labelled "Maoists" are fighting not only government troops but also Muslim returnees called "balikbayans" and Muslim recruits called "bagonglipunans."⁹ A macro view of the whole Muslim struggle shows the Sulu Muslims left alone in what seems a difficult conflict. The Lanao and Cotabato Muslims have

⁷ Cesar A. Majul, *Cultural Diversity, National Integration and National Identity in the Philippines* (Caloocan City: Convislam Press, 1917).

⁸ W. G. Runciman, *Social Science and Political Theory* (Cambridge: University Press, 1969), p. 1; Stuart Chase, *Proper Study Mankind* (N. Y: Harper, 1963), p. 202.

⁹ *Times Journal*, March 1974.

been pacified following a historical pattern in which the last significant battle against colonial rule was fought in Sulu in 1913 after Lanao and Cotabato had long been subdued.¹⁰

It seems then that Glang and Rasul provide repetitious support for unitarism referring to historical events in which inter-relationships are difficult to establish. Rasul restates the same assumption of unity somewhat affected by an emphasis on Muslim search for 'identity' which implies absence of social cohesion. The theory of the "Ninth Ray" which Glang articulated in many occasions and, later, Duma Sinsuat, merely expressed in more symbolic terms and form the unitary approach to Muslim problems and Muslim demand for symbolic representation.¹¹ Thus, the theoretical contributions of Glang and Rasul to Muslim studies offer no alternative to what Saleeby and Majul have already expressed adequately.

Pursuing the same unitary view and expressing it in typical western terminology and methodology are American scholars whose publications and researches on Muslim Filipinos were connected mostly with their graduate work. Clifford Smith in *History of the Moros: A Study in Conquest and Colonial Government*¹² assumed Muslim unity under a benevolent American rule, and Dorothy Rogers in *History of American Occupation and Administration of the Sulu Archipelago, 1899-1920* developed the same emphasis with a local focus.¹³ Peter Gowing in *American Mandate Over Moroland*¹⁴ criticized some aspects of American policy and rule in Muslimland but underscored America's fine record not only in governing the Muslims well but also in bringing them together under one political rule. The same might be said of Ralph Thomas' *Muslim but Filipino; the Integration of Philippine Muslim, 1917-1946*¹⁵ and Thomas Keifer's *Tausug Armed Conflict, the Social Organization of Military Activity in the Philippine Muslim*

¹⁰ Samuel K. Tan, *The Muslim Armed Struggle in the Philippines, 1900-1941*, an unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Syracuse University, 1973, pp. 33-34.

¹¹ Mama S. Sinsuat, "Ninth Ray For the Filipino Flag", *CNI Monthly Bulletin*, Manila (Jan.-Feb. 1970), p. 4.

¹² Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1948.

¹³ Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of San Francisco, 1959.

¹⁴ Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, 1969.

¹⁵ Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1971.

¹⁶ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).

*Society*¹⁷ which assumed the existence of a "Muslim Society." The idea of "Muslim culture" also permeated the studies of Mednick, Saber and Baradas for Maranao society and the Notre Dame of Jolo. A host of others have also written on Muslim culture and History but they all fall within the same unitary context.

Looking back to what had been said, two interrelated questions are brought to focus: first, are the conclusions of unitary Muslim studies reflective of historical and contemporary realities? Or, are they only expressed goals of Muslim movements and leaders vital to the Muslim struggle for justice and recognition in Philippine society? It seems that there are evidences to show that Muslim unity is only found in the hopes, aspirations, and dreams of the Muslim people. The evidences are historical, political, cultural and contemporary.

Historical

The historical argument for unitarism is anchored on the continuity of Muslim resistance to colonialism. Resistance, accordingly had been concerted that the Muslims had never been conquered. Publications, especially by Muslims including the writer's *Sulu Under American Military Rule, 1899-1930* have not failed to emphasize the "unconquerability" aspect of the argument. The unitary premise, however, raises some doubt. While persistent and often times furious, Muslim resistance was not necessarily consolidated or unified. Persistence merely revealed the general impact of colonialism on Muslim and Non-Muslim societies, more or less related to the nature and implementation of colonial policies. The continuity of resistance is not necessarily correlated with the existence of basic unity in culture or history, otherwise, the problem of integration would not have arisen. There was, in fact, no connection between depredations from Sulu and from Mindanao or any relation between armed opposition to Spanish rule in Lanao and Cotabato to that of Sulu and the rest of the Muslim areas.¹⁸

¹⁷ Melvin Mednik, *Encampment on the Lakes: the Social Organization of a Moslem Philippine (Moro) People* (University of Chicago: Philippine Studies Program, 1965); Gerard Rixhon, editor, *Sulu Studies* (Jolo: Notre Dame of Jolo, 1972), Vol. 2, 1973.

¹⁸ *Historical Sketch Dating From the First Expedition Up the Rio Grande de Mindanao to 1897*, Folder I — "History of the Philippine Island-Zamboanga Intelligence Reports", *John L. Pershing Papers (JJP Papers)*, Subject File, Philippines, 1902-1903, Box 319, pp. 9, 25, and 26.

The Muslim struggle was divided and limited. Sultan Kudarat's struggle considered the most significant in Cotabato and Lanao was limited in involvement and extent. But this does not in any way minimize Kudarat's stature as Cotabato's best leader in History equalled only by Datu Uttu of Buayan. The conflict of Datu Uttu with Spanish forces was plagued by Uttu's feuds or differences with Rio Grande datus, especially Datu Ayunan and Datu Gadung, and later, Datu Piang¹⁹ At one instance, Uttu provided boats for Spanish operations against Muslim groups who were not within his alliance.²⁰ In Lanao, the struggle was represented by at least three groups: *Bayabaos*, *Onayans* and *Macius*. The latter claimed to be the most important being more ancient, so they said, than the other two. In Sulu the "Amirul-Harun rivalry" for the Sultanate polarized into two contending parties. Harun's faction supported Spanish claim of sovereignty in exchange for Spanish support for Harun's claim. Harun's stand was either in disregard of Muslim consensus or customary law or in line with the recurrent nature of disruptive patterns in Muslim societies.

In the American military regime the pattern of disunity was again apparent in Muslim resistance. There was no connection between resistance in Lanao led by Datu Sajiduciman, the sultans and datus of Bacolod, Bayabao, Bayan Maciu, Tugaya, and Taraca and similar reaction in Cotabato led by Datus Ali, Sansaluna, Mopuk, Tambilawan, several Upper Cotabato chieftains. Nor were they related in any way to uprisings and movements in Sulu led by Panglima Hassan, Datu Usap, Paruka Utik, Maharajah Andung, and Pala. How then could there be basic historical unity in the absence of even one evidence of cooperation or coordination in the resistance?

In fact, dissensions and rivalries affected the Muslim struggle. In Cotabato, Datu Ali, whose rebellion (1903-1906) was the most significant anti-colonial response in Mindanao during this period, attempted to solicit support from Lanao Muslims for what Ali thought was the only meaningful answer to American militarism.²² But the "united

¹⁹ Reynaldo Ileto, *Magindanao, 1860-1888: Career of Dato Uto of Buayan* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1971).

²⁰ Tan, *Muslim Armed Struggle* . . . , p. 133.

²¹ *Report of John Pershing to the Adjutant General, May 15, 1903, Camp Vicars, Mindanao, JJP Papers, Folder I, "Camp Vicars, 1900-1902", Subject File, Philippines, Box 317, p. 1.*

²² *Sunday Star*, Washington D. C., March 24, 1912, Bureau of Insular Affairs File (B. I. A.) 4865-64; Leonard Wood Diary, October 31, 1906;

front" never materialized because there was no interest or sympathy on the part of the Lanao Muslims many of whom had already been won over by the Americans. More detrimental than Lanao's indifference was his father-in-law's alliance with the government. Datu Piang, dictated, perhaps, more by practical realities than ritual kinship ties, supported American campaigns against Ali and subsequently against all "insurrections" in Cotabato. He provided American authorities with vital information on Ali's movements leading ultimately to Ali's death in Simpetan.²³ Piang's attitude was probably influenced by the old rivalry between Piang and Uttu, Ali's uncle or father. This strained relationship never disappeared in Cotabato's history. It continued to hamper Muslim struggle and came to a more defined hostility between the Piangs and the Ampatuans who claimed lineage to Datu Uttu.

The dissension in Lanao was more pronounced than in other areas during the first decade of the century. This was revealed in numerous letters of local datus, sultans, cabugatans, sangkapans etc. who wrote in the local language and in broken and difficult type of Spanish and English. Local chieftains offered to give information or help to the colonial authorities in the campaigns against recalcitrant Muslim groups or bands. Others even fought each other to court colonial recognition and benefits. Some fought for purely personal reasons or for supremacy. This was, for instance, shown in the "Lumamba-Tawakir dispute"²⁴ over the issue of secular versus religious authority in local matters. The dispute was complicated by customs which recognized avuncular rights or privileges. It was finally settled by American intervention which enforced agreement based on "separation of powers."

Rivalry and dissension were also noted in Sulu.²⁵ The Sultan helped the government in suppressing uprisings and, in fact, was behind the operations against Panglima Hassan and, later, Pala. At the same time, he gave comfort and sometimes support to the uprisings. The Schuck family whose ancestry goes to a German-Tausug origin, assisted American troops in tracking Jikiri and his band to their death in Patian Island. Datu Julkarnain, Datu Kalbi, and Datu Tahil opposed and fought the forces of Sultan Kiram, Panglima Indanan, and Datu Bandahalla. Sometimes they cooperated with American authorities. Jul-

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Report of Provincial Governor H. Gilheuser to the Secretary of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, Zamboanga, October 18, 1916; B. I. A. 5075-119-A, p. 8.*

²⁵ Tan, *Muslim Armed Struggle...*, p. 37.

karnain, until his death in 1912, became one of America's best friends. He was respected not so much for his acquiescence and friendship, but for his stubborn resistance to American rule in the period of the Bates Treaty (1899-1904) which represented the only tangible basis of Sulu-American relations at that point in time. These inter-Muslim conflicts appeared to have been connected with family rivalries. Julkarnain and Kalbi were brothers and Tahil was Julkarnain's son. Indanan and Bandahalla were rivals of Kalbi. Kiram was a constant target of Julkarnain's opposition and his frustration in failing to win over one of Sulu's most powerful families had never failed to inspire him to take advantage of any opportunity to weaken Julkarnain's popular base even if it meant accommodating Indanan's unpredictable alliance.

