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CONTENTS Page

The Record of an Envoy's Voyage to the West
John D. Frodsham 409

Pearl Buck and the Chinese Novel
George A. Cevasco 437

Asian Communist and the Problem of Nationalism
Allan Spitz 451

The 31st General Election in Japan:
Political Turning Point?
George Akita 458

Indian Elections and After
S. N. Ray 494

An Essay on the Political Functions of Corruption
James C. Scott 501

Economic and Technical Feasibility Study of
Cooperatives and Credit in Laos
Nathaniel B. Tablante 524

The Colonial Origins of Manila and Batavia:
Desultory Notes on Nascent Metropolitan Primacy
and Urban Systems in Southeast Asia
Robert R. Reed 543

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THE RECORD OF AN ENVOY'S VOYAGE TO THE WEST

J. D. FRODSHAM

KUO SUNG-T'AO (1818-91), THE FIRST CHINESE AMBASSADOR to England, is a figure of considerable interest in nineteenth-century Chinese history.[1] As a young man, Kuo had studied at the Yüeh-lu academy in Ch'ang-sha, where he became a close friend of Tseng Kuo-fan (1811-72), the most powerful statesman of the time. In 1847, after gaining his *chin-shih* or doctoral degree, Kuo was made a bachelor of the Han-lin Academy, the highest institute of Chinese letters, but was prevented from assuming office by the death of his parents, since officials were forbidden to take up their posts during a period of mourning. During the T'ai-p'ing rebellion, he distinguished himself by leading a force of volunteers to raise the siege of Wu-ch'ang in 1853. Later, in 1859, he assisted the famous Mongolian general, Seng-ko-lin-ch'in, (d. 1865), to build up the defences of Taku against the Anglo-French invaders. It was at this time that Kuo's shrewd assessment of the strength of the Western forces first became apparent, since he wrote to Sen-ko-lin-ch'in time and time again in a futile endeavour to persuade him that negotiations, not war, constituted the only effective way of dealing with the Europeans. "The foreigners are above all concerned with trade," he argued, "hence we should look for a way to deal with them accordingly and not confront them with arms."[2]

Shortly before the fall of Peking, in 1860, Kuo scandalized the guests at a social gathering by declaring that the barbarian problem could never be solved by force, but only through diplomacy.[3] Such sentiments, always

[1] Kuo's official biography is found in his collected works, *Yang-chih shu-wu ch'üan-chi* (30 *chüan,* 1892), XVI, pp. 1a-10b. His autobiography, *Yü-ch'ih lao-jen tzu-hsü* (*Autobiography of the Old Man of the Jade Pool*) is also an important source. Tu Lien-che has a brief biography of Kuo in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period,* ed. A.W. Hummel, 2 vols. (Washington, 1943). A useful short study is that by Immanuel C. Y. Hsü in *China's Entrance into the Family of Nations; the Diplomatic Phase 1858-1880* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 180-85. Other biographies are those of Yang Hung-lieh, "Chi Kuo Sung-t'ao ch'u-shih Ying Fa", in *Ku-chin,* XI (November 16, 1942), pp. 11-15; XII (December 1, 1942), pp. 23-32; and Yü Ch'ang-ho, "Kuo Sung-t'ao yü Chung-kuo wai-chiao," in *Yi-ching,* XXXI (1937), pp. 21-24. I wish to extend my thanks to Professor Liu Ts'un-yan, Head of the Department of Chinese, Australian National University, for his help with many points of my own study of Kuo.

[2] *Yü-ch'ih lao-jen tzu-hsü,* p. 8a.

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 10b.

highly unpopular, were positively dangerous to utter at a time when the enemy was almost at the gates of the capital and patriotic ardour was reaching unprecedented heights of bluster and verbiage. As Kuo's friend, Ch'en Chih-ho, President of the Board of War, warned him later, to make statements of this kind in public was to invite disaster upon himself. Nevertheless, Kuo stuck stubbornly to his views, for he was convinced from his own observation of the Europeans that they could only be handled effectively through the medium of international law and the treaty system. The withdrawal of the Allied armies from Peking after the signature of the treaties strengthened him in his convictions. For what other barbarians would have so readily quitted a capital which was entirely at their mercy, or left enthroned an emperor who had ignominiously fled before their advance?

In 1863 Kuo was appointed Acting-governor of Kuangtung, a post which brought him into direct contact with Westerners at Canton and so gave him further opportunities to study their peculiarities at close quarters. He was discharged from this post in 1866 — perhaps because of his pro-Western feelings—and for the next eight years was compelled to remain out of office. In 1875, however, at the time of the Margary affair, he was serving as Judicial Commissioner of Fukien, another province with a long history of contact with the West. Kuo's views on the way the Western Powers should be handled had already made him highly unpopular with his fellow officials. He now proceeded to add fuel to the flames by demanding the impeachment of Ts'en Yü-ying (1829-89), Governor-General of Yünnan and Kweichow, on the grounds that he had failed to take proper precautions to ensure Margary's safety. His real motive in making this move was simply to save Governor Ts'en from the much graver charge of having connived at Margary's murder: [4] but such subtlety was lost upon the Chinese gentry, who now turned against Kuo in fury, alleging that he was nothing less than a traitor to his country who was trying to curry favour with the Westerners and appease Sir Thomas Wade. In a short time the campaign against Kuo had mounted to such proportions that Wang K'ai-yün, the great Hunanese scholar, was moved to write in his *Diary of the Hsiang-yi Chamber*: "Most of us Hunanese feel very ashamed to be associated with Kuo." [5] When a Catholic cathedral was built in Ch'ang-sha, a place with

[4] *Yang-chih shu-wu ch'üan-chi,* Series I, "Memorials," XII, 1-2b: Hsü, *China's Entrance,* p. 182.

[5] Wang K'ai-yün, *Hsiang-yi-lou jih-chi* (1927), V.6. Wang (*loc. cit.*) also quotes two sets of verses satirizing Kuo's appointment as ambassador:

"He stands out among his contemporaries,
He climbs high above his peers.
Yet the nation of Yao and Shun
Cold-shoulders him.
Incapable of serving men

which Kuo had close connections, the local populace, convinced by the gentry that Kuo had conspired with the missionaries to bring this about, demonstrated against him and threatened to burn down his house. The irony of this was that Kuo was himself strongly opposed to Christianity, which, so his experience with the T'ai-p'ings had convinced him, was a menace to the very existence of the Confucian state.[6]

It was at this juncture that Li Hung-chang decided to convert the mission of apology to England, as demanded by the Chefoo Convention (September 13, 1876), into an embassy.[7] In casting around for an ambassador, his choice fell upon Kuo, who now found himself placed in a very difficult position. Diplomatic assignments, especially those of a humiliating nature demanding the presentation of formal apologies, were shunned by everyone, being looked upon as tantamount to exile. For Kuo to accept such a post, after the attacks that had been mounted upon him, was in popular opinion equivalent to an open admission of his complicity in Western designs against China. He knew well enough that to take on this assignment would irretrievably ruin his official career, such was the stigma attached to those who associated themselves with the West. Yet his profound sense of duty led him to accept this thankless task. Once indeed he did waver momentarily, begging to be allowed to resign from the mission, since he could no longer stand the fury of public condemnation which was steadily mounting against him. But in the end his burning conviction that no one else had the qualifications to undertake this task made him decide to see it through.

On December 1, 1876, the Embassy finally sailed from Shanghai on board the P & O steamer *Travancore*. From the moment he got on board, Kuo began to keep a journal in which he recorded his impressions of the brave new world he was entering. Keeping a journal constituted an important part of an ambassador's duties, for all Chinese envoys were under express orders from the court to record everything of interest that they saw. These diaries when complete, were to be sent back to Peking for the officials of the Tsungli Yamen to peruse. Only in this way, so it was believed, could reliable information about the ways of the Western barbarians be obtained. Kuo's diary, the *Shih-hsi chi-ch'eng* (*Record of an Envoy's Voyage to the West*) caused a tremendous hue and cry when it was published, because the views it expressed were so much at variance with those

---

How can he serve devils?
What does it avail him to leave
His native land?"

[6] Chin Liang, *Chin-shih jen-wu chih* (1934), p. 129.

[7] See Knight Biggerstaff, "The Establishment of Permanent Chinese Missions Abroad," *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, XX, 1 (April, 1936), pp. 27ff.

then prevailing among the Chinese scholar-gentry. The furor eventually reached such a pitch that the diary was banned and the blocks from which it had been printed were destroyed.[8] Fortunately, however, a few copies of this work survived the proscription; and later on, when a saner climate of opinion prevailed, it was printed as part of a collection of traveller's accounts of the West. The selections that follow, taken from this hitherto untranslated work, will suffice to give some indication of the perspicacity with which Kuo observed a totally alien civilization at a time when the eyes of all his contemporaries were clouded with ignorance, prejudice and hate.[9]

Record of an Envoy's Voyage to the West

Kuang-hsü, second year, tenth month, seventeenth day, *chia-ch'en* (Saturday, December 2nd, 1876):

Mai Hua-t'o (W. H. Medhurst)[10] informed me that the P & O steamer Ta-fan-k'uo-erh (*Travancore*) was due to depart at the first watch (11 p.m.-1 a.m.) on the eighteenth day.[11] At 2 p.m. it moved to its moorings at Hung-k'ou. I was informed that we should be on board in good time, for it happened that my friends would be assembled there. I had a great deal of business both public and personal to transact . . .

18th day (December 3rd):

Raining. We left our anchorage exactly at midnight [on the 2nd]. As we came down the coast of Chekiang the gale buffeted us around so violently that all of my suite were sick except four . . .

20th day (December 5th):

Passing the coast of Kuangtung. Between Shan-t'ou (Swatow) and Chieh-shih for several hundred *li* lies an unbroken chain of mountains. An

[8] Hsü, *China's Entrance,* p. 188.

[9] The text of *Shih-hsi chi-ch'eng* is found in *Hsiao fang-hu chai yü-ti ts'ung-ch'ao* (1891), XI, pp. 146a-159b. The writer has just completed an annotated translation of Kuo's whole journal, which is to be published next year by the Clarendon Press, Oxford.

[10] Sir Walter Henry Medhurst (1822-1885) son of the China missionary, Dr. Walter Henry Medhurst (1796-1857), was at this time British consul in Shanghai, a post he retired from a few weeks later on January 1, 1877.

[11] "Leaving per P & O steamer *Travancore* for Southampton, His Excellency Kwoh Sung-tao and suite, Dr. Macartney and Mr. W.C. Hillier" (*North China Herald,* December 1, 1876, p. 552). The *Travancore*, a vessel of 1185 tons, was on the P & O Shanghai to Bombay mail-run under the command of Captain W. Barratt. (See *North China Herald, loc. cit.*). The boat should have sailed at midnight on Thursday, but had been delayed for forty-eight hours at the express wish of Sir Thomas Wade, to allow the Embassy time to catch it.

The *Travancore* had been built in Scotland in August, 1867 and was a screw steamer with three decks and two casts. She was brig-rigged, with elliptic stern, was clench-built and had a female figurehead. Her dimensions were 281 ft. long, 35 ft. broad and 27 ft. depth in hold. She had two direct-acting engines of 400 h.p. built by John Key, Kircaldy. Her gross tonnage was 1899; 1185 tons register. The *Travancore* was lost off Cape Otranto, Southern Italy, in February 1880.

English iron-clad came up astern of us. The captain told me it was the flagship of Admiral Lai-te (Vice-Admiral A. P. Ryder).[12] When our vessel hoisted a flag, the warship also hoisted a flag, whereupon our vessel then lowered the flag. The man-of-war gradually increased its speed until it drew close to us, the two vessels then running side by side perhaps a hundred feet or more from each other. The man-of-war's crew all manned the yards and the ship's band struck up. When our vessel again hoisted a flag, the man-of-war turned its head across our bows and then passed in front of us. Our vessel stopped her engines and waited for a while before hoisting sail and proceeding on course at full speed.

I asked the captain the meaning of our hoisting the flag. He replied that this was to inform the other vessel that we carried an ambassador. I then enquired why that vessel also hoisted a flag. He told me that this was by way of reply: that is to say, a respectful acknowledgement that an ambassador was on board. I then asked why the flag was lowered. He told me that once they had conveyed the message the flag could be hauled down again. I enquired the reason as to why the man-of-war's crew manned the yards. He said that this was a mark of respect, much like drawing the men up in ranks, for after they have manned the yards they can be seen at a distance. The band is used for playing martial music to regulate the movement of the ranks. I then asked why the warship turned across our bows as she passed us, and was told that this was a salutation when a ship was under way. Our stopping the engines indicated that we were yielding precedence. How refined and civilized are these ceremonial courtesies of theirs! This is sufficient to indicate that the foundation of this nation's wealth and power was not acquired by mere chance.[13]

21st day (December 6th):

We reached Hong-kong, latitude 22.12 north, nine degrees nearer the equator than Shanghai. The climate was startingly different, so that everyone

[12] Vice-Admiral A.P. Ryder's flagship, H.M.S. *Audacious,* of 6,034 tons, was a barque-rigged, armour-plated, double-screw, iron ship. Admiral Ryder had been in command of the China fleet since August 31, 1874.

[13] Captain Barratt would have made no mean diplomat himself; for he succeeded in turning into an act of ceremonial courtesy what in fact was only a blunder on the part of the *Audacious,* as the following extract from Halliday Macartney's diary will make clear: "Today was a very pleasant one. The sea was nearly calm and the weather clear and agreeably warm. A steamer which had been seen during the whole morning turned out to be the *Audacious* iron-clad, the flagship of Admiral Ryder. She bore down on us on our showing the Ambassador's flag, and came quite near. For some time we thought she was going to send someone on board. We at one time thought she was going to man her yards, but it turned out she was only going to set sail. In doing this last she made some mistake and came right in front of us; and but for our having stopped our engines we should have run into her. Many speculations were ventured as to the cause of her making this strange movement, but none seemed so likely as that it was the result of mismanagement." Cited in D.C. de Cavanagh Boulger, *The Life of Sir Halliday Macartney* (London and New York, 1908).

was soon putting on thin cotton clothes. The English Rear-Admiral Lan-po-erh-te (Rowley Lambert) came to call on me at Government House. Once he had seen me, he was to sail home with the detached squadron under this command. As it was, they had merely been awaiting my arrival before setting sail.[14] The Governor of Hong-kong, His Excellency K'eng-erh-ti (Sir Arthur Edward Kennedy)[15] sent his Aide-de-Camp A-k'e-na-heng (Captain Cornelius O' Callaghan)[16] with a four-man sedan-chair to meet me. . . .

When I enquired about educational institutions, I found the Inspector of Schools in this colony, Ssu-chüeh-erh-te (Frederick Stewart),[17] was sitting there. He offered to show me round the [Goverment Central] school. After taking a little wine we went to the school, where I met Assistant Inspector (*sic*) Fa-na-keng-erh (Alexander Falconer).[18] These two gentlemen have the entire system of education in their hands. There are five halls altogether. Chinese literature—the Five Classics and the Four Books—along with contemporary literature are taught in three of these. There is one hall for European girls. European boys have one hall where they study the Five Classics and the Four Books. Every hall has a hundred pupils to each master. Where the Five Classics and the Four Books are taught, the master is a Chinese. European masters teach European subjects. Each hall is divided into ten classes, with a space in front of each. In every class there

[14] The detached or flying squadron under the command of Rear-Admiral Rowley Lambert, flagship H.M.S. *Narcissus,* also included the *Topaze, Newcastle* and *Immortalité.* The squadron did in fact leave for Singapore on the morning of December 6, 1876, but the *Narcissus* had an accident to her engines and was forced to return to Hong-kong the next day. See *The Times,* January 16, 1877, p. 6f.

[15] Sir Arthur Edward Kennedy (1810-83) had been knighted in 1868. After a long career in the colonial service, he became Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Hong-kong in 1872, holding that office until 1877, when he was made Governor of Queensland. G. B. Endacott, *A History of Hong-kong* (London, 1958), pp.160-169, gives a good account of Kennedy's career as Governor of Hong-kong. He concludes (p. 169); "The governorship of Kennedy was a period of quiescence and showed how much could be achieved by humane, common-sense administration. He had a balanced, friendly approach; he consulted the community, took pains to treat the Chinese with friendliness and was the first Governor to invite them to functions at Government House. . . ."

[16] Captain Cornelius O'Callaghan, of the First West India Regiment, was Private Secretary and Aide-de-camp to Governor Kennedy. He later accompanied him to Brisbane in that capacity. (*Hong-kong Directory, 1877: Whitacker's Almanack, 1880*).

[17] Frederick Stewart, M.A.LL.D. (1838-89) headmaster of the Government Central School and Inspector of Schools, Hong-kong, was a friend of James Legge's, who mentions him in his preface to the Chinese Classics, vol. III, part I (Hong-kong, 1865), as one of his proof-readers. He spoke fluent Cantonese. On the subject of the Government Central School (this being the name by which Queen's College was known from its foundation in 1862 until 1889) see Gwenneth Stokes, *Queen's College (1862-1962),* (Hong-kong, 1962). For schools in Hong-kong during this period, see G. B. Endacott and A. Hinton, *Fragrant Harbour* (Hong-kong, 1962), pp. 136-141.

[18] Alexander Falconer (d.1888), had been Second Master at the Government Central School since 1874. (Stokes, *Queen's College,* p. 55).

are long desks which can seat ten or more pupils. They are graded in rows, rising towards the back of the class. In front and directly facing the class sits a master. There is another master sitting in the middle of the rows to the left and right of him. The idea is that he can see and hear everything; so not a single boy can escape from or gloss over his work. The Five Classics and the Four Books each have their alloted time for study. There is a limit set for the study of verse, namely one lesson every five days. This is called a minor subject. This is as much as to say that, being an art of little importance, one lesson in five days is enough. The rules are well thought-out and severe and the viewpoint [of those who make them] is far-sighted. It would appear that the Europeans have inherited something of the ancients' ideal of forming and nourishing the talents of their pupils. ...

I remember that in the year *kuei-hai* of the *Hsien-feng* (*sic*) period (1863-64),[19] when I came this way by sea to take up my post as Governor at Canton, the houses I saw in Hong-kong numbered scarcely a third of those today. Now, more than ten years later, streets run in all directions and tall buildings stand everywhere. It has become a veritable metropolis, with what must now be over 130,000 inhabitants.[20] There are six thousand European households. Two forts stand there, one on the east side, one on the west. Two ironclads are stationed there, one called *Ao-ta-hsi-a-ssu* (*Audacious*), the other *Fei-tuo-erh-jih-man-nu-erh* (*Victor Emmanuel*).[21] The latter is the name of the ruler of Italy which the English bestowed on this vessel in his honour. This evening an English merchant paddle-steamer while anchoring struck our vessel with a noise like thunder, destroying ten feet of our stern lights and cutting in two a small boat that was hanging on our stern. The lights were rather high, so no water came in. An envoy on shipboard is certainly in a perilous plight!

22nd day (December 7th)

We remained another day in Hong-kong to repair the damage to the ship. The Governor, Sir Arthur Kennedy, came in the company of Lo Po-sun (Sir Daniel Brooke Robertson)[22] to pay me a return visit. When I referred in conversation to the completeness of the school regulations, the Governor remarked with a sigh that these pupils were all the sons of poor families;

[19] Kuo became Acting-governor of Kuangtung in 1863: but this was during the *T'ung-chih* period, not the *Hsien-feng*.

[20] The population of Hong-kong in 1876, according to the demographers Behm and Wagner, was 121,985. See *the Times* December 13, 1876, p. 6c.

[21] The *Victor Emmanuel* was a wooden sailing-vessel of 5,157 tons, according to *Whitaker's Almanack*, and not an iron-clad. It was receiving ship, Hong-kong; captain George W. Watson.

[22] Sir Daniel Brooke Robertson (d.1881) had been one of the original vice-consuls appointed to China in 1843, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Nanking. He served at Ningpo, Amoy, Canton and Shanghai.

so that after two or three years study, when their education was only partially complete, they would all too often leave of their own accord to look for a living. As a result, very few of them completed the course. This led to a discussion on European methods being characterized by an undeviating impartiality. An instance of this was prison discipline in the colony, where criminals were treated alike, no matter what their nationality. I asked if I might go to visit the prison. The Governor gladly agreed, instructing Captain O'Callaghan to bring a sedan-chair to meet me. Sir Brooke Robertson was to accompany me.

The prison was administered by a Chief Jailer and an Assistant Jailer. The Assistant, Mr. Ta-mo-sen (*sic!*) (G. L. Tomlin) [23] conducted me through the building on arrival. There are three stories, the heaviest offenders being placed in the upper storey. In the lowest storey each prisoner has a cell to himself. In the upper storey there are three men to one cell. All the prisoners have their doors bolted. Each cell is self-contained, either standing alone or else facing another one. All the cells have iron bars and doors that lock. In each of them is a small wooden settle, one for each person. Quilts, mattresses, blankets, towels, brooms, bowls, plates and other things are all provided. Every day quilts and blankets must be meticulously arranged on the settle. If anyone fails to do this, his rations are cut down. The prisoners include over thirty Europeans, Filipinos and Indians, besides some five hundred and fourteen Chinese. As well as these, there are people who have been fined amounts from four or five dollars up to two hundred dollars. Prisoners do not remain in prison for the same length of time. Some serve long sentences of five or seven years: some serve short sentences of only five days: some are confined there for life. There are three categories of treatment. Some spend their time in close confinement: some spend a long period weaving rugs: others have to carry stones and cannon-balls. Those who carry cannon-balls are divided into three groups—Europeans, Filipinos and Chinese. All of them are in squads under military discipline, the file being composed of five men, sometimes of ten. The work is carried on for two periods a day. The carrying of stones is for those who have committed lighter offenses. ...

Outside the prison is a wash-place where every man has to wash once a day. Inside there is a chapel where religious service is held once a week. The prisoners sit round in a ring and listen to sermons. There is a hospital for the treatment of the sick, under the management of a physician. There is another hall for preparing for burial those who have died of disease. Be-

[23] Text reads 森 *sen*, which is clearly a graphic error for 林 *lin*. G.L. Tomlin was Acting Superintendent of Victoria Gaol at that time. (*Hong-kong Directory*, 1877; *Colonial Office List*, 1877).

sides this, there is a punishment hall. The whole place was sprinkled, swept and spotlessly clean; even the floors were polished with rosin. Not only were there no foul odours, but the men themselves were so clean one forgot that this a prison. ...

28th day (December 13th):

Raining. At 11 a.m. we reached Singapore, in latitude 1.20 north, after a run of 720 *li*. Early in the morning we passed an island with a lighthouse on it, named Horsburgh. Horsburgh was one of the first European adventurers to come to China.[24] Dr. Macartney informed me that our (naval) paddle steamer *Yang-wu* had already arrived at Singapore. ...[25]

After this, I went off to Government House, accompanied by the Second Ambassador, Liu,[26] and Councillor Li.[27] Here we saw Sir William Jervois[28] with his Lady[29] and their two daughters. He was much more

[24] John Horsburgh (1762-1836), hydrographer, is best known as the author of the *India Directory, or directions for sailing to and from the East Indies, China, New Holland, Cape of Good Hope, Brazil and the interjacent ports,* 2 vols. (London, 1809-11). The foundation stone of the lighthouse which bears his name was laid on May 24, 1850.

[25] The *Yang-wu* (1,393 tons) was the seventh of the ships built by the Foochow shipyard. Launched in 1872, she was an unarmoured wooden corvette of 250 h.p. with 13 muzzle-loading guns. From 1875 onwards she was in use as a trainer to the South Seas and Japan. She was sunk by the French on August 23, 1884, in the battle of Ma-wei. See John L. Rawlinson, *China's Struggle for Naval Development 1839-1895* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967) *passim.* The *Straits Times* commented on the *Yang-wu's* arrival in Singapore on December 9, 1876, from Hong-kong bound for Calcutta: "We have, too, a Chinese man-of-war which purposes going on a long cruise, in our harbour, and which is manned by Chinamen, the Commander and the Engineer being Englishmen. The Celestials, we are glad to see, are advancing." (Editorial, *Straits Times,* December 16, 1876).

[26] Liu Hsi-hung, style Yün-sheng, Kuo's associate envoy, was a xenophobe and arch-reactionary strongly opposed to everything Western. His position as associate ambassador—a peculiarly Chinese post—was not recognized by the British government. Hence in May, 1877 Liu was made minister to Germany, a position he held for just over a year. His diary, the *Ying-yao jih-chi* (*Journal of a Voyage to England*), reveals his distaste for Europe most markedly.

[27] Li Shu-ch'ang, style Ch'un-chai (1837-97) was third councillor to the Mission. After spending four years in Great Britain, France, Germany and Spain, he was appointed Minister to Tokyo in October 1881.

[28] Major-(later Lieutenant-) General Sir William Francis Drummond Jervois, R.E., G.C.M.G., C.B., F.R.S., (1821-97), was commissioned in the Royal Engineers in 1839, soon making a name for himself as an expert on fortifications and the strategic outposts of the Empire. Between 1863 and 1872 he reported on the defences of Canada, Nova Scotia, Bermuda, Malta, Gibraltar, Aden, Perim, Rangoon, Moulmein, Bombay and the Hooghly. In April 1875 he was appointed Governor of the Straits Settlements, a post he held until July 1877, when he became Governor of South Australia (1877-82). From 1882-89 he was Governor of New Zealand. (C.D. Cowan, *Nineteenth-Century Malaya* (London, 1961), p. 225, gives a brief biography of Jervois. He describes him as "an ambitious man with a brilliant career behind him and a reputation for getting things done." On his record as an administrator in Malaya, see Cowan, *op. cit.,* pp. 225-32 and 238-43. Interestingly enough, Jervois was in favour of allowing Chinese immigration to Australasia, a policy becoming increasingly unpopular in Australia at the time. His pro-Chinese sentiments seem to have been reflected in his genial reception of our Ambassadors.

[29] Lady Jervois, née Lucy Norsworthy (d. March 17, 1895); married since March 19, 1850. She bore two sons and three daughters.

affable in his bearing than Governor Kennedy. His Lady is very intelligent and most sympathetic in her enquiries.

When Mo-li-ya-ssu (Colonel W. K. McLeod)[30] the Officer Commanding the Troops, returned, I went over to the fort with him. Two tiers of fortifications have been constructed along the hill, with the general headquarters and four rows of barracks between them, each capable of holding over one hundred men. There are two sets of married quarters to house the officers and men with families. Behind the barracks are the kitchens, two armouries, a mess-hall, a reading room and a military hospital. There are ten large guns, each in its own strong point, and a powder magazine. Small guns, each on its own gun-carriage, are placed at the corners of the walls. A large telescope stands in front of the highest part of the wall before the headquarters, in a building of its own. This is used for keeping watch on the distance. The construction and layout of the place is entirely different from that of Chinese forts.[31]

The troops are divided into artillery and infantry. The infantry all carry foreign-style rifles to assist the artillery. The Artillery Commander is called Mi-ko-erh-ssu (Brevet-Colonel O. H. Nicolls).[32] The Infantry Commandant is call Lin-chih (Lieutenant-Colonel W. W. Lynch).[33] Their duties are equivalent to those of a Major in the Chinese forces. The troops are divided into two categories. The upper ranks receive one Straits dollar every three days, equivalent to .24 taels of our money a day. The lower ranks receive one Straits dollar every four days, equivalent to .18 taels a day. Married officers receive an allowance for their families. The sol-

[30] The Honorable W. K. McLeod was Officer Commanding the Troops, Singapore. (*The Singapore Directory of the Straits Settlements,* Singapore, 1877).

[31] The construction of Fort Canning was begun in May 1859, on the hill originally called Bukit Larangan, and completed in 1861. John Cameron gives the following description of it as it appeared in 1864: "Fort Canning is a redoubt, following the contour of the top of Government Hill, which stands near the center of the town about half a mile back from the beach. The hill rises abruptly from the level land around. . . . Its apex is of considerable extent, the ramparts measuring nearly 1,200 yards. It mounts at present seventeen heavy pieces, namely, seven 68-pounders, eight 8-inch shell guns, and two 13-inch mortars; there are also in course of construction, platforms for eight more heavy pieces. Besides these, the ramparts of this fort are furnished with a number of 14-pound carronades. Within the ramparts are barracks, hospital and accommodation for 150 European artillerymen." (*Our Tropical Possessions in Malayan India,* London, 1865, pp. 240-41). See also *One Hundred Years of Singapore,* ed. by W. Makepeace, Gilbert E. Brooke and Roland St. J. Braddell, 2 vols. (London, 1921), vol. 1, p. 378. Fort Canning formed part of a defence system, inspired partly by local disturbances, partly by fears aroused since the Indian Mutiny, (1857), which was designed "rather for the safety of the European residents... than for defence against an outside enemy." (Cameron, *op. cit.,* p. 242).

[32] Brevet-Colonel O.H. Nicholls, R.A., commanded the 9th Battery, 2nd Brigade of the Royal Artillery, Straits Settlements, at this time. (*Singapore Directory,* 1877).

[33] Lieutenant-Colonel William Wiltshire Lynch, 1/10 Foot, was commandant, Straits Settlements, Singapore. See *ibid.*

diers' families support themselves through their own efforts by taking in washing and acting as seamstresses. Such is the fort on the north side of the hill, overlooking the town. There is yet another fort on the south side.

29th day (December 14th):

Raining, and thundery. Governor Jervois again sent a carriage for me and despatched his interpreter, Pi Ch'i-lin (W. A. Pickering),[34] to accompany me. We first went out to the *Yang-wu*. The crew all manned the yards and a salute was fired. When we went on board, the Naval Instructor La-k'o-ssu-mo (Captain Luxmore),[35] an Englishman, went to great pains to explain everything to us. He conducted us to his school-room where he has twenty pupils under training. After this there was a display of gunnery and the marines were put through their drill. When we left they again manned the yards and fired a salute for us. ...

On our way back we dropped in at the Law Courts, where the Judge, Fei Li-pu (Sir Theodore Ford)[36] was on the bench hearing a case. [Liu] Yün-sheng and I sat down by his side. The judge's bench is shaped like a platform raised five feet up from the floor. Below this is a long bow-shaped table, where two solicitors have their places while record-clerks and interpreters sit around it. At a higher level, two wooden enclosures stand on either side. Here, I believe, the witnesses take the stand. Inside are eight small stools where those under cross-examination sit while they are waiting. A railing marks off the court so that spectators can look on. There is no flogging and corporal punishment in court, yet the lay-out of the whole court is orderly and severe and no undue noise is heard.

11th month, 6th day (December 21st):

Our run at noon was 864 *li*: latitude 5.40 north. After sailing another 219 *li* we reached Ceylon.

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[34] William Alexander Pickering (1841-1907) had been appointed Chinese Interpreter to the Straits Settlements Government in 1871. In 1874 he was appointed a Police Magistrate and played an important part in the negotiations leading up to the Pangkor Treaty (20 January, 1874). In May 1877, Pickering was appointed Protector of Chinese Immigration, a post he held until July 1888, when he was forced to retire on medical grounds as a result of an attack by a member of the Ghee Hok Society, one Choa Ah Sia. Cowan, *Nineteenth-Century Malaya*, p. 181, remarks on Pickering's "outstanding work" and his "remarkable personal gifts." For his biography see R. N. Jackson, *Pickering: Protector of Chinese* (Oxford, 1965).

[35] Captain Luxmore is mentioned in the *Straits Times*, December 16, 1876 as Captain of the *Yang-wu*.

[36] Sir Theodore Thomas Ford (1829-1920) was called to the Bar at the Middle Temple in 1866 and was appointed to the Straits Bench in 1874. He became Chief Justice in 1886, was knighted in 1888 and retired in 1889. For an account of his work in Singapore, see Roland St. J. Braddell, "Law and the Lawyers," in *One Hundred Years of Singapore*, vol. I, pp. 214-15.

The Judge of this territory, Lu-ssu-ma-li-k'uo (A. H. Roosmalecocg)[37] and the Colonel (?) K'o-la-erh-k'o (Clarke?)[38] had been given instructions by the Governor, K'o-lei-ka-li (Sir W. H. Gregory)[39] to arrange for us to go to a government residence[40] for a short time. Because there was a lot to be done on board, I declined the offer. The ship had anchored at a place called Galle, where an arm of the sea branches into the land, on the extreme west of the south coast of Ceylon. The Governor resides at Colombo, 240 *li* distant. ...

7th day (December 22nd):

At the fifth watch (7-9 a.m.) we went aboard the P & O steamer *Pei-hsia-wa-erh* (S.S. *Peshawur*), a vessel about double the size of the *Travancore,* built just on two (*sic*) years ago.[41] The captain, whose name was Huai-te (Captain C. A. White),[42] told me that Peshawur and Travancore were the names of two Indian provinces, one in the extreme north, the other in the extreme south. Europeans are fond of giving names like this to their ships. The P & O agent, Pu-lai (Captain Bayley),[43] came to meet us on shore. A salute of fifteen guns was then fired from the fort. This is how Europeans receive Ambassadors. When we arrived at the judge's residence a military secretary, Tan-pu-lai (F. B. Templer),[44] sent by the Governor to receive us, was waiting there. He came with us to look at Buddhist temples nearby

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[37] A. H. Roosmalecocq had been Acting District Judge, Galle, since May 1873. (*Colonial Office List,* 1877).

[38] Unidentifiable.

[39] Sir William Gregory (1817-1892) had taken up his duties as Governor of Ceylon in 1872. He is considered one of the island's best governors (see H.A.J. Hulugalle, *British Governors of Ceylon,* Colombo, 1963), especially in view of his work in restoring the ancient tanks or irrigation reservoirs. He is probably better known to most readers as the husband of the Lady Gregory (née Augusta Perse), celebrated by W.B. Yeats and George Bernard Shaw.

[40] This was actually the Oriental Hotel. See *North China Herald,* January 18, 1877, p. 66. "The Chinese Ambassador landed at 11 with eight attendants. He was received by the officials with a guard of honour and a salute of fifteen guns. He drove from the Jetty to the Oriental Hotel, accompanied by the District Judge. His Excellency visited the Jail, the Hospital and the Buddhist Temple, with the Government Agent and the Mudaliyar. He lunched at the Oriental Hotel and re-embarked at three o'clock." (Galle, December 22, 1876. Reuter Political Telegram).

[41] The *Peshawur* had been built in Scotland in December 1871 and underwent her trials on February 9, 1872. She was a screw-steamer with four decks, three masts, schooner-rigged, round stern and was clincher built. She was 378 ft. long, 42 ft. broad and had 33 feet depth in hold. She had two compound engines, inverted cylinders, of 600 horsepower. Her gross tonnage was 3,871. She served twenty-eight years with the P & O before being sold to an Indian Company. (Information contained in letter from the P & O Public Relations Office, London).

[42] Captain White retired from the Company's service in 1879. (Information in a letter from the P & O Public Relations Office, London).

[43] Captain Bayley, the P & O agent in Galle, was a well-known local character who lived in a house on one of the off-shore islands, the "*Villa Marina*", which was famous for its setting. See Ernst Haeckel, *A Visit to Ceylon* (London, 1883), pp. 178-79.

[44] F.B. Templer had been government agent, Southern Province, since June 1868.

and inspect a prison under the jurisdiction of the judge. A local officer, T'i-li-si-la-wa (Da Silva),[45] was appointed to guide us around.

Though the prison is inferior in model to that of Hong-kong, it is just as clean. The main prison has eight sections, each capable of holding 17 or 18 prisoners. During the day these are all set to work under overseers. Those criminals who have committed serious offences are securely confined in a separate building, one man to each cell. The women's prison is a separate building with two sections, each capable of holding 17 prisoners. There is also a prison hospital. . . .

The island of Ceylon is over 1,000 *li* in circumference; Galle lies at its westernmost point. A fort stands there, with four hundred soldiers in it, under the command of Colonel Clarke (?). By now I had been roaming around for half the day yet had not set eyes on a single Chinese. Da Silva pointed out to me a house with an upper storey. This, he said, had once been the palace of a former king and had recently been sold to a merchant. When I asked why the king's palace should be put up for sale, he told me that the family was poor. I asked how it had come about that the palace was surrounded by a huddle of dwellings belonging to the common people, and was told that since the country was governed by the English the king had lost his power and merely occupied the royal palace. When I asked where the king had gone, Da Silva could not tell me.[46]

Europeans colonize other countries with the intention of settling there and making a profit. All they do they plan with wisdom and strength, so that they monopolize power and roll up the country like a mat. Yet they do not have to overthrow the royal house in order to extinguish the state. Hence they take the country without specially relying on military strength. This is, in truth, a policy which was unknown in past ages.

Today we weighed anchor at the tenth watch (5-7 p.m.), in a high wind.

8th day (December 23rd):

Our run at noon was 624 *li*; latitude 6.49 north. In conversation with Hsi Tsai-ming (W. C. Hillier),[47] we got on to the subject of the Dutch

[45] Unidentifiable. But this person must have been the Mudaliyar mentioned in note 40 above.

[46] This garbled story would seem to refer to the "Queen's House," a residence dating from A.D. 1687, which was used by governors of Ceylon when they visited Galle. Da Silva is presumably referring to the sale of this property by Sir William Gregory shortly after the latter assumed office. See H.A.J. Hulugalle, *British Governors of Ceylon*, p. 114.

[47] Walter Caine Hillier (1849-1927), then a Second Class Assistant to the British Legation in Peking, was acting as Foreign Secretary to the Mission.

war in Sumatra.[48]

The local chiefs, the sultans, who had suffered from the Dutch invasion, tried to raise troops and put up a resistance. From this the conversation turned to the Dutch and their colonies in the South Seas. Their rule was characterized by harsh taxation, which was used for the benefit of the mother country.[49] The English do not behave like this. The taxes they levy on a country are spent on that country. So the yearly revenue from India and Australia, which amounts to more than 100 million pounds, is spent entirely on those countries and on nowhere else. It is used for cutting canals, making roads and setting up schools. Using the wealth of the country for that country's own good ensures that all the people have a share in it and thus breeds no resentment. It is because of this that every petty kingdom in Sumatra would be happy to present their country to the English; but none of them wants to be joined to Holland. I said that though the taxes in Europe are ten times heavier than those in China, Europeans make a point of drawing profits from trade and commerce. They set up ports so that their people may grow wealthy from settling there and exchanging commodities over a distance of ten thousand *li*. Profit and loss, success and failure, are all identified with the prosperity and decline of the mother-country. It is because of this that these countries are so stable.

Dutch income always falls short of expenditure. When the sultans revolt, they lack the military strength to suppress them by force, and so have for long been unable to pacify the country. In this respect, their rule is far inferior to the way in which England has subdued Indian Delhi and the other states. The strength of a country makes all the difference.

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[48] The Atjeh war had broken out in March 1873 because of the piracy of the Atjenese, which could no longer be tolerated once navigation through the Straits of Malacca had increased after the opening of the Suez Canal, especially as "under the treaty of 1824, the Dutch Government could be held responsible for any damages resulting from Atjenese piracy". See Bernard H.M. Vlekke, *Nusantara* (Cambridge, Mass. 1944), pp. 297-302. The best general work on this war, which dragged on to the end of the century, is that of C.D.E.J. Hotz, *Beknopt geschiedkundig overzicht van den Atjèh-oorlog* (Leiden, 1924).

[49] Hillier's comments on the Dutch taxation system in the Indies have more than a grain of truth in them. In 1867 the total income of the Indies Government amounted to about 137,500,000 guilders, of which nearly fifteen million were sent back to the Dutch Treasury. Taxes brought in 25,599,000 guilders. Ten years later, in 1877, income from taxes had increased to 35,000,000 guilders. The budget however closed with a loss of 4,239,000 guilders. On this Vlekke comments: "[this was] a deficit for which the government in the Netherlands was partly responsible, for even while he saw the deficit coming, the acting Minister of Finance had managed to siphon off for the home country two and a half million guilders from the Indies treasury." (Vlekke, *Nusantara*, pp. 291-292). Vlekke goes on to comment that "three fourths of the taxes were paid by the Indonesians, and these had little with which to pay." (*Ibid.*, p. 292).

11th day (December 26th):

Our run at noon was 814½ *li;* latitude 10° 11' 12" north. Yao drew my attention to a passage in the *Chung-kuo kuan-hsi lüeh-luan* [*A Brief Discussion of China's Relations with Foreign Countries*] in 4 *chüan,* by Lin Lo-chih (Rev. Young John Allen), the American writer.[50] This dealt with the eight-articled "Memorandum on the Missionary Question" of the Tsung-li Yamen,[51] the contents of which are severe, but clear and detailed. I read them with a sigh. In the past, when I discussed the Roman Catholic religion with Wen Wen-chung-kung,[52] he considered it a very serious source of

[50] Young John Allen (1836-1907) was a well-known American Methodist missionary, who had first arrived in China in 1860. He was active as an educator and tireless as a translator, with some ninety or so works translated into Chinese to his credit. In 1868 he founded the *Chiao-hui hsin-pao,* a weekly review for circulation among the Christian Chinese, which was later expanded into the *Wan-kuo kung-pao* (*The Globe Magazine,* later called *Review of the Times*), which appeared weekly from 1875-83 and monthly from 1889-1907. As J.K. Fairbank puts it: "... this journal, ably edited by Chinese scholars, presented in literary Chinese a wide selection of Western ideas and information, including Timothy Richard's proposals for remaking China. It became in fact one source of the Reform Movement of the late 1890's." (*East Asia: The Modern Transformation,* p. 364).

[51] This must refer to the circular letter and eight draft regulations, aimed at reducing the power of the missionaries, put out by the Tsungli Yamen on February 9, 1871, after the Tientsin Massacre. The articles, briefly summarized, recommended the implementation of the following measures:

(1) The abolition of Catholic orphanages.
(2) A prohibition forbidding Chinese women to enter foreign churches and female missionaries to work in China.
(3) The placing of all missionaries under the control of Chinese officials.
(4) Missionaries not to be allowed to conceal or protect converts who are guilty of crimes.
(5) French missionaries to be allowed to travel only within their own specified district. Holders of missionary passports to be excluded from disaffected areas.
(6) Only persons without a criminal record to be received as converts; any convert committing an unlawful act to be fortwith expelled from the Church.
(7) Missionaries to adhere faithfully to Chinese institutions and customs.
(8) Before erecting buildings or making property transactions, missionaries must lay the matter before the local authorities to make sure that local geomantic conditions are not disturbed.

Since these demands were aimed chiefly at Catholic missionaries, most Protestant missionaries—like Young John Allen—did not find them objectionable. On these proposals put forward by the Tsungli Yamen, see Paul A. Cohen, *China and Christianity* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), pp. 247-61.

[52] Wen-hsiang (1818-76), posthumous name, Wen Wen-chung-kung, was a Manchu, a member of the Gualgiya clan in Mukden. His family belonged to the Manchu Plain Red Banner. He became a *chü-jen* in 1840 and gained his *chin-shih* degree in 1845. His exemplary conduct during the Taiping rebellion brought him to the notice of his superiors, who soon secured his promotion. By 1855 he had become an official of the third grade, and by 1859 had reached the rank of vice-president of the Board of Revenue. In 1860, when the Allies occupied Tientsin during the Anglo-French war with China, Wen-hsiang was one of the three officials in charge of peace negotiations. After the departure of the allies, Wen-hsiang and his two colleagues submitted a memorial recommending the establishment of the Tsungli Yamen, or "Office for General Administration" of China's Foreign Relations (January 13, 1861). In 1861 the Tsungli Yamen was set up, with Wen-hsiang acting as one of the controlling board. In 1865,

trouble, especially in Kweichow and Szechwan. This trouble assuredly springs from the conduct of the government officials there, who are so in want of regular procedure that any course they adopt is counteracted. This has been going on for so long that the practice has become firmly established, and it is now quite impracticable to try to put government orders into effect. For example, after the Tientsin affair, discussions were held with the representatives of the various [European] states to try to find some way of making sensible regulations governing their activities, so that we could patch things up a bit and save the situation. Wen-chung-kung told me that written drafts had been drawn up and submitted to the various countries, only to have them treated with complete indifference. This was the Memorandum in question.

I find that the religion of the Lord of Heaven [Roman Catholicism] dates from the time of Moses. The religion gets its name from Jesus Christ. Several hundred years afterwards, the Islamic religion of Arabia arose. More than a thousand years later, Lu-te (Martin Luther) founded the Western [Protestant] religion, and the religion of Jesus became even more prosperous. The Greeks also established their own interpretation, thus forming the Greek Orthodox Church. Both these doctrines stem from Moses. Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, both of which emanate from Jesus, are at loggerheads with each other. Thus the Roman Pope explains the origin of Catholicism, pointing to its wide extension and antiquity as an argument favouring the propagation of this religion, which is his own devotion. The Protestants do the same. Among the religions of Europe there are those that are held in common by both ruler and people, while in other countries ruler and people are of different religions, each venerating his own gods and not interfering with anyone else. Only China enjoys the religion of the Sages, which is comprehensive and subtle and sets up no territorial limits. Hence Buddhism, Roman Catholicism and Islam have been disseminated throughout China; and neither their rites, their beliefs nor the open profession of these religions has been forbidden (*sic*).

