

PAKṢILASVĀMIN'S INTRODUCTION TO HIS NYĀYABHĀṢYAM*

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PAKṢILASVĀMIN'S INTRODUCTION TO HIS NYĀYABHĀṢYAM¹ IS perhaps one of the most interesting texts of the older Nyāya indispensable to the understanding of the system. This is not because the ideas expressed therein were not to be surpassed at a later period, but because in it the development of the school appears fixed, as it were, in a "transitory moment" (*transitorisches Moment*), and we see there for the first time that line of thought, which historically took form in the Nyāya philosophy, becoming aware of itself in

*Abbreviations:

NS Nyāyasūtram.

Nbh. Nyāyabhāṣyam (Poona Oriental Series edition).

NV. Nyāyavārttikam (Kashi Sanskrit Series edition).

YS Yogasūtram.

Ybh. Yogabhāṣyam (we quote the Pātañjalayogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇam, Madras Government Oriental Series, No. 94).

¹The Nyāyabhāṣyam, a detailed commentary to all parts of the NS, was written by Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana about the 2d half of the 5th century A.D. The date of this work can be ascertained from the fact that no trace of the logic of syllogism of Dignāga (480-540 A.D.) can be found in it, while the Yogabhāṣyam and the Sāṃkhya teacher Vindhyavāsin (1st half of the 5th cent. A.D.) seem to have been known to it. The importance of Pakṣilasvāmin's Nbh. as basic text of the old Nyāya is especially clear from the fact that it was repeatedly commented upon even up to the 9th century. Thus we know that Bhavivikta (about 520-580 A.D.) wrote a Tīkā to the Nbh., as did also Aviddhakarṇa. The Nyāyavārttikam of Uddyotakara is likewise a commentary to the Nbh. Probably the Rucitīkā of Adhyayana also dates from this period. Even in the later period there were commentaries on this work. Thus we hear of a Nyāyabhāṣyaṭīkā of Viśvarūpa and of a work of a similar name of Vācaspati Miśra's teacher Trilocana (about 770-830 A.D.). From the large number of these commentaries, which spread over a period of about three centuries, it is plain, to what great extent the work of Pakṣilasvāmin was esteemed in the old Nyāya school. Such a work which occupied the best thinkers of the school for centuries could not have gone by without leaving its influence on the system and on the way in which the system determined its own nature. It must have acted as a catalyst for the development of the school, giving to it, at least in its fundamental concepts, its particular turn.

a clear, though archaic, manner. Furthermore, if we bear in mind to what extent such an interpretation of a school (given by itself) determines its development, the importance of Pakṣilasvāmin's text for the history of Nyāya cannot be over-estimated.

I

The history of Nyāya begins with a relatively old Vāda tradition² which consisted of a certain number of concepts and doctrines that were gathered from the practice of disputations. These topics of the Vāda doctrine did not form a homogeneous system of concepts but were drawn up for practical purposes and on the basis of practical experience.³ Hence, this Vāda doctrine cannot be considered as a consistent, theoretical science, and in no case as a philosophical system.

It came to be a philosophical system only when an old school of philosophy of nature took up this Vāda doctrine and handed it on further together with its doctrine of liberation.⁴ In my article on the Vāda traditions of India I have tried to show that the oldest Nyāya work, which might have been the oldest core of the Nyāyasūtras (Adhyāyas I and V), must have already undergone an elaboration, because from a philosophical point of view,⁵ the arrangement of topics, usual in a Vāda exposition, were changed. To this must be added another reason, namely, that the relatively detailed explanation of the cosmological doctrine of liberation in the first Adhyāya of the NS is unusual in a pure Vāda exposition and,

² Cf. G. Oberhammer: Ein Beitrag zu den Vāda-Traditionen Indiens. WZKSO, Vol. 7 (1963), especially pp. 63-74. (Abbreviated in this paper as "Vāda-Traditionen").

³ This is clear from the choice of the 16 topics (*padārthūḥ*) of the NS or the collection of the Jātis and Nigrahasthānas, which show no systematic choice or order, but are obviously lists of faults met with in the practice of disputations. This can be seen from a detail, namely, from the category of fallacious reasons (*hetvābhāsāḥ*), which in their logical structure do not show a common principle of definition and are not found in contexts, where one would have expected them. For they are mentioned neither in connection with the logical reason (*hetuḥ*) nor in connection with the enumeration of the Nigrahasthānas (NS V, 2, 24).

⁴ This cosmological doctrine of liberation is already found in the earliest beginnings of the NS, namely, in NS I, 1, 1-2, and I; 1, 9-22. Cp. Note 6.

⁵ Vāda-Traditionen, p. 71 f.

therefore, points to a philosophical elaboration of an old Vāda exposition.⁶

If we compare this elaborated text, which must have been the first real text of the Nyāya school, with the version of the NS which Pakṣilasvāmin comments on, we see that this oldest Nyāya work (=Adhyāyas I and V of the NS) was enlarged according to the cosmological interest of the school.⁷ On the other hand, no essential enlargement was made in the sections on the real Vāda categories, except in the case of the philosophically important category of the Pramāṇas.⁸ Thus, we see a clear trend of development from the Vāda doctrine to a cosmological doctrine of liberation.

⁶ If we compare Caraka's Vāda exposition with that of the NS, we find that the earlier Vāda expositions might have had included as topic also a system of metaphysical concepts, appearing in the NS as Prameya. This system of concepts could vary from school to school and was, so to say, inserted in a special place of their Vāda exposition, which, within the leading Vāda traditions, must have been the same for different philosophical systems. Thus we find in Caraka's exposition the six categories of the older Vaiśeṣikam, while in the case of the Vāda text, which forms the basis of Adhyāyas 1 and 5 of the NS, a cosmological doctrine of liberation (NS I, 1, 9-22) was inserted. Through this insertion and the rearrangement of the topics (Cf. Note 5) must have come into being from a Vāda exposition that oldest Nyāya work, which roughly corresponds to Adhyāyas 1 and 5 of the NS (Cf. W. Ruben: *Die Nyāyasūtren*, Leipzig 1928, p. XV). Together with this adaptation of the Vāda text also NS I, 1, 1-2 must have been added, which must have been likewise absent in the old Vāda text, since the problem of liberation was a philosophical problem and not proper to a Vāda doctrine.

