

## MANUEL L. QUEZON AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTS

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IF ONE WERE WRITING A BIOGRAPHY OF MANUEL LUIS QUEZON, HE MIGHT well appropriate the title of William Harbaugh's excellent study of Theodore Roosevelt—*Power and Responsibility*. Certainly those two words, "power" and "responsibility," run like red skeins through the life of the Philippine president. Power, he very obviously enjoyed; responsibility, he shouldered willingly but occasionally handled poorly. In the course of this paper, we are going to bring up the subject of Quezon and power frequently; it is appropriate to do so, Quezon himself did it regularly. The subject of responsibility will be less intrusive because in Quezon's thinking, a man of power naturally accumulated responsibilities.

In May 1939, President Quezon gave a *despedida* for Quintin Paredes who was about to depart on a mission to the United States. Though Paredes' trip was designed to strengthen the Filipino group under Osmeña which was working to revise the Tydings-McDuffie Act, the table talk that day dealt more with the current proposals to amend the Philippine Constitution. It was no secret that those proposing the amendments really wanted to extend the term of Manuel Quezon as President of the Commonwealth. After lunch, the host spoke and in the course of his presentation turned to the topic of his tenure as president. In his typically candid manner, he commented:

To tell the truth gentlemen, I should like to continue being President of the Philippines if I were sure that I would live one hundred years. Have you ever known of anyone who has voluntarily renounced power unless it was for a lady that, in his opinion, was more important than power itself, or because of the threatening attitude of the people? Everybody likes power. It is the greatest urge of human nature—power. I like to exercise power . . .<sup>1</sup>

This bald statement need shock no one. It would be foolish to elect a person to the presidency who did not enjoy exercising power or who was afraid to use it.

As Quezon moved upward politically from Mindoro fiscal to Tayabas governor, and then to the new Philippine Assembly and party Floor

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<sup>1</sup>"Speech in honor of Floor Leader Quintin Paredes" (typescript), Malacañan, May 22, 1939. Manuel L. Quezon Manuscripts, National Library, Manila. (Hereafter cited as Quezon MSS.)

Leader, to Senator and Senate President, and finally to the presidency of the Philippine Commonwealth, he demonstrated constantly that he understood power and that he was not bashful about using it. It is obvious that the man from Tayabas had a sense of mission and he could not fulfill his destiny, whatever it might be, if people were in a position to thwart him. Perhaps, he accepted the ancient Greek dictum—"YOU must rule, if you are not to be ruled by fools." What the psychological, political, or economic pressures were which motivated Quezon to seek power do not immediately concern us; but we should note that his position as a public official of the Philippines did place him in constant contact with Americans throughout his political career. At times these contacts, particularly as they concerned the Filipino drive for independence, would be the most important part of his public life.

Before we turn more directly to Quezon's relations with the various American presidents, a few generalizations at this point might sharpen our insight into his later activities. Except for his five years in Washington as a Resident Commissioner, Quezon normally dealt with the executive side of the American government—the president, secretaries of war, high commissioners, governors general, or chiefs of the Bureau of Insular Affairs in the War Department. All of these executives supervised the Filipinos in some way or another, and all contributed to Quezon's education. We can further generalize by noting that Quezon seemed to work more harmoniously with American "elective-type" officials, in contrast with those who normally obtained their offices through appointment. Francis B. Harrison, Frank Murphy, and Paul V. McNutt were politicians in every sense of the word; and most importantly, they understood the elective processes and the problems that a man faces who must depend on an electorate for office. Quezon reciprocated their understanding with sincere friendship. By contrast, Leonard Wood, Henry L. Stimson, Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., and Francis B. Sayre were skilled administrators appointed to guide the Philippines; but they lacked the politician's touch and never really entered Quezon's charmed circle. The fact that Harrison, Murphy and McNutt were Democrats, pledged by party tradition to free the Philippines, undoubtedly made them more welcome at Quezon's Pasay residence or at Malacañan. Because the Republicans saw things quite differently, particularly the subject of independence, Quezon treated them as alien proconsuls.

Perhaps, it was because he moved upward so rapidly, or possibly because his public relations advisers never considered the point important, that Manuel L. Quezon never left much of an impression or reputation for being a theoretician or a particularly well-read man. His public

speeches, newspaper interviews, and personal correspondence are singularly free of references to contemporary literature or past masterpieces. His speech writers occasionally sprinkled in quotes from George Washington or Rizal, but normally Quezon eschewed impressing his audience with his learning. Despite the fact that he collected a fairly impressive library, I suspect that most of Quezon's reading was accomplished on the long ocean crossings during his visits to America and during his occasional rest periods in sanitariums when his tuberculosis was active. Quezon did have big programs in mind and he did have a knack for representing them with simple words or phrases—*independence, social justice, distributive democracy, nationalism*—but occasionally, his programs were just words.

