THE ENCOMIENDA IN EARLY PHILIPPINE COLONIAL HISTORY

by

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Immediately the conquest had ended there appeared in the colonization (of conquered territories and peoples) the need to apportion lands and Indians, as a reward to the most vigorous conquistadores. The Indian was the essential element in the work of the land and of the mines. From this subjection of the indigene to the Spaniard was born the institution we know by the name encomienda.¹

Introduction

One of the dilemmas of early Spanish expansion into the Indies was that of securing Indian labour sufficient to support those colonies, while ensuring to the Indians basic human rights. No royal commission, empowered to investigate and advise on Spanish-Indian relationships, was ever fully convinced of the legality (much less the morality) of the encomienda and repartimiento for ordering native labour. At the same time, these or similar commissions could never escape the fact that Spanish settlement in and exploitation of the Americas was untenable without native labour.
The *encomienda* system, which had its roots in Spain of the *Reconquista*, as a policy of rewarding meritorious crown servants in the colonies, attempted to reconcile labour needs with Indian justice. It takes no special gifts of observation or argument to realise that where the need for native labour was acute, and instruments for the protection of natives inefficient and unpopular, these various ends were in continual and fundamental conflict.

*Encomienda*, which began in the American colonies soon after permanent Spanish settlement, was scarcely distinguishable at that time from *repartimiento*. Both were, in their earliest days, irregular systems for extracting labour, alluvial gold and some local native production from contacted Indian peoples. While to some extent the *repartimiento* remained an irregular system, subject to great variation according to local circumstance, the *encomienda*, as formally established under Governor Ovando (Hispaniola, 1502-9), always took the form that was to characterize it throughout Spain's colonial exploits for the next century.

The crown's attitude regarding *encomienda* vassillated, owing to the institution's dubious legality. This attitude is best manifested by the crown's indecision regarding the Laws of Burgos (1521) and the New Laws (1542). Under the latter code, the crown moved, however hesitantly, to abolish *encomienda*; a move which meeting anguished cries and threatened rebellion in the Americas, was quickly modified in subsequent rulings. Despite its vassillation and strong opinion in favor of *encomienda*; the crown, under Emperor Charles V, proceeded to slowly phase out the institution. Historians noted that:

Royal enactments after the mid-1540's abandoned the effort to terminate *encomienda* in any immediate or overall way. Crown policy was now dedicated instead to more attainable goals: control over existing *encomiendas*, the limitation of encomendero behaviour, and the gradual reduction of *encomienda* so that it might no longer threaten monarchical rule. In law, and to a large extent in practice, the mid 1540's represent the highest point of encomendero influence.

Although various crown cedulas or decrees were not without effect to the phasing out of the *encomienda*, the eventual demise of the system was due to other causes: the sudden and catastrophic decline in indigenous populations and the partial redirection of colonial economies due to the chaos of conquest and the exigencies of immediate need. The atrophy of *encomienda* was earliest and most complete on long-established provinces and towns. Conversely, the system continued to function far longer in frontier areas and in specialized economic situations.

In the Philippines, *encomienda* was maintained until the middle of the seventeenth century. The situation remained the same save that there was a slightly higher proportion of royal than private grants during the latter half of the century.
To a great extent the resilience of *encomienda* in the Philippines was due to the frontier nature of the colony. Because the Philippines was a tenuous foothold in the East — in the face of Dutch, English, Muslim, Malay and Chinese assaults, successive Spanish kings allowed *encomiendas* to survive as valuable and inexpensive tools of Iberian imperialism. Moreover, the special geographic and economic characteristics of the colony ensured that *encomenderos* in the Philippines would never assume the stature and political power that they had in the Americas.

Under these circumstances, happy ones for the crown, *encomienda* flourished in the colony and was only finally undercut in the second half of the seventeenth century as the military situation in the region made anachronistic the tactical value of the system.

