Southeast Asian Studies and Southeast Asia: A Filipino Note[1]

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I

The beginnings of "Southeast Asian studies" in Southeast Asia were expectedly colonial. The scholarship of the period was being undertaken by bureaucrat-scholars whose task was to "understand" the societies their empires controlled to ensure a more efficient – and often more brutal – colonial governance, and to devise better ways of exploiting the local communities. Their works were, as Benedict Anderson put it,

> directly commissioned by the colonial state, for its policing and development purposes. The conditions that led to unexpected peasant uprisings, puzzling resistance by remote mountain tribes, or flashflood riots by religious and ethnic groups, could best – so thought the colonial state after 1900, after several decades of internal and external criticism by savants in the metropole and on the spot – be systematically explored by scholarly methods. The same applied to the problems of rural indebtedness, landlessness, rural-urban migrations and so forth.[2]

Some excelled at "varying extents, [in] literary studies, ethnology, Buddhist and Islamic studies, economics, demography and rural sociology," while others studied "precolonial history, archeology, epigraphy, philology and linguistics," spurred by "an obvious practical need for good dictionaries, grammars, and language training manuals, since colonial administrations by the later nineteenth century recognized the need for 'intellectual access' to peoples they governed but did not intend, in any large way, to train to speak the metropolitan languages."[3]

The majority of these bureaucrat-scholars, however, never tried to venture beyond the bounds of their respective colonial societies, in part because imperial rivalry in the region ensured that the different colonial states remain suspicious of each other.[4] In fact, we can regard them as the forerunners of the country specialists: Georges Coedes and Paul Mus were "experts" of the Indochinese states, Bertram Schrieke and Theodoor Pigeaud studied Java, and J.R. Hayden, Roy Barton and Dean C. Worcester were Philippine specialists. The only exception was John Furnivall, whose study of Netherlands India and British Burma, revealed an incomparable comparative grasp of colonial politics.[5] This colony-specific focus of these bureaucrat-scholars would try to frame "Southeast Asian" studies would be built in the academic centers of both the metropoles and the region itself.

It was another group that imagined the region on broader terms. Pre-war Japanese scholars wrote about Southeast Asia, drawn by the curiosity of migrant Japanese labor going around Southeast Asia in the early 1900s, of which the largest number were prostitutes.[6] After Japan acquired the status of honorary European power as a result of her victory over Tsarist Russian in the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese state also began to make its presence felt in East and Southeast Asia. Its target was to curtail the prevalence of prostitution, protect its migrant male labor and make Japan look more respectable among the peoples of Southeast Asia.[7] This led to the emergence of what we may describe as the first policy writings on *Tonan Ajia*, many of which became resource materials for the military's invasion plans in World War II.[8]

In this world of colonial scholarship, the colonized had very little role to play. But this did not mean that they did not aspire to understand their own societies. Those who managed to get an education beyond the primary school began to critically expropriate whatever knowledge they learned from their rulers and to turn these into weapons of criticism of the colonial order. Jose Rizal and Raden Adjeng Kartini stood out as notable examples of these "native" critics, the former utilizing analytical methods he learned from Spanish Jesuits and European liberals to write a devastating portrait of colonial society, while the latter, learning from her correspondence with a Dutch friend, to understand her role as a colonial subject and a woman in the Netherlands East Indies.[9] Rizal and Kartini, however, represented attempts by the colonial young to configure the foundations of a would-be nation. The "spectre of comparison" that haunted their writings was therefore inevitably aimed towards conceptualizing a national community, not a society that transcended the domains of the colonial state. They were, in short, also not regionalists (Benedict Anderson is thus only partly right in noting Rizal's "el demonio de las comparaciones." Rizal's comparative vista was focused on Europe (Spain?) and his beloved Philippines; there was very little in his writings that sought to extend this perspective to colonial neighbors).[10]