⁷ We are justified in assuming the cosmological interest of the school not only if we start from the hypothesis that Adhyāyas 3-4 of the NS are amplifications made by the teachers of the school, but also if we start from the theory that the teachers of the Nyāya school at a particular stage had amalgamated the work of a cosmological school with the NS of Adhyāyas 1 and 5 (perhaps also 2). This last hypothesis seems to be supported by the fact that Tucci has found Sūtras of Adhyāyas 3 and 4 of the NS not quoted as Nyāyasūtras even in the 4th century. Cf. G. Tucci: *Pre-Dinnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources*, p. XXVII ff.

⁸ NS II, 1, 8; II, 2, 12.

Now the problem arises as to why this development did not finally lead to a total subordination of the logico-dialectical problems, as it happened, for example, in the case of the oldest Vaiśeṣika system, which had never integrated in its doctrines a Vāda doctrine, though it must have known and possessed such expositions of the Vāda-doctrine for the practice of school debates.⁹ This is all the more important since the logico-dialectical categories of the old Vāda text were not necessarily topics of the cosmological doctrine of liberation of the oldest Nyāya school, and consequently could have easily been disposed of or subordinated as methodology to the system, as was done with the Tantrayuktis or Vāda doctrine in Caraka. The reason why this was not the case seems to lie, among other reasons, mainly in the interpretation of the school as given to it by Pakṣilasvāmin.

II

Viewed historically, Pakṣilasvāmin's introduction to Nyāyabhāṣyam marks the final stage of the attempts of the Nyāya to justify the objective value of knowledge, in general, and the sixteen categories of the school, in particular, against the criticism of certain Buddhist schools. This justification is contained in the first part (Nbh. 1, 1-2, 8) of the introductory chapter.

Starting from the fact of the ability to act (*pravṛttisāmarthyam*),¹⁰ Pakṣilasvāmin, on the supposition that knowledge of a

⁹ Though the Vāda exposition in Caraka, or more precisely the Vāda exposition which ought with the greatest probability to be assumed as its prototype, may not necessarily have been such an exposition, yet it shows that there were Vāda expositions which were closely connected with the Vaiśeṣika school. Otherwise it would be difficult to explain the presence of Vaiśeṣika categories in Caraka's Vāda exposition.

¹⁰ This idea reminds one of the "arthakriyā" of Dharmakīrti (600-660 A.D.) from which this thinker deduced the validity of the means of knowledge.

thing must be acquired through the means of knowledge,¹¹ concluded that the means of knowledge—contrary to the view of Nāgārjuna and his school—convey an objective knowledge and hence are objectively valid: “The means of knowledge are objectively valid because they are capable of inducing activity (which, being a fact of experience, cannot be called into question) only when the knowledge of things is gained through them.”¹² This starting-point is further elaborated by Pakṣilasvāmin. He divides the entire “truth about things” (*arthatattvam*) into four fundamental categories, namely *pramnaam* (means of knowledge), *pramātā* (the cognizing subject), *prameyam* (object of cognition) and *pramitiḥ*

¹¹ That this principle was not part of the original Vāda text, but originated from the cosmological doctrine of liberation that was connected with it, and consequently could be rightly conceived as a doctrine of the oldest Nyāya, can be gathered from the fact that the importance of the Pramāṇas expressed there stands in clear opposition to the real position of the Pramāṇas in the available Vāda texts, where it usually has only a subordinate importance. Furthermore, the re-arrangement of the topics of the old Vāda text, as we have shown (Cf. Vāda-traditionen, p. 71 ff.) becomes clearly understandable, if one assumes that this principle was one of the fundamental ideas of the cosmology of the old Vāda text; for if this cosmological doctrine of liberation maintained the view that everything will be or must be known through the Pramāṇas, then the doctrine of the Pramāṇas ought to have been treated at the beginning of the exposition of the school doctrine. The view that the principle “*pramāṇataś cārthapratipattiḥ*,” which Pakṣilasvāmin emphatically brings forward at the beginning of his Nbh., belongs to the cosmological doctrine of the liberation, can be strengthened by the fact that this principle is a literal quotation from the later cosmological sections of the NS, where it occurs as NS IV, 2, 29.

In this connection it may be pointed out that this principle suggests the idea that the philosophical school which had fused its cosmological doctrine of liberation with a Vāda text and thus had become the school of Nyāya, was identical with that school against which Nāgārjuna polemizes in his *Vigrahavivartanī* and which commonly is rightly considered to be the school of Nyāya (Cf. Vāda-Traditionen, pp. 64-72). It is thus probable that the later cosmological parts of the NS did not originate in a school other than that old cosmological doctrine of liberation, which had been contained already in the oldest part of the NS (NS I, 1, 9-12).

Whether that school was always known as “Nyāya” or whether Pakṣilasvāmin associated this name with the Sūtras he commented upon, must remain an open question for the present. The fact that Sūtras of the cosmological parts of the NS were quoted as Vaiśeṣika-sūtras, testified to by Vasu in his commentary to Āryadeva’s *Sataśāstram* (Cf. Tucci: *Pre-Dinnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources*, p. XXVII ff.), as well as the fact that Pakṣilasvāmin himself in his introduction to the Nbh. endeavors to determine his science as doctrine of *nyāya* and *ānvīkṣikī*, seem to point to the second possibility.

¹² Nbh., p. 1, 5.

(cognition).¹³ These four categories are necessary elements for the knowledge of things (*arthapratītiḥ*) without which there is no capacity to act. Hence, if the knowledge of things, as shown, is really obtained through the means of knowledge, then also the remaining three categories must have an objective value: "If the means of knowledge have an objective value, then also [the categories like] cognizing subject, object of cognition and cognition have an objective value. Why? Because the knowledge of a thing is not possible, if one of these [categories] is missing... these four [categories] contain the entire 'truth about things' [*arthatattvam*]."¹⁴ Hence, the "truth about the things" as a whole is proved to be objectively valid.

III

In order to show the objective value of the "truth about the things," Pakṣilasvāmin divided it into the four above-mentioned categories. As a next step, he determined—from another starting-point the *content* of this truth about the things: "What is this truth? The being of the existent and the non-being of the non-existent."¹⁵ In doing so Pakṣilasvāmin obtains an important starting-point, defined in its *content*, which enables him to prove the validity of the sixteen categories of the Nyāya. For, if one leaves aside the negation of being, the truth about things—fundamentally already proved to be valid—consists in the *being of the existent*. The truth, apart from negation,

¹³ Nbh., p. 1, 14-16. The classification of reality into these four groups is not found in the NS, but Pakṣilasvāmin makes this classification on purpose in order to bring the existent in a necessary relation with cognition. This division might be traced back to an older doctrine of the school; for Pakṣilasvāmin mentions this classification in Nbh., p. 268, 1 as one of the possible classifications of reality and polemizes against its being taken absolutely. Besides, we meet with this same classification of reality in *pramāṇam*, *pramūtā*, *prameyam* and *pramitīḥ* also in the commentary of Kauṇḍinya to the Pāsupatasūtras, but increased by the category of *pramāpāyitū*, which corresponds to God. The absence of this fifth category could be taken as a hint to the fact that Pakṣilasvāmin himself was probably no Pāśupata. This commentary knows of a doctrine of inference, which fundamentally agrees with a commentary of NS older than the commentary of Pakṣilasvāmin (Cp. "Vāda-Traditionen" p. 97 ff.). Hence it is not probable that this commentary took over this classification of reality from Pakṣilasvāmin.