*Encomienda* was the earliest and, for half a century, the most important system in the Spanish Philippines for the ordering of Filipino society and labour. *Encomenderos* were, in most islands outside of Luzon, the cutting edge of Spanish expansion, and the institution was an important source both of crown revenues and of information concerning native peoples. Because *encomienda* was established as early as 1572, and did not begin to decline for another century, it remains one of the few constant sources of data for early Philippine colonial history.

In spite of these several significant features, *encomienda* in the Philippines has been neglected by historians. Such studies as do exist have relied almost exclusively upon documents translated by Emma Blair and James Robertson in their 55 volume series, *The Philippine Islands, 1491-1899* (Cleveland, 1904). Without undue prejudice to the singular accomplishments of Blair and Robertson, it is necessary to warn future researchers that their work is hardly the last word on the colonial history of the Philippines.

This is particularly true of so ubiquitous a legal concept and institution as *encomienda*. Several bundles of documents (*legajos*) pertaining exclusively to private *encomienda* grants in the Philippines, housed in the *Archivo General de las Indias* (AGI) in Seville, are never mentioned in the Blair and Robertson texts. In those *legajos* (Section *Audiencia de Filipinas*, or F., *legajos* 47-51: “Confirmaciones de Encomiendas de Indias”), there is a wealth of data on *encomienda* assignments, including the names and ranks of offices of grantees, their backgrounds and services to the crown. Similar grants and supportive documents are scattered throughout letters and reports in *secciones Filipinas*, *Real Patronato* and *Contaduría*. The institution supported a diffused and prodigious correspondence.

Although it cannot be said that *encomienda* was inevitably a destructive or exploitative institution insofar as natives were concerned, it is significant that the
most important early investigation of *encomienda* should have occurred on a royal grant. This investigation was prompted by the complaints of natives, through their Augustinian friar, against a royal tax collector, Francisco Salgado. For the crown, this investigation was disquieting, as it was widely thought that royal grants in comparison to private grants were less oppressive of native peoples.

**Abuses of Encomienda**

The first formal grants of *encomienda* in the Philippines were made by the Adelantado Miguel Lopez de Legazpi in 1572. Legazpi was empowered at that time to recommend all the islands in *encomienda* to meritorious grantees—mainly military officers—reserving one-third of all grants to the crown. In 1573, Adelantados were given the right to choose an *encomienda* near each Spanish settlement. This was a right never enjoyed by Legazpi, who died in 1572; but subsequent Governors-General commonly abused their rights.

There is no doubt that *encomienda*, particularly the tribute system as it operated in the Philippines, inflicted considerable hardship on the native population. Tribute payments, which was often the root cause for abuses, could take the form of gold, pearls, wax, cotton cloth or mantas (especially in Ilocos), occasionally salt, agricultural products and labour. Among Filipino peoples whose economic activities were typically limited to fulfilling immediate needs, the necessity to comply with the often limitless wants of the *encomendero* and his retainers was onerous. To some extent, this was inevitable, regardless of the intentions of the *encomendero*.

Even on crown grants, abuses of native peoples were sometimes rife. In examining some of these abuses, I will rely on an investigation of a royal tax collector in Ilocos province late in the sixteenth century. By looking closely at the investigation of the Alferez Francisco Salgado in 1597, some insights can be gained into the functioning of the *encomienda* in the Philippines and the nature of interactions between Spaniards and Filipinos.

The importance of the Salgado investigation may be attributed to its early date, the length of the testimony (extraordinary for the Philippines at this time where paper was at a premium), and the complexity and conciseness of the charges made. That various and often ingenious abuses of Filipinos took place in the collection of tribute is well-established from reports which pre-date the Salgado incident. But for the most part, these charges emanated from the ecclesiastics whose biases, if consistent, were also legion. Moreso, accusations were usually general in nature, unlike the specific charges levelled at Salgado by named *principales* of several Ilocano villages. In this regard, the investigation of 1597 is unique in the early history of the colony.
ENCOMIENDA IN EARLY . . .