The generations that immediately followed Rizal and Kartini were distinct for being more revolutionary and proactive in their efforts to liberate their respective societies. The more notable among this group included Phan Boi Chau who saw in Japan the model for a liberated Vietnam, and Ho Chi Minh, who was drawn to Marxism's internationalist élan, becoming a founding member of the French Communist Party and the Comintern's agent in Asia. In Indonesia, Tan Malaka traveled around the region to establish networks with fellow Asian communists as well as to draw lessons from "foreign experiences" which he hoped he could bring back to aid Indonesians and their revolution against the Dutch and their local allies.[11] Marxism's internationalist ethos and Japan's official propaganda of an Asia for Asians were the initial appeals that could have made these revolutionaries the precursors of an indigenous Southeast Asian

perspective. And in fact we see hints of such imaginings in the manner in which Tan Malaka and Ho Chi Minh sought to organize their comrades.[12] But their priorities were clearly anti-colonial and they would scale down their vista back to "national liberation." Their internationalism would recede in favor of a national one, but this was something not out of the ordinary. For in the supposed centers of internationalist solidarity, nationalist currents had taken over: the Soviet Union under Stalin had reversed back to its Russian chauvinism while in Japan, once the military came to power, all talk of a pan-Asian solidarity could not hide her real intention of Asian dominance.

II

It was only in the post-war period that the contours of a "Southeast Asian" area studies began to take shape. Its first sites however were located somewhere else –in the academic institutions of the former colonial powers and in the United States. There, academic institutions had expropriated the British military's concept of "Southeast Asia" and made it their own.[13] Moreover, with the end of colonial rule and the onset of the Cold War, it became necessary for the new global hegemons – the United States and the Soviet Union – to set up the intellectual apparatuses to study the new nations of the post-colonial world. The latter, after all, constituted a potential power base or instruments of their global interests as well as arenas where they could do combat against each other using surrogate armies. The Americans immediately overextended themselves, intervening in the Indonesian revolution, as well as in the communist movements in the Philippines and Vietnam. This eagerness of the American state to spy on these new countries of the region, and to get involved in local affairs to prevent a slide into communism, would help boost the creation of centers and/or interdisciplinary programs in universities like Cornell and Yale.[14] These institutions however would not necessarily toe the official line; neither did they become simple producers of imperialist secret agents. Cornell University, for example, became a haven of a generation of Southeast

Asian scholars who were not only experts of the countries they were studying, but who also opposed the maneuverings of the American state, often to their intellectual and political detriment.[15]

In Europe, the inspiration to set up Southeast Asian studies programs was driven by a sense of nostalgia for the colonial era and the desire among many of those who served in the "Far East" to maintain ties with the societies they ruled. Southeast Asian institutes were thus formed in Holland and the study of Southeast Asia included in programs that concern the post-colonial world, such as the Southeast Asia Institute set up in Bedefeld, Germany, the University of Hull in England, and the University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies. But the balance in the non-communist West had clearly shifted away from Europe towards the United States simply because the latter "was a rising power in the 1950s and 1960s, while France, England, and Holland were declining [as] the scholars-bureaucrats, who had reluctantly moved back to university slots, aged and died off."[16]

The growth of Southeast Asian studies in top American universities provided an impetus for training the next generations of specialists, many becoming pioneers in establishing additional centers. Charles Hirschman writes:

Compilations of the number of doctoral dissertations show rapid growth in the 1950s and 1960s, but a leveling off in the late 1970s and 1980s...In the early phase of growth, most Ph.D.'s with a specialization in Southeast Asia were in the traditional liberal arts (history, political science, anthropology) and were recruited to teach on international and Asian subjects in American universities. While undoubtedly exceptional, the early career of Professor Norman Parmer represents the era of growth in Southeast Asian studies. Parmer was one of the very first American academics to specialize in Malaysia (then Malaya). Within a decade after receiving his doctorate in history from Cornell (1957), Parmer founded the Southeast Asia Center at Northern Illinois University, served as country director for the first contingent of Peace Corps volunteers in Malaya, and then founded another Southeast Asia Center at Ohio University.[17]

But even this post-war generation did not depart significantly from their colonial predecessors. Like the old bureaucrat-scholars, many preferred to be country experts, to be educated in one or two languages (mainly of the country they studied), and rarely venturing into regional and global comparisons. Only a few possessed the capacity and intelligence to think regionally, and in this small cabal, four stood out. There was O.W. Wolters, a former colonial bureaucrat-scholar who made the successful leap into academia, and was noted for his remarkable overview of the area (including southern China) from the 4th century to the colonial period. His colleague George McTurnan Kahin, wrote the path-breaking work on the Indonesian nationalist revolution which he soon followed with one of the best critical appraisals of American foreign policy in Indochina. A generation younger to Wolters and Kahin consisted of Benedict Anderson, whose brilliant and unusual intellectual and political pilgrimage led him from Indonesia (Java) to Thailand (Bangkok), and the Philippines (Manila), and James C. Scott, whose studies of the Vietnamese, Burmese and Malaysian peasantries' modes of resistance remain a classic.[18]

