Asian Studies

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CONTENTS

THE PRIMATE CITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS AND COLONIAL ORIGINS*

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Although Southeast Asia remains one of the least urbanized areas of the modern world[1] the accelerating rate of urban growth in both the mainland and archipelagic realms has recently generated mounting interest in the city and concern for its future among scholars and within national officialdoms of the region. To planners and governmental personnel involved in metropolitan development the urbanization process[2]

[1] Comparative statistical information concerning the urban populations of the world's major regions may be found in Kingsley Davis, *World Urbanization 1950-1970. Volume 2: Analysis of Trends, Relationships, and Development* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1972), chap. 7; *Demographic Yearbook, 1970* (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1971), pp. 432-511; Gerald Breese, *Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1966), pp. 15, 22-37; Population Division, United Nations Bureau of Social Affairs, "World Urbanization Trends, 1920-1960," in Gerald Breese (ed.), *The City in Newly Developing Countries: Readings on Urbanism and Urbanization* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. 21-53; Eric E. Lampard, "Historical Aspects of Urbanization," in Philip M. Hauser and Leo F. Schnore (eds.), *The Study of Urbanization* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 548.

[2] Definitions of the *urbanization process* are many and are usually tailored to reflect research concerns of individual scholars. Yet most deal directly or indirectly with the reordering of a given rural population in towns and cities, as well as with the associated impact upon man and environment. It almost goes without saying that the exact nature of the process of human concentration in larger settlements remains a subject or continuing discussion. The degree of *urbanization*, on the other hand, usually allowed more precise meaning. Increasingly social scientists use this term to indicate the proportion of a total national or regional population which dwells in towns and cities. Useful commentaries in accessible sources pertaining to these concepts are presented in Lampard, pp. 519-554; Breese, *The City in Newly Developing Countries*, Pts. 1-3; *Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries*, chaps, 1-4; Kingsley Davis, "The Urbanization of the Human Population," *Scientific American*, Vol, 213, No. 3 (September, 1965) pp. 40-53; Kingsley Davis and Hilda H. Golden, "Urbanization and the Development of Pre-Industrial Areas," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (October 1954), pp. 6-24; Eric E. Lampard, "Urbanization and Social Change: On Broadening the Scope and Relevance of Urban History," in Oscar Handlin and John Burhard (eds.), *The Historian and the City* (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1963), pp. 225-247. See also Philip M. Hauser and Leo F. Schnore (eds.), *The Study of Urbanization* (New

and associated social, economic and political problems are of immediate
and obvious import, for they are faced with the complex task of pro-
viding workable solutions to the employment, educational, housing,
transportation and recreational needs of the millions who now crowd
into the major regional cities and towns. Accordingly there is a little
doubt that the ongoing work of all developers and policy makers will
be marked by an intensifying sense of urgency as the scale of urban ex-
pansion continues to become manifest through proliferation of squatter
communities, exceedingly high unemployment and underemployment
figures, rising social discontent and general deterioration in the quality
of human life.

No less concerned with the matter of city growth in Southeast
Asia are a number of Asian, American and European social scientists,
who more than a decade ago began to display a growing commitment
to the study of non-Western urbanism. In recent publications these
scholars, like co-workers in South Asia, Africa, Latin America and
East Asia, have expressed considerable discontent with old models fas-
hioned to explain the multifaceted processes of modernization, indus-
trialization and urbanization exclusively in terms of European and North
American experience. Predictably some have begun to call for the re-
jection of the more inflexible constructs,[3] which seem applicable only
to Western cities. Though this group of researchers still remains small
in number, even now it is clear that through their efforts a fundamental
re-examination of established urban theory has been inaugurated.
Preliminary investigations by certain of these workers are already bring-

York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965); Emrys Jones, *Towns and Cities* (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1968); Brian J. L. Berry and Frank E. Horton, *Geographic
Perspective on Urban Systems: With Integrated Readings* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), pp. 20-63; Jack P. Gibbs (ed.), *Urban Research Methods*
(Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nortrand Company, Inc., 1961). Urbanization should not
be equated with *urbanism*, for the latter word denotes the fact of city existence
and of spatial organization in terms of a functionally integrated complex of higher
social, religious, economic and political institutions. It is generally held that such
institutional systems confer a distinctive character upon certain large and compact
settlements, or cities, whose inhabitants are socially stratified and politically or-
ganized. These societies not only possess a distinctive manner of life, but also tend
to extend their spheres of multi-faceted influence to surrounding territories.
Through this steady spatial expansion of urban authority over the past five millennia
all peoples of the world have been affected to a greater or lesser degree by the city.
For a concise, readable and definitive statement pertaining to this theme, consult
Paul Wheatley, "The Concept of Urbanism," in Peter J. Ucko, Ruth Tringham
and G. W. Dimbleby (eds.), *Man, Settlement and Urbanism* (London: Gerard Duck-
worth & Co., Ltd., 1972), pp. 601-637. One of the more recent collections of
readings on urbanism is Sylvia Fleis (eds.). *Urbanism in World Perspective:
A Reader* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1969).

[3] Probably the most systematic commentary concerning the need for develop-
ment of a new body of theory through which to examine the contemporary pro-
cess of urbanization and the nature of urbanism in non-Western nations has been
presented recently by the geographer T. G. McGee, *The Urbanization Process in the
Third World: Explorations in Search of a Theory* (London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd.,
1971), Pt. 1.

ing into serious question the formerly accepted correlation between industrial development and modern urbanization,[4] the reality or even the heuristic value of the urban-rural continuum,[5] the belief that social disorganization always follows the migration of villagers to cities,[6] and the invariability of the demographic transition in the contemporary

[4] *Ibid.,* pp. 17-27; Philip M. Hauser, "The Social, Economic, and Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization," in Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore (eds.), *Industrialization and Society* (New York: UNESCO, 1968), pp. 199-207; Wilbert E. Moore, Changes in Occupational Structures," in Neil J. Smelser and Seymour M. Lipset (eds.), *Social Structure and Mobility in Economic Development* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1966), p. 203; Donald W. Fryer, *Emerging Southeast Asia: A Study in Growth and Stagnation* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), pp. 88-89.

[5] Studies of urbanism by social theorists in the ancient and medieval pasts, as well as by contemporary scholars, have included numerous conceptualizations designed to isolate supposedly major socio-cultural differences between people of the city and those of the village. Within modern sociology, moreover, the notion of marked and inevitable polarity in attitudes and life-styles gained a degree of acceptance for several decades through the efforts of certain influential scholars who postulated various folk-urban or rural-urban dichotomies and continua. Although these constructs enjoyed only ephemeral popularity, the question of their utility as research tools, or even heuristic aids, has become a subject of considerable and continuing debate. Among the more significant statements concerning these dichotomous formulations are the following articles, many of which include useful references to works of secondary importance: Francisco Benet, "Sociology Uncertain: The Ideology of the Rural-Urban Continuum," *Comparative Studies in Society and History.* Vol. 6 No. 1 (October, 1963), pp. 1-23; Richard Dewey. "The Rural-Urban Continuum: Real but Relatively Unimportant," *The American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 66, No. 1 (July, 1960), pp. 60-66; Horace Miner, "The Folk-Urban Continuum," *American Sociological Review,* Vol. 17, No. 5 (October, 1952), pp. 529-537; C. T. Stewart, Jr., "The Urban-Rural Dichotomy: Concepts and Uses,"*American Journal of Sociology.* Vol. 64, No. 2 (September, 1958), pp. 152-158; R. E. Pahl, "The Rural-Urban Continuum," *Sociologia Ruralis,* Vol. 6, 3-4 (1966), pp. 299-236; "The Rural-Urban Continuum: A Reply to Eugen Lupri,"*Sociologia Ruralis,* Vol. 7, No. 1 (1967), pp. 21-29; Eugen Lupri, "The Rural-Urban Variable Reconsidered: The Cross-Cultural Perspective," *Sociologia Ruralis,* Vol. 7, No. 1 (1967, pp. 1-17; Oscar Lewis, "Further Observations on the Folk-Urban Continuum andUrbanization with Special Reference to Mexico City," and Philip Hauser, "Observations on the Urban-Folk and Urban-Rural Dichotomies as Forms of Western Ethnocentrism," in Philip M. Hauser and Leo F. Schnore (eds.), *The Study of Urbanization* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), chap. 13; T. G. McGee, "The Rural-Urban Continuum Debate: The Pre-Industrial City and Rural-Urban Migration," *Pacific Viewpoint,* Vol. 5, No. 2 (September, 1964), pp. 159-181. Probably the most comprehensive and lucid discussion of rural-urban and folk-urban dichotomies and continua is offered in Wheatley's recent statement concerning "The Concept of Urbanism," pp. 602-605, 625-627 (nn.7-34).

[6] The inadequacies of Western theories of social disorganization and breakdown in the non-Western urban situation have been clearly demonstrated by Edward M. Bruner, "Urbanization and Ethnic Identity in North Sumatra," *American Anthropologist,* Vol. 63, No. 3 (June, 1961), pp. 508-521; H. T. Chabot, "Urbanization Problems in South East Asia,"*Transactions of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology,* Washington, D.C., September 2-8 1962 (Louvain: International Sociological Association, 1964), Vol. 3, pp. 125-131; Oscar Lewis, "Urbanization Without Breakdown: A Case Study," The *Scientific Monthly,* Vol. 75, No. 1 (July, 1952), pp. 31-41; Janet Abu-Lughod, "Migrant Adjustment to City Life: The Egyptian Case," *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 67, No. 1 (July, 1961), pp. 22-32; Lisa R. Peattie, *The View from the Barrio (Ann Arbor:* University of Michigan Press, 1968).

metropolis of the Third World.[7] At the same time other scholars, whose interests focus upon the origin and evolution of urban centers, have contributed significantly to our knowledge of indigenous Southeast Asian urbanism[8] and to our understanding of the role of European colonialism in initiating reorganization of settlement systems throughout the region.[9] Among the critical elements in the latter process was the development within the various Western dependencies of especially large and multi-functional colonial capitals, which today continue to serve as the political, educational, economic and cultural nerve-centers of emergent states. While it is true that nationalists have occasionally called for replacement of the former bastions of imperial rule by new administrative centers,[10] these so-called *primate cities* presently remain unchallenged as the urban keystones of the most nations in Southeast Asia. Their paramountcy is firmly verifying through far-reaching national influence and steady growth in population.

As might be expected, the subject of metropolitan primacy has not gone unmentioned by students of Southeast Asian urbanism. Through the

[7] Davis, pp. 40-53; McGee, *The Urbanization Process in the Third World,* pp. 18-20, 22-25; Janet Abu-Lughod, "Urban-Rural Differences as a Function of the Demographic Transition: Egyptian Data and an Analytical Model," *The American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 69, No. 5 (March, 1964), pp. 476-490.

[8] For authoritative statements concerning the symbolic role of indigenous cities in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, consult Paul Wheatley, *City as Symbol,* An Inaugural Lecture Delivered at University College London, 20 November, 1967 (London: H. K. Lewis & Co., Ltd., 1969); *The Pivot of the Four Quarters: A Preliminary Enquiry into the Origins and Character of the Ancient Chinese City* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1971), Pt. 2. See also T. G. McGee, *The Southeast Asian City: A Social Geography of the Primate Cities of Southeast Asia* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), chap. 2; Robert R. Reed, "Origins of the Philippine City: A Comparative Inquiry Concerning Indigenous Southeast Asian Settlement and Spanish Colonial Urbanism" (Uupublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Geography, University of California, Berkeley, 1972), chap. 1; David Edwin Kaye, The Evolution, Function and Morphology of the Southeast Asian City from 1500 to 1800" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of Geography, University of California, Berkeley, 1963), chaps. 1-.3

[9] See especially McGee, *The Southeast Asian City,* chaps. 3-4; Reed, chaps.2-4; Kaye, chap. 4; Rhoads Murphey, "New Capitals of Asia", *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* Vol. 5, No. 3 (April, 1957), pp. 216-243; "Traditionalism and Colonialism: Changing Urban Roles in Asia", *The Journal of Asian Studies,* Vol. 29, No. 1 (November, 1969), pp. 67-84; Robert R. Reed, "Hispanic Urbanism in the Philippines: A Study of the Impact of Church and State", *University of Manila Journal of East Asiatic Studies,* Vol. 11 (March, 1967), chaps. 4-8; Daniel F. Doeppers, "Spanish Alteration of Indigenous Spatial Patterns on the Central Plain of Luzon, 1565-1780" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of Geography, Syracuse University, 1967); "Ethnicity and Class in the Structure of Philippine Cities" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Geography, Syracuse University, 1971), chaps. 1-3.

[10] Probably the first Southeast Asian leader to advocate abandonment of an established colonial capital in favor of a new urban site was the revolutionary General Emilio Aguinaldo of the Philippines. In 1913, during a visit to the cool and invigorating hill station of Baguio, he suggested transfer of the seat of insular government to the mountains of Northern Luzon. W. Camberon Forbes, "Journal of W. Cameron Forbes, First Series, February, 1904 - November, 1913", Vol. 5, pp. 234-236. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

term primate city appeared only rarely in literature published prior to 1960,[11] it became common currency during the past decade. But despite increasing acceptance by social scientists as an important theme worthy of serious investigation, researchers too often remain content to make the seemingly oversize national metropolis a subordinate topic embedded within large urban studies. Consequently they often neglect discussion of the theoretical implications of metropolitan primacy and also ignore its historical dimentions.[12] The pages which follow, therefore, will be dovoted to commentary concerning these subjects.

The Nature of Metropolitan Primacy

The concept of metropolitan primacy is not new, for it was first introduced to students of urbanism more than three decades ago. In his seminal statement on this theme the geographer Mark Jefferson[13] drew attention to the fact that the leading city in many nations is not merely dominant in terms of population, but also stands foremost in diversity of functions and degree of effective national influence. To express this condition of supereminence, he introduced the notion of the primate city.[14] While admitting the significance of various combinations of economic, political, physical and cultural factors in the original generation of primacy within national urban systems, Jefferson still firmly contended that

> once city is larger than any other in its country, this mere fact gives it an impetus to grow that cannot affect any other city, and it draws away from all of them in character as well as in size....[As a result] it becomes the *primate* city.[15]

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[11] Several frequently quoted works which bear early and specific reference to the primate city are Norton S. Ginsburg, "The Great City in Southeast Asia", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 60, No. 5 (March, 1955), pp. 455-462; Philip M. Hauser (ed.), *Urbanization in Asia and the Far East* (Calcutta: UNESCO, Research Centre on the Social Implications of Industrialization in Southern Asia, 1957), pp. 86-87, 160.

[12] The outstanding exception is T. G. McGee, whose book *The Southeast Asian City* is organized around the theme of metropolitan primacy. Other scholars have also made contributions through investigations of the origin and growth of individual primate cities. For instance see James L. Cobban, "The City of Java: An Essay in Historical Geography" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Geography, University of California, Berkeley, 1970); Pauline Dublin Milone, "Queen City of the East: The Metamorphosis of a Colonial Capital" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, University of California, Berkeley, 1966); Reed, "Hispanic Urbanism in the Philippines", chaps. 5-7.

[13] For brief appraisals of the research and teaching accomplishments of Mark Jefferson, one of the pioneers in American urban geography, see S. S. Visher, "Mark Jefferson, 1863-1949," pp. 307-312; Isiah Bowman, "Mark Jefferson", *Geographical Review*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (January, 1950), pp. 134-137.

[14] Mark Jefferson, "The Law of the Primate City", *Geographical Review*, Vol. 29 No. 2 (April, 1939), pp. 226-232.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 227.

Accordingly metropolitan primacy was envisaged as a continuing condition which generally tends to persist regardless of chance reversals in rates of population growth or even the temporary florescence of secondary urban places. He further argued that the primate city is almost always the national capital, a cultural center, the focus of internal migration, a hub of nationalistic ferment and the multi-functional nucleus of a country's economy. At the same time, according to Jefferson, the paramount urban place usually embraces at least two times as many residents as the second ranking city in any given state. By examining forty-four of the then leading independent nations of the world, he found strong support for the latter hypothesis. In twenty-eight of the countries, which were located on all of the inhabited continents,[16] the primate cities proved to be more than twice as populous as their nearest urban rivals. Eighteen of these, moreover, had capitals over three times the size of the next largest centers.[17] The available evidence thus indicated that in the 1930's metropolitan primacy was a comparatively common urban phenomenon.

Though it cannot be denied that Jefferson convincingly demonstrated the widespread occurrence of primate cities in terms of the data in hand, his body of supportive material remains marked by a curious and especially noteworthy omission. Without providing the reader benefit of explanation, he excluded nearly all European dependencies from the investigation.[18] While this gap in information certainly did not negate the essence of his conclusions, it somewhat reduced their immediate impact. If Jefferson had in fact elected to include in the survey the numerous colonies of Africa and Asia, most of which display a high degree of metropolitan primacy,[19] his argument would have been strengthened even further. Despite this undue focus only upon sovereign states extant in 1939, the concept of the primate city ultimately proved of recognizable utility and has been gradually adopted by social scientists.[20]

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[16] See map, Geoffrey J. Martin, "The Law of Primate Cities Re-Examined", *Journal of Geography*, Vol. 60, No. 4 (April, 1961), p. 170.

[17] Jefferson, pp. 227-228.

[18] The only exceptions were British India and the American dominated Commonwealth of the Philippines. But no explanation for their inclusion in the investigation was offered.

[19] The long assumed correlation between a colonial inheritance and metropolitan primacy in the nations of the Third World was recently confirmed by Arnold S. Linsky, "Some Generalizations Concerning Primate Cities", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 55, No. 3 (September, 1965), pp. 506-513.

[20] Scholars in a number of disciplines have confirmed the utility of metropolitan primacy as a category of research by relating it to investigations in their several areas of urban specialization. For examples of the interdisciplinary interest in the primate city, consult the following publications which have been selected respectively from the fields of geography, public administration, history, regional planning, and economics: A. James Rose, "Dissent from Down Under: Metropolitan Primacy as the Normal State", *Pacific Viewpoint*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (May, 1966), pp. 1-27; Aprodicio A. Laquian, *The City in Nation-Building* (Manila: School of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1966), pp. 2-5; Richard C. Morse, "Recent Research on Latin American Urbanization: A Selective Survey

For almost fifteen years following publication of Jefferson's now widely cited article on great cities,[21] scholars displayed relatively little interest in either the demographic or the functional aspects of metropolitan primacy. Yet by the middle of the 1950's, short commentaries concerning the role of the primate city were beginning to appear within larger urban studies prepared by geographers, historians, sociologists and economists.[22] Although the majority of researchers considered this theme only in a peripheral manner, even their brief discussions began to reflect a growing currency among students of urbanism and urbanization . This continues today. And while metropolitan primacy remains a topic of secondary concern for many researchers, in recent years a number have made it a focus of sustained inquiry.[23] A clear reflection of this quickening interest may be found in new college textbookss for geography and related disciplines, where sections on the primate city now seem to warrant standards inclusion.[24] Nevertheless, one should not assume that scholars are agreed on the precise nature or the manifold implications of metropolitan primacy. Presently all evidence seems to indicate that controversy will continue for some years concerning the political, economic and cultural roles of the primate city.[25]

Questions of Urban Theory and Non-Western Primate Cities

City-size distributions. During the past two decades social scientist have explored four major avenues of inquiry in the continuing investigation of metropolitan primacy. One cluster of researchers has displayed

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with Commentary", Latin American Research Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall, 1965), pp. 47-48; John Friedmann, Regional Development Policy:..A Case Study of Venezuela (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1966). pp. 35-37; Bert F. Hoselitz, Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth (New York: Free Press, 1965), pp. 185-215.

[21] The term "great city" is used frequently as a synonym for primate city.

[22] See, for instance, Ginsburg, pp. 455-462; Hauser, Urbanization in Asia and the Far East, pp. 33-35, 86- 88; Morse, pp. 47-48; Bert F. Hoselitz, "Generative and Parasitic Cities", Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 3, No. 3 (April, 1955), pp. 278-294.

[23] Among the more important theoretical works are Linsky, pp. 506-513; Surinder K. Mehta, "Some Demographic and Economic Correlates of Primate Cities: A Case for Revaluation", Demography, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1964),pp. 136-147; Clyde E. Browning, "Primate Cities and Related Concepts", in Forrest R. Pitts (ed.), Urban System and Economic Development (Eugene, Oregon: The School of Business Administration, University of Oregon, 1962), pp. 16-27. The most substantial statement concerning the primate city in Southeast Asia, of course, is McGee's The Southeast Asian City.

[24] For example, see Berry and Horton, pp. 64-75; Peter Haggett, Locational Analysis in Human Geography (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966), pp. 103-106; Jan. O. M. Broek and John W. Webb, A Geography of Mankind (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969), p. 376; Richard L. Morrill, The Spatial Organization of Society (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1970), p. 157.

[25] Some of the corollaries to the condition of metropolitan primacy which seem to warrant future investigation are identified in Mehta, pp.136-147; Linsky, pp. 506-513.

special interest in the various city-size distributions of nations and in their possible connection with comparative economic development. For many years urban geographers and other location theorists assumed that, with few exceptions, only industrially advanced countries display the tendency towards a regular hierarchical arrangement of urban places according to the rank-size rule.[26] In such cases the paramount city in a state is roughly twice as large as centers of the second stratum, three times the population of those at the third level, and so on down. This regularity in the ordering of cities and towns by rank and size was thought to be indicative of considerable socio-economic viability within an integrated national urban system.[27] At the same time early investigators believed that distributions reflective of primacy, in which a single oversized metropolis is markedly larger than cities, towns and villages of lower strata, were almost always associated with countries still in the early stages of economic development.[28] Research carried out during the past fifteen years, however, strongly suggests the invalidity of these notions. While there is little doubt that a high level of urbanization and considerable industrial development are closely related, scholars now generally question the existence of a significant correlation between rank-size distribution of cities and economic advancement, or between the national presence of a primate city and underdevelopment.[29] In fact some of the lesser developed nations, including the larger states of Brazil, China and India, display mark-

[26] Mehta, p. 137; Brian J. L. Berry, "City Size Distributions and Economic Development", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 9, No. 4, Pt. 1 (July, 1961), p. 573. One of the more widely known ideas concerning the distribution of city sizes is that of George F. Zipf, who several decades ago formally set forth the notion of rank-size relationship. Following considerable empirical observation, he argued that in every country there is a tendency for a city of any given rank in a settlement hierarchy to exhibit a population which is in inverse proportion to its position. Accordingly if all urban centers were arranged in descending order by population, we should expect the second city to have half as many people as the largest, while the n-th settlement would embrace 1/n-th the citizenry of the paramount place. Early commentary on rank-size regularity was offered in George K. Zipf, *Nationality Unity and Disunity* (Bloomington: Principia Press, 1941); *Human Behavior and the Principal of Least Effort: An Introduction to Human Ecology* (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley Press, Inc., 1949). Empirical evidence concerning this formula has been reviewed in Haggett, pp. 100-103; Walter Isard, *Location and Space-Economy: A General Theory Relating to Industrial Location, Market Areas, Land Use, Trade and Urban Structure* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., and The Technology Press of M.I.T., 1956), pp. 55-60; Rutledge Vining, "A Description of Certain Spatial Aspects of an Economic System", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (January, 1955), pp.147-195. For further discussion of the rank-size role and useful references, consult Mehta, pp. 137-138; Berry and Horton, pp. 64-67, 92-93.

[27] Berry and Horton, pp. 64-67; Berry, p. 573.

[28] Mehta, pp. 136-137; Berry, pp. 573-574; Berry and Horton,pp. 64-67; Brian J. L. Berry, "Some Relations of Urbanization and Basic Patterns of Economic Development", in Forrest R. Pitts (ed.), *Urban Systems and Economic Development* (Eugene, Oregon: The School of Business Administration, University of Oregon, 1962), p. 12.

[29] Berry, "City Size Distributions and Economic Development", pp. 585-587; Haggett, pp. 103-105; Berry and Horton, pp. 64-75.

edly regular arrangements of urban places. By the same token certain eco-
nomically advanced countries, such as Sweden, Greece, Austria and Den-
mark, exhibit a clearly recognizable condition of metropolitan primacy
instead of the formerly predicted hierarchical structure. Though these
results are seemingly inconclusive, the findings of recent investigations
do in fact support several tentative generalizations. Scholars now believe
that, regardless of geographical location or stage of economic development,
almost all nations large in area or diversified industrially tend towards
a rank-size distribution of cities and towns. Metropolitan primacy, on
the other hand, is thought to be a feature of the smaller Western states,
as well as of small and intermediate-size countries in the Third World.[30]

In the only serious attempt to test the above hypotheses within the
context of Southeast Asia, the geographer Hamzah Sendut clearly de-
monstrated the regional presence of both rank-size and primate distribu-
tions of urban places.[31] He found that Indonesia alone displays a truly
regular arrangement of cities, though Malaysia also approximates this con-
dition. In marked contrast the nations of Burma, Thailand and the Philip-
pines reveal a distinct primate distribution. For some unexplained reason
Hamzah combined the countries of Laos, South Vietnam, Cambodia and
North Vietnam to illustrate a rank-size situation in the greater Indo-
chinese realm, while leaving unmentioned the fact that these several
states when taken as independent political entities embrace capital
cities which show clear-cut patterns of demographic and functional pri-
macy.[32] Accordingly the city-size arrangements in Southeast Asia seem
to corroborate empirical findings from other parts of the world.[33] Most
of the small states in this developing region are marked by primate dis-
tributions. Only the large and populous nation of Indonesia is char-
acterized by a rank-size arrangement of cities and towns. Thus there
is no indication of any connection between relative economic develop-
ment and city-size distributions within Southeast Asia. Nor does the
available evidence suggest that the condition of primacy will necessarily
begin to evolve toward a rank-size arrangement with the occurrence of
economic progress. This latter question, nevertheless, will probably

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[30] Berry, "City Size Distributions and Economic Development", pp. 573-588;
Berry and Horton, pp. 64-75.

[31] Hamzah Sendut, "City Size Distribution of Southeast Asia", *Asian Studies*,
Vol. 4, No. 2 (August, 1966), pp. 268-280. Useful also are his "Patterns of
Urbanization in Malaya", *Journal of Tropical Geography*, Vol. 16 (October, 1962),
pp. 114-130; "Statistical Distribution of Cities in Malaya", *Kajian Ekonomi Malaysia*,
Vol. 2, No. 2 (December, 1965), pp. 49-66; "Contemporary Urbanization in Malay-
sia", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 6, No. 9 (September, 1966), pp. 484-493.

[32] These capital cities are Saigon-Cholon (South Vietnam), Phnom Penh
(Cambodia), Vientiane (Laos), and Hanoi (North Vietnam).

[33] The most comprehensive study of city-size distributions is Berry's "City
Size Distributions and Economic Development", pp. 573-588, which contains in-
formation concerning thirty-eight countries. A summary of the results of this
inquiry is presented in Berry and Horton, pp. 67-75.

demand serious exploration in future years, for such a trend has been
identified elsewhere in the world and if discerned in Southeast Asia
could undoubtedly have considerable impact upon urban and regional
planning decisions in certain nations.[34]

Notions of parasitic and generative cities. A second and still con-
troversial question associated with the study of metropolitan primacy
concerns the role of great cities as "parasitic" or "generative" instruments
of authority within the economies of developing countries.[35] Since the
middle of the 1950's many students of urbanism have believed that
large capitals in nations of the Third World rarely serve as effective
stimulants to economic growth. Instead these supereminent cities are
viewed as national parasites or urban magnets which invariably extract
considerable quantities of resources from underdeveloped hinterlands and
lure more talented individuals to the metropolitan areas from scattered
villages. At the same time the non-Western primate cities reputedly
fail to provide in return an equitable amount of manufactured goods,
organizational guidance and essential services. In a typical statement
expressing this viewpoint Eric E. Lampard writes that

> the presence of an overly large city in a preindustrial society may act as a
> curb rather than a stimulus to wider growth. Its growth and maintenance
> have been somewhat parasitical in the sense that profits of trade, capital accu-
> mulated in agricultural and other primacy pursuits have been dissipated in
> grandiose construction, servicing, and consuming by a "colonial" elite. The
> labor and enterprise which might otherwise have been invested in some form of
> manufacture or material processing in the interior are drawn off to the great
> city by the attractive dazzle of a million lights.[36]

According to John Friedmann, whose words are especially emphatic, the

> primate cities tend to feed upon the rest of the nation. Instead of generating
> a new socioeconomic order and new wealth. they feast on what may be ex-

[34] In the aforementioned comparative investigation of city-size distributions
(above, n. 33), Berry postulated the development of a trend from the condition
of metropolitan primacy to a rank-size ordering of cities as nations experience
economic progress. Several subsequent empirical studies designed to test the
validity of this notion, however, remain inconclusive. While Berry's model seems
to represent accurately the situation in Israel, it cannot be applied in New Zealand.
Gwen Bell, "Change in City Size Distribution in Israel" *Ekistics,* Vol. 13 (1962),
p. 103. cited in Berry and Horton, p. 93, n. 15; R. J. Johnston, "On the Progress
from Primacy to Rank-Size in an Urban System: The Deviant Case of New
Zealand", *Area,* Vol. 3, No. 3 (1971), pp. 180-184.

[35] The seminar paper on this subject is "Generative and Parasitic Cities,"
which was written by Bert F. Hoselitz in the middle of the 1950's and is cited
above, n. 22. it has also been reprinted in his *Sociological Aspects of Economic
Growth,* chap. 8. Aprodicio A. Laquian in *The City in Nation-Building,* p. 4,
suggests that urban geographers submitted the notion of "parasitic" cities as part
of the original construct concerning metropolitan primacy. In rereading Mark
Jefferson's "The Law of the Primate City," however, I found no support for his
contention. Nor does Hiselitz credit any other scholar with the concept of urban
parasitism.

[36] Eric E. Lampard, "The History of Cities in Economically Advanced Areas,"
Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 3. No. 2 (January, 1955), p. 131.

> tracted by the sweat of poor, provincial labor. The reason for this essentially
> colonial relationship is that any center unopposed on the periphery, by counter-
> vailing powers will yield excessive influence in making basic political decisions.
> The periphery, therefore, is drained, and national progress will fail to occur,
> except as it accrues to a small elite of urban consumers at the center.[37]

For almost two decades these impressions have been echoed and re-
echoed by other researchers, who feel that the former colonial role of
non-Western primate cities as political and economic "head-links"[38] bet-
ween the metropolitan powers of Europe and many dispersed dependen-
cies remains intact even today.[39] Such writers, as one would expect, argue
for the immediate implementation of policies geared to the reversal of this
presumably parasitic condition, to the creation of economically generative
capitals and to the growth of secondary urban places in each developing
nation.

Despite the frequent indictment of non-Western primate cities as
instruments of economic exploitation throughout the Third World, not
all scholars are in full concurrence. Concerning the urban situation in
West Africa, Sheldon Gellar offers the following observations:

> The growing primacy of the capital city, at the present time, seems to be a
> step in the right direction since it is preferable to have a primate capital city
> with some industry than to have no primate city and no industry. Further-
> more, the charge that the primate city, by absorbing a disproportionate share
> of the nation's resources, prevents the emergence of other development poles
> does not hold true in West Africa. Ghana, Senegal, and the Ivory Coast,
> where the primate phenomenon is most advanced, are precisely those countries
> having other important development poles.[40]

In an even more detailed statement pertaining to metropolitan primacy
in Southeast Asia, Donald W. Fryer contends that

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[37] Friedmann, p. 35. For interesting commentaries pertaining to the supposedly
parasitic role of primate cities in Southeast Asia, see Nathan Keyfitz, "The Ecology
of Indonesian Cities," *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 66, No. 4 (January,
1961), pp. 348-354; "Political-Economic Aspects of Urbanization in South and
Southeast Asia." in Philip M. Hauser and Leo F. Schnore (eds.), *The Study of
Urbanization* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), pp. 265-309.

[38] This term is from O. H. K. Spate, "Factors in the Development of Capital
Cities." *Geographical Review*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (October, 1942), p. 628.

[39] For example consult, Browning, pp. 16-27; Ginsburg, pp. 455-462; Hauser
Urbanization in Asia and the Far East, pp. 86-87; Breese, *Urbanization in Newly
Developing Countries*, pp. 38-54; T. G. McGee, "Aspects of the Political Geography
of Southeast Asia: A Study of a Period of Nation-Building," *Pacific Viewpoint*,
Vol. 1, No. 1 (March, 1960), pp. 47-48; Nels Anderson, *The Urban Community: A
World Perspective* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1959), p. 68; Noel P.
Gist and L. A. Halbert, *Urban Society* (4th ed.; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell,
1956), pp. 68-71; Wolfgang Stolper, "Spatial Order and the Economic Growth of
Cities: A Comment on Eric Lampard's Paper," *Economic Development and Cul-
tural Change*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (January, 1955), p. 141; Milton Santos ",Quelques
problèmes des grandes villes dans les pays sous-développés" *Revue de Géographie
de Lyon*. Vol. 36, No. 3 (1961), pp. 197-218.

[40] "West African Capital Cities as Motors for Development," *Civilizations*,
Vol. 17, No. 3 (1967), p. 261.

in modern times at least, it is not possible seriously to claim that over an ap-
preciable period any great city has been essentially parasitic. The European-
created cities may initially have operated to impoverish the indigenous ruling
and merchant classes and to lay heavier burdens on the peasants, but the effects
of economic growth within the cities themselves and their repercussions on the
counrtyside were such that ultimately these parasitic tendencies were greatly
outweighed by new productive ones that did result in an increase in incomes per
head. With an increasing urban population a specialized labour force came
into being; the demand for food and for export crops increased, which together
with improvements in transport did offer new opportunities to indigenous farm-
ers; and the growth of processing industries at ports and the expansion of the
production of inanimate energy began to lay the foundations for a higher
degree of industrial activity.[41]

Many other social scientists, who seem to feel that economic growth in
the typical developing nation is oftentimes facilitated through the medium
of primate cities, have also lent endorsements to the essentials of the
foregoing statements.[42]   Only in the very large urban places, they argue,
are political and business authorities able to exploit the economies of scale
essential to efficient industrialization.[43]   Individuals subscribing to this
position usually admit the ultimate importance of intermediate-size cities
and towns in guaranteeing economic progress on a broad geographical
basis, but still believe that general prosperity depends upon the initial
achievement of considerable commercial, administrative and industrial
momentum in the primate city.[44]

Though commentary concerning the developmental role of great
cities usually revolves around the subject of economic activity, some

[41] Fryer, pp. 84-85. For permission to quote this statement I gratefully thank
George Philip & Son Limited, London, who are the senior publishers of *Emerging
Southeast Asia: A Study in Growth and Stagnation,* and the author Professor Donald
W. Fryer.
[42] See, for example, Edward L. Ullman, *The Primte City and Urbanization in
Southeast Asia: A Preliminary Speculation,* SEADAG Paper No. 31 (New York:
Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group, The Asia Society, 1968), pp. 6-7
(Mimeorgraphed); Harley L. Browning, "Recent Trends in Latin American Urbani-
zation," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* Vol.
316 (March, 1958), pp. 111-120; Donald D. Fryer, *Megalopolis or Tyrannopolis in
Southeast Asia?,* SEADAG Paper No. 36 (New York: Southeast Asia Development
Advisory Group, The Asia Society, 1968), pp. 1-6 (Mimeographed); William Petersen,
"Urban Policies in Africa and Asia", *Population Review,* Vol. 10, No. 1 (January, 1966),
33-35.
[43] A summary statement of this position and some useful references are presented
in Mehta, pp. 138-140. Consult also Petersen, pp. 33-34; Ullman, pp. 5-8; Fryer,
Megalopolis *or Tyrannopolis in Southeast Asia?,* pp. 4-6.
[44] Even those researchers who contend that all primate cities are essentially
parasitic in nature, and who advocate programs of urban decentralization in order
to foster economic progress oftentimes acknowledge the possibility of persistent
dis-economies in developing nations whose indigenous elites fail to fully exploit
the commercial, administrative and social facilities available only in major
metropolitan centers. For example consult Hauser, "The Social, Economic, and
Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization", pp. 204-205; Gerald Breese, *The
Great City and Economic Development in Southeast Asia,* SEADAG Paper No. 29
(New York: Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group, The Asia Society,
1968), pp. 5-8 (Mimeographed).

writers have questioned the validity of a parasitic or generative desig-
nation based upon a single criterion. They rightly contend that this is
only one of the many functions performed by the primate city, for most
ranking urban places serve additionally as national capitals, communi-
cations complexes, military headquarters, educationl centers and hubs of
cultural activities.[45] According to these investigators, truly accurate as-
sessments of the comparative generative and parasitic relationships bet-
ween the metropolitan nerve-centers and their hinterlands must include
full consideration of all function.[46] The balanced evaluation of various
urban external relations, rather than concentration upon economic linkages,
is thus envisaged by such commentators as the key to a full understanding
of the multi-faceted development role of great cities.[47] In light of past
controversy regarding the parasitic and generative influences of the pri-
mate city, therefore, it seems likely that related questions will command the
attention of researchers for some years to come.

Over-urbanization. As in the case of the two foregoing topics corol-
lary to the major theme of metropolitan primacy, the subject of "over-
urbanization"[48] remains a focus of continuing interest and debate among
students concerned with the development of great cities in Asia and in
other parts of the Third World. These individuals generally feel that
the non-Western nations of today are over-urbanized because

> larger proportions of their population live in urban places than their degree
> of economic development justifies. In the [so called] underdeveloped nations,
> a much smaller proportion of the labor force is engaged in non-agricultural
> occupations than was the case in the West at comparable levels of urban-
> ization. Furthermore, during the postwar period, the rate of urbanization in the
> underdeveloped areas has....[proceeded].... more rapidly than the rate
> of economic development.[49]

In such countries the urban labor force apparently expands both through
the internal population growth of cities and the "push" of migrants from

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[45] The multi-functional role of the primate city is detailed in almost all
sustained commentaries on Southern Asian urbanism. For instance see Fryer,
Emerging Southeast Asia, Chap. 3; 'The Million City' in Southeast Asia",
Geographical Review, Vol. 43, No. 4 (October, 1953), pp. 474-494; McGee, *The
Southeast Asian City*, chap. 4-7.

[46] Mehta, pp. 136-147; Breese, *The Great City and Economic Development in
Southeast Asia*, pp. 3-8. It worthy of note that Bert F. Hoselitz fully recognized
that the primate city could be parasitic or generative in a variety of functions,
but elected to confine his discussion only to the economic realm. "Generative and
Parasitic Cities", pp. 278-294.

[47] Mehta, pp. 138-147.

[48] Perhaps the most useful commentaries upon this concept are Davis and Golden,
pp. 16-20; N. V. Sovani, "The Analysis of 'Over-Urbanization'",*Economic Deve-
lopment and Cultural Change*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (anuary, 1964), pp. 113-122;
David Kamerschen, "Further Analysis of Overurbanization", *Economic Development
and Cultural Change*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (January, 1969), pp. 234-253. For a summary
statement concerning over-urbanization, see Breese,*Urbanization in Newly Developing
Countries*, pp. 133-136.

[49] Hauser, "The Social, Economic, and Technological Problems of Rapid
Urbanization", p. 203.

especially overcrowded rural situations, rather than through the "pull" of unskilled workers from villages to rapidly industrializing metropolitan centers.[50]   Accordingly major urban places throughout the Third World have come to embrace populations far in excess of employment demands in the combined public and private sectors of their economies.   This in turn has produced the serious problems of unemployment, underemployment and social unrest which now plague most primate cities in Asia and other developing regions.[51]   Conditions of over-urbanization among nations thus are usually described in terms of comparative levels of city growth, the distribution of labor between urban and agricultural occupations, poverty, job availability in major cities and relative economic progress.

While scholars are in general agreement concerning the typical occupational and economic elements of over-urbanization, their investigations have failed to produce a satisfactory index for the comparative measurement of this condition over lengthy periods of time and in both Western and non-Western countries.   It is certainly true that attempts to find a direct correlation between the degree of industrialization and the degree of urbanization in a number of different regions at given dates in history are useful in identifying exceptional national cases of economic development, stagnation and city growth.[52]   But all efforts to find a clear relationship between these two variables through time and in var-

[50] Sovani, pp. 113-122; Breese, *Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries*, pp. 79-86; Fryer, *Emerging Southeast Asia*, pp. 85-88; Hauser, *Urbanization in Asia and the Far East*, pp. 9, 33-35, 88, 154-156, 160; McGee, *The Southeast Asian City*, pp. 16-17, 83-85; "The Rural-Urban Continuum Debate, the Pre-Industrial City and Rural-Urban Migration", pp. 173-178; Norton S. Ginsburg, "Planning for the Southeast Asian City", *Focus*, Vol. 22, No. 9 (May, 1972), p. 5. Discussion regarding the significance of internal urban population growth in the expansion of primate cities is offered in Kingley Davis, "The Urbanization of the Human Population", *Scientific American*, Vol. 213, No. 3 (September, 1965), pp. 41-53; McGee, *The Urbanization Process in the Third World*, pp. 22-25. Among the more useful studies of rural-urban migration to the primate cities of Southeast Asia are Larry Sternstein," A First Study of Migration in the Greater Bangkok Metropolitan Area", *Pacific Viewpoint*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (May, 1971), pp. 41-67; R. B. Textor *et al., The Social Implications of Industrialization and Urbanization: Five Studies of Urban Populations of Recent Rural Origin in Cities of Southern Asia* (Calcutta: UNESCO, Research Centre of the Social Implications of Industrialization in Southern Asia, 1956), pp. 1-47, 227-268; Aprodicio A. Laquian (ed.), *Rural-Urban Migrants and Metropolitan Development* (Toronto: Intermet, 1971), chaps. 2, 6 and 8; T. G. McGee, "An Aspect of Urbanization in Southeast Asia: The Process of Cityward Migration",*Proceedings Fourth New Zealand Geography Conference* (Dunedin: New Zealand Geographical Society (Inc.), 1965), pp. 207-218.

[51] Hauser, *Urbanization in Asia and the Far East*, pp. 19-21, 154-157, 160-161; Breese, *Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries*, pp. 77-79; McGee, *The Southeast Asian City*, pp. 18, 58-60, 90-92, 155-170; Sir Arthur Lewis, "Unemployment in Developing Countries", *The World Today*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (January, 1967), pp. 13-22.

[52] Many scholars have devoted themselves to the study of the relationship between industrialization and urbanization in the non-Western world.   The more significant publications resulting from this research are cited in Breese, *Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries*, p. 51, n. 15.

ious countries remain inconclusive. Researchers interested in the development of nations in the Third World, in other words, have yet to reach a consensus regarding the statistical dimensions of over-urbanization.[53]

Regardless of continuing controversy concerning the precise definition of an over-urbanized country, there is little disagreement as to the physical and human results of this phenomenon. Almost without exception scholars seem to feel that everywhere in non-Western primate cities

> the most visible consequence of overurbanization and rapid rates of urban growth is the decadence of the urban environment.... The physical city is characterized by a large proportion of shanty towns and tenement slums; inadequate urban services, including housing, water supply, sewerage, utilities, and transport; uncontrolled land use; excessive population densities; deficient educational and recreational facilities; and inefficient commercial and marketing services. Rapid urbanization in the underdeveloped areas is accompanied by not a defective, but also by a deteriorating, urban environment.[54]

It almost goes without saying that the miserable living and working conditions characteristic of the major cities in Asia and other developing countries[55] have generated mounting pressures for massive social investments in the form of public housing, expanded job opportunities and marked improvements in the urban infrastructure.[56] Yet even while such needs are being met in some nations on a minimal basis, many planners, involved governmental personnel and interested scholars, are constantly plagued by the belief that the woefully scare resources of most non-Western nations should be expended primarily upon economically generative industrial and agricultural enterprises. The immediate need of

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[53] Sovani, 113-117.

[54] Hauser, "The Social, Economic, and Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization", p. 207. Other scholars have echoed and re-echoed the essence of this statement concerning the deteriorating urban environment of primate cities in the Third World. See, for example, Fryer, *Emerging Southeast Asia*, pp. 90-98; Breese, *Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries*, chap 4; McGee, *Southeast Asian City*, chaps. 7 to 9.

[55] The past decade has been marked by a mounting interest among scholars in the plight of the poverty stricken squatter in the primate cities of Southeast Asia and increasing participation by concerned planners in charting the growth of major regional urban centers. For instance, see Aprodicio A. Laquian, *The City in Nation-Building; Slums are for People* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1971); Charles Abrams, *Squatter Settlements: The Problem and the Opportunity* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1966); McGee, *The City in Southeast Asia*, chap. 9; D. J. Dwyer, "The Problem of In-Migration and Squatter Settlement in Asian Cities: Two Case Studies, Manila and Victoria-Kowloon", *Asian Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (August, 1964), pp. 145-169; "The City in the Developing World and the Example of Southeast Asia", *Geography*, Vol. 53, Pt. 4 (November, 1968), pp. 357-363; Richard Critchfield, *Hello Mister! Where Are You Going?: The Story of Husen, Javenese Betjak Driver* (New York: The Alicia Patterson Fund, 1970). Consult Laquian, *Rural-Urban Migrants and Metropolitan Development*, pp. 195-213, for useful bibliographical references pertaining to squatters, urban poverty and city planning in Southeast Asia.

[56] Hauser, "The Social, Economic, and Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization", pp. 207-208; *Urbanization in Asia and the Far East*, pp. 24-26.

contemporary urban masses for improved conditions of life, according to
these individuals, must be sacrificed to provide sufficient developmental
capital for more productive national projects.[57] n short, the inadequate
physical plant of the primate city, which is to a considerable extent the by-
product of over-urbanization, has created serious secondary problems
that will demand the attention of urban and regional planners for decades
to come.

Urban origins and evolution. Although comparative urban research
is fundamental to each of the three foregoing approaches to the invest-
igation of metropolitan primacy, the fourth avenue of inquiry remains
much more specific in geographic focus. Its purview concerns the ori-
gin and development of primate cities within certain national or regional
contexts. Such studies, as one would expect, deal primarily with those
unique political, social and historical factors which have tended to condi-
tion the evolution of the paramount metropolitan center in a given nation
or of several capitals situated within a particular region. Early formal
contributions representative of this approach and relevant to Southeast
Asia were made in the 1950's by the geographers Donald W. Fryer and
Norton S. Ginsburg. In several widely quoted articles these writers
concerned themselves with the colonial origins of primate cities within
the region, discussed the long-standing role of such centers as generators
of change and dealt with their continuing function as critical headlinks
between East and West.[58] They thus introduced the concepts of
metropolitan primacy to students interested in Southeast Asian urbanism.