The Salgado Document

The Salgado document begins with the following introduction:

Charges that Bernardo de Ajiar, Visitador of this province of Ilocos, placed against the Alférez Francisco Salgado, tax collector in the years 1594 and 1595 of tributes that pertained to your Majesty, from the natives of the valleys and villages of Bataque and Ilagua and one from the valley and village of Dingulas that is of your Majesty and Captain Antonio Rodriguez Pacon: about the molestation and aggravations that the above mentioned caused to the Indians in the said collections and assessments; and about other things contained in the investigations of the said visita.¹⁴

The document is organized into a series of four charges. These charges were followed by testimonies of Filipinos, variations on the basic charge, and later by the restitution charged upon Salgado.

*First Charge.*

That the tribute was to be only three tostones (coin worth one-half of a Mexican peso) complete, or its value in local production. If a chicken was given in addition to money or cloth, half the value of the tribute was to be returned.

Several principales from Ilagua (Ilagua) testified that Salgado had charged them one chicken each in addition to the regular tribute. This, it was claimed, caused "much damage and loss to their wealth."

With regard to the first charge, Salgado, during sentencing, was ordered to pay restitution to ten villages, between three hundred to two thousand chickens to each.

*Second Charge.*

Tributo was not to be charged of natives who had left the village. Several principales of Ilagua testified that Salgado forced them to pay tribute for their kinsmen ("being of his barangay") who had fled to other encomiendas or died. In one case the number of such tributes was given as seventeen, and each principal was made to pay "against his will."

Salgado was later required to pay back these tributes to each principal.

*Principal (plural) principales; principalia the collective or generic term) meant important or principal members of native society. Generally, it has been thought that this term applied only to incumbent and former village officials (the cabezas de barangays and gobernadorcillos), but recent work has challenged this closed definition. See especially N.G. Owen, The Principalia in Philippine History Kalsikolan, 1790-1898. (1973, unpublished MS).
Third Charge.

That after the normal collection of tribute Salgado made a further assessment and forced purchase (derrama y vendala) of rice, which he charged to the village of Ilagua and others. Furthermore, several natives of these villages were required to transport the rice so collected to the port of Currimao (on the coast of Ilocos, approximately half-way between Vigan and Bangui). They were paid neither for the journey to Currimao nor the return.

Restitution included pay of forty pesos and six tomínes of coarse gold to each porter on the journey to Currimao, and a rice ration for each day. Rice taken from villages under improper assessments was to be returned or redeemed in gold or silver.

Fourth Charge.

That the actions of Salgado — in gaoling and verbally abusing principales who resisted paying tributes for kinsmen who had died or fled the barangay, for using natives as unpaid porters and generally molesting the people to extract greater tribute — caused an exodus away from crown encomiendas. “The said natives are fleeing and leaving the said villages and valleys of Your Majesty... for private encomiendas...”

For this encompassing charge, Salgado was fined one hundred pesos of coarse gold “for aid for the Chamber of Your Majesty, and expenses of the Court of Justice and in the costs of this trial.”

Two points are of special interest in the wording of this charge. First, it is evident that the principales of Ylagua paid the tribute, in contrast with the usual policy of principalc exemption. Given the relatively early date of this investigation, it is possible that the idea of exemption had not yet been fully worked out; that is, decisions about who was a principal, and whether or not all were exempt. In the case of only one plaintiff was the principal described as a representative of his clan or barangay.

Second, there was an obvious unity of outlook and purpose among Filipino villagers and their principales. The long and incompletely realized process of cooperation of the principales had not apparently affected Ilocos by the late sixteenth century.

Persistence of Encomienda

There is no doubt that the Spanish kings and the Council of the Indies were well aware of the occasional excesses of encomenderos and royal tax collectors, and only the most cynical would contend that this knowledge did not weigh on
the monarchial conscience. But against this must be weighed the undoubted benefits which accrued to the crown from the perpetuation of the system. Royal tribute revenues from the Philippines were a mere pittance compared to expenditures and could never be compared to the value of silver shipments from the Americas on the Carrera de Indias. The colony was never a paying proposition; a subsidy or situado from the Viceroyalty of New Spain was annually remitted to the Philippines to keep it operating.15

The value of private encomiendas was in its hispanising and strategic roles. First, the crown viewed the encomienda as a tool for civilizing the Filipino peoples, providing for their religious instruction, securing them from external aggression and teaching them useful social and work habits through the imposition of a tribute-tax, the suppression of native religious forms and the introduction of Castilian juridical principles.

