

THE 31st GENERAL ELECTION IN JAPAN: POLITICAL TURNING POINT?

GEORGE AKITA

*"For to measure something does
not mean to understand it."* — Theodore H. White

IT WAS CLOUDY WITH SHOWERS THROUGHOUT MOST OF Japan in the early morning hours of Sunday, January 29, 1967. In areas usually with heavy snowfall, there was only a light precipitation. In the afternoon, the skies cleared. This was almost ideal voting weather: bad enough in the morning to stop people from going on day-long excursions, but not bad enough at anytime to prevent them from going to the polls. Some observers noted that, based on past elections, this was the kind of weather that would favor the Jiyuminshuto (Liberal Democratic Party, LDP). One of the significant results of the 31st election¹ was the "unexpectedly and relatively" good showing made by the LDP.

No one will seriously argue that the weather alone was responsible for the LDP achievement. Moreover, in spite of the spate statistical data, analysis of voting behavior, like weather prediction, still involves art, involving unequal parts of guesswork, subjectivity, and intuition. This is clear when one reads the *Asahi Shimbun's* (AS) judgment that in the 20-odd years following the war, there was never an election with as many distinctive characteristics, while another analyst called it a "nonsense election" because "nothing" was changed except the appearance of 25 Komeito (Clean Government Party, Fair Play Party, (CGP) members in the House of Representatives (HOR)).²

The 31st general election and its results are important. First there was the emergence of the new. This was the first *national* election in

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¹ Counting from the first held on July 1, 1890. It was also the 10th since the end of World War II.

² AS January 31, 1967 *Dai sanjuikkai shugiingiin sosenkyo no bunseki* (Analysis of the 31st HOR general election), mimeographed Japanese government document, pp. 156-158. Cf. views of Professor Joji Watanuki, *Nihon no seiji shakai* (Japan's Political Society) (Tokyo, 1967), pp. 209; 211-226.

which those born after 1945 voted. They symbolized the gradual passing of the old order, for the leadership of the established parties are mostly in their 60's and many more of the prewar leadership group have already disappeared from the scene through death, retirement, and electoral rejection. This election also saw the maiden participation of the youthful, highly disciplined, ambitious CPG. The Nihon kyosanto (Japanese Communist Party, JCP) also presented a newly refurbished appearance as a "lovable, independent, moderate," party. The meaning and significance of the new will be discussed. Second, there was the persistence of the old. This election marked the continuation of 22 years of conservative rule. For a brief moment, the Nihon shakaito (Japan Socialist Party, JSP) leaders permitted themselves the luxury of thinking about taking over the reins of government in coalition with other parties. This was because many generally assumed that the *kuroi kiri* (black mist [of scandal]) which had engulfed the LDP would greatly benefit the JSP. But the election results confirmed the LDP in their hold on the HOR and solidified the JSP's position as a "permanent minority party." The "other" established party, the Nihon minshushakaito (Japan Democratic Socialist Party, DSP) made a creditable showing, all the more eye-catching because of the "poor" results achieved by the JSP. The reasons and implications of these developments will be analyzed. What follows in tabular form (Table 1)³ are part of the raw data from which the analysis will proceed. (Figures within parentheses denote results of the 30th general election, November 21, 1963).

When the results were finally tabulated, the *Asahi* called them "pitiable" for the JSP, while the *Yomiuri* declared that the most notable aspect of the election was the JSP's "poor showing." JSP secretary-general Tomomi Narita frankly admitted "defeat" and in this he was seconded by the leaders of the General Council of Japanese Labor Unions (Sohyo).⁴ On the other side of the political fence, LDP secretary-general Takeo Fukuda modestly declared himself "satisfied" with the results. Political commentators spoke of the "strength" of the LDP, and the stock market spurted up 29 yen 57 sen over the previous week's closing average. This was the highest jump since April 27, 1966.⁵

³ AS November 23, 1963, January 31, 1967; *Yomiuri shimbun* (YS) January 25, 31, 1967; "Dai 31 ikkai shugiingiin sosenkyo no kekka ni tsuite," (Results of the 31st HOR general election), *Chosa geppo* (CG), XII (April 1967), pp. 8, 14, 20, 36-37; Robert E. Ward, *Japan's Political System* (New Jersey, 1967), Table 6-2, "Results of Postwar General Elections for Japan's House of Representatives," pp. 60-61.

⁴ AS editorial January 31, 1967; YS editorial January 31, 1967; statement by Narita, YS January 31, 1967; YS February 1, 1967.

⁵ AS January 31, 1967; "Tensei jingo" (Vox populi vox dei), AS January 31, 1967; "Henshu techo" (Editor's notebook), YS January 31, 1967; YS January 31, 1967 and February 1, 1967.

Table 1. Results of 30th and 31st General Elections, HOR

Party	No. of Candidates	Seats at Dissolution	No. of Seats Won	% of Seats Won	% of Votes Won	No. of Votes Won
LDP	342 (359)	278 (286)	277 (283)	57.00% (60.60%)	48.80% (54.67%)	22,447,836 (22,423,915)
JSP	209 (198)	141 (137)	140 (144)	28.81 (30.83)	27.88 (29.03)	12,826,100 (11,906,766)
DSP	60 (59)	23 (14)	30 (23)	6.20 (4.97)	7.41 (7.37)	3,406,463 (3,023,302)
CGP	32 (—)	— (—)	25 (—)	5.14 (—)	5.38 (—)	2,472,371 (—)
JCP	123 (118)	4 (3)	5 (5)	1.03 (1.07)	4.76 (4.01)	2,190,563 (1,646,477)
Minor	16 (64)	1 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0.36 (0.15)	166,711 (59,765)
Independents	135 ^a (119)	1 (2)	9 (12)	1.85 (2.78)	5.41 (4.77)	2,488,521 (1,956,313)
Total	917 (917)	488 ^b (467)	486 ^c (467)	100 ^d (100)	100 (100)	45,998,565 (41,016,538)

^a Only five or six were non-DP.

^b 19 vacancies. Deaths, LDP 11, JSP 2; Resignations, LDP 4, JSP 2.

^c Seven women, LDP 3 (2), JSP 3 (4), DSP 1 (1).

^d Rounded out from 100.03 and 100.25 respectively.

There were those who maintained that the LDP did not win a victory, but had merely succeeded in its "defensive measures" and had prevented a defeat of "landslide proportions." Narita strongly upheld this view when he wrote that while he admitted the JSP defeat, he could not concede the LDP victory.⁶ These cautionary voices are probably closer to the truth. The election results indicate LDP success in "defensive measures," and a JSP "defeat." More importantly, the election also spotlighted the persistence of certain trends which have unhappy portents for both parties. To better understand the immediate results, however, let us turn to August 1966, for it was then that the "black mist" began to swirl around the LDP.

On August 5, Shoji Tanaka, a member of the LDP and powerful chairman of the HOR audit committee, was arrested on charges of intimidation, extortion, and fraud involving Y250,000,000 (\$694,444).⁷ He was later further charged with perjury, incitement to commit perjury, breach of trust, and income tax evasion. Tanaka provided an extra fillip to the sensation-seeking Japanese weekly magazines because he was said to have fathered from 18 to 21 children from seven to ten women.⁸

Almost exactly a month later, another high-ranking member of the LDP was accused of misusing his authority as transportation minister. Seijuro Arafune had asked the Japan National Railway authorities to have express trains make a stop at a town which was located in the center of his election district, which would slow the express to the pace of local trains. Even while his "indiscretion" was being questioned, he attended the Japan-South Korea ministerial conference in Seoul. He was accompanied by two businessmen, allegedly at government expense. The two were also said to have consummated a successful business transaction, for which Arafune was sup-

⁶ YS editorial January 31, 1967; Tomomi Narita, "Sohvo no dappi ga hitsuyo," (Sohvo needs to rejuvenate), *Chuo koron* (CK), Spring 1967, p. 376. The points brought out were that in this election the opposition had narrowed the gap between itself and the LDP to 84 seats; that the opposition had won more than 200 seats for the first time since 1955; that the LDP had won less than 50% of the votes cast, also for the first time since 1955; that in the 1963 election, the LDP and independents had numbered 295. If the 19 added seats were taken into account, the LDP/independents total should have numbered 307 in order to have equalled the 1963 achievement. YS editorial January 31, 1967; YS January 31, 1967; February 1, 1967; AS January 31, 1967; CG p. 49; "Senkyo kekka no imi suru mōno," (What the results of the election signify), CK Spring 1967, p. 371.

⁷ Tanaka was first elected in January 1949 and served continuously until his resignation on September 13, 1966. The sum involved was later said to be Y270,000,000 (\$750,000).

⁸ See *Japan Times* (JT), August 6, 7, 30, 1966; November 23, 1966; December 10, 1966; January 10, 1967; February 11, 1967; AS August 8, 1966. For examples of the attention Tanaka received, see articles in *Shukan asahi* August 26, 1966, pp. 112-117; *Shukan gendai* August 25, 1966, pp. 106-110; September 1, 1966, pp. 42-46; *Shukan josei* August 27, 1966, pp. 46-50.

posed to have received a substantial bribe. Another indiscretion was charged against Arafune when he was accused of soliciting for membership in his supporters' association, businessmen in the transportation industry. He resigned on October 11, 1966, a little over 70 days after his appointment.⁹

The biggest scandal involved the Kyowa Sugar Refining Company, whose executives were charged with forgery, fraud, misappropriation, and swindling. Political figures became entangled because the company had negotiated with and had borrowed from Y7-8,000,000,000 (\$19,444,444-22,222,222) from the government, and Matsuno was charged with "indiscretions" involving part of his sum. Other politicians were accused of having received funds for this company. The scandal was still page-one copy when the 31st general election was held.¹⁰

The "black mist mood" fanned by the press had two immediate results which affected the outcome of the election.¹¹ The first was the JSP belief that the "black mist" presented the party an unprecedented opportunity to increase the number of its seats in the HOR and perhaps even to take over the reins of government in coalition with another party or political faction.¹² The second was that the LDP leadership was galvanized into taking strong measures to limit its anticipated losses.

There were three other reasons for the JSP "overoptimism." The first was the belief that the shift toward urbanization and the rapid industrialization in Japan would help the *kakushin* cause.¹³ Indeed, this feeling also

⁹ JT September 4, 5, 28, 1966; October 2, 12, 15, 1966; *Naigai josei chosakai shiryō* (Domestic and foreign conditions research association's materials) January 24, 1967; *Dai sanjuikkai . . . bunseki*, p. 24. Other LDP members, all highly placed, who were involved in "indiscretions" were Eikichi Kambayashiyama, Director of the Self-Defense Agency, Raizo Matsuno, member of the House of Councillors (HOC), Kikuichiro Yamaguchi, president of the HOR, and Seishi Shigemasa.

¹⁰ JT October 18, 19, 1966; November 18, 19, 20, 1966; December 4, 9, 1966; February 9, 17, 1967; AS September 28, 1966; October 30, 1966; November 20, 1966, December 9, 1966, February 8, 1967; *Naigai . . . shiryō*, January 24, 1967.

¹¹ "At one point the two leading dailies, *Asahi* and *Mainichi*, seemed bent on fighting a circulation war over which paper could add more fuel to the flames feeding the 'black mist.'" Hans H. Baerwald, "Japan: 'Black Mist' and Pre-Electioneering," *Asian Survey* VII (January 1967), p. 31.

¹² AS January 31, 1967; *Sankei shinbun* (SS) January 31, 1967. LDP-supporting financial circles were also said to have been concerned about the anticipated size of LDP losses. "Senkyo kekka . . . mono," p. 370. After the election, the *Yomiuri* maintained that had not the LDP exercised stringent control over candidacy and the JSP had done so, there was a possibility that the party out of power might have become the ruling party. YS February 1, 1967.

¹³ The term generally refers to the "progressive" "reformist" parties which oppose the LDP. Baerwald uses "reformist" or "renovationists." Hans H. Baerwald, "Japan at Election Time," *Asian Survey* IV (January 1964), p. 646. Ward designates the opposition, minus the CGP, minor parties, and independents as, "the 'progressive,' or left-wing opposition," and recognizes the problems involved in this generalization. *Japan's Political System*, pp. 57, 60-61. The CG does the same, pp. 28-29. Others include the CGP in *kakushin* ranks. See, for example, *Sengo senkyo no bunseki* (Analysis of postwar

permeated LDP ranks. Hirohide Ishida, a labor minister in two former cabinets, in 1963 suggested that if the LDP did nothing in the face of the political changes accompanying industrialization and urbanization, the JSP will control the government by 1968.¹⁴

The second source of the JSP's sanguineous hopes was the almost universal conclusion reached by newspaper polls that the party was going to increase its seats. (See Table 2). JSP receptivity to the poll results was understandable, of course, because of the favorable predictions made of party prospects.¹⁵

The third reason for JSP hopefulness was the precipitous drop in the Sato cabinet's popularity by November 1966. When the cabinet was first formed in November 1964, 47% of those polled by the *Asahi* said that they "supported" the cabinet. Two years later, the figure, had fallen to 25%.¹⁶ And so the party was swept along by euphoric anticipation—in the face of warnings that talk of JSP strength was not ground on hard political realities.¹⁷ In concrete terms, the JSP expected to win at least 150 seats, and if things really went well, 162.¹⁸ Some leaders, as we have seen, even dreamed of taking over power in concert with another party or political faction.

elections), mimeographed Japanese government document, p. 8; YS editorial April 17, 1967. The impreciseness causes difficulties. As we shall later see, the CGP is often designated as "conservative" and the DSP is unflatteringly called "a second conservative party," "a fifth column of the Liberal Democratic Party." Fukuji Taguchi, "The Democratic Socialist Party," the *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan (JSPI)* II (December 1964), p. 63. Another says that "Parties standing for pure socialistic principles would normally include in Japan both the Socialist (JSP) and Communist parties." Wakao Fujita, "The Life and Political Consciousness of the New Middle Class," *JSPI* (December 1964), p. 134. To define *kakushin* as "opposition" also raises questions because in local elections the JSP, DSP, and LDP sometimes all support the same candidate for governor or mayor. Whenever possible, I shall try to make distinctions between parties and use the term "progressive" or *kakushin* only when the source uses it. At other time, I will use the term, "non-LDP."

