A DIVISIBLE AND GRADUATED PEACE

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Introduction

The task of the peace-maker is said to be to prevent major conflicts from arising among nations and to work for conditions of acceptable peace among nations. Whether inspired by concerns for survival of man or nations or by the Augustinian belief that man by nature strives for a state of peace, conceived as harmony or perfection, the peace-maker seeks to define various ways or means or to devise some schemes or models by which the task can best be accomplished.

History reveals a great many such schemes whose aim was to state conditions that are necessary for the attainment of international stability of peace. Some schemes have been utopian in character while others have been realistic enough, some even greatly affecting both political thought and political reality.

Among the earliest recorded schemes dealing with peace are those that originated in Asian countries roughly 2,300 years ago. Thus the Confucian conception of a universal commonwealth based on morality or goodness or the Legalist concept of a universal imperial state in China and Kautilya's despotic government aiming at universal conquest in India, however short of modern "internationalism", have at least that much in common. In its own peculiar way, each tried to overcome prevailing conflicts among the "warring states" then, ultimately tried to effect universal peace and greater prosperity. It is interesting to note that the three schemes mentioned were not mere utopian ideas but rather practical schemes (with their idea of imposing a universal hegemony on other states) and that they all vastly affected then current and subsequent political thought as well as political actuality both in India and in China.

In modern times, a fresh stimulus to seek rational solutions to problems of peace may be said to have originated in 17th century

Europe with the rise of rationalism.[1] Starting roughly with Grotius' attempt to redefine the universal principles of natural law by reference to human reasoning alone, a great many rational schemes have appeared. The overall effect has been to inject a new element of rationality into the relations among nations, to subject such relations to certain international principles of right.

Some such schemes sought solution to international conflicts in federalism (e.g., the Duke of Sully), yet others in downright universalism (e.g., Emeric Cruce). Among the better known schemes of this period were Rouseau's *Project for Perpetual Peace,* advocating a strong central system of government for Europe, and Kant's *Eternal Peace* reflecting the new liberalism and universalism of the Age of Enlightenment, in favor of free federation of nations. Similar solutions to international conflicts were also manifest in 20th century thought on peace. In one scheme, Bertrand Russell, advocated the total surrendering of sovereignty by nations to one strong world government. In another, John Strachey, another English thinker, advocated a kind of condominium of two super-powers, America and Russia, obviously under the spell of post-World War II political reality.

Every age may be viewed as being influenced in its perceptions of peace by the conditions of international life at that time. If so, our current perceptions of international peace may be said to be shaped by the peculiar experience of the 20th century man. Thus we have been affected in our perceptions of peace by such factors as the conflagration of the two world wars, the recent rivalry between two ideological camps known as the cold war, the enormous advance in modern technology, particularly military technology, and the development of nuclear capacity of certain nations. Suddenly, modern military nuclear technology has come to be seen as having potentially devastating effects on all men and nations, as threatening the very survival of the human race. It is due to these factors that new approaches to solving international conflict situations and ensuring peace had to be developed. Such concepts in the current vocabulary of international politics as "collective security" or "peaceful coexistence" owe their origin exactly to the new conditions of international political life.

[1] See F. S. Northhedge, "Peace, War, and Philosophy" in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (ed. Paul Edward) New York: Macmillan and The Free Press, 1967, Vol. 6.

The near-universally recognized agency for maintaining peace in the contemporary world is the United Nations Organization. It was established after World War II principally in order to maintain peace and to develop conditions favorable to the development of peace. More specifically, as a machinery of peace, it was conceived to accommodate the need for "collective security" mentioned above, to prevent major conflicts among nations from breaking out, to mediate conflicts between disputing parties or nations as well as to encourage activities or development in particular nations that would presumably be conducive to greater general stability among nations — to universal peace. It may be added that the philosophy behind the idea of the U.N.O. as international guardian of peace is as much realistic as it is idealistic. It is idealistic in the sense that behind the U.N.O. there appears an underlying optimism and sentiment in favor of universal peace. It is at the same time realistic, in the sense that conflicts are not regarded as abnormal in relations among men and nations and that the instrument of war has not been abolished from international disputes altogether. Still, not all wars are considered as legitimate, but only wars that are undertaken in behalf of justice, to enforce the rights of man. Moreover certain rules of propriety are insisted on in accordance with which hostilities among nations should be permitted to occur only within certain mutually agreed limits and in good faith.

In the following pages, the authors while freely recognizing the great contribution to peace by the existing U.N. machinery for maintaining peace are looking into ways to improve on the present methods of maintaining peace. As we see it, on the existing peace-keeping arrangement, opportunities for peace can only inadequately be exploited and effective peace-keeping is too often made difficult, if not impossible, in practice. Hence we propose to explore a new direction that would conceivably improve the situation. A more effective approach to peace, however, does not imply merely a critical evaluation of the U.N. machinery or transformation of such a machinery. More than that it implies transformation or a new focusing of man's perceptions of peace. In our exposition we shall briefly consider these two themes. More fully, we shall first throw light on some of the weaknesses as these are reflected in our current perceptions of peace and in the existing U.N. machinery for peace-keeping. Subsequently, we shall suggest possible remedies for such weaknesses, which will lead us to state a new paradigm of peace. This paradigm, it will be shown, implies not

only re-orientation of our perceptions of peace but also certain structural changes in the international machinery for maintaining peace.