Second, the ability to grant or withhold encomiendas provided the crown and its agents with a powerful instrument for maintaining control and discipline in the Islands. Royal control thousands of miles from Spain was tenuous under the best of circumstances, as events in Peru early in the sixteenth century had shown,16 and the Philippines was no exception.17 Encomiendas were used to reward the loyal and long-serving, as well as to recognize and perpetuate Spanish class distinctions in Asia.18

Third, the private encomienda was, for the crown, a cheap and efficient means of expanding Spanish colonial rule. Encomenderos were charged with the task of pacifying natives on their grants; and, since grants were often assigned in areas termed unexplored or hostile, pacification naturally extended the colony’s frontiers. In some cases, expansion was premature and unconsolidated, always in areas of marginal Spanish control.19 But so long as there was some prospect of further expansion, private encomienda remained a viable strategic policy of the crown. Records of private encomienda grants during the first half of the seventeenth century bear this out.

Noting a drop in private encomienda incomes between 1621 and 1655, J.L. Phelan theorized that although “the exact date of the abolition of the private encomienda is not certain... its decline began between 1621 and 1655.”20 Using only two sets of figures three decades apart to remark on the trends of an institution hardly inspires confidence, even were other totals for intervening years to corroborate this conclusion.

The problem is that fluctuation in tributo figures does not correspond in any direct way to a rise or decline in the encomienda system.21 The figures Phelan used refer only to trubutarios — that is, to population — and not the number of encomiendas assigned. There is some, admittedly sketchy, evidence which sug-
suggest that the native population of the Philippines underwent a gradual decline in the first half of the seventeenth century;\(^2\) hence, although the number of private encomiendas remained largely unchanged, the average size of those grants declined.

Table I suggests that private encomienda grants did not begin to decline sharply until the 1650's.

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Other documents present a somewhat confusing picture of the relationship between crown and private encomiendas in the middle two quarters of the seventeenth century. One report of 1651 suggests that most of the private grants which were vacated (usually by death) in the years 1636-1650 reverted to the crown.\(^2\) But the division of private/crown grants in 1655,\(^2\) measured by tribute income totals, approximated the 2:1 ratio originally charged upon Legazpi in 1572.\(^2\)

The geographic distribution of the grants reveals the main reason for the longevity of private encomienda in the Philippines. If a distinction is made between those islands and provinces which were firmly controlled by the colonial government and those frontier regions which were not, a consistent pattern emerges. The government's strength was city based, in Manila, Cebu and Arevalo (Iloilo City); although most of the highly productive provinces adjacent to Manila, in central Luzon, were also effectively controlled from an early date. Encomienda grants in these areas became increasingly concentrated in the hands of the crown.
On the frontiers of Spanish control in the Visayas outside Cebu and Arevalo and Spanish Mindanao, private *encomienda* were regularly reassigned late in the seventeenth century.26

Between 1636 and 1650, 65% of vacant private grants reverting to the crown were in areas in or near Luzon. A much smaller percentage (35%) reverted to the crown in marginal regions.27 Figures for 1655 indicate that, in Luzon, royal tribute incomes exceeded private (34,000 to 26,000 *tributarios*), but that, outside Luzon, private incomes far exceeded royal (35,000 to 13,000). A discrepancy of this magnitude on the colony's frontier cannot be explained by population alone. There was no decline in the number of private encomiendas in the country during this period. The point is clear. Private *encomiendas* were purposely concentrated on the frontiers where their continuing military role was deemed necessary.