Responding to themes set forth in the aforementioned articles by
Fryer and Ginsburg,[59] other schools increasingly came to recognize the
great city as a subject worthy of detailed study. Some workers, following
the lead of these two geographers, soon began to investigate the growth
of primate cities within more or less expansive regional frameworks.
Though most of the results of their efforts have been presented in the
form of short articles,[60] one lengthy and quite comprehensive statement

[57] For notes in readily accessible sources concerning the problems of re-
source allocation in cities of the Third World, consult Hauser, "The Social,
Economic, and Technological Problems of Rapid Ubranization", p. 208; *Urban-
ization in Asia and the Far East,* pp. 22-26; McGee, The Southeast Asia", pp. 360-
363; Ginsburg, "Planning for the Southeast Asian City", pp. 5-8.

[58] Fryer, "The 'Million City' in Southeast Asia", pp. 474-494; Norton S.
Ginsburg, "The Great City in Southeast Asia", *American Journal of Sociology,*
Vol. 60, No. 5 (March, 1958), pp. 455-462.

[59] Both of these geographers have remained interested in the Southeast Asia
city. Among their recent formal statements are Freyer, *Emerging Southeast
Asia,* chap. 3; "Cities of Southeast Asia and Their Problems", *Focus,* Vol. 22, No.
7 (March, 1972), pp. 1-8; Ginsburg, "Planning for the Southeast Asian City",
pp. 1-8; "Urban Geography and 'Non-Western' Areas, in Philip M. Hauser and
Leo F. Schnore (eds.), *The Study of Urbanization* (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, Inc., 1956), pp. 311-346.

[60] For example, see Dwyer, "The City in the Developing World and the Ex-
ample of Southeast Asia", pp. 353-363; Rhoads Murphey, "New Capitals of Asia",

on metropolitan primacy has also appeared.   This, of course, is *The Southeast Asian City,* a book published in the middle of the 1960's in which T. G. McGee offered an interpretation of our then current knowledge of urbanism and the process of urbanization in this region.   Other scholars, in marked contrast, have proved especially interested in the development of particular primate cities in Southeast Asia.   Among the monographs, articles and dissertations[61] resulting from their investigations are several recent studies that feature substantial sections dealing with the beginnings of metropolitan primacy in individual European dependencies during the period of colonial dominion.[62]   In addition to discussions focused upon the economic role and physical form of selected coastal capitals in the region, the authors of these works also include useful statements pertaining to the institutional foundations of nascent primate cities.   Through such sustained commentaries on colonial urbanism a clearer image of the processes underlying the origin and evolution of the great city in Southeast Asia has recently begun to crystallize.

In spite of our growing knowledge of both the past and present dimensions of metropolitan primacy, writers often seem less than willing to commit themselves to sustained inquiries concerning the historical roots of this condition in Southeast Asia.   It is more than likely that their apparent lack of interest reflects an immediate, and predictable, preoccupation with contemporary developmental problems of the major urban centers in the region.[63]   But at the same time one cannot deny

Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 5, No. 3 (April, 1957), pp. 216-243; Robert R. Reed, "The Colonial Origins of Manila and Batavia: Desultory Notes on Nascent Metropolitan Primacy and Urban Systems in Southeast Asia", *Asian Studies,* Vol. 5, No. 3 (December, 1967), pp. 543-562.

[61] For instance, consult R. Wikkramatileke, "Focus on Singapore, 1964", *The Journal of Tropical Geography,* Vol. 20 (June, 1965), pp. 73-83; Mary R. Hollnsteiner, "The Urbanization of Metropolitan Manila", in Walden F. Bello and Alfonso de Guzman II (eds.), *Modernization: Its Impact in the Philippines IV,* IPC Papers No. 7 (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1969), pp. 147- 174; Ooi Jin Bee and Chiang Hai Ding (eds.), *Modern Singapore* (Singapore: University of Singapore Press, 1969); Eric Paul, "The Political-Geographic Viability of Singapore", (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Geography, University of California, c. 1973, in preparation).

[62] These include Milone, "Queen City of the East", chaps. 1-13; Cobban, "The City of Java", chaps. 1-3; Doeppers, "Spanish Alteration of Indigenous Spatial Patterns on the Central Plain of Luzon", chaps. 1-2; Reed, "Hispanic Urbanism in the Philippines", chaps. 6-8; "Origins of the Philipipne City", chap. 4.

[63] This is clearly reflected in several recent statements on the primate city in the Philippines. While not unaware of the historical paramountcy of Manila in the archipelago, the various authors cited below remain essentially concerned with the definition and solution of the multi-faceted urban problems which are thought to be corollaries of contemporary metropolitan primacy. Mary R. Hollsteiner, "The Urbanization of Metropolitan Manila", pp. 147-174; "Utopia or Dystopia: Man and Environment in Metropolitan Manila", *Philippine Sociological Review,* Vol. 18, Nos. 3-4 (July-October, 1970), pp. 185-198; Michael McPhelin, "Manila: The Primate City", *Philippine Studies,* Vol. 17, No. 4 (October, 1969), pp. 781-789; Richard P. Poethig, "Needed: Philippine Urban Growth Centers", *Solidarity,* Vol. 4, No. 12 (December, 1969), pp. 15-20

that an understanding of modern Southeast Asian urbanism remains part-
ly contigent upon the awareness of important social, political, cultural
and economic factors which have contributed over the centuries to the
processes of city growth and change. Accordingly in the subsequent
pages I will discuss briefly the beginnings of metropolitan primacy in this
region and the development of major regional centers. Drawing upon
the research of scholars who have investigated the emergence of coastal
capital in nations of both the peninsular and insular realms, I hope to
show that the functional, demographic and cultural supereminence of
most primate cities is not a recent phenomenon. On the contrary, their
national dominance was firmly established in most cases long before the
dawn of the twentieth century.

A Preface to Metropolitan Primacy: The Indigenous City

During the early decades of the sixteenth century, when the Portu-
guese were attempting to establish their colonial authority in coastal
areas to the east of the Andaman Sea,[64] the Philippine Archipelago re-
mained the only major sector of Southeast Asia without an indigenous
urban tradition. Elsewhere in the region European adventurers found
two characteristic types of cities which had existed in certain lowland
and littoral locations for more than a millennium. The first was the
coastal city-state. These urban places, which were epitomized by the
famed emporium of Melaka,[65] functioned as scattered commercial nodes
in a maritime network with linkages extending far beyond the seas of
Southeast Asia. In such port cities prosperity and effective politico-
economic power directly reflected the foreign demand for local commod-
ities, the relative productivity of surrounding lands, the number of client
villages and the breadth of trade relations.[66] As a result, enduring pol-
itical and commercial policies of the indigenous elite in these centers
were generally geared to the maintenance of a flourishing over seas
exchange. Because their essential domain was the water, rather than the
land, rulers of the ports seldom squandered resources by attempting to
extend urban authority to territories beyond the frontiers of comparative-
ly diminutive hinterlands. Instead they usually maintained fleets of
trading and piratical vessels which were employed effectively to guarantee
the commerce of their cities.[67] Predictably these conditions collectively

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[64] A short and authoritative account of Portuguese colonization is offered
in C. R. Boxer, *Four Centuries of Portuguese Expansion, 1415-1825: A Suc-
cinct Survey* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1963).

[65] For an excellent commentary on precolonial Melaka, consult Paul Wheat-
ley, *The Golden Khersonese: Studies in the Historical Geography of the Malay
Peninsula before A. D. 1500* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1961),
chap. 20.

[66] *Ibid.*, pp. 282-328.

[67] Keyfitz, "The Ecology of Indonesian Cities", p. 349.

gave rise to a proliferation along the coast of both the peninsular and insular realm of city-states that remained small in size,[68] but active in trade. Such indigenous settlements may be indentified appropriately as places of *heterogenetic* change,[69] for they were cosmopolitan ports through which flowed diverse men, materials and ideas.[70] It was in these centers that the far-ranging Lusitanians and other Western adventurers first began to trade and communicate with the Southeast Asians.

The second type of urban settlement encountered by the early Europeans was the indigenous sacred city. These places, marked contrast to the small coastal city-states, served as capitals of extensive kingdoms, were usually situated inland, profited little from international commerce and sometimes embraced more than one hundred thousand inhabitants.[71] Although they did in fact obtain most of their wealth from taxes levied on agricultural lands and the corvée labors of peasants,[72] the sacred cities should not be envisaged merely as economic mechanisms essential to the redistribution of surpluses extracted from dependent populations. Above all the inland capitals were politico-religious instruments essential to the definition and organization of Southeast Asian agrarian civilizations

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[68] Even the famed emporium of Melaka boasted of only six to ten thousand permanent residents on the eve of European intervention in Southeast Asia. Wheatley, *The Golden Khersonese*, p. 312; McGee, *The Southeast Asian City*, p. 41.

[69] In a very preceptive article published more than two decades ago Robert Redfield and Milton B. Singer presented a useful construct for the ordering of urban centers according to their comparative cultural roles. They drew a fundamental distinction between *orthogenetic* cities, which tend to carry forward and slowly elaborate an established local tradition, and *heterogenetic* cities, which provide an environment where old values disintegrate and new modes of thought are developed. According to their scheme the city of *heterogenetic* change

"is a place of conflict of different traditions, a center of heresy, heterodoxy and dissent, of interruption and destruction of ancient tradition, of rootlessness and anomie.... [In such urban places] men are concerned with the market, with 'rational organization of production of goods, with expediental relations between buyer and seller, ruler and ruled, and native and foreigner. It is in cities of this kind that priority comes to be given to economic growth."

"The Cultural Role of Cities," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (October, 1954), p. 58-59.

[70] Wheatley, *The Golden Khersonese*, pp. 282-328; Keyfitz, "The Ecology of Indonesian Cities," p. 349; Reed. "Origins of the Phiippine City," pp. 28-37; McGee, *The Southeast Asian City*, Chap. 2.

[71] Sir John Bowring, *The Kingdom and People of Siam; With a Narrative of the Mission to that Country in* 1855 (London: John W. Parker and Son, 1857),Vol. 1, p. 394; Fray Sebastien Manrique, *Travels of Fray Sebastien Manrique, 1629-1643*, translated from Spanish and edited, with Introduction and Notes, by Lt.-Col. C. Eckford Luard, assisted by Father H. Hosten, S. J. (Oxford: The Hakluyt Society, 1927), Vol. 1, pp. 207-208; Kaye, p. 81; Lt-Col. H. Burney, "On the Population of the Burman Empire," *Journal of the Statistical Society*, Vol. 14 (January, 1843), p. 343; Henry G. Bell, *An Account of the Burman Empire* (Calcutta: D'Rozario and Co., 1852), p. 50; Larry Sternstein, "Krung Kao: The Old Capital of Ayutthaya," *The Journal of the Siam Society*, Vol. 53, Pt. 1 (January, 1965), p. 98, n. 60.

[72] McGee,*The Southeast Asian City*, pp. 32-33; Reed, "Origins of the Philippine City," pp. 24-25; Clifford Geertz, *The Development of the Javanese Economy: A Socio-Cultural Approach* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1956), pp. 51-52. (Mimeographed)

METROPOLITAN PRIMACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

COLONIAL SITUATION, 1941

BURMA

THAILAND

FRENCH
INDOCHINA

PHILIPPINES

BRITISH
MALAYSIA

INDONESIA

Sources:

The Statesman's Yearbook, 1941

Pauline Dublin Milone, Urban Areas in Indonesia: Administrative and Census Concepts

Rhoads Murphey, "New Capitals of Asia," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Volume 5

CONTEMPORARY SITUATION, 1970

BURMA

NORTH VIETNAM

LAOS

THAILAND

CAMBODIA

SOUTH VIETNAM

PHILIPPINES

MALAYSIA

SINGAPORE

INDONESIA

Sources:

Kingsley Davis, World Urbani-
zation, 1950-1970. Volume I.

The Statesman's Yearbook,
1970-1971

DEGREE OF PRIMACY

Fourth city

Third city

Second city

Primate city

POPULATION OF
FOUR LARGEST CITIES

9,000,000

5,000,000

1,000,000

100,000

on a broad territorial basis.[73]   As repositories of a complex of function-
ally integrated urban institutions, the forms of which derived in part from
India,[74] the sacred cities

> were intended as cosmic creations, substantive and symbolic pinnacles of and
> resplendent thrones for the Great Tradition,[75] enshriners as well as administrators
> of a relatively homogeneous and particularistic culture to which the market towns
> and peasant villages of the Little Tradition[76] also belonged. Their planned,
> monumental urban forms reaffirmed their role as the head pieces of unitary
> civilizations centered on their own cultural worlds. They were predominantly
> political and cultural rather than economic phenomena, functioning as micro-
> scosms of the national polity, symbols of authority, legitimacy, and power,
> creators and molders of literate culture, and seats of the dominant ideology.
> Commercial functions.... were for the most part secondary, and were in any
> case under varying degrees of control or manipulation by the state, whose chief
> monument was the city itself.[77]

The typical inland capital, therefore, was not merely the chief consumer
of agricultural surpluses, the largest population agglomeration and the
hub of administrative activity in each state. It also acted as a potent
symbol of political and cultural unity in the indigenous kingdom. To the
Southeast Asian peasantry and the urban masses alike the sacred city
represented a critical magico-religious linkage between the macrocosmic
universe and the microcosmic earthly realm.[78] Accordingly the ruling elites
planned numerous inland capitals as replicas of the Indian celestial

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[73] Probably the most authoritative statements concerning the role of ceremonial
cities in the ancient kingdoms of Southeast Asia, China and other realms are Wheatley,
City as Symbol; The Pivot of the Four Quarters. Pt. 2.

[74] For detailed commentary and numerous bibliographical notes concerning
the transfer of Indian institutions from the subcontinent to Southeast Asia, as well
as discussion pertaining to the origins of cities in the latter region, see Reed,
"Origins of the Philippine City," chap. 1.

[75] The anthropologist Robert Redfield has outlined the essential differences
between the urban-based "Great Tradition" and the rural "Little Tradition in the
following statement:

> "In a civilization there is a great tradition of the reflective few and there
> is a little tradition of the largely unreflective many. The great tradition is cul-
> tivated in schools or temples; the little tradition works itself out and keeps
> itself going in the lives of the unlettered in the village communities. The
> tradition of the philosopher, theologian, and literary man is a tradition cons-
> ciously cultivated and handed down; that of the little people is for the most
> part taken for granted and not submitted to much scrunity or considered re-
> finement and improvement."

Peasant Society and Culture (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965),
pp. 41-42.

[76] *Ibid.*

[77] Rhoads Murphey, "Traditionalism and Colonialism: Changing Urban Roles in
Asia," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (November, 1969), p. 68.

[78] Useful commentary concerning the notion of parallelism between the mac-
rocosmos and the microcosmos, as well as discussion pertaining to the symbolic role
of the city, palace precincts and the ruler within the traditional kingdoms of South-
east Asia, is presented in Robert Heine-Geldern, "Conceptions of State and Kinship
in Southeast Asia", *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (November, 1942),
pp. 15-30.

archetype. The layout of the streets, temples, walls, moats and other morphological features often conformed to the heavenly models of Hindu or Buddhist tradition,[79] thereby providing the surrounding populations with material evidence of the critical cosmic role of these urban centers. Thus there is little doubt that such sacred cities were centers of *orthogenetic change*,[80] for they served by structure and function to perpetuate established civilizations.

Within the hinterland or "effective space"[81] subject to authority emanating from each indigenous city of Southeast Asia the condition of metropolitan primacy apparently proved almost ubiquitous. In the more or less restricted territories of the city-states, of course, there was usually only one significant urban place. Such centers were clearly dominant in terms of size and functional diversity within their small spatial frameworks. Though perhaps less pronounced, metropolitan primacy was equally significant in the extensive agrarian kingdoms of Java and the lowland interiors of the mainland. Probably without exception the sacred cities were paramount in their respective states in population,[82] diversity of functions, administrative influence and effective national power. To a considerable degree, in short, major precolonial urban centers throughout the region seem to have conformed to Jefferson's model of the primate city.

While metropolitan primacy was apparently common in the states of Southeast Asia even before the arrival of the Portuguese early in the sixteenth century, it is not to indigenous urban centers that we must look in an effort to discover the historical antecedents of modern great cities. Though a number of coastal city-states and inland capitals continued to flourish for several centuries following the beginnings of foreign intervention, the advent of the Europeans effectively sealed the ultimate doom of precolonial urbanism. In fact Bangkok among the major metropolitan

[79] Reed, "Origins of the Philippine City", pp. 21-39; McGee, *The Southeast Asian City*, pp. 34-39. For maps and assorted illustrations which illustrate these various elements of morphology in Burmese sacred cities, see V. C. Scott O' Connor, *Mandalay and Other Cities of the Past in Burma* (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1908); Charles Duroiselle, *Guide to the Mandalay Palace* (Rangoon: Superintendent, Government Printing and Stationary, Burma, 1925).

[80] According to the scheme of Redfield and Singer (p. 58), the *orthogenetic* city is a "place where religious, philosophical and literary specialists reflect, synthesize and create out of the traditional material new arrangements and developments that are felt by the people to be outgrowths of the old." In these urban centers, therefore, cultures are preserved in their basic form and are carried forward by successive generations.

[81] The notion of "effective space", or that territory defined and organized in terms of an integrated complex of urban institutions, was first set forth by John Friedman in his "Cities in Social Transformation", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (November, 1961), p. 92.

[82] Although demographic information concerning the indigenous kingdoms of Southeast Asia is scanty and difficult to handle, fairly reliable materials pertaining to Burma at the turn of the nineteenth century clearly illustrate the dominance of sacred cities in terms of population. Burney, pp. 335-347.

centers of today may be said to have strong roots in indigenous urban
tradition. Accordingly it is within the historical record of colonial urban-
ism that we must search for clues to the origins and early evolution
of the contemporary primate cities of Southeast Asia.

Colonoial Urbanism: Nascency

The fall of Melaka to Albuquerque in 1511 signaled the beginning
of a sustained Western presence in Southeast Asia, but it was not fol-
lowed immediately by a period of general European conquest throughout
the region. For almost three hundred years in fact, most independent
traders, chartered companies and governments confined their interests
to matters of trade and wherever possible avoided prolonged conflicts
with indigenous states. This situation, as one might expect, was to a
considerable extent the result of market conditions then obtaining in
pre-industrial Europe. At that time, before the dawn of the nineteenth
century, only the wealthy could afford the fine cloths, spices, jewelry,
scented woods and other exotic commodities of high value and little
bulk that comprised the East-West trade. Yet most of these could
be obtained in Asian marketplaces without drastic modifications of
traditional commercial patterns or direct manipulation of the means of
production.[83] As long as the demands of metropolitan societies remained
restricted to luxuries of guaranteed sale in Europe and ready availability
in Southeast Asia, therefore, the pragmatic merchant-adventurers simly
did not feel inclined to promote colonial intervention on a broad territorial
or formal political basis.

Although it cannot be denied that the Portuguese, Dutch, British
and Spaniards sometimes applied force to discipline indigenous rulers
who challenged the increasingly monopolistic commercial policies of
the Westerners,[84] they apparently did not relish the use of their small

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[83] Although the Portuguese, Dutch and English failed to inaugurate fundamental
changes in the structure of Southeast Asian commerce during the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries, they did introduce centralized military and administrative apparatus
to help facilitate their trading operations. This unity of commercial and political
organization was new to the region and ultimately proved to be a key instrument
in Western control of the regional export economy. As M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz
has pointed out, however, it definitely did not signal the immediate doom of the
indigenous Southeast Asian merchant. *Asian Trade and European Influence in the
Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630* (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1962), chap. 6 and p. 297.

[84] While the Europeans did prove willing to use the ultimate sanction of
force against Southeast Asians· who hindered trading operations, these conflicts
were usually short lived. Much more prolonged and costly were the wars among
the Western nations, each of which sought to establish its commercial supremacy
in the realm east of Melaka. For standard textbook treatment of the ongoing
European competition for trade and power, see D. G. E. Hall, *A History of South-
East Asia* (3rd ed. rev.; London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1968), Pt. 2; John
F. Cady, *Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development* (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., 1964), Pts. 3,4.

armies and navies. Most company and governmental officials well realized that military operations invariably proved costly in men, money and materials, and oftentimes led to further political and economic involvements. In short, they fully understood the direct relationship between peace and profits. The early European colonists thus refrained from excessive interference in the internal affairs of Southeast Asian states, shied away from exhausting wars and made few significant attempts to modify local cultures. Even when the Dutch *Vereenigde Oostindisch Compangnie* found it necessary in the seventeenth century to initiate periodic territorial conquests in parts of Indonesia in order to guarantee unhampered trade, the process of expansion proved haphazard and was not conducted according to a systematic plan of colonization. Following each military success, moreover, the V.O.C. usually hesitated to provide conquered peoples with direct administration. Instead the company introduced a system of indirect rule[85] in which tractable native leaders were allowed to govern on a regional basis as long as they maintained the order essential to profitable commerce. These client administrators of Indonesian birth served not only to reduce the administrative responsibilities of the Dutch, but also acted as important buffers between rulers and ruled. Before the dawn of the nineteenth century, in other words, the enlargement of colonial territories was neither a goal of the V.O.C., nor of most other European companies or nations involved in Southeast Asia. This was indeed an era of "pin-prick" imperialism[86] in which the Westerners confined most of their activities to the commercial sphere and avoided restrictive political or cultural entanglements.

Within such a context of limited territorial and administrative involvement the various European nations[87] were not inclined to establish numerous towns and cities. In order to conserve both human and capital resources they maintained only rudimentary systems of colonial settlements, each of which was dominated by a single entrepôt. These so-called "stabilizing points,"[88] the most significant of which were Melaka, Batavia and Manila, served as the primary warehousing areas for goods

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[85] For useful theoretical and substantive commentary concerning direct and indirect rule in Southeast Asia, consult Rupert Emerson, *Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967).

[86] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

[87] During the first three centuries of Western involvement in Southeast Asia most European governments were not official participants in the expansion process In the case of the English, Dutch and others active colonization was effected through the instrument of companies. These, however, were chartered by metropolitan authorities and usually received their support in times of crisis. In the cases of the Portuguese and Spaniards, on the other hand, the monarchies actively participated in colonization. For informative commentary on the chartered companies, see George Cawston, *The Early Chartered Companies* (London: Edward Arnold, 1896).

[88] This is McGee's term. *The Southeast Asian City*, p. 42.

entering into the East-West trade. But at the same time such centers also functioned as military strongholds, critical places of political decisions and outposts of Western culture. They were in fact the multi-functional urban keystones of the embryonic European imperial realms then beginning to crystallize in Southeast Asia.

Markedly subordinate to these emerging colonial capitals in terms of size and functional diversity were numerous far-flung factories, or trading posts. The Europeans apparently established such scattered stations in order to reduce the costs of middlemen, to prevent the hoarding of certain commodities by especially aggressive competitors, to better control quality by dealing more directly with producers and to help assure steady supplies of both raw and fabricated goods. Some of the factories were situated within the walls or on the outskirts of major sacred cities, where the Western merchants became active participants in already flourishing regional markets.[89] Others consisted of strategically located, though oftentimes isolated, trading posts from which merchants could service relatively extensive territories. Yet both types of factories shared one important feature in common. Operation costs generally remained reasonable, for each outpost required the services of only a handful of adventurous European traders to oversee commercial activities and a small detachment of soldiers to provide some measure of security. By thus limiting the early settlements to widely scattered factories and a single fortified colonial capital, the Westerners avoided excessive operational expenditures and so maximized the profits of their metropolitan sponsors.

Each of the early systems of European colonial settlements in Southeast Asia shared the essentials of the foregoing arrangement, but a truly stable hierarchy of commercial centers developed only in the emerging Dutch empire. While the Portuguese were the first to fashion a widespread network consisting of numerous outlying trading stations and a heavily garrisoned entrepôt, their fortunes declined precipitously following the loss of Melaka to the V.O.C. in 1641.[90] In the absence of this secure warehousing and administrative center Lusitanian commercial activities became increasingly decentralized, with a resultant dissolution of less profitable factories. By the same token the British failed early in the seventeenth century to effectively fortified entrepôt in Southeast Asia. Though the East India Company did continue to maintain a number of more or less ephemeral factories in the area, with Bencoolen functioning as the regional administrative center, effective

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[89] An interesting portrayal of the Dutch factory in the indigenous Siamese capital of Ayutthaya is offered in Sternstein, "Krung Kao: The Old Capital of Ayutthaya," pp. 94-95.

[90] The rise and fall of the Portuguese commercial empire in Southeast Asia is discussed in Cady, chap. 9; Hall, chap. 13.

imperial authority emanated from the distant Fort St. George in Madras and proved less than convincing beyond the Straits of Melaka. Accordingly the English merchants for almost two centuries remained in a comparatively insecure commercial position in Southeast Asia.[91] The Dutch, on the other hand, enjoyed a far-reaching and continuing presence along the littoral of Indonesia and Malaysia. As a result of effective commercial, military and administrative policies, the V.O.C. not only developed a well integrated entrepôt-factory arrangement, but slowly converted it into a fixed urban system. The only other major sector of Southeast Asia in which this transformation occurred prior to the nineteenth century was the Philippines.

From the earliest years of their imperial adventure in Southeast Asia the Spaniards attempted to carry out a program of colonization which differed significantly from those introduced by Europeans elsewhere in the region. As in the American *conquista,* they seem to have driven to new lands by a curious mixture of secular and religious motives.[92] Even during the planning period prior to dispatch of the successful Legazpi expedition, metropolitan authorities in Spain and Nueva España envisaged the Philippine enterprise as an integrated effort of merchants, soldiers, bureaucrats and missionaries.[93] To be sure most of the Spaniards, like Europeans in other parts of Southeast Asia, were attracted to the region by promises of gold, silk and spices. But at the same time the Castillan *conquistadores,* both individually and collectively, secular and priestly, proved firmly committed to the general religious conversation, political subjugation and cultural transformation of all subdued peoples. In pursuit of the goals the Spaniards initiated a program of systematic territorial conquest and direct rule soon after arriving in the Philippines. Their scheme of colonization also included detailed designs for the establishment of numerous towns and cities, which were to secure the archipelago and to provide strategic bases for the Hispanization and Christianization of Filipinos.[94]

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[91] or useful commentary on Anglo-Dutch conflict in Southeast Asia, see Hall, chaps. 15, 27-29; Cady, chaps. 10, 14.

[92] Reed, "Hispanic Urbanism in the Philippines," pp. 13-17.

[93] The instructions for colonization given to the *Adelantado* Legazpi by the royal *Audiencia* of Nueva España prior to his departure for the Philippines, which clearly reveal the mixture of secular and religious motives underlying Hispanic imperialism, called emphatically for cooperation among all Spaniards participating in conquest and settlement. "Expedition of Miguel Lopez de Legazpi -- 1564-1568", (résumé of contemporaneous documents, 1559-1568), in Emma H. Blair and James A. Robertson (eds.), *The Philippine Islands,* 1493-1898 (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Co., 1903), Vol. 2, pp. 89-100.

[94] Recent studies concerning these several themes are Reed, "Hispanic Urbanism in the Philippines," chaps. 1-6; John Leddy Phelan, *The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses,* 1565-1700 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1959); Daniel F. Doeppers, "Spanish Alteration of Indigenous Spatial Patterns on the Central Plain of Luzon," chaps.2-4; "The Development of Philippine Cities Before 1900," *The Journal of Asian Studies,* Vol. 31, No. 4 (August, 1972), pp. 769-792; Philippines Historical Committee, *The Beginnings of Christianity in the Philippines* (Manila: Philippines Historical Committee, 1965).

Despite the concerted efforts of Spanish civil and religious authorities, the creation of an integrated and stable urban system in the Philippines was not achieved with ease. To a considerable extent the Hispanic developmental program suffered from continuing shortages of financial support, insufficient European personnel and conflict among the rulers over matters of bureaucratic jurisdiction. But by far the most serious obstacle to the foundation and rapid growth of colonial cities and towns was the nature of pre-Hispanic settlement. At the time of the Spanish arrival, the Malay inhabitants of the archipelago were scattered amongst thousands of isolated and fiercely independent *barangay,* or village communities, throughout the archipelago. These living groups usually consisted of 100 to 400 people who practiced *swidden* cultivation[95] and occupied between 30 and 100 houses. None of these centers, as I noted in foregoing commentary, had attained urban status prior to colonial contact.[96] Under such circumstances it proved physically impossible for the small corps of several hundred Catholic missionaries to convert and thoroughly indoctrinate the approximately 700,000 Filipinos then occupying the islands. While frustrated with this reality the Spaniards were also repelled by the political and social decentralization of the intensely independent *barangay.* As proselytizing Christians, heirs to an enduring Mediterranean urban heritage and proud citizens of an expanding imperial realm, they valued traditions of national societal organization and instinctually equated civilization with the city. To the Spaniards, in other words, the politically fragmented Filipinos remained in a state of barbarism.[97] In light of these various circumstances, therefore, the colonial authorities launched a sweeping resettlement program in the Philippines late in the sixteenth century.

The Spaniards failed to congregate the majority of Filipinos into urban settlements of 2,400 to 5,000 people, as called for by certain

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[95] *Swidden* can be defined minimally as any system of farming in which impermanent fields are tilled for one or more years before being returned to fallow for longer periods of time. This type of agriculture, which is widespread in the tropics and was formerly found also in middle latitudes, usually involves the use of fire in the preparation of farm plots. It is known by numerous vernacular terms in different parts of the world and appears variously in the literature as slash-and-burn agriculture, shifting cultivation and field-forest rotation. Detailed information concerning the *swidden* eco-system and many references are included in J. E. Spencer, *Shifting Cultivation in Southeastern Asia,* University of California Publications in Geography, Vol. 19 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966); Harold C. Conklin, *Hanunoo Agriculture: A Report on an Integral System of Shifting Cultivation in the Philippines* (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations. 1957); Clifford Geertz. *Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 12-28.

[96] Discussion pertaining to the physical and institutional form of the pre-Hispanic *barangay* is offered in Phelan, chap. 2; Doeppers, "Spanish Alteration of Indigenous Spatial Patterns on the Central Plain of Luzon," chap. 1; Reed, "Hispanic Urbanism in the Philippines," chap. 3. For discussion concerning the question of pre-Hispanic urbanism consult Reed, "Origins of the Philippine Ctiy," pp. 130-150.

[97] Phelan, p. 44.

government officials,[98] yet their efforts certainly were not in vain. During the three hundred years of Hispanic rule, the far-reaching Catholic friars succeeded in establishing more than 1,000 permanent towns and cities in the insular lowlands. While the majority of these urban centers embraced fewer than 2,000 inhabitants throughout the Hispanic period, a considerable number became substantial settlements. By the close of the nineteenth century, or the end of the Spanish period, there were in the Philippines more than two hundred places of at least 2,000 individuals. thirty exceeding 5,000 people, nine greater than 10,000 and a colonial capital with some 220,000 residents.[99] Thus the Spaniards solidified their territorial conquest and fostered fundamental social, political and religious changes among the Filipinos through the widespread establishment of permanent cities and towns.

Almost from the beginning of sustained Spanish involvement in the Philippines, Manila ranked as the foremost city in the emerging urban system of the archipelago. Although the Spaniards had first attempted to established their insular capital in the Visayas, they were forced by insufficient food supplies to abandon several early administrative headquarters and to relocate in Central Luzon.[100] The final selection of a site on the shores of Manila Bay proved to be well made, for this strategic location in a wet-rice region helped guarantee adequate provisions for the fledgling colony. Soon after capturing the small Muslim community of *Maynila,* and in accordance with Hispanic imperial policy, the *conquistadores* began to convert the indigenous village into a fortified city.[101] From this stronghold, Spanish soldiers and missionaries fanned out to effect the military conquest of much of the archipelago in a matter of years and spiritual submission in decades. Through their efforts Manila was legitimized by the turn of the seventeenth century as the insular center of civil, religious and military authority.

Even before the new Hispanic city had been fully transformed into the administrative nerve-center of the Philippines, its Western citizens were beginning to concern themselves with matters of international commerce. But in marked contrast to the Portuguese and Dutch, the Spaniards did not seriously attempt to make their colonial capital an entrepôt for Southeast Asian commodities.[102] Instead they capitalized upon trad-

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[98] Manuel Bernaldex Pizarro, "Reforms Needed in Filipinas," (Madrid: 1827), in Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands,* Vol. 51, pp. 198-200.

[99] Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce and Labor, Bulletin 1: *Population of the Philippines* (Manila: Government Printing Office, 1904), pp. 21, 24-100.

[100] Reed, "Origins of the Philippine City", pp. 201-227, 440-451.

[101] Doeppers, "Spanish Alteration of Indigenous Spatial Patterns on the Central Plain of Luzon", chaps. 2-3; Kaye, pp. 171-187; Reed, "Origins of the Philippine City", chap. 4; "Hispanic Urbanism in the Philippines", chap. 6, 8.

[102] This point might be disputed by some, for the Spaniards certainly did make a concerted attempt to capture a portion of the Maluku spice trade and even main-

itional Sino-Filipino trade relationships and transformed Manila into a
commercial center linking Nueva España and China. The rapid flores-
cence of the resultant Pacific exchange was no less than spectacular. Only
sixteen years after the founding of Manila, the volume of Chinese luxuries
available for transport to America had far outstripped the cargo capacity of
all commissioned Spanish vessels in the Philippines.[103] Expansion in trade
continued, moreover, and by the end of the sixteenth century the Hispanic
colonial capital began to experience its most glorious days. In turn this
commercial growth and increasing prosperity was reflected in the popu-
lation and morphology of the insular capital. From a Malay community
of only 2,000 persons, Manila in only two decades became a multi-racial
city of more than 40,000 inhabitants.[104] By the same token it was changed
from a mere cluster of bamboo-*nipa* huts into a carefully planned and
walled city of substantial stone, brick and tile houses.[105] Although mer-
cantilistic regulations and the general decline of the Spanish empire some-
what restricted the subsequent development of Manila during the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries,[106] its urban paramountcy within the
Philippines proved well founded and remained intact throughout the
years of Hispanic rule.

In light of the foregoing commentary it is clear that the nascent
primate cities of Manila and Batavia originated under somewhat different
colonial conditions. Profiting from experience gained in the Americas,
the Spaniards envisaged their Philippine colonial capital as a metropol-
itan center which would properly service a large territory subject per-
manently to Hispanic authority. Accordingly even while they pursued the
military and religious conquest of the archipelago, the Castillian invaders in-
vested considerable time and money in an attempt to convert Manila into a
fortified, planned and imposing city This early developmental program,
of course, was sustained by profits of the prospering galleon trade. With-
in a matter of decades following the advent of the *conquistadores,* and
almost twenty years before the Dutch founded Batavia, Manila became
a flourishing entrepôt handling Chinese commodities and the crown of an
embryonic hierarchy of provincial towns and cities, which themselves were
developed in terms of a detailed Hispanic urban masterplan.[107] While

tained a fort on Ternate until the middle of the seventeenth century. But early at-
tempts to challenge the Dutch failed and the Spaniards soon became wholly involved
in an emerging commercial exchange between South China and Nueva España.

[103] Antonio M. Regidor y Jurado and J. Warren T. Mason, "Commercial Prog-
ress in the Philippine Islands", *The American Chamber of Commerce Journal,* Vol.
5, No. 2 (March, 1925), p. 7.

[104] Reed, "Origins of the Philippine City", p. 507.

[105] *Ibid.,* pp. 463-476.

[106] The classic work on the Sino-Hispanic trade is William Lytle Schurz, *The
Manila Galleon* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1959).

[107] Zelia Nuttall, "Royal Ordinances Concerning the Laying Out of New
Towns", *The Hispanic American Historical Review,* Vol. 5, No. 2 (May, 1922), pp.
249-254.

comprehensive design was thus the hallmark of colonial urbanism in the Philippines, unplanned change characterized the Dutch urban experience in Indonesia. For almost two centuries the V.O.C. displayed an obvious disdain for burdensome administrative entanglements and an apparent disinterest in the formal acquisition of a sprawling insular colony in Southeast Asia. Yet at the same time the Dutch were committed to expansionist trade policies which resulted in the widespread establishment of factories not only in Southeast Asia, but also at strategic points in South and East Asia. One of the most influential architects of the ambitious V.O.C. program, Jan Pieterszoon Coen, conceived of Batavia as the administrative hub and service center of this developing commercial system. In less than fifty years of colonial involvement, moreover, his vision had become fact.[108] Although the Dutch subsequently lost many of their outlying Asian trading posts, the aggressive efforts to control and manipulate the international trade of insular Southeast Asia led to increasing political embroilments, sporadic territorial advances and stabilitation of an embryonic system of colonial settlements in Indonesia. And by the same token the expansion of Dutch commercial and political power triggered the commensurate growth of Batavia, which was steadily transformed from a single purpose trading base into the multifunctional colonial capital of the largest European colony in Southeast Asia.

Regardless of these differences in colonial context it cannot be denied that even during their periods of genesis and early development both Manila and Batavia displayed certain features which were later to characterize most mature primate cities of the Southeast Asian realm. Firstly, they clearly originated as urban artifacts of foreign creation and continued to serve the needs of Europeans throughout the colonial era. Although each city developed on the site of a precolonial settlement, in neither case did the morphological or institutional forms of the indigenous community remain intact. Both places were in fact Western "replica" cities[109] fashioned to serve as instruments of foreign authority. Secondly, the port locations of Batavia and Manila emphasized the essential function of the European colonial capitals as commercial and political headlinks between East and West. Their coastal situation also tended to underscore the fundamental role of the major Western administrative centers in the process of systems change in Southeast Asia. While a number of sacred cities remained the nuclei of flourishing indigenous kingdoms for several centuries following the advent of the Europeans, from the earliest years of colonial intervention Westerners resident in the nascent primate cities began to formulate and to implement policies which ultimately opened inland areas throughout the region. Accordingly the

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[108] Milone, pp. 109-116.
[109] McGee, *The Southeast Asian City*, p. 49.

development of Batavia and Manila marked the beginning of a shift in
effective regional authority from indigenous cities in the interior to those
located on the coast.[110]   Thirdly, and corollary to their commercial role,
the Hispanic and Dutch colonial capitals acted as magnets which attracted
adventurous persons from points throughout the maritime fringe of Asia.
Especially numerous were the Chinese, whose energy and diverse skills
made them essential members of both urban communities.[111]   Thus Ma-
nila and Batavia not only linked their developing colonial hintrelands to
commercial and political systems of international scope, but also served
as images of the primate cities which evolved in each Southeast Asian
colony during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Colonial Urbanism: Florence

During the waning years of the eighteenth century, the European
presence in Southeast Asia could hardly be described as pervasive.   It is
true that Western merchants were then trading in ports throughout the
region, but in more than a few of these places they still found it neces-
sary to conform to rules of the local market.   Only in urban centers
of the Hispanic Philippines, on Java and in the relatively limited Dutch
sectors of the Indonesian outer islands did the commercial institutions
prove to be of European derivation.   By the same token, before 1800 the
Westerners still controlled comparatively little territory in Southeast Asia.
Although the Portuguese occupied half of Timor and the British main-
tained permanent trading settlements at Penang and Bencoolen, these
represented mere colonial footholds in a vast of land and water.[112]   Even
in the realms of Spanish and Dutch influence, moreover, territorial
conquest proved incomplete.   In the outer islands of Indonesia a dec-
lining V.O.C. had failed to extend its rather limited coastal holdings
into inland areas in more than a few places.   At the same time, and despite
numerous expeditions of conquest, the Spaniards remained unable to
subdue the Muslims of Mindanao and never defeated the proud mountain
peoples of Northern Luzon.[113]   The implications of these conditions
in terms of the Southeast Asian city are almost self-evident.   Throughout
most of the region indigenous urbanism still prevailed, for fixed systems

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[110] Murphey, "Traditionalism and Colonialism: Changing Urban Roles in
Asia", pp. 67-84.
[111] Milone, chap. 4; Reed, "Hispanic Urbanism in the Philippines", chap. 6-7.
[112] Although conflict in Europe led to the British occupation of a number
of Dutch forts and factories late in the eighteenth century, most of these were
returned subsequently.   Furthermore regional competition between the two powers
for Southeast Asian territory was effectively resolved through the Anglo-Dutch
treaty of 1824.
[113] The extent of formal European territorial involvement in Southeast Asia
at the turn of the eighteenth century is illustrated in the *Atlas of South-East Asia*,
with an introduction by D. G. E. Hall (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1964),
backpiece.

of colonial settlement existed only in the fully secure Dutch and Spanish territories. This situation, however, was soon to change dramatically as the era of "pin-prick" imperialism drew to a close.

In the early decades of the nineteenth century a second phase of European involvement began to dawn in Southeast Asia. To a great extent this development, which produced profound political, economic and social changes throughout the region, was an outgrowth of the Industrial Revolution. As the nations of the West began to undergo rapid industrialization, they experienced an escalating demand for raw materials and foreign markets. These conditions in turn generated a compelling drive among Europeans for the acquisition of territory in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. This quickening Western quest for overseas dependencies was further fostered by steady improvements in modern communications systems, increasingly sophisticated armaments, more powerful ocean vessels and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, which permitted great increases in the volume of East-West maritime trade and shortened significantly the time of transit between the Indian Ocean and the North Atlantic. Accordingly the industrializing nations of Europe for the first time had the machinery to exploit distant resources on a massive scale, the need to create foreign markets and the military strength to assert themselves throughout the world. Furthermore most Westerners remained quite unconcerned with the ethical implications of their colonizing actions. As a result of these various developments, the imperial purpose of the European nations underwent a fundamental transformation during the nineteenth century and produced a scramble for territorial possessions. By the turn of the twentieth century Thailand alone among the major political units of Southeast Asia remained free of foreign dominion.[114]

Following the acquisition of new dependent territories in the Southeast Asian realm, the British, French, Dutch and Americans each moved quickly to provide a flexible administrative framework which would not only serve to underwrite the order necessary to efficient manipulation of conquered peoples, but also to guarantee produce, profits and markets for distant metropolitan societies. Although it cannot be denied that private Western capital fueled the engine of economic development, at the same time the various colonial governments actively fostered the process of exploitation through a number of enduring policies. These included the provision of easy credit terms for European companies involved in mining or estate agriculture, programs that promoted the influx of immigrant Chinese and Indian laborers, agricultural experimentation designed to improve the production efficiency of plantations and infrastructural advances in the form of new roads, railways, harbor cons-

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[114] Standard historical accounts of the widespread European territorial acquisitions in Southeast Asia during the nineteenth century are presented in Cady, chap. 14-19; Hall, Pt. 3.

truction, irirgation projects and modern communications systems.[115] Pre-
dictably in each of these public and private activities colonial towns
and cities served as the West's primary instruments of institutional and
spatial organization. Yet very few were centers of international signi-
ficance. Most in fact proved to be smaller places of more or less spe-
cialized function. As one would expect, regional administrative centers
and military settlement were scattered throughout each colony at strateg-
ic locations to assure effective supervision of indigenous peoples. The
development of such essentially political places was paralleled also by
the proliferation of small ports, mining camps, plantation towns, rail-
way communities and hill stations,[116] all of which served as outlying
centers of colonial influence and authority. Yet while the smaller towns
and cities undoubtedly acted as significant linkages between rulers and
ruled, by far the most important urban elements in the emerging systems
of colonial settlement were the coastal capitals. It was primarily through
these large centers that the Europeans organized and directed processes
which facilitated the conversion of the closed indigenous kingdoms of
Southeast Asia into open colonial systems marked by a relatively free ex-
change of men, materials and ideas.

Though space does not permit detailed discussion of either the ins-
titutional or the morphological forms of the Southeast Asian colonial
capitals, a short commentary concerning the more important character-
istics of these centers should serve to illustrate both their role as multi-
functional instruments of change and their very early development as
primate cities. In first place, all of these cities--Rangoon, Singapore,
Batavia, Bangkok, Saigon-Cholon and Manila--shared tidewater sites
where transportation systems serving extensive agricultural hinterlands
could be readily linked to international maritime networks.[117] As one
would expect, this consideration was paramount in the minds of the
Westerners who founded the major urban centers of colonial Southeast
Asia. In the words of Rhoads Murphey,

> European attention to the maritime fringes of each country was rewarded by
> the discovery of plentiful opportunities for a commercially minded and vig-
> orously expanding West to establish trade centers on its own models, respond-
> ing to situational advantages for trade which until then had been largely

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[115] For a useful and recent overview of the economic geography of Southeast
Asia, which includes much commentary concerning the role of Europeans in fostering
development, see Fryer, *Emerging Southeast Asia*, Pt. 1.

[116] Robert R. Reed, "The Colonial Hill Station in Southeast Asia and the
Philippines: Notes on the Origins of Baguio", paper delivered at the Sixty-Eight
Annual Meeting of the Association of American Geographers, Kansas City, Missouri,
April 23-26, 1972. (Mimeographed)

[117] The repeated mention in commentaries on Southeast Asian urbanism of the
riverine or coastal locations of colonial cities serves to underscore their fundamental
role as head-links between East and West. Fryer, pp. 475-478; Murphey,
"Traditionalism and Colonialism: Changing Urban Roles in Asia", pp. 67-84;
McGee, *The Southeast Asian City*, pp. 55-56.

neglected. It was the seaman and the mechant (usually in the same person) who sought out, from the deck of a ship, the most promising places for the establishment of settlements best calculated to serve the interests of external trade. Those....which eventually supported the dominant port cities combined maximum access to and from the sea....with maximum internal access to and from those parts of each country which were actually or potentially (with the help of Western capital and management) productive of goods for export. This was urban development from the point of view of the commercial entrepreneur, in sharp contrast to the urban patterns of the Great Asian Traditions.[118]

To further exploit the natural locational advantages of the tidewater colonial capitals, the Europeans during the nineteenth century began to invest heavily in modern transportation and communications system designed to link outlying urban places even more closely with the developing coastal centers. A second, and quite obvious, feature of the emerging primate cities in Southeast Asia was a pre-eminent administrative role within the framework of their respective colonies. With only few exceptions, the ranking Western officials in civil government and the military were based in the colonial capitals.[119] Though European governmental executives and their immediate staffs in some colonies shifted headquarters to cool mountain hill stations during the dry season,[120] the bulk of the imperial bureaucracy always remained in the large coastal cities to carry on the routine affairs of administration. The third, and probably the most far-reaching, characteristic of the colonial capitals was their great diversity of economic functions. Within these urban places were located the head offices of the agency houses, banks, shipping firms, insurance companies and other commercial institutions through which the Westerners organized and supervised developing Southeast Asian economies.[121] At the same time the major cities served as processing and warehousing centers for goods leaving and entering the European dependencies. A fourth element shared by the colonial capitals was marked ethnic diversity. Not only did the coastal cities contain

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[118] "Traditionaism and Colonialism: Changing Urban Roles in Asia," p. 70.