At the beginning of the T'ang dynasty, the worship of Hsien-shen which is mentioned in the tablet concerning the dissemination of Nestorian-

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he was given the task of putting down banditry in Manchuria, an assignment which he carried out with complete success. On his return to Peking in 1866 he was appointed President of the Board of Civil Office. In 1871 he was made an Associate Grand Secretary and in 1872 became Grand Secretary. In his biography of Wen-hsiang (in Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period*), Fang Chao-ying characterizes him as "one of the enlightened officials of the time" who "won the respect of foreign diplomats by his straight-forwardness and honesty." W.A.P. Martin speaks very highly of him in his *A Cycle of Cathay* (3rd ed. New York, 1900, p. 17).

ism, was already in existence.[53] The monk, Ching-ching,[54] explains this religion arose in Fu-lin (Byzantium), which means that it stems directly from Moses. The tablet says: "He [God] set out the figure of ten [the cross] in order to establish the ultimate."[55] Such is the origin of the Roman Catholic custom of setting up crosses. During the *Wan-li* period (1573-1620) of the Ming, Li Ma-tou (Matteo Ricci)[56] came out east and Hsü Kuang-ch'i gave his house for a Roman Catholic chapel.[57] The religion was propagated throughout the empire, yet did no harm. At the beginning of the *Yung-cheng* period (1723-1736), laws were made for the suppression of this religion and it was prohibited.[58] Thirty years ago the prohibition of Roman Catholicism was revoked.[59] France, which regards the Roman Catholic faith as an ancestor, sought to win fame by taking the part of this religion, relying on her authority and power to protect it.[60] Thereupon robbers, bandits and scoundrels hid themselves among the Catholics so that they could defy the laws of the government. So the power of the priests began to extend itself. During the *Tao-kuang* (1821-1851) and *Hsien-feng* (1851-1862) periods, the government administration in Kwei-

[53] The Nestorian tablet found near Sian in Shensi, in 1625, in a spot where it had lain buried for some eight hundred years, commemorates the arrival of the Nestorian missionary A-lo-pen in Ch'ang-an in 635 A.D. The tablet itself dates from 781. After its discovery, the tablet was set up north of the Ch'ung-jen monastery, outside the west gate of Sian. Here it remained until 1907. For a translation of the inscription, see A.C. Moule, *Christians in China Before the Year 1550* (London, 1930), pp. 34-52.

[54] Ching-ching was the Chinese name of Adam, a Persian monk of the Ta-ch'in monastery, who recorded the inscription. See Moule, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 35.

[56] Matteo Ricci (1552-1610), the great Jesuit missionary, arrived in Macao in 1582.

[57] Hsü Kuang-ch'i (Paul Hsü), was one of Ricci's most important converts. He is well-known for his translation of Euclid into Chinese. He did not "give his house for a Roman Catholic chapel" but helped Ricci to buy a house for the mission in 1605. See the account in L.J. Gallagher, *China in the Sixteenth Century* (New York, 1953) pp. 474-75.

[58] The Sacred Edict of the Yung-cheng Emperor (1724) stamped Catholicism as heterodox. Hence for over a century Christianity in China was relegated to the category of a secret society.

[59] In 1844, after the Opium War, (1839-42), the French Government succeeded in having Christianity legalized. However, it was not until after the Anglo-French invasions of 1858-60 that the foreign missionary was permitted to live, preach and own property in the interior of China.

[60] By 1853, Catholic clerical pressure had persuaded Louis Napoleon that the protection of missionaries and the restoration of Church properties must be an integral part of French policy in China. The murder of the French missionary, August Chapdelaine (February 29, 1856) provided France with a convenient excuse to participate in the expeditions of 1857-1860. Article 13 of the Sino-French Treaty of Tientsin and Article 6 of the French text (but not the Chinese text!) of the Sino-French Convention (1860) virtually gave the missionaries *carte blanche* in China. By 1870, there were about 400,000 Chinese Catholics, under the care of some 250 priests. Protestants, who had started to penetrate the interior only at a much later date, were far fewer in number. In 1869 the total number of Chinese Protestants was only 5,753, though the Protestant misionary contingent numbered over 400. Hence, as Paul A. Cohen has well expressed it: "... When the average Chinese of this time thought of Christianity he generally had in mind Catholic Christianity, its missionary proponents, and its official protector, France." Paul A. Cohen, *China and Christianity*, (Cambridge 1963), p. 71.

chow and Szechwan fell into complete disorder. There were crowds of scoundrels there who were busy preventing the laws of the land, while the missionaries were taking advantage of the situation to do just what they liked. Thus the misery of these two provinces has been growing more pronounced. So after the Tientsin affair, there had to be consultations wi h representatives of the [European] countries concerned. It was pointed out that the mission stations were protecting their converts in every province and that the people of Szechwan and Kweichow were being dragged through fire and water. Just the bare mention of a missionary was enough to drive people wild and start them cursing and swearing, so that they were likely to seize any chance at all to get their own back. The mission-stations everywh~re had become merely so many sanctuaries for criminals, who behaved wantonly, defied the law and were a source of scandal and concern to honest people. Not only have [the missionaries] failed in their original intention of establishing their religions [in China], but I also fear that when these facts are made known to the countries concerned, they will rouse the deepest shame.

There is an urgent necessity for a proclamation to the effect that no distinctions will ordinarily be made betwen the adherents of the various religion; but that when it comes to matters of official business, the converts will be judged along with the common people. Governors and Governors-general should strictly enjoin the prefectural and district authorities to carry out these injunctions; whenever they fail to do so, they should be censured and punished out of hand. Only when we are able to subdue the overbearing influence of these converts will the government of their affairs be carried on without undue dificulty.

12th day (December 27th):

While I was discussing with Ma K'o-li (Halliday Macartney) [61] the expert way in which the captain took his bearings, he told me that in European countries there were Boards of Trade composed of high-ranking officials and nautical schools as well. When the students have completed their studies, they have to sit for a Board of Trade examination. Those who are placed at the top of the list are given master's certificates. Those who come out below them are given subordinate posts as officers. Everyone is given a grade. Those who are placed low on the list are examined again, sometimes two or three times, for before you can be a captain you must

[61] Sir Halliday Macartney (1833-1906), a former Director of the Imperial Arsenal at Nanking, was appointed Secretary to the Mission in November 1876, a post he was to hold for close on thirty years. It was Macartney who hit on the idea of having the embassy travel by a P & O steamer, rather than on a French vessel as originally planned, so that the ambassador would stop only at British ports-of-call. See Boulger, *The Life of Sir Halliday Macartney*, p. 265.

rank high in the examination. Shipowners are not allowed to make clandestine appointments of captains.

When a ship goes to sea, a surveyor from the Board of Trade inspects its capacity for freight and passengers to see that they do not exceed its dimensions. It is forbidden to carry freight in excess of the registered capacity, or passengers in excess of the number of cabins and beds. Those who transgress against these regulations are punished.

When a ship is built, a high official from the Board of Trade inspects it to see that the workmanship is strong and the timbers good and sound. All this must be according to specification. After this [the official] determines the number of years the ship may serve. It may be for ten years or for twenty years; but if it does not come up to specification it is condemned and is not allowed to go to sea. Any contravention of these rules is punished.

When a ship goes to sea, the number of hands employed and the amount of provisions on board are all fixed according to the dimensions of the ship. If the ship does not have its full complement [of men and provisions] it is not allowed to go to sea. Every man has to receive a daily allowance of rice, salt and meat. The food he receives is a fixed amount. If this allowance is not forthcoming, a penalty is imposed.

When a captain puts out to sea, the rewards and punishments to be meted out are all in his hands alone for the duration of the voyage. Every day he records everything that has occured in a log-book. If any dispute should arise, the high officials of the Board of Trade decide the matter according to the entries in this log-book.

In Europe, commerce is the root of government. Their commercial regulations are orderly and dignified and their methods are exact. So captains on the China run are all specially selected for their posts and have great authority. From all this we can see that the [European] acquisition of wealth and power is not without a firm foundation.

13th day (December 28th):

Our run at noon was 792 *li;* latitude 11.26 north. We must be close to Arabia. Dr. Macartney said that outside the Red Sea there was an island belonging to England called Su-k'o-te-la (Socotra), 1,500 *li* from Ya-ting (Aden). He estimated that as we were something over 200 *li* distant from it and there was thus a wide stretch of sea in between, we should not be able to see it. He also told me that there was an island called Pi-erh-lin (Perim) 354 *li* outside the Red Sea. A French envoy had arrived at Aden and announced that his government intended to occupy this island, which was no more than a wasteland. While he was making plans for opening up this territory, the authorities at Aden informed the Gov-

ernor of Meng-mai (Bombay) of this in a despatch. The Governor then sent off a dozen or so soldiers, who landed on the territory by night and planted the English flag there. Two days later the French envoy arrived, only to see the English flag flying there; so he returned downheartedly.[62] Since Englishmen of all classes scheme with all their might for the profit of their country, [this nation] is certain to prosper exceedingly.

Captain White showed me a time-table for the arrival and departure of English vessels at various ports, beginning from January 1st of this year. According to this, *Peshawur* was due to leave Ceylon on December 25th. Now we actually left on the seventh day of the eleventh month, i.e., on December 22nd by the Western calendar. We are thus three days ahead of schedule. All the hundreds of vessels which come and go between the ports of the world have their times fixed in this way. At the beginning of each year these are all classified and published in a table. If you wish to go to such-and-such a place in such-and-such a month, you may see from this table what vessel you must travel by; and so accurately are the multifarious details arranged that there is not the least fear of mistake.

14th day (December 29th):

Dr. Macartney was saying that in European warfare captives are not killed. If they are officers they carry their commissions on their persons. When they are captured they show their commissions and are then treated with the courtesies due to officers. Food, drink and lodging are provided for them in accordance with their rank. Sometimes an agreement is made to release a prisoner on condition that he take no further part in the hostilities. If the prisoner is unwilling to agree to this, then he is put under restraint to prevent his escaping. When the war is over he is released and sent home. Occasionally [an officer] who has been released under promise to take no further part in the war asks to be given a command again. His commanding officer then reprimands him for his breach of faith and very often he is cashiered. There is a general understanding among all the states [of Europe] about the reciprocation of treatment [of prisoners]: hence no breach of faith with the enemy is tolerated. For should a man who has promised to take no further part in hostilities then be allowed to enlist for service again, the enemy would cite his example in the case of prisoners captured later and would refuse to release them. This would not only injure a great number of people, but would also cause the country concerned to incur the stigma of want of faith and breach of contract. So in this matter no one dare contravene the code. Here again we see that

[62] Perim Island, 96 miles west of Aden in the strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, had been garrisoned briefly by the British in 1799. It was reoccupied in 1857, in view of the threat posed, so it was thought, by the imminent cutting of the Suez Canal.

the good faith and enlightened integrity of the states of Europe is very close to that of the ancients.

18th day (Tuesday, January 2nd):

While I was in Singapore, I obtained copies of *The Times* and while in Ceylon I got hold of a copy of another newspaper. All of them contained several articles on the present negotiations between China and England. I handed them over to Te Tsai-ch'u and Feng K'uei-chiu,[63] who have translated them with the assistance of Mr. Hillier. Since the three principles of foreign affairs, national standing and proper [diplomatic] method are involved, these articles will enable us to learn something of the European standpoint and grasp their methods of handling affairs. I then ordered Liu Ho-po, Chang T'ing-fan and Huang Yu-p'ing[64] to write three memorials on this subject, abridging any matters that might prove offensive.

From the Northern Sung dynasty (960-1126) onwards, troubles on our frontiers increased daily, and those who discussed border conflicts became so rash and importunate that [the government] had nowhere to hide itself for shame. Master Ch'eng [Hao] (1032-1085), the great Confucian scholar, during a discussion of the five things that had been best performed under the Northern Sung, remarked that one of them was to have treated the Yi and the Ti [barbarians] with complete sincerity. Before the Northern Sung, our statesmen were still broadminded. Hence it is said in the *Book of Mencius:* "Those who delight in Heaven use a great state to serve a small one. Those who fear Heaven use a small state to serve a great one."[65] Mencius then goes on to quote the example of T'ang serving Ko[66] and King Wen serving the Hun barbarians[67] as examples of those who delight in Heaven. ...

From the beginning to the end of T'ang dynasty, when the Uighurs[68] and the T'u-fan[69] were treated cordially, we bore suffering in patience and endured shame. In this way our rulers protected the country and kept the

[63] Chang Te-yi, style Tsai-ch'u (1847-1919), originally called Te-ming and Feng Yi, style K'uei-chiu, were attached to the embassy as interpreters. Both had accompanied the Pin Ch'un mission to Europe in 1866, when they were language students at the T'ung-wen kuan.

[64] Liu Fou-yi, style Ho-po; Chang Ssu-hsün, style T'ing-fan; and Huang Tsung-hsien, style Yu-p'ing were all junior members of the embassy.

[65] *Meng-tzu* I, *Liang Hui Wang* (B) 3; Legge, *Chinese Classics,* II, p. 155.

[66] *Meng-tzu* V, *T'eng Wen Kung* (B) 5; Legge, *Chinese Classics,* pp. 271-72.

[67] *Meng-tzu,* I, *Liang Hui Wang* (B) 3; Legge, *Chinese Classics,* II, p. 155.

[68] The Turkish Uighurs had been called in by the Chinese to help put down the rebellion of An Lu-shan (703-57). After the death of Emperor Su-tsung (d. 762 A.D.), the Uighurs decided to take over China, allying themselves for this purpose with the T'u-fan. Eventually, in 765, they turned against the T'u-fan and came over to the Chinese side.

[69] The T'u-fan emerged as a new political unit in Northern Tibet at the beginning of the seventh century of our era. They had an upper class of Turks and Mongols ruling a Tibetan lower class.

people happy. The custom of regarding the Yi and the Ti as great evils and peaceful relations with them as a great disgrace really began only with the Southern Sung. The effects of this policy became apparent during the declining years of the Sung and Ming dynasties.

The kingdoms of Europe date back for some two thousand years. Their governmental and educational systems are well-ordered, enlightened and systematic. They are completely different from such upstart dynasties as the Liao (947-1125) and the Chin (1122-1234),[70] which suddenly sprang up and as suddenly declined. They have come to China merely for trade, yet have already firmly entrenched themselves there. They keep pushing forward and oppressing us. Since their knowledge and their strength are both pre-eminent, we must study ways of dealing with them. To engage in such discussions cannot be called appeasement. There are those who baselessly talk of "appeasement" in order to intimidate the court. With gaping mouths and bulging eyes, they seek their own gratifications, even going so far in their discussions as to say that they would rather see the state destroyed and the dynasty overthrown than talk of peace.[71] Many times have I heard such words spoken in the capital. Duke Shao's admonition to King Ch'eng said: "Pray that the Mandate of Heaven may last forever."[72] He who prays to Heaven in fear and trembling will be willing to restrain himself and humble himself, for he has set his heart on the tranquillity of the people and the preservation of the state. I certainly never expected that the Sung and Ming literati would do as much harm as they have done by the transmission of their doctrines and discussions. Liu Ho-po has remarked that those who discuss European affairs only see one side of the truth. I personally think that we must look at every side of the truth. If we see only one side, we are looking at this from a selfish standpoint. What we call truth is none other than something that must be applied both to ourselves and to others. Then what we do will be right and what we practice will be correct. When we extend this to others, our hearts [will be peaceful] and we will have hold of the truth. Once we have put this into practice, then the empire will be at peace. Those who have obtained office will carry out their duties through such practices and shoulder their responsibilities without entertaining any doubts. Those who have not obtained office will understand the truth and recognize it in their hearts, and will not dare to be presumptuous. It is the task of the great officers to honour their lord and protect the people. What is the use of

[70] Barbarian dynasties which controlled regions of North China.

[71] This passage excited great resentment and was largely responsible for the order for the destruction of the diary.

[72] *Shu-ching, Shao Kao,* Legge, *Chinese Classics,* III, p. 431. The full passage reads: "May the king, by means of his virtue, pray that the Mandate of Heaven may last for ever."

leading the country to be vainglorious? A vainglorious man is a foolish man. If an ordinary man were to behave in such a way [as these do] in society, then his fellows would be angry with him and the demons and spirits would punish him. Can one discuss affairs of state with people like these? To act in this way is to stray very far from the truth. I am a very stupid man; yet I shall not spare myself from contending with such people at the top of my voice, speaking to them harshly in order to bring them to their senses. I hope to enlist the aid of all scholarly and intelligent gentlemen in bearing this testimony.

25th day (January 9th):

The captain showed us a Port Said newspaper which reported that delegates from England, Russia and other countries had convened to discuss the military situation in Serbia (*sic*) on behalf of Turkey.[73] The Sultan of Turkey has been unwilling to divide the country up but is inclined to institute major reforms in the government which bring it nearer the European model, such as convening a popular assembly and instituting a parliament, setting up officials charged with special responsibilities and establishing courts to settle the people's suits within a definite period of time. But the most important of all those articles [under consideration] is that providing for those in authority to make no distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim Turkish nationals, so that the people might practise any religion they please, whether the Turkish, the Protestant or the Catholic, each at his own discretion, without let or hindrance. In my opinion, the Sultan of Turkey should bear a repentant heart. Would that the trouble were settled! ...

28th day (January 12th):

By the second watch (1-3 a.m.) we had sailed 384 *li* and reached the island of Ma-erh-ta (Malta), in latitude 37 north. To the north lies the Italian island of Hsi-chih-li (Sicily). It stands opposite the capital of Tripoli, which lies to the south. The island [of Malta] is shaped like a mortar, with a mountain in the centre that is encircled on all four sides. The island measures forty-five *li* from north to south and 30 *li* from east to west, with projecting spurs. There are four or five bays for anchorage. The island possesses a machine factory, which has eleven forts set around it. It is England's most important strong point in the Mediteranean. Originally

[73] This was the Constantinople Conference, proposed by Lord Derby in 1876, in an attempt to impose reforms on the Turks. The reforms agreed on by the conference were rejected by the Turks, who evaded them by the device of proclaiming a constitution (December 23, 1876) and insisting that all changes should be referred to a constituent assembly—an institution which lasted only a few months. See A.J.P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918* (Oxford, 1954), pp. 228-254, for the general background to the eastern crisis of 1875-78. A more detailed study is R.W. Seton-Watson, *Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question* (London, 1935).

it belonged to Fa-lan-shi (France): but the English settled here and took possession of it. Warships from every port put in here for repairs.

The governor of this territory, Ssu-te-lo-pan-hsi (General Sir Charles T. Van Straubenzee)[74] sent two military attachés, Na-erh-ssu (Nares?) and To-sun (Dawson?), [75] to meet me with a carriage. A salute of fifteen guns was fired from the fort. We passed two heavy-gun emplacements on our way to Government House, which is an imposing and spacious residence. The streets of the town [Valleta] are clean and well-kept; the houses, of five or six stories, stand closely together, the one overlooking the other, like the teeth of a comb. They have a quite different air about them from those of Ceylon or Aden.

Governor Straubenzee, a white-haired man of sixty or so, spent many years in Kuangtung. His Lady,[76] who is also very intelligent, detained us to drink wine. Afterwards, they came with us on a stroll. Close by and to the left is a fort containing a hundred and twenty guns, six of them weighing eighteen tons a piece. (A ton is equal to 1,800 catties, which would make its weight equivalent to 32,400 catties). The body of the gun measures over ten feet in circumference. One of the forts stands high up on the crest of a hill. This fort held three enormous guns, but we had no time to go and inspect them. (One gun weighed thirty-six tons, while the other two weighed twenty-five tons each. In front of each gun stood a pile of several hundred shells, ready for defence in case an enemy should appear. There were three iron-clads [to be seen]. One was named *Te-fa-ssu-te-shen* (H.M.S. *Devastation*); one *Ho-te-ssu-po-erh* (H.M.S. *Hotspur*); and one *Lu-p'ai-erh-te* (H.M.S. *Rupert*).[77]

12th month, 3rd day (January 16th):

Our run at noon was 837 *li*, bringing us to Gibraltar, in north latitude 36.7. This is a rock which rises abruptly to a height of over 14,000 feet (*sic*) and is over 7 *li* in length. The English call it a "*no*" (Rock), which means "a great stone". . . .

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[74] General Sir Charles Thomas Van Straubenzee (1812-92) who was himself born in Malta, was appointed Governor and Commander-in-Chief at Malta in June 1872, after a long and distinguished army career. He had been in command of the British land forces in China during the second Anglo-Chinese War, and was thus responsible for the bombardment and subsequent capture of Canton (December 28, 1857–January 5, 1858). He was Governor of Malta until June, 1878.

[75] Both unidentifiable.

[76] In 1841 Van Straubenzee had married Charlotte Louisa, youngest daughter of General John Luther Richardson of the East India Company, and of the Cramond family.

[77] H.M.S. *Devastation* was an iron turret-ship of 9,387 tons, under the command of Captain Frederick W. Richards. (*The Times*, November 7, 1876). H.M.S. *Hotspur* was an iron-clad ram of 4,010 tons. H.M.S. *Rupert* was an iron-clad ram of 5,444 tons, consort vessel of *Hotspur*, under the command of Commander W.J. Hunt-Grubbe, C.B. See *The Times*, January 16, 1877, p. 6e.

Since the English settled here and took possession of this territory, they have made the mountain into what is said to be a most cleverly constructed fortress. . . .

I discovered on enquiry that there are 5,000 troops in Gibraltar, divided into seven regiments. There are five brigades of artillery and five hundred troops to guard the fort, all of whom are artisans. There are 1,500 riflemen, who are in infantry regiments. Each regiment has a school of its own and there is also a high school. There is a library with 40,000 books which is built round the inner flanks of the mountain. The town is built overlooking the Guadarranque river. The population numbers 19,000. . . .

[On sailing] we observed another lighthouse. The captain said these waters were called Te-la-fa-erh-gan (Trafalgar Bay). This was where the English officer Wei-te-lin (Wellington) won his battle with Napoleon the Third (*sic*!) [78]

6th day (January 19th):

Rainy and windy. Our run at noon was 846 *li*; latitude 46.1 north, 9.52 west of London. Since we entered the Atlantic we have been heading northwards, with a slight tendency eastward. We are now making more easting.

In Europe people have been competing with each other with knowledge and power for the last two thousand years. Egypt, Rome and Islam have each in their turn flourished and decayed, yet the principles which formed the basis of these states still endure. Nowadays, England, France, Russia, America and Germany, all of them great nations which have tried their strength against each other to see who is pre-eminent, have evolved a code of international law which gives precedence to fidelity and righteousnsss and attaches the utmost importance to relations between states. Taking full cognizance of feeling and punctiliously observing all due ceremonies, they have evolved a high culture on a firm material basis. They surpass by a long way the states of our Spring and Autumn period. [79]

Today, Russia, whose territories are situated in the bleak lands of the far north, has penetrated to the Hei-lung (Amur) river by way of the Hsing-

[78] A schoolboy howler!

[79] The Marxist historian, Hu Sheng, in his *Ti-kuo chu-yi yü Chung-kuo cheng-chih* (Peking, 1952), pp. 47-49, points out that Kuo was quicker than the rest of the literati to see that traditional China could only survive if it submitted to the imperialist world-order of international law. Yet Kuo was certainly not alone in his understanding of the importance to China of a knowledge of international law. Li Hung-chang and Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng (1838-94), for example, both claimed that China could have avoided a great deal of misery had her officials been acquainted with international law. For a discussion of this question, see Hsü, *op. cit.*, 121-145. In this passage, however, Kuo seems to be asking his countrymen to subscribe to the doctrines of international law, not on the grounds of mere expediency, but rather because it represents a new Tao, the understanding of which is responsible for the high state of civilisation attained by Europe.

an (Great Khingan) mountains, annexed their north-eastern regions, reached the Sung-hua (Sungari) river and made itself a neighbour of Japan.[80] Starting from the far west, England has penetrated the Mediterranean and gained supremacy over all the peoples of India. They have monopolised Southeast Asia and established a colony on the island of Hong-kong, with a strong garrison in possession of it.

When we compare the territories of these countries and estimate their power, we are justified in looking upon them as the two leading nations of the day. They have surrounded China and press close upon her from spots where they may spy out the land. With their hands reaching high and their feet travelling far, they rise up like eagles and glare like tigers, day by day broadening their basis of wealth and power. Yet for all this, they have not the slightest intention of presuming on their military strength to act violently or rapaciously.

When they do deploy their forces, they do so circuitously and indirectly, proceeding by argument and reasoning, never taking any overt action until their position is a strong one. Surely this is not the time for China to indulge in highflown talk and vain boasting in order to aggrandize herself! This is no time for me to embark on an elaborate discussion of the gravity and urgency of the matter. But [we must realize that] the nations of Europe do have insight into what is essential and what is not and possess a Way of their own which assists them in the acquisition of wealth and power. In this manner, a state may well last for a thousand years. On the other hand, if a state does not grasp the Way, then disaster will come upon it. Hence Pan Ku,[81] in his *Appreciation* appended to the chapter on the Hsiung-nu, remarks: "If the barbarians approach us [wanting us to civilise them], then receive them with the appropriate rites. If they prove refractory, then overawe them with military power."[82] We must make it a rule that every wrong movement will be on their part. If this is so in the case of petty contentions, then how much truer must it be

[80] Russia's steady advance into Central Asia, at the expense of what had traditionally been Chinese-controlled territory, had been going on since the 17th century. The Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), the Treaty of Kiakhta (1727), the Treaty of Aigun (1858) and the Treaty of Peking (1860), had given her some 1,648,000 square miles of Chinese territory. In 1871 the Russians had occupied Ili, in Sinkiang. In 1879, only a couple of years after Kuo expressed these fears in his diary, th Manchu envoy, Ch'ung-hou (1826-1893), foolishly gave away most of the Ili region to Russia by the Treaty of Livadia. See Fairbank and Reischauer, *East Asia: The Modern Transformation,* esp. pp. 43-45; Immanuel C.Y. Hsü, *The Ili Crisis: A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy, 1871-1881* (Oxford, 1965), pp. 1-15.

[81] Pan Ku (32-92 A.D.), the author of the *Ch'ien Han-shu* (*History of the Former Han*), is one of the greatest of Chinese historians.

[82] *Han-shu,* XCIV B, p. 32b (*Po-na* ed.), actually say: "*Lai tse ch'eng erh yü chih. Ch'u tse pei erh shou chih*". "If they approach, then control them by force. When they depart, be prepared to stay on guard against them."

when we are dealing with people who show far greater ability in the management of their affairs and whose plans are more deeply laid! Liu Yün-sheng, who considers himself an expert on foreign affairs, has indeed revealed the shallowness of his knowledge at this juncture.[83] He says: "To deal with the present situation we must be extremely sincere in our dealings with other states: otherwise we shall not be able to establish ourselves."

Now I have often been sharply criticised by my contemporaries. Yet Yao Yen-chia[84] is of the opinion that I possess scholarship and insight surpassing that of others. But how can I have any pretensions to scholarship and insight? The histories of the Sung and Ming dynasties are still extant: yet the hearts, the minds, the eyes and ears of our contemporaries have been captivated by the vain and empty discourses of several hundred years, for they never once bother to examine the facts of the case.

I once overheard Ho Yüan-ch'uan[85] talking of foreign affairs, and was astonished at his profound understanding of these matters. In answer to an enquiry of mine, he replied: "The Six Classics[86] and the ancient writings of the Chou and Ch'in dynasties, as well as the works of our Confucian predecessors are all justified by their consistency with historical facts. That much is obvious. Commonplace observations are no more than boastful talk. They lack historical foundation." This can really be called learning and insight!

8th day (January 21st):

By the eight watch (1-3 p.m.) we had run 495 *li* and reached Southampton. As we passed P'o-tzu (Portsea) and Lun-tun (*sic!* Landport), we noticed two very strange and beautiful lighthouses overlooking the anchorage for British warships. As we came into port past the Ni-lo-ssu (Needles), we passed an island called A-lu-wei-te (Isle of Wight), where the queen has a winter residence called A-ssu-pen (Osborne). Our ship ran aground and a thick fog came on. We expected the tide would float us off a little later; and after an hour or so we got into port. . . .

We passed the two market towns of Po-hsing-ssu-to-k'o (Basingstoke) and Wo-to (Woking), where the lamps were shining bright as day. As we came nearer to London, the lights were even brighter. Chin Teng-han

[83] One of Kuo's few public thrusts at Liu Hsi-hung!

[84] Yao Yüeh-wang, style Yen-chia, was a member of the Mission.

[85] Ho Ch'iu-t'ao, style Yüan-ch'uan (1824-62),scholar and historian, is best known for his *Shuo-fang pei-sheng* (*Historical Source Book of the Northern Region*), the first comprehensive work on Sino-Russian relations. See Tu Lien-che's biography of Ho in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period.*

[86] Before the number of the Confucian Classic was stabilized at thirteen, six of them were held to be of the first importance. These were the *Book of Poetry*, the *Documents*, the *Book of Changes*, the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, the *Book of Ceremonies* and a now lost work on music.

(J.D. Campbell)[87] had previosuly ordered carriages for us, which were waiting on the road. The street-lamps were like myriads of bright stars, while the horses and carriages rolled past in an unending stream, with [the horses'] breath rising like mist. The liveliness of the commercial centres and the beauty of the mansions and houses could scarcely be excelled. After a drive of an hour or so we reached our residence in 49 Portland Place, where we asked Mr. Campbell to stay and eat dinner with us

[87] James Duncan Campbell (1833-1907) joined the Chinese Customs Service in 1862, becoming Auditor and Chief Secretary at Peking. In 1868 the Tsungli Yamen sent him to Europe on a special mission in connection with the proposed purchase of Macao from the Portugese. In January, 1874 he was appointed Non-Resident Secretary in London, a post he continued to hold until 1907. He acted as Hart's confidential agent in London, and played a major role in the parleys with the French Government which concluded the Franco-Chinese War of 1884-85. The Chinese Government accorded him Civil Rank of the Third Class (1878), Civil Rank of the Second Class (1882) and the Order of the Double Dragon, 2nd Division, First Class (1897). In 1885, he was created a C.M.G. See *The Times*, December 5, 1907, p.4a.

PEARL BUCK AND THE CHINESE NOVEL

G. A. CEVASCO

ON DECEMBER 11, 1938 PEARL BUCK WAS FORMALLY awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature. The citation read: "For rich and truly epic descriptions of Chinese peasant life, and masterpieces of biography." In the Academy's judgment, the decisive factor was not only the admirable biographies of her parents, but her depiction of the Chinese peasantry. Her Chinese novels are authentic in wealth of detail and rare insight. They recreate a region, a time, a people then little known and barely understood by Western readers. Today Pearl Buck is eminently famous the world over for her vivid accounts of China and its people.

Appropriately, in her formal acceptance speech, Mrs. Buck spoke of the Chinese novel and its influence upon her own philosophy of composition. There was no doubt that the term "Chinese novel" for her meant the traditional Chinese works of fiction, not the novels of contemporary Oriental writers strongly under foreign influence and somewhat ignorant of the riches of their own indigenous literature. She had selected the subject of the traditional Chinese novel for two reasons: first, her own concept of the novel is wholly Chinese; and, secondly, her belief that the Chinese novel possesses an illumination for the Western novel and for the Western novelist.

Her lecture was well received by the Nobel Committee. Direct, unassuming, convincing, it explored a lively and delightful subject. Indirectly, the lecture was an apologia for the novels she had written. Devotees of Oriental literature read[1] her words with understanding and appreciation. Most literary critics and cultural historians found her lecture informative and memorable. A few critics, those who felt she was not quite worthy of the Nobel Prize and all it implies, turned a deaf ear. They were too busy grumbling that she was not equal to such international recognition to listen to what she had to say about the traditional Chinese novel and her own literary aspirations.

[1] The lecture was delivered on December 12, 1938 before the Swedish Academy and was repeated as a Phi Beta Kappa address at Randolph-Macon College, Lynchburg, Virginia on April 22, 1939. Shortly thereafter it was published under the imprint of the John Day Company, New York.

Some of these same critics had complained, in 1930, that Sinclair Lewis was also undeserving of the Swedish Academy's award. At least he was truly an American writer, they now agreed; but Pearl Buck — the only American woman to win the Nobel Prize in literature — was American in name only. Her subject matter and even her places of residence were so completely Chinese. Then the pendulum swung the other way. True, she had written of Chinese life, but had she really caught the reality of the Orient, its people and their way of life?

Too many captious critics chewed on Pearl Buck. Certain adverse judgments maintained that she had written too few significant works, that even the best of what she had accomplished was not worthy of worldwide acclaim. Despite the hearty commendation of such well-known literary figures as Sinclair Lewis, Carl Van Doren, and Malcolm Cowley,[2] Mrs. Buck almost came to regard her own novels as aesthetically wanting. The many regrettable attacks upon the corpus of her writings, however, did produce interesting side effects.

Attack prompted defense. To understand the wellsprings of her own art, her creativity, she had to examine in depth and to explain at length the scope and the limits of her work within the tradition of the Chinese novel. Now that more than twenty-five years have elapsed since her lecture on the Chinese novel before the Nobel Committee, her judgments can be dispassionately reconsidered, objectively commented upon, and critically evaluated. Her conception of the Chinese novel, moreover, can be utilized as a yardstick in an estimation of what Pearl Buck has attempted to do in her fiction, how well she has succeeded, and what value should be placed upon her literary endeavors.

II

During a long and productive life, Pearl Buck has written over seventy books, more than 200 articles, and numerous short stories.[3] Ten of her novels deal with America, one with Japan, one with India, and one with Korea. For the most part, her fiction treats of China and the Chinese.[4]

[2] Malcolm Cowley, for example, maintains that the Swedish Academy and the general reading public are right in their appraisal of Pearl Buck's works and that her supercilious critics are wrong. He suggests, moreover, that her popular appeal disturbs too many critics who prefer to believe that art is only for the fortunate few. Cowley has stated such views in his "Wang Lung's Children," *New Republic*, vol. 99 (May 10, 1939), pp. 24-25.

[3] Paul A. Doyle's *Pearl S. Buck* (New York, 1965), a critical study accompanied by and related to the major events in her life, is the best treatment of her work. The only thing missing from Professor Doyle's excellent study is a consideration of Pearl Buck's short stories, but this he has covered in his "Pearl S. Buck's Short Stories: A Survey," *English Journal*, vol. 55 (January 1966), pp. 62-68.

[4] The most complete bibliography of Pearl Buck's Chinese novels is that of Tung-Li Yuan. See his *China in Western Literature* (New Haven, 1958), pp. 441-443.

Her proclivity for the East rather than the West is mainly a consequence of her many years in China and her love and understanding of its people.

Although born in the United States, she was taken to China by her missionary parents, Absolom and Caroline Sydenstricker, when she was but a few months old. She spent most of her early years in a small bungalow situated atop a hill which overlooked the crowded city of Chinkiang and the Yangtse River. Her mother taught her to read and write, and managed to instill in her daughter-pupil a lasting affection for words. Her father provided an important stimulus to her youthful imagination. Upon his return home after a trip to some remote missionary station, he would often relate his adventures. His experiences beguiled her. So, too, did the Taoist and the Buddhist legends she heard from her amah. The old nurse also spun tales of the Tai-Ping Rebellion, through which she had lived.

In her childhood, Pearl Buck determined to become a writer, the roots of her literary career being nourished by her mother, her father, and her amah. When she was ten, she began to write her first stories. Several of these juvenalia were published in the *Shanghai Mercury*, an English-language newspaper. Their inspiration was wholly Chinese; for in her youth Pearl Buck knew far more about China than she knew about the country of her birth. "I lived with Chinese people," she relates in one of her autobiographies, "and spoke their tongue before I spoke my own, and their children were my first friends." [5] She would daily roam the hills and valleys of Chinkiang, talking with anyone and everyone she met, learning about a way of life possibly never experienced before by a Western child. The beauty of the countryside, the individuality of its people, the day-by-day routine of their lives became a part of her youth that indelibly printed itself upon her memory.

At fifteen she was sent by her parents to a boarding school in Shanghai for her formal education; here she still loved to converse with anyone on any worth-while subject. One of her chief pleasures and interests, Mrs. Buck readily states, has always been people; and since she spent so many years among them, she still delights in the Chinese. At times, she identifies so closely with them that her Sinophilia is not difficult to understand. She speaks the Chinese language and fathoms the Oriental ethos. She has seen myriad aspects of Chinese life, having lived in large cities in China and in towns so small that she and her family were the only Occidentals. She has first-hand knowledge of famines, floods, and the battles of the warlords, as well as a familiarity with the everyday existence of the ordinary Chinese family. From such a background, Pearl Buck was well equipped to draw time after time for the substance of her fiction.

[5] *My Several Worlds: A Personal Record* (New York, 1954), p. 20.

There is so much of China in her books that students of Oriental literature have established different classifications of her Chinese novels. One of the best[6] divides her work into three categories: (1) China at home, (2) China in the intellectual conflict with the West, and (3) China at war with Japan.

Despite the limitations of such a classification, Pearl Buck's Chinese novels can be subsumed under these three divisions. Such novels as *The Good Earth* (1931), *Sons* (1932), *The Mother* (1933), *Pavilion of Women* (1947), and *The Bondmaid* (1949) conveniently fall within the first category. *East Wind: West Wind* (1930), *The First Wife* (1933), *The Young Revolutionist* (1934), *A House Divided* (1935), *The Exile* (1936), *Fighting Angel* (1937), and *Kinfolk* (1949) fit the second division. The best known novels of the third category are *The Patriot* (1939), *Dragon Seed* (1941), *The Promise* (1943), and *China Flight* (1943).

Although the above-named titles are probably Pearl Buck's finest novels, they have received scant attention — with the exception of *The Good Earth* — from critics. Some consolation, perhaps, can be taken from the fact that neither has the traditional Chinese novel been the recipient of critical acclaim. In China, art and the novel have been dichotomous subjects. The novel was hardly ever considered *belles lettres,* nor did the novelist look upon himself as an artist.

Even the term for story — "hsiao shuo" — denotes something slight and lacking in value. The term for novel—"ts'ang p'ien hsiao shuo"—roughly designating something longer than a story, still connotes something unimportant, insignificant, and useless. The pejorative connotations of the Chinese term for novel extend beyond its etymology. Historically, this literary genre has also fared poorly. The *Ssu Ku Chuen Shu,* for example, makes not a single reference to the novel. This vast compilation of Chinese literature, which was drawn up in 1772 by the order of the emperor Ch'ien Lung, does not list the novel in the encyclopedia of its literature proper. Yao Hai, too, ignored the novel when, in 1776, he enumerated the various divisions of literary art. This great scholar categorized essays, government commentaries, biographies, poetry, history, epigrams, even funeral eulogies and epitaphs — but no novels.

Many are the reasons for the ignoble history of the indigenous Chinese novel. One important consideration, undoubtedly, lies in the interdict of Confucius: fiction was supposed to have an immoral influence, especially in turning the mind away from philosophy and virtue. Pearl Buck, incidentally, was first introduced to this Confucian view of fiction early in her youth.

[6] Peter Venne, *China und die Chinesen in der neuren und amerikanischen Literatur* (Zurich, 1951), p. 32.

One of her tutors, a Confucianist himself, often expressed unfavorable comments about fiction. Pearl Buck's missionary parents seconded the Confucian view that novel reading or writing was hardly a worth-while endeavor.

The influence of Confucius on the writing of fictional prose narratives cannot be overemphasized, a consequence of which can be found in the supercilious attitude of some scholars. They felt that the genre had a too common origin, that its chief appeal was to the non-scholarly mind. The tide, however, has changed. Today most modern Chinese intellectuals, under the influence of Western literature,[7] no longer regard the writing of novels as a trifling pastime, although they may still have slight regard for their own indigenous works of fiction.

Many Chinese intellectuals probably have a greater interest in Western fiction than in their own. Pearl Buck, on the other hand, has often expressed a greater interest in Oriental fiction. Her understanding and appreciation of the Chinese novel is a consequence of both scholarship and general familarity. Her scholarship was first made evident in an address she delivered to the Convocation of the North China Union Language School in 1933. In an erudite lecture on "The Sources of the Chinese Novel," she ranged over the development of the novel, East and West, and their differences in meaning and purpose. Several key aspects of this lecture nucleated portions of her acceptance speech before the Noble Academy in 1938.

One theme Mrs. Buck emphasized before the Academy was relative to the natural growth of Chinese fiction. "Happily for the Chinese novel," she noted, "it was not considered by the scholars as literature."[8] It did remain unfetttered by pedantic norms. "The Chinese novel was free," she continued. "It grew as it liked out of its own soil, the common people, nurtured by that heartiest of sunshine, popular approval, and untouched by the cold and frosty winds of the scholar's art."[9]

The excessive freedom of growth enioved by the Chinese novel accounts for its popular appeal, but lack of critical, scholarly direction may be responsible for some of its deficiencies. Chinese novels, according to Western standards, suffer from obvious defects. Chief among the shortcomings are those which also prevailed in the writings of many eighteenth-century English works of fiction. The traditional Chinese novel, like many of the inferior English novels of the late Neo-Classical period, was seldom planned from beginning to end: it just grew and grew with incident added to incident, necessitating the introduction of one new character after another.

[7] Western influence upon Chinese literature is covered succinctly by Lai Ming in his *History of Chinese Literature* (New York, 1964), pp. 346-400.

[8] *The Chinese Novel* (New York, 1939), p. 16.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

Unlike the English novel, which literary historians like to date as beginning in 1740 with Samuel Richardson's *Pamela,* the beginnings of the Chinese novel are difficult to trace. Precisely when and how it arose remains unknown. There are, fortunately, a few extant manuscripts for scholars to study. These scripts, the "hua-pen" or *story-texts,* indicate that the roots of the Chinese novel extend back to tenth-century story tellers. During the Northern Sung dynasty (960-1127), storytelling reached the proportions of a vogue with recitations in tea houses and on lowly city streets.

Professional storytellers spun tales, recorded some, and delivered them to available audiences. Legends, myths, romance, intrigue, and war formed the framework of their narratives. Characters were etched in. Fascinating individuals were created and made to run the gamut of various experiences. Their motivation was wholly external; they lacked interior causation. The English novel, however, even in its embryonic development delved into the minds of its chief characters. This the Chinese novel failed to do. The writer of the typical Chinese saga seldom thought it necessary to probe the internal struggles of his protagonists.[10]

Psychological penetration of character and detailed analyses were not considered important by the Oriental teller of tales. Their audience did not expect it, and the storyteller was most concerned with pleasing his audience. If they were not pleased, they would hardly remain to listen, nor feel disposed to contribute a general collection which invariably accompanied a recitation. To please an audience was most important, and this required definite techniques. Technique merely for technique's sake was not indulged in, however, for there was no desire on the part of the novelist to be recognized as a stylist or a literary technician. Story was more important than style per se, and external motivating forces were preferred to character analyses.

The professional storyteller would usually forego anything that did not embellish the framework of his tale, while yet adding certain touches and flourishes in his characterization in order to make each major character more appealing and unique. As for plot development, the author was omniscient, never allowing his presence to intrude upon the narrative. Above all, he desired "tse ran" — that is, a naturalness, a flexibility, a seemingly effortless presentation of material. The Chinese novelist sought to be, in Pearl Buck's words, "wholly at the command of the material flowing through him."[11]

Of the hundred upon hundreds of narratives that were written over the centuries, most have been lost, discarded, or simply forgotten. Three

[10] Cf. John Biship, "Some Limitations of Chinese Fiction," *Far Eastern Quarterly,* vol. 15 (February 1956), pp. 239-47.

[11] *The Chinese Novel,* p. 31

Chinese novels, in particular, have never been forgotten. The average Chinese, according to Mrs. Buck, usually responds to the term "ts'ang p'ien hsiao shuo" by thinking of *Shui Hu Chuan,*[12] *San Kuo,* and *Hung Lou Meng.* Quite early in her life Mrs. Buck read these three novels. They impressed and delighted her, and influenced her own concepts of fiction. "It is the Chinese and not the American novel which has shaped my own efforts in writing," she has always maintained. "My earliest knowledge of story, of how to tell and write stories came to me in China."[13]

So imbued was Pearl Buck with the Chinese novel that she even employed a large number of cliches in the writing of her first novel. As she explains in a short article entitled, "The Writing of *East Wind: West Wind,*"[14] the hackneyed phrases had been culled from English novels she was especially fond of; and since she knew that in Chinese literature it was considered a mark of rhetorical elegance to employ the same beautiful diction and phraseology of great writers, the over-used and devitalized English expressions found their way into *East Wind: West Wind.* Upon the advice of an American publisher she consented to revise her manuscript, to replace all bromides with original expressions.

The cliche-problem was quickly taken cared of, but other more serious shortcomings in her fiction attributable to the Chinese novel could not be so easily discerned and remedied. To hold the Chinese novel culpable for the defects in Pearl Buck's fiction serves no purpose; however, the converse is also true: since it was the influence and the inspiration of the Chinese novel that helped her reach her greatest literary achievements.

III

Pearl Buck may be somewhat too melodramatic and pollyannish for some readers and too didactic and socially-minded for others, yet most readers are forced to agree that several of her novels are minor masterpieces. Mainly because she is an "insider" rather than an "outsider" in the writing of her Chinese fiction, her Oriental characters seem real and her settings authentic. "It would be hard for me to declare which side of the world is more my own," she once wrote. "I am loyal to Asia as I am loyal to my own land."[15] To this day, more than thirty years after having taken up permanent residence in the United States, she still thinks occasionally

[12] The best translation of this novel is Pearl Buck's *All Men are Brothers* (London, 1933). Typical of the reviews her translation merited is that of Mark Van Doren, who wrote: "Mrs. Buck . . . has performed her gigantic labor with felicity, intelligence, and a never failing power, and has added to English literature one of the classic translations." *Nation,* vol. 137 (Nov. 1933), p. 542.

[13] *The Chinese Novel.* p. 11.

[14] *The Colophon,* Part 12, No. 6 (December 1932), pp. 1-4.

[15] Pearl Buck and Carlos Romulo, *Friend to Friend* (New York, 1958), p. 126.

in Chinese and admits to having a slight difficulty now and again with English idiomatic usage.

The Chinese reality in her fiction cannot be over-emphasized. Without it, she would be just another Western writer exploiting Oriental themes in her books. With it, her narratives, her characters, her locales are so completely Chinese that the reader feels convinced he is experiencing life in ancient China. For literary critics, this Chinese reality is important only if it is fictionalized successfully by a novelist. The sights, the smells, the joys and the sorrows of the Chinese people, their customs, their traditions — all give reality to Pearl Buck's fiction and delight to her devotees.

Of the more than 250 Western novelists who have used China as backdrop, she is quantitively and qualitatively the most outstanding. Although Maugham's *On a Chinese Screen,* Hobart's *Oil for the Lamps of China,* Hilton's *Lost Horizon,* and Cronin's *The Keys of the Kingdom* are all significant literary achievements, even taken collectively these leading British and American novels of China and her people do not surpass the works of Pearl Buck. Most Western writers, moreover, seem to exhaust their knowledge and interest in the Orient with a single book, but not Pearl Buck. She has written almost fifty volumes that treat exclusively of China and the Chinese.