Perceptions of Peace

It is submitted that the problem of finding a workable scheme of international peace is difficult to achieve within the context of contemporary political practice. The difficulty partly emanates from a diversity of perceptions of peace. The first such diversity is said to be due to conflicting interests that characterize developing and developed countries.[2]

In developing countries, for example, the perception of peace is shaped by the need of the nation at issue to find stability for its new order at home and recognition as an independent power abroad. These countries are saddled with certain great and fundamental problems on which the very stability, even survival, of the nation depends, such as economic growth, maintenance of law and order within the nation's boundaries, national integration and general social well-being of the citizens, which frequently involve striving after greater social justice and eradication of poverty in the nation. The perception of peace in developing countries is, then, intimately connected with these objectives, that is, peace depends on the solving of the said problems. Hence their frequent worship of modernization and industrialization, their belief in the need of rapid changes in economic, social and political life. The issue of international peace, or of relation *vis-a-vis* other nations, must be perceived primarily in terms of the mentioned domestic concerns.

In developed countries, on the other hand, the perception of peace is colored by the relatively prosperous conditions of social life, the relative stability that prevails there. Under such conditions peace tends to be identified with the *status quo situation* which is judged beneficial to national interest. Thus the developed countries try to freeze the prevailing international conditions as much as possible, to advocate marginal changes, and to look with suspicion on rapid changes of developing nations, presumably hoping in that way to perpetuate conditions most favorable to themselves.

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[2] Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, "Peace Research and Developing Countries," *Journal of Peace Research,* Vol. 4, 1968, Oslo.

It is evident, then, that national perceptions of peace may radically differ depending on the direction in which national interest, so to speak, pulls. Such interests may be complete opposites, such as in case of conflicting economic policies or when the issue of modernization versus *status quo* is raised. Not surprisingly the leaders of certain developing countries (like in Burma and Indonesia) have become convinced that "a lasting and durable world peace remains elusive because of widening gap in income between developed and developing countries." Needless to say, when perceptions of peace differ so widely, they are hard, if not impossible, to reconcile, for they are related to particular experience or outlook of man and are ultimately derived from the more basic difference in social goals and values.

The second diversity in perceptions of peace is of ideological origin. Ideological theories tend to interpret all reality in terms of certain given categories of thought or belief, to suit their own pre-conceived goals. Likewise, the issue of peace must suitably be reinterpreted to fit in with the given ideological assumptions. The ideological dimension of the problem of peace comes out with particular clarity in Marxist theory.

Briefly stated, in Marxist theory the concept of peace is bound up with Marxist historical explanations and with the idea of class struggle as being an inevitable feature of all social life. The Marxist concept of peace contains a historical and a class element.[3] Concretely, peace is a condition of social life that reflects a relative stability of a particular social system at a particular time. There is, e.g., a "bourgeois" kind of peace that characterizes bourgeois societies, a "feudal" peace under favorable conditions of feudalism, etc. Peace as conceived in Marxism is then a relativist concept; there is nothing like a permanent, universal peace possible for the class-ridden society (as Marxism sees it) of today. The term "universal peace" on Marxist theory is thus but an abstract, "formal" idea, strictly outside the scope of the concrete and historical Marxian vocabulary. Lasting peace will be with people only when classes and states, which are the conditions for the origins of war, will have withered away.

Another major obstacle to our finding a workable scheme of international peace is due to a certain vagueness that characterizes our

[3] Karel Kala, "On the Marxist Theory of War and Peace," *Journal of Peace Research,* Vol. 5, 1968, Oslo.

current perceptions of peace. Man simply does not appear to have a distinct enough idea of what peace means in a positive sense. We shall explain this point presently. To start with, we may divide people's responses to peace into negative or positive responses. Galtung, a prominent researcher of peace, speaks in this connection about "negative peace" and "positive peace".[4] We shall take "negative peace" first for this appears the easier of the two to handle. Briefly, negative peace can be defined as the absence of war or of major international conflict situations, in Galtung's phrases, as "the absence of organized forms of violence." We may note that on this definition our perception of peace is essentially a negative perception, i.e., perceiving in terms of what peace is *not* rather than in terms of the conditions that characterize peace as such. Now such a negative perception of peace is open to immediate criticism. It is admittedly, in one sense, the sharpest and the most precise perception, and the most likely to be acceptable to all parties, but, in another sense it is also the most vague for it fails to tell us what peace actually is or what the positive actions or conditions are by which peace can be accomplished.

To put it differently, it establishes a relation between "non-peace" and the various "non-actions" that have led to "non-peace", but not between peace as such and the operations or actions that are positively conducive to peace. There is also another sound criticism of the negative perception of peace. With its sharp contrast between peace and conflict, it appears to have a discouraging effect on all conflicts, and so has a built-in conservative bias. It appears to favor non-disturbance of the *status quo* both at home and in international relations. It tends to advocate law and order solutions. Yet it may be argued that conflicts need not necessarily be bad whether within nations or internationally for the advancement of nations. They may provide a valuable stimulus for conflict-resolutions and so may ultimately advance the cause of peace in the world. In sum, negative perceptions of peace are vague, for they lack in positive content, apart from suffering from a conservative bias.

Positive peace implies not merely the absence of something, but rather the presence of something. This something is a particular state of being which we call peace or, when we perceive it in more

[4] John Galtung, as quoted by Herman Schmid, "Politics and Peace Research," *ibid.*

dynamic ways, particular peace-inducing actions. Now it has been contended (by, e.g., Galtung) that our perception of positive peace has generally been weak and confused, that is both among people concerned with politics and among people at large. This is then taken to imply that such perceptual confusion about peace creates also confusion among people and nations in peace-oriented efforts or actions and so makes any fruitful pursuit of peace in the world difficult, if not impossible, of achieving. We shall develop this point in more detail.