[119] The most important exception to the concentration of government functions within the coastal capitals occured in French Indochina, where the colonial administration was seated in Hanoi, rather than in the larger city of Saigon-Cholon. By the same token in the Netherlands East Indies the key administrative functions were divided between several cities, for the military officialdom was headquartered in Bandung and the governor-general spent much of his time in the hill station in Buitenzorg (Bogor). Pauline Dubline Milone, "*Indische* Culture, and Its Relationship to Urban Life," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (July, 1967), p. 419.

[120] Reed, "The Colonial Hill Station in Southeast Asia and the Philippines: Notes on the Origins of Baguio," pp. 5-9.

[121] A thoroughgoing statement concerning the effective power within the Malayan economy of European firms based in Singapore is offered in J. J. Puthucheary, *Ownership and Control in the Malayan Economy* (Singapore:) Eastern Universities Press, Ltd., 1960).

small European communities, but they also embraced very large numbers
of Indians and Chinese who had migrated to Southeast Asia because
of intense poverty in their homelands. Although some members of the
alien Asian communities amassed considerable wealth through skillful
commercial dealings and participation in processing industries, most
were a part of the vast force of tertiary laborers who served the emerging
primate cities.[122] Finally, the colonial capitals served as the foremost
beacons of Western education and culture in their respective dependen-
cies. By the dawn of the twentieth century most of these urban centers
were the seats of public and secretarian institutions which provided cleri-
cal, technical and higher educational training for aspiring indigenous
peoples who wished to qualify as professionals or for positions in govern-
ment, the imperial military or European companies.[123] Corollary to
progress in education was the development in this century of a Southeast
Asian elite whose growing sense of identity ultimately converted the
major coastal cities into centers of nationalism.[124] Thus the colonial
capitals acquired a multiplicity of integrated activities during their early
decades of existence and soon became the urban "nerve-centers" through
which the European dependencies were organized, managed and ex-
ploited.

While the emerging cities of Southeast Asia grew in functional di-
versity, they also expanded dramatically in population. Like Manila
and Batavia, those colonial capitals founded during the nineteenth cen-
tury were located on the sites of comparatively insignificant precolonial
towns or villages. But as the developmental roles of the new alien
cities began to crytallize, their populations multiplied rapidly. By the
dawn of the twentieth century most of the Southern Asian colonial
capitals embraced at least 200,000 persons.[125] Equally impressive is
the fact that in the four ensuing decades each of these centers doubled
or even tripled its citizenry.[126] Furthermore, this expansion in the pop-
ulation of the major ports was paralleled by equally significant relative
gains over secondary urban places. As early as 1900 the colonial capitals
of most Southeast Asian dependencies proved to be at least two times

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[122] McGee, *The Southeast Asian City,* pp. 58-60.

[123] Following the demise of indigenous urbanism and the decline of the
Great Traditions, ambitious Southeast Asians increasingly looked to government,
the military and European business as effective avenues of social and economic
advancement. In each of these bureaucratic realms success depended to a great
extent upon clerical skills and proficiency in the prevailing European language.
Thus the newly established schools played an important role in servicing individuals
who required a Western type of education.

[124] McGee, *The Southeast Asian City,* p. 65; Harry J. Benda, "Decolonialization
in Indonesia: The Problem of Continuity and Change," *American Historical Re-
view,* Vol. 70, No. 4 (July, 1965), p. 1069.

[125] The major exception was Batavia, which had only 140,000 inhabitants in
the city proper. Murphey, "New Capitals of Asia,"p. 227.

[126] *Ibid.,* pp. 226-227.

MAJOR URBAN CENTERS
in
SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1970

Population

■   1,000,000-5,000,000
◉   700,000- 1,000,000
●   500,000- 700,000
○   200,000- 500,000
•   100,000- 200,000

RANGOON   Capital city
(1.2)   Population (millions)

Source: Kingsley Davis, World Urbanization 1950-1970

Volume I

Inset (Java):

Telek Betung
DJAKARTA (4.5)
Bogor
Tjirebon
Pakalongan
Bandung (1.5)
Surakarta
Semarang
Madiun
Jogjakarta
Kediri
Malong
Surabaja (1.4)

100 MILES
100   200 KM.

Main map:

BURMA
Mandalay
Thai Nguyen
HANOI (1.4)
Hon Gay
Haiphong
Nam Dinh
Henzada
LAOS
NORTH VIETNAM
assein
RANGOON (1.2)
VIENTIANE
Moulmein
Hue
Da-nang
THAILAND
BANGKOK-THONBURI (2.7)
SOUTH VIETNAM
CAMBODIA
PHNOM PENH
PHILIPPINES
Tarlac
MANILA-QUEZON CITY (4.1)
Bantangas
SAIGON-CHOLON (1.8)
Cantho
Iloilo
San Carlos
Bacolod
Cebu
Songkla
Butuan
George Town
Davao
Medan
Ipoh
MALAYSIA
Zamboanga
Basilan
Pematang Siantar
Klang
KUALA LUMPUR
Malacca
Johore Bahru
Padang
SINGAPORE (2.1)
Djambi
Pontianak
Menado
Palembang
Samarenda
Balikpapan
Telek Betung
Bandjarmasin
DJAKARTA (4.5)
Pare-pare
Makasar
Bandung (1.5)
Surabaja (1.4)
INDONESIA

500 MILES
500   1000 KM

the size of the cities of second rank.[127]   In the decades which followed, moreover, the coastal centers continued to outpace other significant urban places in their rates of population growth.   Accordingly metropolitan primacy intensified throughout the region.   In terms of population, as well as diversity of functions, therefore, the colonial capitals of Southeast Asia had fully matured as primate cities even before the advent of independence following World War II.

Inherited Primacy: A Concluding Note

Although the primate cities of Southeast Asia were originally established and developed as instruments of imperialism, the expulsion of Western officialdoms from the region in recent decades failed to initiate a decline in either the relative size or in the far-reaching influence of these major coastal centers.   The coming of independence in fact brought little opportunity for effective restructuring of the urban and infrastructural systems fashioned during the period of European dominion. In the new countries of Southeast Asia national life had come to focus upon the former colonial capitals to a seemingly irreversible degree. These centers not only retained a complex of economic, cultural and administrative functions created during the days of Western empire, but also served increasingly as the regional loci of intellectual ferment and of nationalism.   The various indigenous elites of Southeast Asia, in short, had little feasible alternative except to convert the alien colonial cities into the capitals of their newly emergent states.[128]   Accordingly despite periodic calls for urban decentralization in order to foster more uniform development throughout the region,[129] the absolute and relative growth of these primate cities in terms of population and national influence continues unabated.   In most Southeast Asian nations metropolitan primacy is thus becoming a permanent condition, and it seems highly unlikely that any but the most drastic remedial measures by public or private authorities could now effect an immediate reversal of this trend.

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[127] The exception to this pattern occured in the Netherlands East Indies, where the cities of Batavia and Surabaya were roughly equal in size early in the twentieth century. *Ibid.*, p. 227.

[128] Murphey, "Traditionalism and Colonialism: Changing Urban Roles in Asia," p. 72.

[129] For example see Poethig, pp. 15-20.

THE QUEST FOR DEVELOPMENT AND THE
DISCOVERY OF ASIA BY ASIANS*

By Gelia T. Castillo**

In the decade of the 50's and the early 60's, rural development was synonymous to *community development* of the variety which the UN defined as "the process by which the efforts of the people themselves are united with those of governmental authorities to improve the economic, social and cultural conditions of communities, to integrate these communities into the life of the nation and to enable them to contribute fully to national progress." It was known as "local improvement through local effort." The vocabulary of the community development era was made up of words like self-help, grassroots, local government, wholistic approach, missionary zeal, involvement, participation, felt needs and a litany of other such holy words. It was an era of village idolatry "dedicated" to the pursuit of a "better" life for the villager. Our late President Ramon Magsaysay expressed this concern in his famous pronouncement in 1956 about the small man's being entitled to "a little bit more food in his stomach, a little more clothes on his back and a little more roof over his head." Present-day activists would hardly be moved by such exhortation which was emotionally teaching then but rather passé now that the battlecry at least in the city streets and university campuses is for structural changes either by peaceful or violent means. What we want for the small man has been considerably expanded to include literacy; a full time job (with no disguised unemployment or underemployment); a God-given acre of land he can call his own; infrastructure of facilities and services such as electricity, roads, communication, health and medical services; not only higher income but more equitably distributed income brought about by the use of labor-intensive intermediate technology. We envision good quality but free and development-relevant schooling for his children; decent housing; long healthy life with only two instead of seven children living in a pollution-free environment. In addition, we prefer that he stay in the village in order not to mess up our tourist-attractive cities.

The demands which have been placed at the doorstep of governments in Asia are certainly Utopian in vision, structural in nature, and urgent in the time horizon. "Time is running out" is the constant threat and if one were to go by the M.I.T. computer, "the world economy is headed for collapse within 70 years bringing widespread pestilence, poverty, and starvation — unless economic growth is halted soon."[1] One is therefore tempted to give up and say, "What's the use? We will all be wiped out anyway?" But as Asians who always have one foot in eternity, we refuse to be intimidated or even hurried by such grim predictions. Our optimistic fatalism (God will take care of the future) finds academic respectability in Albert Hirschman's principle of the Hiding Hand which suggests that "far from seeking out and taking up challenges, people are apt to take on and plunge into a new task because it looks easier and more manageable than it will turn out to be. As a result, the Hiding Hand can help accelerate the rate at which men engage successfully in problem-solving: they take up problems *they think* they can solve, find them more difficult than expected, but then, being stuck with them, attack willy-nilly the unsuspected difficulties — and sometimes even succeed." It is essentially "a mechanism which makes a *risk-averter take risks* and turns him into less of a risk-averter in the process. In this manner, it opens an escape from one of those formidable "prerequisites" or "pre-conditions to development: it permits the so-called prerequisite to come into existence *after* the thing to which it is supposed to be the prerequisite."[2]

Given all the constraints to development, whether real, imagined or anticipated, what has been the response in Asia? This paper presents in capsule form (1) an identification of the common and diverse problems faced by different Asian countries and the "global" events in the region which provide the peculiar setting in which rural development is pursued, (2) the emergence of collaborative undertakings among professionals in the region, and (3) some thoughts on the role or non-role of the rural sociologist in development policies which impinge on rural life. For reasons of as yet incomplete Asianization on the part of the writer, countries and programs mentioned are only meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive.

If one were to scan the Asian headlines for happenings significant in the past two decades, the following phenomena would readily emerge: the continuing rise of Japan as an economic power and her growing conspicuous economic presence most everywhere in the world; the admission of China into the United Nations and its direct and indirect repercussions on Taiwan and the rest of Asia; the Middle East crisis, the

[1] Paul Steiger, "World Economy to Crumble in 70 Years,' *Manila Chronicle*, March 2, 1972, p. 6.

[2] Albert O. Hirschman, "Mysteries of Economic Development," *Dialogue* Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 37-47.

Indo-Pakistan conflict over Bangladesh; the war in Indo-China; the isolation of Burma and the internal domestic problems in the Philippines, Malaysia, Ceylon, Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia which have brought on either a threat or an actual imposition of martial law. Happily, Asia is not in a perpetual state of conflict for signs of mending fences have begun to appear on the political horizon with North and South Korea, India and Pakistan, and hopefully North and South Vietnam about to kiss and make up demurely in private without having to land on Henry Kissinger's lap. As the joint communique from Korea emphasized: "Unification shall be achieved through independent Korean efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference."[3] Lest one get the impression that Asia is one big "shoot-out" punctuated by "love-ins", allow me to point out some of our problems and how we have tried or will try to deal with them. Admittedly the *development vocabulary* of the 1970's is quite different from that of the middle 50's.

An opening sample of the new lexicon comes from Princeton's Wm. Lockwood:

"The labor force in most Asian nations is now growing at 2 to 2½ per cent a year, thanks to the population boom of the 60's. To provide jobs for all with steadily rising levels of productivity is likely to require a growth in output well above the 5½ per cent averaged by developing Asia over the past decade. Still more unemployment is particularly high among young people 15-24 years in age. Mostly they are unskilled, with rising expectations but unable to find jobs of adequate pay and regularity. The two great majorities of India says Prime Minister Indira Gandhi are the *young* and the *poor*. Her remarks underscore the politico-psychological dimensions of the situation. The old tranquilizers are less and less effective in keeping down frustration and latent violence. Already in Ceylon as in West Bengal, unemployed young ABs have mounted a desperate insurgency against the established order. . . . People want education widely dispersed as a consumption good. They agree also that it should be regarded as a productive investment with a high priority assigned to the supply of manpower skills in various categories. Social scientists and educators find it difficult to offer any clear guidance in balancing and integrating these objectives." For another side of the development picture, he refers to Japan as "the affluent society of the East with levels of full employment, technology, and education that project the future towards which other Asian nations hope to move. . . . Her standard of life today — perhaps 4 to 6 times that of most of Asia is assurance that the revolution of modern science and technology can lift people in this half of the world as in the West, to levels of economic well-being undreamed of until our time. Looking back over Japan's

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[3] Special Korea Report No. 96, South-North Joint Communique, July 4, 1972, Embassy of the Republic of Korea.

modern century, — she would hardly have received a high rating from
a World Bank mission appraising her prospects."[4]

On the work front, Stephen Yeh and You Poh Seng conclude that:
"If birth rates fall appreciably, the pressure created by new entrants
to the labor force is likely to be eased in a decade or two but the
fact remains that current problems in the work force are overwhelmingly
difficult problems which will exist for some time, irrespective of the
fertility trend.... Indeed for an increasing number of countries, employ-
ment is emerging as a more serious population problem than the adequacy
of food supply because employment and labor utilization are related to
the central development objectives of a more equal income distribution,
increased output, and policies of industrialization."[5]

The interrelationship of rural and urban development has never been
more dramatically manifested than in the rural-urban migration and
the resulting slums and squatter communities which are the bane of
every national politician. As ECAFE observed as early as 1959, "urban
growth in underdeveloped areas is not a feature of the expansion of the
industrial base but an expression of the severity of the agrarian crises."[6]
Rural development has long ceased to be defined as "a little more of
this" and a "bit more of that." The problems identified with it are
structural in nature and range from population pressure, technology,
terms of trade both domestic and international, income distribution and
administrative capacity.[7] Many of these are outside the decision-making
frame of the villager and the local rural community. Therefore "lifting
themselves by their own bootstraps" is not likely to get them there
except if one wishes to perpetuate a subsistence existence.

Ceylon (Sri Lanka) with its completely free educational system,
subsidized rice rations; free health and medical services backed by pension
schemes and poor relief, sophisticated trade unions, very inexpensive
and well-developed transportation network would have been an excellent
model for other countries aspiring to be welfare states, except that the
Island Paradise is beset with critical problems: "The country's exports
now fall far short of her import needs, and the whole economic machine
is kept turning only by massive injections of foreign capital. Even these
do not avert the need for a system of exchange and import controls of
crippling severity. To put it bluntly, Ceylon has been living far beyond
her means. Her social achievements are in refreshing contrast with
those of other countries, but it can be asked whether there has been

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[4] Wm. W. Lockwood, "Employment, Technology, and Education in Asia,"
Malayan Economic Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, Oct. 1971, pp. 6-24.

[5] Stephen Yeh and You Poh Seng, "Labor Force Supply in SE Asia," *Malayan
Economic Review,* Vol. 16, No. 2, Oct. 1971, pp. 25-26.

[6] UN, ECAFE, *Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East,* Dec. 1959, p. 21.

[7] Sakda Saibua, "Structural Problems of Rural Development" (Paper prepared for
the International Conference on Southeast Asian Studies, Feb. 23-26, 1972, Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia).

a corresponding emphasis in public life on the efficiency, work, thrift, even sacrifice, necessary to maintain and develop a welfare state. In all countries there is a tendency for the public to look to government for benefits, even benefits that have not yet been earned, and in Ceylon this tendency seems especially strong."[8]

The Philippines has tried everything from barrio councils, multi-purpose community development projects, grants-in-aid, agricultural credit cooperatives, rural banks, farmers' associations, an expanded agricultural education system, land reform, its version of the green revolution, even an Israeli-style moshav and the writing of a new Constitution. One novel feature in the Philippine development scene is the activist role of Catholic priests and nuns in social action projects and organized pressure groups. The other is the businessman's approach to social development whereby 150 of the largest business and commercial firms in the country contribute 1 per cent of net income before taxes for social development purposes.[9] At the moment however, whether in spite of or because of all these development undertakings, foreign social analysts consider the Philippines one big *social volcano*. The natives, however, are more cautiously optimistic.[10] As one of our more vitriolic senators remarked: "Insurgency, Yes — Revolution — No!" It is possible that Philippine society which is known for its resiliency will also learn to live with its *social volcano* such that it will remain on the verge of an eruption, without the eruption becoming a reality. The basic social structure could remain unchanged in spite of a steaming surface because those in power have learned how to manage that steam.[11]

It is amazing how very quickly China has become the "Mecca" for development lessons whether it be population control, environmental sanitation, communes, dampening of rural-urban migration, youth involvement, female liberation, or acupuncture. There is a continuous stream of observers from Asian countries eager to learn from the Chinese experience. The Philippine government, for example, has done away with a long standing restriction on travel to communist countries. Before this, everyone went to Taiwan to look at its programs on land reform, farmers' associations, family planning, agricultural diversification, and agro-industrial development.

[8] ILO, "Matching Employment Opportunities and Expectations: A Programme of Action for Ceylon" (Report of an Inter-Agency Team Organized by the ILO), Geneva, 1971, p. 3.

[9] Gelia T. Castillo, Something Happened on My Way to the Barrio: Rural Development Sought, Pursued, and Sowed, (Paper prepared for the International Conference on Southeast Asian Studies, Kuala Lumpur, Feb. 23-26, 1972).

[10] "The Philippines: Problems and Prospects" (Nine Papers Presenting a Cautiously Optimistic View of the Philippines' Future), *Asia*, Vol. 23, Autumn 1971.

[11] Gelia T. Castillo, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: An Analysis of Changing Social Images in a Developing Society," *Asian Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (April 1971), pp. 24-36.

Thailand, in its National Economic and Social Development Plans, has emphasized the development of agricultural infrastructure and factor inputs such as land, fertilizer, farm mechanization, credit, research and extension in order to promote diversification in agriculture in anticipation of a decline in foreign markets for their rice. The politically sensitive Northeast receives special attention by way of accelerated rural development.[12] Just like the other countries, Thailand is also concerned with reducing population growth, generating gainful employment, reducing the scale of rural-urban migration and premature drop-out of school children.[13] An interesting observation is made regarding the relationship between farm mechanization and population growth. It has been suggested that the introduction of the former would lead to lower fertility because of the decreasing demand for manpower but recent happenings suggest "the farm mechanization might not bring about fertility decline in the transitional period. Though the farmers need fewer workers in their farm, they need higher incomes to buy or rent machines. The sons and daughters who are forced to migrate to work in the urban centers are becoming the most important source of cash income for the parents and other members of the families who stay behind in the farms."[14]

For Taiwan, however, Lee and Sun conclude that "agricultural development is altering the attitudes of farmers toward the economics of family size — because the prolonged schooling and small size of farms have reduced the value of children as producers. The high aspiration of education of children increases the perceived cost of rearing children. Highly developed agriculture also increases the felt need for money. All these factors work to reduce the ideal family size and motivate farmers to accept family planning. However, there are non-economic satisfactions associated with ideal number of children such as a very strong desire to have two sons in a family, to continue the family line and to support parents in their old age. This factor alone will keep the number of children in a farm family at four." On the possible repercussion of using labor-intensive agricultural technology, Lee and Sun suggest the side effect of stimulating more rapid population growth through the increase in family size which is advantageous in the rural area where labor intensive agriculture is being practiced.[15]

[12] Kamphol Adulavidhaya and Visid Prachuabmoh, "Some Aspects of Agricultural Production and Population Growth in Thailand" (Paper prepared for the Ramon Magsaysay Award Foundation Seminar on Effects of Agricultural Innovation in Asia on Population Trends, Manila, Feb. 6-9, 1972).

[13] Vinyu Vichitvadakarn, "Extracts from the National Economic and Social Development Plan 1972-76 Thailand" (Presented at the Committee on Asian Manpower Studies (CAMS) Conference on Education and Manpower Development, Singapore, June 26-28, 1972).

[14] Kamphol Adulavidhaya and Visid Prachuabmoh, op. cit.

[15] T. H. Lee and T. H. Sun, "Agricultural Development and Population Trends in Taiwan," (Paper prepared for the Ramon Magsaysay Award Foundation Seminar

In the case of South Korea which shared with Japan and Israel the honor of being the fastest growing economies in the world, Brandt says that the problem is one of extraordinary concentration in Seoul of the technological, cultural, capital and administrative resources which has so far "prevented most of the rural population from participating to any significant degree in the new prosperity that is so evident in the city." Politically, "the importance of placating recalcitrant urban voters through low rice prices was given much higher priority than any concern for rural welfare."[16] This wide gap in income between urban and farming communities has resulted in a flow of farm emigrants in search of new jobs in urban areas thus a drop of almost 10 percent in rural population from 56.5% in 1961 to 45.9% in 1970.[17] The population pressure on limited land has contributed to rural parents' hope for their children to have better jobs in the cities. Because of stiff competition, education was an essential factor for job entry in the cities. This competition combined with the rising cost of education seems to be a principal economic incentive underlying the success of family planning in rural Korea.[18] The obvious rural-urban disparities have given rise to a new nationwide movement to push modernization of rural communities with the ultimate goal of increasing the income of farmers and fishermen. President Park was emphatic, however, that the government will not extend its support to those who are not willing to help themselves for an "equal distribution of government money among the diligent and the idle alike is simply unfair."[19]

Malaysia was noted for its RED (Rural Economic Development) Book and its Operations Room which monitored the progress of infrastructure and other projects in different parts of the country forged a New Economic Policy in their Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975. While the First Plan emphasized land development, drainage, irrigation and rubber replanting to raise productivity and incomes, the New Policy incorporates "the two-pronged objective of eradicating poverty, irrespective of race and restructuring Malaysian society to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function." National unity is a paramount objective in the light of the sensitive position

on Effects of Agricultural Innovation in Asia on Population Trends, Feb. 6-9, 1972, Manila).

[16] Vincent Brandt, "Mass Migration and Urbanization in Contemporary Korea," *Asia,* No. 20, Winter 1970/71 New York, pp. 31-47.

[17] Korea Policy Series No. 4, New Community Movement, Better Tomorrow Through Cooperative Efforts, Seoul, Korea, Korean Overseas Information Service, June 1972.

[18] C. H. Park, "Korean Economic Development, Agricultural Innovations and Farm Population" (Paper prepared for the Ramon Magsaysay Award Foundation Seminar on Effects of Agricultural Innovation in Asia on Population Trends, Feb. 6-9, 1972, Manila).

[19] Korea Policy Series No. 4, *op. cit.*

of the Chinese, the Malays and the Indians within the socio-economic
structure of the country.

Indonesia which is a relatively newcomer to the international devel-
opment scene is currently the object of everybody's assistance to the
point of reported project aid surplus amounting to US $613.3 million
unspent.[20] Soedjatmoko in his assessment of prospects for Indonesia's
development ascribes the changes in his country to the emergence of
a new generation, the first which "grow up in a free Indonesia with
a soul and mind unscarred by the pain and humiliation of the colonialist
period" and therefore much freer in its relation to the outside world.
This generation is much less ideologically inclined, much more prag-
matic, more materialistic and realistic. It shares "a faith in science and
scholarship and in what rationally applied technology can do to solve
many of the problems connected with Indonesia's poverty and back-
wardness." Among the long-term structural problems he identified are
"maldistribution of its population, massive and growing unemployment
and pressures of excessive urbanization upon housing, schools, and jobs";
and the need to "reorient the educational system which tends to train
people away from existing jobs in the rural sector to non-existent ones
in the urban centers."[21]

The Asian Agricultural Survey in 1968 recommended rather strongly
that the only valid route, the single strategy to sustained rural develop-
ment is a movement toward a farming based on the application of the
latest in science and technology. They also indicated that there seems
little validity in the general argument that land reform is a necessary
pre-condition to further agricultural development altho, in the long run
many countries will not be able to escape the need for major tenurial
reforms. Whatever weaknesses were found relative to land tenure seemed
less of a constraint on output expansion than the technical constraints
of poor varieties, inadequate fertilizer, irrigation, etc.[22] Whether or not
it is a consequence of this recommendation, the phenomenon of increased
food grain production occurred in Asia. This phenomenon called the
"green revolution" has had its harvest of conferences, controversies, and
literary productions.[23] More systematic empirical studies and analyses
of its consequences are currently underway.[24] Needless to say there

[20] "Djakarta's Aid Surplus," Asian, July 16-22, 1972, p. 12.
[21] Soedjatmoko, "Problems and Prospects for Development in Indonesia," Asia,
No. 19, Autumn 1970, pp. 7-21.
[22] "Asian Development Bank," Asian Agricultural Survey, Vol. I, Regional Report,
March, 1968, Manila, pp. 45-46.
[23] Antonio Barreto, "A Study of the Social and Economic Implications of the
Large-Scale Introduction of High-Yielding Varieties of Foodgrain: A Selection of
Readings;" UNRISD, Report No. 71.6, Geneva, 1971.
[24] UNDP-Global Two, "A Research Project on The Social and Economic Impli-
cations of the Large-Scale Introduction of High-Yielding Varieties of Foodgrain,"
UNRISD, Geneva; IRRI, "A Study of Changes in Rice Farming in Selected Asian
Countries" (Supported by the Canadian International Development Research Centre,

are prophets of destruction[25] and heralds of hope.[26] One can hypothesize, however, that the scantier the evidence, the more sweeping the generalization. A sobering analysis is provided by Carl Gotsch who compared the distributive aspects of agricultural technology in Pakistan and Bangladesh by explicitly relating them to the social and political dynamics at the village level. The consequences in the two countries differed on the basis of nature of the technology, access to production assets, distribution of land and institutional services, and existing economic, social and political structures.[27]

A most remarkable aspect about all the hindsights on the "green revolution" is the short memory which people have of the situation in 1960 when experts were pessimistic about ever producing enough food commensurate with the rapidly growing population. India, because of its sheer size is particularly illustrative. As Visaria describes it: In 1965 and 1966 unprecented droughts aggravated this fear and the spectre of famine by 1975 was such that the developed countries would have to decide priorities as to which countries were to be saved. Within a few years the centre of future concerns shifted to the problem of adequate markets for rice and wheat outputs. This growth of output will not only improve nutrition but will also enable India to do without PL 480 imports thus increasing her degrees of freedom in pursuing independent policies.[28] Curiously, an American political scientist says that India's new agricultural strategy appears certain to involve her in closer economic dependence on American and other foreign private investors and to increase the constraints on an independent foreign policy.[29] Nevertheless the speed with which these innovations have been adopted in India, Pakistan, and the Philippines has altered our view of the fatalistic Asian farmer who is resistant to change.[30] There are those

IRRI, and Ford Foundation); G. T. Castillo, "Juan de la Cruz in His Search for Rice Sufficiency: A Review of Philippine Studies on the Socio-Economic Implications of the Green Revolution," University of the Philippines, College of Agriculture; Australian National University, *Technical Change in Asian Agriculture;* Bogor, Indonesia, *AgroEconomic Survey* and a number of individual research projects underway in several countries.

[25] Marvin Harris, "How Green the Revolution," *Natural History,* June 1972.

[26] Norman Borlaug, "Hope Replaces Asian Despair," *Manila Times,* Oct. 17, 1971, p. 4.

[27] Carl H. Gotsch, "Technical Change and Distribution of Income Benefits in Rural Areas," *Land Tenure Center Newsletter* (Univ. of Wisconsin), No. 35, Dec.-March 1971-72, pp. 11-17.

[28] Pravin Visaria, "The Adoption of Innovations in Agriculture and Population Trends in India" (Paper prepared for the Ramon Magsaysay Award Foundation Seminar on Effects of Agricultural Innovation in Asia on Population Trends, Feb. 6-9, 1972, Manila).

[29] Francine R. Frankel, "India's New Strategy of Agricultural Development; Political Costs of Agrarian Modernization," *Journal of Asian Studies,* pp. 693-710.

[30] Haider Ali Chaudhri and Abdur Rashid, "Changes in Rice Farming in Gujranwala; West Pakistan, A Preliminary Report," West Pakistan Agricultural University, Lyallpur, June 1972. G.T. Castillo, "Who is the Filipino Farmer?" (Proceedings of

who belittle these events as being mere "pockets of change." It is
well to remember that with the size of India, a pocket there means
more than a whole country in Southeast Asia. As Lockwood points
out: "The exceptional fact about India in the present context is her
extraordinary bulk, one-half of the whole of non-Communist Asia. It is
one thing to modernize rural life and shape the Green Revolution in
a nation of say 25,000 villages; it is quite another to design and execute
policies that must spread through 500,000 villages or more."[31]

M. L. Dantwala's response to all the misgivings about the new
developments was: "It may be argued that the discovery of high-
yielding varieties was not a gift from heaven and but for appropriate
policies, they would not have seen the light of day. Whose policies?
Probably of the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations whose generous grants
made it possible for the scientists in Mexico and Philippines to evolve
the high-yielding varieties. The revolution was a reward of scientific
research and not of the wisdom of economists; few even dream of
it and many even do not believe it. It is our professional privilege
and duty to question its occurrence or its consequences — Palace Revolt,
Pandora's Box, Seeds of Disaster, Dualism — but let us not get into a
stance that nothing good can ever happen in this country (India)."[32]

In recognition of the implications for income distribution, India has
set up Small Farmers Development Agency, schemes for marginal farmers
and agricultural laborers, crash scheme for rural employment, special
projects for drought-prone areas, and promotion of security of tenure.[33]
However, although most everyone is prepared to argue for a more
equitable income distribution, suggestions on how to bring it about are
rather scanty. As D. R. Gadgil for the Indian Planning Commission said:

"The real problem in all progress toward egalitarianism is two-
fold. One is something which arises out of the process of develop-
ment in an underdeveloped economy. The ordinary process of development
in an underdeveloped economy results in strengthening the position of
those who are already in strategic positions and making them richer.
If a city is growing, the land values at the center of the metropolis
grow without people doing anything about it. This is a natural process
which happens everywhere. All through the economy if government
expenditure on development makes the economy more active, then all
those who hold strategic positions in the economy, without necessarily
doing anything themselves grow richer and more powerful. It happens
everywhere unless you do something to counteract the effects. The

Symposium In Search of Breakthroughs in Agricultural Development, University of
the Philippines, College of Agriculture, 1972).
    [31] Wm. Lockwood, op. cit.
    [32] M. L. Dantwala, "From Stagnation to Growth: Relative Roles of Technology,
Economic Policy, and Agrarian Institution," (Presidential Address, Indian Economic
Association, Fifty-third Annual Conference, Gauhati, Dec. 1970).
    [33] Pravin Visaria, op. cit.

other aspect is that when government aid and assistance comes in a uniform pattern, the people who are more knowledgeable, who have access to seats of power, who know about things and have the right approaches are bound to profit more from it than those who do not, so that the richer, the more substantial, and the middle class profit more than the weaker sections. What you have to remember is that the weaker section is weak because the broad elements of general government policy do not touch it. If you want to bring about egalitarianism or at least not to accentuate inequalities during the development process, you have to take very special steps and these special steps are not easy to take."[34]

All of Asia in their different stages of affluence or of poverty have included technology as one of their chosen means of getting there. With varying degrees of achievement, perhaps epitomized by Japan at its pinnacle of four eras of consumer life-style during the years after World War II:[35]

First era 1945-54 — Era of Food and Clothing

Second era 1955-1964 — Era of Home Electrical Appliances (Washing machine, refrigerator and TV set)

Third era 1964-1969 — Era of Large Durable Commodities (The 3 C's — Room Cooler, Color TV and Car)

Fourth era (present) — Era of Travel and Expensive Leisure Activities (Domestic and overseas travel, exclusive golf clubs, etc.)[36]

It has been said that all these commodities and wanderlust are substitutes for owning comfortable homes which are beyond the reach of the average Japanese citizen.

The countryside in Japan has also changed drastically with farm households sustained more by non-farm rather than farm income. There are commuter farmers who work in industry during the week and engage in agriculture on Sundays and holidays. What sustains agriculture is female labor, older people, and power cultivators. Farmers just like city folks want only 2 or 3 children and the oldest son is no longer obliged to inherit the farm. He, too, can have higher education and work elsewhere.[37]

Even a cursory review of what is happening tells that regardless of expected disparities between the manifest objectives of development policy and its actual accomplishments it is difficult to avoid the con-

[34] D. R. Gadgil, "Approach to the Fourth Plan," *Communicator,* Vol. 5, No. 5, Sept. 1969, pp. 16-17.

[35] Hiroyoshi, Ishikawa, "Affluent Society — A Japanese Version," *Japan Times,* July 2, 1969, p. B7.

[36] "The Japanese Image: Affluent Abroad, Wanting at Home," *Asian,* October, 1971.

[37] Tadashi Fukutake, "Population and Agricultural Change in Japan" (Paper prepared for the Ramon Magsaysay Award Foundation Seminar on Effects of Agricultural Innovation in Asia on Population Trends, Feb. 6-9, 1972, Manila).

clusion that changes must be taking place in Asia. Progress is reported on the Mekong project despite the war and the criticism that it has been too much of an engineering affair. Bardach raises the question as to what ecological, social and economic problems can be expected when a river is damned. As he puts it: "There is more to dams than meets the eye." His skepticism as to how the Mekong would end up is expressed as follows: "If planning for social changes seems not to work in the American megalopolis where such funds exist, where many people have goodwill, where everyone is literate, where some administrative channels of communication have been blasted and where there exist a large number of trained social scientists to look at the problems and to mull over them, how can it work under conditions where all these inputs do not exist?"[38] Indeed one could ask how someone with everything could ever be faced with such problems! Not quite as pessimistic is Chalkey who argues that: "There are always costs and drawback .. yet if we were to consider all the drawbacks as being too great a price to pay, then mankind would never advance from the subsistence stage of existence."[39]

Without too much difficulty one can identify in Asia a core of development problems besides the general trilogy of poverty, unemployment and inequality. More specifically there are issues of rapid population growth and inadequate food supply, rural-urban disparities, supply and demand for trained manpower needed for development tasks (tremendous shortage as well as educated unemployment), agrarian reform, environmental crisis, phenomenon of youth in numbers and in revolt, the Green Revolution, urban slums, etc. However, these problems do not manifest themselves uniformly because of the cultural diversities of race, ideology, ethnic identification, politics, religion and language which characterize the region. Hence, all of Asia is similar and yet so fascinatingly different in their many similarities.

Because of the prominent role given to science and technology and the application of the rational planning process to development, and despite the meager results in some cases, the so-called *Technocrats* have become the *new Mandarins* in most of Asia. Indonesia which rightly boast of *no brain drain* has a group of brilliant men facetiously referred to by friends as the "Berkeley Mafia" which is very much involved in national development planning. The Philippines has its brain trust of "Harvard and M.I.T. boys." Thailand and Malaysia have their share of British and American University Ph.D.'s. India certainly has its own as well as foreign-trained academicians turned Technocrats. The decade of the 70's will see less and less of pale-face foreign develop-

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[38] John Bardack, "There is More to Dams than Meets the Eye," *Asia*, No. 20, Winter 1970/71, pp. 9-30.

[39] Alan Chalkley, "Mekong: Progress Despite the War," *Asian*, No. 3, Oct. 1971.

ment experts in these countries. Nationalization of expertise is very much in evidence in several countries. Regionalization has likewise begun with "brown" faces being called upon by their neighbors to come as visiting professors, consultants, and partners in problem-solving. The pattern of doing international development assistance has shifted to whirlwind, high-powered missions launched by the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the UNDP, ILO and other international agencies in which case, the natives are rarely privileged to be experts in their own countries except as information provides to the mission. However, one observes that a few Asians (expatriates or locals) are often included in these missions hopefully for anticipated contributions rather than convenient goodwill entrees.

Contrary to Kipling's famous lines on East is East and West is West, the situation had traditionally been more of East meeting West and West meeting East but East seldom met East. We used to have a mutual ignorance of, prejudice against, and even contempt for each other. At the moment, side by side with divisive forces earlier mentioned, there are a plethora of regional collaborative undertakings arising from a growing consciousness of kind and of common problems. Asia has begun to emerge as a meaningful frame of reference we never had before. At no other time in our history have so many Asian or at least Asian-labelled efforts come into being whether in paper or in actual function. One can begin with the One Asia Assembly held two years ago, the Press Foundation of Asia, the Asian News Service and the *Asian* newspaper long dreamed of in terms of regional journalism so that the world may see Asia through Asian eyes. Politically there is the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), the Asian Parliamentarians' Union which is contemplating an economic arm called the Asian Development Center. Economic cooperation is sought in the Asian Coconut Community, Asian Productivity Organization, Asian Development Bank, Asian tractor plant, car manufacturing, steel mills, etc., and in the drawing board is an Asian Economic Union with Japan and Australia as industrial partners designed to be the Asian answer to the competition posed by the large economic blocs of the world. The Southeast Asia Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO) has centers for agriculture, engineering, tropical biology, tropical medicine, teaching English, and innovative technology located in the different Southeast Asian countries. There is an ASAHIL (Association of Asian Institutes of Higher Learning), a Regional Institute for Higher Education, an Asian Institute of Management, an Asian Vegetable and Research Development Centre, a Food and Fertilizer Technology Centre, an Asian Mass Communication Research and Information Centre (AMIC), an Organization of Demographic Associates for East and Southeast Asia, a Committee on Asian Manpower Studies, an Asian Labor Education

Center, an Asian Center for Development Administration, and an Asian Institute for Economic Development Planning. For the first time we have Asian and Southeast Asian study centers and programs in Asia. They were all in the United States and Europe before such that Asia in the past, was not infrequently represented by Westerners. On the side of Asian pulchritude, we have a Miss Asia Quest and the current Miss Asia is a tall, statuesque blonde from Australia. This is not an accident of biology but rather an indisputable fact of geography.

Although we have discovered each other, it is not necessarily love at first sight for it takes a lot of knowing for enduring love to blossom. The historical and cultural chasms will take time to bridge. The only language we can communicate in right now is English but we all love Chinese food. One must also confess that many of these Asian labels are predominantly Western supported although leadership is almost always Asian except in a few cases. Perhaps this phenomenon should be more accurately termed as the Western recognition of an Asian discovery. But seriously, these regional pursuits belong mostly to prominent statesmen, professionals and intellectuals all of whom have a common background of Westernization. The masses of our people have yet to benefit from an honest-to-goodness consolidation of forces in the interest of bargaining power. The ECAFE prides itself on having broken new ground in a document listing 44 indicators of social development covering population control, health, housing and nutrition, education and culture, employment, social and personal security. These are supposed to include the major aspects of the individual's life and living.[40] It's a pity that indicators of social development do not include number of smiles per square mile and amount of tender loving care lavished on another human being every other day. It is a fact of life in development that our preoccupation with what is quantifiable has taken the place of what is significant. Rural sociologists have not as yet made it to the ranks of the new Mandarins. We might never make it as long as the greatest contribution we have to offer is the generalization that modernization is a multifactor phenomenon and that the more developed villages are the ones most likely to develop. Nowadays, if we want to get ahead of life, there are four possibilities — population, pollution, green revolution, and urbanization. If we throw in employment, education, and equality, we are certain to reap manna from the U.N.

In the light of all these, a great temptation to the rural sociologist is to capitalize on these societal woes but out of a social conscience, if not a professional obligation, we should ponder upon the growing *structuralization of human variables.* Let me illustrate what this means: *People* who have always been people have now become *manpower;*

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[40] "Statistics on Social Development Listed," *Manila Bulletin,* July 18, 1972, p. 8.

education which has traditionally been regarded as good in itself is now being recast from a *consumption good* to a *productive investment;* the peasant's much-awaited bounty harvest has been transformed into a battle of the *green* and the *red revolution;* modern inputs developed to rid us of pest and disease are now ruled out as *pollutants* of the *environment;* children who were loved and cherished then are now the dependency burden of today; the less of them we have, the better is the future; *machines* which used to lighten man's physical burden are mercilessly cursed as *labor displacers;* the country mouse in search of his pot of gold in the city finds himself an eyesore to the urban planner; the youth who were once the hope of the future are now the educated unemployment, the insurgents against the Establishment. Man whose individuality was once held sacred is now the object of equality which borders on uniformity; the family which used to be man's most reliable anchor is dispensed with as a drag on entrepreneurship; destiny which was a matter for "the stars" is now a canned program fed to the computer. Fortunately, the Father of GNP is having second thoughts about his baby. But whatever happened to the old-fashioned human being? Can we bring him back?

BELGIUM AND A PHILIPPINE PROTECTORATE: A STILLBORN PLAN[1]

ARNOLD BLUMBERG

FROM APRIL THROUGH AUGUST 1898, THE UNITED STATES FOUGHT SPAIN in what Secretary of State John Hay described as "a splendid little war." Earlier, on April 30 and May 1, Commodore George Dewey conquered the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay, but the actual occupation of the city of Manila was delayed until August 13.[2]

In the interim between said battle and the final occupation of the city by the United States, Spanish authority hung tenuously in the balance. With Emilio Aguinaldo's Filipino troops besieging the city,[3] and the war vessels of other major powers either in Manila Bay or anchored close to it, there was the gravest danger that the Americans might find themselves embroiled with other rivals for sovereign power.[4]

The ultimate disposition of the Philippines remained an enigma, largely because the United States desisted from public claims to possession of the islands through the entire summer and early fall of 1898. Even when a protocol was signed on August 12 at Washington drawing up the United States peace terms,[5] nothing was said about American possession of the Philippines. Instead, Article III merely stated that: "The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines."[6]

[2] William J. Sexton, *Soldiers in the Sun; An Adventure in Imperialism* (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), pp. 45-46.

[3] Jean Grossholtz, *Politics in the Philippines* (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1964), pp. 22-23. For the military details see Richard H. Titherington, *A History of the Spanish-American War* (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), pp. 350-378.

[4] The United States press contained references to the fact that German warships in Manila Bay had cleared for action when Dewey had assumed the right to assign them anchorages there. The diplomatic corps at Washington also repeated the rumor that Great Britain had urged the United States to an annexionist policy in the Philippines. See Belgian Chargé d'affaires Maurice Joostens to Foreign Minister Paul de Favereau, December 9, 1898, No. 313, Washington, Belge, Ministère des Affaires Éstrangères et du Commerce Extérieui (microfilmed diplomatic correspondence housed at the United States National Archives, cited hereinafter as "Belge, A. E."), Microcopy T 1113, LM43, Roll 12. See also Thomas A. Bailey, "Dewey and the Germans at Manila Bay," *American Historical Review*, Vol. XLV (1939), pp. 59-81.

[5] The Washington Protocol was signed, on behalf of Spain, by French Ambassador Jules Cambon who had been granted plenipotentiary credentials by that country.

[6] Message of President McKinley to the United States Congress, December 5, 1898, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898* (cited

On July 7, 1898 the United States Congress had passed a joint resolution completing the annexation of the Hawaiian Inlands.[7] Subsequent to the actual ratification of the Hispano-American Peace of Paris, Germany had taken advantage of the shift in the Pacific balance of power by purchasing the Caroline Islands from Spain for five million dollars.[8] It is not surprising then, that other maritime powers should have regarded the moment as opportune for self aggrandizement.

For some time, the Belgian foreign ministry had been in receipt of glowing reports concerning the resources and commercial potentialities of the Filipino archipelago. The author of those reports was Edouard André, Belgian consul at Manila, a businessman who had been resident at that city for fifteen years. At the close of the war, André had been granted leave to visit Brussels, primarily in order to raise capital for a new incorporated commercial enterprise he hoped to launch at Manila. At the same time, he was ordered to bring maps, samples of natural resources, and written reports giving as complete a picture as possible, of Filipino potentialities for Belgian enterprise. André was instructed to cross the United States by train, to report to the Belgian Minister at Washington, and to place himself at his orders before completing his journey to Brussels.[9]

On the personal initiative of King Leopold II, orders were sent to Count Lichtervelde, Belgian Minister to the United States, to do as much as was possible to persuade the Washington cabinet to appoint Belgian administrators to govern the conquered islands.[10] It must be remembered that until the completion of negotiations for the Treaty

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hereinafter as *Foreign Relations*) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901), p. LXV. The evolution of President McKinley, from hostility to annexation, to support for the idea, and his well known rationalization for that change in position is well described in Garel A. Grunder and William E. Livezey, *The Philippines and the United States* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951), pp. 36-37.

[7] *Foreign Relations, 1898*, p. LXXVII.

[8] Message of the President to Congress, December 5, 1899, *Foreign Relations, 1899*, p. XXI.

[9] André to Favereau, February 22, 1899, Belge, A.E., Microcopy T125, Roll 6. André had been called to the favorable attention of his own government when Rear Admiral George Dewey had publicly thanked him for having served as an intermediary between the contending forces, expediting the surrender of Manila, thereby reducing losses in life and property (U.S. Minister to Belgium Bellamy Storer to Favereau, October 14, 1898, Brussels, Belge, A.E., *ibid.;* Favereau to Storer, November 8, 1898, Brussels, *ibid.* The indefatigable consul also wrote lengthy reports and letters arguing against the fitness of the Filipinos for self-government. These documents were forwarded to Paris through the good offices of Admiral Dewey, where they were seriously considered by the American Peace Commissioners. Ironically, André's efforts were self defeating since they helped to decide the United States negotiators in favor of outright annexation of the islands. See Whitelaw Reid's Diary, October 4, 24, 1898, Lt. Wayne Morgan (ed.), *Making Peace with Spain; The Diary of Whitelaw Reid* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1965), pp. 55, 103.

[10] Favereau to Lichtervelde, September 12, 1898, Direction P. No. 6121, Order 136, Brussels, *ibid.*

of Paris on December 10, 1898, no one knew whether the victors would
annex the islands, declare a protectorate over them or recognize Emilio
Aguinaldo's[11] republic in at least part of their territory. Apparently the
king and Belgian foreign minister Paul de Favereau imagined that even
if the islands were annexed outright to the United States, the Americans
would welcome such a partnership with little, neutral Belgium. Fave-
reau assumed that the victorious Americans would be happy to sweeten
the pill for the other rival maritime powers by substituting a benign
condominium for outright imperial aggrandizement.