Of all the programs which Quezon supported, the one that paid the highest dividends was the constant demand for Philippine independence. As a political issue, it had roots in the period of the revolution and thus the mantle of the heroic past could be used to dress a political speech or an independence mission to America. Because Republican policy was clearly against early independence for the Islands,<sup>2</sup> the desire for freedom became a steady beacon for patriots and politicians alike, and Quezon became a master of its light.

One significant result of agitating independence for years was to create a double image of Manuel L. Quezon as an independence leader. His public image was crystal clear: he was the indefatigable proponent of Filipino freedom. The ringing phrase, "I would rather have a Philippines run like hell by Filipinos than like heaven by Americans," was typical of Quezonian phrase-making. In America and in the Philippines, the public knew where the fiery Filipino stood. It is significant that Quezon never gave a public speech or statement that departed from the independence ideal. In fact, few professional politicians dared to depart from the independence creed—it could easily mean political perdition.

Yet, the public image of Quezon—the freedom-fighter—was only two-dimensional; it lacked depth. In private (both in the Philippines and in America) Quezon was known to express the view that early independence would be dangerous to the Islands, and that it might be best to abandon the independence goal and work toward a permanent Commonwealth relationship with America. In American public offices, behind closed doors, Quezon was willing to talk about these ideas; American

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<sup>2</sup> Gerald E. Wheeler, "Republican Philippine Policy, 1921-1933," *Pacific Historical Review* (October, 1959), pp. 377-90.

officials normally did not reveal their confidential talks to the public.<sup>3</sup> In the Philippines, because most of his associates were also his rivals for political power, Quezon was even more circumspect in revealing his doubts about the independence goal. But here and there we detect, from the contents of personal letters, that Quezon had quietly begun to test other politicians for their views. But on the whole, the men with whom Quezon could be frank about his independence doubts were Filipino businessmen and not politicians.

The question of whether such dissembling is important or not, ultimately rests on the ends desired and achieved. While Quezon would have been the first to say that the ends should not justify the means, he would also have been willing to modify the statement by saying that "criminal means" cannot be used to arrive at legal ends; and dissembling was not necessarily criminal. And if the end be to hold public office (a goal not in itself illegal), then a little dissembling would hurt no one. On the other hand, Quezon's double image—when it came to independence—was confusing to his friends, some of whom wanted to help him. In the end, as we shall see, some American presidents began to stereotype the illustrious Filipino as being a "shifty Malayan." And some American congressmen wrote ungenerous legislation for the Philippines because they were not sure about what the Filipinos wanted; or more accurately, they did not know what Manuel L. Quezon wanted.

With this background in mind, we can now examine Manuel L. Quezon's relations with America's presidents. I am not going to try to discuss the multitude of tedious questions that arose through the years; but I will attempt to present to you, from the variety of manuscript correspondence and published documents available to the historical researcher, certain generalizations about the interactions that took place as Quezon dealt with America's Chief Executives.<sup>4</sup>

We can touch lightly upon Presidents William McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, and William Howard Taft. Quezon actually had little to do with these worthies on a personal basis: a dinner and a day's entertain-

<sup>3</sup> Gerald E. Wheeler, "Manuel L. Quezon and Independence for the Philippines: Some Qualifications," *The U.P. Research Digest* (July, 1963), pp. 12-16. The research for this article was done in the Quezon Manuscripts, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Manuscripts, and the manuscript American government records in the National Archives, Washington, D.C.

<sup>4</sup> The basic facts concerning Quezon were taken from Isabelo P. Caballero and M. de Garcia Concepcion, *Quezon: The Story of a Nation and Its Foremost Statesman* (Manila, 1935); Sol H. Gwekoh, *Manuel L. Quezon, His Life and Career* (Manila, 1948); Manuel L. Quezon, *The Good Fight* (New York, 1946); Carlos Quirino, *Quezon, Man of Destiny* (Manila, 1935); Joseph R. Hayden, *The Philippines: A Study in National Development* (New York, 1942).

ment at the Roosevelt home on Oyster Bay, Long Island; a warm handshake when he was presented to President Taft as the new junior Resident Commissioner from the Philippines. He fought McKinley's soldiers and observed the work of his two Commissions, but Quezon never shook his hand or even saw him in person. We can judge that Roosevelt probably influenced Quezon much more than Taft, though the Filipino leader saw a great deal more of the portly Taft. Roosevelt was Quezon's type of politician—aggressive, assertive, colorful, cock-sure, a moist finger to the winds of political fortune testing always for direction and force. Yet, each led his people and party with vigor; and each had a very real sense of mission and personal destiny.