Perceptions of positive peace are, of course, an experience not unfamilar to most men. After all, peace is a good presumably desired by all men and all men appear to have at least some idea about peace in their mind. There is, for instance, most likely to be universal consent on such positive assertions as the idea of peace perceived as the state of perfection or the best state of things. This can in turn be identified with such ideas of perceptions as harmony, order, reason, nature, and similar categories. On this perception, international peace would then be perceived as a state of international harmony. Or on a less elevated level, there is likely to be general consent when the perception of peace is expressed in terms of such ideas as social justice, the good life, common good, human happiness and so.

Yet on reflection it becomes immediately clear that perceptions of this general kind are not satisfactory if our aim is to arrive at sound and clear perceptions that could serve as reliable guides to peace-directed actions. Their main weakness is that they are too abstract, too vague, too static and ultimately lacking in operational reference. They tend to become ineffective when definite actions in behalf of peace are called for. They tend to dissolve our thinking about peace into vague generalities and even to lead to contradictions. To illustrate the last point: if peace means the best state of things, then there should be a great number of different "best states of things" given the heterogeneity of goals and values in the contemporary world, with some contradicting others. In that case our perceptions of peace are likely to lead not to harmony of interests but to the opposite, to disharmony! It is, then, our point that such general perceptions, although not unusual in speculative thought, are not concrete or exact enough whether for purposes of modern empirical political science or for decisions concerning peace in political practice.

Our contention that people's perceptions of peace are on the whole ill-formed and hazy appears to have been borne by recent empirical studies. One study aiming to discover reactions to peace was undertaken by Trond Alvik among school children in Norway.[5] The findings of this study indicate that war is most familiar to children while peace elicits fewer responses among them. In other words, they find it easier to perceive war than to perceive peace. Presumably, here the fault is with us and with the ideas of peace that we project. These are usually general or vague, empty of empirical content, that children (and for that matter adults also) have no clear idea how to actually obtain peace.

The mentioned vagueness of perceptions of positive peace "in the abstract" appears to have yet other undesirable effects. Exactly because of its abstract meaning, positive peace invites subjective interpretations or subjective thinking about peace, and subjective thinking, in its turn, is likely to be influenced by political orientation, i.e., to be open to ideological distortions.[6] Or alternatively, because they do not lend themselves to ready application, efforts at positive peace may be abandoned altogether in favor of negative peace. That is, our inability to define or perceive peace in clear and concrete positive terms may ultimately lead us to fall back on the thought of war — on negative peace, despite the difficulties which negative peace itself may have. Thus distortions and more confusions, more vagueness, may ultimately be the consequence of our positive perceptions of peace in the abstract. Instead of strengthening the cause of peace in the world, our perceptions of peace may, then, unwittingly have a mitigating effect on peace.

Our exposition of diverse perceptions of peace has revealed a lack of basic consensus on the meaning or experience of peace. But this does not imply that our diverse perceptions of peace are worthless or unusable in practice. After all, all the perceptions mentioned do elicit material response of some sort. Our point is merely to show that such responses are not congruent in character, that there is no universal consent on positive peace.

It has also been shown that the lack of consensus on peace may partly be attributed to our current practice to unduly generalize about

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[5] Trond Alvik, "The Development of Views on Conflict, War, and Peace Among School Children," *ibid.*

[6] Helge Hveem, "Foreign Policy Thinking in the Elite and General Population," *ibid.*

peace. It seems that we have reduced our perceptions of peace to largely abstract and static ideas and so have made them difficult to relate to the dynamic reality of the rapidly changing world of today.

Having suggested the principal weaknesses of current perceptions of peace as we see them, we would like briefly to consider the remedies that appear available. The principal remedy, it seems would be to get away from the magic circle of abstraction and vagueness that, as we have suggested, appears to dominate today's perceptions of peace. Concretely, it is submitted that what is needed is the strengthening of our perceptions of positive peace or rather of the positive or empirical content in our perception by making these more concrete, more empirical, operationally more effective.

A certain reorientation in our thought and practice must, it seems, be effected if we are to succeed in our effort of developing a more "real-life" oriented sense of peace. First of all, it is clear that such a realistic approach to peace can never be effected by "feeding" people with mere general ideas about peace or by appeals to abstract rational arguments, as this frequently has been the practice today. Such general ideas are likely to create unreasonable expectations about peace that will remain unrealized in practice. Peace to be real or more lasting must grow out of real experiences of man, must be familiar to man's own personal experience. We should, then, approach peace from the bottom of the ladder of international relations rather than from the top. More specifically, we should concern ourselves first with peace-building, peace-making or peace-keeping on a local or regional level rather than on a "universal" level, as presumably the U.N. aims at, such as through cooperation on regional level in matters of common social, economic and cultural interests, by learning to solve the problems of peace at our doorsteps. In this way the perception of positive peace would in time acquire a new dimension or significance, and neither children of Norway nor adults in other countries would likely be at a loss when asked to say what positive peace means to them.

United Nations Peace-Keeping

The second great obstacle to our finding a workable scheme of international peace has to do with the present-day machinery of peace-keeping organizations. In the present section we shall try to identify this obstacle, suggesting what is "wrong" with today's institutional

peace arrangements or at least what makes such arrangements less effective than they conceivably could be. But first we shall give a brief account of the reasons why such institutional arrangement are needed, to dispell the idea that the world can somehow get along without them. What is ultimately proposed is not getting rid of an international machinery for peace keeping altogether, but rather to transform the structure and some of the assumptions and methods of the existing machinery.