The Good Earth is undisputably Pearl Buck's best Chinese novel and one of her outstanding literary achievements. Published on March 2, 1931, this novel became an immediate success. For almost two full years, it remained on best-seller lists. Of universal appeal, it attracted translators and soon was available in over thirty languages. Within one year of its publication it was dramatized and made into a first-rate motion picture.

This story of Chinese peasant life is a powerful epic of the soil, in particular of one man's pride in and love for his land. The narrative is simple and is easily recalled by anyone who has read the novel. Especially memorable, perhaps, is its beginning when the earth is good to Wang Lung, a young farmer who is married to O-Lan, an honest, faithful, though plain woman who shares his life and bears him sons. There is no forgetting how Wang enjoys peace and prosperity on his hard-worked land. Then, with a crop failure, comes dire poverty. Famine forces him to take his family south to beg for food.

Disaster follows disaster, but Wang Lung never relinquishes his land or his dreams. Eventually he can return to his good earth. From assidous labor he reaps prosperity. He builds a great manor, obtains servants and slaves, hoards silver, and brings concubines into his household. His every dream is fulfilled. Only his sons prove a tragic disappointment. He has given them life, care, an education; supplied them with wealth and wives;

but not one of them has his father's love for the soil. No one who has read *The Good Earth* is likely to forget the poignant scene at the end of the novel when, over the dying body of their father, Wang Lung's sons make plans to sell his land and move as rich men to the city.

Virtually all critics greeted *The Good Earth* with praise. They commented particularly upon the novel's Oriental quality. There had been many melodramatic stories about Shanghai, but *The Good Earth* was the first sympathetic novel to reveal the interior of China to the West. "This is China as it has never before been portrayed in fiction," explained one critic, "the China that Chinese live in and as the Chinese live." [16] Another reviewer wrote: "Though I may never see a rice-field, I shall always feel that I have lived for a long time in China." [17] A critic for the *London Times* stated, "*The Good Earth* never fails to hold the attention, and conveys a convincing effect of presenting a true picture of Chinese life." [18]

It almost seemed as if the critics were echoing one another on the essential Orientalism of the novel. Florence Ayscough perhaps expressed it best when she added: "A beautiful, beautiful book. At last we read, in the pages of a novel, of the real people of China. They seem to spring from their roots, to develop and mature even as their own rice springs from a jade green seed bed and comes to its golden harvest." [19] Drawing upon her own experiences in China, she continued: "I have lived for many years in such a country and among such people as Mrs. Buck describes, and as I read her pages I smell once more the sweet scent of bean flowers opening in the spring, the acrid odor of nightsoil poured lavishly on the soil during the growing season, and I feel again the blazing sunshine of the harvest months; all as it was . . . in the Yangtze Valley." [20]

An occassional critic was not so ebullient as the majority. One or two even had harsh words about Mrs. Buck's treatment of persons, places, and things Oriental. "None of her major descriptions is correct," complained Younghill Kang, "except in minor details." [21] Kang found little in the work to admire other than "technique and much artistic sincerity." The novel struck him as "discouraging" because it "works toward confusion, not clarification. Its implied comparison between Western and Eastern ways is unjust to the latter." [22]

Kang could not find fault with the clear, effective story line of *The Good Earth,* nor with its appropriate prose style. Instead, hypercritical of

[16] Nathaniel Peffer, *New York Herald-Tribune Books* (March 1, 1931), p. 1.
[17] Nancy Evans, *Bookman,* vol. 73 (May 1931), p. 324.
[18] *London Times Literary Supplement,* April 30, 1931, p. 344.
[19] *Saturday Review of Literature,* vol. 7 (March 21, 1931), p. 676.
[20] *Ibid.*
[21] *New Republic,* vol. 67 (July 1, 1931), p. 185.
[22] *Ibid.*

what he believed was an unfavorable depiction of Oriental life, he questioned the reality of a Wang Lung. A peasant such as Wang Lung, Kang complained, could not improve his social standing through farming and dedication to his land. Born a peasant, Wang would have to die a peasant, since there was no way he could reasonably rise above his milieu.[23] Kang also maintained that Wang and his family behave without propriety and with a frankness abhorrent to the Oriental. At the core of Kang's animadversion to *The Good Earth,* perhaps, was his refusal to accept Wang Lung, a peasant, as the hero of the work. Had Wang been a philosopher or intellectual, Kang's reaction to him might have been different; but, then so too would have been the entire novel.

Kang's criticism of *The Good Earth* was wide off the mark but could readily be accepted by Pearl Buck as a minority opinion. She was, however, somewhat disturbed by the caustic and thoroughly unreasonable views of another Oriental intellectual, Kiang Kang-Hu, who attacked her novels in an article published in New York *Times.*[24] Believing that Westerners should not write about Chinese life, Kang-Hu excoriated Pearl Buck for doing so. Her not being Chinese would necessarily mean that she would misrepresent and distort all things. Accordingly, he scrutinized *The Good Earth* for errors in fact and judgment. Oblivious of the fact that he was judging works of fiction, he read her novels as though they were socio-historical tomes.

In his article, Kang-Hu caviled at such incidentals in *The Good Earth* as the slaughter of cows for food, the making of tea by sprinkling leaves upon water, the likelihood of medicines being made from a tiger's heart or a dog's tooth. He carped over questions of suicide and religious matters. To point out what a critic believes to be errors is one thing, but to conclude that Mrs. Buck was guilty of an offence against the Chinese people is another. Obviously, Kiang Kang-Hu read things into and out of Pearl Buck's novels that are simply not there.

The New York *Times,* sensing the injustice of Kang-Hu's views, graciously allowed Pearl Buck to defend herself.[25] In her rebuttal she considered each of Kang-Hu's charges carefully and objectively. She defended herself brilliantly. Where he generalized, she gave specific references to local customs and peasant practices that she herself witnessed and which could easily be substantiated. Mrs. Buck acknowledged her fallibility: as

[23] Doan-Cao-Ly, on the contrary, in his *The Image of the Chinese Family in Pearl Buck's Novels* (Saigon, 1964), suggests that Wang Lung's family in *The Good Earth* and in the next two books of the same trilogy, namely *Sons* and *A House Divided,* constitute "a history of the rise and fall of many a family in China" (p. 28).

[24] "A Chinese Scholar's View of Mrs. Buck's Novels," New York *Times* (January 15, 1933), Section 5, pp. 2 and 19.

[25] "Mrs. Buck Replies to Her Chinese Critic," New York *Times* (January 15, 1933), Section 5, pp. 2 and 19

a novelist she could easily be guilty of certain factual details, but she should not be reproved for the chimeras Kang-Hu claimed destroyed the fabric of all she had written. What possibly disturbed Kang-Hu most was that Pearl Buck had too realistically depicted the Chinese peasantry, and he preferred to think of peasants as non-existent in China. Could non-existent peasants really be worth all the attention expended upon them in *The Good Earth* and in Pearl Buck's other novels?

Younghill Kang and Kiang Kang-Hu are representative of certain Oriental intellectuals who prefer to think less than objectively of some of the reprehensible conditions existent in the China Pearl Buck chose to write about. Lin Yutang and the majority of Chinese intellectuals, however, defend the accuracy of *The Good Earth.* [26] If the novel is to be judged harshly, it cannot be condemned on the grounds that it lacks a true Chinese reality.

Possibly *The Good Earth* should be criticized because of poor characterization or faulty style. Characterization, after all, is an acid test for any novelist; yet Pearl Buck's characters, with the exceptions of a few subsidiary ones in her minor works, have been ingeniously created, carefully differentiated, and effectively dramatized in all sorts of conflicts. Her characters are embodied with both good and bad — but always credible — human qualities. True to life, they are neither idealized nor intrinsically evil. They behave the way they do not because they are moved in puppet-like fashion by their literary creator; their actions are a consequence of their inner nature reacting to and upon external forces. Wang Lung and his family are as real as any flesh and blood individuals who have ever lived in China.

Critics have not squabbled over Pearl Buck's characterization, and they cannot legitimately do so. In a study of Mrs. Buck's effectiveness as a novelist, Phyllis Bentley discusses the author's ability to create and manipulate characters. Pearl Buck, states Phyliss Bentley, is "equally successful with characters of every age, sex, type, and in the indication of differences between these various types. The war lord, the merchant, the decadent poet, the kitchen slave, the teahouse girl, the village mother, the learned lady, the petted child, the stormy adolescent, the farmer in his healthy prime, the dying old man — all these figures in her pages, and all have life and truth." [27]

Miss Bentley even questions Pearl Buck's ability to handle congenital characterization. Does the novelist portray children as mechanical duplicates

[26] A thesis written at the University of Montreal in 1953 investigates in depth the Chinese reality in her fiction. See Jean Tong's *The China of Pearl Buck,* which confirms the majority opinion.

[27] "The Art of Pearl Buck," *English Journal,* vol. 24 (December 1935), pp. 794-95.

of their parents, or do they have no reasonable resemblance to them at all? The author of *The Good Earth* has managed to avoid both pitfalls; for her, each child is "an individual character . . . yet possessing the flesh of his parents' flesh and blood of their blood." [28] Pearl Buck's characters proved equal to every critical norm Miss Bentley devised. She maintains that unlike the majority of modern novelists Pearl Buck has a "Christ-like-all-embracing compassion for her characters." [29] Such a judgment may strike those unfamiliar with Mrs. Buck's ability to characterize as hyperbole. Zealous readers of Pearl Buck's fiction will tend to concur with most of Phyllis Bentley's adulatory remarks.

As for Pearl Buck's style, it has been designated biblical by some critics, Chinese by others. A biblical flavor can be found in her easy-flowing, dignified, and graceful narratives mainly because of her frequent use of conjunctive elements to link simple sentences. The Testament has undoubtedly had some influence upon her writing, but she once commented that her style "is not biblical, it is Chinese." [30] What she meant by her Chinese style she made clear by stating, "When I wrote in China of Chinese things about Chinese, I used the Chinese tongue. . . . The consequence is that when . . . writing about Chinese people the story spins itself in my mind entirely in the Chinese idioms, and I literally translate as I go." [31]

The more important question is not whether Mrs. Buck's style is biblical or Chinese, but whether it is effective. That her Chinese style is appropriate for her Chinese novels has been acknowledged by most critics. They concur that her style is an excellent vehicle for rich and genuine sentiments expressed in poignant terms. Her prose is unmarked by labored passages and rhetorical flourishes: it is always clear and central to her characterization. Only on occasion does her Chinese style fail her. One penetrating critic, for example, has remarked that *Sons* is not equal to *The Good Earth* because in its greater length and wordiness *Sons* "exposes the shortcomings of Mrs. Buck's workmanship as the stretching of a piece of cloth shows up defects in the weave. . . ." [32]

Pearl Buck's supreme success with *The Good Earth* has given critics the opportunity to measure all her other novels against this one work. Virtually everything else she has written has been measured against her magnum opus — and usually found wanting. In one way, *The Good Earth* was written too early in her career, for she has not been able to surpass this brilliant achievement with any of the more than fifty books that have

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 797.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 795.
[30] "Advice to Unborn Novelists," *Saturday Review of Literature*, vol. 11 (March 2, 1935), p. 520.
[31] *Ibid.*
[32] Isador Schneider, *Nation*, vol. 135 (November 16, 1932), p. 481.

followed. Regrettably, the more facility she displayed in plotting, character creation, invention of incident, and dialogue after writing *The Good Earth* the less impression her books seemed to make upon contemporary critics, most of whom were caught up with such avant-garde considerations as archetypes, symbolism, the subconscious, the unconscious, interior monologues, and stream-of-consciousness techniques to be interested in the quintessential element of the novel — its narrative quality.

Experimentation in the novel, however, has just about come to an end. When it ultimately does, Pearl Buck's reputation is bound to grow. After being virtually ignored for so many years by critics, she will be "rediscovered." When this general reevaluation does take place, it will undoubtedly become increasingly proper to say that her Oriental novels display a full measure of greatness.

What can be definitely posited now is that of all she has written, her best works are her Chinese novels. According to their overall quality they should be ranked after *The Good Earth* as *Sons, Imperial Woman, Mothers, The Patriot, East Wind: West Wind,* and *Dragon Seed.*[33] Mainly because they conform to the norms of Chinese fiction, these novels are her very best. In writing them she has tried to entertain and delight, to reach a large audience, to follow the traditional Chinese practice of emphasizing event and characterization. It is likewise true that conformation to the norms of traditional Chinese fiction is responsible for some of the shortcomings American critics detect in her work, although it may be somewhat uncritical of them to judge her fictional efforts according to artistic dogmas and aesthetic criteria she herself does not accept or attempt to emulate.

A good critic, Pearl Buck once wrote, judged a writer "on how well he had accomplished the goal he had set for himself".[34] It is plainly obvious that her goal has been to model her novels on the plan of the orthodox Chinese novel,[35] that she always wanted to be a storyteller, not a literary innovator extending the bounds of the novel. It is also quite obvious that her novels, short stories, translations, and non-fictional works interpreting China and her people that were written after *The Good Earth* have fully justified the early award to her of the Nobel Prize in Literature. That her books on China are still being devoured by readers the world

[33] Until recently, Pearl Buck has avoided judging any one of her works as superior or inferior to another. In a letter (dated February 27, 1967) to the author of this article, however, she stated: "In my own opinion, my best Chinese novel is *Imperial Woman.*" She also added: ". . . I place *The Townsman* as my best American novel, and *The Living Reed* as the best of my Asian Books."

[34] *A Bridge for Passing* (New York, 1962), p. 153.

[35] In writing about *Sons,* for example, she once noted that the work "is modelled on the plan of the orthodox Chinese novel, the material is purely Chinese . . . ." *Saturday Review of Literature,* vol. 11 (March 2, 1935), p. 514.

over is evidence of good judgment on the part of the Swedish Academy in their bestowing the Nobel Prize upon Pearl Buck in 1938. Few recipients of the Academy's award can rival her staying power or equal her universal acceptance.

Pearl Buck's popularity is proof of her storytelling ability. There is no question that she reaches a far greater reading public than all the esthetes and experimenters working in contemporary fiction combined.[36] Universal acclaim may not always be indicative of literary excellence, but Pearl Buck's continuous appeal over some thirty years gives indisputable testimony to the fact that she has what every great novelist must have — "tse ran."

[36] The John Day Publishing Company of New York continually re-issues her books in hard covers. Paperback editions of her best known works run into the millions. The Unesco publication *Index Translationum* lists the annual translations of her books into various foreign languages. Spiller's *Literary History of the United States* (New York, 1948) notes that Pearl Buck is one of the most widely read American authors throughout the world. And the *Writer's Yearbook* in 1963 estimated that she is the most popular American writer in Europe and Asia.

ASIAN COMMUNIST PARTIES AND THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALISM

ALLAN SPITZ

BOTH THE PERVASIVENESS AND THE EXPLOSIVE FORCE of nationalism have been vital dimensions of Asian political movements in the twentieth century. Communist parties in particular have demonstrated an ability and an interest in channelling nationalism into an effective political force in the quest for political control. Nonetheless, Communist parties in Asia have not had unqualified success in every setting, and the wide differences in the Communist Parties of Japan (JCP) and India (CPI) in identifying with nationalism and in amassing popular support may point out the importance of a nationalist line and at the same time indicate some of the limitations of this particular party tactic.

The consideration of these parties will be confined to a short period after World War II, when these countries first experienced independent representative government, Communist Parties were legal and aimed for parliamentary power, and nationalism was important in Japan and parts of India.

To understand the Japanese Communist Party's relations with nationalism, one must first consider some obstacles arising from a historical incompatibility of Japanese nationalism with the JCP.

Japan had no bitter, direct experience with colonialism, thus limiting the concern of Japanese nationalism to other interests more difficult for the JCP to assume. Even though Japan was occupied by a foreign power after World War II, this experience was neither so harsh nor so lengthy as to produce widespread hatred of the imperialists or a truly national movement for "liberation." Furthermore, Japanese nationalism contained elements of pre-war sentiments such as the glorification of the Emperor and rivalry with Russia. At the same time, the JCP was widely believed to be a tool of the USSR, and thus in agreement with Russian foreign policy on significant issues of Japanese national concern. Throughout most of its history, the JCP has attacked the Imperial system and even the Emperor himself, as demonstrated by the Party call for the trial of the Emperor as a war criminal immediately after the war.

Other characteristics of the JCP made its effective use of nationalism difficult. Because of pre-war repression, JCP leaders often were in prison or in exile, preventing them from acquiring a satisfactory understanding of the immediate needs of the populace. Many members of the JCP were intellectuals, better read in the Marxian Classics than understanding Japanese society. [1]

The Party tried to overcome these obstacles and to establish broad mass appeal through moderate tactics and aims, appearing independent of Soviet domination, and making the American Occupation a nationalist issue. In February, 1946, Nosaka Sanzo, the Party leader, instructed regional members to refrain from anti-emperor talk and terrorist agitation and become "lovable." The new goal became "peaceful revolution." A distinction was made between the Emperor and the foul Imperial system.[2] The Party spoke often of its program to aid the victims of the Pacific War. In 1947, JCP members tried to associate the conservative parties with the imperialists-colonialists. Thus, from a militant secret organization, the JCP tried to become a patriotic organization with a mass appeal.

During the period 1946-1950, the JCP grew greatly in prestige, as demonstrated by the number of new student and general public sympathizers, and its impressive 1949 election successes. Perhaps 40% of the university students supported the Party, due in part no doubt to their traditional anti-government stand whatever the issue. [3] Swearingen estimated that as many as three million Japanese may have symphatized with the JCP. In 1949 the Party received nearly 10% of the vote, obtaining 35 seats in the House of Representatives, and becoming the fourth largest party. This is compared with the 5 seats it obtained in the 1946 election out of a 464 member House.

Nationalist propaganda was involved in this relatively successful experiment with democratic tactics but several additional political factors probably contributed to its victory. The temporary division and discrediting of the Socialists at this time probably helped the communists [4] as did such factors as the eclipse of the pre-war leaders, the general instability of the war-aftermath and the general moderate image the JCP assumed. [5]

A rather sharp turn of events in 1950 brought out again the differences between JCP aims and those of Japanese nationalism. The JCP association with the Russian indoctrination and treatment of Japanese war prisoners

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[1] Doak A. Barnett, *Communist Strategies in Asia* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 65.

[2] Rodger Swearingen and Paul Langer, *Red Flag in Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 134.

[3] Rodger Swearingen, "The Communist Line in Japan," *Far Eastern Survey,* XXXIII (April, 1954), p. 56.

[4] Robert Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), p. 36.

[5] Barnett, *op. cit.,* p. 67.

and the Party's reaction to Cominform criticism of JCP policy revealed the anti-nationalist aims of the Party.

In the Spring of 1950 a Committee of the Japanese Diet stated that the JCP had assisted Russian authorities in obstructing the repatriation of Japanese war prisoners. The Japanese government estimated that 234,151 Japanese had died in Chinese and Russian camps by summer of 1951 and that 17,637 still remained in Soviet hands. Information was revealed to the effect that JCP members had edited the prison newspaper which contained policy statements of the Soviet and Japanese Parties and their account of events in Japan. Such indoctrination presumably served the purpose of broadening the JCP base of support in its goal of government domination. [6]

After only a short time, riots and demonstrations commenced. On May 30, only four days before an election, several American soldiers were assaulted by Communists during a Memorial Day observance. On June 3, a general strike was advocated by the Communists. The JCP again began its attack on the Emperor and refused to support territorial claims against the USSR.

In the June 4 election, the JCP received only two seats in the House of Councilors, and none in the House of Representatives in the election of October 1, 1952.

Several factors contributed to this setback. When Party membership decreased from 108,693 in March, 1950, to 56,000 in September, 1951, a considerable number withdrew from recognized communist affiliation to join the underground. [7] Soon after the initiation of terrorism, General MacArthur instructed Premier Yoshida to purge the Communist Central Committee and other communists from the press, government and industry—21,000 in all. In addition, several newspapers were closed. As the JCP had failed to gain an alliance with the Socialists in the late 40's it now had to compete with them. Many Socialists were far enough left to attract potential communist votes, particularly when the Socialists had the advantage of having no conspiratorial past or foreign affiliation. Thus, it cannot be said that the decline of the Party's influence resulted solely from the withdrawal of support from a nationalist oriented public. Yet such a dramatic reversal of Party fortunes at the time when it so clearly showed its subordination to Soviet Union indicated the importance of the nationalist issue. Evelyn Colbert summarizes the situation thus: [8]

> The Cominform attack and the Party's response served in the eyes of the Japanese people to underline the Party's interconnection and its subservience to Moscow at a time when long-held antipathies to Russia were intensified by the repatriation issue and Soviet accusations against the Emperor.

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[6] Swearingen and Langer, *op. cit.*, pp. 232-233.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 214.

[8] Evelyn Colbert, *The Left Wing in Japanese Politics* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1925), p. 291.

As with the Japan Communist Party, the Communist Party of India faced severe problems in creating a nationalist image as a result of certain factors within the party. By the end of World War II, the CPI had acquired an anti-nationalist reputation. From 1928-1935, at the urging of Stalin, the CPI attacked Gandhi, Nehru, and the Congress Party, cutting itself off from India's greatest nationalist force and ruining its chances for an alliance of the left. In 1942, after the Allies and USSR had joined forces against the Axis Powers, the CPI supported the British war effort, as a result of which it was denounced by the entire nationalist movement. Furthermore, the Party supported British attempts to court-martial Indian officers who assisted the Japanese. Public hostility toward the CPI was demonstrated by attacks on Party members and officers, particularly in Bombay and Calcutta. In September 1945 when the CPI tried to join a Congress sponsored public meeting, a riot took place.[9]

To overcome this image, the CPI attempted to associate itself with nationalist terrorist bands by means of various pamphlets.[10] Yet, during the Naval Mutiny of February 1946 against the British, the Party failed to claim involvement in it. Further, in accordance with Soviet policy, during the critical period of the independence settlement the CPI "disassociated itself from the major problems of Indian independence by turning to international issues on the one hand, and to local issues on the other."[11] In 1948, during the February Calcutta Conference, the Party initiated a terrorist campaign at the call of the international leadership, quarreling during the next three years about whether to use the Russian or the Chinese plan of revolution.

Internally, the Party leadership was badly disorganized and unable to take concerted action. Linguistic, caste and cultural differences increased the difficulty of uniting local parties into a strong, centralized one. Each regional party was interested in its own activities such as trade unions and front organizations. The Politburo at times ceased to meet while local parties drew up their own manifesto and led their own rebellions. In addition, the division between Chinese and Russian oriented party members created further disunity. The lack of concerted action during the Terrorist period (1946-1951) indicated this tendency. By the end of 1946, the CPI Central Office appeared to be throughly uncoordinated—"contradictory statements followed one another in quick succession."[12] Randivi, the head of the Party during much of this period, and his concept of a proletarian revolu-

[9] Gene Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, *Communism in India* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1959), p. 234.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 335.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 248.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 245.

tion were ignored by local communists who led peasant uprisings in sections of Senegana and Andhra. [13]

Thus a historical incompatibility of the CPI with Indian nationalism coupled with decentralized party organization would indicate the almost insurmountable difficulty of the Party in creating an effective nationalist identity. Yet this same concentration of political party power at the local level would seem to make easy an exploitation of regional nationalism based upon linguistic and cultural differences. The central party organs, seeing the value of such exploitation in 1946, advocated the fragmentation of the Indian subcontinent into sixteen "nations."[14] When in 1948-1949 Hindi was made the national language, the Party said that no one language could serve those of the dominant central bourgeoise. [15] The opportunity for the local parties to exploit this particularism on specific issues came in September, 1951, when the CPI finally joined the democratic fold in enthusiastically campaigning for the 1951-1952 elections.

The flexibility with which local parties used regional nationalism can be seen by the tactics of several of these parties. In Travincore-Cochin, where the people were the best educated in India, the CPI sponsored a literary movement. In Andhra, where the Telugu speaking population sought a lingual province independent of Madras (in which Andhra was included), the CPI fervently supported the separation. In the Tengana district of Hyderabad the Party exploited the "chaotic conditions resulting from the resistance of the Nizam of Hyderabad to the incorporation of his principality into the Indian Union." [16]

These were some of the factors contributing to a likelihood of a CPI identification with Indian and regional nationalism. A brief consideration of the 1951-1952 election results may show an important relationship between election success and the nationalist factor.

The CPI and the People's Democratic Front (several small Marxist groups in Hyderabad) won 23 of 70 contested seats in Parliament compared with the 362 for the Congress Party. The CPI nationally was fourth in popular vote (4,712,000), receiving 5.4% while the Congress got 47,530,000 with 44.8%. The Socialists, second in rank, got 11,000,000 votes. In Madras, Hyderabad, and Travancore-Cochin, the Communists were relatively more successful, particularly in the elections for the provincial assemblies. In Madras the CPI received 2,594,000 of the 19,975,000 votes cast for the regional seats, winning 8 of the 75 seats entitled to Madras. Significantly,

[13] Morton Schwartz, "The Wavering 'Line' of Indian Communism," *Political Science Quarterly*, LII (December, 1955), pp. 552-572.

[14] Overstreet and Windmiller, *op. cit.*, p. 493.

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 502-503.

[16] Schwartz, *op. cit.*, p. 564.

41 of the 61 assembly seats were from Andhra. A similar record appeared in Hyderabad where the People's Democratic Front polled 1,367,000 votes of the 5,202,000 total, receiving 42 of the 175 regional seats, and in Travancore-Cochin, where the party was outlawed, Communists ran as independents in the United Front of Leftists winning 32 of 108 seats in the assembly whereas it won only 4 of the 25 National seats.[17]

In Upper Pradesh, the CPI received only 59,700 of the 17,075,000 votes cast winning no seats in Parliament and having a similar record in the assembly election where it won no seats after contesting 41. Only 17 assembly seats were won in Madras, Hyderabad, Travancore-Cochin and West Bengal, where the CPI received 28 of 238 seats.[18]

A number of factors contributed to these results. In Hyderabad and Travancore-Cochin the Communists were in alliances; thus, their true popular support could not be accurately measured. Corruption and maladministration by the Congress Party in these areas led to voter defection.[19] Further, the Communists spent more time and more money in these three regions. Finally, the Communists probably gained from the Congress' speeches warning against the evils of communalism and feudalism.

Thus, while obviously the nationalist factor was hardly the only one of importance, there seems to be a very real relationship between nationalist identification and election success. In an intra-party report concerning the 1951 election, it was stated that success came where "provincial units of the Party brought out their own manifestoes, where agitation was positive and such concrete factors as the 'national' factor, the factor of unification of the nationalities into linguistic provinces, were effectively utilized." [20]

The poor showing of the Party in the dominant states where there was little need for protection from the center and where Indian nationalism had greater appeal, in part at least, indicates the dilemma faced by the CPI.

While this study doesn't presume to make a historical account of the Indian Communists, several significant events during the middle 50's point to several prerequisites for an effective use of the nationalist issue. When the cause of local frustration is eliminated, as it was in Andhra when it became a state in 1953, the Congress could make Indian nationalism the issue against the Communists, such as occurred in the 1955 elections when the CPI in Andhra received only 8% of the assembly seats compared with the Congress' 61%.[21] Additionally, the USSR at this time worked

[17] M. R. Masani, *The Communist Party of India* (Boston: The Macmillan Co., 1954), pp. 157-160.
[18] *Ibid.*
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 161.
[20] Selig Harrison, "The Challenge to Indian Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIV (July, 1956), p. 630.
[21] Overstreet and Windmiller, *op. cit.*, p. 318.

very hard to seek Indian friendship or at least her neutrality and thus praised more and more both Nehru's domestic and foreign policies, resulting in the frustration of the CPI. For the same reason the Russians instructed the Indian Party to put less emphasis on particularist agitation, which it understandably and incompletely did. The subordination of the CPI, a revolutionary party, to the Russian Communists who were seeking international respectability, thus greatly limited the CPI's opportunity.

This brief examination of two unsuccessful Communist Party organizations indicates that the historical experience of colonial subjection is not in itself sufficient to create Communist success; rather, a more critical factor would be the extent of nationalistic feeling channeled into non-revolutionary political organizations. The differences in India are particularly instructive in that they indicate variations in the emerging nations regarding their relationship with communism. From the point of view of general communist doctrine and its acceptance by those able to influence the political systems of these areas, there appears to be a need for a highly independent Party, particularly in the rather sensitively self-conscious countries like Japan and India. That what is good for the international leadership may not be good for the national communist party's bid for power is clearly indicated by the frustrations of the parties in India and Japan. If this factor coupled with a sincere nationalism is necessary for communist growth, a further expansion of world communist power may only come with a corresponding further development of polycentrism of the communist movement.

THE 31st GENERAL ELECTION IN JAPAN: POLITICAL TURNING POINT?

GEORGE AKITA

"For to measure something does not mean to understand it." — Theodore H. White

IT WAS CLOUDY WITH SHOWERS THROUGHOUT MOST OF Japan in the early morning hours of Sunday, January 29, 1967. In areas usually with heavy snowfall, there was only a light precipitation. In the afternoon, the skies cleared. This was almost ideal voting weather: bad enough in the morning to stop people from going on day-long excursions, but not bad enough at anytime to prevent them from going to the polls. Some observers noted that, based on past elections, this was the kind of weather that would favor the Jiyuminshuto (Liberal Democratic Party, LDP). One of the significant results of the 31st election [1] was the "unexpectedly and relatively" good showing made by the LDP.

No one will seriously argue that the weather alone was responsible for the LDP achievement. Moreover, in spite of the spate statistical data, analysis of voting behavior, like weather prediction, still involves art, involving unequal parts of guesswork, subjectivity, and intuition. This is clear when one reads the *Asahi Shimbun*'s (*AS*) judgment that in the 20-odd years following the war, there was never an election with as many distinctive characteristics, while another analyst called it a "nonsense election" because "nothing" was changed except the appearance of 25 Komeito (Clean Government Party, Fair Play Party, (CGP) members in the House of Representatives (HOR).[2]

The 31st general election and its results are important. First there was the emergence of the new. This was the first *national* election in

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[1] Counting from the first held on July 1, 1890. It was also the 10th since the end of World War II.

[2] *AS* January 31, 1967 *Dai sanjuikkai shugiingiin sosenkyo no bunseki* (Analysis of the 31st HOR general election), mimeographed Japanese government document, pp. 156-158. Cf. views of Professor Joji Watanuki, *Nihon no seiji shakai* (Japan's Political Society) (Tokyo, 1967), pp. 209; 211-226.

which those born after 1945 voted. They symbolized the gradual passing of the old order, for the leadership of the established parties are mostly in their 60's and many more of the prewar leadership group have already disappeared from the scene through death, retirement, and electoral rejection. This election also saw the maiden participation of the youthful, highly disciplined, ambitious CPG. The Nihon kyosanto (Japanese Communist Party, JCP) also presented a newly refurbished appearance as a "lovable, independent, moderate," party. The meaning and significance of the new will be discussed. Second, there was the persistence of the old. This election marked the continuation of 22 years of conservative rule. For a brief moment, the Nihon shakaito (Japan Socialist Party, JSP) leaders permitted themselves the luxury of thinking about taking over the reins of government in coalition with other parties. This was because many generally assumed that the *kuroi kiri* (black mist [of scandal]) which had engulfed the LDP would greatly benefit the JSP. But the election results confirmed the LDP in their hold on the HOR and solidified the JSP's position as a "permanent minority party." The "other" established party, the Nihon minshushakaito (Japan Democratic Socialist Party, DSP) made a creditable showing, all the more eye-catching because of the "poor" results achieved by the JSP. The reasons and implications of these developments will be analyzed. What follows in tabular form (Table 1)[3] are part of the raw data from which the analysis will proceed. (Figures within parentheses denote results of the 30th general election, November 21, 1963).

When the results were finally tabulated, the *Asahi* called them "pitiable" for the JSP, while the *Yomiuri* declared that the most notable aspect of the election was the JSP's "poor showing." JSP secretary-general Tomomi Narita frankly admitted "defeat" and in this he was seconded by the leaders of the General Council of Japanese Labor Unions (Sohyo).[4] On the other side of the political fence, LDP secretary-general Takeo Fukuda modestly declared himself "satisfied" with the results. Political commentators spoke of the "strength" of the LDP, and the stock market spurted up 29 yen 57 sen over the previous week's closing average. This was the highest jump since April 27, 1966.[5]

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[3] *AS* November 23, 1963, January 31, 1967; *Yomiuri shimbun* (*YS*) January 25, 31, 1967; "Dai 31 ikkai shugiingiin sosenkyo no kekka ni tsuite," (Results of the 31st HOR general election), *Chosa geppo* (*CG*), XII (April 1967), pp. 8, 14, 20, 36-37; Robert E. Ward, *Japan's Political System* (New Jersey, 1967), Table 6-2, "Results of Postwar General Elections for Japan's House of Representatives," pp. 60-61.

[4] *AS* editorial January 31, 1967; *YS* editorial January 31, 1967; statement by Narita, *YS* January 31, 1967; *YS* February 1, 1967.

[5] *AS* January 31, 1967; "Tensei jingo" (Vox populis vox dei), *AS* January 31, 1967; "Henshu techo" (Editor's notebook), *YS* January 31, 1967; *YS* January 31, 1967 and February 1, 1967.

Table 1. Results of 30th and 31st General Elections, HOR

Party	No. of Candidates	Seats at Dissolution	No. of Seats Won	% of Seats Won	% of Votes Won	No. of Votes Won
LDP	342 (359)	278 (286)	277 (283)	57.00% (60.60%)	48.80% (54.67%)	22,447,836 (22,423,915)
JSP	209 (198)	141 (137)	140 (144)	28.81 (30.83)	27.88 (29.03)	12,826,100 (11,906,766)
DSP	60 (59)	23 (14)	30 (23)	6.20 (4.97)	7.41 (7.37)	3,406,463 (3,023,302)
CGP	32 (—)	— (—)	25 (—)	5.14 (—)	5.38 (—)	2,472,371 (—)
JCP	123 (118)	4 (3)	5 (5)	1.03 (1.07)	4.76 (4.01)	2,190,563 (1,646,477)
Minor	16 (64)	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0.36 (0.15)	166,711 (59,765)
Independents	135[a] (119)	1 (2)	9 (12)	1.85 (2.78)	5.41 (4.77)	2,488,521 (1,956,313)
Total	917 (917)	488[b] (467)	486[c] (467)	100[d] (100)	100 (100)	45,998,565 (41,016,538)

[a] Only five or six were non-DP.
[b] 19 vacancies. Deaths, LDP 11, JSP 2; Resignations, LDP 4, JSP 2.
[c] Seven women, LDP 3 (2), JSP 3 (4), DSP 1 (1).
[d] Rounded out from 100.03 and 100.25 respectively.

There were those who maintained that the LDP did not win a victory, but had merely succeeded in its "defensive measures" and had prevented a defeat of "landslide proportions." Narita strongly upheld this view when he wrote that while he admitted the JSP defeat, he could not concede the LDP victory.[6] These cautionary voices are probably closer to the truth. The election results indicate LDP success in "defensive measures," and a JSP "defeat." More importantly, the election also spotlighted the persistence of certain trends which have unhappy portents for both parties. To better understand the immediate results, however, let us turn to August 1966, for it was then that the "black mist" began to swirl around the LDP.

On August 5, Shoji Tanaka, a member of the LDP and powerful chairman of the HOR audit committee, was arrested on charges of intimidation, extortion, and fraud involving Y250,000,000 ($694,444).[7] He was later further charged with perjury, incitement to commit perjury, breach of trust, and income tax evasion. Tanaka provided an extra fillip to the sensation-seeking Japanese weekly magazines because he was said to have fathered from 18 to 21 children from seven to ten women.[8]

Almost exactly a month later, another high-ranking member of the LDP was accused of misusing his authority as transportation minister. Seijuro Arafune had asked the Japan National Railway authorities to have express trains make a stop at a town which was located in the center of his election district, which would slow the express to the pace of local trains. Even while his "indiscretion" was being questioned, he attended the Japan-South Korea ministerial conference in Seoul. He was accompanied by two businessmen, allegedly at government expense. The two were also said to have consummated a successful business transaction, for which Arafune was sup-

[6] *YS* editorial January 31, 1967; Tomomi Narita, "Sohvo no dappi ga hitsuyo," (Sohyo needs to rejuvenate), *Chuo koron* (*CK*), Spring 1967, p. 376. The points brought out were that in this election the opposition had narrowed the gap between itself and the LDP to 84 seats; that the opposition had won more than 200 seats for the first time since 1955; that the LDP had won less than 50% of the votes cast, also for the first time since 1955; that in the 1963 election, the LDP and independents had numbered 295. If the 19 added seats were taken into account, the LDP/independents total should have numbered 307 in order to have equalled the 1963 achievement. *YS* editorial January 31, 1967; *YS* January 31, 1967; February 1, 1967; *AS* January 31, 1967; *CG* p. 49; "Senkyo kekka no imi suru mono," (What the results of the election signify), *CK* Spring 1967, p. 371.

[7] Tanaka was first elected in January 1949 and served continuously until his resignation on September 13, 1966. The sum involved was later said to be Y270,000,000 ($750,000).

[8] See *Japan Times* (*JT*), August 6, 7, 30, 1966; November 23, 1966; December 10, 1966; January 10, 1967; February 11, 1967; *AS* August 8, 1966. For examples of the attention Tanaka received, see articles in *Shukan asahi* August 26, 1966, pp. 112-117; *Shukan gendai* August 25, 1966, pp. 106-110; September 1, 1966, pp. 42-46; *Shukan josei* August 27, 1966, pp. 46-50.

posed to have received a substantial bribe. Another indiscretion was charged against Arafune when he was accused of soliciting for membership in his supporters' association, businessmen in the transportation industry. He resigned on October 11, 1966, a little over 70 days after his appointment.[9]

The biggest scandal involved the Kyowa Sugar Refining Company, whose executives were charged with forgery, fraud, misappropriation, and swindling. Political figures became entangled because the company had negotiated with and had borrowed from Y7-8,000,000,000 ($19,444,444-22,222,222) from the government, and Matsuno was charged with "indiscretions" involving part of his sum. Other politicians were accused of having received funds for this company. The scandal was still page-one copy when the 31st general election was held.[10]

The "black mist mood" fanned by the press had two immediate results which affected the outcome of the election.[11] The first was the JSP belief that the "black mist" presented the party an unprecedented opportunity to increase the number of its seats in the HOR and perhaps even to take over the reins of government in coalition with another party or political faction.[12] The second was that the LDP leadership was galvanized into taking strong measures to limit its anticipated losses.

There were three other reasons for the JSP "overoptimism." The first was the belief that the shift toward urbanization and the rapid industrialization in Japan would help the *kakushin* cause.[13] Indeed, this feeling also

[9] *JT* September 4, 5, 28, 1966; October 2, 12, 15, 1966; *Naigai josei chosakai shiryo* (Domestic and foreign conditions research association's materials) January 24, 1967; *Dai sanjuikkai . . . bunseki,* p. 24. Other LDP members, all highly placed, who were involved in "indiscretions" were Eikichi Kambayashiyama, Director of the Self-Defense Agency, Raizo Matsuno, member of the House of Councillors (HOC), Kikuichiro Yamaguchi, president of the HOR, and Seishi Shigemasa.

[10] *JT* October 18, 19, 1966; November 18, 19, 20, 1966; December 4, 9, 1966; February 9, 17, 1967; *AS* September 28, 1966; October 30, 1966; November 20, 1966, December 9, 1966, February 8, 1967; *Naigai . . . shiryo,* January 24, 1967.

[11] "At one point the two leading dailies, *Asahi* and *Mainichi,* seemed bent on fighting a circulation war over which paper could add more fuel to the flames feeding the 'black mist'." Hans H. Baerwald, "Japan: 'Black Mist' and Pre-Electioneering," *Asian Survey* VII (January 1967), p. 31.

[12] *AS* January 31, 1967; *Sankei shimbun* (*SS*) January 31, 1967. LDP-supporting financial circles were also said to have been concerned about the anticipated size of LDP losses. "Senkyo kekka . . . mono," p. 370. After the election, the *Yomiuri* maintained that had not the LDP exercised stringent control over candidacy and the JSP had done so, there was a possibility that the party out of power might have become the ruling party. *YS* February 1, 1967.

[13] The term generally refers to the "progressive" "reformist" parties which oppose the LDP. Baerwald uses "reformist" or "renovationists." Hans H. Baerwald, "Japan at Election Time," *Asian Survey* IV (January 1964), p. 646. Ward designates the opposition, minus the CGP, minor parties, and independents as, "the 'progressive,' or left-wing opposition," and recognizes the problems involved in this generalization. *Japan's Political System,* pp. 57, 60-61. The *CG* does the same, pp. 28-29. Others include the CGP in *kakushin* ranks. See, for example, *Sengo senkyo no bunseki* (Analysis of postwar

permeated LDP ranks. Hirohide Ishida, a labor minister in two former cabinets, in 1963 suggested that if the LDP did nothing in the face of the political changes accompanying industrialization and urbanization, the JSP will control the government by 1968.[14]

The second source of the JSP's sanguineous hopes was the almost universal conclusion reached by newspaper polls that the party was going to increase its seats. (See Table 2). JSP receptivity to the poll results was understandable, of course, because of the favorable predicitions made of party prospects.[15]

The third reason for JSP hopefulness was the precipitous drop in the Sato cabinet's popularity by November 1966. When the cabinet was first formed in November 1964, 47% of those polled by the *Asahi* said that they "supported" the cabinet. Two years later, the figure, had fallen to 25%.[16] And so the party was swept along by euphoric anticipation—in the face of warnings that talk of JSP strength was not ground on hard political realities.[17] In concrete terms, the JSP expected to win at least 150 seats, and if things really went well, 162.[18] Some leaders, as we have seen, even dreamed of taking over power in concert with another party or political faction.

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elections), mimeographed Japanese government document, p. 8; *YS* editorial April 17, 1967. The impreciseness causes difficulties. As we shall later see, the CGP is often designated as "conservative" and the DSP is unflatteringly called "a second conservative party," "a fifth column of the Liberal Democratic Party." Fukuji Taguchi, "The Democratic Socialist Party," the *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan* (*JSPIJ*) II (December 1964), p. 63. Another says that "Parties standing for pure socialistic principles would normally include in Japan both the Socialist (JSP) and Communist parties." Wakao Fujita, "The Life and Political Consciousness of the New Middle Class," *JSPIJ* (December 1964), p. 134. To define *kakushin* as "opposition" also raises questions because in local elections the JSP, DSP, and LDP sometimes all support the same candidate for governor or mayor. Whenever possible, I shall try to make distinctions between parties and use the term "progressive" or *kakushin* only when the source uses it. At other time, I will use the term, "non-LDP."

[14] "Hoshuseito no vision" (The conservative party's vision), *CK* January 1963, p. 94.

[15] An *Asahi* polling expert also maintained that generally, in elections for the HOR, unlike the situation in local and HOC elections, there is a high correlation between rates of support for parties shown in public opinion polls and the actual percentage of support gained by parties, and that there is a relatively strong tendency to vote for the party, rather than the person in HOR elections. *AS* November 19, 1963 quoted in Watanuki, *Nihon no seiji shakai,* p. 219.

[16] *AS* November 30, 1966; November 30, 1964; *Mainichi shimbun* (*MS*) December 14, 1964; Motoo Goto, "Political Awareness Among the Japanese: On the *Asahi Shimbun* Public Opinion Survey," *Japan Quarterly* XIV (April-June 1967), p. 167.

[17] In his book published just before the election, Watanuki stated that in spite of criticisms, it was possible that the LDP could hold their losses to a minimum. *Nihon no seiji shakai,* pp. 218-219. The *Asahi* noted JSP weakness in the urban electoral districts where the party stood in danger of losing seats to the DSP, CGP, and JCP. January 26, 1967. Though unfortunately no date and percentages are given, an *Asahi* poll is said to have shown that while support for the Sato cabinet had declined, support for the LDP had climbed, while that of the JSP had fallen. *CG,* p. 50.

[18] *YS* January 31, 1967; *AS* December 25, 1966. Kozo Sasaki, JSP chairman, gave 170 as the number of seats to be won. *YS* February 1, 1967.

Table 2. Election Predictions by Newspapers and Parties

	LDP (277)[a]	JSP (140)	DSP (30)	JCP (5)	CGP (25)	Minor (0)	Ind (9)
Mainichi [b]	273 (±5)	153 (±4)	28 (±2)	5 (±1)	22 (—1) (+5)	0	5 (±1)
Asahi [c]	271 (±8)	141 (±8)	27 (±5)	9 (±4)	21 (±4)	0 (+1)	17 (±5)
Tokyo [d]	269 (±6)	155 (±5)	28 (±3)	4 (±1)	26 (±2)		4 (±2) [h]
Nihon Keizai [e]	271 (±6)	154 (±5)	28 (±2)	5 (±2)	24 (±4)	0	5
Sankei [f]	266	155	30	4	26	0	2-5
LDP [g]	270-283	145-150	24-27	3-5	20-30		5
JSP	260 (±)	148-168	26-27	4-5	24-25		A few.
DSP	270s	140s	32-33	5	20-30		
JCP				10 (±)			
CGP					26-28		

[a] Seats actually won.
[b] 122 electoral districts, omitting Amami Oshima. 112,600 interviewed. (25 Jan. 67)
[c] 122 electoral districts, omitting Amami Oshima. 98,600 interviewed. (26 Jan. 67)
[d] All 123 electoral districts checked (25 Jan. 67)
[e] (26 Jan. 67)
[f] Interviews, past elections' data analyzed as in the case of *Asahi* analysis. (24 Jan. 67)
[g] Predictions by respective parties. JCP and CGP limited to own party. (*Tokyo Shimbun, TS,* 24 Jan. 67)
[h] Combined minor parties and independent gains.