In the civil regime (1914-1935), the Lanao Muslims were divided into pro-Americans and pro-Filipinos.²⁶ The *Americanistas*, as the first group was referred to, were led by Amai Manibilang of Madaya and Datu Lawi Usongan of Maciu. The *Filipinistas*, largely composed of government officials and employees, were led by Datu Ibra. A showdown came during the 1924 visit of Gov.-Gen. Wood in which both factions were eager to demonstrate loyalties and convictions.²⁷ Wood had to meet separately with the Manibilang-Usongan faction because of tension that the rivalry created, while Secretary of Interior, Felipe Agoncillo, had to confer with the Ibra group. In 1934, Lanao was again torn by strifes and violence when several bands roamed around, particularly those led by Amai Milon, Dimakaling, and Ingud.²⁸

About the same time in Cotabato, peace and order were disrupted by a number of incidents. Datu Alamada continued Ali's anti-colonial movement.²⁹ But Datu Inuk and Datu Piang opposed Alamada and offered to help American troops to bring Alamada to surrender and, if

²⁶ Maj. Charles S. Livingston, *Constabulary Monograph of the Sulu Province*, November 15, 1915, *Joseph R. Hayden Papers (JRH Papers)*, Box 29-35, pp. 71-72.

²⁷ "Inside Story of Wood's Last Tour". *Philippine Herald*, April 2, 1924, B. I. A. Wood File, Clippings, pt. 3.

²⁸ Gov. Gen. Dwight Davis to Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, May 22, 1930, No. 267, B. I. A. 4865-172; *Report of Provincial Governor J. Heffington*, December 21, 1934, *JRH Papers*, Box 28; Confidential Letters of Elpidio Mamaradlo and Sabar Muto to the Division Superintendent of Schools, Lanao, August 26, 1935; Fred J. Passmore, Superintendent of Schools, to the Director of Education, August 20, 1935, *JRH Papers*, Box 28.

²⁹ District Governor Edward Dworak to Gen. John Pershing, December 25, 1912, Folder 5— "Gov. of Moro Province 1910-13", *JJP Papers*, Book File, Memoirs (unpublished), 1904-1913, Box 371.

unsuccessful, to liquidate him and his followers. In 1923, Datu Santiago rose up against the government because of abuses committed by school authorities who forced them, under constabulary guards and threat, to repair school buildings without compensation.³⁰ He was followed four years later by Datu Mampuroc of Kitibud who had grievances against Datu Piang for collecting ₱20,000 from his Manobo people. His reaction, marked by bloody clashes with government troops, led to what became known as the *Alangkat Movement* which included Muslims.³¹ The movement started in the heart of Mt. Kitibud, Northern Cotabato where Mampuroc established some kind of mountain or messianic rituals which bound devotees to the cause.

In Sulu, disunity in Muslim leadership and struggle was portrayed in political disputes and intrigues. Datu Tahil, an escapee of the 1913 Bud Bagsak encounter and husband of Princess Tarhata, revolted against the government because of political grievances and economic problems.³² In the early thirties the Sultan was opposed by a powerful combination of Sangkula, Tulawi, and Indanan who earlier was Kiram's ally against Julkarnain's faction.³³ Toward the close of the decade, the disputes, sometimes accompanied by violence, led to a political fragmentation of Sulu into several contending parties each claiming right to succession.³⁴ The factions finally polarized into two powerful camps led by Datu Tambuyong on one hand and by Dayang Dayang Piandao and Datu Ombra, her husband, on the other.³⁵ The resulting establishment of two sultanates, one in Igasan under Tambuyong and another in Maimbung under Ombra in 1937, marked the eclipse of the Sultanate as a significant institution in Muslim History. The unity it had maintained loosely in Sulu through a delicate balance and

³⁰ *Ibid.*; Frank Carpenter to Frank McIntyre, February 19, 1927, B. I. A. 5075.

³¹ *Manila Bulletin*, February 22, 1927, *JRH Papers*, Box 28-34. The term "Alangkat" might have been derived from local terminology which means "ruined".

³² Frank W. Carpenter to Gen. Frank McIntyre, B. I. A. Chief, January 28, 1927, Frank W. Carpenter "P" File, Pt. II; National Archives, Washington D.C.; *New York Times*, January 15, 1972, B. I. A. 4865-A-88.

³³ Arolas Tulawi to Bishop Mosher of the Episcopal Church, August 23, 1933, *JRH Papers*, Box 28-31; Akuk Sangkula's *Memorandum of Charges Against Governor Spiller*, January 6, 1934, *JRH Papers*, Box 29-35; Sangkula to James Fugate, November 12, 1933, *JRH Papers*, Box 29-39; Fugate to Hayden, May 27, 1934, *JRH Papers*, Box 29-31.

³⁴ Howard Eager to Sergeant Walter S. Hurley, December 2, 1938, B. I. A. 21887-147.

³⁵ *New York Tribune*, January 31, 1937, *JRH Papers*, Box 29-30.

compromise of vested interest, sometimes through intrigues, came to an end. Since unity disappeared with the collapse of the Sultanate structure, was therefore not rooted in strong cultural foundations, either Malay or Islamic, and Muslim unity was at best idealistic.

After the last war the only meaningful outbreak in Muslimland was the Kamlun Uprising in 1952 which was triggered by political threats, agrarian intrigues, and socio-economic problems.³⁶ During his surrender to Magsaysay, in Jolo, Kamlun revealed what appeared to be the Tausug fear of the future in the face of modern changes which tended to benefit the Christian sectors rather than the natives. In the uprising which dismembered the famed Nenita Unit of the Armed Forces, the pattern of weakness emerged from Tausug individualism. But Magsaysay's program or promise was more idealistic than realistic having no adequate funds to undertake massive development projects for Sulu. Tausug grievances, as the uprising demonstrated, were not eradicated. They were, in fact, nurtured by the "resettlement" of Kamlun and his closest men in Muntinlupa rather than in Tawi-Tawi. These grievances were buoyed up by Tausug fear of dismemberment on account of rapid Christianization in Sulu undertaken by religious missions (Catholic and Protestant) and secular institutions which promoted Christian culture. This created the preconditions to conflict and tensions.

Postwar conflicts or movements were not felt in other Muslim areas such as Lanao and Cotabato which remained quiet until the Muslim struggle gained momentum and gradually assumed *jihadic* pattern as a result of both Christian and Muslim atrocities and prejudice.³⁷ Violent conflagration was fanned by internal politics in which Christian politicians and traditional Muslim leaders seized the opportunity to get government concessions at the expense of the Muslim people. It was also reinforced by influence from both rightist and leftist elements which sought to mix ideology with religion in an effort to create a Muslim base for revolutionary and counter-revolutionary movements.³⁸

From historical patterns, it seems quite difficult to see a "Muslim society" bound together by historical experiences and the struggle against colonialism. It is hard to find any inter-relationship between uprisings.

³⁶ "Kamlon Case Ends", *Manila Chronicle*, November 23, 1952.

³⁷ Harvey Stockwin, "A State of Violent Suspense", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 18, 1974, pp. 27-28.

³⁸ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 25, 1974, reprinted in *Times Journal*, April 3, 1974, p. 6.

movements, or reaction in various areas of Muslimland. It is even more difficult to deny the numerous feuds, rivalries, and bloodshed which occurred between Muslim groups and within Muslim societies. How then can historical events support the unitary approach to Muslim studies and problems?

Political

Based on folk literature, the political structure of Muslim societies such as found in Sulu offers proof of what may be called a "centrifugal" tendency in Muslim development.³⁹ Structural forms in pre and post-Spanish times were represented by four institutions which probably marked the distinctive structural developments in the political evolution of Muslim societies. The four phases or stages have survived through centuries of interactions with external forces, internal disruptions, and conflicts with foreign powers because Muslim societies were free from colonial imposition as a result of Spanish failure to subdue the Muslims. The subjugation of Muslimland came in the second decade of the twentieth century when American rule was accepted throughout Muslim areas following Muslim defeats in a series of uprisings from the Bud Dajo Encounter in 1906 to the decisive battle of Bud Bagsak in 1913.

The structural evolution of Tausug polity involved delineation of power, role, and status not necessarily along kinship line. This may be seen from an examination of four institutions: *Kamaasmaasan*, *banua*, *kaduatuan*, and *sultan*.

The *Kamaasmaasan*⁴⁰ was probably the earliest not necessarily the simplest form of Muslim society in Sulu. There was no formal ve-

³⁹ Kiefer used the same terms to describe change in Tausug polity, "Tausug polity and the Sultanate of Sulu: A Segmentary State in the Southern Philippines", *Sulu Studies* (Quezon City: Bustamante Press, 1972), I, pp. 19-64. Although Kiefer leans very much on Majul's theoretical model, yet in making a comparative reference to Southeast Asian structure such as Clifford Geertz' analysis of Balinese polity, he admits the possible existence of a "centripetal pattern" in Tausug society somewhat neutralized by a centrifugal force provided by what he calls a "vision of a unitary state", p. 39.