¹⁴ Nbh., p. 1, 12-16. Here I deviate from the translation of these lines of G. Jha, who seems to follow an interpretation of this passage by Uddyotakara, but does not do justice to the idea.

¹⁵ *kim punas tattvam? sataś ca sadbhāvo 'sataś cūsadbhāvaḥ*. Nbh. p. 1, 17; 2, 1.

is nothing else than the existent, correctly and objectively cognized as such.¹⁶ It is precisely this existent (*sat*) which is expounded in the sixteen topics of the Nyāya: means of knowledge (*pramāṇam*), object of cognition (*prameyam*), doubt (*saṁśayah*), purpose (*prayojanam*), example (*dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ*), theory (*siddhāntaḥ*), syllogism (*avayavāḥ*), methodical consideration (*tarkaḥ*), decision (*nirṇayaḥ*), discussion (*vādah*), debate (*jalpaḥ*), wrangling (*vitandā*), fallacious reason (*hetvābhāsaḥ*), quibbling (*chalaḥ*), false rejoinder (*jātiḥ*) and reason of defeat (*nigrahasthānam*).¹⁷ Inasmuch as Pakṣilasvāmin had, therefore, proved the validity of those necessary conditions of the cognition of a thing, namely, *pramāṇam*, *pramātā*, *prameyam* and *pramatiḥ*, he had also shown that sixteen topics of the Nyāya were valid; for these were nothing else than the four conditions of possible cognition of a thing seen from the point of view of *what* they are.

IV

Through this interpretation of the sixteen topics of the school as classifications of the existent Pakṣilasvāmin had furthermore claimed—at least *in nuce* and implicitly—that these sixteen purely accidental categories of the school are consciously deduced topics of *one* science and that this science was a *philosophical system*, and not a mere “organon” of logic and dialectics. This claim manifests itself clearly in the attempt of Pakṣilasvāmin to determine the doctrine of his school from a double point of view, on the one hand, as *nyāyavidyā* (doctrine of *nyāyah*) and, on the other, as *adhyātmavidyā* (philosophical doctrine of liberation), understanding this double determination in the sense that the Nyāya represents an Adhyātma-doctrine which is worked out with the help of rational method (*nyāyah*).

For whatever reasons it might be Pakṣilasvāmin identifies his science with the Ānvīkṣikī mentioned by Kauṭilya in his Arthaśāstra.¹⁸ If he, therefore, makes statements about this Ānvīkṣikī, they can safely be considered as applicable also to his own system. Now, he states expressly that the Ānvīkṣikī is *nyāyavidyā* since it

¹⁶ *sat sad iti gr̥hyamānam yathābhūtam aviparītam tattvaṁ bhavati.* Nbh., p. 2, 1-2.

¹⁷ *sac ca khalu ṣoḍaśadhā vyūdhā upadekṣyate, tāsām khalv āsām sadvidhānām pramāṇaprameyasamśayaprayojanadr̥ṣṭāntasiddhāntāvayavatarakanirṇayavāda jalpavitandāhetvābhāsacchala=jātinigrahasthānānām tattvajñānān niḥśreyasūdhigamaḥ.* Nbh., p. 2, 8-12.

¹⁸ Cf. P. Hacker: *Anvīkṣikī* (WZKSO, Vol. II (1958) pp. 67 ff.

works with *anvikṣā*, which he identifies with *nyāyah*.¹⁹ Thus, the *nyāyah* in the broadest sense of the term (both as *pramāṇair arthaparīkṣaṇam* and as syllogism which Pakṣilasvāmin characterizes as *paramo nyāyah*) is the typical method and, as will be shown, an essential topic of his science. Primarily and basically, however, the Nyāya is an Adhyātma-doctrine: "Knowledge of the truth, (*tattvajñānam*)," writes Pakṣilasvāmin, "which serves as means for the attainment of the highest good, must be understood in accordance with the science in question. Here in the case of the Adhyātma doctrine, however, is the knowledge of the truth, knowledge of the truth about the Ātmā etc.; by attainment of the highest good is (to be understood) the attainment of liberation."²⁰ Thus, for Pakṣilasvāmin, his science is in a double sense the Ānvīkṣikī: first, inasmuch as it works with the method of *nyāyah* and teaches it; and secondly, inasmuch as the Ānvīkṣikī is Adhyātma doctrine.²¹

Through this double identification, Pakṣilasvāmin could determine the specific nature of his science in such a way that the categories of the NS, gathered originally as accidental topics of a Vāda manual, appears as a coherent system of philosophy: "These four sciences (transmitted by Kauṭilya), each of which has its own formal object, has been taught for the sake of living beings. The fourth of these is the Ānvīkṣikī or the science of Nyāya (*nyāyavidyā*). Its specific objects are the topics "doubt," etc. Without their separate enumeration it would be, like the Upaniṣads,

¹⁹Apart from the explicit identification (Nbh., 3, 16, f.), this follows from the fact that he uses the definition of the method of the Ānvīkṣikī given by Kauṭilya in his Arthaśāstram, namely ". . . *hetubhir anvikṣamāṇā* . . ." in order to determine the concept of *nyāyah*. According to Pakṣilasvāmin this *nyāyah* is *pramāṇair arthaparīkṣaṇam*. The new term *pramāṇa* is evidently a synonym for the term *hetuḥ* used by Kauṭilya. Caraka defines the concept of *hetuḥ* simply as *upalabdihikāraṇam*, which he explains as *pratyakṣam*, *anumānam*, *aitihyam* and *aupamyam*, i.e., as means of knowledge (*pramāṇam*). Caraka then continues: *ebhir hetubhir yad upalabhyate tat tattvam*. (Carakasamhitā, Vim. 8, 33). Hence we can be certain that in their early period the concepts '*pramāṇam*' and '*hetuḥ*' had identical significance. Thus Pakṣilasvāmin has not at all changed the content of the definition of *nyāyah* through the use of the term *pramāṇam*. I am therefore inclined to make precise P. Hacker's interpretation of *anvikṣā* as "Untersuchen mit Gründen" (inquiry with reasons) in the sense that it is "an inquiry with the help of the means of knowledge" ("Untersuchen mit Hilfe der Erkenntnisgründe). Cf. P. Hacker: Ānvīkṣikī, p. 66.