Institutional peace arrangements may be said to originate in situations of inter-state conflicts. These arise when the interest or goal of one nation, such as national security or economic development, is inconsistent with, or in direct conflict with, the interests or goals of other nations. Every single country tries to stabilize its position and to extend its sphere of interest in the world. With that aim in mind, it mobilizes its power, and other resources or acts in such a way as to affect the conduct of other nations in a manner advantageous to itself. This is normally accomplished by such measures as formation of alliances, regional security arrangements, a deliberate policy of mutual cooperation with certain friendly nations, pursuit of a "balance of power" policy, etc. The idea behind all such measures is to narrow the area of potential conflicts or, to express it differently, to reduce potential conflicts to manageable proportions.

It is clear that the ideal inter-state relations is to eradicate as much as possible major conflict situations, which might lead to unmanageable frictions, even to war. Still, it may be argued that conflicts will always remain as an unavoidable feature of international life and that they may even do some good. It may be contended that no state exists without experiencing some amount of conflict. For there are certain problems that appear sufficiently universal and ever-recurring that make a perfect functioning of the world in the foreseeable future at least, near impossible of achieving. We may think of such problems as arise out of differences in ideological interests, out of economic problems (due, e.g., to raw materials, oil), new technological problems (such as, e.g., affect the current arms race), new social problems (such as have to do with malnutrition or education) or simply arising out of certain uncontrollable factors, such as drought, floods, famine. It is obvious that problems like these do not lend themselves to easy rational solutions and that they are likely to remain always with us to haunt the present-day social planner. Needless to say, they cannot but have

an upsetting effect on the relation among nations, being always a source of potential conflicts among nations, even of a serious kind. We may even argue that conflicts need not be necessarily bad or fatal to relationships among states. On the contrary, we may see them as having stimulating effects. Situations without conflict would presumably involve static, unchanging conditions. But change is generally wanted, hence some degree of conflict is likely to be beneficial and will provide the dynamism called for in effecting changes. What is important, of course, is that conflicts do not exceed certain limits, that they do not lead to irreconcilable differences of interest between two nations, or groups of nations. Extreme conflicts would make these a potential source of war-producing situations.

With ever-present conflicts in the world, some machinery for reducing inter-state conflicts, or at least the major conflicts, appears necessary if our intention is to have the world function in a reasonably rational and orderly manner. Here such peace-keeping organizations as the old League of Nations or the United Nations Organization of today have come into existence to fulfill exactly such a task. They have been established to deal particularly with conflicts that are of a more serious character, to effect specific settlements of international disputes, allegedly, so as to create a favorable climate for the existence of a lasting international peace.

It is not our purpose in this paper to describe the machinery or institutional structure of the U.N. having to do with peace keeping. Our purpose here is rather to critically evaluate the effectiveness of such machinery to see whether it is, particularly today, a "workable" or effective instrument for what it has been established — peace keeping.

The great contribution of the United Nations peace keeping machinery since its inception after World War II cannot be underrated. It has to its credit for instance such significant actions (however critically they have frequently been received by some parties) as resolving major threats to international peace in Korea, the Middle East and Congo. Moreover, the United Nations Organization has provided a valuable forum for discussing outstanding international conflicts, which by itself has descalated tensions, reduced the scope of such conflicts. Still, the machinery of peace keeping has been increasingly criticized as lacking in effectiveness and as not too well suited to the realites of present-day world. With increasing frequency, we hear voices

contending that it has demonstrated only limited usefulness in practice for peace keeping or peace making operations. Some voices even contend that it is unnecessary, that in practice there are other ways for solving international conflicts than current peace keeping methods. A reference is made here to certain states that prosper and live in peace even outside the framework of the existing international machinery for maintaining peace, such as South Africa or Taiwan, and to the fact that even these states that accept U.N. machinery by virtue of their membership in the United Nations Organization do not necessarily abide by it when they find it disadvantageous to themselves. An example is the recent unwillingness of Turkey to explore U.N. machinery for resolving the "Cyprus crisis," preferring instead "to take the law in her own hands." We shall presently consider in this section some of the principal specific points of criticism that are raised against the existing peace keeping machinery.

In the first place, the present weakness of the U.N. machinery for maintenance of peace is traced to the very structure of the organization which is said to have become outdated by the actuality of contemporary international life. As one prominent political scientist has put it bluntly: "The U.N. is unsuited in its present form."[7] Established after the war, the organization was heavily influenced in its structural form by conditions, moods and climate of opinion then. It was assumed that the great powers were likeky to cooperate in the maintenance of peace, that they would do the policing in behalf of less powerful nations. Moreover, a lasting universal peace was optimistically envisaged to be within man's possibility of achieving. Political reality, however, has undergone considerable transformation since then. There have been the great cold-war rivalry between the two powers, the United States and Russia; the rise to prominence of new powers such as Japan and Communist China; the increasing self-assertiveness of the new developing nations, as well as the rise in importance of certain nations due to their special strategic or economic importance such as the oil countries. In its present form then the U.N. machinery can hardly be said to reflect fairly the real alignment of forces in the contemporary world. This should then adversely affect not only its prestige but, more importantly, its effectiveness to act as the spokesman of "international interest."

[7] William T. R. Fox and Annette Baker Fox, "International Politics," in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (ed. D. L. Sills) (U.S.A.: Macmillan and The Free Press, 1968), p. 59.