¹⁴ "Hoshuseito no vision" (The conservative party's vision), *CK* January 1963, p. 94.

¹⁵ An *Asahi* polling expert also maintained that generally, in elections for the HOR, unlike the situation in local and HOC elections, there is a high correlation between rates of support for parties shown in public opinion polls and the actual percentage of support gained by parties, and that there is a relatively strong tendency to vote for the party, rather than the person in HOR elections. *AS* November 19, 1963 quoted in Watanuki, *Nihon no seiji shakai*, p. 219.

¹⁶ *AS* November 30, 1966; November 30, 1964; *Mainichi shimbun (MS)* December 14, 1964; Moroo Goto, "Political Awareness Among the Japanese: On the *Asahi Shimbun* Public Opinion Survey," *Japan Quarterly* XIV (April-June 1967), p. 167.

¹⁷ In his book published just before the election, Watanuki stated that in spite of criticisms, it was possible that the LDP could hold their losses to a minimum. *Nihon no seiji shakai*, pp. 218-219. The *Asahi* noted JSP weakness in the urban electoral districts where the party stood in danger of losing seats to the DSP, CGP, and JCP. January 26, 1967. Though unfortunately no date and percentages are given, an *Asahi* poll is said to have shown that while support for the Sato cabinet had declined, support for the LDP had climbed, while that of the JSP had fallen. *CG*, p. 50.

¹⁸ *YS* January 31, 1967; *AS* December 25, 1966. Kozo Sasaki, JSP chairman, gave 170 as the number of seats to be won. *YS* February 1, 1967.

Table 2. Election Predictions by Newspapers and Parties

	LDP (277) ^a	JSP (140)	DSP (30)	JCP (5)	CGP (25)	Minor (0)	Ind (9)
Mainichi ^b	273 (±5)	153 (±4)	28 (±2)	5 (±1)	(+5) 22 (—1)	0	5 (±1)
Asahi ^c	271 (±8)	141 (±8)	27 (±5)	9 (±4)	21 (±4)	0 (+1)	17 (±5)
Tokyo ^d	269 (±6)	155 (±5)	28 (±3)	4 (±1)	26 (±2)		4 (±2) ^h
Nihon Keizai ^e	271 (±6)	154 (±5)	28 (±2)	5 (±2)	24 (±4)	0	5
Sankei ^f	266	155	30	4	26	0	2.5
LDP ^g	270-283	145-150	24-27	3-5	20-30		5
JSP	260 (±)	148-168	26-27	4-5	24-25		A few.
DSP	270s	140s	32-33	5	20-30		
JCP				10 (±)			
CGP					26-28		

^a Seats actually won.

^b 122 electoral districts, omitting Amami Oshima. 112,600 interviewed. (25 Jan. 67)

^c 122 electoral districts, omitting Amami Oshima. 98,600 interviewed. (26 Jan. 67)

^d All 123 electoral districts checked (25 Jan. 67)

^e (26 Jan. 67)

^f Interviews, past elections' data analyzed as in the case of *Asahi* analysis. (24 Jan. 67)

^g Predictions by respective parties. JCP and CGP limited to own party. (*Tokyo Shimbun*, TS, 24 Jan. 67)

^h Combined minor parties and independent gains.

The results shocked the JSP. It won 140 seats, one less than the number held just before the election.¹⁹ The percentage of votes won by the party slipped from 29.03% in 1963 to 27.88%.²⁰ Furthermore, in spite of a revision in the election law which increased the number of seats in urban constituencies, the JSP made a poor showing in these electoral districts.²¹ For example, the JSP was able to increase its number of seats in Tokyo by only one (from 12 to 13), and in Osaka, lost two seats (from six to four). As if to add insult to injury, the electors rejected the JSP election campaign chairman and four others of the central executive committee.²² There are three basic reasons for the JSP "defeat." The first is "psychological," that is, a misreading of the prevailing "mood."²³ The second is immediate, tactical weaknesses. The third is the continuation and hardening of trends which appear unfavorable, at this stage, for the party. The first two will now be discussed, leaving the analysis of the long-range problems to the end.

An astute observer of the Hawaiian political scene has said that, "More politicians have lost elections on overconfidence than on issues." Both Sasaki and Narita after the election quickly admitted that the party had become "overintoxicated by the 'black mist' mood" before the election.²⁴ Three reasons for JSP overconfidence have already been mentioned. A fourth must now be added. This is the role of the mass media, particularly the newspapers. Baerwald has stated that the *Asabi* and the *Mainichi* seemed to be fighting a circulation war on the "black mist" issue. The two newspapers, plus the *Yomiuri* are truly national newspapers with Japan-wide distribution. However, since Tokyo is the political, social, industrial, finan-

¹⁹ An independent from Wakayama prefecture entered the party, making the total, 141. *MS* February 1, 1967.

²⁰ An LDP supporter correctly pointed out that the JSP was unable to increase the percentage won in spite of the "large number" of candidates which would have raised the percentage. Yoshizane Iwasa, "Jiminto ni atarashii shiren," (A new test for the LDP), *CK Spring* 1967, p. 390.

²¹ The law was revised on July 2, 1964. Under this revision, the number of seats in the HOR was increased from 467 to 486 and the number of electoral districts from 118 to 123. The new seats were allocated to Tokyo (12), Kanagawa (1), Aichi (1), Osaka (4), and Hyogo (1). *CG*, p. 9.

²² *YS* February 1, 1967; *AS* January 31, 1967. Another blow was the defeat of Hyo Hata, "the conscience of the political world." *YS* January 31, 1967.

²³ ". . . ['mood'] . . . must be recognized as a vital element in the Japanese political scene . . . it is doubtful whether any other civilized people act and react with so much unspoken consensus and emotional homogeneity as the Japanese do on some occasions." George R. Packard, III, *Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960* (Princeton, 1966), pp. 45-46.

²⁴ Larry McManus, *Sunday Star-Bulletin and Advertiser*, June 18, 1967; *YS* January 31, 1967; *SS* January 31, 1967. There is another dimension to the psychological factor. The pre-election over-optimism induced a proportionately deep post-election gloom. "Senkyo kekka . . . mono," p. 370. This was also the case in the 1963 election which the JSP considered a defeat. Baerwald, "Japan at Election Time," p. 648.

cial, and cultural center of Japan, its moods, according to Whittemore, "tend to predominate in the national papers." The "big three" are headquartered in Tokyo, and it is from Tokyo that they receive direction and stimuli. The danger is that the national mood is sometimes interpreted by what is seen and felt in Tokyo.²⁵ The LDP, like the JSP, is highly centralized in Tokyo also. It was in Tokyo that the fury of the attack against the LDP involvement in the "black mist" was concentrated—to the delight and hopeful anticipation of the JSP.²⁶ Before the election, however, Watanuki warned against overestimating the impact of the "black mist" on voter sentiment. After the election, Professor Tadashi Fukutake of Tokyo University commented that it was easy enough to criticize the voters' consciousness of Saitama's 3rd district (Arafune's), but that these remarks were the expressions of the intellectual class of the metropolitan areas, and that the people in Arafune's district did not think his actions were deplorable.²⁷ In fact, the JSP itself probably became aware that the "black mist" was not all that potent an issue. This is indicated by the shift in the middle of the campaign period from attacking the LDP on the "black mist" to a discussion of issues, such as the high cost of living, housing, traffic, smog and water pollution.²⁸ Still, there can be no denying that the JSP to the end felt that the "black mist" afforded them great opportunities.²⁹

This conviction that the corruption issue presented the party an unprecedented chance to gain seats resulted in one immediate, tactical error. The party, beset by factional struggles, was unable to fully control the number of candidates it put up. Candidate control is vital to electoral success under

²⁵ Edward P. Whittemore, *The Press in Japan Today . . . A Case Study* (Columbia, 1961), pp. 1-2, 7-18. An excellent summary of the role of the press on a national issue is found in Packard, *Protest in Tokyo*, pp. 278-284.

²⁶ Official JSP publications also pushed hard on the "black mist" issue. See for example, *Oshoku: sengo Nihon oshokushi gaikean* (Corruption: A survey of the history of corruption in postwar Japan) [Tokyo, 1966 (published in December)]; "Oshoku to fuhai no Jiminto," (The corruption and graft-tainted LDP), *Shakai shimpo* December 3, 1966.

²⁷ Watanuki, *Nihon no seiji shakai*, p. 219; *AS* January 30, 1967.

²⁸ *YS* January 19, 23, 1967; *MS* January 21, 1967; *AS* January 22, 25, 30 (editorial) 1967; *TS* December 28, 1966; *SS* January 23, 1967; *JT* January 14, 1967. Another reason for the shift was that some JSP members were linked with the Kyowa Seito scandal. *SS* January 31, 1967; *JT* November 19, 1966; "Kuroi kiri' sosankyō no igai na kekka," (The unexpected results of the 'black mist' election), *CK* March 1967, p. 38. Two incumbent JSP candidates associated with the Kyowa Seito question lost. "Dai sanjuikai . . . bunseki," p. 111. Although the DSP's hands were not completely clean, this party, plus the CGP and JCP hammered at the theme that the two major parties were both culpable and that they only were guiltless. *JT* January 14, 1967; *AS* editorial January 30, 1967. Another reason for the shift is typically Japanese. Eiichi Nishimura, secretary-general of the DSP said that for the parties to have continued to emphasize the "black mist" would have reflected on Japan's national honor. *YS* January 31, 1967.

²⁹ Saburo Eda, a leader of the anti-mainstream faction in the JSP, strongly implied that the party erred in not rigorously pursuing the "black mist" issue. *YS* February 1, 1967; see also by Eda, "Leadership no ketsujo," (Deficiency in leadership), *CK* Spring 1967, p. 378.

Japan's voting system. Japan has, according to Ward, a "multimember single-vote system." Under this system, there is no primary election and each electoral district in Japan is represented from three to five members in the HOR, except for Amami Oshima which returns only one member. Each voter votes for only one candidate. The candidates with the highest votes, irrespective of the percentages of votes cast in the district, win. In order to maximize its representation, a party must carefully choose, limit, and distribute its support in a given district. It must be agreed among the candidates from one party that no single candidate get too many votes else the other candidates suffer, allowing candidates from rival parties to slip in.³⁰ Since this system has a "sort of built-in bias in favor of weaker parties and candidates," the LDP is constantly faced with the problem of controlling the number of candidates it fields in an election.³¹ The JSP, though weaker than the LDP, is no longer so weak that it would not suffer from careless control and choice of candidates. Partly to capitalize on the "black mist" issue, and partly because of intense and bitter factional differences, the JSP put up too many candidates.³² By December 24, the party had already selected 209 *konin kobosha* (endorsed candidates). The result on January 31, was what Narita and the *Asahi* have described as *tomodaore* (falling together) and the *Sankei* as *tomogui* (cannibalism).³³ The *Yomiuri* even postulated that had the JSP controlled the number of candidates, and had the JCP not run candidates in every electoral district, and had pushed JSP candidates instead, the JSP might have won 37 seats.³⁴

The JSP had only partial control over the second major tactical weakness. After the election, the *Yomiuri* criticized the JSP for what it called the party's "abstract views" on the Vietnam war and the Red Guards, which, the *Yomiuri* said, were even farther left than those held by the JCP. The *Asahi* recalled that during the campaign, Sasaki had mentioned a possible trip to Communist China, and that when Sasaki had been elected as chairman for the third time, he had declared: "We must never flinch from our

³⁰ Baerwald, "Japan at Election Time," p. 652; Jun-ichi Kyogoku and Nobutaka Ike, "Urban-Rural Differences in Voting Behavior in Postwar Japan," *Stanford University Political Science Series*, No. 66, p. 12-15

³¹ Ward, *Japan's Political System*, p. 54; see also Keiichi Matsushita, "The Conservatives and the Progressives: An Organizational Confrontation," *JSPJ*, II (December 1964), pp. 46-47. The *Japan Quarterly* errs in stating that this system works in favor of the LDP. XIV (April-June 1967), p. 132.