The results shocked the JSP. It won 140 seats, one less than the number held just before the election.[19] The percentage of votes won by the party slipped from 29.03% in 1963 to 27.88%.[20] Furthermore, in spite of a revision in the election law which increased the number of seats in urban constituencies, the JSP made a poor showing in these electoral districts.[21] For example, the JSP was able to increase its number of seats in Tokyo by only one (from 12 to 13), and in Osaka, lost two seats (from six to four). As if to add insult to injury, the electors rejected the JSP election campaign chairman and four others of the central executive committee.[22] There are three basic reasons for the JSP "defeat." The first is "psychological," that is, a misreading of the prevailing "mood."[23] The second is immediate, tactical weaknesses. The third is the continuation and hardening of trends which appear unfavorable, at this stage, for the party. The first two will now be discussed, leaving the analysis of the long-range problems to the end.

An astute observer of the Hawaiian political scene has said that, "More politicians have lost elections on overconfidence than on issues." Both Sasaki and Narita after the election quickly admitted that the party had become "overintoxicated by the 'black mist' mood" before the election.[24] Three reasons for JSP overconfidence have already been mentioned. A fourth must now be added. This is the role of the mass media, particularly the newspapers. Baerwald has stated that the *Asahi* and the *Mainichi* seemed to be fighting a circulation war on the "black mist" issue. The two newspapers, plus the *Yomiuri* are truly national newspapers with Japan-wide distribution. However, since Tokyo is the political, social, industrial, finan-

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[19] An independent from Wakayama prefecture entered the party, making the total, 141. *MS* February 1, 1967.

[20] An LDP supporter correctly pointed out that the JSP was unable to increase the percentage won in spite of the "large number" of candidates which would have raised the percentage. Yoshizane Iwasa, "Jiminto ni atarashii shiren," (A new test for the LDP), *CK* Spring 1967, p. 390.

[21] The law was revised on July 2, 1964. Under this revision, the number of seats in the HOR was increased from 467 to 486 and the number of electoral districts from 118 to 123. The new seats were allocated to Tokyo (12), Kanagawa (1), Aichi (1), Osaka (4), and Hyogo (1). *CG*, p. 9.

[22] *YS* February 1, 1967; *AS* January 31, 1967. Another blow was the defeat of Hyo Hata, "the conscience of the political world." *YS* January 31, 1967.

[23] ". . . . ['mood'] . . . must be recognized as a vital element in the Japanese political scene . . . . it is doubtful whether any other civilized people act and react with so much unspoken consensus and emotional homogeneity as the Japanese do on some occasions." George R. Packard, III, *Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960* (Princeton, 1966), pp. 45-46.

[24] Larry McManus, *Sunday Star-Bulletin and Advertiser*, June 18, 1967; *YS* January 31, 1967; *SS* January 31, 1967. There is another dimension to the psychological factor. The pre-election over-optimism induced a proportionately deep post-election gloom. "Senkyo kekka . . . mono," p. 370. This was also the case in the 1963 election which the JSP considered a defeat. Baerwald, "Japan at Election Time," p. 648.

cial, and cultural center of Japan, its moods, according to Whittemore, "tend to predominate in the national papers." The "big three" are headquartered in Tokyo, and it is from Tokyo that they receive direction and stimuli. The danger is that the national mood is sometimes interpreted by what is seen and felt in Tokyo.[25] The LDP, like the JSP, is highly centralized in Tokyo also. It was in Tokyo that the fury of the attack against the LDP involvement in the "black mist" was concentrated—to the delight and hopeful anticipation of the JSP.[26] Before the election, however, Watanuki warned against overestimating the impact of the "black mist" on voter sentiment. After the election, Professor Tadashi Fukutake of Tokyo University commented that it was easy enough to criticize the voters' consciousness of Saitama's 3rd district (Arafune's), but that these remarks were the expressions of the intellectual class of the metropolitan areas, and that the people in Arafune's district did not think his actions were deplorable.[27] In fact, the JSP itself probably became aware that the "black mist" was not all that potent an issue. This is indicated by the shift in the middle of the campaign period from attacking the LDP on the "black mist" to a discussion of issues, such as the high cost of living, housing, traffic, smog and water pollution.[28] Still, there can be no denying that the JSP to the end felt that the "black mist" afforded them great opportunities.[29]

This conviction that the corruption issue presented the party an unprecedented chance to gain seats resulted in one immediate, tactical error. The party, beset by factional struggles, was unable to fully control the number of candidates it put up. Candidate control is vital to electoral success under

[25] Edward P. Whittemore, *The Press in Japan Today . . . A Case Study* (Columbia, 1961), pp. 1-2, 7-18. An excellent summary of the role of the press on a national issue is found in Packard, *Protest in Tokyo,* pp. 278-284.

[26] Official JSP publications also pushed hard on the "black mist" issue. See for example, *Oshoku: sengo Nihon oshokushi gaikan* (Corruption: A survey of the history of corruption in postwar Japan) [Tokyo, 1966 (published in December)]; "Oshoku to fuhai no Jiminto," (The corruption and graft-tainted LDP), *Shakai shimpo* December 3, 1966.

[27] Watanuki, *Nihon no seiji shakai,* p. 219; *AS* January 30, 1967.

[28] *YS* January 19, 23, 1967; *MS* January 21, 1967; *AS* January 22, 25, 30 (editorial) 1967; *TS* December 28, 1966; *SS* January 23, 1967; *JT* January 14, 1967. Another reason for the shift was that some JSP members were linked with the Kyowa Seito scandal. *SS* January 31, 1967; *JT* November 19, 1966; " 'Kuroi kiri' sosenkyo no igai na kekka," (The unexpected results of the 'black mist' election), *CK* March 1967, p. 38. Two incumbent JSP candidates associated with the Kyowa Seito question lost. "Dai sanjuikkai . . . bunseki," p. 111. Although the DSP's hands were not completely clean, this party, plus the CGP and JCP hammered at the theme that the two major parties were both culpable and that they only were guiltless. *JT* January 14, 1967; *AS* editorial January 30, 1967. Another reason for the shift is typically Japanese. Eiichi Nishimura, secretary-general of the DSP said that for the parties to have continued to emphasize the "black mist" would have reflected on Japan's national honor. *YS* January 31, 1967.

[29] Saburo Eda, a leader of the anti-mainstream faction in the JSP, strongly implied that the party erred in not rigorously pursuing the "black mist" issue. *YS* February 1, 1967; see also by Eda, "Leadership no ketsujo," (Deficiency in leadership), *CK* Spring 1967, p. 378.

Japan's voting system. Japan has, according to Ward, a "multimember single-vote system." Under this system, there is no primary election and each electoral district in Japan is represented from three to five members in the HOR, except for Amami Oshima which returns only one member. Each voter votes for only one candidate. The candidates with the highest votes, irrespective of the percentages of votes cast in the district, win. In order to maximize its representation, a party must carefully choose, limit, and distribute its support in a given district. It must be agreed among the candidates from one party that no single candidate get too many votes else the other candidates suffer, allowing candidates from rival parties to slip in.[30] Since this system has a "sort of built-in bias in favor of weaker parties and candidates," the LDP is constantly faced with the problem of controlling the number of candidates it fields in an election.[31] The JSP, though weaker than the LDP, is no longer so weak that it would not suffer from careless control and choice of candidates. Partlv to capitalize on the "black mist" issue, and partly because of intense and bitter factional differences, the JSP put up too many candidates.[32] By December 24, the party had already selected 209 *konin kohosha* (endorsed candidates). The result on January 31, was what Narita and the *Asahi* have described as *tomodaore* (falling together) and the *Sankei* as *tomogui* (cannibalism).[33] The *Yomiuri* even postulated that had the JSP controlled the number of candidates, and had the JCP not run candidates in every electoral district, and had pushed JSP candidates instead, the JSP might have won 37 seats.[34]

The JSP had only partial control over the second major tactical weakness. After the election, the *Yomiuri* criticized the JSP for what it called the party's "abstract views" on the Vietnam war and the Red Guards, which, the *Yomiuri* said, were even farther left than those held by the JCP. The *Asahi* recalled that during the campaign, Sasaki had mentioned a possible trip to Communist China, and that when Sasaki had been elected as chairman for the third time, he had declared: "We must never flinch from our

[30] Baerwald, "Japan at Election Time," p. 652; Jun-ichi Kyogoku and Nobutaka Ike, "Urban-Rural Differences in Voting Behavior in Postwar Japan," *Stanford University Political Science Series, No. 66*, p. 12-15

[31] Ward, *Japan's Political System*, p. 54; see also Keiichi Matsushita, "The Conservatives and the Progressives: An Organizational Confrontation," *JSPIJ*, II (December 1964), pp. 46-47. The *Japan Quarterly* errs in stating that this system works in favor of the LDP. XIV (April-June 1967), p. 132.

[32] The incumbents naturally favor limiting the number. R. P. Dore, "The Japanese Socialist Party and 'Structural Reform,'" *Asian Survey* I (October 1961), p. 10. For an excellent description of the factions and factional disputes, see J. A. A. Stockwin, "The Japanese Socialist Party Under New Leadership," *Asian Survey* VI (April 1966), pp. 187-200; also, *Dai sanjuikkai . . . bunseki*, p. 13-14. The post-election factional breakdowns are given in *SS* January 31, 1967 and *YS* January 31, 1967.

[33] *CG*, p. 3. *SS* January 31, 1967; *AS* editorial January 31, 1967. See *CG*, p. 52 and *YS*, January 31, 1967 for examples of cannibalism.

[34] *YS* February 1, 1967.

position that we are pro-China." The *Asahi* wondered whether these remarks were helpful at all to the JSP cause.[35] The "great cultural revolution" in China also reached one of its frenzied peaks at the height of the campaign and the LDP was quick to seize this opening to accuse the JSP of being tainted by the "red mist."[36] And in one of the most fortuitous strokes of luck for the LDP, in the evening edition of the *Yomiuri* of January 26, there appeared a photograph of Chinese "anti-Maoist" with dunce caps and hands tied behind their backs, being led through the streets. It is felt that this one picture cost the JSP thousands of votes.[37] Kakuei Tanaka of the LDP, the JSP's Eda, and even the JCP's secretary-general, Kenji Miyamoto are agreed that the upheaval in China and the JSP position on the whole China question helped the LDP.[38]

The JSP's tactical weaknesses contributed to the LDP "successes." There are several other reasons for the relatively and unexpectedly good results for the LDP. These are the rigid controls exercised over candidate selection—including limiting numbers; the momentum the party enjoyed as the oldest and most solidly established, richest, and strongest party; and, prosperity.

When the results were known, Kakuei Tanaka, ex-secretary-general of the LDP, said that the party owed a debt of gratitude to the mass media. What he meant was that thanks to the attacks against the party on the "black mist" issue, the party waged a life-and-death campaign.[39] No one seriously doubted that the LDP would not win an absolute majority of 244 seats. However, a bare majority would not be enough to insure political stability. If the LDP had dropped from the 270's to the 260's, there would have been danger for the party.[40] So the LDP labored vigorously to main-

[35] *YS* editorial January 31, 1967; *AS* editorial January 31, 1967.

[36] "'Kuroi kiri' sosenkyo . . . kekka," p. 38. In the April 1967 Tokyo gubernatorial election, the LDP/DSP camp pushed the line that a victory by Ryokichi Minobe, the JSP/JCP candidate will mean that a "red flag" will fly over the Tokyo government office and that there will be a revolution in Tokyo. Newspaper commentary agrees that this line was ineffectual. *YS* April 16, 1967.

[37] Drew Middleton, "A Shift in Japanese Sentiment," the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, March 6, 1967. This opinion was broached by a professor of sociology, Tokyo Education University in a conversation in Honolulu immediately after the election. Subsequently, two letters, one from a "Suginami (ward) intellectual" (March 1967), and an LDP supporter (April 1967) corroborated this suggestion.

[38] *YS* February 1, 1967; *AS* January 31, 1967. Sasaki, however, stoutly maintains that the party's policies with respect to China cannot be given as a cause for the defeat. *SS* January 31, 1967. Perhaps, but a nationwide poll taken by the monthly *Jiji* showed that throughout 1966, China kept pace with the Soviet Union as the "most disliked" nation. Douglas H. Mendel, "Japanese Views of Sato's Foreign Policy: The Credibility Gap," *Asian Survey* VII (July 1967), p. 452.

[39] *YS* February 1, 1967. See also, "Henshu techo," *YS* January 31, 1967.

[40] *YS* editorial January 31, 1967; the *Asahi* felt that the LDP had to win at least 270 seats to be assured of political stability and effectiveness. *AS* editorial January 31, 1967. The reason is that it is necessary to choose around 40 members of the party to

tain the status quo in terms of the number of those to be elected. The major effort was concentrated on limiting the number of candidates. This was crucial, for as we have seen, the electoral system of Japan favors the weaker party and candidates.[41] The party was largely successful in this effort. In spite of the increase in HOR seats by 19, the party limited the "endorsed" candidates to 342, 17 less than in 1963. Overall, the candidate to seats ratio was 1.89, the lowest since the end of World War II. The ratio was actually lower since there were candidates who did not have any expectation of winning. Recalculated, the ratio was closer to 1.44.[42]

There are other indices which show that LDP candidate control had good results. First, the lower the number of votes needed to elect a candidate, the more efficacious the vote. Through the 28th election (May 1958) the non-LDP parties were able to elect their candidates with fewer votes. But after the 28th election, it has taken an average of 10-20,000 less votes to elect an LDP member than candidates from other parties. In this election, it took an average of 81,039 votes to elect an LDP candidate, as against 91,615 for a JSP candidate.[43] Second, the smaller the difference between the average number of votes won per candidate and the average number of votes needed to elect a candidate, the smaller number of "wasted" votes.[44] On this score, the difference for the LDP was 15,402 votes, and the JSP, 30,246.[45] Third, the higher the average number of votes received

serve in the cabinet, serve as parliamentary vice-ministers, and in other official government capacities. Although these men can vote when the HOR is in plenary session, they cannot vote in the committees. The LDP can call on HOC members to serve in the cabinet and certain other government positions. However, the number that can be tapped is limited. Therefore, a ruling party would find it extremely difficult to control the Diet effectively with less than 260 members. Watanuki, *Nihon no seiji shakai,* p. 224.

[41] See Baerwald, "Japan at Election Time," pp. 652-653 for a concrete example of the dangers stemming from undisciplined voting in an electoral district. See also Frank C. Langdon, "The Political Contributions of Big Business in Japan," *Asian Survey* III (October 1963), p. 471.

[42] 219 candidates out of the 917 were considered too weak to be serious candidates. These were those who did not get the minimum number of votes as required by law. Of the 219, the JCP contributed 94 and the minor and independents, 106. *CG,* p. 7. See also, Table 2, *CG,* p. 6 which shows declining ratio since the 22nd election. See Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962), p. 102, for calculation of minimum number of votes required by law.

[43] For the JSP this was an increase by approximately 9,000 votes over the 1963 average of 82,686, an indication of insufficient candidate control. *CG,* pp. 34-35. See Table 18, *CG,* p. 33.

[44] Ward suggests another way in which parties can "waste" votes. Under Japan's electoral system, if a party runs too few candidates, it "wastes" those votes which are in excess of the number required to elect this smaller number of candidates, which excess can be used to elect another person. *Japan's Political System,* p. 54.

[45] *CG,* p. 34. The difference was smallest for the LDP, even smaller than the highly disciplined CGP (21,633). For the JSP, the difference in 1967 was around 8,000 greater than in 1963, another indication of ineffective candidate control. *CG,* Table 19, p. 35.

per candidate, the more effective the vote. The average number of votes received by an LDP candidate was 65,637, a figure surpassed only by the CGP average of 77,262. The JSP average per candidate was 61,369.[46] Fourth, the LDP elected 80% of all its candidates, the highest percentage among the parties, and the percentage of seats it controls in the HOR (57%) is much greater than the percentage of votes won (48.8%).[47] Fifth, the number of independent candidates rose from 119 in 1963 to 135 in 1967. One reason is because the LDP strictly controlled the number of endorsed candidates. Therefore, those who would have run as endorsed candidates in halcyon days had to compete as independents.[48]

The primary thrust of the LDP campaign tactic was the limitation of endorsed candidates.[49] The party also took care to deflect "black mist" charges by withholding endorsement from those involved in the "black mist" scandals as well as those fighting charges of election violations. Instead, they were considered candidates with *toseki shomei* (certificate of party membership).[50] There was good political sense in not rejecting some of these men, for a pre-election survey showed that the "black mist" had not affected the strength of people like Arafune and Kambayashiyama in their constituencies.[51] The results confirmed the soundness of the LDP strategy. Arafune and Kambayashiyama were returned at the top of their respective districts, and Matsuno, Shigemasa, and Yamaguchi were also successful.[52]

Ward has observed that, "The most notable fact about the Japanese electoral record is the continuous and strong predominance of the conserv-

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[46] *CG*, p. 35.

[47] *CG*, p. 50. In seven electoral districts only one LDP candidate ran. All won. *CG*, p. 50.

[48] *AS* January 31, 1967. Of the 135, only five or six were *"kakushin."* Of the rest, 72 missed being endorsed by the LDP. These were serious candidates who took away votes from LDP candidates. It is estimated, for example, that conservative independents prevented the LDP from increasing seats in 10 or 11 electoral district. *CG*, pp. 36-37.

[49] It is highly important to be endorsed. In this election an endorsed candidate received Y2,000,000 ($5,555), and was entitled to borrow another Y1,000,000 ($2,778). *AS* January 31, 1967; *TS* January 13, 1967. With the development of mass media and education, the party image, rather than personalities is becoming more important. Candidates can maintain their prestige by associating themselves with the national party image by being endorsed. Junnosuke Masumi, "A Profile of the Japanese Conservative Party," *Asian Survey* III (August 1963), p. 401. Toward the end of the campaign, the endorsed candidate often receives an "encouragement bonus" to support the final push. Scalapino and Masumi, *Parties and Politics*, p. 87.

[50] These included Arafune, Kambayashiyama, Yamaguchi, and Shigemasa. Fifteen candidates in all received certification. *CG*, p. 8. These candidates do not receive official financial aid from the party. See post-election comments of Takeo Fukuda, *AS* January 31, 1967.

[51] *Asahi Journal* (*AJ*) November 27, 1966, quoted in Watanuki, *Nihon no seiji shakai*, p. 220.

[52] Tanaka did not run. However, Shu Takatori, a newcomer and considered Tanaka's "substitute" lost. *YS* January 31, 1967, *TS* January 31, 1967. Eight of the "certified" candidates lost.

ative vote."[53] This predominance, on the one hand, is based on the *samban* (three *bans*) that is, *jiban, kaban,* and *kamban.*[54] On the other hand, the continued strength of the LDP itself serves to perpetuate and strengthen the *samban.* It is almost unanimously believed that the relatively good LDP showing in this election was attributable to the *samban,* especially the *jiban.* The strength revealed by Arafune, Kambayashiyama, Shigemasa, and Yamaguchi is said to prove the solidness and dependability of the *jiban.*[55] Another indication is the perpetuation of the *jiban* by a son, relative, or close political associate.[56] JSP secretary-general Narita sounded almost wistful when he said that the candidate who "built bridges and roads," or one who put priority on the "provincial welfare" had the support of the voters. And he pinpointed the root of LDP strength when he said, "This is something that the conservative parties have cultivated from before the war, and is something truly strong."[57] One final point must be made about the LDP *jiban.* While the LDP is stronger in the provinces and is losing strength in the urban areas, this does not mean that the party's urban *jiban* are completely disintegrating. For example, the party held onto the 13 seats it had in Tokyo at the time of the dissolution, and added three more. It also gained one seat in Osaka. In Chiba 1st which is located close to Tokyo and has many *danchi* (large-scale suburban housing projects), the LDP won three of four seats. In the industrial Kanagawa 2nd, the party took two out of four.[58]

Another source of LDP power and advantage in this and past elections is *kaban* or money available to candidates. It is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately determine the amount spent on an election or in the pre-election period by a candidate, his party, faction, and supporters' group. Moreover,

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[53] *Japan's Political System,* p. 57.

[54] Ike defines *jiban* as political machine, *kamban* as the candidate's reputation or standing in the constituency, and *kaban* as money spent in elections. Nobutaka Ike, *Japanese Politics: An Introductory Survey* (New York, 1957). For his discussion see, pp. 192-202.

[55] *SS* January 31, 1967; *AS* January 31, 1967; The *Asahi* predicted before the election that issues and the "black mist" were not important, but that the long-standing *samban* would determine the outcome. *AS* January 30, 1967.

[56] There were 37 candidates who ran for their fathers', husbands', and other relatives' seats as well as in *jiban* "handed down" to them. Of these, 27 succeeded, for a success percentage of just under 73%. *CG,* pp. 42-43. Yohei Kono, age 30, son of Ichiro Kono, led the field in his district. Toshio Yamagata, the youngest person elected at age 26, also followed in his father's footsteps. Tomio Kawakami, son of former JSP chairman, Jotaro Kawakami, led his district without campaigning. *YS* January 30, 31, 1967.

[57] *YS* January 31, 1967.

[58] Takeo Fukuda, "Wagato ga nobiru jishin," (Confident that our party will expand), *CK,* Spring 1967, p. 372. See also *CG,* pp. 30-32.

there is a gradual shift from the "traditional" to "modern" type of voting behavior, that is, from "apathetic political behavior" characterized by a high vote rate and subservience to authority to "habitual awareness," or, an awareness of politics as a way to increase personal and concrete advantages, combined with a critical attitude toward politics and an interest in remoter political problems.[59] This means that *kaban* in the traditional sense of outright vote-buying by bribery and "entertainment" is no longer too effective.[60] It is believed that this election was a particularly clean election because of a reaction against the "black mist," but the persistence of this trend in the first round of the unified local elections on April 15, 1967 indicates that Watanuki and Masumi are basically correct.[61]

The foregoing does not mean that money is less valued or necessary in political campaigns. The politicians are compelled to conduct year round activities, sometimes bordering on the illegal, to maintain the support of their constituencies. Furthermore, it is possible that the new emphasis on mass media is even more expensive than the vote-buying of yesteryear.[62] It is in this context that the financial support available to the LDP and its candidates become a significant factor. There are various estimates of the sums which were available to the two major parties in this election, but Y3,000,000,000 ($8,333,333) for the LDP and Y220,000,000 ($1,111,111) for the JSP are sometimes cited in publications.[63] In the 29th election (1960), it is estimated that the LDP candidates spent a total of between Y3,500,000,000 ($9,722,222) and Y4,000,000,000 ($11,111,111), compared to the Y1,100,000,000 ($3,055,556) spent by the JSP, DSP, and JCP combined.[64] In 1952 the expression *"nito ichiraku"* (Y20,000,000 [$55,556] will insure election while Y10,000,000, defeat) became popular. In the 1962 HOC election, the phrase was *"santo niraku"* (Y30,000,000 [83,333] wins

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[59] Scalapino and Masumi, *Parties and Politics*, pp. 103-104, 121-124; and Joji Watanuki, "Political Attitude of the Japanese People," the *Sociological Review Monograph* No. 10: "Japanese Sociological Studies" (September 1966), pp. 165-168.

[60] Watanuki, "Political Attitudes," p. 166; *AS* January 31, 1967. Actually, the election law is so strict that it is nearly impossible not to have violations. Baerwald, "Japan at Election Time," p. 654. For a description of the law, see Scalapino and Masumi, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-103.

[61] Professor Kikuo Nakamura in *YS* January 31, 1967; *SS* January 31, 1967; *AS* January 31, 1967. *AS* editorial April 17, 1967; *YS* April 16, 1967.

[62] See Chitoshi Yanaga, *Japanese People and Politics* (New York, 1956), pp. 286-293 for a description of Japanese election campaigns.

[63] *AS* December 27, 1966; *MS* January 18, 1967; *TS* January 21, 1967; "Senkyo kekka . . . mono," p. 370 (Y2,000,000,000 [5,556,556]).

[64] Scalapino and Masumi, *Parties and Politics*, p. 87. In the same election, the JSP is reported to have spent only 11% of the estimated expenditures of the LDP. Ward, *Japan's Political System*, p. 68. In the 1960 election, each LDP candidate is reputed to have spent Y10,000,000 ($26,778). It is estimated by the *Asahi* that about the same amount was spent by an LDP candidate in this election. Scalapino and Masumi, *op. cit.*, p. 87; *AS* January 31, 1967.

an election, Y20,000,000, loses)[65] The ratio probably did not change much in this election, and it is the kind of ratio that obviously favors the LDP.

Another factor of utmost importance assisted the LDP. This is the economic growth and concomitant prosperity being experienced by Japan. A commentator in the *Asahi* aptly characterized the voters' reaction to prosperity as the "tranquility mood," or the feeling that since times are good, let us take care not to "rock the boat." [66] This trend was already reported in 1960 when Mendel in analysing the 29th election wrote that, "no one should overlook the pervasive impact of economic prosperity on the average Japanese voter in 1960," and continued through the mid-1960's when Takane tentatively concluded that Japanese intellectuals too, were being affected by Japan's economic growth. [67]

One sign that prosperity is a vital factor in Japanese politics today is that the CGP, DSP, and JCP are all trying to project themselves as middle-of-the-road parties (*chukan seito*). The DSP, especially, has had an early start on this because it wanted to contrast itself with the JSP, which it called a "class party." Some analysts have concluded that disaffected voters who left the LDP fold in this election did not vote for the JSP, but for the DSP and the CGP.[68] This may be true, but it should be noted that the LDP lost 16 seats to the JSP, while the latter lost 10 to the LDP for a gain of six seats at LDP expense. However, the JSP lost eight seats to the DSP while taking only one from the DSP. This is probably more serious for the JSP since it appears to be remaining stationary or losing ground where it is purported to be the strongest: the metropolitan urban areas.[69] Table 3 shows this.

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[65] Yanaga, *Japanese People and Politics*, p. 292, fn. 24; Nobushige Ukai, "The Japanese House of Councillors Election of July 1962," *Asian Survey* II (August, 1962), p. 1.

[66] "Tensei jingo," *AS* January 31, 1967. See also, *SS* January 31, 1967; *YS* editorial January 31, 1967. The JSP suffered because it was felt that if it were to assume power, there would be a depression, controls would become stringent, and it would be hard to do business. "Tensei jingo," *AS* January 31, 1967.

[67] Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., "Behind the 1960 Japanese Diet Election," *Asian Survey* I (March 1961), p. 5; see also, Dore, "Japanese Socialist Party," pp. 3-4; Masaaki Takane, "Economic Growth and the 'End of Ideology' in Japan," *Asian Survey* V (June 1965), pp. 295-304. Economic growth has been accompanied by inflation and rise in the cost of living. These are causes of danger both to the economy and the LDP. See Robert S. Ozaki, "Japan's 'Price-Doubling' Plan," *Asian Survey* V (October 1965), pp. 515-521.

[68] *AS* January 31, 1967, *AS* editorial January 31, 1967; *SS* editorial January 31, 1967; "'Kuroi kiri' sosenkyo . . . kekka," p. 39. "Seikyoku wa donoyoni tenkai shitsutsu aru ka," (How is the political situation developing?) *CK* Spring 1967, p. 402. There were 34 electoral districts in which the balance in terms of number of seats was altered with favorable results for the non-LDP parties. In the majority of the cases, this resulted from CGP and DSP advances. *CG*, pp. 21-22, 41.

[69] *CG*, pp. 25-27; Kyogoku and Ike, "Urban-Rural Differences," p. 21. The right-wing socialists have been strong in the metropolitan/urban areas in the past few elections. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

Table 3. Percentage of Votes Won by Parties in the Seven *daitofuken* (Metropolitan areas)[70]

	LDP	*JSP*	*DSP*	*CGP*	*JCP*
Tokyo	32.1% (44.1%)	27.1% (36.3%)	11.8% (10.2%)	13.1% (—)	9.9% (6.9%)
Kanagawa (Yokohama)	37.0 (44.8)	27.3 (32.4)	15.3 (15.2)	13.4 (—)	5.5 * (4.9)
Aichi (Nagoya)	47.4 (53.9)	31.6 (29.2)	7.9 (10.6)	3.6 (—)	6.5 (4.4)
Kyoto	35.2 (41.1)	25.7 (29.4)	14.1 (15.7)	6.2 (—)	14.4 (13.5)
Osaka	28.6 (38.8)	21.7 (26.3)	19.0 (20.6)	18.0 (—)	9.0 (13.4)
Hyogo (Kobe)	38.4 (45.4)	25.7 (29.0)	15.2 (15.9)	10.0 (—)	4.6 (3.6)
Fukuoka	41.0 (43.6)	29.9 (31.3)	9.5 (10.7)	8.5 (—)	6.7 (5.7)
7 *daitofuken* Average	35.9 (44.6)	26.8 (31.3)	13.3 (13.7)	11.5 (—)	8.0 (7.2)
National Average	48.8 (54.7)	27.9 (29.0)	7.41 (7.37)	5.4 (—)	4.8 (4.0)

(1963 Percentages in Parentheses)

[70] *CG*, Table 16, pp. 28-29.

The JSP averages have dropped in all but one area: Aichi. The DSP and JCP averages in these seven *daitofuken* are nearly double that of their national averages, while the CGP average here is more than double that of its national average. It should be noted that the DSP also elected 20 of its 30 winners in these metropolitan areas.[71]

Other indications of the good showing made by the DSP are: 1) it increased the number of votes won per candidate over the last election by 5,000 which was the best growth record among the LDP, JSP, DSP, and JCP; 2) it decreased the number of votes needed to elect per candidate by 18,000, while the LDP, JSP, and JCP increased the number; 3) compared to 1963, it reduced by 23,000, the difference between votes per candidate and votes needed to elect a candidate; 4) it doubled the number of "new faces" elected from four in 1963, and had the second best record in this category: 26.7% of all DSP representatives are "new faces." The CPG, of course, scored 100% in this category.[72]

The DSP, naturally, is by no means a threat to the position of the JSP as the leading non-LDP party. It has grave organizational weaknesses, the same kind that plague the LDP and JSP, in that it "is dominated by its individual Diet members and candidates and their respective backing groups."[73] Furthermore, one of the lessons of the election of Minobe as governor of Tokyo is that in Tokyo at least, many supporters of the DSP would desert the party if it associates itself too closely with the LDP.[74]

The JCP, like the DSP, also can point to some success, as can be seen by Table 3. These successes, though small in themselves, tend to hurt the JSP because, like the DSP, the JCP has its greatest strength in the metropolitan/urban areas.[75] One indication of this is that while the JCP lost

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[71] *CG*, pp. 20-21, 30, 40-41, 53; see also, "Seikyoku wa . . . aruka," p. 402.

[72] *CG*, p. 35. Baerwald believes that DSP candidate control, hard work, and dissatisfaction wih the LDP and JSP, won the DSP 23 seats in 1963 and confounded the critics. "Japan at Election Time," pp. 646-647. The same reasons can probably be given to explain the DSP performance this time. Cf. "Sosenkyo kekka . . . mono," p. 371.

[73] Taguchi, "The Democratic Socialist Party," p. 63.

[74] On the basis of a poll taken just prior to the election, over 40% of the DSP vote probably went to Minobe. *YS* April 16, 1967. In the HOR election, moreover, five of its incumbent party executives lost, and it increased the number of new votes received by 380,000, compared to the JCP's 540,000 and the JSP's 920,000. *CG*, p. 53.

[75] Okino Yasuharu, *Showa 30 nendai ni okeru toshika-kogyoka to tohyo kodo henka —sosenkyo ni okeru senkyoku ruigatabetsu tokyo kodo bunseki*—(Changes in voting behavior with the urbanization and industrialiation in the 1955-65 decade — analysis of voting behavior in general elections by types of electoral districts) mimeographed Japanese government document, pp. 32, 33-36; *CG*, p. 30. In the Tokyo ward assemblies elections of April 15, 1967, the JCP ran 87 candidates, of whom 81 won, for 60% increase in JCP seats. This approximates a CGP-like performance. In the prefectural assemblies, the party increased the percentage of votes won by 2.8% to a total of 4.0%. *AS* April 18, 1967; *YS* April 18, 1967.

one seat each to the LDP and DSP, it took one seat from the DSP and JSP.[76]

There are several reasons for the relative successes of the JCP. 1) Since about the spring of 1966, the party shifted away from a pro-Peking position and began to emphasize the "sovereignty and independence" of Japan's foreign policy, and to oppose both "revisionism and dogmatism." This meant advancing the Communist revolutionary movement in terms of the situation existing in Japan itself. This "lovable party" posture was formally adopted at its tenth congress held during the last week of October 1966. 2) The JCP not only maintained a moderate stance, but like the CGP and DSP strongly asserted that its hands were clean. Party secretary Miyamoto believes that this is one reason for the increase in votes for the party. 3) It is perhaps more tightly organized than the CGP; it is reportedly the second richest party; and has a larger membership than the JSP.[77]

Still, the position of the JCP in the total political system is not crucial. As Ward succinctly puts it: "Its electoral and parliamentary successes have been modest." And in this election, though it bravely talked of winning 10 seats, it was able to gain only one extra seat over its pre-dissolution strength—this in the face of the 19 additional urban seats.[78]

The party also cannot seem to completely become detached from the ebb and flow of events in the world of international communism. Miyamoto, for example, felt that the newspaper coverage of the Red Guards and the LDP's utilization of the news hurt its chances at the polls.[79] Even the successful joint venture with the JSP in electing Minobe cannot mask one of the basic problems that the party constantly faces: dissatisfaction on the part of moderates in the JSP with any long-term, close ties with the party.[80]

The CGP could not have selected a more auspicious time than the 31st election to embark on its first try in an HOR election. The election law had been revised to add 19 new seats in urban constituencies, the very districts in which CGP strength was strongest. The corruption issue raised by the "black mist," the practical problems of livelihood—high cost of

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[76] *CG*, p. 25

[77] Arthur J. Dommen, "Japan's Communists: Rich and Cautious," the *Reporter*, April 6, 1967, pp. 33-36; Baerwald, "Japan: Black Mist," pp. 36-37; *YS* January 31, 1967; Ward, *Japan's Political System*, pp. 71-72; Packard, *Protest in Tokyo*, pp. 84-85, 332; Stockwin, "The Japanese Socialist Party," p. 199.

[78] Ward, *Japan's Political System*, p. 71, also, p. 58. Though the party ran a candidate in each of the 123 electoral districts, it concentrated on 11. All five came from one of these districts. It should also be noted that though the average age of JCP candidates is low, the average age of those elected is the highest of all parties. Thus the leadership does not present a new, fresh look. *CG*, pp. 57, 43.

[79] Kenji Miyamoto, "Jishudokuritsu rosen de jishin," (Confidence in the autonomous-independence line), *CK* Spring 1967, p. 384; also, *SS* February 12, 1967.

[80] *MS* April 17, 1967; *JT* June 3, 1967; see also, Packard, *Protest in Tokyo*, pp. 310-315.

living, housing, traffic, pollution—matched perfectly the stated reasons for *Soka gakkai* (SG) involvement in politics. These are that: 1) politics and values cannot be separated; 2) corruption in politics was destroying values; 3) politicians must respond to the people's will; 4) the SG knows what the people desire—individual happiness and social welfare.[81] Even a brief history of its electoral successes, however, is convincing evidence that the SG has never relied on fortuitous coincidences.

The SG's first try in politics was on the local level in 1955. It elected one man to the Tokyo metropolitan assembly and ninety to smaller local bodies. In July 1956, the first step into national politics was taken when the SG elected two from the national constituency and one from the local constituency in the 4th HOC election.[82] The SG did not really begin to attract attention as a political force until 1959. On the local level, it elected four to the Tokyo metropolitan assembly, elected all of its 76 candidates to Tokyo ward assemblies, and won 261 seats in other local assemblies. On the national level, all its six candidates in the 5th HOC election won (one in local, five in the national constituency). In November 1961, the Koseiren was established, and in the 6th HOC election held in July 1963, the nine Koseiren candidates were all elected.[83] The SG members in the HOC, numbering 15, forthwith combined as the Komeikai, the political "party" with the third largest membership in that body. On November 17, 1964, the Koseiren became the Komeito. The Komeikai's 15 members and the 1200 members of the metropolitan, prefectural, municipal and other local assemblies became members of the CGP. A primary purpose for the change was to prepare the SG for its initial plunge into an HOR election.[84]

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[81] James A. Dator, "The Soka Gakkai: A Socio-Political Interpretation," *Contemporary Religions in Japan,* VI (September 1965), p. 229. The very names of the "political arms" of the SG emphasize its concern with "clean government and politics." These are Komeiseijiremmei or Koseiren (Fair Politics League), Komeikai (Fair Society), and Komeito (Clean Government Party). A very promising study of the SG will be available sometime in 1968 when Professor Harry K. Nishio of the University of Toronto publishes his monograph: *An analysis of the ideology and organization of the Soka gakkai.* He was in Hawaii to study a SG general chapter (but known in Hawaii as *Nichiren shoshu*) and generously shared some of his findings and insights with me.

[82] The 250-member HOC is broken up into two categories of members. One hundred are elected from the nation at large (national constituency). Each voter casts one vote and those with the highest totals are elected. The others are elected from prefectural or metropolitan districts (local constituencies). The councillors serve for six years and one half of the House is elected every three years. Ukai, "The Japanese House of Councillors," p. 1.

[83] Up to this point, all SG candidates had run as independents because article 20 of the Japanese constitution reads in part: "No religious organization shall receive any privileges from the State nor exercise any political authority." The Koseiren, Komeikai, and Komeito were organized to circumvent this constitutional provision. The SG and CGP maintain separate headquarters and their formal organizational structures are different. The CGP is the first religion-based party in the parliamentary history of Japan.

[84] Robert L. Ramseyer, "The Sokka Gakkai," in *Studies in Japanese Culture* (Center for Japanese Studies Occasional Papers No. 9), ed., Richard K. Beardsley, (Ann Arbor, 1965), pp. 179-183; Lawrence Olson, "The Value Creation Society," *AUFS. East Asia*

The results achieved by the CGP in this election have already been shown. We must now address ourselves to more fundamental questions. 1) Where on the political spectrum does the CGP lie? Is it left-wing; conservative; or middle-of-the-road as it claims? 2) Which party or parties stand to lose most from CGP participation in Japanese elections? 3) What accounts for its electoral achievement so far? 4) What are its electoral prospects?

The answer to the first is that in spite of some very positive statements by some writers, the CGP's political position is not clear [85] — which is admittedly a positive statement of sorts. Helton, after a careful study of its policy statements, has concluded that the CGP is "decidedly left," by which he means that CGP policies bear a distinct resemblance to those of the JSP, DSP, and even the JCP. In this he is seconded by Stockwin who states that the CGP "seems likely to remain well to the left, and has not been averse to joint arrangements with the Communists." The new CGP chairman, Yoshikatsu Takeiri appears to support this position when he announced that, "We are *kakushin.* The present JSP is not *kakushin.* . . . What they are doing is worse than conservative. . . . We are more *kakushin* than the JSP." [86] As many, if not more, observers, however, are presently persuaded that the SG/CGP is "essentially conservative" or will become a "second conservative party." Kenji Miyamoto and Tomomi Narita, secretaries-general of the JCP and JSP respectively, feel that the CGP is or will be on the side of the LDP. Futhermore, Ukai points out that the party's voting record, prior to the HOC election of 1962 at least, was similar to that of the LDP. [87]

One suspects that like all political parties, the CGP will not be bound ideologically if these strictures conflict with political demands and realities.

Series XI (June 1964), pp. 15-18; Felix Moos, "Religion and Politics in Japan: The Case of the Soka Gakkai," *Asian Survey,* III (March 1963), pp. 137-138; William Helton, "Political Prospects of Soka Gakkai," *Pacific Affairs,* XXXVIII (Fall-Winter, 1965-66), pp. 232-234; *Soka Gakkai (Komeito) gaikan* (A general view of the Soka gakkai [Komeito]), (June 1966), mimeographed Japanese government document, pp. 10-24; 96-101; *MS* July 2, 1964.

[85] Ward, "Japan's Political System," p. 73 and Baerwald, "Japan: 'Black Mist,'" p. 36.

[86] Helton, "Political Prospects," pp. 236-240; Stockwin, "The Japanese Socialist Party,"p. 200. "Komeito iincho kotaigeki to korekara no dekata," (The change of Komeito chairman show and future moves), *Shukan yomiuri* February 17, 1967, p. 13. Kazuhiko Nagoya, in his "Japan's New Political Party," *Atlas,* February 1965, says that the CGP Party line is similar to that of the DSP. p. 133.

[87] Ukai, "The Japanese House of Councillors," p. 3; Miyamoto, "Jishu dokuritsu... jishin," p. 384; Narita, "Sohyo no dappi ga hitsuyo," p. 376; see views of Professors Hiroo Tagaki and Hirotatsu Fujiwara in *AJ* March 5, 1967, pp. 13 and 15; Iichi Oguchi and Kazuo Kasahara in *Shukan gendai* February 28, 1967, pp. 16-17. Frank Langdon says that the CGP's organization and "appeal to nationalistic and exclusive form of Buddhism represent a combination of attitudes reminiscent of prewar ultranationalistic societies and groups." *Politics in Japan* (Boston, 1967), p. 140. Olson writes that "the authorities list the Gakkai as a right-wing group," "The Value Creation Society,"

Helton himself talks of the "flexibility" of the CGP. Moreover, other parties will not let matters of religion, ideology, and theology stand in the way of compromise with the CGP if compromise will suit their political purposes.[88]

It has been postulated that DSP and JCP gains have hurt the JSP. The expansion of CGP fortunes is primarily damaging to the LDP and secondarily corrosive of JSP strength. A gross example of the first proposition is given by *Asahi*. It compares the percentage of votes won by the LDP in the 30th and 31st general elections (54.7% vs. 48.8%) and shows that the LDP's share of the total vote dropped by 5.9%. And because the other parties' percentages did not change significantly and the CGP won 5.4%, it concludes that the LDP votes went to the CGP.[89] The *Chosa geppo* approaches the question in another manner but arrives at the same conclusion. It compares the percentages of votes won by each party in these two elections in the 32 districts in which the CGP ran candidates.

Table 4. Number of Districts in Which Percentages of Votes Lower Than in 1963, by Parties[90]

Party	*Over 10%*	*Between 5-10%*	*Under 5%*	*Subtotal*	*(A)*[a]	*Total*
LDP	13	12	3	28	1	29[b]
JSP	5	9	12	26	3	29
DSP	0	4	12	16	12	29
JCP	0	2	8	10	19	29

[a] Number of districts in which percentages won were greater in 1967.

[b] Three of the 32 districts were newly created from existing districts. To simplify matters, these three were joined to their old districts when the percentages were calculated. Thus 29 "districts" were compared, instead of 32.

When these percentages are translated into seats, it is calculated that of the 25 seats won by the CGP, nine were taken from the LDP, four from the

p. 22. The *Asahi* after the first round of the 1967 local elections combined the LDP and CGP as belonging to the *hoshu seiryoku* (conservative political camp). *AS* April 18, 1967. The Min'on and Min'en, two SG cultural groups are "confronting" two similar JCP-established organizations. *Soka Gakkai (Kometito) gaikan*, p. 83.

[88] Helton, "Political Prospects," p. 239; Kozo Sasaki, JSP chairman, in 1965 said that he was prepared to form a "Socialist Front Cabinet" with the DSP, JCP, and CGP. Stockwin, "The Japanese Socialist Party," p. 191. Just before the 31st general election, he attacked the CGP, when he sensed that CGP votes might eat into possible JSP gains. *YS* January 19, 1967. After the Tokyo gubernatorial election, he saw that Minobe would be unable to carry out his programs without CGP support, so he did the obviously necessary: He sought CGP cooperation. *YS* April 17, 1967. Inejiro Asanuma, assassinated secretary-general of the JSP, pointed to the danger that the CGP "will be used by existing politicans," by which he probably meant LDP politicans. Ramseyer, "The Soka Gakkai," p. 186.

[89] *AS* January 31, 1967; *Japan Quarterly*, "The General Election," p. 134. (Please refer to Table 3).

[90] *CG*, p. 39.

JSP, and one from the DSP, while it won 11 out of the 19 added seats.[91] The LDP, then, plainly suffers from the electoral presence of the CGP. The material cited shows that the JSP too, loses because of the CGP participation in politics. Olson further puts it this way: ". . . in cases where no Komeikai candidate was put up Soka Gakkai members were estimated to vote conservative rather than socialist in a ratio of about 6.5 to 3.5."[92] But the CGP hurts the JSP in a particularly vulnerable spot for it draws its support primarily in urban areas. The CGP, DSP, and in JCP, in other words, prevent the JSP from taking full advantage of the gradual weakening of LDP fortunes.

The fundamentally urban character of the CGP is clear. In 1963, all 17 of its candidates were elected to the Tokyo metropolitan assembly, making the Komeikai the third largest "party" there. The same year, it elected 971 to local assemblies, winning 2.8% of the votes cast nationwide. Seventy per cent of these votes came from five metropolitan areas and 58% came from Tokyo, Osaka and Kanagawa alone. The record this year is similar. Twenty of its 25 seats in the HOR (or 80%) came from the seven *daitofuken*. The 123 electoral districts can be broken down into four categories: metropolitan, urban, semi-rural, and rural. The CGP ran 21 candidates in the metropolitan districts, eight in urban, three in semi-rural, and none in rural districts. As we have seen earlier, the CGP won 5.3% or all the votes cast, but its percentage in the seven *daitofuken* was 11.5%.[93]

How can the CGP successes at the polls be explained? The *Asahi* feels that the clean party image attracted some voters.[94] It is possible that the youthfulness of its leadership is attractive to some. The average age of the 25 who were elected is 41, over 10 years younger than the average age of the representatives of the next youngest party, the JSP.[95] It is

[91] *CG*, p. 25.

[92] Olson, "The Value Creation Society," p. 18. According to Helton, "It is said that Komeito gets two Liberal-Democrat votes for every Socialist vote. . . ." Helton, "Political Prospects," p. 233. A person acquainted with an LDP candidate of the Saitama 2nd district says that because the CGP did not have a candidate there, "many SG votes went to the conservative party." Personal correspondence. However, other results based on studies in Nagoya and Gifu (1961) and Tokyo and Tochigi (1964) showed that CGP supporters previously had voted for the LDP by 19.4%, the JSP by 22.6% and 58% had abstained. "Komeito no taishitsu to kino," (The structure and function of the CGP), *AJ* March 5, 1967, p. 14.