⁴⁰ Based on The Legend. "Manik Buwangsi", told by Bapah Sayuman of South Laud, Siasi, still alive during the Japanese occupation and in whose house the writer and his parents lived. Sayuman was very fond of telling *kissas* or *katakata* after returning from his fishing trips. His *kissas* refer to numerous accounts which show *kamaasmaasan* as an established institution. Such terms as "ha waktu sin kamaasmaasan" or "awal jaman" in the *kissas* or *katakata* seem to refer to pre-hispanic, pre-historic, or pre-islamic eras. The first term means "in the time

hicle which constituted this entity. It was an informal socio-political organization of elders in the village in which age appeared to be one of the bases, if not, the basis of acceptance or inclusion in the group which carried some authority and influence. It was developed possibly by "social consensus" based on familial recognition and acceptance of patriarchal or matriarchal role. Although no existing written sources give information on this institution, it more or less functioned as a mechanism of social control, rendering judgment on the conduct of village affairs and social action. It was only convened when serious problems such as external threat or epidemics required immediate action by the village. The composition of the group was general in a sense that both sexes were represented. But it was also limited in that membership was confined in a descending direction to the heads of the nuclear families. This was the simplest way to determine the age limit within which a person could be called an elder or *maas*. So that the age criterion involved in the *kamaasmaasan* was not chronological or numerical but rather socio-structural. In brief nominal and actual heads of nuclear families, regardless of age, were considered *maas*⁴¹ and, therefore, part of the institution.

It seems that there was no delineation of responsibility and distinction of levels of authority in the *kamaasmaasan*. Group consensus seemed to be the basis of decision or judgment. There was consequently no simplification, based on specialization, of functions or roles in the institution. Possibly, the institution, in the course of social development, was modified and simplified to accommodate needs for a

of the old" or "in olden times" and could not have meant the time of the old people during which the reciter Sayuman lived or told the *Kissa*. The reference was to a time in history when an institution of old sages was recognized in the community. The second term literally means "historic time". *Jaman* means "time" or "time device" and "*awal*" refers to "beginning" or "start". The time would either be the time of the "bangsawan" a race believed to have developed from a mixture of the three racial groups in Sulu before the Islamic advent: the *Buranuns*, the *Tagimahas*, and the *Bakalya*. Or, the term could refer to the "*Muslims*" who ushered in a historic era in Sulu's development. The term could not refer to post-Islamic time since local terminologies distinguish Spanish, American, and Japanese eras as *waktu* or *timpu kastila*, *milikan*, and *jipun*.

⁴¹ *Maas* is a Tausug term for an old person, male or female. It is often used by spouses, children, and kinsmen when referring to the mother or the father in the family. *Maas babai* (Literally, old woman) refers to mother and *Maas usug* (Literally, old man) to father. The *Samal* term for old man (general) is *Aa toa* which is a general designation for both sexes. *Matoa dinda* is used when referring to old woman and *Matoa lul'la* when referring to old man.

more efficient way of conducting affairs of the village or of coordinating the increasing and diversifying activities of the people. It was not, however, eradicated. It was only functionally relegated to a nominal overseeing entity serving as an invisible but real, although less influential, instrument of social control. From it probably emerged what became known as the *banua* which manifested clear evidences of relationship to the *kamaasmaasan*.

The transition from *maas* to *banua* followed a socio-transformational process in which social needs preconditioned the emergence of appropriate political forms. In the *banua*,⁴² therefore, could be found or traced the beginning of a political role in an institutional level. That is, it was a role more characteristic of a group rather than an individual. The *banua* was thus a small duly-established or recognized association of elders in the village in which membership appeared to have been limited or restricted to male heads of the nuclear families. There was in this institution a definition of political role or function although not status which came in later development, probably in the *kadatuan*. The *banua* member, who was also a part of the larger *kamaasmaasan*, became delineated as a leader with specific political role. He, therefore, with the rest in the *banua*, exercised the prerogative and, consequently, the power of decision-making which involved judicial, legislative, and executive responsibilities although the tripartite distinction in the power structure was not really distinguished or specialized as in the case of the *kadatuan*. But it was, however, more identifiable than in the *kamaasmaasan*.

Growth in population and increase in social activities resulted in the further simplification of the flow of authority in the *banua* system which underwent a "second phase" of structural transformation in which *banua* members became the heads of relatively self-supporting groups. The self-supporting units which were called *kaum* or *lung*⁴³

⁴² The legend, "Lunsay Buhuk" is a story of a beautiful woman with long hair that reached to her toes. Her final marriage to a wealthy and powerful prince came only after repeated frustrations and intrigues of ambitious women of royalty. The old council of elders (*banua*) finally recognized her right and status. This theme is also found in several similar stories.

⁴³ *Kaum* and *lung* are Tausug and Samal terms used to designate types of places. The *lung banua* existed in what is now San Raymundo, a part of Jolo Town where the *adjungs* or galleons used to dock. The place could have been an important pre-hispanic area in Jolo where the council of elders (*banua*) lived or met. The term means the "section of the *banua*".

in its narrowest limit became consequently self-governing. The breakdown in the initial interdependence of constituting units in the *banua* system, which in the early phase was characterized by a more or less primitive type of communalism, tended to draw the unit or units around the personality of the *banua* member whose political role and, hence, status were to be clarified by internal rivalries in the system. The issue of leadership of the group was determined by certain "criteria of leadership" such as age, wealth, prowess, consensus, or lineage.⁴⁴

The conflict, which sometimes brought bloody feuds was so allowed to develop that units were alienated from the whole system, aided by absence of any common law and strong mechanism of social control. Individualization and consequently separation of units, in the *banua*, with the emergence of personal leadership provided the ground for what might be termed "the institutionalization of role and status" of *banua* members. Institutionalization led to polarization of Muslim society into "primary wielders of power" — the *datu*s and the "recipients of responsibility," the people. Long period of "unit independence" led not to democratization but to "autocratization" of power represented by the institution of the *datu* or its collective form, the *kadatuan*. In short, the *kadatuan* was the outcome of internal changes in the *banua* system which manifested centrifugal rather than centripetal directions in development.

The *kadatuan*,⁴⁵ as a political institution manifested characteristics that differentiated it substantially from either the *banua* or *kamaasmaasan*. It was a loose cooperation or association of independent *datu*s with a formalized structure of power. The *datu*'s autocracy was the ultimate development in the process of power delineation and it was probably reinforced, if not, brought about by the economic dependence of the subject on the *datu*'s wealth which came from produce of communal lands and raids. It may be essential to point out that, in the communal stage of land tenure, the tendency was to give economic advantage to the *datu* who by virtue of his institutionalized political role and power which accompanied it received portions from each cultivator.

⁴⁴ Literally, in Sulu age continues to be observed as a criterion for proper ethics and conduct.

⁴⁵ The term *kadatuan* is a collective term used today in Muslim societies. It has survived in Tausug as well as Samal terminologies.

For purposes of common protection against threats too strong for one *datu* to meet, an organization of more than one *datu* resulted in the formation of the *kadatuan*. But the independence of the datuship seemed to have so developed that no formalization of the *kadatuan* structure resulted and various datus remained loosely bound to each other. The same centrifugal pattern which characterized the *banua* system also marked the process of transformation in the *kadatuan*. The *datu* was delineated from the people as the source of authority and the dispenser of justice and it was not uncommon or unusual for interdatuship conflicts to occur as a result of personal differences between datus or interkinship conflicts to arise as a consequence of the priority of political over consanguinal ties.⁴⁶ It was in this context that the *Sultanate*, which was not indigenuous in origin, found a place in the political structure of the Muslim society.

The sultanate, being an external introduction in the Islamic advent, provided Muslim societies with one important source of centralizing force. That is, it became a vehicle of political cohesion, because datus tended to accept the authority of an external power rather than that of a rival *datu*. Acceptance of the sultanate which began with Abu Bakar in Sulu and Kabungsuwan in Mindanao was aided partly by an attraction to Islamic beliefs and rituals accompanied by the introduction of gorgeous and impressive attire, ornaments, and displays of Islamic royalties. The Sultan assumed the prerogatives and power of a typical Middle Eastern or South East Asian Sultan or King with a retinue of subordinate chiefs, attendants and guards.

The political process through which Muslim societies passed followed a pattern of development from the complex *kamaasmaasan* through a simplification of the power structure in the *banua*, *kadatuan*, and, finally, to the centralization of authority in the Sultan. The process was marked by concentration not the democratization of power, first, in a few in the case of the *banua* and, then, in a person, in the case of the *datu* and the Sultan. The trend toward absolutism, was, however, checked by the *datu's* reassertion of independence re-

⁴⁶ The Case of Sihaban and Asjali may illustrate kinship in conflict. Sihaban and Asjali were kinsmen or cousins. They both lived in Pata Island. But Asjali worked as a public school teacher and as such was linked to the government which Sihaban did not favor. Sihaban killed Asjali for siding with the government.

sulting in the emergence of the *ruma bichara*⁴⁷ which served as a check and help to the Sultanate.

The *ruma bichara* which had acquired important status in Muslim history was a council of recognized leaders or *datus* within the jurisdiction of the *Sultanate*. Since the jurisdiction of the Sultan was measured initially by the extent to which the sound of the Sultan's gong could be heard, membership was therefore relative to the ability of the *datu* or his aide's to hear or to the change in ecological conditions. To extend the authority of the Sultanate or to keep *datuship* within its jurisdiction, a political machinery had to be developed and institutionalized among more objective criteria not affected easily by transitory factors. In effect the *ruma bichara* which served as an advisory body to the Sultan actively shared in the power of the Sultanate and participated in the decision-making process. The body became territorially rather than personally oriented. But the institution was so constituted so that it actually represented a loose combination of power structures represented by the individual *datu*. The inter-relationship between these power units was contingent not on the Sultanate but on the nature of the interests which affected the various *datuships* and which were sometimes in harmony with that of the Sultanate. The breakdown, therefore, in cooperation or relationship between the *datus* and the Sultan resulted from the lack of common interest or need.