In the second place, the weakness of the United Nations is attributed to the absence of a definite machinery for enforcing U.N. decisions on peace and to its being slow in acting. To paraphrase Hobbes, a theorist of power politics, decisions without sword are but empty words. There is no standing army to enforce peace such as when flagrant violation of rights occurs or a situation of serious conflicts between two nations arises. If it acts at all, it tends to act *only after* aggression has taken place, when it may be too late to solve the conflict at issue. Its main concern then is merely to defuse the explosive situation. In that way the conflict at issue tends to be swept under the carpet, that is, peace is restored or kept by submerging the conflict itself. This inability to enforce peace, to act effectively to prevent hostilities as well as to satisfactorily solve certain outstanding problems concerning peace appears to vastly weaken the usefulness in practice of the U.N. peace keeping machinery. Not surprisingly certain nations prefer not to take advantage of this machinery in settling their disputes; they prefer acting on their own, hoping for the best in the future.

Thirdly, another major weakness of the U.N. machinery is due to certain built-in mechanisms or practices that mitigate against its effective functioning. We have in mind the veto power of the great powers, which effectively concentrates all real power in the hands of the great powers and so can bring the machinery to a halt. Or we think of the practice by the General Assembly (when the Security Council chooses to leave the issue at stake to be decided by that body) to pass on the responsibility for action to the Secretary-General, which in practice may have similarly paralyzing effects overburdening this one person who has no real power (such as an army) to lean on. Depending on his power of persuasion he can do only so much, most likely the minimum; namely, to defuse or isolate the conflict.

Fourthly, another great weakness of the U.N. machinery is said to be ideological. Decisions that are made in situations of conflict are made not on their own merit or following some objective impartial standard, but tend to be ideology-oriented. Each party tends to see the issue of conflict or peace in its own peculiar ideological way, to suit its own peculiar ideological ends. Hence there is not one peace they talk about, but many kinds of peace, each party having something else in mind. Needless to say, such ideological differences in outlook, have distorting effects and lead to confusion when peace-directed

actions are called for. They can thus seriously undermine the effectiveness of the U.N. peace keeping or peace making efforts, and in more extreme cases, render the machinery itself inoperative. It is significant that in this respect the U.N.O. has been charged with being a mere propaganda forum for certain nations, useful to some members for spreading their ideological message, but a poor instrument for arriving at genuine peace.

Fifthly, another major weakness of the U.N. machinery is the absence of well-defined and agreed-on international law procedures. There is no transactional law that would be acceptable to and binding on all governments. True, there is an International Court of Justice which adjudicates international disputes, but its authority is a strictly limited authority. It deals only with cases submitted to it on a voluntary basis and its decisions are not strictly obligatory on the parties of the dispute, for they cannot be enforced. This appears to reduce the mutual relationship in the U.N.O. to the good will of its members without any sound provisions as to how to handle those who disturb the peace. In practice, then, the U.N. may be strong as a moral force exerting restraining influence, but it is weak on the side of sanctions, incapable of preventing outbreaks of serious hostilities.

Sixthly, another weakness of the U.N. machinery is said to be due to its impersonality or vastness. There are obvious advantages in bringing so many nations together under one roof to cooperate, but the vastness of the organization is inevitably conducive to a dilution of mutual ties. An atmosphere of mutual trust can hardly be sustained with conviction when the vast majority of members can at best establish only superficial acquaintance. There is thus limited communication possible and with it limited genuine interest or cooperation. Even more, behind the facade of U.N. rhetoric advocating great principles of mankind, there is the old problem of how to express these general principles in the concrete terms of political reality. The nations that are not directly involved will try to talk the conflict out of existence rather than to provide a permanent solution to it. Not surprisingly collective security arrangements have been so far confined not to this body but to smaller region-oriented bodies. There is simply no trust in universal security arrangements because, again, the vastness of the organizaton precludes any definite idea about how these would work in practice. Such arrangements could only be vague in form and so unhelpful for definite anti-aggression actions. Conceivably they would

also pose the unpalatable prospect of having current U.N. difficulties magnified. As one writer has expressed this idea, such arrangements fail because "no government would be willing to commit itself beforehand to action against an unspecified aggressor," because "the potential aggressor might well have allies that would make action against it far from 'police action,' i.e., far from one-sided."[8]

Finally, there is another substantial weakness that cannot be written off lightly. This may be expressed by the charge frequently heard that the U.N.O. has failed on the side of idealism, that it stands for *status quo* political conditions, or at least that it is too static in its vastness and the diversity of interests involved in the organization, it would naturally tend to compromise solutions, to prevention of immediate conflicts rather than to take a more positive or active role in peace making or peace building. In this sense it is charged with being more negative than positive in its philosophy. Furthermore, it appears to regard its function terminated by ensuring for nations liberation from the slavery of colonialism. Yet, it is widely argued particularly by developing countries, that there are other forms of slavery than the former colonial forms and these are still to be overcome. The U.N. does not appear to be sufficiently alert in this respect. Ultimately, it seems, the idealism of U.N. is forgotten and in practice each nation plays its own peculiar game of pursuing its own self-interest. There appears a gap between the noble ideas of the organization and the actual performance. More specifically, developing nations are impatient to progress fast, to put the noble ideas such as concerning better material conditions of mankind in practice in their own lands. Yet they are frequently frustrated in their efforts by the interest of advanced nations which appears to be pulling in another direction. Hence political realism of the cruder kind, pure self-interest, becomes the norm of U.N. action and considerable disillusionment with the organization ensues. Needless to say, this reaction has an adverse effect on the image of the organization. It fails to provide a healthy and favorable climate for inter-state relations that are desirable for the solutions of their mutual problems, including problems of peace.