Indirectly, Roosevelt and Taft started Quezon down the road to political immortality when they (Roosevelt as President and Taft as Secretary of War) ordered the establishment of the Philippine Assembly in 1907. Quezon resigned as the Governor of Tayabas and stood for election to this first representative body. He won and continued to win every election he entered after 1907. In the Assembly, his party—the Nacionalista—elected him Floor Leader, a position second to that of Speaker Sergio Osmeña of Cebu.

Three years later, Quezon was off to America. The Assembly had elected him one of the two Resident Commissioners; he was now to sit in the American House of Representatives. While denied the right to vote, the junior Resident Commissioner could debate, inform, report, and above all, make American friends for the Philippines. More important than his legislative role, Quezon steeped himself in America's culture. He learned its language, mastered its government (particularly the intricacies of the legislative branch), and acquired an appreciation for the lighter side of that highly complex civilization. The young Resident Commissioner was soon known in Congress for his fiery eloquence; and he became equally well known to Washington society for his taste in clothes, dancing ability, and palate for good liquors. He appears to have learned his English from a young woman he was dating at the time, and only the political counsel of Osmeña kept him from making the relationship with his tutor a permanent one.

The preliminaries and election of 1912 in America possibly gave Quezon some of his most important insights into the operations of practical politics. As we recall, Roosevelt had hand-picked Taft to succeed him as president; he expected that this would result in a continuation of his policies—"The Square Deal." But Taft was no Roosevelt. Within two years, Roosevelt was at war with his successor, working to unseat him

in the election of 1912. Failing to block Taft's renomination for the presidency by the Republican Party, Roosevelt split the party, formed his own "Bull Moose Party," and entered the election struggle. The results were inevitable: Taft and Roosevelt both lost to Governor Woodrow Wilson of New Jersey. The lessons for Quezon were obvious: be careful when selecting candidates to succeed you, they seldom live up to expectations; and never split the party in the face of strong opponents.

The campaign also provided Quezon with an education about Roosevelt's political-economic blueprint for the future called the "New Nationalism." By the end of his second administration, but more blatantly in the 1912 campaign, Theodore Roosevelt was calling for the creation of a positive acting government. He wanted this new "Leviathan State" to regulate big business, strike down monopolies when they seemed to work against the commonweal, participate in the economy through the ownership of certain business enterprises, clean up American political practices, and develop a new and deeper interest in the personal welfare of the people. Roosevelt was thus associating himself with a new reform wave in America of the early Twentieth Century called the "Social Justice Movement." While we cannot positively tie Quezon's economic and social programs of the Commonwealth Period to Roosevelt's "New Nationalism" and "Social Justice Movement," the parallels are very striking and do suggest the influence of one upon the other.

There is one point, however, where Theodore Roosevelt's influence on Quezon's thinking can be pinned down. In July of 1921, just a few years after Roosevelt's death, Quezon voyaged to America aboard the *Shinyo Maru*. During the passage, he read Joseph Bucklin Bishop's two-volume biography, *Roosevelt and His Times*. On shipboard stationery, the Filipino Senator penned his reactions to the biography and he noted in passing:

He really was a man of great capacity for work. It is almost inconceivable that he could read and write so much and still do some strenuous exercise at a time when he was fighting for his policies and principles and performing the duties of the presidency. He was doubtless a man of ideals and principles and consistently stood for them. A man of action he was not very particular about the law, provided there was no specific injunction against the action he proposed to take . . .<sup>5</sup>

Quezon then drew a few lessons which he had learned from Roosevelt's career and listed them:

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<sup>5</sup> Untitled manuscript, dated July 12, 1921. Quezon MSS.

One should have principles and fight for them, but at the same time should be practical trying to get results; therefore one must try to be with his party organization as long as it is possible to do so without authorizing any real wrong . . .<sup>6</sup>

Perhaps we could summarize Quezon's summary—use your power to the legal limit; have principles, but make sure they are practical; and stand by the party!