²⁰Nbh., p. 7, 7 f.

²¹On this aspect of Ānvīkṣikī cf. P. Hacker: Ānvīkṣikī, p. 73 f.

only an Adhyātma doctrine."²² If we bear in mind that Pakṣilasvāmin did characterize his system as Adhyātma doctrine, then here cannot be denied that the Nyāya is an Adhyātma doctrine, but only that it is a *mere* Adhyātma doctrine like the Upaniṣads. Just because it is an Adhyātma doctrine, it requires specific topics like the categories "doubt," etc. for being a science of its own.

Thus, Pakṣilasvāmin marks for us that stage in the history of the Nyāya where the trend of its development, starting from a pure Vāda doctrine, is transformed into a clear and conscious form of Adhyātma doctrine. It is true that already, at the beginning of this development, when NS I, 1, 1 had introduced the oldest work of the school, the system of concepts handed down in the old Vāda tradition had been changed into a philosophical system. Yet, in spite of this change, the topics of the Vāda tradition still remained the most extensive and the most emphasized part of the system: "From the knowledge of the truth about the means of knowledge, object of cognition, doubt, purpose, example, theory, syllogism, methodical consideration, decision, discussion, debate, wrangling, fallacious reason, quibbling, false rejoinder and reason of defeat, proceeds the attainment of the highest good."²³

In this introductory Sūtram an attempt is in fact made to integrate the system of Vāda topics into the liberation-doctrine of an old cosmological school, though in a most superficial and external manner; for it is only the second Sūtram which brings this liberation-doctrine to the forefront. But in doing so, it neglects completely the topics of the Vāda doctrine: "Liberation follows therefore, that pain, birth, activity, defect and false knowledge cease, each (member of the series) ceasing at the cessation of that which immediately precedes it"²⁴ Regarding the question on how the contents of these two Sūtras are to be combined, or what necessary role the Vāda topics of NS I, 1, 1 have to play in this system of liberation, we are completely kept in the dark. Pakṣilasvāmin, on the contrary, has with full consciousness emphasized the aspect and importance of the Nyāya philosophy as liberation-doctrine *restricting* the basic thought of NS I, 1, 1 to the idea that it is only the knowledge of the Prameya like Ātmā etc. which brings about liberation, and not that of the dialectical categories: "Happiness, indeed, is attained through the truth about the Prameya (objects

²² Nbh., 3, 5-8.

²³ NS, I, 1, 1.

²⁴ NS, I, 1, 2.

of cognition) like Ātmā etc. . . . ; for it is only when these four categories (*padārthāḥ*) are completely known, namely *heyam* (that which is to be avoided), *tasya nirvartakam* (that which causes it), *ātyantikam hānam* (absolute avoidance), *tasyopāyaḥ* (the means thereto) and *adhigantavyaḥ* (that which ought to be attained), that one attains the highest happiness.²⁵

That Pakṣilasvāmin purposely restricted the liberating knowledge to the knowledge of the truth about Ātmā etc. is seen, among other reasons, from the strange division of Prameya²⁶ into these four Mokṣa-categories, which are entirely foreign to the Nyāyasūtras. Therefore, if Pakṣilasvāmin, nevertheless, applies them to the Nyāya category of Prameya, it can only mean that he intended to demonstrate and confirm the fact that his Nyāya system represented a real liberation-doctrine; for the division into these four categories is not restricted to this single passage, but occurs in a second one too, though somewhat less clearly expressed. This shows that their use was not a momentary fancy of Pakṣilasvāmin, but was indeed based on the idea he had himself formed about the philosophy of his school. In his commentary on the cosmological Sūtras dealing with knowledge and liberation, he writes: "... If the unhappiness (*duḥkham*) is known, it will be avoided (*prahīṇam*) . . . in the same way, one knows that the faults (*doṣāḥ*) and the deed (*karma*) are the causes of unhappiness (*duḥkhaḥetuḥ*) . . . Thus one comes to the view that (the topics) like rebirth after death (*pretyabhāvaḥ*), fruit (*phalam*) and unhappiness (*duḥkham*) are to be known, and deed (*karma*) and faults (*doṣāḥ*) are to be avoided (*praheyāḥ*), that the liberation (*apavargaḥ*) is that which ought to be attained (*adhigantavyaḥ*) and that the means to its attainment (*adhigamopāyaḥ*) is the knowledge of the truth (*tattvajñānam*). Thus, a person who constantly applies himself to, and studies and reflects over the objects of knowledge, which are divided in this fourfold manner,²⁷ gains a complete knowledge (*samyag-*

²⁵ Nbh., p. 2, 16-3, 2.

²⁶ This category comprises: soul (*ūtmā*), body (*śarīram*), sense organ (*indriyam*), sense object (*arthaḥ*), thought (*buddhiḥ*), inner organ (*manas*), action (*pravṛttiḥ*) fault (*doṣaḥ*), life after death (*pretyabhāvaḥ*), fruit of action (*phalam*), unhappiness (*duḥkham*) and liberation (*apavargaḥ*). Cf. Ns. I, 1 9-22. The key-words of this category contain the entire old cosmological doctrine of liberation.