Our brief review of the major points of criticism frequently heard of the U.N. peace-keeping machinery reveals that not all is good and healthy with this machinery as it stands today. It is, of course, freely

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 58.

admitted that no organization dealing with matters as complex as peace efforts can ever be perfect in its working, in the sense of being to the liking of all U.N. members. Still, it is clear that if the organization — and this perhaps applies to any organization — is to function as a truly workable and effective organization, its weaknesses must be identified and a remedy sought. In the next section, the authors set out a paradigm which, in their view, will remove some of the weaknesses that are present in the existing U.N. machinery.

Regional Associations; Positive Peace

The paradigm which the authors submit as a workable or realistic scheme of international peace, as a model for peace-keeping, peace-making, peace-building activities, follows closely the recommendations advanced in the argument on perceptions of peace. In sum, its aim is to strengthen positive peace and to approach the issue of peace through regions rather than through the existing machinery of peace. The authors are convinced that a scheme of peace based on positive peace and regions will overcome some of the constraints or weaknesses from which the existing machinery of peace appears to suffer. Furthermore, it will promote more meaningful, more gratifying relations among the nations of the world, particularly in the long run.

First then the value of a negative approach to peace will not be denied. Assuming, as we do, that conflict is a characteristic feature of social life and not necessarily bad, we cannot imagine a world without conflict. Hence some thinking in terms of deterrents or danger of major conflicts or war can never be eradicated from man's perceptions of peace altogether nor can we have institutional peace arrangements without it. What is important is not that negative peace perceptions and negatively operating machinery for peace persist but rather that they assume less importance and positive peace is strengthened. The two should in fact be complementary, both strong in their own right, with positive peace increasingly assuming more significance in people's (or nations') life. That is, if negative peace is unavoidable, as we maintain, then for it to be meaningul or operative, it should be based on a solid foundation of stable positive peace. We can perhaps sum up this particular view on the value of negative peace under three points: (1) The assumption that a condition of conflict always exists due to heterogeneity of interests, resources and values. (2) The idea of peace based on absence of collective violence cannot exist unless

there is peace-building, i.e., negative peace appears to logically presuppose some form of positive peace. (3) Negative peace cannot be lasting without some lasting support from positive peace.

Our idea of the role of negative peace in peace-making may be given pictorial representation, as suggested recently by a prominent Japanese political scientist.[9] The relationship of positive peace and negative peace may be likened to an iceberg. Its submerged part is our positive peace, its mountain-like part floating above the water is our negative peace. Now it is clear that the floating part can never endure for long unless the submerged part is a solid and enduring mass of ice. On this analogy, effective negative peace exists only in the presence of stable positive peace. We can extend our analogy even further. We can contend that the floating part of the iceberg is crucial to the safety of navigation. Without that part acting as a visible warning, a sort of a light-house, peaceful sailing in turbulent waters wou'd be a much more perilous enterprise. On the second analogy, we of course assume that there will always be some turbulence, some conflicts present. If so, complete absence of negative peace appears undesirable, for perfect (positive) peace is really beyond the reach of man.

The core of our paradigm for international peace is the concept of a regional associations. By "regional association" we mean an arrangement under which several states group themselves together to form a regional organization with the view of mutual cooperation for some common good to attain. They see more benefit in working together, in sharing their interests with other similar nations than in competing with one another or trying to solve their problems singly. Such a regional association is conceived as flexible in its structure, to involve no loss of sovereignty for participating countries, to operate on a voluntary basis, to accommodate even heterogeneous value systems. It may be added that regional associations in our sense are not strictly conceived as geographic entities, although countries from the same geographic region are more likely to be drawn in them, presumably by virtue of similar interests. What holds them rather together is the political will motivated by attempts at cooperation and a certain degree of rationality among the participating members rather than feelings of competition. A particular country may, incidentally, be a member of more than one regional association.

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[9] Prof. Kinhide Mushakoji's idea at the International Peace Academy (IPA) Seminar in Tokyo, July 1974.

Under the proposed regional arrangement it would be the regions themselves that would look after peace and conflict-resolution at least within the boundary of the region. It is envisaged that such concrete regional arrangements are likely to make peace efforts more effective, more workable in practice than the present arrangement through the agency of the United Nations. On this arrangement the member-states would have near exclusive monopoly over negative peace solutions, the U.N. machinery no more intervening with particular states. It would be on the states themselves to thresh out their differences and to apply such negative measures as could be applied without breaking the regional cooperation. In this way, it seems, both negative peace and positive peace would vastly be strengthened or made more effective. It may, for example, be predicted that the area of negative peace is likely to be reduced to manageable proportions, for with constant need of practical cooperation within the group of nations involved in the regional arrangement, negative measures are likely to be more effective and at the same time more limited in scope. There is likely to be a gradual reduction of mutual incompatibilities, less conflicting goals, attitudes and behavior, less likelihood of violence. Likewise positive peace is likely to be strengthened, for we may anticipate gradual development of common goals, common attitudes and behaviour, of a "community of interests," mutual concerns for regional stability as well as mutual concern in such general matters as economic progress, modernization and people's general welfare. We may note that the importance of negative peace would be gradually receding in the background, positive peace becoming the principal agent of regional peace-directed efforts.