**Atrophy of the Private Encomienda**

An unmistakable move from private to crown grants began only in the early 1660s, and it is tempting to relate this transition to changes in the broader military conditions of the colony. In 1661 and 1662, the threat of invasion by a Chinese pirate, Koxinga, resulted in a precipitate Spanish withdrawal from outposts in the Moluccas, Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago and small southern Visayan islands.28 By mid-1662, the military perimeter of the colony encompassed only Luzon and the larger Visayan islands. Since these were the very islands which had experienced nearly a century of Spanish penetration and, to one extent or another, rule, the military role of the private *encomienda* suddenly became anachronistic. Moreover, withdrawal from the south, in any case, meant a far greater secular and military commitment to what possessions remained. As a consequence, the private *encomienda* quickly became a moribund institution after 1662.

**Conclusion**

*Encomienda* in the Philippines pursued different though complementary goals: to reward soldiers for long, faithful or hazardous service to the crown and to expand Spanish control through grants on the colony's frontiers. In both cases, the crown met with only moderate success. There were never enough *encomiendas* to satisfy all claimants, and grantees were usually interested in pacifying their native wards only insofar as was necessary for the extraction of tribute.

The crown impulse toward the approximation of justice for "Indians", could not easily be reconciled with *encomienda*. The abuses of Francisco Salgado as tax collector on a royal grant showed that however much the King and his Council of the Indies tried to mitigate the worst features of *encomienda*, there was ample room for excesses. As the galleon trade in Manila siphoned off Spanish energies from the rural sector, the military value of that system on the colony's frontiers was its most important reason for existence. With the Spanish pullback from the
south in 1662, the military value of encomienda was finally and completely undercut. Thereafter the qualms which the crown always entertained regarding encomienda were quickly translated into a policy of studied neglect. Private encomienda atrophied in favour of more benign and, for the crown, more profitable royal grants.

FOOTNOTES

1Gonzalez Pomes, Maria Isabel, “La encomienda, indigena en Chile durante el siglo xvii,” Historia, V, 7-103-7.


3In theory the tributo levied on natives through the encomienda system was to be paid in gold or silver or an equivalent value in agricultural products, local specialities — such as wax, pearls, cloth or salt — or domestic animals. However, where agricultural yields were low, or dislocations and crop destruction — due to native resistance, civil war or natural disaster — made in-kind payment difficult, tribute in labour was widely accepted, even preferred by encomenderos.


7Private ecomiendas, as the name implies, were granted to private citizens, not crown employees. In the Philippines these citizens were nearly always soldiers of the rank of Sargento-mayor and above. Royal grants were retained by the crown for their revenues, and were ran by appointed tax collectors.

8The standard citation used for references to documents in the Archivo General de Indias (AGI) is by section, legajo, and, whenever possible, by a more full explication of letter number (carta or simply c.) and its date, author and destination. Hence all full citation might appear as follows: AGI, F.6... c. 12 (1567, from Miguel Lopez de Legazpi to the King).

9See, for example, AGI, F.38, 39, 41, 42, 76, 347, 348, and 371; and RP (Real Patronato) 25 and 52. Documents in these bundles deal, among other things, with encomienda grants, notices of vacancies in private grants, and population and revenue reports taken from encomendero records.

11Collection de Documentos ineditos relativos al descubrimientos conquista y coloni- 
zacion de las posesiones españoles en America y Oceania. 42 vols. (Madrid, 1864-84). XVI, 
p. 160.

12AGI. F. 59, file titled “Cargas contra el Cobrador Francisco Salgado.” Despite the 
seriousness of the charges — and the tenor of the document makes it obvious that the investiga-
tion was more a litany of freely admitted illegalities than a trial of guilt or innocence — Salgado 
appears not to have suffered unduly thereby. In 1606 Salgado was described as “Captain 
y cabo” of the province of Cebu, and was being investigated concerning irregularities in the 
procurement of good for an expedition against Mindanao. Two years later Salgado was back 
in Ilocos, this time as deputy to the alcalde mayor of the province, and being censured for his 
poor planning and lack of courage in an expedition in the mountainous Cordillera. In 1691 he 
appears as a Captain, requesting an encomienda in recognition of his “merits and services.” 
In papers accompanying and supporting this request, it is reported that Salgado had fought 
bandits while serving as alcalded mayor of Batangas province at the beginning of the seventeenth 
century. See AGI, F. 59, and F. 47, 1619.