Such was the case of Muslim opposition and resistance to Spanish and American rule. There appeared to be a united action during the period of serious confrontation (1850-1903) when no definitive policy was pursued by the colonial power except that of militarism which Muslim societies perceived as a common problem requiring armed resistance. But the introduction of American policy of attraction after 1903 and its realistic implementation during the Carpenter Era (1914-1921) brought some Muslim leaders and *datus* to the side of the colonial administration. The policy was based on the recognition of traditional power structure and status and ambiguous acceptance of an external colonial superstructure. The common interest of armed resistance to foreign domination was lost and conflicts between *datu*-

⁴⁷ *Ruma bichara* means "house of speech". The Tausug term for house is *bai* and *ruma* has no Tausug meaning except in relation to *Ruma Bichara*. *Ruma* seems to be the same as *luma* the Samal term for house. *Banua* is both Tausug and Samal while *kamaasmaasan* is Tausug.

ships became frequent. The so-called "unity" brought by common opposition to colonialism was therefore circumstantial or incidental. It lacked the essence of unity which could come only from a realistic integration of experiences and meaningful communications and relationships which were not present in Muslim societies.

Today the political institutions which outline the evolution of Sulu's society are still evident in Tausug polity except that they are either remembered merely as history or are substantially devoid of their status, role, or power. Interaction with Christian and western civilization has been largely instrumental in bringing about the changes although the traditional forms have remarkably remained unchanged.

Cultural

Indigenous Malay tradition and Islamic influence have been brought out as proofs of Muslim unity but it seems quite difficult to comprehend or to grasp the nature or meaning of such a tradition or influence. What are evident in Muslimland are works of art and social forms: *masjids* (mosques), *madrassas* (religious schools), and Islamic secular schools. But are these proofs of unity based on Islamic influence? Or, are these mere symbols of Muslim aspirations, ideals, and goals? It seems that historical and non-historical evidences show that the introduction of Islam, like the penetration of Malay culture in pre-Islamic period, was shrouded in ambiguity although some clarifications are found in the works of Saleeby and, more recently, in Majul's.

The Islamic culture or tradition referred to by Muslim scholars as well as by Non-Muslim scholars often refer to that "ambiguous reality" somewhat revealed by visible art forms and artifacts of culture: *sari-manok*, *ukul*, *gulis*, *kalis*, *barung*, *kampi'an*, brasswares, ornaments, attire, music, dances, etc. These things, however, vary from one Muslim group to another and it is quite difficult to trace or identify what Islamic strain is present — Southeast Asian syncreticism, sunnism, sufism, or shiism. What in fact appeared in Muslimland were pluralistic or syncretic forms of Islam, showing dominant indigenous features: *adat*, *omboh kadja*, and *tampat* which somewhat resembled in structure to but differed in substance from, their counterparts in Southeast Asia.

The only tangible aspects of Islam which became part of Muslim societies were the Arabic script and the Five Pillars. But the integration of these Islamic features was accompanied by the "localization" or "na-

tivization" of indigenous traditions. The Arabic was transformed scriptologically into the *Jawi*⁴⁸ which is not substantively intelligible to an Arab or even to other Muslim groups. The adherence to the Five Pillars, especially to the *shahada*⁴⁹ was mainly theoretical and the practical application of theological belief in terms of appropriate rituals was done through local customs and practices. In Sulu, for instance, Islamic worship and practice were wrapped up in the *kadja*⁵⁰ among the Tapul people, the *omboh*⁵¹ among the *Samals* and *Badjaos*, and the *tampat*⁵² which is observed generally by people in Sulu including Non-Muslims. Islamic ethics was submerged in *adat*, *tabiat*, and *martabat* which all involved proper etiquettes, customs, and courtesies.

In theory, one therefore finds Islamic influence and, in practice, one sees a continuous adherence to local beliefs and practices which are not Islamic. Since these local traditions tend to reinforce ethnocentrism along definite practices or norms of conduct, the integration of various ethnic groups and their unity can only be done by something external and by so dominant an influence as to compel independent cultural units to come together. This was what actually happened when American colonial superstructure based on strong militarism and American institutions brought various ethnic groups under one central control, including the Muslims. But American unity was confined mainly to the political organization of Muslim societies and American policy of religious toleration allowed Islam to remain as an important ins-

⁴⁸ *Jawi* is the script derived from Arabic and is found in Southeast Asia. Perhaps, in the Philippines it has a better prospect of survival among the Muslim societies of Mindanao and Sulu where it is used in preserving traditional genealogies.

⁴⁹ The *shadada* is the "First Pillar" of Islam.

⁵⁰ *Kadja* refers to an indigenous practice in Tapul Island, Sulu in which the devotees offer a sacrifice of white chicken, rice, and other food-stuffs in a mountain shrine. The purpose is to prevent *bala* (calamity) or *mulka* (curse) and to attain *pahala* (blessing).

⁵¹ *Omboh* is an animistic practice among Samals and Badjaos of Sulu. It consists of a small shrine located usually in one of the remote corners or areas of the house where certain things (a pillow, a small mat, strings, bones, and other sacred objects) are kept. Disturbances of the site or things means curse or even death unless counteracted by appropriate rituals.

⁵² *Tampat* is a small rock shrine located on a mount, near the shore or in the middle of the river or sea. The location is always on top or by the side of a huge weird-looking rock, or huge tree, or mount believed to be the habitation of spirits. It is common practice among natives of Sulu including even some marginal groups. Non-observation of rites before the shrines may mean *sakit* (illness), *busung* (a light curse) or *bala* (curse).

titution in Southern Philippines. In effect, the socio-cultural oneness of the Muslims was left alone to the capacity of Islam to unite. But Islam, unlike Catholicism, which culturally brought "christianized groups" into one society, did not have a monolithic mechanism of socio-religious control such as a priesthood which could standardize practice and impose doctrines. The Islamic *ulama* and *imams* who performed religious functions were independent and, sometimes were in conflict. Cultural unity, therefore, became difficult to achieve. Islam remains diversified and not monolithic.

Linguistically, no common medium has ever been spoken by Muslim groups, in Mindanao and Sulu. Arabic has never been developed or allowed to develop as a proper vehicle of communication. It was submerged by dominant local languages and dialects except as a form of writing, the *Jawi*. The *Jawi*, however, has been limited to and used by men and women of older generations, particularly members of the ruling class. The *Maranao language*, although somewhat akin structurally to the *Magindanao* language of Cotabato is not intelligible to Muslims outside of Lanao. Similarly, *Yakan*, spoken in Basilan, and *Tausug*, *Samal*, and *Badjao*, used in Sulu, Zamboanga, and Davao, are not intelligible to *Maranaos* and *Magindanaos*. How could there be cultural unity without exchange and how could there be exchange without a common language. The absence, therefore, of a common language in Muslimland strengthened the ethnocentric isolation of Muslim groups and no meaningful exchanges and communications were possible among the Muslims. In fact conflicts have often arose between groups and one could be easily played against another by third parties.

Consaguinal relationship somewhat played an important part in reinforcing centripetal and centrifugal tendencies in *Tausug* society. It seems that the kinship structure which followed either matrilineal or patrilineal patterns involved two general categories of relationship; *internal* and *external*. The internal structure was a framework of relationship within which were included primary nuclear relationships (*magtaianak*, *magtaimanghud*) and immediate nuclear extensions collectively called *lahasiya*. The external structure was the framework which included *kakampungan*, *pamikitan*, and *husbawaris*.

Tausug society was and is exogenous and patrilocal. This was noted also by Keifer in his study of Parang society in Jolo island.⁵³ For reasons not clear, Tausugs did not and do not encourage marriage within the group except in extremely few cases in which marriage between third cousins or sometimes second cousins were allowed. The search for a spouse had mainly been external necessitating quite an amount of dowry which depended on class value. In most, if not all cases, the wife followed the husband. Patrilocal residence determined the degree of social distance in a kinship group. Social distance was, therefore, closer among men than among women in the kinship domain which might be a *lung*, a *kaum*, or a datuship. The non-consanguinal character of the women group was reinforced by the slave raids or trade which usually carried away women rather than men. Men were often killed and the captive women, contrary to longtime beliefs, were not enslaved in the western sense. They were used as domestic helps and cared for or were taken as wives or concubines, the beautiful ones by the datu and his kinsmen. One reason for preferring women to men was to safeguard internal security of the datuship. Outside men or strangers posed a greater threat than women whose marital adjustment would not be difficult.

The absence of nuclear or biological connection between the women provided a strong base for centrifugal direction in kinship development just as the direct biological link between men furnished the centripetal tendencies. In effect, therefore, it was difficult to create or maintain unity between families in the same territorial jurisdiction although the nuclear families were cohesive units and their patriarchs were related to each other. Consequently, this situation allowed for the growth of individual-oriented leadership not determined categorically and strictly by kinship. It also reinforced the datuship which became both a political and a social institution whose membership was no longer confined to direct kinsmen but also included non-kinship groups. The datu, therefore, had to have resources, prestige, and power to remain the focus of loyalty and the source of unity. Economic dependence and security of individuals or families had to be provided by him or his household. This created the need for communal lands with the datu holding general right of ownership and the subjects merely enjoying the right to use them. It was, therefore, the socio-economic ties that more or less reinforced the kinship ties within the datuship. For this

⁵³ Keifer, *loc. cit.*, p. 26.

reason, the datu who lost his lands also lost his influence and power. He became prey to other datuships. Consequently, regular raids even to other outlying datuships were conducted and maintained and alliances with other datuships were forged. In brief, conflicts often arose within and between datuships leading to the strengthening of kinship as the basis of cohesiveness in the institution.

