



# ASIAN STUDIES

Journal of Critical Perspectives on Asia

## ARTICLES

Macro-Historical Conditions for a Reconciliation in East Asia:  
Remaking History in an Age of Civilizational Crisis | Kinhide MUSHAKOJI

States as Managers of International Labor Migration:  
The Cases of South Korea and Taiwan | Vicente Angel YBIERNAS

Remembering the Great Ancestors: Images of Japanese Emigrants  
from the Perspective of Third- and Fourth-Generation Philippine *Nikkeijin*  
Ron Bridget VILOG

The Making of a Philippine Province: Romblon During the American  
Colonial Period | Kristoffer ESQUEJO

## COMMENTARIES and DOCUMENTS

Timor Leste's Preparation for Accession into ASEAN: Public Participation,  
Production of Knowledge/s, Comparative Histories, and Perspectives  
from Below | Jacqueline Aquino SIAPNO

Declaration of the Leaders of Climate Communities from Asia, Africa,  
and Latin America | Coalition of Climate Communities

Cambodia at a Crossroads: New Laws Would Limit Freedoms | Various CSOs  
Political Conference on a Progressive Agrarian Reform | A Joint Statement

FDC to the World Bank: Get Out of Dirty Energy and Pay Up Your  
Climate Debt | Freedom from Debt Coalition

Statement by International Solidarity Group for Thai Democracy  
and Human Rights

REVIEWS Ma.Victoria RAQUIZA | Raul NAVARRO | Angelo ARRIOLA

TRAVEL NARRATIVES Caroline Sy HAU

POETRY Isabel BANZON | Temario RIVERA

ASIAN STUDIES is an open-access, peer-reviewed academic journal published since 1963 by the Asian Center, University of the Philippines Diliman.

#### EDITORIAL BOARD\*

- Eduardo C. Tadem (Editor in Chief), Asian Studies
- Michiyo Yoneno-Reyes (Review editor), Asian Studies
- Eduardo T. Gonzalez, Asian and Philippine Studies
- Ricardo T. Jose, History
- Joseph Anthony Lim, Economics\*
- Antoinette R. Raquiza, Asian Studies
- Teresa Encarnacion Tadem, Political Science
- Lily Rose Tope, English and Comparative Literature

\* Ateneo de Manila University. All the other members of the editorial board are from UP Diliman.

Managing Editor: Janus Isaac V. Nolasco

Editorial Associate: Katrina S. Navallo

Layout Artist: Ariel G. Manuel

#### EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

- Patricio N. Abinales, University of Hawaii at Manoa
- Andrew Charles Bernard Aeria, University of Malaysia Sarawak
- Benedict Anderson, Cornell University
- Melani Budianta, University of Indonesia
- Urvashi Butalia, Zubaan Books (An imprint of Kali for Women)
- Vedi Renandi Hadiz, Murdoch University
- Caroline S. Hau, Kyoto University
- Huang Renwei, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences
- Reynaldo C. Iletto, Australian National University
- Benedict Tria Kerkvliet, Australian National University & University of Hawaii
- Lau Kin Chi, Lingnan University
- Lee Jung Ok, Daegu Catholic University
- Francis Loh Kok Wah, Universiti Sains Malaysia
- Armando S. Malay, Jr., University of the Philippines Diliman
- Kinhide Mushakoji, Osaka University
- Raul Pertierra, Philippine Women's University
- Somchai Phatharathananunth, Mahasarakham University
- Michael Pinches, University of Western Australia
- Bambang Purwanto, Gadjah Mada University
- Vicente Rafael, University of Washington
- Helen Yu-Rivera, University of the Philippines Diliman
- Harsh Sethi, Seminar Journal (New Delhi)
- Wen Tiejun, Renmin University of China
- Surichai Wun'Gaeo, Chulalongkorn University

#### ASIAN STUDIES

Copyright 2014 | ISSN: 0004-4679 (print) | ISSN: 2244-5927 (online)

Asian Center, Magsaysay cor. Guerrero Sts.

University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City

EMAIL: [upasianstudies@gmail.com](mailto:upasianstudies@gmail.com) | [jvnolasco@up.edu.ph](mailto:jvnolasco@up.edu.ph)

PHONE: 63.2.920.3535 or 63.2.981.8500 loc. 3586

The cover is based on the design of Marco Malto. The silhouette on the front cover is that of Borubudur in Indonesia. The content of *Asian Studies* may not be republished without the written permission of the Asian Center.

# Contents

## ARTICLES

Macro-Historical Conditions for a Reconciliation in East Asia: Remaking History in an Age of Civilizational Crisis Kinhide MUSHAKOJI .....	1
States as Managers of International Labor Migration: The Cases of South Korea and Taiwan Vicente Angel YBIERNAS .....	15
Remembering the Great Ancestors: Images of Japanese Emigrants from the Perspective of Third- and Fourth-Generation Philippine <i>Nikkeijin</i> Ron Bridget VILOG .....	39
The Making of a Philippine Province: Romblon During the American Colonial Period Kristoffer ESQUEJO .....	74

## COMMENTARIES AND DOCUMENTS

Timor Leste's Preparation for Accession into ASEAN: Public Participation, Production of Knowledge/s, Comparative Histories, and Perspectives from Below Jacqueline Aquino SIAPNO .....	108
Declaration of the Leaders of Climate Communities from Asia, Africa, and Latin America Coalition of Climate Communities .....	119
Cambodia at a Crossroads: New Laws Would Limit Freedoms Various CSOs .....	125
Political Conference on a Progressive Agrarian Reform A Joint Statement .....	131
FDC to the World Bank: Get Out of Dirty Energy and Pay Up Your Climate Debt Freedom from Debt Coalition .....	138
Statement by International Solidarity Group for Thai Democracy and Human Rights .....	137

# Contents

## REVIEWS

- State of Fragmentation: The Philippines in Transition*  
by Various Authors  
Reviewed by Ma. Victoria RAQUIZA ..... 140
- The Song of the Babaylan: Living Voices, Medicines, Spiritualities of  
Philippine Ritualist-Oralist-Healers* by Grace Nono  
Reviewed by Raul NAVARRO ..... 145
- New Colonial Women in Korea* by Hyaeweol Choi  
Reviewed by Angelo ARRIOLA ..... 149

## TRAVEL NARRATIVES

- Dead Season  
Caroline Sy HAU ..... 154

## LITERARY WRITINGS

- Dragons  
Isabel BANZON ..... 160
- Transitions: Four Haiku  
Temario RIVERA ..... 161

# Macro-Historical Conditions for a Reconciliation in East Asia: Remaking History in an Age of Civilizational Crisis<sup>1</sup>

Kinhide MUSHAKOJI

Professor, Centre for Asia Pacific Partnership  
Osaka University of Economics and Law

## **Abstract**

This article talks about how the dominant Westphalian model, which is rooted in the capitalist development, has failed to institute peace among the countries in different regions in the world—a product of a civilization’s crisis. This crisis is a confluence of expansionism and cultural imperialism wielded by the circle of “civilized nations,” which Japan joined, resulted in the Great Japan Asianism, and fueled the development of Japan’s war state, the new Cold War between the haves and have-nots, and the growth of antihegemonic movements all over the world. Citing the 1955 Bandung Conference as a precedent, the article seeks to establish alternatives to the Westphalian peace narrative and suggests that Asian nations, in particular, look inwards and find amongst themselves local and indigenous means to achieve peace. This also calls for a reconciliation among the four countries of East Asia to look beyond the historical transgressions of the past and move forward towards building a pluralistic “common home of East Asian peoples.”

Keywords: Westphalian peace, totalitarian war state, Bandung Conference, exogenous modernization, Japan Asianism

### ***Kairos vs. mythos: The neoliberal global economy of Westphalian capitalism***

THE TIME (*KAIROS*) IS RIPE for reconciliation in East Asia but the Myth (*mythos*) of colonialist glory, based on a misinterpretation of the Westphalian Peace System<sup>2</sup> by Japan, makes it impossible to build a Common House of East Asia—together with China and the two Koreas, North and South. It is necessary to overcome this myth of national glory and counter it with another that supports local endogenous development and opposes cultural imperialism from its emulator, Japan.<sup>3</sup> We are experiencing a Cold War between the cultural imperialism of the global financial capitalist forces and the anti-imperialist forces of the emerging endogenous ecocultural forces of local citizens and the multitude. The four states of East Asia will have to overcome their belief in the myth of state-based developmentalism, which adheres to Westphalian capitalist peace. Instead, they have to build a new endogenous regional community of communities as part of the emerging non-Western world united by a pluralistic vision against cultural imperialism.

The development of such a new vision has to found itself on an alternative reading of the history of modernization in East Asia. This model will be a triad. First, it must depict Japan's exogenous developmental project, which turned East Asia into a regional arena of Westphalian interstate conflict, the target of external and local forces of cultural imperialism. The external imperialism led by the British and then the American hegemons, along with the internal countercolonialist expansion of Japan, was based on an imitation of the exogenous Westphalian model of universalism and expansionism. Second, the model must paint a picture of the present civilizational crisis. Third, it must look to the Bandung Conference, which is posited as an alternative to the present myth of Westphalian peace; its reinterpretation will be a target of our efforts in East Asia.

## **The tragic experience of cultural imperialism in East Asia**

I wish to give an interpretation of the Japanese anticolonialist state project, which was based on a grand strategy of maintaining Japan's independence. Japan, encircled by Western colonial powers, became a colonialist state. And, to counteract potential aggression by the Western hegemony, Japan eventually turned into a modern developmentalist total-war state—attacking and distinguishing herself from neighbor countries in the name of modernization—and into a non-Western Westphalian great power.<sup>4</sup>

This was Japan's State Civilizational Project, which the great Westphalian states wanted to admit into the inner circle of civilized powers. Japan underwent a nation-building effort of exogenous modernization, and stayed Westernized while keeping its patriarchal traditions reformulated according to the Westphalian peace project.

The state project of the Meiji "modern" state was coined by Yoshida Shoin of the Choshu Clan. Alerted by the Opium War in China, Shoin taught his disciples a plan to build a modern state that emulates the Western powers, to accept Western technology and institutions, and to develop Japan into a modern unified nation state. One very dangerous component of this project was to counteract Western colonialism by transforming modern Japan into a powerful colonial state. He wanted Japan to colonize the North Pacific beginning from Hokkaido, Korea, Manchuria, the Ryukyu Kingdom, Taiwan, and down to the Philippines.<sup>5</sup>

One of his disciples, Ito Hirobumi, who became a key leader of the Meiji State, applied this plan to build a modern state and reported at his master's grave that he implemented his will and colonized Korea. The colonial expansion of Japan, which started with the annexation of the Ryukyu Kingdom, was followed by the annexation of the Korean Kingdom and by the invasion of China, which in turn precipitated the creation of the Manchukuo puppet state. At present, the colonial expansion of Japan is still legitimized by conservative political and economic leaders, who continue Japan's expansion post-1945 Defeat, through an economic project based on

a course-correction that combines the subaltern role of the United States as the new hegemon, and focuses on the building of an economic influence with a potential for regaining political and military supremacy in the future.

This trend of Asianism, combined with Japan's great power status, did not end with the 1945 defeat. It kept the principle of a developmentalist "total-war state," which demilitarized Japan and developed and applied nuclear energy to build a prosperous national economy. The "peaceful use" of nuclear power, nevertheless, maintained a potential capacity for military use through the enrichment of the accumulated used nuclear fuel, plutonium. The total-war state of Japan wanted to maintain a technological capacity that would eventually develop its nuclear power for military purposes. The creation of an economic sphere of influence represented ambivalence in the Great Japan tradition, while the alternative Small Japan Asianism was recently represented by the Peshawar Project of Dr. Nakamura Tetsu.<sup>6</sup>

Small Japan Asianism does not support the military "counterterrorist" activities of the United States in Afghanistan, nor does it try to develop a Japanese economic sphere of influence in any part of Asia. It is the basis of the Japanese ecological movement that supports the Convention of Biodiversity, which developed activities that criticize the Western ideology of assuming the supremacy of human interests over life and its diversity. It supports a decentralized nation-building that turn the regions of the country into units of participatory democracy,<sup>7</sup> opposing the challenge of a Great Japan nationalist revisionism. This movement includes the Abe Shinzo government, which can be regarded as an ideological descendant of Yoshida Shoin.

The small Japan Asianist tradition also represents Shidehara Kijuro's attempt to keep the Japanese military from invading China through a policy of non-expansion. The same Shidehara played a key role during the occupation in introducing the concept of the "right to live in peace," whose logical consequence is the renunciation of military forces in Article 9, Paragraph 2. It is important to take note of this alternative state project, which fructified, with the support of American New Dealers, into the concept of the "right of all nations in the world to have their rights to live in peace,



free from fear and wants.” It is an anticolonialist concept that declares illegal all colonialist aggression, which violates the right to live in peace, and outlaws any exogenous intervention from the outside. The tradition of a small Japan Asianism was an influential alternative state project proposed by Sakamoto Ryouma and Katsu Kaishu during the Meiji Restoration.

The version of small Japan Asianism and anticolonialism was neither in support of Japan’s countercolonialist aggression against its neighboring countries, nor was it an attempt to build a strongly unified nation; rather, it is a developmentalist and a total war national mobilization. It was trying to keep pluralism from arising in the different regions in Japan by keeping them under a parliamentary rule by the feudal lords in the Upper Chamber of a new democratic parliament of the British type. This alternative state project, had it been adopted, would have made Japan an independent state similar to Thailand, maintaining a tradition of self-sufficiency rather than of unlimited national economic growth. It is only now, after the nuclear plant explosion during the March 11 Great East Japan Earthquake, that this small Japan model regained support from Japanese civil society. This has been so in spite of the combined efforts of the government, the corporate circles, and the mass media to maintain the Great Japan total-war state economic project and the eventual return to a military expansionism, which was officially renounced in the Preamble of the Constitution.

The Cold War period in East Asia was an occasion to develop different types of developmentalist total-war state projects in opposition to or in cooperation with the external hegemonic influence of the United States. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a typical example of a total war anti-imperialist state opposed to the exogenous expansionism of Japan and the United States. *Juche* is an alternative to Meiji Japan’s edict on education. During the Cultural Revolution, China turned into an anti-imperialist total war state as well. Its adoption of open policy altered its state project in many respects. Nevertheless, it remained unchanged in terms of its aim to develop into a prosperous state that can compete with Western hegemonic alliance through the total mobilization

of national capital, including human resources. The Republic of Korea, before and after its democratization in the 1990s, is also a total-war developmentalist state; it tries to maximize its national economic share of the world market through the mobilization of its rich national capital.<sup>8</sup>

It is unthinkable how regional integration can be achieved in this situation where national identities oppose each other. Obviously, nothing will happen unless and until Japan renounces its Great Japan Asianism. It is also unthinkable how the DPRK and the US can develop a positive path for diplomatic negotiation towards regional denuclearization unless and until US hegemonic cultural imperialism acknowledges the tradition of multicultural democracy. The role of the nonhegemonic side of the American state project played a positive role in allying with the Small Japan Project; however, this positive aspect of the American occupation of Japan was replaced with a hegemonic cultural imperialism.

The end of the Cold War did not end the American hegemonic imposition of exogenous modernization. Samuel Huntington became the new prophet of cultural imperialism in advocating the clash of civilizations. The Obama government seems to go in this direction of multicultural democracy as proclaimed in the US Constitution, but fails to gain international confidence because of the hidden control of global political economy and cultural relations by the US government. The double standard in support of Israel is combined with another one vis-a-vis China, where economic cooperation occurs alongside politico-military tensions, especially in the Taiwan Strait. The US and Europe's agreement in claiming their right to and obligation for humanitarian intervention is a question we will treat in the next section of this paper.

### **The new Cold War between the haves and the have-nots**

We are at an interesting period of transition when modern civilization is at a critical point, which is both at its apogee and at its terminal phase. It is a time of a new global Cold War—between the haves and the have-nots—a tacit conflict between global hegemony, which tries to keep its

dominance by engaging in a cultural imperialist campaign, and the citizens and multitudes of networks of endogenous development movements.

We are in a three-level global system where the Westphalian sphere is in a terminal phase and is covered by (1) a global sphere of mega-TNCs and emerging states experiencing an unsustainable boom, (2) a chaotic sphere with islands of despair supported by transnational terrorism, and (3) islands of hope supported by NGOs, ILCs, and antihegemonic coalitions.<sup>9</sup> The global financial order is dominated by gigantic TNCs, supported by three major industrial states—US, EU, and Japan—the so-called “industrial democracies,” which eagerly deploy “humanitarian” intervention forces in countries where their financially-based cultural imperialism benefit. This global standard of new constitutionalism<sup>10</sup> rules over two layers of the world system. Balancing this global rule of neoliberalism, human security plays two major roles in protecting vulnerable sectors in this new Dark Age and in empowering new agents towards the emergence of a counterhegemonic sociocultural renaissance.

The Cold War is taking place within an international system where Westphalian peace under the United Nations is no longer able to extend its control over the world; MNCs demand to be part of the global governance system, which is challenged by citizens, multitudes, and weaker states and ethnic/religious minorities challenge.

In this way, we must realize the fact that the present world we live in is no longer the Westphalian peace system proposed by Kant and that which materialized under the United Nations.

The original accumulation of Westphalian capitalism was based on the colonial expansion of successive hegemony extracting mineral and biological resources through their cultural imperialist system. This system played a dialectically positive role in the exogenous development of the non-Western world by transferring universal values of nationalism and liberalism, while establishing slavery and colonial domination.

This Westphalian peace is now in deep crisis because of the limits to economic growth characterized by Eurocentric modernity. The limits to

growth caused the apogee and the end of productive capitalism by creating a global financial capitalist system on top of the nation-state system, and a chaotic antihegemonic level where Westphalian peace could not function because of the evolution of nonstate security communities, ethnoreligious conflicts, and anti-Western and anticolonial movements between the global South and the global North.

This is how the Cold War of global cultural imperialism under the neoliberal rule of global financial standards is widening the polarization between the haves and the have-nots. The hegemony of cultural imperialism, whose global standards are symbolized by Wall Street and the World Economic Forum of Davos, triggered a diversity of antihegemonic movements in the non-Westphalian level of the world system. This included not only terrorism as a pretext for “humanitarian interventions” from the global hegemon but also a number of antihegemonic movements where citizens and multitudes gathered locally. Their nonviolent movements were symbolized by the World Social Forums, which began in Porto Alegre in the second half of the 1990s and developed in the different regions of the global South: Asia, Africa, and the Latin American and Caribbean Region.

The crisis of the Westphalian capitalism was, in a sense, a process which allowed the development of a variety of non-Western, antihegemonic movements. To mention only some, the African antiapartheid struggle prepared the UN Conference against Racism of Durban 2001; the Bolivarian Revolution began in Central America; and the Caribbean region developed into an indigenous movement combining human rights and the right of Mother Earth. The UN Human Rights Council turned from an instrument of exogenous human rights imposition by the industrial North into a tool of the South and the peripheral countries to develop the endogenous rights of minorities, and to activate a re-evaluation of traditional values. This movement from the global South also includes attempts to reactivate non-Western regional systems: the Arab/Islamic *Ummah*, the Pax-Indica represented by the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and the Pax-Sinica *Tienxa* system.

The role of the Westphalian states was minimized by the emergence of neoliberalism in the 1980s. Yet since the Lehman Shock, the financially affluent states in North America and Europe are now called upon to extend their financial support to the affluent sectors of the weaker states to avoid their bankruptcy, which would lead to the collapse of the entire Westphalian capitalist system. The survival of the moribund financial capitalism relies on the financial support of total-war coalitions of Westphalian states of the industrial North. Dollars from the US and euros from EU are given by the rich financial institutions to the states in crisis, imposing stringent policies to the governments of subaltern states, which are forced to accept the widening gap between the haves and have-nots among their citizens. In a sense, the weaker states transfer debt bonds to vulnerable citizens and multitudes. This new kind of domestic colonialism has been causing massive demonstrations and regime changes in the Middle East.

This is why nation states, which, according to the democratic development of Westphalian states, have been traditionally expected to protect people from fear and want, are no longer able to take care of the domestic welfare of their citizens. The states, especially the weaker ones in the world market such as Libya, develop paternalistic governments and become the target of humanitarian intervention from the North.

In East Asia, the DPRK is a target of international interventionism, while Japan continues to play a countercolonialist role by allying with the United States and refusing to recognize the historical mistakes it committed when it broke the rights of neighboring nations to live in peace. Japanese cultural imperialism became the target of economic and military opposition by an equally powerful cultural developmentalist state, China. The myth of national interest created by the Westphalian political economy makes it impossible for the peoples of East Asia to develop a common security and a “common home.” In spite of the fact that the conflicts among Westphalian states became practically unrealistic, the role of the developmentalist states becomes more and more important in Northeast

Asian nations, which try to keep themselves from becoming the object of financial protection by the hegemonic North.

The tensions created by the territorial claims between the total-war states of Japan against China and Korea combines itself with another polarization between the DPRK on the one hand, and with the Republic of Korea on the other. China plays a key role in both cases because of her growing economic and military power.

In a sense, the East Asian situation is a historical remnant of the past—past colonialist expansion on one hand, and past cold-War polarization on the other. The citizens of the four developmentalist states of East Asia, whose human insecurity is growing because of their respective domestic Cold Wars, must unite and develop a common perception in the region about the futility of adhering to the myth of the balance of great power rule in the past Westphalian peace system.

East Asian civil societies must move towards a post-Westphalian approach in revising regional history distorted by the Japanese's exogenous path to modernity (i.e. aggression and colonization justified by the logic of Westphalian peace based on cultural imperialism). The time is ripe to develop an alternative path beyond Westphalian peace in an age when its powers are forced to maintain a global order dominated by multinational corporations, which force the states to serve their interests as the only way to survive under the present global financial crisis.

### **Revisiting the Bandung message in this age of civilizational crisis**

We already saw that Japan had become—by her recognition of the right of peoples to live in peace—the first modern power to recognize the injustice of colonial expansion (that is bound to be accompanied by a violation of the rights of all peoples of the world to live in peace), free from fear of exogenous domination caused by the exploitation of natural resources and the labor force of respective local communities.

The present Great Japan nationalism attempts, under the leadership of Premier Abe Shinzo, to justify the aggression and violation of basic human rights and justice. Essentially, it is unacceptable to all peoples of the world, and also a serious act of betrayal against the Japanese people, who have officially recognized the mistake of the aggression and colonization committed by their leaders since the Meiji Restoration.

We already mentioned the alternative path towards a small Japan Asianism, which led some Japanese political leaders to seek the possibility for Japan to remake its history by joining the camp of the anticolonialist peoples. This was where the Bandung Conference became an important opening for Japan to join the anticolonialist countries.

Led by Takasaki Tatsunosuke, the Japanese delegation had been involved in the aggression towards China, but had also been part of the Small Japan political leaders trying to minimize the damages brought about by Japanese military expansion. Another participant, who also belonged to the Small Japan School of Thought, was the Buraku minority leader, Matsumoto Jiichiro, leader of a movement which had declared its commitment to build a world without discrimination and racism.

The Bandung Conference, which will celebrate its 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary in 2015, was indeed an historical event, unforgettable yet forgotten, in view of its civilizational implication that opens new possibilities to go beyond the West-dominated Westphalian peace.<sup>11</sup> It is often defined as a meeting of emerging new nation states who had successfully fought their anticolonial wars of liberation or had obtained their independence peacefully.

As pointed out by a unifying common experience, the Bandung Conference was not a Westphalian state-building project; it came from a much deeper sense of the injustice of colonial rule that successfully allowed them to obtain political independence; however, there is still a long way to successfully overcoming the economic and cultural aspects of Western universalist hegemony. Their message must become the basis for overcoming the past memory of the Japanese countercolonialist aggression in the regions of North and Southeast Asia. We must correctly interpret

the Bandung message, especially its non-Westphalian message that is formulated in the language of the rights of nation states.

The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence signed by Pandit Nehru and Premier Zhou En-Lai was broadened to the Ten Principles in the Declaration in Bandung. Yet the core ideas remained the same. The author of these lines remember, having been told by the members of the Indian Commission for Afro-Asian Solidarity, that the principles agreed upon by the Indian and Chinese leaders were based on the fact that both nations were composed of many nationalities and cultures under a pyramidal structure.

In India, it was the *Mandala* order with the emperor at the centre; in China, it was the *Tienxa* also united by the emperor. The two great civilizations needed to develop a united front of all anti-imperialist forces within and between them. This is why “peaceful coexistence” and “equal mutual benefits” were extremely important in leveling the two pyramidal structures, making all components within the two emerging nations agree on the principles of cultural and economic cooperation.

The Japanese delegation in Bandung was allowed to participate through the agreement of the participants to welcome a repentant Japan from the moment it dissociated itself from its aggressive militarist leadership—that violated several countries’ rights to live in peace—through the creation of a new Constitution that denounces the injustice of colonialism. Matsumoto Jiichiro was well-known for the “Levelers Declaration” of the Buraku Liberation Movement, which demanded the building of an egalitarian state within an egalitarian world.

This is where Bandung can and should be reinterpreted, in spite of its Westphalian language, to issue a message beyond the Westphalian peace system, which accepts colonial expansion outside the West. The message in East Asia is a new interpretation of the *Tienxa* regional order which will now flatten its pyramidal structure and agree to the peaceful coexistence of different domestic and international identity communities.

Besides the recognition of equality between the emerging nations, aimed at achieving their respective endogenous development, the Ten



Principles of the Bandung Declaration begin with a solemn declaration of the South's support of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We must realize the fact that this conference was an official gesture from the South for reconciliation with the North. A historical occasion which started as a process of North-South reconciliation has not yet been achieved, and is indispensable for building a new world order that is just and sustainable.

We, the Japanese, must cease to presume that our people are composed of a homogeneous unified group of people. We must realize that Japan has traditionally been a nation composed of diverse local identity communities. We must also keep a cultural tolerance towards new diaspora communities who have non-Japanese cultures and identities. The recognition of local multicultural and multiethnic pluralism in all member nations of a common home of East Asian peoples must be built by us, the citizens of East Asian nations. Such a metamorphosis is indispensable, in spite of the fact that it contradicts high national mobilization that built a total war state and facilitated Japanese, Chinese and Korean competitiveness in the neoliberal global market.

We saw that this will be possible if we accept our common historical experience of being part of the *Tienxa* of Pax Sinica. The Bandung principles agreed upon by the representatives of both pyramidal civilizations, Pax Indica and Pax Sinica, aim to develop an egalitarian cooperation in both civilizational spheres, in opposition to cultural imperialism. We, Japanese citizens, must be proud of the declaration made in the Preamble of our Constitution about Japan's full recognition of the rights of people to live in peace—in repentance of the mistake of choosing the path of modernization that imitates Western colonialism and violates the rights of our East Asian neighbors to live in peace. We must join all of them in building a common home of East Asia as part of the worldwide common front against cultural imperialism. Bandung Plus Sixty will provide us with a good occasion to redo our modern history. The present trends of a global civilizational change make it possible to go back to square one and restart our modern history by correcting our mistakes.

We believe that such a remaking of history is now possible because the emergence of the post-Westphalian trends permits and invites states and non-state actors, not only in the global South, but also in the peripheries, to return to Bandung to seek the sources for building a new regional project. This project will be based on our local cultural traditions and our civilians' historical courage to recognize past mistakes and assume the task of building a new home within the common front, in search of a new pluralistic universalism beyond the Westphalian peace system.

### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> This article is an edited version of the paper delivered as the Keynote Address at the 5<sup>th</sup> International NGO Conference on History and Peace on 22–25 July 2013 at Kyung Hee University, Seoul, Korea.
- <sup>2</sup> Japan believed that colonial power was an indispensable attribute of Great Powers in the Westphalian peace system.
- <sup>3</sup> We use here the term “myth” in its Gramscian sense, which is a concept with normative psychic force. Cf. Stephen Gill, *Power and Resistance in New World Order*, (New York and Basington, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2003), 19.
- <sup>4</sup> We discuss the ethnopolitical aspect of non-Western Great Power projects as a manifestation of “smart Occidentalism” in “Ethno-politics in Contemporary Japan: The Mutual Occlusion of Orientalism and Occidentalism,” a forthcoming article in *Proto-Sociology*.
- <sup>5</sup> The Project of Colonization was stated in the “Yu-Shu Roku” of Yoshida Shouin. On Yoshida, cf. Tokutomi Sohau, *Yoshida Shouin* (Minyu-Sha 1893), Iwanami Shoten.
- <sup>6</sup> Cf. Hatsuse Ryouhei, “Pan-Asianism in International Relations: Prewar, Postwar and Present,” in *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History*, ed. Sven Saaler, et. al. (New York and Oxon: Routledge, 2007), 233–245.
- <sup>7</sup> Cf. Chubu ESD Kyoten Suishin Kaigi ed. *Global ESD Taiwa Jigyuu Hokokusho: i-dialog* (Global ESD Dialogue Report) Chubu ESD Kyoten Suishinkaigi, 2011.
- <sup>8</sup> Cf. Kinhide Mushakoji, “*Higashi-Asia Kaihatsushugi Shokokkaniokeru Identity Seiji: Shimin-Shakai no Keiseiniokerru Ijusha Community no Yakuwari* (Identity Politics in the Developmentalist States of East Asia: the Role of the Migrant Communities in the Formation of Civil Societies),” in *Ritsumei-Kan Daigaku Jinbun-Kagaku Kenkyuujo Kiyuu*, no. 99 (2013): 133–147.
- <sup>9</sup> This three-layer World Order Model is a revised version of the model proposed by Akihiko Tanaka. Cf. Akihiko Tanaka, *Atarashii Chusei: 21 Seiki no Sekai Shisutemu*, (The New Middle-Age: The World System of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century). Nihon-Keizai Shinbun-Sha, 1996.
- <sup>10</sup> Cf. Stephen Gill, A. Clair Cutler eds., *New Constitutionalism and World Order*, Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- <sup>11</sup> Cf. Kinhide Mushakoji, “Bandung plus 50: a call for a tri-continental dialogue on global hegemony,” *Inter Asia Cultural Studies* 6:4 (2005): 510–622.

# States as Managers of International Labor Migration: The Cases of South Korea and Taiwan

Vicente Angel YBIERNAS

Assistant Professor

Department of History, De La Salle University Manila

## **Abstract**

South Korea and Taiwan became labor-receiving countries during the long economic boom of the 1980s when they transformed into Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs). Having built their economic development around labor-intensive export-oriented industries, these countries experienced a substantial need for lesser-paid foreign migrant workers, especially after local workers either refused to work in such industries or employers found labor costs too expensive. However, the recruitment of foreign workers, while solving the initial problem of labor shortage, actually generated new and more complex dilemmas along the way, including: (1) the phenomenon of irregular migrant workers and (2) the process of integrating foreign migrant workers into the fabric of domestic society, formally (in terms of immigration status) and socio culturally. The paper explores the actions taken by the South Korean and Taiwanese states since the 1980s to address these issues and avert social conflicts. Lastly, it reveals that the policies of South Korea and Taiwan towards migrant labor diverged after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.

Keywords: migrant workers; labor shortage; cheap source of labor; labor-intensive export-oriented industry; Asian Financial Crisis

## Introduction

THE 1980S ARE A MAJOR turning point in the histories of South Korea and Taiwan, marking a period when both enjoyed a prolonged economic boom and became newly industrialized countries (NICs). South Korea in particular grabbed the international limelight in 1988 with a successful hosting of the summer Olympic Games in Seoul, the first in which “eastern” and “western” bloc countries participated. The Olympics also announced South Korea’s “arrival” as an economic power and drew attention to its democratizing efforts.<sup>1</sup>

There is an abundance of literature that credit the developmental state regimes in both countries for the economic transformation (Johnson, 1985; Amsden 1989; Cheng 1990; Woo 1991; Evans 1995).<sup>2</sup> The literature, in particular, points to the shift in economic policy from import substitution industrialization (ISI) to export-oriented industrialization (EOI), which helped Taiwan and South Korea transition into New Industrialized Countries (NIC) in the 1980s.<sup>3</sup> In both cases, in the years leading to NIC-hood, EOI served a crucial purpose: economic growth led to (near or actual) full employment, which strengthened domestic political stability in the aftermath of the Kuomintang exile (1949) and the Korean War (1950–53) for Taiwan and South Korea, respectively. At any rate, EOI in both countries—largely motivated by political factors (Cheng 1990)—was fueled by labor-intensive export-oriented industries.

Because of EOI, standards of living rose as well. Native workers began to refuse employment in the export-oriented industries because of the low pay and poor working conditions (cf. below), creating a debilitating labor shortage in South Korea and Taiwan by the late 1980s. It was at that point that South Korea and Taiwan began to look at foreign workers to fill the gap and became labor-receiving countries (Park 2008, 1; Lee 2008, 1); the South Korean case is more striking because it was a labor-sending country from the 1960s to the early 1980s, sending workers mainly to the Middle East (Park, Md Nasrudin and Pitch 2005, 1).

Even as South Korea and Taiwan turned to foreigners to solve their labor shortage in key industries in the late 1980s, they did not have an existing legal framework to deal with the employment of these workers and integrate them into their respective social and political fabric. As it turned out, foreign workers seeking higher wages (in comparison to their country of origin) came to South Korea and Taiwan in droves without proper state regulation. Ultimately, there emerged the phenomenon of migrant workers, who either entered or stayed in their host countries through irregular means (Wickramasekara 2000, 1–2).

What were the actions taken by the state to remedy this situation? How did the state address labor shortage and maintain growth on the one hand, and manage the blatant inconsistencies of the (irregular) migrant worker phenomenon through immigration policies (or the absence thereof) on the other?

This matter takes on an even more crucial importance given Piyasiri Wickramasekara's (2000, 33) accurate prediction at the start of the new millennium that international labor migration to East Asia would continue to increase in the years to come. As such, this matter is not just a question of chronicling the history of migrant workers in South Korea and Taiwan from the 1980s onwards. In a broader sense, this essay also seeks to interrogate the fact that the state remains a very active force—perhaps the most viable one—in mediating the effects of economic globalization within its boundaries, especially with regard to international labor migration (Ybiernas 2013). Thus, the main issue to be tackled in this essay revolves around the role of the state in labor-receiving countries in managing the complicated phenomenon of labor migration.