³² The incumbents naturally favor limiting the number. R. P. Dore, "The Japanese Socialist Party and 'Structural Reform,'" *Asian Survey* I (October 1961), p. 10. For an excellent description of the factions and factional disputes, see J. A. A. Stockwin, "The Japanese Socialist Party Under New Leadership," *Asian Survey* VI (April 1966), pp. 187-200; also, *Dai sanjuikkai . . . bunseki*, p. 13-14. The post-election factional breakdowns are given in *SS* January 31, 1967 and *YS* January 31, 1967.

³³ *CG*, p. 3. *SS* January 31, 1967; *AS* editorial January 31, 1967. See *CG*, p. 52 and *YS*, January 31, 1967 for examples of cannibalism.

³⁴ *YS* February 1, 1967.

position that we are pro-China." The *Asabi* wondered whether these remarks were helpful at all to the JSP cause.³⁵ The "great cultural revolution" in China also reached one of its frenzied peaks at the height of the campaign and the LDP was quick to seize this opening to accuse the JSP of being tainted by the "red mist."³⁶ And in one of the most fortuitous strokes of luck for the LDP, in the evening edition of the *Yomiuri* of January 26, there appeared a photograph of Chinese "anti-Maoist" with dunce caps and hands tied behind their backs, being led through the streets. It is felt that this one picture cost the JSP thousands of votes.³⁷ Kakuei Tanaka of the LDP, the JSP's Eda, and even the JCP's secretary-general, Kenji Miyamoto are agreed that the upheaval in China and the JSP position on the whole China question helped the LDP.³⁸

The JSP's tactical weaknesses contributed to the LDP "successes." There are several other reasons for the relatively and unexpectedly good results for the LDP. These are the rigid controls exercised over candidate selection—including limiting numbers; the momentum the party enjoyed as the oldest and most solidly established, richest, and strongest party; and, prosperity.

When the results were known, Kakuei Tanaka, ex-secretary-general of the LDP, said that the party owed a debt of gratitude to the mass media. What he meant was that thanks to the attacks against the party on the "black mist" issue, the party waged a life-and-death campaign.³⁹ No one seriously doubted that the LDP would not win an absolute majority of 244 seats. However, a bare majority would not be enough to insure political stability. If the LDP had dropped from the 270's to the 260's, there would have been danger for the party.⁴⁰ So the LDP labored vigorously to main-

³⁵ *YS* editorial January 31, 1967; *AS* editorial January 31, 1967.

³⁶ "Kuroi kiri' sosenkyo . . . kekka," p. 38. In the April 1967 Tokyo gubernatorial election, the LDP/DSP camp pushed the line that a victory by Rvokichi Minobe, the JSP/JCP candidate will mean that a "red flag" will fly over the Tokyo government office and that there will be a revolution in Tokyo. Newspaper commentary agrees that this line was ineffectual. *YS* April 16, 1967.

³⁷ Drew Middleton, "A Shift in Japanese Sentiment," the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, March 6, 1967. This opinion was broached by a professor of sociology, Tokyo Education University in a conversation in Honolulu immediately after the election. Subsequently, two letters, one from a "Suginami (ward) intellectual" (March 1967), and an LDP supporter (April 1967) corroborated this suggestion.

³⁸ *YS* February 1, 1967; *AS* January 31, 1967. Sasaki, however, stoutly maintains that the party's policies with respect to China cannot be given as a cause for the defeat. *SS* January 31, 1967. Perhaps, but a nationwide poll taken by the monthly *Jiji* showed that throughout 1966, China kept pace with the Soviet Union as the "most disliked" nation. Douglas H. Mendel, "Japanese Views of Sato's Foreign Policy: The Credibility Gap," *Asian Survey* VII (July 1967), p. 452.

³⁹ *YS* February 1, 1967. See also, "Henshu techo," *YS* January 31, 1967.

⁴⁰ *YS* editorial January 31, 1967; the *Asabi* felt that the LDP had to win at least 270 seats to be assured of political stability and effectiveness. *AS* editorial January 31, 1967. The reason is that it is necessary to choose around 40 members of the party to

tain the status quo in terms of the number of those to be elected. The major effort was concentrated on limiting the number of candidates. This was crucial, for as we have seen, the electoral system of Japan favors the weaker party and candidates.⁴¹ The party was largely successful in this effort. In spite of the increase in HOR seats by 19, the party limited the "endorsed" candidates to 342, 17 less than in 1963. Overall, the candidate to seats ratio was 1.89, the lowest since the end of World War II. The ratio was actually lower since there were candidates who did not have any expectation of winning. Recalculated, the ratio was closer to 1.44.⁴²

There are other indices which show that LDP candidate control had good results. First, the lower the number of votes needed to elect a candidate, the more efficacious the vote. Through the 28th election (May 1958) the non-LDP parties were able to elect their candidates with fewer votes. But after the 28th election, it has taken an average of 10-20,000 less votes to elect an LDP member than candidates from other parties. In this election, it took an average of 81,039 votes to elect an LDP candidate, as against 91,615 for a JSP candidate.⁴³ Second, the smaller the difference between the average number of votes won per candidate and the average number of votes needed to elect a candidate, the smaller number of "wasted" votes.⁴⁴ On this score, the difference for the LDP was 15,402 votes, and the JSP, 30,246.⁴⁵ Third, the higher the average number of votes received

serve in the cabinet, serve as parliamentary vice-ministers, and in other official government capacities. Although these men can vote when the HOR is in plenary session, they cannot vote in the committees. The LDP can call on HOC members to serve in the cabinet and certain other government positions. However, the number that can be tapped is limited. Therefore, a ruling party would find it extremely difficult to control the Diet effectively with less than 260 members. Watanuki, *Nihon no seiji shakai*, p. 224.

⁴¹ See Baerwald, "Japan at Election Time," pp. 652-653 for a concrete example of the dangers stemming from undisciplined voting in an electoral district. See also Frank C. Langdon, "The Political Contributions of Big Business in Japan," *Asian Survey* III (October 1963), p. 471.

⁴² 219 candidates out of the 917 were considered too weak to be serious candidates. These were those who did not get the minimum number of votes as required by law. Of the 219, the JCP contributed 94 and the minor and independents, 106. CG, p. 7. See also, Table 2, CG, p. 6 which shows declining ratio since the 22nd election. See Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962), p. 102, for calculation of minimum number of votes required by law.

⁴³ For the JSP this was an increase by approximately 9,000 votes over the 1963 average of 82,686, an indication of insufficient candidate control. CG, pp. 34-35. See Table 18, CG, p. 33.

⁴⁴ Ward suggests another way in which parties can "waste" votes. Under Japan's electoral system, if a party runs too few candidates, it "wastes" those votes which are in excess of the number required to elect this smaller number of candidates, which excess can be used to elect another person. *Japan's Political System*, p. 54.

⁴⁵ CG, p. 34. The difference was smallest for the LDP, even smaller than the highly disciplined CGP (21,633). For the JSP, the difference in 1967 was around 8,000 greater than in 1963, another indication of ineffective candidate control. CG, Table 19, p. 35.

per candidate, the more effective the vote. The average number of votes received by an LDP candidate was 65,637, a figure surpassed only by the CGP average of 77,262. The JSP average per candidate was 61,369.⁴⁶ Fourth, the LDP elected 80% of all its candidates, the highest percentage among the parties, and the percentage of seats it controls in the HOR (57%) is much greater than the percentage of votes won (48.8%).⁴⁷ Fifth, the number of independent candidates rose from 119 in 1963 to 135 in 1967. One reason is because the LDP strictly controlled the number of endorsed candidates. Therefore, those who would have run as endorsed candidates in halcyon days had to compete as independents.⁴⁸

The primary thrust of the LDP campaign tactic was the limitation of endorsed candidates.⁴⁹ The party also took care to deflect "black mist" charges by withholding endorsement from those involved in the "black mist" scandals as well as those fighting charges of election violations. Instead, they were considered candidates with *toseki shomei* (certificate of party membership).⁵⁰ There was good political sense in not rejecting some of these men, for a pre-election survey showed that the "black mist" had not affected the strength of people like Arafune and Kambayashiyama in their constituencies.⁵¹ The results confirmed the soundness of the LDP strategy. Arafune and Kambayashiyama were returned at the top of their respective districts, and Matsuno, Shigemasa, and Yamaguchi were also successful.⁵²

Ward has observed that, "The most notable fact about the Japanese electoral record is the continuous and strong predominance of the conserv-

⁴⁶ CG, p. 35.

⁴⁷ CG, p. 50. In seven electoral districts only one LDP candidate ran. All won. CG, p. 50.

⁴⁸ AS January 31, 1967. Of the 135, only five or six were "*kakushin*." Of the rest, 72 missed being endorsed by the LDP. These were serious candidates who took away votes from LDP candidates. It is estimated, for example, that conservative independents prevented the LDP from increasing seats in 10 or 11 electoral district. CG, pp. 36-37.

⁴⁹ It is highly important to be endorsed. In this election an endorsed candidate received Y2,000,000 (\$5,555), and was entitled to borrow another Y1,000,000 (\$2,778). AS January 31, 1967; TS January 13, 1967. With the development of mass media and education, the party image, rather than personalities is becoming more important. Candidates can maintain their prestige by associating themselves with the national party image by being endorsed. Junnosuke Masumi, "A Profile of the Japanese Conservative Party," *Asian Survey* III (August 1963), p. 401. Toward the end of the campaign, the endorsed candidate often receives an "encouragement bonus" to support the final push. Scalapino and Masumi, *Parties and Politics*, p. 87.

⁵⁰ These included Arafune, Kambayashiyama, Yamaguchi, and Shigemasa. Fifteen candidates in all received certification. CG, p. 8. These candidates do not receive official financial aid from the party. See post-election comments of Takeo Fukuda, AS January 31, 1967.

⁵¹ *Asahi Journal* (AJ) November 27, 1966, quoted in Watanuki, *Nihon no seiji shakai*, p. 220.

⁵² Tanaka did not run. However, Shu Takatori, a newcomer and considered Tanaka's "substitute" lost. YS January 31, 1967, TS January 31, 1967. Eight of the "certified" candidates lost.

ative vote.”⁵³ This predominance, on the one hand, is based on the *samban* (three *bans*) that is, *jiban*, *kaban*, and *kamban*.⁵⁴ On the other hand, the continued strength of the LDP itself serves to perpetuate and strengthen the *samban*. It is almost unanimously believed that the relatively good LDP showing in this election was attributable to the *samban*, especially the *jiban*. The strength revealed by Arafune, Kambayashiyama, Shigemasa, and Yamaguchi is said to prove the solidness and dependability of the *jiban*.⁵⁵ Another indication is the perpetuation of the *jiban* by a son, relative, or close political associate.⁵⁶ JSP secretary-general Narita sounded almost wistful when he said that the candidate who “built bridges and roads,” or one who put priority on the “provincial welfare” had the support of the voters. And he pinpointed the root of LDP strength when he said, “This is something that the conservative parties have cultivated from before the war, and is something truly strong.”⁵⁷ One final point must be made about the LDP *jiban*. While the LDP is stronger in the provinces and is losing strength in the urban areas, this does not mean that the party’s urban *jiban* are completely disintegrating. For example, the party held onto the 13 seats it had in Tokyo at the time of the dissolution, and added three more. It also gained one seat in Osaka. In Chiba 1st which is located close to Tokyo and has many *danchi* (large-scale suburban housing projects), the LDP won three of four seats. In the industrial Kanagawa 2nd, the party took two out of four.⁵⁸

Another source of LDP power and advantage in this and past elections is *kaban* or money available to candidates. It is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately determine the amount spent on an election or in the pre-election period by a candidate, his party, faction, and supporters’ group. Moreover,

⁵³ *Japan’s Political System*, p. 57.

⁵⁴ Ike defines *jiban* as political machine, *kamban* as the candidate’s reputation or standing in the constituency, and *kaban* as money spent in elections. Nobutaka Ike, *Japanese Politics: An Introductory Survey* (New York, 1957). For his discussion see, pp. 192-202.

⁵⁵ *SS* January 31, 1967; *AS* January 31, 1967; The *Asahi* predicted before the election that issues and the “black mist” were not important, but that the long-standing *samban* would determine the outcome. *AS* January 30, 1967.

⁵⁶ There were 37 candidates who ran for their fathers’, husbands’, and other relatives’ seats as well as in *jiban* “handed down” to them. Of these, 27 succeeded, for a success percentage of just under 73%. *CG*, pp. 42-43. Yohei Kono, age 30, son of Ichiro Kono, led the field in his district. Toshio Yamagata, the youngest person elected at age 26, also followed in his father’s footsteps. Tomio Kawakami, son of former JSP chairman, Jotaro Kawakami, led his district without campaigning. *YS* January 30, 31, 1967.

⁵⁷ *YS* January 31, 1967.