Lichtervelde was warned to avoid any appearance of having taken
the initiative in the matter. Instead, he was ordered to approach Mon-
signor John Ireland, Archbishop of St. Paul, Minnesota,[12] and persuade
him to serve as intermediary with President McKinley and Secretary
of State John Hay. Monsignor Ireland was specifically designated because
the Belgians had noted with great interest the fact that he had already
opened conversations with the president to safeguard Roman Catholic
interests in Cuba.[13] In addition, Lichtervelde knew that prelate personally,
having recently enjoyed a long conversation with him, on that subject,
at an intimate dinner tendered by the French ambassador.[14] Favereau
underlined the importance which the king placed upon the success of
Lichtervelde's efforts to enlist the archbishop's support.[15]

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[11] Aguinaldo had been transported from his exile at Hong Kong by Dewey
and landed in the Philippines to raise a native army against Spain. When it
became apparent, after the capture of Manila, that the United States had no
intention of recognizing Aguinaldo's regime as the government of the islands, he
withdrew to Malolos and made that the capital of the territories he held. When,
ultimately, the Treaty of Paris provided for the outright sale of the Philippines to
the United States, conflict ensued between Aguinaldo's forces and the Americans.
The last major Filipino guerrilla force surrendered in April 1902. See Grossholtz,
op. cit., pp. 22-23. Having lived to see the establishment of an independent
republic in 1946, Aguinaldo made his peace with the United States when close
to his ninetieth birthday. See Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy and Vicente A. Pacis,
A Second Look at America (New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1957).

[12] Monsignor Ireland and Cardinal Gibbons of Baltimore, both of whom are
discussed at greater length later in this paper, were leading "Americanists." The
Americanist doctrine, adopted by nineteenth century Catholic liberals, maintained
that democracy was the wave of the future, and that the Roman Catholic Church
in the United States could look forward to a great growth in the country, participating
not only in the material prosperity of an industrialized country, but in its political
life as well. Gibbons, especially, was intimate with all the Presidents of the
United States from Grover Cleveland to William Howard Taft. The present writer
is grateful to Reverend Father John J. Tierney, Archivist of the Archdiocese of
Baltimore, for his cooperation in allowing him to examine the 60,000 piece manuscript
collection of Cardinal Gibbons' papers. Although meticulously arranged chronological-
ly, for the most part, the collections of letters from presidents, and royal personages
are filed separately. Hereinafter, references to this collection will be cited, "Gibbons
Papers."

[13] Favereau to Lichtervelde, September 12, 1898, Brussels, Order 136, Belge,
A.E., Microcopy T125, Roll 6.

[14] Lichtervelde to Favereau, October 1, 1898, No. 252, Omaha, Belge, A.E.,
ibid.; same to same, October 6, 1898, No. 278, New York, *ibid.*

[15] Favereau to Lichtervelde, September 12, 1898, No. 136, Brussels, *ibid.*

By happy coincidence, the Belgian envoy was returning from a vacation trip to Yellowstone, Wyoming when he was met at Omaha, Nebraska by his legation courier bearing Favereau's detailed instructions. He telegraphed the archbishop at St. Paul immediately to ask for an appointment. Ireland replied cordially, assuring Lichtervelde that he intended to visit the Bishop of Omaha immediately and that he would be happy to meet him at the latter's residence.[16]

Thus on the evening of September 30, 1898, the diplomat had the first of several long conversations with Monsignor Ireland on the subject of the potential role of Belgian administrators in the Philippines.[17] As the Omaha Exposition was then open, the two men could visit the exhibits and continue their exchange of ideas without arousing the curiosity of newspapermen.[18]

For obvious reasons, Lichtervelde avoided describing the Belgian-ization of the Filipino civil service as an end in itself. Instead, he laid emphasis upon the advantages which would accrue to the church if the government of the islands were entrusted to the subject of a small, neutral, Roman Catholic state. At that moment, just as the peace conference was opening at Paris, Lichtervelde believed that the United States was actually "embarrassed by its victory," and would settle for outright possession of a Filipino naval station. In his report to his superiors, Lichtervelde expressed the frank opinion that King Leopold's proposal would be workable only if the Americans stopped short of annexing the archipelago outright. He added that in such an eventuality,

[16] Lichtervelde to Favereau, October 1, 1898, No. 252, Omaha, *ibid.*

[17] After his first meeting with Ireland at Omaha, Lichtervelde sent a ciphered telegram to Brussels, a copy of which was sent immediately to King Leopold. It stated: "He is sympathetic to our ideas and will speak of them eventually to the president, but thinks that a great uncertainty still reigns on the general future of the Philippines (same to same, October 1, 1898, unnumbered ciphered tele-gram, Omaha, *ibid.*). Upon hearing the rumor that the United States might take the Philippines, then give them to some other power, Count Hatzfeldt, the German Ambassador at London asked the British foreign secretary, Lord Salisbury, to describe his government's policy in such a case. Salisbury denied the vaidity of the rumor. See Salisbury to Sir Frank Cavendish Lascelles, May 11, 1898, Kenneth Bourne, *The Foreign Policy of Victorian England* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970) p. 455. In actual fact, British diplomatic policy encouraged the United States to annex the Philippines, but made it equally clear that if the Senate rejected annexation, Britain was to be given the first option to purchase the islands. See R. G. Neale, *Great Britain and United States Expansion, 1898-1900* (Michigan State University Press, 1966), p. 212.

[18] The United States Government had formally invited the Belgian Government to create a special Belgian Section at the Omaha International Exposition. No interest had been shown in the idea, however, by Belgian industrialists. The Belgian foreign minister had offered the United States Minister at Brussels his regrets that there would be no Belgian Section at Omaha. See Favereau to Storer June 8, 1898, Brussels, U.S. National Archives, State Department Correspondence (hereinafter cited as U.S.N.A.) Microcopy 193, Roll T34. The visit of Count Lichtervelde to Omaha, could be described as merely a friendly gesture without political significance.

United States citizens of Roman Catholic faith would be the best guarantors of Catholic religious interests in the islands.[19]

If, in retrospect, the entire Belgian proposal seems naive and unrealistic, it was not rejected by the archbishop. Indeed, Ireland promised to discuss it with President McKinley "eventually." He also assured Lichtervelde that he would not inform the president that the proposal had been initiated by the Belgian government.[20]

On both sides of the Atlantic, Belgian observers convinced themselves that events could be controlled by the sort of diplomatic minuet that Lichtervelde and the archbishop had considered. As late as mid-October, Secretary of State John Hay had predicted that the peace negotiations at Paris would be prolonged. Indeed, through that month, the Belgian envoy at Washington remained convinced that the United States would seek to annex only a portion of the Philippines.[21] On October 16, 1898 King Leopold had delivered an address at Antwerp which stands as a sort of eulogy for imperialism. Having expressed satisfaction with his own work as administrator of the Congo, he spoke openly of his rivalry with the other maritime powers in the realms of ship building, commerce, and industry. His hopes for even greater colonial expansion were noted by observers.[22]

At the end of October, however, the Belgian legation at Washington noted a sharp reversal in the previous American attitude toward Filipino destiny. Maurice Joostens, the Belgian chargé d'affaires, during the temporary absence of Count Lichtervelde from Washington, alerted his government to that shift. Joostens was most impressed by an almost universal demand in the United States press for complete annexation of the Philippines. He also repeated the rumor that President McKinley had been converted to annexation by a recently completed tour of the western states.[23]

In the age of cable and telegraph, however, it is scarcely likely that the Belgians needed diplomatic dispatches from their envoys abroad to learn of shifts affecting their policy. The King of the Belgians,

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[19] Lichtervelde to Favereau, October 1, 6, 1898, Nos. 252, 278, Belge, A. E. Microcopy T125, Roll 6.

[20] Same to same, October 6, 1898, No. 278, New York, *ibid.*

[21] Chargé d'affaires Maurice Joostens to Favereau, No. 12, Washington, Belge, A.E., Microcopy T1113, LM43, Roll 12.

[22] Storer to Hay, October 22, 1898, No. 153, Brussels, U.S.N.A., Microcopy M193, Roll T34.

[23] Joostens to Favereau, No. 12, Washington, Belge, A.E., Microcopy T1113, LM43, Roll 12. There is not much doubt that the enthusiasm of the crowds addressed by McKinley while on his way to and from the Omaha Exposition, between October 10 and 22, merely confirmed what the president had already determined. Nevertheless, it was not until October 26 that he ordered John Hay to telegraph the Paris peace commissioners, instructing them to demand cession of all the Philippines. See James F. Rhodes, *The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, 1897-1909* (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1965), pp. 102-103.

whose interest in the Philippines was personal and direct, opened conversations with the Spanish government concerning the future of the islands. It apparently was less painful to Spanish pride to surrender their Asian commonwealth to Belgium than to the parvenu Yankees.[24] King Leopold then approached the Washington cabinet, unofficially and without involving the Belgian foreign ministry directly, through Bellamy Storer, the United States Minister at Brussels. Storer's surprise was scarcely concealed behind the impersonal language of the ciphered cablegram he dispatched to Washington immediately.

> Confidential. The King of the Belgians has just sent a confidential legal advisor with letter requesting that I cable the President of the United States that Spanish Government is willing to cede to a neutral, meaning the King of the Belgians, the whole Philippine Islands with the object of securing a civilized stable form of government with trade open to all the world equally as in case of Congo but it will not make the proposition unless fully assured will be accepted in whole or in part by the Government of the United States. . . .[25]

Storer's cable was received at the State Department at 12:20 P.M. on November 9.[26] The proposal was unceremoniously dismissed on the next day in a ciphered cablegram: "Your despatch as to Philippine Islands received. Such a proposition would not be favorably considered by the Government of the United States." The minister at Brussels was left to his own devices to communicate his government's repulse of the king's proposal, as tactfully and as unofficially as possible.[27]

Although King Leopold's pretensions to the government of the Philippines had been repulsed, the Belgian foreign ministry still harbored illusions that the United States might yet welcome a sort of shared administration of the islands. Even after the signing of the Peace of Paris on December 10, 1898, in which Spain agreed to sell the Philippines for twenty million dollars, there was some Belgian speculation that anti-expansionist elements in the Senate might refuse ratification.[28]

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[24] Spanish diplomatic archives are rarely opened to scholarly research prior to the passage of a full century. The present writer has therefore been confined to the use of United States and Belgian correspondence.

[25] Storer to Hay, November 9, 1898, Unnumbered ciphered telegram, Brussels, U.S.N.A., Microcopy M193, Roll T34. A copy of the cable was sent to President McKinley immediately. Storer also took responsibility for sending a copy to Judge Wiliam R. Day who had preceded Hay as Secretary of State, and who was currently serving as head of the United States treaty negotiators at Paris (*ibid.*). Judge Day called the Belgian-Spanish proposal to the attention of his colleagues, but they dismissed it as an attempt by a bankrupt Spain to dispose of her property before settling with her creditors. See Whitelaw Reid's Diary, November 10, 1898, Morgan, p. 145.

[26] Storer to Hay, November 9, 1898, telegram, Brussels, U.S.N.A., Microcopy M193, Roll T34.

[27] Hay to Storer, November 10, 1898, ciphered cable, Washington, U.S.N.A., Microcopy 77, Roll 21.

[28] The Senate did, in fact, ratify the treaty on February 6, 1899.

Consequently, the Belgian foreign ministry continued to urge Lichtervelde to explore any paths which might lead to a Belgian share in the administration of the Philippines. The Belgians continued to regard the support of American Roman Catholic prelates as their surest auxiliary to that end, if the Brussels cabinet was to be spared the humiliation of having its proposals rejected at an official level. Consequently, the arrival at Washington of Belgium's consul at Manila was warmly anticipated and welcomed by Count Lichtervelde.[29]

Before leaving the Philippines, Edouard André had paid a parting visit to Monsignor Bernardino de Nozaleda, the Archbishop of Manila. As André informed the archbishop that he would return to Europe via a transcontinental railroad journey across the United States, Nozaleda offered the consul a letter of introduction to James, Cardinal Gibbons, Archbishop of Baltimore.[30] As André took care to inform Favereau of his plans, including his intention of visiting Cardinal Gibbons, fresh instructions were sent to Count Lichtervelde which involved the use of André's services while he was in Washington.[31]

Primarily, this consisted of André visiting the cardinal as soon as he arrived in the capital. Unlike the earlier talks between Lichtervelde and Archbishop Ireland, André's conversations were to be concerned with convincing the cardinal to use his good offices to persuade the Holy See to appoint Belgians to the Filipino ecclesiastical hierarchy. To that end, André submitted lengthy memorials attesting to the low quality of the native clergy. He informed his superiors that the cardinal had been receptive to his ideas and that he had urged him to forward the information to Rome.

Cardinal Gibbons also offered to discuss the administration of the Philippine church with President McKinley and promised that he would forward the information on the condition of the island clergy to Rome. The cardinal was understandably reserved about any commitment to support André's thesis, namely, that a Belgian clergy and hierarchy could more effectively gain acceptance among native Filipino Roman Catholics than could citizens of the United States.[32]

[29] Favereau to Lichtervelde, January 11, 1899, No. 252, Confidential, Brussels, Belge, A.E., Microcopy T1113, LM43, Roll 15; André to Favereau, February 22, 1899, Washington, Belge, A.E., Microcopy T125, Roll 6.

[30] André to Lichtervelde, February 27, 1899, Private, Washington, Belge, A.E., Microcopy T125, Roll 6.

[31] André to Favereau, February 22, 1899, Washington, ibid. While André was crossing the United States by railroad, he was accompanied by three Americans who did not reveal that they were newspaper reporters until they reached Chicago. André claimed that his only mission was private business at Brussels. As André was a minor celebrity, thanks to his role at the siege of Manila, his journey to Brussels via Washington did earn some attention in the press (ibid.).

[32] Lichtervelde to Favereau, February 28, 1899, Confidential, Washington, ibid. For serious recent studies of the Filipino church, see P. S. de Achutegui and Miguel A. Bernad, Religious Revolution in the Philippines: The Life and Church of Gregorio Aglipay, 1860-1960 (2 vols., Manila: Ateneo de Manila, 1960); Gerald

The cardinal was as good as his word in that he addressed a note to Archbishop Sebastian Martinelli, who had been stationed in Washington since 1896 as Apostolic Delegate to the United States. With it he enclosed the lengthy documents in which André had described the flight of the Spanish clergy from the Philippines, the alleged moral inadequacy of the native clergy, and the wisdom of installing a Belgian leadership for the church in the islands. The Apostolic Delegate's reply, through his secretary, sounded the death knell of Belgian illusions:

> I return the letter which you sent a few days ago for the Most Rev. Delegate's inspection. He desires to thank His Eminence for his courtesy in sending it to him, and says that he is glad to have from an outside source the information which it contains. He is not, however, in a position to make any practical use of it, since he is not being and never has been consulted by Rome on matters pertaining to the changes likely to be required in the territory lately subtracted from Spanish dominion.[33]

After the final ratification of the peace treaty, Belgium would surely have abandoned her Filipino projects, even if they had enjoyed more support from Americans than they had, in fact, received. By the end of 1899, Lichtervelde was writing lengthy strictures to his superiors advising them that the best hope for the advancement of Belgian interests in the Philippines lay in complete avoidance of even the appearance of intrusion into United States policy there. Even André, happily returned from Brussels, where he had succeeded in chartering and raising capital for a new *Compagnie Générale des Philippines* was reconciled to the dominant role of United States citizens in the political and ecclesiastical life of the islands.[34] Almost three quarters of a century after the Spanish-American War, the ambitions of King Leopold II's Belgium seem naive or inane. In 1898, however, the *mission civilisatrice* of the white race was taken as an article of western political and religious faith. In that light, the brief Belgian interest in a Filipino protectorate deserves to be recorded.

H. Anderson (ed.), *Studies in Philippine Church History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969).

[33] F. Rooker to Rev. Father O'Brien, March 8, 1899, Gibbons Papers. Cardinal Gibbons continued to interest himself in the affairs of the Philippines, as Catholic primate of the United States. In 1901 he journied to Rome, in the company of Archbishop Nozaleda of Manila, to discuss church affairs, in the islands, with Pope Leo XIII (John Tracy Ellis, Manuscript copy of *Life of Cardinal Gibbons*, Gibbons Papers). Gibbons continued to enjoy a warm relationship with the sovereigns of Belgium as long as he lived. In addition to annual Christmas letters, sent and received, a letter thanking the cardinal for his consistent defense of Leopold II's Congo policy is revealing (Leopold II to Cardinal Gibbons, January 15, 1905, Laeken, Royal Letters, Gibbons Papers).

[34] Lichtervelde to Favereau, November 14, 1899, No. 269, Washington, Belge, A.E., Microcopy T1113, LM43, Roll 15.

TWO POEMS IN CARLOS A. ANGELES:
AN EXPERIMENT TOWARD A POETICS OF THE LYRIC POEM[1]

GÉMINO H. ABAD

FROM THE ROOFTOP

From the rooftop now, the inward eye's
Concern, a sudden landscape and the green
Proximity confirm the space's, the sky's
Pleasure, and what could not be seen
Before, could be.

But for a time, it is window and door
Must shape the rectangular scene
By the neighbor's face, by the poor
And futile garden, by the focus thin
Upon a bee,

Or a bloom that, against the summer heat,
Is dazed by my city's rage and sun,
By the hostile space of a street
Where one by unsuccessful one
The eye must see

The human fable rise and swell and fall
And disappear beyond an actual wall.

THE SUMMER TREES

The copper sun that scalds the april boughs
Of summer, from the noon's burst cauldron, there,
In concentrates of fury, hardly knows
The pertinence of patience the trees bear,

Who, with their metal branches, scour the air
For rumors of impending May to flood
Their throbbing thirst, or, to defy despair
The stirring breeze makes vocable and loud.

All summer long the bare trees stand and wait
While roots probe deepest for a hoard of silt
And seepage — till, silver in the sky, the late
Rains pour at last, hard where the treetops tilt.

Principles of Formal Analysis

WHENEVER A POEM HAPPENS TO BE AN IMITATION OF A HUMAN ACTION OR experience,[2] the general principles of analysis that may be employed in a strictly formal approach are the object, the manner, the means, and the effect or power of the imitation since, collectively, they are capable of discriminating the *kind* of poem that a given lyric is.

In terms, then, of the *object* of imitation, lyric poems[3] may differ as they render different *objects:*

1)   someone who is simply moved by an emotion, say, a passionate longing ("O Western Wind") or grief (Walter Savage Landor's "Mother, I Cannot Mind My Wheel"); or

2)   someone who is engaged in a solitary activity of thought, say, contemplating (Keats' "Ode on a Grecian Urn") or deliberating, making a choice (Frost's "Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening"); or

3)   someone who is committing a verbal act on someone else, say, persuading (Marvell's "To His Coy Mistress") or threatening (Browning's "My Last Duchess"); or

4)   two or more people interacting with each other as in "Edward" (where the dialogue between mother and son unfolds the real situation) or in Browning's "The Bishop Orders His Tomb" (where the dying bishop, as he perceives his children's reactions in the course of his plea, revises again and again his last wishes).[4]

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the *Theory of Drama* (Wayne State University, 1961); and R.S. Crane, *The Languages of Criticism and the Structure of Poetry* (University of Toronto, 1953).

   [2] A lyric poem is either *didactic* or *mimetic.* It is didactic when it inculcates a particular moral or idea: Emerson's "Fable," Dickinson's "Much Madness is Divinest Sense," or Blake's "The Sick Rose." It is mimetic when it renders someone's particular action or experience for the sake of its emotional power and the beauty of its representation: Lovelace's "To Lucasta, On Going to the Wars," Hopkins' "Spring and Fall," or Eliot's "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock." When a poem is didactic, its object (*i.e.,* the poetic "thesis"), manner of exposition, and means of presentation are directed toward our intellectual assent. The capacity to convince or at least provoke us intellectually is its distinctive power. When a poem is mimetic, its object (*i.e.,* the poetic experience), manner, and means of imitation are directed toward our emotional response, based of course upon an intelligent apprehension of the whole experience. The capacity to move us emotionally is its distinctive power. We are *not* saying that no emotion may be involved in a didactic poem or, conversely, that no idea may be involved in a mimetic poem; it is a matter of what is really the primary interest in the poem itself. And neither is the distinction between didactic and mimetic poems a question of literary merit.

   [3] The definition of a given *kind* of lyric poem results, precisely, from "the formulation of the distinctive means, object, manner, and effect of the (poetic) synthesis (since it) gives all four of the causes which are collectively, but not singly, peculiar to it." (Olson, "Outline of Poetic Theory." *op. cit.,* p. 558.)

   [4] Such a classification of the *poetic object* (or object of imitation) in relation to the lyric poem is found in Olson's "Outline," p. 560. He notes there that "these classifications must not be confused with species; they are not poetic species but lines of differentiation of the object of imitation." The various *poetic objects* admit also of a number of possible variations in terms of their *specific* organizing principle. Wallace Stevens' "Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird," for example, consists of a series of impressions or perceptions somehow unified in terms of the speaker, the object of the various perceptions, etc.

In terms of the *manner* of imitation, lyric poems may differ as they are (1) dramatic, *i.e.*, the speaker acts in his own person, as in all the aforementioned poems; or (2) narrative, *i.e.*, a narrator recounts the poetic experience, as in Edwin Arlington Robinson's "Richard Cory" or T. S. Eliot's "Aunt Helen"; or (3) a mixed mode, as in "Sir Patrick Spens" or "The Wife of Usher's Well."[5]

Again, in terms of the *effect or power* of the imitation, a lyric poem may in general be serious or comic. The distinction is, however, a thorny problem in criticism. Suffice it to say that the peculiar comic effect is "either infectious gaiety or the ridiculous."[6] Most lyric poetry is perhaps serious since it is somewhat difficult to come upon specimens of the comic lyric poem: "To His Coy Mistress," Herrick's "Upon Julia's Clothes" or "Upon the Nipples of Julia's Breast," and Suckling's "The Constant Lover" (all induce an infectious gaiety); Eliot's "Prufrock" and "Aunt Helen," Robinson's "Miniver Cheevy," and Browning's "Soliloquy of the Spanish Cloister" (all evoke the ridiculous).[7]

Finally, in terms of the *means* of imitation or the *verbal medium* itself, a poem may employ familiar or uncommon words, conventional or unusual imagery and other rhetorical devices, ordinary or uncommon syntax, etc. Compare, for example, Burns' "A Red, Red Rose" or Leigh Hunt's "Jenny Kiss'd Me" with Donne's "A Valediction: Forbidding Mourning" or T. S. Eliot's "Sunday Morning Service."

But the object, manner, means, and effect or power of the imitation are, as we said, *general* formal principles since they apply equally well to other literary works — plays, novels, short-stories, etc. — which happen to imitate a human action or experience. We must, therefore, seek in the same principles a certain analytical refinement by which poems may further be discriminated *inter se* as to their more specific kinds.

We have already seen how, in terms of the specific *object*, one could formally distinguish "O Western Wind" from "To His Coy Mistress" or Frost's "Stopping By Woods" from Hopkins' "Spring and Fall." For even when the *object* is the same in two given poems (*e.g.*, an activity of thought), there may yet be found a *specific* formal difference in the same structural or organizing principles: thus, the speaker in Frost's

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[5] I can only touch here on an interesting critical problem. "Edward" is a lyric poem because its chief interest lies in the interaction between mother and son. The grim situation that their interaction unfolds has the effect of shock since it changes completely our impression of the encounter which the poem enacts. But in "Sir Patrick Spens" and "The Wife of Usher's Well," the chief interest lies in the *plot* or *story* rather than in any one particular action or event (such as the encounter in "Edward") which the poem renders. Hence, both popular ballads are *narrative poems*, *i.e.*, plot is their organizing principle. I am, of course, distinguishing a lyric poem *in the narrative mode* from a *narrative poem* on the order of Keats' "La Belle Dame Sans Merci" and "The Eve of St. Agnes" or Coleridge's "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner."

[6] Olson, *Tragedy and the Theory of Drama*, p. 164.

[7] Note that we are not speaking of "the comic spirit" or "the comic vision."

poem is deliberating, making a choice, whereas in Hopkin's poem, he is simply meditating, brooding[8]; in one, the principal part of the *poetic object* is the choice or moral action, but in the other, simply the train of reflection; and obviously, the poetic power is different, for to the one imitation of action, we respond with a kind of noble relief, as over a temptation successfully resisted, but to the other, we respond with a kind of solemn and pensive mood.

Evidently, too, there are various dramatic and narrative devices and techniques by which one may differentiate among poems. A few obvious instances must here suffice. In "Richard Cory," the narrator is a reliable spokesman, but in "Aunt Helen," a sardonic observer. Such a difference significantly qualifies our response to the poetic experience in either poem.[9] Both poems, too, exemplify one kind of lyric poem in the narrative mode, what I may call the *lyric character sketch* since the delineation of character is the organizing principle. Yet another kind may be called the *scenic lyric* since the description of a scene is the structural principle: Shakespeare's "When Icicles Hang by the Wall" and Jonathan Swift's "A Description of the Morning."

In terms also of the *effect or power* of the imitation, a poem may induce in us an emotion or frame of mind similar to, or different from, that of the lyric speaker. In Landor's "Rose Aylmer" or Hopkins' "Spring and Fall," we tend to share the speaker's grief or pensive mood; but in "O Western Wind," we do not ourselves long for the beloved though we feel a general sort of sympathy, as for any lover in distress. Or, again, the poem may move us with sympathy for the speaker or with antipathy toward him. In "Coy Mistress," we feel friendly toward the lover, we admire him as being clever and witty, and wish him well; but in "Last Duchess," we feel hostile toward the lover, we loathe him as a ruthless egomaniac, and wish him thwarted or punished.

And even in terms of the *means* of imitation, we can, if we like, distinguish between Hunt's "Jenny Kiss'd Me," for example, and Housman's "With Rue My Heart is Laden." Both employ conventional metaphors; but in Hunt, a single metaphor serves, in Housman, several, though both poems are of about the same length. It is a small point, of course, but indicative: in Hunt, a straight and almost literal statement of fact is sufficient to evoke the mood of celebration; but in Housman, the

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[8] *Simply,* I say, because it is not, as in "Ode on a Grecian Urn," for example, a complex process of discovering a new "truth" or insight. The speaker has always known from experience "the blight man was born for," and is only responding, just now, to Margaret's situation. Margaret only confirms his knowledge of "sorrow's springs" and is, therefore, only the occasion for his pensive activity.

[9] A similar difference between the narrators in "Sir Patrick Spens" and "The Wife of Usher's Well" may also be remarked: in one, the narrator also comments at some length on the tragic action in order to enlist our pity, but in the other, he remains a detached and uninvolved reporter (except for his comment on the hats of "birk"). It is a *formal* difference since it is determinative of the effect or power of the poetic imitation.

poetic statement is a little more elaborate and almost entirely meta-
phorical in order to induce the rueful mood.

Thus, it all depends *how specific* the critic wishes to be in any
formal analysis of a given poem; but the more discriminating one is,
the more one is able to appreciate and judge the peculiar excellence
of a given poem in terms of determinate criteria relevant to one or
another distinctive *kind* of lyric poem.[10]

The Reflective Lyric

Most of the lyric poems in Carlos A. Angeles' *a stun of jewels*[11]
belong to the same general class, *i.e.*, serious lyric poetry in the dramatic
mode, imitating a mental action or experience of a single character in a
single *closed situation*,[12] through a verbal medium more or less remote
from ordinary diction and construction. For the sake of convenience,
I shall call this kind of lyric poem a *reflective lyric*.

The principal part of the reflective lyric is the activity of thought
or reflection, whatever else is its more specific nature or character
as someone's action. But the other parts of the *object* of imitation are,
in the order of their importance, the lyric character, his situation, his
thought and emotion, and his own idiom or diction. Character, thought
and emotion, and sometimes a more or less specific situation,[13] are
the causes of the lyric speaker's activity.

The lyric speaker must be one or another sort of character to
act in just such a way and think just such thoughts and feel just
such emotions; and sometimes, he must confront a particular situation
in order that, given a certain character, he must react exactly as he
does. But the lyric character is a potentiality in the sense that only
a particular action in the poem actualizes and manifests it to us.[14]
There is, for example, no villainous character as such; there must first
be a villainous deed or a series of mean and cruel acts before the

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[10] Note that what I have presented thus far is a mere sketch of the general
critical framework. A fuller discussion will have to be the subject of another
essay. My only intention now is to show how a critical study of the *forms* of
the lyric poem may be most fruitfully undertaken. The basic assumption is that
lyric poems should be appreciated and judged *as poems of certain distinctive kinds*
such that criteria relevant to one form or species (*e.q.*, a poem on the order of
"O Western Wind") may not necessarily be relevant to another form or species
(*e.q.*, a poem on the order of T. S. Eliot's "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock").
[11] Manila: Alberto S. Florentino, 1963.
[12] That is: one which does not permit any interruption of the speaker's activity
by another character. (Olson, "Outline," p. 560.)
[13] Strictly speaking, the situation is usually merely the *occasion* of the speaker's
action in the poem.
[14] As noted, earlier, when a poem is a lyric poem, such action may be an
emotional movement or outcry, an activity of thought, a verbal act on someone,
or an interaction between characters in a single *closed situation*, i.e., when an
interaction is involved, a situation which does not permit any interruption of the
activity by other than those originally present.

villainous character is established in the poem, to which you may then respond. You are not moved by character as such; you are moved by it only as a particular action manifests it. Hence, in poetry, action is primary, and character, secondary.[15]

By lyric *thought* I mean not the "theme" or central idea of the poem but the speaker's own thoughts in the poem. We must of course distinguish thought from the activity itself of thought or reflection. As mental action or experience of one sort or another, someone's reflection is precisely, as we said, the principal part in the *object* of poetic imitation.

Diction is primarily the vehicle of the speaker's thoughts from which we infer what precisely he is doing, his character, his situation, and his mood or emotion.[16] In the analysis, therefore, of the *words* in the poem, we must keep aware of an important distinction: between their own distinctive character *as thoughts,* whosoever they are, or as a train of ideas signified by particular words such that their implications involve only other ideas; and their "dramatic" character *as someone's own activity* of musing, deliberating, etc. so that their implications involve such things as his character, his mood, his situation, etc.

The lyric *emotion* must of course be distinguished from our own emotional reaction to the poetic experience since, obviously, we may feel differently from the lyric speaker. We do not quite *identify* with him since, otherwise, it would be difficult (and sometimes, impossible) to form an opinion upon which to react intelligently.

Our inferences from someone's "speech"[17] concerning his action, character, emotion, and situation lead to particular opinions and judgments[18] which form the basis of our emotional response to the whole

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[15] Given the size or magnitude of the action in most lyric poems (*i.e.,* a single character acting in a single closed situation), we do not normally expect a highly individualized character in the lyric speaker. But the degree of individuality may yet vary from poem to poem, *i.e.,* from a more or less universalized character, as in all of Angeles' poems, to a more or less remarkable fullness of identity, like Browning's Duke of Ferrara or Eliot's Prufrock. Of course, neither the Duke nor Prufrock can ever be as complex a character as, say, Hamlet or the Karamazovs, since these are involved in more actions and, consequently, we infer more about their character.

But the character of the lyric speaker is a *formal* element: however universalized his character is in a given poem, it remains an important part in the *object* of imitation, capable of affecting us in some way. If, for example, the lover in "O Western Wind" were less passionate, we should be a little less moved by his outcry of longing; the difference, also, in poetic power between "To His Coy Mistress" and "My Last Duchess" is due chiefly to the character of the lovers which their particular actions manifest.

[16] Diction as the lyric speaker's own peculiar idiom may be a sign of character; *e.q.,* a shallow or conventional mind, a country bumpkin, etc.

[17] Such "speech" is of course only the *apparent form* of the poetic imitation since the real nature or character of the speaker's activity remains to be inferred as an emotional outcry, etc.

[18] We must needs form an opinion concerning the poetic experience as warranted of course by the poetic data. Otherwise, we could not take the poetic experience either lightly or seriously, and we would not be moved by it in any way, since emotion proceeds from an opinion about something or about some-

poetic experience. Our response manifests the inherent power of the poem as an imitation.

"From The Rooftop" and "The Summer Trees"[19]

"From the Rooftop" and "The Summer Trees," to take two representative poems in Angeles, are essentially the same *kind* of lyric poem. For, in terms of the *object* of imitation, both imitate a mental experience involving a single character in a single closed situation. Again, in terms of the *manner* of imitation, both are dramatic since the lyric speaker acts in his own person. Also, in terms of the means of imitation, both employ diction more or less remote from ordinary words and ordinary construction, and embellished by rhythm and rhyme. And finally, in terms of the *effect or power* of the imitation, both are serious since, in responding to the poetic experience, we do not regard it as trivial, amusing, or ridiculous.

But we may discriminate among variant forms of the reflective lyric for purposes of a more specific formal criticism. We may, for example, discover in the object, the manner, the effect, and even the means of imitation, certain formal differences between "Rooftop" and "Summer Trees." Let us therefore examine these poems more closely in terms of our principles of analysis.

The Object of Imitation: The Lyric Action

In "Rooftop," the experience is one of release from a mental or spiritual oppression. The lyric action therefore consists of two parts: someone makes a sudden discovery which brings about his release from a limiting outlook ("what could not be seen / Before, could be"); and this, in turn, initiates a retrospective brooding on the oppressiveness of a dismal situation from which he has just now escaped. When one considers the speaker's present discovery and sense of freedom, there seems involved in his bitter cry of protest against "my city's rage and sun" a kind of plea for all frustrated lives which cannot share, as he does now, "the space's, the sky's / Pleasure ... the inward eye's / Concern." He realizes that those lives will remain a "fable" (*i.e.*, "unsuccessful," uneventful, unreal) just so long as, given their particular situation, they are unable to scale, as it were, the imprisoning "actual wall" (*i.e.*, the city as "hostile").

In "Summer Trees," on the other hand, the experience is essentially a joyful recollection, a celebration. The lyric action is from its inception to its end purely an activity of memory. There are no discrete parts: you have one and the same sort of mental action, and it is one straight

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one. We cannot feel the emotion of fear unless we have the opinion that something or someone is fearful; a confused emotion is owing to a confused opinion; etc.

[19] Angeles, *a stun of jewels*, pp. 9, 10.

or continuous train of reflection. What you have is a series of perceptions in someone's memory of summer trees by which he ever knows "The pertinence of patience the trees bear." It is a sort of habitual knowledge.

Thus, it can be said that the lyric action in "Rooftop" is relatively complex, but in "Summer Trees," relatively simple. That is: in one, action consists of discrete parts since more things are involved; for example, the speaker's situation has undergone a sudden change and hence, his own frame of mind and emotional condition have changed also.

In considering action as the principal part in the *object* of imitation, we also have to specify, in so far as that is possible, the character of the lyric speaker, his thought,[20] emotion, and situation. Only then shall we grasp the whole poetic experience which may be said to be the *soul* or form of the poem in more or less the same sense that Aristotle calls plot the soul of drama.[21] Then, also, shall we apprehend the unique power of a given poem as an imitation of action or experience.

The Lyric Character

The lyric speaker in any poem by Angeles is a perceptive and morally sensitive observer.[22] You do not have, as in Browning or Edwin Arlington Robinson, a complex variety of *dramatis personae*. It is clearly Angeles (or, if you will, the same mind or sensibility) who speaks through the lyric speaker in every poem. But in this, Angeles is like most other lyric poets.

Nevertheless, from poem to poem, we do respond in some way to the character of the lyric speaker. It is an aspect of the whole poetic experience and, therefore, part of its inherent power to move us. And thus, between two poems, it can sometimes happen that certain moral traits or qualities of the lyric speaker will make for a certain formal difference, *i.e.*, a difference in their specific power.[23] It may of course be said that some sort of character is inevitably implied by the

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[20] The lyric *thought*, as the sole basis of inferences concerning all other parts of the *object* of imitation, is always involved in the analysis of those other parts as well as in the analysis of the manner, the means, and the effect of the poetic imitation.

[21] In the *Poetics*, Aristotle considers only a particular kind or species of mimetic drama, *i.e.*, tragedy on the order of, say, "Oedipus the King" or "Hamlet," but not tragedy on the order of, say, "Macbeth" or "Death of a Salesman."

[22] Except in "Asylum Piece" (*a stun of jewels,* p. 18), which is a narrative poem, or a kind of lyric anecdote. It is, incidentally, the only instance in Angeles of the mixed mode in the manner of imitation, and the only instance of the comic lyric poem.

[23] In "The Invalid" (*a stun of jewels,* p. 11), for example, a certain habitual disposition of soul betrays an apparent moral deficiency of a sort in the lyric actor. Such a difference in character — quite apart from the specific nature of his action — establishes a formal difference between this poem and "Rooftop" or "Summer Trees." Generally speaking, one tends toward a kind of moral disapproval of the invalid, since one judges unfavorably of his disposition, and toward a kind of moral approbation for the speaker in "Rooftop" or "Summer Trees."

specific nature of the action in a given poem. True: but what I want to stress is that character, as a *cause* of the lyric action, is an aspect of the organizing principle in any poem which happens to be an imitation. The lyric action in such a poem always *requires* a given sort of character to carry it through and make it seem probable or necessary.

In "Rooftop", then, and "Summer Trees," the moral sensitivity and perceptiveness of the lyric speaker is more or less of the same cast. Again, it may be said that the similarity arises simply from the object of the speaker's reflection: but this cannot be true. In one or the other poem, the sort of lyric action that you do have requires just that sort of moral sensitivity to render it probable or necessary. In "Rooftop," for example, someone does protest against "the poor / And futile garden" or lament "the focus thin / Upon a bee"; he is made unhappy by "a bloom that, against the summer heat, / Is dazed by my city's rage and sun"; he feels a compassion for "the human fable ... (that) one by unsuccessful one (must) rise and swell and fall / And disappear beyond an actual wall." And of course, the speaker's "pleasure" is also a kind of moral triumph since his "inward eye's concern" is essentially a moral one, *i.e.*, a concern for breadth of vision or perspective by which a certain freedom is secured and a richer or fuller life is made possible.

There is, too, in "Summer Trees," a similar moral sensitivity. The lyric speaker "knows / The pertinence of patience," and may also be said to feel a kind of moral triumph when,

> silver in the sky, the late
> Rains pour at last, hard where the treetops tilt.

As in "Rooftop," therefore, a moral interest may be said to underlie the speaker's perceptions and to be the cause of his pleasure when the trees seem to him to rejoice in the "late rains."

But when we say that the lyric speaker in "Summer Trees" is morally sensitive, we mean primarily that his impressions have a moral tenor: note, for example, "The pertinence of patience the trees bear" under the scalding sun, or their "metal branches" that seem in their sound "to defy despair." It may therefore be said that the moral concern is a more dominant element in "Rooftop" since there the speaker shows, for example, moral indignation and compassion for pent-up lives. The difference is of course a matter of degree, and yet, owing to it, the poetic imitation affects us somewhat differently.

The Lyric Emotion

In considering the lyric action and character, we have of course touched also on the emotion of the lyric speaker and his situation; but

this is unavoidable since, after all, the poem is a certain interrelationship of such elements as action, character, etc. by which a unique and particular experience is constituted. The *object* of imitation is a whole unity to which we respond; its elements are more or less separable only in specific formal analysis.

Generally speaking, in both "Rooftop" and "Summer Trees," the central emotion is a kind of pleasure which we tend to share with the lyric speaker; but in "The Invalid" (to illustrate an obvious difference), a kind of pain, a resentment and uneasiness or perplexity which move us with pity toward the lyric actor.[24] More specifically, the speaker in "Rooftop" feels released from a past and dismal situation. Hence, the emotion is a certain buoyancy or exhiliration of spirit that the speaker's sudden discovery or insight brings on:

> From the rooftop now, the inward eye's
> Concern, a sudden landscape and the green
> Proximity confirm the space's, the sky's
> Pleasure, and what could not be seen
> Before, could be.

And yet, his present mood of joy is also tinged with gloom owing to his own compelling recognition of "the focus thin" and "hostile space" from which he is just now released. The *manner* of imitation enforces not only the sudden emotional change from a past condition but also the exact character of the present mood. For, should one reverse the order of the speaker's thoughts, *e.q.*, reserve the first stanza for the conclusion, the effect would be different: the gloom should be quite dispelled or mitigated, and the joy increased into a kind of exultation.

If "Rooftop" is a kind of affirmation of "the inward eye's concern," "Summer Trees" is a celebration of "the pertinence of patience." The speaker is vividly recollecting certain impressions which, from "copper sun that scalds" to "the late rains," progressively magnify the central insight. And therefore, his thoughts, unlike those of the speaker in "Rooftop," do not have a pensive cast but remain throughout a kind of joyful musing. The sombreness is entirely in the object of reflection ("the noon's burst cauldron," the trees' "throbbing thirst," etc.): the activity of recollection itself is one of celebration. Indeed, the speaker's thought and emotion even reach a kind of climax as he imaginatively shares in the trees' rejoicing when, released from summer oppression, they receive their patience's meed. There is no sudden discovery, no looking back from a changed perspective, no qualification of a present

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[24] We speak of a "lyric actor" because "The Invalid" (like "Bearded Lady," *a stun of jewels,* p. 21) is a reflective lyric in the narrative mode; *i.e.*, you are told about someone, though the narrator, in both poems, enters fully into the lyric actor's consciousness.

emotion or mood owing to any change in the speaker's situation. The speaker is only and simply recollecting and celebrating "The Summer Trees."[25]

The Manner of Imitation

Both "Rooftop" and "Summer Trees" are essentially dramatic. But each poem affects us differently, and part of the reason lies in the precise manner of imitation.

In "Rooftop," the manner has to do chiefly with the ordering of the parts of the lyric action itself and with the arrangement of the speaker's thoughts or perceptions. First, then, as regards the lyric action, you begin with the speaker's sudden discovery of a new perspective which, though a mental event, is momentous since the speaker feels a certain exhiliration of spirit. You grasp the event and share the speaker's mood. But, next, you have the speaker's retrospection, an activity of thought initiated by his discovery; he looks back and considers what it was "before ... for a time." And you realize, only then, that the speaker feels released just now from an oppressive outlook; you move from the present situation and mood of the speaker to his dismal past. Consequently, you feel at the end of the poem a certain admixture of gloom. The poem itself ends with the speaker's pensive consideration of "the human fable." As noted earlier, to reverse the order of the lyric action would change the peculiar effect or power of the poetic imitation.

The speaker's thoughts, on the other hand, are arranged in climactic and logical order: from the present view to a past "scene," and from each particular scene to its effect. Thus, you move from "a sudden landscape and the green proximity" to "the rectangular scene ... the poor and futile garden ... the hostile space of a street"; and from "the space's, the sky's pleasure" to the poverty and oppressiveness of the old "scene" and the futility of life under its narrow and limiting sponsorship. In the speaker's retrospection, particular stress is laid, from one object of perception to another, on the frustrating character of the "scene" as "the focus thin"; in fact, from "the rectangular scene" to "the human fable," there is a progression of oppressiveness. Logical order might also be seen in terms of the speaker's coign of vantage: he sees "from the rooftop now ... a sudden landscape," but from "window and door" in the past, only "the poor and futile garden." Also, he

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[25] He is not actually "there," watching "all summer long" and making his observations till "the late rains pour at last." This is patently absurd. It is only *as* though he were actually "there," as a witness, his memory being so vivid and perceptive that he could, for example, imaginatively feel, even now, "the noon's burst cauldron," or see what "roots probe deepest for," or even know the trees' motive, "to defy despair."

shifts and adjusts his focus from larger to smaller "scene," and vice-versa: from garden to bee or bloom, and from "my city's rage and sun" to "the hostile space of a street." The effect of such shifts and adjustments is to make us see more vividly the objects of the speaker's perceptions since a greater effort on our part is required than if the particular objects were observed from a constant standpoint; and seeing more vividly what the speaker himself sees and judges reinforces the total effect of the poetic imitation.

In "Summer Trees," the manner has to do chiefly with the ordering of the speaker's impressions. You do not begin, as in "Rooftop," from a high point, so to speak, of the lyric action (such as a sudden discovery and release from oppression). What you have is something like a straight series of impressions in someone's recollection of trees in torrid summer. The speaker, who is only recalling a "scene," does shift his standpoint but the object of perception ("The Summer Trees") remains constant. Such concentration has the effect of intensifying our own impressions of the "scene" (as of "concentrates of fury" in "copper sun" and "metal branches") toward the fullest apprehension of "the pertinence of patience the trees bear."[26]

The speaker's impressions are recalled in logical and climactic order: first, the occasion for the trees' "patience" in the punishing heat of summer; next, the defiant endurance of their "patience"; and finally, its fit requital in "the late rains." Or, you first have the hardship "under the noon's burst cauldron," the persevering toil for moisture, the long waiting — and then, the sudden succor when "the late rains pour at last." Or, again, you have first a statement of the speaker's central insight, "The pertinence of patience the trees bear"; and the rest of the poem demonstrates it in a kind of "dramatization" of the scene (trees versus sun, and then, the liberating rain).[27] Surely, then, however one views the order, it does serve to heighten the power of the poetic imitation, *i.e.*, its capacity to make us rejoice with the speaker as he recalls his knowledge of summer trees.[28]

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[26] Compare, again, with the various objects of perception and the marked shifts in standpoint and focus that they required in "Rooftop." The effect there is to deepen our sense of the speaker's moral agitation in the past.

[27] The speaker's thoughts in "Summer Trees" may thus be said to partake of the character of an *argument*. It constitutes a formal difference between this poem and "Rooftop" (where the speaker's thoughts may be said to be a kind of brooding) — a difference that pertains, of course, to the *object* of imitation.

[28] Note also that, at the outset of the poem, you are looking up with the speaker at "the copper sun"; next, you regard the trees' "metal branches," and then probe underneath where "roots probe deepest for a hoard of silt and seepage." And at the end of the poem, you are looking up again, but this time you see, not "the copper sun," but the "silver . . . rains"; not the "noon's burst cauldron. . . . In concentrates of fury," but the rains that "pour at last, hard." Where before you saw the "metal branches scour the air," now you see "the treetops tilt" as though fulfilled. Summer's trying regimen has ended in the joyful triumph of the trees' "patience."

Thus, the *manner* of imitation, considered as a cause of the poetic power inherent in each poem, constitutes a formal difference between "Rooftop" and "Summer Trees"; *i.e.*, the manner in each poem is directed toward a peculiar effect of the poem as an imitation of a mental experience. In one, the specific manner of imitation helps to qualify the effect of joy with a certain degree of gloom or pensiveness; in the other, it helps to intensify the mood of celebration.

The Means of Imitation[29]

The words in "Rooftop" are governed by two contrasting experiences of the speaker: the present satisfies, the past frustrates, his "inward eye's concern." The contrast is chiefly indicated by his particular coign of vantage: in one experience, "the rooftop," in the other, "window and door." The balance in the contrast is tilted toward his recollected past, and the effect is to make us perceive that the speaker's mood is yet alloyed with a certain oppressive gloom; he cannot yet enter fully into "the space's, the sky's pleasure." And thus, after the first stanza, the words serve to make the speaker's past loom into prominence and cast a pall over the moment's sudden triumph. The "landscape and the green proximity (which) confirm the space's, the sky's pleasure" and fulfill his "inward eye's concern" are heavily counterbalanced by the rest of the poem — "the rectangular scene by the neighbor's face," "the poor and futile garden," "the focus thin upon a bee," etc. In contrast to his inward eye's "pleasure," all these recollections have, even now in his present mood, precisely that effect on the speaker on which the poem ends: "The eye must see"

> The human fable rise and swell and fall
> And disappear beyond an actual wall.