Secondly, the essay also seeks to prove that it is impossible for the South Korean and Taiwanese states to serve with equal fidelity the interests of these two competing groups: those of their constituencies and those of migrant workers. It is anathema to the mandate of the state to prioritize the interests of foreign migrant workers over those of its domestic constituency, who in a democratic system (such as those that existed in

South Korea and Taiwan after 1987) can hold the state responsible for its failure to advance their welfare via periodic elections. The state, however, cannot entirely disregard the interests of the foreign migrant workers, who make substantial contributions to the economy. Failure to alleviate the onerous conditions of the sizable number of migrant workers could result in social friction and ultimately undermine the security of the state. Thus, it is in the best interest of the state to maneuver between the divergent interests of these two broadly-defined groups—its domestic constituents and foreign labor—and minimize social tensions.

### **Beginnings of the Foreign Worker Program in South Korea and Taiwan**

Taiwan in the late 1980s suffered from a chronic shortage in its low-skilled labor force (Lee 2008, 1). Lee explains that the shortage arose mainly because of the country's economic development, which generated higher incomes and educational attainment among the native workforce. They began to refuse low-skilled, low-paying jobs in crucial labor-intensive export-oriented industries, which created a labor gap that threatened the stability of an economy that was heavily dependent on this sector. This situation was also mirrored in South Korea at roughly the same time (Ybiernas 2013, 5–6).

Consequently, industries in both countries lobbied hard for the privilege to legally hire foreign workers. Joseph Lee and Su-wan Wang (1996, 281) disclose that as early as 1985, industrialists in Taiwan petitioned the government to allow the “importation” of low-skilled foreign workers and help address the burgeoning labor shortage. For the same purpose, South Korean business organizations such as the Korea Federation of Small Business (KFSB) pushed, to no avail, for the recruitment of foreign workers (Seol 2000, 116).

While the South Korean and Taiwanese states debated this matter from the mid- to late 1980s, they already had a sizeable population of

foreign workers, mostly irregular migrants. The number of foreign workers in South Korea grew rapidly from 6,409 in 1987 to 45,449 in 1991; almost all of them had no proper visa or work permits (Seol 2000, 116). Taiwan had an estimated 30,000 irregular migrants in construction and other labor-intensive industries (Lee 2008, 1). Two instances illuminate this situation further. The arrival of hundreds of Filipina household workers in the South Korean capital's posh Gangnam district was casually reported in a 1987 edition of *Dong-A Ilbo*, one of Seoul's major newspaper dailies. These household workers were irregular migrants because the government was not yet issuing work permits at the time (cf. above). In the case of Taiwan, bishops of the Chinese Regional Bishops' Conference issued a pastoral letter dated 6 February 1989. It quoted a letter sent by the foreign workers themselves to the *China Post*, which was dated 12 December 1988 and published in the daily the following day. The migrants said, "we bind ourselves into hard labor that most locals don't want" (CRBC 1989). This letter is noteworthy in so far as it proves the public character of the irregular migrant situation in the island-nation by the late 1980s.

Two factors kept the Taiwanese and South Korean governments from formulating early and decisively a legal framework that would facilitate the recruitment of foreign workers: for political reasons, they did not want to adversely affect the employment of native workers and cause social and political conflict. There was an economic reason as well; they were unsure of the true extent of the labor shortage in key labor-intensive export-oriented industries. Shu-ju Ada Cheng (2003, 172) cited a Taiwanese legislator in 1988 who opposed the "importation of foreign workers," predicting that their presence will create "social, educational and cultural problems" for the country. Moreover, Lee and Wang (1996, 282–286) illuminate these points further by identifying four key principles of Taiwan's foreign labor policies: (1) restricting the importation of foreign workers to certain industries and occupations; (2) limiting the duration of the employment of foreign workers (to prevent permanent immigration); (3) preventing the displacement of domestic workers by foreign labor; and (4) keeping foreign workers from bringing social and health problems.

Embedded in this policy statement is the vagueness with which the Taiwanese state understood the extent of the labor shortage.

South Korea took a different route in its initial attempt to solve the problem of labor shortage in key labor-intensive export-oriented industries. Even so, the South Korean state still sought to avoid a political and economic backlash from the entry of foreign workers into the country. This can be seen in the case of the *Joseonjok*, ethnic Koreans who had moved to China during the Japanese colonial period. They comprised the largest number of migrant workers to South Korea (Park, Md Nasrudin and Pitch 2005, 4). Irregular migrants, they came to the country disguised as tourists but fully intended to work. Curiously, Athukorala maintains that the state “virtually turned a blind eye to (their) violation of immigration rules” (2006, 34).

Park, Md Nasrudin and Pitch (2005, 4) explain why the South Korean state preferred the recruitment of *Joseonjok*. (1) Most of them could speak Korean fluently; (2) they could get visitor’s visas easily because of their ties in and to South Korea; and (3) Korean employers had a strong sense of nationalism and a perceived shared affinity with the *Joseonjeok*, who were thus more acceptable than other foreign workers (*ibid.*). Further analysis of the reasons for preferring the *Joseonjeok* will expose the same kind of xenophobic tendencies among the Koreans and Taiwanese.

Seol and Skrentny (2009, 153) relate that the Roh Tae-woo administration in the late 1980s was poised to grant permanent residence and citizenship to the *Joseonjok*. But China protested the move, seeing it as an affront to her sovereignty. A similar attempt was made for ethnic Koreans living in Russia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, who were known as the *Goyeoin* during the Roh administration. This too collapsed. In the late 1980s, the *Joseonjok* and *Goyeoin* working in South Korea were still considered irregular migrants.

By 1989, the Taiwanese government decided it could not continue to hold off the recruitment of foreign workers; the Fourteen Key



Construction Project, a major public project that began in 1985, ran into a serious labor shortage problem (Liu 1994). Thus, the government decreed that migrant laborers on the said project would be given a one-year work permit, with the possibility of extension for another year (Lee 2008, 1). Clearly, Taiwanese anxiety over opening the gates for foreign workers had not abated; the state wanted to take the conservative route in the matter. Nevertheless, Taiwan had a headstart on South Korea, which had yet to establish a legal framework to bring in foreign workers after the *Joseonjok/Goyeoin* debacle.

Evidently, the South Korean and Taiwanese states were unsure to what extent the labor force needed migrant workers, which explains why their steps appeared to be slow, clumsy even. Thus, the proposition that the state's primary motives for allowing foreign labor stemmed from the need to shore up the labor supply was still valid at that point. And this held true until Taiwan implemented the Employment Services Act (ESA) in 1992, and South Korea enforced the Industrial Training Program for Joint Ventures (JVTP) in 1991 and the Industrial Technical Training Program for foreigners (ITTP) in 1993. By the time these programs got off the ground, recruiting migrant workers had become a remedy for the labor shortage in key labor-intensive export-oriented industries and a source of cheap labor. This became so despite the Taiwanese state's valiant efforts to prevent the latter from occurring. The Korean state was a bit more disingenuous in the labor-shortage-versus-cheap labor debate (see below).

The initial implementation of the ESA in Taiwan, when a limited number of industries were allowed to recruit foreign workers, was only meant to address the labor shortage in key labor-intensive export-oriented industries (Cheng 2004, 98). Afterwards, the ESA evolved to become a legal mechanism that brought cheap foreign labor into Taiwan and help capitalists lower wages, albeit on a more modest scale than in South Korea. Majority of Taiwanese businesses had traditionally consisted of "family owned small and medium-sized enterprises that could rely on flexible business strategies to find new niches in the international market" (Kaneko 2009, 24). These Taiwanese export-oriented manufacturing companies

started to feel the heat from rising competition from mainland China and Southeast Asia, where cheaper goods were being produced and exported.

Philip Liu (1994) chronicles how this phenomenon came about between 1989 and 1994 when the policy on foreign workers was initially reviewed. As mentioned, the first official and legal channel for hiring foreign workers opened in 1989 under the government's Fourteen Major Construction Projects. Two years later, the Council of Labor Affairs (CLA) also allowed foreign workers in public infrastructure projects under the Six-Year National Development Plan. Moreover, private companies in a number of industries—construction, textiles, basic metals, metal products, machinery equipment, and power and electronic equipment—received the go-signal to employ foreign laborers. At the same time, other industries experiencing a labor shortage, including fabric dyeing and electrical plating, also obtained permission to hire a limited number of foreign workers. In 1992, the CLA further approved overseas hiring for private firms in key export and manufacturing industries, such as textiles, plastics, and tires (*ibid.*). Later in the year, the government allowed the entry of foreign housekeepers and nannies. The following year, in 1993, businesses engaged in factory expansion or opening new factories with an investment value of more than US\$1.1 million were given permission to hire migrant labor. In sum, around 210,000 foreign workers were approved for employment before the hiring quotas set by the government were capped; of the said figure, roughly two-thirds came in 1994 alone.

A similar story, albeit with different details, may be seen in South Korea. As mentioned, after the collapse of the moves to grant the *Joseonjeok* and *Goyeoin* citizenship, the South Korean state established the Industrial Training Program for Joint Ventures (JVTP) in 1991 as a legal framework that allowed foreign workers in South Korea. Following the example of a similar program in Japan, the JVTP allowed South Korean firms with foreign affiliates to recruit a small number of “trainees” for a six-month period, which could be extended by another six months subject to approval by the Ministry of Justice. Later, even companies without

foreign affiliates were given access to the pool of foreign trainees under the ITTP (Seol 2000, 117). With the implementation of the JVTP and ITTP, the South Korean government simultaneously offered an amnesty program for irregular migrants. Under this program, Korean businesses would exchange their supply of irregular migrant workers for a fresh batch of ITTP trainees. However, as the number of trainees did not match the demand among small and medium enterprises, the demand for irregular migrant workers did not diminish.

More than its failure to replace irregular migrant workers, the JVTP/ITTP formula was fundamentally flawed and disingenuous; it brought in “disguised” workers who were given “allowances” roughly half the wages of irregular migrants in the labor market (Ignacio-Esteban 2000, 27). This crude exploitative move to introduce foreign labor into the market led to the desertion of around 60 percent of trainees who eventually became irregular migrants (Lim 2002, 17). Finally, as Seol (2000, 117) almost apologetically explains, the South Korean government, in a desperate attempt to alleviate the labor shortage, indirectly allowed small and medium enterprises to employ irregular workers and provided numerous extensions to the deadline to report these fugitives. This alleviation was done through “temporary legalization” or “legalizing in times of crisis.”

As the status of foreign workers changed to being a source of cheap labor to being a solution to a labor shortage, Taiwan developed a distinct advantage over South Korea. Conceivably, Taiwanese labor unions felt threatened by the influx of cheap foreign labor. Even as Taiwan accepted foreign workers for the 1989 Fourteen Key Construction Project, the authoritarian Kuomintang regime, through various legal and extralegal measures, “ensure(d) labor quiescence” to state corporatist control in Taiwan (Ho 2006, 107). The government effectively pushed through with the recruitment of foreign workers despite “strong opposition” from “politically-weak” labor and aboriginal groups (Cheng 2004, 95). Of course, in comparison with the JVTP/ITTP formula, Taiwan’s ESA, with its recruitment caps and other control mechanisms, was not entirely an unabashed attempt at introducing cheap labor into Taiwan.

### Impulses of the State

The initial impulse of the state in South Korea and Taiwan during the late 1980s/early 1990s was simple: it needed to address a labor shortage in and provide cheap labor for export-oriented industries; it gave little thought to the interests of the foreign workers. In this sense, according to Peter Evans' (1995, 78) typology of the roles of the state, the South Korean and Taiwanese states served as a custodian, regulating the flow of foreign workers to ease gaps in labor supply and lower its costs.

At the same time, an important matter that needs to be raised is the accommodation of foreign workers as migrants in South Korea and Taiwan. To start off, both nations essentially were non-immigrant countries, that is, they accommodated foreign "guest workers" but expected them to leave after a certain period. Permanent settlement was out of the question. According to Seol (2005b, 78), non-immigrant countries like South Korea, Taiwan (and Japan and Germany) can be contrasted with "countries of immigration" such as the United States, Canada, and Australia, and with countries that "reluctantly" receive immigrants like France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. In the latter two categories, the countries distinguish between immigrants and temporary migrant workers. The immigrants and temporary migrant workers are segregated using legal mechanisms such as immigration law and work permits, among others. Thus, one can start off as a temporary migrant worker in Canada and eventually end up as an immigrant/permanent resident. In the case of South Korea and Taiwan, no such progression of status was possible; a foreign worker was simply a guest worker in those countries.

Furthermore, South Korea and Taiwan fell under the category of the "exclusionary model" of international labor migration (Castles and Miller 2003, 249–252, as cited in Seol 2005b, 78). The exclusionary model admits foreign workers only in limited sectors of the economy, in this case the key labor-intensive export-oriented industries, and not in social, civic, political, and cultural arenas. It can be contrasted with the assimilationist and multicultural models, which either seek to integrate foreign workers

into mainstream society from linguistic, cultural and social standpoints (assimilationist) or promote the coexistence between migrant groups and mainstream society. This issue is also related to the foundations of citizenship in South Korea and Taiwan. Both countries follow the principle of *jus sanguinis* or “blood” ties to the nation, whereas other nations base citizenship on *jus soli*, which bases citizenship on the person’s birthplace, or on *jus domicili* or residency (for a certain period of time).

The principle of *jus sanguinis* guides the essence of South Korea’s and Taiwan’s initial attitudes towards foreign laborers. Migrant workers were needed to address a labor shortage in key labor-intensive export-oriented industries, nothing more. It was thus not necessary for them to be sewn into the main fabric of society from a political, civic, and sociocultural standpoint. Lastly, they were not to be made permanent residents or citizens. It is in this context that the evolution of the migrant worker situation in both countries, as seen in the next section, must be understood. It also helps explain why the migrant worker situation from the mid-1990s onwards in both countries became very volatile; there was a growing perception, accurate in most cases, that the system in both countries—especially when the recruitment of foreign workers escalated in the mid-1990s—was set up to exploit the migrant worker through and through. This in turn triggered a certain degree of militancy among the migrant workers, thereby disrupting the status quo.

### Escalation

After overcoming initial resistance by domestic interest groups like trade unions to the recruitment of foreign workers, the South Korean and Taiwanese governments wasted no time in expanding their respective foreign worker programs (FWP). In Taiwan, the number of foreign workers grew from 15,924 in 1992 to 248,396 in 1997 (Tsai and Hsiao 2006, Table no. 1, 6). As the figures come from official sources, they do not include irregular migrants. According to Lee and Wang (1996, 282), the number of irregular migrants could rival those of foreign workers recruited

using official channels; thus, if irregular migrants are included, the total number of foreign workers in Taiwan in 1996 would increase to 450,000 (cited in *China Times Express*, 13 February 1996, 4); it might be recalled that Liu's (1994) figure for regular migrant workers in 1994 was 210,000.

Apart from the rise in the number of irregular migrants, Taiwan shifted its objectives vis-à-vis their foreign worker program (Lee 2008, 7–8). The original goal of the FWP was to ease the labor shortage in public construction projects and labor-intensive industries, and data shows that as of 1997, about two-thirds of foreign workers in Taiwan were actually employed in manufacturing. Two-thirds of these workers in manufacturing worked for labor-intensive jobs, and the other third did so in capital- and technology-intensive occupations. By the late 1990s, Taiwan's industrial policy gradually moved away from labor-intensive to capital- and technology-intensive industries. Naturally, the demand for foreign workers shifted from the former to the latter. Recruitment pattern for foreign workers followed suit.

In South Korea, labor-intensive export-oriented industries employed foreign workers—whether irregular migrants or not—to keep labor costs down or address a labor shortage, depending on which source one consults. In a survey of Korean business owners in the mid-1990s, 59 percent believed that paying native workers higher wages would solve the labor shortage (Abella and Park 1994, 75, as cited in Seol 2005a, 4). Other solutions included “extending extra work hours of the existing workers” (44 percent); “adopting labor-saving manufacturing technology” (36 percent); “employment of foreign labor” (20 percent) [*ibid.*]. A different survey by the Labor Ministry provided answers to why small- and medium-sized businesses hired migrant workers: 82 percent answered “inability to find indigenous workers.” This bolstered the labor shortage thesis; “low wage level” according to 46 percent of the respondents; “high productivity” (24 percent); and “low turnover rates” (24 percent) [Song and Seol 2001, 113–114, as cited in Seol 2005a, 4–5]. A third survey found different reasons why businesses employed migrant workers. “[T]he wage level is

too low for indigenous workers,” said 78 percent; “working condition is too poor to hire indigenous workers” (59 percent); and “labor intensity is too high for indigenous workers” (32 percent)[Song and Seol 2001, 114–115, as cited in Seol 2005a, 4–5].

Dong-hoon Seol (2005a, 10) clarifies the perception that the trade unions *remained* opposed to migrant workers. He reveals that, in a survey conducted by the Central Institute of the Federation of Korean Trade Unions in October 1995 (Uh and Kwon 1995, 82, cited in *ibid.*), the trade unions viewed migrant labor as a supplement to the native workers’ jobs. Moreover, companies in Korea presented their plans to hire migrant workers during labor-management meetings, to which the unions gave their provisional assent, with the proviso that it did not infringe on job security or working conditions of their members.

Nevertheless, whether by design or not, government policy, it may be argued, encouraged the growth of irregular migrants in Taiwan during the late 1990s. For instance, while it was illegal for foreign laborers to work without a government permit, there was no penalty for Taiwanese employers who hired—knowingly or not—irregular migrant workers. Furthermore, there was no legislation to prosecute businesses that did so. Instead, the irregular migrants were “permitted” to stay in Taiwan and work in construction and manufacturing, as well as in households (Liu 1996, 609). Worse, foreign workers were abused and exploited by third-party labor recruiters who lured them to Taiwan with the promise of employment, but left out important details during the recruitment process. When the workers arrived in Taiwan, their employers withheld their passports and deducted a portion of their wages as “finder’s fees.” This did not include brokerage fees for third-party recruiters. To cap it all off, the workers would later discover that their actual jobs, wages, and living conditions were not what they were originally promised. Through it all, the Taiwanese government did not see it fit to intervene and punish those who abused and exploited the foreign workers.

Many of these stories had their counterparts in South Korea. The actions of the South Korean state moved “between strategic ambivalence and systematic exploitation” (Ybiernas 2013, 1). On the one hand, the state was generally ambivalent towards the legal implications of the irregular migrant phenomenon in so far as this served to lower the cost of labor through wages or “allowances” in the case of the ITTP trainees (6–8). Systematic exploitation, on the other hand, manifested itself, whether willful or not, in the actions of private entities like the Korea International Training Cooperation Corps (KITCO), the Korea Federation of Small Businesses (KFSB), the Korea Fisheries Federation, and the Korea Construction Federation, who were given public franchises to recruit trainees under the ITTP on their own (9). As in Taiwan, these private entities were accused of partnering with third-party recruiters who collected exorbitant brokerage fees from the trainees. There were also similar reports of passport confiscation and misrepresentation of jobs, wages, and living arrangements in Korea.

Despite the onerous circumstances, the plight of foreign workers in South Korea and Taiwan had not yet *found* its way into public consciousness, partially because their migrant worker population was relatively small. Indeed, foreign workers in South Korea and Taiwan, as newly minted labor-receiving countries, accounted for only 3 percent of the total labor force by the middle of the 1990s (Athukorala 2006, 20). In contrast, in other more established labor-receiving states in East and Southeast Asia such as Hong Kong and Singapore, the ratio was more than 20 percent and 10 percent, respectively, of the total labor force. This partially explains why the migrant labor situation did not become a national controversy in Taiwan and South Korea before the new millennium despite the efforts of the migrants themselves and non-government organizations (NGOs) that supported them (Tsai and Hsiao 2006, 8).<sup>4</sup>



## Divergence

The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) split South Korea and Taiwan into two divergent paths in relation to the question of labor migration. While South Korea was hit hard by the crisis, Taiwan escaped relatively unscathed (Kil 2004). South Korea had to be bailed out by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which prescribed a set of structural reforms that put the Korean economy in line with the so-called Washington Consensus as a pre-condition for the “rescue.” These neoliberal reforms, including “austere fiscal and financial policies, introduction of a floating exchange rate system, complete liberalization of the capital market, and abolition of the import source diversification system” (Kim 2000, n.p.), practically meant dismantling the developmental state in South Korea.

In the post-AFC turmoil, many highly paid Korean workers lost their jobs as firms restructured their operations in response to the liberalization of the national economy; in effect, the gap between the wages of native and migrant workers narrowed. However, the financial crisis merely exacerbated the drastic effects of neoliberal reforms that had been implemented as early as the 1980s which “abolished the economic security of the working and middle classes, primarily by eliminating stable, long-term employment” (Hyun Ok Park 2005, 79) and created the need for migrant workers in the first place. Thus, even when Koreans faced the specter of unemployment during the post-crisis period, many still refused to seek jobs in manufacturing. This finally clarified for the state a dilemma that had befuddled it from the start: the extent to which the economy needed the migrant workers. It became clear that native workers were never going to find work in the manufacturing sector again. It had turned into a permanent enclave of migrant workers.

This clarified for the government the niche of migrant workers in the economy. And with mass media, NGOs, and even international organizations such as the International Labor Organization (ILO) focusing on the migrant workers especially after the 1995 sit-down protest at the Myeong-dong Catholic Cathedral,<sup>5</sup> South Korea began to seriously look

at migrant workers as important national stakeholders; as Wickramasekera (2000) pointed out, the migrant workers were not going to go away in the near future; in fact, they were projected to grow in numbers—and they did. Because of the Myeong-dong protest, for example, the Ministry of Labor announced the formulation of “A Measure Pertaining to the Protection and Control of Foreign Industrial and Technical Trainees.” This was a recognition, finally, that migrant workers needed to work in better conditions (Seol 2000, 10). Further proof of some government sympathy towards the migrant workers came from court decisions in a number of landmark cases, which proved instrumental in altering the plight of migrant workers in South Korea. According to Lim (2002, 20–21) these changes began with a 1993 decision by the Seoul Superior Court (Case No. 93 Ku 16774), which granted irregular migrants the privilege to receive compensation for industrial injuries. Another case decided by the Seoul Supreme Court in 1997 (Case No. 97 Ta 18875) affirmed that migrant workers are entitled to severance pay. Finally, because of successive court decisions, the Ministry of Labor on 14 October 1998 gave irregular migrants the same protection under the Labor Standards Act as native workers.

Nevertheless, initial moves to pass legislation to employ foreign workers not as trainees or disguised employees in 1997 were overtaken by the severity of the Asian Financial Crisis. President Kim Dae-jung pushed to rectify the onerous conditions of the trainees in South Korea with the Working After Training Program for foreigners (WATP), which allowed the trainees to become full-fledged migrant workers from 1998 onwards (Hasan n.d., 4–5; Seol 2000, 10). Even so, between 1998 and 2003, when the Employment of Foreign Workers Act (EFWA) was promulgated, there was still a residual effect of the now-debunked traditional perspective on foreign workers (solution to the labor shortage). In 2001, an earlier version of the EFWA did not make it past the National Assembly. Lee Yong-wook (2004, 7) explained that the measure was blocked by the Assembly because of “economic downturns,” hinting anew that the matter of foreign migrant workers was primarily an economic issue, perpetuating

the guest-worker framework of the 1980s. The EFWA eventually became law during the presidency of Roh Moo-hyun on 31 July 2003, and went into effect in August 2004. The law allowed for a transition period between the EFWA and the earlier JWTP-IITP-WATP system until the latter's phase-out that started on 1 January 2007.

In Taiwan, the development in migrant worker rights after the passage of the ESA in 1992 was rather flat despite the radical increase in the number of migrant workers in the island-nation. Joseph Lee (2008, 3–5) enumerates the general principles of Taiwan's foreign worker program according to the ESA: (1) the foreign workers merely supplement the native labor force; (2) the foreign workers are guest workers; (3) the recruitment of foreign workers cannot impede the industrial and economic development of Taiwan; (4) foreign workers will keep social costs to a minimum—i.e., workers cannot bring their family with them; they cannot marry and raise a family in Taiwan; female workers cannot get pregnant or they will be deported; foreign workers will be deported if they commit a crime, even a minor one; (5) there is no on-site change in status for irregular migrants; (6) only a specific set of source-countries of the migrant workers are allowed.

Since 1992, there have only been minor changes to these general principles. In fact, only the provision concerning pregnant workers has been changed by the authorities. Nevertheless, other regulations in the ESA have been relaxed, for better or for worse since 1992. For instance, in order to stay true to the supplementary character of the migrant workers, the authorities insisted that the migrant workers receive the same minimum wage as the locals; in that way, the migrant workers cannot—in theory—be a source of cheaper labor and replace the native workers in the labor force. However, by the late 1990s, employers were allowed to deduct from the migrant workers' wages the cost of their room and board, subject to a hard cap or ceiling of NT\$ 4,000 per month (Lee 2008, 8–9).

In 2006, another rule altered the migrant worker landscape in Taiwan. This was the provision lifting the cap on foreign healthcare workers, who

were mostly caregivers. The new policy transformed the distribution patterns of foreign migrant workers in Taiwan according to industry. Policy dictates that all foreign workers in the island-state should not be more than 3.26 percent of the total labor force (*ibid.*, 9). But because the cap on healthcare employees was lifted, the caregivers accounted for 40 percent of all foreign workers in Taiwan (*ibid.*). Clearly, even as the Korean foreign worker program was gaining sophistication and cosmopolitanism (mainly in the judicial branch, *cf.* above) from the 1980s to the 1990s, the Taiwanese version stuck to its 1992 agenda, give or take a few minor concessions towards the migrant workers.

A sore point in the case of South Korean moves toward cosmopolitanism, however, has been the harsh treatment of irregular migrants by law enforcement post-EFWA. After the EFWA was passed, South Korea virtually implemented a zero-tolerance policy towards irregular migrants. Of course, the state knew where the irregular migrants were from the very beginning; the state simply chose to ignore them—to be ambivalent to their existence—when it suited the economic situation. With the EFWA in place, there was no longer any reason to tolerate irregular migrants; they were arrested in public places like the workplace, streets, transportation terminals, markets, and even in private places like homes of the migrant workers. A high-profile arrest was made on 8 October 2009 involving Minod Moktan, an irregular migrant, a famous Nepalese migrant worker rights activist, and an 18-year resident of South Korea. He was arrested in the backyard of the Migrant Workers Television offices in Seoul. The event was described as “a media production group organized by migrant workers in 2004 to communicate migrants’ human rights issues and to promote the right to know” (Lee 2013, 2615). And symbolic of the state’s resolve to eradicate irregular migrants no matter their fame, it also conveyed the message that the state was unfazed by any organizational support the irregular migrants had; the state was determined to enforce the law.

Another blow to South Korean cosmopolitanism was the fire that hit the foreigner detention centre at the Yeosu Immigration Office in

Southern Jeolla province on 11 February 2007. At the time of the fire, around 55 migrant workers—including 42 Chinese, four Uzbeks, two Sri Lankans, and two Kazakhs—were in the security facility. According to reports, when the fire broke out, the alarm and sprinkler systems did not work. Worst of all, the officers of the facility “did not unlock the cell door out of fear that the migrant workers would attempt to escape” (Asian Human Rights Commission 2007). Of the 55 detainees, 10 were killed, 17 injured and the rest suffered from superficial wounds. The Korean authorities supposedly kept the incident from the victims’ families and conducted an autopsy examination without notification of, or permission from, the latter. The authorities were also said to have handcuffed three of the injured workers in the hospital to prevent them from escaping.

These harrowing stories, however, do not detract from the efforts by South Korea to embrace the concept of multiculturalism. Jasmine Lee, a Filipina widow of a Korean national, has become the most important symbol of South Korean multiculturalism; she was elected to the National Assembly through proportional representation. According to a government-run website under the Korea Culture and Information Service, Lee’s election was proof of “the increasing diversity of South Korean society” and an indication that “South Korea is indeed embracing foreigners as members of society” (Korea.net 2012). Still, multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism in South Korea are experiencing tremendous “growth pains” (Kang 2013). South Korea is still not a signatory to the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. Taiwan is constrained by its relations with the People’s Republic of China in signing any international covenant; nevertheless, given Taiwan’s track record, it might not be a signatory to the agreement even if it were free to become one. Nevertheless, compared to the situation in Taiwan, the South Korean case has shown much promise, although a lot of improvement is still needed.

## Conclusion

What a difference 20 years makes in South Korea! In Taiwan, in contrast, nothing much has changed over the past two decades. This divergence reflects how the states of both countries managed issues—old and new—created by the rise of the migrant worker phenomenon. Although it may be more difficult to assess the effectiveness of both states in handling the multifaceted impact of migrant-worker matters, it has seemed easier to explain their motivations in responding to such challenges. In a way, both states have directed the “problem” of the migrant worker phenomenon towards their desired path. The Taiwanese government, faced with the astounding rise of migrant laborers, has largely identified and confined them to the role of guest worker since the 1980s.

South Korea surprisingly took a different path in the mid-1990s. From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, exploitation was the primary impulse to hiring foreign labor. This initial attitude was brought about by the inability to determine how much South Korea needed migrant workers. Not until after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 did Seoul clarify the role of foreign labor in the Korean economy. Such a realization and acceptance paved the way for a firm evolution of policy vis-a-vis (irregular) migrant labor. Especially after the EFWA standards were clarified, conflict between employers and migrant worker had been reduced. There are growing pains to be sure, and the process will take a very long time to complete, but it is becoming apparent that South Korea is moving towards multiculturalism in reality, not just in rhetoric.

Why haven't we seen the same kind of evolution in Taiwan? To an extent, the Asian Financial Crisis has also shown how stable the Taiwanese economy is. This stability allows the state to set a specific role for migrant workers in that country, a role that has not changed much in 20 years since the promulgation of the ESA. Another way of looking at it is that the steadfastness of the state towards the migrant worker situation in Taiwan, especially setting a cap on the numerical impact of migrant workers in the labor force, may have contributed to this stability as well.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> The Seoul Olympics at a cost of US\$ 4 billion was the sixth most expensive holding of the Games, the fifth most expensive of the Summer edition and had been costliest when it was held in 1988 (Fils 2013).
- <sup>2</sup> In light, however, of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, David Kang (2002) has questioned the *purposive* role of the developmental state in the economic transformation of South Korea.
- <sup>3</sup> Tung-jen Cheng (1990) tried to differentiate between specific economic policies in South Korea (i.e., heavy and chemical industrialization or HCI) and Taiwan (i.e., emphasis on small and medium-scale enterprises or SMEs), but conceding, nonetheless, the central role of the developmental state in the success in both instances. Meredith Jung-en Woo (1991) clarifies that in the case of South Korea, HCI was a way of deepening EOI orientation.
- <sup>4</sup> This does not mean, however, that the migrant workers were left alone to contemplate their fate and fight for their universal rights as workers. According to Seol (2005a, 11), media attention was first attracted by the migrant workers in May 1992 when a Filipino priest celebrated Mass in Tagalog at Jayang-dong Catholic Church in the Gwangjin district of Seoul. A more political episode came when a handful of migrant, mostly from South Asia, staged a sit-down protest in front of a Catholic church in the famous tourism and shopping district of Myeong-dong. The Myeong-dong protest served as the key impetus to the establishment of the Joint Committee for Migrant Workers Korea (JCMK), which was described as “a coalition of NGOs involved in supporting migrant workers that has taken a leading role in the promotion of a new legal framework for the employment of migrant workers” (Gray 2006, 382). In Taiwan, as Tsai and Hsiao (2006, 14) have shown, the earliest NGOs providing support and assistance to migrant workers are Catholic organizations: the Stella Maris International Service Center in Kaohsiung City and the Hope Workers’ Center. Other early support organizations concentrated on the plight of irregular migrants in Taiwan’s fishing industry. These include M. R. Lin, who set up the Fisherman’s Concerns Desk with help from the Presbyterian Church of the island in November 1985. A couple of years later, the Fisherman Services Center Committee was established and over the years it has provided assistance to over 4,000 cases annually. The Hope Workers’ Center, on the other hand, was established by St. Columban missionaries in 1986. Its main purpose is to help foreign workers adjust to life in Taiwan.
- <sup>5</sup> The Myeong-dong protest inspired the establishment of the JCMK (Gray 2006). The JCMK’s advocacy centered on the replacement of the ITTP with a Labor Permit System (LPS) that would recognize the migrants as workers.

## References

- Amsden, Alice. 1989. *Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Asian Human Rights Commission. 2007. "South Korea: Fire kills and injures 55 migrant workers in foreigner detention centre." 19 March. <http://www.humanrights.asia/news/urgent-appeals/UA-089-2007>.
- Athukorala, Prema-chandra. 2006. "International Labour Migration in East Asia: Trends, Patterns and Policy Issues." *Asian-Pacific Economic Literature* 20 (1): 18–39. Doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8411.2006.00176.x.
- Castles, Stephen, Magdalena Arias Cubas, Chulhyo Kim and Derya Ozkul. 2012. "Irregular Migration: Causes, Patterns and Strategies." In *Global Perspectives on Migration and Development: GMFD Puerto Vallarta and Beyond*, edited by Irene Omelaniuk, 117–152. New York: Springer.
- Cheng, Lucie. 2004. "Transnational Labor, Citizenship and the Taiwan State." In *East Asian Law: Universal Norms and Local Cultures*, edited by Lucie Cheng, Arthur Rosett and Margaret Woo, 85–105. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Cheng, Shu-ju Ada. 2003. "Rethinking the Globalization of Domestic Service: Foreign Domestic Workers, State Control, and the Politics of Identity in Taiwan." *Gender & Society* 17 (2): 166–186.
- Cheng, Tuin-jen. 1990. "Political Regimes and Development Strategies: South Korea and Taiwan." In *Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia*, edited by Gary Gereffi and Donald L. Wyman, 139–178. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- CRBC (Chinese Regional Bishops Conference). 1989. "On the Question of Foreign Workers." 6 February. <http://www.catholic.org.tw/en/Document/documentquestion.html>.
- Evans, Peter B. 1995. *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Fils, Rob. 2013. "1988 Summer Olympics: Seoul, South Korea: \$4 Billion." *The Richest*, 7 November. <http://www.therichest.com/sports/top-10-most-expensive-olympics-ever/5/>
- Hasan, Sarah. n.d. *Labour Migration to South Korea: Policies and Problems Related to Illegal Workers*. [http://congress.aks.ac.kr/korean/files/2\\_1357629284.pdf](http://congress.aks.ac.kr/korean/files/2_1357629284.pdf)
- Ho, Ming-sho. 2006. "Challenging State Corporatism: The Politics of Taiwan's Labor Federation Movement." *The China Journal* 56: 107–27.
- Ignacio-Esteban, Ma. Angelina. 2000. "The Dynamics of Illegal Migration: The Philippines-South Korea Case." Master's Thesis, School of Public Policy and Management, Korean Development Institute.