[93] Olson, "The Value Creation Society," p. 18; *CG*, 30, 54; Okino, *Showa 30 nendai . . . bunseki*. pp. 128-139 (checked against list of candidates and those elected *TS* January 31, 1961); *AS* January 31, 1967.

[94] *AS* January 31, 1967; see also "Seikyoku wa . . . aruka," p. 402. It is said that some 400 Tokyo University students have joined the SG, and one of the reasons for this is that "both the Soka Gakkai and the Komeito show no sign of being associated with political corruption. their leaders leading a clean life." *Asahi Evening News*, April 3, 1967.

[95] The average age of JSP members is 53.9, while that of the independents is 45.1. *CG*, pp. 43-44, 54.

also possible that the SG/CGP efforts to project a middle-of-the-road respectability may be enjoying some success. Two examples of this effort may be cited. A SG cultural organization, the Minshuongakukyokai (Democratic Music Association) also known as Min'on, with membership of 860,000, has been inviting leading foreign cultural troupes to Japan. In the fall of 1966, it invited the Novosibirsk Ballet troupe to Japan which performed to great popular acclaim. It is said that the Min'on sponsors around 250 events a month with Japanese and foreign talent.[96] The SG has been having phenomenal success with its *sogo zasshi* (monthly journal of intellectuals' opinions). This periodical, *Ushio,* was first published in 1960. By the end of 1963, it had overtaken two leading *sogo zasshi,* the *Chuo koron* and *Sekai.* It is now said to have a circulation of 340,000, many of whom are SG members. First rate scholars, critics, and journalists are well paid to write for this periodical without the SG exercising any editorial control. It is therefore highly regarded and gives a sheen of respectability to the SG.[97]

There is one danger for the SG/CGP in this attempt to gain middle-class respectablity. The more successful they become, the less militant and cohesive they may become. One consequence may be that some members will shift their support to other parties.[98]

The two most important reasons for its successes are: 1) it is perhaps the only party with a recognizable, solid-core mass base; and, 2) if it is not the equal of, it is at least a very close second to the JCP as the most tightly-organized political party in Japan. Having made the point about a recognizable mass base, one is immediately forced to state that there are great differences in the estimates of SG membership. The estimates range from 4,000,000 in 1958 (Ramseyer), to 7,000,000 in 1964 (Olson), to 10,000,000 in 1967 (Ward).[99] It is from this great pool of believers that

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[96] *AS* September 20, 1966; *Soka gakkai (Komeito) gaikan,* pp. 82-83.

[97] The estimated circulations of the three other leading journals of opinions are: *Bungei shunju* 580,000, *Chuo koron,* 140,000, *Sekai* 90,000. *AS* September 20, 1966; direct contact with Ushio publishers; *Soka gakkai (Komeito) gaikan,* p. 137. The SG is not neglecting any segment of society. It has established a chain of restaurants called *Yoro no taki* which serve what the Japanese like to call "inexpensive but delicious food and drinks." It is estimated that there are over 100 of these restaurants in Tokyo, and they are always crowded, though not necessarily only with SG members.

[98] ". . . . there is a connection between support for the Liberal Democratic Party and consciousness of belonging to the middle class." Watanuki, "Political Attitudes," p. 168. Cf. Ward, *Japan's Political System,* p. 41.

[99] Ramseyer, "The Soka Gakkai," p. 141; Olson, "The Value Creation Society," p. 13; Ward, *Japan's Political System,* p. 72. The *New York Times* in 1964 guessed the membership at 12,000,000 (May 13, 1964). Moos in 1962 placed the number at 3,500,000. "Religion and Politics in Japan," p. 140. The SG itself claims a membership of 15,000,000. Ward, *op. cit.,* p. 72. Ramseyer states that one dificulty in calculating membership is that membership in religious bodies is often given in terms of households rather than individuals. Ramseyer, *op. cit.,* p. 189. This problem is compounded in the case of the SG because it tends to count as one *setai* (household)

the CGP draws its disciplined votes. In some important ways, the CGP resembles the highly disciplined JCP. The CGP, like the JCP, has favored a cell-type organization. It has, as does the JCP, the only corps of devoted, voluntary workers working in the urban areas. The JSP receives low marks on these two points, being characterized by a diffused organization, and dependent on union backing which is not necessarily dependable or dedicated.[100]

The manifestations and the results of the CGP's rigidly organized and disciplined voting are what attracts attention and dismays rival parties and non-SG members. In the 6th (1962) HOC election, for example, 95% of the Komeikai votes were cast by regional blocs as pre-planned by SG leadership. One candidate received 449,635 votes out of his nationwide total of 459,789 votes from seven prefectures in western Japan. In the 7th (1965) HOC election, another CGP candidate received 93% of his 594,210 votes from four prefectures. SG members are sometimes moved from one prefecture to another where votes are required.[101]

The CGP's electoral success provides the best proof for Ward's proposition that Japan's multimember constituency, single-vote system has a "built-in bias in favor of [effectively disciplined-mine] weaker parties and candidates." In the local elections of April 1959, the record was 76 out of 76 in the Tokyo ward elections, and 261 out of 287 in other local assemblies. In this general election, it won only 5.8% of the votes but elected 25, and all CGP losers were *jitensha* (runner-ups). The independents won 5.41% of the votes but only nine were elected. In the first round of the local elections of April 15, 1967, the CGP elected 61 out of 67 candidates to municipal assemblies of five major cities (Yokohama, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka, Kobe), and 839 out of 875 in smaller legislative

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everytime a *gohonzon* (a piece of paper inscribed with words from the Lotus sutra) is presented. The rationale is that one believer in a household will surely mean the conversion of the others. See Moos, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-141; *AS* July 13, 1965. In early 1967, SG headquarters announced that there were 6,100,000 *setai* in the organization. *MS* February 7, 1967. I personally favor the figure cited in Kasahara who says that SG has below 1,500,000 *setai* with the *setai* not constituted as popularly construed. Kazuo Kasahara, *Seiji to shukyo: kiro ni tatsu Soka gakkai* (Politics and Religion: Soka gakkai at the crossroads) (Tokyo, 1965), pp. 293-294. The following also seems reasonable. A survey on Japanese attitudes revealed that in late 1963, 2,000,000 *adults* (age 20 and above) would have acknowledged belief in SG tenets. Tatsuzo Suzuki, *A Study of the Japanese National Character-Part III. Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Supplement IV, 1966,* pp. 22-23.

[100] Stockwin, "The Japanese Socialist Party," p. 194; Watanuki, *Nihon no seiji shakai,* p. 221; Packard, *Protest in Tokyo,* p. 85. The CGP also boasts of 200,000 members, whereas the JSP has an estimated membership of between 50-60,000. The JCP membership in 1965 was estimated to be about 130,000 members. Ward, *Japan's Political System,* p. 72.

[101] Olson, "The Value Creation Society," p. 17; Helton, "Political Prospects, pp. 235-236; Kiyoaki Murata, "Komeito in Election," *JT* July 22, 1965, "Stamping in Nichiren's Footsteps," *Economist,* March 20, 1965.

bodies. In the second round, held on April 28, 90% of its candidates were elected. [102]

What are the CGP's electoral prospects? Helton's statement that, ". . . . it is unlikely that the Komeito will ever be able to capture more than 20 per cent of the popular vote," standing by itself is not very meaningful. The CGP has already won 13.7% of the popular vote in the 7th (1965) HOC election. [103] However, a 15% popular vote in an HOR election, assuming the same care and discipline shown thus far, would cause a dramatic change in the Japanese political picture. But is the CGP likely to achieve this kind of success in a Lower House election? Assuming no radical changes in the domestic economic picture and drastic power realignments outside of Japan, it is *not* probable that the CGP will continue to make *significant* gains in elections and drastically alter the political balance in Japan. The main reason is that both the SG and the CGP have "built-in" limitations.

For one thing, as pointed out earlier, the CGP is essentially an urban-based party. Its strength is limited to certain urban centers such as Osaka and Tokyo, and coal mining regions of southern Honshu, Kyushu, and Hokkaido. [104] CGP power is also conditional on the continued growth of the SG. The SG appeals to the less fortunate and the dissatisfied, but economic conditions are improving in Japan. It attracts the credulous, but the credulous are declining in number. It preaches a crisis philosophy, but fewer and fewer Japanese feel a sense of crisis. [105]

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[102] Kiyaoki Murata, "New Force in Politics," *Japan Times Weekly,* June 3, 1967; *JT* April 30, 1967.

Komeito members in legislative bodies:

Prefectural	107	(46)
Tokyo ward	129	(136)
Municipal	1165	(839)
Town and village	480	(287)
HOR	25	
HOC	20	

(Figures in parenthesis indicate numbers prior to April 1967 elections. The CGP has yet to elect a person to an executive position as mayor or governor).

AS April 17, 1967; *MS* February 7, 1967; April 17, 1967; *Seikyo shimbun* May 1, 1967.

[103] Helton, "Political Prospects,"p. 240. Togawa says that the CGP has a good chance to pick up the approximately 6% "floating vote" that is usually available in an HOC election. If this occurs, the CGP can receive 20% of the total votes in an HOC election. He also feels that urbanization will enable the CGP to achieve further electoral successes. He predicts that after the 8th (1968) HOC election, the CGP will have 30 members in the HOC, an increase of 10 over the present 20. Isao Togawa, *Zenshinsuru Komeito* (Advancing Komeito) (Tokyo, 1966), pp. 214-218.

[104] Helton, "Political Prospects," p. 241.

[105] Olson, "The Value Creation Society," pp. 22-23; *Economist,* March 20, 1965. Dore says that the JSP, too, suffers from the diminishing sense of crisis in Japan. "The Japanese Socialist Party," p. 11.

The SG and its political arm are also handicapped by a negative image. In a telepol interview conducted by NTV television in 1964, 42% of 1500 people interviewed said that the SG was "fanatical" and only 2% said that they might vote for Koseiren candidates. At the same time, the Koseiren ranked only slightly behind the JCP as the party most frequently named in the question, "What party would you absolutely not vote for?"[106] And finally, its intolerance and successes have caused other groups and parties to counter-attack. Tanro (Japan Federation of Coal Mine Workers' Union) has had some success in diminishing SG influence among coal miners. Shinshuren (Union of New Religions in Japan) is attempting to cause defection among SG members and to stop them from voting for the CGP.[107] The SG/CGP faces attacks from another sector: commentators and scholars. Recently the questioning has become sharper. An example is Mamoru Sakamoto's "Ikeda Daisaku shi e no shitsumonjo," (Questions to Mr. Daisaku Ikeda), an article in which Sakamoto, among other things, criticized the inseparable relation between the SG and CGP.[108] These attacks, however, may have some beneficial effects for the CGP in that it may draw the membership closer, increase its militancy, and enable the leadership to cope with weaknesses exposed by the attacks.

Indeed, the CGP has continued to enjoy good successes, and will probably continue to do so for some time. We have already mentioned their achievements in the April local election.[109] However, the basic proposition still stands: the CGP probably will not make significant gains, enough to drastically alter the political structure of Japan. Tentative evidence is available to support this proposition.

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[106] Dator, "The Soka Gakkai," p. 233-234.

[107] Helton, "Political Prospects," pp. 241-242; Ramseyer, "The Soka Gakkai," pp. 177-178; Kiyoaki Murata, "A Battle of Faiths," *JT* November 2, 1965. See also Eda, "Leadership no ketsujo," p. 378; " 'Kuroi kiri' sonsenkyo. . . kekka," p. 39; "Tatoka e no izanai," (Pull towards multipartism), *AJ* December 18, 1966, pp. 87-93.

[108] *Jiyu,* March 1967, pp. 35-48. Daisaku Ikeda, the president of the SG, was constrained to reply in the May issue of *Jiyu.* "Komeito e no gimon ni kotaeru," (Replies to doubts about the CGP), pp. 68-84. Other examples are Hajime Shinohara's, "Komeito e no gimon," (Doubts about the CGP), *Sekai* April 1967, pp. 67-75; Hirotatsu Fujiwara, "Komeito nanatsu no tsumi," (The seven faults of the CGP), *Shimpyo* April 1967, pp. 20-39; Joji Watanuki, "Komeito," *SS* January 8, 1967.

[109] The showing made by the CGP on the local level is a measure of its approach to politics and of its successes. It is building from the bottom up. In this election, 18 of the 25 who were elected had had previous experience in legislative bodies on the local level while the other seven were involved in regional politics as officials of SG. *CG,* p. 54. See also "Komeito no taishitsu to kino," p. 12. The CGP is here described as being almost compulsively concerned with day-to-day contacts with the electorate, a point of great difference with the other parties. The CGP also can and does shrewdly maximize its position as holder of the casting vote in assemblies. This may ultimately prove its strongest political asset.

Table 5. Number of Votes Per SG *setai* in HOC Elections.[110]

Election No.	Votes Won by SG (round numbers)	No. of *setai* (round numbers)	No. of Votes Per *setai*
4th (1956)	991,000 (3.5%)[a]	406,000	2.44
5th (1959)	2,486,000 (8.5%)	1,177,000	2.32
6th (1962)	4,124,000 (11.6%)	2,700,000	1.52
7th (1965)	5,097,000 (13.7%)	5,300,000	0.96

[a] Percentage of total votes cast in elections.

The following statements may be made about this table. 1) The number of *setai* is exaggerated by the SG and/or the manner of counting *setai* is peculiar to the SG (see fn. 99). 2) The SG has a considerable number of young members who do not vote. It is believed that its membership composition is changing from family members to unmarried young members who are still counted as *setai*.[111] Therefore, *setai* count no longer gives an accurate picture of SG electoral power. If the young continue to remain in the organization, however, this factor would work in favor of the CGP. But there is no guarantee that the SG has an iron-grip on its membership.[112] 3) The SG electoral strength has just about reached a plateau because SG has generally reached the limit of its membership. 4) SG members are abstaining or are voting for other parties.[113]

If we take the number of CGP votes in the 32 electoral districts in 1967 and compare it with the total number of votes won in these same districts by CGP candidates running in the national constituency in the 1965 HOC election, we find that the CGP vote increased in 1967 by about 270,000.

[110] *AS* July 13, 1965; January 18, 1967.

[111] The SG claims 150,000 college and university students and 100,000 high school students as members. *MS* February 7, 1967. These numbers are hard to believe. They also do not include young members who do not attend school.

[112] One source estimates that the average length of membership is from three to four years. Olson, "The Value Creation Society," p. 23; in Osaka, out of ten new members, four have remained loyal, four have blacksliding; and two have "disappared." Ramseyer, "The Soka Gakkai," p. 179. He also adds that many young members in large plants in the Kawasaki and Tsurumi areas left "after a few weeks," *op. cit.*, p. 177. In the *setai* count, blacksliders may still be included and counted. Kasahara, *Seiji to shukyo*, p. 275.

[113] Helton, "Political Prospects," p. 242. Kasahara speaking of the 1962 HOC election says that "quite a few" SG members did not support SG participation in politics. *Seiji to shukyo*, p. 273. However, other sources show that CGP members are really tightly-knit, one maintaining that 99% of SG members support the CGP. *AJ* December 18, 1966. An *Asahi* opinion survey shows that CGP members are solidly against the Sato cabinet and highly negative in their views of the accomplishments of the conservative government. They are stronger in their criticism than JSP and DSP supporters and closer to JCP supporters in this regard. "Komeito no taishitsu to kino," pp. 14, 16. All of these statements may ultimately be disputed when the findings of Mr. James White who is working on the CGP for his Ph.D. thesis (Stanford) are available.

According to the SG organ *Seikyo shimbun* the number of converts in these 32 districts had increased by 600,000 since 1965. This is further indication, perhaps, that the SG appeals to younger people who do not vote, or, the CGP is not attracting the floating vote. [114]

The April 15 elections in Tokyo, however, have provided the clearest signs of CGP peaking—at least in Tokyo. Its gubernatorial candidate, Ken'ichi Abe, won 601,527 votes or 12.4% of the total. This was 18,000 votes less than the total CGP vote in the 31st general election and much less than the 800,000 votes it boasted it would win. It was in the elections for ward assemblies, however, that the CGP suffered its biggest setbacks. In 1963, it ran 136 candidates and elected them all. In 1967, it put up 202 candidates, talked of 100% success, and had to be satisfied with 124 assemblymen, or a 61.4% ratio. In the process, the CGP yielded to the JSP the position as the party with the second largest number of members in ward assemblies. In one ward, only one out of eight was elected, in another three out of 16, and in still another, three of eight. In nine of the 22 wards (one ward out of 23 did not hold an election), only half of the candidates were elected. The CGP, in short, has begun to fall prey to weaknesses plaguing older, more successful parties: inability to control candidacy and *tomogui* or "cannibalism." [115]

The 31st general election cannot be considered a political turning point if one were expecting dramatic turns of event. The DSP and JCP made modest gains, thus continuing the trend evident since the last two HOR elections. The CGP achievement was generally what was expected, and the results do not herald any sudden upswing in CGP electoral fortunes. The advances made by these three parties, have however, eaten into the electoral and representational strengths of the two largest parties, the LDP and JSP. More and more, therefore, one hears the term *tatoka* (transformation into multi-partism) being used by politicians, political commentators, and newspapermen. Takeo Fukuda of the LDP is emphatic in maintaining that there is no multi-party system in Japan, that is, defining multi-partism as the absence of a party with an absolute majority which forces a coalition government to be formed. [116] One suspects that his insistent vehemence on this

[114] "Senkyo kekka. . .mono," p. 371. *CG*, pp. 54-55. We will be closer to definitive answers to these and other questions when the results of a detailed and comprehensive survey on the political consciousness and voting behavior of young Japanese is published by Professors Akira Kubota and Robert E. Ward of Michigan University. The questionnaire is in two major parts (pre- and post-election), covers a wide range of topics, the five parties, plus independents and minor parties.

[115] *MS* April 17, 1967; *Japan Times Weekly* June 3, 1967; *AS* April 17, 18, 1967.

[116] Fukuda, "Wagato ga nobiru jishin," p. 373; *YS* January 31, 1967; also *AS* editorial January 31, 1967. Cf. views of Eiichi Nishimura, secretary-general, DSP, "Shimpoteki hoshu to kensetsuteki kakushin e no michi," (Progressive conservatism and constructive reformism) *CK* Spring 1967, p. 380. The *Yomiuri* maintains that *tatoka* is a continuing trend as evidenced by the results of the April 15 prefectural assemblies

point masks a concern about the implications of the so-called *tatoka* phenomenon. This is that the LDP's electoral position is slowly, but surely being corroded. If the LDP feels some anxiety, the JSP must certainly feel anxious.[117] For one lesson of this election is that the JSP, unless it changes in certain basic ways, will have to be satisfied with "permanent" minority party status. To be sure, the LDP shares with the JSP certain basic shortcomings. However, the JSP as the much weaker party cannot afford to carry these burdens.

Immediately after this election, JSP secretary-general Narita listed the party's three basic shortcomings, all of which are closely related.[118] The first is *nichijo katsudo no fusoku* (inadequacy of [the party's] day-to-day activities). This statement points to a number of failures: the failure of the party to sell its programs on a year-round basis; the failure to deal with problems directly involving the people's livelihood; the involvement with foreign policy questions to the detriment of the attention which should be paid to domestic problems; opposition for opposition's sake in the Diet; and adherence to theory and unrealistic positions.[119] And if two recent studies have any significance at all, it is that the JSP for the past decade at least has had its priorities gravely confused. Mendel writes that, "From all studies of Japanese public opinion after 1952, it seems clear that the LDP wins elections despite its unpopular foreign policies."[120] An *Asahi* poll suggests a reason for this. In the poll, taken in 1966, 80% of the respondents said that they knew of the "black mist" scandals. Yet, only 10% "wanted a cleaning up and disciplining of Japanese politics," while 33% were concerned with high prices. Moreover, the same poll showed that the most desirable type of politician was one that "got things done," whereas only six per cent admired "persons with an idealist character," and only four per cent lauded "theoretic persons."[121] The reader is directed to Dore's article for one of the finest exposition of the reasons

elections. *YS* editorial April 17, 1967. Maurice Duverger discusses multi-partism in his *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State* (New York, 1965), pp. 228-255.

[117] After dissecting the causes of the JSP's poor showing in this election, the *Yomiuri* declared that, "In a certain sense, the JSP is facing an even greater danger than the LDP." *YS* editorial January 31, 1967. The paper also said after the April 15 elections that had the party lost in the Tokyo gubernatorial election, the damage to the party would have been irreparable. *YS* April 16, 1967.

[118] *AS* January 31, 1967; *YS* February 1, 1967; see also *AS* editorial January 31, 1967.

[119] "Seiji no kotoba: tatakau shisei," (Political discussion: fighting posture), *CK* April 1967, pp. 46-51. In this article, five men who are obviously sympathetic to the JSP twits the party for being overly theoretical and not enough concerned about concrete problems. *YS* editorial January 31, 1967; *AS* February 5, 1967; Ward, *Japan's Political System*, p. 74.

[120] Mendel, "Japanese Views of Sato's Foreign Policy," p. 444.

[121] Goto, "Political Awareness Among the Japanese," pp. 168, 173.

for the JSP's weakness and the difficulties the party faces in trying to overcome these debilities.[122] Japanese commentators embarass the party by reminding it that it had promised to reform after every recent election.[123]

The second is the JSP's *giintoteki taishitsu* (structure as a parliamentary party). This means that the JSP pays primary attention to the HOR and the activities there. It also means that the party becomes attentive to the electorate only during campaigns. The LDP also shares this liability, but the party at least has deep and widespread roots on the local level. We have also seen that the CGP is building from the bottom up. The JSP's political strength, it has been aptly observed, "must be represented by an inverted pyramid, with its greatest support coming at the national level."[124]

The third weakness is *rogumi izon* or overdependence on labor unions. The party is dependent on unions, especially the Sohyo, for money, votes, hard-core workers, and members to the HOR.[125] The dangers of this overdependence are: 1) the party's image is that of a class party of workingmen which limits its appeal; 2) because the unions provide a ready-made organization and source of funds, the party does not work very hard on strengthening party organization or to seek new members or funds; 3) if Sohyo support is diminished, the party would have a difficult time trying to recoup;[126] 4) there is encouragement of political cynicism which works

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[122] "The Japanese Socialist Party and 'Structural Reform,'" pp. 3-15; see also Scalapino, "Japanese Socialism in Crisis," *Foreign Affairs* XXXVIII (January 1960), pp. 318-328; Stockwin, "The Japanese Socialist Party," pp. 187-200.

[123] *AS* editorial January 31, 1967; *SS* January 31, 1967; "Seiji no kotoba," p. 46.

[124] Scalapino and Masumi, *Parties and Politics*, pp. 95-97. Ward also points out that JSP local organizations exist in "somewhat more than one-third of Japan's 3,422 prefectures, cities, town and villages." Ward *op. cit.*, p. 67. This means that the JSP has no local organizations in about 2,100 political subdivisions. The JSP has also launched several membership drives to broaden its bases, but has been unsuccessful. It membership has been stable or stagnant for at least over a decade. Estimates vary from "not over 60,000 in 1960" (Scalapino and Masumi, *op. cit.*, p. 96) to 42,975 in 1961 (Dore, "The Japanese Socialist Party," p. 10) to "a little over 50,000" in 1967 (Ward, *op. cit.*, pp. 67, 68; *JT* January 15, 1967). The highest figure, 80,000 for 1959, is cited in Packard, *Protest in Tokyo*, p. 85; Cf. p. 312. The LDP like the JSP has many nominal members, but membership is far greater. Ward gives the figure 350,000 for 1966, out of a claimed membership of 1,700,000. Ward, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-63.

[125] The amount of money contributed is not known, but the Sohyo is the single largest contributor to the JSP. Ward, *Japan's Political System*, p. 68, see also, pp. 76-77. One estimate is that "over 50% of the party members are workers, most of them from organized labor." Robert A. Scalapino, "Japanese Socialism in Crisis," p. 322. In the period 1958-60, some fifty per cent of the JSP members of the HOR had union backgrounds. Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 69. In this election, Sohyo announced that 209 candidates were connected in some way with Sohyo. *YS* February 1, 1967. One source states that of the 140 elected, 72 or 51% had a history of labor unionism, and 69 were with the Sohyo. *CG*, pp. 45-46. See also *Dai sanjuiikkai. . . bunseki*, pp. 166-170.

[126] For the first time in years, Sohyo membership dropped whereas the rival Domei's membership climbed. According to Labor Ministry figures, at the end of June 1966, Sohyo membership stood at 4,250,000. Compared with the same period in 1965, this represented a drop of about 2,200. The Domei had a membership of 1,720,000 and compared with the same period in 1965, this was an increase of about 57,000. *CG*, p. 53.

to the detriment of the party. For example, after the election, Narita said that in spite of the defeat, the fact that many "new faces" were elected gave the JSP hope. However, it was clear to most observers that these new faces were essentially labor union leaders and that the unions sent new faces to the HOR by shifting their support among union candidates. [127]

In spite of these weaknesses and the persistence of these weaknesses, the future for the JSP is not one of unrelieved gloom. In this election, while the party lost in the urban districts, in certain rural areas which are strongly conservative, it has made some gains. In Yamagata, Fukui, Kumamoto and Oita prefectures, the percentage of votes won went up by over 5%. The party also made gains in rural Tokushima, Kochi prefectures, and the Kanagawa third, in spite of CGP candidates there. [128] In the April 1967 local elections, the party also made gains in prefectural assemblies, the Tokyo ward assemblies, and mayoralty races. [129] The most cheering success was the election of Ryokichi Minobe as governor of Tokyo. Here is a special opportunity for the party to break out of what Scalapino has called a closed circle: "in order to retain responsibility, it must acquire power; but in order to acquire power, it must attain responsibility." [130] One of the first party reaction to Minobe's victory was that it will try to seek the people's confidence in the JSP by doing a good job of administering Tokyo. The party also pointed to the successful administration of JSP mayor Kazuo Asukata of Yokohama from 1963-67 as one of the reasons for Minobe's victory. Indeed, if Asukata's margin of victory in 1967 is a measure of the fruits of the exercise of responsible power, then the JSP's future may be more hopeful than the results of this election have indicated. [131]

It has already been shown that the election results cannot give the LDP cause for wild optimism. If the JSP is prisoner of its past, then the LDP has reasons for the serious concern over future socio-economic-political trends in Japan. For over a decade now, scholars, government and newspaper analysts, and politicians have been measuring the urbanization rate, the shifts in educational attainment, age brackets, and industrialization and have been pondering over the political consequences of these changes. Certain

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[127] *AS* January 31, 1967; *YS* editorial January 31, 1967. Twenty-seven out of 56 "new face" candidates and 16 out of 32 new faces elected were from labor unions. *Dai sanjuikkai bunseki*, pp. 55, 116-117.

[128] *CG*, pp. 30, 41, 20-21, 51. LDP votes dropped in the conservative bastions of Iwate (by 10.31%), Yamagata (12.16%), Gifu (14.40%), Ibaragi (13.41%). *CG*, p. 20

[129] *AS* April 17, 18, 1967; *JT* April 30, 1967; *YS* April 18, 1967.

[130] Scalapino, "Japanese Socialism in Crisis," p. 327 The grave difficulties facing Minobe, however, are described in "New Governor Faces Red Tape," *JT* April 18, 1967. It is also noted that there has been "progressively-minded prefectural governors," and "progressive mayors." *Asahi Evening News* editorial April 25, 1967.

[131] *AS* April 17, 1967. In 1963 Asukata won 43% of the votes, while his opponents won 57% . On April 15, 1967, he won 62%, while his two rivals won 38%. *MS* April 17, 1967.

care, however, must be used in handling the published studies. Firstly, many simply categorize the non-LDP parties under the rubric, *kakushin* (see fn. 13). This practice has some utility because it isolates the LDP, thus making it simpler to analyze trends affecting that party. However, the non-specialist is prevented from distinguishing fundamental differences between parties lumped together as *kakushin*. Furthermore, it tends to deflect attention from the small, gradual, but significant trends affecting the JSP. Still another difficulty arising from this practice is that while studies by Masumi and Watanuki have shown that people are now gradually voting for parties rather than personalities in HOR elections, the pull of personalities is still very strong.[132] Thus the use of *kakushin* tends to give a somewhat distorted impression of the importance of party voting. Secondly, Japanese statistics, as Ward correctly points out, somewhat overstates the truly urban segment of the population, and people like Okino follow Japanese census practice and categorizes as *shibu* (urban sector) those entities which are administered as cities and all the other entities as *gumbu* (rural sector—towns and villages). Okino admits that this is a "formal and mechanistic division which in many instances may not be related to actualities."[133] Thirdly, Watanuki clearly shows that occupation is not necessarily an infallible guide to predicting political behavior, so that the shifts from primary to tertiary industries in Japan cannot be said to automatically result in LDP losses.[134] Subject to these qualifications, which are carefully made by people like Ward, Okino, and Watanuki, there can be no denying that the shifts toward urbanization and toward secondary and tertiary occupations are causing a gradual deterioration of the LDP electoral and representational positions.

Okino in his long and detailed study concludes that in all the 19 metropolitan electoral districts and a majority of the urban electoral districts, the non-LDP parties have shown gains at the expense of the LDP."[135] More significantly, powerful voices in the LDP and among LDP supporters believe that these trends, put into motion by the socio-economic programs of the LDP-controlled governments, forebode dark days for the party unless it "reforms."[136]

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[132] Goto, "Political Awareness Among the Japanese," p. 172.

[133] Ward, *Japan's Political System*, p. 35; Okino, *Showa 30 nendai . . . bunseki*, pp. 14-15. The Agriculture-Forestry Ministry also announced that the influx from villages to cities *dropped* in 1966. *JT* May 4, 1967. I have also been guilty in not being precise enough in using the terms, "urban," "rural," "metropolitan," and "local."

[134] Joji Watanuki, "Political Consciousness and Behavior of the Old Middle Class," *JSPII*, II (December 1964), pp. 127-132; also his "Political Attitudes," pp. 170-171.

[135] Okino, *Showa 30 nendai. . .bunseki*, pp. 125-126.

[136] Yasuhiro Nakasone, "Mondai wa leader no image," (The problem is leader's image) *CK* Spring 1967, pp. 374-375; Ishida, "Hoshu seito no vision," pp. 93-94; Iwasa, "Jiminto ni atarashii shiren," pp. 390-391; Heigo Fujii, "Jiko hansei no ue ni tatte dappi wo," (Renovation on the basis of self-criticism), *CK* Spring 1967, pp. 392-393.

At present, and on balance, however, the prospects for the LDP are somewhat better than the outlook for the JSP. This is because the LDP has some advantages unavailable to the JSP. First, one aspect of the electoral system favors the LDP. This is the underrepresentation of the urban districts. The reapportionment which added 19 new seats has not really touched the roots of the inequities between urban and rural districts. Since, as Ward states, "few institutions are more difficult to change than electoral systems," these inequities will continue to handicap the JSP and other non-LDP parties.[137] Second, while it is true that the number of qualified voters are increasing in the metropolitan and urban electoral districts, these voters are not going to the polls in numbers matching those from semi-rural and rural districts. Watanuki has called this kind of behavior, "habitual apathy."[138] A third advantage is the LDP's close connection with big business and highly placed bureaucrats and ex-bureaucrats. The first group provides funds unmatchable by the unions; the second, expertise to deal with complex problems of modern society—problems deeply affecting political decisions and politicians.[139] A fourth advantage involves factors difficult to measure: resiliency, continuity in power which gives the LDP room for adjustment, the pragmatism and professionalism of the LDP which enables factions to reach agreements on issues more readily than the theore-

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Nakasone and Ishida are now part of the "anti-mainstream" faction of the LDP. *Yomiuri* reported that the LDP was "resigned" to losing the Tokyo governorship to the JSP because the "advancing *kakushin* strength in the metropolitan areas resembled silkworms eating through mulberry leaves." It further stated that the "political world" accepts the fact that urbanization and shifts in industrialization will bring about the *kakushinka* (control by "progressives") of the urban areas. *YS* April 18, 1967. See also *AS* April 17, 1967; Minoru Shimizu, "LDP's Urban Policies," *JT* April 22, 1967.

[137] Ward, *Japan's Political System,* p. 55. In the Chiba 1st (urban), the runner-up lost with 91,783 votes, whereas in the rural Chiba 2nd, two candidates won with little over 30,000 votes. In the Tokyo 7th, the runner-up had 96,620 votes. *AS* editorial January 31, 1967; *CG,* p. 21. See also, Kyogoku and Ike, "Urban and Rural Differences," pp. 16-19. For the most comprehensive discussion on the weaknesses of Japan's electoral system and the obstacles to reform, see Robert E. Ward, "Recent Electoral Developments in Japan," *Asian Survey VI* (October 1966), pp. 547-567.

[138] *CG,* p. 12; Okino, *Showa 30 nendai. . .bunseki,* pp. 51-52; Watanuki. "Political Attitudes," p. 168. See also, Kyogoku and Ike, "Urban-Rural Differences," pp. 9-12. A study using the July 1965 HOC election as a basis shows that the situation reported by Kyogoku and Ike, that metropolitan and urban non-voting is higher than rural abstentions still obtains. See Mitsunori Ohara, *Toshika to kikensha no jittai,* (Urbanization and abstention), mimeographed Japanese government document.

[139] Ward, *Japan's Political System,* p. 99. He says of the 168 JSP members of the HOR in the 1958-60 period, only four per cent had bureaucratic backgrounds. A survey in 1963 showed that about 25% of the 300 LDP members in the HOR were former high-ranking ex-bureaucrats in the national and prefectural governments. Ward, *op. cit.,* pp. 66, 69. In this election, of the 277 elected, 97 had bureaucratic experience. *CG,* p. 45. The whole issue of the *Annuals of the Japanese Political Science Association, 1967* is devoted to the subject: "The Parties and Bureaucracy in Contemporary Japan —Since the Conservative Fusion in 1955," (Tokyo, 1967). The bureaucrats also appear to have another advantage: the Japanese hold "government bureaucrats in high esteem." Goto, "Political Awareness among the Japanese," pp. 170, 172.

tically-oriented JSP.[140] A concrete benefit stemming from these factors was the generally effective candidate control exercised by the party in this election. A fifth and incomparable asset of the LDP is the prosperity enjoyed by the Japanese today. A good illustration of the benefit accrued to the LDP from this factor is the alienation of the young Japanese voter from the JSP. A decade ago, 41.5-44% of voters in the 20-35 year age bracket supported the socialists, whereas the conservatives were backed by 33-35% of this age group. In 1963, the percentages remained unchanged for the conservatives, but the support for the socialists has dropped to about 30%. In 1966, according to the *Asahi* poll of 1966, 34% of the respondents in their 20's supported the LDP while 30%, the JSP. Nishihira suggests that Japan's accelerated economic growth rate has led to fewer "social dissatisfactions"—previously one of the prime reasons for supporting what he calls the progressive parties.[141] A point to note is that the support for the conservatives has remained fairly constant whereas the JSP support has dropped. It would appear that the young voter and the urbanite, who are more apt to vote for the JSP, are now marking time: disenchanted with the LDP, but unable to bring themselves to voting for the JSP for fear of rocking the prosperity boat."[142]

And so we witness the continued LDP strength at the polls. It has yet to win less than 50% of the votes cast in a nationwide election, if the percentage of the votes won by successful conservative independents are added.[143] The results of the April local elections tell the story of continued LDP/conservative strength in Japan. The press pointed to gains made by the other parties, but also stressed that "no great changes resulted from the gubernatorial elections," "in the prefectural assemblies, the conservatives are overwhelmingly strong as usual, winning more than half (1536) of 2734 seats," "in the Tokyo ward assemblies, the LDP won 542 of 1039

[140] Mendel, "Behind the 1960 Japanese Diet Election," p. 11; Scalapino, "Japanese Socialism in Crisis," p. 327. Ward, *Japan's Political System*, p. 74.

[141] Warren M. Tsuneishi, *Japanese Political Style: An Introduction to the Government and Politics of Modern Japan* (New York, 1966), p. 128; Goto, "Political Awareness Among the Japanese," pp. 173-174; Shigeki Nishihira, "Are Young People Becoming More Conservative?" *JSPIJ* II (December 1964), pp. 137-143. He cites other reasons for the growing lack of appeal of the "progressive parties."

[142] In the Tokyo gubernatorial election, however, Minobe led Matsushita by 12% among voters in their 20's, 17% among those in their 30's, and by 6% among those in their 40's. Matsushita led by 13% among those in their 50's and 22% among those in their 60's and above. *YS* April 18, 1967. As Japan's standard of living rises, there will be fewer babies born and an increasing number of elderly citizens. This development will favor the LDP.

[143] In the general election, the LDP went below 50% (48.80%) for the first time, but to this is added the 5.41% won by independents, eight of the nine being conservatives. In the April 15, 1967 elections for prefectural assemblies, the LDP for the first time also won less than 50% (48.3%) of the total votes cast. However, the independents won 16.63%, and 70% of this is "LDP-inclined." *MS* April 17, 1967.

seats," "of the 564 mayors, 80% are conservatives or conservative independents." [144]

The "on the one hand this," "on the other hand that" approach in this article is revelatory of the real significance of this election: a reaffirmation of political stability in Japan. For the various reasons stated in this article, the LDP while unquestionably losing ground, is not losing swiftly and precipitately, and the JSP, the putative and "logical" beneficiary of LDP losses is not making much progress. The disenchanted voter turns to the three minor parties, but these parties too, suffer from certain weaknesses. All three are urban-based, and the CGP and JCP, because of their militancy, past and present the nature of their organizations and programs, are still distrusted by a majority of the voters, while the DSP suffers from many of the same infirmities afflicting the LDP and JSP. The result then, is for the development of a distinctively Japanese brand of multipartism. An even more important result is that the very gradualness of the erosion of LDP strength will enable politicians and parties to make adjustments to the changing political structure, which in turn will contribute to the further stability of the political system. [145]

[144] *AS* editorial April 17, 1967; *AS* April 18, 30, 1967; *YS* April 16, 1967.

[145] One possible way a realignment or readjustment may take place is the splitting off of factions from the established parties (LDP, JSP, DSP) to form a new "party" or faction. This suggestion is not offered confidently since the article is based primarily on documentary sources rather than on-the-spot investigation.

INDIAN ELECTIONS AND AFTER

S. N. RAY

THE FOURTH GENERAL ELECTIONS IN INDIA IN FEBRUARY this year registered significant changes in the balance of political power. That such changes could be brought about peacefully through the ballot box indicates that India's choice of parliamentary democracy has been neither superficial nor unrealistic. At the same time the new situation is fraught with problems and hazards which have become increasingly evident in the last few months.

India's first experience of elections on the basis of adult franchise took place in 1951-52 when the electorate comprised 173 million people.[1] The number increased to 193 and 216 million respectively in the general elections of 1957 and 1962. This time there were about 251 million registered voters; 60 per cent cast their votes. The elections were for a total of 521 seats in the Lok Sabha (House of the People, or the Lower House of the Federal Parliament), and over three thousand seats in the State and Territorial Assemblies. There were over 18 thousand candidates and 260 thousand polling stations.

In the previous three elections the Indian National Congress had been repeatedly returned to power both in the Union (*i.e.,* Federal) and the State governments (except once in the State of Kerala where a Communist government was in office from 1957-59).[2] Founded in 1885, the Congress is India's oldest political party, but during the first three decades of its history its membership was almost entirely limited to a relatively small though highly articulate urban middle class. In the 'twenties, it was transformed into a powerful mass-organisation with a sizeable rural base, thanks primarily to the techniques of political struggle developed and used by Gandhi. It accommodated a wide range of views and interests, and became in effect a national front of nearly all political groups which were engaged in the movement for independence. Its dominant position in the country's politics over the last twenty years has been due in no small measure to its historic role in the pre-independence period.

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[1] Franchise was introduced under the British but on a limited scale — 33 thousand voters under the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909; 5.1 million in 1919; 30 million under the Government of India Act, 1935.

[2] See the three Reports of the Election Commission of India — 1951-52; 1957; and 1962 (New Delhi). Also S.V. Kogekar and R.L. Park (eds.), *Reports on the Indian General Elections 1951-52* (Bombay, 1956); S.L. Poplai (ed.), *National Politics and 1957 Elections in India* (Delhi), and *1962 General Elections in India* (Bombay).

However, since independence, the Congress has been undergoing political erosion. Many groups which formerly belonged to it began to break away and form rival organizations of their own. But since these parties were neither very strong nor united, their challenge was hardly effective either at the national or the State level. Although the Congress received only 45%, 48% and 45% of the total votes cast in the elections of 1952, 1957 and 1962 respectively, it nevertheless managed each time to gain control of the Union and State legislatures, due to the fragmentation of the non-Congress vote among a multiplicity of opposition parties and independent candidates. This situation has been substantially altered by the elections this year.

The Congress this time secured only about 40% of the votes cast, showing a 5% decline since the last elections. It returned 282 candidates to the Lok Sabha (361 in 1952, 371 in 1957, and 358 in 1962), thus retaining its absolute majority (54.50% of seats) but substantially reduced from the last parliament (when it had 72.50% of seats). Much more dramatic was its set-back in the States where it won a majority in only 8 states out of 16. In one of these eight states, Haryana, thirteen members defected from the party shortly after the elections leading to the fall of the Congress government there. The Congress made up for this loss by winning over some independent legislators in another State, Rajasthan, where originally it had not returned a majority. But in Uttar Pradesh (India's most populous State which has also furnished all the Prime Ministers of India to date) where the Congress, although without a majority of its own, had formed the government with the support of some independents, it was forced to resign when some of its own members broke away and formed a new party.

Currently anti-Congress parties are in office in eight States. Except in Madras (recently renamed Tamizhagham), these are all multi-party coalition governments. In Madras, the Congress was virtually wiped out by the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (D.M.K.), which won 138 seats out of 234 (Congress: 49). In Kerala and West Bengal, the coalition is dominated by the Communists, in Orissa by the Swatantra Party, in Bihar by the Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP), and in Punjab by the Akali Dal. In Uttar Pradesh and Haryana, the largest anti-Congress Party is the Jana Sangh which also controls Delhi, India's capital, where it won 33 out of 56 seats on the Metropolitan Council.

There are many reasons for this political debacle of the Congress. Nehru's death in 1964 marked the end of the generation of leaders of national stature who had given to the Congress its great prestige and popularity. In fact, Nehru's own stature declined sharply during the last two years of his Prime Ministership — after the Chinese invasion of India in 1962. Two decades of power-monopoly had made the organisation corrupt, slothful and complacent; its leadership was faction-ridden at every level; it had

become grossly indifferent to public opinion. While the first two Five Year Plans (1951-61) had considerable economic achievements to their credit, the third Plan (1961-66) was in most respects a failure.[3] Rapid population growth, increased defence expenditure, neglect of agricultural priorities, administrative mismanagement and wastage, and repeated failure of the monsoon rains greatly worsened the food situation. The result was growing public discontent which, instead of unifying the Congress and revitalizing its leadership, tempted unsuccessful factions within the party to break away from the parent organisation and form alliances with opposition parties. What, however, in the end proved decisive was that the opposition parties, despite strong ideological and programmatic differences among themselves, managed in a number of States to form United Fronts or tactical alliances before the elections, thus substantially reducing fragmentation of the anti-Congress vote. Had these Fronts been more extensive and not restricted to the State level, the Congress reverses would in all probability have been more severe, even to the extent of forcing it to seek a coalition government at the Centre.

II

The elections clearly demonstrated that in a parliamentary democracy, governments may be changed peacefully when they no longer enjoy majority support even though they may have been in office for a considerable period of time. This, of course, would be taken for granted in a few Western societies (including Australia), but in most parts of the world changes of political power continue to be associated with *coup d'etat,* organized violence, civil war and dictatorship. One has only to look at China, Indonesia, the Middle East, Africa and the countries of Latin America to appreciate the political achievements of Indian democracy.

However, major changes in the balance of power, even if peaceful, are rarely without problems and hazards. In India, the first post-election problem is the relation between the Union and the States. Being a land of many races, languages and cultures, India after gaining independence advisedly adopted a Federal Constitution which would base its polity on the principle of unity in diversity. But as long as both the Union and the State governments were run by the same party, the main trend was expectedly towards increasing domination of the federated units by the Central authority. Now that eight states are governed by non-Congress parties, conflict between the Union and the States would be difficult to avoid or resolve.

[3]Between 1951-61 the index of industrial production rose at an average rate of about 9.5 per cent; between 1961-66 it fluctuated between 6.6 and 8 per cent. Food production which had steadily increased during the 'fifties (from 50 million tons in 1950-51 to 82 million in 1960-61) suffered a sharp decline in the 'sixties (77 million tons in 1965-66).

The danger in this context often emphasized by political pundits is that since in India centrifugal forces are quite strong, a weakened Federal authority may eventually provoke secessional adventures. However, developments of the last few months do not particularly support this apprehension (except possibly in the case of West Bengal where the pro-Chinese Communist party which constitutes the largest group in the coalition is trying to exploit the traditional Bengali distrust of Delhi and precipitate a crisis.) The D.M.K. in Madras, which in the past spoke threateningly of secession, has proved to be responsible and cooperative; so surprisingly enough has Kerala where the Communist Chief Minister, Mr. Namboodiripad has in fact been criticised by his own party for his readiness to abide by the Constitution and cooperate with Delhi.

A more immediately relevant aspect of this problem would seem to be that of national policy making. Until now economic planning, for example, has been conceived on a national plane although its execution had to rely heavily on the States. The opposition is strongly critical of the Congress approach to economic planning — the Left because it is not socialistic enough, the Right because its excessive restrictions on private enterprise and foreign investment prevent quicker economic growth. Now that both the Right and the Left are in power in a number of states, their criticism would have to be seriously taken into account. This is likely to make national planning more ambiguous and ineffective, but on the other hand it may very well lead to welcome decentralization of developmental authority and efforts. It is at least conceivable, though as yet far from certain, that there will be healthy competition among the States to increase their respective rates of economic growth by following alternative principles and methods.