No tangible Southeast Asian studies program developed in Japan until the early 1960s with the establishment of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS) in Kyoto University and the organization of the Japan Society for Southeast Asian History in November 1966. Even then, these organizations were pretty much country-specific. Kyoto University's CSEAS, for example, states that one of its first projects was "a joint research project with special emphasis on Thailand and Malaysia [where researchers] went...to conduct fieldwork ranging from detailed community studies by anthropologists, to investigations of tropical forests, paddy soils, and agricultural techniques, further confined these country interests by natural scientists."[19] There was hardly anything devoted to understanding regional politics, and historical writings were too concentrated on "a more subjective, microscopic account of Filipino self-consciousness, both at the national and regional levels" and a partiality on social history over national histories.[20] Japanese academia's passionate empiricism also accounted for

the preponderance of long-term studies of changes at the village level, very often failing to connect with larger national and regional processes.[21]

In Southeast Asia, the development was much slower where, with the exception of Thailand and the Philippines, the establishment of national universities only came after World War II.[22] These schools' history and politics departments were – as expected – created to mainly devote their attention to writing and propagating the official national stories of these new republics.[23] The graduate training of young scholars within the country and abroad were likewise directed at producing country experts. Young Filipinos, Indonesians, Malaysians and Thais went to Leiden, London, Chicago, Ithaca, and New Haven to write dissertations on their countries.[24] There were some exceptions to this country-centric scholarship. In the Philippines, the Siquijodnon Jose Eliseo Rocamora wrote an exceptional dissertation about Indonesia which, to this very day, remains the definitive study on the *Partai Nasionalis Indonesia*.[25] Slightly older than him is the Malaysian historian Wang Gung Wu, whose curiosity about his "origins" led him to explore the world of the Chinese diaspora in the region and its connections to the "motherland."[26] Rocamora and Wang, unfortunately, were the only ones in the region with a curiosity to compare, with their numerical marginality only mitigated by the brilliance of their respective works. Elsewhere, it was easier for a budding scholar to specialize on his or her own country.

Meanwhile in the national universities, course listings that included seminars and classes on Europe, the United States, greater "Asia," or other countries in Southeast Asia were developed. "Asian Centers" were being built in places like the University of the Philippines, but university support was miniscule compared to the attention devoted to building up the disciplines and the major departments. The only exception in the 1960s appeared to be Malaysia, where a Southeast Asia Program was built to provide institutional support to students of Malaysian history and politics, as well as those who specialized on the "larger Malay world." This program also became the domain for scholars working on subjects like the origins

of the country's multiethnic communities, the break away and birth of Singapore and the incorporation of Borneo and Sarawak to the Federation.[27] Still, even this pioneering institution was only ancillary to such disciplines as economics and public administration. Hence, early post-colonial Southeast Asia still paralleled the developments in metropoles where the academic concerns remained mainly country-specific, albeit this time to support the building of official nationalism.

The budding institutional curiosity about Southeast Asia was to be found elsewhere, in the think tank groups supported by or sympathetic to government and American interests, and fearful of local communist threats as well as of Mao's China. Created at various times during the Cold War era, these institutes gained credence through their frequent evaluations of regional "security risks.". In the process of tracing the efforts of "enemy countries" like Vietnam and/or China to promote revolutionary solidarity, and later, in the flow of drugs and arms by warlords and syndicates, these centers slowly became the odd precursors of a comparative perspective that took into account the relationships between countries vis-à-vis these problems.[28] Because many of their members were academics, these centers kept close ties with the university, thereby keeping open the possibility of extending their regional curiosities and contaminating the country-focus of many specialists.