Because of the intricate nature of the datuship in terms of the dichotomy or integration of political and social structures, it was difficult to establish one common law which could bind the various datus and their domains. It could only be done loosely based on some kind of common interest or ambiguous agreement. Or, it could be imposed by a greater authority with more power and resources such as the Sultanate, the American colonial power, and the Philippine government. Moreover, the patrilocal pattern of Tausug society could not provide better opportunities for cohesion as much as a matrilocal society. Tausug men who preferred to be warriors than farmers often left home for raids, war, and adventure. The women were left to till the field, keep the home, and educate the children. Since kinship ties were not strong among the womenfolk except that they were married to related men, the cohesion of the unit could not be properly and essentially reinforced by the women who have always represented the most important factor in the home. The reduction in the number of men as a result of conflicts left Muslim society virtually in the hands of women and children. Centrifugal tendency was increased rather than reduced. The process eventually developed appropriate individualistic values neutralized only by strong and autocratic datu or an outside power.

There seems to be evidences from folk literature that the same historical, political, religious, and social patterns were also found in Muslim societies of Lanao, Cotabato, Basilan, and other parts of Mindanao.⁵⁴ Studies by ethnohistorians and anthropologists reveal close structural relation between Tausug and Samal-Badjao societies. The same is also true with *Maranao* and *Magindanao* societies. But similarity of patterns does not necessarily mean cohesiveness of society. It merely suggests the possibility of a primordial origin in a common ethnolinguistic tradition before fragmentation or diversification began.

⁵⁴ Cephas Bateman, *Moros and Their Myths* (1906), Bureau of Insular Files.

Contemporary

Today, it is easy to detect the same pattern of disunity which has always plagued the Muslim struggle since their first confrontation with the Spanish conquistadores. Until more recently the Muslim movements in Mindanao and Sulu had been somewhat unified by a traditional call to *jihad* based on the assumption that there had been conscious and determined efforts on the part of Christians to wipe out not only the Islamic faith but also the Muslim people. This *jihadic* appeal was augmented by Muslim independence agitation particularly the Mamadra movement in Lanao in 1924, the Sulu independence movement in the 1950s, and the Matalam movement in 1968. The realization of this goal came with the declaration of the Bangsa Moro Republic reportedly by Nur Mizuari, at the start of the Sulu Revolt in 1971.

The crack in the Muslim movement came toward the end of 1970. Two factors might be attributed for the dissension in leadership as well as ranks. First was the reassertion of historical patterns in which Muslim groups abandoned anti-colonial resistance in exchange for certain favors or benefits. The Lanao Muslims, organized into "Ansar al Islam" (warriors of Islam) by Domocao Alonto returned to the government for reasons difficult to understand. The abandonment of the Sulu Muslims by the Lanao group followed historical pattern in which Sulu was left as the only one to continue resistance against American power. The second factor was the introduction of an external ideological element into what Muslims considered a "Holy War." The alleged intrusion of a Maoist motivation in the struggle brought disagreement between Sulu and Lanao leaders and eventually a split, one in favor of surrender (Lanao) and the other (Sulu) in favor of continuing resistance.

The disunity in the Muslim struggle is also portrayed in the Sulu resistance in which leadership is divided into those who favored return to the government (*balik-bayans*) and those who wish to continue. This dissension has not been resolved and, in fact, has actually helped in strengthening the government position. Why the Muslim struggle has come to a point of weakness despite the infusion of both traditional *jihadic* fervor and radical sophistication may be explained in two ways. First, Muslim leaders misread Muslim history and culture where they thought the foundation of unity existed. Second, radical elements failed to see the actual level or state of social consciousness

which comes from politicalization or from exposure to ideological influences. They failed to see the correlation between ideological rejection and the nature of Islam. Third, the Muslim leaders failed to realize the extent to which Muslim mentality has been affected by colonialism which includes intense aversion to radicalism and even to new changes.

The evident effect of division in the Muslim struggle is somewhat revealed in the way Muslim groups have been treated or have reacted to such treatment. The Lanao Muslims who were the first to withdraw from the struggle have been elevated to position of prominence, power, and prestige. They occupy key political positions, control the only university created to promote Muslim integration — Mindanao State University, and manage the Amana Bank which represents the single most significant agency for Muslim development. The concentration of privileges, influence, and power in the hands of one Muslim group has created suspicion and resentment on the part of other Muslim groups.⁵⁵

In the case of the Sulu struggle, returnees led by Maas Bawang have been given both financial and political benefits as well as the honor of being the undisputed power in Sulu second only to the Philippine Army. That dissension has weakened the Muslim struggle is quite evident but that it finally resolved the Muslim problem, associated usually with persistent violence, remains still a question. For the same pattern of disunity also guarantees the continuity of the seed of hatred, resentment, and grievances which erupt into uprisings, revolts, and violence. The hope for lasting peace remains anchored not on pure militarism nor on instant programs or benefits, but on a transcendental perspective of the Muslim Problem recognizing its many variations and the distinctiveness of each Muslim group.

Summary

The pattern of disunity or fragmentation in Muslimland followed, therefore, a “centrifugal-centripetal” movements in which the disrupting tendencies (centrifugal) were in the macro levels of Muslim society. That is, within the structures of Tausug, Maranao, or Magindanao societies, the process of disintegration was, perhaps, brought about by the strengthening of the *datus*' political role which led to the institutionalization of the *datuship* as an independent power unit in Muslim

⁵⁵ Sulu-Tawi-Tawi Professionals, Inc., *Letter of Appeals to President Ferdinand Marcos*, March 1974, p. 1.

society. In the larger framework embracing all groups nominally bound by belief in Islam, the disuniting force was brought about by linguistic-cultural isolation. The only unifying tendency (centripetal) was found in the micro levels. That is, within the structure of the datuship, the datu's autocratic power evoked loyalty and obedience, the people being economically dependent on the datu's resources. In the smallest structure of the nuclear family cohesion was brought about or maintained by kinship ties along either matrilineal or patrilineal patterns. But nuclear cohesiveness is basic to all human societies. Therefore, it cannot be referred to as a unity that permeates all Muslim groups in the Philippines but one which has partly contributed to the preservation of the datuship.

The dichotomy of centrifugal and centripetal tendencies which seem to characterize the process of change or transformation in Muslimland seem to rule out the unitary approach to Muslim studies. It points rather to a need to explore the explicatory range as well as the relevance of a pluralistic approach to Muslim history and culture.

IMAGES OF NATURE IN SWETTENHAM'S EARLY WRITINGS: PROLEGOMENON TO A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON PENINSULAR MALAYSIA'S ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

S. ROBERT AIKEN

Introduction

My major purpose in this article is to make a plea for a more firmly rooted historical perspective on Malaysia's rapidly burgeoning ecological problems. Let me make it quite clear, however, that my objective is not to trace men's role in changing the face of nature in Peninsular Malaysia, but rather to offer a modest introduction to the history of ideas associated with the natural environment of that country over the past 100 years. Viewed in this way the present study falls within the many faceted, multi-disciplinary field of the history of environmental ideas in general, and the study of man's attitudes towards forest environments in particular.

During the past decade there has been a growing awareness among social scientists, and especially among psychologists, anthropologists and geographers, of the need to get within the cognitive worlds of the people they study. Much of the impetus for this new trend has come from psychology, in particular environmental psychology, and from the related fields of architecture and design. In this paper a strong emphasis is placed on the importance of the cognitive viewpoint, especially as it relates to the rapidly growing area of interest now commonly referred to as environmental perception.

The Global Concern

"We travel together, passengers on a little spaceship, dependent on its vulnerable reserves of air and soil: all committed for our safety to its security and peace; preserved from annihilation only by the care, and the work, and I will say the love we give our fragile craft"¹

¹Stevenson, A. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Official Records, 39th Sessions p. 90. Quoted in Caldwell, L. K. *Environment: A Challenge for Modern Society* (New York, 1970), p. 84.

In recent years a number of writers have contended that indefinite growth cannot be maintained by the finite resources of the earth (Forrester, 1970; SCEP, 1971; Meadows et al., 1972). If these predictions are close to the mark, then an industrial way of life which places high priorities on economic growth and consumption may not be sustainable. Policies which focus on the quantity of economic production rather than on the quality of life will inevitably result in the disruption of ecosystems, the depletion of resources, and the undermining of the very foundations of survival.

A small but growing body concerned citizens, scholars and politicians are coming to realize that a society based on stability may be more desirable than one based on expansion. Central to the idea of the stable society is the view of man as an integral, functioning part of nature, with all the responsibilities that this implies for the proper maintenance of the planet.

Ecological Problems in Peninsular Malaysia

One does not have to invoke prophecies of gloom and doom to be aware of the fact that Peninsular Malaysia is fast approaching a period of severe ecological disruption. At a time when our knowledge of the biosphere, though considerable, is still full of gaps and question marks, there is a definite need to view issues pertaining to ecological problems with a great deal of caution. In Malaysia, unfortunately, ecological caution is afforded only passing and rather parsimonious recognition.

Species diversity tends to reach a maximum in tropical rain forests and tropical coral islands. Since each species is of potential value to man there is an overwhelming need to maintain the natural diversity of these ecosystems. But there is also another reason why we should be concerned with maintaining species diversity. It is well known that ecosystems tend towards stability. The more diverse and complex the system the more stable it is; the more species there are, and the more they interrelate, the more stable is their environment.