At least in respect of one policy issue the new balance of power would seem to be favourable to greater realism and statesmanship. The Congress with its power base in North India was committed to replace English by Hindi as the official language of the Union, even though the latter was neither developed enough nor acceptable to most non-Hindi speaking people. This was in particular opposed passionately by the Dravidian South, and the spectacular defeat of the Congress in Madras was almost entirely due to this issue. The new policy which seems to be emerging under pressure from some of the non-Congress Governments is that of continuing English indefinitely as the official language of the Union, and of placing the regional languages on an equal footing with Hindi.

Another apprehension raised by the new set-up is that of growing political instability, especially in some of the States. The Congress has a solid majority in seven, but in Rajasthan it depends on the support of a group of independents who may again cross the floor. Except in Madras where the D.M.K. commands absolute majority, all the other non-Congress gov-

ernments are based on coalition. Among them the seven party coalition in Kerala dominated by the Communists and the two party coalition in Orissa led by the Swatantra party would seem on the whole to be stable. In Bihar the six-party United Front includes parties as diametrically opposed as the Jana Sangh and the Swatantra on one side, and the pro-Peking Communists on the other. In West Bengal, the Front is composed of as many as fourteen parties and several independents. In Uttar Pradesh and Haryana, non-Congress Governments were made possible by post-election defections from the Congress; and in Punjab, the majority of the seven-party coalition government is precariously slender. Thus possibly in six states, certainly in four, the danger of political instability would seem to be quite genuine.

But the most serious risk of the new situation comes from the nature of some of the non-Congress parties which the elections have brought to the fore of Indian politics. Despite all its ambiguities and shortcomings, the Congress has always been committed to democratic principles and practices. Among its principal rivals the Swatantra party alone would seem definitely to share this commitment. Founded in 1959, it is heterogeneous in its leadership and support (Parsee businessmen, ex-rulers of princely states and their erstwhile subjects, peasants, anti-communist intellectuals, etc.); it opposes expansion of the government's powers and role in the economy and advocates decentralisation and greater scope for private enterprise. Rejecting the Congress policy of non-alignment, it advocates closer ties with the Western democracies and a regional alliance in South and South-East Asia against Chinese expansion and subversion. It is now the second largest party in the Parliament (44 seats) and the leading partner in the Orissa Coalition Government, and it has substantial strength in the State legislatures of Gujarat (64 seats), Rajasthan (49) and Andhra (29).

Of the other powerful non-Congress parties, the D.M.K.'s support and activities are limited to Madras. In the past it has not been altogether averse to violence and political extremism especially in its opposition to Hindi, but the new responsibilities of government seem to have already had a sobering effect. In some respects the SSP may be called its counterpart in the North with its passionate pro-Hindi and anti-English stand; but its cultural populism is of a more extreme variety and it has a much stronger penchant for violent demonstrations and unconstitutional activities. It is strong in Bihar (where it is the largest party in the anti-Congress coalition) and Uttar Pradesh, but it also enjoys some support in Kerala and Madhya Pradesh. Again the responsibilities of office in Bihar are having their effect on its political stance and behaviour, although it is rather doubtful if the effect will prove to be lasting.

The real political threat to democracy in India, however, comes from the Jana Sangh (JS) on the one hand, and the two Communist parties on the other. Founded in 1951, the Jana Sangh is essentially a Hindu national-

ist party, opposed to secularism and distrustful of democracy. It is believed to be the public political facade of an extremist authoritarian organization called the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh.[4] Since its inception it has grown steadily in strength and popularity; its main support comes from six states in North and Central India (Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh). Currently it is the third largest party in the Union parliament (35 seats), and has the second largest number (264) of the total of seats in the State legislatures. It controls the Delhi Metropolitan Council and consequently is in a position to exert much pressure on the Union Government. It is bitterly opposed to Pakistan, and is militantly anti-liberal in its outlook and methods.

Indian Communists[5] are now divided into two parties — the pro-Moscow CPI and the pro-Peking CPIM. The latter dominates the coalition governments in Kerala and West Bengal but the former has a somewhat larger representation in some other states (Bihar, Assam, Maharastra, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh). They have a combined strength of 42 seats in the Lok Sabha and polled together over 12 million votes. While the pro-Moscow party would wish to take, for the time being, a relatively moderate political tone, the CPIM is bent on subversion and chaos. The struggle between the two parties cost them their commanding position in Andhra; they lost 32 of their previous 51 seats in the state legislature. In Kerala, although the CPIM (52 seats) dominates the coalition, Chief Minister Namboodiripad (who belongs to the CPIM) has been trying to put a brake on the extremism of his party. For this, he is under strong attack from the national leadership of the CPIM. In West Bengal, on the other hand, the CPIM dominated United Front government is fast heading towards a crisis. The extremists in the CPIM have already set up a "liberated area" at a place called Naxalbari situated in the sensitive north border of the state and close to Sikkim, Nepal and East Pakistan. According to reports, this is to be a base of guerrilla training and operation on the Chinese model. At the same time, widespread subversive activities are being organised in the state, much to the dismay of the other more moderate partners in the coalition. The plan would seem to be to establish a full CPIM controlled State in West Bengal which, with support from China and possibly East Pakistan, will eventually plunge the Union into a Civil War.

Whether the threats from the Jana Sangh and the Communists become more serious or not would seem to depend on several factors. Its debacle

[4] For a description of the RSS, see J.A. Curran, *Militant Hinduism in Indian Politics* (Institute of Pacific Relations, New York). For Jana Sangh, see Myron Weiner, *Party Politics in India; the development of a multi-party system* (Princeton, 1957).

[5] See G. D. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, *Communism in India* (University of California, 1959). Also J.H. Kautsky, *Moscow and the Communist Party of India; a study in the post war evolution of International Communist Strategy* (Wiley, New York, 1956).

in the elections may revitalise the Congress and make it more active, realistic and united.[6] The moderately inclined opposition parties and groups may try to work in a cooperative and responsible manner, thus providing the country with a peaceful alternative to the Congress. The efforts of both when they are in office may raise the tempo of economic growth which slackened ominously during the last five years. It is hard to foretell if any or all of these will take place, but the next few years are sure to be decisive for the future of India.

[6] Unfortunately the signs are not at all encouraging. At this writing 35 Congress MLAS are reported to have crossed the floor in Madhya Pradesh reducing the Congress strength in a House of 296 to 141. It looks as if the Congress will lose another state to its rivals. The largest non-Congress party in Madhaya Pradesh legislature is the Jana Sangh (78 seats).

AN ESSAY ON THE POLITICAL FUNCTIONS OF CORRUPTION

JAMES C. SCOTT

Introduction

MOST DISCUSSIONS OF CORRUPTION IN DEVELOPING nations have generated vast quantities of heat and righteous indignation while shedding little light on the phenomenon itself. Observers from Western nations, often quite oblivious of their own recent history, have contributed more than their share to the resulting confusion and moralizing. Only recently have a handful of American and English economists and political scientists — profiting perhaps from their respective nations' long experience in this area — began to examine corruption in a more systematic, dispassionate, and comparative manner.[1]

In this new spirit an attempt is made here to examine in some detail the political functions of corruption. Before plunging in, however, we must have a working definition of corruption, a difficult task in view of the immense variety of entrepreneurial skill which has been devoted to its actual practice. Profiting from the definitional efforts of J.S. Nye, we may, with one caveat, subscribe to the statement that, "Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence."[2] The only problem with this definition is that with the meaning it attaches to the term, "private regarding," it seems to exclude illegal favors done without reward by public officials on behalf of, say, their ethnic or religious group. Perhaps the term "non-public" would be more appropriate here as it includes, within the definition, deviations which favor longer groupings. With this qualification, the term covers most of what is meant when people speak of corruption among public officials. It includes behavior ranging from a peasant's minute payment to the government hospital orderly so that he might be examined by the physician more quickly to a large firm's generous

[1] See for example, Nathaniel Leff, "Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption," *The American Behavioral Scientist* (November, 1964), pp. 8-14; J.S. Nye, "Corruption and Political Development, A Cost-Benefit Analysis," *The American Political Science Review* (June, 1967), pp. 417-427; Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simkins, *Corruption in Developing Countries* (London: Oxford U. Press, 1963); and Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949), pp. 71-81.

[2] J.S. Nye, *op. cit.*, p. 419.

contribution to a politician in return for his fiddling with the tax laws to its advantage. It includes not only favors done for cash, but illegal favors done for motives of loyalty or kinship.

About the actual causes of corruption we shall have very little to say except as they touch on its political function. But one point should be clear; while there may well be a greater incidence of *illegal* corrupt acts in the developing nations than in the West at a similar stage of economic development, there is no reason to suppose that the actual behavior we are referring to—forgetting for a moment its legal status—is any more widespread in the new nations than in the West at a comparable epoch. Judgments which imply otherwise are not simply cases of Westerners forgetting their own past and wagging their fingers at developing nations. The misunderstanding is usually more subtle and involves: a) a failure to compare legal systems at analogous periods and b) a failure to distinguish between the private and public sectors.[3]

1. The gap between the legal system and social practice: The development of the legal system in most Western nations was a more or less internal affair. At any given time, there were a host of governmental and non-governmental practices the legal standing of which had not yet been determined. In Great Britain, for example, before civil service reforms were instituted a tremendous number of sinecures—"officers without employment"—and pensions were distributed or sold by the crown. Although even contemporary observers called this corruption,[4] such patronage did not contravene any existing law until the Whigs found it to their political advantage to pass one.

The new nations, by contrast, have often adopted a system of laws and general orders which give expression to reforms which were the product of long political struggle in the West. Consequently, the Malaysian politician, for example, finds himself denied by much of the patronage which helped build strong political parties in England and the United States. Acts which were at one stage in Britain or the U.S. quite legal, or at least legally ambiguous, are now expressly forbidden by the laws and regulations of new nations. The behavior is the same in each case, but the legal status of the act has made corruption seem more widespread in developing areas.[5]

2. Private morality and public morality: It is quite obvious that, even today the standards of behavior for the public sector are more puri-

[3] See Wraith and Simkins, *op. cit.*, pp 12, 13.

[4] See John Wade, *The Black Book,* (1820) cited in J.F.C. Harrison, ed., *Society and Politics in England: 1780-1960* (New York: Harper, 1965), pp. 93-98.

[5] In fact, many new nations regulate public appointments in a more stringent manner than nations like the U.S. If a Nigerian were told about the political considerations involved in the appointments of postmasters in America he would undoubtedly call it corruption. The fact that it is now institutionalized, "legal" patronage and accepted practice would not change his view of it.

tanical than those of the private sector. The president of a business firm may appoint his inept son assistant vice president and, although he may regret the appointment from a financial point of view and be accused of bad taste, he is quite within the limits of the law. Similarly, if he lets an overpriced supply contract to a close friend, the market may punish him but not the law. Should a politician Smith or bureaucrat Smith feel inclined likewise, however, he is likely to find himself without office and perhaps the object of the State-vs-Smith criminal action.

Whether a given act takes place within the public or private sector thus makes all the difference in the world as to whether it is defined legally as corruption or not. Restraints in the one case are the responsibility of law enforcement agencies and, in the other, it is the discipline of the market which checks such behavior. The point here is simply that the larger the relative size and scope of the public sector, the greater is the proportion of certain acts which will be legally considered corrupt. And this is precisely the case in new nations where the role of the public sector is comparatively more important than it was in the West. Many of the acts which we are considering took place within the confines of the private sector in developed nations and therefore fell outside the formal definition of corruption. By contrast, the public sector's size in developing areas changes what were private concerns in the West into public concerns, making the incidence of corruption—legally defined—that much greater.

The restrictiveness of the legal system and the expansion of the public sector, then, turn what might otherwise be simply bad taste or stupidity into corruption. But we should keep in mind that the incidence of such behavior in the national community as a whole may well have been as high or higher in the West than in the new nations although its legal status is vastly different.[6]

II

Input Influence-vs-Output Influence

1. The Distortion of Formal Analysis

By now political scientists are well acquainted with a growing body of theoretical and empirical literature which examines the process by which

[6] One further distorting factor concerns the greater attention paid to corruption at the national level. In the West, although there are wide differences here, local and/or state governments were more powerful than they are in developing areas generally, and a great deal of the total "volume" of corruption took place at this level. By comparison then, the national governments in the West may have seem less corrupt than in the new nations since local units were an equally attractive source of plunder in the West.

interest groups influence legislation. The strategies of influence, the nature of the relationship between elected officials and pressure groups, and the independent effects of the legislative process itself are among the subjects in this area which have received considerable scrutiny. Using the common distinction between input and output functions, the studies referred to are concerned with a portion of the input functions of a political system.

In contrast to the well developed structures for interest articulation and aggregation found in industrialized Western nations, students who have attempted similar analyses in less developed nations have encountered slim pickings indeed. The picture which has emerged from such attempts most often emphasizes: 1) the lack of subjective civic competence which inhibits the expression of demands; 2) the weakness of interest structures which might organize and clarify previously inchoate interests; 3) and the relative absence of institutionalized forms through which political demands might be communicated to political decision-makers. In this context, the weakness of interest structures when coupled with the personalistic character of political loyalty allows national leaders to formulate policy free from many of the restraints imposed by party interest groups in the Western setting.[7]

Even given competitive elections, then, the very weakness of political interest structures means that demands originating outside elite circles will not have nearly the degree of influence on legislation which they do in more highly organized political systems As far as it goes, this seems to be an accurate analysis. It would be a grave mistake, however, to assume that because legislation is often drawn up in an atmosphere free from the organized pressure of interest groups, that therefore the public has little or no effect on the eventual "output" of government.

My point is simply that much of the interest articulation in the new states has been disregarded because Westerners, accustomed to their own polities, have been looking in the wrong place. A sizeable proportion of individual, and occasionally group, demands in less developed nations reach the political system, not before laws are passed, but rather at the enforcement stage. Influence before legislation is passed is generally called "pressure-group politics" and is the frequent object of examination by political scientists: influence at the enforcement stage is generallv called "corruption" and has seldom been treated as the alternative means of interest articulation which it in fact constitutes.

2. Rational Impulses to Corruption

The peasants who avoid their land taxes by making a smaller and illegal payment which supplements the Assistant District Officers' disposable income, are as surely influencing policy outcomes as they would if they formed

[7] See Lucien W. Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 19, 26, 27.

a peasant union and agitated for the reduction of land taxes. In a similar fashion, businessmen who protect their black market sales by buying protection from civil servants are changing policy outcomes as effectively as they might by working as a pressure group through Chambers of Commerce for an end to government price controls. A strong case can be made as well that, within the context of certain political system, it may be more "rational" —and here we use the term "rational" in its economizing sense—to protect one's interests when laws are being implemented rather than when they are still being debated by politicians. Three examples of situations in which corruption may well conserve scarce resources are suggested below:

a. Where organizational skills are scarce and where, as a result, interest group associations are either weak or non-existent, the corruption of law enforcement may be a more economizing way to exert influence over policy outcomes. The divisive loyalties of peasants to their ethnic, village, religious or caste grouping creates enormous organizational barriers which all but preclude their induction into an association which would seek to advance their interests *qua* peasants. Given this situation, it is more rational for the individual peasant or for the peasants of one village, say, to influence the laws which disadvantage them by bribing local government officials.

b. Where legislative acts tend to be formalistic—where the administration of law is so loose and erratic that existing law has little relation to eventual governmental outputs, it may well be more rational to make demands known at the enforcement stage than at the legislative stage. Businessmen in a developing nation may realize that, although the government has passed what they consider to be an unfair tax law, their actual administration bears little or no resemblance to what is called for by the statutes. This may occur because enforcement personnel are unwilling or unable to follow its directives or because politicians do not allow them to. Under the circumstances, it may make more sense for each firm to "buy" precisely what it needs in terms of enforcement rather than financing a campaign to press for a new law that would be as formalistic as the present one.

c. Where a minority is discriminated against politically and regarded more as a "subject" than a "citizen" group by the general population, its members may well feel that pressure group action would destroy what little political credit they enjoy and thus turn to the corruption of enforcement officials to avoid damaging political attacks from more powerful groups. Throughout much of Southeast Asia and East Africa, a large proportion of commerce and industry is in the hands of groups which, even if they have managed to acquire local citizenship, are considered as aliens by large sections of the local population. It would be foolish, even suicidal in some cases, for these so-called "pariah" capitalists to seek influence openly as an organized pressure group. A healthy regard for their property and skin alike forces them as a

group to rely upon illegal payments to strategically placed bureaucrats if they are to safeguard their economic interests.

At least two of the conditions (a and c above) under which influence at the enforcement stage becomes "rational" are off-cited characteristics of the less developed nations.[8] We have already remarked on the relative absence of associational interest groups which might bring the demands of their constituency to bear on the legislative process. Quite by itself this deficiency in organization makes the resort to corruption a rational strategy for many. And in underdeveloped areas there are groups which are virtually denied access to the open political area whether for ethnic reasons (the Chinese in Southeast Asia) or for ideological reasons (the private business sector in nations where the political elite champions public sector enterprise) or both, who thus exert their influence via more informal routes or else forego the effort to shape policy altogether.

The reader will note, however, that the specified conditions under which it would be rational—other things equal—to seek influence at the enforcement stage have applied only to the seeker (buyer) of influence. The ultimate success of the transaction, of course, depends on the bureaucrat(s)or politician(s) in question. Provided that the civil servants' concern for the law or the nation at large does not impose restraints upon him,[9] we may say that the probability of him refusing, say a bribe, will be equal to the product of the probability of being punished times the severity of the penalty if punished.[10] Thus a severe penalty coupled with a very small probability of being caught and punished is roughly equivalent in its disincentive effects as a quite small penalty coupled to a high probability of being found out. Looking at things from the government side for a moment, then, there are three factors at work determining the probability of corruption (assuming the value of the reward to be constant):

1. The extent to which loyalty to the law, to the government, or to the nation has become a private value.
2. The probability of being caught.
3. The severity of the penalty if caught.

As regards the initial factor, the growth of concern for the national community, law, or to government policy *per se* is a slow process and, although such concern has begun to take root quite firmly in many new

[8] The remaining situation (b) where, because the laws are formalistic, influence at the enforcement stage would be more rational is fairly common among new nations, but not so general that one could call it "characteristic".

[9] The value of the "reward" for a corrupt act is the other factor here, but we are assuming, for the moment, a "constant" reward.

[10] Similar restraints are of course applicable to the case of the "buyer" of influence too, although we have thus far assumed the buyer to be a pure *homo economicus.*

nations, the leaders of these nations would be the first to concede that it has not yet rendered their civil establishments immune to corruption. The crucial importance of whether one's loyalties are engaged or not can be seen by the fact that corruption by the officials of clan associations among the Chinese in Southeast Asia or of tribal associations in Dakar or Kinshasa is rare in comparison with corruption among public servants in the same areas.[11] In the one case group loyalties are firmly engaged and in the other, group loyalties are less strongly at work. Given the predominance of familial and parochial loyalties in the less developed areas, restraints, for the short-run at least, are often more a function of the penalties involved and the likelihood of being apprehended. In most new nations the penalties are quite severe—involving at least the loss of a relatively secure, high-paying, high-status past and, at most, loss of life. The probability of being apprehended, however, although it varies considerably from nation to nation, is generally quite low. The disincentive effects of severe penalties are therefore largely vitiated by the small likelihood of prosecution.

Under the circumstances we have described—circumstances which apply to most developing nations—it is not only rational for individuals and groups to seek influence at the enforcement stage but it is also rational for governmental officials to admit such influence.

III

Corruption and the Process of Political Inclusion

In a piece that challenges many of the assumptions commonly held by students of *political development,* Samuel Huntington, proposes an alternative theory of *political decay.*[12] Briefly put, Huntington's argument is that the rapid social mobilization—urbanization, politicization, etc.—characteristic of new nations has placed an all but impossible burden on their new and frail political institutions and has led to the decline of political competition, political instability, national disintegration, corruption, and institutional decay. The new nations are, accordingly, "buying rapid social modernization at the price of political degeneration." [13]

I would like to suggest, however, that what we have called corruption represents an effort—albeit informal—of the political system to cope with

[11] See Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simkins, *Corruption in Developing Countries* (London: Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1963), p. 50.

[12] Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," in Claude E. Welch, Jr., ed., *Political Modernization: A Reader in Comparative Political Change,* pp. 207-241.

[13] *Ibid.*

a rate of social change which chokes the formal channels of political influence. Thus we can view corruption as an *index* of the disjunction between the social system and the formal political system; a subversive effort by the social system to bend the political system to its demands. In fact, the extent and variety of corruption in a new nation is a fairly accurate reflection of the failure of the formal political system to aggregate and meet the demands of important sectors of the society. Groups or individuals who seek influence through corruption have what they feel are essential interest which the open political system has failed to meet or perhaps even regards as illegitimate. In this way corruption supplements the capacity of a formal political system which is unable to process demands created by social mobilization.

The fact of corruption means that, while the formal political system may seem rigid and restrictive, the informal political system represented by corruption may add a substantial openness and flexibility to ultimate policy outputs. Political competitiveness may, if you will, enter unobtrusively through the back door. An empirical assessment of the interests represented by policy outputs would be quite inadequate if it stopped at the content of laws and failed to ask in what direction and to what extent corruption in fact altered the implementation of policy. The table below is an effort to distinguished between those groups which achieve access to political influence via the formal political system and those groups which, for a variety of reasons, must enter the competition at a more informal level.

Table I

Groaps and Their Means of Access to the Political System in Less Developed Nations

Granted Access to Formal Political System	*Groups Resorting to Informal (Corrupt) Political System Because Denied Formal Access by virtue of:*		
	Ideological Reasons	*Parochial Reasons*	*Lack of Organization*
a. Political elites	a. Indigenous business groups	a. Minority ethnic or religious groups	a. Unorganized peasants
b. Party branches	b. Foreign business interests		b. Unorganized urban lower classes
c. Civil servant ass'ns	c. Political opposition		
d. Professional ass'ns			
e. Trade unions			

This categorization is rather sketchy and cannot do complete justice to any single developing nation but it is sufficiently descriptive of the situation in most to alert us to the variety of interests which make their surreptitious way through the political back door. Aside from those groups which are

blocked from formal participation by ideological reasons—and which are often well organized—the formal political system is *par excellance* the domain, the monopoly, of the modern social sector. The very nature of the formal political system places the unorganized and the minority communities at a tremendous disadvantage such that their interests are seldom represented in the content of legislation. This imbalance is, if not rectified, at least mitigated by the influence at the enforcement stage which constitutes virtually the only access to the political system afforded these groups. Thus corruption serves as an important corrective to the competitive advantage enjoyed by the modern sector in a formally modern political system.

Corruption as an Alternative to Violence

As we have indicated, the incidence of corruption in a developing nation is one indicator of a lack of integration in the formal political system. To the extent that corruption admits important interests which are blocked from formal participation, we may say that it seems as a deterrent to politically motivated violence.[14]

The political history of the West is rich in occasions where the timeliness of corruption allowed a new group to secure a measure of influence denied them by the formal political system and thereby diverted them from what might have become revolutionary pursuits into more mundane calculations of advantage. England may well owe the relatively peaceful inclusion of her bourgeoisie to the venality of her public officials while in France, on the other hand, the relative efficiency of the centralized bureaucracy under the monarchy left open only the revolutionary path to political power. Fattened by the West Indian trade, the British *nouveaux riches* were able to outbid rural landlords for seals in Parliament and to secure, by bribery, the conditions under which commerce might flourish. Urban and rural capitalists in France were less fortunate in this regard and resorted to a successful frontal assault on the system itself.[15]

In a similar vein, the corruption of the big city machines secured a measure of influence for the European immigrants who arrived in the United States in the late 9th and early 20th centuries. In return for their political support of the machine boss the newly arrived received patronage employment, favored treatment in court, and loans and welfare payments which were often quite outside the bounds of strict legality. Thus groups which might have otherwise become susceptible to more radical, not to say revo-

[14] Cf. Martin C. Needler, "The Political Development of Mexico," *American Political Science Review* (June, 1961), pp. 308-312.

[15] Nathaniel Leff, "Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption," *The American Behavioral Scientist* (November, 1964), pp. 8-14.

lutionary, doctrines were effectively domesticated and given a stake in the system.[16]

Much of what we have said about the West is true as well for underdeveloped areas: the villagers who have recently arrived in the cities of West Africa, the Chinese or Indian businessman in Southeast Asia, have all been attached, in greater or lesser degree, to the informal political system which attempts to meet their needs and demands. Corruption acts on these groups as essentially a conservative force which, by granting them influence over policy outputs, weds them more firmly to the political system and dilutes the impulse toward more radical solutions. In this limited sense, then, corruption is also a democratizing influence inasmuch as it allows for the participation of interest groups beyond what the formal political system alone can presently manage.

Referring again to Huntington's theory of political decay, it would perhaps be more accurate to look at corruption as a sort of half-way house between violence and constitutionality, a means by which some of the new demands produced by rapid social change are accommodated within a political system whose formal institutions are inadequate to the task. If the concept of political development includes the capacity of a political system to respond to new demands in such a way as to reduce the potential for violence, then corruption and political development are not at all incompatible. Viewing corruption from this angle, the following paradigm might represent an appropriate developmental sequence.

Table II

A Political System's Capacity for Integration Demands Over Time

Non-Integration	*Informal Integration*	*Formal Integration*
Violence — — — →	Corruption — — — — →	Constitutionality (*i.e.* institutionalization of demands)
e.g. Congo	Thailand	England/USSR

Any existing political system will, of course, exhibit all three tendencies and one must ask by what means the *preponderance* of political conflict is managed. Thus, within the United States, one can find violence where the demands of negroes are frustrated and corruption as the avenue by which

[16] For one group, and an important one, widespread corruption may well increase political alienation and the attractiveness of radical solution. The urban, Westernized, middle class have often incorporated current Western notions of governmental probity and are thus likely to view corruption as a symptom of the nation's moral turpitude. The same comment might apply to a lesser extent to the military officer corps.

illegal gambling and prostitution are represented,[17] but the preponderance of political demands are now processed at the formal, institutional level.

When violence becomes less common in a political system, corruption often becomes more common. The relationship is not simply fortuitious, but rather represents the substitution of bargaining for raw contests of strength. In this context, one might say that in England violence was beginning to give way to corruption around the period of the Glorious Revolution and that corruption became less prominent than institutional politics by the reform period of the 1830's. In the United States the apogee of violence represented by the Civil War—where fellow citizens slew one another on a scale not equalled before or since—gave way to corruption of similarly Texas style proportions through the 1880's and 90's well into the first portion of the 20th century.

It is important to understand that the conservative effects of corruption are a direct consequence of the fact that corruption places influence in the hands of individuals and groups which are most likely to be non-participants in the formal political system,[18] that is, corruption is conservative to the degree it is democratizing. In spite of the fact that corruption is often particularistic—dispensing favors to certain sections of the community more than others—and that when it is not particularistic it usually benefits wealth elites more than other groups, the question is historically not one of choosing between the formal political system and corruption. Either because of their lack of organization or their outright exclusion from formal influence by the dominant elites, the groups which acquire influence at the enforcement stage are exercizing the only means of influence open to them. Thus the choice is usually between no access or else limited, imperfect access which corruption at least provides.

Political Adjustment by Self-Interest

The question of loyalties sheds further light on the function of corruption. In most developing nations the loyalties of the great proportion of citizens are restricted largely to parochial groupings and to close kinsmen. In the absence of the wider loyalties which would facilitate both the growth of effective parties and a measure of consensus on national goals, a system of political influence which emphasizes narrow self-interest—and corruption

[17] As the growth of a nation's political institutions continues, much of the residual corruption represents the effort of business interests which are *per se* illegal such as gambling and prostitution in the U.S., to protect themselves from prosecution.

[18] One must, of course, assess the openness and effectiveness of the informal political system as well. Often some groups are excluded from both the formal *and* informal channels of influence, a problem we shall examine later.

does precisely this—may well succeed in producing a degree of cooperation that would otherwise not be possible.[19] The "man in the street" in Bangkok or Bogota cares a good deal less whether the actions of the politician or bureaucrat conform to standards of due process than whether the outcomes benefit him or not. What is suggested here is that the system of self-interest represented by corruption is perhaps the only viable basis of political adjustment during the early stages of political development when narrow loyalties predominate. Later, the growth of wider loyalties leads to an increase of participation in the formal political system and a consequent decline in the level of corruption.

Where the interests of one's family dwarfs wider loyalties[20] and where political and economic life are seen as a zero-sum game, then, the cement which binds a group together must come from the individual rewards each receives by virtue of his participation. Operating in such circumstances, political parties in new nations are generally not so suicidal as to assume a high degree of loyalty to the political system *per se* or to modern interest groups. If a competitive political party wishes either to maintain or enlarge its basis of support it will of necessity have to turn to those inducements which motivate a good portion of its cadre and those whose electoral support it hopes to attract. In this setting, the resort to particularistic rewards (including patronage, exemption from prosecution, contracts, and land grants) is quite understandable. Some of these rewards can be distributed quite legally (through the "pork barrel", for example, in the Philippines) but many must be obtained in a less formal manner. In the short run, competitive political parties are more likely to respond to the incentives which motivate their clientele than to alter the nature of those incentives. Thus, as long as the circumstances we have described persist, political competition will always be associated with a certain amount of corruption.

IV

Who Benefits Most?

A. Parochial-vs-Market Corruption

Determining which groups benefit from corruption is quite a complex task. One might begin by recognizing that most corruption involves the

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[19] David Greenstone suggested this in his article, "Corruption and Self Interest in Kampala and Nairobi," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* (January, 1966), p. 208. "The crucial function of self interest in politics is to replace a mutual dedication to the goals of 'good government' with a mutual if more selfish loyalty to a system of specific material incentives. Some of the decline in political capacity is offset by a modified and politicized version of the invisible hand."

[20] . . . "Amoral Familism," to use Banfield's term. Cf., *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (Chicago: The Free Press, 1958).

trading of a resource like wealth of family connections for power; that is, it involves the "purchase" of an authoritative governmental decision by some individual or group not legally entitled to enter into such a transaction. Both the buyer and the seller benefit in this "black market government" [21] since the buyer pays something less than what he estimates the benefits of the decision to be for him, while the power-holder, as a monopolist, charges what the traffic will bear and at least enough to compensate himself for the risks he runs.

Aside from the power-holder, be he politician or bureaucrat, who always benefits as a necessary partner in the transaction, the nature of the beneficiary depends to a great extent on whether the power holder is motivated more strongly by parochial loyalties to kinsmen, friends, or ethnic group or whether he is more impersonal and market oriented. Both play a role—sometimes simultaneously when say a politician will only do favors for his ethnic group but nonetheless exacts from them what he can in terms of cash, goods, or services. To the extent that parochial considerations predominate, however, the beneficiaries will be those with "connections" such as kinship, friendship, ethnicity, etc. Where market considerations prevail, on the other hand, wealth elites will benefit more since they are in a position to make the most lucrative bids. The two by two table below illustrates the relationships we have just discussed.

Table III

Type of Corruption	*Major Benificiary*
1. "Parochial"	Individuals and groups with "connections"
2. "Market"	Individuals and groups with wealth

South Vietnam under Diem would tend to fall in the "parochial" category given the favoritism shown northern Catholics, the Philippines would approach the "market" variety of corruption, while Thailand would have to be termed a "mixed" system.

B. Political Competition and the Beneficiaries of Corruption

Two other important factors which determine who profits from corruption are the balance of political-vs-bureaucratic power within the polity and the degree to which politics is competitive in the electoral sense. The table directly below suggests how these variables affect the direction of benefits.

[21] A term borrowed from Robert O. Tilman's unpublished paper, "Administrative Corruption: An Interpretation".

Table IV

Level of Benefits from Corruption by Social Group and Type of Regime

	Recipients of Benefits of Corruption				
	e.g. Indiv. & Groups with Parochial Connections to Elite	*Wealth Elites*	*Bureaucrats*	*Party Leaders Cadre*	*Voters*
1. Bureaucracy Polity (non-traditional—Thailand)	x	X	X		
Type of Regime					
2. Party-dominated Polity non-competitive—Tunisia	x	x	x	X	
3. Party-dominated Polity competitive-Philippines	x	X	x	X	X
investment/consumption/ orientation	Uncertain	Investment	Uncertain	Uncertain	Consumption

* large X's indicate the probable major beneficiaries of corruption in each type of regime, while small x's indicate minor beneficiaries.

In the table we assume that realistically those persons and groups closely identified with members of the ruling elite will always profit to some extent from corruption. If corruption exists at all, it will be difficult to deny the persuasive claims of family and friends.

The probable patterning of rewards for each type of political system is explained at greater length below:

1. Where parties are either weak or non-existent and where the bureaucrats—perhaps in league with the military—dominate, it is clear that bureaucrats and wealth elites will be the chief recipients of corruption's fruits. This pattern is typical of Thailand where the reigning military/bureaucratic elite is relieved of electoral anxieties and where non-parochial corruption consequently centers largely around payments made by local and foreign business concerns to secure licenses, tax relief, government contracts, etc.

The bureaucracy-dominated polity and the sort of corruption which characterizes it are becoming, if anything, increasingly common as the decline of political parties coupled with restive officer corps and a strong central bureaucracy conspire to create them. New nations such as Pakistan, Indonesia, Ghana, Burma, Dahomey, and perhaps even Nigeria, to mention but a few, fall into this classification at present.

2. Non-competitive, party-dominated regimes often have a strong ideological cast and a program for national reconstruction which has led some analysts to refer to them as "movement" regimes. Although the durability of

such regimes is now rather questionable, Tunisia, Tanzania, Kenya and pre-coup Ghana, come to mind as examples of this system of government.

The need of such regimes to strengthen the party as the engine of economic and social change means that, to the extent corruption exists, a portion of its benefits will flow to party cadre and supporters.[22] Whereas for the bureaucratic regime only parochial considerations are likely to interfere with "market" corruption, for the "movement" regime, the need to build the party organization also becomes a factor in determining who gets what. Virtually, by definition, a larger portion of corruption in a non-competitive party-dominated system is processed by the party elite with the bureaucracy becoming, as it were, a junior partner.

In actual practice during the 20th century, "movement" regimes have generally been motivated by socialist preferences for the public sector. The greater their success in propagating this doctrine, the less likely it is that wealth elites in the private sector will profit from corruption.

3. Political systems dominated by competitive parties further widen the range of beneficiaries of corruption to include the voters themselves. When elections are hard fought, those who control votes possess a power resource as surely as those who control wealth and can thus bargain in the informal political system. The access of wealth elites to the fruits of corruption is as evident in this regime as in a bureaucratic one and perhaps even greater since parties and politicians must have bonds for campaign purposes. But unlike the bureaucratic regime where there is no particular reason for the power holder to disburse his proceeds, the politicians in a competitive political system have great incentives to distribute a portion of their gains in buying votes and/or doing illegal favors for those who control votes which may influence the outcome of elections. Thus the competitive party regime, although it may encourage a greater amount of corruption, includes voters and vote brokers within the range of beneficiaries simply because the electoral process places bargaining resources in their hands.[23]

The outstanding example of this system and the corruption which typifies it is the Philippines, while nations such as Ceylon, Malaysia, Uruguay, Chile, Columbia, and Venezuela are possible candidates for inclusion here too. In the Philippines, which boasts the world's highest *per capita* cost for electoral campaigns, businessmen have easy access to politicians, and, the powerful "sugar bloc" virtually provides salaries for a certain number of senators and congressmen who protect its interests. The very competitive-

[22] To the degree such regimes are successful in creating national loyalty they will most likely reduce the *overall* level of corruption, although the direction of benefits will remain as we have indicated.

[23] This is not to say that wealth elites or bureaucrats profit less *in an absolute sense* from corruption since the level of corruption could, hypothetically, be so much higher than in another system that both groups might have higher absolute gains.

ness of the system, however, means that politicians find it useful to buy votes or perform illegal favors for local influentials.

What occurs in the Philippines is quite comparable to what happened in England, particularly before legislation against rotten bouroughs, or in the immigrant choked cities of the U.S. Furthermore, one can already see in the Philippines the growth of institutionalized means to reward voters and the consequent decline of more particularistic, illegal rewards—a process already experienced in much of the West. Two mechanisms are notable in this respect: first, pork-barrel legislation which enables the politician to channel employment, goods, and services to his constituents and remain within the law; and second, a legal patronage system which allows the successful candidate in the ruling party to nominate a number of his supporters for positions in the executive branch.[24]

The transfer of rewards from the informal to the formal political system—from illegality to legality—in this fashion presupposes certain changes in the nature of the electorate. For one thing, many of the rewards of "pork-barrel" legislation include indivisible benefits such as schools and public works and thus require a measure of community identification since voters must see themselves sharing in the gains of the entire community.[25] A system of legal rewards, in addition, necessitates a higher level of trust between voters and new candidates because pork-barrel funds and legal patronage can only be distributed after the nominee has won election while under pre-election bribery, the voter is paid off before he casts his ballot. Inasmuch as the transformation from outright corruption to the institutionalized rewards we have described requires the growth of both wider loyalties and political trust, we would not be inaccurate to describe it as a step in political development.

V

Economic Growth and the Benificiaries of Corruption

The relative success or failure of a nation to achieve a high rate of economic growth depends on a host of factors beside corruption. The motivation of the ruling elite, the skills and resources at its disposal, and its capacity for carrying out agreed policies are more central to the question of capital formation than corruption. Nevertheless, corruption may have some independent influence on economic growth which merits examination.

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[24] See Gregoria A. Francisco and Paul de Guzman, "The 50-50 Agreement: A Political Administrative Case," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration* (October, 1960), pp. 328-347. The institutionalized political appointment of local postmasters and the nomination of cadets to the armed forces academies are instances of the same process in the United States.

[25] The conditions of "amoral familism" in the Southern Italian town Banfield, (*op. cit.*,) describes would render the pork-barrel an ineffective means of winning voter support.

A. Non-Distortive Corruption

Here it is useful to distinguish between corruption which distorts formal government policy, as it generally does, and corruption which has no appreciable effect on policy. In the latter category we would include what might be called "payments for speed". Such "speed money" may either add economic growth or have no effect on it, but only rarely would such corruption have a negative influence on growth. The citizen who pays a small illegal fee to a government clerk to receive his radio license more quickly is probably having no influence on economic activity.[26] Government policy is not changed since the citizen would have received his license anyway after, say, a half hour wait. On the other hand, the business firm which bribes a civil servant to secure a license to begin operation without a lengthy wait has decided that the wait would cost it more than the "bakshish" or "dash" needed to avoid such a delay. Providing the firm's calculations are accurate in this respect, corruption here has a net beneficial effect on the rate of economic growth.

B. Distortive Corruption: The Private Sector

Most of what we call corruption, however, involves not merely a payment for speed but a real distortion of official government policy. The peasant who bribes to avoid his taxes and the businessman who receives an overpriced contract through a highly placed relative are both changing government policy: the peasant escapes his legal tax obligation and the entrepreneur secures a contract he would not otherwise be granted.

If we are interested in economic growth this "distortive" type of corruption impels us to ask whether the policy which results from such corruption is more likely to contribute to economic growth than the original governmental policy which is being distorted. Here again the distinction between "parochial" and "market" corruption is central. In the case of parochial corruption, only an examination of the marginal propensity to save of groups with "connections" will begin to reveal whether this distortion will promote economic growth more than formal government policy. There is some evidence, however, that "market" corruption, inasmuch as it benefits wealth elites, is likely to have a greater multiplier effect than the formal economic policy of most new nations.

The case for market corruption can be made persuasively for Southeast Asia. The nations which have made the most economic progress to date are the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia while Burma and Indonesia have

[26] The act, however, increases the clerk's income and decreases the citizen's by an equal amount and if there is a difference in their marginal propensity to save, this may have some effect on economic growth.

hardly reached pre-war standards of real *per capita* income.[27] Although it is risky to generalize from only five cases, we would suggest that the size of the private sector is significant here. Both pre-coup Indonesia and Burma have opted for a largely state-run economy while Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines have imposed fewer restraints on the private sector. What few restrictions there are on private sector activity in the three more successful nations have been partly vitiated by corruption—the Philippines and Thailand would rank fairly high on anyone's scale of corruption—while ever widespread corruption in Burma and Indonesia failed to protect the private sector from state control or operation. In spite of the best intentions and a declared policy of economic growth, the state-run economies have performed significantly less well than those where the private sector predominates. Indications are that Southeast Asia is not an exception in this respect.[28]

If this analysis is correct, it follows that, other things being equal corruption which secures greater freedom of operation for the private sector will generally promote economic growth. The impetus to such corruption would, of course, be less if government policy imposed fewer restrictions on the private sector. But since we are speaking of the real world where most new nations are inclined to severely circumscribe or eliminate the private sector, "market" corruption may well enhance the possibilities for economic growth.

C. Effects of Political Competition on Corruption and Growth

Leaving aside for the moment the question of how effectively government policy promotes economic growth, one can distinguish between the groups which profits from corruption in terms of their marginal propensity to save. To the extent that corruption places power or money at the disposal of groups with a high marginal propensity to save it will clearly contribute more to economic growth than if it benefits groups with low marginal propensities to save (MPS). Using the list of groups in Table IV we can make but a few provisional judgments on this nature.

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[27] Dee Douglas S. Paauw, "Economic Progress in Southeast Asia," *Journal of Asian Studies* (November, 1963), pp. 69-91. We have omitted the Indo-Chinese states from consideration here for obvious reasons.

[28] One might compare the performance of Ghana or Guinea (state-run economies), to that of the Ivory Coast, for example. Albert O. Hirschman has argued too, that the concern for balanced growth and the creation of the economic infrastructure, both of which require greater government intervention, are perhaps less conducive to growth than orthodox theorists would suppose. Our generalization is meant to apply to non-communist state-run economies. How much better, however, is the subject of some dispute.

Table V

	Recipient Groups				
	Individual and Groups with Parochial Connections to Elite	*Wealth Elites*	*Bureaucratic Elites*	*Pol. Leaders & Pol. Cadre*	*Voters*
MPS Estimate	uncertain	high	uncertain	uncertain	low

For those with parochial ties to the elite, bureaucrats, and politicians we cannot estimate *a priori* their MPS. It will vary greatly from country to country. In Malaysia one might suspect that bureaucrats have a higher MPS than politicians, and politicians a higher MPS than groups with parochial connections to the elite. Even if this is accurate, the order could well be reversed in other national settings. For voters and wealth elites, however, one can say with some confidence that the MPS of voters is relatively low and that of wealth elites relatively high. Thus, if we were concerned exclusively with economic growth, corruption which benefited wealth elites more than voters would be of greater benefit than corruption which favored voters. The fact that competitive political systems are more likely to include voters among the beneficiaries of corruption implies that corruption here is less favorable to growth—other things equal—than corruption in a non-competitive political system where voters are not among the beneficiaries. Under conditions of political competition the gains of voters from corruption will probably spread the wealth more evenly—an egalitarian income effect—but may well have less salutary growth effects since voters are more likely to consume than to save their gains. Corruption in a non-competitive system, on the other hand, does not have this levelling effect but may well contribute more to economic growth by favoring groups with a higher MPS. This is not to say that corruption amidst political competition necessarily retards economic growth but rather that it is not as likely to assist economic growth as much as corruption in a non-competitive setting.[29]

D. Qualifications

The proposition that "market" corruption which benefits wealth elites will contribute to economic growth is, alas, subject to a few other qualification which bear enumeration.

1. Not all of those who argue for the possible benefits of certain kinds of corruption in certain circumstances realize that, if carried too far, corruption is apt to be counter productive. There are at least two reasons for this.[30]

[29] Corruption in a competitive political system may marginally assist growth by subverting the bias of the electorate for present consumption and welfare.

[30] Leff, *op. cit.*, is an example of an analysis which errs, unlike traditional discussions, in its virtually unqualified praise for "market" corruption as a path to economic growth.

First, most forms of corruption, in fact, constitute a tax on economic activity. The payments for a license to do business, a construction permit, etc., are part of the costs of doing business to the merchant or entrepreneur. When such costs are relatively modest they are more than outweighed by the bureaucratic obstacles which they overcome and the incentive which they may provide for efficient operation. At some level, however, corruption may become so costly that many businesses which could otherwise operate at a profit become marginal or clearly unprofitable. One might imagine that politicians and bureaucrats would realize the point at which they are killing the goose which lays their golden eggs—and while the Philippines seem to appreciate these limits, it appears that in Indonesia, quite apart from the policy of nationalization, the race for spoils becomes so wild that many potentially profitable enterprises were either not begun or were actually forced to close down. In such circumstances, many Indonesians preferred to deposit their holdings in foreign banks.

The level of corruption leads us to a second, and related, problem of uncertainty. Many of the bribes paid to bureaucrats and politicians by businessmen were in effect efforts to reduce somewhat the high risk factor which surrounds investment decisions in underdeveloped areas. In this context businessmen would prefer a predictable system of corruption which assures them of the service or decision for which they are paying and sets known limits on the costs they will have to bear. A strong, cohesive party often creates these conditions of certainty by acting as a central clearing house for corruption of this kind. But when uncertainty prevails, when the payment for a decision offers little assurance that it will actually be carried out or if the full cost of a needed decision cannot be known, the businessman may prefer to remain "liquid" rather than running risks of such magnitude. Thus, the greater the extent of corruption (the costliness of a decision) or the greater the uncertainties involved (the risk factor) the less likely that corruption by wealth elites will have a postive effect on economic growth.

2. Until now we have assumed that most of the corrupt transactions between businessmen and bureaucrats or politicians expand the freedom of the private sector to respond to market forces. Some transactions, however, may actually restrict or distort market forces and have negative effects on economic growth. For example, a firm may secure a contract to supply materials to the government by bribing selected officials who are then unable to complain when he delivers materials well below contract standards or fails to observe other terms of the agreement. Similarly, an import or export enterprise might pay politicians or bureaucrats to enact laws or regulations which will give it a monopoly in a certain area or place obstacles in the path of its competitors. In such cases, corruption has the effect of inhibiting normal competitive pressures which serve to encourage more effi-

cient operation. Economic growth is more likely to be retarded than accelerated when corruption follows this pattern.