14This is as close rendering of the Castillian as is possible without sacrificing intended 
meaning to a more strict translation. The scribe or escribano responsible for drafting the docu-
ment, while certainly not illiterate, had a less than desirable grasp of spelling and elementary 
punctuation; and this even by the rather more loose literary standards of the day. Castilian 
legalese was turgid enough without stylistic problems of these kinds. Fortunately the escriba-
no’s script is, with few and minor exceptions, easily legible, and the document has weathered 
the last four centuries well.

15L.E. Banzon, “Mexican Financial Aid: The Situado.” Philippine Historical Review, 
IV, 68-96.

and V.

17AGI, F.6, c.5 (23 July 1567, from Legazpi to the King).

18The relative political impotence of encomenderos in the Philippines was a factor 
influencing the crown to allow the system to remain largely unchaned until the mid-seven-
teenth century. There were several reasons for the weakness of encomenderos, aside from the 
increasing severity of crown restrictions on encomendero behaviour. First, there was consid-
erable competition among Spaniards for the few grants available. This, when combined with 
the fact that grantees was geographically dispersed, militated against the development of 
encomendero consciousness or sense of united purpose. Second, grantees in the Philippines 
were never able to amass personal fortunes from their grants. This is not to say that many 
did not try, but the unfamiliarity of South-East Asian crops and the lack of profitable local 
or international markets worked against the accumulation of private fortunes. Large-scale 
private trade with Chinese merchants and speculation in the Manila galleon commerce undercut 
any incipient demand for Filiphero agricultural production or manufactures.

19For example, Muslim Jolo was granted encomienda in 1629 after a successful 
Spanish expedition there. It took less than a year for the Joloanos to drive out the Spaniards, 
and repeated attempts to subjugate the island failed. AGI, F.50 (grant of encomienda to Gonzal-
do Martin).


21The most useful encomienda reports prior to the keeping of regular records in 1616
are confined to aggregate numbers of Filipinos affected (tributarios), listed by province or less commonly by village. See, for example, tributario lists for the following years: 1591 (AGI, F.79), 1601 (AGI, F.7, c.22), 1606 (AGI, F.29, c.142), 1630 (Consejo de Indias, "Extracto historico del expediente que pende en el Consejo Real . . . Sobre la forma en que se ha de hacer, y continuar el Comercio . . . (Madrid, 1736, folios 222-222 vuelto; and 1655 (F.22, c.64). These figures provide the basis for most later speculation about population size and trends in the colony's early history.

22Compare figures for 1606 (AGI, F.29, c.142) with those of 1630 (Consejo de Indias, 1736, folios 222-222 vuelto and 1655 (AGI, F.22, c.64). See also D.G.E. Ha., A History of South-East Asia, 3rd. ed. (London, 1970), p. 252: "Starvation and disease took so heavy a toll in lives that the population under Spanish control declined appreciably. When peace returned after the Treaty of Munster in 1648, ending the Hispano-Dutch war in the East, however, the pressure on the Filipino was relaxed, and the population curve began to move upwards."

23 AGI, F.43, c.10.

24 This ratio was earliest exceeded, in favor of private grants. See AGI, f.7, c.89 (17 August 1608 from the Governor-General to the King), and Blair and Robertson, IX, pp. 85-119 (1594), when the ration of private to crown grants was in each case about 2.5/1.

25 AGI, F.43, c.10.

26 The Visayas were settled first by Spaniards under Legazpi in the period 1565-1571, but by the turn of the seventeenth century colonial control was under severe and constant challenge from the Dutch and Muslim Malay raiders. In these circumstances these islands must be considered to have been tenuously held, as unconsolidated frontiers in the military sense.

27 AGI, F.22, c.64.

28 AGI, F.201, c.7 (March 1665), and c. fo 12 April 1663; F.9, c. of 13 July 1662; and F.23, c.70 (10 July 1664).