Unfortunately we still do not know enough about the complexities of the tropical rain forest. We are, in fact, in danger of destroying it before we have come to understand it. "At the moment, we value it only for a few plants, principally timbers like mahogany and

greenheart. For the rest it is considered useless, best cut down in the search for minerals or cleared for agriculture"²

Throughout Malaysia true wilderness areas are in rapid retreat. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to trace the forces behind this trend, it should be pointed out that we still know very little about man's impact on the tropical environment of Malaysia. Indeed, it is only in recent years that a few concerned citizens (Straits Times, 1973) and scholars have begun to examine the impact of the rapid removal of the jungle on problems such as soil erosion and water quality (Leigh, 1973; Leigh and Low, 1972), the issue of annual flooding, especially on the east coast of Peninsular Malaysia (Leigh and Low, 1972), and the results of forest clearance on plant and animal life (Wyatt-Smith and Wycherley, eds., 1961; Wycherley, 1969; Marshal, 1973). In Malaysia, questions relating to air and water pollution, the ill side effects of rapid urbanization and the profound problem of the quality of life are only now beginning to emerge. This rather tardy concern, however, must be welcomed as a step forward. Interest in the quality of the natural world and the value of human existence must, at least in part, be seen within the context of the development process which is at work throughout most of the Third World. That process, as Kenneth Boulding has so aptly stated, "involves a unified social dynamics which exists only in embryo".³

Environmental Perception and Behaviour

Given the situation I have outlined above, it surely behooves us to reconstruct, as far as possible, the ideas and attitudes which men at different times and in different places have imputed to nature in Malaysia. A pursuit of this type is valid both in and for itself and also because it may well shed some light on present day problems.

The distinction between attitude and perception is still a blurred one even (especially?) in the literature of psychology. Here I have taken up Thurston's notion that an attitude is the "sum total of man's inclinations and feelings, prejudice or bias, preconceived notions, ideas, fears, threats, and convictions about any specified topic... It is ad-

² Allen R. & Goldsmith, E. "The Need for Wilderness *The Ecologist*, Vol. 1, 1971, p. 24.

³ Boulding, K. E. *The Impact of the Social Sciences* (New Brunswirck, 1966), p. 50.

mittedly a subjective and personal affair"⁴ This definition is fairly similar to Boulding's (1956) concept of the 'image', or the subjective content of knowledge. In Boulding's words, this "is what a man thinks the world is like, the sum total of his beliefs, his image of the world and himself and space and time, his ideas of causal connection, and so on."⁵ In order to avoid confusion the words 'perception' and 'attitude' are used interchangeably in this paper.

The recent output of review articles and bibliographical guides attests to a growing interest in environmental perception studies. (Brookfield, 1969; Wood, 1970; Goodey, 1971; Walmsley and Day, 1972). In human geography, it has been noted that perception is not a sub-branch of that discipline, but rather an all-pervasive and supremely important intervening variable in any analysis of the spatial expression of human activities."⁶ The relationships, however, between attitudes and overt behaviour are still far from clear, and it will probably be quite some time before the lacunae in this area are bridged (O'Riordan, 1973).

Since the early 1960's a number of geographers have written a few splendid works in the areas of environmental perception and the history of environmental ideas (see, for example, Lowenthal, 1961; Glacken, 1967; Tuan, 1971). For the most part, however, these studies have been confined to Western experiences and therefore set within the framework of occidental cultures (for an exception, see Tuan, 1968). This study offers a preface to the study of environmental ideas in what might be termed the neo-European world of nineteenth century Malaya. Ultimately such an enquiry will have to be expanded so as to encompass both Malay and Chinese attitude towards the natural environment of Malaysia. For the time being, however, a start must be made somewhere. Few, if any, answers are provided in what follows. Instead, the interested reader will find that quite a number of questions are raised; hopefully some of them will prompt further research.

⁴ Thurstone, L. L. "Attitudes can be measured" *Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement*, ed. by Martin Fishtein (New York, 1937), p. 77.

⁵ Boulding, K. E. *The Meaning of the Twentieth Century: The Great Transition* (London, 1965), p. 40.

⁶ Golledge, R. G., Brown, L.A. & Williamson, F. "Behavioral Approaches in Geography: An Overview" *Australian Geographies*, Vol. 12, 1972. p. 3.7

Malaya Circa 1875

In 1819 Sir Stamford Raffles wrote to Colonel Attenbrooke informing him that "Our object is not territory but trade, a great commercial Emporium, and a fulcrum whence we may extend our influence politically, as circumstances may hereafter require..."⁷ By 1874 circumstances did in fact seem to merit greater political intervention in the Malay Peninsula. From that date onward Britain began to take a much greater interest in the political and economic affairs of the inland portions of the Peninsula.

The period of the 1870's and 80's offers an appropriate starting point for an enquiry into British attitudes towards nature in Malaya. Looking back on his early years in the country Swettenham could later write that Malaya in 1874 was *terra incognita* to both official and trader alike. "There were", in his words, "no reliable books on the subject, the whole country was an absolute blank on every map... Of the nature of the country, the character of the people, their numbers, distribution, sentiments, or condition, there was an ignorance, profound, absolute and complete".⁸ This, of course, was something of an exaggeration since Swettenham and accounts of the country (for example, Anderson, 1828; Begbie, 1834; Newbold, 1839; Wallace, 1869). But for the most part Swettenham's statement can be taken at face value: Europeans still knew very little about the interior of the Peninsula.

The period after 1874 was characterized by a rapid upsurge of interest in the geography, geology and ethnography of Malaya. A new and fascinating world being opened up to European eyes for the first time. It was a world filled with exotic plants, animals and peoples; a world of scenic diversity and strangeness, of gloom and foreboding; it was a period of considerable excitement, of rapid exploration and observation; it was a period during which impressions of the new land were being hastily set down.

Swettenham's Travels (1874-85)

With the exception of Raffles, Sir Frank Athelstane Swettenham (1860-1946) is perhaps the most remembered of nineteenth century ci-

⁷ Raffles, S. Sir Stamford Raffles to Colonel Attenbrooke (letter, Singapore, June 10, 1819) Reprinted as "The Founding of Singapore" Journal, Straits Branch Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 2, (1878) p. 179.

⁸ Swettenham, F. A. *The Real Malay* (London, n.d.) pp. 7-8.

vil servants and administrators. His long and distinguished career in Malay spanned a period of more than thirty years during which time he held a variety of important positions. Toward the end of his career he was appointed Governor of the Straits Settlements and eventually retired in 1904.

The years 1874-76, as pointed out earlier, mark a turning point in the history of Malaya. British intervention in those years "was to a large extent provoked by the threat which the bloodshed and disorder of the old order in Malaya constituted to the peace and security of the Straits Settlements..."⁹ But as Swettenham himself so aptly put it, intervention "would be highly beneficial to British interests and British trade, though these pleas had hitherto been dismissed as of no importance."¹⁰

During the early years of intervention Swettenham played a subordinate but nevertheless important role in structuring relationships between Perak and Great Britain. In the period 1874-76 he undertook a number of missions to Perak, five of which are contained in his Perak Journals (Cowan, ed., 1951). In the years that followed he also made a number of trips to various parts of the Peninsula including an overland trek to the East Coast in 1885.

Swettenham was, in fact, one of the most indefatigable travellers of his time. Though an extremely busy man he always seemed to be able to find time off from his many official chores to record his feelings about what he had seen, heard and learned on his many journeys. His writings, therefore, constitute a valuable reservoir of information on the land and life of Malaya during the latter part of the nineteenth century. His early writings specifically are important because they provide us with some of the first glimpses of the interior of the Peninsula and contribute to a small but growing storehouse of ideas about the nineteenth century Malayan scene.

Images of Nature

The natural environment is frequently imputed with content that can only be described as moral, esthetic, religious and psychological.

⁹ Cowan, C.D. ed. "Sir Frank Swettenham's Peak Journals, 1874-1878" Journal, Malayan Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 24 (1951) p. 7.

¹⁰ Swettenham, F. A. *British Malaya: an account of the origin and progress of British influences in Malaya* (London, 1906) p. 174.

¹¹ O'Riordan, T. "Some Reflections on Environmental Attitudes and Environmental Behavior: Area, (1973) Vol. 5 p. 20.

Unfortunately, as Yi-Fu Tuan (1966) has pointed out, little work has been done on this difficult, often elusive area which deals with the values and the meanings people have placed on the land. The problem of reconstructing ideas is further compounded by the fact that there is "cognitive conflict both between individuals and groups and within the individual as different needs and situations stimulate attitudinal responses,"¹¹ In what follows I have identified a number of themes around which Swettenham's attitudes tend to cluster. Where it is possible I have drawn on the writings of a few of Swettenham's contemporaries in an effort to show that the themes I have identified may well have more general applicability.

(1) *The Jungle as Wilderness*

If "what we see, what we study, and the way we build and shape the landscape is selected and structured for each of us by custom, culture, desire and faith"¹² then it would seem reasonable to expect that Europeans would view nature in Malaya from a very particular perspective. It must be kept in mind that even before the opening of the nineteenth century many Western European countries, including Britain, had been radically transformed by the hand of man. Vast areas once heavily wooded had been cleared over many centuries and landscapes in many areas had taken on a totally man-made look (see, for example, Hoskins, 1970). Indeed it can be argued that the rural, ordered and cultivated landscape had become the ideal. Wilderness areas were viewed as anathema to man, a hindrance to progress, morally inferior to the cultivated man-created landscape, in short, the antithesis of civilization, (for comparison with the American experience, see, for example, Huth, 1957; Aiken, 1971). It should not surprise us, therefore, if we find similar views in Swettenham's early writings.