E. Corruption and Growth

Throughout this discussion we have suggested a number of conditions under which corruption may actually promote the process of economic growth. For the sake of convenience, most of these propositions are stated more succinctly below.

Corruption is more likely to have a positive influence on economic growth when:

1. National rulers are either uninterested or hostile to economic growth.
2. The government lacks the skills, capacity, or resources to effectively promote economic growth.

and when:

3. Corruption is "market" corruption where all "buyers" of influence have equal access to bureaucrats and politicians. (The assumption here is that if parochial considerations are weak, only the ability to pay will count and efficient producers will gain an advantage).
4. Corruption benefits groups with a high marginal propensity to save (*e.g.* wealth elites) more than groups with a low marginal propensity to save (voters)[31]
   — this situation is, in turn, more likely in a non-competitive political system than in a competitive one where votes can be traded for influence.
5. The cost of a unit of influence is not so high as to discourage otherwise profitable undertakings.
   — this situation is more likely when there is price competition among politicians and bureaucrats who sell influence.
6. There is greater certainty as to the price of a unit of influence and a high probability of receiving the paid-for "decision".
   — this is more likely when:
   a. The political and bureaucratic elites are strong *and* cohesive
   b. Corruption has become "regularized"—even institutionalized after a fashion—by long practice.
7. Corruption serves to increase competition in the private sector rather than to secure a special advantage or monopolistic position for any one competitor.

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[31] For this reason Nye (*op. cit.*, pp. 424-425) feels corruption among the upper levels of the elite is more likely to be beneficial for economic development than corruption at lower levels.

This listing is, of course, far from complete although it does represent many of the major considerations involved in determining whether corruption will have a net positive or negative effect on economic growth. The greater the number of these enumerated conditions which a system of corruption satisfies, the greater the likelihood that corruption will contribute to economic growth.

VI

Conclusion

The preconditions for corruption are the existence of a government monopoly over goods, services, or posts and a level of demand for these benefits which outstrips available supply.[32] When the value of the scarce benefit is driven up by demand pressure to a level that exceeds the price the government has set (in many cases the government price is zero), offers to purchase it illegally are likely to occur. One writer has approximately called corruption a form of "black market bureaucracy".[33]

Since much corruption thus represents the penetration of the free market into areas where it is legally forbidden it becomes important to ask how "perfect" the bureaucratic and political "black market" is. A "perfest" market, among other things, responds only to cash and not to voting strength or kinship ties, its prices are determined solely by the interaction of demand and supply, and information as to product and price are available to all.

To the extent that this black market approaches "perfection" in this sense, it will be more likely to contribute to economic growth. A good many of the conditions we enumerated in the previous section reflect the fact that the freer the corruption market is, the higher the probability that wealth elites with their high marginal propensity to save will dominate the market. As beneficial as this might be for economic growth, chances are that it will restrict the equally important process of political inclusion or integration.

What we are suggesting is that, when it comes to corruption, political integration and economic growth may work against each other. The kind of corruption which most accelerates economic growth favors wealth elites and largely excludes voters and those with parochial ties to the elite from the market. Pure market corruption, then, may wed the wealth elite to the regime while excluding voters and "parochials". On the other hand, corruption which distributes the fruits of corruption not only to wealth elites but also to voters and "parochials" is surely more beneficial for political

[32] This excludes, for the moment, corruption which involves avoiding the enforcement of laws (*e.g.* tax laws, criminal laws) by a lesser "payment" to enforcement officials.

[33] Robert O. Tilman, "Administrative Corruption: An Interpretation," Unpublished paper, p. 7.

inclusion but is, at the same time, likely to spread rewards among consumers who are less apt to use these rewards as productively as investors. Which variety of corruption is considered "better" therefore depends whether economic development or political integration is deemed to be the most crucial systemic problem. The Congo, one might say, would be better off with corruption which maximizes political integration while Tunisia or the Philippines might be better off with corruption that maximizes economic growth.

Regardless of the potential economic benefits of market corruption, there are important objections to such corruption which relate to the adequacy of the price system in allocating values. Market corruption suffers from all the recognized shortcomings of any free market pricing system. First, claims in the market must be backed with money and distribution is therefore highly unequal. Such goods and services as education, health care, etc., for example, are subject to government intervention because the distribution which would result from the price system is considered by almost all as unsatisfactory.[34] Secondly, the price system often involves third party damages or costs which are not a part of the market's calculations. Examples such as pollution or the depletion of natural resources come to mind where the community attempts collectively to restrict the price system so as to protect third party interests. Market allocation may finally result in the private control of functions which the community has decided to collectively allocate. Private control over courts or military units, for example, are results of market penetration into government services which could impose tremendous costs on the community at large. The importance of such considerations as these may be great enough to warrant centralized decisions rather than market decisions (in this case corruption) whether or not the political system is democratic and whether or not corruption might promote economic growth.

In concluding, it is well to remember that the fundamental objection to corruption is that it always assigns greater importance to wealth and/or "connections" than to votes. This is presumably the democratic response to corruption in public life. If as in many developing nations, however, the political system is closed or oligarchic, the democratic objection to corruption becomes less valid since corruption may, in such instances, serve as an informal democratizing force.

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[34] This and succeeding points are taken from Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare* (New York: Harper, 1953), pp. 387-391.

ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY STUDY OF COOPERATIVES AND CREDIT IN LAOS*

NATHANIEL B. TABLANTE

The Role of Cooperatives in Social and Economic Development

IN MANY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD TODAY, cooperatives offer tremendous possibilities for enhancing the economic status and well-being of the people and for strengthening democracy. Through the various types of cooperatives, the people may find practical means

* This study was undertaken from September 24 to October 14, 1964 upon the invitation of USAID/Laos. In preparing this report, the author was guided by the background information and materials supplied by various individuals and entities and by information gathered from his own observations. Among those with whom the author consulted concerning the cooperatives and credit situations in Laos were the following:—Mr. Charles A. Mann, Director, USAID/Laos; Mr. Leroy S. Wehrle, Deputy Director, USAID; Dr. J. Russel Andrus, Assistant Director for Technical Services, USAID; Dr. Howard E. Thomas, Assistant for Rural Development, USAID; Mr. Norman L. Sweet, Program Officer, USAID; Mr. Edward J. Thrasher, Chief, Office of Economic Affairs; Mr. William C. Tucker, Chief, Agriculture Branch, USAID; Mr. James H. Faulhaber, Chief, Education Branch, USAID; Mr. Clark Joel, Assistant Program Economist, Office of Economic Affairs; USAID; Mr. J.W. MacQueen, Area Coordinator (Pakse), USAID; Mr. John N. Doolittle, IVS; Mr. Roy Moffett, Community Development Advisor, USAID (Pakse); Mr. Aubrey Elliott, Area Coordinator, USAID (Savannakhet); Mr. James Krause, Community Development Advisor USAID (Savannakhet); Mr. Silas J. Smucker, Community Development Advisor, USAID (Sayaboury); Mr. Froe, Agricultural Extension Advisor, USAID (Savannakhet); Mr. Tiao Somsavath Vongkoth, Director of Lao Agriculture; Dr. Khamsouk Singharaj, Director of Lao Veterinary Services; Mr. Sisavath, Director General of Finances, Royal Lao Government; Mr. Phouvong Phimmasone, President of the Syndicat des Fonctionnaires; General Sang, Deputy Chief of Staff and in charge of refugee and disabled veterans resettlement, Royal Lao Army; Major Singthong Inthavong, Director, Lao Veterans Agriculture Training Center; Mr. Eligio J. Tavanlar, Land Settlement Advisor, United Nations; Mr. Nicanor Bustamante, Cluster Manager, Sayaboury (on detail from Operations Brotherhood); and Mr. Benicio Revilla, Agriculture Advisor, Asia Foundation/Laos. To them and to all others who helped provide valuable information pertinent to this study, the author wishes to express his profound gratitude. A special word of grateful appreciation is extended to Mr. William G. Tucker, Chief of the Agriculture Division, USAID, for his recommendation to invite the author as a consultant as well as for invaluable assistance he extended while the author was in Laos; to Mr. Clark Joel, Assistant Program Economist, USAID, for making the necessary arrangements and contacts for this study. Finally the author wishes to thank the Mission for giving him the opportunity to visit and to be of service to Laos.

The period of the author's assignment was rather short to enable him to make a thorough or comprehensive study of cooperatives and credit in Laos. This was aggravated by language difficulties or by the problem of communication. However, in this brief period, the author was able to gain some insights into the nature and magnitude of the problems which had to be faced and the necessary approaches to these problems that were to be taken, based on basic information. It is hoped that the author's experience in cooperatives partially offset the time limitation and language deficiency.

of meeting their needs for essential commodities and services for production and consumption activities, as well as for the enjoyment of the social amenities of life.

In fact, cooperatives may provide the instrument by which almost any kind of socio-economic need can be met. Thus, consumer cooperatives provide the members with household goods and other items of consumption; credit cooperatives, funds needed for production and marketing operations; cooperative credit unions, a means for encouraging savings and a source of credit for meeting personal and providential expenses of members; marketing cooperatives, better prices through processing, storing, grading, and selling produce efficiently and relatively free from exploitation by unscrupulous middlemen; supply cooperatives, agricultural supplies and tools needed for farm production, such as improved seeds, insecticides, fertilizers, feed, veterinary supplies, and others, at reasonable prices; service cooperatives, essential services for the members, such as electricity, insurance, housing, health and medical care, transportation, machinery pool, irrigation, and the like; industrial cooperatives, raw materials used to produce better quality goods as well as the means of marketing the products of cottage or home industries; cooperative farms, the pool of limited resources of small, uneconomic holdings in order to achieve the advantages of large-scale farming and to bring new lands under cultivation.

All these types of cooperatives provide opportunities for small individual producers and consumers to jointly obtain commodities and services otherwise not available to them as individuals but available to larger producers or consumers. The former are, therefore, placed in a position to enjoy the benefits of large-scale operations in purchases, sales and service.

It is well to point out here that cooperatives possess certain well-defined characteristics not found in other types of business organization. A cooperative society is a voluntary organization legally constituted under existing laws of the country to carry out certain economic functions and services for the mutual benefit of the people who own and control it on a democratic basis and in accordance with established principles and techniques. It emerges out of felt needs. Its services are, therefore, designed to meet the actual needs of its members. As implied above, its membership is open and voluntary. It is founded on mutual interest in removing a particular economic disadvantage or achieving a desirable objective, rather than on the basis of race, religion, nationality, political affiliation and other considerations not related to its objectives. Other important practices of cooperatives are: the democratic control of the affairs of the society by the members themselves, on the basis of one-man, one-vote and not in proportion to the amount of capital a member has invested in the cooperative; limited returns on capital; patronage refunds, whereby members benefit from the activity

of the cooperative in proportion to the volume of business they transact with it; trading on cash basis and at prevailing market prices; and continuous cooperative education. Cooperatives afford the common people an excellent means to participate in management and in business decisions affecting their interests as individual producers or consumers. Furthermore, full ownership of the instruments of production and distribution eventually accumulates in the hands of those who use these instruments.

In addition to their usefulness as a tool for economic development, cooperatives can also be employed as a counter-insurgency measure. By their very nature and their primary objectives, they have a special appeal to the masses. Perhaps, no form of organization other than the cooperative cuts across all levels and practically all kinds of economic activity in which the mass of the population are involved or are deeply concerned. Thus, in some countries like the Philippines, cooperatives have been used to regain people's confidence in their government at such crucial times when democracy is being threatened by communistic infiltrations.

While stressing the significant potential contribution of cooperatives to the social and economic advancement of developing nations, we must not think of cooperatives as a wonderful panacea to all possible problems. We must not neglect to explore other forms of organization which can also be used in pursuit of similar objectives we have set for cooperatives to achieve. Nor must we assume that cooperatives are necessarily always superior to other institutional arrangements in all places or for any specific purpose. We must bear in mind that cooperatives have also their own limitations and may not be the desirable program to pursue under certain conditions and circumstances. We should not let ourselves be carried away by our enthusiasm and our emotions to recommend cooperatives as the only means by which the economic and social ills of a nation may be remedied.

In some developing countries, many officials (and sometimes their foreign advisors, too) — recognizing the potentialities of cooperatives in promoting "better farming, better business and better living," to quote the late Sir Horace Plunkett—often imbued with missionary zeal and a flare for dramatics, have embarked upon ambitious programs of cooperative development. Thus cooperatives mushroom overnight without the preliminary establishment of solid foundations of cooperative business through intensive cooperative education and training. Sometimes, the people themselves, contribute to the feverish expansion of cooperatives on unsound lines. They organize themselves into cooperatives, not because they feel that there is an economic need for it, but because they merely want to take advantage of tax exemptions and other benefits and privileges granted cooperatives by the government. Consequently, these activities have often been very wasteful of financial and human resources. The failure of many cooperatives,

organized without any strong foundation, have caused disillusionment among the people and have tended to set back the cooperative movement for a good number of years. Obviously, such a situation seriously impairs the future development of cooperatives on a sounder basis.

Development of Cooperatives and Credit in Laos

As in other underdeveloped areas where the United States government has been extending financial and technical assistance, the development of a cooperative program in Laos is in line with the general policy of American foreign aid programs. It has, for instance, placed greater emphasis on the development of democratic institutions like the cooperatives.

Section 601 of the Congressional Act of 1961 providing for International Development, underscores "the policy of the United States to encourage the development and use of cooperatives, credit unions and savings and loan associations . . . ." This provision is, of course, binding on the U.S. Agency for International Development.

On June 23, 1961, the Director of the International Cooperation Administration announced that "greater emphasis on development of and assistance to cooperatives in underdeveloped countries will be among the major objectives of the administration's new foreign aid program." Before the end of the year (on December 13), the Acting Director of AID/Washington stated in AIDTO Circular A-52:

> In general, AID is in agreement with the importance of and suggestions for associations as one of the means of implementing technical and financial assistance to developing nations. It will be the policy of AID to use these organizations and the development of them to the fullest extent possible within policy and program balance.

In the light of these policy pronouncements, USAID/Laos has received numerous requests for assistance in establishing and developing agricultural and consumers cooperatives. The Mission believes that cooperatives can be used as a counter-insurgency measure and as an instrument of economic development for Laos.. Officials of the Royal Lao Government have expressed their interest and support for a program of cooperatives and credit for Laos, and have requested assistance and guidance.

In June 1962, the U.S. Military Assistance Group (MAAG) White Star initiated the establishment of consumer purchasing and rice milling facilities in Ban Kok Mai and Ban Houei Khong. Similar facilities were put up in Ville de Paksong and Ban Nong Lom the following October. Material support given by MAAG to these stores consisted of a rice mill, the construction of a warehouse and a consumer store, capital equipment grants, and consumer merchandise provision.

The USAID has continued to subsidize these facilities and the program has recently been expanded to include additional funding and supervising personnel support. Mr. John N. Doolittle, a hotel administration graduate from Cornell University and IVS Business Manager, was assigned to set up a system of bookkeeping and accounting for these stores. He has been teaching bookkeeping to some local personnel. At the time this study was being undertaken (August 1964) Mr. Doolittle was due to leave on October 25 for further studies. The USAID Regional Office/Paksé did not then have a replacement who could continue the work of managing these stores which he so painstakingly started.

About the last week of September, a trusted TON employee of USAID in the Paksé Regional Office disappeared with 2,000,000 kips of the accumulated collection of the four stores, presumably USAID funds contributed to the stores.

An analysis of the structure of these organizations disclosed that they are not, in fact, cooperatives, although the stores are referred to as co-ops. The total capital was provided by the USAID, including salaries and wages paid to hired employees of the four stores. There was no participation by the "members" in the management of the organizations—management and control being performed by USAID. Goods were sold at subsidized rates. Essentially, therefore, these stores were run just like any small commissary store, with membership extended to those persons who render one day's work a month to any of the stores' projects which were not in anyway related to cooperative business.

It should be strongly emphasized here that the term "cooperative" is not a magic word. Just because the association is called a cooperative does not make it a cooperative. The injudicious use of the term "cooperative" to refer to organizations such as the White Star stores which are not operated in accordance with established cooperative principles, tends to create a wrong impression of cooperatives. This may impair the future development of cooperatives on a sounder basis. The services of a cooperative society must not only meet the felt needs of members but the members themselves must realize that the services meet their needs and they are given the opportunity to participate in its management and to support its capital structure on a sound basis.

Despite these criticisms against the misuse of the word "cooperatives" we can commend the people behind the establishment of these organizations. These organizations are serving a useful purpose in their own sphere. They provide the members with essential consumer goods at prices lower than those prevailing in other local stores. They have served as a vehicle for the establishment of good rapport between the Mission and the local villagers. With some adjustments in their organizational structure, they can be trans-

formed into economic cooperatives and can be used to attain both the short-run objective of counter insurgency and the long-run objective of economic development of Laos.

There have been other attempts to organize cooperatives in various parts of Laos. In Luang Prabang, a state--subsidized organization selling consumer goods, known as "economat," operated for a while. But it was closed when it lost its manager at the time the government withdrew its subsidy and passed the management of the organization to the Lao War Veterans Association. With the transfer of administration of these organizations to the Veterans Association, they came to be known as "Cooperatives des Anciens Combattants". Like its predecessor, "economats", these organizations were not strictly speaking, cooperatives. They were nothing more than government-subsidized stores selling basic consumer goods to war veterans, military personnel, and government employees. Merchandise was bought by these "economats" with government - import - monopoly - rights and sold to the buyers at fairly reasonable prices.

By December, 1963, an encouraging development took place when the "Cooperative Agricole des Fonctionnaires" was established in Vientiane. This organization replaced the "economat" and was supposed to engage in both production and consumption services for the members. On the production side, the members were to cultivate lands to be given them by the government. The organization was to import agricultural tools and implements which were to be loaned or rented to members at reasonable prices. It was to undertake the marketing of the members' agricultural produce. Since most of the members were civil servants in active service, it was doubtful whether they would have the time to farm their lands. So far, the production aspect of the organization has been dormant.

On the consumption side, the organization assumed the functions of the "economat". It continued the program of importation formerly undertaken by its predecessor with foreign exchange provided by USAID, upon the request of the Minister of Finance. For the time being, the store dealt only with imported goods such as rice, milk, fish sauce, sugar and salt. The "Syndicat des Fonctionaires," which had been instrumental in initiating the organization of this cooperative, conceived the idea as a means of helping the government employees to fight rising cost of living by enabling members to buy goods at lower prices. (It is estimated that real income of civil servants had declined by more than 50 per cent during the preceding two years). Membership in the cooperative was opened to all civil servants — either active or retired—who were also members of the "Syndicat des Fonctionnaires." At the time this study was made, there were about 3,000 members.

The "Cooperative Agricole des Fonctionnaires" had the makings of a true cooperative. It had adopted its own by-laws. The members helped provide the capital of the organization by buying shares of stocks—either the series "A" shares for agricultural production at 10,000 kips each share or the series "B" shares for consumption at 1,000 kips each share. There was no limit to the number of shares each member could hold. The members had already put in about 3,000,000 kips as capital for their cooperative when this study was undertaken. The "Credit National" was supposed to provide the initial capital of the co-op, but because of lack of loanable funds, it was not able to do so.

The members of the cooperative were also given the opportunity to participate in the management of their association. Members of an administrative council, numbering three to ten, were elected by all members of the co-op for a term of two years at a general meeting. The Council, in turn, elected the officers of the cooperative also for a two-year term. The Council was supposed to meet once a month, but because the volume of business was still very small (at the time this study was made), regular meetings were not yet held. Other related cooperative business practices followed were: prohibition of trading or cash basis sales to non-members; the allocation of 10% of net savings as reserves. The cooperative was planning to distribute "profits" to the members on the basis of their purchases, and to allocate a certain portion of the net savings to the "Syndicat des Fonctionnaires" to be used for members' education.

Off to a good start, this cooperative was faced with the problem of whether it was to continue to operate as such. There was a conflict between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of National Development and Plans. The former was satisfied with the co-op and desired it to continue. The latter—apparently a more powerful agency—wished to revive the "economat" type of organization on the grounds that the co-op was believed to be not functioning well, that there were delays in importations because the co-op was using old procedures, and that not all civil servants were being served by the organization since those who were not members of the "Syndicat des Fonctionnaires" were not eligible for membership and the co-op, therefore, would not sell to these non-members. Moreover, the Ministry of National Economy and Plans was thinking of paying part of the salaries of government employees in kind so that it could import the commodities directly. The Cabinet decided that all importations were to be under the control of the Ministry of National Economy and Plans.

Another cooperative worth mentioning here was the one established about one and a half years before this study was made at the Poultry, Mushroom and Pig Production Center (about 10 kilometers form Vientiane), by the Lao War Veterans Association, with the assistance of the Asia Founda-

tion and the World Veterans Federation. The cooperative was born out of a need for an organization that was to help the members market their produce in an orderly and efficient manner so that they could get better prices for their products. It had a set of officers elected annually by the members at their general assembly. Membership was based on shares of stock rather than on the membership fee system. Each share of stock was worth 200 kips and there was no limit as to the number of shares a member could buy. A certain portion of the "profits" was distributed to the members in the form of patronage rebates, and 10% of the net savings was allocated as reserves.

Initially, the veterans who had been settled on individual plots of land suitable for gardening and the raising of small livestock at the Production Center, were given pigs and chickens which they could raise and sell. From the proceeds of the sale of their produce, they were expected to repay by installment what they received from the center until the amount was fully paid for. Because of the difficulty of selling their produce on an individual basis, the veterans decided to organize a marketing cooperative.

At the start, the cooperative could not raise capital from its members. Gradually, however, it was able to build up capital out of the profits from the sale of the produce. The value of one share of stock had already been deducted from the patronage refunds of each member. In addition, it was able to set aside a certain portion of the net proceeds from marketing for buying basic consumer commodities to be sold at the store. This cooperative appeared to be on the road to success, thanks to the guidance provided by Mr. Benicio Revilla, a Filipino Agricultural Advisor of the Asian Foundation.

Thus, we have examples of the beginnings of cooperative effort in Laos. Officials of the Royal Lao Government and military officers were enthusiastic about the expansion of the cooperative movement in the country and sought the advice of USAID in this regard. Neither the Mission nor the RLG had a cooperatives expert on its staff. The USAID believed that the advisability and feasibility of cooperatives and agricultural credit in Laos should first be determined before undertaking a program of expanded technical and financial assistance for these activities in the future. Hence, an invitation was issued by the Mission for a consultant on cooperatives and credit to come to Laos and conduct the feasibility study and make recommendations as to the future activities it could undertake along these lines.

As to the agricultural credit situation in Laos, I would like to quote here excerpts from observations made by Mr. Clark Joel of the Office of Economic Affairs, USAID/Laos, as contained in his excellent paper (Office Memorandum to W.W. Thomas, dated September 16, 1964), to which I am in general agreement:

> Laos has no agricultural credit system of any consequence to finance either the production or the marketing of agricultural products.
>
> Interviews with six village chiefs in the vicinity of Vientiane, as well as reports from IVS and USAID agriculture staff, indicate that production and marketing is non-existent for practical purposes. Chinese merchants and money leaders are not established as providers of agricultural credit in Laos, as they are in other parts of Southeast Asia. Laos agriculture is largely of the traditional subsistence type and is characterized by limited use of money and of capital goods, small or non-existent surpluses over current consumption, a fairly even distribution of wealth (or more precisely, of poverty, and a certain reluctance to deal with outsiders . . .)
>
> The government has not been able to provide agricultural credit in any significant extent. The Credit National — an RLG financial institution set up by the government to provide productive credit to industry and agriculture — has a statutory authority to make loans for agricultural pursuits, but the limitation of personnel and facilities have prevented it from becoming a significant factor in the development of the country's agriculture. Most of its loans and investments are to large scale enterprises, particularly in the industrial and public utility fields.
>
> . . . The problem of a lack of rural credit is only one of several key factors that interfere with increased agricultural production. The implication is that the provision of rural credit will do little to increase the level of agricultural production unless this measure is coordinated with a set of other measures designated to remove the other bottlenecks that prevent or discourage the growth of agricultural output.

Favorable Factors

From the mass of information that I collected, and from my own observations of the situation in the country, the following factors or conditions seem to favor the development of successful cooperative and credit programs in Laos. I should like to point out, however, that the list is by no means exhaustive nor are the favorable factors listed in the order of their importance.

1. *USAID Policy of Giving Priority to Development of Cooperatives.* As stated earlier in this report, greater emphasis was being given to the encouragement of the cooperative approach in developing countries under the new foreign aid program of the United States. In line with this policy, USAID/Laos can be expected to provide greater support and assistance to the development of cooperatives in Laos, both as a counter-insurgency measure and a development tool, within the limits of technical and economic feasibility of these democratic organizations and overall program balance.

2. *Faith of the Royal Law Government (RLG) Officials and Lao people in the Potentialities of Cooperatives.* Officials of the Royal Lao Government, including the military, accept the fact that cooperatives can play a major role in various aspects of development of their country. They

recognize the great potentials of cooperation in supplying the people with the things needed for daily living, for agricultural production and marketing, for settling refugees and veterans, for promoting savings, and for carrying on a host of other economic activities, and they have sought, or are seeking, the assistance of USAID and other organizations to enhance the establishment and growth of cooperative institutions in Laos. In fact, even the people themselves have gone ahead on their own with the organization of some cooperatives. This is an important consideration because there is need for a congenial atmosphere for cooperatives to develop and they must be adapted to the culture, customs and value systems of the people who are to make use of them. After all, it is to be their program, not of the United States or any other country for that matter.

3. *Growing Awareness of the People to Develop.* Until recently, and for a long time, the Lao people thought there was no longer need for development. Now, they are becoming more aware of their need for advancement. There are evidences of a growing awareness of the value of education, of the importance of better care and management of crops and livestock, of the effects of opening or improvement of roads, and of increasing production in order to increase earning. They recognize that they have limited experience, therefore, they seek advice and guidance. The younger people are becoming more active in the affairs of the community and there is a willingness, on their part, to take risks in order to develop their community and their country.

4. *Cooperative Spirit among the Rural People.* Cooperation in one form or another has been practiced in the rural areas of Laos, for many years before the organized enterprise came to be known. *Ad hoc* group activities had been observed in performing certain farm operations, undertaking communal works, building houses, building wats, digging wells, and carrying out certain social activities. Farmers helped their neighbors in plowing their fields, harvesting their crops, and doing other things cooperatively. Our job is to transform this social (or *ad hoc*) cooperation into economic cooperation, using the latent cooperative spirit among the rural people as a springboard for action. It must be remembered, however, that the general propensity to work together does not necessarily imply that the rural people will also work together successfully in a cooperative business enterprise.

5. *Existence and Development of Other Programs Related or Complementary to Cooperatives and Credit.* The successful implementation of cooperatives and credit programs depends to a large extent on how well they are integrated with the overall development plans providing economic development and security. It is encouraging to note that great strides have been made by both the Lao Government and the USAID/Laos in the de-

velopment of programs that would enhance cooperatives and agricultural credit programs in Laos. Thus, we have programs designed to promote increased agricultural production, rural community development, construction and improvement of roads and bridges, education, health and sanitation, construction of school buildings and market facilities, and other projects which, in one way or another, contribute to the growth of cooperatives and credit in the country. While these projects may aid in the healthy development of cooperative and credit institutions, these organizations can also be used to support activities in both economic and social welfare programs of USAID and the Government.

6. *Increase in Production of Cash Crops.* Where a high production goes to subsistence, the incentive to establish cooperatives as a form of business is reduced. In many part of Laos, there has been a trend to produce more cash crops such as coffee, vegetable, pineapple, sugar cane, peanuts, tobacco, *et cetera.* In a few years, it can reasonably be expected that production for the market could increase and the prospects of establishing marketing and credit cooperatives would be better.

Unfavorable Factors or Conditions

Consideration of the prerequisites that should be filled for the successful implementation of strong and efficient cooperative and credit programs will be placed in proper perspective if the unfavorable conditions or obstacles are carefully examined. In Laos, many of these unfavorable factors stem from the economic backwardness of the country itself. To overcome these impediments will, therefore, require tackling the problem on a broad front. As in the case of the favorable factors enumerated in the preceding section, the obstacles or unfavorable factors to the orderly development of cooperatives and credit are listed here also not necessarily in the order of their importance or seriousness.

1. *Illiteracy, Ignorance and Lack of Experience.* The most serious impediment in the establishment of cooperatives and credit program in Laos, I believe, is the low level of literacy of the bulk of the population. The average level of educational attainment is three years of formal schooling. It is estimated that only 40% of children 6-7 years, 7% of those between 9 and 11 years, and about 1% of those who are 12 years or over are in school. There are about 3,500 to 4,000 public elementary school teachers in the entire country, 80 per cent of whom are said to be inadequately trained. Even in their own native language, a large majority of the people can hardly read and write, much less carry on the fundamentals of addition and subtraction.

Under these conditions, it would be extremely difficult to find trained personnel to manage and operate the cooperative and credit institutions,

or to have a sufficient number of literate members who can keep a check on the literate officers of cooperative societies who might exploit them. Illiteracy renders communication and the spread of knowledge difficult and costly. If the people are illiterate and ignorant, they fall an easy prey to the unscrupulous. Without trained leadership and management personnel, and with a general lack of experience among the population, it is difficut to see how cooperatives and credit organizations can flourish. Under these circumstances, cooperative development in Laos will certainly require a long period of acculturation and education, intensive training in cooperative and business principles, membership responsibilities and productive use of credit. It would not be wise to develop cooperatives and credit immediately on a large scale in Laos, under these conditions.

2. *Subsistence Economy and Lack of Motivation to Increase Production.* Agricultural production in Laos is intended more for meeting family consumption needs than for sale in the market. Only a very small proportion of total production or none at all, can be considered as marketable over and above current consumption requirements of the average farm family. In the case of rice, for example, probably less than five per cent goes to commercial channels.

The description of the existing farm conditions in Laos given in an FAO report,[1] gives a clear picture of the typical Lao subsistence farm;

> A home as well as a means of earning a livelihood; a source of subsistence as well as cash income; a focus for nearly all the interest and activities of the family and not merely economic interests or activities; the means by which the security and perpetuation of the family may be assured, as well as its current needs satisfied ... Without romanticizing the situations the complex of conditions referred to affords justification for the common description of peasant farming as a way of life and not merely as a business.

Having a considerable proportion of production going for subsistence, the Lao farmer's cash income is small and precarious and his capacity to save is very limited. This means that he, himself, can seldom provide capital to finance farm improvements, or even operational expenses, and he must thus rely on borrowed funds. Often, his borrowing would tie up his crops to the fellow who gave him the cash advance, at a price which the latter dictates. And so, if he had any surplus produce to sell, he usually gets a low price for it.

Many Lao farmers lack the motivation to increase their production. They see no advantage in producing more because of unstable conditions in the country. They are afraid that their produce would only be confiscated by the

[1] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. *Report of the Center on Agricultural Financing and Credit for Asia and the Far East, Labore, Pakistan, 1-13 October, 1956.* Rome, Italy.

Pathet Lao or commandeered by the army at low prices. In many provinces, it was reported that the Chaokhoueng (equivalent to governor of the province) and the military monopolized rice purchases at prices set by them. Poor security has also prevented the free movement of commodities from one area to another, thereby interfering with the development of a market-oriented economy. Another factor which accounts for the lack of motivation to increase agricultural production has been the prohibition to export rice from a surplus to a deficit province, in line with a policy of the military to make each province self-sufficient in this staple. To these factors may be added the lack of market because of the generally low income levels of the mass of the population, lack of good transport and communication facilities, and lack of processing facilities. If the farmers cannot sell their produce, it is useless, they say, to increase production.

If cooperatives and credit organizations are to be developed on a sound basis, the agricultural economy of Laos has to be market-oriented rather than kitchen-oriented. Economic development requires that an increasing proportion of total production be sold in the market so that the farmers will have more cash incomes and greater savings to be used as capital for improving farm production. This would neecessitate prior increases in production. Cooperatives as well as credit can be useful in bringing this about.

3. *Absence of Sound Legislation and a Government Agency.* In Laos, there is no suitable law governing the operation of cooperatives. A law was passed sometime ago but applied only to a particular "cooperative" organized in Vientiane. In the absence of a local law, the French general law covering the former French Indo-China has been followed in Laos.

It is necessary to establish first a legal framework for cooperation before attempting to organize cooperatives on a nationwide scale. If appreciable cooperative development takes place before the enactment of a suitable law to control it, there will be a lot of abuses which would be difficult to eradicate later on. The high proportion of illiterate members may be exploited by unscrupulous officers and other members and by government officials or employees.

A cooperative law should be designed to suit the requirements of cooperatives and the general legal and administrative structure, customs and level of economic development of the country. It must be of a broad, enabling nature, as simple as possible, and with a minimum of specific details. It generally lays down the conditions under which cooperatives operate and with which they must conform, as well as some minimum provisions concerning governmental authority, responsibility, or control.

There is no agency in the structure of the Royal Lao Government which is responsible for cooperative development, registration, and supervision.

Under the present stage of development of the country, it is inevitable that the government should play an active role in the cooperative movement in terms of providing encouragement, guidance, and financial as well as technical assistance to cooperatives of all types. It should be emphasized right from the very beginning that the assistance of the government should be regarded as transitional until such time as the cooperatives have gained sufficient experience, competence, and financial strength to stand on their own. The success of a government cooperative agency will be gauged by the extent to which it works itself out of certain responsibilities by transferring them to the cooperatives themselves — the objective being to increase the real self-reliance and independence of the societies. It is not desirable that the cooperatives forever continue to depend on the government. Therefore, it must be made clear, at the outset that the cooperative societies will gradually assume most of the responsibilities borne by the government, particularly the participation in capital and management, as soon as they are in a position to do so.

4. *Lack of Banking Facilities.* There are only five commercial banks in Laos, with few branch offices outside Vientiane. Successful cooperative and credit programs demand that there be an adequate banking system where people can deposit their savings, where they can borrow money on reasonable terms, where cooperatives can deposit their surplus funds and obtain accommodation from it for their banking requirements, and where they can secure additional capital for their facilities and operations. As the economy moves to the direction of being market-oriented, the need for more banking facilities will grow.

5. *Tendency to Use Cooperative Program for Political Purposes.* Because of the great prospect of cooperatives as a counter-insurgency weapon, there is the temptation for RLG and USAID officials to use the program as a political tool to attain a short-run objective. If this happens, the programs would probably be expanded faster than available trained manpower and other resources would permit. People who have no knowledge or adequate understanding of cooperative principles will be asked to implement the program, and the already overloaded USAID staff will get an additional burden to handle the program. Cooperatives with no solid foundation will be organized and government funds and foreign assistance will largely be channelled to these projects, in order to accomplish the objective of countering the inroads of communism. Such a political decision will spell the doom of cooperatives.

I should like to reiterate that if we go slow on this, that is, build first the solid foundation and a good organization base of cooperative business, through a vigorous education and training program, then we can kill two

birds with one stone: strong cooperatives to counter communism and to develop the economy of Laos.

6. *Conservative Value System.* In Lao culture, there are certain traditions and value systems which tend to resist the introduction of new ideas or techniques. Religion is believed to be one of these, in the sense that it is tradition-bound and thus resists change. A basic Buddhist teaching is said to keep the people satisfied with what they presently have and uninterested in improving their material circumstances. In other words, if my interpretation is right, the Buddhists followers are taught not to aspire for something better than what they have now. If this is true, it will be a serious deterrent to development efforts, including cooperatives and credit.

Conclusion

There are two principal areas in which cooperatives and credit program may be used to maximum advantage in Laos:

1. On a short-run basis, it can be an effective counter-insurgency measure in the current conflict with non-democratic forms of institutions.
2. On a long-run basis, it can greatly help in the total development of the Lao economy.

Provided a strong, solid foundation is laid for the program, there is no reason why the two objectives cannot be achieved, since there is no point of incompatibility between them. But certainly, it will be a slow process though responsible officials will probably desire to move ahead to accomplish the short-range objective immediately.

The economic backwardness of Laos demands that an integrated approach be followed in attempting to overcome the obstacles which result from the existing socio-economic conditions. This means that cooperatives and credit should not be considered in complete isolation of other programs designed to increase production and real incomes and promote rural betterment in general. Efficient cooperatives and credit system are useful instruments of economic and social advancement, but their contribution will be greatly limited if they are not supported by other measures within the rural sector as well as by the development of other sectors of the economy.

The present low level of economic development of Laos also implies the impracticability of employing orthodox or sophisticated Western forms of developmental measures and organization. In the environment of the Lao economy, a pragmatic approach should be adopted. Obviously, it will be futile to require application of ideas and principles accepted in more developed economies that may not work at all in the local scene. This may mean that, in the early stages at least, some modifications of established principles found workable in other countries may have to be made and that

some compromise with traditional methods and concepts may be desirable, or even necessary. In the case of Laos, it is essential that cooperatives and credit development should proceed on a pilot basis before any attempt is made to blow up the program to a nationwide scale. This would allow the evolution of ideas and methods that would suit the peculiar characteristics of the Lao economy.

The successful development and implementation of sound cooperatives and credit program will depend, to a large extent, on our ability to fill certain minimum prerequisites. As yet, many of these prerequisites are lacking or non-existent in Laos. The main concern of change agents is to overcome the obstacles and unfavorable conditions which impede the growth and development of cooperatives and credit on a sound and lasting foundation. This task will require the collaboration of the Royal Lao Government, the USAID and other organizations. Because of the social and economic conditions in highly underdeveloped Laos, the government must necessarily play a more active role by providing adequately trained leadership and personnel and the necessary technical and financial help — the objective being to assist cooperative and credit institutions to assume progressively the responsibility for finance, management, promotion, audit, education, research, and training.

Cooperatives and credit can make their greatest contribution to the economic growth and development of Laos, if they are oriented to the complex and interrelated character of agricultural and rural advancement, as well as to the level of aspirations and motivations of the village people. It is the peasantry which needs the services of cooperatives and agricultural credit institutions most; it is they who stand to reap the greatest benefits from the program. Ideally, the cooperative form of organization is best suited to the social and economic conditions in rural Laos. It provides the villagers an excellent opportunity to meet their problems through self-help and mutual help, and there is no better environment for working together to solve a common problem than the rural villages.

Cooperation is not a wonderful panacea as many are inclined to think. Like other forms of organization, it has its limitations. Its usefulness cannot be assured under all types of conditions. Nevertheless, it offers tremendous possibilities for the development of Laos. If the obstacles to building a strong foundation for a cooperative structure are overcome, there is hope to accelerate the task of nation-building in Laos. But the time is not yet ripe to expand cooperatives and credit in Laos to a scale beyond that which present resources and administrative framework would permit.

Recommendations

To meet the requirements and overcome the obstacles for the successful and orderly development of a sound cooperative and agricultural credit

program in Laos, it is recommended that serious consideration be given to the following:

1. *Development of a well planned and permanent training program for cooperative leaders, prospective trainers as well as selected government officers, and initiation of a vigorous education and information program on cooperatives and credit.* Training courses may be conducted either in the country itself or in another country with practically similar problems and conditions as those of Laos. The Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Institute at Los Baños, Laguna, Philippines is prepared to devise a special training course for Lao nationals who have enough knowledge of spoken and written English to be able to benefit from the course, since English is the medium of instruction used at the Institute. With respect to cooperative education and information, a modest beginning can be made by preparing informational materials, study guides, brochures, pamphlets and the like, as well as audio-visual materials to improve the understanding by the rural people of cooperatives and credit.

2. *Development of Sound Cooperatives Legislation.* Representations should be made to the proper Lao authorities to assure the enactment of a suitable national cooperative law as soon as possible. USAID can provide assistance in framing this legislation and in developing model by-laws for various types of cooperatives. The sample cooperatives act and the standard by-laws prepared by Dr. Remi Joseph Chiasson of St. Francis Xavier University, Nova Scotia, Canada, appended to his report to the Director, Asia Foundation/Laos, dated March-May, 1963, may be used as a guide for this purpose.

3. *Establishment of a Suitable Administrative Structure for the Promotion, Dvelopment and Supervision of Cooperatives.* There is need for a government agency that will be responsible for existing national policy and for pursuing an active program of encouraging the organization of cooperatives of all types as well as assisting them when they are established. In anticipation of the growth of the cooperative movement in Laos in the future, it is well to think seriously about setting up an agency for this purpose. I am almost tempted to recommend the organization of a separate ministry, or at least a department, of cooperatives development in order to ensure that this function will not be regarded merely as a subsidiary function, if placed under an existing department or direction. However, considering the fact that in the immediate future the volume of work will be too small for a separate department, it will be wise to entrust cooperatives to an existing agency. Because the economy of Laos is basically agricultural, most of the work on cooperatives will have to be related to agricultural development. I therefore, suggest that temporarily, at least, there should be a cooperatives development section created under the Director of Agriculture. Going one

step farther, I am inclined to recommend the establishment of a Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry to comprise agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry (presently Veterinary Services), agricultural extension, and later, cooperatives development—considering the importance of agriculture to the economy of Laos. USAID is expected to help in the establishment of an appropriate government agency for cooperative development. If this agency is established, irrespective of what the organization will be and where it is to be located, the staff should be given special training in cooperative principles and practices so that they can perform their functions more efficiently.

4. *Establishment of Pilot Projects in Selected Areas.* Both from the technical and economic standpoints, Laos is not yet ready to go into the organization of cooperatives on a large scale. It will take some time, perhaps a minimum of three to five years, before it can have the trained people to implement a sound cooperative program. This will include, among them, the education of the peasantry and the development of a market economy.

In the meantime, sufficient enthusiasm and interest have already been generated and cooperatives and pseudo-cooperatives are beginning to get organized. Before proceeding into a massive cooperatives program, it is desirable and imperative to gain basic information on the applicability of a particular type of cooperative to a given local situation. The establishment of pilot projects wil be an effective means to provide such information.

On the surface, it would appear that the cluster areas developed by the Rural Development Division of USAID would be the logical place to start cooperative pilot projects. A cluster area consists of several neighboring villages. The efforts of the people themselves, are united with those of government authorities and USAID to improve the economic, social, and cultural conditions of the commodities through a variety of programs designed to achieve improvement in agriculture, education, health and sanitation, as well as community development or public works facilities. Living together in a cluster area, the people have many interests in common and have a stronger tendency to work together — a form of cooperation in a broad sense. Thus, it is argued that cooperatives for economic purposes would flourish better in a cluster area than elsewhere in the rural community.

I have no quarrel with this argument in favor of the cluster area. But from my limited information about it, I am inclined to believe that cooperative business would not thrive very well in a cluster area. This is due to the fact that a cluster area is ordinarily situated in isolated places in the province, close to the border areas occupied by Pathet Lao, far from market centers, and with little or no transportation and communication facilities. The villagers have barely sufficient products even for their own con-

sumption. Under these conditions cooperatives as a business enterprise cannot last very long.

Until the cluster areas will have been developed to such an extent that the people are able to produce more, and, until such time as market and transportation facilities will have become sufficiently available, it might be better to locate the pilot projects outside the cluster areas, such as in places lying close to the main market centers and where the people have products to sell and are oriented to a market economy. However, since I myself, did not have the opportunity to visit a cluster area I am not in a position to rule out totally the possibility of putting up a cooperative pilot project in one of the cluster areas. After all, a pilot project is a means of determining whether a particular type of cooperative is feasible under a given set of conditions.

The initiation of the following pilot projects is suggested:

1. An integrated marketing and credit cooperative system in the vicinity of Vientiane. This will include the formation and coordination of activities of two separate cooperatives in the areas: one society to sell the produce of members; the other, to provide credit in kind (seeds, farm tools and implements, feeds, agricultural chemicals, fertilizers, etc.). The peasant must be a member of both. He should be required to enter into a marketing agreement to sell all his marketable produce through the marketing co-op. The proceeds of crops and/or livestock sold should be directed towards repaying the cost of items supplied by the credit society, only the balance going to the farmer in cash.

2. A credit union among civil servants in a large government agency in Vientiane. In a credit union, the members regularly put their savings either in a fixed deposit account or in a savings deposit account. Out of these pooled savings, they borrow money for personal or providential purposes. It is desirable to have the cashier authorized to make deductions on the salaries of employees who are members of the credit union for their regular deposits or for their payment of loans on installment.

3. An industrial cooperative among needlecraft workers and others engaged in home industries in the Muong Phieng area in Sayaboury. This cooperative will handle the purchasing of supplies, raw materials and equipment needed by members, and the marketing of the members' products.

THE COLONIAL ORIGINS OF MANILA AND BATAVIA: DESULTORY NOTES ON NASCENT METROPOLITAN PRIMACY AND URBAN SYSTEMS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

ROBERT R. REED

The primate cities in Asia are the most important centers of cultural change, especially in those fields which vitally affect economic development. Advanced education, new forms of business organization, new administrative practices, and, last but not least, new technologies find a fertile soil in these primate capital cities. Their intermediate position between East and West, their contact with world markets of commodities and ideas, their lack of many traditional bonds make them into eminently suitable vehicles for the introduction of new ideas and new techniques. [1]

IN 1939 THE GEOGRAPHER MARK JEFFERSON [2] PUBLISHED his cogent and seminal paper on the *primate city,* thereby introducing a concept that has been readily incorporated into the literature of the social sciences. [3] His discussion focused upon the pattern of pronounced metropolitan centralization which prevails in many nations throughout the world. To help systematize studies of the relationship between the premier city and other secondary centers, Jefferson argued that urban hierarchies are often

[1] Bert F. Hoselitz, *Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth* (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 224.

[2] Mark Jefferson, "The Law of the Primate City," *Geographical Review,* Vol. 29, No. 2 (April, 1939), pp. 226-232.