- Johnson, Chalmers. 1985. *Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan*. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California.
- Kil, Joon S. 2004. "Korea, Taiwan, and the Asian Financial Crisis: Domestic Institutional Differences and Impact of External Pressure for Liberalization." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania.
- Kang, David. 2002. *Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines*. Cambridge University Press.
- Kang, Tae-jun. 2013. "Korea's Growing Multi-Cultural Pains." *The Diplomat*, August 20.
- Korea.net. 2012. "Korea goes multicultural." 8 May. Korea.net. <http://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/Society/view?articleId=100308>.
- Kim, Kwan S. 2000. *The 1997 Financial Crisis and Governance: The Case of South Korea*. The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies.
- Lee, Joseph S. 2008. *The Admission of Foreign Labour and its Impact on the Labour Market in Taiwan, Province of China*. Bangkok: ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, Asian Regional Program on Governance of Labour Migration.
- Lee, Joseph S and Su-Wan Wang. 1996. "Recruiting and Managing Foreign Workers in Taiwan." *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 5 (2-3): 281-301.
- Lee, Hun-yul. 2013. "Bonding and Bridging Migrant Workers to Korean Society: A Study of Migrant Workers' Television as a CounterpublicSphere." *International Journal of Communication* 7: 2609-2629.
- Lee, Yong-wook. 2004. "The Evolution of Korean Foreign Labor Policies in the Global Context: Toward the Politics of Societal (In)security?" Paper presented at the *Korea and Global Migration Conference*. Los Angeles, California, United States of America.
- Lim, Timothy C. 2002. "The Changing Face of South Korea: The Emergence of Korea as a 'Land of Immigration.'" *The Korea Society Quarterly* 3 (2/3): 16-21.
- Liu, Philip. 1994. "Pulling Up the Welcoming Mat?" *Taiwan Today*, 1 November.
- Park, Hyun-ok. 2005. *Democracy, History, and Migrant Labor in South Korea: Korean Chinese, North Koreans, and Guest Workers*. Working Series Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University.
- Park, Tae-gyun, Md Akhir, Md Nasrudin, and Pongsawat Pitch. 2005. *Orientalization in the Orient: Illegal Asian Workers in Korea, Malaysia and Thailand*. Association of Pacific Rim Universities.
- Park, Young-bum. 2008. *Admission of Foreign Workers as Trainees in Korea*. Bangkok: ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, Asian Regional Program on Governance of Labour Migration.

- Seol, Dong-hoon. 2005b. "Global Dimensions in Mapping the Foreign Labor Policies of Korea: A Comparative and Functional Analysis." *Development and Society* 34 (1): 75–124.
- Seol, Dong-hoon. 2000. "Foreign Workers in Korea: Issues and Discussions." *Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies* 15 (1): 115–138.
- Wickramasekara, Piyasiri. 2000. *Asian Labour Migration: Issues and Challenges in an Era of Globalization*. Geneva, Switzerland: International Migration Programme, Bureau of Workers Activities, International Labour Office.
- Woo, Jung-en. 1991. *Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Ybiernas, Vicente Angel S. 2013. "Migrant Workers in South Korea: Between Strategic Ambivalence and Systematic Exploitation." *Social Science Diliman* 9 (1): 1–19.

# Remembering the Great Ancestors: Images of Japanese Emigrants from the Perspective of Third- and Fourth-Generation Philippine *Nikkeijin* in Japan

Ron Bridget VILOG

Associate Professor, International Studies Department  
De La Salle University Manila

## Abstract

The term *nikkeijin* refers to the descendants of Japanese emigrants who arrived in the Philippines before 1945 or in the aftermath of the Second World War. After the war, anti-Japanese sentiment within and outside the Philippines heightened. As a result, first- and second-generation *nikkeijin* sought to conceal their identities and destroy all documents revealing their Japanese blood. The third- and fourth-generation (*sansei* and *yonsei*) *nikkeijin*, in contrast, lived in the decades of Japan's rise as an economic giant. This was an epoch of technological and cultural fame as younger generations of Filipinos excitedly consumed popular culture produced by, and in the homeland of, their former invader. In spite of the country's current stature, however, the *nikkeijin* live in a society in which Japan's wartime role highlights the antagonistic images of the Japanese soldiers.

Utilizing the narratives of the *sansei* and *yonsei*, this paper reveals how these third- and fourth-generation *nikkeijin* portray their Japanese ancestors who lived in the Philippines before, during, or after the Second World War. Amidst the discourses of Japan's aggressiveness, *nikkeijin* provide an alternative view, emphasizing the heroic,

benevolent, and even victimized images of their forefathers. This positive view of their ancestors, I argue, is neither a manifestation of Japanese identity nor of nationalist predispositions. Instead, *nikkeijin* find an opportunity to expose a counternarrative that has been kept from earlier generations, with hopes that these alternative discourses may promote further social acceptance of their histories and ancestral legacies, thereby enhancing their integration to the Philippine society.

Keywords: Filipino *nikkeijin*, *sansei*, *yonseï*, Japanese ancestors

## Introduction

WHILE THEY ARE KNOWN as *Hapon* (Japanese) in their respective communities, third-generation (*sanseï*) and fourth-generation (*yonseï*) *nikkeijin* see themselves as genuine Filipinos. Indeed, they embrace deeply ingrained Filipino values, traditions and beliefs, a mark of successful cultural socialization and integration in their homeland. Nevertheless, they also reveal their connections to Japan through their narratives about their ancestors—candid accounts of the legacies and valor of wartime Japanese. These narratives, which encompass stories passed from their forefathers, are entwined with the cultural perception and identities of the *nikkeijin* narrators.

How do Philippine *nikkeijin* present their ancestral narratives to a Filipino audience exposed to the historical issues of widespread wartime iniquities of the Japanese occupation? With this question, I examined the accounts of the third- and fourth-generation *nikkeijin* that dealt with the lives and legacies of their ancestors, the so-called “*dekasegi*” emigrants who left their impoverished communities in Japan, worked and settled in the Philippines, and eventually became victims of the anti-Japanese sentiment during and after the war. Examined through thematic and content analysis, this paper argues that the narratives of the *sanseï* and *yonseï* *nikkeijin* deliberately attempt to emphasize in wartime memoirs the marginalization of unpopular and untold accounts of early Japanese emigrants. Determined to voice out their “unspoken truths,” *nikkeijin* offer alternatives to the popular narratives in order to promote further social

acceptance of their ethnic identities and legacies. Inspired by Kinoshita's (2003) dissertation about "Storied Identities," this article applies the concept formulated by Cindy Kobayashi Mackey in understanding the narratives of the Japanese in Hawaii. These narratives are "an outcome of a constructive process in which Japanese Americans fictionalize stories but justify them as real by emphasizing the role of human agency in making the stories" (Mackey, quoted by Kinoshita 2003, 5). The stories were seemingly manipulated, but the storytellers entirely believed that they are speaking of reality. Similarly, the author treats the narratives in this present study as 'reconstructed' realities, which have been subjected to contextualized modifications after passing through generations of Philippine *nikkeijin*. The stories told by the *sansei* and *yonsei nikkeijin* are artifacts shaped by their interactions with the Filipino and Japanese audience, responses to what they think are their audience's thoughts, and meanings incurred during socialization and cultural contact.

Kinoshita's framework is relevant to my study because of the contextual similarities of our research subjects. In Kinoshita's work, the sources of the narratives are the Japanese American elderly in Puna who expressed their thoughts and memories for a meaningful purpose.

The remaining Japanese American elderly, knowing that their memories of the plantation may be headed to oblivion, remember and talk about the plantation experience whenever they find an opportunity at church activities, senior citizens clubs, funerals, community festivals, family reunions, school reunions, or plantation camp reunions. They also consent to interviews conducted by researchers from high schools and universities. Their incentives for telling about their plantation experience vary one to another. Some just wish to feel nostalgic, while others seriously seek to leave a history to their offspring as proof of their existence, and still others tell their stories as part of socializing with friends and acquaintances who share similar experiences. (Kinoshita 2003, 17)

Likewise, my interviewees spoke about historical matters that seem to be reconstructions, as these are passed from generation to generation. They wanted to narrate the lives of their ancestors because they also fear that such accounts risk being forgotten. My objective is thus to relay how the sansei and yonsei remember their ancestors and how such memories are told and retold in a manner that goes against the popular opinion of their society, causing a reinterpretation of their experiences, and defining their collective identity as *nikkeijin* from the Philippines.

Exploring the “identity” of *nikkeijin* warrants conceptual understanding of being Japanese. Discussing the essence of Japaneseness, Takenaka (2003) emphasized the concept of blood as “a symbol of familial ties... the conflated notion of Japanese race and culture... (which) served well to justify the right of *nikkeijin* to enter, reside, and work in Japan”(225). Using this logic, Japan has utilized the skills and labor of foreigners of Japanese descent. However, the term “*nikkeijin*” reflects “how Japanese conceive of their relationship to those who have migrated overseas and their descendants” (Roth 2002, 23). Since the term does not refer to the ethnically Japanese people residing in Japan, it connotes exclusion from the inner socioethnic loop of Japanese society. *Nikkeijin* may share a part of the lineage, yet they are still *gaikokujin* (foreigner or outsider) from the perspective of the natives. This was further expounded by Yamashiro (2008) who claimed that the notion of *nikkeijin* “may or may not include the original migrants themselves” (983). In a Japanese context, a *nikkeijin* is different from a “Japanese” in terms of two components.

From a Japanese perspective, those who were born and socialized primarily in Japan, especially if they still have Japanese citizenship, will in most cases be considered as Japanese. At the same time, however, if these Japanese adapted to a different society and developed new communities and worldviews, and if they gave up their Japanese citizenship, they could be seen as having become a *nikkeijin*. (Ibid.)

Away from their home society (Japan), the Japanese diaspora and the *nikkeijin* and their identities are shaped by “complex historical, social

and cultural dynamics within the group and in its relationship with other groups” (Alegado 2003, 14). Thus, the retention of “ancestral customs, language, and religion, the marriage pattern of its members, and particularly the case of communication between various parts of the transnational group” (ibid.) highly influences the features and characteristics of their fluid identities. Such elements also shape the *nikkeijin*’s images of their grandparents and great grandparents. Through these conceptual musings, I argue that the narratives of the *sansei* and *yonsei* reflect their identities as Filipino *nikkeijin*. In the absence of rich symbolic practices and traditions, younger generations of *nikkeijin* engage in a politics of remembering as they embrace their own storied identities during their temporary sojourn in their ancestral homeland.

### Methodology

This study utilizes in-depth interviews of Philippine *nikkeijin* residing and working in Japan. The fieldwork was carried out in Aichi Prefecture, one of the areas with significant concentration of *nikkeijin* engaging in factory labor. To recruit research participants, I visited three religious institutions where Philippine *nikkeijin* attend worship services: *Mikokoro* Catholic Center, *Iglesia Ni Cristo* (INC), and Immanuel Christian Fellowship in Nagoya City. Through the assistance of the leaders of these religious institutions and their affiliate Filipino migrant organizations, I was able to collect the contact details of Philippine *nikkeijin*. In total, I interviewed 50 of them: 4 *nisei* (second-generation), 29 *sansei* (third-generation), and 17 *yonsei* (fourth-generation) *nikkeijin*.

Most of the interviewees (20 *sansei* and 10 *yonsei*) come from Davao, one of the areas with the highest population of Philippine *nikkeijin*. Twelve interviewees (3 *sansei* and 9 *yonsei*) came from Metro Manila, although some of them have close relatives in Davao or other provinces. The rest of the interviewees resided in Surigao, General Santos City, Baguio, Ilocos, and Isabela. Twenty-eight interviewees are female and 22 are male. Almost all respondents attained higher education: 34 *nikkeijin* graduated

from college, 4 underwent post-high school vocational training, 5 graduated from high school, and only 7 did not reach secondary education.

It is important to specifically choose a generational group because of the differences of cultural behavior and perception of each generation. Takahashi (1997), for instance, noted that the *issei*, *nisei*, and *sansei* in a Japanese American community are depicted as “having their own characterological traits, as well as being relatively uniform in their beliefs and behavior” (7). In this paper, I focused on the narratives of the third- and fourth- generation because of the following reasons: First, they have no direct encounter with their Japanese ancestors; their knowledge of the *issei* (first-generation) were based on anecdotes of their parents and grandparents, as well as accumulated information gathered from social institutions like the school, NGOs, workplaces, and mass media. Second, the *sansei* and *yonsei* currently dominate Philippine *nikkeijin* communities in various factories and manufacturing centers in Aichi prefecture. Because of their increasing population, they are the easiest to find in Japanese factories and churches. Their presence in Filipino parties and social gatherings signifies generational proximity and closeness to non-*nikkeijin* Filipinos, a feature that clearly distinguishes them from the *nisei* migrants. Third, having little Japanese blood, *sansei* and *yonsei* are more integrated in Philippine society. It is interesting, then, to elicit their views on their Japanese lineage, since perceptions are deemed products of their personal reflections and social interactions with the dominant ethnic majority in the Philippines.

Each interview session was divided into two parts—a session on *nikkeijin* consciousness and another on their current labor status in Japan. This paper utilized the narratives on the first part, which describe their perception on being a *nikkei*, the processes that led to their discovery of being a *nikkeijin*, their knowledge and images of their Japanese ancestors, and the effects of those images on their family culture and traditions. The first part of the interviews lasted, on average, for one hour.

The common themes of the narratives are presented in this paper. Because of the volume of stories, comments, perceptions, and worldviews



culled from the interviews, I selected few narratives that clearly represent the collective stories of the group. Pseudonyms were used to protect the identities of the interviewees, although most of them allowed me to write the real name/s of their ancestors.

### **From Emigrants to Nikkeijin**

The International Nikkei Research Project defines “nikkei” as “persons of Japanese descent or descendants, who emigrated from Japan and who created unique communities and lifestyles within the societies in which they now live” (Ohno 2007, 243). In a legal context, the Embassy of Japan in Manila, through its official webpage, declares that a nikkeijin visa can be granted to the “children of Japanese Nationals born on or before the end of World War II (referred to as the second-generation or nisei), the second-generation’s descendants, and their spouses” (Visa Section of the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines 2012).

The nikkeijin owe their roots to Japanese migration that started in the 1880s when the Meiji government sent laborers to Australia, Hawaii, the United States of America, and Canada because of rising population and failing agricultural policies in rural Japan (Sasaki 2008, 54). In 1908, Japanese farmers began to join the emigration wave as they found jobs in Brazilian coffee plantations (Knight 2002, 16). Some of these Japanese peasants were also contracted to work in cotton and silk farms, while others managed to establish their own businesses in Sao Paolo. Through emigration organization and companies (*imindantai* and *imingaisha*), emigration to Brazil, which was sustained by a massive outflow of laborers together with their families and relatives, peaked at 188,209 (MOFA 1971, as cited in Sasaki 2008).

In contrast to the enormous family migration of Japanese to Latin America, migration to the Philippines in the early 1900s was initially composed of farmers and construction workers. As early as 1888, the Japanese Emperor Mutsuhito promulgated an imperial decree creating

a first-class consulate in Manila in order to maintain trading ties and intensify the migration of businessmen and workers (Saniel 1962, 271). Between 1903 and 1904, thousands of Japanese male workers arrived in the Philippines to work on the Benguet Road and other infrastructure projects of the American colonial government (Yu-Jose 1994, 11). While most male emigrants came to work on roads, railroads, bridges, coal mine sites, and military barracks, there were also around 300 Japanese female emigrants known as *karayukisan* who worked as prostitutes for the American soldiers in the Philippines. However, with the rising number of soldiers contracting venereal diseases, the colonial government closed the brothel businesses and deported 122 Japanese women (Terami-Wada 2010, 65). As anti-prostitution policy drastically decreased the number of *karayukisan* in the Philippines, the Japanese government in the 1920s still encouraged emigration of Japanese women who would become wives of Japanese laborers. Watanabe Kaoru, correspondent of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, insisted that Japanese women should go to the Philippines to serve as wives and “give comfort to the lonely Japanese men” (Yu-Jose 1994, 17).

It seemed that a significant number of Japanese women responded to the government’s call for marriage migration. However, most of them stayed in Metro Manila; six hundred and eighty-four Japanese wives were registered under the 1939 Philippine census survey (Ohno 2007, 35). Outside the country’s capital, many Japanese migrants married or lived with Filipino women. In fact, the aforementioned survey indicated that the number of Filipinas married to Japanese male citizens was 874 for the whole country, and that 269 of those marriages took place in Davao. It is important to note that the said figure possibly excluded unregistered marriages, specifically those who had partners from non-Christian indigenous ethnic groups. Nevertheless, such intermarriages resulted in the proliferation of Japanese communities in Manila, Davao, Baguio, Mountain Province, and other areas before the outbreak of the Second World War. Their children, known as the *nisei* (second-generation) or “Japanese mestizo children” were mostly unregistered at the local civil registry.

Although the *nisei* in the Philippines had mixed parentage, they were exposed to Japanese tradition and culture, as were their counterparts in Brazil and other Latin American territories. Most of these children were enrolled in Japanese elementary schools where teachers taught *shushin* (morals) and *Kyoiku Chokugo* (the Imperial rescript on education)[Ohno 2007, 37]. The “Japanization” program of second-generation *nikkeijin* in the Philippines taught them that they were real Japanese, and thus were subjects of the Emperor. This system of Japanese education, along with the imperial government’s Japanization campaign and propaganda, ended when America defeated Japan in the Second World War and transformed Philippine society thereafter.

About five decades after the war, the *nisei* and their descendants were offered a chance to return to their ancestral land. Concerned about a labor shortage, the Japanese government welcomed their return from Brazil and Latin American countries, declaring to the wary public that these *nikkeijin* deserve to experience the rich culture of Japan because they are distinctly coethnics. Policies on immigration were framed and justified by emphasizing the shared culture between Japanese nationals and foreign-born descendants. In 1990, the government promulgated a revised immigration law that “sanctioned the *teijusha* visa which allows *nikkeijin* to legally emigrate, live, and work in Japan on the basis of their Japanese blood descent” (Sharpe 2010, 359).

Today, the Philippine *nikkeijin* in Japan are mostly factory workers. *Sansei* and *yonsei* dominate Japanese manufacturing centers, while their *nisei* parents or grandparents repatriated to the Philippines because of their age and health. Most of my interviewees earn JPY151,000–200,000 per month, inclusive of overtime. They described their salary “unsatisfactory,” which is significantly lower than the wages in the 1990s. Most of these factory workers were placed under “unstable employment situation” for being either temporary or contract workers (Ohno & Iijima 2010, 86). In terms of their visa status, majority are long-term and permanent residents, while some opted to become Japanese citizens.

Compared with other migrants from the Philippines, *nikkeijin* are entitled to better opportunities and compensation packages. As documented workers, they are “in limited supply and great demand” (Rebick 2005, 163). In contrast, the entertainers who comprised the majority of Filipino migrants in the 1980s and 1990s were allowed to stay for only a maximum of six months. A number of them did not complete their contracts, and instead ran away to join their Filipino friends or transfer to better-paying jobs, notwithstanding their illegal status in Japan (Ballestas 2003, 555). Other Filipinos in construction, manufacturing, or agricultural labor have longer contracts, but employment schemes limit their mobility and length of stay in Japan. In short, the *nikkeijin*, considered as “co-ethnics” of the Japanese nationals, have better prospects in the labor market, thereby obtaining the best employment packages for foreigners. Although they have limited political and civic rights, the *nikkeijin* have full access to medical care and public health services (Shipper 2008, 30). On the one hand, this is advantageous for sojourners who simply want to improve their economic status before returning home. On the other hand, this emphasized the fact that *nikkeijin* are still considered foreigners, despite their ethnic status. *Nikkeijin* groups, including those from the Philippines, experience the politics of acceptance and rejection in Japan, which affects their perception of the country, people, and even their ancestral images.

Several scholars have explored the identities and ethnic consciousness of various *nikkeijin* groups from North and Latin America. Lamentably, there is a dearth of literature dealing with the identity dynamics and negotiations of *nikkeijin* from the Philippines save for ethnographic research, combined with documentary analysis that had been conducted to explore the historical and social development of *nikkeijin* communities, particularly in Davao (Fresnoza-Flot 2008) and Baguio (Afaible 2008). Focusing on identity development, a relevant study on the Filipino *shin-nikkeijin* revealed three interlocking patterns of ethnic identification among Filipino-Japanese children: ethnic preference, the colonizing lens of the majority, and the interiorized ethnic clash/struggle (Almonte-Acosta 2008). Filipino-Japanese children wrestle with their

feelings and reactions towards members of a majority group who emphasized their difference or inferiority. The findings from these foregoing studies are valuable in advancing more research on nikkeijin children, but differ from the present study, which focuses on the “new” nikkeijin.

Shun Ohno thoroughly explored the Philippine nikkeijin ethnic consciousness through historical analysis, documentary research, and surveys. Describing Philippine nikkeijin identity as “diasporic” and/or “deterritorialized,” Ohno (2008, 2) noted that the transnational citizenship of the nikkeijin is merely for instrumental purposes and “does not mean the loss of Filipino identity”(16). Also, his findings suggest a manifestation of having “multiethnic dual identity” (ibid).

Similarly, the nikkeijin from Okinawa seemed to retain their Filipino-ness during migratory processes. Zulueta (2011) argues that the return of “Philippine *uchinanchu*” (Filipino migrants of Okinawan descent) to their ethnic homeland is transitory and their perception of home is tied to “how they construct their identity in relation to current global conditions” (12). Okinawa, for Zulueta, is a place of intersecting movements, a homeland for some who want to connect to their Okinawan roots, or a transitory place for those who have a stronger Filipino identity.

The aforementioned studies explore the dynamics of ethnic identities from the viewpoint of those who were exposed to the culture and practices of the Japanese in diaspora. The third- and fourth- generations, however, remain unnoticed and voiceless in the academic literature. Their narratives and perceptions are highly important to document their stories and uncover the linkages of images and perceptions and the formation of transnational identity.

### **The Discovery of Being a Nikkeijin in the Philippines**

Understandably, the nisei (second-generation) descendants encountered first-generation (issei) Japanese emigrants at some point. The nisei had full knowledge of their Japanese background from their childhood to the Second World War, when they had to conceal their ethnic identity. However, for the third-and fourth-generation nikkeijin, ethnic awareness

depends on several factors. In terms of physical features, the traces of Japanese ancestry are rather difficult to identify. Also, they have Filipino or Spanish-sounding surnames and Christian names. They only speak the languages spoken by other Filipinos—Tagalog and/or their regional/ethnic languages. In some localities, nikkeijin organizations exist to promote cultural awareness and employment (Fresnoza-Flot 2008), although not all are vibrant and well-organized.

Most of the sansei have been aware of their ethnic composition since childhood, when they were informed about their Japanese lineage by their parents or grandparents. These sansei heard wartime stories that highlight the tragic events experienced by their ancestors. Other interviewees claimed that they saw photos of their Japanese relatives, as well as some articles—Japanese money, newspaper, and family documents—that were left behind. Mel, a nikkeijin from Cavite, learned about her ethnic roots because of the physical appearance of her father. She also saw the photos of her grandfather in Japanese attire. Moreover, Mel grew curious about her Japanese background through her father's social circle, and because her father constantly wrote letters to relatives in Japan. She used to wonder why her father spoke 'Hapon' (*Nihongo*) to several friends who resided there. She later understood that these friends were actually relatives.

Education was another point of ethnic discovery for nikkei children. Eight interviewees attended a nikkeijin school in the Philippines. Chesca from Davao recalled her experience at the Philippine Nikkeijin Kai in Davao City.

My brother and I had attended school at the Philippine Nikkeijin-Kai. That's where I learned the Japanese counting system, simple greetings, and expressions like *suwattekudasai*... Every afternoon we practice writing *a,i,u,e,o...hiragana, katakata, kanji*. But that time, I didn't understand why I was there. I was wondering what's with that school, and why we needed to learn Japanese. Eventually, I've learned that we are descendants. I still didn't understand what they meant by that,

but I remember my dad showing us a picture of our great grandfather who looked like Emperor Hirohito (laugh). Then, I understood what being *nikkeijin* means.

This school was established by the Philippine *Nikkeijin Kai Incorporated*, an organization of *nikkeijin* whose Japanese ancestors migrated to Davao between 1903 and 1941. The organization established numerous learning institutions, including the *Mindanao Kokusai Daigaku*, which offers regular college courses that integrate Japanese language and cultural training in their curricula. Noel also remembers that his awareness of being *nikkeijin* was first raised by his elementary teacher.

My teacher spoke to me when I was still in elementary school: “study harder...so that after you graduate high school, you can go to Japan because you’re a descendant.” I was surprised and amazed. I was very excited. So when I graduated high school, I was already determined to go to Japan. I still entered college, but when my visa came out during my second year in the university, I just decided to stop. I knew there’s much to earn here.

Some of the *sansei* interviewees discovered their ethnic roots in adulthood. They said they were unaware of their *nikkeijin* status until “a group of Japanese” visited their home sometime in the 1990s to talk to their parents. Purportedly, these Japanese groups, either to reconnect with relations or recruit for Japanese companies, were seeking descendants in the Philippines. Some of the interviewees believe that these Japanese were members of NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) that supported the plight and conditions of the *nikkeijin*.

This coincided with the peak of Brazilian *nikkeijin*’s return migration to Japan. Adrian recalled that

It was in 1992 when my dad learned that we are Japanese descendants. Before that, we knew nothing about being *nikkeijin*. That year, my grandfather’s brother who lived here in Japan, in Fukuoka, visited the

Philippines to look for us. The Japanese man told my dad that he was aware that he has relatives in the Philippines, and he also confessed that he left a family in the Philippines. He said he was an intelligence personnel during the war. The brother of my grandfather told us that our grandfather registered my dad's name in Fukuoka, so he came to the Philippines to bring the kosekitohon. We're very lucky for that, and we're thankful. Without the koseki, it would be really difficult to come to Japan.

Adrian's father, who was making a living as a small-scale farmer, was surprised about the document delivered by his grandfather's brother. Eventually, their relatives in Japan supported and facilitated their deployment to the country.

In sum, a large number of descendants knew of and emphasized their lineage even during childhood. And regardless of the timing of their discovery, their stories present interesting themes that highlight their symbolic and actual connections to Japan. First are narratives about "symbolic" linkages, represented by their grandparents' photos, books, letters, and other emblems of Japanese identity. Second are stories about "human" connections. Some nikkeijin emphasized people-to-people relationships as they talked about their relatives or even friends who invited them to work in Japan. For others, Japan-sponsored organizations found and helped them, despite the absence of cultural markers that identify them as nikkeijin. These personal anecdotes and self-characterizations differentiate them from other Japan-bound workers. Referring to Kinoshita's storied identities, I argue that these narratives of connections are the "powerful collective voice" that "assert the meaningfulness of their lives to others as well as to themselves" (Ibid. 2003, 5).

### **Recollection of Ancestral Legacies**

The powerful wave of anti-Japanese sentiment following the Pacific War forced the first- and second- generation nikkeijin to conceal their



ethnic identity and destroy all the tangible proofs that link them to Japanese nationals. The once vibrant Japanese communities in the country vanished, leaving the descendants no communal enclave for ethnic and cultural bonding and socialization. Nikkeijin children were even prevented by their parents from disclosing their Japanese lineage to evade discrimination in schools and home communities.

This paper does not present the accounts of the interviewees as historical realities. Rather, these are the idiosyncratic truths viewed by the nikkejin as they make sense of their nikkeijin-ness in a society that has regarded Japan as an enemy in the past, and as an inspiration in the present. While historical and popular discourses highlight the cruelties of the Japanese military during the war, the nikkeijin have interesting narratives stressing heroism and benevolence.

All the interviewees were aware of the general occupational status of their Japanese ancestors. Most of them lack details of their ancestral histories, yet know why and how they came to the Philippines. During the interview session, I asked them to tell the stories about their Japanese ancestors: when, why, and how they migrated to the Philippines. I categorized their responses according to the themes of their narratives. Most of them claimed that their ancestors were Japanese soldiers (25 interviewees); paramilitary, intelligence, staff, spy, or translator for Japanese military (8 interviewees), businessman (7 interviewees), farmer (4 interviewees), construction worker (1 interviewee), “laborer” (unaware of the specific type of labor) (1 interviewee), and Japanese housewife (4 interviewees).

### My Great Grandfather was a Soldier

The soldiers of the Japanese Imperial Army entered the Philippine islands on 8 December 1941. The Philippines severely suffered because of the occupants’ inhumane treatment and policies, killing thousands of Filipinos who resisted or refused to cooperate with the regime (Agoncillo 1980). Understandably, post-war Philippine society developed a negative perception of Japanese soldiers and paramilitary members. Throughout the decade

following Japan's defeat, Japan was considered the "enemy" of the Filipino people. The improvement of relations between Japan and the Philippines were only realized after going through the diplomacy of apologies and the "politics of mourning" (Satoshi 2008, 337). The memory of war gradually faded in the 1980s as Japan reemerged as an economic inspiration, a "model," and a "place of greener pasture" (Yu-Jose 2000, 9).

Majority of the interviewees claimed that their great grandfathers were members or accessories of the Japanese Imperial Army. Japanese spies reportedly came even before the occupation of the Philippines. Historical accounts of the suffering and traumatic experiences of Filipinos were documented and taught to Filipino students from primary school to college. Apparently, some *nikkeijin*, especially those educated in the Philippine academic system, had painstakingly accepted such historical details with repugnance and discomfort. Ms. Osawa, one of the *nisei* from Naga City, joined us while I was interviewing her *sansei* daughter. She tearfully recalled the story of her father.

What I know is that he came to the Philippines during the war. He was with Commandant Matsubara. He served as an interpreter under Matsubara. Chinese, Indian, Spanish, and English – he can translate these languages. It was an incredible skill to do that job. He was a nice person. They said I look like him. People who saw him before said he's a good person. I'm sure he was.

Like Osawa, Eloisa, a *yonsei* from Manila, claimed that her great grandfather was also an interpreter. In her narrative, Eloisa said her ancestor was brought by the Japanese military to the Philippines before the war. Eventually, her great grandfather fell in love with a Filipina, her great grandmother. When the war broke out, her great grandfather refused to go back to Japan, but the government ordered him to repatriate. Thus, Eloisa's great grandfather boarded the ship to Japan, leaving behind his wife and children. Eloisa's narrative indicates the lack of "agency" of her grandfather to resist government orders. At one point, she stressed that

her great grandparents “were victims of war.” Asked to clarify, she responded that “the war had separated him from his Filipino family. He had no other choice but to obey his government, because disobedience was not acceptable during his time.”

A grandfather of another *nikkeijin*, Simon, was instrumental to the Japanese war effort, but Simon stressed that his ancestor was a peace-loving person who wanted reconciliation rather than conflict.

My grandfather came to the Philippines when he was 16 or 17 years old. He was a spy of the Japanese Imperial Army during the war. He worked in the Philippines as a spy, until the time he married my grandmother who was a Filipina. My auntie, who was still very young that time, wondered why there were so many Japanese meeting in our house. They had a huge house. That time, my grandmother owned a large truck which delivered cargoes. Aside from this land cargo business, my grandma also owned a bakery – so they were pretty much earning well. My auntie was so confused every time my dad gathered a group of Japanese secretly inside their house in Pampanga. It was a weekly meeting, usually on the ground floor.

Then my grandfather spoke to his children and talked about a war that would be launched by Japan. My grandfather said, ‘I don’t want this to happen. This must not happen! I want to die before this war starts.’ My aunt told us that our grandfather loved the Filipinos, and one evidence is the fact that he married a Filipina. At the same time, my grandfather was also well-loved by the Filipinos. He was a very nice person, you know.

Simon’s grandfather got his wish, dying from a pulmonary disease few days before the war broke out. Melay has a similar story to Simon’s. A *nikkeijin* from Sorsogon, she was proud of her grandfather.

There are many stories about my grandfather. That was world war, and my grandfather joined the military. They were planning to

‘conquer the world.’ My grandfather served as a spy. He worked with them for thirteen years, and even before the war he was already here in the Philippines. But I saw his picture, and I can tell that he was not that kind of person.

My grandfather met my grandmother in Sorsogon. They got married and had seven children. They were living peacefully, and they had business, until the war broke out.

During the war, four children were able to go to Japan, but the three, including my mother, were left in the Philippines. They said my grandfather stayed here during the war, and he was not even killed by the guerillas because he was a good person. They (guerillas) protected him (grandfather) because he was a kind person... he shouldn’t be killed, and he should be allowed to go back to Japan. And so, he safely returned to his home.

The narratives of the Filipino nikkeijin demonstrate an interesting process of reconciling their knowledge of the horrific events of the Second World War on the one hand, and the character and involvement of their ancestors in the conflict, on the other. Instead of defending the Japanese soldiers, the narratives highlighted the passive role of their ancestors. In some narratives, the ancestor was even depicted as a ‘victim’ because of the unfortunate events that occurred after their surrender. Consider Robert’s story about his great grandfather.

“...he helped many Filipinos. When he encountered a starving Filipino, he secretly gave bread or anything edible in his pocket. There were so many bad Japanese soldiers, but my great grandfather was different. He loved the Filipinos. Other Japanese killed Filipinos, but he helped them survive during the war. But because he was a Japanese soldier, they thought he was bad. He got killed in Bulacan. It’s really sad that we tend to generalize them... We judged them. But there were good souls who fought during the war.”