²⁷ By that is meant: 1) *jñeyam* (= *pretyabhāva-phala-duḥkham*); 2) *praheyam* (= *karma* and *doṣāḥ* = *duḥkhaḥetuḥ*); 3) *adhigantavyaḥ* (= *apavargaḥ*); 4) *tasyopāyaḥ* (= *tattvajñānam*).

darśanam), knowledge (of things) just as they are (*yathābhūtāva-bodhaḥ*), knowledge of the truth (*tattvajñānam*)."²⁸

VI

In both the above-quoted passages we have the same division into four categories. Yet this division cannot be considered as proper to the system of Nyāya. For, firstly, it is nowhere to be met with in the Nyāyasūtras; and secondly, it cannot be easily applied to the content of the category mentioned as "*prameyam*." The last difficulty seems to have been felt by Pakṣilasvāmin himself, because in the passage last quoted there is no category of *hānam* to be found, so that the division consists only of *praheyam*, *adhigantavyaḥ* and *upāyaḥ*, while in the first passage^{28a} there are, really speaking, five categories, and not four, as Pakṣilasvāmin pretends: *heyam*, *tasya nirvartakam*, *hānam*, *upāyaḥ* and *adhigantavyaḥ*. This is clear from the fact that in the second passage, *adhigantavyaḥ* is to be taken as a category of its own, namely *apavargaḥ*. Thus, in order to obtain the *fourfold* division, *heyam* and *tasya nirvartakam* had obviously to be taken as one, which it was not, according to the original conception. Pakṣilasvāmin seems therefore, to have taken over this division from a liberation-doctrine, where only the *fourfold* division was used. This doctrine of liberation, which made use of these four categories, can really be traced back: it is the Yoga of Patañjali. The source whence Pakṣilasvāmin took over this division seems to have been the Yogabhāṣyam. There we read: "Just as the medical science is divided into four (parts), namely sickness, cause of sickness, health and means of health, so also is this system (the Yoga of Patañjali) divided into four, namely, transmigration (*samsāraḥ*), cause of transmigration (*samsārabījaḥ*), liberation (*mokṣaḥ*) and the means of liberation (*mokṣopāyaḥ*). Of these, transmigration, which is full of pain, is the Heya, the union of prime matter and spirit, the Heyahetu, the complete cessation of this union the Hāna, and the right knowledge (*samyagdarśanam*), the Hānopāya."²⁹

A comparison of this passage, with the division of Pakṣilasvāmin, shows a clear dependence. Both are acquainted with the category of *heyam* — in the first passage of Pakṣilasvāmin as *heyam*, while in the second, it appears as *praheyam*, by which is

²⁸ Nbh., p. 288, 10; 289, 4.

^{28a} See footnote 25.

²⁹ Ybh., p. 168, 3-7.

meant the *heyahetuḥ* (= *doṣāḥ* and *karma*). In the same way, the category of *heyahetuḥ* is found in both the texts. In the first passage of the Nyāyabhāṣyam Pakṣilasvāmin explains it as *tasya* (= *heyasya*) *nirvartakam*, while in the second passage it appears as *duḥkhaḥetuḥ* (= *praheyam*). He mentions the concept of *hānam* only in the first passage of his Nyāyabhāṣyam, while in both passages, he mentions the category of *upāyah*.

Though there is a fundamental agreement between Yogabhāṣyam and Nyāyabhāṣyam, there are differences which are important for the understanding of the relation of both the texts.³⁰ First of all, it is worthy of note that in the series of concepts in Pakṣilasvāmin the concept of *adhigantavyaḥ* appears, while it is absent in that of the Yogabhāṣyam. Secondly, the concept of *hānam* appears in Pakṣilasvāmin only in the first passage (Nbh. 2, 17.) but it is absent in the second. Finally, on close study, one finds a certain disagreement in the interpretation of the concept of *upāyah*. In the first passage, it appears as means for the *hānam*, while in the second, where the concept of *hānam* is absent, as means for the attainment of *apavargaḥ*, i.e., as means for the *adhigantavyaḥ* (Nbh. 289, 2). All these disagreements seem to be connected with the concept of *hānam*, which puts Pakṣilasvāmin into difficulties while applying it to the Nyāya category of Prameya.

VII

What is the interpretation given to this concept in the Yoga of Patañjali, from where Pakṣilasvāmin took the concepts *heyam*, *heyahetuḥ*, *hānam* and *tasyopāyah*? In the Yogabhāṣyam, the concept of *hānam* is defined as "complete cessation of the union (be-

³⁰ The disagreement that results from the application of these four categories within the Nyāya doctrine will be still clearer, if we consider the interpretation given to them by Uddyotakara, who attempts to bring them in agreement with the Nyāya doctrine: "By 'heyam' is meant unhappiness (*duḥkham*); '*tasya nirvartakam*' is ignorance and longing (*avidyātrṣṇe*), *dharma* and *adharma*; '*hānam*' is knowledge of the truth; '*tasyopāyah*' is the Sāstra and '*adhigantavyaḥ*' is liberation (*mokṣaḥ*)" (NV. p. 12, 5-6). This interpretation testifies that Pakṣilasvāmin really enumerated five, and not four, categories. Further it shows how problematic the classification of the category of Prameya in these four Yoga-categories was: for firstly, Sāstram is no *prameyam* according to the NS; and secondly Uddyotakara's interpretation of these categories differs from that of Pakṣilasvāmin. In the second passage (Nbh., p. 289, 1-2), where Pakṣilasvāmin speaks of these categories, *tattvañānam* is not at all to be equated with '*hānam*,' but with '*upāyah*,' which Uddyotakara had interpreted as Sāstra, though Pakṣilasvāmin makes no mention at all of it in this connection.

tween spirit and prime matter)."³¹ In a second passage, this idea is more clearly expressed: "*hānam* is the absence of the union (of spirit and prime matter) on account of the absence of this [ignorance]. This [*hānam*] is the emancipation of the spirit [*dr̥ṣeḥ kairvalyam*]. [With this *Sūtram* is meant that] on account of the absence of ignorance [*adarśanam*] the union of the intellectual organ [*buddhiḥ*] and spirit [*puruṣaḥ*] is absent. [In other words] there is absolute cessation of bondage. This is the *hānam*, this the emancipation of the spirit."³² From this definition of *hānam*, in terms of the Sāṃkhya metaphysics of the Pātañjala-Yoga, it is clear that this concept signifies nothing else than liberation (*mokṣaḥ*). Thus it is easy to understand, why in the Yoga series of these four concepts there is no other term for liberation. Consequently the Pātañjala-Yoga defines the means to attain liberation as "right knowledge" (*samyagdarśanam*),³³ i.e., "unshakable knowledge of the difference [between spirit and prime matter]."³⁴ Such an interpretation of the concepts *hānam* and *hānopāyaḥ*, however, was not possible within the framework of the Nyāya philosophy, and thus Pakṣilasvāmin must have had to give a new interpretation to these concepts. And this he did. He could keep the term *upāyaḥ*, but giving it the Nyāya sense of means for the attainment of *apavargaḥ* (= *adhigantavyaḥ*). In doing so, he also gave a new interpretation to the term *samyagdarśanam* by changing its original sense of "knowledge of the difference between spirit and prime matter" into that of *tattvajñānam*, that is to say, "knowledge of the truth about the objects of cognition [*prameyāṇi*, not *padārthāḥ*!]."