Take, for instance, the word "concern" or "proximity." The word is meant to suggest all that is relevant to the speaker's experience,

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[29] I only wish here to indicate the direction that an analysis of the specific means of imitation must take whereby we may apprehend any formal difference between "Rooftop" and "Summer Trees." We must note, however, that from another point of view, the words in the poem are its most important part since they are the vehicle of someone's thoughts; one must apprehend these thoughts before one can apprehend anything of the poem at all. But someone's thoughts are not the *whole* poem; they imply, as we said earlier, those other things which are non-verbal but which constitute the whole experience of which the poem is an imitation. And no exact paraphrase, if that were possible, will do as well as the poem itself, not only because each word has somehow its own integrity but also because, in a given poem, it is just this word or that word, and no other, which can more precisely or more forcefully render the speaker's thoughts, or invest him with a particular character, or define his action or situation, or limn his mood or emotion. All these elements of the poetic experience determine and control the words in the poem; the complexity of such governance is indeed owing to the complexity of the experience which the poet, in employing particular words or devices, seeks to render.

nothing more and nothing less. Of course, we would not know what is relevant unless we have first grasped that experience. "The inward eye" is a metaphor for the mind or the imagination or, if you will, the spirit — not as an abstract entity, but the speaker's own faculty or spirit. Considering his experience, then, "concern" implies on his part an anxious moral care and even preoccupation with breadth of vision. When he says, "it is window and door / Must shape the rectangular scene," he is saying that "for a time" there was no choice at all, and his spirit felt cramped and deprived. Note the full force of "rectangular scene." It derives not only from its juxtaposition with "the neighbor's face" (which has the painful effect of somehow demeaning the human or spiritual element in the "scene"), nor its connexion with such other words as "landscape" (in the sense of almost unlimited vista) and "wall" (which denotes a certain rectangularity). The full force of the description chiefly derives from its "dramatic" context, *i.e.*, the experience of the speaker who feels released on "the rooftop now." The old "scene," to his "inward eye," is not only flat and uninteresting[30] since it confirms no pleasure in his particular "concern"; it is also oppressive, as though his mind or spirit were mured in a rectangle, or he himself were hemmed by "an actual wall." And similarly, when he says, "The eye must see / The human fable rise and swell and fall," he is lamenting that "before" he was constrained to see the pitiful effect of that "hostile space" which gave his "inward eye" no pleasure; and so his words imply, as we said, a protestation and a plea.

"Proximity," like "concern," is also governed by the poetic experience; we can claim that it is just the right word only in terms of the peculiar experience it bears on. "The green proximity" seems rather formal or stiff, for it really means the closeness of trees to the speaker or, at least, a clear prospect of greenery "from the rooftop now." But since it is a "sudden" view of "landscape" and the speaker "for a time" has had only "the rectangular scene," their closeness just now seems to him to have an alien or unfamiliar character; and that precisely is what the formality of the expression suggests in the speaker's own experience. As we said earlier, the speaker is not quite ready as yet to enter fully into "the space's, the sky's pleasure." This is why he can only say that the green vista "confirms" *their* "pleasure."

Similarly, the words in "Summer Trees" serve to convey not only the speaker's insight but also his celebration of "the pertinence of patience the trees bear." The first stanza is governed by a vivid recollection of "the copper sun", but the recollection celebrates the speaker's central perception in the poem. Hence, the words must not only stress the intense heat (in such metaphors as "copper" and "metal") but also

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[30] "Scene" (as opposed to "landscape") adds to the speaker's sense of its dullness and spiritual aridity as he recollects it.

underscore the jubilant mood. This, in fact, is the peculiar effect of the ironic understatement in "The copper sun ... hardly knows." The same effect is heightened in the second stanza which (even syntactically) flows directly from the central perception and demonstrates it, since there the speaker's thoughts bear directly on the persevering and defiant effort of trees against summer. The first and second stanzas contrast two sets of perceptions: "the copper sun that scalds the april boughs" and the trees' "metal branches (that) scour the air (or) defy despair." The contrast not only accentuates the insight into the trees' "patience" by giving it body, as it were, but it also dramatizes the mood of celebration. Someone is not only recollecting sun versus trees: even as he seems to feel again "the noon's burst cauldron, there," so also he seems, even now, to participate in the trees' enduring toil against summer.

There is a sort of pause in the third stanza as the speaker recapitulates:

> All summer long the bare trees stand and wait
> While roots probe deepest for a hoard of silt
> And seepage —

Note that the pause, the recapitulation, is an aspect of the lyric action which the words are made to convey. But more than that, the words magnify the celebration. "All summer long" intensifies the speaker's impression of the punishing heat; and "the *late* rains (which) pour *at last*" underscore it further. The words ("All summer long") recapitulate the first stanza. But the speaker is also saying, "the bare trees stand and wait," etc. These words, recapitulating the second stanza, are ordered toward the speaker's final declaration of a deeply-felt admiration (or even reverence). "Bare" recalls the sun that "scalds the april boughs" and converts them into "metal branches"; but the roots that probe deep for moisture evoke those boughs that

> scour the air
> For rumors of impending May to flood
> Their throbbing thirst.

And finally, the advent of rain brings the celebration to its highest point:

> till, silver in the sky, the late
> Rains pour at last, hard where the treetops tilt.

Note that "silver" (as opposed to "copper sun" or "metal branches") at once sounds the triumphant note; that the rains "pour hard" even as the sun before poured "from the noon's burst cauldron.... In concentrates of fury"; and that "the treetops tilt," rejoicing, even as before "their metal branches" could only sound in "the stirring breeze ... to defy despair."[31]

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[31] Incidentally, the striking shift in subject (since it is the breeze which "makes (the trees) vocable and loud") reinforces the speaker's impression of the breeze as an ally: it brings "rumors of impending May."

If, then, there is any formal difference between "Rooftop" and "Summer Trees" in terms of the specific *means* of imitation, the difference is attributable to the particular ends for which the words are employed.[32] Generally speaking, "Rooftop" is more literal, and "Summer Trees," more metaphorical. A greater degree of literalness is effective in "Rooftop" toward a direct and unequivocal delineation of a past and oppressive situation of the speaker. The figurative statements (as in "a bloom...dazed by my city's rage") are quite simple in the sense that they do not really require any subtle interpretation; they translate more or less immediately into their literal purport. In comparison with the richly metaphorical language in "Summer Trees," they are intended primarily to assert a comparison, to describe a situation, at a certain level or depth of the sensibility. Neither poem is of course *symbolic* in the sense that Blake's "The Sick Rose" is a symbolic lyric poem[33]; nor *ironic* in the sense of an "ironic" awareness in either poem of an opposite and complementary outlook or attitude.[34]

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[32] We must note here that words may be deemed "dramatic" in another sense, *i.e.*, when, considered as signs, they present whatever they signify so vividly or so cogently that we are struck by the expression and regard it as memorable. It is in this sense that metaphor, irony, etc. have been considered as essentially "poetic" devices, or even as principles of poetic structure, when in fact they are fundamentally rhetorical devices which may or may not be necessary in a given poem. It is perhaps true that they have more currency in poems; and yet the fact remains that they are controlled by everything else in the poem itself. If there is ironic contrast, for example, between "rooftop" and "window and door," or between "human fable" and "actual wall," it cannot follow that, therefore, irony is the organizing principle of the poem itself (unless, of course, one considers the poem merely as a verbal composite). The irony is determined and controlled by the experience which the poem renders; and, certainly, the *verbal* irony is the least of it since the ironic effect results chiefly from our perception of the whole experience itself. For — to repeat — we are not chiefly responding to a linguistic structure (the poem as a verbal composition), but rather, to someone's experience (the poem as imitation).

[33] I quote the poem herewith:

> O Rose, thou art sick!
> The invisible worm
> That flies in the night,
> In the howling storm
> Has found out thy bed
> Of crimson joy,
> And his dark secret love
> Does thy life destroy

The poem compels us to interpret it symbolically because it insists on a further range of significance than the mere spectacle of a rose attacked by a worm on a stormy night. In "Rooftop" or "Summer Trees," however, there is no compelling necessity to scour the air, as it were, for rumors of a hidden or more profound meaning than the speaker's experience as rendered.

[34] Again, there is clearly no need to unravel an "ironic" tension between an implied attitude and an obvious or literally expressed evaluation. The speaker's attitude in either poem is unequivocally rendered.

The Power cr Effect of the Imitation

At this stage in our analysis, we need only recapitulate formal differences in terms of poetic effect.[35] Both "Rooftop" and "Summer Trees" put us in a frame of mind more or less similar to that of the lyric speaker. This happens naturally, so to speak, since we are made to reflect on the same object that the speaker muses on in more or less the same manner that he does; and we are not given any ground for disagreement with his thoughts or disapproval of his action or character. In "Rooftop," the experience is one of sudden release from a mental or spiritual oppression, and hence, we feel a certain exhiliration or buoyancy of spirit with the speaker. But the greater part of the poetic experience consists of a brooding on a dismal and oppressive "scene" which reduces life into "the human fable," and hence, our exhiliration is depressed somewhat by a certain gloom. In "Summer Trees," on the other hand, the experience is essentially a joyful recollection, a celebration; and we share the speaker's jubilant mood, accepting without question "The pertinence of patience the trees bear" against summer. Such a difference in poetic power between the two poems is indicative of each their peculiar nature or kind as a reflective lyric.

Conclusion

Only a specific formal analysis of lyric poems can distinguish their various forms or distinctive kinds for purposes of evaluating their excellence as products of the poetic art in terms of their own peculiar standards or criteria. While such analysis is necessarily laborious and cannot give comfort or inspiration through grand insights into the nature of poetry or literature as a whole, it alone can judge individual poems according to their own nature as poetic wholes of a given kind.

We have discriminated at least two distinctive forms of the reflective lyric by specifying the object, the manner, the means, and the effect or power of the poetic imitation in each case. There may be other forms, but we cannot say what these are before we have specified their structures.

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[35] I am unhappily aware that in what may be called "atomic analysis," the elements assume, after a time, a character of unrelieved monotony against which the mind rebels. There is perhaps a point in criticism at which the mind rests content with a kind of "negative capability." Any irritable reaching after fact or explanation ceases, and "the immovable critic," as Marianne Moore puts it, no longer "twitches his skin like a horse that feels a flea."

PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE IN UTTAR PRADESH (INDIA) AND ITS IMPACT ON SOCIAL CHANGE AND MODERNIZATION*

DHIRENDRA K. VAJPEYI

THE PROCESS OF NATION-BUILDING IN EMERGING NATIONS LIKE INDIA IS inconceivable today without massive and direct participation of government, and qualitative performance of the bureaucracy. The new conception of the state requires a new conception of a public service.[1] Researches have demonstrated how unreal and impractical it would be to think of any type of national development in which the bureaucracy, even if its role is limited, is excluded.[2] This is more pertinent in developing nations where the bureaucracy has to develop a potential capacity to sustain continuously changing, new types of political and social demands and organizations. In the Indian situation, as has been emphasized by the Indian planners, the success of five year plans and other nation-building projects depends on active citizen participation and interest. In Indian villages, as Dube notes, "the relations between the common village people and government officials are characterized by considerable distance, reserve and distrust."[3] A long history of exploitation at the hands of outsiders has conditioned the villager to a hostile view. Bailey talking about Indian peasant attitudes and beliefs observes that:

> One justifies cheating government agencies by saying that the officials concerned are cheating you. This perception is often so firm that even behavior which is interpreted as a hypocritical cover for some as yet undisclosed interest: by definition, all horses are Trojan.[4]

The Indian officials have to overcome the legacies of the freedom movement which discredited not only British rule, but also the administration

[1] Joseph La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 4-5.

[2] Morestein E. Marx, "The Higher Civil Service as an Action Group in Western Political Development," in La Palombara (ed), *ibid*, pp. 62-95.

[3] V. T. Krishmanachari, *Towards a Welfare State* (New Delhi: Government of India, 1956), p. 105.

[4] S. C. Dube, *India's Changing Villages: Human Factor in Community Development* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1958), p. 82.

and the steel-frame bureaucracy, and hence intensified the personal and social distance between citizens and official representatives of government.

The citizen's image of the government is shaped by the treatment he is accorded by the bureaucracy. Researches have indicated citizen involvement as a precondition for an effective process in the modern policy. Administrative contacts help move the public toward greater knowledge of the system, greater optimism about the public's role in the system, greater attitudinal support and greater cooperation with the goals of the system.[5]

The testable hypothesis in this paper is that greater citizen satisfaction tends to create greater support to governmental programs of transforming and modernizing the society. The fewer contacts with the government, the less chance there is that citizen's law abidance is put to the test. The research reported in this paper is based on the data collected in a north Indian state, Uttar Pradesh. The survey was conducted in June, 1972.

Sampling

Districts were used as primary sampling units as they, firstly, are the largest administrative units and have identical administrative structure. Secondly, they allowed us to take into account the geographical spread of a state. Thirdly, they provided a convenient unit for stratifying the state into socio-economically developed and underdeveloped regions. Lastly, they helped us to cluster the interviews. For the purpose of this study, I selected three districts on the basis of their socio-economic development — one most developed, second medium developed, and the third least developed.[6]

Within districts the community development blocks were used as sampling units because they automatically cluster the villages. As I was also interested in exposure to urbanization and the modern sectors of the community, these blocks were ranked with reference to the distance between block and district headquarters. In case of alternative routes the shortest route was taken into consideration. Then, using a median split the blocks were stratified into proximal and distal blocks. Then from each stratum one block was selected — making two blocks from each district. The quota of interviews for each district was distributed between the two blocks with reference to the latter's population size.

In selecting the villages within each block no standard procedure was adopted. Firstly, because any procedure that favored the selection of

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[5] F. G. Bailey, "The Peasant View of Bad Life," *Journal of British Association for the Advancement of Science,* Vol. 23 (1966), pp. 399-409.

[6] Samual J. Eldersveld, V. Iagnnadham, and A.. P. Barnabas, *The Citizen and the Administrator in a Developing Democracy* (Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1968), p. 13.

the larger villages would have deprived the study of the opportunity of studying small size communities on a regular basis from district to district. Secondly, the presence in the sample of villages of different sizes (varying in size from below 200 to above 10,000) would assure the availability of adequate data on larger villages which in terms of size verged on smaller towns. The villages were, therefore, ranked in terms of their size and once again the median split was used to stratify them into large and small villages. Selecting then one village from each of the strata, the block-quota of interviews was distributed between the two villages proportionate to their size.

For the urban sample the towns were classified in three categories:
1. those which would include industrial centers
2. those which were in intermediate or transitory stages of industrialization, and
3. those which overlapped the villages in terms of their traditional structure and low level of industrialization.

Thus, three towns, one from each category, were selected for the study. Total number of urban interviews were distributed with reference to the proportion of state population in all towns of that size within the state.

At each sampling point, respondents were selected from the available voters' list. In the absence of an actual voters' list a master list was made of lists of adult residents that were available with the village or town administration. The names of actual respondents were picked with the help of a random number total. Thus the following sampling framework emerged:
1. 3 districts
2. 2 blocks from each district (total blocks, 6)
3. 2 villages from each block (total villages, 12)
4. 3 towns

Total respondents = 456

The distribution of interviews in these selected three districts was as follows:

District	Rural Interviews	Towns	Urban Interviews	Total
Varanasi	92	Varanasi	56	148
Badaun	91	Lucknow	36	127
Gorakhpur	101	Ghaziabad	80	181
TOTAL	284		172	456

The original questionnaire which was in English was translated by me into Hindi, the language spoken in the state.

The central variables selected for the study were public expectation of treatment, public contacts with government, and public evaluation of governmental performance.

I. *Expectation of Treatment*

The government is identified in the eyes of citizens by the treatment they receive. Their attitudes of support or hostility toward the government are shaped by these impressions. In this study respondents were asked as to what kinds of treatment they expected from various government officials such as village level worker, Block Development officer, and other district officers, and the police. The question was asked for each office mentioned:

Do you expect (mention of the officer's position) to treat all citizens equally?

The data reported here indicate that those who expected equal treatment were 17% of the rural male respondents, and 2% rural females, 26% urban males, and 7% urban females in the sample. A high number of respondents reported that they do not expect equal treatment (51% rural males, 68% rural females; and 57% urban males, and 61% urban females) by bureaucracy and the police. 20% rural males, and 12% rural females, 15% of urban males and 26% of the females reported that treatment depends upon a variety of factors. Those respondents who have been categorized under the "other" category are those who had either no opinion or were quite confused about the situation. The data indicate that urban respondents, both males (57%) and females (61%) have low opinion of government officials on this question. Greater number of females were cynical and did not expect equal treatment (68% rural; 61% urban) (Table I). This may be due to very few contacts women have with government, and they accumulate their impressions by remembering what their menfolks and other neighbors have told them.

TABLE I

EXPECTATION OF TREATMENT BY BUREAUCRACY AND POLICE,
BY RESIDENCE AND SEX

N = 450

Respondents Reporting	Rural		Urban	
	Male (%)	Female (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)
1. They expect equal treatment	17	2	26	7
2. They do not expect equal treatment	51	68	57	61
3. Depends	20	12	15	26
4. Other (D.K., No opinion)	12	18	2	6
TOTAL PERCENT	100	100	100	100

A very general question followed asking those respondents who did not expect equal treatment or said that treatment depended on many factors. The question asked was:

In your opinion what are the reasons that some citizens get better treatment while others do not?

A wide variety of factors were reported by the respondents. If the citizen is rich, powerful, influential, and related to some local or state politician or government official then his chances of getting better treatment are far more than a person with no such connections. The caste was not considered to be a very important factor. The percentage of respondents reporting that the bureaucracy gives preferential treatment to some citizens is high, both in rural (71% males, and 80% females) and urban (72% males, and 87% females) samples. Only 3% rural males, 10% rural females and 2% urban males and 6% urban females felt that caste has any relation to the type of treatment they receive. (Table II) In a situation like India where caste has been considered as one of the most important behavior influencing factor, the low percentage of respondents under this category is an interesting indication as to how new factors are taking place in their social interaction. The data reported here indicate that the great majority of Indians do not feel that the ordinary citizen can get fair and equal treatment. This is much more evident in the case of urban areas. This raises serious questions about the political system's capability to create a sense of legitimacy among citizens.

TABLE II

EQUALITARIANISM IN ADMINISTRATION AS PERCEIVED BY THE PUBLIC, BY RESIDENCE AND SEX

N = 450

Those reporting	Rural		Urban	
	Male (%)	Female (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)
All are treated equally	17	2	26	7
Preferential treatment is given	71	80	72	87
1. Wealthy	47	51	31	39
2. With relatives	21	19	39	42
3. High caste	3	10	2	6
Other	12	18	2	6
(Don't know; No opinion)				
TOTAL PERCENT	100	100	100	100

In the same series respondents were asked about the amount of consideration they expect for their opinions and point of views from the bureaucracy and the police. The percentage of respondents who expect serious consideration was not high. Only 11% males and 4% females in the rural sample, and 24% and 7% in the urban sample expected serious consideration. (Table III)

TABLE III

AMOUNT OF CONSIDERATION EXPECTED FOR POINT OF VIEW/OPINIONS
FROM BUREAUCRACY AND THE POLICE, BY RESIDENCE AND SEX

N = 450

Percent who expect:	Rural		Urban	
	Male (%)	Female (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)
Serious consideration	11	4	24	7
A little attention	19	9	21	15
To be ignored	44	47	41	44
Depends	22	29	13	27
Other (D.K., no opinion)	4	11	1	7
TOTAL PERCENT	100	100	100	100

Studies have shown that high education, greater mass media exposure, and serious consideration of opinions and expectations of equal treatment by government officials are positively correlated. The data reported here (Table IV) points out that 21% males and 7% females in the rural sample, and 36% urban males and 21% urban females who were highly exposed to the mass media channels also expected equal treatment. With less media exposure the expectation also go down (Table IV). The data indicates that the lower the mass media exposure and education, both in the urban and the rural samples, the lower is the expectation of being treated equally and getting any serious consideration. The high percentage of female respondents both rural and urban, is under 'to be ignored' and 'not treated equally' category. They report to be more suspicious and cynical than their menfolks, possibly due to fewer contacts, and knowledge about administration.

If we combine two indices of 'equal treatment', and 'high consideration' the following pattern emerges.

II. *Public Contact with Government and its support to Government Programs*

As noted earlier, public beliefs and attitudes towards government are formed by treatment given by the agents of administration. In

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[7] D. L. Sheth, *Socio-Economic Profiles of Districts of Four States in India* (New Delhi: Center for the Study of Developing Societies, 1966) (mimeographed).

TABLE IV

EXPOSURE TO MASS MEDIA, LEVEL OF EDUCATION, EXPECTATION OF
EQUAL TREATMENT AND SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO OPINIONS,
BY RESIDENCE AND SEX

Media Exposure/Level of Education	Urban				Rural			
	High Expectation of equal treatment		High serious Consideration		High Expectation of equal treatment		High serious Consideration	
	M (%)	F (%)	M (%)	F (%)	M (%)	F (%)	M (%)	F (%)
High exposure	21	7	13	10	36	21	32	26
Medium exposure	17	5	8	7	27	16	27	15
Low exposure	11	3	2	—	14	9	8	2
High education	23	19	21	13	41	33	39	23
Medium education	19	13	11	6	23	19	19	10
Low education	9	4	3	1	12	8	8	2

the absence of any meaningful communication and contacts between the public and the bureaucracy there are greater chances of misunderstanding, distrust, and suspicion about each other. Frequent contacts, theoretically, help in changing these attitudes and create a 'good will', and feeling of mutual cooperation.

The respondents were asked a series of questions about their contacts with bureaucracy which helped us in developing an administrative contact index for each respondent. In rural areas these officers about whom contact questions were asked included Block Development officers, district officers (Zila Vikas Adhikari Tehsildar, Police Superintendent), and village level workers, for urban respondents they were municipal officials and district officials. Both urban and rural respondents were also asked about their contacts with state officers, and frequency and nature of such contacts.

The same questions were asked from urban and rural respondents about the state and district officials.

Those respondents who had very high contact score were also the ones who believed that various government officials at different levels were doing a good/very good job. The data also indicated, comparatively,

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[8] Alex Inkeles, "Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries", *American Political Science Review* LXIII, No. 4, 1969.

TABLE V

The Role of Administrative Contact in Developing Belief in and Support For Governmental Programs, by Residence and Sex

N = 450

Believe government officials are doing good job/very good job	Administrative Contact Score*											
	Very High		High*		Average*		Occasional		Rare		Never	
	M (%)	F (%)	M (%)	F (%)	M (%)	F (%)	M (%)	F (%)	M (%)	F (%)	M (%	F (%)
Rural Sample												
(1) Village officials	77	61	68	73	59	41	47	49	41	36	33	45
(2) Block officials	88	43	51	38	67	45	41	37	43	45	39	49
(3) District officials	63	31	47	29	41	37	35	22	37	28	31	29
(4) State officials	55	21	43	17	39	19	43	26	48	18	47	26
Urban Sample												
(1) Municipal officials	88	68	73	61	65	53	59	41	51	33	41	36
(2) District officials	62	53	51	49	43	47	57	49	49	38	43	37
(3) State officials	51	46	43	37	39	31	49	36	42	41	61	52

* Very High — More than three times
  High — Three times
  Average — Two times
  Occasional — Once
  Rare — Less than once
  Never —

that a high percentage of respondents were satisfied by the performance of their local officials than district and state officials. This may be due to few contacts made by an average citizen with state officials. The decrease in the contact score was found to be positively correlated with respondents' decreased beliefs about job performance by government officials. Both urban and rural respondents who scored very high on administrative contact score were also the ones who had greater faith in government officials as doing a good job. Those respondents who never had any contacts with the bureaucracy were also the ones who thought that the government officers were not doing a good job (Table V).

Researches have shown that if the perception of the possibility of self-help is low, dependence upon government is high, and the chances of frustrations are greater. This is partly due to the lack of self-confidence in doing things which may prove to be detrimental to citizen initiative.

Keeping these theoretical concerns in mind respondents were asked a series of questions to measure the concept of self-confidence.[10] An adjective list was provided to each respondent as to how he perceived himself. The respondent indicated, in terms of eighteen adjectives or phrases, whether he was usually or not very often this kind of person. The nine positive and negative words and phrases were as follows:

Positive	Negative
1. Strong	1. Not smart
2. Popular	2. Afraid
3. Can handle problems himself	3. Cannot handle problems himself
4. Friendly	4. Not popular
5. Dependable	5. Easy going
6. Honest	6. Selfish
7. Takes initiative	7. Lacks initiative
8. Knowledgeable	8. Lacks knowledge
9. Resourceful	9. Not resourceful

The respondents were also asked as to how much support they give to the bureaucracy, their dealings with officials, whether they felt they could act if there was a problem, and how much influence they had on government officials. Their answers to whether the public officials really cared about people like them, and respect their opinions and point of views were also taken into consideration in developing the self-confidence index. The percentage of rural respondents was higher on high

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[9] Peter M. Hall, 'Identification with the Delinquent Sub-Culture and Level of Self-Evaluation.' *Sociometry*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (June, 1966).

[10] Alex Inkeles, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

support scale (Table VI). It is interesting if we compare these figures with rural respondents' expectation of being treated equally and serious consideration of their opinions. Low confidence was found to be positively correlated with low support of government (53% rural; 58% urban) (Table VII). It seems that the urban respondents are more cynical, anomic and hostile. Alex Inkeles in his study of Indian citizens found the similar general pattern.[11] If we combine the two indices of high support and high self-confidence, the following pattern emerges:

		Urban	Rural
High self-confidence	— high support	41%	57%
Moderate self-confidence	— moderate support	19%	23%
Low self-confidence	— low support	58%	65%

The self-confidence series of questions continued, and respondents were asked that if something went wrong, or if the respondents were faced with negligent behavior of subordinate officers, could they complain to some higher officers in the administration or could they take their grievances to some political leader. A high percent of the respondents (56% rural males, and 78% of the rural females; 51% urban males, and 75% urban females) did not feel that they could do much (Table VII).

TABLE VI

PATTERNS OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTITUDES TOWARD
GOVERNMENTAL OFFICIALS, AND ATITUDES OF SELF-CONFIDENCE IN
CITIZEN RELATIONSHIPS TOWARD GOVERNMENTAL OFFICERS,
BY RESIDENCE

N = 450

Levels of Support for Government

	Rural			Urban		
Levels of Self-confidence	High Support (%)	Moderate Support (%)	Low Support (%)	High Support (%)	Moderate Support (%)	Low Support (%)
1. High Self-confidence	57	39	21	41	28	17
2. Moderate Self-confidence	33	23	13	26	19	13
3. Low Self-confidence	10	31	65	19	16	58
4. Not Ascertained	—	7	1	14	37	12
5. Total PERCENT	100	100	100	100	100	100

[11] Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical Viet", in La Palombara (ed.), op. cit.

TABLE VII

SENSE OF PERSONAL CONFIDENCE OR EFFICACY IN CONTACTING
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

N = 450

Respondents who report that they	Rural		Urban	
	Male (%)	Female (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)
Could complain to higher officials or other leaders	43	21	49	25
Don't know if could complain or to whom	34	54	26	47
Nothing could be done	21	24	25	28
Not Ascertained	2	1	—	—
TOTAL PERCENT	100	100	100	100

The impact of administrative contact on confidence is quite noticeable in Table IX. The data show that those respondents who have very high contact scores are the ones who report that officials treat all citizens fairly, citizens can act if officials are not doing their jobs properly and would act by themselves if confronted by a problem. This confidence in the bureaucracy and in themselves decreases as the administrative contact score goes down. A high percentage of respondents reported that they will be treated fairly, can take initiative individually and collectively the percentage reporting that political contacts and pulls are quite important. Our data are not completely consistent on this matter. But in general, the administrative contact is functional to the achievement of greater realism about administrative behavior and greater self-confidence.

III. General Evaluation of Governmental Performance

Modern democratic systems are very sensitive to the public opinion and the public evaluations of governmental performance. Public support and evaluation of administration is favorable and positive if the public is satisfied in terms of material rewards, and there exist adequate psycho-political channels for the citizen to ventilate his grievances and participate in policy formulation. The data reported here indicate that a high percentage of respondents thought that the government officials were doing a poor job. The same pattern of responses were given about the state officials. It is to be noted here that the higher the level of officials, the higher is the percentage of respondents who felt that those officers were not doing a good job (Table IX).

The data reported in Table IX do not speak very highly about the general performance of the administration in India at different

TABLE VIII

THE RELEVANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONTACT FOR CITIZEN CONFIDENCE IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, BY RESIDENCE AND SEX

N = 450

| | Administrative Contact Scores | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Very High | | High | | Average | | Occasional | | Rare | | Never | |
	M (%)	F (%)	M (%)	F (%)	M (%)	F (%)	M (%)	F (%)	M (%)	F (%)	M (%)	F (%)
A. Rural												
1. Officials treat all citizens fairly	61	52	54	49	46	41	41	39	59	51	48	41
2. Citizens can act if officials are not doing their job properly	63	59	57	51	43	39	37	36	51	44	46	39
3. Would act by himself if has a problem with the government	42	39	29	22	21	22	46	42	45	38	49	37
4. Political pull is important	71	66	74	64	69	61	69	64	59	57	56	51
B. Urban												
1. Officials treat all citizens fairly	54	49	59	56	55	51	41	33	33	27	31	27
2. Citizens can act if officials are not doing their job properly	67	61	36	38	33	29	61	57	59	48	56	47
3. Would act by himself if has a problem with the government	30	27	42	47	45	41	27	21	21	24	27	18
4. Political pull is important	64	61	66	58	69	67	45	41	47	49	39	36

TABLE IX

General Evaluation of Governmental Performance, by Residence and Sex

| | RURAL | | | | | | | | URBAN | | | | | |
| | Village Officials | | Block Officials | | District Officials | | State Officials | | Municipal Officials | | District Officials | | State Officials | |
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Very good job	8	2	3	2	4	—	6	—	17	6	17	4	11	5
Good job	13	12	15	7	13	5	23	5	14	8	20	8	12	8
Fair job	14	17	22	12	26	9	28	8	18	9	14	17	19	15
Poor job	46	21	49	37	51	55	38	46	49	52	44	61	45	66
No opinion	19	48	11	42	6	31	5	41	2	25	5	10	13	6
TOTAL PERCENT	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

levels. The possible explanation for this low evaluation is that villagers tend to regard most village improvements as the job of the government rather that their own. This over-reliance on government and a frustrated wait for the arrival of such help affects the general evaluative opinion of the public.

It scarcely requires any exhaustive documentation to observe that corruption and graft are rampant among the officials of developing societies. This not only hampers the development and transformation of the society but also produces a very negative, not too flattering image of the bureaucracy in the public mind which in turn becomes less supportive, and more cynical and hostile toward government as such. It has both long-range and short-range implications for the political system.

An opposite view has been taken by Professor Fred W. Riggs in his 'Sala' model of bureaucracy where he maintains that graft and corruption may be quite functional in the development of stable political institutions in the beginning stages of nation and state building.

The respondents were asked about their perception of corruption in bureaucracy. Corruption, somehow, was considered quite natural. The work used for bribe in India is 'Haq' (the right). A large number of respondents while reporting rampant corruption also maintained that it was quite natural and that they were ready to go with it. Even the percentage of respondents who felt that only a few are corrupt is high. Again the data show that urban respondents were more cynical. Females, both rural and urban, were also more cynical than their male counterparts (Table X).

TABLE X

PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

N = 450

Those reporting	Rural		Urban	
	Male (%)	Female (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)
Majority are corrupt	37	41	48	43
About a half are corrupt	13	8	30	21
Just a few are corrupt	26	19	8	17
None are corrupt	8	5	2	4
No opinion/D.K.	16	27	12	15
TOTAL PERCENT	100	100	100	100

In the same series respondents were asked to report as to how confident they feel about their own status and relationships with govern-

TABLE XI

SUMMARY INDICES OF ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION, BY RESIDENCE AND SEX

N = 450

	Rural		Urban	
	Male (%)	Female (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)
A. Index of attitudinal support for officials and programs				
1. Very supportive	18	30	6	17
2. Moderately supportive	48	45	37	47
3. Moderately critical	27	21	46	28
4. Very critical	7	4	11	8
TOTAL PERCENT	100	100	100	100
B. Index of self-confidence about own status and relationships with government officials				
1. High self-confidence	22	18	3	2
2. Moderate self-confidence	57	41	62	71
3. Limited self-confidence	18	31	29	19
4. No self-confidence	3	10	6	8
TOTAL PERCENT	100	100	100	100

mental officials and their attitudinal support for officials and programs. It is to be noted that rural respondents were more self-confident (22% males, 10% females) than the urban respondents (3% males and 2% females). Both urban males and females (11% and 8%, respectively) are very critical of the programs and officials in comparison to 7% rural male sample and 4% rural females (Table XI). Village India seems to be more satisfied and less critical. Urban respondents, probably, have higher expectations and live in greater tensions than rural folks and therefore are more hostile and less supportive of government. No condition is as unstable as a transitional one when it is improving.

Summary

In summary, the data reported here indicate that the Indian citizens do not expect equal treatment, and serious consideration for their opinions. They feel that wealthy and influential persons with connections and pulls stand better chances with the bureaucracy (Table II). The frequency of administrative contact did affect their attitudes toward the administration. Those respondents who came into frequent contacts believed that governmental officials in general were doing a good job (Table V), officials treat all citizens fairly, and citizens could take their grievances to higher officials for redress if they were not satisfied (Table VIII). Those respondents who were very high on administrative contact score also reported that political pull is quite important to get things done. The data reveal paradoxical patterns of support and hostility, of consensus and criticism. Those respondents who were highly self-confident were also high supportive. On the balance, our respondents tend to be more supportive of the administration, despite being quite critical of the bureaucracy (Table XI). The findings also indicate a positive correlation between attitudes of citizens towards administration and other variables of modernization such as mass media, education, initiative and self-confidence. Those respondents who were highly educated and exposed to mass media were the ones who possessed egalitarian values and expected equal treatment and serious consideration from the adminisration. Highly self-confident respondents provided greater support to the administration (Table IV). Highly self-confident respondents provided greater support to the administration (Table VI), and were willing to take initiative to solve their problems (Table VII and VIII). High confidence and greater frequency of administrative contacts were also found to be related. Our data also indicate that hostility reactions can increase, particularly in the urban areas, as a result of bureaucratic contact and probably of the not very cordial treatment received by urban citizens. But, despite this, citizens who associate with bureaucrats at different levels reveal attitudes and orientations

which are supportive and not rejective of the political system. One could be both optimistic and alarmed at these findings, but with greater mass media exposure, more education, greater number of highly self-confident and initiative-talking citizens this relationship between elite-citizen may be improved. Unless these basic conflicts are resolved to the satisfaction of the public and the administration, no efforts can be successful in bringing about political and social change in India.

IDEOLOGICAL AND ATTITUDINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG SINGAPORE TRADE UNION LEADERS[1]

NOELEEN HEYZER, PETER D. WELDON, AND WEE GEK SIM

Introduction

TRADE UNIONS IN SINGAPORE OVER THE LAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS HAVE been characterized by intense anti-colonial activity, hundreds of major strikes, violence, major political involvement, and more recently, docility. In this same period Singapore has been a colony, a colonial territory with home rule, a part of Malaysia and since 1965, an independent nation. The political history of Singapore and the history of its trade unions are, of course, intertwined and while the former is becoming increasingly well documented,[2] the latter lies for the most part in newspapers, union pamphlets, and in the minds of the men who have led the unions.[3] The history of trade unions is by no means dead, since there are more than 100,000 members on the books of trade unions today in Singapore.[4]

This paper is concerned with the attitudes of present trade union leaders towards a variety of issues related to the integration of unions in Singapore. The study of these attitudes should enable greater comprehension and possibly prediction of the behaviour of present-day trade union leaders. It is impossible, however, to evaluate these attitudinal patterns without some understanding of the history of trade unions in Singapore, particularly since this history is so recent.

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[1] This paper is partially based on Noeleen Heyzer and Wee Gek Sim, *Survey of Trade Unions in Singapore*, an unpublished academic exercise submitted in 1971 to the University of Singapore as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Social Science. Gratitude is expressed to the Asia Foundation for support of the exercise and to John MacDougall for his assistance in questionnaire construction and data analysis.

[2] See, for example, Pang Cheng Lian, *Singapore's People's Action Party* (Singapore and Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971) and Thomas J. Bellows, *The People's Action Party of Singapore: Emergence of a Dominant Party System* (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1970).

[3] The exceptions are M.R. Stenson, *Industrial Conflict in Malaya* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970); Charles Gamba, *The Origins of Trade Unionism in Malaya* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press Ltd., 1962); Teddy Lim Khek Chuan, "The Trade Union Movement in Singapore," in National Trades Union Congress, *Why Labour Must Go Modern* (Singapore: National Trades Union Congress, 1970), pp. 48-53; W.E. Chalmers and Pang Eng Fong, "Industrial Relations" in Ooi Jin-Bee and Chiang Hai-Ding, *Modern Singapore* (Singapore: University of Singapore, 1969), pp. 109-126.

[4] The most recent official figures come from the Ministry of Labour, *Annual Report, 1969* (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1970).

Historical Background

Even before World War II "it was officially estimated that in 1941 there were in Singapore 51 registered associations of employees which exercised trade union functions and which were recognized by employers for bargaining purposes and there were probably many more which were not registered."[5] Many of these unions actively participated in resistance activities, trade union members forming an important part of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (M.P.A.J.A.); both this army and the trade unions were dominated by the Malayan Communist Party (M.C.P.). In fact, it was often impossible to differentiate between the M.C.P., M.P.A.J.A. and General Labour Union (G.L.U.) members.

The economic situation in the immediate post-war period was extremely bad and it was not difficult for the G.L.U. to call on even non-members for support of their strikes and pickets. This support was strengthened by what can only be regarded as heavy-handed rule by the British Military Administration (B.M.A.) and its employment of Japanese Surrendered Personnel to replace those workers on strike.[6] Various strikes were called during 1945 with a major strike set for 15th February 1946 to be accompanied by the inauguration of the Pan-Malayan General Labour Union. The B.M.A. arrested twenty-four major union leaders, dealing a blow to both the immediate strike and the long range plans of the M.C.P. No longer was cooperation with the B.M.A. to be possible.

The Pan-Malayan G.L.U. turned increasingly to the strike and in the year following 1 April 1946, 1,173,000 man-days were lost in Singapore as a result of strikes, an average loss of more than ten days per employee.[7] These strikes were not generally called as part of any planned union action for better wages or conditions, but served rather to build up the organizational strength of union structure. There were certainly gains made for the workers; this was often also true in the case of non-G.L.U. unions, whose members were assisted by volunteers from the G.L.U. Building goodwill among the workers, "the Pan-Malayan G.L.U. became, in the course of 1946, a genuinely popular movement."[8] Those ready to condemn the G.L.U. as a M.C.P. front organization should not forget that "most Singapore workers seem to have gained some or all of the standard G.L.U. demands, including wage increases, medical benefits, sick pay, overtime pay, longer holidays, better housing, improved gratuities, greater security of employment and less arbitrary promotion or dismissal procedures."[9]

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[5] Stenson, *op. cit.* pp 34-35.
[6] *Ibid,* p. 73; Gamba, *op. cit.,* Chapter II.
[7] Stenson, p. 104.
[8] *Ibid,* p. 108.
[9] *Ibid,* p. 114.

Much of this organizational success had taken place at a time when government supervision of trade union activity was not severe. A new post of Trade Union Adviser was created and the pre-war Trade Unions and Industrial Courts Ordinances were brought into force. The Singapore G.L.U. was reorganized as the Singapore Federation of Trade Unions (S.F.T.U.), but still registration was carried out very slowly and by March 1947, only twenty unions had been registered in Singapore.[10] However, employers, who had been slow in returning to Malaya and Singapore after the war, were now becoming better organized and were putting pressure on the government for more severe regulation of trade union activity. The results of this pressure were increased activity on the part of government and a drop in the number of man-days lost to 205,000 in the year April 1947 to March 1948 in Singapore.[11] The situation has been described well by Stenson while referring to the S.F.T.U.: "Its leaders were indeed correct when they asserted that reformism had failed, but they did not appreciate how completely it had failed nor how much the balance of forces between employers, government, and unions had altered in the brief space of one year."[12]

After 1948, trade unionism in Singapore entered a phase of inactivity which lasted till 1950 and the organization of the Singapore Trade Union Congress; the Congress was organized by English-educated leaders in contrast to the pre-1950 trade union activity which was led by vernacular-educated Chinese and Indians. The English-educated were ideologically and linguistically closer to the government than the previous trade union leaders had been; the new leaders tended to be over-whelmingly white collar, again, a contrast to the previous blue collar leaders.

Despite the difference in leadership structure between the forties and the fifties, Singapore trade union activity in the latter period did increase and by 1956, 157,216 workers were unionized, more than ever before.[13] The struggle for political power in Singapore during this period involved the trade unions with the People's Action Party's P.A.P. strength based on the militant unions. Leadership was divided "between the mainly vernacular-educated, militant socialists, M.C.P. sympathizers or cadres such as Lim Chin Siong, Fong Swee Suan, James Puthucheary, and S. Woodhull and the English-educated moderate socialists such as Lee Kuan Yew, Toh Chin Chye and S. Rajaratnam."[14] In August 1957 these left-wing leaders were arrested by the colonial government, strengthen-ing the hand of the moderate leaders. While the P.A.P. fought for their release, the men were never restored to the party's good graces nor

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[10] *Ibid*, p. 139.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 198.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 220.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 224.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 244.

did they ever receive cadre membership.[15] These same leaders even-
tually split from the P.A.P., forming in mid-1961 the Barisan Sosialis
party; some of them were imprisoned again, this time by the P.A.P.
government in 1963; many have been released, but some of the left-
wing leaders remain in jail today.[16]

The National Trades Union Congress (N.T.U.C.) was established
in late 1964, succeeding the S.F.T.U. in which a split had occured, similar
to that which took place within the P.A.P. The N.T.U.C. is the only
registered federation of trade unions in Singapore today and receives
an annual allocation from the government. Many of the left-wing unions
which were active in the fifties and early sixties have been deregistered
by government. The period from 1964 to the present may be said to
be one of transition, when the labor movement was beginning to recon-
cile itself to the national need for the industrial peace and economic
development.

The Employment Act was passed in 1968 as one of a series of steps
taken by the government to stabilize the labour situation in Singapore
and ensure an attractive climate for foreign investors. Instead of curb-
ing wage increases, this legislation sought to wage cost through restric-
tions on bonuses, retrenchment benefits and overtime. A large array of
labor issues relating to job security was transferred to the employers'
prerogative.

With the passage of this legislation, the only issue of significance
that remains negotiable is that of wage rates. However, trade unions
are unable to have any significant impact on wage rates as the basic
wage structure is invariate, and is incorporated into the next collective
agreement when the present one expires. The trade unions have been
passing through a state of impotence and lethargy, resulting in apathy
and a decline in membership strength.[17]

The N.T.U.C. union leaders decided that this trend could not be
allowed to continue. What is required to rectify the status quo is a new
approach to trade unionism, a re-education of union membership that a
trade union has a much wider variety of roles to play besides the
traditional ones. A modernization programme was proposed by the
N.T.U.C. in a four day seminar in late 1969 and the various papers
have been compiled into a book, *Why Labour Must Go Modern?*

[15] Bellows, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

[16] Pang, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-18.

[17] For the official N.T.U.C. presentation of this legislation, see Choo Eng Khoon,
"Employment Legislation," and Chue Shui Hoong, "Employment Legislation —
(Addendum)," in National Trades Union Congress, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-75 and 75-89
respectively. For more critical commentary, see David B. Johnson, "The New
Labour Legislation: Remedy or Retrogression?," *Suara Ekonomi*, January 1969,
pp. 21-28; Robert Quek Sio Chua, "Industrial Relations and Labour Legislation
in Singapore," *Suara Ekonomi*, May 1970, pp. 8-16, and "Employment Act — A
Comment," *Suara Ekonomi*, January 1969, pp. 25-27.

The briefness of this history does not give just and full coverage to the extremely complex changes which took place within Singapore trade unions in the fifties and the sixties. Hopefully, however, it provides an indication of the extent of the leadership and ideological crises which have faced trade unions over the last twenty-five years. As the attitudes of the present-day trade union leaders are examined, the events of the past cannot be overlooked.

The Sample

In July 1970 there were 105 registered trade unions; 39 of these were affiliated with the N.T.U.C., leaving a majority of the unions, 66 with no federation affiliation. Secretary-Generals of all unions were included in the study, but for the reasons shown in Table 1, 10% of the Secretary-Generals of the affiliated unions and 23% of the Secretary-Generals of the non-affiliated unions could not be interviewed, giving an overall completion rate of 82%. From Table 1 differences in the reasons for the non-completion of interviews reflect some of the trade union history already outlined. Three of the Secretary-Generals of the non-affiliated unions remain in jail under political detention and six of them refused to be interviewed. These reasons are in contrast to those applicable to the Secretary-Generals of the affiliated unions, who were not interviewed.

TABLE 1

REASONS FOR NON-COMPLETION OF INTERVIEW

Reason	Affiliate	Non-Affiliate
Could not be contacted after three visits	8	4
Away from Singapore	2	1
Home address could not be located	0	1
Under political detention	0	3
Refused	0	6
Total % not interviewed	(10%)	(23%)

The unions in the sample are representative of the unions in Singapore, regardless of affiliation status, as indicated in Table 2. Additionally though the N.T.U.C. affiliated unions are smaller in number, they include a majority of organized workers. There are no population check data available on the Secretary-Generals of unions in Singapore, but it is assumed that the sample of these leaders is as representative as the union sample.

TABLE 2

DISTRIBUTION OF ALL UNIONS AND SAMPLE UNIONS BY BOOK MEMBERSHIP (%)

Size	Affiliate Unions	Affiliate Sample	Non-Affiliate Unions	Non-Affiliate Sample
Under 100	10	12	18	18
100 to 249	31	31	46	44
250-999	26	20	28	28
999-4999	28	31	8	10
5000 and above	5	6	0	0
Total	(39)	(35)	(66)	(51)

The Study

A series of attitudinal questions were formed from depth interviews with some leaders of both affiliated unions and non-affiliated unions of the N.T.U.C. These interviews focused on three issues, believed to be relevant to the future development of the labour movement in Singapore:

1) the role of trade unions in society;
2) the labour laws in Singapore;
3) the modernization effort of N.T.U.C.