The stories of benevolent soldiers have several versions from different narrators, but they all had an underlying theme: a presentation of a positive image of the ancestor. The stories, molded by emotional narrators, have been established as a collective memory of the clan to inspire the next generation of descendants.

### My Hardworking Great Grandfather

The sansei and yonsei *nikkeijin* also see their ancestors as hardworking. Vina still recalls the stories of her parents about her grandfather who was brought to the Philippines to build dikes. Her great grandfather, named Teruichi Okuoka from Chiba, arrived in the Philippines when he was still 18. Vina has limited knowledge of her ancestral roots, but she was certain that this ancestor worked so hard for the sake of his family. “He was so young, but he sacrificed a lot. He was poor, but he never gave up. He rose from rags to riches.”

For the *nikkeijin* that I interviewed, stories about pre-war prosperity and intercultural harmony are recurrent. For Dave, marriage with a Filipina symbolizes a boundless partnership between two cultures. Dave does not know what exactly his great grandfather did for a living, but his parents knew that he was a laborer who spent some years in the Philippines before the war. His ancestor got married to a ‘Bagobo’ native and worked in a farm. They had children, one of whom was Dave’s grandfather.

The war broke out. My great grandfather was left in the Philippines. During the war, he was still very young, and he got lost somewhere. They said he got really sick, to the point that he was about to die. But somebody saw him. They helped him... they took him to a medical facility, and they hosted him after recovering from sickness. Eventually, he worked as a farmer. He married a Filipina.

Dave’s great grandfather died in Hawaii, and his grandfather was left in the Philippines. His grandfather’s brother asked him to migrate to Japan and discover his own cultural roots. However, he refused to leave the Philippines

because of his emotional attachment to the people and the country. Dave's grandfather loved the Philippines so much that he was no longer willing to repatriate to Japan. He still communicated with his brother in Japan, but he was not interested to live in any country other than the Philippines.

Chesca shared her limited knowledge of her grandfather who worked in a plantation company in Davao.

I really don't know when, how, and why he came to the Philippines. I've heard from my parents that he used to work in a plantation. He's a Japanese from Okinawa, but I could imagine how he dealt with the local people. That was before the war, so they were still living peacefully without any animosity or whatsoever. When the war broke out, they started to hate the Japanese, and my grandfather had to hide from those Filipinos who hated them. Well, they said they 'kill' every Japanese that time. They needed to hide.

David's and Chesca's accounts highlight the harmonious relationship between Filipinos and Japan before the war. David went further, stressing that Filipinos loved his grandfather, and Chesca also shares how her grandfather escaped from the wrath of the nationalistic, anti-Japanese Filipinos.

There are also accounts of laborers who were recruited to the Japanese military when the war broke out. During the military rule between January 1942 and early 1945, almost all issei and some nisei were enlisted as soldiers or paramilitary personnel or 'gunzoku' for the Japanese forces. Failure to participate in the military entailed severe punishment or even execution (Ohno 2007, 247). Antoniette's grandfather, for instance, was forced to join the military.

His name is Yuchi Fujimoto, and he was named in the Philippines as Manuel Kuizon. He was sent to the Philippines as one of the Japanese laborers for the Kennon Road construction. After the road was done, he went to Leyte and there he met his wife Sofia. When the Second World War broke out, he was caught early because it was already known to the public that he was a Japanese soldier.

Antoniette and other *nikkeijin* tell similar stories. For them, their forefathers were victims of forced labor. Laborers, usually construction workers, plantation workers, or simple farmers were imagined as wartime sacrificial lambs. They bore the punishment of the war, lost everything, and took to hiding in spite of their ‘non-voluntary involvement’ in the Japanese occupation. For the *sansei* and *yonsei*, their ancestors were innocent actors who were only concerned about their livelihood, but inevitably faced anti-Japanese sentiments of the Filipinos despite their benevolent deeds.

### My Grandma was a “Haponesa”

While the narratives are dominated by the ‘Japanese grandfather figure,’ some *nikkeijin* have a Filipino grandfather and a Japanese grandmother. The common theme in these stories is that of a ‘Japanese lady’ who goes with her Filipino lover and leaves her family in Japan, who eventually disowns her.

The stories of these *nikkeijin* have a contextual background different from the accounts of the laborers and soldiers who came to the Philippines prior to the Second World War. These women from Okinawa, the would-be great grandmothers of today’s *nikkeijin*, used to work in American bases in Japan before travelling to the Philippines. They married their Filipino partners who were their co-workers. Ultimately, these women and their husbands moved to the Philippines in the 1950s, expecting a new beginning and a life different from that in Okinawa (Maehara 2001). Their experiences in the Philippines, however, are rather comparable to those of other first-generation migrants from mainland Japan who refused to leave the Philippines. Consider the interesting story of Ced.

He (his grandfather) actually worked at the US airbase in Okinawa. There, he met my grandma. They had a relationship, despite the fact that the two nations, during that time, were still ‘bitter’ against each other because of the war. It was a kind of animosity that was evident in every Japanese family. That time, the Japanese were the losers of the war... and they really hated the foreigners. My grandpa felt that.

Grandma and grandpa decided to live in an apartment in Okinawa. The family of my grandma was angry, and threatened to disown her. She still refused to listen to her parents. She secretly stayed with my grandpa, until my grandma's family started to search for her. The family tried to look for both of them.

They decided to move to the Philippines. That was in 1955. My grandma liked the place and the people, and she converted to Catholicism. My grandma started to write letters to her family in Okinawa, but all letters were sent back. They rejected even the packages of dried mangoes and stuff. For 20 long years, her family rejected everything that came from her. She was disowned by her own family.

Ced knew that he was a *nikkeijin*. When Japanese companies recruited for the descendants of Japanese nationals in the Philippines, he immediately applied for a job. He sought assistance from a recruitment agency to locate the *kosekitohon* (certified true copy of family registration) of his mother in Okinawa. Eventually, the agency contacted his mother's family in Okinawa, and his mother's sister agreed to help them. After several decades, his grandmother and her sisters talked to him over the phone. Ced served as the bridge to reconnect her mother to her Okinawan roots.

Eric, whose grandmother is presently living in the Philippines, shared the story of his grandmother who was totally disconnected from her family until the present time.

She came from Okinawa. She decided to go to the Philippines with my grandfather. That's what love does, right? So, against all odds (laugh). That infuriated her family in Japan. They despised her. They didn't talk to her. Even her share of the family's land was given to another relative. Nothing was left for her.

These narratives present another example of the victimization of the *nikkei* ancestors. Facing fear and uncertainty, Eric's grandmother endured a hard life in the Philippines, worsened by the persecution of the public against the Japanese. She found herself helpless because her family in Japan



refused to forgive her disobedience. Hers is a painful story that inspired and taught her nikkeijin descendants the lessons of life, love, and sacrifice.

This section has focused on the gendered circumstances of some of the nikkeijin's Okinawan ancestors. As women, they chose to live with their husbands in the Philippines, accepting the consequences of those actions on their relationships with their families and communities in Okinawa. Interestingly, the narratives also emphasize themes of friendship and coexistence, attempt to shape a collective memory of cultural friendship, and promote an interesting thesis: that their Japanese ancestors truly loved the Philippines, including its society, people, religion, and culture.

### **Tales of Suffering and Persecution**

Filipino nikkeijin, most especially the first and second generations, experienced the fury of Filipino nationals against the Japanese forces after the Second World War. Following Japan's formal surrender on 2 September 1945, thousands of Japanese nationals including laborers, military and paramilitary personnel had to repatriate, leaving behind their Filipino wives and children. Those who were left in the Philippines faced severe persecution from Filipino nationalists who blamed them for the wartime crimes committed by Japan.

One of the Japanese repatriates to Japan after the war, Mr. Mamoru Tanaka, wrote an essay about his experiences before leaving the Philippines. He recalled how hard it was to leave his family in the Philippines for the sake of their safety. According to Tanaka, leaving the family was the only way to protect them; if not, then his wife Juana and his child Toshiyuki would be guilty by association, and the Filipino guerrillas might harm them. Leaving them, according to him, was the only way to avoid persecution. With a heavy heart, Tanaka wrote that

My thoughts were confused. My heart was heavy. I could not understand. I need to understand. Why would Juana want to remain behind when it would be dangerous for her to do so? The war was over, yes, but the

hatred toward the Japanese by Filipino guerillas has not abated, nor would it stop soon. The Japanese atrocities committed during the war are still fresh in their hearts. I never took part in those violent acts; we are mere victims of the war (Khanser and Dela Pena 2009, 2).

In the following section, nikkeijin emphasize the unenviable condition of being persecuted. They share narratives of oppression and relate it to the failure of the emergence of nikkeijin solidarity in the Philippines.

### Social Discrimination after the War

Nikkeijin usually attribute their limited knowledge of their Japanese heritage to the events during the war. Understandably, these nikkeijin were raised in a social environment where their Japanese identity was kept hidden. Although most of my interviewees belonging to the third- and fourth- generations (both de facto and upgraded) did not experience such kind of social discrimination in the Philippines, a few can vividly recall how their parents or grandparents were maltreated after the war. For instance, Eric, a nikkei from Manila, recounted the sufferings of his grandmother. Socially isolated, his grandmother exhibited mental instability, a reason that hindered her from going back to Japan to visit her sisters. Those experiences prevented her from talking about Japanese culture and society to her children and grandchildren. Since childhood, Eric's parents have embraced Filipino identity as though they did not have mixed roots/parentage, and they have no intention of going to Japan. Eric's Okinawan grandmother's story is deeply moving.

My grandmother is still in the Philippines. She's now considered as TNT (illegal migrant). She can still speak Hogen (dialect). She can still write Japanese. Look at her picture, here... She's dark, her back is twisted, and you know, she lost some fingers. She had experienced being hit by a car when she got lost in Mindoro. It's a long story, Ron. But basically there was a point in her life when she was 'palabay-laboy' (moving from one place to another). Her mentality is now

quite different, maybe unstable. Well, she has experienced being discriminated ('na-ijime siya sa Pilipinas') in the Philippines. From the time when my grandfather married another wife, she moved away from us...That time, she could not speak fluent Tagalog, so people were tricking her whenever she buys, for example, 'Galunggong' from the market...they overprice the Galunggong for her. Then of course, people would make fun of her. She was very unhappy. She couldn't talk to anyone because nobody, during that time, spoke Japanese.

Eric's grandmother was isolated and depressed during her first few years in the Philippines. Apart from a broken marriage, her sister in Japan decided to seize all her properties in Okinawa. Emotionally devastated by these painful experiences, Eric's grandmother became mentally unstable.

Other *nikkeijin* also claimed that their grandparents, parents, and even themselves had to contend with verbal harassment and teasing. Mel also recalled that

Our grandfather used to teach my parents how to speak and read Japanese. He had given a Japanese name to some of his daughters. But after the war, it was such a disadvantage to reveal your identity as a Japanese. It was a shame ('ikinahihiya') to reveal that you have Japanese relatives. They were cursed by the Filipinos! Filipinos gave names, called them killers, murderers...Well you know why. You know what my father did? He distanced himself from us. He stayed away from us, so that we (his children) wouldn't be identified with him (because he obviously looked like Japanese).

I was psychologically affected by those curses. And I knew that my mother was also psychologically tormented. She became too defensive. She was too defensive in dealing with other people, especially with our neighbors. She was harmless, she didn't say anything, but she remained aloof from the people. She tended to divert the discussion everytime there was an issue about the war, the soldiers, and the occupation.

The widespread prejudice and harassment against *nikkeijin* forced many parents to either change or withhold the Japanese name of their children. The word “Hapon,” which literally refers to Japanese nationals, acquired a negative connotation, and the term and its referents were mocked and insulted by the locals after the war. “Altogether, fears of social ostracism, if not reprisal for direct or indirect association with atrocities and collaboration during the occupation as well as a sense of humiliation of national defeat and international condemnation led them to deny, sublimate or hide their Japanese identity and heritage” (Mabunay 2006, 16). For Mina, being called “Hapon” is neither a slur nor harassment. But she wondered why her brothers got into trouble because of the label.

Our family is known as ‘Hapon’ in our town. ‘Hapon! Hapon!’ that’s how our playmates called us when we were kids. I didn’t feel offended whenever they would call us Hapon. But my brothers got into trouble because they felt being harassed. I actually heard some words like, ‘you don’t belong here! Go back to Japan, you don’t belong here.’ Oh, that was actually offensive.

The term “Hapon” was associated to being a “collaborator” during the war. But even until the 1970s and 1980s, it retained its negative connotation, albeit with some modifications that reflect new realities:

I was silent throughout our ride back to the boarding house. I usually feigned my emotions when conversations drifted to Japanese atrocities against the Filipinos. Yes I am a Japanese descendant. The kind of slit in my eyes told everyone that I was one. But who wants to be identified with the aggressors of a horrible world war? I do not want to be called a *Yakuza* (syndicate). Or a *Japayuki-san*. Or a granddaughter of a Filipina comfort woman. These are common Filipino images of the Japanese. (Khanser & Dela Pena 2009, 14)

Although anti-Japanese sentiments have already subsided in Philippine society, *nikkeijin*, like the *yonsei* who wrote the account above,

still feel the social stigma and prejudice of the majority. The label “Hapon” is no longer related to being a traitor or a war aggressor; it now connotes a relation to an entertainer or a club hostess in Japan (*japayuki*), a Japanese gang/syndicate member (*yakuza*), or a grandchild of a comfort woman. The current negative and sexist images of Japan have also been imparted to the *nikkeijin*.

Indeed, despite significant improvement in Japan’s image in the decades after the war, popular ideas and discourses on the country and its people remain unconstructive. These include the *Japayukis*, the struggle of the comfort women, and the proliferation of *yakuza* activities in the country. Since these realities embody the Filipino experience of Japan, they have also affected the image of *nikkeijin*. Clearly, *nikkeijin*’s cultural engagement and interaction within the Philippines have shaped their consciousness and identity, and such negative ethnic attributions may help explain why the descendants narrate their stories from the discourse of victimhood and deprivation.

### Economic Deprivation

Anti-Japanese sentiment after the war forced *nikkeijin* to hide in the woods or in the rural areas where local people accepted them. There are accounts of locals stealing *nikkeijin*’s properties, and of local officials confiscating lands and financial savings, the fruits of their hard work and perseverance before the war. The narrative of Teresita illustrates the impact of this deprivation.

They (her great grandparents) were well off, considering that they had a huge farm. Business was running well until the war ruined everything. What is even more frustrating is that, everything, including the rice field, and the large house where they lived before the war were gone. They (Filipino authorities) took it from us. My grandparents had to struggle and start from zero. It was very frustrating on their part. And from that time, they lived in poverty.

Another nikkeijin from Sorsogon named Gracia narrated her ancestor's experience.

My grandfather was a businessman. He was one of the trusted entrepreneurs in their town. They said he was a nice person... and very passionate in what he was doing. He was just staying in his office all day long, counting money. Very business-minded. They had their own candy factory. My grandmother was really good in making candies, and my grandfather was good at managing it. The business went well, and my aunts and uncles had experienced all the good things in life. Suddenly, the war broke out, and that ended everything. They (unknown Filipinos) seized everything in the factory. They stole everything. Everything had vanished, nothing was left. From that time, they experienced utmost poverty. They really suffered... but luckily they survived.

Teresita and Gracia's accounts represent the economic downfall of the nikkeijin because of the anger against the Japanese after the war. The first Japanese emigrants who worked so hard in plantations, farms, and even construction roads in the early 1900s transformed their families to middleclass and upperclass entrepreneurs who purchased large farms, factories, and commercial facilities. It is thus unsurprising that another nikkeijin, Ellen, says that her ancestor "was a millionaire..." or that James describe his great grandfather as "super, super rich..." Possibly an exaggeration, those accounts merely prove how sansei and yonsei perceive their ancestors as successful individuals who escaped the poverty that they endured before migrating to the Philippines.

It is interesting to emphasize that the counterparts of Filipino nikkeijin in Latin America, specifically the Brazilian-Japanese (see Roth 2002) are relatively well-off in terms of economic status compared to Filipino nikkeijin. These Brazilian nikkeijin, usually belonging to the middle class, are more highly educated than the locals. There is a general perception among Brazilians nationals that the Japanese-Brazilians are rich. "A marriage with a nikkeijin man is understood in Brazilian society to be *garantido* (guaranteed), that is, economically secure" (Tsuda 2003, 66).

On the contrary, *nikkeijin* in the Philippines experienced extreme poverty after the war. It was only after the first-generation of migrants who entered Japan in the 1990s, when the fruits of the remittances reached the second- and third-generation, that the socioeconomic well-being of the younger *nikkeijin* improved. Later generations have depended on the older generation for their education, small business, and even necessities. Riza, a *nikkeijin* from Davao shares that

My great grandparents were very poor. My great grandfather who previously worked in Okinawa, and my great grandmother, an Okinawan, decided to plant crops for a living. Before the war, the farm was doing well. After the war, they hid somewhere in Negros but the constant drought starved them. I've heard about their financial struggle at that time—that they were only having a meal in a day, or they were eating rice and farm veggies. So, our family was very poor. Luckily, in the 1990s, my grandparents were able to work in Japan. That transformed our lives. Later on, my aunties and uncle also left the Philippines to work in Hamamatsu. They somehow supported my parent's small store and also my education.

This anecdote about Riza's great grandparents is a typical success story among Filipino *nikkeijin*. Many *sansei* interviewees revealed that they were fortunate enough to be supported by second-generation relatives. Many *nikkeijin* from rural regions also experienced economic struggle until they were given opportunity to work in Japan.

### **Ancestral Narratives as Identity Marker**

Receiving the privilege to reside and work in Japan eased the economic struggles of the *sansei* and *yonseis*. Most *nikkeijin* found jobs in factories which offered much more than what their blue-collar jobs could offer in the Philippines. In a way, they seem to have regained what their ancestors lost by being identified as Japanese in the Philippines. Culturally, however, the struggle for acceptance remains. Factory jobs, while brokered

by fellow nikkeijin relatives who work with them, have also brought them alongside the Japanese people. In this environment, their similarities and differences are inevitably highlighted, reviving anew the struggle for acceptance that their Japanese ancestors experienced in the Philippines. And just as their ancestral narratives proved to be handy in defending themselves against the negative image of what being partly “Hapon” meant back home, these narratives likewise become useful in establishing their Japaneseness when challenged by the natives themselves. Jenna shared one of her most unforgettable encounters with her Japanese boss.

The leader in our *kaisha* (company) told me, “hmmm... I guess you’re also carrying a fake visa...you just bought that, didn’t you?” I was shocked. Then he explained, “Well, everytime I ask a Filipino nikkeijin about the hometown of their ancestor, the response was always Okinawa, Okinawa, Okinawa... everybody is from Okinawa? Is that even possible?” I told the leader, “hey, it’s true that many Filipinos have bought a fake visa. But remember, not all Filipinos are carrying fake visas. Not all. Do not generalize. We are not like them.” To convince him, I even showed the picture of our first-generation relative. I told him the story of my ancestor. I told him all the details that I knew about my Japanese grandfather. That is the only way to prove that I am a true nikkeijin.

While it is difficult to establish with certainty the effect of these interactions on the ancestral narratives, one can surmise, by deducing from Kinoshita’s theory, that interactions with fellow nikkeijin on one hand can possibly shape these narratives in casual conversations, where each would inevitably share stories about their ancestors and get to know fellow nikkeijin better. This could potentially solidify ancestral narratives as collective memory. On the other hand, challenges to their nikkeijin identity as relayed by Jenna, trigger a defensiveness that makes retelling ancestral narratives all the more important not just in establishing identity, but also in proving their entitlement to the privileges granted to them as nikkeijin.



## Conclusion

This paper examines the images of Japanese ancestors from the stories of the third- and fourth-generation *nikkeijin*. Grounding my analysis on Kinoshita's (2003) storied identities, I hypothesized that the narratives are similar to Kinoshita's collection of stories which were "culturally elaborated representations of collective identities that are continuously and consciously reproduced and redefined within the social world of the Japanese American elderly in Puna" (222). Collective memory, then, is an "interpretation of the past based on shared knowledge of current and past social and cultural contexts" (227). In the case of my *sansei* and *yonsei* respondents, their narratives were continuously shaped by social interactions with parents and grandparents, relatives and friends, fellow *nikkeijin* in the Philippines and Japan, foreign migrants, and even their Japanese employers. As Kinoshita reminds his readers, such stories are highly "contextualized" (4). For Philippine *nikkeijin*, the themes are nuanced by their situation as labor migrants, factory workers, children and grandchildren of discriminated and unrecognized *nikkei* group, and descendants of those who orchestrated the war. Their everyday experiences in either the Philippines or Japan, within or beyond their workplaces, reinforce their proclivity to tell these stories and convey the collective sentiments of the younger generation *nikkeijin*. Indeed, these narratives exhibit elements of storied identities, a schema of collective memories that articulate their meaningfulness in different contexts such as ethnicity, class, generation, and even gender. The narratives also articulate their identity as a people, a discourse created within the transnational spaces of Japan and the Philippines in response to their experiences of marginalization. Through the narratives, they uphold their *nikkeijin* status by emphasizing their Japanese connection. Also, they make sense of their embeddedness in the social and economic infrastructure of Japanese society.

Given the aforementioned contextualizations, my *nikkeijin* interviewees highlight the positive rather than the negative, the unknown rather than the popular, and the constructive rather than the offensive.

They told narratives that depict the pre-war emigrants as benevolent, concerned, and generous Japanese nationals. Dominant images of the ancestors are soldiers and members of the paramilitary groups, construction workers and farmers, and Japanese wives who joined their Filipino husbands in the Philippines. In these groups, the ancestors were described in a positive light, highlighting their noble qualities and simplicity. The stories also underscore the peaceful coexistence and the virtuous role of their ancestors in bridging and harmonizing both cultures.

It is also evident from the narratives that the third-and fourth-generation nikkeijin view their ancestors as “victims” of various circumstances. Post-war Philippine society blamed these ancestors for their participation with the Japanese aggressors, even if they themselves did not actually carry out atrocities. Interestingly, the narrative of victimhood also resonates in the current political discourses in Japan as “many Japanese nationals regard themselves as victims of the Second World War and few recall the sustained victimization of neighboring countries” (Kingston 2011, 40). Critics have called it “selective amnesia” of Japanese policymakers, but the nuances differ in the case of nikkeijin storytellers. While right-wing politicians adhere to their nationalist principles, my nikkeijin interviewees narrate their stories as Filipinos who relate to and contrast such narratives with popular historical discourse. They take a cautious stance as they interact with fellow Filipinos or even Japanese who know a different version of war-time narratives. In other words, the nikkeijin narratives were told from the Filipino perspective, which deviates from upholding or justifying the wartime behavior of the Japanese. Instead, they speak on behalf of their nikkeijin families who have kept a heroic account of the ancestors. The stories, they believe, are factual and truthful as the accounts came from their parents and grandparents. For them, it is about time to narrate the unspoken stories as the society becomes more willing to listen and understand the alternative discourses of history.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> According to Kinoshita, the title “Storied Identities” suggests that the stories are self-reflexive texts used by his research subjects “to communicate with each other and intelligibly delineate their peoplehood.” He argues that storied identities are “culturally elaborated representations of collective identities that are continuously and consciously reproduced and redefined within the social world of Japanese American elderly in Puna” (Kinoshita 2003).
- <sup>2</sup> Generation upgrading is a legal process of converting generation level through registration or acquisition of a new *koseki*. Through this process, the second-generation *nikkeijin* converts his/her status to first-generation by applying for another *koseki* (family registry). This would entitle their grandchildren (who are de facto fourth-generation) to become third-generation; hence eligible to apply for a Japanese visa. The third-generation becomes second-generation, while the fourth-generation becomes third-generation descendants, thereby qualifying them to enter and work in Japan.

## References

- Afable, Patricia O. 2008. “Compelling Memories and Telling Archival Documents and Photographs: The Search for the Baguio Japanese Community.” *Asian Studies* 44 (1):23–65.
- Agoncillo, Teodoro. 1980. *Ang Pilipinas at ang mga Pilipino*. Quezon City: Garotech Publishing.
- Alegado, Dean. 2003. “International Labor Migration, Diaspora, and the Emergence of Transnational Filipino Communities.” In *Filipino Diaspora: Demography, Social Networks, Empowerment, and Culture*, edited by Mamoru Tsuda, 1–22, Quezon City: PMRN & PSSC.
- Almonte-Acosta, Sherlyne. 2008. “Ethnic Identity: The Case of Filipino-Japanese Children in Japan.” *Asia Pacific Social Science Review* 8 (2): 17–33.
- Ballescás, Ma. Rosario Piquero. 2003. “Filipino Migration to Japan, 1970s to 1990s”. In *Philippines-Japan Relations*, edited by Ikehata Setsuho and Lydia Yu-Jose, 337–376. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
- Fresnoza-Flot, Asuncion. 2008. “Labor Migration and Minority Group Empowerment: The *Nikkeijin* in Davao and their Association.” *Asian Studies* 44 (2008): 66–101.
- Khanser, Marites and Lilian Dela Pena. 2009. *Japan Imagined: Tale from a Bagobo Tagabawa Nikkeijin*. Cagayan de Oro City: Capitol University Press.
- Komai, Hiroshi. 2001. *Foreign Migrants in Contemporary Japan*. Melbourne: TransPacific Press.

- Kinoshita, Gaku. 2003. "Storied Identities: Japanese American Elderly from a Sugar Plantation Community in Hawaii." Ph.D. dissertation., University of Hawaii.
- Kingston, Jeff. 2011. *Japan in Transformation 1945-2010*. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited.
- Knight, W. Andy. 2002. "Conceptualizing Transnational Community Formation: Migrants, Sojourners, and Diasporas in a Globalized Era." *Migration and Globalization: Canadian Studies in Population* 29(1): 1–30.
- Mabunay, Ma. Luisa. 2006. "Tracing the Roots of the *Nikkeijin* of Panay, Philippines." *Danyag: UPV Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences* 11:137–174.
- Machara, Yoko. 2001. "Negotiating Multiple Ethnic Identities: The Case of Okinawan Women in the Philippines." MA Thesis. University of the Philippines.
- Ohno, Shun. 2008. "Transnational Citizenship and Deterritorialized Identity: The Meanings of Nikkei Diasporas' Shuttling Between the Philippines and Japan." *Asian Studies*, 44 (1): 1–22.
- Ohno, Shun. 2007. "Recognising Japaneseness: The Politics of Recognition by the Philippine *Nikkeijin*." *Asian Studies Review* 31(3): 243–260.
- Ohno, Shun. 2006. "The Intermarried Issei and Mestizo Nissei in the Philippines: Reflections on the Origins of Philippine *Nikkeijin* Problems". In *Conflicting Presents and Uncertain Futures*, edited by Nobue Adachi, 85–101. New York: Routledge.
- Ohno, Shun and Mariko Iijima. 2010. *Citizenships, Lives, and Identities of the Philippine Nikkeijin Residing in Japan: Report on the Results of a Nationwide Survey*. Fukuoka: Kyushu University.
- Rebick, Marcus. 2005. *The Japanese Employment System: Adopting to a New Economic Environment*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Roth, Joshua. 2002. *Brokered Homeland: Japanese Brazilian Migrants in Japan*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Saniel, Josefa. 1969. *Japan and the Philippines, 1868-1898*. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.
- Sasaki, Koji. 2008. "Between Emigration and Immigration: Japanese Emigrants to Brazil and their Descendants." In *Transnational Migration in East Asia: Japan in a Comparative Focus*, edited by David Heines, et.al., 53–66. Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology.
- Satoshi, Nakano. 2003. "The Politics of Mourning." In *Philippines-Japan Relations*, edited by Ikehata Setsuho and Lydia Yu-Jose, 337–376. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
- Sharpe, Michael Orlando. 2010. "What Does Blood Membership Mean in Political Terms?: The Political Incorporation of Latin American *Nikkeijin* (Japanese Descendants) (Lan) in Japan 1990–2004." *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 12(1):113–142.
- Shipper, Apichai. 2008. *Fighting for Foreigners*. Ithaca: Cornell University.

- Takahashi, Jere. 1997. *Sansei: Shifting Japanese American Identities and Politics*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Takenaka, A. 2003. "Paradoxes of Ethnicity-based Immigrants: Peruvians and Japanese-Peruvian Migrants in Japan." In *Global Japan: The Experience of Japan's New Immigrant and Overseas Communities*, edited by Roger Goodman, Ceri Peach, Ayumi Takanaka, and Paul White, 222–234. New York: Routledge.
- Terami-Wada, Motoe. 2010. *The Japanese in the Philippines, 1880s to 1980s*. Manila: National Historical Commission of the Philippines.
- Tsuda, Takeyuki. 2010. "Ethnic Return Migration and the Nation-State: Encouraging the Diaspora to Return Home." *Journal for the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism* 16(4): 616–636.
- Tsuda, Takeyuki. 2003. *Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland: Japanese Brazilian Return Migration*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Visa Section: Nikkeijin (Japanese Descendant). 2012. Embassy of Japan in the Philippines. Accessed 10 January 2014. <http://www.ph.emb-japan.go.jp/visiting/new%20visa/nikkeijin.htm>
- Yamashiro, Jane. 2008. "Nikkeijin." In *Encyclopedia of Race, Ethnicity and Society*, edited by Richard Schaefer, 983–985. California: Sage Publications.
- Yu-Jose, Lydia. 2000. "Japan: Curio, Enemy, Inspiration, Model, and Now?" In *Philippines and Japan: Directions and Challenges*, edited by Lydia Yu-Jose & Rosalina Tan, 1–15. Quezon City: Japanese Studies Program, Ateneo de Manila University.
- Yu-Jose, Lydia. 1994. *International and Domestic Factors that Affected Japanese Emigration to the Philippines*. Tokyo: Setsutaro Kobayashi Memorial Fund.
- Zulueta, Johanna. 2011. "A Place of Intersecting Movements: A Look at "Return" Migration and "Home" in the Context of the "Occupation" of Okinawa." Ph.D. dissertation, Hitotsubashi University. Accessed from <http://hdl.handle.net/10086/19323>.

# The Making of a Philippine Province: Romblon During the American Colonial Period<sup>1</sup>

Kristoffer ESQUEJO

Assistant Professor, Department of History  
University of the Philippines Diliman

## **Abstract**

This paper discusses the political transformation of Romblon in the Central Philippines during the American colonial era. Its status as a province underwent a series of changes that arose from the strategies of two local politicians, Francisco P. Sanz and Leonardo F. Festin, with the assistance of two national political figures. Romblon was first established as an independent province by the Taft Commission in 1901. Six years later, it was abolished and annexed to Capiz, its former mother province during the Spanish era. This first abolition was a result of Dean C. Worcester's intervention to appoint Sanz as governor and restore the political fortunes of the latter, who had lost an election. In 1918, Romblon again became a separate province through the initiative of Festin, who, ironically, would be responsible for its later demotion into an experimental province in 1940. For more than two decades, Festin dominated local politics as the Representative to the National Commission, while his patron and party head Manuel L. Quezon, who later became President of the Philippine Commonwealth, monopolized power at the national level.

Keywords: Romblon, sub-province, patronage, restoration

## Introduction

AMIDST THE EMERGENCE of new trends and directions in Philippine historiography, the study of local history remains popular among contemporary Filipino historians. Local historiography is seen as a positive step towards the writing of a broader, more inclusive history of the Philippines. Several studies have been done in this respect; Resil Mojares on Cebu, Patricio Abinales on Davao and Cotabato, Macario Tiu on Davao, Luis Dery on Sorsogon, Jaime Veneracion on Bulacan, and Lino Dizon on Pampanga and Tarlac, just to name a few. Even so, there are still plenty of gaps; the history of other provinces, including Abra, Marinduque, Catanduanes, Masbate, Siquijor, and Romblon, still have to be written. As a province, Romblon's role and significance is overlooked save for three things—typhoons, marble, and sinking ships.

Geography may be partly to blame. An archipelago, Romblon has a considerable distance from the capital, Manila. Plus, composed of several islands, remains isolated in all directions—it lies west of Mindoro, south of Marinduque, east of Masbate, and north of Panay. Demography plays a part as well. It has a population of less than three hundred thousand (according to the 2011 census),<sup>2</sup> which translates to a very small voting population that barely impacts national politics and the economy. This helps explain why most candidates running for national offices have not gone to visit and campaign in the area.

This paper answers the following questions: How did Sanz and Festin rise to power and monopolize Romblon politics for years? Why did Worcester and Quezon help Sanz and Festin in their respective political careers? Through various primary and secondary sources, the study explores these issues to shed light on the unique, albeit frustrating type of politics in Romblon during the American colonial period. It also highlights the efforts of other Romblomanon politicians—Governor Adriano Rios and Assemblyman Modesto Formilleza—who campaigned for Romblon's restoration as a separate province of the Philippines.

Throughout the paper, the term “Romblon” refers to the entire province and not only to the town capital. In the same way, “Romblomanons” means the people of the whole province and not just the inhabitants of the provincial capital.

### **Romblon during the Spanish Occupation**

According to Blair and Robertson (1903–1909a), Martín de Goiti and his men were the first Europeans to visit the Romblon archipelago. Before their departure, they divided the islands into three *encomiendas*, royally-granted territories, where taxes were collected by the Spanish conquistadores (73–74). Miguel López de Legazpi and his men later set foot in Romblon en route to northern Philippines, as did Miguel de Loarca and his men in 1582.<sup>3</sup>

Like any other pueblo in the Philippines at that time, the Spanish parish priest always handled the affairs of the local church and government in Romblon.<sup>4</sup> Along with him were officers, who helped run the administration: *capitan municipal*, who acted as the municipal chief executive; *teniente mayor*, who took charge of public services and records; *juez de policía*, who served as inspector of the barrios; *aguacil mayor*, *comisarios*, *cuadrilleros*, *guardia civiles*, and *auxillantes*, who were tasked as peacekeepers and guards of the town, and *cabezas de barangay*, who collected taxes in their respective villages (Meñez 1998, 54).

There were annual elections for local leaders during the Spanish period; however, only a few propertied men known as *principales* could be entitled as electors or *vocales*. Moreover, the provincial governor and/or the local parish priest (local inspector ex-officio) could always intervene in the outcomes of the local tribunal by influencing the town electors or altering the ballot (55–58).