⁵⁸ Takeo Fukuda, “Wagato ga nobiru jishin,” (Confident that our party will expand), *CK*, Spring 1967, p. 372. See also *CG*, pp. 30-32.

there is a gradual shift from the "traditional" to "modern" type of voting behavior, that is, from "apathetic political behavior" characterized by a high vote rate and subservience to authority to "habitual awareness," or, an awareness of politics as a way to increase personal and concrete advantages, combined with a critical attitude toward politics and an interest in remoter political problems.⁵⁹ This means that *kaban* in the traditional sense of outright vote-buying by bribery and "entertainment" is no longer too effective.⁶⁰ It is believed that this election was a particularly clean election because of a reaction against the "black mist," but the persistence of this trend in the first round of the unified local elections on April 15, 1967 indicates that Watanuki and Masumi are basically correct.⁶¹

The foregoing does not mean that money is less valued or necessary in political campaigns. The politicians are compelled to conduct year round activities, sometimes bordering on the illegal, to maintain the support of their constituencies. Furthermore, it is possible that the new emphasis on mass media is even more expensive than the vote-buying of yesteryear.⁶² It is in this context that the financial support available to the LDP and its candidates become a significant factor. There are various estimates of the sums which were available to the two major parties in this election, but Y3,000,000,000 (\$8,333,333) for the LDP and Y220,000,000 (\$1,111,111) for the JSP are sometimes cited in publications.⁶³ In the 29th election (1960), it is estimated that the LDP candidates spent a total of between Y3,500,000,000 (\$9,722,222) and Y4,000,000,000 (\$11,111,111), compared to the Y1,100,000,000 (\$3,055,556) spent by the JSP, DSP, and JCP combined.⁶⁴ In 1952 the expression "*nito ichiraku*" (Y20,000,000 [\$55,556] will insure election while Y10,000,000, defeat) became popular. In the 1962 HOC election, the phrase was "*santo niraku*" (Y30,000,000 [83,333] wins

⁵⁹ Scalapino and Masumi, *Parties and Politics*, pp. 103-104, 121-124; and Joji Watanuki, "Political Attitude of the Japanese People," the *Sociological Review Monograph* No. 10: "Japanese Sociological Studies" (September 1966), pp. 165-168.

⁶⁰ Watanuki, "Political Attitudes," p. 166; *AS* January 31, 1967. Actually, the election law is so strict that it is nearly impossible not to have violations. Baerwald, "Japan at Election Time," p. 654. For a description of the law, see Scalapino and Masumi, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-103.

⁶¹ Professor Kikuo Nakamura in *YS* January 31, 1967; *SS* January 31, 1967; *AS* January 31, 1967. *AS* editorial April 17, 1967; *YS* April 16, 1967.

⁶² See Chitoshi Yanaga, *Japanese People and Politics* (New York, 1956), pp. 286-293 for a description of Japanese election campaigns.

⁶³ *AS* December 27, 1966; *MS* January 18, 1967; *TS* January 21, 1967; "Senkyo kekka . . . mono," p. 370 (Y2,000,000,000 [5,556,556]).

⁶⁴ Scalapino and Masumi, *Parties and Politics*, p. 87. In the same election, the JSP is reported to have spent only 11% of the estimated expenditures of the LDP. Ward, *Japan's Political System*, p. 68. In the 1960 election, each LDP candidate is reputed to have spent Y10,000,000 (\$26,778). It is estimated by the *Asahi* that about the same amount was spent by an LDP candidate in this election. Scalapino and Masumi, *op. cit.*, p. 87; *AS* January 31, 1967.

an election, Y20,000,000, loses)⁶⁵ The ratio probably did not change much in this election, and it is the kind of ratio that obviously favors the LDP.

Another factor of utmost importance assisted the LDP. This is the economic growth and concomitant prosperity being experienced by Japan. A commentator in the *Asahi* aptly characterized the voters' reaction to prosperity as the "tranquility mood," or the feeling that since times are good, let us take care not to "rock the boat."⁶⁶ This trend was already reported in 1960 when Mendel in analysing the 29th election wrote that, "no one should overlook the pervasive impact of economic prosperity on the average Japanese voter in 1960," and continued through the mid-1960's when Takane tentatively concluded that Japanese intellectuals too, were being affected by Japan's economic growth.⁶⁷

One sign that prosperity is a vital factor in Japanese politics today is that the CGP, DSP, and JCP are all trying to project themselves as middle-of-the-road parties (*chukan seito*). The DSP, especially, has had an early start on this because it wanted to contrast itself with the JSP, which it called a "class party." Some analysts have concluded that disaffected voters who left the LDP fold in this election did not vote for the JSP, but for the DSP and the CGP.⁶⁸ This may be true, but it should be noted that the LDP lost 16 seats to the JSP, while the latter lost 10 to the LDP for a gain of six seats at LDP expense. However, the JSP lost eight seats to the DSP while taking only one from the DSP. This is probably more serious for the JSP since it appears to be remaining stationary or losing ground where it is purported to be the strongest: the metropolitan urban areas.⁶⁹ Table 3 shows this.

⁶⁵ Yanaga, *Japanese People and Politics*, p. 292, fn. 24; Nobushige Ukai, "The Japanese House of Councillors Election of July 1962," *Asian Survey* II (August, 1962), p. 1.

⁶⁶ "Tensei jingo," *AS* January 31, 1967. See also, *SS* January 31, 1967; *YS* editorial January 31, 1967. The JSP suffered because it was felt that if it were to assume power, there would be a depression, controls would become stringent, and it would be hard to do business. "Tensei jingo," *AS* January 31, 1967.

⁶⁷ Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., "Behind the 1960 Japanese Diet Election," *Asian Survey* I (March 1961), p. 5; see also, Dore, "Japanese Socialist Party," pp. 3-4; Masaaki Takane, "Economic Growth and the 'End of Ideology' in Japan," *Asian Survey* V (June 1965), pp. 295-304. Economic growth has been accompanied by inflation and rise in the cost of living. These are causes of danger both to the economy and the LDP. See Robert S. Ozaki, "Japan's 'Price-Doubling' Plan," *Asian Survey* V (October 1965), pp. 515-521.

⁶⁸ *AS* January 31, 1967, *AS* editorial January 31, 1967; *SS* editorial January 31, 1967; "'Kuroi kiri' sosensho . . . kekka," p. 39. "Seikyoku wa donoyoni tenkai shitsutsu aru ka," (How is the political situation developing?) *CK* Spring 1967, p. 402. There were 34 electoral districts in which the balance in terms of number of seats was altered with favorable results for the non-LDP parties. In the majority of the cases, this resulted from CGP and DSP advances. *CG*, pp. 21-22, 41.

⁶⁹ *CG*, pp. 25-27; Kyogoku and Ike, "Urban-Rural Differences," p. 21. The right-wing socialists have been strong in the metropolitan/urban areas in the past few elections. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

Table 3. Percentage of Votes Won by Parties in the Seven
daitofuken (Metropolitan areas)⁷⁰

	LDP	JSP	DSP	CGP	JCP
Tokyo	32.1% (44.1%)	27.1% (36.3%)	11.8% (10.2%)	13.1% (—)	9.9% (6.9%)
Kanagawa (Yokohama)	37.0 (44.8)	27.3 (32.4)	15.3 (15.2)	13.4 (—)	5.5 * (4.9)
Aichi (Nagoya)	47.4 (53.9)	31.6 (29.2)	7.9 (10.6)	3.6 (—)	6.5 (4.4)
Kyoto	35.2 (41.1)	25.7 (29.4)	14.1 (15.7)	6.2 (—)	14.4 (13.5)
Osaka	28.6 (38.8)	21.7 (26.3)	19.0 (20.6)	18.0 (—)	9.0 (13.4)
Hyogo (Kobe)	38.4 (45.4)	25.7 (29.0)	15.2 (15.9)	10.0 (—)	4.6 (3.6)
Fukuoka	41.0 (43.6)	29.9 (31.3)	9.5 (10.7)	8.5 (—)	6.7 (5.7)
7 <i>daitofuken</i> Average	35.9 (44.6)	26.8 (31.3)	13.3 (13.7)	11.5 (—)	8.0 (7.2)
National Average	48.8 (54.7)	27.9 (29.0)	7.41 (7.37)	5.4 (—)	4.8 (4.0)

(1963 Percentages in Parentheses)

⁷⁰ CG, Table 16, pp. 28-29.

The JSP averages have dropped in all but one area: Aichi. The DSP and JCP averages in these seven *daitofuken* are nearly double that of their national averages, while the CGP average here is more than double that of its national average. It should be noted that the DSP also elected 20 of its 30 winners in these metropolitan areas.⁷¹

Other indications of the good showing made by the DSP are: 1) it increased the number of votes won per candidate over the last election by 5,000 which was the best growth record among the LDP, JSP, DSP, and JCP; 2) it decreased the number of votes needed to elect per candidate by 18,000, while the LDP, JSP, and JCP increased the number; 3) compared to 1963, it reduced by 23,000, the difference between votes per candidate and votes needed to elect a candidate; 4) it doubled the number of "new faces" elected from four in 1963, and had the second best record in this category: 26.7% of all DSP representatives are "new faces." The CPG, of course, scored 100% in this category.⁷²

The DSP, naturally, is by no means a threat to the position of the JSP as the leading non-LDP party. It has grave organizational weaknesses, the same kind that plague the LDP and JSP, in that it "is dominated by its individual Diet members and candidates and their respective backing groups."⁷³ Furthermore, one of the lessons of the election of Minobe as governor of Tokyo is that in Tokyo at least, many supporters of the DSP would desert the party if it associates itself too closely with the LDP.⁷⁴

The JCP, like the DSP, also can point to some success, as can be seen by Table 3. These successes, though small in themselves, tend to hurt the JSP because, like the DSP, the JCP has its greatest strength in the metropolitan/urban areas.⁷⁵ One indication of this is that while the JCP lost

⁷¹ CG, pp. 20-21, 30, 40-41, 53; see also, "Seikyoku wa . . . aruka," p. 402.

⁷² CG, p. 35. Baerwald believes that DSP candidate control, hard work, and dissatisfaction with the LDP and JSP, won the DSP 23 seats in 1963 and confounded the critics. "Japan at Election Time," pp. 646-647. The same reasons can probably be given to explain the DSP performance this time. Cf. "Sosenkyo kekka . . . mono," p. 371.

⁷³ Taguchi, "The Democratic Socialist Party," p. 63.

⁷⁴ On the basis of a poll taken just prior to the election, over 40% of the DSP vote probably went to Minobe. *YS* April 16, 1967. In the HOR election, moreover, five of its incumbent party executives lost, and it increased the number of new votes received by 380,000, compared to the JCP's 540,000 and the JSP's 920,000. CG, p. 53.

⁷⁵ Okino Yasuharu, *Showa 30 nendai ni okeru toshika-kogyoka to tohyo kodo henka—sosenkyo ni okeru senkyoku ruigatabetsu tokyo kodo bunseki*—(Changes in voting behavior with the urbanization and industrialization in the 1955-65 decade — analysis of voting behavior in general elections by types of electoral districts) mimeographed Japanese government document, pp. 32, 33-36; CG, p. 30. In the Tokyo ward assemblies elections of April 15, 1967, the JCP ran 87 candidates, of whom 81 won, for 60% increase in JCP seats. This approximates a CGP-like performance. In the prefectural assemblies, the party increased the percentage of votes won by 2.8% to a total of 4.0%. *AS* April 18, 1967; *YS* April 18, 1967.

one seat each to the LDP and DSP, it took one seat from the DSP and JSP.⁷⁶

There are several reasons for the relative successes of the JCP. 1) Since about the spring of 1966, the party shifted away from a pro-Peking position and began to emphasize the "sovereignty and independence" of Japan's foreign policy, and to oppose both "revisionism and dogmatism." This meant advancing the Communist revolutionary movement in terms of the situation existing in Japan itself. This "lovable party" posture was formally adopted at its tenth congress held during the last week of October 1966. 2) The JCP not only maintained a moderate stance, but like the CGP and DSP strongly asserted that its hands were clean. Party secretary Miyamoto believes that this is one reason for the increase in votes for the party. 3) It is perhaps more tightly organized than the CGP; it is reportedly the second richest party; and has a larger membership than the JSP.⁷⁷

Still, the position of the JCP in the total political system is not crucial. As Ward succinctly puts it: "Its electoral and parliamentary successes have been modest." And in this election, though it bravely talked of winning 10 seats, it was able to gain only one extra seat over its pre-dissolution strength—this in the face of the 19 additional urban seats.⁷⁸

The party also cannot seem to completely become detached from the ebb and flow of events in the world of international communism. Miyamoto, for example, felt that the newspaper coverage of the Red Guards and the LDP's utilization of the news hurt its chances at the polls.⁷⁹ Even the successful joint venture with the JSP in electing Minobe cannot mask one of the basic problems that the party constantly faces: dissatisfaction on the part of moderates in the JSP with any long-term, close ties with the party.⁸⁰

The CGP could not have selected a more auspicious time than the 31st election to embark on its first try in an HOR election. The election law had been revised to add 19 new seats in urban constituencies, the very districts in which CGP strength was strongest. The corruption issue raised by the "black mist," the practical problems of livelihood—high cost of

⁷⁶ CG, p. 25

⁷⁷ Arthur J. Dommen, "Japan's Communists: Rich and Cautious," the *Reporter*, April 6, 1967, pp. 33-36; Baerwald, "Japan: Black Mist," pp. 36-37; YS January 31, 1967; Ward, *Japan's Political System*, pp. 71-72; Packard, *Protest in Tokyo*, pp. 84-85, 332; Stockwin, "The Japanese Socialist Party," p. 199.