The one negative but perhaps unintended outcome of this national bias of Southeast Asian universities was the intellectual diminution of the local, the periphery and the frontier as subjects of study. In many cases, what was often written as national politics or history was narrowly centered on the stories of the dominant elites and the national capitals. The areas outside of the capital's orbit were often ignored, with the communities at the margins of the national body politic suffering the most for their exclusion. For their stories would be reduced to uneasy accounts of their ungovernability and perilous nature, where smuggling, rebellion, criminality and other inscrutable acts occur to the befuddlement and irritation of those in the capital. Ironically it was also in these areas that a

regional consciousness could have prevailed in the early postwar period. Driven mainly by trade concerns, the histories of pre-colonial Southeast Asian states as well as the early colonial states demonstrated a cosmopolitan interaction between them, without being bothered by the delineation of clear-cut territorial boundaries. This, in turn, engendered an intellectual and cultural cosmopolitanism that saw Maguindanao or Riau datus conversing with Portuguese assisted by Chinese finance advisers, of Thai kings inquiring about the merits and demerits of Western education, and of Vietnamese merchants trading effortlessly with their Chinese counterparts.[29] This consciousness waned as the policing of the borders by colonial states improved. But it never really disappeared. The borders remained porous, and the nation-states with the weakest navies or immigration agencies could only tolerate the continued human and material exchanges that were now classified under the rubric "smuggling."[30] The point I wish to make in this aside is that had scholars in the region searched for an infrastructure for the development of a Southeast Asian perspective, the frontiers ironically could have provided that source of inspiration. But because the predisposition was to write national history or politics from the capital, this was never given due consideration.[31]

III

In the late 20th century, two major changes occurred in the metropole and in Southeast Asia that would make the prospect of a more secure region-wide "Southeast Asian" studies possible. The American state's defeat in the Vietnam War and the collapse of the Soviet Union over a decade later brought about the unsurprising decline in American interest on Southeast Asia. Federal and private funding for research and graduate education were now shifted to more "strategic" and "newsworthy" areas like post-communist Russia and Eastern Europe, and in Asia, a revitalized communist China and the new power dynamos of South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan. This diminished institutional interest coincided with shifts in university departments that emphasized "theory" over "area

studies," and "broad comparisons" over "country studies." Southeast Asian studies, which was already a minor "area" compared to East or South Asia, would experience further marginalization by the disinterest of new hegemonic theories like deconstruction, post-structuralism and rational choice. Once cultural studies in particular began to "interrogate" the authenticity of "Southeast Asia," even the intellectual premises of Southeast Asian studies began to erode, prompting concerns from specialists but also prodding them to explore new pathways that may not necessarily be tied anymore to the now-dubious terrain that is "Southeast Asia."[32]

Financial constraints and foreign policy shifts also affected European and Australian Southeast Asian centers, with only the "bigger" ones being able to survive.[33] Finally, in Japan, despite the resources in their hand and despite their government's commitment to enrich the local version of "area studies," scholars continue to focus on country-centered investigations. Although there are indications that some scholars are pushing their colleagues to be more adventurous and hence engage in much broader regional comparisons, the majority of Japanese Southeast Asianists remained heavily tilted towards the local and the anthropological.[34]

In Southeast Asia, the trend seems to go the opposite direction. The decision by many revolutionaries to abandon the *maquis* and move to graduate studies has produced a bevy of studies that are outstanding in both theory and empirical substance. What is more important, however, is that these studies could not simply be situated within national boundaries anymore for the subjects they explore are issues that many countries in Southeast Asia and the larger post-colonial world share in common. There is, therefore, an opening to compare.[35] Meanwhile, no sooner had specialists in the anti-communist think tanks began to settle down into their academic niches, when they and their more academic colleagues were drawn towards new social problems. The fragile presence of the nation-states in their peripheries, and their use of excessive force to compensate for this weakness, had led to uprisings by communities in these marginal areas. Islamic separatist movements have challenged the

governments of Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, while in Burma and Vietnam, "minorities" seeking to break away and form their own nation-states were confronting the state.[36] The failure of the authoritarian project in Southeast Asia has raised questions about the enduring viability of the nation-state as the institutional and symbolic inspiration for communities of the region. The use of Islam as a political weapon in Aceh, Maguindanao, Pattani and Sulawesi is thus not simply just the purported invocation of a superior philosophy over the more limited national idea. The notion of a universal Islamic *umma* has also become the inspiration for imagining a politico-moral order that transcends the limited boundaries of the nation-state. To academics in the various national universities, these were concerns demanding their attention if only to defend the continuing "goodness of nations" against processes that tend to unravel a now-fundamental notion of political space.[37]