The election of 1912 required Quezon to contact the possible Democratic nominees for the presidency. He wanted to press upon them the Filipino desire for freedom and, if possible, get from the various Democrats a promise to support Philippine independence legislation, if they were nominated and elected. Not much time was spent on William Jennings Bryan because as an anti-imperialist, he had stood for independence in every Democratic campaign since 1900. Speaker of the House, Champ Bennet Clark (another possible presidential nominee), was contacted and pledged to the Filipino cause. Anti-imperialist League friends of Quezon opened the door for him to contact Governor Wilson of New Jersey, a dark-horse candidate for the presidency. Quezon was never able to work closely with Wilson, but he did correspond with the man and, in time, Wilson's views began to swing around to those of Bryan concerning the Philippines.<sup>7</sup> After his election, Woodrow Wilson began to speak openly about independence for the Philippines, just as soon as they could handle it; and he supported the idea of enlarging Filipino participation in the government of the archipelago.

With President Wilson's inauguration, the Philippine independence movement began to accelerate in pace. Resident Commissioner Quezon helped select Congressman Francis Burton Harrison to be the new Governor General of the Philippines, and the New Yorker immediately began the "Filipinizing" of the Manila government. Beginning in 1913, Representative William Atkinson Jones, an old-line Progressive Democrat from Virginia, introduced bills calling for a new structure of government for the Filipinos. He proposed a two-house legislature and wanted a promise of independence in the final law. The 1916 Jones Law gave the Philippines a new organic act for managing its affairs but only declared in its preamble that "it is . . . the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein." Missing, of course, was a date when independence would be declared.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> Letters from 1911-1912. Quezon MSS.

Manuel L. Quezon played an ambiguous role in the passage of the Jones Act. His public statements and the editorials in *The Filipino People*, a publication of the Resident Commissioner's office, constantly stressed the Filipino desire for immediate independence.<sup>8</sup> But privately, he admitted to the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs that he was in no great hurry. He proposed that seventy-five per cent literacy be achieved first; this alone would have taken another generation.<sup>9</sup> Consciously or not, Quezon was speaking "for the record" in America's executive branch. Colonel McIntyre, Secretary of War Garrison, and President Wilson recognized the difference between Quezon's public utterances and personal views and thus there developed, as early as 1914, an American executive attitude that independence was a political slogan and not the real desire of the Filipino leadership. This American interpretation, correct or not, was to plague Filipino-American relations in the future and was, to some degree, to lessen the effectiveness of Quezon as an independence leader.

Quezon's relations with the presidents and governors general during the period of Republican ascendancy, 1921-1933, have normally been described as stormy. The root of this turbulence is generally laid to the clash that developed between Governor General Leonard Wood and the Philippine Senate President. Emerging somewhat victorious from his struggle with Osmeña for control of the party and government, Quezon was in no mood to accept heavy-handed direction from General Wood and his so-called "Khaki Cabinet." A factor which also contributed to Quezon's extremism was the pressure he was receiving from a "Young Turk" element in his party which resented the fusion with Osmeña's clique. Yet recent research, especially that by Dr. Michael Onorato,<sup>10</sup> suggests that the Wood-Quezon jousting had a great deal of *Moro-moro* to it. Believing firmly that the Republican presidents would never consent to Filipino freedom in the near future, Quezon was free to beat the independence drum for all it was worth. The evidence also suggests that Quezon's attacks against Wood were backed by the comfortable assumption that Harding and Coolidge would never remove the general. Occasionally, the Senate President had to admit—though only to his most intimate friends—that Wood actually was an excellent governor general.

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<sup>8</sup> Napolcon J. Casambre, "Manuel L. Quezon and the Jones Bill," *Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review* (June-December, 1958), pp. 265-82.

<sup>9</sup> Roy Watson Curry, "Woodrow Wilson and Philippine Policy," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* (December, 1954), 440-42; Wheeler, "Manuel Quezon," p. 13.

<sup>10</sup> Michael J. Onorato, "Governor General Leonard Wood and the Philippine Cabinet Crisis of July 17, 1923." (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgetown University, 1960).