Though not salaried, these elected officials usually worked through favours, promoting the power of the church and perpetuating the feudal relationship between the government and the people. As in other



Christianized provinces, local elites monopolized land and political offices in exchange for guaranteed exclusive rights to these resources. This was the so-called Spanish-style local politics of Romblon.

In 1818, Romblon became part of Capiz, and was converted into a *comandancia politico-militar* (Lancion 1995, 136) in 1853. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, *pueblos* (towns) emerged as external and internal migrations took place within the archipelago and significantly contributed to the rapid rise of the native population. Aside from the Ati group of Panay and the Mangyan of Mindoro, Unhan Visayans and Nayon Visayans from northern Panay poured into Tablas Island. Bantoanons from the north also established settlements in the neighbouring isles, while the Tagalogs from Batangas came at the end of the 19th century (Meñez 1998, 3–32).

In 1898, in the midst of Philippine Revolution, Emilio Aguinaldo sent his generals to several provinces in the Visayas to expand the recognition of his revolutionary government in the central and southern Philippines. The Caviteño Mariano Riego de Dios and his forces liberated Romblon, while Ananias Diocno and Leandro Fullon proceeded to Panay. On July 25 of the same year, Riego de Dios took the Romblon capital and captured Spanish officials (Reyes 1995, 56–58). Four days later, the Spanish politico-military governor Don Carlos Mendoza y Cerrada formally signed the surrender of Romblon's district government, ending more than three hundred years of Spanish rule in the archipelagic province (Madeja 1993, 236).

Later, Don Wenceslao Molo, a local from Romblon town, was appointed governor and became responsible for the collection of a total amount of P22,765.21, Romblon's share to the war expenditures of the Revolutionary Government from 31 May 1898 to 28 February 1899. A local election was also held in Romblon town for its ministers of justice and barrio officials (Reyes 1995, 54). However, Molo's term was a brief transition to another era.<sup>5</sup>

### **Romblon as an independent province: 1901–1907**

After the signing of the Treaty of Paris and the outbreak of the Filipino-American War, the Americans frustrated the Filipino-led governments in the provinces and put down Filipino resistance all over the archipelago. Since the Americans were busily engaged in “Philippine insurrection,” a civil government was only established a few years later. The United States wanted to develop this former Spanish colony in Asia into an image of herself.

In the case of Romblon, the Philippine Commission<sup>6</sup> arrived in the town capital on 16 March 1901 to establish a civil government. The said commission was headed by William Howard Taft and consisted of the following: Dean C. Worcester, Luke E. Wright, Henry C. Ide, and Bernard Moses. Upon their arrival, all the local leaders from 11 *pueblos* (towns) were summoned and convened in the town capital. Together with their vice-presidents, secretaries, and councilors, the municipal presidents who attended were: Cornelio Madrigal (Romblon); Hugo Gabuna (Looc); Licerio Fallar (Corcuera); Daniel Fortuna (Odiongan); Emeterio Rida (Cajidiocan); Francisco Recto (San Fernando); Leonardo Madrilejos (Badajoz); Teodorico Fainsan (Despujols); Francisco Festin (Banton); Doroteo Rubio (Magallanes); and Melecio Tean (Sta. Fe).<sup>7</sup>

Taft’s visit was significant for two reasons. First, it was the first time that Romblon’s political entity was recognized as a separate province. Second, the local leaders of every pueblo were empowered by the Commission to decide on several issues concerning the new province, which is perhaps why many Romblomanons fully collaborated with their new colonizers, unlike during the Spanish period.<sup>8</sup>

One of the intense debates centered on the transfer of the provincial capital from Romblon town to Looc, a municipality in southern Tablas. Lucas Kunanán, the municipal secretary of Looc, advocated for the transfer since the majority of the pueblos were in Tablas Island, which also had a bay and safe harbor. He was supported by Don Santiago Estudillo of Looc and Don Eugenio Festin of Odiongan, both powerful landlords in their respective towns. Opposing the proposal was Cornelio Madrilejos,

who insisted on retaining Romblon as the capital since it already had the colonial edifices of a provincial government. Two prominent individuals from Sibuyan—Don Francisco P. Sanz and Don Adriano N. Rios—also voiced their opposition; they found the proposition disadvantageous, since it would hinder their access to the provincial government, which would be farther in the new set-up. It took only two days of sea travel for their constituents to reach Romblon town, but a capital in Looc would mean four days of sea and land travel (*ibid.*; Fabella 1960, 66).

In the end, the Taft Commission decided to retain Romblon town as the capital and placed the entire Romblon archipelago under one province. After local leaders unanimously signed an endorsement, an American military officer, Major Evan M. Johnson, was appointed as Romblon's first American provincial governor. The other posts were filled by other American military officers and one local official: Cornelio Madrigal as secretary, Captain A.S. Williams as treasurer, Lt. S.H. Hopson as supervisor, and Simson Davidos y Dones as fiscal (*ibid.*, 69).

Johnson earned a favorable reputation among Romblomanons despite his brief term in office. During his tenure, he was responsible for the building of two reservoirs in the town capital and established access to potable water. In August 1901, he was replaced by Don Francisco P. Sanz as acting governor of Romblon—an early manifestation of American-sponsored Filipinization of the insular government.

The Philippine Commission passed Act No. 994, which affected all new provinces, including Romblon. On 17 November 1903, the original 11 pueblos were reduced into six municipalities, putting Corcuera under Banton, Magallanes (Magdiwang) under Cajidiocan, Despujols (San Andres) under Odiongan, and Sta. Fe under Looc (Vance 1980, 518). The subsequent 1906 gubernatorial elections replaced almost all the appointed governors in Western Visayas. Sanz was defeated by Bonifacio Marron in Romblon, S. Jugo Vidal lost to Antonio Habana in Capiz, while Leandro Fullon, a former revolutionary general, was succeeded by Angel Salazar in Antique (Cullinane 2003, 165–166).

For Romblomanons, Marron's electoral victory marked a political transition. Governing Romblon was now in the hands of a local leader, and not in appointed officials like Molo and Sanz. Marron enjoyed a long political career. Prior to his election as provincial governor, he was elected Delegate of Justice in Molo's Revolutionary Government. When Taft visited in 1901, he became the municipal vice-president and later municipal president after Madrilejos' appointment (Reyes 1995, 60).

Under Marron's term, the American insular government intensified its efforts to Filipinize the administration. Starting in 1902, the number of Romblomanons appointed in provincial offices increased; these include Modesto Marquez as clerk of the Court of First Instance; Francisco Villanueva as provincial fiscal; Sebastian de Castro as president of Provincial Health Board; Antonio Malbas as provincial office clerk; and Matias Martinez as deputy treasurer. Three Romblomanons held key positions in the education sector: Constancio Madrilejos as principal of Romblon Central School; Segundo Manza as a teacher of Romblon Provincial High School; and Pedro Maaba as clerk in the office of Superintendent Guy Van Schaick. A few years later, more positions were given to local professionals in the offices of municipal treasury, the courts of the justice of the peace, and the Bureau of Posts (Reyes 1995, 68).

In addition, the American government implemented widespread vaccination and quarantine as part of a national campaign to get rid of perennial epidemics of diseases, including small pox. More than 10 million Filipinos were vaccinated between 1905 and 1910—an effort which was claimed to have lessened the annual fatalities from 40,000 in 1901 to 700 in 1912. Cholera struck the province twice and reduced its population in 1897 and 1903 (Reyes 1995, 68, 73). Many Romblomanons gladly welcomed these medical improvements, despite their strong adherence to indigenous medicine.

Despite these developments, a significant part of the Filipino population kept the revolutionary spirit alive and continued to pursue independence amidst American efforts to promote self-rule and the promise of gradual independence. Reynaldo Ileto captures the revolutionary fervor in several Filipino provinces.

...As late as 1907, the constabulary in southern Luzon reported that in Sorsogon, Romblon, and Tayabas the whole population seems swept off its feet by the independence idea. Only a few men of prominence have been strong enough to stand in opposition. (1997, 171)

### **Romblon's devolution to a subprovince of Capiz: 1907–1917**

Romblon's status as an independent province only lasted for six years and three months. In 2 July 1907, Act No. 1665 subjugated Romblon to Capiz, its former mother province (along with Aklan).<sup>9</sup> This law also removed Maestre de Ocampo Island from Romblon's territorial jurisdiction and was added to Mindoro, which was nearer.<sup>10</sup>

All six municipalities of Romblon were assigned to the Third District of Capiz, an arrangement which lasted for a little more than a decade (*ibid.*, 198–200). The table below shows the distribution of municipalities into new districts.

**TABLE 1: Municipalities of Capiz under three assembly districts in 1907 (*ibid.*, 200)**

DISTRICT	MUNICIPALITIES
First District	Capiz (now Roxas City), Dao, Panay, Panitan, Pilar and Pontevedra
Second District	Dumalag, Dumarao, Iuisan (or Ivisan), Jamindan, Mambusao, New Washington, Sapián, Sigma and Tapas (or Tapaz)
Third District	Badajoz, Buruanga, Cajidiocan, Calibo (or Kalibo), Ibajay, Libacao, Looc, Malinao, Nabas, Odiongan, Romblon, San Fernando and Taft (now Makato)

What was the justification for this move? There are three common speculations. The first and widely accepted assumption was the insufficiency of tax collection to sustain an independent and regular provincial government (Madeja 1993, 162). Another is the American insular government's plan to limit between 50 and 100 the number of delegates to the Philippine Assembly (Reyes 1995, 77). Finally, it could have been a result of Interior Secretary Worcester's manipulations to resurrect Sanz's political career after the latter lost an election against Marron in 1906. A provision in the new law required only an appointed lieutenant governor to lead the new sub-province, which meant that Sanz was qualified (Fabella 1960, 66–67). Section 5 of the Provincial Government Act of 1907 cites the functions of this new position.

There shall be a lieutenant governor for the sub province of Romblon who shall be appointed by the Governor-General and with the consent of the Philippine Commission. He shall have his office in the municipality of Romblon and shall receive an annual salary not to exceed one thousand four hundred and forty pesos, payable monthly from funds of the sub province; he shall represent the provincial governor in the sub province and shall carry out the lawful directions of that officer as transmitted to him from time to time; he shall inspect the municipalities in the subprovince at least once every six months and shall make report between July first and July fifteenth of each year of the commercial, economic, financial, industrial, and political conditions therein to the provincial board, through the provincial governor; he shall from time to time make such recommendation to the provincial board, through the provincial governor, as he shall deem necessary for the best interests of the subprovince; he shall employ and discharge, with the approval of the provincial board, all subordinate employees of the subprovince that may be authorized by the board; he shall be the custodian of the public records and documents of the subprovince; and, in general, he shall exercise, subject to the supervision of the provincial governor, the powers and duties conferred upon a provincial governor by the Provincial Government Act.”<sup>11</sup>

Evidently, there is little difference between a provincial governor and a lieutenant governor of a subprovince. Almost all the functions of the former, as well as the benefits and privileges thereof, are also accorded to the latter, except that he is accountable to the provincial governor. In retrospect, nothing much changed, but the transfer of Romblon to Capiz in July 1907 deprived the Romblomanons a seat in the Philippine Assembly. How did this happen?

Earlier, on 9 January 1907, Act No. 1582 was passed, mandating, among others, elections for the Philippine Assembly on 30 July of the same year. Romblon was allocated one representative slot, while more populous provinces such as Cebu and Pangasinan were given seven and five, respectively (one delegate represents every 90,000). All in all, 81 slots were prepared for as many delegates from duly recognized provinces. Section 12 of the Provincial Government Act of 1907 lists the qualifications for a delegate.

A Delegate to the Philippine Assembly must be at the time of his election a qualified elector of the district from which he may be chosen, owing allegiance to the United States, and not less than twenty-five years of age.<sup>12</sup>

But less than a month before the election, in July 1907, Act No. 1665 was passed, reducing Romblon into a subprovince under the jurisdiction of Capiz. Six days later, Act No. 1669 would cut down the number of slots for the Philippine Assembly from 81 to 80. This reflected the loss of Romblon's provincial status.

Who was responsible for Romblon's demotion? As one of the most powerful men at that time, Worcester had enough influence to have this act passed. He had a seat in the Schurman Commission from 20 January 1899 to 15 March 1900. A few years later, he was holding two significant positions: as a member of the Taft Commission (16 March 1900 to 15 September 1913) and as Secretary of the Interior (1 September 1901 to 15 September 1913). He was in power for more than a decade and had

built an influence that penetrated every corner of the American insular government (Sullivan 1992, 237–238).

The Worcester-Sanz connection is very telling. According to Worcester's own account, he visited the Philippine Islands even before the American occupation to conduct scientific expeditions. As an anthropologist, he and some companions gathered data in several islands south of Manila in 1890. In Tablas, Romblon, and Sibuyan, he met a rich Spaniard named Don Pedro Sanz, the father of Francisco Sanz, whom he described as hospitable and friendly. Don Pedro owned vast lands in the three islands, two houses in Romblon and San Fernando, and a steamer used for business. He was popularly known to the townspeople as "King of Sibuyan," and had good relations with the natives since his arrival 39 years before (Worcester 1898, 464–467).<sup>13</sup>

During his inter-island trip, Worcester was disappointed with how the Spanish officials ran the local government. He himself was a victim of petty crime and his expectations of securing justice were, most of the time, frustrated by the colonial authorities. However, his relation with the older Sanz provided him with efficient, paternal supervision. This was positively described in one of his accounts.

...The kindly Spaniard knew by name every old grandmother and every tiny child that we met, and for each of them he had a pleasant word. He seemed to take a genuine interest in the petty affairs of his people and they fairly worshipped him...His native helpers were everywhere contented and prosperous, and the results accomplished during his 39 years of residence in the Philippines served to show what might have been brought about in the colony at large had the conquering nation contained more men like him. (Worcester 1898, 467)<sup>14</sup>

Two significant assumptions can be made based on Worcester's account of the events of 1890. First, it can be safely deduced that Don Pedro Sanz, after residing in Sibuyan for 39 years, arrived in the island in



1851. Second, because of Worcester's friendship with Don Pedro, both men reciprocated favors, and this was a relationship that would benefit Don Pedro's son, Don Francisco, when Worcester rose to power. This political connection between Worcester and Sanz is a classic American story of patronage politics. The former contributed a great deal to the rise and advancement of Francisco Sanz's political career.

Don Francisco Sanz was born on 26 March 1872, the youngest child of Don Pedro Sanz y Masa and Doña Enriqueta Perez—a lady of mixed French-Spanish ancestry. Paco, as he is fondly called, was privileged enough to have graduated at the Colegio de San Juan de Letran in Manila. He married Soledad Villaruz Acuña, a member of a powerful political clan in Capiz and sister of Rosario Acuña was the mother of President Manuel A. Roxas (Sanz 2010).<sup>15</sup> According to the Acuña clan history, the Sanz couple was blessed with seven children—three sons and four daughters. They were Ramona Frial, Marietta Beltran, Pedro, Carolina Moulton, Aida Gonzales, Antonio, and Angel (Acuña 1983, 46–47).

In 1901, as a member of the Taft Commission, Worcester was instrumental to Sanz's immediate appointment as governor after Evan Johnson. A few years later, a more powerful Worcester re-empowered his old friend Sanz, unfortunately, at the expense of the local people of Romblon. In his account, Sullivan (1992) dubbed Worcester as the "exemplar of Americanism," which fit his personality despite a show of corruption and abuse of power.

...He (Worcester) personified many of the typically American values of his New England forebears: industry, achievement, tenacity, and national pride. His world view was shaped by a powerful emotional attachment to an idealized United States. He maintained that American capital was always a beneficent investment, and that Americans were strikingly gifted at the "white man's job" of administering tribal people. He saw his country as the vanguard of civilization. Other, therefore lesser, peoples progressed only as they adopted American values and institutions. (229)

Contrary to the American promise to end Spanish-style feudal politics and spread American-inspired democracy in the Philippines, Worcester was guilty of using *utang-na-loob* (debt of gratitude) to grant favors in return for assistance or favors he himself received. However, Sanz was unsuccessful in following after his father's footsteps. If the father captured the trust and favour of the locals, the son proved otherwise—he never got elected in any position and he was able to stay in power only through the help of his father's old friend. Perhaps knowing that the young Sanz could not win the people's mandate to become Romblon's delegate in the national assembly, his patron continued to craft a series of legislative acts to keep him in his position.

However, on the inauguration of the Philippine Assembly, the Philippine Commission's power decreased as a new generation of Filipino leaders emerged, reared in American political culture. Since democracy required an electoral process, Sanz's type of patronage politics became archaic and irrelevant.

...Younger, more aggressive politicians had taken over the debating floor of the Assembly. Factional alliances, electoral base-building, realpolitik—instead of intellectual titles, lineage, or Spanish oratory—had become the new instruments of power. (Mojares 2006, 41)

In the case of Worcester, his image gradually deteriorated as he gained more critics and enemies:

...In 1909 he (Worcester) was probably the most unpopular American in the islands, held responsible for the ruthless disrespect for Filipinos associated with such draconian measures as the land quarantine, detention camps, enforced isolation of cholera victims, and the firing of dwellings. (Sullivan 1992, 115)

Worcester's fall, as it were, was paralleled somewhat in the political fortunes of Francisco Sanz. An active member of *Partido Progresista* (formerly *Partido Federal*) in Romblon, Francisco Sanz remained in his

political appointment as Lieutenant Governore for another eight years (Reyes 1995, 75) from 1907 to 1915, after which he was forced to run in another gubernatorial election. Act No. 2354, enacted on 28 February 1914, repealed previous appointments and mandated elections for lieutenant governors for subprovinces, such as Romblon (part of Capiz), Marinduque (part of Tayabas, now Quezon), Catanduanes (part of Albay), Abra (part of Ilocos Sur), Siquijor (part of Negros Oriental), and Masbate (part of Sorsogon).<sup>16</sup> Sanz lost the election as governor.

However, Sanz's political career did not completely end. He was immediately appointed as Governor of Palawan, another island province. The appointment lasted for four years (1915 to 1919). It is not clear whether this was facilitated by Worcester, who had already retired as Secretary of Interior. At any rate, Sanz and his family moved to Palawan during a time when its capital, Puerto Princesa, was still a very backward municipality with only one police officer. For the next four years, he did his best to gradually promote progress in the province. He constructed new roads, increased the number of police officers with enough arms and training, enhanced the education system, and improved health facilities. He retired from government service one year after the end of his term as Palawan's governor.<sup>17</sup> At the age of 73, Sanz passed away on 25 March 1945 in Manila as Allied Forces liberated the Philippines from Japanese rule (Sanz 2010).

Sanz was succeeded by Pablo G. Mayor, another Romblomanon and son of a former municipal president. He served as provincial treasurer and member of the provincial board prior to the election. Unfortunately, his term was only brief when Romblon once again became an independent province. His position was abolished in the latter part of 1917.<sup>18</sup>

### **Romblon regains independent province status: 1917–1940**

Two local politicians worked together to restore Romblon as an independent province: Don Adriano N. Rios, municipal president of San Fernando, and Don Leonardo F. Festin, a lawyer-turned-politician from Odiongan.

Born on 8 September 1880, Rios was the youngest among the eight children of a migrant couple from Aklan. He grew up in San Fernando and had the privilege of studying in a local parochial school. He mastered the Spanish language and eventually landed a clerical job in Romblon town. Land grabbing was a common issue, and he used his ability to speak Spanish fluently to defend his townmates against Spanish officials (Rios-Subido 2009).

A *Katipunero* (member of the revolutionary movement against Spain) and a veteran of the 1896 Philippine Revolution, Rios began to carve a name in local politics. He was in Romblon town when the Taft Commission arrived in 1901. After a brief stint as a teacher, he was municipal president of San Fernando from 1904 to 1910. His political career was interrupted when Military Order No. 40 prohibited elected officials to hold office for more than two terms. He did regain the same position from 1912 to 1918 (Fabella 1960, 64–66).

When Rios was elected as Speaker in the annual gathering of municipal presidents in Capiz, he drafted a resolution for the separation of Romblon as an independent province. The proposal was adopted by Governor Jose Altavas and supported by the townspeople. This move helped Altavas win a seat as the first Senator of the Fourth Senate District and overwhelmed big political names in Western Visayas, such as Ruperto Montinola, Salvador Laguda, and Francisco Villanueva. In exchange for his election, he sponsored a bill for Romblon's restoration as a separate province. This led to the enactment of Act No. 2724 on 7 December 1917, which made Romblon, once again, a regular independent province and brought under the same territorial jurisdiction according to Act No. 104 in 1901. The Act also assigned the province under the newly created Seventh Senate District (Fabella 1960, 67–68). Furthermore, the former subprovince of Romblon was taken back from Capiz, and the representative of the Third Electoral District of Capiz was assigned to Romblon. Capiz continued to have three electoral districts, each with several municipalities.<sup>19</sup>

Because of his decisive role in restoring Romblon's independent status, Rios was immediately appointed as provincial governor. A few months later, he was elected in the same position. From 1918 to 1921, he spearheaded the acquisition of two steamboats for the provincial government and initiated the surveying of a new venue for the provincial capitol building. He also led the Liberty Loan Funds Campaign and the recruitment of Romblomanon youth to the National Guards program of Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison. During the first months of Leonard Wood's term, Rios resigned as provincial governor because of his opposition to the harsh political atmosphere imposed by the new governor-general; this happened two years before the infamous "Ronley Case" and the Cabinet Crisis of 1923. After his retirement from politics, he again led his own townmates in San Fernando during and after the World War II (Fabella 1960, 68–70).

Unlike Rios, Don Leonardo Festin dominated provincial politics for the next three decades. Of course, his long monopoly of power would not have been possible if he did not have a powerful patron. His political career is another proof of the failed American experiment in democracy. At any rate, the restoration of Romblon as a regular province facilitated Festin's rise to prominence. Here was a provincial politician who was an educated member of the local elite class, who had the resources to maintain control. Aside from charm, money kept one in power, the display of which is evident in elections. Then as now, electoral politics was expensive, resembling a fiesta.

During those days, offering of food, drinks and transportation to the voters were not prohibited, so that every election time several heads of cows and some hundred sacks of rice find their way to Carmen (part of San Agustin) from Odiongan or Despujol (San Andres). It was like a big fiesta where not only the voters enjoyed the food and drinks but also some non-voters. It was only during the Commonwealth period when the offering of food, drinks and transportation started to be prohibited. (Villan 1990, 17)

Born on 6 November 1886, Don Leonardo Festin is the eldest son of Don Eugenio Festin and Doña Francisca Fabon, both from wealthy landed families in Odiongan. The outbreak of the 1896 Revolution interrupted his early education while his father succeeded Molo as governor of the Revolutionary Government when the American forces came. When Odiongan fell to American hands, his father was imprisoned but was later freed (Festin Story 2001, 62–63).

Like other Romblomanon politicians of his generation, Leonardo Festin was educated in Manila, where he finished a bachelor's degree at the *Liceo de Manila* and a law degree at the *Escuela de Derecho*. He passed the bar exam in 1910 and returned to his hometown, where he was designated as provincial judge of Capiz for three years. Known as Don Leonardo, Festin was popular and had a formidable reputation among his people. Fluent in Spanish, he never tried to learn English, a sign of his deep disgust of the Americans. He had a booming voice, an erect posture, and recognizable ears. Though dictatorial to his subordinates, he was claimed to have been a benevolent landlord to his tenants and endearingly called by many as “Tang Nardo” (Festin Story 2001, 49–50, 52, 72).

In 1916, he ran under the ruling *Partido Nacionalista* and won as Assemblyman of Capiz's Third District. His initial bill sought to rename the municipality of Banton into Jones as a token of gratitude to William Atkinson Jones, the American legislator who authored the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 (Festin Story 2001, 34–38, 51–52; Fabella 1976, 1). The *Partido Nacionalista* and *Partido Federalista* were not very different in terms of history, type of politics, and platforms. Festin undeniably belonged to this breed of politicians.

The Nacionalista Party, which replaced the Federalista as the dominant party from 1907 to 1946, was only different in the sense that its members, unlike the Federalistas, did not want the Philippines to be annexed permanently to America but wanted eventual independence. In terms of leaders and members, it was exactly the same as the Federalista Party. Its membership mainly consisted of the cream of

the Philippine plutocracy—landlords, propertied professionals, and businessmen. In fact, not a few of its leaders and members were former Federalistas. (Simbulan 2005, 42)

Festin is the longest-serving legislator of Romblon province. At that time when there was no term limit for a *diputado* (or assemblyman), Festin won in the 1916 election and subsequent nine re-elections: Fourth Legislature (1916–1919), Fifth Legislature (1919–1922), Sixth Legislature (1922–1925), Seventh Legislature (1925–1928), Eighth Legislature (1928–1931), Ninth Legislature (1931–1934), Tenth Legislature (1934–1935), Second National Assembly (1938–1941), and Third National Assembly (1941–1946)[Roster of Philippine Legislators 1989].

Festin managed to stay in power for so long because of the support of Manuel Quezon, who began his quest for the presidency in 1917, the year he became Senate President. As the most powerful Filipino politician of his time, he had gradually perfected a patronage system and obtained a monopoly of power, frustrating other national politicians who wanted to topple him. Also, he always intervened in provincial politics in order to strengthen his hand against the U.S. High Commissioner and his superiors in Washington, D.C. Like other politicians, Quezon and Festin were both guilty in keeping themselves in power, instead of fully preparing for the coming war. By 1940, Quezon had shattered all elite opposition inside and outside his own party, including progressive leaders in Central Luzon (McCoy 1989, 118–121). As a result, he undeniably made a strong impact even in post-war Philippine politics.

...Quezon was not only the leading advocate of national independence; he was the progenitor of a system of politics and a style of leadership that has left an indelible imprint on the Philippine state. By the effective end of the Commonwealth in 1941, Quezon had shaped the written and unwritten constitution, set the standard of executive leadership, forged the terms of postcolonial relations with the United States, fashioned a close link between provincial and national politics, and selected the next generation of political leaders. (116)

Another local politician from Romblon reacted against Quezon's so-called "authoritarianism." Manuel T. Albero, former governor and one of the two delegates to the 1934 Constitutional Convention, introduced a controversial provision in the 1935 Constitution which limited the power of a strong president (he was later hailed as the "Father of Local Autonomy Bill") [Fabella 1962, 76]. Approved by the Committee on Executive Power, it was included in the Article 7, Section 10a of the said constitution.

The President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise general provision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. (emphasis by the author)<sup>20</sup>

It was under this authoritarian, patronage style of politics that Leonardo Festin's political career flourished. Because of his long legislative experience, Festin gained more fame and influence within his party, and was called the "Dean of the Lower House." With the support of then Senate President Manuel L. Quezon, he was made the majority floor leader and chairman of the powerful House Committee on Appropriations, a position he held for ten years. Between 1935 and 1938, Quezon appointed him member of Committee for the Reorganization of the Government and commissioner of the Bureau of Census and Statistics (Festin Story 2001, 53–54, 67).

In response to Quezon's patronage, Festin showed unwavering loyalty and obedience to the former. Festin's prowess as a popular orator was fully utilized in the rallies of the Nacionalista Party in Quezon's several trips to the Visayas. It was said that when delivering a speech, his booming voice could be heard a kilometer away even without a loudspeaker (Festin Story 2001, 53).

Furthermore, Festin significantly helped Quezon's political agenda in two ways. First, as the majority floor leader, Festin was an expert troubleshooter, resolving the quarrels and rivalries among the politicians and candidates from all over the country who were often in Manila. Second,



as chairman of House Committee on Appropriations, he annually sponsored Quezon's all important general appropriations bill (national budget) which, as expected, always got passed amidst all heated debates among lawmakers (Festin Story 2001, 65–67).

Festin was widely acclaimed as an honest public servant. He was not accused of any acts of corruption, abuse of power, and neglect of duties. He drafted a bill re-empowering the Bureau of Posts to have control over the nine government radio stations throughout the country from Vigan to Zamboanga. Before its final approval, an agent of a private corporation was pushing for its withdrawal and attempted to bribe him, but instead of giving in, he made sure that the law was passed (Festin Story 2001, 73). There is also another incident where he rejected a bribe from a British shipping company to get a government franchise (Rogero 2008). Still, Festin earned a growing dislike from select Romblomanons, who were educated under the American educational system (more on this later). After staying in power for almost three decades, Festin suffered his first electoral defeat in the hands of Gabriel F. Fabella in 1935. Fabella's autobiography clearly stated that beating Festin was one of his ultimate dreams.

A product of American colonial education, Gabriel Fabella was born in Banton to a poor but large family. He earned three degrees at the University of the Philippines (UP): Bachelor of Arts (B.A.), Bachelor of Science in Education (B.S.E.), and High School Teachers' Certificate (H.S.T.C.). Later, he earned two more degrees, Master of Arts in History from UP and Bachelor of Laws from the University of Manila. After teaching in different levels, he joined the faculty of the UP Department of History; he later passed the bar and became a lawyer (Fabella 1998, 1–25).

In 1922, Fabella was actively involved in the electoral campaign of Juan Fetalvero, a *Partido Democrata* candidate who attempted to defeat Leonardo Festin. When Fetalvero lost by a close margin, Fabella vowed to stop Festin's winning streak.

I do not know why young people generally sympathize with underdogs. They are more inclined to think of the old, especially those who were brought up during the Spanish period, as belonging to a class not in keeping with modern life. We who were schooled under the aegis of democracy hate to see someone perpetuated in power. This is the way I feel towards Leonardo Festin...In 1922, he ran again and that was my first time to vote, and I voted against him because I thought two terms were long enough for one man. We wanted a change so that every deserving person could have a chance to help his people...I was sorely disappointed, but in my heart, I began nurturing the idea that if nobody could beat Festin, I would, later on. I never lost sight of this fact since that time. (Fabella 1998, 36)

Thirteen years later, Festin and Fabella fought in an epic election. The 1935 elections for Romblon representative to the National Assembly became very controversial; even Festin was warned of Fabella's probability of winning. In exchange for Festin's long and unwavering loyalty to Quezon and to the party, Quezon decided to intervene. He summoned the neophyte lawyer, Fabella, to his residence in Pasay and tried to persuade him to withdraw his candidacy in lieu of a government position and to campaign for his presidential bid. However, Fabella politely declined the offer and expressed his strong desire to run amidst a lack of financial resources and political experience (Ancheta 1962, 11–13).

When Fabella was finally declared the winner, Festin was so devastated that he was rumored to have not gotten out of bed for days. Quezon and almost everybody in Manila were shocked; however, the people of Romblon town rejoiced, burning an effigy of Festin. They strongly supported any candidate opposing Festin, who had been, until then, the perennial winner. Festin's family considered his defeat a result of the combined efforts of all their political enemies who sided with and supported Fabella. They also saw Festin's commitment to Quezon's national campaign (against other contenders, such as Emilio Aguinaldo and Gregorio

Aglipay) as a setback, which took his time and focus away from his own provincial campaign (Fabella 1998, 50–62; Festin Story 2001, 45–46, 51, 65).

Fabella saw several reasons why he won against Festin: first, there already was a deafening clamour for change, as Festin had always been the perennial rule, and was becoming the butt of jokes [he was branded as “*peste*” (pest), “floor wax”, and “*tiki*” (gecko), both terms referring to one’s attachment to a powerful patron to remain in position]; second, Festin overestimated the local people and no longer bothered to campaign among Romblomanons; third, Fabella in contrast conducted an intensive twenty-four-day campaign in the major islands from 24 August to 17 September 1935; fourth, he also garnered the unanimous support of the people who identified with him; fifth, the electoral law at that time forbade illiterate people from voting, and they would have otherwise voted for Festin; sixth, Festin underestimated Fabella, who was thought to be virtually unknown to the townspeople; and lastly, most, if not all, political opponents of Festin supported Fabella’s campaign and election (Fabella 1998, 43–61; Ancheta 1962, 14; Rogero 2009).<sup>21</sup>

However, Festin was not one to easily accept defeat. He filed a protest questioning the legitimacy of Fabella’s residency in Banton and arguing that he, Fabella, was not really living there and in fact works in Manila. If the petition was granted, Fabella would be disqualified and Romblon would have been denied their chosen representative. Some of the members of the Electoral Commission were known party mates and colleagues of Festin in the legislature, and Fabella was initially disheartened by this protest, especially when he was abandoned by his own lawyer. Fabella and Modesto Formilleza, a friend, helped in formulating their own arguments. In a surprising turn of events and much to the chagrin of Festin, Fabella won the case gaining the support of seven out of the nine commissioners: Real, Imperial, Recto, Perfecto, Rafols, Yoranon, and Ramos; while Sandoval and Kapunan, Festin’s friends, voted for the latter (Fabella 1998, 65–66). It is a wonder why Quezon, the newly elected President of the

Commonwealth and the manipulative party boss, did not intervene in this matter. In retrospect, at any rate, Fabella seemed to have defeated Festin not once, but twice.

Despite the strong pressure to conform to traditional politics, Fabella also enjoyed and cultivated his political career by focusin on education. He allocated 80% of his pork barrel in the construction of new school buildings, and the remaining 20% to the building of roads in the province. As much as possible, he ensured that the funds he received were equally divided among all the municipalities of Romblon; thus, those areas which were formerly financially deprived during Festin’s administration received money and public services from the national government (Fabella 1998, 70–71).

Consistent with his campaign vow in 1935, Fabella served only one term as assemblyman and did not seek reelection. He went back to the academe and became a known historian and university administrator. After the war, he returned to advocate for changing the Philippine Independence Day from 4 July to 12 June. In 1962, President Macapagal enacted an executive order that earned him the title, “Father of June 12.” He died on 29 January 1982.<sup>22</sup>

### **Romblon becomes an “experimental province” during the War: 1940–1946**

In 1938, three years after losing to Fabella, Leonardo Festin returned to provincial politics. He sponsored two bills: Commonwealth Electoral Reform Law and Commonwealth Act No. 581, another controversial legislation which was simply perceived as a way to consolidate power. Also called the “Festin Bill,” Commonwealth Act No. 581 was initially rejected by President Quezon. Festin filed it again, and it was finally approved by the National Assembly on 8 June 1940. The law allowed the devolution of the provincial government of Romblon and its 11 municipalities, and their replacement by four special municipalities, Romblon, Maghali, Sibuyan, and Tablas, which collectively came to be known as ROMASITA (Madeja 1993, 272–273).