⁷⁸ Ward, *Japan's Political System*, p. 71, also, p. 58. Though the party ran a candidate in each of the 123 electoral districts, it concentrated on 11. All five came from one of these districts. It should also be noted that though the average age of JCP candidates is low, the average age of those elected is the highest of all parties. Thus the leadership does not present a new, fresh look. CG, pp. 57, 43.

⁷⁹ Kenji Miyamoto, "Jishudokuritsu rosen de jishin," (Confidence in the autonomous-independence line), *CK Spring* 1967, p. 384; also, *SS* February 12, 1967.

⁸⁰ *MS* April 17, 1967; *JT* June 3, 1967; see also, Packard, *Protest in Tokyo*, pp. 310-315.

living, housing, traffic, pollution—matched perfectly the stated reasons for *Soka gakkai* (SG) involvement in politics. These are that: 1) politics and values cannot be separated; 2) corruption in politics was destroying values; 3) politicians must respond to the people's will; 4) the SG knows what the people desire—individual happiness and social welfare.⁸¹ Even a brief history of its electoral successes, however, is convincing evidence that the SG has never relied on fortuitous coincidences.

The SG's first try in politics was on the local level in 1955. It elected one man to the Tokyo metropolitan assembly and ninety to smaller local bodies. In July 1956, the first step into national politics was taken when the SG elected two from the national constituency and one from the local constituency in the 4th HOC election.⁸² The SG did not really begin to attract attention as a political force until 1959. On the local level, it elected four to the Tokyo metropolitan assembly, elected all of its 76 candidates to Tokyo ward assemblies, and won 261 seats in other local assemblies. On the national level, all its six candidates in the 5th HOC election won (one in local, five in the national constituency). In November 1961, the Koseiren was established, and in the 6th HOC election held in July 1963, the nine Koseiren candidates were all elected.⁸³ The SG members in the HOC, numbering 15, forthwith combined as the Komeikai, the political "party" with the third largest membership in that body. On November 17, 1964, the Koseiren became the Komeito. The Komeikai's 15 members and the 1200 members of the metropolitan, prefectural, municipal and other local assemblies became members of the CGP. A primary purpose for the change was to prepare the SG for its initial plunge into an HOR election.⁸⁴

⁸¹ James A. Dator, "The Soka Gakkai: A Socio-Political Interpretation," *Contemporary Religions in Japan*, VI (September 1965), p. 229. The very names of the "political arms" of the SG emphasize its concern with "clean government and politics." These are Komeiseijiremmei or Koseiren (Fair Politics League), Komeikai (Fair Society), and Komeito (Clean Government Party). A very promising study of the SG will be available sometime in 1968 when Professor Harry K. Nishio of the University of Toronto publishes his monograph: *An analysis of the ideology and organization of the Soka gakkai*. He was in Hawaii to study a SG general chapter (but known in Hawaii as *Nichiren shoshu*) and generously shared some of his findings and insights with me.

⁸² The 250-member HOC is broken up into two categories of members. One hundred are elected from the nation at large (national constituency). Each voter casts one vote and those with the highest totals are elected. The others are elected from prefectural or metropolitan districts (local constituencies). The councillors serve for six years and one half of the House is elected every three years. Ukai, "The Japanese House of Councillors," p. 1.

⁸³ Up to this point, all SG candidates had run as independents because article 20 of the Japanese constitution reads in part: "No religious organization shall receive any privileges from the State nor exercise any political authority." The Koseiren, Komeikai, and Komeito were organized to circumvent this constitutional provision. The SG and CGP maintain separate headquarters and their formal organizational structures are different. The CGP is the first religion-based party in the parliamentary history of Japan.

⁸⁴ Robert L. Ramseyer, "The Soka Gakkai," in *Studies in Japanese Culture* (Center for Japanese Studies Occasional Papers No. 9), ed., Richard K. Beardsley, (Ann Arbor, 1965), pp. 179-183; Lawrence Olson, "The Value Creation Society," *AUFS. East Asia*

The results achieved by the CGP in this election have already been shown. We must now address ourselves to more fundamental questions. 1) Where on the political spectrum does the CGP lie? Is it left-wing; conservative; or middle-of-the-road as it claims? 2) Which party or parties stand to lose most from CGP participation in Japanese elections? 3) What accounts for its electoral achievement so far? 4) What are its electoral prospects?

The answer to the first is that in spite of some very positive statements by some writers, the CGP's political position is not clear⁸⁵ — which is admittedly a positive statement of sorts. Helton, after a careful study of its policy statements, has concluded that the CGP is "decidedly left," by which he means that CGP policies bear a distinct resemblance to those of the JSP, DSP, and even the JCP. In this he is seconded by Stockwin who states that the CGP "seems likely to remain well to the left, and has not been averse to joint arrangements with the Communists." The new CGP chairman, Yoshikatsu Takeiri appears to support this position when he announced that, "We are *kakushin*. The present JSP is not *kakushin*. . . . What they are doing is worse than conservative. . . . We are more *kakushin* than the JSP."⁸⁶ As many, if not more, observers, however, are presently persuaded that the SG/CGP is "essentially conservative" or will become a "second conservative party." Kenji Miyamoto and Tomomi Narita, secretaries-general of the JCP and JSP respectively, feel that the CGP is or will be on the side of the LDP. Furthermore, Ukai points out that the party's voting record, prior to the HOC election of 1962 at least, was similar to that of the LDP.⁸⁷

One suspects that like all political parties, the CGP will not be bound ideologically if these strictures conflict with political demands and realities.

Series XI (June 1964), pp. 15-18; Felix Moos, "Religion and Politics in Japan: The Case of the Soka Gakkai," *Asian Survey*, III (March 1963), pp. 137-138; William Helton, "Political Prospects of Soka Gakkai," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXVIII (Fall-Winter, 1965-66), pp. 232-234; *Soka Gakkai (Komeito) gaikan* (A general view of the Soka gakkai [Komeito]), (June 1966), mimeographed Japanese government document, pp. 10-24; 96-101; *MS* July 2, 1964.

⁸⁵ Ward, "Japan's Political System," p. 73 and Baerwald, "Japan: 'Black Mist,'" p. 36.

⁸⁶ Helton, "Political Prospects," pp. 236-240; Stockwin, "The Japanese Socialist Party," p. 200. "Komeito iincho kotaigeki to korekara no dekata," (The change of Komeito chairman show and future moves), *Shukan yomiuri* February 17, 1967, p. 13. Kazuhiko Nagoya, in his "Japan's New Political Party," *Atlas*, February 1965, says that the CGP Party line is similar to that of the DSP. p. 133.

⁸⁷ Ukai, "The Japanese House of Councillors," p. 3; Miyamoto, "Jishu dokuritsu. . . jishin," p. 384; Narita, "Sohyo no dappi ga hitsuyo," p. 376; see views of Professors Hiroo Tagaki and Hirotatsu Fujiwara in *AJ* March 5, 1967, pp. 13 and 15; Iichi Oguchi and Kazuo Kasahara in *Shukan gendai* February 28, 1967, pp. 16-17. Frank Langdon says that the CGP's organization and "appeal to nationalistic and exclusive form of Buddhism represent a combination of attitudes reminiscent of prewar ultranationalistic societies and groups." *Politics in Japan* (Boston, 1967), p. 140. Olson writes that "the authorities list the Gakkai as a right-wing group," "The Value Creation Society,"

Helton himself talks of the "flexibility" of the CGP. Moreover, other parties will not let matters of religion, ideology, and theology stand in the way of compromise with the CGP if compromise will suit their political purposes.⁸⁸

It has been postulated that DSP and JCP gains have hurt the JSP. The expansion of CGP fortunes is primarily damaging to the LDP and secondarily corrosive of JSP strength. A gross example of the first proposition is given by *Asahi*. It compares the percentage of votes won by the LDP in the 30th and 31st general elections (54.7% vs. 48.8%) and shows that the LDP's share of the total vote dropped by 5.9%. And because the other parties' percentages did not change significantly and the CGP won 5.4%, it concludes that the LDP votes went to the CGP.⁸⁹ The *Chosa geppo* approaches the question in another manner but arrives at the same conclusion. It compares the percentages of votes won by each party in these two elections in the 32 districts in which the CGP ran candidates.

Table 4. Number of Districts in Which Percentages of Votes Lower Than in 1963, by Parties⁹⁰

Party	Over 10%	Between 5-10%	Under 5%	Subtotal	(A) ^a	Total
LDP	13	12	3	28	1	29 ^b
JSP	5	9	12	26	3	29
DSP	0	4	12	16	12	29
JCP	0	2	8	10	19	29

^a Number of districts in which percentages won were greater in 1967.

^b Three of the 32 districts were newly created from existing districts. To simplify matters, these three were joined to their old districts when the percentages were calculated. Thus 29 "districts" were compared, instead of 32.

When these percentages are translated into seats, it is calculated that of the 25 seats won by the CGP, nine were taken from the LDP, four from the

p. 22. The *Asahi* after the first round of the 1967 local elections combined the LDP and CGP as belonging to the *hosbu seiryoku* (conservative political camp). *AS* April 18, 1967. The Min'on and Min'en, two SG cultural groups are "confronting" two similar JCP-established organizations. *Soka Gakkai (Kometito) gaikan*, p. 83.

⁸⁸ Helton, "Political Prospects," p. 239; Kozo Sasaki, JSP chairman, in 1965 said that he was prepared to form a "Socialist Front Cabinet" with the DSP, JCP, and CGP. Stockwin, "The Japanese Socialist Party," p. 191. Just before the 31st general election, he attacked the CGP, when he sensed that CGP votes might eat into possible JSP gains. *YS* January 19, 1967. After the Tokyo gubernatorial election, he saw that Minobe would be unable to carry out his programs without CGP support, so he did the obviously necessary: He sought CGP cooperation. *YS* April 17, 1967. Inejiro Asanuma, assassinated secretary-general of the JSP, pointed to the danger that the CGP "will be used by existing politicians," by which he probably meant LDP politicians. Ramseyer, "The Soka Gakkai," p. 186.

⁸⁹ *AS* January 31, 1967; *Japan Quarterly*, "The General Election," p. 134. (Please refer to Table 3).

⁹⁰ *CG*, p. 39.

JSP, and one from the DSP, while it won 11 out of the 19 added seats.⁹¹ The LDP, then, plainly suffers from the electoral presence of the CGP. The material cited shows that the JSP too, loses because of the CGP participation in politics. Olson further puts it this way: "... in cases where no Komeikai candidate was put up Soka Gakkai members were estimated to vote conservative rather than socialist in a ratio of about 6.5 to 3.5."⁹² But the CGP hurts the JSP in a particularly vulnerable spot for it draws its support primarily in urban areas. The CGP, DSP, and in JCP, in other words, prevent the JSP from taking full advantage of the gradual weakening of LDP fortunes.

The fundamentally urban character of the CGP is clear. In 1963, all 17 of its candidates were elected to the Tokyo metropolitan assembly, making the Komeikai the third largest "party" there. The same year, it elected 971 to local assemblies, winning 2.8% of the votes cast nationwide. Seventy per cent of these votes came from five metropolitan areas and 58% came from Tokyo, Osaka and Kanagawa alone. The record this year is similar. Twenty of its 25 seats in the HOR (or 80%) came from the seven *daitofuken*. The 123 electoral districts can be broken down into four categories: metropolitan, urban, semi-rural, and rural. The CGP ran 21 candidates in the metropolitan districts, eight in urban, three in semi-rural, and none in rural districts. As we have seen earlier, the CGP won 5.3% of all the votes cast, but its percentage in the seven *daitofuken* was 11.5%.⁹³

How can the CGP successes at the polls be explained? The *Asahi* feels that the clean party image attracted some voters.⁹⁴ It is possible that the youthfulness of its leadership is attractive to some. The average age of the 25 who were elected is 41, over 10 years younger than the average age of the representatives of the next youngest party, the JSP.⁹⁵ It is

⁹¹ CG, p. 25.

⁹² Olson, "The Value Creation Society," p. 18. According to Helton, "It is said that Komeito gets two Liberal-Democrat votes for every Socialist vote. . . ." Helton, "Political Prospects," p. 233. A person acquainted with an LDP candidate of the Saitama 2nd district says that because the CGP did not have a candidate there, "many SG votes went to the conservative party." Personal correspondence. However, other results based on studies in Nagoya and Gifu (1961) and Tokyo and Tochigi (1964) showed that CGP supporters previously had voted for the LDP, by 19.4%, the JSP by 22.6% and 58% had abstained. "Komeito no taishitsu to kino," (The structure and function of the CGP), *AJ* March 5, 1967, p. 14.

⁹³ Olson, "The Value Creation Society," p. 18; CG, 30, 54; Okino, *Showa 30 nendai . . . bunseki*, pp. 128-139 (checked against list of candidates and those elected *TS* January 31, 1961); *AS* January 31, 1967.