Like a number of his contemporaries, Swettenham found the jungle gloomy, boring, and weird, but at the same time beautiful and enchanting. These seemingly contradictory views existed side by side and seem to have depended on the location of the observer. In his second Perak Journal (10th-18th June, 1874) Swettenham records how he was held up for quite a while at Senggang on the Perak River. He

¹² Lowenthal, D. ed. *Environmental Perception and Behavior* University of Chicago, Department of Geography Research Paper No. 109 (Chicago, 1967) p. 1.

found the people there to be very kind and hospitable and "except for the inexpressible dullness and junglyness of the place one might almost exist without being miserable"¹³ When he was at Senggang he made a short visit to the hot springs nearby. However, he again found the jungle "a weird, gloomy looking place, filled the Malays say with ghosts. . ."¹⁴

In the following year (1875) Swettenham made a difficult journey down the Slim and Bernam rivers. He recounts that for ten miles below the junction of the Slim and Bernam he passed through an extensive area of reeds and ferns, the home of alligators, snakes and strange birds. According to our intrepid traveller he "never saw such a horrid ghostly place. . . The river looks as if it were visited by men perhaps not once in a century"¹⁵ Ten years later (1885) Swettenham made a journey across the Peninsula from west to east. We find, however, that his ideas about the heart of the jungle and his psychological reaction to it have not changed. He was still uneasy in the "impenetrable gloom of [the] virgin forest."¹⁶

Swettenham makes it quite clear that an uninhabited, uncultivated wilderness is not desirable, presumably from both an aesthetic and practical point of view. He shared this belief with a number of his contemporaries and predecessors. In 1819 Raffles wrote that the site of Singapore, which was a wilderness before and which had no inhabitants was now a bone of contention between Holland and Britain. In his journey across the Peninsula in 1885 Swettenham ascended the Bernam River on his way eastward. He found the upper reaches of the Bernam to be "most lovely," although the district was not populated and rather not cleaned. In the vicinity of the Slim River, Leech had earlier commented that the country he passed through was very pretty "if it were cleared, but at present there is no more to be seen at an elevation of 4,000 or 5,000 feet than there is in the plains, the jungle being so dense"¹⁷ And Daly, writing about the metalliferous formations of the Peninsula, thought that Malaya would be a "vast un-

¹³ Cowan, *op. cit.* p. 84

¹⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 84-85.

¹⁵ Swettenham "From Perak to Slim, and Down the Slim and Bernam" Journal, Straits Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 5 (1880 a) p. 65.

¹⁶ Swettenham "Journal kept during a Journey across the Malay Peninsula", Journal, Straits Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 15 (1885) p. 4.

¹⁷ Leech, H.W.C. "About Slim and Burnam" Journal, Straits Branch Royal Asiatic Society, (1879 b) Vol. 4 p. 43.

inhabited jungle, were it not that the interior yields rich gold and tin alluvial deposits on either side of the range of hills that form the back-bone of the country".¹⁸

(2) *The Jungle as Sensual Delight*

The jungle, however, was not always depressing and full of gloom; it could also be a source of great pleasure. Early travellers in Malay forests often found great delight in the ever-changing kaleidoscopic nature of the local scene. As I have already indicated, these seemingly contradictory views of nature may be related to the relative location of the observer. Those who travelled and lived *in* the jungle often found it a disturbing, even frightening, experience. All this changed when the jungle could be viewed from *afar*, from a vantage point, while floating on a river or standing in a clearing. Given an opportunity to observe and contemplate the richness of the natural world, the observer gained an opportunity to develop an aesthetic interest in the jungle.

Let us rejoin Swettenham on one of his early trips to Perak (1874). We find him just about to leave Senggang on the Perak River. He comments: "Beautiful as this place always is I never saw it look so lovely as it did this morning (June 22). Gunong Buboh... was for half its height clothed in thick clouds, which directly over the tops of the hills were the darkest purple while the edges had caught from the rising sun a deep soft saffron which was wonderfully lovely in striking contrast to the dark foliage of the jungle with which these hills are covered (Cowan, ed., 1951, pp. 85-86).

During his journey across the Peninsula in 1885 Swettenham constantly remarked on the beauties of nature. One or two extracts from his journal will suffice to make this quite clear. In the neighborhood of the upper reaches of the Lipis he noted that all "the trees that do flower seem to have come out in this dry weather, and we passed many covered all over with a splendid purple bloom, others bright scarlet and yellow, and the Memplas (*Michelia?*), the leaves of which are used as sand-paper in full flower, a delicate pale yellow blossom with the sweetest scent"¹⁹ The descent of rapids in the river he found both amusing and exciting. On one occasion he noted that the rapids and the approach

¹⁸ Daly, D.D. "The Metalliferous Formation of the Peninsula" *Journal, Straits Branch, Royal Asiatic Society*, (1878) Vol. 2 p. 194.

¹⁹ Swettenham, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

to them "form the most striking picture we have yet seen on this river, which presents a long succession of lovely ever-changing scenes . . . Huge boulders are piled in picturesque confusion on either side of the channel . . . and the clouds of spray dashed up from the rapid against the deep shadow of jungle foliage make a picture not to be forgotten"²⁰

Many of Swettenham's contemporaries recorded similar landscape images in their journals, diaries and letters. Indeed it would be quite difficult to find a writer of the 1890's and 80's who did not find at least some pleasure in the constant variety of nature in Malaya. For the naturalist, of course, the Malay Peninsula was a continual source of interest and delight. I will close this section with a quotation from Hervey:

"The Jahor river is certainly a fine one, but in the Lenggü (Linggiu?), though narrower, the beauty of the scenery increases; some of the winding bits are wonderfully lovely, rattans everywhere adding to their charm and variety with their beautiful featherlike sprays; the monkey-ropes hanging gracefully here and there, their pale tint limning out with delicious contrast the cool dark green of the leafy walls around them."²¹

(3) *The Jungle as Cornucopia*

My reference to the naturalist's interest in the Malay Peninsula leads on directly to a more general consideration of the 'Jungle as Cornucopia'. Swettenham, and many other writers of his time, were fascinated with the overwhelming variety of flora and fauna which they saw on their travels. Of course their interests in the richness of the tropical environment were often based on utilitarian motives, but not always. The jungle was frequently viewed as a veritable Garden of Eden, of interest in and of itself.

To be sure, there was nothing really new about this. Much earlier in the century Raffles had shown a very deep interest in natural history. He did, in fact, keep a herbarium and was often in contact with the famous Sir Joseph Banks of the Royal Society. The period after 1875, however, was characterized by a great outpouring of

²⁰ *Ibid.* p. 13-14.

²¹ Henry, D.F.A. "A Trip to Gunong Blumirt" Journal, Straits Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 3 (1879) p. 99.

interest not only in the flora and fauna of Malaya but also in the geology of the country, its mineral resources, soil fertility and climate. Everything came under scrutiny as the land was rapidly opened up to European eyes. The result was a general amazement at the richness of the tropical world. Consider the following extracts from the writings of the 1870's:

During a journey to Batu Caves, Daly noted that "wild elephants are plentiful, and Durians, Pelasan, Rambutan, Rambei, Mangostin and other large fruit trees grow plentifully in the rich soil surrounding this limestone hill, in the midst of the most luxurious jungle vegetation."²²

In his explorations of the tin country of the Kinta area Leech had this to say: "To the naturalist and botanist this district is full of interest; that magnificent butterfly — the ornithoptera Brookani formerly supposed to be peculiar to Borneo, is found plentifully in several places. It is almost needless for me to add that the presence of limestone is a pretty certain sign of good soil."²³

To Hornaday, a naturalist, Selangor was a wealthy storehouse of animal life of great interest. In the vicinity of Jeram he noticed "water birds, notably a few pelicans, two species of ibis, a small white egret, the stone plover, a booby, two terns, snipe, sandpiper, etc."²⁴ Further inland "Rhinoceros hornbills (*B. rhinoceros*) were frequently seen, and we obtained one good specimen. The Malays and Jakuns brought us many specimens of the beautiful little mouse deer (*tragulus*)..."²⁵

Throughout Swettenham's writings we also find a similar interest in the bounties of the natural environment. He was impressed, for example, by the ability of certain aboriginal groups to sustain a simple but adequate life in the depths of the jungle. The Sakeis, he said are "clever gardeners, and they grow sugar-cane, plantains, sweet potatoes, and other vegetables in abundance." They also grow although consume little rice. They are fond of tobacco but they chew rather than

²² Daly "Caves at Sungir Batu in Silangos" Journal, Straits Branch, Royal Asiatic Society Vol. 3 (1879) p. 119

²³ Leech, "About Kinta" Journals, Straits Branch, Royal Asiatic Vol. 4 (1879 a), p. 25.

²⁴ Hornaday, W.T. "Account of a Nationalist's Visit to the Territory of Selangor" Journal, Straits Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 3 (1879), p. 125.

²⁵ *Ibid.* p. 129.

smoke it. It is quite obvious that the riches of the earth could be obtained with a minimum of exertion.

Everything caught Swettenham's attention and keen eye. He was just as interested in Malay pottery, limestone caves, and sugar mills as he was in the maiden-hair fern, peacock, plover, jungle fowl, snipe, elephant and assorted other animals, some of which he could not name. To Swettenham's practical mind the country also offered great opportunities for exploitation, development and economic gain. This brings me to my fourth and final theme.

(4) *The Jungle as Renumeration*

There is undoubtedly a great deal of truth in Albert Memmi's comment that "the colonialist does not plan his future in terms of the colony, for he is there only temporarily and invests only what will bear fruit in his time."²⁶ British attitudes towards the Peninsula, especially after 1875, were to a large extent influenced by the possibilities the country offered to trade and the exploitation of natural resources. As an administrator and civil servant Swettenham was eager to promote those interests.