At the other end, Singapore's exceptional development from a non-descript fishing village to an internationalized economic powerhouse has led to a major rethinking of the nationalism-inspired import-substitution orthodoxy of the early post-war period, and its displacement by a more globalized export-oriented approach to progress.[38] Singapore's transformation paralleled those of South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan, and the one important consequence of the emergence of these "East Asian tiger economies" to the rest of Southeast Asia was the increase in their demand for the latter's natural and human resources to feed their burgeoning industries, increasingly prosperous citizens and remarkably changed lifestyles. In the 1980s, therefore, Indonesians, Filipinos, Thais began to fill up the lower end of the labor hierarchy of these countries and supplying the domestic assistance to enhance the leisure time for middle class and elite Singaporeans, Taiwanese, South Koreans and Hong Kong residents. It was inevitable that this flow would catch the attention of academics and area specialists.[39]

Rebellions in the periphery, the merits of full participation in the global capitalist system and increased flow of humans and resources all

throughout Asia, combined to increase the level of curiosity on "Southeast Asian studies" within the region. In the late postwar period, universities began to create the appropriate Southeast Asia programs, or where they were already in existence, strengthen them with additional staff and resources. Of these programs, the National University of Singapore has been the most prolific, with its Southeast Asia Program becoming the top graduate program in the region.[40]

IV

Two other impulses are expected to bolster this emergence of Southeast Asian studies in the long-term. The first comes from changes in international relations in today's Asia, with a more assertive presence by China and South Korea and the coming out of the hitherto isolated socialist states of Indochina. China apparently has had a number of institutions dedicated to the study of Southeast Asia (the largest and most prominent is in Xiamen, southern China) and whose statures appear to have risen as Chinese business and economic interests in Southeast Asian grew. South Korean universities have also begin the process of creating similar centers, in part prompted by the active presence of Southeast Asia migrant labor in the Korean economy, and indirectly by the effects of its citizens vacationing in Southeast Asia. Finally, as Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam rebuild their universities in anticipation of completely opening to the world capitalist system, there are indications that this would involve introducing programs or courses on the region.[41] Of these countries, Vietnam is several steps ahead institutionally speaking, with the founding of its Institute for Southeast Asian Studies in 1973. The war against the Americans and the subsequent attempts by the latter to isolate Vietnam from the rest of the world, however, put a limit to what this institute could do. This, however, has changed at present and the prospects for Vietnam leading the renewed interest in Southeast Asia in Indochina are quite positive. [42]

The second impulse comes from "civil society" groups and governments that are increasingly concerned with problems whose

resolution is transnational. Ecological and environmental problems, human rights and religious politics are just some of the concerns that drew attention of state and anti-state forces. This has led to, among other things, increased attention by alliances like the ASEAN to understanding and dealing with them. With the return of a security angle in the "war against terrorism," there is more bases for further cooperation.

Much closer "solidarity" networking among civil society forces all over the region has become the imperative to deal with the same issues. Non-government organizations (NGOs) and people's organizations (POs) from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand have come together to share experiences on how to handle the state, ecological problems and promote community-based development. They also became closely involved with each other in dealing with regional problems. The Asia Pacific Conference on East Timor (APCET) that Southeast Asian NGOs and POs set up in support of Timorese independence was one classic example of this regional solidarity.[43] These collaborations have inevitably drawn scholarly interest, made easy by the fact that many academics are themselves involved in these social problems.

Already there are academic movements aimed at promoting this rejuvenated perspective. The Toyota Foundation-supported Southeast Asian Studies Regional Exchange Program network continues to make its mark among the participating universities, and efforts by Singaporean academics, American-funded Southeast-Asia based fellowship programs, and Japanese foundations to promote a "We Asians" dialogue have created more opportunities for Southeast Asian intellectuals to discuss how to develop further this regional perspective.[44] But there are dangers: this "feel good" mentality could also breed a misplaced "we Southeast Asians versus them of the West" sentiment which could undermine or make a caricature of the cosmopolitanism inherent in Southeast Asian studies. Moreover, this sentiment could also hide the major institutional and resource discrepancies between nations.[45] The optimism over the possibilities of going beyond national perspectives into a regional one, and enriching inter-country

comparison alongside national focus, however, is still dominant. It is this enthusiasm that the spread of "Southeast Asian studies" in Southeast Asia will most likely build on.