There was, however, no equivalent for the concept of *hānam*. Hence Pakṣilasvāmin avoided it when he expressed his own thoughts (Nbh. 288 ff.) and let it remain only in that place where

³¹ '*Hānam*' is the absolute cessation of the union (between prime matter and spirit). Ybh., p. 168, 8.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 203, 5-8.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 168, 8.

³⁴ *vivekakhayātir aviplavāhānopāyaḥ*, YS., II, 26.

he made a more or less explicit reference to the Yogabhāṣyam.³⁵ Since the Yoga term *hānam* was not suited for characterizing the Nyāya concept of *apavargaḥ*, Pakṣilasvāmin endeavored to increase the concept-series of the Yoga (*heyam*, *heyahetuḥ*, *hānam* and *hānopāyaḥ*) by one more concept, *adhigantavyaḥ*, which, on the testimony of Pakṣilasvāmin himself, has to be taken in the sense of *apavargaḥ*.

From the foregoing inquiry, we come to an important result: Pakṣilasvāmin makes a *conscious* effort to apply to the Nyāya category of Prameya, the categories of liberation of the Yoga of Patañjali. This he does in connection with the claim that the Nyāya as Adhyātma doctrine leads to liberation through the "knowledge of the truth about the Prameyas such as Ātmā, etc." Why does he do so? The only sensible answer is, that the Yoga of Patañjali was at that time held to be the model doctrine of liberation, and hence allusion to its terminology seemed best suited to strengthen Pakṣilasvāmin's claim that his school represented a real liberation-doctrine (*adhyātmavidyā*).

In this way, Pakṣilasvāmin had certainly shown that the Nyāya, as an Adhyātma doctrine, was a genuine philosophical system and not a school of mere dialectical techniques. Yet, he did not succeed in determining his science from the philosophical point of view in such a way that its difference from other philosophical systems was made clear.

³⁵ This is textually attested to through the use of the term *samyagdarśanam* in this connection: *etūni catvāry arthapadāni samyagbuddhvā niḥśreyasam adhigacchati*. Here the agreement of the word *samyagbuddhvā* with the world *samyagdarśanam* is not fully convincing, though very probable, when taken with the foregoing enumeration of the four categories from Ybh., p. 168, 4 ff., which is evidently an inexact quotation. (In Nbh., 289, 4, on the contrary, *samyagdarśanam* is expressly identified with *tattvajñānam*: . . . *prameyam . . . bhāvayataḥ samyagdarśanam yathābhūtāvabodhas tattvajñānam utpadyate*). To show that Pakṣilasvāmin (Nbh., p. 2, 17; 3, 1) really gives an inexact quotation, I would like to put forward the parallelism of *hanam ātyantikam* (Nbh., p. 3, 1) and *samyogasyātyantikī nivṛtir hānam* (Ybh., p. 168, 8) as also the use of *samyagbuddhvā* (Nbh., 3, 1) which reminds one of *hānopāyaḥ samyagdarśanam* in Ybh., 168, 8. Another important reason for it seems to be the fact that Pakṣilasvāmin speaks of four categories, but he really enumerates five, though by omitting *hānam*, which in fact did not fit properly in the Nyāya context, he would have easily got the four categories. It is true, in doing so, these four categories would no more have been the same as in the Yoga. Thus we can conclude that Pakṣilasvāmin did want to mention the Yoga categories and that he therefore quoted the Yogabhāṣyam.

The starting point for such a determination can be found in two remarks which Pakṣilasvāmin makes while he identifies his science with the Ānvīkṣikī. There, he observes that the Ānvīkṣikī, and consequently also his science, is a *nyāyavidyā*³⁶ and explains this idea in the second passage, where the Ānvīkṣikī is said to be *ānvīkṣikī* or *nyāyavidyā* because it operates with *anvīkṣā* (= *nyāyah*).³⁷ In other words, the starting point for the determination of the nature of his science is, for Pakṣilasvāmin, the idea already mentioned: that the Nyāya represents an Adhyātma-doctrine, which operates essentially with the method of *nyāyah*,³⁸ i.e., a rationally worked out Adhyātma-doctrine. This idea is, after all, not new. It was already implicitly contained in the attitude of the oldest Nyāya tradition, as we find it in NS I, 1, 1 and 2, and this must have been one of the reasons why this old cosmologically oriented doctrine of liberation integrated into its system an exposition of Vāda doctrine. Besides, this attitude is not even typical for the oldest Nyāya; it is already found in a developed form in the still older system of Sāṃkhya, which was a genuine Adhyātma-doctrine and operating so much with rational method, that its followers could be characterized as *tārkikāh*. What is new is the fact that Pakṣilasvāmin, starting from this determination of his science, endeavors to show the old categories of the Vāda doctrine as an integral part of the Nyāya. In doing so, he therefore preserves these categories in the tradition of his school, in as far as he shows them as necessary topics of the system.

The starting point of this demonstration is, as mentioned already, the determination of Nyāya as a rationally worked out liberation-doctrine. The dominating idea of this doctrine is the "knowledge of the truth" (*tattvajñānam*). By this is meant not only the topics (*padārthāh*) of the Nyāya being the knowledge of the truth as determined in its content, but also the knowledge of the truth in as far as it is movement of thought, as spiritual event obeying objective norms. Hence, those topics of Nyāya explaining and analyzing the knowledge of truth as movement of thought are also to be considered as necessarily belonging to the topics of Nyāya, and not only the categories of Pramāṇa and Prameya which needed no further justification.

³⁶ Nbh., 3, 6.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 3, 64, 1.

³⁸ Cf. P. Hacker: *Ānvīkṣikī* p. 70 ff.

Thus in the last part (Nbh. 3, 3; 7, 6) of his introduction to the Nyāyabhāṣyam Pakṣilasvāmin shows why the old dialectical categories, whose quality as necessary topics is called into question, are yet to be considered as constitutive topics of the Nyāya; for even if they are not necessary topics of Nyāya as Adhyātma doctrine, they all stand in a necessary, or at least proportionate, relation to the knowledge of truth *as movement of thought*, which is a necessary aspect of Nyāya as Ānvīkṣikī. This relation is inferred either as a method of this knowledge of the truth taken as *nyāyah* and its conditions of possibility,³⁹ or as form of this knowledge so far as it is result, namely, theory (*siddhāntah*) and decision (*nirṇayah*), or as means of dealing with the knowledge of the truth within or between the schools, namely as *vādah* and its conditions of possibility.⁴⁰

VIII

Viewed systematically and historically, the group of topics containing the *nyāyah* and its conditions of possibility is the most important. According to its general structure, the *nyāyah* as method is the inquiry into an object with the help of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇair arthaparīkṣaṇam*). Syllogism, the highest form of *nyāyah*, also is such an inquiry with the means of knowledge.⁴¹ Thus the *nyāyah* is the only and indispensable method which corresponds to the basic view of the Nyāya, that a cogni-

³⁹ These are the topics: doubt, purpose, example, syllogism and methodical consideration.