In 1924, following the "Cabinet Crisis" that has been many times chronicled but little understood, Manuel A. Roxas headed a mission to America to ask for General Wood's relief or independence. Congressional patience was short with the Filipinos; President Coolidge's was even shorter. Coolidge said "no" to Roxas; but at the same time Representative Louis Fairfield of Indiana introduced an independence bill that gained unusual strength in Congress. Fairfield's measure called for greater Filipino autonomy, including a Filipino governor general, and independence in twenty-five years or possibly less. The Roxas group was hurriedly joined by Quezon and Osmeña who arrived with the blessings of Colonel McIntyre of the Bureau of Insular Affairs. McIntyre was afraid that the Fairfield measure would pass. All were a bit astounded to find that Coolidge had swung around 180 degrees and was willing to see the bill passed if (and this was very critical) Quezon and his party leaders would defend the bill in the Philippines. Quezon was extremely careful here, but indicated he would accept as much as a twenty-five year delay of independence if he could be sure Congress would pass the bill. In the end, he pledged that he would work to get Filipino acceptance of the Fairfield bill; this pledge, he never redeemed.<sup>11</sup> An even greater crisis arose in the Philippines—one that drove Quezon to his bed, when Representative Claro M. Recto exposed what Quezon had done. When the chance was there, Quezon had been unwilling to press for independence. Again, it must be noted, Quezon was on record. Coolidge and his cabinet, which included Herbert Hoover, knew what the Philippine Senate President had done. It was further confirmed—at least in their minds—that Quezon's interest in Philippine freedom was lacking in depth.

The Hawes-Cutting Act that was passed over President Hoover's veto in January 1933, finally granted the Filipinos their independence—if they would accept it. The law that Osmeña and Roxas had promoted was not particularly generous in its economic provisions—from a congressional point of view, it did not have to be. The sustained Filipino propaganda for independence had led many Americans to believe that the Filipino politicians would have to accept whatever was offered. Senator Quezon, for a variety of personal and political reasons, attacked this product of the "Osrox Mission" and eventually convinced the Filipino electorate that the Hawes-Cutting Act was poor fare. Returning to America in 1934, Quezon was almost forced to accept the Hawes-Cutting Act or return home empty-handed. However, the same American pressure groups that had demanded Philippine independence in 1932-1933 (farm groups,

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<sup>11</sup> Colonel Frank McIntyre to General Leonard Wood, Washington, D.C., June 3, 1924 (copy). Quezon MSS.

dairymen associations, cordage interests, the American Federation of Labor, and last ditch isolationists) forced the American Congress to relent a bit and Quezon was able to bring home a slightly amended version of the Hawes-Cutting Act known as the Tydings-McDuffie Act.<sup>12</sup> Ironically enough, the one major change in the Hawes-Cutting Act, eliminating the retention of military reservations after independence, was a provision that economy-minded isolationist congressmen had been most eager to grant.

It is hard to escape the conclusion that Quezon was exceptionally fortunate in the way the Tydings-McDuffie Act turned out. His conduct had irritated President Hoover to the core, but Hoover was no longer in control of Philippine matters. In rejecting the Hawes-Cutting Act he offended a host of congressmen, including Senator Harry B. Hawes who had missed the opportunity to be known as the "father" of Philippine independence. Quezon received a verbal spanking from Senator Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas. Yet, in the end, Congress gave him a few face-saving clauses that allowed him to take a new bill back to the Philippines. Possibly the greatest bonus that Quezon received during those trying days of early 1934 was President Roosevelt's endorsement of the Tydings-McDuffie Bill. Because of a crowded legislative calendar, it looked like Quezon would get no legislation from Congress that year. The President intervened and asked that the bill be passed despite its "inequalities and imperfections." The implication, one that Quezon converted into the semblance of a sworn promise, was that the bill had flaws and Franklin Roosevelt would see that they were corrected in the future.<sup>13</sup> This "pledge" was all that Quezon needed before heading back to Manila to face his political enemies. Even before he had arrived, one of his public relations advisers (Carlos P. Romulo) had already begun the defense of the Tydings Act in a speech in Iloilo. The heart of Romulo's defense was the implied promise that Quezon had extracted from President Roosevelt—the Tydings Act would not be the last word, there would be improvements in the future.<sup>14</sup>

The Philippine Legislature quickly accepted the Tydings-McDuffie Act on May 1, 1934 and then provided legislation for a constitutional conven-

<sup>12</sup> Grayson Kirk, *Philippine Independence* (New York, 1936), remains the best book in print, at this time, on the independence effort. Professor Theodore W. Friend III, in his doctoral dissertation, "Strategy and Tactics of the Philippine Independence Movement, 1927-1934" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1957)—tells the story of the struggle in most enlightening detail. Friend has also published a series of articles in *Philippine Studies*, commencing in the October, 1963, issue ("American Interests and Philippine Independence, 1929-1933") which take up the background to the 1933 Hawes-Cutting Act.

<sup>13</sup> "Press Statement of Senate President Manuel L. Quezon," Washington, D.C., March 22, 1934. Quezon MSS.