On his way to Perak in April 1874 Swettenham spent some time on Pangkor Island. He noted in his journal that there "does not seem to be anything on the island in the way of cultivation except coconuts and they do well, bearing after 5 years. Pepper I believe would do well here, perhaps coffee also. I saw some bits of a very fine wood cut on the island — it resembles mahogany very closely, will take a splendid polish, and is hard and heavy; there is nothing like it in Penang. Ebony can also be got here."²⁷ During his numerous journeys in the Peninsula Swettenham invariably kept an eye on the possibilities the country offered to speculation, trade and development.

Other writers too were confident of Malaya's economic prospects. Leech, for example, felt that large sections of Perak offered excellent opportunities for the cultivation and transport of coffee, tea, and other tropical products.

In 1875 Swettenham could write that in spite of "Pahang's rich deposits of gold and tin, its large population (about 60,000) and its almost total freedom from taxation, it does not advance in prosperity

²⁶ Memmi, A. *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (Boston, 1970), p. 69.

²⁷ Cowan, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

or importance...²⁸ But he foresaw great prospects for this part of Malaya. Ten years later we are informed that "no intelligent person could see the country [Pahang] without regretting the circumstances which still kept it closed to legitimate enterprise..."²⁹ It would appear that Swettenham was somewhat chagrined at this lack of 'progress'. Undaunted by these circumstances, he suggested that a road be built between Johor Bharu and Pekan. "This would put Singapore and its resources in direct communication with the lower country of Pahang, besides tapping a long stretch of land, both in Johor and Pahang, useful for the cultivation of low country tropical products".³⁰ It is hardly necessary to expound on the implications of these ideas, especially as they relate to British economic gain. Swettenham was also quite sanguine concerning the economic future of Selangor where, due to "the richness of the soil, both for cultivation and in minerals, there is reason to hope that [it] will eventually become one of the wealthiest States in the Peninsula"³¹ Swettenham saw a great trading and mining future for Selangor. Nature was benevolent indeed in the Malay Peninsula.

Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research

The natural environment of Malaysia is currently being disrupted at a hitherto unprecedented pace. Given this situation there is an overwhelming need for further research into the causes and effects of man's impact on the land. In the very near future a high priority should be given to the collection, tabulation and analysis of data relating to air and water pollution, rates of soil erosion and river sedimentation, and to problems arising from noise, congestion, and aesthetic blight — to mention only a few problem areas. The sad fact is that most of this basic data is not currently available.

In the study of ecological disruptions the natural and biological sciences will obviously have an important role to play. I would argue, however, that scholars from the social sciences and humanities might

²⁸ Swettenham "Some Account of the Independent Native States of the Malay Peninsula" *Journal, Straits Branch, Royal Asiatic Society* (1880 b), Vol. 6 p. 199.

²⁹ Swettenham "Journal kept during a Journey across the Malay Peninsula" *Journal, Straits Branch, Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. 15, (1885), pp. 33-34.

³⁰ *Ibid.* p. 36.

³¹ Swettenham. "Some Account of the Independent Native States p. 191.

play a more important role than they have to date. In many problem areas, as one ecologist has pointed out, the "ecological information is available. The sociological and anthropological information is not".³² Ecological problems, where they exist, must surely be set with their historical and cultural perspective. An attempt must also be made to uncover people's attitudes towards and ideas about the natural world and how these are related to their overt behaviour.

In this article I have demonstrated that a number of environmental attitudes coexisted in the minds of Europeans who travelled and lived in Malaya during the 1870's and 80's. I have drawn primarily on the work of Swettenham because he travelled and wrote more than most of his colleagues and contemporaries, and also because he recorded his ideas about Malaya at a time when the interior of the country was rapidly being explored, mapped and described.

The four themes discussed earlier are not meant to be mutually exclusive or exhaustive. Since attitudes tend, on the one hand, to co-exist in a person's mind and, on the other hand, to change over time, the best scheme to adopt is probably one which allows for maximum flexibility. The themes identified in this article provide a means whereby disparate materials and ideas may be brought together in a coherent and meaningful way.

A number of research topics which merit further enquiry include:

(1) A much more fully developed history of environmental ideas associated with the Malay Peninsula. Hopefully the themes identified in this article will prove to be of value in such an enquiry. The time periods covered will, of course, depend on the interests of the writer and on the availability of primary and secondary source materials. For the researcher interested in the history of British attitudes towards nature in Malaya, 1786 (the acquisition of Penang) and 1874 offer two obvious starting points.

(2) Much needed, too, is further research on ideas associated with specific environmental attributes such as soil fertility, reactions and adaptations to tropical climatic conditions, and attitudes towards the natural resources of the country. One would like to know, for example, what types of ideas the Chinese and the British have held about the tin deposits of the Peninsula and to what extent these ideas have influenced subsequent decision making.

³² Dasmann, R.F. *Planet in Peril* (Harmondsworth, 1972) p. 115.

(3) Have the Malays, the Chinese, and the former small minority of British administrators and speculators traditionally viewed the tropical jungle as an alien presence to man? Was the jungle viewed as a moral and physical wasteland fit only for conquest and fructification? An answer to these questions might well provide a perspective on current problems associated with forest exploitation and the conservation of natural resources, to mention only two areas of concern.

(4) The cultural and ethnological matrix of Malaysia would appear to offer an ideal setting for the comparative study of both past and present environmental ideas. Unfortunately this very difficult, elusive and often refractory field of enquiry is beyond the scope and ability of most geographers. For the small minority of scholars who possess a sound training in cultural history and the history of ideas (amongst other things) and who also have an aptitude for languages, the comparative study of environmental attitudes will probably prove to be greatly rewarding.

It is my contention that the geographer can make significant contributions to the history of environmental ideas associated with the Malay Peninsula. Hopefully a great deal more research will be conducted in this field of enquiry in the near future.

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SUGBUANON DRAMA: A PRELIMINARY LIST OF PLAYS ACQUIRED BY THE UNIVERSITY

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The following is an abridged listing of plays — holographs, typescripts, and published manuscripts — which have been acquired as donations to the University of the Philippines under a project approved by the Social Science and Humanities Research Committee and supported by grants from the University and the Ford Foundation in 1972-73. It comprises 627 titles of 1408 manuscripts written in Sugbuanon-Visayan by 184 playwrights. It is one part of a list of theatrical materials in the vernacular that has been compiled for a team research project on the drama of seven major linguistic areas in the country. It will be included in a fuller, descriptive and classified listing of all Sugbuanon plays acquired by the University, which is to be appended to a study of Sugbuanon drama. The list excludes donated play collections of which separate listings have already been made by the University Library.

The donors were, in most cases, the authors of the plays who realized that the University is in a better position than they to preserve their works. Reverend Estanislao Villoria, parish priest formerly of Alegria and Ronda and at present of Acuña, Carcar, Cebu, donated an entire collection of manuscripts and musical scores that had been written by him through a lifetime spent among the rural folk of Cebu. Anatalio Saballa, an actor-playwright of Cebu who was held in high regard by both his audiences and his colleagues in the field, donated holographs and typescript revisions of all his plays only a few months before his death last November. The LUDABI, a well-known organization of writers in the Sugbuanon vernacular, increased the number of manuscript donations to a considerable degree. Donors from many provinces — housewives, farmers, laborers, sacristans, media men, school-teachers, many of whom had written their plays to provide their com-

munities with deliberately instructive entertainment — donated their manuscripts immediately upon request. It is in acknowledgement of the trust reposed by them in the University that this list is being published.

The plays represent a wide spectrum of dramatic forms from urban stage, radio, and folk theatre: The nationally familiar *zarzuela*, the *tistis ug komedya* or wit and fun play, the dramatic exemplum; *pastores*, a play depicting the Christmas story embellished with songs and dances, traditionally performed out of doors, on a city street where there are interested spectators, around a barrio chapel, or in some townsman's front yard; the saint's play, depicting inspiring moments in the life of the town or barrio patron saint; *balagtasan*, an extemporaneous debate by two performers who address each other in declamatory, argumentative verse, an obvious borrowing from Tagalog tradition; *balitaw*, a dialogue of courtship that develops into a wit combat, sung and danced in three-quarter time to the accompaniment of a native harp or guitar by only one pair of performers, in a comic figuring of the eternal battle of the sexes; *drama-balitaw*, a play improvised around several *balitaw* scenes, intended largely to allow more than one pair of *balitaw* performers to exhibit their talents; *kolilisi*, an entertainment among barrio folk, performed extempore by visitors at a wake, for the diversion of the bereaved family, and at a *novena* for the dead, frequently to attract a large crowd of young people for the *novena* prayers preceding the entertainment, in which a group play-act a rhyming king and his court, putting on a roundel toss-the-handkerchief game of verse recitations where anyone caught without a suitable and immediate verse rejoinder is sentenced to pay a penalty, unless someone else takes up his defense in persuasive verse argument; *melodrama*, a play adorned with songs borrowed from the popular tunes of the day; *linambay* or the *moro-moro* of Cebu, so called because the traditionally stylized backward-forward movement of combatants in the battle scenes reminded spectators (like Vicente Sotto, to whom the coinage of the originally derogative term is frequently ascribed) of the behavior of fighting crabs which are called *lambay* or *langbay* in Sugbuanon; *minoros*, a play apparently inspired by the *moro-moro* tradition, set in the early days of Philippine history and portraying either

romantic adventures in love and war of members of pre-Spanish tribal nobility, or the conflict between Filipino Christians and Muslims; and *drama-drama* pieces or amateur theatricals of one or two acts, intended merely as curtain-raisers to main events that are not always dramatic in nature in barrio and town celebrations. Manuscripts of extemporaneous folk plays, such as *balitaw*, *drama-balitaw*, and *kolilisi*, consist in either transcripts or re-creation by experienced actors of typical performances.

The plays are being studied as a multiform expression of the Sugbuanon character.

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