But this perhaps may not last long. For already, the contagion of cultural studies is beginning to infect the "traditional disciplines" in each country, spurred in part by the growing curiosity of the humanities on the universal claims and theoretical assertions of the social sciences, and the attempts to transcend the confining borders of the disciplines.[46] Post-structural and post-colonial scholarship is making its way into Southeast Asia, posing as both a positive addition to this renewed curiosity of the region, but also imperiling – by the sheer energy of its interrogation – the idea that there is indeed a Southeast Asia.

Notes

1 By reasons of professional training and limited knowledge, this essay will mainly confine itself to the social sciences. Its tendency to focus on the Philippines and Malaysia has also something to do with my training as well as that of my partner, Donna J. Amoroso, a historian of colonial and early post-colonial Malaysia.

2 Benedict R. Anderson, "The Changing Ecology of Southeast Asian Studies in the United States, 1950-1990," in *Southeast Asian Studies in the Balance: Reflections from America* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Association for Asian Studies, 1992), 26.

3 Anderson, "The Changing Ecology of Southeast Asian Studies in the United States, 1950-1990," 26-27.

4 One gets a sense of this mutual distrust in Anne L. Foster, "Alienation and Cooperation: European, Southeast Asian and American Perceptions of Anti-Colonial Rebellion, 1919-1937," Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1995

5 J.S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948).

6 *The Japanese in Colonial Southeast Asia*, Saya Shiraishi and Takashi Shiraishi, eds. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Translation Series, Volume III). See in particular the introduction by the editors and the essay of Hajime Shimizu, "Southeast Asia as a Regional Concept in Modern Japan: An Analysis of Geography Textbooks," 27-30.

7 Shiraishi and Shiraishi *The Japanese in Colonial Southeast Asia*, 14-15.

8 Ken'ichi Goto, "Cooperation, Submission, and Resistance of Indigenous Elites of Southeast Asia in the Wartime Empire," in *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945,* Peter Duus, Ramon Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), 274-277.

9 See Jose Rizal, *Noli Me Tangere*, as translated by Ma. Soledad Lacson-Locsin (Manila: Bookmark, 1966); and Raden Adjeng Kartini, *Letters of a Javanese Princess* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1964). This kind of "awakening" was not unique to Kartini. Indonesian Arabs were likewise evolving their own identity by the early 1900s. See Natalie Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening: Community and Identity in the Netherlands East Indies, 1900-1942* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1999).

10 Benedict Anderson, *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World* (London: Verso, 1998), 2. On Rizal's nationalist imaginings, see Caroline S. Hau, *Necessary Fictions: Philippine Literature and the Nation, 1946-1980* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000), 48-93. Rizal was not alone. Mabini himself

was aware of the region (which he called "Oceania"), while Isabelo de los Reyes wrote his studies on Filipino "folklore" conscious of the world beyond the colony. On de los Reyes, see Benedict Anderson, "The Rooster's Egg: Pioneering World Folklore in the Philippines," *New Left Review* 2 (March-April 2000), 47-62.

11 See Phan Boi Chau, *Overturned Chariot: The Autobiography of Phan Boi Chau* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999); David G. Marr, *Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885-1925* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), 98-119; William J. Duiker, *Ho Chi Minh* (New York: Hyperion, 2000), 46-104; Rudolf Mrazek, "Tan Malaka: A Political Personality's Structure of Experience," *Indonesia* 14 (October 1972), 1-47.

12 Duiker, *Ho Chi Minh*, 149-167; Rudolf Mrazek, "Tan Malaka: A Political Personality's Structure of Experience," *Indonesia* 14 (October 1972), 1-47.

13 The provenance of "Southeast Asia" was military: this was how the British Far East Command divided the Asian region into different spheres of operations during World War II.

14 Charles Hirschman, "Southeast Asian Studies in American Universities," in *Southeast Asian Studies in the Balance*, 43.