<sup>14</sup> Carlos P. Romulo to Manuel Quezon, Manila, April 11, 1934. Quezon MSS.

tion. Quezon, from this point forward, was undisputed master of the situation; and it was foregone conclusion that he would be elected president of the Commonwealth of the Philippines once it had a constitution. And so it came to pass!

When we turn to examine the relations between President Quezon and Franklin Roosevelt, we can easily find enough material for a substantial article or a small book. For the purpose of this paper, however, we will confine ourselves to a few selected problem areas that developed in the years 1935 to 1944. Among those questions that arose were: Should the United States try to limit the power of the Philippine president? What changes should be made to eliminate the "imperfections" of the Tydings-McDuffie Act? Should the constitution of the Philippines be amended? And, most importantly, should the Commonwealth actually end in full independence?

At the beginning of this paper, we noted that Quezon enjoyed the exercise of power; he considered it one of the greatest of the human urges. As might be expected, the Philippine President was jealous of his prerogatives and was alert to any attempt on the part of the American President, or his High Commissioner in the Islands, to diminish his power. The match-lighting scene with High Commissioner Frank Murphy (Quezon did the lighting), the quarrel with Paul V. McNutt over precedence between the High Commissioner and the Commonwealth President (Quezon lost), and the newspaper debate with Francis B. Sayre over the right of President Roosevelt to pass judgment on the Philippine constitutional amendments (Roosevelt did not try to judge them) all reveal Quezon's touchiness on the subject of infringing his powers and office. He was, of course, aware that his countrymen took these matters seriously; a misstep could suggest, to some aggressive political opponents, that President Quezon was demeaning his office, and there were many who would have liked to fill his shoes. Yet, in most cases, Quezon need not have feared for his position or for the autonomy of the Commonwealth. President Roosevelt showed on many occasions that he wanted the Filipinos to exercise all of the power they legally possessed. In his instructions to High Commissioner McNutt he stated:

It should be our policy, therefore, not only to avoid unnecessary interference with this autonomous authority so long as it is exercised in accordance with the purposes and provisions of the Independence Act and of the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government but also to give helpful encouragement to this new government.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Franklin D. Roosevelt to Paul V. McNutt, Washington, D.C., March 1, 1937. Department of Interior, Division of Territories and Island Possessions, Records Box 11, National Archives. (Hereafter cited as D/I Records Box 11.)

McNutt actually followed this policy rather consistently and in the end, perhaps because he lost regularly at poker to Quezon, won the Philippine president's confidence and affection.

When Francis B. Sayre travelled to Manila to assume the High Commissioner's office in September 1939, he came with the same basic instructions that had been given to McNutt. In addition, he was specifically told to observe whether certain funds, derived from American excise taxes on coconut oil and sugar, were being spent properly and to recommend action to President Roosevelt when he suspected that the laws were not being followed.<sup>16</sup> Sayre lacked McNutt's political wisdom that had come from holding high elective offices; and he possessed the humorless personality of a law school dean who had absorbed the crusading spirit of Woodrow Wilson. His social relationships were not helped by his wife, despite the fact that she was Wilson's daughter. Lacking the rolled-sleeves contact of the poker table, this Boston *brahmin* never really got to know or understand Quezon, and their relations suffered for it. President Roosevelt did understand Quezon—at least in human terms—and in the end, he tended to discard Sayre's harsh advices and relied on his own intuitive judgments.

In 1940 and 1941, Department of State officials, charged with dealing with Philippine affairs, began to feel that the Commonwealth was being driven down the road toward dictatorship by the mercurial Quezon. The amending of the constitution to change the presidential term, the development of a citizen army backed by conscription, the request for emergency powers in 1940, and the chartering of many new cities—with the denial of popular control to the inhabitants—all seemed conspiratorial to the bureaucrats in Washington and to the editors of *Time*, *The Nation*, *New Republic*, and *Christian Century*.<sup>17</sup> Perhaps, because of his intuition; perhaps, because he had suffered from the same types of slanders as the New Deal was being consolidated in 1935 to 1939, President Roosevelt generally followed the policy of not meddling in what he considered the internal affairs of the Philippines.

<sup>16</sup> Franklin D. Roosevelt to Francis B. Sayre, Washington, D.C., September 7, 1939. D/I Records Box 11.