⁴⁰ These are the topics: discussion, debate wrangling, theory, fallacious reasons, quibbling, false rejoinder, and reason of defeat.

⁴¹ For Pakṣilasvāmin syllogism was not yet, as it was for the logic after Dignāga, formalization of inference (*anumānam*), but a fixed schema for the inquiry into an object with the help of the means of knowledge. I hope to elaborate this idea in another context. Here I shall only refer to the remark of Pakṣilasvāmin in which he expresses the nature of syllogism succinctly: "In the verbal formulation consisting of the totality of the members of syllogism, the Pramāṇas (!) prove the objects because they (correspond to the respective members of the syllogism and, corresponding to them) depend on each other" — *avayavasamuḍāye ca vākye sambhūyaretarābhisambandhāt pramāṇāny arthaṃ sādhayanti* (Nbh. 50, 10-11). In this short remark the expression *itaretarābhisambandhāt* (because they depend upon each other) points to the fact that the syllogism is to be considered as a formal schema while the expression *sambhūya* (corresponding to them) shows that the nature of syllogism consists in the inquiry with the help of Pramāṇas, because the *pratijñā* corresponds to *śabdaḥ*, the *hetuḥ* to *anumānam*, the *udāharaṇam* to *pratyakṣam* and the *upanayaḥ* to *upamānam* (Nbh. 50, 11-51, 4).

tion can be had only with the help of the means of knowledge (*pramānataś cārthapratipatteḥ*) and thus enables the school to be Ānvīksikī, rational Adhyātma-doctrine.⁴² In as far as certain topics (*padārthāḥ*) of the Nyāya are conditions of possibility of the method proper to the school, they too should be considered as necessary topics of the school doctrine. Pakṣilasvāmin offers such a demonstration in connection with the *nyāyaḥ* with regard to doubt (*saṃśayaḥ*), purpose (*prayojanam*), example (*dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ*) and syllogism (*avayavāḥ*): on principle, the *nyāyaḥ* can be applied only to something which is cognized in a preliminary cognition as existing, but which is not yet conceptually determined in its "what": "the *nyāyaḥ* is applied neither to an unknown thing nor to a thing known for certain, but to a doubtful thing."⁴³ Hence, doubt (*saṃśayaḥ*), "that knowledge, which consists in a mere consideration of an object . . . without determining it,"⁴⁴ is a necessary condition of the *nyāyaḥ* as its occasion and should therefore be considered as a necessary topic of the system. In the same way its purpose (*prayojanam*) a necessary condition of the *nyāyaḥ*, since as motive inducing a person to act, it extends to every activity. Therefore, "the *nyāyaḥ* takes place in dependence upon it."⁴⁵ While both the hitherto discussed topics of the Nyāyasūtras were conditions of the *nyāyaḥ* as an existential philosophical act, the category of example (*dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ*) is necessary condition of the *nyāyaḥ* as a logical structure. "(Only) in dependence upon it is the

⁴² In addition to the method of *nyāyaḥ* is a second method, namely, methodical consideration (*tarkaḥ*) which is, according to the NS, I, 1, 40 "the examination (*ūhaḥ*) of an object, whose truth is not yet known by means of the given reasons with a view to know the truth." Pakṣilasvāmin justifies it as topic of the Nyāya as follows: "The methodical consideration does not belong to the means of knowledge, nor is it an additional means of knowledge. It is a help for the means of knowledge and it is meant for the knowledge of the truth (*tattvajñānāya kalpate*) (Nbh., 5, 15). It is thus clear that the *tarkaḥ* stands in close relation to inquiry with the help of the means of knowledge, and hence it is to be considered necessary for the *nyāyavidyā* as methodical scheme of inquiry. Cf. also Pakṣilasvāmin's implicit identification of *nyāyaḥ* with *tarkaḥ*, when he says: "The *nyāyaḥ* is applied to something doubtful; as has been said: 'Decision (*nirṇayaḥ*) is the ascertainment of the object by means of statement and counter-statement consequent upon a doubt'." (Nbh., 3, 9 f.). Decision is, however, the result of *tarkaḥ*; for the result of *nyāyaḥ* in the strict sense of syllogism (= *avayavāḥ*) is the *nigamanam*.

⁴³ Nbh., 3, 9.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 3, 12.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 3, 14-16.

process of *nyāyah* possible."⁴⁶ This becomes plain, if we bear in mind, that Pakṣilasvāmin takes his stand on the logic of analogy, in which the conclusiveness of an argument can be known only by its example. For only if "(an example) is given, are inference and verbal cognition (*anumānāgamau*) possible; if it is missing, they are not possible."⁴⁷ Finally, the syllogism (*avayavāḥ*) requires no further justification as necessary topic of the Nyāya doctrine, since it is the highest form of *nyāyah* itself⁴⁸. Pakṣilasvāmin connects it in a double manner with the topics of his school: "It is only through (syllogism) that discussion (*vādah*) debate (*jalpah*) and wrangling (*vitandā*) take place, and in no other way. In dependence on it is the ascertainment of truth."⁴⁹ Thus, the *nyāyah* is not only constitutive method of the Nyāya to ascertain the truth, and consequently necessary condition of the Nyāya as Ānvīksikī, but likewise a means of dealing with the truth in philosophical exchange of ideas.

Thus, a group of topics (*padārthāḥ*) must be subjected to inquiry, which, though of minor importance from the systematic point of view, yet is not less typical from the historical point of view due to its broad treatment in the Nyāyasūtras, namely, the *vādah* and those categories which Pakṣilasvāmin deduces from it as necessary topics of the Nyāya. Pakṣilasvāmin had deduced the *nyāyah*, and through it the categories subordinated to it, from the knowledge of truth (*tattvajñānam*) as movement of thought, and thus justified their necessity. In the same way, he deduced also the necessity to deal with the topic of *vādah*, the philosophical exchange of ideas. For while *nyāyah* was the *method* of the knowledge of the truth, *vādah* was for Pakṣilasvāmin the very movement of thought itself, which leads to the knowledge of truth: "Deci-

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 5, 1.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 5, 12. It may be observed in this context that Pakṣilasvāmin in several places endeavors to bring the concept of *nyāyah* in relation with certain categories of the NS, not only to show that they are necessary topics of the system, but especially to interpret the concept of the *nyāyah* into the categories of the NS, where it does not occur at all. For this purpose he had to identify the *avayavāḥ* through an appropriate interpretation (namely, through the relation he established between the members of syllogism and the means of knowledge) with the *nyāyah* of the Ānvīksikī and to declare the *avayavāḥ* to be the highest *nyāyah*. It seems, therefore, possible to assume Pakṣilasvāmin's school could be designated as "Nyāya" only because of his interpretation of it as *nyāyavidyā* (= *ānvīksikī*).