15 See the academic and political autobiography of Benedict Anderson, *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), 1-13; and, George McTurnan Kahin, *Southeast Asia: A Testament* (New York: Routledge and Curzon, 2002)

16 Anderson, "The Changing Ecology of Southeast Asian Studies in the United States, 1950-1990," 29.

17 Hircschman, "Southeast Asian Studies in American Universities," 45.

18 O.W. Wolters, *History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1999); George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952); George McTurnan Kahin, *Intervention: How American became involved in Vietnam* (New York: 1987); Benedict Anderson, *The Spectre of Comparisons*; James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976); and James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985).

19 Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, 12th Report, 1999-2001, 2.

20 Kiichi Fujiwara, "Philippine Studies in Japan," *Philippine Studies Newsletter* 24: 2-3 (June-October 1996): 24. Fujiwara refers here to the inordinate concern by Japanese historians of religious, local and indigenous community histories.

21 See, for example, Tsubouchi Yoshihiro, *One Malay Village: A Thirty-Year Community Study* (Kyoto, Japan: Kyoto University Press and Trans Pacific Press, 2001).

22 The University of Malaya was established only in October 1949

23 A sampling of the leading historical works in Malaysia and the Philippines is indicative of this inclination. For Malaysia: Cheah Boon Khen, "The Erosion of Ideological Hegemony and Royal Power and the Rise of Postwar Malay Nationalism, 1945-1946," *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 19, 1 (March 1998); Khon Kim Hong, *Merdeka: British Rule and the Struggle for Independence in Malaya, 1945-1957* (Selangor, Malaysia: Institute for Social Analysis, 1984); Khoo Kay Kim, *The Western Malay States* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1972); Ishak bin Tadin, "Dato Onn and Malay Nationalism, 1946-1951," *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 1, 1 (March 1960): 56-88. On the Philippines, see Teodoro Agoncillo, *Revolt of the Masses: The Story of Bonifacio and the Katipunan* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1956); Teodoro Agoncillo, *Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1960; Renato Constantino, *The Philippines: A Past Revisited* (Quezon City: Renato Constantino, 1974); Letizia Constantino and Renato Constantino, *The Philippines: A Continuing Past* (Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1978); Cesar Abid Majul, *The Political and Constitutional Ideas of the Philippine Revolution* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press,1996); Cesar Abid Majul, *Mabini and the Philippine Revolution* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1960)

24 The University of Chicago's Anthropology Department supported for a while a Philippine Studies Program.

25 Jose Eliseo Rocamora, "Nationalism in Search of an Ideology: Indonesia's Nationalist Party, 1945-1965," Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1974.

26 See the collection of his past essays in Wang Gungwu, *A Short History of the Nanyang Chinese* (Singapore: Donald Moore-Eastern Universities Press, 1959).

27 See the list of sources and further readings in Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, *A History of Malaysia* (London: Palgrave, 2001).

28 Among the notable were the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore (established 1968) and the Indonesian Centre for Strategic Studies (established 1971).

29 Wolters, *History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives*; Robert Elson, "International Commerce, the State and Society: Economic and Social Change," in *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia,* Nicholas Tarling, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 131-196; and Robert S. Wicks, *Money, Markets and Trade in Early Southeast Asia* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1992).

30 There has yet to be a comprehensive study of smuggling in Southeast Asia. Hints of this resilient informal economy, however, can be found in Alfred W. McCoy, *The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Trade* (New York: Lawrence Hill, 1991), 283+.

31 The nation-state would also exclude the stories of those who opposed its formation, especially those who joined the communist movement or the more radical of the anti-colonial movement whose continued presence in the political arena after independence threatened the hegemony of the faction in power. These excluded stories are only slowly coming out now in the form of political memoirs. See Said Zahari, *Dark Clouds at Dawn: A Political Memoir* (Kuala Lumpur: Insan, 2001); *Comet in our Sky: Lim Chin Siong in History*, Tan Jung Quee and Jomo K.S., eds. (Kuala Lumpur: Insan, 2001); Jose Y. Dalisay, *The Lavas: A Filipino Family* (Pasig City: Anvil, 1999); *Sa Tungki ng Ilong ng Kaaway: Talambuhay ni Tatang* (Manila: Linang, 1988); and the essays of Vina Lanzona, Alfred W. McCoy, Brian Fegan, Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet and Rosanne Rutten, in the collection *Lives at the Margins: Biography of Filipinos, Obscure, Ordinary and Heroic*, Alfred W. McCoy, ed. (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000

32 On these anxieties, see *Weighing the Balance: Southeast Asian Studies Ten Years After* (New York City: Social Science Research Council, 1999).