<sup>17</sup> State Department uneasiness concerning Quezon, and Sayre's feelings about the amendments to the Philippine Constitution and the 1940 emergency powers act, can be traced out in U.S. Department of State, File 811b.001 Quezon/145, Manila, July 24, 1940; File 811b.001 Quezon/153, Memorandum, August 6, 1940; File 811b.00/107, Manila, September 26, 1940. All State Department files cited are located at the U.S. National Archives. (Hereafter cited as D/S File —.) On July 25, 1940, Sayre wrote to President Roosevelt and advised him to sign the new constitutional amendments even though they were "unnecessary, undemocratic, and inadvisable." Francis B. Sayre to President Franklin Roosevelt, Manila, July 25, 1940. D/I Records Box 3.

Into one area of internal affairs, however, President Quezon insisted on dragging the American president. In the unanimous opinion of the Filipinos, the Tydings-McDuffie Act needed amending. In 1940, a percentage of the American tariff schedule would begin to be applied to Philippine imports, and most Filipino exporters were positive that the Philippine economy would then collapse within a few years. Conscious of his statement that the Tydings Act contained "inequalities" and "imperfections," Roosevelt worked with the Filipino leadership to improve the situation. In 1937 and 1938, a Joint Preparatory Commission on Philippine Affairs prepared a set of recommended changes to be made to the Tydings-McDuffie Act. In 1939, Vice-President Osmeña headed a mission to America that successfully shepherded a great many of the Joint Committee's suggestions through Congress. At the critical moment, when it appeared that Congress would be too busy with neutrality legislation to take up a Philippine measure, President Roosevelt used the prestige of his office and the loyalty of his party managers in Congress to press through the Tydings-Kocalkowski Act. Not only was the Philippine economy saved, but Quezon and Osmeña had achieved a major political victory that would be useful when facing the electorate in 1941.<sup>18</sup>

Of all the questions that Quezon and Roosevelt had to consider, none was more important (at least in long-term consequences) than whether the Philippines should really adhere to the schedule of the Tydings-McDuffie Act and become completely independent on July 4, 1946. President Roosevelt was aware that Quezon had followed a most devious path in this matter, and as the years after 1934 passed, it became increasingly evident in Washington that the Philippine president was still undecided on whether complete independence was a desirable end. While considerations of increasing American tariffs (diminishing tariff-free quotas for some products), Japanese aggressiveness, and inability to defend the Philippines effectively forced Quezon and a great many important Filipinos to give serious thought to a permanent Commonwealth status, around-the-clock politics in the Philippines held the Nacionalista leader to the independence ideal. During his visit to America in 1937, Quezon admitted to State Department officials that he felt the Philippines should continue as a Commonwealth. He confided the same to McNutt in early 1938 and even encouraged him to press Americans to reexamine the independence issue.<sup>19</sup> His long-time friend and head of the Scripps-Howard newspaper

<sup>18</sup> Full details concerning the Osmeña Mission of 1939 exist in the Quezon papers. Osmeña summed up the work of the mission, including the political efforts of President Roosevelt, in a lengthy letter to Quezon dated August 12, 1939. See Sergio Osmeña to Manuel L. Quezon, Washington, D.C., August 12, 1939. Quezon MSS.

<sup>19</sup> Wheeler, Manuel Quezon . . . , *op. cit.*, pp. 13-16. An interesting survey

chain, Roy W. Howard, knew of Quezon's doubts and used his papers to suggest to the American public that it should reconsider the Philippine independence question.<sup>20</sup> Yet there was no really meaningful reexamination. Franklin Roosevelt set the one qualification for any reexamination move by his administration—the Filipinos had to ask for it; and this was impossible politically. The key political question that Quezon faced was simple: What would happen to his power of leadership were he to ask for permanent Commonwealth status and Roosevelt could not get Congress to give it? The answer was all too obvious.<sup>21</sup> Because the history of Quezon's politicking with the independence movement was known to the American Congress—the fate of the Hawes-Cutting Act was not easily forgotten by many—there was no incentive for Millard Tydings, Bronson Cutting, or Butler Hare to speak up. American politicians have their sensitive constituencies also. In the end, the defense of Bataan and Corregidor, and the destruction of Japan as a menace to Philippine security, made it inevitable that the Philippines would be a Republic and not a Commonwealth.