[3] Scholars from a number of disciplines have proved the utility of the topic of metropolitan primacy by relating it to urban investigations in their separate areas of interest. While several researchers have endeavored to examine the subject in a rather rigorous fashion, most remain content to treat the primate city as a subordinate theme. For affirmation of the interdisciplinary interest in urban primacy, see the following examples which have been drawn respectively from the fields of public administration, geography, sociology, urban and regional planning, history and economics: Aprodicio A. Laquian, *The City in Nation-Building* (Manila: School of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1966), pp. 2-5; Robert E. Dickinson, *City and Region: A Geographical Interpretation* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1966), p. 14; Raymond W. Mack and Dennis C. McElrath, "Urban Social Differentiation and the Allocation of Resources," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* Vol. 352 (March, 1964), p. 27; John Friedmann, *Regional Development Policy: A Case Study of Venezuela* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), pp. 35-37; Richard M. Morse, "Recent Research on Latin American Urbanization: A Selective Survey with Commentary," *Latin American Research Review,* Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall, 1965), pp. 47-48; Hoselitz, *op cit.,* pp. 185-215.

dominated by a single metropolis which "is always disproportionately large and exceptionally expressive of national capacity and feeling."[4] He suggested that the typical primate city is a capital, the nucleus of nationalistic ferment, a hub of cultural activity, the migrational locus of the state and the multifunctional center of the country's economy. In addition to these qualifications for primacy the paramount urban settlement generally has at least twice as many inhabitants as the second city. By testing this final criterion on the highest ranking metropolitan areas in fifty-one of the world's leading nations, he further substantiated the hypothesis. In twenty-eight countries the chief city was more than twice as large as the next, whereas in eighteen of these nations the primate city boasted a population more than three times as large as its nearest rival.[5]

Investigations of Primacy

Geographers concerned with Jefferson's theme have followed two avenues of inquiry which are applicable to investigations of metropolitan primacy in Southeast Asia. Those interested in the size continuum of population clusters and trained in the use of quantitative methods of analysis have examined the special problem of irregular city-size distribution that typifies nations dominated by a single city. All regions of high primacy feature a conspicuous population gap between the metropolis and the network of smaller centers, which stands in marked contrast to the orderly hierarchal arrangement formalized by George K. Zipf in the *rank-size rule*.[6] To facilitate the study of primate and rank-size distributions, researchers have adopted a rather simple and effective method of visual comparison. As the first step in a tripartite procedure, all cities in a given region are ar-

[4] Jefferson, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

[5] Although Mark Jefferson included the Commonwealth of the Philippines among the fifty-one "leading countries of the world," all major European dependencies of the mid-1930's were excluded. If he had listed the numerous colonies of South Asia, Africa and Southeast Asia, the argument would have been further strengthened, as most of the underdeveloped regions display a high degree of primacy. For pervasive commentaries on the dominant role of primate cities in Latin America and Asia, see Philip M. Hauser (ed.), *Urbanization in Latin America* (Paris: Unesco, 1961); Philip M. Hauser (ed.), *Urbanization in Asia and the Far East* (Calcutta: Unesco Research Centre on the Social Implications of Industrialization in Southern Asia, 1957).

[6] According to Zipf's theory, in every territory there is a tendency for a city of any given hierarchal rank to exhibit a population which is in inverse proportion to its rank. Therefore, if all the urban centers in a given state were arranged in descending order by population we should expect the second city to have exactly half as many people as the largest, while the nth settlement should display $1/n$th the citizenry of the premier city. George K. Zipf, *National Unity and Disunity* (Bloomington: Principia Press, 1941); George K. Zipf, *Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort* (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley Press, Inc., 1949). For a review of the literature, both empirical and theoretical, on rank-size relationships, see Peter Haggett, *Locational Analysis in Human Geography* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966), pp. 100-107; Harold M. Mayer and Clyde F. Kohn (eds.), *Readings in Urban Geography* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 230-260.

ranged into size classes according to population.[7] The resultant frequency distribution is then transformed arithmetically into cumulative percentages. Characteristic graph patterns are revealed when this information is plotted on lognormal probability paper. Lognormal (rank-size) distributions produce a fairly straight line, while conditions of primacy yield a line that approximates the form of a reclining capital "L".[8] In recent investigations several intermediate patterns have been identified by Norton S. Ginsburg, Brian J. L. Berry and A. James Rose, thus suggesting that the primate and rank-size dichotomy may actually represent the extremes of a continuum.[9] To better understand the origin of these dissimilar distributions and hierarchal arrangements, geographers are now attempting to determine the conditions under which primacy evolves[10] and to illuminate "the complex interrelationships between urbanization, type of city-size distribution, and economic development."[11] In light of the recent genesis of this area of research, most conclusions are tentative or generalized in nature and work is concentrated upon the examination of world-wide patterns. Nevertheless, two researchers have pioneered in the study of city systems in Southeast Asia. Hamzah Sendut has recently published two articles on the subject. One focused upon urban primacy in the states of Malaysia, while the other is a regionally oriented work on city-size distributions. Both include substantive commentary on the historical development of the urban structure.[12] An empirical study by Edward L. Ullman represents an attempt to identify a hierarchy in the Philippines based on functions and population.[13]

A second avenue of inquiry highlighted by Jefferson's paper concerns the origin, development, function and cultural role of primate cities in

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[7] The number of size classes, the population range of each, and the threshold of the smallest cities is arbitrary. In his pioneering work Berry used six classes with the following ranges: 20,000-50,000; 50,000-100,000; 100,000-250,000; 250,000-500,000; 500,000-1,000,000; and over 1,000,000. Brian J.L Berry, "City Size Distributions and Economic Development," *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* Vol. 9, No. 4, Part 1 (July, 1961), p. 575.

[8] See Figure 1.

[9] Norton S. Ginsburg, *Atlas of Economic Development* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. 34-37 and Section 8; Berry, *op. cit.,* pp. 573-588; A. James Rose, "Dissent from Down Under: Metropolitan Primacy as the Normal State," *Pacific Viewpoint,* Vol. 7, No. 1 (May, 1966), pp. 1-27.

[10] Arnold S. Linsky, "Some Generalizations Concerning Primate Cities," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers,* Vol. 55, No. 3 (September, 1965), pp. 506-513.

[11] Brian J. L. Berry, "Research Frontiers in Urban Geography," in Philip M. Hauser and Leo F. Schnore (eds.), *The Study of Urbanization* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 413-414.

[12] Hamzah Sendut, "Statistical Distribution of Cities in Malaya," *Kajian Ekonomi Malaysia,* Vol. 2, No. 2 (December, 1965), pp. 49-66; Hamzah Sendut, "City Size Distribution of Southeast Asia." *Asian Studies,* Vol. 4, No. 2 (August, 1966), pp. 268-280.

[13] Edward L. Ullman, "Trade Centers and Tributary Areas of the Philippines," *Geographical Review,* Vol. 50, No. 2 (April, 1960), pp. 203-218.



FIGURE 1. MODEL CITY-SIZE DISTRIBUTIONS

terms of unique national, regional and historical factors.[14] But as in the case of hierarchal studies, the geographical literature on this aspect of metropolitan primacy in Southeast Asia remains scanty. Indeed, the two most comprehensive statements on the major urban centers of the region were published by D. W. Fryer and Norton S. Ginsburg in the mid-1950's.[15] While the statistical data included therein has become somewhat dated, the articles are valuable as easily accessible sources of general information on the great cities of Southeast Asia. In addition to these two works a number of geographers and other social scientists have dealt indirectly with primacy while considering various problems subsumed under the heading of urbanization.[16] Although this dispersed commentary seems to reflect a genuine interest in primate cities, apparently few scholars have committed themselves to research specialization on the theme.

Despite the relative paucity of sustained essays on metropolitan primacy in Southeast Asia, one can scarcely ignore or deny the urban ascendancy of the primate cities — Rangoon, Manila, Djakarta, Saigon-Cholon, Bangkok and Singapore — in their respective nations.[17] Predictably, many writers

[14] Harley L. Browning's work on the development of urban primacy in Latin America is a representative study of this type. Harley L. Browning, "Recent Trends in Latin American Urbanization," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* Vol. 316 (March, 1958), pp. 111-120.

[15] D. W. Fryer, "The 'Million City' in Southeast Asia," *Geographical Review,* Vol. 43, No. 4 (October, 1953), pp. 474-494; Norton S. Ginsburg, "The Great City in Southeast Asia," *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 60, No. 5 (March, 1955), pp. 455-462. For another generalized statement, see Rhoads Murphey, "New Capitals of Asia," *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* Vol. 5, No. 3 (April, 1957), pp. 216-243.

[16] I am not aware of a comprehensive bibliography on the Southeast Asian city. Only twenty-nine articles are listed for this region in Sommer's review of urban geographical literature. But it must be noted that these items are derived solely from geographical journals published in English or French, thus neglecting all articles that geographers have contributed to professional serials in other languages and to related social science periodicals. For an introduction to the dispersed literature on urbanization in Southeast Asia and general commentary on the subject, consult the text and bibliographical notes of the following: Hamzah Sendut, "Urbanization," in Wang Gungwu (ed.), *Malaysia* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 82-98; Hauser, *Urbanization in Asia and the Far East, op. cit.*; John W. Sommer, *Bibliography of Urban Geography, 1940-1964* (Hanover, New Hampshire: Department of Geography, Dartmouth College, 1966) pp. 72-73; T. G. McGee, "An Aspect of Urbanization in Southeast Asia: The Process of Cityward Migration," *Proceedings Fourth N.Z. Geography, Conference* (Dunedin: New Zealand Geographical Society, 1965), pp. 207-218; W. F. Wertheim, *East-West Parallels: Sociological Approaches to Modern Asia* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1964); Norton S. Ginsburg, "Urban Geography and 'Non-Western' Areas," in Philip M. Hauser and Leo F. Schnore (eds.), *The Study of Urbanization* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 311-346; Pauline D. Milone, *Urban Areas in Indonesia: Administrative and Census Concepts* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1966); J. M. van der Kroef, "The Indonesian City: Its Culture and Evolution," *Asia,* Vol. 2, No. 8 (March, 1953), pp. 563-579; J. C. van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1955); W. F. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1964), pp. 170-194.

[17] These six cities are indisputably the dominant metropolitan centers of Southeast Asia. With the sole exception of Rangoon, all have over 1,000,000 inhabitants. Although Phnom Penh, Kuala Lumpur, Hanoi and Vientiane are the capitals of sovereign nations,

have testified to the vital role of these urban agglomerations. In his survey of the region's dominant centers Ginsburg identified Bangkok "as a true Primate City, that is, a city with many times the population of the next largest city and a multiplicity of functions and attractions which give it dominance." [18] At a seminar on urbanization in the ECAFE Region, Philip M. Hauser noted that "many of the countries in Asia are characterized by one great metropolis, 'the primate city'; a great city which dominates the urban situation." [19] In the words of Hugh Tinker,

> Of Burma, Thailand, and the Philippines it can be said that the whole of industrial and technical development, of intellectual activity, of political power and administrative control is concentrated within twelve miles of the centre of Rangoon, Bangkok, and Manila. [20]

According to Bert F. Hoselitz, "in some underdeveloped countries this 'law of the primate city' is so strong that apart from a capital which may have a million inhabitants or more, there are no other 'large' cities." [21] The following portrayal of a typical primate city by a Filipino educator and resident of the archipelagic metropolis of Manila is even more convincing than the words of Western commentators:

> Metropolitan Manila is truly a primate city in that it dominates the whole country. In this small area, fully one-third of all manufacturing establishments in the Philippines are concentrated. Metropolitan Manila employs 40 per cent of the country's non-agricultural labor force and pays more than half of the total manufacturing payroll.
>
> Within Metropolitan Manila are 90 of the country's 100 biggest corporations, 56 of these within the city of Manila alone. All but one of the main Philippine and foreign banks have their main offices in the area. All of the major newspapers, most of the radio stations and all of the commercial television stations are located in it. The city of Manila is the country's main port, the hub of all transportation facilities. As such Metropolitan Manila is the country's economic, educational, political and cultural center.[22]

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several conditions seem to preclude their inclusion among the paramount primate cities of the region. While Kuala Lumpur is the largest city of Malaysia, it remains functionally overshadowed by Singapore. As a result of recent investigations, Hamzah Sendut discounts the existence of a primate city-size distribution in Malaysia and in the unit produced by combining the two Vietnams, Laos and Cambodia. Furthermore, each of these cities has less than 500,000 people. Thomas Frank Barton, "Rural and Urban Dwellers of Southeast Asia," *The Journal of Geography*, Vol. 64, No. 3 (March, 1965), p. 117. Hamzah, "City Size Distribution of Southeast Asia," *op. cit.*, pp. 270-275.

[18] Ginsburg, "The Great City in Southeast Asia," *op. cit.*, p. 455.

[19] Hauser, *Urbanization in Asia and the Far East, op. cit.*, p. 87.

[20] Hugh Tinker, *Reorientations: Studies on Asia in Transition* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), p. 48.

[21] In subsequent commentary Hoselitz defined a "large" city as a center of more than 100,000 inhabintants. Hoselitz, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

[22] Laquian, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

Considering the overwhelming urban supremacy of primate cities, it is somewhat curious that a systematic monograph has not been published on this interesting facet of regional urbanization.[23] If the expansion of the great cities in Southeast Asia continues unabated, it seems apparent that scholars must increasingly devote themselves to investigations of the growth and development of the dominant urban centers. In the subsequent discussion I propose to describe the traditional urban systems of Southeast Asia, to review the colonial origins of Manila and Batavia, and to examine briefly the multi-functional role of these nascent primate cities in their respective colonies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Traditional Urban Systems

Prior to the period of European colonial expansion in Southeast Asia, both the insular and peninsular portions of the realm were dominated by a succession of aristocratic kingdoms. The essential integrative element in each realm was a sacred city that functioned as a center of *orthogenetic* transformation.[24] These urban nuclei, most of which were located in Java or in the river basins of the mainland, served as the inland capitals of territorially based domains. As the foci of agrarian civilizations that derived their politico-religious organizational framework from India and China,[25] the sacred cities were considered to be the crucial magical links between the microcosmos (an earthly kingdom) and the macrocosmos (the

[23] This statement must soon be amended. Shortly after preparing this article I received a brochure from Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publishers, announcing the publication and imminent distribution of *The Southeast Asian City* by T. G. McGee. Though my order was placed eight weeks ago, in July, 1967, the book has not yet arrived. But based upon McGee's numerous articles on Southeast Asian urbanization, I expect a readable and comprehensive treatment of the subject. A more inaccessible work is that of David Edwin Kaye, "The Evolution, Function, and Morphology of the Southeast Asian City from 1500 to 1800" (Unpublished Master's thesis, Department of Geography, University of California, Berkeley, 1963).

[24] Robert Redfield and Milton B. Singer have suggested that the cultural role of cities provides a useful and legitimate basis for the classification and the comparative study of urban centers. In terms of their construct orthogenetic cities are those in which the traditional culture is crystallized and transferred to successive generations. These urban places are characteristic of the phase of primary urbanization. During this stage a "precivilized folk society is transformed by urbanization into a peasant society and correlated urban center." The primary function of a typical orthogenetic city "is to carry forward, develop [and] elaborate a long-established local culture or civilization." Robert Redfield and Milton B. Singer, "The Cultural Role of Cities," *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* Vol. 3, No. 1 (October, 1954), pp. 57, 60.

[25] While Chinese influences on urbanism were most pronounced on the Indochinese Peninsula, the impact of Indian culture remained pervasive throughout the rest of the region. For summary accounts of the historical impact of the Indian and Chinese cultural traditions in Southeast Asia, see D. G. E. Hall, *A History of South-East Asia* (London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1960); Brian Harrison, *South-East Asia, A Short History* (London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1960).

universe).[26] Each inland capital was planned and constructed as an imitation of the celestial archetype based on the Indian model, thereby furnishing physical evidence of its fundamental role.[27] The layout of the walls, temples, moats, avenues and other morphological features was designed to symbolize the cosmological universe and to emphasize the king's palace from which all power radiated. By structure and function the sacred city provided the circumambient peasantry with psychic security and served as the repository of the Great Tradition. Therefore, the typical capital was not merely the largest city, chief consumer of agricultural surpluses, cultural hub and political center of the kingdom; it was also the magical catalyst that guaranteed coalescence of the realm.[28]

In terms of general systems theory[29] these kingdoms might be conceptualized as nodal regions with rather hazy political boundaries and a single urban nucleus. The "surface" of each regional system consisted of *sawah* lands from which the sacred city or primary "node" derived its sustenance. Agricultural surpluses, which accumulated in outlying farms, villages and minor towns, or the lower ranks of the settlement "hierarchy", were delivered to the orthogenetic capital by means of a "network" of inland waterways and a few rudimentary roads. The typical nodal region consisting of a capital city and its hinterland remained essentially a "closed system",[30] as the model kingdom in Southeast Asia was materially self-sufficient, culturally introverted and politically autonomous.

Although the inland cities often maintained markets with international linkages, this did not seem to negate their basic orthogenetic character or

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[26] For a concise statement on parallelism between the macrocosmos and the microcosmos, as well as commentary on the cosmic role of the city, court and ruler in the traditional kingdoms of Southeast Asia, see Robert Heine-Geldern, "Conceptions of State and Kinship in Southeast Asia," *The Far Eastern Quarterly,* Vol. 2, No. 1 (November, 1942), pp. 15-30.

[27] For plans of the orthogenetic cities of Burma and illustrations of representative architectural types, see V. C. Scott O'Connor, *Mandalay and Other Cities of the Past in Burma* (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1908).

[28] By regarding the peasants as unrecompensed tributaries of agrarian surpluses and presuming that cities must be defined in terms of Western civilization, some scholars have argued that the sacred cities were merely cult centers and not true urban places. Michael D. Coe, "Social Typology and the Tropical Forest Civilizations," *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* Vol. 4, No. 1 (November, 1961), pp. 65-85.

[29] In a rather succinct definition Peter Haggett describes systems as "arbitrarily demarcated sections of the real world which have some common functional connections." Peter Haggett, *op. cit.,* p. 17. For more detailed statements on general systems theory, see A. D. Hall and R. E. Fagen, "Definition of System," *General Systems Yearbook,* Vol. I (1956), pp. 18-28; Richard J. Chorley, "Geomorphology and General Systems Theory," *United States Geological Survey Professional Paper 500-B* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1962), p. B2. In the subsequent commentary quotation marks will be used to denote the structural elements of a model system as outlined by Haggett, p. 18.

[30] Closed systems are those which experience no inflow or outflow of energy. The opposite condition holds true in open systems. Chorley, *op. cit.,* pp. B3-B8; Haggett, *op. cit.,* pp. 17-19.

the closed-system structure of their tributary kingdoms.[31] Because they remained dependent upon the benevolence of the aristocracy for commercial rights and the guarantee of personal safety, the foreign and domestic merchants seldom induced revolutionary cultural changes. Accordingly, most traders proved willing to accept the established customs of the market, to reside in segregated districts and to obey the local authorities. Clifford Geertz has clearly demonstrated that the dominant participants in these closed systems were the urban elite and the peasants:

> There is a cultural elite, whose ultimate basis of power is their control over the central symbolic resources of the society (religion, philosophy, art, science, and, most crucially in the more complex civilizations, writing); and there is a subordinated practical hard-working peasantry, whose ultimate basis of power is their control over the central material resource of the society, its food supply. The two become symbiotically dependent upon one another, their two varient traditions reflecting back and forth within one another as in two etched mirrors, each catching dimly the other's reflection. One cannot have a peasantry without a gentry or a gentry without a peasantry . . . . There is a persistent cultural dialogue between gentry and peasantry, a constant interchange of cultural material in which fading urban forms 'coarsen' and 'sink' into the peasant mass and elaborated rural forms 'etherealize' and 'rise' into the urban elite.[32]

While change did occur in the sacred cities, it evidently remained within the context of traditional norms and derived primarily from rearrangements of indigenous cultural materials.

There were two exceptions to this urban and territorial model. The first was epitomized by the trade emporium of Malacca, an entrepôt that linked the commercial networks of the Indian Ocean with those of the Java and China Seas.[33] In the pre-European period hundreds of coastal cities proliferated along the shores of the region and all had the same *raison d'être* — trade. Because they obtained sufficient wealth from an active maritime exchange, their rulers generally did not seek to establish extensive agrarian kingdoms. As noted by Paul Wheatley, these city-states flourished only "in proportion to the productivity of their immediate territories and the demand for their commodities."[34] Contrasting the inland and port

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[31] The presence of a market does not necessarily deny the orthogenetic role of a city. To emphasize this fact, Redfield and Singer noted that "In the medieval Muslim town we see an orthogenetic city; the market and the keeper of the market submitted economic activities to explicit cultural and religious definition of the norms." Redfield and Singer, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

[32] Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 227-228

[33] Paul Wheatley, *The Golden Khersonese: Studies in the Histroical Geography of the Malay Peninsula Before A.D. 1500* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1966), pp. 306-325.

[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 308-309.

cities, Nathan Keyfitz describes the latter as follows:

> Different in their relation to sources of food, and their internal form, were the coastal cities, where the porcelains of China were exchanged for the cloves and nutmegs of the Moluccas; the cloth of Gujerat and Bengal for the pepper of Sumatra; the rice of Java for the tin of Malaya. They were likewise under the absolute rule of a prince, but one whose domain was the water as much as the land. He maintained himself by taxes on the town market and the harbor, by the profits of his own ships which went out to trade, by piracy [and] by providing slaves or other easily available local commodities to the passing trade. [35]

As cosmopolitan emporiums with regional and international contacts, the port cities were centers of *heterogenetic* cultural transformation.[36] Each existed as a separate node in an open regional system through which flowed men, materials and ideas.[37] A final contrast between the sacred capitals and the coastal cities was evident in their morphologies. The former were carefully planned politico-religious centers dominated by substantial temple complexes and built of durable materials. Coastal cities, on the other hand, developed near river mouths or on the banks of harbors and displayed a rather chaotic appearance. While the aristocracy in large ports occasionally possessed houses of brick and stone, most dwellings were fabricated of perishable materials such as bamboo and *nipa*. Early in the sixteenth century Antonio Pigafetta, Magellan's aide and chronicler, presented the following description of the city-state of Brunei:

> That city is entirely built in salt water, except the houses of the kings and certain chiefs. It contains twenty-five thousand fires. The houses are all constructed of wood and built up from the ground on tall pillars. When the tide is high the women go in boats through the settlement selling the articles necessary to maintain life. There is a large brick wall in front of the king's house with towers like a fort, in which were mounted fifty-six bronze pieces, and six of iron. [38]

One characteristic, however, was shared by inland and coastal cities; both were relatively ephemeral urban places. As the loci of shipping lanes, the port cities prospered or declined in response to trade fluctuations, regional conflict and adjustments in the network of maritime routes.[39] Because the

[35] Nathan Keyfitz, "The Ecology of Indonesian Cities," *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 64, No. 4 (January, 1961), p. 349.

[36] Cities of heterogenetic transformation facilitate the disintegration or modification of the indigenous norms and generate new social and mental integrations. Redfield and Singer, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

[37] Keyfitz, *op cit.*, p. 349.

[38] Antonio Pigafetta, *Magellan's Voyage Around the World* (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1906), Vol. 2, p. 35.

[39] For a definitive statement on the rise and fall of city-states on the Malay Peninsula, see Wheatley, *op. cit.*

inland capitals focused upon the palace of a god-king and could be sited elsewhere if he so desired, the rise and fall of sacred cities was often extremely abrupt. These centers were frequently relocated after the death or deposal of a king. Predictably, as a result of constant warfare and incessant dynastic conflict, the sacred cities underwent numerous rearrangements of sites and situations.[40]

A second exception was to be found in the Philippines. When Miguel López de Legazpi and his small band of Spanish *conquistadores* secured the archipelago, the Malay inhabitants occupied thousands of small and widely scattered villages. These lowland communities, which generally consisted of thirty to one hundred houses, were located on the banks of rivers and streams. The model *barangay* (village) was sustained by the produce of *sawah and swidden*[41] agriculture supplemented by hunting and fishing. Each functioned as the nucleus of a small, closed system nestled within a matrix of rainforests, mountains and seas. Inter-barangay contacts remained minimal and were polarized by ritualistic politeness and hostility born of mutual suspicion.[42] While several short-lived *barangay* confederations were apparently established under the leadership of outstanding native chieftains, most communities managed to preserve their autonomy and on the eve of European colonization the Philippines remained politically fragmented. Although Manila and several other large settlements were superficially Islamized at the time of conquest, the faith had failed to provide mortar for the organization of a defensive force capable of ousting the invaders from the islands or for the generation of cities.

Systems Change, 1511-1800

Portugal initiated the European economic penetration and colonization of Southeast Asia by capturing Malacca in 1511. Almost before the city was fully secured the Lusitanian merchant-adventurers began to embark for coastal cities throughout the region. Late in the sixteenth century they were joined by traders from England, Spain, Holland and other North European countries. Some arrived as independent merchants, whereas others came as employees of the chartered companies. During the two centuries that ensued these invaders confined their efforts to the economic sphere and

[40] The last relocation of a sacred city occurred in middle of the nineteenth century when King Mindon moved his court from Amarapura to the new capital of Mandalay.

[41] For an excellent and readable discussion of the *swidden* and *sawah* ecosystems, see Clifford Geertz, *Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 12-37.

[42] For a more detailed description of the pre-Hispanic settlement pattern in the Philippines, see Robert R. Reed, "Hispanic Urbanism in the Philippines: A Study of the Impact of Church and State," *The University of Manila Journal of East Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 11 (March, 1967), pp. 18-32.


COLONIAL PENETRATION OF
SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1800
Macao
Manila
Batavia
Spanish
Dutch
British
Portuguese
Capitals
0 300 600
Miles

Map 1

did not endeavor to gain direct control of Asian territories, governments or people.[43]

Despite the steady growth of the insular holdings of the powerful *Vereenigde Oostindische Compangnie* during this period, there is no evidence of a concerted attempt on the part of the corporate body to expand its territorial domain. As long as the indigenous rulers guaranteed the safety of the Company's employees, accepted European naval superiority and did not interfere excessively with their commercial dealings, the administration in Batavia refrained from direct intervention in the affairs of the local governments.[44] This pattern of general acquiescence to native authorities did not necessarily indicate that individual Europeans were submissive by nature. On the contrary, most of these pirate-merchants appear to have been rough-and-ready fellows driven to the East in search of wealth and adventure.[45] But there simply was no need for territorial or political imperialism before 1800.

In the metropolitan societies of pre-industrial Europe only the rich could afford luxury items from the Orient. Thus the chartered companies and independent merchants were able to satisfy the limited market demands without a drastic alteration of the regional trade patterns or widespread dissolution of the Southeast Asian political systems. As suggested in the foregoing paragraph, the Europeans came on more or less equal terms to barter their silver for spices and other luxury goods of the Indies. The traditional structure for exchange, which required no more effort on the part of the Westerners than the establishment of fortified factories in existing port cities or of garrisoned trading posts on strategic harbors, was preserved.[46] By limiting their acquisitions to scattered trading stations that were managed by only five to fifteen merchants and protected by small military detachments, the Europeans avoided excessive administrative expenditures and maximized profits for their metropolitan sponsors. During

[43] The Hispanic colonial experience in the Philippines provided a marked contrast. From the beginning the Spaniards sought to establish themselves as the territorial masters of the archipelago. This was considered a basic requirement for the radical politico-religious program of Christianization and Hispanization that they envisaged and implemented with a marked degree of success. See John Leddy Phelan, *The Hispanization of the Philippines* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1959).

[44] Even when force was employed to preserve the order necessary for profitable commercial dealings and when victory crowned the Company's efforts, the Dutch remained quite unwilling to assume the more expensive and complex task of administration. Therefore, they adopted a system of indirect rule whereby the local organization remained in the hands of acquiescent chieftains who proved willing to guarantee peace and protect European commercial interests. For an excellent commentary on direct and indirect rule, see Rupert Emerson, *Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937).

[45] Conrad Bekker, "Historical Patterns of Cultural Contact in Southeast Asia," *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (November, 1951), p. 5.

[46] For a fine description of Asian trade at this time, see J. C. van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, Ltd., 1955).

this period of superficial economic penetration, the indigenous urban systems, both inland and coastal, remained essentially intact.

In peninsular Southeast Asia the sacred cities and their tributary kingdoms continued to flourish as closed structures. Although Europeans were often permitted to locate factories within the walls or on the outskirts of the inland capitals and to engage in cut-throat competition with Asian traders, the foreigners did not seriously disrupt the continuing process of orthogenetic cultural transformation.[47] Indeed, the merchant-adventurers were tolerated only as long as they acknowledged the authority of the indigenous rulers.

In insular Southeast Asia the European presence was somewhat more evident because the chartered companies occasionally emphasized it by force and the Spaniards embarked upon an ambitious resettlement program to facilitate the Hispanization and Christianization of Filipinos. When native rulers actively resisted commercial encroachment, the Dutch invoked the ultimate sanction of military power by launching short punitive expeditions against the offenders. After achieving victory, securing commercial treaties and guarantying European interests, however, they proved quite willing to restore authority to tractable indigenous princes. Through this process a number of Javanese rulers were forced to accept the suzerainty of the Company. Under the resultant system of indirect rule the native leaders were allowed to govern their respective territories as long as they did not unilaterally abrogate treaties made with the Dutch.[48] Although the Batavian officials became adept in manipulating the native states against each other, their goals were always commercial in nature and the market remained inviolate. While peace reigned and European merchants prospered, the Dutch made no attempt to restructure the systems of *kraton* or coastal cities.

Despite an obvious disdain for administrative entanglements and an apparent disinterest in developing a colony based upon a framework of cities and towns, through their aggressive economic activities the Dutch did create a fairly stable network of trading settlements. Early in the seventeenth century, after a rather brief perod of intense conflict with the British and Portuguese, the V.O.C. firmly established itself as the supreme maritime and commercial power in Southeast Asia.[49] Though other European merchants continued to operate in the region, their undertakings remained small in scale and relatively disorganized compared with those of the Netherlanders. The Dutch commercial empire, as conceived by Jan Pieterszoon Coen and de-

[47] In his well-documented portrayal of Ayutthaya Larry Sternstein describes the foreign trading stations in the former Siamese capital. Included in the article is Dr. Gybert Heecq's detailed report on the sumptuous Dutch factory. It was written in 1655 and reflects the layout of European trading posts throughout the region. Larry Sternstein, "'Krung Kao': The Old Capital of Ayutthaya," *The Journal of the Siam Society,* Vol. 53, Part 1 (January, 1965), pp. 83-121.

[48] Emerson, *op. cit.,* pp. 1-9, 378-465.

[49] Hall, *op. cit.,* pp. 197-206, 224-282.

veloped by Antonie van Diemen,[50] displayed two ranks: a single dominant entrêpot and a lower level of "pin-prick" trading posts.[51] The latter consisted of scattered factories and garrisoned settlements, some of which served as the nuclei of small communities composed of a few Europeans, Eurasians, Malays and other Asians. The keystone in this system was Batavia, which, from its founding in 1619, functioned as the administrative, economic, cultural and military center of the Netherlands East Indies. Its stability among the transitory indigenous cities of Southeast Asia and its multifunctional character testified to the role of this colonial capital as the nascent primate city of Indonesia.

An even more stable urban network of colonial towns and cities was created by zealous Catholic missionaries in the Philippines. Upon their arrival in the archipelago the Spaniards were repelled by the decentralization of the intensely independent *barangays*. As proselytizing Christians, heirs of the Mediterranean urban heritage and citizens of the Hispanic imperial realm, they valued traditions of national and international societal organization. Many Iberians were disturbed because the Filipinos seemed to be living *sin policia*.[52] Furthermore, village dispersion presented a quite serious obstacle to the friars engaged in mission work. It was physically impossible for several hundred priests to indoctrinate approximately 700,000 people scattered in thousands of hamlets throughout the islands.[53] Only by community consolidation or reduction [54] could the spiritual conquest be achieved.. Diego Aduarte, a seventeenth-century historian, summarized the problem of *barangay* disunity and its solution as follows:

> The Indians [Filipinos] in their heathen conditions live in farmsteads and tiny hamlets, where it is difficult to teach them; and it is impossible that teaching

[50] *Ibid.*, pp. 252-260.

[51] A two-step colonial hierarchy also existed during the sixteenth century when Portuguese Malacca controlled a small network of trading stations that were scattered throughout the region. But the resources of the mother country were meager and her manpower proved insufficient to stablize the structure. With the arrival of North European traders the Portuguese position became increasingly precarious and the decaying system collapsed after the Dutch capture of Malacca in 1641.

[52] Phelan, *op cit.*, p. 44.

[53] The first census of *tributos* (taxpayers), ordered by Governor Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas, totaled 166,903. It was assumed that each *tributo* supported three dependents. Based upon an average family size of four persons, a total of 667,612 souls were registered in 1951. Therefore, with the More population the archipelago probably had somewhat over 700,000 inhabitants. Unsigned (ordered by Governor Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas), "Relación de las Encomiendas existentes en Filipinas el día 31 de mayo de 1591," in W. E. Retana, *Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino* (Madrid: Viuda de M. Minuesa de los Ríos, 1898), Vol. 4, p. 73.

[54] In colonial narratives Spanish chroniclers often employed the words "reduce" and "reduction" when reviewing the friars' missionary activities. The terms carried a dual connotation, religious and civil. They were used most frequently in reference to the process of Filipino conversion. Missionaries constantly strove to Christianize (*reducir*) the natives. A second meaning in official terminology described the process of resettlement or community consolidation. Thus a newly established colonial town or village was called a reduction (*reducción*).

> shall enlighten them, because of the inability of the religious to care for and attend to so many small villages. Hence, to make good Christians of them, it is necessary to gather them in larger villages.[55]

Both civil and clerical authorities recognized that successful colonial administration and thorough Catholic indoctrination remained contingent upon the congregation of Filipinos into larger communities. Indeed, resettlement was a necessary and logical corollary of Spain's politico-religious program in the Philippines.[56]

Throughout the Hispanic period the friars labored to restructure the traditional settlement pattern of the Philippines.[57] The resultant urban network was described by James A. LeRoy in 1905 as follows:

> Under one governmental unit, the old *pueblo* of Spanish phraseology, are included in the main center of population, which may range anywhere from a cluster of two hundred houses to a thriving rural city with perhaps a cathedral church, with secondary schools and even a printing-press, and the outlying rural districts, sometimes spreading over an area of forty or even more square miles, in which are various subordinate little centers of population, with from ten to several hundred houses in each, commonly called *barrios*. . . . A *barrio* may be but a little cluster of huts, located on the edge of the untouched forest or where they will be contiguous to the planted crops; but a *barrio* may also sometimes be a little village in itself, with its separate school (quite as it had a *visita,* or chapel dependent upon the parish church of the town in Spanish times) and with a thousand or more inhabitants.[58]

As a result of the missionaries' efforts, the Filipinos were stabilized in a fairly permanent system of villages, towns and provincial cities that facilitated the Spanish program of religious and cultural change.

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[55] Diego Aduarte, O. P., "Historia de la Provincia del Sancto Rosario de la Orden de Predicadores, Manila, 1640," in Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson, *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898* (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1905), Vol. 32, p. 273.

[56] The authors of the Hispanic reduction programs envisioned a complete transformation of the preconquest settlement patterns. Reconstructed Filipino communities were to vary in size between 2,400 and 5,000 inhabitants, numbers which Spanish officials regarded as suitable for efficient civil and religious administration. Manuel Bernaldez Pizarro, "Reforms Needed in Filipinas, Madrid, 1827," in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.,* Vol. 51, pp. 198-200; Phelan, *op. cit.,* p. 44.

[57] The lessons of Indian congregation in Hispanic America had proved the utility of compact communities in Christian conversion and societal reorganization. Although the Latin American experience served as a model for programs of community consolidation in the Philippines the actual instruments of resettlement differed. Whereas in the New World the task of reduction was a joint effort of Church and State, in the Philippines civil congregations were rare. George Kubler, *Mexican Architecture of the Sixteenth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), Vol. 1, pp. 69, 87-88; Howard F. Cline, "Civil Congregations of the Indians in New Spain, 1598-1606," *The Hispanic American Historical Review,* Vol. 29, No. 3 (August, 1949), pp. 349-369; José Algué, S. J., and others, *Atlas de Filipinas* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900).

[58] James A. LeRoy, *Philippine Life in Town and Country* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1905), pp. 42-44.

Almost from the beginning of Hispanic colonization Manila flourished as the primary node of the insular network of settlements.[59] Like Batavia, it was conceived as the nerve-center of an integrated colonial system and its prosperity derived from commerce. In contrast to the Dutch colonial city, however, Manila did not function as an entrêpot for Southeast Asian luxury items. Instead, the Spaniards exploited traditional Sino-Filipino trade relations and fashioned Manila into an urban warehouse linking Nueva España and China.[60] During the first four decades of this trade Manila experienced a golden age of prosperity. Late in the sixteenth century the commerce began to flourish, unhindered by restrictions and binding regulations. As the number of galleon voyages to Acapulco increased, Manila enjoyed a tremendous expansion in population and wealth.[61] By the dawn of the seventeenth century the galleon exchange was firmly established and the city was seeing its most glorious days. In this early period of Philippine colonial history the profits of the Sino-Spanish trade were fantastic and were shared by soldiers, government officials and clergymen, as well as merchants.[62] In 1587, only sixteen years after Manila's founding, Governor Santiago de Vera lamented that commerce had outstripped transportation. He informed Philip II that "trade continues to increase so that were vessels not lacking, a great quantity of goods would be sent to New Spain." [63]

In 1580 Manila commenced a brief reign as the foremost colonial capital in Asia. After the Duke of Alba conquered Portugal, Manila replaced Golden Goa as the administrative seat of Iberian power and for a time Spain's Asian empire extended from Ormuz to the Philippines. Predictably, Manila's trading linkages were equally extensive. During this period of Hispanic domination the city emerged as an emporium of Oriental trade.

[59] Cebu was the seat of Spanish authority in the Philippines for six years. But food supplies in the Visayas proved insufficient for establishment of a permanent capital city, so that starvation remained an ever-present specter confronting the Europeans. To alleviate the food shortages, Legazpi transferred his headquarters to Manila, the foremost *barangay* of the northern islands. As anticipated, Luzon's "rice basket" provided a secure economic base for the new colony.

[60] For a definitive statement on the Manila galleon trade and the city's warehouse function between China and Mexico, see William Lytle Schurz, *The Manila Galleon* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1939).

[61] In twenty years Manila grew from a settlement of 2,000 persons to a multiracial city of 34,000. The population continued to increase, reaching a total of 42,000 inhabitants by the middle of the seventeenth century. In 1650 Manila's Spanish population numbered 7,350, most of whom lived in the walled city. Approximately 15,000 Chinese occupied the Parián quarter and 20,000 Filipinos were scattered throughout the suburbs. Human Relations Area Files, Inc., *Area Handbook on the Philippines*, Subcontractor's Monographs HRAF-16, Chicago 5, edited by Fred Eggan, 4 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press for HRAF, 1956), p. 399; Phelan, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

[62] Benito Legarda, Jr., "Two and a Half Centuries of the Galleon Trade," *Philippine Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (December, 1955), p. 347, 351.

[63] Santiago de Vera, "Letter to Philip II," quoted in Gregorio F. Zaide, *Philippine Political and Cultural History* (Manila: Philippine Education Company, 1957), Vol. 1, p. 324.

The manifest lists of vessels which converged upon Manila Bay provided a veritable index of Asian trade commodities.[64] Manila's position as the multifunctional capital of the Philippines and the primary node in the embryonic urban network was firmly consolidated during this period of commercial and administrative florescence.

Although Batavia and Manila became the paramount colonial cities of Southeast Asia during the early period of European imperialism, they were actually rather small centers of population when compared with the metropolitan capitals that were to evolve in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Nevertheless, they shared many of the features and functions that later characterized the primate cities of the region. Both were foreign innovations created to serve the needs of the West. The very location of Manila and Batavia as seaboard cities on the mouths of the Pasig and Tji Liwung emphasized their basic function as commercial centers that linked the European and Asian markets. As a corollary of their economic role, the two colonial capitals acted as magnets that drew men from all parts of the world. As early as 1609 the Spanish chronicler Antonio de Morga testified to the ethnic diversity of Manila.[65] The following account by Bartholomé de Letona, O.S.F. is even more convincing:

> The commerce of this city is extensive, rich, and unusually profitable; for it is carried on by all these Chinese and their ships, with those of all the islands above mentioned [in Southeast Asia] and of Tunquin [Tong-king], Cochinchina, Camboja [Cambodia], and Sian [Siam] — four separate kingdoms, which lie opposite these islands on the continent of Great China — and of the gulfs and the numberless kingdoms of Eastern India, Persia, Bengala, and Ceilan [Ceylon], when there are no wars; and of the empire and kingdoms of Xapon [Japan]. The diversity of the peoples, therefore, who are seen in Manila and its environs is the greatest in the world; for these include men from all kingdoms and nations — España, Francia, Ingalaterra, Italia Flanders, Almania, Dinamarca, Suecia, Polonia, Moscobia; people from all the Indias, both eastern and western; and Turks, Greeks, Moros, Persians, Tartars, Chinos, Japanese, Africans, and Asiatics. And hardly is there in the four quarters of the world a kingdom, province, or nation which has not representatives here.[66]

In Batavia a similar situation prevailed.[67] As a result the colonial cities became centers of heterogenetic transformation, which facilitated the disin-

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[64] For a catalogue and commentary on several hundred of these Asian items of exchange, see Antonio de Morga, "Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas, Mexico, 1609," in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, Vol. 16, pp. 178-185.

[65] In 1609 he observed the annual arrival of traders from China, Japan, the Moluccas, Malacca, Siam, Portuguese Goa, Cambodia, Borneo, India, Patani and "other districts." *Ibid.*, pp. 176, 184, 199.

[66] Bartholomé de Letona, O.S.F., "Description of Filipinas Islands, La Puebla, Mexico, 1662," in Blair and Robertson, *op cit.*, Vol. 36, p. 205.

[67] Bernard H. M. Vlekke, *Nusantara, a History of Indonesia* (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, Ltd., 1959), pp. 154-157.

tegration or modification of indigenous norms and generated new mental and social integrations.[68] They readily absorbed foreign cultural elements, thereby inducing processes of social, political and economic change.

There were also parallels in the physical structure of the colonial cities. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the urban cores of Manila and Batavia were surrounded by massive walls and moats that symbolized their role as the nerve-centers of each colonial system and guaranteed security in times of crisis. The governors-general, the foremost merchants, most of the colonies' administrative personnel, the major warehouses, the European religious authorities and the elite military forces were all resident within Manila's Intramuros and Batavia's Castle.[69] Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that these fortifications proved their worth against both European and Asian invaders.[70]

By their morphology the Dutch and Spanish colonial capitals clearly emphasized the fact that they were alien transplants on Southeast Asian soil. Both were constructed as images of the typical metropolitan cities of the time. Early in the seventeenth century Morga portrayed Manila as follows:

> It occupies the same site where Rajamora had his settlement and fort. . . . The whole site was occupied by this new settlement [Manila], and Legazpi apportioned it to the Spaniards in equal building-lots. It was laid out with well-arranged streets and squares, straight and level. A sufficiently large main square [*Plaza mayor*] was left, fronting which were erected the cathedral church and municipal buildings. He left another square, that of arms [*Plaza de armas*], fronting which was built the fort, as well as the royal buildings. He gave sites for the monasteries, hospital, and chapels which were to be built. Streets of the city are compactly built up with houses, mostly of stone, although some are of wood. Many are roofed with clay tiling and others with nipa. They are excellent edifices, lofty and spacious, and have large rooms and many windows, and balconies, with iron gratings. . . . There are about six hundred houses within the walls . . . and all are the habitations and homes of Spaniards.[71]

D. G. E. Hall describes Antonie van Diemen's work in developing Batavia in the following summary statement:

> He completed its castle, built a town hall and a Latin school and did much to expand and beautify the original settlement. Cultivation and industry were developed around it, chiefly by the Chinese whom Coen had encouraged to settle.

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[68] Both Manila and Batavia fit Redfield and Singer's model of the heterogenetic city: "In cities of this kind men are concerned with the market, with 'rational' organization of production of goods, with expediental relations between buyer and seller, ruler and ruled, and native and foreigner. In this kind of city the predominant social types are businessmen, administrators . . . rebels, reformers, planners and plotters of many varieties. It is in cities of this kind that priority comes to be given to economic growth and the expansion of power." Redfield and Singer, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

[69] Reed, *op. cit.* Chapter 6; Vlekke, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-190.

[70] Zaide, *op. cit.*, pp. 248-286, 306-322; Hall, p. 253.

[71] Morga, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-137, 143.

> A new church was built, houses in the Dutch style lined the banks of the canals, and the whole place began to look almost like a Dutch city transplanted from Europe.[72]

The European-style urban cores were occupied almost exclusively by the Dutch and Spaniards and, therefore, served as physical indicators of the power and prestige of the foreign sojouners.[73]

Conclusion

As the eighteenth century drew to a close, Southeast Asia was dominated by two contrasting types of cities. In the peninsular areas sacred cities continued to thrive as the orthogenetic centers of relatively closed territorial systems. By contrast the multifunctional capitals of Manila and Batavia, each of which controlled a rudimentary network of colonial settlements, were the foremost centers of the insular realm. Though the indigenous *kraton* cities of Java and a number of coastal centers continued to function, their princes were unable to destroy the foreign implants that dotted the archipelagic shores. On land and sea the Dutch prevailed in all prolonged tests of military power. In the Philippines the Spaniards were quite successful in achieving their territorial, cultural, commercial and religious objectives. Through the efforts of a dedicated corps of missionaries, who used compact colonial settlements as instruments of Hispanization and Christianization, an embryonic urban hierarchy was established. In both systems the colonial capital reigned supreme in all functions. Thus an enduring consequence of Spanish and Dutch imperialism was the transformation of two small riverine communities into the undisputed colonial capitals, multifunctional nerve-centers and nascent primate cities of the Philippine and Indonesian archipelagos

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[72] Hall, *op. cit.*, p. 529. As one might expect, the narrow streets, canals, and moats that gathered rubbish and bred the *Anopheles* mosquito were quite out of place in the tropics. Thus Manila and Batavia were not only the homes of many Europeans, but often became their graves soon after they arrived. W. F. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, Ltd., 1964), pp. 172-173.

[73] Morga, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

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