For a veteran politician, Festin wanted to promote the divide-and-rule strategy and consolidate his power among the newly formed four special municipalities. The law may have been effected because Festin was nearly beaten by a certain Reta, his rival from Sibuyan in the 1938 elections. There were rumors that some ballots were intentionally invalidated in Simara that led to another victory for Festin. At any rate, enacting the bill would mean no elections in 1941 and help ensure that Festin could avoid electoral defeat (Rogero 2009).

The Festin Bill was also an experiment in local government during the Commonwealth period. It was a strange arrangement; it declared Romblon as an irregular province that did not have any use for the national government, but it continued to receive financial subsidy and privileges from the national government. The Interior Secretary of the Commonwealth Government was also designated as the Governor Ex-officio of Romblon (Madeja 1993, 275–276). The Festin Bill also created a semifeudal and antidemocratic government because of the power of the assemblyman to recommend to the Interior Secretary prospective appointees for many local positions, including those for mayor, treasurer-assessor, chief of police, and five police officers. Exempted from the law were appointments to the *ayuntamiento* or municipal council. As an incumbent assemblyman, Festin had the prerogative to appoint people in those four special municipalities. When it took effect on 1 January 1941, the *ayuntamiento* of Tablas had the following members: Daniel Atienza (Speaker), Amado Manlolo, Nemesio Ganan, Pablo Baculinao, Guillermo Gadaoni and Rafael Gomez. Only Jose Firmalo (mayor), Marcial Fondevilla (treasurer-assessor) and Camilo Montesa (chief of police) were recommended by Festin (Meñez 1998, 97–98).

However, the detailed contents of this law were not fully implemented. First, its original provision of a weekly council meeting was replaced by an advisory board because of a scarcity of gasoline for the transportation of the municipal officials. Second, its organizational set-up was replaced by a supervising governor and four deputy governors, who

were all appointed by the military government in Panay during the war. (Meñez 1998, 98). All in all, the Festin Bill did not help its author stay in power, and the creation of four special municipalities of Romblon created difficult conditions of governance during the Second World War.

During World War II, the Japanese forces tried their best to capture Festin, but never did. And he did not become a Japanese collaborator; four of his sons joined the local resistance movement. After the war, he attended Congress' session when it convened on 9 June 1945. Quezon had passed in 1944, and the new party head, Osmeña did not favour Festin (Festin Story 2001, 59–62), as did Manuel Roxas. When the Capiz-born Roxas ran for presidency under his newly formed *Partido Liberal*, he chose, for Romblon representative, Modesto Formilleza, who would win the election. Formilleza studied in Capiz and he was a trusted ally of Roxas. As Roxas beat Osmeña, Formilleza garnered 7,816 votes while Festin got 4,374 (Formilleza 2009).

Festin's political career finally came to an end. In his later years, his daughter tried her luck in politics but lost in the gubernatorial elections. Finally, one of his grandsons won a provincial post as one of the two delegates for the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Before his death on 18 June 1971, Festin expressed his pride for his past political triumphs.

Those people can't rest because I beat them, because I have done more for Romblon than they ever did, and because I have proved my worth in Congress against the best in the country, I am more than content with my life. Let them say anything, but at least I wish to ask: Why do they have to bring me down in order to raise themselves up? And Don Leonardo, rich in public esteem and the affection of his peers, is happy with the memory of a job well-done. (Festin Story 66–67)

### **Romblon's final battle as an independent province: 1946 onwards**

Formilleza's election initiated a new era in Romblon's political history. Fulfilling his election vow, he immediately sought to enact another bill that would become Republic Act No. 38. Approved on 1 October 1946, it repealed the so-called "Festin Bill" and restored the regular provincial government and municipalities of Romblon, including Sta. Fe, whose territory is comprised of four former barangays of Looc municipality.

Like Festin, Formilleza was also an Odiongan-born lawyer. Born on 15 June 1894 to a poor family, he taught in Capiz and studied law in Manila; he was a working student. Eventually, Formilleza rose through the ranks of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). He was appointed by Roxas as the bureau's deputy collector before his (Roxas) candidacy and election in 1946. As Romblon's representative, Formilleza's greatest legacy was the creation of the National Revenue Code of the Philippines (Formilleza 2009).

Unfortunately, Formilleza's political stint was short-lived. In 1949, he was defeated by Florencio Moreno, a UP-educated engineer who would also do well in the House of Representatives. Formilleza did resume government service as commissioner of the Bureau of Import Controls (now Bureau of Customs) from 1950 to 1952. After two years, he was invited by Andres Soriano to become one of the stockholders and eventually became vice-president of the Tax Service of the Philippines (1952–1956). Formilleza died on 22 December 1958 (Formilleza 2009).

After Formilleza and Moreno, Romblon as a province was never again abolished and underwent no further political experimentations. As decades went by, new municipalities were created, such as Alcantara (1961) from Looc, Calatrava (1969) from San Agustin, Ferrol (1978) from Odiongan, and Santa Maria (1984) from San Agustin. Romblon today has 17 municipalities, and Romblon town still remains the capital.

## Conclusion

This study provides a detailed discussion of the forty-five year political history of the peripheral and archipelagic province of Romblon. During this time, Romblon underwent political transformations because of five legislative acts: Act No. 104 (1901), Act No. 1665 (1907), Act No. 2724 (1917), Commonwealth Act No. 581 (1940) and Republic Act No. 38 (1946).

The study examined these transformations through the careers of Romblon's several politicians, Adriano Rios, Gabriel Fabella, and Modesto Formilleza. But two others stand out, Don Francisco "Paco" Sanz and Don Leonardo "Nardo" Festin, who dominated Romblon's politics for most of the American colonial period. Through wealth, education, and political connections, Sanz and Festin assumed and maintained political power with or without a popular mandate.

Sanz was a big figure Romblon's political scene in the first two decades of American colonial era. Not elected for any position, he was appointed governor and lieutenant governor of the province for two separate terms (1901–1906 and 1908–1915), the result of the schemes of the powerful member of Taft Commission and later Secretary of Interior, Dean C. Worcester. This patronage partly arose from the friendship between Worcester and the Francisco Sanz's father. Under Sanz, Romblomanons were deprived of representation in the Philippine Assembly, as Romblon fell under the jurisdiction of Capiz.

The paper also charted the political career of Leonardo Festin, who restored Romblon as a province in 1917, sponsoring a bill that would repeal a previous law which had subjected Romblon to the jurisdiction of Capiz. Senate President and later President Quezon made great efforts to keep Festin in power; in turn, he, Festin, showed uncompromising loyalty and obedience to the former. Dominating Romblon politics for three decades (except for three years), Festin sponsored a bill (and later law) that turned Romblon into experimental province in 1940 composed of four separate special municipalities. The



act was, among other things, an attempt to consolidate power, and may have been one reason for his defeat in 1946.

The study is significant for three reasons. First, it highlights the history of a relatively neglected province in Philippine history, providing as yet another example of local history. In particular, by tracing the relationship between Romblon politicians and those of the national government, the paper offers another case study of politics during the American colonial period, which has been the subject of books such as *Philippine Colonial Democracy ; Ilustrado Politics: Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule, 1898-1908*; and *Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation State*, among others. This kind of research needs to cover other provinces or subprovinces in the American colonial period.<sup>23</sup>

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> This article is based on several chapters in the author's Master's thesis in History, which was awarded the NCCA Young Historian's Prize 2011 for Local History (Filipino Category).
- <sup>2</sup> Based on the 2007 National Census, the total population of Romblon was 279,774. This slightly increased in 2011 to 283,920.
- <sup>3</sup> Legazpi and his men are believed to have landed in the southwestern part of Romblon Island known today as Sitio Aglummyom, a place whose name originated from a popular legend of a native woman talking to a Spaniard. Asked for the name of the place, she mistakenly answered him 'nagalummyom,' thinking of what a hen was doing in its nest. After hearing the vernacular word, which meant 'sitting in the nest,' Spaniards are believed to have adopted it until it evolved into 'Lomlom' and 'Donblon.' Eventually, it became 'Romblon,' the present name of the island which was adopted by the town as well as the entire province (Prado 2005, 15). Other theories explain the origin of the provincial name. Interestingly, two of these have something to do with the shape of the Romblon Island itself. For one historian, it was derived from the Spanish word 'roblon,' another term for 'tornillo,' which in English means 'screw.' Spaniards who were already foremost experts in navigation were claimed to have observed the screw-like shape of this island (Madeja 1993, 38). For another historian, 'Romblon' originated from the word 'doubloon,' which refers to the Spanish coin that was eventually adopted by their enemies, the Muslims, in paying dowries for their brides-to-be. Spaniards might have named the island after the shape of this coin (Reyes 1995, 12).
- <sup>4</sup> Catholic devotion was further strengthened when Romblon was put under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Bishop of Cebu. While Moro attacks were so rampant, these islands, also known as "Las Isletas," became a territory of evangelism for the Augustinian

Recollects. In 1644, Fr. Miguel de la Concepcion, parish priest of Romblon town, was captured by these Muslim warriors from the south. In response, Fr. Juan de San Antonio assigned the famous Fr. Agustin de San Pedro to Romblon in order to gather and defend the newly Christianized inhabitants. Dubbed as ‘El Padre Capitan’ in Philippine History, he had spearheaded military campaigns against the equally famous Sultan Kudarat in Mindanao. In his new post, San Pedro erected several fortresses in Romblon town and Banton, the two earliest *pueblos* in the province, between 1640 and 1650. He was so enamoured by the place and the people that he chose to be re-assigned there in the twilight years of his life. In 1661, he died and was buried beside the Saint Joseph Cathedral, the church he built himself (Diocese of Romblon 2000, 27). Though Romblon was not as affluent as other Philippine provinces, it seemed that the friar missionaries were pleased to have been assigned there. In one account, Fr. Mateo Delgado praised the positive traits and skills of its inhabitants. “The people are honest, pacific, docile, and very intelligent. They trade in the products of the land – oil, goats, swine, wine and bonete. They have a great abundance of domestic animals. They construct ships, build houses, and make other things of wood with great skills, all of which they take to Manila, as well as to other places, to sell” (Blair and Robertson, 1903–1909b, 85–86).

- <sup>5</sup> For a more detailed discussion on Romblon’s experience during the First Filipino Republic, see Kristoffer R. Esquejo, “Himagsikan at Rehiyonalismo: Ang Romblon sa Ika-19 na Dantaon,” in *Kasaysayang Pamook: Pananaw, Pananaliksik, Pagtuturo*, eds., Atoy M. Navarro and Ma. Florina Y. Orillos-Juan (Quezon City: Limbagang Pangkasaysayan, 2012): 254–276.
- <sup>6</sup> Since the Philippine Commission was headed by William Howard Taft, later President and Chief Justice of the United States, this was also called the Taft Commission. In fact, the whole period from 1901 to 1913 in Philippine history is often dubbed as the “Taft Era.”
- <sup>7</sup> See *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1901*, 65–67.
- <sup>8</sup> Several elected officials of Romblon launched programs to commemorate this significant date. Former Governor Jose M. Madrid (1986–1998) commissioned a research on the lives of former provincial leaders in 1990, while former Congressman and now Governor Eduardo C. Firmalo (2004–2007; 2010–present) gave a tribute to 21 most outstanding Romblomanons in 2006. Congressman Eleandro Jesus F. Madrona’s sponsored a bill, which became Republic Act No. 9642 (*An Act Declaring Every March 16 of Every Year as Romblon Foundation Day and a Special Non-Working Public Holiday in the Province of Romblon*).
- <sup>9</sup> Aklan became an independent province from Capiz only in 1956.
- <sup>10</sup> Since 1907, Sibalenhons wanted to separate from Romblon province since it would be politically and economically beneficial for them to be part of Mindoro. Only linguistic and cultural ties connect them to their fellow Asi-speakers in Banton and Simara. Interestingly, these two islands and Maestre de Ocampo compose what they call as ‘Maghali,’ the Asi word for cousins.

- 
- <sup>11</sup> See *Public Laws Passed by the Philippine Commission During the Period from September 1, 1906 to October 15, 1907 comprising Acts Nos. 1537 to 1800*. Vol. 6, (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1908):195.
- <sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 47–76.
- <sup>13</sup> Though Sanz was perceived to be benevolent to the natives, his family was one of those prominent Spanish families who were targeted for capture by the Riego de Dios expedition in 1898. Using the steamer “Enriqueta,” the Sanz family escaped to Iloilo and returned only to Romblon in 1901.
- <sup>14</sup> For a detailed description on the life and career of Dean C. Worcester, see Rodney J. Sullivan, *Exemplar of Americanism: The Philippine Career of Dean C. Worcester* (Quezon City: New Day Publisher, 1992).
- <sup>15</sup> Though political in nature, this marriage was not impossible since Romblon was a former part of Capiz province during 19<sup>th</sup> century and only the Jintotolo Channel separates Sibuyan and Panay. Moreover, I was informed that there is a regular five-hour trip of pump boats between San Fernando and Roxas City.
- <sup>16</sup> See *Public Laws and Resolutions Passed by the Philippine Commission During the Second Session and Special Session of 1914 of the Third Legislature, and by the Philippine Commission in its Exclusive Legislative Capacity, From June 14, 1913 to July 24, 1914 Nos. 2279 to 2409 Inclusive*, (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1914): 451–453.
- <sup>17</sup> See Humphrey O’Leary III, “The Fighting Governor,” *The Irishman’s Tales*.
- <sup>18</sup> See *Romblon Province 90<sup>th</sup> Foundation Anniversary (1901-1991) Souvenir Program*, 7.
- <sup>19</sup> See *Public Laws Enacted by the Philippine Legislature During the Period March 17, 1917 to May 29, 1918 comprising Acts Nos. 2711 to 2780*, Vol. 13, (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1918): 37–38.
- <sup>20</sup> For the full text of the 1935 Constitution, see [www.lawphil.net/consti/cons1935.html](http://www.lawphil.net/consti/cons1935.html).
- <sup>21</sup> For a more detailed discussion on the 1935 elections between Festin and Fabella, see Kristoffer R. Esquejo, “Tunggaliang Festin at Fabella: Ang Halalang 1935 sa Kasaysayang Pampolitika ng Romblon,” *Daluyan: Journal ng Wikang Filipino* 16, no. 1 (2011):101–118.
- <sup>22</sup> For a more detailed description on the life and legacies of Gabriel F. Fabella, see Kristoffer R. Esquejo, “Gabriel F. Fabella: Talambuhay at Pamana ng Tinaguriang ‘Ama ng Hunyo 12,’ 1898-1982,” *Philippine Social Science Review* 63, no. 2 (July-December 2011): 55–88.
- <sup>23</sup> This study could have been enhanced if only there were more available provincial reports. Political dynasties in various Philippine provinces are widely discussed in, among others, Alfred W. McCoy’s book, *An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines*.
-

---

## References

### Books

- Ancheta, Celedonio. 1962. *The Father of Philippine Independence Day*. Quezon City: Pilipino Teacher Publications.
- Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1901* (Report of the Philippine Commission in Two Parts) Part 2, 1901. Washington: Government Printing Office.
- Blair, Emma Helen and James Alexander Robertson (eds.). 1903-1909a. *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898*, Volume 3. Cleveland: The Arthur and Clark Company.
- . 1903-1909b. *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898*, Volume 35. Cleveland: The Arthur and Clark Company.
- Cullinane, Michael. 2003. *Ilustrado Politics: Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule, 1898-1908*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
- Esquejo, Kristoffer. 2012. "Himagsikan at Rehiyonalismo: Ang Romblon sa Ika-19 na Dantaon." In *Kasaysayang Pampook: Pananaw, Pananaliksik, Pagtuturo*, edited by Atoy M. Navarro and Ma. Florina Y. Orillos-Juan, 254-276. Quezon City: Limbagang Pangkasaysayan.
- Fabella, Gabriel. 1960. "Don Adriano N. Rios: Romblon's Patriarch." *Historical Bulletin* 4 (3) 63-71.
- . 1962. "Manuel T. Albero: A Father of Our Constitution." *Historical Bulletin* 6:1(March) 71-80.
- . 1976. *The Romblon Archipelago Series No. 1* (Banton, Calatrava, Concepcion and Corcuera). San Mateo, Rizal: ITP Press.
- . 1998. *The Man from Romblon*. San Fernando City and Aringay, La Union: Northern Educational Development Center, Inc.
- Festin Story: More than 150 Years of Family Lore*. 2001. Private publication.
- Ireto, Reynaldo C. 1997. *Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
- Lancion, Conrado Jr. 1995. *Fast Facts About Philippine Provinces*. Makati: Tahanan Books.
- McCoy, Alfred W. 1989. "Quezon's Commonwealth: The Emergence of Philippine Authoritarianism." In *Philippine Colonial Democracy*, edited Ruby R. Paredes, 114-160. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
- McCoy, Alfred W., ed. 1994. *An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
- Meñez, Mateo. 1998. *Brief History of a Typical Philippine Town*. Manila: Saint Rafael Press.

- Mojares, Resil B. 2006. *Brains of the Nation: Pedro Paterno, T.H. Pardo de Tavera, Isabelo de los Reyes and the Production of Modern Knowledge*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
- O’Leary, Humphrey III. n.d. “The Fighting Governor.” *The Irishman’s Tales*.
- Paredes, Ruby, ed. 1989. *Philippine Colonial Democracy*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
- Prado, Francis Ray. 2005. *The History of Carmen Including Historical and Cultural Background of North-eastern Barangays of the Municipality of San Agustin, Romblon*. Private publication.
- Political History and Socio-Demographic Profile Province of Romblon*. n.d. Romblon, Romblon: Provincial Government of Romblon.
- Public Laws and Resolutions Passed by the Philippine Commission During the Second Session and Special Session of 1914 of the Third Legislature, and by the Philippine Commission in its Exclusive Legislative Capacity, From June 14, 1913 to July 24, 1914 Nos. 2279 to 2409 Inclusive*. 1914. Manila: Bureau of Printing.
- Public Laws Enacted by the Philippine Legislature During the Period March 17, 1917 to May 29, 1918 comprising Acts Nos. 2711 to 2780, Volume 13*, 1918. Manila: Bureau of Printing.
- Public Laws Passed by the Philippine Commission During the Period from September 1, 1906 to October 15, 1907 comprising Acts Nos. 1537 to 1800, Volume 6*. 1908. Manila: Bureau of Printing.
- Romblon on the Wings of Time: A Commemorative Book on the Silver Jubilee Celebration of the Diocese of Romblon (1975-2000)*. 2001. Romblon, Romblon: Diocese of Romblon.
- Roster of Philippine Legislators 1907-1987*. 1989. Quezon City: House of Representatives Congressional Library.
- Simbulan, Dante C. 2005. *The Modern Principalia: The Historical Evolution of the Philippine Ruling Oligarchy*. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.
- Sullivan, Rodney J. 1992. *Exemplar of Americanism: The Philippine Career of Dean C. Worcester*. Quezon City: New Day Publishers.
- The Acuñaas of Capiz Souvenir Book*. 1983. Manila: Private publication.
- Vance, Lee W. 1980. *Tracing Your Philippine Ancestors*. Provo, Utah: Stevenson’s Genealogical Center.
- Worcester, Dean C. 1898. *The Philippine Islands and Their People*. New York: The MacMillan Co.; London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd.
- Villan, Francisco. 1990. *Barangay Carmen: Past, Present and Future*. Private publication.
- Zafra, Galileo. 1994. “Romblonanon.” In *CCP Encyclopedia of Philippine Art*, Vol. 2 (Peoples of the Philippines Kalinga to Yakan). Manila: Cultural Center of the Philippines.

### Journal Articles

- Esquejo, Kristoffer R. 2011. "Gabriel F. Fabella: Talambuhay at Pamana ng Tinaguriang 'Ama ng Hunyo 12,' 1898-1982." *Philippine Social Sciences Review* 63:2 (July-December) 55-88.
- . 2010. "Tunggaliang Festin at Fabella: Ang Halalang 1935 sa Kasaysayang Pampolitika ng Romblon." *Daluyan: Journal ng Wikang Filipino* 16(1):101-118.

### Interviews

- Ms. Edna F. Formilleza at Cubao, Quezon City on 27 June 2009 by the author.
- Mrs. Marcia Rios-Subido at Tayuman, Manila on 8 June 2009 by the author.
- Mr. Servillano Rogero at Romblon, Romblon on 28 May 2009 by the author.
- Mr. Angel A. Sanz at Mandaluyong City on 23 January 2010 by the author.

### Theses and Dissertations

- Esquejo, Kristoffer R. 2010. "Pu-od Romblon: Kasaysayang Pampolitika ng Lalawigang Kapuluan, 1896-2006." Master of Arts in History Thesis. Quezon City: University of the Philippines.
- Madeja, Roland F. 1993. "Romblon Province, 1570-1946: Its History and Development." Master of Arts in History Thesis. Manila: Manuel Luis Quezon University.
- Reyes, Evelyn M. 1995. "Romblon During American Regime, 1898-1946." Master of Arts in Philippine Studies Thesis. Manila: De La Salle University.

## Commentaries and Documents

# Timor Leste's Preparation for Accession into ASEAN: Public Participation, Production of Knowledge, Comparative Histories, and Perspectives from Below<sup>1</sup>

Jacqueline Aquino SIAPNO

Independent Researcher  
Centro Para a Mulher e Estudos do Genero

This paper examines political institutions in Timor Leste and the country's preparedness for joining the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It explores and tries to understand the processes of formulating a national strategy in Timor Leste, especially its foreign policy, and determining whether the institutions and characters within are effective in achieving national and regional goals. It stresses the importance of and obstacles to building knowledge of Southeast Asian states in Timor Leste and the need to establish collaborative research between scholars in the country.

ASEAN is a 47-year old institution, and while numerous studies and literature reviews examine and critique its ineffectiveness as an organization, some have also celebrated its strengths (Acharya 2009; von Feigenblatt 2012; Seng Tan 2014, among others). Despite the available literature, I am not sure where to search for more public information on Timor Leste's foreign policy, especially towards ASEAN. This lack begs me to raise the following questions: is the problem really in ASEAN (considering some member states' snobbish refusal to let Timor Leste join)? Or is it in our own nation-building processes and strategies? Are we taking our time too slowly and don't really know when or how we will join? Do we have any idea how joining ASEAN will benefit Timor Leste? Is our



Ministry of Foreign Affairs well-coordinated? Does it share information effectively with other ministries? And is there a public information campaign that shares the results of our public officials' numerous foreign trips to ASEAN meetings to the larger Timorese public? Or is foreign policy only for a very small group of elite men, who are not accountable to anyone? Dr. Tam Nguyen's (2014) eye-opening research is very enlightening concerning these points.

One might also ask: does public opinion even count or matter on a national development strategy, especially on foreign policy? Should they set the standards (if there are any) and lead the way (however contradictory, ill-informed, and/or unsustainable)? Should a national development strategy and foreign policy be more than just government policy? Should it not include civil society organizations, academics, students, women's groups, youth organizations, religious groups, and other people, whose lives and futures will be affected by economic integration, trade liberalization, labor migration, and other political, economic, and ecological issues?

Timor Leste's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jose Luis Guterres, responds to the question on the "lack of human resources" as a justification for the "lack of preparation."

"The remaining challenges to join ASEAN, in my point of view, is human resources, because in other areas we are more or less (on par) with many of the ASEAN countries... To address the lack of qualified professionals in the country, the country has enough financial resources—from oil and gas revenue—to hire retired ASEAN diplomats from other countries to come work in Timor Leste." (Guterres 2014)

But why do we immediately assume that we don't have enough human resources within the country? And why do we need to hire foreign experts—for example, retired ASEAN diplomats, including former Indonesian Ambassadors—to formulate our foreign policy strategies (including resolving border disputes with Indonesia)? We do have local experts and human

resources; we just have not identified them as “intellectual capital and assets” because of patronage politics. So far, we have misused and underused our human resources and intellectual capital, basing recruitment on patronage favours, rather than meritocracy. As for hiring Indonesian diplomats as our foreign policy advisers, the following question arises: what was the point of becoming an independent, sovereign nation?

### **Building knowledge economies**

I want to focus on “knowledge economies” in Southeast Asia and ask why we are not investing in the human development fund for more research, knowledge-production, and educational and informative exchanges that could enrich and strengthen our bargaining position in ASEAN. Why aren’t we empowering our researchers, scholars, students, and public officials by providing more scholarships that will enable them to participate in Southeast Asian Studies fora in ASEAN, with the rest of Asia, and the world? They barely have access to online journals! As Milena Pires, Director of the Centro Para a Mulher e Estudos do Genero and the Timor Leste Representative to the CEDAW Committee in Geneva and New York observes: “As a nation, we are stunted not only physically, but also intellectually” (2014). This brings us to the paradox: is it possible to be “stunted” even when one has control of power and resources, oil, and money? Apparently, yes, for several reasons which I will discuss below.

In today’s regional economic integration, the most important capital is intellectual capital, and the most successful and sustainable will not be those who are oil-rich, but those with the most knowledge and capacity to translate that knowledge into social and political change and to improve the human condition (e.g. Singapore and Korea—they who have no oil!). So why do we continue to perpetuate an unsustainable system that does not value knowledge producers? What kinds of new knowledge are we producing in Timor Leste about our Southeast Asian neighbors, the regional community, ASEAN, and even ASEAN +3? So much money is being spent on foreign travel (total amount for the entire

Timor Leste government as of July 2014 was \$9,193,966.00, and for 2013 is \$15,364,320.69) and yet there is no public information about these costly official visits. Is our foreign policy relying primarily on old clandestine methods?

What kinds of new social scientists and natural scientists are we producing who can help improve, enrich, analyse, critique, and/or reform not only ASEAN, but also the study of Southeast Asia in Asia? Let us say that Timor Leste is accepted as a member of ASEAN tomorrow. In which case, what kinds of conversations can we engage in at dinner table meetings if our knowledge base of other Southeast Asian countries is minimal? How can we participate in panels about Southeast Asian histories, politics, and cultures within the Asian region when our scholars and public officials barely have access to information and cutting-edge online research journals?

### **Obstacles to cutting-edge, innovative knowledge economies**

Without overstating the obvious, the greatest obstacle to production of new knowledge about our immediate geographic neighbours is the lack of curiosity (and thus, by extension, our lack of preparation in joining ASEAN). Except for a very curious few, many Timorese are not interested in learning about their Southeast Asian neighbors, who may also not think much about Timorese culture, history, and politics. Another obstacle is arrogance and lack of humility; also, too much resources are wasted on superficial foreign travel and are not invested on rigorous research, thorough analysis and writing, and/or on sharing public information after the expensive *viagem estrangeiro* to other Southeast Asian countries. Finally, plain, narrow-minded ultranationalism excludes the contributions of non-Timorese citizens, who are labelled as “outsiders,” “anti-establishment,” “trouble-makers,” as in the recent infamous case of the expulsion of international judges from Timor Leste. Some ethical international advisers can be useful “mirrors” of our society, especially when it comes to corruption, waste of resources, and

maladministration. Instead of just kicking them out as a “threat to national security,” it would be meaningful to reflect carefully on their investigations and observations in order to improve our systems and institutions.

Let me explain these three points through anecdotes. The first one (lack of curiosity) is a colonial legacy of our former European colonizers, and the Indonesian occupation of Timor Leste. Most Southeast Asians, including Timorese, are more interested in learning the language of their former oppressors and colonizers than in getting to know their immediate neighbours. The second one (arrogance and lack of humility) is a little bit more complex and it comes from the new Timorese elite’s attitudes towards their “poorer” Southeast Asian neighbours. Once, I ran into Timorese MPs at the airport and asked them about what they learned during their “study tours” in other Southeast Asian countries, including Cambodia and Laos, and they replied: “What could we possibly learn? They are so much poorer than us.” Surely, there is a lot to learn from the history of Angkor Wat or the Khmer Rouge (even Noam Chomsky and Ben Kiernan managed to research and write books comparing Timor Leste and Cambodia). There is a kind of arrogance that because Timor Leste is oil-rich, there is no need to learn about anyone else, especially poorer countries. How truly ironic. At other times, I have asked Timorese officials and some students about their impressions of the Philippines. Fortunately, the responses are varied: some very negative, some positive, as one would expect; but very rarely have I ever come across anyone with an avid curiosity and a serious desire to learn about Philippine histories, languages and cultures, beyond superficial browsing on Facebook and the internet.

On the question of a narrow-minded ultranationalism, some Timorese think that Timor Leste is the best nation on earth and that its citizens suffered greatly and thus deserve the most (especially because they “lost” their youth during the war, among other reasons). This kind of attitude prevents us from learning about other conflicts, colonialisms, patriarchies and matriarchies, dictatorships, and militarized masculinities; it blocks us

from enriching our knowledge on how to save ourselves in a time of severe climate change, rising sea levels, and the imminent end of this planet. How can we possibly still adhere to a narrow-minded nationalism? Where does it get us? What does it mean to be a nationalist in the brave new world of the digital and online revolution, which has undermined nation-state boundaries in many ways? These are questions that we need to start addressing collectively.

### **What can Timor Leste gain by joining ASEAN?**

The Philippines was one of the five founding members of ASEAN. Yet one might ask, what do the poverty-stricken minorities and rural people in the Philippines, or in Thailand and Vietnam for that matter, think of and know about ASEAN? Is it even relevant to their lives? According to the Malaysian Ambassador to Timor Leste, as a child growing up in rural Malaysia, he could not care less about what ASEAN was; but as a diplomat representing Malaysia, he had to learn. Has there been any change in ASEAN as an institution since its inception 47 years ago to make it more community-oriented, participatory, and inclusive of the perspectives of poor people in Southeast Asia, who are the most affected by the onslaught of climate change, military rule, war, forced displacements, and violence against women?

At any rate, regional and international solidarity amongst Southeast Asians today (for instance, Filipinos protesting and condemning martial law and military rule in Thailand, and international cooperation on human trafficking) come from grassroots social movements, political parties, and women's organizations. Indeed, non-state spaces—educational exchanges, knowledge economy networks and linkages, conversations, comparative studies of penal and judicial systems, public discussions about strengthening anticorruption activities in the region and worldwide—represent creative possibilities for ASEAN integration.

At the same time, by joining ASEAN, Timor Leste may reduce its dependence on Indonesian trade and investment; accelerate the

“decolonization” process; establish new allies in the region; provide a counterbalancing strategy; diversify sources of foreign direct investment (FDI); and facilitate the transfer of expensive scientific, health, and technology machinery to Timor Leste (we have to pool and share our resources for the youth and students to be able to learn together about women’s health, cancer, heart diseases, and others).

However, questions and obstacles remain: can one open up the Timorese economy and still have a policy deemed nationalistic (e.g. Singapore model)? Or is it better to become protectionist and nationalistic (e.g. South Korean model)? And assuming Timor Leste joins ASEAN, what is the role of the President’s Office in shaping foreign policy? Should our foreign policy be left to one person alone? How can the Timorese government, in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be more accountable, visionary, and better coordinated with other ministries of Southeast Asian countries? What can be done about the lack of coordination, fragmentation, and harmonization—all resulting in a general lack of preparation? What are the consequences for seeking justice for crimes against humanity (through the Truth and Friendship Commission) when our relationship with Indonesia is based on too much friendship and not enough truth?

### **Timor Leste and ASEAN: Hidden Resources and Future Possibilities**

Having raised all these rather depressing questions about the state of our nation, is there any hope? Yes, Timor Leste has enough open-minded people, who in many ways are integrated (in one way or another) into Southeast Asian communities (way ahead of the government’s efforts). These include Timorese workers and students, who have lived in, studied, worked at, or are currently working and studying in various countries of Southeast and East Asia (i.e. South Korea, Japan, and China). They are avidly learning and speaking the local languages, reading everything they can about the regional histories, and even marrying locals. These

transnational, multicultural families are raising multiracial children, constantly crossing borders, negotiating citizenship and rights, transforming parenting styles, sharing cultural backgrounds, and creating more opportunities to learn other languages and areas of study for others. They symbolize the hope of a Timor Leste that wishes to be more inclusive, and build a strong knowledge economy of the region based on rigorous language-based research.

Moreover, there is hope if we invest on research, education, and in the production of knowledge and new social scientists. These include learning other Southeast Asian languages (and in the same process, learning humility as one crosses borders); investing in existing critical research centers; engendering curiosity in other Southeast Asian cultures; building a Department of History; teaching Southeast Asian histories; and developing a foreign policy of international cooperation without domination. Research initiatives with our Southeast Asian neighbors can focus on:

- Comparative penal and judicial systems
- Political, economic, and ecological developments in Southeast Asia
- Analysis of different paths to political-economic development from the perspectives of the *longue durée* and ethnography
- Hidden labour of men and women who are marginalized in the history of their societies
- Interrelationships between and among political and economic agents, actors, institutions, systems, and social processes
- Multidisciplinary approaches that seek to combine historical studies, national case studies, comparative and regional studies, and theoretical analyses
- New political economy perspectives, in addition to more established, historical, sociological, and anthropological studies on the social processes that

influence the decisions of peasant farmers, household economic managers, local traders, governing elites, powerful interest groups and change agents in civil society, the private sector, and governments and state bureaucracies

- Comparative rural development policies and change and resistance in rural Southeast Asia
- Comparative foreign policies and international relations (for instance, what was the foreign policy and political thought of Ho Chi Minh when it came to regional cooperation? What was the foreign policy of Timor Leste during the anticolonial resistance period and how is it different now, post-independence?)
- International migration process and labour mobility in the region, as well as social policies of labour-exporting states, such as Indonesia and the Philippines
- Gender and natural resource management
- Energy industrial complex, particularly the problem of the predominantly supply-side treatment of the energy issue, which hampers efforts to reframe it in the context of social and ecological recovery
- Dynamics of the financial markets in the region, including, for instance, the hunt for the richest in Asia-Pacific by the top asset management conglomerates. Region-wise, it is increasingly clear that a more serious examination of China is needed. On the other hand, we also need to read India and Russia now on the same page; and
- Political economy of decolonization, nation-building, state-building, development, and the bureaucracy of foreign aid in the region.