The questions were administered to each of the Secretary-Generals in the language preferred by the respondent. This involved the translation of these questions into Tamil, Hokkien, Cantonese and Malay; back-translation into English was also performed to insure the accuracy of the translation.

A Likert, five point response pattern of strongly agree, agree, undecided, disagree and strongly disagree, was used; several reversals were included to preclude response set. For purposes of analysis questions were grouped under key conceptual areas; each question was then cross-tabulated with a typology described below. If the cross-tabulations were in the expected direction, an overall composite scale of the items was constructed and a mean score was computed; all items were found to scale.

The basic independent variable was a typology of trade union leaders, constructed with the history of trade unions in Singapore as the guide. The first group in the typology was labelled the "policy makers" of the N.T.U.C. and includes: the President, the Vice-President, the Secretary-General, the Secretary for Organization and Administration, the Secretary for Research and Training and two central committee members. The first five persons obviously hold official positions of authority within the trade union federation; the two committee members were included

as "policy makers" because they fulfilled at least two of the following
criteria:

   a)   was a top union official in the last central committee;

   b)   had been public spokesman for union policies during 1970;

   c)   was on the organizing committee of at least two major N.T.U.C.
activities.

   The second group included Secretary-Generals on the central com-
mittee of the N.T.U.C., who represent their affiliated unions on this
committee; there were thirteen such unions and Secretary-Generals. The
third group is composed of twenty-two Secretary-Generals of affiliate
unions, which are not represented on the Central Committee of the
N.T.U.C. The fourth group includes twenty Secretary-Generals of unions,
which are not affiliated with the N.T.U.C., but whose Secretary-Generals
indicated that they are considered affiliating. Finally there were thirty-one
Secretary-Generals, whose unions had no intention whatsoever of affiliating
with the N.T.U.C.

   In interpreting findings involving this typology it must be kept in
mind that the size of each of the five groups is small, particularly the
first two groups, the policy makers of the N.T.U.C. and the affiliate
representatives on the N.T.U.C. Central Committee. Despite this limita-
tion the five groups are seen as distinct in their relationship to the
"establishment" trade union organization in Singapore; attitudinal dif-
ferences are projected as linked to these distinctions, particularly on
issues which touch on official trade union policy.

   With these very general guidelines let us now examine some of
the results. The first scale has been labelled "union responsibility for
society" and includes four items:

   a)   "Trade unions have a responsibility to do whatever possible for
the jobless and the potential job seeker of the future besides servicing
their members.

   b)   Trade unions should prove especially uncooperative to foreign
investments because the latter are not here for the good of Singapore.
(reversal)

   c)   The acceptance by certain unions of the Employment Act and
the Industrial Relations Ordinance means that the trade union move-
ment has forsaken its commitment to protect the rights of workers.
(reversal)

   d)   The demands of society as a whole take precedence over the
claims of the workers."

   The range of the union responsibility scale is from 20 (strong
agreement) to 4 (strong disagreement) with the scoring technique ad-
justed for the reversals. The mean scores for each of the groups are
shown in Table 3. Three groupings are clear from the distribution
of the scores with the overall distribution as anticipated: those closer

to the establishment score highest on union responsibility for society. Somewhat surprising is the similarity of the scores of those affiliates who do not have representation on the N.T.U.C. central committee and those non-affiliates who intend to affiliate. The former group had been expected to score much like the other groups of affiliates. The extreme positions of the policy-makers and the hard-core non-affiliates are clear.

TABLE 3

MEAN SCORES OF TRADE UNION LEADERS ON A SCALE OF
UNION RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOCIETY

Policy makers of N.T.U.C.	17.2
Affiliates represented on N.T.U.C. central committee	17.0
Affiliates not represented on N.T.U.C. central committee	15.4
Non-affiliates with intention of affiliation	15.5
Non-affiliates with no intention of affiliation	11.7

The next set of questions was concerned more specifically with the labor laws themselves to which previous reference has been made:
"*a*)   For the vast majority of workers, over three-quarters of whom are not in any union at all, the new labor laws mean an improvement in their working conditions.
b)   The labor laws are go-ahead licenses to deprive the workers of what is rightfully theirs. (reversal)
c)   The labor laws give management absolute power and a completely free hand in dealing with the employees, without any real safeguard for the interest and welfare of the workers. (reversal)
d)   The labor laws are attempts to tackle the problem of finding jobs for over a hundred thousand forgotten and largely inarticulate group of unemployed citizens.
e)   The labor laws are designed to further enrich the rich at the expense of the poor. (reversal)
f)   The new labor laws are made because the workers should cooperate with the government to attract foreign investors to build more factories here and to provide more jobs."
The range here is from 30 (strong agreement with the latest labor laws in Singapore) to 6 (strong disagreement) and the mean scores can be seen in Table 4. The difference between the two extreme groups is greater here than in the previous table and there is a distinction between affiliates not represented on the N.T.U.C. central committee and those non-affiliates with intention of affiliation. The non-affiliates take a much stronger stand against the labor laws than do the affiliates, and even within this latter group, there is a clear difference between those with and those without central committee representation.

TABLE 4

MEAN SCORES OF TRADE UNION LEADERS ON A SCALE OF
ATTITUDES TOWARD LABOR LAWS

Policy makers of N.T.U.C.	24.5
Affiliates represented on N.T.U.C. central committee	24.5
Affiliates not represented on N.T.U.C. central committee	21.4
Non-affiliates with intention of affiliation	17.7
Non-affiliates with no intention of affiliation	13.4

The next three series of questions are concerned with the moderniza-
tion program proposed by the N.T.U.C. The questions which follow
indicate the content of this program and no further details will be
presented. The first series of questions is concerned with the concept
of modernization as formulated by the N.T.U.C., though no specific
mention of the N.T.U.C. is made in any of the questions:

"*a*) Modernization is the realization that there must be a steady
increase in national wealth before workers can have an increased share
of it.

b) Modernization is a plot to perpetuate P.A.P. control of unions
and workers. (reversal)

c) Modernization is the emergence of a tripartite partnership among
workers, employers and the government.

d) Modernization is an escape from the real confrontation with
the capitalist class which exploits the workers. (reversal)

e) Modernization is a conspiracy to further enslave the workers
of Singapore and place them at the tender mercies of the reactionaires
and imperialists. (reversal)

f) Modernization is the process by which the labor movement lays
for itself the economic foundation of real social power and influence."

The second series of questions has to do with the rationale for
modernization; this would seem tied to the concept itself, although it
was thought that there might be greater agreement about the concept,
but not about the rationale for implementation. The questions related
to the rationale were as follows:

"*a*) It is necessary for new style trade unionists to think out ways
and means of how workers can get a greater share of capital without
slowing down the rate of development.

b) The clamor for modernization betrays the utter failure of the
N.T.U.C.; it is an open, reluctant admission of its being a sham and
self-serving organization. (reversal)

c) The modernization program is old ideology in new clothes and
irrelevant to problems faced by workers today. (reversal)

d)   The labor movement must acquire self-sufficiency in financial and human resources and a self-generating capacity for growth."

It should be noted that the second item above specifically mentions the N.T.U.C. in contrast to the previous set of questions. The third set of questions is related to the methods or means for bringing about modernization and includes the following:

"*a*)   Unions and their representatives must be uncompromising in looking after labor's own interests in all negotiating bodies which include government and management.

b)   The organization of sit-down strikes whenever union demands can be won by them. (reversal)

c)   The formation of an effective joint consultative machinery for workers' participation in management.

d)   The organization of more courses in industrial relations particularly in work study, union laws and advocacy for rank and file members so that they would be able to negotiate at branch level.

e)   The establishment of a workers' Co-operative Commonwealth through life insurance, housing, servicing, consumer and producer co-operatives and a workers' bank.

f)   A strategy of militant agitation for the total repeal of all undemocratic restrictive and repressive labor laws." (reversal)

In Table 5 the mean scores of the trade union leaders on the three composite measures are shown; though the ranges of each dimension are not the same, it can be clearly seen that the rank order of the leaders is consistent across all three dimensions. The difference between the extreme groups, the policy makers and the non-affiliates with no intention of affiliation is greatest along the rationale dimension; both the concept and the methods of modernization seem more acceptable than the rationale to the non-affiliates. The difference between affiliates with and without representation on the central committee also can be seen in this table, an indication of the level of consensus within the N.T.U.C. affiliated unions.

TABLE 5

Mean Scores of Trade Union Leaders on Scales Related to Modernization

	Concept	Rationale	Methods
Policy makers of N.T.U.C.	26.8	19.5	25.1
Affiliates represented on N.T.U.C. central committee	26.0	19.2	25.0
Affiliates not represented on N.T.U.C. central committee	24.6	17.8	24.0
Non-affiliates with intention of affiliation	20.3	15.9	22.4.
Non-affiliates with no intention of affiliation	18.6	12.0	19.4

The final series of questions has to do with the Secretary-Generals' attitudes towards co-operatives as a form of organization for improving the lots of workers. Co-operatives have been advocated by the N.T.U.C. in its program of modernization; it is believed, however, that the concept of co-operatives at the time of the survey was not identified as a N.T.U.C. program. Rather co-operatives had a neutral image, and for this reason, the series of questions about co-operatives is treated separately from those regarding modernization.

There were ten questions touching on the subject of co-operatives:

"*a*)   The improvement of the workers' lot does not depend on co-operatives but on progressive trade unions. (reversal)

b)   Co-operatives destroy individual ownership, initiative, and respon-sibility. (reversal)

c)   Co-operatives reduce the cost of living for workers.

d)   Co-operatives would lead to the widening of Singapore's economy by adding a workers' co-operative sector to the government and private sectors.

e)   As a framework of organized mutual aid, the co-operative structure seems a most efficient tool for the training of manpower.

f)   Co-operatives in Singapore would not improve the workers' con-dition to any significant extent (reversal)

g)   The formation of capital is easier and more rapid in a co-operative enterprise, if properly established and managed, than in a personal enterprise.

h)   Co-operatives are unfeasible in Singapore, because people are not sufficiently sophisticated. (reversal)

i)   Conflicting interests due to a heterogenous population would lead to the co-operatives' disintegration.

j)   Co-operation ensures that economically weak people will be strong if they unite and co-ordinate their efforts."

The mean scores with a potential range from 10 to 50 are shown in Table 6. The results are similar to those seen in the last two tables; the rank order remains consistent. There is a marked difference between those affiliates with and without central committee representation. The difference between the extreme groups compares with the difference along the dimensions of the concept and methods of modernization, not as extreme as that found for the rationale of modernization scale.

If the various concepts measured by these scales reflect the degree of consensus or attitudinal integration of trade union leaders in Singapore, then it seems clear that there are major differences between these leaders. Some of these divisions reflect the historical development of trade union-ism in Singapore, which has seen a· split between unions affiliated to a federation acceptable to government and those which have chosen to remain independent. Within these non-affiliated unions, there are

differences between those who are contemplating affiliation with the N.T.U.C. and those who are not, the position of the Secretary-Generals in the former often nearer to that of their colleagues in the affiliated unions which do not have representation on the N.T.U.C. central committee. There are important differences within N.T.U.C. unions with those Secretary-Generals without representation on N.T.U.C. central committee taking a more negative attitudinal position on most issues.

TABLE 6

MEAN SCORES OF TRADE UNION LEADERS ON A SCALE
OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS CO-OPERATIVES

Policy makers of N.T.U.C.	42.3
Affiliates represented on N.T.U.C. central committee	41.1
Affiliates not represented on N.T.U.C. central committee	39.4
Non-affiliates with intention of affiliation	36.4
Non-affiliates with no intention of affiliation	33.6

These various differences are not consistent across all issues; the greatest of them is between the N.T.U.C. policy makers and the affiliates with N.T.U.C. central committee representation, and the group of non-affiliates who have no intention of affiliating with the N.T.U.C. These differences are most severe on the issues of labor laws in Singapore, union responsibility for society, and rationale for modernization. They are less severe on the issues of co-operatives, the concept of modernization and the methods of modernization. The former issues have a greater ideological content and the latter are more related to action or strategy; clearly the former reflect traditional historical trade union differences in Singapore. These differences are not likely to disappear without radical changes in leadership and ideology. It is possible, however, that greater consensus among trade union leaders can be achieved in the area of strategy, since differences here are not as great as the ideological divisions. Given the impact of trade union history and the close, interdependent relationship between the N.T.U.C. and government, even the attainment of consensus concerning strategy may be difficult. Finally, it should be pointed out that nearly three-quarters of Singapore's labor force remains non-unionized; in the light of the differences pointed out above, a concerted organizational effort of this mass of workers will be difficult to mount and implement.

AGRARIAN REFORM COMMUNICATION: CONCEPTS AND METHODS

LEOTHINY S. CLAVEL

Introduction

THE WIDELY FELT NEED FOR AGRARIAN REFORM COMMUNICATION DERIVES from the trend that in many countries[1] agrarian reform is pursued as a goal and considered an indicator, of development.[2] Quite naturally, because of its strong capacity to spur societal progress, more and more governments[3] make agrarian reform one of their national policies.

Pushing agrarian reform toward development can enhance such need, as it may promote development once successfully communicated to the people it affects. It means that in a given communication situation, the people must not only be fed with the necessary information on agrarian reform, but with the necessary information fed to them, they must be moved to change for the better some, if not all of their agrarian ideas, outlook, values and attitudes.

To describe such process is the over-all aim of this paper.

Specifically, this paper deals with agrarian reform against the background of communication. It 1) discusses the nature of agrarian reform communication; 2) points out basic concepts from the social sciences that are relevant to such communication; and 3) describes some methods of agrarian reform communication.

Examples from Philippine experience will be given, whenever necessary, to illustrate the relationship between agrarian reform and communication.

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[1] Among these countries are the United Arab Republic, Colombia, Venezuela, Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines.

[2] The term "development" is here taken to mean what Peter Dorner views as "a process resulting in an improvement in levels of living for vast numbers of people at the bottom of the income distribution pyramid, a general decrease in poverty, a reduction in high rates of unemployment and underemployment, a greater equality in the distribution of income, more wide-spread participation by all groups in the economic and political affairs of the nation, as well as an increase in output and productivity." Cf. Peter Dorner, "Needed Redirections in Economic Analysis for Agricultural Development Policy," *The American Journal of Agricultural Economics,* Vol. LIII (February 1971), pp. 8-16.

[3] Governments of both developed (e.g., Japan) and developing (e.g., the Philippines) countries.

Nature of Agrarian Reform Communication

There are two key concepts subsumed under the term, "agrarian reform communication". These are *agrarian reform* and *communication.*

Agrarian reform, according to the United Nations, refers to the improvement in

> ...the institutional framework of agricultural production. It includes in the first place, land tenure, the legal or customary system under which land is owned; the distribution of ownership of farm property between large estates and peasant farms of various sizes; land tenancy, the system under which land is operated and its product divided between operator and owner; the organization of credit; production and marketing; the mechanism through which agriculture is financed; the burdens imposed on rural populations by governments in the form of taxation; and the services supplied by governments to rural populations, such as technical advice and educational facilities, health services, water supply and communication.[4]

Briefly, there is agrarian reform when the agrarian structure[5], or any of its components,[6] is improved.

Communication, on the other hand, is the transfer of information from one individual to another through the use of symbols.[7] Theoretically, after the latter individual (the receiver of the message) has received the information, he experiences a change in his ideas, values and/or attitudes. And it happens mainly because the former (the source) had sought this change. As Berlo says:

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[4] United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Land Reform: Defects in Agrarian Structure as Obstacles to Economic Development* (New York: The United Nations, 1951), pp. 4-5.

[5] In this paper, agrarian structure is defined as the arrangement or interrelation of all the components of a human organization based on land and man's relations with it, that exists within social limits in a given territory. It is, according to the United Nations, that "complex of institutions with interconnecting sets of relationships between tenure structure, production structure and structure of supporting services, and other related rural institutions each constituting an integral part of the wider whole." Cf. United Nations, *Progress in Land Reform,* fifth report, Vol. 1 (New York: The United Nations, 1970), pp. 30-31; also see Vol. III of the same report, p. 303.

[6] Its major components are the *land,* the *people* who have relations with it, the *technology* they use, the people's *institutional* (social, economic, religious, political, cultural) *practices* as these relate to the land, and the *symbolic means* (e.g., language) they use in associating, communicating and interacting with one another. For a discussion of these components, see my paper mentioned in footnote 31.

[7] For further discussion see David K. Berlo, *The Process of Communication* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960); Colin Cherry, *On Human Communication* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1957); Wilbur Schramm, *The Science of Human Communication* (New York and London: Basic Books, Inc., 1963); Edwin Emery, Philip H. Ault and Warren K. Agee, *Introduction to Mass Communications* (New York and Toronto: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1960); Edward T. Hall, *The Silent Language* (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1959); and Leothiny S. Clavel, "Anthropology and Mass Communication: Synthesis and Symbiosis," in Mario D. Zamora and Zeus A. Salazar, eds., *Anthropology: Range and Relevance* (Quezon City: Kayumanggi Publishers, 1969).

> Our basic purpose in communication is to become an affecting agent, to affect others, a determining agent, to have a vote in how things are. *In short, we communicate to influence -- to affect with intent.*[8]

Considering the above definitions, agrarian reform communication means the process of transmitting and receiving ideas, values or attitudes which aim at or result in any improvement in the agrarian structure. It is the flow of a *message* (information) from a *source* through a *channel* (means) toward an intended *receiver* (audience), that seeks to correct certain defects in the agricultural frame of production.

In an agrarian reform communication situation, the source of a message may be a government agency working for agrarian reform, a public official, an extension worker, a journalist, or the like. Contents of the message include ideas about land tenure; land tenancy; credit, taxation and marketing with respect to agricultural productivity; cooperatives; and social services aimed at improving the agrarian structure. Channel may be the vocal chord, a radio or a TV station, a printed page, or a movie. The receiver may be anybody or any group belonging to an agrarian community; for example, the tenants or the landlords.

This means that agrarian reform communication may be carried out on the level of either mass or face-to-face communication. On the level of mass communication, agrarian reform communication uses the mass media, such as the press, radio, television and cinema, and is directed to a mass audience in an agrarian community. On the level of face-to-face communication, it is conducted through the use of such physical faculties as speech, gestures, and other bodily means of communication. In contrast to the level of mass communication, there is on this level some personal contact between the source and the receiver.

Proceeding from the Source-Message-Channel-Receiver Model, agrarian reform communication, when successful, is characterized by several conditions. Theoretically, when the source and the receiver belong to the same culture, have more or less the same levels of knowledge, are governed by the same social system, pay the same amount of attention to the message, and possess the same communication skills,[9] agrarian reform communication will most probably be understood by the receiver This understanding may lead him to action (feedback), and if his action is in the direction predetermined by the source, the communication, it may be said, is successful. Its success depends for the main part on the ability of the source of a given message to influence the thinking or action of the receiver.

Let us take, for example, a radio announcer in the Philippines who, on his radio program, tells a specific group consisting of farmers to

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[8] Berlo, *op. cit.,* p. 11.
[9] *Ibid.*

affiliate themselves with the cooperatives of their respective places. In so doing, he must choose a language that is intelligible to the listening farmers and words that suggest respect for them, because in Philippine culture smooth interpersonal communication is fostered by respect words. He should use, as is usually done, such phrase as "*Ang inyong abang lingkod*" (Your humble servant) and such words as "*po*" and "*ho*" which heavily imply the connotations of the English "Sir" and "Madam".

In this example, we have the radio announcer as the source of the message, the message which states that farmers should join certain cooperatives, the radio as the channel, and the listening farmers as the receivers.[10] The announcer's speaking behavior is influenced by Philippine culture in terms of its norms regarding smooth interpersonal communication. But while he adapts his speaking behavior to the kind of message he communicates, the message necessarily has to adapt also to the intelligence and personality of its receivers by seeing to it that it is not beyond their comprehension. The choice of the radio as the channel is an adaptation, too. It is so chosen because, unlike the newspapers, magazines, television and cinema, it can reach many farmers, including those in the remote areas.

The communication just described may yet succeed, partly because the announcer and the listening farmers belong to the same culture and social system. The manner of the announcer's speech is influenced by the culture and the social system; but as the manner of speaking[11] is widely observed, his message can be understood by the farmers to whose intelligence and personality its degree of difficulty has been adapted. The communication succeeds as the farmers join the cooperatives he refers to.

Agrarian reform communication is an example of development communication, which is concerned with the institutions and forms in which messages that aim to bring about development are transmitted and received. As development communication, its serves its own purpose when it results, in addition to the growth of a nation's agricultural strength, in political stability, higher per capita income, and social and cultural integration, among other occurrences. These particular and other related occurrences decisively influence one another as a result of such communication.

In clearer terms, agrarian reform communication must, from the point of view of politics, be in accordance with the objectives of power and government; it must, ideally, contribute to the perpetuation of power and government. From the point of view of economics, it must help bring about

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[10] For discussion purposes, we assume that the audience is composed of farmers. Actually, this may be an incorrect assumption, since the audience may also include non-farmers.

[11] The manner of speaking, in the example, can attract and maintain the listeners' attention, a factor that contributes to the success of the given communication.

greater agricultural production, improved marketing facilities, stronger
social services system, and better definition of property as it relates to
the agrarian structure. From that of traditional culture, it must pro-
mote the introduction of necessary innovations as long as these are com-
patible with the institutions and customs of those people who should be co-
vered by them. Otherwise, it must engage in a viable and appropriate
information campaign to prepare the people for the innovations: this is,
above all, to ensure social and cultural cohesiveness.

Agrarian reform communication, in short, does not directly effect —
it simply helps bring about — physical or quantitative changes, such as
greater agricultural productivity. The changes it causes are qualitative
in nature, and they usually come as modifications in existing attitudes,
values, motivations, and ideas.

Basic Conceptual Tools

Practitioners[12] in the field of agrarian reform communication should
be equipped with basic knowledge of cultural and human behaviors.
For lending itself as some reference point to their thinking regarding
agrarian reform, this knowledge will enable them to understand their
roles and limitations as communicators in a given agrarian reform com-
munication situation. With it, also, they may be able to determine how
and to what extent they may create the public opinions they desire,
since it can suggest to them the possible responses of people to specific
informational and/or motivational communications, like agrarian reform
communication.

A practitioner should be aware of this knowledge, because it can
constitute the theoretical framework within which he may solve problems,
plan programs and create new ideas as all these — problems, programs
and ideas — address themselves to agrarian reform. But while the theo-
retical framework can guide his thinking and, on analysis, his actions based
on his ideas, there is still need for extensive gathering of data on the results
of his actions to confirm the validity and firmness of the framework.

Actions are related to communication as they affect or indicate
its meaning. In operational terms, actions carry messages with them;
or better still, actions may be or are messages themselves, as those who
see or witness them react to them in some way.

In short, when a practitioner is testing for himself the validity of his
theoretical framework, he may give out "actions-messages" that aim
to elicit some response from people. Conceivably, he should be able
to identify and understand this response to the degree that he may use

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12 They include extension workers, policy-makers, classroom teachers, mass
communicators and researchers who promote the idea of and work for agrarian
reform.

it to determine whether his communication (i.e., through actions) has been a success or a failure.

All this implies that while performing one's duties as communicator, one should be guided by certain conceptual tools from the time the process of communication begins until it ends, or, in some cases, until it leads to a new start of that process. The agrarian reform communicator, in effect, does not only need to know the basic concepts that will help him communicate most effectively; he should also determine how these concepts stand or appear with the results of communications based on them. This determined, he can somehow understand how, where, when and why these concepts may influence his future communication.

The seven basic concepts from the social sciences that will be pointed out in this section must serve as mere guide to practitioners in the field of agrarian reform communication. Since their usefulness depends on their applicability to specific situations, they should not be taken as the only framework within which practitioners may form their ideas in agrarian reform communication situations.

The first and apparently the most important of these concepts is *culture*. It is likely to be so, because agrarian reform communication is undertaken within and by way of culture.

Culture refers to the way of life of a people in a given place at a given time[13]. Its five categories, Beals and Hoijer[14] say, are: 1) *technology,* the ways of behaving by means of which men use natural resources to meet their various needs; 2) *economics,* the patterns of behaving and the resultant organization of society with respect to the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services; 3) *social organization,* the ways of behaving and the resultant organization of society relative to the preservation of smooth and harmonious relations between individuals and groups within a society or its segments and other societies; 4) *religion,* the patterns of behaving relative to man's relations to supernatural beings; and 5) *symbolic culture,* the systems of symbols and the techniques of using them, that are operant in the transmission of knowledge.

The concept of culture in relation to agrarian reform communication deserves a lengthy treatise, and any paper of the same scope and objectives as the present one cannot give justice to the discussion of it (the concept). Besides, to my knowledge, there has been no substantial study on the relationship between culture and agrarian reform communication. Even the discussion here of their relationship is largely theoretical in nature and in approach.

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[13] For more definitions of culture see A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions* (Cambridge, Massachusetts; Peabody Museum, 1952).

[14] Ralph L. Beals and H. Hoijer, *An Introduction to Anthropology* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965).

Under the concept of culture, agrarian reform communication is at any instant a cultural reality. It may be about specific agrarian ideas, values or attitudes being transmitted to affect the "technology", "economics", "social organization", "religion", and/or the 'symbolic culture" of an agrarian group. It necessarily has to exist in culture, since it is here where it acquires meaning and results. It is a cultural phenomenon brought about by people for people under limitations imposed by widely recognized norms of behavior.

To clarify the influence of culture and agrarian reform communication on each other let us take the case of a tenant I met in Capiz, a province in Central Philippines, during my research in 1970 on the ethnography of the place.

The tenant referred to was illiterate and had worked under a very influential landlords for more than twenty-five years. During my interview with him about traditional agriculture, I asked him whether he would like to own the land he tilled if Government gave him a chance to own it. He said "yes" without hesitation but on second thought, he changed his answer to a negative one.

In support of his second answer, the tenant said he could not afford to see his landlord landless, because the latter had been very kind to him: the landlord financially helped him when his wife gave birth to their three sons and two daughters, when he or anybody in his family got sick and when his three sons got married. But he was convinced that his owning the land could result in some improvement in his socio-economic life. For while he was confident he would be recognized in social circles as a landowner, a respected status in Capiz, he believed he could increase his income.

Yet, he was not sure, he added, whether his landlord would be willing to dispense with the land. Since the latter inherited it from his (the landlord's) parents, he thought it was significant to the landlord, it having more than just financial value.

Apparently to the land was attached some "sentimental" value as by the property the landlord could remember his dead parents, who provided for him out of the produce of the land.

I, then, did not pay much attention to the tenant's answer. But as I recalled them while writing this paper I realized that the tenant indirectly stated two variables to consider in communicating agrarian reform to him. Briefly, these are *attitude*[15] and *value*[16].

The attitude concerned was the tenant's unwillingness to own the land he tilled because it was actually owned by someone to whom he

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[15] Here, "attitude" refers to the manner of thinking, feeling and/or acting that indicates one's opinion, mood or inclination regarding a fact or state.

[16] By "value" is here meant a standard of behavior that is considered ideal by a people and that governs their thinking, feeling and/or acting in social situations.

had to demonstrate what the Capiceños call *utang nga kabalaslan* "(debt of reciprocal favor"). The value involved was *utang nga kabalaslan* itself which is one's moral and social obligation to reciprocate, at the present or in the future, the favors and graces one has received from another.[17]

Operationally, in communicating agrarian reform to the tenant one should aim at changing the above-mentioned attitude and value. The tenant's attitude should be changed to one with which he becomes predisposed to use all acceptable means in an effort to own the land, primarily for this reason: That he should own the land he tills because it is in line with the societal goal of achieving social equity and that because he is the one who exerts most or all of the physical efforts needed in production.

Meanwhile, the *utang nga kabalaslan* value worked on the tenant in a rather indirect manner. He did not want to own the land he tilled, because he had some *utang nga kabalaslan* to his landlord which he had not yet "paid" by equally returning the favors the latter had granted him. In real terms, he simply did not like to displease his landlord. It is culturally observed, in Capiz, that one should not think ill of or do harm to another who has done him a favor; otherwise, one will be regarded as some kind of a traitor and therefore unworthy of his fellowmen's respect.[18]

In this regard, the appropriate agrarian reform communication should make it clear to the tenant that *utang nga kabalaslan* can be "paid" in some other way, such as providing the landlord with manpower for free whenever he needs it; and that the Philippine Government, which works for agrarian reform, will help in seeing to it that the landlord is reasonably paid for the land the tenant may own.[19] Of course, there are other ideas that should be communicated in addition to the ones already discussed, and these include the argument that by making him ownercultivator he may be able to improve his socio-economic conditions and, as he achieves greater productivity, to contribute to economic development.

In sum, the relationship between culture and agrarian reform communication may be generally expressed as follows: While culture determines the nature of the kind of agrarian reform communication that will succeed in it, agrarian reform communication can direct the changes that will occur in culture.

By implying or alluding to it we have indicated, too, the concept of *change*, the second one to be described. Technically, change is a departure from the status quo and in view of agrarian reform communica-

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[17] Cf. Leothiny S. Clavel, "Folklore and Communication," *Asian Studies*, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (August 1970), pp. 221-222.

[18] Cf. Leothiny S. Clavel, *The Oral Literature of Capiz* (Quezon City: Fely L. Villareal, 1972).

[19] Cf. the Philippines' Republic Act No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code.

tion it means a modification in existing attitudes, values, ideas, or motivations.

The agrarian reform communicator's knowledge of the concept of change will suggest to him that some qualitative variation of attitudes, values, ideas, or motivations is inevitable as he effectively transmits his message to his audience. To a great measure, the type of variation that occurs can indicate whether or not he has succeeded in the transmission. He has succeeded if the type coincides with that which he had preconceived for the audience to experience; and not, if the contrary. Thus, there is change, when the farmer who had earlier refused to use fertilizers on his crops, decides to use them after an agrarian reform communicator has promoted application of same to bring about bigger productivity.

The third concept we will consider is the theory of *coqnitive dissonance*. This theory maintains that man always rationalizes for his behavior[20] and that he tends to make his attitude and behavior consistent.[21] It may be illustrated, thus: A farmer buys X fertilizer fully believing it is the best one. Then, a friend tells him, later, that Y fertilizer is actually better than the one he had bought. Granted that he trusts his friend's opinion, he will soon experience cognitive dissonance. To justify his buying X fertilizer, he will gather more information on the fertilizer, such as its price compared to those of the other fertilizers, its effectiveness and institutional prestige, and use this knowledge to support his argument that may run something like this: That as far as he knows — and he can prove his point — X fertilizer is more efficacious than Y. He will hold that his decision to buy X fertilizer was correct and, despite his friend's claim, his liking for (i.e., attitude toward) it does not change. So, he makes his attitude conform with his behavior (ie., buying X fertilizer).

Cognitive dissonance, in the context of agrarian reform communication, results from some information-giving situation that leads to some information-seeking situation. The former situation is created by the source of a message and the latter, by its receiver. Cognitive dissonance is experienced by the latter, in that as the target of the message he is the one being urged to change attitudes, values, ideas and/or motivations.

The fourth concept related to agrarian reform communication is the *reinforcement* theory, which proposes that people may change

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[20] Elliot Aronson, "Dissonance Theory: Progress and Problems," in Robert Abelson *et. al., Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1968). Cited in Cesar M. Mercado, "Communication Strategies and their Impact on Launching the 1967 'Green Revolution' in the Philippines," *Philippine Journal of Communication Studies,* Vol. 1, No. 1 (September, 1971), pp. 25-43.

[21] Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Evanston, Illinois: Row Peterson, 1957). Cited in Mercado, *op. cit.*

their attitudes and behavior owing to reinforcement or reward[22]
This means that change in attitude and in behavior will be promoted
by certain benefits (rewards) and that the larger the benefits are,
the bigger is the possibility that the change will follow.

In his study on the "Green Revolution" program in the Philip-
pines, Mercado[23] pointed out how the reinforcement theory explained
the farmers' acceptance of IR-8 or, as is popularly called, the "Miracle
Rice". He said that once a farmer observed that IR-8 could turn
out a high yield (a reward) he would most likely accept and plant it.
The high yield was enough incentive for him to try it.

Agrarian reform communication can use this theory in its attempt
to persuade people to accept the program of agrarian reform. Applying
this theory, it must put across people affected by the program, the mes-
sage that agrarian reform will reward them with, among other bene-
fits, greater productivity, better income distribution and high employ-
ment.[24] The message must spell and stress these benefits.

The theory of *diffusion,* the fifth concept in our discussion, may
indicate the proposition that an agrarian reform message can spread
from a given point to another one or more in a given territory or group
of territories. By diffusion is meant the "transfer of culture elements
from one society to another",[25] and in agrarian reform communication
situations, the element that "moves" or will "move" is the message
(idea, value or attitude) being transmitted.

Thus, the message that is transmitted by, say, an extension work-
er may reach a farmer who may, in turn, transmit it to his fellow
farmers. This spread is, technically, brought about by word-of-mouth
communication.

It is possible, though, that the message will reach as many people,
initially as a result of mass communication. On a radio program, for
example, it is communicated that tenants in the Philippines will final-
ly become owners of the lands they till. Here, the radio station serves
as the source of the message. Let us assume that a tenant hears the
announcement and decides to inform his tenant friends about it. This
tenant becomes, in effect, another source; and as the other tenants
communicate this announcement to many others, they, in turn, cons-
titute another source of the same message — and the process may go

[22] Chester A. Insko, *Theories of Attitude Change* (New York: Appleton-
Century Crofts, 1967). Cited in Mercado, *op. cit.*

[23] Mercado, *op cit.*

[24] Cf. P. Dorner and D. Kanel, "The Economic Case for Land Reform: Em-
ployment, Income Distribution and Productivity," in P. Dorner, ed., *Land Reform
in Latin America: Issues and Cases* (Madison: Land Tenure Center, University of
Wisconsin, 1971), pp. 41-56.

[25] Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man: An Introduction* (New York: Apple-Cen-
tury-Crofts, 1936), p. 324.

on as long as possible. The fact that the number of new sources
of the same information increases indicates diffusion.

The agrarian reform communicator who understands the theory
of diffusion should expect that once he transmits a message it can pos-
sibly pass on one after another, since each person is a potential "message
center" from which it may spread out.

In folk culture,[26] there are at least three considerations to take when
communicating an agrarian reform message to tenants. Generally, a mes-
sage that seeks to be easily understood must be 1) communicated on the
folk level of communication; 2) compatible with the local lores; and 3) so
composed as to contain folkloristic ideas. This is what I call the theory
of folklore and communication,[27] the sixth concept to be explained.

The folk level of communication, as I said elsewhere,

> ...refers to the degree of difficulty of a given message or messages
> beyond which said message or messages are unintelligible and meaningless
> to the average member of a folk culture. It may also mean the over-all
> success in conveying to the average member of a folk culture, any symbols,
> such as signs, signals, words and other sounds, etc., whose meanings and cul-
> tural implications are determined by customs and traditions rather than by
> any scholastic or academic learning and understanding. Beyond this level,
> no message is easily understood by the folk, for such message must be a
> product of an intellectual culture, or because the channel through which the
> message is transmitted is incomprehensible to the folk. The insufficient ability
> of the source of the message to express his ideas may also contribute to the fail-
> ure of communication.[28]

The compatibility of a given message with folk knowledge in a given
folk society can ensure not only its "understandable-ness" but also its
easy acceptability. While the message does not discredit that knowledge,
it can, in fact, reinforce the society's adherence to or support for it. In
the course of time the message can become part of the local folklore as
it is transmitted from one generation to another.

The rate at which the message may be understood in a folk culture
may be increased, further, if the message itself contains folkloristic ideas.
The folk may react favorably to such ideas, since these are altogether
considered to be near sacred, if not definitely sacred. Culturally, the
"sacredness" of the ideas lies in the fact that these were thought out by
their forefathers and have been tested through several generations. The
usual argument is that the ideas still exist because they have been found

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[26] Folk culture refers to the way of life of a people whose thoughts and behaviors
are largely, if not wholly, predetermined by traditions, centuries-old institutions,
and customs.

[27] Cf. Leothiny S. Clavel, "Folklore and Communication," *op. cit.*, pp. 221-222.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 232.

to be "truthful" and useful; if they are fictitious and erratic, the folk could have just discarded them in the past.

In view of the theory of folklore and communication, the agrarian reform communicator's target receiver of his message in a folk culture must be the culture's average member. He should aim at communicating to him because at the time of communication, he probably does not have any reliable idea as to whether he will be understood by all of the remaining members. It is thus required of him to know the characteristics of the average member, so that he can suit the nature and degree of difficulty of his message to the member's intelligence and behavior.

Also, since folklore predetermines to a large extent the member's ideas and actions,[29] the agrarian reform communicator should, before communicating to him, know the functions, content and meaning of folklore in the former's culture and society. A message based on this knowledge will possibly be acceptable to the member. If the message is compatible with the local lores, its *integration* into the thinking of the folk who understand it can even happen.

Anthropologically, integration, which is the seventh and the last concept to be mentioned, means the "progressive development of more and more perfect adjustments between the various elements which compose the total culture."[30] Using this concept in agrarian reform communication, it suggests 1) that any idea, product or institution that is successfully sold by agrarian reform communication will constitute part of one's knowledge, and 2) that that idea, product or institution does not supplant preëxisting ideas, products or institutions if it is compatible with them, in fact it will continuously adjust with them in an attempt either to complement or to reinforce them.

For example, in the light of this concept, the idea which the aforementioned Capiceño tenant may learn of his having to own the land he tills to improve his socio-economic life, should reinforce his desire to achieve greater production as when he has actually owned it. Theoretically, he will, as has been pointed out, repulse this idea, if he finds it incompatible with his attitude and value regarding the prospect of owning the land dear to his landlord. But the idea, now constituting part of his total knowledge, can affect his behavior within the agrarian structure as it finds some purpose: Perhaps it could somehow satisfy his psychological need of determining some solution to his problem of improving his socio-economic life. He could not just, as a result, forget the idea, although it offends his values.

The seven concepts so far discussed are not the only ones an agrarian reform communicator should know; there are still many others, such as

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[29] Cf. William R. Bascom, "Four Functions of Folklore," in Alan Dundes, ed., *The Study of Folklore* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965); and Maria Leach. *Dictionary of Mythology and Folklore,* 2 vols. (New York: Funk and Wagnall's Company, 1949).

[30] Linton, *op. cit.*, p. 348.

the economic law of diminishing returns;[31] the anthropological concepts of cultural patterns, acculturation and functionalism;[32] the psychological theories of learning and motivation,[33] and the sociological concepts of ethnocentrism and stereotypes.[34] Owing to space limitations, these related concepts, although useful to the agrarian reform communicator, are not, however, discussed here. In this paper special stress is placed, only on seven concepts that are, to my mind, basic in understanding the nature and influence of agrarian reform communication.

Communication Methods

Communication method refers to the procedure and techniques involved in the transmission of a given information. Mercado calls it "communication strategy".[35]

Based on Philippine experience, there are two communication methods or strategies with respect to directed change, such as agrarian reform. These are *persuasion* and *compulsion*. In his study on the "Green Revolution" program in forty-four barrios in Albay, a Philippine province, Mercado explained these methods or strategies as follows:

> Persuasion may be defined as a process of changing a person's or a group's attitude through reason, hoping that the behavior desired by the communicator will follow. Farm and home visits, method demonstrations, result demonstrations, farmers' meetings, rice seminars, field trips, the use of various media such as radio, newspaper, magazine to promote the first "Miracle Rice" were examples of persuasive techniques.
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> Compulsion may be defined as a process of directly changing a person's or group's behavior toward the direction desired by the communicator through the use of reward or punishment. This strategy included the policy of agricultural credit agencies to give loans only to farmers who promised to plant IR-8 and other recommended rice varieties. The other techniques employed by some landlords were giving planting materials to tenants who did not like to plant IR-8, threatening some tenants with ejection from their farms if they would not plant IR-8, promising to handle the initial expenses for planting, fertilizing and weeding if the tenants planted IR-8, and promising to pay for the number of cavans that would fall short of the expected harvest.[36]

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[31] For a discussion on how this concept may be related to agrarian reform communication, see my paper, "Some Social, Cultural and Psychological Considerations in Agrarian Reform," which I will deliver before college and university professors in agrarian reform at the Regional Seminar on Agrarian Reform on May 18, 1973 in Iloilo City, Philippines.

[32] My paper, " Some Social, Cultural and Psychological Considerations in Agrarian Reform," discusses these concepts in relation to agrarian reform.

[33] Illustrations of the concepts as these relate to agrarian reform are given in my paper cited in the preceding footnote.

[34] These concepts in the context of agrarian reform communication are briefly discussed in the paper mentioned in footnotes 31, 32 and 33.

[35] Mercado, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-30.

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

In other words, the first method is used when communication seeks to "change a person's or group's attitude through reason", so that the desired behavioral change will take place. It assumes that "attitudinal change directs behavioral change."[37]

The second method is, in contrast, based on the assumption that "behavioral change directs attitudinal change".[38] In using it, the communicator's aim is to change a person's or group's behavior, thinking that the changing will result in a corresponding attitudinal change.

Specifically, Mercado's study wanted to determine which of the two methods or strategies "tended to be more effective in changing the attitude and behavior of the farmers toward the new rice varieties [i.e., IR varieties] and the accompanying cultural practices."[39] Its results can offer the agrarian reform communicator some idea on what method or strategy to use in a given communication situation. Summarizing these, Mercado reported that

> ... the compulsion strategy seemed more effective than the persuasion strategy in jolting the farmer respondents to follow cultural practices needed by IR-8. It seemed to be as effective as the persuasion strategy in convincing farmers to adopt IR-8 and other IR varieties.
> ... compulsion seems to be a promising communication strategy for meeting crucial problems such as rice shortage.[40]

In all, Mercado's study suggests that compulsive communication can draw the wanted feedback from Filipino farmers. Therefore, the agrarian reform communicator who should get some hint from this, may, whenever possible, make his message compulsive to get utmost results.

Although in the Philippines still untried in the field of agrarian reform communication, a third communication method seems probable and this may be the combination of the two. We may call it the compulsive-persuasive method, for lack of a better term.

The compulsive-persuasive method is one by which a person's or group's behavior and attitude are changed at the same time through the use of force and reason, so that the desired attitude and behavior will come about. It is based on the assumption that attitude and behavior can change and correspond with each other at the same time.

One example illustrating this method is the compulsory primary education in the Philippines. The studying citizens, while compelled, are actually persuaded at the same time to support and finish it, the common reason being that it will help them meet the demands of an intellectual society and of an enlightened citizenry. The direct punishment of those who fail to complete it is that they cannot proceed to high

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[37] *Ibid.*, p. 26.
[38] *Ibid., loc. cit.*
[39] *Ibid., loc. cit.*
[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43.

school and college; conversely, the reward of those who complete it is their resultant qualification to proceed to these levels of education. Besides, people may take for granted those who have not gone to school or those who cannot read and write. In this case, the use of compulsion is at the same time being justified or made to appear reasonable because it is necessary and beneficial. The aim in all this effort is to lead one to like (attitude) and undertake (behavior) primary education.

In agrarian reform communication situations, this method may be used when implementing certain agrarian reform laws or policies. For example, if a government expropriates a landlord's large estates owing to an agrarian reform law it should, also, make him understand the reason for it. So, the appropriate agrarian reform communication should compel him to observe the law. At the same time, however, it should explain to him the rationale behind the expropriation and, finally, motivate him to submit his estates for expropriation by, perhaps, giving him certain benefits in return. The communication method used is effective, if while in the beginning he was against expropriation (attitude) and was hampering or frustrating such effort (behavior), he, in the end, is actually for it (change in attitude) and will even help facilitate it (change in behavior). In this case, attitude and behavior change at the same time through the use of force and reason.

Despite the absence of studies on it, I would like to claim, based on the results of my researches into Philippine culture and society, that of the three methods discussed the compulsive-persuasive method will generally prove most effective in Philippine situations. In this vein, I believe that agrarian reform may be achieved if the people are compelled to accept it as a program of development, but with a great success on the part of the workers for such reform, in convincing them through the use of reason (persuasion) as to its importance and meaning to national progress. The Filipinos respect legitimate force and authority, and so I maintain that any directed change that uses force and authority within the limits of reason will most likely succeed.

Where agrarian reform has to be communicated to specific audiences, any of the three methods may be used but the third one may be generally preferred in Philippine situations. The simple rule the agrarian reform communicator should observe, though, in choosing the appropriate method for his communication activities is, that he use the method which, in his judgment, will be most acceptable to his target audience and/or which is most practical under given circumstances. Oftentimes, if not always, his common sense must be his guide.

Table 1 shows the different audio-visual media the agrarian reform communicator may use under certain conditions — be he a radio or a TV announcer, an extension worker, a classroom teacher, a public official, a journalist, or an enlightened farmer. But just the same, he

should use the right media at the right time in the right place. His common sense, again, will be his practical guide.

So if a public official would like to communicate an agrarian reform message to tenants in places that cannot be reached by television, the cinema and the newspapers and magazines, he should use the radio. And an extension worker promoting agrarian reform may use the chalk board if the more sophisticated aids, such as a projector or a sound film, are not available.

Table 1

AUDIO-VISUAL MEDIA FOR AGRARIAN REFORM ACTION

A. *Aural*
  Phonograph
  Radio receiver
  Tape recorder

B. *Visual*

| Non-Projection | Projection | | Electronics |
	Still	Cinematic	
Chalk board	Opaque projector	Silent film (conventional)	Open circuit TV
Wall chart	Overhead projector	Silent cartridged loop film	Closed circuit TV
Adhesion board	Slide projector (manual)	Sound film	Radio
Flip book	Film strip projector (manual)	TV receiver	
Models	Automatic slide projector	Closed circuit	
Printed matters (newspapers, magazines, books, brochures, etc)			

Concluding Remarks

Any government hoping for the success of its agrarian reform project must implement a viable, sustained and effective program of agrarian reform communication. It is claimed that agrarian reform as a development goal may be achieved, if it is successfully communicated to the people it affects. The primary goal of agrarian reform communication is to

engage these people in improving the agrarian structure, or any of its components, in a given place.

The agrarian message in a given communication should not only be informational but motivational. If so, it can attain utmost communication results.

While agrarian reform communication may be carried out on both the mass and the face-to-face communication levels, the agrarian reform communicator should use his common sense in choosing and applying the appropriate audio-visual means and the methods of achieving successful communication. But in all cases there is no substitute for the actual gathering of data (research) on which he may actually base his choice and application. Also, before proceeding with his communication, he should know some concepts that will help him execute his duties most effectively.

The social responsibility of agrarian reform communication is immense as it influences individual thinking and action in the agrarian structure. This should altogether be realized by the agrarian reform communicator. For affecting individual behavior in that structure is directing, in the broad analysis, a truly decisive social change.