⁹⁴ *AS* January 31, 1967; see also "Seikyoku wa . . . aruka," p. 402. It is said that some 400 Tokyo University students have joined the SG, and one of the reasons for this is that "both the Soka Gakkai and the Komeito show no sign of being associated with political corruption. their leaders leading a clean life." *Asahi Evening News*, April 3, 1967.

⁹⁵ The average age of JSP members is 53.9, while that of the independents is 45.1. CG, pp. 43-44, 54.

also possible that the SG/CGP efforts to project a middle-of-the-road respectability may be enjoying some success. Two examples of this effort may be cited. A SG cultural organization, the Minshuonagakukyokai (Democratic Music Association) also known as Min'on, with membership of 860,000, has been inviting leading foreign cultural troupes to Japan. In the fall of 1966, it invited the Novosibirsk Ballet troupe to Japan which performed to great popular acclaim. It is said that the Min'on sponsors around 250 events a month with Japanese and foreign talent.⁹⁶ The SG has been having phenomenal success with its *sogo zasshi* (monthly journal of intellectuals' opinions). This periodical, *Ushio*, was first published in 1960. By the end of 1963, it had overtaken two leading *sogo zasshi*, the *Chuo koron* and *Sekai*. It is now said to have a circulation of 340,000, many of whom are SG members. First rate scholars, critics, and journalists are well paid to write for this periodical without the SG exercising any editorial control. It is therefore highly regarded and gives a sheen of respectability to the SG.⁹⁷

There is one danger for the SG/CGP in this attempt to gain middle-class respectability. The more successful they become, the less militant and cohesive they may become. One consequence may be that some members will shift their support to other parties.⁹⁸

The two most important reasons for its successes are: 1) it is perhaps the only party with a recognizable, solid-core mass base; and, 2) if it is not the equal of, it is at least a very close second to the JCP as the most tightly-organized political party in Japan. Having made the point about a recognizable mass base, one is immediately forced to state that there are great differences in the estimates of SG membership. The estimates range from 4,000,000 in 1958 (Ramseyer), to 7,000,000 in 1964 (Olson), to 10,000,000 in 1967 (Ward).⁹⁹ It is from this great pool of believers that

⁹⁶ AS September 20, 1966; *Soka gakkai (Komeito) gaikan*, pp. 82-83.

⁹⁷ The estimated circulations of the three other leading journals of opinions are: *Bungei shunju* 580,000, *Chuo koron*, 140,000, *Sekai* 90,000. AS September 20, 1966; direct contact with Ushio publishers; *Soka gakkai (Komeito) gaikan*, p. 137. The SG is not neglecting any segment of society. It has established a chain of restaurants called *Yoro no taki* which serve what the Japanese like to call "inexpensive but delicious food and drinks." It is estimated that there are over 100 of these restaurants in Tokyo, and they are always crowded, though not necessarily only with SG members.

⁹⁸ ". . . there is a connection between support for the Liberal Democratic Party and consciousness of belonging to the middle class." Watanuki, "Political Attitudes," p. 168. Cf. Ward, *Japan's Political System*, p. 41.

⁹⁹ Ramseyer, "The Soka Gakkai," p. 141; Olson, "The Value Creation Society," p. 13; Ward, *Japan's Political System*, p. 72. The *New York Times* in 1964 guessed the membership at 12,000,000 (May 13, 1964). Moos in 1962 placed the number at 3,500,000. "Religion and Politics in Japan," p. 140. The SG itself claims a membership of 15,000,000. Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 72. Ramseyer states that one difficulty in calculating membership is that membership in religious bodies is often given in terms of households rather than individuals. Ramseyer, *op. cit.*, p. 189. This problem is compounded in the case of the SG because it tends to count as one *setai* (household)

the CGP draws its disciplined votes. In some important ways, the CGP resembles the highly disciplined JCP. The CGP, like the JCP, has favored a cell-type organization. It has, as does the JCP, the only corps of devoted, voluntary workers working in the urban areas. The JSP receives low marks on these two points, being characterized by a diffused organization, and dependent on union backing which is not necessarily dependable or dedicated.¹⁰⁰

The manifestations and the results of the CGP's rigidly organized and disciplined voting are what attracts attention and dismays rival parties and non-SG members. In the 6th (1962) HOC election, for example, 95% of the Komeikai votes were cast by regional blocs as pre-planned by SG leadership. One candidate received 449,635 votes out of his nationwide total of 459,789 votes from seven prefectures in western Japan. In the 7th (1965) HOC election, another CGP candidate received 93% of his 594,210 votes from four prefectures. SG members are sometimes moved from one prefecture to another where votes are required.¹⁰¹

The CGP's electoral success provides the best proof for Ward's proposition that Japan's multimember constituency, single-vote system has a "built-in bias in favor of [effectively disciplined-mine] weaker parties and candidates." In the local elections of April 1959, the record was 76 out of 76 in the Tokyo ward elections, and 261 out of 287 in other local assemblies. In this general election, it won only 5.8% of the votes but elected 25, and all CGP losers were *jitensha* (runner-ups). The independents won 5.41% of the votes but only nine were elected. In the first round of the local elections of April 15, 1967, the CGP elected 61 out of 67 candidates to municipal assemblies of five major cities (Yokohama, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka, Kobe), and 839 out of 875 in smaller legislative

everytime a *gobonzon* (a piece of paper inscribed with words from the Lotus sutra) is presented. The rationale is that one believer in a household will surely mean the conversion of the others. See Moos, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-141; *AS* July 13, 1965. In early 1967, SG headquarters announced that there were 6,100,000 *setai* in the organization. *MS* February 7, 1967. I personally favor the figure cited in Kasahara who says that SG has below 1,500,000 *setai* with the *setai* not constituted as popularly construed. Kazuo Kasahara, *Seiji to shukyo: kiro ni tatsu Soka gakkai* (Politics and Religion: Soka gakkai at the crossroads) (Tokyo, 1965), pp. 293-294. The following also seems reasonable. A survey on Japanese attitudes revealed that in late 1963, 2,000,000 *adults* (age 20 and above) would have acknowledged belief in SG tenets. Tatsuzo Suzuki, *A Study of the Japanese National Character-Part III. Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Supplement IV, 1966*, pp. 22-23.

¹⁰⁰ Stockwin, "The Japanese Socialist Party," p. 194; Watanuki, *Nihon no seiji shakai*, p. 221; Packard, *Protest in Tokyo*, p. 85. The CGP also boasts of 200,000 members, whereas the JSP has an estimated membership of between 50-60,000. The JCP membership in 1965 was estimated to be about 130,000 members. Ward, *Japan's Political System*, p. 72.

¹⁰¹ Olson, "The Value Creation Society," p. 17; Helton, "Political Prospects," pp. 235-236; Kiyooki Murata, "Komeito in Election," *JT* July 22, 1965, "Stamping in Nichiren's Footsteps," *Economist*, March 20, 1965.

bodies. In the second round, held on April 28, 90% of its candidates were elected.¹⁰²

What are the CGP's electoral prospects? Helton's statement that, ". . . it is unlikely that the Komeito will ever be able to capture more than 20 per cent of the popular vote," standing by itself is not very meaningful. The CGP has already won 13.7% of the popular vote in the 7th (1965) HOC election.¹⁰³ However, a 15% popular vote in an HOR election, assuming the same care and discipline shown thus far, would cause a dramatic change in the Japanese political picture. But is the CGP likely to achieve this kind of success in a Lower House election? Assuming no radical changes in the domestic economic picture and drastic power realignments outside of Japan, it is *not* probable that the CGP will continue to make *significant* gains in elections and drastically alter the political balance in Japan. The main reason is that both the SG and the CGP have "built-in" limitations.

For one thing, as pointed out earlier, the CGP is essentially an urban-based party. Its strength is limited to certain urban centers such as Osaka and Tokyo, and coal mining regions of southern Honshu, Kyushu, and Hokkaido.¹⁰⁴ CGP power is also conditional on the continued growth of the SG. The SG appeals to the less fortunate and the dissatisfied, but economic conditions are improving in Japan. It attracts the credulous, but the credulous are declining in number. It preaches a crisis philosophy, but fewer and fewer Japanese feel a sense of crisis.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² Kiyaoiki Murata, "New Force in Politics," *Japan Times Weekly*, June 3, 1967; *JT* April 30, 1967.

Komeito members in legislative bodies:

Prefectural	107	(46)
Tokyo ward	129	(136)
Municipal	1165	(839)
Town and village	480	(287)
HOR	25	
HOC	20	

(Figures in parenthesis indicate numbers prior to April 1967 elections. The CGP has yet to elect a person to an executive position as mayor or governor).

AS April 17, 1967; MS February 7, 1967; April 17, 1967; *Seikyo shimbun* May 1, 1967.

¹⁰³ Helton, "Political Prospects," p. 240. Togawa says that the CGP has a good chance to pick up the approximately 6% "floating vote" that is usually available in an HOC election. If this occurs, the CGP can receive 20% of the total votes in an HOC election. He also feels that urbanization will enable the CGP to achieve further electoral successes. He predicts that after the 8th (1968) HOC election, the CGP will have 30 members in the HOC, an increase of 10 over the present 20. Isao Togawa, *Zenshin. suru Komeito* (Advancing Komeito) (Tokyo, 1966), pp. 214-218.

¹⁰⁴ Helton, "Political Prospects," p. 241.

¹⁰⁵ Olson, "The Value Creation Society," pp. 22-23; *Economist*, March 20, 1965. Dore says that the JSP, too, suffers from the diminishing sense of crisis in Japan. "The Japanese Socialist Party," p. 11.

The SG and its political arm are also handicapped by a negative image. In a telepoll interview conducted by NTV television in 1964, 42% of 1500 people interviewed said that the SG was "fanatical" and only 2% said that they might vote for Koseiren candidates. At the same time, the Koseiren ranked only slightly behind the JCP as the party most frequently named in the question, "What party would you absolutely not vote for?"¹⁰⁶ And finally, its intolerance and successes have caused other groups and parties to counter-attack. Tanro (Japan Federation of Coal Mine Workers' Union) has had some success in diminishing SG influence among coal miners. Shinshuren (Union of New Religions in Japan) is attempting to cause defection among SG members and to stop them from voting for the CGP.¹⁰⁷ The SG/CGP faces attacks from another sector: commentators and scholars. Recently the questioning has become sharper. An example is Mamoru Sakamoto's "Ikeda Daisaku shi e no shitsumonjo," (Questions to Mr. Daisaku Ikeda), an article in which Sakamoto, among other things, criticized the inseparable relation between the SG and CGP.¹⁰⁸ These attacks, however, may have some beneficial effects for the CGP in that it may draw the membership closer, increase its militancy, and enable the leadership to cope with weaknesses exposed by the attacks.

Indeed, the CGP has continued to enjoy good successes, and will probably continue to do so for some time. We have already mentioned their achievements in the April local election.¹⁰⁹ However, the basic proposition still stands: the CGP probably will not make significant gains, enough to drastically alter the political structure of Japan. Tentative evidence is available to support this proposition.

¹⁰⁶ Dator, "The Soka Gakkai," p. 233-234.

¹⁰⁷ Helton, "Political Prospects," pp. 241-242; Ramseyer, "The Soka Gakkai," pp. 177-178; Kiyooki Murata, "A Battle of Faiths," *JT* November 2, 1965. See also Eda, "Leadership no ketsujo," p. 378; "'Kuroi kiri' sonsenkyo. . . kekka," p. 39; "Tatoka e no izanai," (Pull towards multipartism), *AJ* December 18, 1966, pp. 87-93.

¹⁰⁸ *Jiyu*, March 1967, pp. 35-48. Daisaku Ikeda, the president of the SG, was constrained to reply in the May issue of *Jiyu*, "Komeito e no gimon ni kotaeru," (Replies to doubts about the CGP), pp. 68-84. Other examples are Hajime Shinohara's, "Komeito e no gimon," (Doubts about the CGP), *Sekai* April 1967, pp. 67-75; Hirotsugu Fujiwara, "Komeito nanatsu no tsumi," (The seven faults of the CGP), *Shimpyo* April 1967, pp. 20-39; Joji Watanuki, "Komeito," *SS* January 8, 1967.

¹⁰⁹ The showing made by the CGP on the local level is a measure of its approach to politics and of its successes. It is building from the bottom up. In this election, 18 of the 25 who were elected had had previous experience in legislative bodies on the local level while the other seven were involved in regional politics as officials of SG. *CG*, p. 54. See also "Komeito no taishitsu to kino," p. 12. The CGP is here described as being almost compulsively concerned with day-to-day contacts with the electorate, a point of great difference with the other parties. The CGP also can and does shrewdly maximize its position as holder of the casting vote in assemblies. This may ultimately prove its strongest political asset.

Table 5. Number of Votes Per SG *setai* in HOC Elections.¹¹⁰

Election No.	Votes Won by SG (round numbers)	No. of <i>setai</i> (round numbers)	No. of Votes Per <i>setai</i>
4th (1956)	991,000 (3.5%) ^a	406,000	2.44
5th (1959)	2,486,000 (8.5%)	1,177,000	2.32
6th (1962)	4,124,000 (11.6%)	2,700,000	1.52
7th (1965)	5,097,000 (13.7%)	5,300,000	0.96

^a Percentage of total votes cast in elections.