## Concluding remarks

Timor Leste has only been independent for only 12 years, but a young nation offers some comparative advantages, including youthful idealism, hope, and a capacity to contribute towards change and reform. A principled, idealistic 12-year-old country can make a very meaningful contribution to a 47-year-old institution that has been criticized for all kinds of negative problems. But first, the 12-year-old must get its own act together and have a vision of where it wants to be. Without a vision, we have a Ministry of Foreign Affairs that may literally just be about having foreign affairs that does not benefit Timor Leste. Without a vision, we just have ministries full of functionaries literally with no imagination, and a country full of juvenile-delinquent-type leaders and policy-makers who prioritize their private foreign affairs (literally) above national interests.

<sup>1</sup> This paper was solicited by Mr. Flavio Simoes Martins, Adviser in the Casa Militar and presented at the Casa Militar, Office of the President, Timor Leste, for a Panel on "Timor Leste's Preparation for Accession into ASEAN," 12 July 2014, which was attended by officials from the Casa Militar, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ASEAN diplomats, academics and students, NGO leaders, and members of civil society.

## References

- Acharya, Amitav, 2009 (2001 and 2014). *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Ananta, Aris and Evi Nurvidya Arifin, eds. 2004. *International Migration in Southeast Asia*. Singapore: ISEAS.
- Anderson, Benedict. 2011. "Benedict Anderson: Outsider View of Thai Politics." *Prachatai*, 5 August. <http://www.prachatai.com/english/node/2694>.
- Guterres, Jose Luis 2014. "Timor Leste ready to fulfil ASEAN obligations: PM." *Brunei Times*, 18 March. <http://www.bt.com.bn/news-national/2014/03/18/timor-leste-ready-fulfil-asean-obligations-pm>.
- Hau, Caroline and Kasian Tejapira, eds. 2011. *Traveling Nation-Makers: Transnational Flows and Movements in the Making of Modern Southeast Asia*. National University of Singapore Press in Association with Kyoto University Press.

- Hugo, Graeme and Soogil Young, eds. 2008. *Labour Mobility in the Asia-Pacific Region: Dynamics, Issues and a new APEC Agenda. A Survey and Analyses of Governance Challenges of Migration for APEC Economies*. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing.
- Pires, Milena. Personal correspondence, July 2014.
- Rasiah, Rajah and Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt, eds. 2010. *The New Political Economy of Southeast Asia*. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
- Resosudarmo, Budy P. and Frank Jotzo. 2009. *Working with Nature Against Poverty: Development, Resources and the Environment in Eastern Indonesia*. Singapore: ISEAS.
- Resureccion, Bernadette and Rebecca Elmhurst, eds. 2009 (2008). *Gender and Natural Resource Management: Livelihoods, Mobility and Interventions*. London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan 2008; Singapore: ISEAS, 2009.
- Sahin, Selver. 2012. "Timor Leste: A more Confident or Over-confident Foreign Policy Actor." In *Southeast Asian Affairs 2012*, 341–351. Singapore: ISEAS.
- Tan, See Seng. 2013. "Herding Cats: The role of persuasion in political change and continuity in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations." In *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 16 January. doi: 10.1093/irap/lcs020.
- Von Feigenblatt, Otto. 2012. *The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): Conflict and Development*. India: New Century Publications.
- Nguyen, Therese Tam. 2014. "Preparation for Timor-Leste's integration to ASEAN: A start from ground is needed (A result of the quick survey in Social Science Faculty, UNTL)." Paper presented to Casa Militar, Office of the President, July 2014.
- Vu, Tuong. 2010. *Paths to Development in Asia: South Korea, Korea, Vietnam, China and Indonesia*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Waterson, Roxana and Kwok Kian-Woon. 2012. *Contestations of Memory in Southeast Asia*. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press.

# Declaration of the Leaders of Climate Communities from Asia, Africa and Latin America

At the UN Climate Summit, Copenhagen  
(16 Dec 2009)

Right at the outset let us declare that we are not here to demand anything from the global political leaders who have gathered here in Copenhagen to negotiate their solutions for the Climate Crisis. We—the grassroots communities in the forests, the women, small farmers, pastoralists, nomads and fisher communities—are resource-rich in our own right. We know how to use our resources wisely as we are the centers of ecological knowledge. Therefore there is nothing that you can give us to combat the climate crisis. On the other hand, if you want to reclaim life on this planet, it is you who have to demand this strength from us.

We want to register our strongest protest against the shutting out of our voices from the Climate Convention you are holding here in Copenhagen. This is unprecedented in the tradition of UN's international conventions and already creates deep doubts in our minds on the intent of this meeting. Your negotiations are a farce and you will arrive at a solution that has already been predetermined by you who have not lived and loved the earth and its resources as we have.

In this process you have openly shown how undemocratic this process has been. Without bringing in the voices of the 'climate communities' like us, the decisions that you take will never be legitimate. We want to make it clear to you that the decisions taken without our involvement will not be binding on us, who represent the majority of the people who walk this earth and who live with nature on a day-to-day basis with our lives depending on climate and its changes.

Unlike you, it is the community leaders of the world who have shown real courage and vision by organizing people across their own countries to come out together to share, talk and engage with the global climate debate. We invite you to take inspiration from the wisdom that has emerged from the ground in defining the text that you will bring out of the Copenhagen Summit, and we offer you our own text for your climate change convention. Use this as the basis of your agreements if you want to retain life on earth:

### **Our Identity**

We, the people of this planet from the mountains, coasts, forests, deserts, plains and plateaus of this vast and rich earth—who have lived with nature for millennia, whose farming, fishing, forestry and pastoralism have been seen nourished by Mother Earth—have today decided to articulate more strongly, more clearly and more loudly our issues, concerns, and solutions to the climate crisis.

We are of the firm view that our bonding with nature, our respect for it, and the way we have learnt from our forefathers to live in harmony with it, shows us many ways of dealing with the projected problems of climate change such as higher temperature, scanty and erratic rainfall, ill health and malnutrition. In our discussions with each other in Copenhagen, outside the confines of the intergovernmental negotiations, we have rediscovered our strengths which spur us to assert that the world needs to recognize these as the foundation of our capacity to combat the climate crisis.

### **Our Strength**

1. The great plant and animal biodiversity in the Global South, including edible, medicinal, domesticated, and wild varieties which we have inherited and protected for millennia on our farms, in our forests and our seas, and with whom we have a relationship of mutual care and respect are our greatest resource. As a community, we

have been able to bond together to face the threats posed to the environment by the current climate change. We have the understanding that we the 'Children of the Soil' cannot survive without our land and our seas, our good mother-earth, because she is an integral part of our life, livelihood and dignity. Our forests, coral reefs, sand dunes protect us from natural calamities, give us food, fodder and other livelihood options, and offer shelter to a large number of species with whom we share the earth. We have been living with the problems of cyclones, water-logging and salinisation for years, and we have the knowledge to anticipate and adapt to their adverse impact. Our Community cohesiveness and social bonding are still alive with us and can help us to take collective actions to confront the climate crisis.

2. It is our profound belief that the rich ancestral knowledge that we have been bequeathed, can guide us to combat the current climate crisis. This centuries-old community knowledge has enabled us to nurture our flora and fauna in the forests. As fishers, we are unswerving in our obedience and respect towards the heritage given by our forefathers through the practice of complete ecological harvesting, which does not muddle the balance of coastal flora and fauna. As fishers, we are unswerving in our obedience and respect towards the heritage given by our forefathers through the practice of complete ecological harvesting, which does not muddle the balance of coastal flora and fauna.
3. Our heritage of seed saving and exchange, and the knowledge associated with it is an invaluable asset in our engagement with climatic factors. Our traditional seeds can withstand the climate crisis, and our cultural

practices for preservation of seeds and flowers, forever adaptive to the needs of the hour, can nourish them even in adverse circumstances. We are the proud conservers of valuable genetic and ecological varieties of aquatic flora and fauna, which provide us food and means of survival and dignity as fisher-folk.

4. Our agriculture is nonpolluting, self-regenerating, least energy demanding, and is based on ecological principles. Our cropping system, in its pristine diversity, not only feeds us with diverse foods but also comforts us with its capacity to retain the richness and fertility of our soils. The organic system which has been the hallmark of our farming for millennia provides us with safe and nutritionally rich food.
5. Our forests protect us from natural calamities, give us food-fodder and other livelihood options, and offer shelter to a large number of species with whom we share the earth.

### **Our Demand**

We demand that the global communities recognize these great community assets of ours and initiate actions. The actions we demand from all concerned, particularly the developmental agencies, locally, nationally and globally are the following:

1. Recognize the diversity and integrity of our farms, livestock, forests and seas as civilizational assets and do not do anything to disturb them. Declare officially that these are fundamental in our fight against the Climate Crisis;
2. Endorse the multifunctional, ecological, and diverse agriculture we practice as the greatest defense against climate change. Considering the rich practices and knowledge that we bring to agriculture, we urge that our communities be declared as ecological communities and

by law, prohibit chemical fertilizers and pesticides from our region. In order to further promote this form of agriculture, calculate and provide carbon credit to our form of agriculture and let our communities benefit from them. We demand that the ecological and diversified agriculture we practice be declared as the most viable and suitable strategy to adapt to and mitigate climate crises. Initiate policy measures to prevent mono-culturalisation, and protect and promote these multi-level diversities in our crop, livelihood, food, and culture;

3. Respect pastoralism and mobility as distinctive sources of cultural identity, integrity, and rights. Empower Pastoralists in the management of existing protected areas and recognise their customary territories as community conserved areas (CCAs) when so demanded by the Pastoral peoples. Recognise the crucial role of indigenous knowledge and the capacity of pastoralists and all other indigenous communities to conserve biodiversity in full compatibility with pastoral livelihoods;
4. Recognise that the traditional fishers are the stewards of the coast and waters. Our communities have historically lived on the edge of the water and land; governing its resources, using methods handed down to us by our forefathers. To carry out our work, we daily risk our lives, against vagaries of wind and currents. The climate crisis has aggravated our risks. For us, this crisis is not in our future scenario, but in the reality we are already living. It has made our livelihood more insecure. Current government policies and economic paradigms that have promoted unplanned and rampant development, and the greedy extraction of resources from our ecosystems, have not been viable and sustainable; and

5. Honour each one of our community members and Frontline Warriors against Climate Change and enact policy measures to provide them with incentives to practice and promote this diversity.

**Signed: Coalition of Climate Communities**

- Baiga Community, Chattisgarh, India
- Bhils and Bhilalas, Madhya Pradesh, India
- Chakhesang Nagas, Nagaland, India
- Women Dalit Farmers, Andhra Pradesh, India
- Dalit Farmers, Tamil Nadu, India
- Dongria Kondhis, Niyamgiri Hills - Orissa, India
- Jele, Chashi and Moule, Sunderbans - West Bengal, India
- Kaunta, Khatia, Pandra and Lolias, Orissa, India
- Maldharis, Gujarat
- Parava, Muthurayar and Nadars, Tamil Nadu
- Santhals, Jharkhand, India
- Movimiento Ciudadano Frente al Cambio Climatico (MOCICC), Peru
- Niger Delta Women's Movement for Peace and Development, Nigeria
- ACTWID, Cameroon Rural Women's Movement
- Ghana National Youth Coalition on Climate Change (GNYCCC)
- Ekta Parishad
- People's Coalition of Climate Communities
- Global Call to Action Against Poverty

The Coalition of Climate Communities is a spontaneous platform that represents the hope and anguish of grassroots leaders attending the UN Climate Summit at Copenhagen (Dec 2009) – and their resolve that grassroots communities need to be the protagonists and not the exhibits of the global debate on climate change.



# Cambodia at a Crossroads: New Laws Would Limit Freedoms

CSO Statement on Cambodia | 10 October 2014

Set against a background of endemic corruption, unsustainably low wages, and impoverishing confiscations of land, Cambodia is considering a series of laws that will severely restrict human rights and the activities of civil society organisations working on these issues, according to a team of international experts visiting the country.

Five new laws on agricultural land, associations and non-governmental organisations, cybercrime, telecommunications and trade unions are being drafted by government ministries and are expected to be brought before the National Assembly in the coming term. An additional three laws that compromise the judiciary were just adopted.

“This is not a patchwork of legislation,” says Professor Kwak Nohyun of Forum Asia, a network of human rights NGOs. “If implemented in their current form, these eight laws will restrict the space for dissenting voices and criminalise demands for justice.”

“We’re at a crossroads in Cambodia, where the space for democratic freedoms could go either way,” adds Tor Hodenfield of CIVICUS, a global network dedicated to strengthening civil society and citizen action. “On the one hand, Cambodia experienced a robust election last year, but at the same time the government intimidates activists and is proposing legislation that would enable it to silence critics. We hope Cambodia will revisit these laws.”

The international delegation representing seven global civil society networks: Asia Democracy Network (ADN), Beyond 2015, CIVICUS, FORUM-ASIA, Global Call to Action Against Poverty (GCAP),

International Forum of National NGO Platforms (IFP), and South East Asian Committee for Advocacy (SEACA), met with parliamentarians from Cambodia's National Assembly and Senate, officials at the Ministry of Justice, development partners including the World Bank, USAID, European Union, and United Nations officers, as well as with activists who have been beaten by security forces and families dispossessed from their land.

"Information, consultation and human rights are key to the fight against poverty," says Michael Switow of the Global Call to Action Against Poverty (GCAP). "A law on access to information should be a priority, before these other pieces of legislation are adopted. The public should also have a chance to comment on draft legislation, which must be consistent with Cambodia's international human rights obligations."

Unfortunately, parts of the Royal Government of Cambodia do not appear to place a high value on civil society's opinions. Officials at the Ministry of Justice said that NGOs often 'interfere' with government work, while on at least two occasions in the past three months, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen has said that his government does not need civil society input.

### **Cybercrime and Telecommunications Laws**

A new cybercrime law that the government says is designed to prevent "ill-willed groups or individuals" from spreading false information could criminalise individual input as well. Article 28 of the draft legislation states that people who "hinder the sovereignty and integrity" of the state could be subject to a substantial fine and jailed up to three years. The telecommunications bill meanwhile will make carriers responsible for censoring content.

"Freedom of expression is essential for democracy," notes Consuelo Katrina A. Lopa of the Asia Democracy Network, "but these telecom and cyber bills could be used to jail and bankrupt citizens whose comments on social media are critical of the government."

## **NGO Law**

The environment for much of civil society is already difficult. Hotels and other public venues are frequently pressured to not rent meeting rooms to activists, who note that they have also been intimidated and followed by security officers. The proposed law on associations and NGOs, which was first tabled in 2011 and is expected to be presented again to legislature again this term, would subject civil society organisations to debilitating restrictions.

“The latest version of the NGO law would reportedly force all civil society organisations to register and give government officials broad discretionary powers to oversee and control their operations,” says Sarah Enees of IFP, the International Forum of National NGO Platforms. “We’re worried that this law could be used by the government to arbitrarily deny registration to organisations that are critical of its policies.”

Meetings with the National Assembly and Senate Human Rights Commissions offered a ray of hope to the international delegation as parliamentarians pledged to highlight violations of human rights and address the impunity of officials who are not brought to justice. Both committees expressed interest in establishing an online forum for individuals to submit grievance. The Senate Commission also pledged to address the lack of civil society participation in drafting laws. At the same time, some Members of Parliament shared civil society’s frustration with the lack of government transparency, noting that often they are also not privy to draft legislation.

## **Land, Unions and Judicial Laws**

Civil society activists in Cambodia are also extremely concerned about issues of land tenure, decent work, and justice.

### **Management and Use of Agricultural Land**

Land grabbing is a huge issue in Cambodia and the international delegation met a number of women and families whose homes were

destroyed to make way for corporate developments. Just this week, a brief was filed at the International Criminal Court noting that over the past 14 years some 770,000 people have been adversely affected by land grabs in the country and nearly 150,000 forcibly transferred from the capital. The proposed bill on agricultural lands would make the situation worse, institutionalising land seizures for both corporate and state use.

### Trade Unions

Cambodian workers face difficult conditions and low wages. Earlier this year, a general strike by garment workers (seeking a living wage of US\$160/month) was violently suppressed. The proposed trade union law would require that 20% of workers in a given company support unionisation. By contrast, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) says that there should be no threshold.

### Judicial Laws

The three judicial laws recently passed by the National Assembly, after seven minutes of debate, will compromise the independence of the judiciary by providing the executive branch of government, via the Ministry of Justice, with control over the courts' finances, personnel, and general administration. Details of the laws' implementation have yet to be worked out and the Ministry of Justice will hold a Dissemination Workshop later this year to discuss implementation. They said the workshops will also provide an opportunity for proposing amendments to the three laws. Members of Parliament in the National Assembly and Senate agreed to the need to review these laws. We hope that the Royal Government of Cambodia will revisit these laws before they are implemented.

## Recommendations

The international delegation urges the Royal Government of Cambodia to:

1. Create a safe and enabling environment for civil society and human rights defenders in line with its international and constitutional human rights obligations as well as the commitments it has undertaken through the United Nations Universal Periodic Review.
2. Promote significant and systematic stakeholder and civil society consultations on all legislation, including the five laws mentioned above, and should only place laws before parliament after these inputs have been taken into account.
3. Adopt and implement a law on the process for drafting legislation. This law should include provisions to institutionalise mechanisms for public input, public consultations and structures for civil society interaction, and to integrate this input into new drafts. Government ministries and other state institutions should be legally required to publicly disseminate draft laws, regulations and policies and to organise public consultations and invite comments from the public on these items prior to submission to the Council of Ministers. Civil society and public consultations should begin when laws are first being drafted, not only when they reach parliament.
4. Adopt and implement a law on Access to Information. This should take precedence over the adoption of the five laws mentioned above. This law should also create a public database with information on the scope, scale and details of land transfers and sales.
5. Immediately revisit the three judicial laws to rewrite and remove provisions that threaten the independence of the judiciary.

6. Allow trade union activity and do not require a 20% threshold to establish a trade union. All workers, including civil servants and members of the informal economy, should be able to unionise. The Trade Union law should comply with ILO best practices. Ensure that all Cambodian workers receive a living wage.
7. Respect and ensure the freedom of online expression.
8. Establish independent investigations into arbitrary arrests and the excessive use of force against protestors and human rights defenders. The authorities must also cease the use of violence and lethal force at peaceful demonstrations and not take actions that threaten or intimidate activists and journalists.
9. Rapidly create an independent national human rights institution in conformity with UN guidelines including, the Paris Principles.
10. Establish online mechanisms in the National Assembly and Senate Human Rights Commissions for individuals to submit human rights grievances and for these submissions to be recorded and reviewed.

**Joint Statement:**

Asia Democracy Network (ADN)  
Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)  
Global Call to Action Against Poverty  
Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC)  
South East Asian Committee for Advocacy  
International Forum of National NGO Platforms  
CIVICUS World Alliance for Citizen Participation

# Political Conference on a Progressive Agrarian Reform

Asian Center, University of the Philippines Diliman

25 June 2014

## **STATEMENT OF UNITY**

The Aquino administration has recently declared support for a two-year extension of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP/CARPER) until 2016, making the 25 year-old land reform program one of the world's longest-running in modern history.

Unlike radical land reform models in other countries which on average took five years to complete, CARP's seemingly unending period of completion is evidence of the program's weaknesses, primarily attributable to inherent flaws in program design and lackluster performance or lack of political will on the part of the implementing bureaucracy.

When CARP was enacted in 1988, it was riddled with loopholes that allowed non-redistributive forms of land transfer (stock distribution option, leaseback, voluntary land transfer, etc.), exemptions from coverage, and land valuation based on fair market prices. Although a few improvements were introduced into CARPER in 2007, they were not enough to plug these loopholes. After 25 years, CARP was able to cover mainly non-private agricultural lands (government-owned lands, settlements, public A&D), leaving behind a large balance of CARPable private agricultural lands (PAL) mostly in sugar and coconut. In commercial farms, CARP was implemented through non-redistributive forms such as leaseback, voluntary land transfer, and stock distribution option, all of which practically preserved the control of corporate land-owners over the land and farm operations.

What is a more alarming trend throughout CARP's 25 years is the re-concentration of land distributed either under CARP or Marcos' Operation Land Transfer in many places, and at a pace fast enough to nullify the meager land distribution under CARP. Agrarian reform beneficiaries in these areas have either "sold" or mortgaged their lands and forced back to various forms of share-tenancy such as "*arenda*", "*pabuto*", "10% sharing", forms that are far worse than the sharing system prevailing before CARP took effect.

The fact is that where land was actually distributed, CARP did not improve the livelihood of peasant beneficiaries nor did it make them economically viable. The so-called support services to beneficiaries of land distribution is sparsely dispersed, not generalized, and more important, was never meant to break the layers of monopolies exploiting the mass of peasants through predatory pricing and usurious interest rates among others. Peasant bankruptcy is rampant and ultimately leads to displacement from the land.

In peri-urban areas, land reform reversal occurs through land use conversion triggered by real estate speculation.

The failure of redistributive agrarian reform and rural development on one hand and lack of national industrialization on the other continue to produce an army of landless and jobless rural poor. While the administration boasts of spurts in GDP growth, it could hardly be sustainable as the drivers of such growth mainly come from speculative investments and the services sector (real estate, retail malls, etc.) while the productive sectors of the economy (i.e. agriculture and industry) stagnate.

The economic situation hence exposes the mass of poor peasants to the onslaught of global economic integration. Without capacity to compete or adjust to the impact of trade liberalization, small agricultural producers are outsold in their own markets. Without regulation on land accumulation by real estate developers, mining companies, and tourism investors, displacement of peasants have become rampant.



Extending CARP's life for another two years, without correcting its fundamental flaws, is a lame response to the peasant's and social movements' clamour for social justice and rural democratization. While some neoliberal stalwarts in the academe would like CARP to end ASAP, the discourse on agrarian reform and national development has to be sharpened without falling into the trap of defending CARP for the largely imaginary reprieve it could give the peasant movement in the next two years.

On the other hand, we reject the argument propounded by neoliberal economists that CARP/ER's failures can be traced to a non-functioning "property rights regime...due to strictures on the sale (and rental) of reformed lands and the land ownership ceiling." Where political factors often play a leading role under a rural elite bereft of commitment to a sustainable, long-term, and inclusive agrarian development and where rent-seeking property developers eagerly gobble up agricultural lands, instituting a market-oriented "property-rights regime" will simply be a step backward and a reversion of the countryside to the era of unrestrained and oppressive landlord rule.

At this juncture of the struggle, we, representatives of various peasant and social movements gathered in this political conference, hereby affirm our commitment to:

- Develop and build a democratic movement for a people's agrarian reform that is linked to the overall goal of national industrialization and development; and
- We will rally the broad masses of the peasantry and people for a radical agrarian reform that embodies the key principles of social justice and rural democracy with the following features:
  - Comprehensive coverage to include redistributive reforms in all agricultural, aquaculture and other alienable and disposable public land;

- Selective and progressive compensation to landlords based on tax-declared land value;
  - Zero retention limit for landowners;
  - Zero amortization for agrarian reform beneficiaries (or discounted amortization by subtracting the value of peasant labor already expended for years of tilling the land);
  - State recognition of peasant organizations as the lead organization in rural development; full state subsidies and adequate support services to increase productivity; and
  - While campaigning for fundamental changes in state policy on agrarian reform and agricultural development, we will pursue alternative economic models on the ground that empowers the peasantry, both economically and politically.
- In the immediate, we support the establishment of a *high level independent people's audit commission* that will investigate the performance of DAR, its professed accomplishment of CARP, including its ever-ambiguous data on land acquisition and distribution (LAD) targets, accomplishment and balances and litany of complaints about corrupt practices within the DAR bureaucracy.

[Statement issued by the Political Conference on a Radical Agrarian reform held on 25 June 2014 and participated in by 40 leading agrarian reform advocates, peasant leaders, and members of the academe, among these: Francisco Nemenzo, (Professor Emeritus and former UP President); Rene Ofreneo (Professor and former Dean UP School of Labor and Industrial Relations); Eduardo C. Tadem (Professor, Asian Center, UP). For reference and clarifications, please call IRDF Tel 9214673.]

# FDC to the World Bank: Get Out of Dirty Energy and Pay Up Your Climate Debt

Press Release | 10 October 2014

With the world being witness to and victim of extreme events caused by sudden weather changes, countries, institutions and peoples are challenged to drastically reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to avoid the 2°C global warming danger threshold. The World Bank Group, however, remains hideously immersed in the dirty energy business. Worse, it has turned deaf to demands for restitution for damages from its continued financing of fossil fuel and hydropower projects while feigning concern for climate change and taking charge of global funds for adaptation and mitigation in developing countries.

This year, the World Bank Group has already approved 11 hydroelectric power projects in several countries across the globe. As of September 2014, it has 78 active projects with six more in the pipeline. In addition, its energy portfolio by 2012 has seen a US\$700 million increase from the previous year of its financing for upstream oil, gas, and coal. In the Philippines, three coal-fired power plants in Zambales, Quezon, and Pangasinan have been funded by the Group through its private sector investment arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC).

Misleadingly grouped under the Bank's renewable, "clean" energy portfolio, hydroelectric dams have long been exposed by the scientific community, including the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), as producers of significant amounts of carbon dioxide and methane. Fossil fuels, especially coal, are already widely known as major sources of GHGs.

Yet, despite its track record in supporting dirty energy, the World Bank has unabashedly wiggled its way to becoming the interim trustee for the Green Climate Fund (GCF) established by the United Nations.

Originally intended to assist developing countries to cope with the changing climate, the GCF is now being looked at suspiciously by climate activists as the character, management, and structure of the fund is being manipulated to mirror the World Bank's own system and its market-driven, private sector-led propensity.

Further aggravating this situation is the recent redrafting of the World Bank's Environmental and Social Safeguards Framework which reveals the watering down of policies and mechanisms to protect human rights and natural resources. Accordingly, the 2014 draft provides more latitude, even legal immunity, to the World Bank so as to escape accountability for the harmful impact of its projects.

The World Bank Group's hypocrisy has to stop now! People must reclaim power over energy systems and promote alternative ones that do not compromise the well-being and even the existence of people and planet. The Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC has painted a grim scenario: global surface temperature is increasing and may surpass in 20 to 30 years the 2°C threshold if demands for deep and drastic cuts in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from human activities remain unheeded or merely placated. It recommends cuts in current anthropogenic GHG emissions by 40 to 70 percent from 2010 to 2050 towards zero or below by 2100.

With global warming averaging at almost 1°C from 1880 to 2012, the world has already seen and experienced the wastage of lives and livelihoods by extreme weather events. The most recent large-scale devastation happened right here in the Philippines almost a year ago when Typhoon Yolanda victimized more than 16 million people in the Visayas region. No matter how tragic the situation in areas wrecked by Yolanda, the World Bank even saw this as an opportunity to lead the Philippines almost a billion dollars deeper into debt while the country struggles to recover from the effects of global warming that the World Bank has helped to produce.

# Statement of International Solidarity Group for Thai Democracy and Human Rights

Since the military seized power from the interim government on 22 May 2014 and established the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), the international community is gravely concerned by the severe backlash of human rights and democracy in Thailand.

The International Solidarity Group for Thai Democracy and Human Rights (ISG-Thai) was set up during the International Conference on “Thailand: Human Rights and Democracy in Crisis” in Quezon City, Philippines, by representatives of various organisations across the region to express their solidarity with the Thai people.

While we recognise the important and inseparable relationship between human rights and democracy, we have to emphasise that, in the difficult time for democracy in Thailand, human rights cannot be ignored by anyone in any side.

The International Solidarity Group for Thai Democracy and Human Rights therefore demands the Thai military to:

- 1) Lift the Martial Law and repeal the repressive orders that violate international human rights standards especially civil and political rights of Thai people;
- 2) Return democratically-elected civilian government;
- 3) Stop all human rights violations especially on the following issues:
  - a. The harassment of human rights defenders, community rights defenders and grassroots activists
  - b. Arbitrary arrest, custody and detention
  - c. Freedom of Assembly

- d. Freedom of Expression
  - e. Right to Information
  - f. Respect due process
  - g. Right of migrant workers
- 4) Assert civilian authority and control over the military;
  - 5) End impunity and bring human rights perpetrators to justice; and
  - 6) Repeal all provisions in the interim constitution that violate international human rights standards.

# Reviews

# Book Reviews

## ***State of Fragmentation: The Philippines***

***in Transition.*** Walden Bello, Kenneth Cardenas, Jenina Joy Chavez, Jerome Patrick Cruz, Mary Ann Manahan, Clarissa Militante, and Joseph Purugganan. Focus on the Global South and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2014, 299 pp. ISBN 9789719488484.

*State of Fragmentation: The Philippines in Transition* by the Focus on the Global South (FGS) is a well-researched, incisive critique of neoliberalism and its various forms in the Philippines. This is no small feat considering this ideology's hegemonic grip on the country's intellectual and policy climate. The book offers a rich trove of insights for those who want to critically engage in and look for alternative readings of sociopolitical problems in the Philippines. The selection of its themes and the wealth of data marshalled to argue certain points provide a formidable intellectual challenge to the dominant narrative of Philippine underdevelopment.

For example, Chapter 4, "A Labor Exporting State: The Globalization of the Philippine Migration Model," makes for emotional reading, putting a human face on labor trafficking with highly descriptive data, both official and anecdotal. The book narrates how Filipina domestic workers are subjected to the everyday threat and reality of sexual abuse such as rape, "particularly in the Middle East, where millions of OFWs are deployed and numerous domestic workers have reported giving in to the wishes of the master in order to keep their jobs" (141)[OFWs stand for Overseas Filipino Workers]. Another strength of the chapter is its analysis of how labor trafficking, with a strong overlay of sexual abuse, is an important, even necessary, pillar of contemporary globalization.

This iconoclastic book dares to challenge the popular myth that corruption is a decisive determinant of underdevelopment. While there is broad consensus on the negative effects of corruption, *State of Fragmentation* rightly points out that many countries have successfully built broad-based prosperity despite conditions of endemic corruption. This underscores empirical findings that the link between corruption and growth (or lack thereof)



---

is actually weak. Furthermore, the authors note how this anticorruption discourse plays into the dynamics of elite politics, and is fostered by institutions like the World Bank whose policy focuses on individual transgressions, not on systemic inequalities. It is silent on the issue of redistribution.

Despite these strengths, *State of Fragmentation* raises some troubling points. The chapter entitled “Population Pressure, Poverty and Development” opens that “...the Philippines in the 70s suffered from high rates of poverty” (223). I suggest that the authors cite the reference for the poverty figures for the 1970s. This is because the Philippine government started monitoring poverty only in 1987, using the Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES) and applying it to the 1985 data. Since then, the government has relied on the FIES (conducted triennially) to report on poverty incidence,<sup>1</sup> which in 2012 stood at 25.2 percent and at 26.3 percent in 2009. These figures from the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB) indicate that the variation is statistically insignificant, and that poverty incidence essentially remained the same for both periods. But to better appreciate the significance of this, we have to go back to the period of 2003–2006, where poverty incidence rose from 24.9 percent to 26.6 percent. This suggests that in 2012, poverty levels have not only remained almost unchanged but also remained high. Poverty statistics are always politically contested, especially because it is one of the most important benchmarks of government performance. Today, there is a debate on poverty rates: did the government tweak or change its methodology? It cannot be denied that the FIES has been “refined” several times, by my reckoning, about 4 or 5 times, first in 1991, and the last in 2011. Today, government says that its parameters have been updated. With each “tweak” or “update”, however, poverty incidence goes down every time. In 2014, with the switch from FIES to APIS (Annual Poverty Indicators Survey) in officially reporting poverty incidence, the effect has been the same. That is, poverty incidence again decreased, at least statistically.

But given these changes, are the poverty data from 1985 still comparable? And how do we compare FIES and APIS? Furthermore, there is also a need to democratize poverty discourse, which is elitist, monopolized by statisticians, economists, and the like, who reduce poverty to only what can be counted. Even the multidimensional approach to poverty, while recognizing the diverse dimensions to poverty, does not take into account the notion of inequality or

redistribution (unlike the social exclusion approach). More importantly, the main subjects of official poverty discourse, the poor, are not active participants, but, more often than not, are simply the objects of study.

Chapter 7, “Population Pressure, Poverty and Development” connects poverty and population growth, examining how “Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand managed to rein in the growth of their populations through effective state-sponsored family planning programs”(231) in contrast to the Philippines. While I do not discount the correlations between poverty and population growth, I find that the chapter’s framing of the connection is reminiscent of the population control discourse of the 1970s, which feminists and gender-justice advocates have roundly criticized on a number of grounds. First, that discourse implicitly blames women’s fertility as a cause of poverty because it increases pressure on the country’s carrying capacity and social conflict. Second, such a discourse transforms women’s fertility into an arena of state control and undermines the principle of reproductive self-determination. In contrast, experiences of many developed countries show that increased prosperity have led to more informed decisions on careers and well-being, one of whose natural consequences is the declining size of the family. As such, it is more useful to focus on creating these conditions and upholding the principle of bodily integrity.

In the Conclusion, the need for an “alternative paradigm” is raised, which is later qualified and called an “alternative economic paradigm” (276). There are three points to mention here. First, I agree with all of the components identified. Second, given the centrality of decent work, livelihoods and employment in effectively combating poverty and creating greater prosperity for all, I would like to suggest that this aspect be linked not only to fiscal and monetary policy but also with other important components such as agriculture, where the majority of the poor still work, and industry, which is a potential source of employment. Third, I wonder if Focus on the Global South can include in its future work an alternative paradigm which contains a framework for social policy. After all, if the dominant development strategy is essentially neoliberal, what is its expression and how is this played out not only in the economic but also in the social sphere? An analysis of the social policy agenda flowing from an essentially neoliberal paradigm should serve as the backdrop to an

---

assessment of social programs, which include the conditional cash transfer (CCT) program in the Philippines. This brings me to my next point.