33 Australian scholar Mark Turner suggests that of the Australian universities with Southeast Asian programs, only the Australian National University may survive. Conversation with author, October 2002, Cebu City. In Europe, Southeast Asian scholars are linked to institutions that have broader area coverage like the Institute of Social Studies in the Netherlands.

34 Takashi Shiraishi, *The Making of a Region: How to Think about East Asia* (Japan: Chuko Shinsho, 2000); and Narifumi Tachimoto, *Area Studies Methodologies* (Japan: Kyoto University Press, 1999) These works, however, suffer from being too limited to a Japanese audience. There is little attempt from Southeast Asia to translate these works, unlike the inordinate concern given to reproducing and translating the writings of Southeast Asianists from the West. But there are exceptions like Kunio Yoshihara, *Building a Prosperous Southeast Asia* (England: Curzon Press, 1999).

35 See the following: Reynaldo Ileto, *Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979); Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994); and, Kasian Tejapira, *Commodifying Marxism: The Formation of Modern Thai Radical Culture, 1927-1958* (Kyoto: Kyoto University Press, 2001).

36 These include: Benedict Anderson, "Majorities and Minorities," in *Spectre of Comparison*, 318-332; Geoffrey Robinson, "*Rawan* is as *Rawan* Does: The Origins of Disorder in New Order Aceh," in *Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia*, Benedict R.O'G. Anderson, ed. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 2001), 213-242; Geoffrey

Robinson, "The Fruitless Search for a Smoking Gun: Tracing the Origins of Violence in East Timor," in *Roots of Violence in Indonesia*, Freek Colombjin and J. Thomas Lindblad, eds. (The Netherlands: KITLV Press, 2002), 243-276; Marites Danguilan Vitug and Glenda Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao* (Quezon City: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs and Institute for Popular Democracy, 2000); W.K. Che Man, *Muslim Separatism: The Moros of the Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1990); Martin Smith, *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity* (London: Zed Press, 1991).

37 The term "goodness of nations" is from Anderson, *The Spectre of Comparison*, 360-368.

38 Frederick Deyo, The Political Economy of New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); and, City States in the Global Economy: Industrial Restructuring in Hong Kong and Singapore, Stephen W.K. Chiu et. al., eds. (Boulder: Westview, 1997);

39 In the case of the Filipino labor diaspora, see *Filipinos in Global Migrations: At Home in the World?* Filomeno Aguilar, ed. (Manila: Philippine Migration Research Network and the Philippine Social Science Council, 2002).

40 Hong Lysa, "Southeast Asian Studies, National University of Singapore," *Southeast Asian Studies Bulletin*, 2, 99 (October-November 1999): 31.

41 See the reports of participants from various Asian universities with Southeast Asian studies in their curricula in the Conference-Workshop on "Southeast Asian Studies in Asia: An Assessment towards a Collaborative Action Plan," University of the Philippines, January 8-10, 2002.

42 Check the website: www.iias.nl/iiasn/iiasn7/southeast/vietnam.html

43 I thank Malaysian scholar and activist Sumit Mandal for this information.

44 *'We Asians': Between Past and Future*, Kwok Kian-Woon et. al., eds. (Singapore: Japan Foundation Asian Center, National Archives of Singapore and Singapore Heritage Society. 2000); *Asianizing Asia: Reflexivity, History and Identity: First Annual Conference of the Asia Fellows Program* (Bangkok" ASIA Fellows Program, Institute of International Education, 2001). See also the various topics covered by SEASREP's *Southeast Asian Studies Bulletin.*

45 Conference-Workshop on "Southeast Asian Studies in Asia: An Assessment towards a Collaborative Action Plan," University of the Philippines, January 8-10, 2002.

46 An example is Caroline S. Hau, "The 'Cultural' and 'Linguistic' Turns in the Writing of Philippine History," in *Journal of Commonwealth and Postcolonial Studies* 7, 2 (Fall 2000): 89-122.