The following statements may be made about this table. 1) The number of *setai* is exaggerated by the SG and/or the manner of counting *setai* is peculiar to the SG (see fn. 99). 2) The SG has a considerable number of young members who do not vote. It is believed that its membership composition is changing from family members to unmarried young members who are still counted as *setai*.¹¹¹ Therefore, *setai* count no longer gives an accurate picture of SG electoral power. If the young continue to remain in the organization, however, this factor would work in favor of the CGP. But there is no guarantee that the SG has an iron-grip on its membership.¹¹² 3) The SG electoral strength has just about reached a plateau because SG has generally reached the limit of its membership. 4) SG members are abstaining or are voting for other parties.¹¹³

If we take the number of CGP votes in the 32 electoral districts in 1967 and compare it with the total number of votes won in these same districts by CGP candidates running in the national constituency in the 1965 HOC election, we find that the CGP vote increased in 1967 by about 270,000.

¹¹⁰ AS July 13, 1965; January 18, 1967.

¹¹¹ The SG claims 150,000 college and university students and 100,000 high school students as members. MS February 7, 1967. These numbers are hard to believe. They also do not include young members who do not attend school.

¹¹² One source estimates that the average length of membership is from three to four years. Olson, "The Value Creation Society," p. 23; in Osaka, out of ten new members, four have remained loyal, four have blackslided; and two have "disappeared." Ramseyer, "The Soka Gakkai," p. 179. He also adds that many young members in large plants in the Kawasaki and Tsurumi areas left "after a few weeks," *op. cit.*, p. 177. In the *setai* count, blacksliders may still be included and counted. Kasahara, *Seiji to shukyo*, p. 275.

¹¹³ Helton, "Political Prospects," p. 242. Kasahara speaking of the 1962 HOC election says that "quite a few" SG members did not support SG participation in politics. *Seiji to shukyo*, p. 273. However, other sources show that CGP members are really tightly-knit, one maintaining that 99% of SG members support the CGP. AJ December 18, 1966. An *Asahi* opinion survey shows that CGP members are solidly against the Sato cabinet and highly negative in their views of the accomplishments of the conservative government. They are stronger in their criticism than JSP and DSP supporters and closer to JCP supporters in this regard. "Komeito no taishitsu to kino," pp. 14, 16. All of these statements may ultimately be disputed when the findings of Mr. James White who is working on the CGP for his Ph.D. thesis (Stanford) are available.

According to the SG organ *Seikyo shimbun* the number of converts in these 32 districts had increased by 600,000 since 1965. This is further indication, perhaps, that the SG appeals to younger people who do not vote, or, the CGP is not attracting the floating vote.¹¹⁴

The April 15 elections in Tokyo, however, have provided the clearest signs of CGP peaking—at least in Tokyo. Its gubernatorial candidate, Ken'ichi Abe, won 601,527 votes or 12.4% of the total. This was 18,000 votes less than the total CGP vote in the 31st general election and much less than the 800,000 votes it boasted it would win. It was in the elections for ward assemblies, however, that the CGP suffered its biggest setbacks. In 1963, it ran 136 candidates and elected them all. In 1967, it put up 202 candidates, talked of 100% success, and had to be satisfied with 124 assemblymen, or a 61.4% ratio. In the process, the CGP yielded to the JSP the position as the party with the second largest number of members in ward assemblies. In one ward, only one out of eight was elected, in another three out of 16, and in still another, three of eight. In nine of the 22 wards (one ward out of 23 did not hold an election), only half of the candidates were elected. The CGP, in short, has begun to fall prey to weaknesses plaguing older, more successful parties: inability to control candidacy and *tomogui* or “cannibalism.”¹¹⁵

The 31st general election cannot be considered a political turning point if one were expecting dramatic turns of event. The DSP and JCP made modest gains, thus continuing the trend evident since the last two HOR elections. The CGP achievement was generally what was expected, and the results do not herald any sudden upswing in CGP electoral fortunes. The advances made by these three parties, have however, eaten into the electoral and representational strengths of the two largest parties, the LDP and JSP. More and more, therefore, one hears the term *tatoka* (transformation into multi-partism) being used by politicians, political commentators, and newspapermen. Takeo Fukuda of the LDP is emphatic in maintaining that there is no multi-party system in Japan, that is, defining multi-partism as the absence of a party with an absolute majority which forces a coalition government to be formed.¹¹⁶ One suspects that his insistent vehemence on this

¹¹⁴ “Senkyo kekka. . . mono,” p. 371. *CG*, pp. 54-55. We will be closer to definitive answers to these and other questions when the results of a detailed and comprehensive survey on the political consciousness and voting behavior of young Japanese is published by Professors Akira Kubota and Robert E. Ward of Michigan University. The questionnaire is in two major parts (pre- and post-election), covers a wide range of topics, the five parties, plus independents and minor parties.

¹¹⁵ *MS* April 17, 1967; *Japan Times Weekly* June 3, 1967; *AS* April 17, 18, 1967.

¹¹⁶ Fukuda, “Wagato ga nobiru jishin,” p. 373; *YS* January 31, 1967; also *AS* editorial January 31, 1967. Cf. views of Eiichi Nishimura, secretary-general, DSP, “Shim-poteki hoshu to kensetsuteki kakushin e no michi.” (Progressive conservatism and constructive reformism) *CK Spring* 1967, p. 380. The *Yomiuri* maintains that *tatoka* is a continuing trend as evidenced by the results of the April 15 prefectural assemblies

point masks a concern about the implications of the so-called *tatoka* phenomenon. This is that the LDP's electoral position is slowly, but surely being corroded. If the LDP feels some anxiety, the JSP must certainly feel anxious.¹¹⁷ For one lesson of this election is that the JSP, unless it changes in certain basic ways, will have to be satisfied with "permanent" minority party status. To be sure, the LDP shares with the JSP certain basic shortcomings. However, the JSP as the much weaker party cannot afford to carry these burdens.

Immediately after this election, JSP secretary-general Narita listed the party's three basic shortcomings, all of which are closely related.¹¹⁸ The first is *nichijo katsudo no fusoku* (inadequacy of [the party's] day-to-day activities). This statement points to a number of failures: the failure of the party to sell its programs on a year-round basis; the failure to deal with problems directly involving the people's livelihood; the involvement with foreign policy questions to the detriment of the attention which should be paid to domestic problems; opposition for opposition's sake in the Diet; and adherence to theory and unrealistic positions.¹¹⁹ And if two recent studies have any significance at all, it is that the JSP for the past decade at least has had its priorities gravely confused. Mendel writes that, "From all studies of Japanese public opinion after 1952, it seems clear that the LDP wins elections despite its unpopular foreign policies."¹²⁰ An *Asahi* poll suggests a reason for this. In the poll, taken in 1966, 80% of the respondents said that they knew of the "black mist" scandals. Yet, only 10% "wanted a cleaning up and disciplining of Japanese politics," while 33% were concerned with high prices. Moreover, the same poll showed that the most desirable type of politician was one that "got things done," whereas only six per cent admired "persons with an idealist character," and only four per cent lauded "theoretic persons."¹²¹ The reader is directed to Dore's article for one of the finest exposition of the reasons

elections. *YS* editorial April 17, 1967. Maurice Duverger discusses multi-partism in his *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State* (New York, 1965), pp. 228-255.

¹¹⁷ After dissecting the causes of the JSP's poor showing in this election, the *Yomiuri* declared that, "In a certain sense, the JSP is facing an even greater danger than the LDP." *YS* editorial January 31, 1967. The paper also said after the April 15 elections that had the party lost in the Tokyo gubernatorial election, the damage to the party would have been irreparable. *YS* April 16, 1967.

¹¹⁸ *AS* January 31, 1967; *YS* February 1, 1967; see also *AS* editorial January 31, 1967.

¹¹⁹ "Seiji no kotoba: tatakau shisei," (Political discussion: fighting posture), *CK* April 1967, pp. 46-51. In this article, five men who are obviously sympathetic to the JSP twits the party for being overly theoretical and not enough concerned about concrete problems. *YS* editorial January 31, 1967; *AS* February 5, 1967; Ward, *Japan's Political System*, p. 74.

¹²⁰ Mendel, "Japanese Views of Sato's Foreign Policy," p. 444.

¹²¹ Goto, "Political Awareness Among the Japanese," pp. 168, 173.

for the JSP's weakness and the difficulties the party faces in trying to overcome these debilities.¹²² Japanese commentators embarrass the party by reminding it that it had promised to reform after every recent election.¹²³

The second is the JSP's *giintoteki taishitsu* (structure as a parliamentary party). This means that the JSP pays primary attention to the HOR and the activities there. It also means that the party becomes attentive to the electorate only during campaigns. The LDP also shares this liability, but the party at least has deep and widespread roots on the local level. We have also seen that the CGP is building from the bottom up. The JSP's political strength, it has been aptly observed, "must be represented by an inverted pyramid, with its greatest support coming at the national level."¹²⁴

The third weakness is *rogumi izon* or overdependence on labor unions. The party is dependent on unions, especially the Sohyo, for money, votes, hard-core workers, and members to the HOR.¹²⁵ The dangers of this overdependence are: 1) the party's image is that of a class party of workingmen which limits its appeal; 2) because the unions provide a ready-made organization and source of funds, the party does not work very hard on strengthening party organization or to seek new members or funds; 3) if Sohyo support is diminished, the party would have a difficult time trying to recoup;¹²⁶ 4) there is encouragement of political cynicism which works

¹²² "The Japanese Socialist Party and 'Structural Reform,'" pp. 3-15; see also Scalapino, "Japanese Socialism in Crisis," *Foreign Affairs* XXXVIII (January 1960), pp. 318-328; Stockwin, "The Japanese Socialist Party," pp. 187-200.

¹²³ AS editorial January 31, 1967; SS January 31, 1967; "Seiji no kotoba," p. 46.

¹²⁴ Scalapino and Masumi, *Parties and Politics*, pp. 95-97. Ward also points out that JSP local organizations exist in "somewhat more than one-third of Japan's 3,422 prefectures, cities, town and villages." Ward *op. cit.*, p. 67. This means that the JSP has no local organizations in about 2,100 political subdivisions. The JSP has also launched several membership drives to broaden its bases, but has been unsuccessful. Its membership has been stable or stagnant for at least over a decade. Estimates vary from "not over 60,000 in 1960" (Scalapino and Masumi, *op. cit.*, p. 96) to 42,975 in 1961 (Dore, "The Japanese Socialist Party," p. 10) to "a little over 50,000" in 1967 (Ward, *op. cit.*, pp. 67, 68; JT January 15, 1967). The highest figure, 80,000 for 1959, is cited in Packard, *Protest in Tokyo*, p. 85; Cf. p. 312. The LDP like the JSP has many nominal members, but membership is far greater. Ward gives the figure 350,000 for 1966, out of a claimed membership of 1,700,000. Ward, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-63.

¹²⁵ The amount of money contributed is not known, but the Sohyo is the single largest contributor to the JSP. Ward, *Japan's Political System*, p. 68, see also, pp. 76-77. One estimate is that "over 50% of the party members are workers, most of them from organized labor." Robert A. Scalapino, "Japanese Socialism in Crisis," p. 322. In the period 1958-60, some fifty per cent of the JSP members of the HOR had union backgrounds. Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 69. In this election, Sohyo announced that 209 candidates were connected in some way with Sohyo. YS February 1, 1967. One source states that of the 140 elected, 72 or 51% had a history of labor unionism, and 69 were with the Sohyo. CG, pp. 45-46. See also *Dai sanjuiikkai. . . bunseki*, pp. 166-170.

¹²⁶ For the first time in years, Sohyo membership dropped whereas the rival Domei's membership climbed. According to Labor Ministry figures, at the end of June 1966, Sohyo membership stood at 4,250,000. Compared with the same period in 1965, this represented a drop of about 2,200. The Domei had a membership of 1,720,000 and compared with the same period in 1965, this was an increase of about 57,000. CG, p. 53.

to the detriment of the party. For example, after the election, Narita said that in spite of the defeat, the fact that many "new faces" were elected gave the JSP hope. However, it was clear to most observers that these new faces were essentially labor union leaders and that the unions sent new faces to the HOR by shifting their support among union candidates.¹²⁷

In spite of these weaknesses and the persistence of these weaknesses, the future for the JSP is not one of unrelieved gloom. In this election, while the party lost in the urban districts, in certain rural areas which are strongly conservative, it has made some gains. In Yamagata, Fukui, Kumamoto and Oita prefectures, the percentage of votes won went up by over 5%. The party also made gains in rural Tokushima, Kochi prefectures, and the Kanagawa third, in spite of CGP candidates there.¹²⁸ In the April 1967 local elections, the party also made gains in prefectural assemblies, the Tokyo ward assemblies, and mayoralty races.¹²⁹ The most cheering success was the election of Ryokichi Minobe as governor of Tokyo. Here is a special opportunity for the party to break out of what Scalapino has called a closed circle: "in order to retain responsibility, it must acquire power; but in order to acquire power, it must attain responsibility."¹³⁰ One of the first party reaction to Minobe's victory was that it will try to seek the people's confidence in the JSP by doing a good job of administering Tokyo. The party also pointed to the successful administration of JSP mayor Kazuo Asukata of Yokohama from 1963-67 as one of the reasons for Minobe's victory. Indeed, if Asukata's margin of victory in 1967 is a measure of the fruits of the exercise of responsible power, then the JSP's future may be more hopeful than the results of this election have indicated.¹³¹

It has already been shown that the election results cannot give the LDP cause for wild optimism. If the JSP is prisoner of its past, then the LDP has reasons for the serious concern over future socio-economic-political trends in Japan. For over a decade now, scholars, government and newspaper analysts, and politicians have been measuring the urbanization rate, the shifts in educational attainment, age brackets, and industrialization and have been pondering over the political consequences of these changes. Certain

¹²⁷ *AS* January 31, 1967; *YS* editorial January 31, 1967. Twenty-seven out of 56 "new face" candidates and 16 out of 32 new faces elected were from labor unions. *Dai sanjuikkai bunseki*, pp. 55, 116-117.