⁴⁹ Nbh., p. 6, 8.

sion (*nirṇayaḥ*) is the knowledge of the truth, the fruit of the means of knowledge. *With it ends the Vāda (tadavasāno vādaḥ)*".⁵⁰

Here the school of Nyāya clearly appears as intimately connected with the Vāda tradition. The knowledge of the "truth about the things," which was considered as leading to liberation, needed from the systematic point of view, in no way to be connected with the *vādaḥ*, the philosophic exchange of ideas. Yet the philosophic exchange of ideas is a historical fact in the school of Nyāya. It characterizes that type of striving after truth which, from the beginning, had been a habitus of the school, and was as such not only typical, but also necessary for the manner in which the Nyāya sought for truth. The philosophical exchange of ideas was for the Nyāya thinker Pakṣilasvāmin, in fact, that *movement of thought, which ended with the knowledge of the truth*. Vāda is fundamentally that macro-structure of dealing with the truth, in which *nyāyaḥ* has its proper place.

The *nyāyaḥ*, as understood by Pakṣilasvāmin, is primarily the inquiry of an object with the help of the Pramāṇas, and hence it is not quite clear, why it should have an essential relation to the Vāda, and why the Vāda, in its turn, should be that superposed whole, in which the *nyāyaḥ* had its original and proper place. Yet, if one bears in mind that Pakṣilasvāmin designates the inquiry with the help of the Pramāṇas as *nyāyaḥ*, as did Kauṭilya, and that he considers syllogism (*avayavāḥ*) as the highest and the most proper form of *nyāyaḥ*, a closer relation between the *nyāyaḥ* as method and the phenomenon of Vāda reveals itself. According to Pakṣilasvāmin, syllogism is an assemblage of *verbal expression*, by which the proof of a thing is accomplished,⁵¹ and as such it belongs essentially to the reality of Vāda. This relatedness extends itself also to a more essential aspect; for Pakṣilasvāmin defines Vāda as an assemblage of verbal expressions of several speakers (*nānā-pravakṛkaḥ . . . vākyasamūhaḥ*) requiring a proof (=syllogism) with regard to each object (*pratyaadhikaranasādhanāḥ*), in as far as it should terminate in a decision, *i.e.*, in the ascertainment of the truth.⁵² Thus, Vāda and *nyāyaḥ* (=syllogism) stand in a necessa-

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 6, 8.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 5, 9 and p. 50, 10.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 6, 11-12. It is not surprising that, for Pakṣilasvāmin, the scientific method of *nyāyaḥ* is so closely related to the Vāda, since knowledge of truth was striven after to a great extent in oral discussions, rather than through the help of books as is the case with the procedure of modern science.

ry relation to each other: it is *nyāyah* which makes Vāda to be that movement of thought which leads to the knowledge of the truth, while the *nyāyah* as verbal expression belongs essentially and originally to the Vāda, without which it would not be possible. If, therefore, *nyāyah* is that method which constitutes the Nyāya philosophy, and further, if the Vāda is that historically given *milieu* for the search of truth, in which the method of the *nyāyah* must be applied, then it will be absolutely clear that all those categories of the Nyāyasūtras,⁵³ which define and explain the phenomenon of Vāda and give it its norm, could not only not be suppressed in the Nyāya philosophy as understood by Pakṣilasvāmin, but, historically speaking, are constitutive and necessary elements of the system.

In this paper, whose aim is to ascertain the idea Pakṣilasvāmin had regarding the nature of Nyāya as a philosophy, it is not necessary to show in detail how he brings each of these categories in relation with the Vāda. It is enough to sum up the main results of this study:

1. Pakṣilasvāmin considers the Nyāya as a rationally worked out and rationally working doctrine of liberation (*adhyātmavidyā*), and hence he identifies it with the Ānvīkṣikī of Kauṭilya. In doing so, he makes explicit the conception which the school of Nyāya had regarding its own nature, namely, the conception of the school as a philosophical system, and not merely as logic or dialectical doctrine.

2. The element that constitutes this philosophy is the rational method of *nyāyah*, and as such, it had not only to be applied, but also to be taught and studied as topic of the system. The Nyāya is, therefore, also doctrine of *nyāyah* and of the logical and dialectical categories conditioning this *nyāyah*.

3. In accordance with the old school tradition, the method of *nyāyah*, for Pakṣilasvāmin, is primarily the syllogism, namely syllogism as verbally expressed in discussion, and not as formalized inference; for inference is itself a Pramāṇa, and not an inquiry with the help of Pramāṇa. Therefore, the process which leads to the attainment of truth is, really speaking, the Vāda working with syllogism. From this historically given situation follows that the Nyāya, in as far as it is the doctrine of *nyāyah*, is necessarily to be considered also as a doctrine of Vāda and its conditioning categories.

⁵³ Cf. Note 40.

Through this threefold unfolding of the nature of *nyāyah*, as Pakṣilasvāmin carries out in his introduction to the *Nyāyabhāṣyam* at the occasion of the justification of the categories of the *Nyāya-sūtras*, he has not only definitively formulated an old development of idea within the school, but through the explanation of this nature, he has also determined the further development of the *Nyāya*, whose aspect of *Adhyātma*-doctrine began to fade more and more into the background,⁵⁴ while the specific and formal aspect of *Nyāya* as science of *nyāyah* and of *vādaḥ* comes more and more into the foreground, until in the *Navyanyāya* this is the only important aspect. Thus Pakṣilasvāmin can be considered, in a somewhat inaccurate generalization, to have been the most important thinker of the old *Nyāya*, perhaps even of the *Nyāya* in general, not because his theories were not surpassed in later times, but because it was he, who — as far as we know — brought the *Nyāya* to its self-knowledge and thereby to the knowledge of itself as a real science.

⁵⁴ This aspect slowly disappeared through the gradual fusion of the *Nyāya* with *Vaiśeṣika* from about the 17th century A.D. when there existed practically only the combined school of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikam*.