More specifically, the new regional arrangement is likely to enhance the prospect of peace in the following major respects:[10] (1) Regional cooperation will replace national competition. (2) With mutual cooperation present, mutual confidence in time will grow as against mutual distrust. (3) With growing mutual cooperation and confidence, a homogeneity of values on a number of important issues is likely to develop. Perceptions will become compatible. (4) In case of conflicts within regions themselves, intervention from outside will be avoided, as peace-keeping is done by associated members themselves. In this way intrusion of alien interests, goals or values will be prevented

[10] Estrella D. Solidum, "Maintenance of International Peace and Security," paper delivered at the IPA Seminar in Tokyo, July 1974.

or minimized, and the danger of states becoming mere pawns of great powers such as through direct U.N. intervention will be avoided. (5) As all associate members are directly involved in decision making process about peace, their decisions are likely to carry more weight or legitimacy with parties in dispute. Presumably, the problem at issue will be given sufficient airing, so that the solution to it likely to be more than superficial, hence to be more acceptable even to disputing parties. (6) Peace-makers are selected by member-states and should therefore be more acceptable than outside agents of peace. Also, since they are consensually recognized, they should more likely succeed where imposed solutions may fail. (7) Because of their personal interest in regional stability, regional members are more vitally interested than countries not involved directly in keeping conflicts to sub-threshold violence. (8) Regional members know best what measures are appropriate for their common security arrangements.

Our paradigm is not confined, however, to mere regional arrangements, It is rather a two-tiered arrangement, a two-layer structure. On the bottom level, as we have seen we have regional associations. There is in addition the role played in peace efforts by the U.N.O. on a "higher" level. In short U.N. peace activity is complementary to our regional activity. Concretely, current practice of negative peace-keeping on the part of U.N.O. will be abandoned in favor of regional negative peace-keeping arrangement. The negative function of U.N. machinery will not be, however, abandoned altogether. It will rather change in form. It will be directed to inter-regional conflicts rather than inter-state conflicts as it has been until now. In this way, many of the disadvantages of the existing U.N. machinery will be overcome, such as the danger of particular states being used as mere pawns by the great powers. It is envisaged that, by confining itself to regions, the U.N.O. will extricate itself from the unrewarding — and perhaps impossible — task which it has at present, namely, to act as a watchdog — policeman for maintaining peace in behalf of all independent countries of the world, and that it will assume what appears to be the more manageable part of becoming a mere referee or watchdog of peace among conflicting regions or camps. In this new role, the U.N.O. would then act essentially as an agent for preventing collective forms of violence among regional groupings, doing its best to prevent or settle military confrontations or violent wide-spread international conflicts. To settle these it could then use such conventional methods as nego-

tiations, mediation, intervention, summitry, raprochment, brokerage, arms control, both methods of persuasion and of compulsion.

It may be added that the current U.N. positive peace efforts would remain unaffected by the proposed changed role of the U.N. machinery in matters of negative peace. That is in such areas as social, economic and cultural relations or development, the existing U.N. machinery would function as usual. The U.N.O. still remains the central international authority in these areas. It may indeed be contended that our new arrangement is likely to affect beneficially also our positive peace operations. It seems that under the existing arrangement questions of international development (positive peace) are frequently closely bound with the consideration of international security (negative peace), and so the various U.N. programs of assistance become open to political pressures and even to blackmail by the more powerful nations or blocs of nations. The proposed separations of positive and negative peace, at least on the level of states, should lessen such pressures, should make it possible for U.N. development to approach their task in a more objective way.

We may finally highlight another realistic aspect of our paradigm, namely, its flexibility. This may be contrasted with the existing U.N. machinery with its largely negative approach to peace-keeping, which appears by far too static in character. More fully, the paradigm is intended not only to state the conditions for future peace operations but also to suggest the way to such operations. It is our conviction that negative peace is costly in maintaining and that we should therefore devote less of our time and effort on negative peace, more on positive peace. Now our development toward positive peace may be expressed in terms of certain correlations.[11] Briefly, the reduction in negative peace is a correlate of the increase in positive peace. On this formula the area of positive peace becomes extended over a certain period of time with increased positive peace efforts, there will be a corresponding decrease in time in our negative peace efforts, or the need for such negative efforts. Thus our paradigm may be viewed as dynamic in character, as accommodating changes, and having a definite time-dimension.

It should be evident by now that the proposed scheme will vastly effect international peace-keeping efforts. Its general impact may be

[11] This is Nguyen Chi's proposed improvement on Estrella D. Solidum's paradigm for peace, *ibid.*

summarized under the following points. First, peace-keeping efforts will aim at regional arrangements rather than at universal arrangements as they do under the existing U.N. machinery. Second, regions will acquire a new importance in international peace-keeping operations. They will become the focus for dealing with inter-state problems, the principal agent for establishing conditions of political stability and international cooperation. Third, universal multi-polarization of value system is likely to arise, which should favorably affect peace-keeping operations, for this should lead to reduction of national incompatibilities and to better management of conflicts among nations at least within the same general value system. Fourth, decentralization of international conflicts will be made possible, which again should enhance the prospect of success of peace-keeping operatoins, for high level conflicts will presumably be decentralized into conflicts affecting only a relatively small part of the world — regions — which are more manageable. Moreover, all "outside" intervention will be removed when peaceful solutions are sought. Fifth, regional responsibilities recognized in the Articles of the U.N. Charter will be strengthened and this by itself should give more chance of success to region-originating peace-keeping efforts.