¹²⁸ *CG*, pp. 30, 41, 20-21, 51. LDP votes dropped in the conservative bastions of Iwate (by 10.31%), Yamagata (12.16%), Gifu (14.40%), Ibaragi (13.41%). *CG*, p. 20

¹²⁹ *AS* April 17, 18, 1967; *JT* April 30, 1967; *YS* April 18, 1967.

¹³⁰ Scalapino, "Japanese Socialism in Crisis," p. 327. The grave difficulties facing Minobe, however, are described in "New Governor Faces Red Tape," *JT* April 18, 1967. It is also noted that there has been "progressively-minded prefectural governors," and "progressive mayors." *Asahi Evening News* editorial April 25, 1967.

¹³¹ *AS* April 17, 1967. In 1963 Asukata won 43% of the votes, while his opponents won 57%. On April 15, 1967, he won 62%, while his two rivals won 38%. *MS* April 17, 1967.

care, however, must be used in handling the published studies. Firstly, many simply categorize the non-LDP parties under the rubric, *kakushin* (see fn. 13). This practice has some utility because it isolates the LDP, thus making it simpler to analyze trends affecting that party. However, the non-specialist is prevented from distinguishing fundamental differences between parties lumped together as *kakushin*. Furthermore, it tends to deflect attention from the small, gradual, but significant trends affecting the JSP. Still another difficulty arising from this practice is that while studies by Masumi and Watanuki have shown that people are now gradually voting for parties rather than personalities in HOR elections, the pull of personalities is still very strong.¹³² Thus the use of *kakushin* tends to give a somewhat distorted impression of the importance of party voting. Secondly, Japanese statistics, as Ward correctly points out, somewhat overstates the truly urban segment of the population, and people like Okino follow Japanese census practice and categorizes as *shibu* (urban sector) those entities which are administered as cities and all the other entities as *gumbu* (rural sector—towns and villages). Okino admits that this is a “formal and mechanistic division which in many instances may not be related to actualities.”¹³³ Thirdly, Watanuki clearly shows that occupation is not necessarily an infallible guide to predicting political behavior, so that the shifts from primary to tertiary industries in Japan cannot be said to automatically result in LDP losses.¹³⁴ Subject to these qualifications, which are carefully made by people like Ward, Okino, and Watanuki, there can be no denying that the shifts toward urbanization and toward secondary and tertiary occupations are causing a gradual deterioration of the LDP electoral and representational positions.

Okino in his long and detailed study concludes that in all the 19 metropolitan electoral districts and a majority of the urban electoral districts, the non-LDP parties have shown gains at the expense of the LDP.”¹³⁵ More significantly, powerful voices in the LDP and among LDP supporters believe that these trends, put into motion by the socio-economic programs of the LDP-controlled governments, forebode dark days for the party unless it “reforms.”¹³⁶

¹³² Goto, “Political Awareness Among the Japanese,” p. 172.

¹³³ Ward, *Japan's Political System*, p. 35; Okino, *Showa 30 nendai . . . bunseki*, pp. 14-15. The Agriculture-Forestry Ministry also announced that the influx from villages to cities dropped in 1966. *JT* May 4, 1967. I have also been guilty in not being precise enough in using the terms, “urban,” “rural,” “metropolitan,” and “local.”

¹³⁴ Toji Watanuki, “Political Consciousness and Behavior of the Old Middle Class,” *JSPJ*, II (December 1964), pp. 127-132; also his “Political Attitudes,” pp. 170-171.

¹³⁵ Okino, *Showa 30 nendai . . . bunseki*, pp. 125-126.

¹³⁶ Yasuhiro Nakasone, “Mondai wa leader no image,” (The problem is leader's image) *CK Spring* 1967, pp. 374-375; Ishida, “Hoshu seito no vision,” pp. 93-94; Iwasa, “Jiminto ni atarashii shiren,” pp. 390-391; Heigo Fujii, “Jiko hansei no ue ni tatte dappi wo,” (Renovation on the basis of self-criticism), *CK Spring* 1967, pp. 392-393.

At present, and on balance, however, the prospects for the LDP are somewhat better than the outlook for the JSP. This is because the LDP has some advantages unavailable to the JSP. First, one aspect of the electoral system favors the LDP. This is the underrepresentation of the urban districts. The reapportionment which added 19 new seats has not really touched the roots of the inequities between urban and rural districts. Since, as Ward states, "few institutions are more difficult to change than electoral systems," these inequities will continue to handicap the JSP and other non-LDP parties.¹³⁷ Second, while it is true that the number of qualified voters are increasing in the metropolitan and urban electoral districts, these voters are not going to the polls in numbers matching those from semi-rural and rural districts. Watanuki has called this kind of behavior, "habitual apathy."¹³⁸ A third advantage is the LDP's close connection with big business and highly placed bureaucrats and ex-bureaucrats. The first group provides funds unmatched by the unions; the second, expertise to deal with complex problems of modern society—problems deeply affecting political decisions and politicians.¹³⁹ A fourth advantage involves factors difficult to measure: resiliency, continuity in power which gives the LDP room for adjustment, the pragmatism and professionalism of the LDP which enables factions to reach agreements on issues more readily than the theoret-

Nakasone and Ishida are now part of the "anti-mainstream" faction of the LDP. *Yomiuri* reported that the LDP was "resigned" to losing the Tokyo governorship to the JSP because the "advancing *kakushin* strength in the metropolitan areas resembled silkworms eating through mulberry leaves." It further stated that the "political world" accepts the fact that urbanization and shifts in industrialization will bring about the *kakushinka* (control by "progressives") of the urban areas. *YS* April 18, 1967. See also *AS* April 17, 1967; Minoru Shimizu, "LDP's Urban Policies," *JT* April 22, 1967.

¹³⁷ Ward, *Japan's Political System*, p. 55. In the Chiba 1st (urban), the runner-up lost with 91,783 votes, whereas in the rural Chiba 2nd, two candidates won with little over 30,000 votes. In the Tokyo 7th, the runner-up had 96,620 votes. *AS* editorial January 31, 1967; *CG*, p. 21. See also, Kyogoku and Ike, "Urban and Rural Differences," pp. 16-19. For the most comprehensive discussion on the weaknesses of Japan's electoral system and the obstacles to reform, see Robert E. Ward, "Recent Electoral Developments in Japan," *Asian Survey* VI (October 1966), pp. 547-567.

¹³⁸ *CG*, p. 12; Okino, *Showa 30 nendai . . . bunseki*, pp. 51-52; Watanuki, "Political Attitudes," p. 168. See also, Kyogoku and Ike, "Urban-Rural Differences," pp. 9-12. A study using the July 1965 HOC election as a basis shows that the situation reported by Kyogoku and Ike, that metropolitan and urban non-voting is higher than rural abstentions still obtains. See Mitsunori Ohara, *Toshika to kikenka no jittai*, (Urbanization and abstention), mimeographed Japanese government document.

¹³⁹ Ward, *Japan's Political System*, p. 99. He says of the 168 JSP members of the HOR in the 1958-60 period, only four per cent had bureaucratic backgrounds. A survey in 1963 showed that about 25% of the 300 LDP members in the HOR were former high-ranking ex-bureaucrats in the national and prefectural governments. Ward, *op. cit.*, pp. 66, 69. In this election, of the 277 elected, 97 had bureaucratic experience. *CG*, p. 45. The whole issue of the *Annals of the Japanese Political Science Association*, 1967 is devoted to the subject: "The Parties and Bureaucracy in Contemporary Japan—Since the Conservative Fusion in 1955," (Tokyo, 1967). The bureaucrats also appear to have another advantage: the Japanese hold "government bureaucrats in high esteem." Goto, "Political Awareness among the Japanese," pp. 170, 172.

tically-oriented JSP.¹⁴⁰ A concrete benefit stemming from these factors was the generally effective candidate control exercised by the party in this election. A fifth and incomparable asset of the LDP is the prosperity enjoyed by the Japanese today. A good illustration of the benefit accrued to the LDP from this factor is the alienation of the young Japanese voter from the JSP. A decade ago, 41.5-44% of voters in the 20-35 year age bracket supported the socialists, whereas the conservatives were backed by 33-35% of this age group. In 1963, the percentages remained unchanged for the conservatives, but the support for the socialists has dropped to about 30%. In 1966, according to the *Asabi* poll of 1966, 34% of the respondents in their 20's supported the LDP while 30%, the JSP. Nishihira suggests that Japan's accelerated economic growth rate has led to fewer "social dissatisfactions"—previously one of the prime reasons for supporting what he calls the progressive parties.¹⁴¹ A point to note is that the support for the conservatives has remained fairly constant whereas the JSP support has dropped. It would appear that the young voter and the urbanite, who are more apt to vote for the JSP, are now marking time: disenchanted with the LDP, but unable to bring themselves to voting for the JSP for fear of rocking the prosperity boat."¹⁴²

And so we witness the continued LDP strength at the polls. It has yet to win less than 50% of the votes cast in a nationwide election, if the percentage of the votes won by successful conservative independents are added.¹⁴³ The results of the April local elections tell the story of continued LDP/conservative strength in Japan. The press pointed to gains made by the other parties, but also stressed that "no great changes resulted from the gubernatorial elections," "in the prefectural assemblies, the conservatives are overwhelmingly strong as usual, winning more than half (1536) of 2734 seats," "in the Tokyo ward assemblies, the LDP won 542 of 1039

¹⁴⁰ Mendel, "Behind the 1960 Japanese Diet Election," p. 11; Scalapino, "Japanese Socialism in Crisis," p. 327. Ward, *Japan's Political System*, p. 74.

¹⁴¹ Warren M. Tsuneishi, *Japanese Political Style: An Introduction to the Government and Politics of Modern Japan* (New York, 1966), p. 128; Goto, "Political Awareness Among the Japanese," pp. 173-174; Shigeki Nishihira, "Are Young People Becoming More Conservative?" *JSPJ* II (December 1964), pp. 137-143. He cites other reasons for the growing lack of appeal of the "progressive parties."

¹⁴² In the Tokyo gubernatorial election, however, Minobe led Matsushita by 12% among voters in their 20's, 17% among those in their 30's, and by 6% among those in their 40's. Matsushita led by 13% among those in their 50's and 22% among those in their 60's and above. *YS* April 18, 1967. As Japan's standard of living rises, there will be fewer babies born and an increasing number of elderly citizens. This development will favor the LDP.

¹⁴³ In the general election, the LDP went below 50% (48.80%) for the first time, but to this is added the 5.41% won by independents, eight of the nine being conservatives. In the April 15, 1967 elections for prefectural assemblies, the LDP for the first time also won less than 50% (48.3%) of the total votes cast. However, the independents won 16.63%, and 70% of this is "LDP-inclined." *MS* April 17, 1967.

seats," "of the 564 mayors, 80% are conservatives or conservative independents."¹⁴⁴

The "on the one hand this," "on the other hand that" approach in this article is revelatory of the real significance of this election: a reaffirmation of political stability in Japan. For the various reasons stated in this article, the LDP while unquestionably losing ground, is not losing swiftly and precipitately, and the JSP, the putative and "logical" beneficiary of LDP losses is not making much progress. The disenchanted voter turns to the three minor parties, but these parties too, suffer from certain weaknesses. All three are urban-based, and the CGP and JCP, because of their militancy, past and present the nature of their organizations and programs, are still distrusted by a majority of the voters, while the DSP suffers from many of the same infirmities afflicting the LDP and JSP. The result then, is for the development of a distinctively Japanese brand of multipartism. An even more important result is that the very gradualness of the erosion of LDP strength will enable politicians and parties to make adjustments to the changing political structure, which in turn will contribute to the further stability of the political system.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁴ *AS* editorial April 17, 1967; *AS* April 18, 30, 1967; *YS* April 16, 1967.

¹⁴⁵ One possible way a realignment or readjustment may take place is the splitting off of factions from the established parties (LDP, JSP, DSP) to form a new "party" or faction. This suggestion is not offered confidently since the article is based primarily on documentary sources rather than on-the-spot investigation.