THE ATTITUDE OF INDONESIA TOWARDS THE JAPANESE PEACE TREATY

K.V. KESAVAN

PEACE SETTLEMENT WITH JAPAN WAS ONE OF THE EARLIEST FOREIGN policy subjects that drew the utmost attention of the newly independent non-aligned nations of Southeast Asia during 1950-52. As the question of formulating a peace treaty for Japan was largely governed by considerations of cold war politics, non-aligned Southeast Asian nations like Indonesia and Burma took a stand different from the one desired by the architects of the peace settlement. They refused to be drawn into the conflict between the two Power Blocs and preferred to consider the problem purely from the viewpoint of their national interests and national ideology. In terms of their national interests, they wanted adequate reparations from Japan and the guarantee for Japan's firm adherence to normal international practices in trade and fishing. In terms of their national ideology, they wanted a peace treaty that would be consistent with their independent foreign policy.

The attitude of Indonesia towards the Japanese peace settlement provides an interesting study. The majority of the Indonesians while being sympathetic towards Japan were keen on entering into a bilateral peace settlement with that country. On the contrary their Government under Premier Sukiman compelled by various reasons participated in the multilateral San Francisco Peace Conference, and signed the treaty drafted by the Western Block. But Sukiman's action did not have the sanction of the nation, and ultimately the will of the people for a bilateral peace treaty prevailed.

A cursory idea of the American policy towards the Japanese peace settlement is necessary for our study of the Indonesian attitude.[1] At the end of the war, the concept of Allied Occupation as embodied in the Potsdam Declaration, the Initial Post-Surrender Policy Directive and the Far Eastern Commission Policy Directive was restrictive in nature. During the initial years following 1945, the United States carried out the punitive phase of the Occupation true to the letter and spirit of these documents, and this created a good impression in the minds of those nations directly concerned with Japan. But soon, American policy

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[1] For a detailed study see George H. Blakeslee, *The Far Eastern Commission: A Study in International Cooperation 1945 to 1948* (Washington, 1953); Frederick S. Dunn, *Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan* (Princeton, 1963).

began to show signs of a basic change. This change was brought about
by economic considerations though strategic interests were not incon-
sistent with it. By 1948, there was a growing realisation on the part
of American statemen that it would not be advisable to keep Japan
in a state of economic and political surveillance, partly because they
believed that any such attempt would be contrary to the Occupation
objective of maintaining a viable economy in Japan and partly because
they were anxious to relieve themselves of the huge financial burden
involved in the Occupation. Constantly in the background was also
the consideration that communism posed a greater threat to the world
than Japan. This consideration gained overriding importance in American
strategic calculations after 1949. The success of the communists in
China in October 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in June
1950 compelled the United States not only to expedite the drafting of
the Japanese peace treaty, but also to think in terms of making Japan
a "bulwark against the rising tide of communism." Japan became what
the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson called a "vital link in the
defence perimeter" that ran from the Aleutians to the Philippines.[2]

Once the concept of peace crystallized, the United States made
vigorous attempts to give effect to it in a treaty. Having decided on
a "peace of reconciliation", she exerted the utmost pressure on her
Pacific Allies to accept it. She called upon them to show the same
degree of unity in peace-making as they had shown in waging the
war. She exhorted them to show a greater awareness of the new threat
which the Sino-Soviet bloc posed not only to them but also to Japan.
Dulles, the architect of the peace treaty, argued that it was imperative
to save Japan from falling a victim to the Communist Bloc because
he feared that a combination of the Soviet Union, Communist China
and Japan was fraught with dangers of the greatest dimensions for the
whole of the Pacific and the Southeast Asian region.[3] He sought to
bring Japan closer to the Southeast Asian region by means of a network
of security ties directed against Communism. His efforts succeeded only
partly, because, except the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, no
other nation in the region was enthusiastic about Dulles's security plans.
Even the above three countries had deep misgivings about Japan, while
entering into bilateral security pacts with the United States. Though
Dulles approached Indonesia also for support to his security arrangements,
he found the Indonesian response unfavourable. While Indonesia wel-

[2] "Crisis in Asia — An Examination of U.S. Policy", Address by U.S. Secretary
of State Dean Acheson on 23 January 1950. *Department of State Bulletin,* vol. 22,
no. 551, 23 January 1950, p. 115.
[3] "Laying the Foundations for a Pacific Peace", Address by J. F. Dulles, on
1 March 1951. *Department of State Bulletin,* vol. 24, no. 610, 12 March 1951,
p. 403.

comed the re-emergence of Japan as an independent nation, she did not want to get embroiled in cold-war politics.

A brief account of the nature of Indonesia's foreign policy is necessary for understanding the Indonesian attitude. Soon after attaining freedom in December 1949, Indonesia pursued an active and independent foreign policy which was meant to be a policy of peace and friendship with both Power Blocs on the basis of mutual friendship and non-interference.[4] Like India and Burma, she was confronted with the urgent task of nation-building, and wanted to direct all her energies towards building up economic and political stability in the country. She could not therefore afford the luxury of involving herself in cold-war politics. The task of national reconstruction entailed foreign assistance on a large scale. She took the decision of accepting technical, material and moral assistance from any country, provided such assistance did not involve the barter of her independence and sovereignty. The ideological orientation of Indonesia was similar to that of India and Burma, and there was a natural tendency for these countries to work together in the international sphere. The drafting of the Japanese peace treaty provided an opportunity for these three countries to discuss a common subject, and if possible to take a united stand. But in the end, Indonesia chose to sign the peace treaty, whereas India and Burma abstained.

Indonesia was not a member of the Far Eastern Commission and her attempts to join it did not materialise. The Netherlands by virtue of her fight against Japan during the Second World War held that seat.[5] This naturally deprived Indonesia of a forum to express her views on various matters affecting Japan. It was in September 1950 that Dulles for the first time conducted discussions on the treaty with the Indonesian delegation at the United Nations.[6]

From March 1951 onwards, when the prospects of a peace treaty had brightened, the Indonesian Government began to pay much thought to it. In April 1951, the Secretary-General of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry Dharmasathiawan declared, "Indonesia would prefer to sign a peace treaty in which all nations involved in the Pacific War against Japan would participate. He, however, added that if such a conference proved impossible, Indonesia would join in a "partial peace settlement" without the Soviet Union.[7] The Indonesian Government's

[4] For a detailed study see Dunning Idle IV, Indonesia's Independent and Active Foreign Policy (unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Yale, 1956). G. M. Kahin, "Indonesian Politics and Nationalism" in W. L. Holland, ed., Asian Nationalism and the West (New York, 1953). Also Mohammad Hatta, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs (New York), April 1953, pp. 441-52.

[5] Idle IV, op. cit., pp. 58-59.

[6] Dunn, op. cit., p. 109.

[7] See Report on Indonesia (Information office of the Republic of Indonesia, New York), 16 April 1951, p. 2.

thinking on the treaty was governed by two dominant considerations. One was that Japan should pay adequate reparations to Indonesia. The other was the rehabilitation of Japan. The Indonesian Government declared, "Japan is an Asiatic country which should be rehabilitated in the spirit of the U.N. Charter." It also wanted that the terms of such rehabilitation should be included in the peace treaty. It believed that the Japanese peace treaty should be formulated in such a way as to promote the cause of world peace. It observed, "In considering the issues of Japanese peace, we must study extensively those factors which in the long-run can guarantee world peace. We should not, in the expediency of a short-term policy, conclude a treaty with Japan which would only lead to various other crises later on."[8]

Anglo-American July Draft

Indonesia received the Anglo-American treaty draft on 20 July 1951, and after careful study, she made many suggestions, and wanted them to be included in the peace treaty as "factors deserving of special attention." These suggestions were: (a) that the treaty should clearly recognise the sovereignty of Japan over her territories, and waters; (b) that in order to ascertain the wishes of the people, a free plebiscite should be held in the areas taken away from Japan by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.; (c) that Indonesia should received fair and just reparations; (d) that the peace conference should provide for a full discussion on the final text of the treaty; and (e) the Chinese People's Republic, and the Soviet Union should also participate in the conference "in the interests of lessening tension in the Far East."[9]

But the final text of the peace treaty rejected Indonesia's suggestion for a plebiscite in the areas taken away from Japan by the United States and the Soviet Union. It also excluded the participation of Communist China in the Peace Conference. Indonesia's suggestion for a full discussion in the Conference on the terms of the treaty was also rejected. Her suggestion concerning the recognition of Japan's sovereignty over her territories and waters alone was accepted.[10] As regards reparations, the United States had to make certain modifications in the treaty in order to meet the demands not only of Indonesia but also of other Southeast Asian nations.[11]

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[8] *Ibid.*

[9] "The Japanese Peace Treaty", Indonesian Government's views on the July draft, issued on 6 August 1951. *Indonesian Review*, July/September 1951, pp. 290-91.

[10] See Chapter 1, Article 1(b) of the Peace Treaty. This particular article was included in the 1951 March draft, but omitted in the July draft. Indonesia wanted its inclusion.

[11] Especially the pressure brought on the U.S. by the Philippines proved decisive. For the Philippine attitude towards the Japanese Peace Treaty, see the author's recently published doctoral dissertation, *Japan's Relations with Southeast Asia 1952-60* (Bombay: Somaiya Publications Ltd., 1972), pp. 31-61.

On account of the rejection of the majority of the Indonesian sug-gestions, the Sukiman Government felt considerably embarrassed, and could not make up its mind whether it should attend the Conference. It therefore chose to follow a policy of "watchful waiting."

In the meantime, it evinced a keen interest in knowing the views of other Asian countries on the issue and even endeavoured to con-vene, in Rangoon, a conference of four nations — India, Burma, Pakistan and Indonesia.[12] But such a conference could not come through for want of time. It therefore suggested that the talks could be held in Jakarta after the publication of the final text of the treaty.[13] But the talks were never held. Only Indonesia and Burma conducted some discussion on the subject. On 8 August, the Indonesian Foreign Minister Ahmad Su-bardjo paid a visit to Rangoon to study the Burmese stand.[14] Though for a while it appeared that Burma and Indonesia could come to an agreement on the question, nothing concrete emerged from their talks.[15] This was because Burma was more influenced by the views of India than those of Indonesia. The Burmese Foreign Minister, Sao Hkun Hkio had visited New Delhi in the last week of July and held discussions with the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on the implications of the Japanese peace treaty.[16]

About 25 August, the stand taken by these three countries became clear. India and Burma declined the invitation to attend the Peace Con-ference, whereas Indonesia accepted it. But the decision to attend the Conference did not mean that Indonesia would automatically sign the peace treaty. The final decision was to be taken in the Conference in the light of "the political situation", with the approval of the Jakarta Government.[17]

In the San Francisco Peace Conference, the Indonesian Foreign Minister Ahmad Subardjo wanted to make amendments to certain clauses of the peace treaty. But the Conference did not permit any amendment. Hence the Indonesian statesman remained content only with making known the wishes of his country on certain subjects.

On reparations, Indonesia proposed that Japan should render assistance to the Allied countries.

(a) by making available the skills and industry of the Japanese people for the interest of the Allied Powers in question, in manufacturing,

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[12] See Secretary-General Dharmasathiawan's statement, Nation (Rangoon), 6 August 1951.

[13] Ibid. Also "South Asia Resists Tokyo Pact Draft", New York Times, 5 August 1951.

[14] New York Times, 9 August 1951.

[15] See Mohammad Yamin's statement. Yamin went to Rangoon with Subardjo. Ibid., 13 August 1951.

[16] See the editorial, "The Japanese Peace Treaty", Nation, 29 July 1951.

[17] Report on Indonesia, 28 August 1951, p. 7.

salvaging and other services to be rendered to the Allied Powers in question;

(b) by paying all expenditures incurred by the consignment of raw materials which will be made available by the Allied Powers for the manufacturing of goods in (a);

(c) by making available such goods as machinery, and workshops required for the reconstruction of the Allied Powers so desiring;

(d) by making available technicians required by the Allied Powers so desiring;

(e) by giving opportunity for trainees to work in Japan; and

(f) in conjunction with the suffering of the nationals of the Allied Powers during the war, by making funds available to mitigate the suffering.

Thus, Indonesia's terms on the form of reparations were much broader than those stipulated in Article 14 of the peace treaty.[19]

With regard to fisheries (Article 9), Indonesia wanted Tokyo to enter into a bilateral agreement with her and argued that pending the signing of such an agrement, Japan could fish in the seas "between and surrounding" the Indonesian Islands only after obtaining special permission. Indonesia also sought to make an amendment to Article 12 to the effect that Japan would strictly observe "internationally accepted fair practices" in public and private trade and commerce.[20]

As we have already noted, the Conference did not permit any amendments and therefore Indonesia demanded positive guarantees from Japan that she would promptly enter into bilateral negotiations with her for the conclusion of satisfactory agreements on reparations and fishing. Premier Yoshida Shigeru in his private talks with the Indonesian delegation at San Francisco gave both oral and written assurances that Japan would carry out her obligations in "good faith", and "flexibly interpret" Articles 14 and 9 of the treaty. This resolved the Indonesian scepticism considerably and induced Subardjo to sign the treaty[21]

The signing of the treaty stirred up a political controversy in Indonesia, and parties like the Indonesian National Party, the Socialist Party and the Communist Party vigorously criticised the action of the Government for two reasons. They argued that Indonesia ought to have rejected the treaty as it did not incorporate the suggestion made by

    [18] Foreign Minister Ahmad Subardjo's speech in the San Francisco Peace Conference, *Provisional Verbatim Minutes of the Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 1951), p. 253.

    [19] Article 14 a para (1) said that Japan would make available "the services of the Japanese people in production, salvaging and other work for the Allied Powers in question."

    [20] *Ibid.*, pp. 252-53.

    [21] See Yoshida's reply to Subardjo in the Peace Conference, *Provisional Verbatim Minutes*, p. 329; also "Indonesia Achieving the Utmost at the San Francisco Conference", *Indonesian Review* (Jakarta), October-December 1951, pp. 424-25.

the Government. They further contended that by signing the treaty, Indonesia had violated her active and independent foreign policy. The correct attitude, they pointed out, "would have been to send no delegation to San Francisco."[22] Soetan Sjahrir, the former Indonesian Prime Minister was nearer truth when he said in New Delhi on 23 September 1951 that the differences between India and Indonesia on the peace treaty were unfortunate and that a large section of people in Indonesia "appreciated India's viewpoint in this matter."[23]

Opposition to the signing of the treaty also came from the powerful Natsir group within Premier Sukiman's Masjumi Party. The Natsir group feared that the peace treaty had imposed certain economic and political limitations on Japan and that the Japanese people in future would try to liberate themselves from these restrictions. The Natsir group however fully sympathised with Japan's right to enter the comity of free nations, but advocated that Indonesia should enter into a bilateral peace treaty with Japan.[24]

It is also interesting to note the extent to which the party was sharply divided on the question. The Masjumi Party's National Executive discussed the question in the first week of September and finally decided on 6 September in favour of signing the treaty. The voting in the Party Executive was 17 in favour, and 14 against with 2 abstentions. It should be pointed out that out of the total 60 members of the Executive, only 33 took part in the voting. Hence the final decision of the Party represented only the wishes of a minority.[25] This greatly weakened the position of Premier Sukiman.

Yet another factor that weakened the position of the Sukiman Cabinet was the attitude of the Indonesian National Party (PNI). Sukiman's was a coalition cabinet in which the PNI held five out of its total sixteen posts. On 7 September the PNI took the decision of opposing the signing of the treaty. On the same day the Sukiman Cabinet also considered the question and finally decided to sign the treaty. The voting in the Cabinet was 10 in favour and 6 against. The Masjumi, PIR, Catholic and Democratic ministers and the non-party member Djuanda supported it while it was opposed by the PNI and the Labour Party.[26] With the Masjumi Party itself sharply divided, not only did the ratification of the treaty appear impossible, but the

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[22] "Parliamentary Circles on the Conference", *Report on Indonesia*, 7 September 1951, p. 2.

[23] *Japan Times* (Tokyo), 25 September 1951.

[24] See Noer Deliar, Masjumi: Its Organisation, Ideology, Political Role in Indonesia (unpublished M.A. thesis, Cornell, 1960), pp. 245-51.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 245. See also *Report on Indonesia*, 16 September 1951; Kahin, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-92.

[26] Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (New York, 1962), p. 196. See a good article in Japanese, "Indonesia no Seijo", *Sekai*, February 1952, pp. 15-19.

Cabinet itself faced a crisis. On 30 September, the PNI Executive Council, however, announced that though it would oppose the parliamentary ratification of the treaty, it would not withdraw its members from the Cabinet and precipitate a crisis.[27] This decision of the PNI saved the life of the Cabinet for the time being.

The Governmnt stand in favour of signing the treaty rested on certain grounds. First it did not agree with the opposition parties that the signing of the treaty meant the abandonment of Indonesia's active and independent foreign policy. It contended that an independent foreign policy did not mean "non-activity or neutralism." Premier Sukiman declared on 11 September that the Japanese peace treaty was "an attempt to establish a new structure of relationships in the Pacific" and that "it would become a reality with or without Indonesia's consent." He argued that, "whether or not Indonesia participates in such a treaty, she will be influenced directly or indirectly by this new structure in the political, economic, social and military fields. If we participate, we have the chance to utilise our position to our interests."[28]

As regards Indonesia's failure to toe the line of India, the Government stated that though Indonesia's foreign policy generally paralleled that of India, in the case of the Japanese peace treaty, the two policies differed, due to their respective national interests and geographical positions.[29] It even felt that if Indonesia had fallen in line with India, she would not have created goodwill among the participating countries.[30] It further observed that in the Peace Conference most of the Allied nations had shown a change of attitude towards Japan, and therefore it advised the Indonesian delegation at the Conference to sign the treaty. Foreign Minister Subardjo put it more effectively when he declared that "with the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty, Indonesia has strengthened her position in the international world; if we had not signed the treaty, we would have become isolated, lost prestige and suffered damage in our international relations."[31]

Yet another consideration that weighed with the Indonesian Government was the economic co-operation it hoped to build up with Japan. While it was aware of the "dangers of Japanese economic expansion", it refused to believe that "there is no hope to be gained from new Japan." It declared: "If MacArthur is right, and the Japanese people are well on the way to absorbing the attitudes of democracy, then it is surely the duty of all peace-loving nations to assist them. Japan cannot be either occupied or isolated for ever, and if other nations are

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[27] *Report on Indonesia,* 30 September 1951, p. 12.
[28] *Ibid.,* 29 October 1951, p. 3.
[29] *Ibid.,* 30 September 1951, p. 2.
[30] "Indonesia at the San Francisco Conference", *Indonesian Review,* October/December 1951, p. 375.
[31] *Report on Indonesia,* 30 September 1951, p. 2.

inclined to be watchful and vigilant, they can nevertheless see that certain advantages accrue to them in ending the Occupation and bringing the isolation to an end."[32]

Since the Sukiman Government anticipated stiff opposition to the ratification of the peace treaty in Parliament, it decided to conduct bilateral negotiations with Japan and settle the questions of reparations and fisheries. It thought of submitting this bilateral agreement along with the peace treaty to Parliament for ratification. It believed that such a course of action would pacify the opposition and facilitate ratification.[33] The bilateral negotiations started in December 1951 at Tokyo and the outcome of the talks provided the real key to the ratification of the peace treaty. Though an interim agreement was signed on 18 January 1952 between Indonesia and Japan on the form of reparations, they failed to come to any understanding on its amount.[34] Similarly, no agreement could be reached on the question of fisheries. Even the interim agreement on the form of reparations came in for scathing criticism in Indonesia.[35] Hence Premier Sukiman could not take any action on the Japanese peace treaty. In the meantime, there arose a controversy over the Government's action on the Mutual Security Aid Agreement with the United States which led to the downfall of the Sukiman Cabinet on 23 February 1952.

The fall of the Sukiman Cabinet brought about a basic change in the stand of Indonesia on the Japanese peace treaty. The Wilopo Cabinet which followed disapproved of the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and preferred a bilateral peace treaty with Japan.[36] As the interim reparations agreement of 18 January 1952 was based on the letter and spirit of the San Francisco peace treaty, its fate was also dealed. Hence both countries had to start the negotiations once again on an entirely new basis. Subsequent cabinets headed by Ali Sastroamidjojo, Harahap and Djuanda also pursued Wilopo's policy, and it was only in January 1958, following a satisfactory settlement of the reparations question that Indonesian Premier Djuanda and Japanese Premier Kishi Nobusuke signed a bilateral peace treaty leading to normalisation of diplomatic relations between the two nations.

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[32] "Indonesia and Peace Treaty with Japan", *Indonesian Affairs* (Ministry of Information, Jakarta), October/November 1951, p. 6.

[33] "The Question of Ratifying the Peace Treaty", *Report on Indonesia*, 11 October 1951, pp. 2-3.

[34] "Indonesia and Japan Sign the Interim Agreement", *ibid.*, 19 January 1952, pp. 1-2.

[35] See the views of various party dailies, *ibid.*, 31 January 1952, p. 1.

[36] See Wilopo's statement in Indonesian Parliament on 9 May 1952. *Indonesian Affairs*, April-May 1952, vol. 3, no. 2, p. 3. See for background story, "Furippin, Indonesia: Naze hijun ga okurete iru ka?", *Asahi*, 23 June 1952.

POLITICAL CULTURE AS A FACTOR OF POLITICAL DECAY IN CHINA AND JAPAN

YEARN H. CHOI

Introduction

THE RELATIVE SUCCESS IN A RAPID "MODERNIZATION" OF PRE-WORLD WAR II Japan has inspired a number of comparative studies aimed at delineating the "pre-conditions" of modernization.[1] However, the single country whose modernization has not been most frequently compared with that of Japan seems to be China. The two countries indeed present an interesting contrast.[2] Despite the similarities in their cultural heritage, China and Japan have gone through dramatically different processes of modernization and ended up with completely different sets of political systems.

One important concept here is "political modernization." It has been often argued as if Japan was better able to "politically modernize" than China, and thus more easily achieve overall modernization. What is actually meant is that Japan enjoyed more political stability and effectiveness of government compared to China during the initial period of modernization. However, equating political stability and governmental effectiveness on the one hand with political modernization on the other hand is doing an injustice to the latter term. According to Huntington, political modernization is characterized by (1) rationalization of the procedures for the making of political decisions, (2) high degree of national integration, (3) democratization in the sense that the government will become responsive to social pressures and interests, and (4) high degree of social mobilization or participation.[3] In short, Huntington regards political modernization as any combination of political institutionalization and social mobilization. When the institutionalization overbalances social mobilization, the system will become stable, effective, and thus "developed." Such was the situation in Japan during the half a century following the Meiji Restoration. When the latter outruns the former, the system will become highly unstable and ineffective, in

[1] For example, Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (University of California Press, 1964); also, Robert E. Ward and D. A. Rustow, eds., *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton University Press, 1964).

[2] A classical example would be Marion J. Levy Jr., "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, October, 1963.

[3] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Yale University Press, 1968).

which case, the system can be said to be experiencing "political decay." Such was the case in China until the end of the Second World War. This contrast between political development and political decay in two countries will be further elaborated in this essay.

Despite oversimplification, I find Huntington's notion of political development and decay very helpful in analyzing a modernizing political system because it enables us to say much more than simply whether a system is "modernized" or not. In other words, even if a system is politically "modernized" in the sense that it shows one or more of the traits attributed to modernity, when however they are wrongly balanced, it can be described as political decay. Huntington also argues that the institutionalization can be either that of the input system (e.g., political parties) or of the output system (e.g., administrative apparatus), or both. Although Huntington stops here, I would further argue that the implications is that, the output institutions are necessary whether mobilization exists or not, and that the input institutions are necessary only when the population is "mobilized."[4] Thus, in China, when the output institutions were found inadequate with the Western intrusion, the system fell into decay despite the relative lack of social mobilization. In Japan, output institutions were necessary — and they were available — for the rapid modernization despite similar lack of social mobilization.

It is my contention in this paper that although Japan experienced a successful modernization through an effective system of "output institutions," it was possible only because of the lack of social mobilization. With the gradual social mobilization, however, the inadequacy of input institutions is being acutely felt in the contemporary Japanese politics. It seems that such an inadequacy is largely attributable to the very kind of "political culture" that made the output institutions successful earlier. In China, on the other hand, it can be argued that the very "political culture" that paralyzed output institutions during the similar period and subsequently helped retard the process of modernization, has in the long run demanded and successfully acquired an effective input system as well as an output systems, which would lead to subsequent "political development."

The comparative studies mentioned in the foregoing statements are largely concerned with identifying the factors responsible for the contrasting course of modernization in China and Japan. Whatever factors are thus identified, it seems to have been generally agreed that they would not constitute sufficient but merely necessary conditions for the different processes, thus precluding any inevitability of the kind of development that each has had to go through. I think it can be

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[4] Here and elsewhere, the term "mobilization" is used to mean not only the people's becoming aware of the nation as an entity but also their possession of a sense of efficacy and desire for participation with expectations and demands from the state.

further argued that many of these factors constitute not even necessary but perhaps only contributing conditions without which similar developments would have been possible albeit with difficulty.

If we accept Scalapino's distinction between the "impersonal" and "personal" forces that shape the course of social and political change,[5] it is conceivable that certain deficiencies in the "impersonal" forces can be made up with the "personal" forces. It is nevertheless clear that these impersonal forces are important, and except Norman who seems to argue that the apparent success of the Meiji modernization is attributable primarily to the "brilliant leadership of samurai-bureaucrats,"[6] Most of the works on this subject place heavy emphasis on the "givens," including such factors as geopolitical factors, timing of external stimuli for change, and factors relating to the nature of a society's traditional heritage.[7] Such an approach can also be justified by arguing that, after all, the so-called "personal" factors are ultimately a function of the impersonal forces in that men are necessarily "culture-bound."

It seems that the question as to what these "impersonal" factors were in Japan that contributed to the relatively rapid and peaceful conversion from a premodern to a highly industrialized society, as well as what they were in China with the opposite result, has been rather exhaustively dealt with and with persuasive answers. In this essay, I propose to examine the third of the categories of "impersonal" factors introduced above, namely the nature of a society's traditional heritage, and especially as it is relevant to political association. Here, I subscribe to the definition of political culture by Almond and Verba as "attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system."[8]

Whatever can be said about the importance of the political culture in the shaping of a political system, it cannot be claimed that it would constitute a sufficient condition or even necessary condition for a particular course that the system takes. Hence, it is conceivable that the system may be following a course of considerably different nature from that which the political culture would otherwise dictate. It is possible that Japanese "democracy" may be perpetuated despite its political culture (if my argument about its inadequacy is correct). Even as a contributing factor, however, it is worth examining. In the following, I will discuss and reproduce, in summary form, the findings of those aspects of political

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[5] Robert Scalapino, *Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan* (University of California Press, 1962), pp. 394-395. Ward and Rustow make a similar but not entirely identical distinction; (1) those which are set or predetermined in such a manner as to be wholly or largely beyond the control of the leaders of the modernizing society and (2) those which are amenable to some significant degree of influence or control by these leaders. *Ibid.*, p. 465.

[7] Ward and Rustow, *Ibid.*, pp. 465-66.

[8] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *Civic Culture* (Princeton University Press, 1963) p. 12.

culture that contributed to political development and political decay in two countries, China and Japan. In the last section of this paper, I will try to present how and why the essentially same political culture of a people would contribute to different results of political development and political decay in a different time span.

The First Stage of Modernization

China experienced a political decay during the period between the intrusion of the Western powers in the mid-nineteenth century and the end of Second World War, for reasons of the inadequacy of output institutions and later (especially after the Japanese invasion of 1937), for the lack of both output and input institutions.

In Japan, on the other hand, a "developed" political system had been sustained until the 1920s when a small portion of the population began to be "mobilized" and when the system was unable to harness the social unrest by ordinary means. I would call those periods when only the effective output institutions were necessary "the first stage of modernization."

According to Pye, the process of political development involves essentially six crises that must successfully be dealt with to become a modern nation state: (1) the identity crisis, (2) the legitimacy crisis, (3) the penetration crisis, (4) integration crisis, (5) the participation crisis, and (6) the distribution crisis.[9] Among these, the last two crises are largely irrelevant for discussion of the first stage of modernization for the obvious reason that popular participation is excluded from this stage by virtue of definition. At the same time, by examining the political culture of China and Japan in the light of Pye's first four categories, we can say whether it could contribute to the success or failure of each country's output institutionalization and the resultant political development or political decay.

The Identity and Integration Crises

The parochial attitude of the Chinese peasant is well described by Yang in his study of the Nanching Village in Southern China. Yang characterized Nanching as multi-clan village which had been closed to outsiders as a unit of permanent community life. Despite its proximity to the urban center of Canton, the peasants in the village on the eve of the Communist takeover remained "bound to their agrarian tradition" which was largely "woven out of the social fabric of kinship relations."[10] Such an attitude of the peasants was reciprocated by the ruling elite whose attitude was characterized as Lockean by Levy. According to

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[9] Lucian Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston, 1966).

[10] C. K. Yang, *Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition*, (MIT Press, 1959).

Levy, it was believed that "the structure of society would function to the best interest of everyone if it were set up in accord with the will of Heaven and left as much alone as possible.[11]

Under these circumstances, the Chinese peasantry was at best indifferent to politics of the national level, and could not be sensitized to a Communist (or Nationalist for that matter) ideology. Whatever national consciousness there was, even on the elite level, was a loose sense of Chineseness which permitted all who agreed to submit themselves to the enlightened rule of the Son of Heaven to participate as members of the Middle Kingdom. But such an ethnocentrism not only inhibited the development of a national consciousness but also constituted a lasting barrier to cultural borrowing which carried with it the stigma of inferiority and indignity.

As far as national integration was concerned, all that the Chinese shared in common was the ethical culture. Ethnically and linguistically, China was highly heterogeneous at the time of the Western arrival. In the course of China's contact with the West, other forms of social divisions began to take shape — among the elite as well as the masses. Some Chinese leaders turned to Western ideas and technology, while the rest rejected Westernization except to preserve what is essentially Chinese. On the mass level, a degree of social mobilization was to be found in the commercial coastal areas as well as major urban centers whereas the rest remained more or less untouched.

Japan was exceptionally fortunate in this respect. Her boundaries were clearcut during the early modernization period. As Ward puts it, "Her population was racially homogeneous; the same language was spoken throughout the islands; religion was not a divisive factor; and there was a tradition of national unity and identity extending back at least twelve hundred years. The major elements of a new national identification were already at hand."[12] The cultural coherence is most frequently attributed to Japan's insular position. According to Scalapino, the physical separation permitted the society to develop in relatively homogeneous fashion and to become possessed of a sense of identity and a quality of uniqueness.[13]

The Japanese political culture during the Tokugawa was "parochial" if by that term we mean lack of horizontal ties with other local social units. It was certainly not parochial if by that term we mean the failure to recognize the hierarchical top. The *Shogun* demanded the *daimyo*'s loyalty to the Emperor. The *daimyo* demanded their retainers' loyalty only his own to the Shogun, of at the least, to the "Emperor. The *samurai* claimed superiority over the peasants only through their own

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[11] Levy, *op. cit.*, p. 182.
[12] Ward and Rustow, *op. cit.*, p. 448.
[13] Robert Scalapino, "Environmental and Foreign Contributions," *Ibid.*, p. 67.

subordination to the *daimyo*. The supremacy of the Emperor in the Japanese rank-order of values could be easily translated by the Meiji leadership who gave them a new formulation and heightened emphasis in the name of the Japanese nation.

Another important factor that should be mentioned in connection with the identity crisis is education. Dore remarks that about half of the male population in the Islands could read and write as early as 1870.[14] Since Japanese education, both before and after the Meiji Restoration, was not thought of primary benefit of the individual, but rather of the system, we can expect that the people would become reasonably well aware of the national entity without exploring individual demands on the system. Certainly, the contribution of Japanese education during this stage in making a good subject, although not a good participant, cannot be overestimated. By the end of the First World War, most Japanese thought of themselves as citizens of Japan, not of their respective prefectures as in feudal days.[15]

Ward and Rustow regard as a measure of political modernization "a widespread and effective sense of popular identification with the history, territory, and national identity of the state."[16] During a period when quiet subordination rather than creative participation was of prime necessity of the day, just how much the higher degree of national identification in Japan was instrumental in her more effective modernization, is questionable. Of far more significance, during this period would be the degree of national integration, especially on the elite level. Ward and Rustow see integration as primarily that within the governmental structure. But both in and out of government, the Japanese elite was much more homogeneous and integrated than their Chinese counterpart in terms of their social origin purposes and outlook despite the deep-rooted factionalism and regionalism. Later, Bendix writes of the Japanese elite as follows:

> Japanese opinion leaders and intellectuals were principally recruited from the samurai. As such they were oriented toward action and united in their common goal to ensure Japan's greatness as a nation, however divided they were on the best way of achieving that goal. Socially and culturally homogeneous, Japan's educated elite was not alienated from the establishment of autocratic government with the Emperor as its symbolic apex.[17]

A relatively integrated nation and united leadership made effective "output institutions" successful. This was also possible, however, because the Japanese people at large were accustomed to be good subjects. Why they were good subjects and how it contributed to the building of

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[14] R. P. Dore, "Education," *Ibid.,* p. 177.
[15] Scalapino, *op. cit.,* p. 84.
[16] Ward and Rustow, *op. cit.,* p. 7.
[17] Bendix, *op. cit.,* p. 198.

the output institutions, as well as how this picture compares with
that in China, will be the subject of the following words.

The Legitimacy and Penetration Crises

No government can function properly unless the majority of the
people accept its authority either passively or actively. Thus, at a
time of modernization when the demand for extensive activities of
the government is multiplied, the problem of reaching down into the
society and effecting basic policies is directly related with the problem
of the people's acceptance of, or at least acquiescence to, the authority.

One is tempted to say that the Japanese Emperor claimed more
legitimacy among the Japanese during this period than the *Ching* Emperor
could among the Chinese people. What matters more in comparing the
nature of authority in the two countries is, however, not only the kind
of legitimacy that the system claimed, but more importantly, the intensity
that the respective peoples felt of their authorities.

Yang pointed out that the formal government had little to do
with the life of a Wang or Lee family in the village because their
respective clans performed the function of enforcing social and moral
order among their members.[18] Accordingly, there was an absence of
state power in the village. The Nationalist government's *Pao Chia* system
failed to facilitate the flow of central authority down to the village and
family levels because it could not break the firm hold of decentralized
particularistic social system in rural life of China. Whatever socio-economic
change there was in "modern" China, therefore, was concentrated in
the urban centers and failed to alter ordinary peasants' outlook.

I think Levy presents a somewhat mistaken view of social control in
China when he says, "The Chinese society had developed no other
forms of control that would operate effectively and stably in the absence
of family controls."[19] Despite the frequent argument by many literatures
on the subject that the family system which had been the only means
of social control in the Continent, broke down with the Western intrusion,
I am inclined to believe that it was the inadequacy of family control
and not the destruction of it and the failure of formal government to
supplement it and not to replace it that are responsible for the political
decay in China. Yang shows that the family control began to crack in
most parts of China only during the last phase of the first stage of
modernization.

Japan is seen in an opposite picture. Hall calls the "density of govern-
ment" which was the secret of the "great peace" of the Tokugawa period
and the "great leap" of the Meiji period. Hall continues: few people in
pre-modern times have lived under such a heavy load of official regulation

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[18] Yang, *op. cit.*
[19] Levy, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

and supervision as the Tokugawa Japanese."[20] Such a system of personal loyalty to the superior was a function of the Japanese "feudalism" if we accept Levy's definition of the term.[21]

From the rulers' point of view, they could more easily perceive than their Chinese counterparts the possibilities of manipulating social structure for purposes of control and this developing administrative apparatus. It is widely discussed that the pre-Restoration samurai had been relatively well trained in administrative tasks. While the Chinese officials (both imperial and republican) were largely incapacitated by their training to the sort of planning necessary in meeting the necessity for governmental leadership, their Japanese counterparts did know that planning and execution were under proper realm of ruling.

In short, as Levy puts it, "the differing system of control over individuals in China and Japan made for much of the difference in their respective experience with industrialization."[22] But such a difference in effectiveness of the control system presupposed a difference in the class system. In Japan, the leaders were assured that their positions and those of their class would not be threatened from below, and they could embark on drastic socio-economic changes on a reasonably safe ground. China's "open class system" was in this sense a severe liability for her political development as well as overall modernization. In China, as Levy shows, ideally (and this is what counts) everybody could move upward without fixed personal hierarchy. It meant that since anyone can be as high-positioned as any other person, the position is thus obtainable as well as deprivable.

The implications of the above discussion are clear. At the risk of oversimplification and exaggeration, we can say that the Chinese society was based, at least on ideal terms, on equality. In view of the primary emphasis given to family by the Chinese over the state, it can also be argued that the Chinese were basically individualistic. The above statement may sound contradictory. Certainly, the Chinese were not individualistic when the individual was set against the family. He was individualistic, however, in the sense that he did represent the private self-interest of the family as a basic unit of society. The Japanese society was one without these atomistic units capable of exerting such private interests. Whatever units there were in Japan were subsumed under the authoritative institutions. There was no doubt that a society with built-

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[20] John W. Hall, "The Nature of Traditional Society," in Ward and Rustow,
    [21] Levy defines feudalism as the characteristics of a society with (1) closed social classes; (2) a well-defined hierarchy of powerholders; (3) identification, at least ideally speaking, of each individual responsible to some particular individual higher than himself in the hierarchy and related to others outside of that direct line by virtue of his overlord's relation to them; and (4) a distribution of goods and services, most especially land ownership and control, primarily on the basis of ranks distinguished in the hierarchy and responsibility. Levy, *op. cit.*, p. 161.
    [22] *Ibid.*, p. 186.

in inequality and lacking the divisive forces of self-interest could achieve "political development" much more easily than a society with the opposite traits. A politically developed society would achieve modernization more easily when the political system set it as its goal.

However, different conditions brought about by the modernization in both countries, political and otherwise, during the second stage of modernization would make the designation of "political development" for Japan and "political decay" for China not much irrelevant.

The Second Stage of Modernization

Most literatures concerning the successful process of modernization in Japan content with identifying those factors that presumably con-tributed to such a "success" and suggesting what lessons can be derived from this for other modernizing nation states. Some, however, stop to consider the implications of this success and drop somber "notes" on such an optimism. Scalapino among others writes a negative view on the optimism:

> The cenrtal problem confronting Japanese democracy in its various attempts to find expression has lain in the difficulty of surmounting the obstacle of timing. A solution to this problem contained from the beginning the only hope of challenging effectively an overwhelmingly hostile tradition.[23]

If the Japanese tradition has helped her political development and modernization, why is it to be considered as "overwhelmingly hostile" now? What is the difference in circumstances that makes the same object "helpful" during one period and "hostile" at another? The answer may be suggested in the delineation of what I could call the second stage of modernization.

As the first stage of modernization designates the period of mod-ernization when there was a substantial need for output institutions for reasons of external demands, so is the second stage meant to designate the period when there is a great need for both the input and output institutions for reasons of internal as well as external demands; the second stage is outstanding in that, during this period, one begins to notice the emergence and growth of demands for participation in, as well as protection and advantage from, the political system. It is also during this stage that Pye's participation and distribution crises become relevant.

If my contention that the Chinese are more interest-oriented than the Japanese is accepted, there is little wonder that the social mobilization begins to take shape earlier in China than in Japan. To repeat, it was not the disintegration of family system that prompted social mobilization

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[23] Scalapino, *Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan* (University of California Press, 1962), p. 1.

and social division; rather, the nature of family system and its pre-
ponderance over other forms of authority accelerated the later develop-
ments. According to Johnson, Japan's invasion and occupation of China
decisively altered the political "interests" of the peasantry. It should
be noted that these "interests" are to be best understood as private
interests which take the form of a demand on the political system.
These interests are essentially Hobbesian in that they are aggregates of
individual interests even when they amount to "nationalism." The Japan-
ese nationalism, on the other hand, would take a Rousseauean form in
that it is necessarily of public nature and not an aggregate of individual
interests as such. It is not something that an individual Japanese demands
from his government. For the Japanese, the best way to serve his
nationalism is to serve his government.

The result of social mobilization in China was the achievement
of a strong political party which would act as receptacle for the individual
demands. When one considers the appearance of various "political parties"
following the May Fourth Movement of 1919, it appears that the term
"political party" is for them either presumption or premature as an
input institution. It would be presumptuous if one recognizes that their
activities limited primarily among the elite. It would be premature
because whatever social mobilization there was, it was confined to a few
coastal and urban areas which hardly necessitated a system of input insti-
tutions as such. When the masses were mobilized in the thirties and
forties, and only then, they would attempt, and successfully so, to
unseat a previously mobilized and nationalist elite. In China, social
mobilization spread rather widely and quickly once its process got started
while the process in Japan appeared to be remarkably slow and limited.

In Japan, the process of mobilization began considerably later than in
China to begin with. The first visible sign of such a process was seen
in the wake of world depression, and as in China, mostly in the urban
areas. Industrial dynamism following modernization inevitably uprooted
many people from the traditional social relationships (both in form and
imagination) of personal obligation and imbued them with more equali-
tarian and individualistic ideas. The significant fact was, however, that
even the process of urbanization left most of the masses of Japan on
the lower stratus in their traditional modes of thinking about social
relationships. It was only the intellectual and enlightened few who
acquired new ideas and new modes of life, slowly and hesitantly at that.
As Lockwood points out, Japanese liberalism lacked the mass support
which would have enabled it to withstand the counter-revolutionary
assault of the militarists.[24] The implications of these developments were
not simply the Japanese militarism overcoming liberalism, but more sig-

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[24] Lockwood, "Economic and Political Modernization," in Ward and Rustow,
op. cit., p. 136.

nificantly, those forces buttressed by overpowering traditional modes swallowing up new modes of life and human relationships.

The Japanese political parties which had hitherto existed were not political parties as input institutions. As Scalapino and Masumi remarks, they had developed primarily as protest movements — protest by the dissident elite — and were not intended or required to be channels through which self-interests would be translated, transmitted, and dissipated.[25] It can be summed up in Ike's words:

> In the pre-war period, parties were assigned a minor role in the political process. They were able to provide only limited access to the political elite. Especially in the 1930's most of the political leaders came from the military or from the bureaucracy. On the eve of World War II, the Parties disappeared being amalgamated into a single organization known as the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.[26]

If one had wished to see political parties with the rule as an input institution, even in ideal, he would have had to wait for the day when the American conquest and military occupation after the War would impose a new kind of political structure on the Japanese people.

How new is this new system of government? At least, it provided an opportunity for the political parties to solicit public support and pose as input institutions if such were demanded by the society. But, again, the degree of social mobilization was disappointingly low (from a democrat's point of view) and only minority sought political parties as input institutions.[27] The conservatives rely heavily on local notables and political bosses, while the socialists, especially left-wing factions, make use of the labor unions, both for votes and for funds. The Liberal Democratic Party which has been supported by the traditional rural population and the lowest urban bracket as well as voters of business and well-to-do sectors shows that the only "full" party can rule.

Scalapino's distinction between the "pure politicians" and bureaucrat representatives' within the Liberal-Democratic Party is immaterial for my argument here, because the "bureaucrat representatives" have already been insulated from the input process and the "pure politicians" are none other than those local notables who receive votes by virtue of the traditional modes of social relationship, an extreme form of which would be *oyabun-kobun* relationship.

Such an arrangement may be just fine as long as the population remain unmobilized. However, the precise pretention of democracy which was inevitable by the imposition of such a system by the victor as

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[25] Scalapino and Masumi, *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan,* (University of California Press, 1962).

[26] Nobutaka Ike, "Political Leadership and Political Parties," in Ward and Rustow, *op. cit.,* p. 404.

[27] Chong Lim Kim, "Socio-Economic Development and Political Democracy in Japanese Prefectures," *American Political Science Review,* March, 1971, p. 186.

well as the ever rapid process of industrialization has fostered and
nurtured participant culture and subsequent social mobilization among
some sectors of the society which the ruling party is incapable of ab-
sorbing. These are not necessarily the Lockean liberals. But they can
be called "liberals" in that they appear to have acquired those egali-
tarian and individualistic values characteristics of a "democratic" society.
The paradox seems to be clear. As long as the ruling party sustains the
present economic prosperity, the frequency of these individuals pouring
out into the streets will not likely to increase. But if they stay "at home,"
it is because of acquiescence of "silent majority," not by legitimacy.
Such legitimacy will most likely to take shape if these "liberals" come
to feel a spontaneous "system effect" and there is no reason to believe
at the present time at least, that such a process is in the making. Two
possibilities can be counted:

1) the system may not be able to provide the kind of prosperity it has
   sustained during the post-War period. Or,
2) the number of citizens may surpass that of the subjects.

The possible consequences of these developments may be: in the first
case, the streets will become noisier and a demand for the subjects who
still constitute the majority of population will rise; in the second case,
the creation of an ineffective system with the consequent *immobilisme*
characterized by the French Third and Fourth Republic is a visible
possibility. The "citizens" will have had no experience of a government
capable of ruling as well as being responsive and responsible, and become
ever jealous about their control of the executive and suspicious of a
"strong" government. A demand for a "restoration" will be the logical
response.

   The above discussion dwells upon certain possibilities arising from
the incongruence between the political culture of the Japanese people
and the political superstructure. What seems apparent in the Japanese
society is the systematically mixed nature of political culture; some are
subjects and some citizens rather than the same man being both a
subject and citizen. This may, in the long run, result in a violent
oscillation between the two extremes of an authoritarian government
and a "popular but ineffective government" after the French style.
Yet, there is nothing inevitable about those possibilities. As discussed
in the introduction of this paper, political culture is only one of the
many factors and its destructiveness can certainly be averted by other
factors such as intelligent maneuvering of the leadership, cataclysmic
events, or foreign intervention. Seen through the eyes of political culture,
however, the present Japanese political system anticipates political decay
rather than development. The very factor that enabled an effective
administration in Japan during the first stage of modernization prevented

the development of adequate system of input intitutions despite its amounting needs.

China is difficult to discuss under the same framework as in Japan. China is a secretive, closed society, where it is difficult to determine at what point spontaneity ends and coercion begins. But as Johnson has observed, "totalitarianism is not incompatible with legitimacy, or nationalism or the self-appraised interests of the masses."[28] If coercion and/or the symbol manipulated by the thoughts of Mao is not a satisfactory explanation for the entire Chinese Communist work ethic, we have to admit that, at least to a considerable degree, the Chinese Communist Party is indeed an effective input institution which has also provided a system of effective output institutions. The failure of the Chinese to be good subjects which had been such a great liability during the first stage of modernization, has at the same time effectively prevented the creation of a political system based on those "feudal modes" during the second stage of modernization.