Reorientation

It should be evident by now that our scheme of peace differs in many significant respects from the vast majority of contemporary schemes, whether in the area of perceptions of peace or in the area of the machinery for peace-keeping arrangements. It implies a major reorientation in our perceptions of international peace as well as certain structural changes in the existing peace-keeping organizations. It challenges some of the time-honored notions or beliefs about peace — what we mean by peace and how to go about securing peace. Even more, it is an implied call to loosen the grip over our imagination of some of the old notions of peace, to exorcise from our minds what Bacon has called the "idols of thought," that is those beliefs that have lost their vitality or are of limited practical usefulness today. This call is directed particularly to scholars and practitioners of politics concerned with peace. In this concluding section, we shall briefly suggest which of the old notions or ideas will have to be vastly modified, if not abandoned altogether, if our scheme is to apply, as well as what new notions or ideas we propose to put in their place.

The first notion that may have to be vastly modified, if not abandoned altogether, is the notion of peace itself as it is generally understood today. Our region-oriented scheme appears to directly challenge the near universally accepted belief that peace to be sought is "indivisible peace," *i.e.,* that there is something like one grand state of peace fitting for all mankind. Such a belief goes against the grain of our argument. Our scheme implies instead decentralization of peace-keeping and peace-making operations. It is contended that the most productive approach to conflict-resolutions or establishing peace is not by way of "universal" arrangements but rather by way of 'regional" arrangements. We should not try to solve problems of peace on a world-wide basis but rather in pieces or parts, on a regional basis. Our approach, then, is not a universal scheme of peace but rather, what may be called, "peace by regions," "peace by pieces," "peace by parts." We believe in the wisdom of "dividing" peace, in "divisibility" of international peace. We advocate a "divisible peace" for mankind in place of the prevailing idea of "indivisible peace."

Our idea of a divisible peace may be illustrated by an analogy. We may think of our conflict or peace-solving operations on the analogy a jigzaw puzzle game.[12] In this game every piece represents a small conflict situation to be resolved. This in its turn may be regarded as an indicator — a warning signal — of other conflicts to come, of potentially bigger conflicts. Likewise, in our game of international life, we may regard every situation of conflict as part of a potentially much bigger conflict situation. It is, of course, in our interest to prevent such bigger conflicts from arising. Now to stop such potential conflicts we must *not* try to complete our jigzaw puzzle game (unlike in the real game), for if we allowed the jigzaw pieces to accumulate, we would in effect magnify our conflict situations, having conceivably a situation of a total conflict at hand, which might be immpossible to handle. We should rather proceed with caution, solving one conflict after another, as they arise. We should, that is, "decentralize" our conflicts, treat them in relative isolation. Our real aim is to remove particular conflict-situations from the potential for bigger conflicts, from situations that might lead to a total conflict.

Another habit of thought that, on our scheme, may have to be corrected or expurgated is the current habit of undue idealizations and

[12] Somsakdi Xuto, "Emerging Conflicts in Southeast Asia," paper delivered at the IPA Seminar in Tokyo, July 1974.

generalizations about peace. This is a habit widely practiced by perhaps most modern men and is particularly dear to liberal traditions of thought, which implies an optimistic belief that a state of a perfectly rational — perfectly peaceful — world, where all conflicts among men and among nation will be terminated, is conceivable and possible of achieving. This belief is reflected in the terminology of most of our contemporary peace-talk, whether by the general public or by scholars or even practitioners of political life. It is reflected in such expressions as "universal pease", "indivisible peace" mentioned above, Rouseau's "perpetual peace", Kant's "eternal peace" or in the expression "durable" or "enduring" peace, favorite, it seems with American political leaders, such as Wilson, Roosevelt and more recently Ford. Now our scheme places the validity of such ideas of peace in question. It has been contended that such highly generalized notions lack empirical content or objective reference, that they are weak as useful operation principles or at best of limited usefulness for actual peace-directed actions. Moreover, we have also contended that they tend to distort our perceptions of peace, to give rise to confusion and so to false hopes about peace. In this sense our scheme is a plea for a more concrete, more operationally effective approach to peace, a plea in behalf of return to more empirically-oriented treatment of peace.

Our region-oriented scheme may lead us to abandon also another "idol" of modern thought concerning peace. This is the assumption which appears to lie under the existing machinery of the United Nations Organization, that peace-keeping or peace-making should be supervised from above such as by the great powers sitting in the Security Council, presumably acting in behalf of potentially unruly nations. The emphasis here appears to be on peace-keeping activities being initiated or conducted from above, the great powers playing the role of international policeman or "impartial" game referees. The present scheme rejects this approach. It regards itself as a more democratic scheme, more in line with the current self-confidence of all nations. It implies an approach to peace from the bottom rather than from the top. It stresses real agreement among nations involved in the scheme, consensual action on at least certain minimal conditions such as mutual stability, cooperation and social progress. It emphasizes the presence of concrete results. By enlisting the participation of all parties concerned, the scheme may be said to practice a democratization of politics on an inter-national scale.

It may be added that our region-oriented scheme of peace is not intended to exclude, nor to render invalid, the idea of universal peace altogether. Its aim is rather to throw light on a workable path toward peace-making. Thus we may start with the "piece" of our regional peace, where peace becomes in time a property of the nations concerned deeply felt and then we extend our peace more universally. A possible analogy can be made between our notion of peace and the Confucian notion of human affection. This is a graduated affair starting with the family until it becomes extended to all mankind. In the end the universal state is likened to one large family in which all men are bound together by the bond of mutual affection. Likewise, our idea of peace is a graduated peace, from parts to the whole. It is to be a peace established on the solid ground of regional loyalties and interests, to lead ultimately to a world-wide network of common loyalties and interests of nations.