*State of Fragmentation* correctly recognized that CCT was making little headway in reducing poverty in the country (8), but it also asserts that “[t]he expansion of the CCT program has had the effect of reducing the level of hunger”(12). This statement is based on hunger figures for the last two quarters of 2012—21% in the third quarter, and 16.3% in the fourth. A look at hunger levels in the following year (2013) shows that hunger levels once again rose, peaking at 23% and seesawing throughout the year. The point is that it is difficult to assert reduced hunger levels based only on two quarters. Furthermore, methodologically speaking, even if it were true that hunger had significantly gone down, we must be able to discount other factors before attributing this decisively to CCT. It is instructive to learn from the impact assessment of CCT,<sup>2</sup> which was conducted in cooperation with the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and funded by the World Bank and AusAid. Examining CCT data from 2008 to 2011, this impact assessment revealed that even if cash grants were reaching target beneficiaries, a number of trends also emerged. First, in reality, the beneficiaries were receiving considerably less than the maximum benefit amount. Second, there was no increase in overall levels of consumption between beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries. Third, in 2011, the beneficiaries seemed to have higher estimated per capita incomes and lower poverty rates than nonbeneficiaries, but these differences were insignificant.

*State of Fragmentation* also claims that “the CCT program may play an important role in breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty” (276). I can theoretically agree with this assertion as long as we are clear about the requisites. For example, in Brazil, their CCT version, *Bolsa Família*, did manage to significantly reduce poverty and inequality but only in combination with other measures. These include (1) periodic mandated increases in the minimum wage, which favorably affected workers both in the formal and informal sectors; (2) bank loans for those who never had bank accounts, with repayments automatically deducted from monthly wages or pensions (Anderson 2011); and (3) high and rapid economic growth during the Lula period, which facilitated productive

investments in various areas of the economy. Because of the interventionist role of the Brazilian state in an open economy, it has been referred to in the literature as a liberal neodevelopmental state. Furthermore, the *Bolsa Família* was born in the imagination of members of the Workers Party (WP), rooted in social movements and initially implemented in a few places in the country. It was later consolidated (along with different antipoverty initiatives), scaled up, and expanded by another WP member, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. In other words, it was a program indigenous to Brazil and came from the popular imagination and pressures from below.

Because of its success in Brazil, the World Bank has appropriated and promoted the conditional cash transfer program in many developing countries, including the Philippines. This tool, born from the sociopolitical movements in Brazil, but now in the hands of neoliberal technocrats, has been mechanically foisted and implemented in other national contexts as a technocratic exercise, albeit using the popular language of “participation” and “empowerment.” This hits the crux of the matter when analyzing CCT: what development strategy the CCT is embedded in, and what role it plays in that strategy. Here, context is everything. *State of Fragmentation* helps us see with new eyes the failure of the old development paradigm in the Philippines. If it prompts us not only to talk about but also to embark on a new path of development, it would have met its objective. And I certainly believe the book has done that and more.

**Ma. Victoria RAQUIZA**

University of the Philippines Diliman

### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> In 2014, the government also used the Annual Poverty Indicators Survey (APIS) as a basis for reporting poverty incidence. According to them, this is because the FIES is conducted triennially and therefore does not provide up-to-date poverty statistics unlike the APIS which is conducted every year. This, however, raises comparability questions in poverty statistics.
- <sup>2</sup> Nazmul Chaudhury, Jed Friedman, and Junko Onishi, *Philippines Conditional Cash Transfer Program Impact Evaluation 2012*, (World Bank 2013). [http://pantawid.dswd.gov.ph/images/philippines\\_conditional\\_cash\\_transfer\\_program\\_impact\\_evaluation\\_2012.pdf](http://pantawid.dswd.gov.ph/images/philippines_conditional_cash_transfer_program_impact_evaluation_2012.pdf).

### Reference

Anderson, Perry. 2011. “Lula’s Brazil.” *London Review of Books* 33:7 (31 March), 3–12.

***Song of the Babaylan: Living Voices, Medicines, Spiritualities of Philippine Ritualist-Oralist-Healers***  
Grace Nono. Institute of Spirituality in Asia, 2013, 400 pp. ISBN 9789719517030.

Divided into three major sections, *Song of the Babaylan* attempts to reintroduce the nearly forgotten *babaylan* practices of healing, divination, and spirit possession to modern readers. In the first part, “Invocations,” Grace Nono shares her exposure to the Philippine shamanistic tradition. In laying down her research methods, she informs us that she selected resource persons from the Kalinga, Ibaloi, Maguindanao, Manobo, Ibanag, Tagbanua, Cebuano, and Tagalog ethnolinguistic groups. On her methodology, she claims that “instead of beginning with the theoretical problems, the ethnographer can begin with informant-expressed needs, then develop a research agenda to relate these topics to the enduring concerns within social science...” (33).

Moreover, Nono situates the *babaylan* in a historico-cultural frame, narrating the history of the *babaylan* across pre-Hispanic, Hispanic, and American eras. It also shows the present-day *babaylan*, re-casts them in a more positive light, and challenges the accounts of the colonizers of the Philippines who described the *babaylan* as servants of the devil. She quotes from several authors to support her claim of the *babaylan*’s potency as healers and community leaders vis-à-vis Western medical practitioners.

The second section of the book, “Song of the Babaylan,” features transcriptions of ritual performances, as well as pedagogic illustrations, while the third part, “Reflections and Recommendations” organizes and features Nono’s interpretation of her data.

The transcriptions of the ritual texts are undeniably valuable, but I have some reservations on Nono’s framework and methodology. First, while explaining the role of the *babaylan* in the history of the Philippines, Nono makes a sweeping claim that they were fierce defenders of the land (13). This may be true to a certain extent, but many *babaylan* also

embraced the Catholic faith and became devout Christians or *hermanas* (literally “sisters” in Spanish) [Salazar 1999, 23] lest they be relegated to the margins of society.

Second, Nono states that she “purposely sought the participation of those who have upheld their pre-Christian and pre-Islamic practices” (36). The book attempts to place *babaylanism* in its proper historical context and its rootedness on its pre-Hispanic past, but this endeavour is undercut by the fact that the interpretation and translation of the data she gathered reveal that such practices are already tainted with the very influence the researcher wanted to avoid—Christianity/modernity. Gone are the “foaming in the mouth, fiery eyes, hair standing on ends, etc.” (Placencia, 190) that Christian missionaries observed when the *babaylan* were under spirit possession. And that the *babaylan* uses the combined texts of the prayers “Hail Mary,” “Our Father,” “Glory Be,” and calls to the soul of a departed (182–188, 190–191) shows that Christianity has already altered the vocabulary of shamanistic rituals, which, then as now, take on both Catholic and folk characteristics.

Third, I also find the blurring of boundaries between the “self and other” (39) equally problematic. This blurring is part of Nono’s attempt to free herself from the rigors of traditional Western anthropology. The author emphasizes *pakikipawa* (interpersonal relationship) which she adopted to Filipinize her approach. She quotes Obusan, who writes that “[T]he emerging picture of the Filipino *mananaliksik* or researcher is... not as an objective bystander, zealously guarding his/her data against contamination. The Filipino *mananaliksik* is one who sees the *kapwa* (neighbour, fellow man) not as a mere subject, but as a *kapwa*-Filipino who carries indigenous knowledge within him/herself” (ibid.). Nono claims right away that “I am that *mananaliksik* whom Obusan refers to, and the *babaylan*/carrier of indigenous knowledge is my *kapwa*-Filipino... (39)” Furthermore, Nono cites Kisliuk, who says that “[t]he most in-depth and intimate field experiences intersect with both a researcher’s life stories and a researcher’s subject’s until self-other boundaries are blurred” (ibid.). However, self-other boundaries will always remain. No matter how deep the conversations

---

and interactions become, there will always be differences in perspectives—everyone is separated by a number of culturally-specific endowments, like language, education, religion, worldview, etc.

Despite these inconsistencies, the work is still among the very few scholarly pieces that cover great archipelagic areas that cradle the babaylan, the *daitan*, the *catalonan*, the *balyan*, et. al. The babaylan has been hidden under the cloak of Westernization and the trappings of Christianity and modernity, but the murmurs, the prayers, the people, especially modern women (feminists), are once again summoning and highlighting pre-Christian images of the babaylan—a cultural leader, medicine man/woman who establishes a link between the here and the hereafter.

The accompanying CD to the book presents an interesting mixture of sung/chanted “pedagogic/al illustrations” (63, etc.) and actual ritual texts transcribed in the second section. It gives the reader/listener an idea that however Westernized some of the prayers/texts have become, the forms, melodies, and performances that embody the rituals continue to adhere to the praxis of the pre-Hispanic society in the Philippines. Nono admonishes would-be listeners “to listen with respect and an open heart” (inside back cover) before they “enter” the world of the babaylan.

*Song of the Babaylan* is a personal crusade as much as it is a scholarly endeavor. And as it is about ancient religious practices that came under attack through the Westernizing gaze of Catholic Spain, it is therefore wise to take time to look back, read and listen, as spirits might still be at hand to fill gaps in our modern worldview. Nono admits to her being an advocate of the babaylan tradition, which her book admiringly aims to preserve. It narrates the past and present of this cultural practice for future generations so that they can appreciate the remnants of a tradition that is still fighting for survival and recognition.

**Raul NAVARRO**

University of the Philippines Diliman

### References

- Alcina, Francisco. 2002. *History of the Bisayan People in the Philippine Islands*, 3 vols. Translated and edited by Cantius Kobak and Lucio Gutierrez. Manila: UST Publishing House.
- Placencia, Juan de. 2000. "Worship of the Tagalog, their Gods, and their Burials and Superstitions." In *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898, Vol. VII*, edited by Emma Blair and James Robertson. Manila: Bank of the Philippine Islands. CD-ROM.
- Salazar, Zeus. 1999. *Ang Babaylan sa Kasaysayan ng Pilipinas* (The Babaylan in Philippine History). Quezon City: Palimbagan ng Lahi.
- Scott, William Henry. 2004. *Barangay: Sixteenth-Century Philippine Culture and Society*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
- Tan, Michael. n.d. *Traditional Medical Practitioners in the Philippines*. Quezon City: College of Social Sciences and Philosophy Publications.



***New Women in Colonial Korea: A Sourcebook.***  
Compiled, translated, and introduced by Hyaeweol Choi.  
Routledge, 2013, 244 pp., ISBN 9780415517096.

HYAWEOL CHOI UNDERTOOK the arduous task of translating 65 Korean sources on the New Women (*Sin yösŏng*) into English. Her reason: so that “the voices of women and men who had passionately argued for or against New Woman in colonial Korea should be available to a wider audience” (xv). The “New Woman” was a movement that spread from the West to Asia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It challenged conventional views about female sexuality and femininity and insisted on certain rights (Heilmann and Beetham 2004, 1). The New Woman was found not only in the West but also in China, Taiwan, Japan, and Korea (Muta 2004, 205).

The sources in *New Women in Colonial Korea* come from 21 magazines and newspapers, among them the pioneering *Sin yŏja* (*New Woman*) magazine and the influential *Sin yösŏng* magazine. All highlight the circumstances that led to and nurtured the Korean New Women, most important of which was Japan’s colonization of Korea from 1895 to 1945. Indeed, the presence of Japan pervades many of the sources, especially those that were censored by the Japanese. The emergence of the New Women also coincided with the entry of Western traditions and the blossoming of Korean nationalism.

*Sin yŏja* was the first journal to initiate and spread the discourse of the New Woman in Korea. Thereafter, different definitions of the New Woman appeared in literary pieces, newspapers, and popular magazines (2). Choi calls attention to the difference between the “New Woman” and the “New Women” in the debate. The former was “discursively constructed” (4) and an “oversimplified image” (3), while the latter referred to “actual historical figures, individuals with their own specific contexts” (4). Choi’s sourcebook shows both the “image” of New Woman and the heterogeneous nature of the New Women.

Chapter 1 is devoted to sources that discuss the “woman question.” They condemn practices that chained Korean women, such as the “inside-outside rule” (16) (*naeoböŏp*). An especially important source in this chapter is source 2, the first public document that called for upholding women’s rights in Korea. Sources 5 and 6 equate the low status of women with the weak position of the Korean nation, which was a colony of Japan at that time. Both assert that women’s education would help recover national strength and achieve “enlightenment” (24). Similarly, other sources see a connection between the status of Korean women and that of the nation vis-à-vis foreign powers.

Chapter 2 focuses on sources that discuss “New Woman” and “Old Woman.” Source 7 cites Japanese New Women, Hiratsuka Raicho and Yosano Akiko, as models for Korea’s New Women. This is not surprising since *Sin yŏjja* was patterned after Hiratsuka’s *Seitō* (*Bluestocking*) magazine (26). Source 17 sets the criteria for New Womanhood but eventually states that being a “wise mother and good wife” was the goal of every woman (45–46). Source 11 is unique because the male author, Ham Sep’ung, flatly denounces the idea that women are inferior because of the “theory of evolution,” which asserts men are supposedly naturally more intelligent than women because men’s brains are larger than women’s brains (34). For him, women’s second-class status is merely the result of a lack of education.

Chapter 3 is filled with sources exploring issues on “schoolgirls” (*yŏhaksæng*), who were also associated with the New Women. These sources discuss the perceived “decline of morality among schoolgirls” (49), which actually originated in the penchant of prostitutes and female entertainers to wear schoolgirls’ uniforms. Source 24 examines the efforts of Alice Appenzeller and other women in establishing Ewha Women’s Professional School, and the successes of the school’s alumnae.

Chapter 4 is replete with sources on the Modern Girl (*modŏn kkŏl*) in Korea. Choi surmises that the concept came from Japan but points out that the phenomenon had a limited social space to thrive

---

because of economic conditions during the Japanese occupation. Sources in chapter 5 discuss love, marriage, and divorce. Source 34 expresses the hope of a New Woman trapped in a loveless marriage. Na Hyesök's "A confession about my divorce: To Ch'önggu" is a rare account of divorce from a Korean woman's perspective at a time males controlled the print media. It was also considered extraordinary that a divorced woman would be able to express her views (96).

Chapter 6 focuses on chastity, birth control, and fashion. One source asserts that men should also be required to be chaste while other sources discuss eugenics and the external, physical characteristics of the New Women, among others. Transcultural experiences of the New Women are featured in chapter 7. The New Women's accounts focus on their experiences in countries such as the United States, Denmark, Germany, and France. Source 53 discusses the status of women in the United States and women's higher education in that country, making special mention of five of the top seven women's colleges called the "Seven Sisters." Sources in chapter 8 tackle different issues in the Korean women's movement. Source 62 criticizes bourgeois women's presumed concern over their appearances, calls attention to the problems of proletarian women, and appeals to the New Women to help educate proletarian sisters.

Choi's sourcebook includes the works of many men and women who all contributed to the discourse. Sources written by Korean men show that not all Korean males dismissed Korean women as inferior. Some offer support for the intrepid Korean New Women, or at least champion their education. The book also features a cartoon section that gives us both the idealized and stereotyped images of the New Woman in Korea. Appendix 1 provides capsule biographies of the authors of the sources, while Appendix 2 offers detailed descriptions of each source magazine and newspaper.

One topic that may be further explored is the concept of the "New Men" (Sin chongnyong), a term that appears in Source 10 and Source 43. Perhaps Choi and other scholars in Korean Studies can shed more light on this phenomenon.

Overall, Choi's book is a gold mine of primary data. It belongs to and complements a growing number of studies of New Women in Northeast Asia, including her own *Gender and Mission Encounters in Korea: New Women, Old Ways* (2009). Read alongside Barbara Sato's *The New Japanese Woman* (2003) and Barbara Molony and Kathleen Uno's *Gendering Modern Japanese History* (2005), *New Women in Colonial Korea* contributes to the construction of a more holistic view of New Women in Northeast Asia.

**Angelo Christiane ARRIOLA**

University of the Philippines Diliman

### References

- Heilmann, Ann and Margaret Beetham. 2004. "Introduction." In *New Woman Hybridities: Femininity, Feminism and International Consumer Culture, 1880–1930*, edited by Ann Heilmann and Margaret Beetham, 1–14. London and New York: Routledge.
- Muta Kazue. 2004. "The New Woman in Japan: Radicalism and Ambivalence towards Love and Sex." In *New Woman Hybridities: Femininity, Feminism and International Consumer Culture, 1880–1930*, edited by Ann Heilmann and Margaret Beetham, 205–220. London and New York: Routledge.

# Travel Narratives

# Dead Season<sup>1</sup>

Caroline Sy HAU

Professor, Center for Southeast Asian Studies  
Kyoto University

In Kyoto, the Obon festival in honor of the spirits of ancestors falls around the middle of August. The day of the festival varies according to region and the type of calendar (solar or lunar) used. The Kanto region, including Tokyo, observes Obon in mid-July, while northern Kanto, Chugoku, Shikoku, and Okinawa celebrate their Old Bon (Kyu Bon) on the 15<sup>th</sup> day of the seventh month of the lunar calendar.

For most Japanese, though, August, shimmering Nilotic August, is dead season. Children have their school break, Parliament is not in session, and as many who can afford it go abroad. Because Kyoto sits in a valley, daytime temperature can run up to the mid- and even upper 30s.

Obon is not a public holiday, but people often take leave to return to their ancestral hometowns to visit and clean the family burial grounds. The Bon Odori dance is based on the story of the monk Mokuren, who on Buddha's advice was able to ease the suffering of his dead mother and who was said to have danced for joy at her release. The festival culminates in paper lanterns being floated across rivers and in dazzling displays of fireworks.

An added attraction in Kyoto is the Daimonji festival held on August 16. Between 8:00 and 8:20 p.m., fires in the shape of the characters "great" (dai, 大) and "wondrous dharma" (myo/ho 妙法) and in the shapes of a boat and a torii gate are lit in succession on five mountains encircling the city. These fires are intended to send off the spirits to their world after their all-too-brief visit among the living.

For those who are used to paying their respects to the dead by the Christian calendar, the heat and humidity that attend Obon seem a world away from the chilly November mornings of Todos los Santos and All Souls' Day. But for those in Asia who grew up with a syncretism of Buddhist, Taoist

and folk practices, Obon is more likely to remind them of the Chinese Ghost Festival, which falls on the 15<sup>th</sup> day (14<sup>th</sup> for Southern Chinese) of the seventh month of the lunisolar calendar, August 10 this year. In the Chinese tradition, the ghosts and spirits get to spend a longer time—up to a month—abroad, and unlike the Qingming festival, the living are expected to honor all of the dead, and not just their own kin, during the Ghost festival.

Because the dead roam the world at will during this time, stories abound of their doings and their effects on the living. These days, however, stories are no longer enough; they have to be authenticated by technology to prove that they are as real as the movies based on them.

In Japan, the belief that things, not merely persons, can be possessed has a long history. Any number of things can acquire self-awareness if they become old enough: there are distinct terms for haunted umbrellas, sake jars, prayer beads, saddles, mirrors, graters, clocks, kimono hung from racks, tea kettles, futon beds, scrolls and papers, straw coats and sandals, and folding screens.

The other day on Japanese television, a show called “Scream Nonstop” featured ghosts allegedly captured on video and in photographs. Some of them are amateur J-Horror, pure contrivances in bad make-up. One man appears to have an inexplicable knack for carrying a video camera with him whenever he responds to a knock on the door, only to record thin air and then, after the second knocking, a woman in black squatting by his refrigerator.

In another, a man tapes his girlfriend crossing a wooden footbridge and watches her stumble, but his camera just happens to freeze at the moment when a dark, male face appears between the wooden slats of the bridge.

Other clips claim to be from closed-circuit security cameras in a parking lot in Malaysia or a convenience store in Japan, capturing the moment when a car comes to a sudden halt before a semi-transparent figure in a business suit, serenely headed toward an empty stall, or a woman in a low-cut red dress standing—no, hovering—behind a customer who strolls casually into the store.

The spookiest may be a cc-camera shot of an underground parking garage, where a small, unmanned tricycle rolls out of a hallway and then comes to an abrupt stop, followed seconds later by what appears to be a pair of pale feet taking baby steps away from the bike.

There is an interview with a train conductor who claims to be able to see death in the faces of other people, death basically taking the form of a dark cloud that erases their features. There is a woman who was unfortunate enough to have been on board a bus tour when a female ghost came gliding down the aisle, moaning, "Let me go with you."

Another bus driver, seeing a little girl dribbling a ball in the parking lot, takes her by the hand and asks her to bring him to her mother, who is sitting in a bench nearby, texting busily on a cellphone. When he scolds the woman for letting her child play in a dangerous area, the woman does not look up from her mass of hair, merely growling: "Yes, it's dangerous. What did you do to my child?" And he looks down to see the badly burned face of the little girl and then the decaying features of the mother.

One small temple specializes in long-distance exorcism. A novice monk brings out a cardboard box filled with letters from all over the country, going back decades. In some of the photographs attached, faces appear on windshields of playground cars and even under the armpits of schoolboys having their group photo taken. More than any video chat footage of hands crawling over women's shoulders, these vintage photographs bear residues of disquiet, if not fear, at least enough to send them by airmail in search of answers or, failing those, prayers.

For all that ghosts and spirits appear universal in the sense that many cultures believe in their existence, they remain culture-bound in the way that they present themselves to the living. In Japan, they flit in the corner of one's gaze or off to the side of the camera in dead-white kimono. If they are women, they sport long, disheveled hair that covers most of their Kabuki-painted faces, but if they are men, they are stuck with 1970s-style shag haircuts and David Bowie eye mascara.

But in an age where people move around more freely and frequently, what happens when they encounter ghosts in a country not their own? Would a crucifix work in Bangkok and would a mantra suffice in Manila? Pinoys from the Tagalog region would be brought up on tales of the viscera-sucking manananggal, women with bat wings, capable of detaching their upper torsos from the rest of their bodies, but their cousins in Sabah and



the Malay peninsula would be more familiar with the penanggalan, the flying female heads whose stomachs and entrails emit twinkling light as the hantu go about their business.

We expect our ghosts to travel the long route across time but insist that they remain rooted in a specific place.

What to do, then, when an old woman appears at the foot of the bed, in a tiny apartment in Singapore, to an overseas Filipino worker? Is the crone from home, or is she bound to this place that the OFW calls her temporary home? This actually happened to a sister's friend, and the friend found no relief after mumbling all the prayers she knew, for after appealing to the Christian God and to Buddha and Kwan Yin to send the old woman away, the girl peeked out of her blanket, only to find the old woman still standing there, gazing mournfully at her. After a while, though, the old woman disappeared, probably out of boredom.

As far as playful commentaries on hauntings and ghosts go, few can match Hong Kong-based Alfonso Wong (Wong Chak, 王澤)'s Lao Fu Zi (Old Master Q) comics, which many Southeast Asian Chinese grew up reading. Some of the classic strips are available on the official website, and to see them is to laugh and marvel at the ways in which talking about ghosts can be a way of talking about ourselves.

In one strip, Old Master Q introduces a woman sporting a "shaggy devil" haircut to a Thousand-Year-Old Vampire sporting a similar hairstyle. In another, Master Q, having died in a car accident, ascends to heaven, and the dead people around him get excited when they learn that he was run over by a Rolls Royce, not just any car. In still another, Master Q is hit by a chair that someone has carelessly thrown out of a balcony, and Lao Fu Zi's gentlemanly ghost returns the chair to its terrified owner. Old Master Q goes fishing, and wheels an irate version of himself out of the water. Dracula is frightened off by Master Q's screams of terror. A demon scares Master Q out of bed, and when Master Q comes back to his bedroom, he finds the demon sleeping in his bed. Big Potato, Master Q's friend, is so frightened by a movie that he comes out of the movie house literally diminished. Running away from a demon, Master Q frantically scavenges

for objects that he can fashion into a cross, and ends up waving a crossed hammer and sickle (youngsters born after the fall of the Berlin Wall may miss the joke about Communism here).

In some episodes, Master Q appears as a demon-slayer, dispatching demons, bureaucrats from the underworld, and a capricious, white-haired and bearded God who unleashes earthquakes and natural disasters, pestilence, false truths, and jealousy on humankind. In one instance, Master Q dies from poverty and hunger, and wreaks vengeance upon the spirit in charge of human souls who, acting like a typical bureaucrat, asks for an accounting of his deeds.

Ghost stories can be commentaries as well. Master Q escapes the clutches of a ghost but fares badly in the hands of another predator, the mugger. Master Q ascends to heaven, only to complain to God that the air pollution in heaven is worse than that on earth, and comes back to life, surprising his grieving friends. Master Q puts an umbrella over the God of Earth's altar on a rainy day, and finds a large gold tael on the road, but the gold promptly disappears when a sudden wind blows off the umbrella over the To-Ti-Kong altar. Master Q prays to a god from Jiangsu province, and when Big Potato asks him how he can pray to the god when he does not speak the Suzhou topolect, Master Q matter-of-factly says that he uses English. The moon goddess Chang'e, clad in traditional Chinese clothing, brings Master Q a box of pizza rather than mooncakes. Master Q chances upon a wad of cash, only to have it snatched away by a thief, who then loses the money to a Chinese god borne on a cloud. Master Q's guardian angel counsels him against drinking, but surreptitiously takes a sip himself. A ghost creeps up behind Master Q to scare him, only to be scared off by the ghost stories Master Q is reading.

These stories, by mixing religions and their gods and demons and reflecting on divine and human retribution (or the lack thereof), convey the fear and skepticism, the awe and absurdity, that underpin our sense of the straight but porous line that separates the living from the dead.

### Note

- <sup>1</sup> This travel narrative was originally published in the author's blog, *Letters to Narcissus*, on 13 August 2014. Its original title is "Obon." Visit <http://letterstonarcissus.com/>.

Poetry

# Dragons

for Krista, Minh & Chari

Isabela BANZON

Are there really dragons  
in the nondescript  
solid block of rock quarried a thousand years ago?  
No matter what the angle,  
no matter that we tilt our bodies  
forward, sideward, backward to where the tiger-  
and the snake-like hills are sentries,  
I don't see the dragons.

*Nine dragonscatting a pearl*, our guide  
from Hanoi says.  
Does he mean *sitting* or *eating*? What's in a pearl?  
I still don't see the dragons.  
*Dragon, power.*  
Use imagination.  
He's memorized his English;  
beyond the guidebook, nothing else.

The hills surround and fortify the absent palace,  
the lake is like a moat;  
but what is strategic planning to we  
who merely backpack to seek the unfamiliar?  
Perhaps it's almost  
knowing what to trek, where to camp  
when like the sun,  
our restlessness turns imperious.

This remnant of a dynasty, of Le,  
is geomancy consulted,  
a perfect land and water complement.  
Perhaps we travel to pause,  
for balance.  
Perhaps then I will see the dragons.

---

## Transitions: Four Haiku

Temario RIVERA

Twittering Mayas  
Tiptoeing on rain-drenched road  
Twirling out of sight.

\*\*

Green mangoes hint at  
Feasts of grilled fish and sea greens,  
Scent of salted dips.

\*\*

Silver moon lingers  
on dawn's looming light, unmoved  
by sun's radiant rush.

\*\*

Cocks crowing at dawn  
Tired workers break night's brief lull,  
Dreams of unlived lives.

## About the Contributors

**Isabela BANZON** teaches and currently heads the creative writing program at the University of the Philippines Diliman. She is the author of the poetry books *Paper Cage* and *Lola Coqueta*, and coeditor of *An Anthology of English Writing from Southeast Asia* (Singapore).

**Kristoffer ESQUEJO** is Assistant Professor at the Department of History, University of the Philippines Diliman. He was a recipient of the NCCA Young Historian's Prize in Local History (Filipino Category) in 2010 and is the author of several articles "The Last Voyage of the Galleon 'Santisima Trinidad' (La Ultima Viaje del Galeon 'Santisima Trinidad), which was published in *The Manila Galleon: Traversing the Pacific* (El Galeon de Manila: Atravesando el Pacifico). He is a member of the Philippine Historical Association and is pursuing his Ph.D. in History at the University of the Philippines Diliman.

**Caroline Sy HAU** is Professor at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University. She has a Ph.D. from Cornell University and specializes on the literature and culture of Southeast Asia (especially the Philippines); on Chinese overseas in Southeast Asia; and nationalism and regionalism in Southeast Asia. She is the author of *The Chinese Question: Ethnicity, Nation and Region in and beyond the Philippines* (2013); *On the Subject of the Nation: Filipino Writing from 1981 to 2004* (2005); and *Necessary Fictions: Philippine Literature and the Nation, 1946–1980* (2000). Her more recent scholarly articles include "Privileging Roots and Routes: Filipino Intellectuals and the Contest Over Epistemic Power and Authority" [*Philippine Studies* 62(1)29–65] and "Regional Studies on the Chinese Diaspora in the Philippines" [*Kritika Kultura* no. 21–22 (2013)].

**Kinhide MUSHAKOJI** is Professor at the Centre for Asia Pacific Partnership in Osaka University of Economics and Law, President of the Japan Association of Human Security Studies, and Vice Chair of the International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism. He graduated at the Department of Law, Gakushuin University and has

---

taught at Osaka University of Economics and Law, Chubu University, Ferris Jogakuin University, among others. He has published extensively and his recent articles include “Global Issues and Interparadigmatic Dialogue: Essays on Multipolar Politics” and “State and Immigrant Community in Contemporary Japan: From Developmentalist State Ethics to Development Ethics of Common Human Security” in *Transnational Migration and Human Security: The Migration-Development-Security Nexus* (2011).

**Temario RIVERA** is currently professorial lecturer in political science at the University of the Philippines Diliman. He was formerly professor and chair of the U.P. Department of Political Science and also taught as professor of comparative politics and international relations for about a decade at the International Christian University of Tokyo. At present, he is the chairperson of the Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG), a research and policy advocacy NGO. His major publications include the multi-awarded book, *Landlords and Capitalists* (1994); *Philippines: State of the Nation* (1996) and *Chasing the Wind: Assessing Philippine Democracy* (2011), of which he was co-editor. He served as editor-in-chief (1993–2013) of the *Philippine Political Science Journal*, an internationally peer-reviewed ISI journal published by Routledge. He has written some 50 various journal articles and book chapters in local and international publications.

**Jacqueline Aquino SIAPNO** is an Independent Researcher with the Centro Para a Mulher e Estudos do Genero. Last year, she was a Visiting Professor at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, Japan. Before that, she was an Associate Professor in the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, Korea. She has published extensively on Southeast Asian politics and histories and taught graduate seminars on “Political Economies of Southeast Asia.” For some of her publications and Southeast Asian Studies Teaching Syllabi please see: <http://independent.academia.edu/JacquelineSiapno>

**Ron Bridget VILOG** is Associate Professor at the International Studies Department of De La Salle University, Manila. He recently obtained his Ph.D. in International Development from Nagoya University, Japan. His research interests include migration policies and migration dynamics of ethnicity-based immigrants. Among Vilog's recent articles include "Perceived Discrimination in Ancestral Homeland: Filipino Nikkeijins and the Dynamics of Migrant Resistance" which was published by the *Asia-Pacific Social Science Review* in December 2012.

**Vicente Angel YBIERNAS** is Assistant Professor at the Department of History in De La Salle University-Manila. He finished his Master of Political Science (major in International Relations) at the Catholic University of Korea, and his BA in History at the University of the Philippines Diliman. His research interests include Philippine economic history during the American colonial period, US and Philippines security relations, Mindanao secessionist conflict, migrant workers in South Korea, South Korean public policy on foreign immigration, conflict in the Korean peninsula, and state and business relations in South Korea. His recent publications include "Migrant Workers in South Korea: Between Strategic Ambivalence and Systematic Exploitation" and "Governor-general Leonard Wood's Neoliberal Agenda for Privatizing Public Assets Stymied: 1921-1927."

### List of Reviewers

Bernardita CHURCHILL | Jean FRANCO

Asuncion FRESNOZA-FLOT | Kin Chi LAU | Jung Ok LEE  
Jaime VENERACION | Jorge TIGNO | Marianne UBALDE

Johanna ZULUETA




# SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

Published three times a year April/August/December

ISSN 2186-7275

OPEN ACCESS ONLINE JOURNAL

<http://englishkyoto-seas.org/>



Since its first publication in 1963, the bilingual quarterly *Southeast Asian Studies* (SEAS), Kyoto University has reflected the Center for Southeast Asian Studies' strong commitment to publishing the best of empirically grounded, multidisciplinary, and contemporary research on Southeast Asia and related areas.

In 2012, we re-launched *Southeast Asian Studies* as an all-English journal, alongside its Japanese sister journal, *Tonan Ajia Kenkyu*. Intended for a regional as well as global readership, *Southeast Asian Studies* is published three times a year.

The new journal aims to promote excellent, agenda-setting scholarship and provide a forum for dialogue and collaboration both within and beyond the region. *Southeast Asian Studies* engages in wide-ranging and in-depth discussions that are attuned to the issues, debates, and imperatives within the region, while affirming the importance of learning and sharing ideas on a cross-country, global, and historical scale. An integral part of the journal's mandate is to foster scholarship that is capable of bridging the continuing divide in area studies between the social sciences and humanities, on the one hand, and the natural sciences, on the other hand. To this end, the journal welcomes accessibly written articles that build on insights and cutting-edge research from the natural sciences. The journal also publishes research reports, which are shorter but fully peer-reviewed articles that present original findings or new concepts that result from specific research projects or outcomes of research collaboration.



Send submissions to [english-editorial@cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp](mailto:english-editorial@cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp)

Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University,

46 Shimoadachi-cho, Yoshida, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan

# CALL FOR PAPERS

**ASIAN STUDIES: JOURNAL OF CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ASIA** is an open-access, peer-reviewed academic journal published since 1963 by the Asian Center, University of the Philippines Diliman. Promoting original and penetrating research, it offers novel and alternative interpretations of Asian experiences, helps deepen the understanding of the region, and enlivens debates on issues affecting Asian peoples and societies.

One of the pioneering journals of its kind in Asia, **Asian Studies** offers a critical, multidisciplinary platform where scholars, practitioners, and activists can publish research that draws on the theories and perspectives from the social sciences, humanities, or cultural studies. Published twice a year, the journal welcomes:

- Full-length research articles;
- Commentaries and documents;
- Reviews (films, books, novels, exhibits, plays, websites, etc.);
- Poetry and short fiction; and
- Travel narratives.

View content and submission guidelines: <http://asj.upd.edu.ph>. Submissions are welcome year-round. Send all manuscripts to [upasianstudies@gmail.com](mailto:upasianstudies@gmail.com) or [jvnolasco@up.edu.ph](mailto:jvnolasco@up.edu.ph).