If we discard — as the Communist would do — the Utopian part of Marxism, and if modernization is the order of the day, private self-interest based upon egalitarian and individualistic ways of thinking will be one of the mainstays of a "modern" system, whether Communist or democratic. China has gone and is still going through difficult paths. But if Soviet Russia provides any lesson, it would be that the meeting point between spontaneity and coercion would gradually move towards the coercion end of the spectrum with increasing socio-economic modernization. If the same can be expected of the Chinese system one might in the long run expect a political development in China more properly than in Japan, in that the system will congrue with the input as well as the output needs of the individual citizens.

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[28] Chalmer Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* (Stanford University Press, 1962) p. 11.

THE EARTH-DIVER MYTH: TOWARDS A THEORY OF ITS DIFFUSION IN ASIA

Rogelio M. Lopez

Introduction

THE STORY THAT THE WORLD ORIGINATED FROM SMALL BITS OF EARTH TAKEN from the bottom of the sea[1] is widespread in various parts of the world. In his extensive survey on the geographical occurrences of this myth, Hatt[2] demonstrated the greater possibility that this myth originated somewhere in southern Asia. From there, it spread northward and then eastward to North America.

Following Hatt ten years later, Rooth[3] attempted to establish the genetic relationship between the extant Eurasian and North American versions of the earth-diver myth. In her investigations she noted that in eastern and southeastern Asia, exceptional offshoots of the myth existed. In about the same year, a version that was recorded from the island of Bohol, Philippines, was published in the *Journal of American Folklore*.[4] Kirtley remarked that "if the story is in fact traditional and not introduced, its affinities are puzzling, for the closest are found among versions told by the American Indians."[5] The same version was mentioned on the bibliographical list of Arsenio Manuel.[6] Recently, it was quoted in the article of Francisco Demetrio,[7] making it appear as though the authencity of the version is now a foregone conclusion.

The purpose of this paper is threefold: firstly, to make a brief, background survey of the extant earth-diver myth versions as far as

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[1] This story is classified under Motif 4812 in Stith Thompson, *Motif-Index of Folk-Literature* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955). pp. 161.

[2] Gudmund Hatt, *Asiatic Influences In American Folklore* (Kobenhavn: Kommission Hos Ejnar Munkgaard, 1947-49), p. 30.

[3] Anna Birgitta Rooth, "The Creation in Myths of the N. American Indians," *Anthropos*, Vol. 52 (1957), p. 500.

[4] Bacil F. Kirtley, "A Bicol [sic.] Version of the Earth-Diver Myth," *Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. 70 (1957), p. 362. The version was first reported by Mrs. Maria Caseñas Pajo in her master's thesis, as allegedly told to her by a 60-year old informant from a coastal municipality Duero, Bohol (not Bicol), Philippines. See: Maria Caseñas Pajo, "Bohol Folklore" (unpublished master's thesis, University of San Carlos, Cebu City, 1954). pp. 45f. Also see footnote 75 below.

[5] Kirtley, *loc. cit.*

[6] Arsenio Manuel, "A Survey of Philippine Folk Epics," *Asian Folklore Studies*, Vol. 22 (1963), p. 74; Arsenio Manuel, *Philippine Folklore Bibliography: A Preliminary Survey* (Quezon City, Philippine Folklore Society, 1965), p. 58.

[7] Francisco Demetrio, "The Religious Dimension of Philippine Folktale, *Solidarity*, Vol. 4 (April 1969), p. 61.

available materials can give; secondly, to show how much of the earth-diver myth elements can be traced in Philippine folktales; and, thirdly, to evaluate the earth-diver myth version recorded from Bohol and its possible contribution to Philippine folklore.

The Continental and Insular Distribution of the Earth-diver Myth

1.   In America

The earth-diver myth is found among ethnic groups all over North America except in the States of Arizona, New Mexico and Alaska.[8] A consistent version was recorded by Thompson[9] from the Iroquois tribes. It contains the following elements which can serve as bases for subsequent comparative treatment of the other versions:

(1)   the existence of an upper world and of the primeval water;

(2)   there was a sick daughter of the sky chief, the cure of which was that the girl must lie on a trench dug beside a great tree which furnished food for the sky peoples;

(3)   an angry man shoved the girl into the hole (an opening in the sky); consequently, the girl fell down through the hole into the water beneath the sky;

(4)   the waterfowls, upon seeing her, flew up and catched her to ease her down to the surface of the water;

(5)   the waterfowls persuaded the great Turtle to receive her. Thereafter it was decided to have a place where the girl will rest permanently;

(6)   from the back of the Turtle, animals (unspecified) were sent to dive for earth in the bottom of the water; all failed except the toad, who brought back some soil;

(7)   out of the soil, the earth (i.e. world) evolved, resting on the back of the turtle, where then the woman lived on and, subsequently, mankind;

(8)   the girl's daughter was impregnated by the West Wind;

(9)   she gave birth to twins who, while still in her womb, quarreled as to who should be born first;

(10)   these twins, one was Good and the other was Bad, were the culture heroes of the Iroquoian.

In the 17th century, a Jesuit father recorded from another American Indian tribe a version.[10] This version differed from that of the Iroquois in that in element number (2) it stated that "a woman was thrown by her husband (the Chieftain) down through a hole which had been formed in digging up a big tree." In element number (4), it stated that "the animals of the primeval sea caught sight of her while she was falling away."

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[8] Rooth, *op. cit.,* p. 498.

[9] Stith Thompson, *The Folktales* (New York: The Dryden Press, 1951). p. 307.

[10] William Feldman, "This Island, the World on the Turtle's Back," *Journal of American Folklore,* Vol. 75 (1962), p. 285.

The versions recorded from the Onondaga and Mohawk tribes[11] differed from the Iroquois in element number (6) in that here "three animal divers were sent one after the other, namely, beaver, otter, muskrat; only the muskrat succeeded." The muskrat returned from the sea with soil in his claws and in his mouth, and then died instantly of exhaustion.

Among the Seneca Indians,[12] their version does not contain the diving trait, as indicated in element number (6) above. Instead, "the woman (who) landed upon the back of the turtle, has carried some soil from the sky with her hands because she tried to hold on to the edge of the hole in the sky." This soil "brought from the sky" (let us introduce here a term for such a trait, the "sky-borne trait"), instead of from the bottom of the sea, was spread out by her over the back of the turtle, and the earth gradually increased in size.

A version parallel to the Iroquois in completeness was recorded from the Wyandot tribes[13] who are affiliated to the Iroquoian language-speaking group.[14] The differences lie in element numbers (2), (4), (5), and so forth. For number (2), for instance, the version states that the news spread that the illness of the chief's daughter could not be cured by the medicine-men so that the very old shaman living far away was fetched up by a moccassin (the runner). The shaman immediately told the people to dig into the roots of the wild apple tree standing by the chief's lodge. For number (4), the girl fell entangled in the branches with the tree when the ground around the tree collapsed. For number (5), two swans upon seeing the girl swam closely to each other to catch her lightly on their back. The Big Turtle called a council of animals to decide what should be done. Then, for number (6) and (7), the bits of earth (that were dived from the bottom of the sea) were the same earth that clung to the roots when the tree fell with the girl. As such the earth, as a materiel, has a "sky-borne trait" like that of the Seneca version cited above.

The best divers in the Wyandot version were summoned one after the other, namely, otter, muskrat, beaver, and so on. All failed and died upon reaching back to the surface so that Big Turtle finally declined to summon any more diver. Then an old toad volunteered, and she succeeded. The earth she dived was rubbed and spread around the edge of Big Turtle's shell. Soon, an island began to grow and then, the world. The woman in the same version was already

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[11] Hatt, op. cit., p. 12.

[12] Ibid.

[13] C. M. Barbeau, Huron and Wyandot Mythology (Ottawa: Gov't Printing Press, 1915). p. 37-47.

[14] D'Arcy McNicle, The Indian Tribes of the U.S. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962). p. 79; John R. Swanton, The Indian Tribes of North America (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952). p. 234.

pregnant when she fell (a combination of numbers 4 and 8 elements). One of the twins desired to be delivered from the mother's womb by "kicking his own way out through the mother's side," for which he was remonstrated by his twin. Their forceful delivery caused the instant death of the mother (element 9).

The Wyandot version depicts in greater detail element number (10). It relates the good and bad works of the twins. Bad One always destroyed Good One's work; the latter kept on trying to reconstruct, but unsuccessfully, what Bad One destroyed. Finally, the twins fought and with the help of deer's horns strewn along the trail, Good One killed Bad One.

Among the Crow Indians,[15] the version that was recorded from them does not mention element numbers (2), (3), (4), and (5). It only states that the world began with Old Man Coyote and the primeval sea. Then, after looking around Old Man Coyote seized a swallow (bird) and commanded him to dive for mud, the swallow failed. Old Man Coyote then ordered the crow, the wolf, and then the duck who finally succeeded. Out of the mud, Old Man Coyote made the earth and afterwards the first man and woman.

2.   In India

The earth-diver myth exists in India among the inland peoples, namely, the Sema Nagas, Mundas, Birhors, and Garos.[16] Except for the Nanga Baiga version, all the other versions contain the primeval water or element number (1) of the Iroquois. The Nanga Baiga myth, on the other hand, relates the existence of three primeval regions: the sky, earth, and the netherworld.[17] Its elements such as (a) the barren earth was made suitable for habitation, (b) fertile soil was fetched from the netherworld (from the lower layers parallel to the ocean floor), and (c) the difficulty of making the earth habitable to men suggests some analogy with element numbers (5), (6), and (7) of the earth-diver myth.

Except for the Nanga Baiga again, an additional feature to element number (1) of the earth-diver myth generally occurs. There is something floating over the primeval ocean, on which the Supreme Being (the creator) rested and from which he commanded the divers. This something is lotus flower among the Chero and Birhor tribes;[18] water-

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[15] Robert Lowie, *Crow Text* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960). p. 195.

[16] Hatt, *op. cit.*, 31.

[17] Stephen Fuch, *Tales of Gondavana* (Bombay: Sirier Printing Press, 1960). pp. 1-17.

[18] Verrier Elwin, *Myths of Middle India* (Madras: Oxford University Press, 1922). pp. 6f.

lily among the Garo;[19] fish among the Kurmis of NE Madhya Pradesh.[20] In some other versions, it is not the lotus-flower but the lotus-leaf that appears, and Prajapati (the Supreme Being) did not rest on it. He merely spread on it soil taken from the bottom of the sea; as a consequence, the earth was created.[21]

In a Birhor version,[22] three divers were sent by Singbonga (Supreme Being) one after the other: the tortoise who failed because the clay was washed off having been simply placed on its back; the crab who also failed after taking up some clay in its leg; and finally, the leach who succeeded by devouring the clay. Additional features to element number (7) also appear in this version. Singbonga threw a bit of this clay in each of the four directions of the compass and forthwith there arose on the surface of the waters a four-sided land mass. Then Singbonga levelled the rough surfaces of the newly made earth and planted it for the benefit of the future inhabitants.

Among the Chero, the divers were the tortoise, the rat, and then the vulture. But the clay was taken (by the successful vulture) from heaven, instead of from the bottom of the sea. It was then pressed by the creator in his hands. Portions of it were thrown into each of the four directions.

In the Kurmis story,[23] the serpent plays an important role. In order to make the earth, Shri Krishna spread mud over the rock on the serpent's back. This reminds us of element number (7) that the earth rested on the back of the turtle; the rocks over the serpent's back correspond to the rough contours of the turtle's shell.

The Garo cosmogony starts with an egg.[24] Nustoo, who sprang from a self-begotten egg, went to the lower region for soil, again, reminiscent of the diving for earth from the bottom of the sea.

3.   In Northern Asia and Eastern Europe

Versions of the earth-diver myth were encountered in Galicia and Bulgaria; among the Chukchees, Yukaghirs, Buryats, Turkish and Finnish tribes; the Yenisseis, Lebedtatars, Votyaks and the Yakuts.[25] An example of a Wogul (Vogul) version is given by B. Munkacsi and was quoted by Rooth:[26]

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[19] Edward Tuite Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal* (Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, 1872). pp. 66f.

[20] Joseph Thaliath, "Notes on the Kurmis of the NE Madhya Pradesh," *Anthropos*, Vol. 57 (1962), p. 124f.

[21] Hatt, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

[22] Elwin, *op. cit.*, p. 6; Hatt, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] Dalton, *loc. cit.*

[25] Thaliath, *loc. cit.*

[26] Rooth, *op. cit.*, p. 499.

> The old man and the old woman of the tundra-mound live surrounded by the primeval waters. To their astonishment, earth begins to grow around their mounds, after three "diver-birds" from heaven have successfully tried to bring up mud from the bottom of the sea. The old couple send out a white raven to learn the size of the earth. The first and second day he is away for a short time; on the third day he does not return until late in the evening — so much has the earth has grown — but he is all black because he has eaten from a corpse.

The primeval water, the diving for earth, and its growth into a habitable size are present. The sending out of a bird and the consequent blackening after eating a corpse are also recurring features in the North American versions.[27]

Hatt[28] summarized the differences between the N. American, the N. Asiatic and E. European versions as follows: among the N. American versions, element (10) is prevalent; secondly, several animals among whom the last succeeded after the preceding divers failed as shown in element number (6), generally occur in N. America while in N. Asia and E. Europe, there is only one diver who succeeded after making three attempts. There is only one variant recorded from the northern Yakuts. Here, two divers (the redbreasted-diver and the wild duck) were sent, although at the same time; and the mother of God acted as the earth's creator.

Existence of the earth-diver myth in Tibet, China and Mongolia was doubted by Lowie (1926), in spite of Dahnhardt's earlier presentation of a Mongolian earth-diver myth version.[29] In the work of Mackenzie[30] on the myths and legends of China, possible traces of some of the elements of the earth-diver myth can be seen.

According to a Taoist version, for instance, there only existed in the beginning, Shu, Hu, and Hwun-tun (literally, Chaos), and the southern ocean, northern ocean, and the central land which they respectively ruled. Hwun-tun had closed eyes, ears, and nostrils. He was mouthless, too. Hu and Shu, who were his constant visitors, pitied him and thus, daily, opened an orifice in him. But just as the vital openings were to be finished on the seventh day, Chaos died. Mackenzie interpreted this as the Chinese way of explaining the transformation of the earth from Chaos to Cosmos (order).

The "hole" in the Chinese story was a means "to fall down" Hwun-tun for an "orderly" life on earth. In the N. American earth-diver myth versions, the hole was the place through which man's ancestor (woman) fell down (element number 3) for an earthly existence. Seven days

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[27] *Ibid.,* p. 498.

[28] Hatt, *op. cit.,* p. 24.

[29] *Ibid.,* p. 28.

[30] Donald A. MacKenzie, *Myths of China and Japan* (London: The Gresham Publication Co., Ltd., n.d.). pp. 258f.

in the Chinese story remind us of the time factor in the earth-diver myth, that is, the duration needed to wait for the earth taken from the bottom of the water by a number of divers.

The primeval water as well as the other features associated with element number (1) in the earth-diver myth versions appears in the Chinese story. For instance, the earth is flat, over it is a dome of the firmament supported by four pillars that stand at the four cardinal points guarded by a sentinel deity. These pillars remind us of the turtle's legs and so of element number (7) of the earth-diver myth.

In another Chinese version,[31] P'an ku had to be destroyed so that the material universe may be formed. Thus, from his flesh came the soil; from his bones, rocks; from his blood, water; and so on. P'an ku's body was covered by vermin, and the vermin became the races of mankind. This is a feature somewhat analogous to the role played by the turtle whose body was "covered" by earth and subsequently, by mankind in element number (7) of the earth-diver myth.[32]

4.   In Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands

It is already a well-established fact that the Southeast Asian as well as some Pacific Islands population had received a considerable amount of Indian and mainland Asian influences.[33] Features of the earth-diver myth may be still encountered among the remote and ethnologically older population. Among the Shan of Central Burma,[34] the ants play the role of the divers in the primeval sea. The Semang of Malaya[35] has the dung-bettle, but the earth was not taken from the sea but just down below the earth surface. Unlike the Kintak Bong (Kenta Bogn) group, the primeval water seems unknown to the Semang. Meanwhile, the Kensiu tribes believe that the dung-bettle pulled the earth up from the mire, after which the sun dried the earth and made it firm.[36]

The primeval water (element number 1) is common to the Dusuns of Borneo.[37] However, in one of the versions, the earth was made out of dirt from Morunsansadon's (creator) body. In another version, a variant of element number (6) occurs: a flock of small green parrots (birds) was sent above to ask help from the "rajas" (high chief) to make the earth solid (or strong). The birds simply stole five grains

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[31] *Ibid.*, p. 260f.

[32] *Ibid.* This element, however, belongs more to the Ymir motif. See Rooth, *op. cit.*, pp. 506f.

[33] D.G.E. Hall, *A History of Southeast Asia* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1955); Quaritch Wales, *Prehistory and Religion in Southeast Asia* (London: Bernard Quaritch, 1957).

[34] Hatt, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] *Ibid.*

[37] I.H.N. Evans, *The Religion of the Tempasuk Dusun of Borneo* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1953). pp. 15, 372-379.

of pearl which were then mixed with the earth and thus made the latter hard.

The idea that the earth was made out of materials taken from the sky appears to be prevalent in the Indonesian Archipelago. Among the Toba Bataks of the interior of northern Sumatra,[38] a woman from the sky went down into the middle of the world and, in order to have something to rest on, sent a swallow to ask Mula Djadi a handful of earth from the sky. The Dairi Bataks[39] related that the earth was made by Batara Guru (high god) out of the earth brought by his servants from the sky, and was spread on a raft supported by the goat and the bumble-bee, a variant feature of element number (7).

In a story from southeastern Borneo,[40] Hatalla (this name could be an adaptation either of the Indian Bhattara or of the Islamic Allah) made the world by throwing down earth from the sky upon the head of a big snake living in the primeval sea. Among the Kayans[41] in the northwestern side of the same island, it was a rock falling down from the sky into the primordial sea which became the earth.

Dixon was somewhat hasty in presuming that cosmogonic myth is entirely or almost entirely lacking in Indonesia even as several versions were already encountered in Borneo and Sumatra. He based his opinion on the ground that these "native peoples" constitute one of the "purest remnants of the earliest non-Negrito stratum and have been practically uninfluenced by Indian and Islamic cultures."[42] According to him, the earth for the Indonesian natives is a pre-existing phenomenon.

Dixon illustrated his points in the mythical version told in Minahassa (Celebes). According to the Minahassa story,[43] in the beginning there were only the sea and a great rock washed by the waves. The rock sweated after giving birth to a crane and, from the sweat, Lumimuut (a female deity) came out. Advised by the crane, Lumimuut got from the "original land" two handfuls of earth which she spread upon the rock. Through this act, she made the world which she later planted to all seeds of plants and trees obtained from the same "original land." This "original land" being interpreted by Dixon as the skyworld stands for what he asserted as the pre-existing earth.[44]

Be that as it may, element number (6) of the earth-diver myth, that is, the diving for earth from the bottom of the water, does not appear in the Minahassa story. But parallels to some of the essential

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[38] *Ibid.*, p. 33.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

[40] *Ibid.*

[41] *Ibid.*

[42] Roland B. Dixon, "*Oceania*," in Herbert Gray, ed., the *Mythology of all Races*, Vol. IX (Boston: Marshall Jones Co., 1916), p. 155.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 157. Dixon classify this myth under such a wide class of myths "which assumes the existence of a skyworld or upper realm, and of a primeval sea."

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 155 (footnote).

elements of the earth-diver myth are present, namely, the primeval sea (element number 1) and the making of the earth out of procured materiel (element number 7).

Cosmogonic stories of the Toradja group in Central Celebes[45] contain an idea analogous to element number (7): the earth is carried on the back of a giant buffalo. The same group believes that the upperworld rests on the earth like a cupola supported at the horizon, reminding us of a parallel belief of the Chinese and of the Dusuns. The latter believes that the sky was made of iron ribs like umbrella under which the earth was made to fit.[46]

Regarding the Pacific Islands, Dixon commented that the incident in the Minahassa myth concerning Lumimuut's birth from the rock is comparable with the Tongan and Samoan myths. In the latter, the world and first being originated from a stone which split open. A similar belief also occurs in Melanesia.[47]

As for Central Polynesia,[48] Williamson reported a common belief that the world was dragged up from the bottom of the sea with a fishhook and line. Maui is the South Sea superman who fished out the world from the sea.[49]

A diving motif likewise appears in a Samoan story. Sale-efe's (cuttle-fish) was told by Tangaroa (Supreme Being) to go down the lower regions of the sea and subsequently brought forth all kinds of rocks. The largest rock was that where the Samoans now live.[50] This passage, however, seems to imply that the earth was drawn up *en masse* instead of growing out of tiny bits.

In Tahiti, the natives said that Tiki (the primordial god) floated on the water in a canoe,[51] suggestive of the Indian features. He made the land by digging it up from the bottom of the ocean, where it was hidden (element number 6). The cosmic egg motif parallel to the Garo (Indian) cosmogonic trait, is said to be also prevalent in Tahiti.[52]

5. In the Philippines

Two remarkable earth-diver myth versions were encountered by this writer in the literature on Philippine Folklore, all recorded from

[45] Richard Erskine Downs, *The Religion of the Baree-Speaking Toradja of Central Celebes* ('s-Gravenhage: Uitgeverji Excelsior Oranjeplein 96, 1956). p. 9.
[46] Evans, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
[47] Dixon, *op. cit.*, p. 158; Robert Williamson, *Religion and Cosmic Beliefs of Central Polynesia* (Cambridge: University Press, 1933). p. 32-41.
[48] Williamson, *ibid.*
[49] Katherine Loumala, *Voices on the Wind* (Hawaii: Bishop Museum Press, 1955). 187.
[50] Williamson, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
[51] Herbert Spenser Robeinson and Knox Wilson, *Myths and Legends of all Nations* (New York: Bantam Books, 1950). p. 267.
[52] *Ibid.*

the Visayas region.[53] In other parts of the country, only parallels to some elements of the earth-diver myth can be traced.

The first version was recorded in 1578 from the island of Negros.[54] It relates that in the beginning there was nothing but the sky, the sea and the ruler King Manaul (a folkloristic bird believed to have formerly a size larger than an eagle) who controlled the destiny of space. Tired of flying over for a long time, he looked for something to rest on but found nothing. Then, for an unspecified plan, King Manaul decided that the sky and the sea should wage war. The war dragged on but nothing happened until King Manaul lost his patience. He clawed from the depth of the ocean many large rocks, lifted them up into the air and then dropped them below in various places to put an end to the war. The rocks he had thrown down formed the land.[55]

Present in the Negros story are the following elements of the earth-diver myth: the primeval sea (element number 1); the diving into the bottom of the sea (element number 6); and the subsequent growth of islands out of the materiel taken from the bottom of the sea (element number 7). The variations are: (a) the diver in the Negros version is the creator himself; (b) many large rocks were taken, not just bits of sand or earth; and (c) these rocks were brought up first into the air before casting them back to the surface of the sea, thus rendering the materiel a "sky-borne" trait.

The version recorded from the island of Bohol runs as follows:

> The people were living beyond the sky. One day, the chief's only daughter fell sick. The medicine man of the barangay said: "The cure is in the roots of this wild Balite tree. Dig around it and let her arms touch the root."

> They dug around the root and they placed the sick girl in the trench, when suddenly, the woman fell through a hole in the sky. Below the sky was a big water. Two *gakits* (wild ducks) saw the woman fall. They caught her lightly on their backs where she rested. The gakits found Big Turtle. When Big Turtle saw the woman, he called a council of all swimming animals. They said: "We must save the woman and make her a home."

> The leader commanded the frog: "Dive and bring up dirt from the tree roots." The frog tried and failed.

> The mouse tried also and failed. Finally, the Big Toad volunteered: "I will try."

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[53] The Visayas is the group of islands in the central Philippines generally called by the Spaniards as the Pintados (ety. *painted*, after the tattoed bodies of the natives). The Pintados archipelago mentioned by Hatt means the Visayas. See: Hatt, *op. cit.*, p. 32. Also see: Emma Blair and James A. Robertson, *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898* (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1903-1909). vol. 15, p. 49.

[54] Rebecca Ignacio (translator), *The Povedano Manuscript of 1578* (Chicago Department of Anthropology, Phil Studies Program, Transcript No. 3, 1954). p. 1-3.

[55] See variant of this version recorded in 1838-39 in *The Robertson Translation of the Pavon Manuscript* (Chicago University, Department of Anthropology, Phil Studies Program, Transcript No. 5-D, 1957). p. 3f.

At this, all animals jeered and laughed except Big Turtle who said: "You do well to try. Perhaps you will be lucky."

The old Toad took a long breath and went down, down. At last a bubble of air came up and the old toad followed. In its mouth she carried a few grains of sand, which she spread around the edge of Big Turtle's shell. Then an island grew on Big Turtle's back, and it become Bohol island, and the woman lived on it."

The story goes on with the adventure of little turtle to provide the island with light; the giving birth of the woman to twin boys after living with an old man whom she finds on the island; then finally, of the good and bad works of the twins.

The Bohol version contains the three recurring elements of the typical earth-diver myth, namely, element numbers (1), (6), and (7). In addition, all the other elements, namely, numbers (2), (3), (4) and (5), found only among the N. American Indians are also present in the Bohol version. It is true that element numbers (8) and (10) of the typical versions have parallels almost everywhere, but it is only in the Bohol version where even the small details have striking similarities. Furthermore, there are several terms and phrases in the Bohol version that are identical with those in the recorded Wyandot (N. American Indian) version (see footnote 13). Compare, for example, the first three paragraphs of the Wyandot version reproduced below with that of the Bohol version above.

The people were living beyond [the sky]. They were Wyandots.

The news spread, one day, that the Chief's only daughter was sick, and that the medicine-men had declared themselves unable to bring relief to her. A Moccassin, or runner, was sent out to bring back a very old shaman living far away from other people.

As soon as he saw the young woman, the old shaman told the people at once to dig into the roots of the wild apple tree standing by the chief's lodge. A party of men began digging all around the tree; and following the old man's advice, they laid down the young woman at the edge of the trench; for he said, "When you dig into the roots of the tree, you will find the remedy that will cure her. Lay her down so near that she may get it merely by stretching out her arm as soon as she detected it."

A comparison of the two versions will show that the Bohol version contains more details and is narrated in a rather neat style. The substantial differences between the two that may be pointed out are in the characters of the story and their corresponding behaviors.

In the province of Davao, Mindanao, the Bilaan[56] tribe has a version which nearly contains some elements of the earth-diver myth. They narrated that in the beginning, there was only the primeval sea (element

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[56] Mabel Cook Cole, *Philippine Folk Tales* (Chicago: A.C. McClug and Co., 1916). p. 141-42.

number 1) and four beings living on the island not larger than a hat. The four beings sent Buswit (bird) out across the waters to see what he could find. The bird returned with some earth (element number 6) which Melu (the chief among the four) shaped and beat with paddle and thus made the earth-world (element number 7). It is not explicitly stated in this story where the bird obtained the earth, whether from the sky or from the bottom of the sea.

The Bukidnon tribe of Mindanao believes that the earth was created by the eight Magbabaya.[57] The same idea is held by the Manobo of Agusan.[58] Some features worth noting in the Agusan Manobo myth are: the world was set on posts and at the central post, Makalidung (the creator) lives in company with a python. This brings to mind the "four pillars" of the Chinese and the "turtle's legs" of the earth-diver myth. The python reminds of the serpent that guards Gaia, the Greed goddess of vegetation who resides at the center of the earth. In another Manobo version, the world is said to be like a huge mushroom supported by an iron pillar in the center, a feature almost parallel to the "umbrella" of the Dusun's sky.

The Samals of the southern Philippines[59] related that the earth originated from a boat which accumulated dirt. This is quite similar to the Tahitian belief. The cosmic egg is, also, mentioned in the myths of the Samals.

In the Mountain Province (Luzon), Beyer (1913)[60] claimed that cosmogonic explanation is absent in the area. However, subsequent researches conducted in the Mt. Province discovered new lights to shed into this matter. Mallari,[61] for example, reported that the Ifugaos believe on Maknongan who created the earth and the first ancestors of man. In the Nabaloi tales,[62] the earth was made by the angered sun (the Supreme Deity) as a blockage to end the quarrel between the sky-people and underworld people. This tale, it seems, provides some of the missing links in the story about King Manaul of the Negros version.

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[57] Fay-Cooper Cole, The Bukidnon of Mindanao (Chicago: Chicago Natural History Museum, 1956). p. 127. Cole commented that the influence of Christian and Mohammedan neighbors is very evident among the Bukidnons. This can be applied, to a certain extent, to all the natives of Mindanao.

[58] John Garvan, The Manobos of Mindanao (Washington: Government Printing Press, 1931). p. 224; quoted by Otley H. Beyer, "Origin Myth among the Mountain Peoples of the Philippines," Philippine Journal of Science, Vol. 8 (1913), p. 88.

[59] C. P. Malay, "Philippine Folklore" (series of Philippine myths and legends), Weekly Women's Magazine, Oct. 3, 1952, p. 23; July 19, 1957; May 25, 1956, p. 35.

[60] Beyer, op. cit., p. 34.

[61] T. V. Mallari, Tales from the Mountain Province (Manila: Philippine Education Co., 1958). p. 2-4.

[62] C. R. Moss, Nabaloi Tales, University of California Publications in American Archeology and Ethnology, Vol. 17, No. 5 (1924), p. 232.

The Negritos, the so-called aboriginal groups scattered in the remote hinterlands of the Philippines, believe in the Supreme Being as the creator of earth.[63] Their belief that earthquakes are caused by animals, as for instance, giant snake, or a crocodile-shaped creature or any of the like, is suggestive of element number (7) of the earth-diver myth, that is, the earth is rested on the back of an animal (the turtle).[64]

Discussion and Conclusion

Out of the different versions of the earth-diver myth in N. America, Asia, and the Pacific Islands, there are three essential elements which persist either alone or together all throughout. These are namely, the existence of the primeval sea (1); the diving for materiel from the bottom of this primeval sea (6); and the earth-world that emerged out of this materiel (7).

The primeval water seems to have a very eminent position in India while the sky-world appears to be more important in the N. American versions.[65] The Supreme God in India came out to the surface of the ocean on a tortoise back. In N. Asia and E. Europe these three essential elements are fully represented except for element number (6). In Mongolia, a version of the earth-diver myth was reported. In China, except for the element of the primeval water, only vague parallels can be traced. Nothing can be associated with the earth-diver myth elements in Tibet.

In Burma and Malaya, the essential elements of the myth occur, while it is not fully represented in the Southeast Asian archipelago (excepting the Philippines). The diving feature (element number 6) is not known in the Indonesian islands, but the "sky-borne" trait is prevalent. In the Pacific islands these materials were fished out from the sea, excepting the account from Tahiti which intrigues this writer. On the whole, the three essential elements of the earth-diver myth (1), (6), and (7) are disappearing in a progressive manner from the eastern fringes of mainland Southeast Asia down to the farther islands of the Pacific.

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[63] Marcelino N. Maceda, *The Culture of the Mamanua* (*Northeastern Mindanao*) *as compared with that of the Other Negritos of Southeast Asia* (Manila: Catholic Trade School, 1964), p. 113-5.

[64] In his survey, Maceda encounters no account about the existence of this belief among the most primitive Negrito groups, the Andamanese.

[65] Note, however, the importance of the primeval water in the Yuki (N. American Indian) origin myth: "Now that our Father (Taikomol) was about to come into existence, he who had been floating in a circle on the water like a down-feather...." [and then] "... In the beginning, there was no world, only a down-feather floating on the water, which was like an ocean...." See: A. L. Kroeber, "Yuki Myths" (*Anthropos* 27:905-939, 1932). p. 907-917.

According to Hatt,[66] the earth-diver myth had been distributed through cultural transmission. For this idea he has the support of other scholars. His assertion on the greater probability that the earth-diver myth originated from those peoples who were living in or near large inland water bodies is based on the fact that the divers in the story — boar (in the oldest Indian version), turtle, crawfish, beetle, ducks and other waterfowls, beaver, otter, muskrat, etc. — cannot be associated with wide deep oceans but rather with peaceful lakes and rivers. The wide dissemination of the myth among inland peoples in Asia and America, on the one hand, and its general disappearance or non-existence in the oceanic islands, on the other hand, become understandable in this context.

Hatt did not pinpoint the original location of the earth-diver myth. He simply suggested inland Asia. It could not originate in America because the distribution of the myth there is limited only to the northern continent, more strongly in the lake region and gradually disappearing in the southern areas where other creation motifs predominate. Had it originated in America, it could have disseminated even up to as far as the S. American continent. But already in C. America, the myth fades away completely.

In Asia, meanwhile, the myth is widely scattered from Siberia to India and from Burma to Indonesia and the Pacific Islands, although in the latter two areas, the essential elements are already disappearing.

The migration of the myth to America from Asia, possibly through the Bering Strait,[67] must have been during the pre-Columbian times and before the advanced cultural influences from C. America reached the northern continent. The southern Pacific route through Polynesia, which is the southern trans-Pacific route of prehistoric migrations, could not be suspected because here, as already stated, the elements of the earth-diver myth are already obscure.

It must have taken a long way for the myth to finally reach the American continent, considering the pace of movement of prehistoric men. Assuming that the earliest period of migration started during the late neolithic, the "birth" of the myth elsewhere in Asia may have been during the early neolithic or mesolithic period. It is quite tempting to correlate the birth of the earth-diver myth with the late mesolithic and the early neolithic dispersal of the agricultural tradition. In his theoretical

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[66] Hatt, op. cit., p. 35.

[67] Irving Rouse, "Recent Developments in American Archeology" in Anthony Wallace, ed., Man and Culture (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960). pp. 64-73; Erland Nordenskiold, Origin of the Indian Civilization in South America (Goteborg: Elanders Boktrijckeri Aktiebolag, 1931). p. 1.

discussions on the origin of agriculture, Sauer (1952)[68] postulated that the lowlands of Burma are the most favorable spot in Asia for the first agricultural discoveries and inventions which then characterized the beginnings of the neolithic age. He showed that the tradition of agriculture spread in three directions: one went on from Burma westward to India and on to Europe and Africa; another, northward to China and Japan; then, the third, downward to the SEA peninsula and then to the Philippines and the Indonesian archipelago and the Pacific.

The primeval water could correspond to the post-glacial mesolithic water bodies; the "creation of the earth" with the post-mesolithic geological formation of lands. The first domestication of plants and animals then ensued. It may be noted that most of the earth-diver myth versions were recorded from primitive agriculturists who are living remnants of the neolithic period, especially those who have not been so much influenced by the more advanced cultural traditions.

In spite of its very early beginnings, the earth-diver myth is not found nor well-represented in all the groups living within the same geographical areas where this myth is widely scattered. For this, Hatt explained that lacunae is an outcome of the "wanderings of active bearers of a tradition" or after the "motifs are dropped because they do not fit into the new cultural milieu."[69] For instance, Tibet and China, having been recipients of the Old Asiatic, religious-philosophical traditions of long ago. People in these areas then might have discarded or almost totally forgotten the possibly earlier mythical explanation of the origin of the universe.[70]

It is, however, still possible to encounter in China the earth-diver myth or some of its important elements among the more uninfluenced aboriginal inhabitants. In Tibet, the possibility is very slim though. Here, the people have completely "nature-rooted and nature-dominated ideas (that) revolved reverently and submissively around the powers and forces of their wild highland landscape."[71] These pose as a geographical inhibitions for the earth-diver myth to have persisted there, notwithstanding the Mongoloid ancestry of the Tibetans and their cultural connection with Assam and Burma[72] — places where earth-diver myth versions were recorded.

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[68] Carl O. Sauer, *Agricultural Origins and Dispersal* (New York: The American Geographical Society, 1952). p. 26.

[69] See summary of Hatt, *op. cit.*, published in *Anthropos*, Vol. 45 (1950), p. 885.

[70] The same thing may be also said of the aboriginal groups in India. The Nanga Baiga shows how Hindu philosophical speculations invaded their cosmogonic traditions. See Stephen Fuch, "Another Version of the Baiga Creation Myth", *Anthropos*, Vol. 47 (1952), pp. 607-609; cf. Jan de Vries, *The Problem of Loki* (Helsinki: Soumalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1933), p. 282f.

[71] Helmut Hoffman, *The Religion of Tibet* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961). p. 17.

[72] Jen Nai-Ch'iang, "Die Fandse: Fin Beitrag Zur Volkskunde Von Khan," *Folklore Studies,* Vol. 5, No. 1 (1946), p. 5.

As for the Southeast Asian archipelago and the Pacific islands, explanation on the disappearance of the earth-diver myth and the pre-valence of the "sky-borne" trait may have been already clear in the discussions above. As already stated, the earth-diver myth generally thrives among marginal cultivators living near inland water bodies. The early inhabitants (Polynesians and the Malayans) of these regions are well-known seafarers. The sky must have greatly inspired them in their maritime adventures. They depended upon favorable heavenly signs for their long voyages and dangerous encounters with the sea. Associating the sky with goodness and goodness with its logical source, the Malayo-Polynesians must have developed the notion that the sky is occupied with "people" who are sympathetic to them, hence, the strong persistence of the belief that the habitable earth came from the sky. From the standpoint of cultural diffusion, on the other hand, it is possible that the uranic elements in the myth (that is, the "sky-borne" trait) of the old inhabitants in the archipelago are of Iranian (or Old Asiatic Religion) influences. These influences spread into Southeast Asia side by side with the indigenous or Indian chtonic traits.

The Negritos who cannot be suspected as carriers of the earth-diver myth since they are culturally non-cultivators, believe that the world is a product of the creative powers of one Supreme Being. The world for them was created by God.[73] The reported belief that the earth rests on an animal's back[74] is quite revealing therefore. For al-though its occurrence is widespread among these groups, its absence among the Andamanese would mean that, among the Negritos, this element is borrowed instead of its being an original element. As such, it illustrates an early cultural blending of possibly two traditions: that of the "wanderers" and that of the "cultivators."

Turning our attention to the two earth-diver myth versions in the Philippines. The Negros version is not as much a problem as the one from Bohol. In Negros, there are still primitive groups, namely, the Bukidnons (Magahats) and the Negritos (Ata or Agta). The Negros version which was recorded in 1578, at a time when western influences were not yet felt nor had spread in the island (for that matter, the Philip-pines as a whole), may be considered as survival of those early inhabitants of the island. The combination of element numbers (6) and (7) in one character, King Manaul, in the story, suggests of the possible syn-thesis of two different cultural traditions, namely, the "Creation by the Supreme Being" of the Negritos and the "diving for the materiel from the sea" of the primitive cultivators (Bukidnons or Magahats). Another

73 Wilhelm Schmidt, *The Origin and Growth of Religion* (New York: The Dial Press Inc., 1935). p. 257-261.
74 Thompson considers this belief as an independent motif, A844. Thompson, *Motif-Index . . . op. cit.,* p. 165.

element, possibly coming from another tradition, perhaps Iranian, must have been adapted into the story. This is the "bringing up of the materiel (rocks) to the sky," thereby, adding into said materiel the "sky-borne" trait.

The cultural, geographical and historical situations which explain the existence of the earth-diver myth elements in Negros are not present in Bohol. But there are two possible explanations for the existence of recorded Bohol version. These are: (a) it was learned by the informant directly from early American folktale teacher or from an American-influenced native story-teller, may be during the early part of the American colonization in the Philippines, and was mistakenly recorded by the reporter (Pajo) as indigenous to the area;[75] or (b) the reporter has "lifted" the story, although not entirely literally, from the Wyandot (N. American Indian) version.[76] If it is the latter case, the

[75] I led a brief anthropological survey last May 1972, together with a number of graduate students of the University of San Carlos to make follow-up inquiries in Bohol on the earth-diver myth version, particularly in Duero, the municipality cited by Pajo where the myth was recorded. A member of the survey team was Prof. Pantaleon Maboloc, of the University of Bohol, who was working for his Ph.D. at USC. Then in his middle 60's, Mr. Maboloc was instrumental in guiding the team to the different places and persons where interesting anthropological data about the province were obtained.

The husband of the late Mrs. Pajo was very kind in showing us the original manuscripts where the informant of the earth-diver myth was named. The informant was a certain Oyang Pinanda living, according to the author, "just below the forest Verde of Duero." We could not, however, get precise information from Duero residents as to where and who this lady was. After a number of tries, I was advised to see the oldest man in Duero, residing in barrio Langkis. This was Mr. Cipriano (Panoy) Berro, an 80-year old man.

Like the others whom I interviewed, Mr. Berro could only relate the story of Adam and Eve. Another story which he insisted to narrate was about the peopling of Duero and the rest of the southern borders of the island by "small people" (Negritoids?) led by Dagohoy, (the Spanish time Hero who apparently turned out to be the culture hero of the Boholanos). I resorted to narrating the earth-diver myth version to Mr. Berro, but he confessed his ignorance of the story. Rather talkative, Mr. Berro instead told us about the Americans in the early 1900's. He was a pupil of a certain Mr. Maine in 1909. The following year, according to him, a certain Guilbert Perez was assigned as a supervisor and had his office in Duero. Still later, an American named Mr. Morey was assigned as a principal teacher in the Intermediate School in Duero.

I continued the investigations in Carmen, an inland municipality of Bohol. After intensive inquiries about known origin myths, legends and the like, among some old residents there, I finally got an unsolicited information from a retired teacher, Mrs. Ganade, who, in the desire to satisfy our curiousity, told us about an American textbook which pupils during her time used to read. Copies of this book were distributed by the first American teachers in Bohol in the early 1900's. Several copies, she said, are preserved in the library of Carmen Central School where she used to be in-charge of. She wanted to show these copies to us if just to get the exact title and other data, but she failed to do so for lack of time. This book contains folktale stories, among which is the earth-diver myth which Mrs. Ganade recalled to us by demonstrating the picture of the fallen girl in the story.

[76] There is another folkloristic story reported by Mrs. Pajo which was likewise cited by Demetrio (op. cit., p. 62). This story, written first in the same thesis containing the earth-diver myth version, was published in the Anthropos 1956. It was entitled, "The Ascension into Heaven, A Folktale from Bohol." This same story was reported to be plagiarized from Tranquilino Sitoy's "The Bukidnon

Bohol version contributes nothing to Philippine folklore nor to the advancement of folklore studies in the Philippines. On the contrary, it tends only to mislead the scholars in their efforts to understand old Philippine values and beliefs that are reflected in myths.

If it is the first case, however, then the Bohol version is an authentic myth which migrated from America to the Philippines as part of the deliberate attempt of the Americans to impose their culture upon the Philippine natives. The myth was introduced through formal classroom instructions mainly with the help of a written medium (books). But the story cannot be said to have gained roots in the oral tradition of the people in Bohol. Except for the alleged informant of Pajo, the living old residents in Duero and adjacent municipalities in Bohol do not seem to know the story though the story was introduced at about the time when these residents were in the grade school. The Bohol version may be, therefore, considered an authentic myth but it is, definitely, not a traditional Boholano myth.

There seems to be no possibility for the American-introduced earth-diver myth to attain traditionality in Bohol because the story had fallen into disuse soon after the American regime ended. It was subsequently forgotten even by those who had presumably undergone classroom studies in the early 1900's. This brings to mind the basic principle underlying the adoption and preservation of a particular myth. That is, the myth must be suited, one way or another, to the historical, cultural and environmental conditions where it is introduced. When the earth-diver myth was introduced in Bohol, the people there were already long-christianized and were thus imbued with the biblical teachings of the Christian Church. Besides, the Boholanos were no longer primitive agriculturists in the 20th century. They were civilized, wet-rice farmers; other were traders, bringing merchant goods to and from distant islands across the seas. Moreover, Bohol does not have wide fertile plains nor large inland water bodies but rolling, mountainous terrains with few flatland patches.

Our review of the recorded mythical versions from the population of Negros and Mindanao who are decidedly more "primitive" than the population of Bohol, does not only point to the apparent prehistoricity of the earth-diver myth elements in the Philippines. It has also validated another basic principle underlying the nature of myths. That is, the

Ascension to Heaven" published in the *Philippine Magazine,* Vol. 34, No. 10 (1937), pp. 445-446. See Manuel, *op. cit.,* 1963, p. 74; Manuel *op. cit.,* 1965, p. 58. In fairness to Mrs. Pajo, she wrote an explanation in the footnote of her original manuscript: *(The story was) Retold by the writer (Pajo) from various versions found in the province. A similar story was told by the one, Rufino Namoc, a Boholano who now lives in Gingoog, Misamis Oriental. It is possible that the same version is found there too, possibly brought by Boholanos who migrated there."

susceptibility of myths to undergo some kind of "blending" in their elements, especially so when the people cherishing said myths encounter significant events in their life, new environment, or new cultural influences which are not wholly incompatible with those characterized by the elements in the myths. Otherwise, instead of blending, the mythical element would be completely substituted for new ones as a result of the encounter or they would simply be forgotten by the folks.

Among the primitive agricultural groups in the Philippines, the earth-diver myth has lost much of its original elements. This is due, first of all, to the fact that these agriculturists were not, in the beginning, natives of the Philippines. They were migrants from mainland Asia, who had to undergo certain life adjustments as they moved from place to place. In the Philippines, they had to face an entirely new environment and had to coexist with the ethnic groups who came ahead of them: the aboriginal Negrito groups. During the ensuing millenia, advanced cultural groups arrived successively in the Philippines either in trickles or in large numbers. The first of these groups brought in influences possibly with traits of the old Asiatic religion. They were followed by carriers of the Dongson culture which flourished in North Vietnam. Later came the Hindu-Buddhist, and much later still, the Muslim followed by the Christian culture bearers.

The noticeable blending of cultural elements in the Negros and Mindanao mythical versions shows the compatibility of the primitive earth-diver myth with the old Asiatic, Dongsonian, Hindu and/or Buddhistic traditions. On the other hand, the absence of the earth-diver myth elements in the Christian and Muslim origin myths indicates the incompatibility of the earth-diver myth with the Christian and the Muslim belief systems. Whether this absence also proves the supremacy of the latter two systems over that of the primitive agriculturists is, however, another matter to be considered.

It may be a valid hypothesis to raise at this point that as long as the living primitive agriculturists in the Philippine hinterlands are still in relative control of their existing social, cultural and environmental situations, the traces of the earth-diver myth elements may remain as such in the folks' belief systems. An intensive, time series study focused along this line of inquiry may lead to an empirical understanding of the process of how myths are preserved or forgotten in the course of unavoidable socio-cultural and environmental changes; and how these myths perform their role as integral parts of the similarly unavoidable changes in the belief systems of the primitive folks. The same could be said of the other primitive groups in the surrounding countries in Asia. Though the original elements of the earth-diver myth in these countries

seemed to have undergone considerable blending and dropping out, especially upon the advent of the Christian and Muslim influences, traces of these elements would afford comparative analyses and make the study of the Philippine versions more meaningful. This study has to be done right away. The hinterland primitives are, like earth-diver, fast losing their stronghold in view of the steady powerful encroachment of modern culture into their backward territories.

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