The years of superb relations between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Manuel L. Quezon developed a mutual trust between Malacañan and the White House that is evident in several ways. At certain times but not consistently, Quezon advocated early independence, earlier than July 4, 1946, and for this purpose he used a very candid argument. He stressed constantly that President Roosevelt was a friend of the Philippines and every effort should be made to achieve independence while he was still in office. Accelerated independence would mean that the post-independence treaty between the United States and the new Republic of the Philippines would be negotiated while Roosevelt was president. Had both men lived longer, this situation would have come to pass in 1946 when Roosevelt would still have been in the White House. In a more dramatic

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of the "reexamination" movement in the Philippines can be found in a memorandum prepared by Sayre's staff for the Philippines Office of the Division of Territories and Island Possessions in the Interior Department. A copy went to the Office of Philippine Affairs in the Department of State. D/S File 811b.01/442, Manila, January 20, 1940.

<sup>20</sup> Roy Howard's interest in "reexamination" stemmed from an honest conviction that people not interested in Filipino welfare, in the United States, had pressed through the independence bills. Howard's relations with Quezon were close, but Howard never pressed his point of view. The evidence shows decidedly that between 1935 and 1940 Howard was responding, in his work of educating America to the need of reexamining the independence question, to stimuli originating in Malacañan. The Quezon manuscripts have a rich file of Howard-Quezon letters in each year.

<sup>21</sup> President Roosevelt's feelings on this subject are spelled out in D/S File 811b.00 General Conditions/10, Manila, January 30, 1939. Quezon's (The Filipino's) dilemma is explained in Paul V. McNutt to Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, Manila, December 24, 1938. Harry E. Yarnell Manuscripts, Box 6, Library of Congress (U.S.A.).

way, the Filipino leader showed that the esteem that had developed between him and Franklin D. Roosevelt had considerable depth. In October 1934, Senator Quezon entered The Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, Maryland, for a kidney stone removal. It was a routine operation but Quezon was worried and penned a "last testament" addressed "Sa Bayan Filipino" (To the Filipino people). In it he set down some advice based on his years in high office. Concerning international relations, he advised the Filipinos:<sup>22</sup>

4. America should be recognized as true friend of the Filipino Nation and the politics we must strive at is not to quarrel with America.
5. Beware of Japan. Let us not be remiss with them, but avoid our being dominated by them. We will gain nothing from it.
6. Be in harmony with all nations; but seek help from America alone.
7. Recognize what we owe Spain. The Spaniards love us.

Almost nine years later to the day, Quezon was even closer to death's door. His nation was occupied by Japan; he stood a good chance of dying an exile in America. On October 26, 1943 he carefully drafted a "last letter" to Franklin D. Roosevelt to be published for the Filipinos in the event he died before the war ended and he could return to his beloved Filipinas. He opened by commenting that Japan was trying to destroy the western roots of Philippine civilization by encouraging the Filipinos to focus only on things oriental. To this he answered:<sup>23</sup>

After the lessons of the present war, one would be very blind indeed not to see that the post-war relationship between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of the United States should be as close, if not closer, than our relationship before the war. The security of both the United States and the Philippines, and perhaps the future peace of the Pacific, will depend very much on that relationship. Moreover, such a relationship is vital for the future influence of occidental civilization in the Far East.

The preservation of the present way of life of the Filipino people and their occidental culture, which in effect are one and the same thing, would serve as a link between the East and the West, and might avert the coming of that day, which has been so often predicted by pessimists, when East and West will clash.

My advice and counsel to the Filipino people is that they should preserve and perpetuate their occidental way of life which they can only do through continued association and cooperation with America and the

<sup>22</sup> "To the Filipino People," Baltimore, Maryland, October 23, 1934. Quezon MSS. The letter is exhibited with letters written to his family at the same time.

<sup>23</sup> Manuel L. Quezon to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Washington, D.C., October 26, 1943. Franklin D. Roosevelt Manuscripts, Box 42. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.

Western World. Geographically, we Filipinos are Orientals and will forever be so. Spiritually, that is to say, because of our culture and Christian civilization, we are with the West.

The great destiny of the Filipino people, as I conceive, is to play the role as the connecting link between Orient and Occident.

When one surveys current affairs, it is surprising to see how closely Quezon's advice is being accepted. The current Philippine interest in acting as a "bridge" between the East and West is easily traced to Quezon's views; and the commitment to Asian affairs by the Philippine government certainly represents an extension of his admission that the Filipinos "are orientals and will forever be so." Throughout the Philippine institutions of higher education, there is a large body of scholars which has been educated in the finest universities of America and western Europe; and, though small in number, there exists an annual group of Western scholars that is eager to teach in the Republic's schools and is eager to learn all that can be had. One can hope that in the Philippines, the tradition of studying about the West as well as the East will continue and that Filipinos will be as proud of their Western heritage—Spanish and American—as they are of their indigenous culture.